Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

PAUL T. STAVENJORD, 

Appellant, 

v. 

JOSEPH SCHMIDT, 

CRAIG TURNBULL, and 

MIKE ENSCH, 

Appellees. 

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) Supreme Court No. S-14917 

Superior Court No. 3AN-10-11932 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 6989 – March 20, 2015 

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Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 

Judicial District, Anchorage, Mark Rindner, Judge. 

Appearances: Paul T. Stavenjord, pro se, Wasilla, Appellant. 

John K. Bodick, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and 

Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for 

Appellees. 

Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and 

Bolger, Justices. 

BOLGER, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Paul Stavenjord, a Buddhist inmate, asked to receive a Kosher diet and to 

be permitted to purchase a prayer shawl. Prison officials at the Alaska Department of 

Corrections (the Department) denied his requests. Stavenjord filed a complaint alleging 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 

various constitutional provisions. But the superior court granted the Department’s 

motion for summary judgment, concluding that Stavenjord had failed to demonstrate (1) 

that a Kosher diet and prayer shawl were necessary for the practice of his religion; (2) 

that he was sincere in his requests for religious accommodation; and (3) that the 

Department’s lack of accommodations substantially burdened the practice of his religion. 

Under our summary judgment standard, however, the initial burden falls on the moving 

party — the Department. Furthermore, religious necessity is not an element of RLUIPA. 

Because summary judgment was granted by placing the initial burden on the non-moving 

party and by focusing on Stavenjord’s failure to make an evidentiary showing not 

required under RLUIPA, we reverse and remand. 

II. FACTS 

Paul Stavenjord is an inmate currently residing at the Goose Creek 

Correctional Center in Wasilla. In his verified complaint, Stavenjord asserted that he is 

a Buddhist monk ordained by the Tenshin Ryushin-Ji Buddhist Temple, a qualified 

teacher of Buddhism with thirty years of experience studying the Hinayana, Mahayana, 

Vajrayana, and Zen sects, and a “Prison Ministries Advisor” of the Tenshin Ryushin-Ji 

Temple. 

A. The Kosher Diet 

In August 2010 Stavenjord submitted a request for a vegan diet to the 

kitchen manager at Spring Creek Correctional Center (Spring Creek) in Seward, where 

he was then incarcerated. The request was granted, and Stavenjord remained on a vegan 

diet for two months. In October he asked that this diet be discontinued, writing: 

Please remove my name from the vegan diet list. Try tasting 

the food once in a while. I can’t believe you allow such poor 

quality in your kitchen. 

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Three months later, in January 2011, Stavenjord submitted a request “to be 

placed on a Kosher diet, for religious reasons.” Chaplain Mike Ensch, the Chaplaincy 

Coordinator for the Department, reviewed this request and recommended that it be 

denied: 

The Department of Corrections will only authorize vegetarian 

or vegan for [Stavenjord’s] religious diet. This is a fairly 

standard practice in many Correctional systems in the USA 

and is adequate for his religion. 

The superintendent of Spring Creek, Craig Turnbull, adopted Ensch’s recommendation, 

writing, “No reason to approve this preference. Not related to Buddhist faith.” 

Stavenjord appealed Turnbull’s decision, arguing: 

It is a substantial burden on my religious practice to be 

denied a religious (kosher) diet. Both Ensch and Turnbull are 

acting as “arbiters-of-orthodoxy concerning what Buddhist[s] 

require” when neither are Buddhist or are knowledg[e]able in 

Stavenjord’s practice of Madhyamaka Buddhism. 

Timothy Lyden, the Standards Administrator for the Department, responded in a letter 

dated May 27, 2011, writing: 

I have carefully reviewed documentation in relation to your 

request. However, you have not provided any information 

indicating that the practice of Madhyamaka Buddhism 

prescribes a kosher diet. In addition, I have not been able to 

find any evidence of this claim after extensive review of 

resources on Madhyamaka Buddhism. Based upon this 

information, I do not find that your desire for a kosher diet 

[can] be established to be any more than a personal 

preference. As a result, I uphold the previous decisions 

rendered on this grievance. 

This was the Department’s final action concerning Stavenjord’s request for a Kosher 

diet. 

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B. The Prayer Shawl 

Sometime before August 2010, Stavenjord requested authorization to 

purchase a prayer shawl. This request was denied. 

Stavenjord appealed to Lyden, arguing that, because the Department’s 

policies and procedures expressly permit the use of “prayer shawls during religious 

activity,” it was unreasonable to refuse to allow Stavenjord to purchase a shawl. Lyden 

affirmed the denial of his request, writing: 

Although policy specifically references the allowable use of 

prayer shawls, policy also extends discretionary authority to 

the superintendent [of the prison] to restrict their use along 

with other religious activities. As a result, no violation is 

found. 

This was the Department’s final action concerning Stavenjord’s request for a prayer 

shawl. 

III. PROCEEDINGS 

In June 2011 Stavenjord filed suit in the Anchorage Superior Court, 

alleging that prison officials at Spring Creek violated RLUIPA, as well as the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, by denying his requests to receive a 

Kosher diet and purchase a prayer shawl. 

In April 2012 Stavenjord filed a motion for summary judgment on these 

claims. He submitted an affidavit stating, “It is my sincerely held religious belief that 

these two requests will benefit my exercise of religion,” and referring to his verified 

complaint. The verified complaint contained a number of relevant statements: 

(1) “The request submitted by Stavenjord for a 

Kosher (religious) diet, was Stavenjord’s firmly held 

religious belief that a Kosher diet would benefit him as an 

important religious practice.” 

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(2) “The request for religious diet was Stavenjord’s 

firmly held religious belief that this diet would benefit his 

religious exercise.” 

(3) “It is Stavenjord’s firmly held religious belief 

that a Kosher diet is the closest to Buddhist requirements 

possible for a Buddhist that eats meat.” 

(4) “Stavenjord’s inability to possess and use a 

prayer shawl, and inability to partake in a religious diet, 

forced him to refrain from religiously motivated conduct and 

imposed substantial burden on his exercise of religion.” 

The Department opposed Stavenjord’s motion and filed a cross-motion for 

summary judgment. The Department submitted no affidavit with its opposition and 

cross-motion, but (1) attached copies of grievance-related documents regarding 

Stavenjord’s original request for a vegan diet, his later request to get off the vegan diet, 

and his subsequent request for a Kosher diet, and (2) referred generally to evidence from 

a preliminary injunction hearing “regarding what items are necessary for the practice of 

Buddhism.” The preliminary injunction hearing involved separate RLUIPA claims that 

Stavenjord had brought against the Department, and neither party introduced evidence 

at the hearing regarding the two claims at issue here. Nevertheless, the Department 

argued that because there had been no evidence at the hearing that a prayer shawl or 

Kosher diet was necessary for the practice of Buddhism, Stavenjord’s claims must be 

dismissed. 

The superior court ruled as follows: 

[Stavenjord] contends that his requests for a Kosher 

diet and a prayer shawl were denied and that this denial 

violates his rights under the RLUIPA and the First 

Amendment. The court previously conducted an evidentiary 

hearing and issued a decision relevant to this matter in 

conjunction with the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 

There is no evidence that a prayer shawl or a Kosher diet [is] 

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necessary for the practice of Buddhism. [Stavenjord] 

previously requested and was allowed a vegan diet in 

conformance with his Buddhist practice, which he then 

rejected because he did not like the food. This suggests that 

the request for a Kosher diet is related to food preference and 

not to religious requirements. Likewise, based on the 

evidentiary hearing previously conducted[,] the court finds 

that the denial of a prayer shawl does not violate 

[Stavenjord’s] rights under either the First Amendment or the 

RLUIPA. [Stavenjord’s] Motion for Summary Judgment is 

denied. The State’s Cross-motion for Summary Judgment is 

granted. 

Stavenjord moved for reconsideration, asserting, as he asserted in 

connection with the denial of his preliminary injunction motion, that the superior court 

erred in applying RLUIPA by judging his personal religious beliefs based on those of 

Buddhism in general and by concluding that RLUIPA protects only religious practices 

that are “necessary” for the exercise of a claimant’s religion. He further asserted that the 

court erred by relying on the evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing when that 

hearing addressed neither the prayer shawl nor the religious diet. And he noted the 

court’s suggestion that his religious beliefs were insincere was an issue that rarely can 

be decided on summary judgment. 

In its court-ordered response to the reconsideration motion, the Department 

conceded that Stavenjord’s legal analysis was correct in part and that “the focus should 

have been on Stavenjord’s practice of religion and the sincerity of that practice as it 

relates to his demand for a prayer shawl and [K]osher diet.”1 But the Department 

nonetheless urged the court to affirm its decision on other grounds: 

The Department failed to mention that in the earlier preliminary injunction 

proceeding, it had successfully persuaded the superior court to use the erroneous 

“religious necessity” analysis in its ruling. 

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Since Stavenjord has failed to sustain his burden of proof that 

the prayer shawl [and] [K]osher diet are necessary to practice 

his religion, that he is sincere in his request for these religious 

accommodations, or that the lack of these accommodations 

substantially burden[s] his practice of his religion[,] the 

court’s order granting summary judgment must stand. 

The superior court then modified its ruling in two respects. Trying to 

remedy its legal error of evaluating religious beliefs of Buddhists in general rather than 

Stavenjord’s personal religious beliefs, it changed the third sentence, and then included 

additional comments at the end of the order (before the denial and grant of summary of 

judgment): 

[Stavenjord] contends that his requests for a Kosher 

diet and a prayer shawl were denied and that this denial 

violates his rights under the RLUIPA and the First 

Amendment. The court previously conducted an evidentiary 

hearing and issued a decision relevant to this matter in 

conjunction with the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 

There is no evidence that a prayer shawl or a Kosher diet [is] 

necessary for Stavenjord’s practice of his religion. 

[Stavenjord] previously requested and was allowed a vegan 

diet in conformance with his Buddhist practice, which he then 

rejected because he did not like the food. This suggests that 

the request for a Kosher diet is related to food preference and 

not to religious requirements. Likewise, based on the 

evidentiary hearing previously conducted[,] the court finds 

that the denial of a prayer shawl does not violate 

[Stavenjord’s] rights under either the First Amendment or the 

RLUIPA. Stavenjord previously did not assert that a prayer 

shawl was necessary for the practice of his religion. The 

assertion that he needs a prayer shawl is a recent one. Given 

his history, Stavenjord has failed to meet his burden that the 

prayer shawl or [K]osher diet [is] necessary to practice his 

religion, that he is sincere in his request for these 

accommodations[,] or that the lack of accommodations 

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substantially burden[s] his practice of his religion. 

(Emphasis added.) 

Stavenjord appeals the grant of summary judgment against him. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Summary judgment is appropriate where, “view[ing] the facts in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party,” “the record presents no genuine issue of 

material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”2

 The moving 

party has the initial burden of proving, through admissible evidence, that summary 

judgment is warranted.3 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. 4 

V. DISCUSSION 

RLUIPA provides, in relevant part: 

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the 

religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 

institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of 

general applicability, unless the government demonstrates 

that imposition of the burden on that person 

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling 

government interest; and 

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering 

[ ] that compelling government interest. 5

2 Olson v. City of Hooper Bay, 251 P.3d 1024, 1030 (Alaska 2011) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

3 Mitchell v. Teck Cominco Alaska Inc., 193 P.3d 751, 760 n.25 (Alaska 

2008); Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c) (“There must . . . be served and filed with each motion 

[for summary judgment] a memorandum showing that there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). 

4 Olson, 251 P.3d at 1030. 

5 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2012). 

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The Act defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not 

compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”6 

Stavenjord argued before the superior court that the Department’s denial 

of his requests for a Kosher diet and a prayer shawl imposed a substantial burden on his 

religious exercise. On appeal, he maintains that the superior court misapplied RLUIPA 

by requiring him to show that “the prayer shawl or [K]osher diet [is] necessary to 

practice his religion.” He also argues that the sincerity of his professed beliefs is a 

material question of fact that should not have been determined at the summary judgment 

stage.7 

The superior court concluded that summary judgment was warranted 

because “Stavenjord has failed to meet his burden that the prayer shawl or [K]osher diet 

[is] necessary to practice his religion, that he is sincere in his request for these 

accommodations[,] or that the lack of accommodations substantially burden[s] his 

practice of religion.” But this analysis makes several false steps. 

First, the superior court order suggests that Stavenjord was required to 

prove the elements of his RLUIPA claim in order to defeat the Department’s motion for 

summary judgment. But the initial burden was on the Department, as the moving party, 

to show that it was entitled to summary judgment; “[o]nly when the moving party 

establishes a prima facie case for summary judgment is the non-moving party required 

6 Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 

7 In addition to his RLUIPA claim, Stavenjord argued before the superior 

court that the Department violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 

Constitution by denying his requests. However, his briefing to this court focuses 

exclusively on the RLUIPA claim. We therefore will not address the constitutional 

claim. Shearer v. Mundt, 36 P.3d 1196, 1199 (Alaska 2001) (“[I]ssues not briefed or 

only cursorily briefed are considered waived . . . .”). 

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to come forward with contradictory evidence.” 8 It was error to address Stavenjord’s 

burden without first determining whether the Department had met its burden. 

Second, Stavenjord is correct that the sincerity of a claimant’s religious 

beliefs is not normally amenable to summary disposition. 9 Although the Department did 

point to evidence suggesting that Stavenjord had ulterior, non-religious motives for his 

requests for religious accommodation,10 Stavenjord’s claims of sincerity in his verified 

complaint were sufficient to create a triable question of fact on this issue. 

Third, as Stavenjord argues, RLUIPA protects “any exercise of religion, 

whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”11 Therefore, 

Stavenjord was not required to show that his personal religious beliefs were consistent 

with the beliefs of other Buddhists, as the Department suggested in its motion for 

summary judgment.12 Nor was Stavenjord required to show that a prayer shawl and 

8 Mitchell, 193 P.3d at 760 n.25. 

9 See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The inquiry into 

the sincerity of a free-exercise plaintiff’s religious beliefs is almost exclusively a 

credibility assessment, and therefore the issue of sincerity can rarely be determined on 

summary judgment.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

10 See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (“[O]f course, a prisoner’s 

request for an accommodation must be sincerely based on a religious belief and not some 

other motivation.” (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 

n.28 (2014))). 

11 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7); Krieger v. Brown, 496 F. App’x 322, 325 (4th 

Cir. 2012) (“A plaintiff is not required . . . to prove that the exercise at issue is required 

by or essential to his religion.”). 

12 See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862-63 (“[E]ven if [prisoner’s beliefs were 

idiosyncratic], the protection of RLUIPA, no less than the guarantee of the Free Exercise 

Clause, is ‘not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious 

(continued...) 

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Kosher diet were necessary for the practice of his religion, as the superior court appears 

to have concluded.13 

On appeal, the Department argues that it was entitled to summary judgment 

under the correct RLUIPA standard. We disagree. The prima facie elements of a 

RLUIPA claim are the “wish[] to engage in (1) a religious exercise (2) motivated by a 

sincerely held belief, which exercise (3) is subject to a substantial burden imposed by the 

government.”14 Therefore, to be entitled to summary judgment regarding this showing,15 

the Department as the moving party was required to demonstrate that the record 

12 (...continued) 

sect.’ ” (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 

(1981))); see also Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1314 (10th Cir. 2012) 

(“[T]he issue is not whether the [prison’s practice] substantially burdens the religious 

exercises of any Muslim practitioner, but whether it substantially burdens Mr. 

Abdulhaseeb’s own exercises of his sincerely held religious beliefs.” (emphasis in 

original)). 

13 See Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 879 (7th Cir. 2009) (prison’s refusal to 

provide a Roman Catholic plaintiff with a diet free from the meat of four-legged animals 

and free from all meat on Fridays and during Lent violated RLUIPA even though 

Catholicism does not require such a diet); Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 

2008) (plaintiff’s adherence to a vegetarian diet was a “religious exercise” for purposes 

of RLUIPA even though a vegetarian diet was not required to practice Thelema). 

14 Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1312 (citing Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 

960 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862. 

15 Alternatively, the Department could meet its summary judgment burden by 

showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding its RLUIPA burden — 

that is, demonstrating that the burden on Stavenjord’s religious exercise is the “least 

restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling government interest” — and that it is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); see also Holt, 135 

S. Ct. at 863-67 (analyzing whether a prison’s policy prohibiting beards was the least 

restrictive means of preventing prisoners from hiding contraband or concealing their 

identities). 

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contained “no genuine issue as to any material fact” regarding at least one of these three 

elements and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.16 

But the Department’s summary judgment motion — like the superior court 

order — focused primarily on whether a Kosher diet or a prayer shawl was necessary for 

the general practice of Buddhism. Although the Department stated on several occasions 

that it had not substantially burdened Stavenjord’s personal religious exercise, these 

statements were conclusory and without evidentiary support. 

Assuming Stavenjord’s practice of following a Kosher diet is motivated by 

a sincerely held belief, it is a religious exercise.17 The denial of Stavenjord’s request for 

that diet, absent any evidence of a reasonable alternative accommodation, imposes a 

substantial burden on that religious exercise by “prevent[ing] participation in conduct 

motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.”18 

The Tenth Circuit confronted a similar case in Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 

where a prisoner claimed that the government’s refusal to provide a Halal meal that 

included meat violated RLUIPA. 19 The court accepted the prisoner’s assertions that 

eating a Halal meal with meat was a religious exercise and that the request was motivated 

16 Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

17 See Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1312-13. 

18 Id. at 1315; see also Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 

1114, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2013) (“ ‘[A] substantial burden . . . impose[s] a significantly 

great restriction or onus upon [a religious] exercise.’ ” (quoting San Jose Christian Coll. 

v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004))); Derek L. Gaubatz, 

RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner 

Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 558 (2005) (“There has been little dispute 

in these cases that refusing to provide a diet that accords with the teachings of a 

prisoner’s faith is a substantial burden.”). 

19 600 F.3d at 1305-06. 

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by a sincerely held religious belief.20 Based on the prisoner’s verified complaint and 

supporting affidavit, the court concluded that the government’s refusal to provide the 

requested diet was a substantial burden because it prevented “participation in conduct 

motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.”21 

Similarly, assuming Stavenjord’s use of the shawl is motivated by a 

sincerely held belief,22 it also is a personal religious exercise. As with the Kosher diet, 

the denial of Stavenjord’s shawl request, absent any evidence of a reasonable alternative 

accommodation, prevents him from participating in that religious exercise.23 That 

Stavenjord is being denied access to a prayer shawl is sufficient to defeat summary 

judgment on his prima facie claim; Stavenjord is being “pressured to abandon [his] 

religious belief[]” regarding the religious use of a shawl.24 

We note that the State did present evidence that Stavenjord previously 

rejected a vegan diet out of culinary preference — not religious belief. But in the 

absence of evidence showing that a vegan diet continues to be compatible with 

Stavenjord’s religious beliefs and that the Department remains willing to provide this 

20 Id. at 1313-15.
 

21 Id. at 1315-17.
 

22 See id. at 1312-13.
 

23 See id. at 1315; cf. Grumbley v. Michigan, No. 2:11-cv-185, 2011 WL 

3418245, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2011) (holding inmate’s religious practice not 

substantially burdened because prison made prayer shawls available). 

24 Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 

2013). 

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accommodation, this evidence goes only to Stavenjord’s sincerity, where a genuine issue 

of material fact exists.25 

For these reasons, we cannot affirm the summary judgment grant under 

either the superior court’s analysis or the Department’s proposed alternative grounds. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

We REVERSE the judgment of the superior court and REMAND for 

further proceedings. 

25 To be clear, this narrow holding does not preclude the superior court from 

concluding that the vegan diet was a sufficient accommodation under RLUIPA’s 

substantial burden element, if the Department provides evidentiary support for such a 

conclusion. Cf. Ciempa v. Jones, 745 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1197-98 (N.D. Okla. 2010), 

aff’d, 511 F. App’x 781 (10th Cir. 2013) (“To the extent that Ciempa seeks to bring a 

claim based on the failure to provide him with a Halal diet, he has failed to establish that 

such failure imposes a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Ciempa himself 

stated that his religious needs could be satisfied by the provision of a Kosher diet.” 

(citation omitted)); Shoemaker v. Williams, No. CV 10-0826-JO, 2013 WL 528306, at 

*2 (D. Or. Feb. 11, 2013) (“[Plaintiff] conceded that the vegetarian and fish meals 

provided by [the prison] are halal and comply with the dietary restrictions of his religion. 

Thus, there is no basis from which to conclude that his consumption of these meals 

infringed his religious exercise.”). 

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