U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

57–663 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024

S. HRG. 118–508 

U.S. STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 14, 2024 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via http://www.govinfo.gov 
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

MITT ROMNEY, Utah 

PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

DAMIAN MURPHY, Staff Director

CHRISTOPHER M. SOCHA, Republican Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................... 1 

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho .................................................. 3 

Kritenbrink, Hon. Daniel J., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ..................... 5 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 7 

Ratner, Hon. Ely, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security 

Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC .................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 10 

Schiffer, Hon. Michael, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Asia, U.S. 

Agency for International Development, Washington, DC ................................. 13 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 15 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by: 

Senator Benjamin L. Cardin ............................................................................ 40 

Senator James E. Risch ................................................................................... 43 

Senator Robert Menendez ................................................................................ 49 

Senator Pete Ricketts ....................................................................................... 51 

Response of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to a Question Submitted by Senator 

Todd Young ........................................................................................................... 52 

Responses of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by Senator 

Tim Scott ............................................................................................................... 52 

Responses of Mr. Ely Ratner to Questions Submitted by: 

Senator Benjamin L. Cardin ............................................................................ 53 

Senator James E. Risch ................................................................................... 54 

Senator Pete Ricketts ....................................................................................... 56 

Response of Mr. Ely Ratner to a Question Submitted by Senator Tim Scott ..... 57 

Responses of Mr. Michael Schiffer to Questions Submitted by: 

Senator Benjamin L. Cardin ............................................................................ 57 

Senator James E. Risch ................................................................................... 59 

Senator Robert Menendez ................................................................................ 60 

Legislative History Memorandum, Compact of Free Association Amendment 

Act of 2024, submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin ................................... 63 

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U.S. STRATEGY 

IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION 

THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2024 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin J. Cardin, 

chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Menendez, Kaine, Schatz, 

Van Hollen, Duckworth, Risch, Romney, Ricketts, Young, and 

Hagerty. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee will come to order. 

For thousands of years Pacific Islanders have been masters of 

the sea, navigating oceans by canoe guided only by the stars. With 

climate change and globalization hitting their shores, they have become innovators on how to save their heritage. 

There are over a million and a half Americans of Pacific Island 

ancestry and over 1,000 citizens from Freely Associated States 

serving in the United States Armed Forces. 

This puts people to people ties at the heart of our relationship 

to a part of the world that has been vital to the strategic interests 

of the United States. 

During World War II the U.S. Navy built an airstrip on what is 

now the Nation of Kiribati. But today it is the People’s Republic 

of China that has planned to rebuild the former American airstrip. 

Beijing is signing policing deals to provide cybersecurity and 

community policing assistance in the region. Since the Solomon Islands changed their recognition from Taiwan to China, PRC nationals have moved to the islands, flooding the market with low cost 

goods, extracting timber and fish and other resources, bringing in 

tourism practices that threaten the natural environment, in some 

cases setting up transnational criminal operations that evade the 

limited capacity of local law enforcement. 

All this compounds the forces that drive young people to search 

for economic opportunities elsewhere, developments that are deeply 

concerning to the United States and our allies in the region like 

Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. 

At the same time Pacific Island nations are on the front lines of 

the climate crisis. Many are only a few feet above sea level. This 
2 

makes them particularly vulnerable to extreme weather events 

brought on by climate change. 

Not only does this mean many of these nations could be uninhabitable in coming decades, it presents serious threats to important 

sensitive American military installations. 

Earlier this year a series of extreme waves damaged a U.S. military base at the Marshall Islands, a base used as a space and missile test range for the United States Department of Defense with 

some of the Army’s most sophisticated tracking equipment. 

So I am pleased that the Biden administration has prioritized 

our engagement in the region. Building new embassies is not 

easy—we all know that—especially where land and domestic capacity is limited and ocean levels are rising. But I want to encourage 

the department to be creative and to move as quickly as possible. 

Beijing will not slow down its efforts to gain influence in this important region. Neither should we. Congress recently passed and 

funded for all three Compact of Free Association nations, and we 

are glad that the COFA was finally enacted. 

For more than 40 years COFA agreements have governed these 

critical relationships. The Biden administration has called these 

COFA the bedrock of the U.S. role in the Pacific. 

I want to thank Senator Manchin, Barrasso, and Ranking Member Risch for their bipartisan leadership in getting COFA agreements across the finish line and signed by the President. I also 

want to acknowledge the leadership of Senator Schatz and Senator 

Hirono in regards to that agreement. 

I wish the same spirit of cooperation applied to our China bill 

and the Administration’s outcompete China proposal which has 

been proposed again in this year’s budget. 

U.S. competition with China concerns almost every single member of our committee as well as most members of the U.S. Senate. 

I appreciate the staff on both sides getting us to about 80 percent 

there. We now need to reach the finish line. But if we are serious 

about countering China, I ask the ranking member to work with 

me and every member of this committee to finish the job in the 

next work period. 

I also want to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today. 

We have a distinguished panel of witnesses, and I look forward to 

your presentations. 

I hope you will speak about how we can speed up the expansion 

of our diplomatic presence, how do we work with Australia, New 

Zealand, and Japan and others to support and foster economic opportunities in the Pacific Islands, what we can do to climate proof 

our military installations to defend our national security interests 

in the years to come, recognizing the great risks there. 

And finally, I ask that you lay out what is at stake for the 

United States military in the region if we fail to engage. I look forward to your testimony. 

With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member Senator Risch. 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO 

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I start on my prepared remarks, let me say that on the 

China issue, like the issues we are talking about today, this is a 

bipartisan issue, and we should do that. 

On February 6, as you know, I wrote you a letter about this, and 

we have not had a response to that yet. But we should air these 

things privately, and that will continue on, I am sure. But these 

are bipartisan issues—nonpartisan issues, not partisan issues. 

We have had a long history of friendship with the Pacific Islands, 

and this hearing comes as we usher in the next chapter of U.S. 

commitment to the region. Just last week Congress acted to renew 

the Compacts of Free Association. 

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, these agreements are foremost a 

promise to the three compact countries—Micronesia, the Marshall 

Islands, and Papua. Through these compacts we partner with them 

to advance economic prosperity, provide for U.S. military veterans 

from these nations, provide cooperation in areas of law enforcement 

and judicial training, and much more. 

Further, our security partnership with these states are critical. 

In World War II we fought our way across the Pacific, costing significant American blood and treasure. We have been in that region 

for decades, and with these agreements we stay for years to come. 

They are a strategic investment in our national defense and in our 

partners in the Indo-Pacific region. 

However, in order to maximize these partnerships the Administration must adjust its policies to demonstrate U.S. focus and commitment are not going anywhere. First, our diplomatic presence in 

this region still need serious work. We have been too slow to get 

our diplomats permanently on the ground to push back against 

Chinese influence. 

I am also concerned about the lack of support for the diplomats 

we do have in the Pacific. Nowhere is this more evident than the 

Solomon Islands. By the time the State Department started paying 

attention, China was already signing a major security agreement. 

When the department asked for personnel for the post it did not 

ask for a single public affairs officer to push back against the Chinese propaganda. 

This is a large globe. There is a lot of countries. But my staff has 

been monitoring this particular region for the numerous important 

reasons that I just mentioned. 

This is not just about getting our people on the ground. Once 

there they must be able to do their job and advance U.S. interests. 

It is clear we are moving at the speed of bureaucracy and not the 

speed of relevance. 

I have sent five letters to Secretary Blinken urging a nuanced expeditionary approach to our diplomatic expansion. I have encouraged using these flexibilities that my Secure Embassies Construction and Counterterrorism Act provides to stand up our diplomatic 

presence and creating a South Pacific management platform to improve support to these remote missions. 

The Solomon Islands example brings me to a second issue, security cooperation. In addition to greater Chinese military and law 
4 

enforcement presence in the Solomon Islands, other nations continue to explore security arrangements with China. 

Luckily, in May 2022 Pacific Island countries came together and 

rejected China’s push for a region wide security agreement. That 

was proof of what dedication to sovereignty and regional unity can 

achieve. 

Papua New Guinea, which just signed a new security pact with 

us last year, has been approached by China about new security and 

policing arrangements. Chinese police are present in Kiribati and 

we know China has set its sights on other nations. 

I would like the Departments of State and Defense here today to 

discuss the implementation of our security pact with Papua New 

Guinea and help the committee understand how this agreement 

serves our interests region wide. 

I would also like an update on where Chinese security cooperation initiatives are causing the greatest concern and how we are 

working with our partners to address it. I would especially like the 

Defense Department to discuss Australia’s role in security for the 

Pacific Islands. We all know about AUKUS, but there is certainly 

more to it than that. 

Finally, I would like an update on economic development in this 

region. I am aware of our work on undersea cables and illegal fishing but want to know what other concrete projects we are pursuing. 

I want real details on this, not just descriptions about creating 

an enabling environment or building stakeholder networks, et 

cetera, et cetera. We know that some Chinese projects, like a hospital in Fiji, did backfire. But this means the U.S. and our partners 

need to get our act together more quickly. 

With that, I will turn it back to the chairman. 

Thanks, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank Senator Risch for his opening comments, 

and we will always attempt to work together on all issues, including this region. 

I want to welcome all three of our witnesses to today’s hearing. 

I will introduce you, and then you will have approximately 5 minutes to give your opening statements. Your entire statements, without objections, will be made part of the record. 

Welcome, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink. 

He is a career member of the senior Foreign Service and has 

been an American diplomat since 1994. He has served in numerous 

posts in the Indo-Pacific region including most recently as the 

former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam. 

Assistant Secretary Ratner, welcome. 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs 

and also along with this committee under then Chairman Biden. 

So you get special privileges. You can speak for 5 minutes and 

10 seconds. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. He has also served as a senior adviser on China 

to the Secretary of Defense. 

And then we have Assistant Administrator Schiffer who is no 

stranger to this committee, and we welcome his return to SD–419 

in his capacity at USAID to talk about his work in the Pacific Island region. 
5 

Again, as alum you get the extra—we will give you an extra 15 

seconds because you and I worked together when I was chair of 

that subcommittee. 

Mr. Schiffer is a former senior advisor and counselor on the Foreign Relations Committee covering issues related to the Indo-Pacific, so he in theory should be able to anticipate and answer every 

one of our questions. 

Mr. Schiffer also brings an abundance of experience prior to his 

service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, previously 

served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and 

as program officer at the Stanley Foundation responsible for the 

foundation’s Asia programs. 

With that, we will start. 

Senator RICKETTS. Mr. Chairman, can I interrupt for just a moment? 

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. 

Senator RICKETTS. I would like to note that Assistant Secretary 

Kritenbrink is actually from Nebraska so maybe he should get 10 

seconds for that. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. 

Senator RISCH. This committee is getting a little out of hand. 

The CHAIRMAN. I can understand that. 

Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Mr. Chairman, good morning. 

Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, members of this committee, thank you very much for convening this hearing and for the 

opportunity to testify on U.S. strategy in the strategically important Pacific Islands region. 

I am honored to be joined by my colleagues from the Department 

of Defense and USAID today, and I understand my good friend, the 

Pacific Island former Secretary General Henry Puna, is here as 

well and honored by his presence as well. 

The United States is a Pacific nation, and we share longstanding 

historic and cultural ties with our Pacific Island neighbors. As Vice 

President Harris said in 2022, the history and future of the Pacific 

Islands and the United States are inextricably linked. 

U.S. prosperity and security depend on the Pacific region remaining free and open, prosperous, secure, and resilient. The Pacific Islands are important partners on many global issues, from standing 

together at the U.N. on human rights and opposing Russia’s illegal 

and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine to contributing to global security through peacekeeping operations and to tackling the climate 

crisis as well as combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated 

fishing. 

The Pacific Islands face significant challenges to their security 

and their prosperity, including from climate change and economic 

shocks, making the region more vulnerable to influence from the 

PRC. 
6 

As Secretary Blinken has said the PRC is the only country with 

both the intent to reshape the international order, and increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to 

do it. 

That certainly holds true in the Pacific. Through foreign assistance, elite capture, and robust public messaging campaigns, the 

PRC has moved aggressively to assert itself in the Pacific Islands. 

In addition, in recent years three Pacific Island countries have 

switched diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the PRC. And in 2022, as 

the chairman and ranking member noted, the Solomon Islands 

signed an unprecedented security agreement with the PRC, the details of which have not been publicly released. 

Of course, as we have often said, we are not in the business of 

forcing countries to choose, neither in the Pacific nor anywhere 

else. But we do want to ensure that countries in the Pacific have 

a choice and the ability to make their own sovereign decisions free 

from coercion. 

Under the Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy and Pacific 

Partnership Strategy the United States has expanded its diplomatic and development engagement with the Pacific Islands. 

President Biden has convened two summits to engage with Pacific Island leaders on shared priorities including climate change, 

trade and investment, and a free and open Pacific region. 

Since the first Pacific Island summit in 2022 we have announced 

plans to work with Congress to provide over $8 billion in new funding and programs. We opened embassies in the Solomon Islands 

and Tonga in 2023, and we will open an embassy in Vanuatu later 

this year. 

We also continue to work with the government of Kiribati on our 

plan to open an embassy there. We recognize the Cook Islands and 

Niue as sovereign and independent states. Peace Corps volunteers 

have returned to Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga, and they are planning to 

return to Vanuatu later this year and Palau in 2025. 

We appointed the first ever U.S. envoy to the Pacific Islands 

Forum to enhance cooperation with the region’s leading foreign policy body. 

We have also increased our presence and assistance through the 

U.S. Coast Guard and maritime domain awareness programs. 

In 2023 we signed the Defense Cooperation Agreement with 

Papua New Guinea, which will increase our engagement with the 

region’s most populous country. We are also working with partners 

to increase internet access in the Pacific, and together with Australia have pledged $65 million to finance future submarine cable 

connectivity for Pacific Island countries. 

We have announced our intention to request from Congress $600 

million over 10 years beginning with the fiscal year 2024 request 

in support of a new economic assistance agreement related to the 

South Pacific tuna treaty, which is crucial to the region’s economy 

and has been a cornerstone of our relationship in the region for 

over three decades. 

Our strategy is also multilateral. In 2022 the United States, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom launched the 

Partners in the Blue Pacific, an informal strategic coordination initiative guided by Pacific priorities. 
7 

Since its inception the grouping has expanded to include additional partners and has announced tangible initiatives on disaster 

relief, disaster resilience, cybersecurity, and ocean and fisheries research. 

The U.S. shares especially close relationships with the Republic 

of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated 

States of Micronesia. Our Compacts of Free Association with these 

three countries and the economic assistance we provide in support 

of those compacts are key to maintaining the stability and prosperity of our closest Pacific Island partners and to safeguarding our 

shared long term defense and strategic interests in the region. 

I want to sincerely thank the Congress and the members of this 

committee for approving the compact agreements and authorizing 

the necessary funding and authorities on a bipartisan basis that 

will allow us to move steadily ahead in our partnership with these 

vitally important countries. 

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate the Pacific region’s critical importance to the United States and our long term strategic interests. 

I look forward to working with Congress and this committee to continue our renewed engagement across the Pacific in an era of increased geostrategic competition. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kritenbrink follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink 

Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the committee, thank 

you for convening this hearing and for the opportunity to testify on U.S. strategy 

in the strategically important Pacific Islands region. I’m pleased to be joined today 

by Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary for Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, and 

Michael Schiffer, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Asia at USAID. 

The United States is a Pacific nation, and we share longstanding historic and cultural ties with our Pacific Islands neighbors. As Vice President Harris said in 2022, 

‘‘The history and future of the Pacific Islands and the United States are inextricably 

linked.’’ U.S. prosperity and security depend on the Pacific region remaining free 

and open, prosperous, secure, and resilient. The Pacific Islands are important partners on many global issues, from standing together at the U.N. on human rights 

and opposing Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine; to contributing 

to global security through peacekeeping operations; and to tackling the climate crisis as well as combatting illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. 

The Pacific Islands face significant challenges to their security and prosperity including from climate change and economic shocks, making the region more vulnerable to influence from the PRC. As Secretary Blinken has said, the PRC is the only 

country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, 

the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. That certainly 

holds true in the Pacific. Through foreign assistance, elite capture, and robust public 

messaging campaigns, the PRC has moved aggressively to assert itself in the Pacific 

Islands. In addition, in recent years, three Pacific Island countries have switched 

diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the PRC. And in 2022, Solomon Islands signed an 

unprecedented security agreement with the PRC, the details of which have not been 

publicly released. Of course, as we have often said, we are not in the business of 

forcing countries to choose—neither in the Pacific nor anywhere else. But we do 

want to ensure that countries in the Pacific have a choice, and the ability to make 

their own sovereign decisions, free from coercion. 

Under the Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Pacific Partnership Strategy, the United States has expanded its diplomatic and development engagement 

with the Pacific Islands. President Biden has convened two Summits to engage with 

Pacific Islands leaders on shared priorities, including climate change, trade and investment, and a free and open Pacific region. Since the first Summit in 2022, we 

have announced plans to work with Congress to provide over $8 billion in new funding and programs. We opened embassies in Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2023 and 

intend to open an embassy in Vanuatu later this year. We also continue to work 
8 

with the Government of Kiribati on our plan to open an embassy there. We have 

recognized the Cook Islands and Niue as sovereign and independent states. Peace 

Corps Volunteers have returned to Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga, and are planning to return to Vanuatu later this year and Palau in 2025. We appointed the first-ever U.S. 

Envoy to the Pacific Islands Forum to enhance cooperation with the region’s leading 

foreign policy body. 

We have also increased our presence and assistance through the U.S. Coast 

Guard and maritime domain awareness programs. In 2023, we signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Papua New Guinea, which will increase our engagement 

with the region’s most populous country. We are also working with partners to increase internet access in the Pacific Islands, and together with Australia have 

pledged $65 million to finance future submarine cable connectivity for Pacific Island 

countries. 

We have announced our intention to request from Congress $600 million over 10 

years, beginning with the fiscal year 2024 request, in support of a new economic 

assistance agreement related to the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, which is crucial to 

the region’s economy and has been a cornerstone of our relationship in the region 

for over three decades. 

Our strategy is also multilateral. In 2022, the United States, Australia, Japan, 

New Zealand, and the United Kingdom launched the Partners in the Blue Pacific, 

an informal strategic coordination initiative guided by Pacific priorities. Since its inception, the grouping has expanded to include additional partners and has announced tangible initiatives on disaster resilience, cybersecurity, and ocean and fisheries research. 

The United States shares especially close relationships with the Republic of 

Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. 

Our Compacts of Free Association with these countries, and the economic assistance 

we provide in support of those Compacts, are key to maintaining the stability and 

prosperity of our closest Pacific Island partners and to safeguarding our shared 

long-term defense and strategic interests in the region. I want to thank Congress 

for approving the Compact agreements and authorizing the necessary funding and 

authorities on a bipartisan basis that will allow us to move steadily ahead in our 

partnership with these countries. 

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate the Pacific region’s critical importance to the 

United States and our long-term strategic interests. We look forward to working 

with Congress to continue our renewed engagement across the Pacific in an era of 

increased geostrategic competition. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Secretary Ratner. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ELY RATNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. RATNER. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to 

testify today about how the Department of Defense is contributing 

to peace and security with U.S. partners across the Pacific Islands. 

I am here with my good friends Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink 

and Assistant Administrator Schiffer to underscore the Administration’s whole of government approach. 

From a national security perspective the Pacific Islands form an 

essential part of a strategically vital region. The U.S. military’s access and posture in the Pacific Islands are crucial for our logistics, 

sustainment, and power projection throughout the region. 

Moreover, hundreds of billions of dollars in maritime trade flow 

through the Pacific Islands, and our partners there provide critical 

linkages between the continental United States and our allies 

across the Indo-Pacific. 

That is why the United States is strengthening our diplomatic, 

economic, and security ties throughout the Pacific Islands, and it 
9 

is why DOD plays a significant role in deepening these partnerships and sustaining our defense posture and presence. 

Importantly, this also includes our posture in Hawaii and the 

territories of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 

Islands, and American Samoa. To highlight a few areas, the department is doubling down on our relationships with the Freely Associated States, and we are capitalizing on our momentum with 

Papua New Guinea after concluding a landmark defense cooperation agreement last year. 

We are building capacity through security cooperation, and we 

are conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities with our partners. 

We are also working together with allies and partners like Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. More than ever, we are devoting 

attention and resources that reflect the strategic significance of this 

region. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take a moment to underscore 

the importance of our Compacts of Free Association with the federated states of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. 

For decades our relationships with these partners have been anchored in the economic assistance that the United States has delivered under the compacts. Thanks to strong bipartisan support from 

Congress including critical leadership by members of this committee, that economic assistance will now extend to the 2040s 

through the appropriations bill that President Biden signed last 

week. 

Last year our friends at the State Department negotiated strong 

deals with each of the Freely Associated States to renew our compacts. Providing the necessary funding was one of the most important things Congress could do this year to advance our priorities 

in the Indo-Pacific. 

Defense experts, diplomats, senior military officials, and friends 

in the region all agreed that we had to get this done and because 

of you, we did. The compacts ensure that the United States can 

maintain a military presence in the Freely Associated States, and 

they enable FAS citizens to serve in the U.S. military. 

These agreements provide assured access for our operations, and 

they prevent would be adversaries from accessing sovereign FAS 

land, airspace, and territorial waters. 

The bottom line is that the compacts help secure a part of the 

Indo-Pacific that is larger than the continental United States. 

Mr. Chairman, we also know that the PRC is drawing from a 

range of coercive tools in an attempt to erode long standing U.S. 

partnerships and advance China’s own influence. 

In recent years these activities have included covert efforts to 

bribe local officials, economic pressure against sovereign nations 

that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and illegal, unreported, 

and unregulated fishing that harms both the environment and local 

economies. 

But Mr. Chairman, our commitment to the Pacific Islands and to 

peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, will endure. The Department of Defense looks forward to continue to work 

with Congress in this endeavor. 
10 

What we have achieved with our Pacific Islands partners in recent years would not have been possible without your support, and 

delivering meaningful results in the years ahead will continue to 

require urgency, attention, resources, and strong partnership with 

Capitol Hill. 

Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to 

your questions, and I yield back my alumni 10 seconds. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ratner follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Mr. Ely Ratner 

Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of the Committee: thank 

you for the opportunity today to discuss how the Department of Defense (DoD) is 

contributing to peace and security with U.S. partners across the Pacific Islands region. 

I am pleased to testify today alongside Assistant Secretary of State Kritenbrink 

and Assistant Administrator Schiffer, underscoring DoD’s commitment to advancing 

the Administration’s whole-of-government approach to this vital region. 

RECOGNIZING THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Peace, stability, and prosperity in the Pacific Islands are essential for advancing 

a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. economy—and indeed, the global economy—relies upon hundreds of billions of dollars in maritime trade that flows 

through the Pacific, with the Pacific Islands forming a strategically critical geography. Additionally, as the broader Indo-Pacific region’s populations and economies 

continue to grow, the millions of people who live across the Pacific Islands make 

important cultural and economic contributions in the world’s most dynamic region. 

That is why the United States has committed to strengthening our diplomatic, economic, and security ties with partners across the Pacific Islands, and the Department of Defense is proud to play an important part. 

The United States is a Pacific power. Our defense posture in the Pacific Islands 

countries, ranging in levels of presence from a permanent footprint to rotational 

forces is critical for U.S. military logistics, sustainment, and power projection. This 

also includes our posture in Hawaii and the territories of Guam, the Commonwealth 

of the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. The Department of Defense 

is supporting U.S. efforts to strengthen our partnerships across the Pacific Islands, 

including through our defense and security ties with the Freely Associated States 

(FAS), capitalizing on momentum with Papua New Guinea following the signing of 

a landmark Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2023, building partner capacity 

through security cooperation, and conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster 

relief. Importantly, we will also continue to work with U.S. allies and partners 

across the broader Indo-Pacific region as they deepen their connections with the Pacific Islands. 

STRENGTHENING U.S. PARTNERSHIPS ACROSS THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Our strategic approach to the Pacific Islands region draws strength from our longstanding partnerships, as well as the geographic proximity of Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and other U.S. territories. We share common concerns for our security 

and prosperity. And when it comes to honoring our shared history, our Defense 

POW/MIA Accounting Agency, for example, benefits from the strong cooperation of 

eight Pacific Island countries in their critical mission to provide the fullest possible 

accounting of missing DoD personnel from World War II. 

Across the region, the Department of Defense is supporting the Administration’s 

efforts to deliver on an unprecedented commitment to our relationships with the Pacific Islands. 

RENEWING THE COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION

The Department of Defense was pleased to see Congress recently pass the Administration’s Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024 with a strong bipartisan majority—and we thank the many Members of this Committee who played 

a pivotal role in advocating for this legislation until its final passage. 

The U.S. Government has provided economic assistance to our partners in the 

Freely Associated States (FAS) for the last four decades; the vast majority of this 

assistance has been provided under the Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) and 

related agreements between the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Republic of 
11 

Palau (Palau), and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). This assistance supports education, the environment, healthcare, and civilian infrastructure—and it 

provides a strong economic anchor that complements our defense and security partnership. Last year, the Administration reached agreements with the FAS partners 

that would extend U.S. economic assistance for an additional 20 years. 

Importantly, the Compacts ensure that the United States—and only the United 

States—can maintain a military presence in the FAS, and they allow FAS citizens 

to strengthen our All-Volunteer Force through dedicated military service in the U.S. 

Armed Forces. As part of these agreements, the U.S. military serves as the defense 

force for FSM, Palau, and RMI, which in return grant the United States assured 

access for our military operations, as well as sites for critical defense posture in the 

region. In particular, the Marshall Islands hosts the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile 

Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll; Palau will soon host the highly anticipated Tactical 

multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar (TACMOR); and we are exploring opportunities for new cooperation, including with FSM on Yap island. The Compacts also 

limit the access of third country militaries or their personnel, including would-be adversaries from accessing FAS land, airspace, and territorial seas, securing a key 

area of the Indo-Pacific region. Crucially, FAS citizens serve in the U.S. Armed 

Forces at higher proportionate rates than most American States, and we are proud 

of and grateful for their service. 

Failure to extend the economic assistance related to the Compacts would have had 

serious consequences for the economies of our FAS partners, our strategy in the 

broader Pacific Islands region, and, ultimately, our national security. However, Republicans and Democrats, diplomats and defense experts, and senior U.S. civilian 

and military officials all agreed: U.S. partners in the FAS—and broader U.S. defense priorities in the Indo-Pacific region—simply could not wait any longer. That 

is why passing the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024 marked 

one of the 118th Congress’ most significant achievements to advance U.S. strategic 

priorities in the Indo-Pacific region. 

DEEPENING DEFENSE TIES WITH PAPUA NEW GUINEA

In 2023, the U.S. defense and security relationship with Papua New Guinea 

(PNG) broke new ground in historic ways. We entered into a Defense Cooperation 

Agreement (DCA) with PNG that will deepen bilateral security cooperation, 

strengthen the capacity of the PNG Defence Force, and increase regional stability 

and security. The agreement will facilitate bilateral and multilateral exercises and 

engagements in support of regional capacity building priorities and enables the 

United States to be more responsive in emergency situations, including through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). Secretary Austin also had an opportunity to discuss the importance of our new DCA with senior leaders in Port 

Moresby, where he made history as the first U.S. Secretary of Defense to visit 

Papua New Guinea. 

BUILDING CAPACITY THROUGH SECURITY COOPERATION

The Department of Defense works with countries bilaterally and on a regional 

basis to build partner capacity in critical areas like maritime domain awareness, 

maritime security, border security, and advancing women, peace, and security initiatives. DoD allocated more than $27 million to building partner capacity through 

Title 10 programming in Fiscal Year 2023. A significant amount of this maritime 

security-focused assistance can also support regional partner capacity to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which has serious economic, environmental, and security consequences for Pacific Island partners. 

The important work of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force 

West (JIATF West), as well as the U.S. Coast Guard, also helps strengthen maritime domain awareness in the Pacific Islands. In Fiji, for example, JIATF West has 

supported the local government’s Maritime Surveillance and Rescue Coordination 

Center with computer equipment and updated software for maritime surveillance 

activities. Meanwhile, across the region, maritime law enforcement (or ‘‘shiprider’’) 

agreements with over one dozen partners in the Pacific Islands allow the Coast 

Guard to help patrol local exclusive economic zones with counterparts. Together, 

these efforts help the United States maintain a robust presence, deepen defense and 

security ties with partners, and help uphold the rule of law in the region. 

The Department’s security cooperation efforts extend beyond the maritime sphere. 

The DoD State Partnership Program plays an important role in the Pacific Islands, 

enabling the establishment of enduring people-to-people ties while building partner 

capacity and improving interoperability. The Nevada National Guard is partnered 

with Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa, and the Wisconsin National Guard is partnered with 
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Papua New Guinea. We are excited to expand the Guam/Hawaii partnership with 

the Philippines to the Republic of Palau this year. Another of our most enduring 

programs is our Civic Action Team in Palau—a tri-military service initiative that 

supports the community through construction projects, medical civic actions, and 

community relations. 

CONDUCTING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

The Department also continues to strengthen U.S. ties across the Pacific Islands 

through supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, in close 

partnership with our counterparts at the Department of State and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID). In January, the nineteenth iteration of our 

Pacific Partnership mission concluded after 4 months of strengthening disaster response preparedness and providing critical medical support across the Pacific Islands region. In August 2023, USAID requested the unique capabilities of the Department in response to a request of the Government of Papua New Guinea to support humanitarian assistance following volcanic eruptions at Mount Bagana. The 

Department was able to provide heavy lift rotary wing and tiltrotor support to 

USAID through the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, moving personnel and supplies 

in and out of the affected area. In 2022, the USS SAMPSON supported a multinational humanitarian assistance effort alongside France, Australia, New Zealand, 

the UK, Japan, and others, following a volcanic eruption in Tonga. These operations 

demonstrate U.S. commitment and strengthen relationships in moments when our 

partners need us most. 

In addition to responding in times of need, we are also working to build our partners’ own resilience to respond to such events, including by prioritizing HA/DR-focused exercises to build interoperability and share best practices. By joining with 

allies and partners in efforts to enhance resilience, we will both strengthen defense 

relationships and reduce requests for U.S. forces to respond to instability and humanitarian emergencies. 

CONNECTING THE PACIFIC ISLANDS WITH THE BROADER INDO-PACIFIC REGION

As the United States deepens our longstanding relationships with the Pacific Islands, the Department is encouraged by how likeminded allies and partners across 

the broader Indo-Pacific region are also taking important steps to further strengthen ties with the Pacific Island countries. These efforts exemplify how, across the 

Indo-Pacific region, the United States can work with our allies and partners as they 

advance a shared vision for peace and stability. 

In recent years, for example, the Department has launched the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) alongside the Indo-Pacific Quad 

partners Australia, India, and Japan. The IPMDA initiative uses cutting-edge technology, including space-based commercial platforms, to deliver a sharper common 

maritime operating picture throughout the Indo-Pacific region. With radio frequency 

data, Pacific Island countries are gaining the ability to address potential violations 

of fisheries regulations in their waters by detecting vessels that have turned off 

their transponders. In a region as vast as the Pacific Ocean, where IUU fishing and 

trafficking remain persistent challenges, the IPMDA initiative will equip the Pacific 

Islands to protect fish stocks, ensure sustainability, and strengthen the livelihoods 

of local communities. We are also working on countering IUU fishing and strengthening maritime domain awareness through Partners in the Blue Pacific alongside 

Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the 

United Kingdom. 

Additionally, the United States and key Indo-Pacific allies and partners are delivering targeted economic and security assistance to strengthen resilience across the 

Pacific Islands. In 2020, for example, the United States joined with Australia and 

Japan to support a crucial undersea cable project for Palau that will promote 

connectivity and protect against interference. Australia has pledged to deliver patrol 

boats and related infrastructure upgrades to our FAS partners under Australia’s Pacific Maritime Security Program. Meanwhile, Japan has also helped donate equipment to the FAS, and assisted with the construction of Palau’s Maritime Coordination Center. When our countries work together in these ways to expand our capabilities and connections with each other, we are advancing our shared vision for a free 

and open Indo-Pacific region. 

The United States and our partners, however, are not the only countries that recognize the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands. According to the 2022 National Security Strategy, the PRC ‘‘is the only competitor with both the intent to 

reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.’’ That assessment remains true when it comes 
13 

to the PRC’s approach to the Pacific Islands, where the PRC seeks to erode longstanding U.S. partnerships in the region. In recent years, the PRC has drawn from 

a range of diplomatic and economic tools to advance its foreign policy goals. This 

includes through infrastructure projects that lack transparency, pressure against 

sovereign nations that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan instead of the PRC, 

and support of distant water fleets engaged in harmful practices like IUU fishing 

throughout the region. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, the achievements in the Pacific Islands region that I have just described would not have been possible without bipartisan attention and robust resources from Congress. At the same time, we also know that continuing to deliver 

meaningful results will require even greater urgency in the years ahead. 

The Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy concludes by stating that the region’s 

future ‘‘depends on the choices we make now.’’ The Department of Defense remains 

committed to working alongside our partners across the executive branch, as well 

as every Member of Congress, in support of strong U.S. partnerships across the Pacific Islands and the broader Indo-Pacific region. 

Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You are very mindful of this committee’s protocol. You know how to get on the good side of the committee. 

Administrator Schiffer, there is no pressure on you on time. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL SCHIFFER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE BUREAU FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on the 

strategic importance of the Pacific Islands and how USAID is working to deepen U.S. engagement in the region. 

The only way for us to tackle the complex problems of the IndoPacific is to align the three Ds of diplomacy, defense, and development, drawing on our successful whole of government approach, as 

Assistant Secretary Ratner offered. 

We have learned the hard way that one D without the others or 

even two Ds without the third is not a sustainable pathway to success. As a steadfast partner to the Pacific Islands USAID plays a 

key role in advancing a free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific region. 

Our relationships are based on mutual respect, shared history, 

and our shared values of diversity, fairness, and freedom, and consistent with the Pacific way, it starts with listening. 

Last August I had the privilege of joining USAID Administrator 

Power at the opening of our Pacific Islands mission in Fiji at our 

country representative office in Papua New Guinea. 

It was a critical milestone delivering on a promise made by the 

President, illustrating that USAID is on the ground to listen, partner, and deliver together with the people of the Pacific Islands. And 

we have demonstrated that the United States has heard our Pacific 

partners loud and clear. 

Enduring presence matters. Our vision for the Pacific, embodied 

in our first ever strategic framework for the Pacific Islands, approved in March 2022, reflects our shared aspirations. 

It is about listening to the voices of the region and rolling up our 

sleeves to partner and deliver on our commitments, and we are ensuring that our engagement with the region is guided by the Pacific 
14 

Islands, respects the existing regional architecture, and delivers 

sustainable, tangible benefits to Pacific Islanders, a contrast to the 

approach of the People’s Republic of China. 

While we are clear eyed about PRC capabilities and intent, as 

Secretary Blinken has offered, we have no objection to the engagement in the Pacific by any country, including the PRC. On the contrary, if it helps generate a race to the top, that is a good thing. 

However, in recent years we have seen a range of increasingly 

problematic PRC behavior in the region: Predatory economic activities including illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and investments that undermine good governance and promote corruption. 

USAID offers Pacific Island countries a different way, a tailored 

development model responsive to their needs and their aspirations 

rooted in economic trade and integration, in inclusivity, in locally 

led solutions, and in the democratic values that can positively 

transform our shared planet. 

USAID’s work is designed to address what the region itself has 

defined as its own most pressing challenges in climate, health, 

democratic governance, infrastructure, and economic growth. 

Meeting these goals depends on enhancing our cooperation with 

local communities, individual countries, as well as Pacific led organizations including the Pacific Island Forum in the Pacific community. 

In Papua New Guinea, USAID is expanding access to renewable 

energy, protecting the country’s environment, combating the HIV/ 

AIDS epidemic, addressing gender based violence, and promoting 

peace and stability. 

In Palau, we have partnered with Australia and Japan to support the development of an undersea cable spur that will connect 

the country to the world’s longest undersea cable and increase reliable, safe, and secure internet bandwidth to spark economic 

growth. 

In the Solomon Islands we work with partners at all levels to advance the country’s economic competitiveness and inclusiveness 

with specific emphasis on developing the agribusiness sector and 

improving natural resource governance. 

Through the USAID climate ready activity we have mobilized 

more than $550 million for Pacific Island countries to improve access to climate finance from various institutions such as the Green 

Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund, and the Global Environmental 

Facility. 

We are also responding directly to requests from Pacific Island 

governments to expand opportunities for economic growth. At last 

year’s U.S. Pacific Island Forum summit, President Biden announced the U.S. will launch a flexible micro finance facility valued 

at up to $50 million to expand access to fair and competitive finance for micro, small, and medium enterprises in the Pacific Islands. 

USAID and the Development Finance Corporation are now bringing together our comparative advantages to fulfill this commitment. 

Last, the United States remains one of the largest bilateral humanitarian and disaster donors in the Pacific, providing year round 
15 

disaster preparedness, responsiveness, and resilience to enable the 

Pacific Island nations to more effectively lead their own disaster responses. 

Across all these efforts USAID works directly with like minded 

allies and partners through mechanisms such as the Quad and 

Partners in the Blue Pacific, and we do so to ensure that our work 

is complementary and led and guided by the Pacific Islands. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Risch, members of the committee, 

USAID’s investment in the Pacific Islands regions are a critical 

part of the U.S. vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, a vision 

that animates our activities not just in this region but around the 

globe. 

Thank you for your support and providing us the necessary resources to implement our strategy and our policy with our partners 

in the Pacific and the opportunity to share with you today what 

USAID is doing in this important region of the world. 

I look forward to your guidance and to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schiffer follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Mr. Michael Schiffer 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me to testify on the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands and how USAID is working to deepen U.S. engagement in the region. 

The only way for us to tackle complex problems in the Indo-Pacific is to align the 

three D’s of diplomacy, defense, and development, drawing on our successful wholeof-government approach. We have learned the hard way that one ‘D’ without the 

others—or even two ‘Ds’ without the third—is not sustainable and not a pathway 

to success. 

As a Pacific nation with a state and territories in the region, the United States 

is committed to, and has a vested interest in, our neighbors’ success. We consider 

our Pacific neighbors to be essential partners in fostering a free and open Indo-Pacific region. 

The United States—through USAID and its support from Congress—partners 

with 12 Pacific Island nations to bolster their ability to lead their countries to democratic, resilient, and prosperous futures. USAID’s support to improve the well-being 

of the Pacific’s diverse communities spans the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, 

Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall Islands, 

Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 

Hosting a vast proportion of the world’s shipping and global fisheries, Pacific 

waters supply food and income to millions of people in Pacific Island nations and 

beyond. Yet, being surrounded by these same waters exposes these nations to catastrophic climate-change risks that threaten their very existence. With some Pacific 

Island nations’ highest point only 15 feet above sea level, the most subtle environmental changes—from coastline erosion to storm surge to rainfall—can translate 

into catastrophic consequences for communities and livelihoods. As natural disasters 

grow more severe in intensity and frequency, these effects are compounded. Furthermore, the Pacific Islands face numerous challenges to economic development due to 

distance and disconnection from major markets, inefficiencies related to economies 

of scale. 

USAID STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC

Our vision for the Pacific Islands is about listening to the voices of the region and 

rolling up our sleeves to partner and deliver on our commitments. We are ensuring 

our engagement with the region is guided by the Pacific Islands, respects the existing regional architecture, and delivers sustainable, tangible benefits to Pacific Islanders—a contrast to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) approach. 

The PRC is seemingly intent on rewriting, for its own narrow advantage, the 

international rules-based order that has for decades provided a free and open architecture for peace, security, and prosperity. In contrast, USAID offers Pacific Island 

countries a tailored development model not rooted in debt and dependence, but in 
16 

economic trade and integration, inclusivity, locally led solutions, and the democratic 

values that can positively transform our shared planet. 

The PRC government has capitalized on instability and natural disasters in this 

vulnerable region to make inroads that often come with additional problematic costs 

For example, in Tonga, a country with a high level of PRC-financed debt, the PRC 

touted the speed and extent of its humanitarian assistance vis-a-vis other donors 

in the wake of the volcanic eruption and tsunami in January 2022, but Tonga is 

saddled with a high level of PRC-financed debt and the PRC followed up the next 

year proposing security agreements tailored to PRC’s unilateral regional security interests In contrast, USAID formed partnerships with organizations in Tonga that 

allowed USAID to swiftly build a $2.6 million multi-sector response and recovery 

effort that also prepares Tongan communities to be more resilient to future disasters. 

EXPANSION OF USAID PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC

We have heard the importance of robust presence from Pacific Island leaders. Last 

year, USAID re-opened its Pacific Islands regional mission in Suva, Fiji and we elevated our presence in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu to a Country Representative Office based in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. This allows 

us to benefit more Pacific Islanders, strengthen our actions on the ground, and build 

an enduring and genuine partnership with the region. 

USAID’s work is designed to address what the region itself has defined as its 

most pressing challenges, specifically to solve urgent climate challenges; strengthen 

global health security; strengthen democratic values, good governance, and human 

rights to counter rising autocracy; expand secure and environmentally sustainable 

digital infrastructure; and develop stronger, inclusive economies. USAID’s first-ever 

Strategic Framework for the Pacific Islands, approved in March 2022, reflects a 

shared aspiration to advance a more resilient, prosperous, and Pacific Islands region. 

Meeting these goals and driving sustainable development progress depends on enhancing our cooperation with individual Pacific Island countries as well as Pacificled organizations, including the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community. 

In addition to reinforcing Pacific regional organizations, USAID is also supporting 

the Partners in the Blue Pacific, which is a group of likeminded countries committed 

to more effective development coordination on Pacific-identified priorities. Under 

Partners in the Blue Pacific, USAID is supporting an initiative that will enhance 

Pacific Island countries’ disaster preparedness and resilience by building national 

humanitarian warehouses. 

USAID’S PROGRAMS IN THE PACIFIC

USAID has reaffirmed its commitment to help our Pacific Island partners address 

existential climate threats, including through additional investments as part of the 

USG’s Pacific Partnership Declaration and the President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE). We continue to unlock public and private funding that will preserve the region’s rich biodiversity, assist low-lying communities 

threatened by rising sea levels, and help farmers adopt climate-smart agriculture 

practices—including those that rehabilitate soil, which improves the quality of crops 

and, in turn, boosts nutrition and food security. USAID is also partnering with local 

civil society organizations under our regional grant facility known as the Pacific 

American Fund to advance Pacific-identified and led solutions to complex development challenges. 

In Papua New Guinea, for instance, USAID is expanding access to renewable energy, protecting the country’s environment, combatting the HIV/AIDS epidemic, bolstering gender equity, and addressing gender-based violence. USAID’s work promoting peace and stability is one facet of the 3D approach under the U.S. Strategy 

to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS) in Papua New Guinea, which 

aims to strengthen regional partnership and elevate locally led efforts to address the 

shared objectives of strengthening community capacity to prevent, mitigate, and respond to violence; supporting sustainable and equitable economic growth; and improving justice systems and professionalizing security forces. In Palau, USAID 

partnered with Australia and Japan to support the development of an undersea 

spur cable—Palau’s second—that will connect the country to the world’s longest undersea cable and increase the internet bandwidth needed to spark greater economic 

growth. In the Solomon Islands, USAID works with partners at all levels to advance 

the country’s economic competitiveness and inclusiveness, with specific emphasis on 

developing the agribusiness sector and improving natural resources governance. 
17 

USAID’s environment and climate readiness work remains a top priority. Through 

the USAID Climate Ready activity, which ended only a few months ago, we mobilized more than $550 million dollars for Pacific Islands countries to improve access 

to climate finance from various climate institutions such as the Green Climate 

Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the Global Environment Facility. Building on the 

success of Climate Ready, USAID is developing a new climate finance activity that 

will seek to unlock resources from additional sources, bringing traditional multidonor sources together with private sector and foreign direct investment to become 

more resilient to climate change and disaster risks. 

We are also responding directly to requests from Pacific Island governments to expand opportunities for economic growth. At last year’s U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum 

Summit, President Biden announced the U.S. would launch a flexible Pacific Microfinance Facility valued at up to $50 million to expand access to fair and competitive 

finance for micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSME) in the Pacific Islands. 

USAID and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation are now bringing together our comparative advantages to fulfill this commitment. We have received more than a dozen expressions of interest and are now in the process of identifying viable financial institutions to partner with. 

Last year, Pacific Island countries joined together to develop, endorse, and launch 

the Unlocking Blue Pacific Prosperity Initiative. This initiative, led by the Pacific 

Community, sets a clear and bold vision to protect the region’s ecosystem, which is 

five times the size of the United States, as well as ensure food security and livelihoods for Pacific Islanders. USAID is supporting this Pacific-led initiative by working with the Pacific Community to align donors behind this vision, utilizing our convening power, and by ensuring that UBPP is complementary to other important initiatives in the region. The Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting later this year 

is a key opportunity for donors, including the United States, to coalesce and to follow through on supporting Pacific-led priorities. 

The United States remains one of the largest bi-lateral humanitarian and disaster 

assistance donors in the Pacific. In addition to our efforts to build countries’ resilience through PREPARE, advance progress on shared development priorities, and 

strengthen our enduring bonds across the region, we provide year-round disaster 

preparedness and resilience assistance, which enables Pacific Island nations to more 

effectively lead their own disaster responses. 

We do this by supporting early recovery, risk reduction, and strengthening resilience throughout the Pacific Islands. This allows partner countries to lead in figuring out solutions to lessen the impacts of natural hazards and respond more effectively to disasters. USAID’s three-pronged approach—to enhance early warning systems, improve disaster preparedness, and strengthen first-responder capabilities— 

helps Pacific Island nations to strengthen national disaster risk management capacities. 

Last year, tropical cyclones Judy and Kevin made landfall over Vanuatu between 

February 28 and March 4, and affected more than 85 percent of the country’s population. USAID responded swiftly by supporting the distribution of emergency relief 

items and coordination for the humanitarian response. USAID provided a total of 

$3.2 million in humanitarian assistance for shelter so that communities could start 

rebuilding their homes; water, sanitation and hygiene assistance including safe 

drinking water and supplies; support for humanitarian coordination and assessments; nutrition services; and protection for the most vulnerable people affected by 

the storms. 

Across all of these efforts, USAID works directly with like minded allies and partners in the region, as well as through coordinating mechanisms such as Partners 

in the Blue Pacific and the QUAD. By doing so, we are able to leverage each other’s 

resources and technical expertise, while ensuring USAID’s work is complementary, 

respects existing regional architecture, and is led and guided by the Pacific Islands. 

CLOSING

Mr. Chairman, USAID’s investments in the Pacific Islands region are a critical 

part of the United States’ vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific that contributes 

to greater global security and prosperity. 

Thank you for your support in providing us the necessary resources as well as 

the opportunity to share what USAID is doing in this important region. I look forward to your counsel and questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Again, I want to thank all three of our witnesses, 

not just for their appearance here but for what you do. 
18 

It is true that the United States is a Pacific nation, but we have 

one Pacific Island State, and I am going to yield the place in order 

for questioning to Senator Schatz who has been our leader on Pacific Island issues. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member, and thank you all for being here. I also want to recognize 

Secretary General Puna for our continued and productive engagement—he is in the audience—and also the finance minister of 

Tonga, Mr. Tiueti, for being here. 

I want to start with Mr. Kritenbrink. The United States has provided $4.5 million to the Pacific Resilience Facility. Can you talk 

about the importance of PRF and how you see it as a mechanism 

for the kind of engagement that Secretary Blinken and President 

Biden have talked about, and I think we are all on a bipartisan 

basis in the middle of executing. 

But as I talk to the PIF, they are prioritizing the Pacific Resilience Facility, and I would like you to just talk about why we made 

that first investment and maybe why we should consider continued 

investments. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, thank you very much for the question 

and for the opportunity to be here today. 

I would just underscore what you have said. Our whole approach 

to the Pacific Islands is to listen to the Pacific Island leaders what 

their top needs are, to study the Pacific Island Forum’s own 2050 

strategy for the Blue Pacific continent, and then to make sure that 

we meet the needs that are outlined in that strategy, and the number one need that they have outlined is the existential challenge of 

climate change. 

So the Pacific Resilience Facility is one of several steps we have 

taken to show our support for meeting the Pacific Islanders where 

they live, so to speak. That initial investment is designed to build 

local resilience and capacity to help combat climate change, but I 

do think it is just the beginning of what we are doing and what 

we need to do, and we will need to do more, going forward. 

My colleague Michael Schiffer may have more details on the actual implementation on the ground. But I could not agree more, 

Senator, with the importance of the climate issue. 

Senator SCHATZ. Sorry. Mr. Schiffer, I actually want to pivot a 

little bit to something that you said in your testimony about predatory economic arrangements with Pacific Island nations, and I 

think our theory of the case at least in the last 3 or 4 years has 

been to really listen, to try to respond, to understand these are 

sovereigns—they are not colonies, they are not insular areas—and 

to be more sensitive to that, and to understand that they—as 

sovereigns—get to have whatever economic partnerships that make 

the most sense to them. 

I would like you to make the case a little more explicitly about 

how these predatory economic arrangements are, in the end, bad 

for some of our friends across the Pacific. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Thank you for that question, and let me underscore from the outset, and as Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink offered, we fully recognize that our partners in the Pacific are sovereign that they can make their and should make their own choices 
19 

and that our role is to support them in that process, and that is 

what we seek to do. 

But as we look around at PRC behavior in the Pacific we see that 

the PRC is violating many of the rules and norms that have been 

established by the international community for its own benefit. 

And that negatively impacts the work that we do, including in the 

Pacific Island in the economic growth and the development sphere. 

So, for example, we have seen a surge in investment by the PRC 

in the telecommunications sector in recent years, which can leave 

nations vulnerable to cybersecurity risks and other national security concerns. 

And so we see our role as partnering with like minded and 

partnering with our Pacific Island friends to ensure that they have 

the options that they need for fast, secure, and reliable 

connectivity. 

Senator SCHATZ. Mr. Schiffer, sorry to interrupt. I just want you 

to get to what is the catch here? When you go into a partnership 

with PRC on a harbor or whatever it may be, what is the catch on 

the back end? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. The catch on the back end for the partners is that 

oftentimes the PRC is not motivated by developing an economically 

viable and sustainable program, but is motivated by other 

geostrategic considerations and will work to create a project that 

is not economic, not sustainable, and leaves a partner saddled with 

debt on the back side. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you very much. 

A final question for Mr. Kritenbrink. 

This is either yes or no or as quick as you can do. How important 

is it to—I guess it is not yes or no—how important is it to ratify 

the Law of the Sea? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, Senator, I think Secretary Blinken has 

spoken to this before. It would be very effective to our diplomacy 

in the region. 

And maybe just on the previous question to underscore my colleague’s point where, of course, countries make their own decisions 

and their own choices. We want to make sure that they can do that 

freely. 

Oftentimes, we find that deals with the Chinese can undermine 

a country’s sovereignty and can lead to giving China leverage over 

a country that undermines their position. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Kritenbrink, can you describe for us challenges if there are 

any or difficulties there are of attracting diplomats to serve in the 

EAP area that you oversee? 

Is it difficult? Is it challenging? What is unique about it? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. The challenges of recruiting diplomats to serve 

in the Pacific? 

Senator RISCH. Yes, correct. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. I would say two things. I think there are certain challenges because we need to make sure we have diplomats 

who are ready to serve, who are truly creative and expeditionary 
20 

and can serve in some of our most important but some of our 

smallest environments. 

But I have been really gratified, Mr. Ranking Member, that thus 

far there has been a lot of enthusiasm for service in the Pacific. 

As I noted, in addition to our previously operating six embassies, 

we have opened two new ones, and we have two more on the way, 

and I have been gratified that we have had people step up in every 

instance and including both at the senior level and at the working 

level. 

Senator RISCH. Well, we appreciate that, and we have tried to 

help. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir. 

Senator RISCH. You know, I passed the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act—I assume you are familiar 

with that—and it was in 2022, and it provides State with much 

needed flexibilities to stand up our overseas missions—— 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir. 

Senator RISCH [continuing]. Which is especially useful in the Pacific Islands. 

Well, since you are here, and your boss is not, you get the opportunity to explain to me why he has only answered two out of the 

five letters I have written about that subject to him, and one of 

those two that he answered we just got this week. So—— 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. I see. 

Senator RISCH [continuing]. It has been over a long period of 

time. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Mr. Ranking Member, I will—— 

Senator RISCH. When you see him tell him I want to chat with 

him about it. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. I will look into that immediately. We are 

grateful to you and other members of this committee for your support. 

Because of your support we have been able to open our two new 

embassies in the Solomons and Tonga in record speed, and I am 

confident we will do the same in the very near future in Vanuatu, 

and we are still working on Kiribati. But grateful for the support. 

Senator RISCH. I appreciate that. 

Second, that law that we just discussed requires that the Secretary issue official guidance on implementing it. That has not 

been done, and I do not suppose you can enlighten me as to when 

that might be done. That is something that—— 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. I cannot, Mr. Ranking Member, but I will look 

into it immediately. 

Senator RISCH. Would you take that for the record, please? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Senator RISCH. And I would like to hear about that. 

OK. 

Mr. Ratner, I have been intrigued by the fact that the Chinese 

have been modestly successful in these policing agreements that 

they have entered into with some of the countries. 

When we go out to try to work with another country, we offer 

things in food or medical area or education or human rights or 

things like that. But the Chinese focus on policing agreements. I 
21 

think I know why, but can you enlighten us a little bit maybe why 

the Chinese focus on that? 

Mr. RATNER. Senator, I believe the PRC is focused on policing 

agreements because it is a mechanism through which they can support and gain leverage over host regimes. 

Senator RISCH. And the population itself. Would you agree with 

that? 

Mr. RATNER. Yes. 

Senator RISCH. Have we thought about at all offering the same 

kind of services? Because, look, certainly for the people who run 

the country, obviously, security becomes number one, particularly 

their own security, and hopefully, being able to stay in office. 

So it seems like that is a pretty attractive bait to put out there 

for getting countries to bite. So have you guys thought at all about 

making some kind of offers like that in the same lane? 

Mr. RATNER. The Defense Department has a number of security 

cooperation activities and military to military cooperation activities 

with countries in the Pacific Islands. We do not do internal policing 

support in that regard. So I would defer to Assistant Secretary 

Kritenbrink to talk about some of our programs there. 

Senator RISCH. Right. And I understand that, by the way. There 

are two different lanes, the military and the police in very, very different lanes, obviously, one being domestic one, one not. But maybe 

you could—— 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. I could speak to that very briefly, Mr. Ranking 

Member—— 

Senator RISCH. Sure. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK [continuing]. That we have increased our own 

law enforcement assistance in the region. But I think perhaps even 

more importantly we work together with partners in the Pacific 

family—Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand—who 

have a long standing tradition of helping countries in the region 

with security and with policing, and I think that has been quite effective to show that there are, obviously, alternatives to PRC policing agreements, which are opaque, and we think, deeply concerning. 

Senator RISCH. Yes. I think we are all concerned about that 

when they first started popping up. I would strongly suggest that 

you guys revisit your efforts in that regard and see how you might 

be able to make them more attractive so when they do bite on the 

hook that it is our hook and not the Chinese. 

So thank you. My time is up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Kritenbrink, is it fair to say that China remains an important market for Pacific Island countries’ natural resource exports and tourism? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir, Senator. I think that is an accurate 

statement for probably the majority. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And is it also right that 10 Pacific Island 

countries have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative which promotes PRC backed infrastructure development? 
22 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. I do not know that figure, but I would not dispute it. Happy to look into that. I will take that at face value. Yes, 

sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I would commend it to you. I am pretty sure 

it is 10. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So is it also fair to say that since China is 

the economic force within that region that we are challenged in 

terms of our own national interests in meeting that economic force 

with one that can compete with it? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, I would agree with that. But I would 

say having engaged intensively with our Pacific Island leader 

friends over the last couple of years the demand signal for U.S. engagement is probably as strong as I have ever seen in any region. 

Certainly, there are economic engagements with China that are 

important to these countries, and we are not asking countries to 

choose. But it is clear to us that our Pacific Island friends want to 

have options. They have a desire to partner with the United States, 

and we are doing everything we can to do that. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I agree with you they would like to have options. The problem is is that we provide them no option in terms 

of an economic or trade agenda. There is no trade agenda of consequence with the Pacific Island countries, and for so long as they 

therefore do not have an option for their economic vitality and well 

being of their citizens, they are somewhat hostage to China. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. We have certainly tried to meet their needs, 

and in—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. How so? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, as I indicated, sir, our strategy is based 

on meeting their needs in terms of security, combating climate 

change, infrastructure investment, and the like. 

So our focus has been primarily in those sectors. We also promote good governance and people to people ties as well. But those 

would be the priority sectors. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And I appreciate—those are all worthwhile 

things, Mr. Secretary, some of the things that I have advocated for 

for the better part of nearly two decades of being here in the Senate and three decades in Congress. 

But we have to be realistic that if we do not have a robust trade 

agenda in the Pacific Island countries that they will not by desire, 

maybe, but by default ultimately deal with the Chinese. 

And the urgency of climate change; there is a lot more that we 

should be doing as it relates to climate change, which is in our collective interests as well as a global interest that we have, but 

which is really an existential challenge to our Pacific Island neighbors. 

And so I just hope the Administration gets to a better place because IPEF is a nice framework, but it does not deal with any market access, at the end of the day, and without market access I 

think that we are going to be at a competitive disadvantage with 

China. 

Mr. Schiffer, it is good to see you back before the committee. I 

see you have adopted the State Department’s ways of expanding 
23 

beyond the 5 minutes. But I hope that is the only thing that you 

adopt from that experience. 

Let me just say—I think our colleague was trying to get to this— 

at the end of the day is it not what China often does through its 

Belt and Road Initiative, is to trap many of these countries in debt 

diplomacy? 

Mr. SCHIFFER. That is exactly the behavior pattern that we have 

seen where China offers what appears to be an attractive proposition but the back side of debt and entrapment, and then the leverage and the additional openings for corrupt practices create serious problems down the line. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And they entrap them not only in debt, but 

then entrap them in their political diplomatic questions. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Yes. Beijing is very, very skilled at using the leverage that it finds itself to have available. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally, Secretary Ratner, in March 2022 

the Solomon Islands and China signed a security agreement ostensibly aiming in part to address, quote, ‘‘internal threats’’ including 

protecting Chinese owned businesses in the country. 

In 2023 the two countries signed a deal on police cooperation as 

part of their comprehensive strategic partnership. And while I certainly applaud last year’s opening of an embassy in the Solomon 

Islands, what tools is the United States using and utilizing to encourage the Solomon Islands’ commitment to continue working 

with the United States and Australia as security partners? 

Mr. RATNER. Senator, again, I would defer to Assistant Secretary 

Kritenbrink particularly on the question of policing. 

But as it relates to the Department of Defense’s role throughout 

the Pacific Islands, much of our cooperation depends on the nature 

of the island, the size, and their resident forces. 

There are, of course, three Pacific Islands that have militaries— 

so PNG, Tonga, and Fiji—and we maintain military to military relations with them and maintain status as partner of choice there. 

We have a number of Section 333 capacity building programs. 

We have DOD-State partnership programs through our National 

Guard programs. We do a number of regular exercises with Pacific 

Island partners, and we are deeply engaged with Australia, New 

Zealand, France, Japan, and other partners from a multilateral—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. My time has expired, but that is not the 

question I was seeking an answer to. 

For the record, Mr. Secretary, since my time has expired would 

you respond to that question for me, what are we doing to get the 

Solomon Islands to be aligned with us, particularly in our security 

partnership with Australia? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I would appreciate hearing that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ricketts. 

Senator RICKETTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Actually, Senator Menendez, I am actually going to follow up 

with Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink on that as well with regard 

to the—if you could go into more details. 

We have covered a number of the countries already like the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, that have es-
24 

tablished these security arrangements with the People’s Republic of 

China. 

Can you talk more in detail what we are doing to, say, for example, supply the training or international standards, working with 

our allies like Australia and New Zealand to be able to counter 

some of the things that the PRC is doing? 

You can certainly, again, understand countries wanting to have 

security but, obviously, the malign influence that the PRC can do 

once they have a whole security apparatus. 

So maybe you could hit upon what we are trying to do to counter 

it, and also talk a little bit about what the PRC does. For example, 

we have seen them be able to extradite people from Fiji—Chinese 

dissidents and so forth—about how that once the PRC gets a hold 

of that security forces what kind of malign influence they can exercise in those countries. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Thank you, Senator, for the question. 

As we indicated, it is deeply concerning when we see these agreements inked because they are opaque. They have caused concern 

both within the individual countries and across the region as well, 

and I think our most effective approach in every instance is we continue to engage with every partner in the Pacific, including those 

who have signed these agreements. 

But I think we are most effective when we work together with 

others in the region who share those concerns, who can also quietly 

convey the depth of our concern and to offer alternatives. 

And I think, really, that is the crux of our entire approach. We 

have to give these countries options. 

Senator RICKETTS. Can you get into some of the alternatives that 

you are offering some of these countries? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, for example—— 

Senator RICKETTS. What can we do to counter China saying, hey, 

we are going to provide you people that can be on the ground? 

What can we do to counter that? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. We have our own law enforcement training 

programs active throughout the Pacific but is providing us an explicit alternative and boots on the ground, so to speak, of security 

forces that can help these countries. 

That is really where partners like Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and New Zealand, they actually have police forces on the 

ground in many of these countries. 

I think that is the most effective way forward, and again, finding 

that solution that is comfortable with friends in the Pacific I think 

is the most effective way forward, and including in the Solomon Islands itself where those countries that I have mentioned have 

helped to provide security even after this PRC—— 

Senator RICKETTS. So are we offering new training in places like 

the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu and—— 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. I would have to look at the details of each 

country, but yes, we do provide training in the region, and again, 

our partners in the Pacific in particular are very active because 

they actually have police forces on the ground in many of these 

places. 

Senator RICKETTS. OK. Can you also talk a little about PRC 

linked organized crime in these places, and again, how it under-
25 

mines the security? Can you talk about what we know about that 

and how that may relate to the security issues? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, I do not have a great deal of depth 

on that. I would probably have to bring that back. 

But certainly, when you think about some areas where countries 

ought to be cautious about their engagement with China, part of 

it is the leverage and the coercive avenues that are opened up for 

the government, but part of it is related to organized crime as well. 

But for any details I would have to take that back, but I would 

be happy to do so. 

Senator RICKETTS. Can you talk in a little detail about, again, 

when security forces are on the ground in some of these countries 

and how the PRC then uses that to suppress their dissidents who 

may be there, or anything like that? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, that is the concern, Senator, the very 

clear concern voiced by partners, citizens of countries where these 

forces have been and others in the region. 

I am not sure if we have seen much of that yet, but that is certainly the concern, and I think as Assistant Secretary Ratner indicated, when we have seen China do this elsewhere oftentimes they 

are looking for an avenue to get in the door, so to speak, and to 

expand security arrangements from there. And so that would be of 

deep concern, I think, to many in the region, including ourselves. 

Senator RICKETTS. OK. 

I am going to switch gears on you just a little bit here. Can you 

talk about—obviously, after the Taiwan elections Nauru switched 

their diplomatic ties against—— 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir. 

Senator RICKETTS [continuing]. Taiwan to the PRC. How much 

awareness do we have of that in the State Department? And obviously, this is not the first time it has happened. What are we doing 

to maybe try and flip them back to Taiwan recognition? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, there is a history for some of these countries flipping back and forth, so there is that precedent. I think 

what disappointed us in that move is the way it was done, the excuses that were used by the PRC including certain economic inducements and U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758, which was 

misused and misinterpreted. 

But our message to Nauru and then to the three remaining partners of Taiwan in the region is, again, countries ought to be careful 

and clear eyed about entering in these arrangements with China. 

China will often make many promises that remain unfulfilled 

and that can have negative consequences. And then with those 

three remaining partners—three formal diplomatic partners of Taiwan—we worked very carefully and closely with them to make sure 

their needs are met, and that we try to close off any opportunities 

for—that China could exploit. 

Senator RICKETTS. But do we know that that was going to happen? Did we know that Nauru was going to do that right after the 

Taiwan elections? Because were they not just talking a lot about 

it—— 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. For—— 

Senator RICKETTS [continuing]. Flights and so forth right before 

that? 
26 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. We had known for some time that there were 

concerns in Nauru, and we were working with partners to meet 

those. 

But in this instance they decided to flip. There is a history in 

some of these places of going back and forth, and we will have to 

see. But I would just say, again, we issued a public statement right 

after this was done. Every country has the sovereign decision to 

make their own decision including on these recognition questions. 

But we do encourage countries to be cautious and careful given the 

track record of the PRC. 

Senator RICKETTS. Great. Thank you, Assistant Secretary. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator RICKETTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Secretary Kritenbrink and Administrator Schiffer, I want to ask 

you a question related to the local media and information space. 

We talk a lot about the need for Western engagement on infrastructure. We recognize that in many cases that China might be 

the only player in town to deal with some of the infrastructure 

projects, and therefore, they give a deal that is too good to believe, 

and it turns out not to be what they thought it was going to be, 

and then you have the debt diplomacy issues. 

But it also seems like the PRC is actively engaged in influencing 

local media and information in the region, and what is the United 

States doing to try to counter that activity? 

Let me start with the secretary. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Very important question. I will mention two critical efforts at the 

outset. 

First is in every place where we have a presence, and we are on 

the ground, we are active in the local media space and through our 

own public diplomacy to make sure that there is alternative messaging to the PRC there so, again, our partners in the region have 

choice and have accurate information. 

And second, we are working on programs to provide many of our 

partners in the region with access to credible news wires and the 

like, the AP and others. 

So, again, a newspaper, for example, on the ground in island 

countries not completely dependent on Xinhua for its news but has 

other options. Those are the two that I would mention at the outset, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Sure, and if I can build on that, Mr. Chairman. 

In addition to the cable spur project that I had talked about earlier and the work that we have done with other partners on the 

East Micronesia cable, we have also been extraordinarily active 

working with our Department of State colleagues supporting free 

and independent press in the region, including through a number 

of journalism fellowships, particularly targeting journalists who are 

interested in working on natural resource management as that addresses a number of the corruption and governance concerns that 

we have. 

And then we also recently launched with the University of the 

South Pacific a digital cyber connectivity partnership that allows 

us to step into the digital space in a more forward leaning way, re-
27 

sponsive to the requests that we are getting from our partners to 

provide them the digital services that they need to be able to control their own information destinies. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think this is an area that we really need to 

work on. 

I am going to turn the gavel to Senator Kaine. I have to be on 

the floor in regards to our nominee for Haiti. We will be voting on 

confirming an ambassador for Haiti which, obviously, is extremely 

important in our foreign policy decisionmaking. 

So let me thank you all, and I will recognize Senator Romney. 

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do not watch as closely as I am sure you do to see just what 

China is doing, but I must admit it strikes me that they have a 

very comprehensive plan to establish global leadership and to replace us, whether that is in international institutions where they 

insinuate themselves into people in leadership, whether it is the 

movement away from democracy generally and the growth in autocracy. Freedom House indicates that trend continued again this 

year. 

They dominate certain raw materials that are the raw materials 

of the future, whether it is nickel or magnesium or rare earths, and 

so forth. They either dominate the mining of those things or the 

processing of them. 

They put in place the rail lines to get the raw materials to their 

ports. They own the ports to get the products to their market. Of 

course, then they have TikTok which allows them to gather data 

on the American people and to provide propaganda, as they did in 

the Taiwan election with the TikTok algorithm there. 

They, of course, likewise have Huawei. I mean, you could look 

through the things they have done. They dominate the—I should 

not say dominate—they lead in a number of the new technologies 

and businesses whether it is electric vehicles or solar panels. They 

have invested in hypersonics, which allow them potentially to 

threaten our fleet. 

I mean, you look at the things they do, and it is a comprehensive 

plan and appears to be a very effective strategy. If we have a strategy to counter China, it is not working. 

So 2 years ago or longer the chairman of this committee and I 

drafted legislation requiring the State Department to gather internally and with external input experts with different points of view 

to create options and to develop a China strategy. 

We included that in legislation that was passed. It was due to 

be provided to this committee and to the Congress in July 2022. 

So it is, obviously, late. 

Now, call me old fashioned—I thought that when we passed a 

law and required the State Department to do something, that they 

would do it and the State Department has not, or someone has not, 

and I do not understand why. 

Now, I can understand people say, hey, we are late—we will get 

it to you. But apparently the work has been done, but this has not 

been provided. By the way, if it is classified, let it be classified. 

But China, from what I can tell, has a game plan, and it is succeeding. We do not have a game plan I recognize, and whether we 

do or not, we are not succeeding. 
28 

So, Mr. Kritenbrink, why do we not have this in hand, and when 

will we? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, thank you very much. 

Senator ROMNEY. You know that was coming, by the way. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. It is good to see you. Thank you, Senator. 

I will say two things. We do have a strategy. We have talked 

about publicly the pillars of that strategy—invest, align, and compete. I would—— 

Senator ROMNEY. Three words does not make a strategy. I mean, 

it is a wonderful headline—invest, align, compete—and the Secretary gave a speech of that nature over 2 years ago—3 years ago. 

And I said, that is terrific. That is exactly right. 

But we need a comprehensive strategy. I have just described a 

few things China has in their strategy. We do not have that, at 

least it has not been provided to this committee or to the U.S. Congress or the American people, and we are losing, if you will, on the 

strategic battlefield. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, I will take this back immediately. I 

have committed to you before to provide this report, and I apologize 

that that has not been done, and I commit to doing so, number one. 

Number two, the point I would take issue with our strategy, it 

is a lot more than those three elements, and I think if you look at 

the actions that this administration is taking, investing in our 

sources of strength at home, and you are aware of that agenda. 

The align piece, which I think has been unprecedentedly successful, all the alignment with our allies and partners and friends 

around the world in the Indo-Pacific and especially in the Pacific 

Islands, and then the actions we have taken to compete against 

China including protecting the sources of our economic strength at 

home but in many other domains as well. 

So I am confident that we have a strategy. I am confident that 

our China strategy is succeeding—has been successful and is succeeding. But this is an unprecedented challenge. But I commit to 

being responsive to your request, Senator. Thank you. 

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KAINE [presiding]. Senator Duckworth. 

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

to all the witnesses for being here today. 

To start, I would like to say congratulations to Special Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations Joseph Yun and the team 

that worked for more than 2 years to successfully renegotiate the 

Compacts of Free Association with the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau. This is critically 

important to our national security, and I am glad we can highlight 

it today. 

Over a thousand citizens at the Freely Associated States serve 

proudly in the United States military. They are more than just 

good neighbors in the Pacific. They serve alongside us, study, innovate, and trade together with us, and they should not be put in a 

position to doubt our commitment to continuing our decades long 

partnership nor our willingness and ability to make right the 

wrongs of the past, including providing compensation for damages 

caused by past nuclear testing. 
29 

Secretary Ratner, I want to dive in a bit more on DOD’s vision 

for Joint Task Force Micronesia. As you know, the fiscal year 2024 

NDAA mandated an assessment on the implementation of JTF Micronesia. While we await the results of that report and the related 

assessments pertaining to Guam, I want to make my interest in 

this issue clear. 

While our plans and reports recognize the vastness of the Pacific, 

we have to make sure our structure and resourcing also reckons 

with that vastness sufficiently. For example, our Coast Guard has 

realigned assets to Honolulu to better meet the heightened demand 

signal, a signal that is not only coming from our planning process 

but from our allies and partners who are asking us for more opportunities to work together. 

Secretary Ratner, what are your thoughts on the question of how 

our resourcing in that region currently aligns with the actual vastness of the scale of the region? 

Mr. RATNER. Well, thank you, Senator. 

And I will tell you that the department is currently looking at 

the evolution of our command and control structures throughout 

the Indo-Pacific, not just as it relates to current structures but potential reforms of that. 

So what that looks like down the road is something we are taking a look at including as it relates to how we operate in the Pacific 

Islands. 

The National Defense Strategy is laser focused on the PRC as 

the pacing challenge, and that has informed a lot of our resourcing 

as it relates to the Pacific Islands, including in major posture initiatives throughout the Pacific Islands, and we have ongoing exercises, and as Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink has said, we are 

doing everything we can to leverage our allies and partners who 

have great contributions to make down there. 

So we have stepped up our game. We are doubling down in 

places like Papua New Guinea, and we are looking for additional 

opportunities. 

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

I sit on both SFRC and SASC. I feel a special responsibility to 

ensure there is strong interagency coordination to address pressing 

national security challenges, and last week I spoke to the commanders of CENTCOM and AFRICOM about how important it is 

to do this in their areas of responsibility. 

Secretary Ratner, what can you say about how Joint Task Force 

Micronesia may include liaisons not only from across the different 

service branches but also the interagency to ensure robust coordination across diplomatic, developmental, and defense functions directly from the region, as it is already being done at INDOPACOM 

complementing the work that is done at JIATF West? 

Mr. RATNER. Well, thank you, Senator. I will refer to 

INDOPACOM on the specific staffing. But I a hundred percent 

agree with your point, and it is a broader point to make here today 

is that even as it relates to our security issues the work that 

USAID is doing, the work the State Department is doing, and other 

departments and agencies are fundamental contributions to our security in the region. 
30 

So when we when we talk about concerns about China’s influence, concerns about China’s military, resourcing and funding some 

of our economic and assistance programs are critically important, 

and we work very closely with the State Department and USAID. 

I know Admiral Aquilino hosted a regional ambassadors conference recently where Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink attended, 

and we are taking every chance we get opportunities to integrate 

our posture and our military strategy with our assistance and diplomacy. 

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you. I think that speaks very 

strongly to the importance of our presence in the region. 

Secretary Kritenbrink and Administrator Schiffer, I would like to 

stay on the topic of this interagency cooperation when it comes to 

implementing the Indo-Pacific strategy through our engagement 

with the Pacific Island countries in particular and in the context 

of COFA specifically. 

We know that our failure to pass a budget on time did nothing 

to help make the case for U.S. leadership and reliability in the 

world, including in the Pacific. But now that COFA funding has 

passed, I want to understand your assessment of whether the U.S. 

Government is presenting a unified, consistent presence to our allies and partners, particularly the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, 

and Palau. 

In your opinion is the United States building strategies that 

project not only our strength but our values that makes a case that 

the United States is a responsible Pacific power and that democracy actually does deliver because you know that the PRC is making the opposite argument? 

Our investments and commitments need to be visibly American, 

and what more can we do to reinforce our reputation as a reliable 

partner of choice? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, thank you very much for the question, for your leadership and support on these issues. 

On the issue of our interagency cooperation and implementing 

the COFA agreements, I am very confident in the work that the 

three of us have done at this table together with our colleagues at 

the White House, especially Senior Director Mira Rapp-Hooper, our 

colleagues at the Department of the Interior as well. 

So I am very confident about that, going forward. I fully agree 

with your point about that our values have to be on display as well. 

But Senator, I think my experience over the last couple of years 

dealing with friends in the Pacific, I feel very well aligned for the 

most part with many of the leaders and most of the peoples on the 

ground, and where we do have concerns we worked in particular 

to build the capacity of our partners. 

But I could not agree more. I want to thank you and the Congress for the leadership. Passing the COFA was one of the most important things that we could have done, I think, in the last decade 

to demonstrate our commitment to this vitally important region. 

Very, very grateful to you. 

Mr. SCHIFFER. And I will add very briefly to Secretary 

Kritenbrink’s comments. 

I think we have had exceptional interagency cooperation over the 

past several years under the Biden-Harris administration really 
31 

linking together all of the elements of our national security community to be able to deliver to our partners and as you offered, Senator Duckworth, to be able to present that unified face that demonstrates America’s added value as a partner and a friend in the 

region. 

As I offered earlier, our approach has been to listen, partner, and 

deliver, and to your point delivery is just as critical as any of the 

other pieces, and I think we have stepped up our game in the past 

couple of years. 

Senator KAINE. And if I could ask you to summarize. We are over 

time—— 

Mr. SCHIFFER. Sure. 

Senator KAINE [continuing]. And I want to have Senator 

Hagerty—— 

Mr. SCHIFFER. My apologies, Mr. Chairman. 

I was just going to offer that when the President has made commitments at our recent Pacific Island summits, both the State Department, USAID, the Department of Defense, and other elements 

of the U.S. Government have moved out quickly to implement and 

to make sure that we are showing up in tangible ways. 

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

I apologize to Senator Hagerty. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. Good discussion. 

Senator Hagerty. 

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Administrator Schiffer, Secretary Ratner, Secretary Kritenbrink. It is 

good to see all three of you. 

I would like to talk with you about the investment strategy that 

we do undertake. I know that each of you have different tools. 

Secretary Ratner, you have got the Office of Strategic Capital I 

would like to hear about. 

Administrator Schiffer, you have got the microfinance program 

that you are dealing with. 

And Ambassador Kritenbrink, we talked about the strategy document that you are putting together. 

I am deeply concerned about our ability to show up, particularly 

when it comes to hard infrastructure in the region, and I may have 

shared this with some of you, but when I was in my previous role 

as Ambassador to Japan I was literally reading in Nikkei Asia 

about a bankruptcy that was underway in the Philippines. The old 

Subic Bay Port, the Hanjin shipyard there—a South Korean shipyard—was in bankruptcy. 

The two bidders’ names were of concern to me, and I reached out 

to the appropriate people and found out that those two bidders 

were both affiliated with the PRC. They were trying to take control 

of a very strategic shipyard, one that had been a U.S. Navy post 

back in the 1980s when I lived in Japan the first time, and I was 

deeply concerned about that and what we might be able to do. 

I will not go into the details of it here, but we put a tremendous 

amount of effort into trying to address that situation, and that 

asset now is called Agila shipyard. It is now a U.S. asset. It is a 

very strategic asset for us in the region. 
32 

And the way we got that done was by me making a lot of phone 

calls, the State Department, the Department of Defense coming together on an ad hoc basis, Cerberus Capital Management in New 

York taking a very important leading role in doing all of this, and 

the Japanese government stepping up and helping us as well. 

We worked with the Philippine government, with the Japanese 

government, certainly with the U.S. Government to make all this 

happen. It probably took the better part of 2 years to get it to work, 

and the Development Finance Corporation, which I thought would 

be the tool that we could use to really step up the U.S. Government’s participation, was unable to participate in this. 

In fact, we were not able to get any U.S. Government direct participation. A lot of effort and a lot of elbow grease, but not direct 

participation. 

So I would like to come to you, and I will start with you, Secretary Ratner, to talk about the new Office of Strategic Capital. Is 

this a means, a tool, by which you might be able to do hard infrastructure? 

I know you talk about technology here, but is that a tool, or are 

there other tools where you could step up and play a more direct 

role? 

Mr. RATNER. Yes, Senator, I will get back to you specifically on 

the Office of Strategic Capital as it relates to the Pacific Islands. 

What I will say related to infrastructure we have a number of 

major posture initiatives underway throughout the Pacific Islands, 

obviously, in U.S. territories such as Guam and CNMI, in the 

COFA states, in Marshall Islands and Palau we have some major 

projects underway, and of course, last year concluded a defense cooperation agreement with Papua New Guinea and have already 

had one INDOPACOM site survey team down and another one on 

the way to start looking at some of the infrastructure projects that 

we can do there. 

So we do see this as a huge priority. It connects to the development and economic issues that we have been talking about this 

morning, and we are looking to do more throughout the region, and 

some of those projects are included in the President’s fiscal year 

2025 budget request. 

Senator HAGERTY. I would encourage you to take a very hard 

look at the Philippines, too. There are more assets there that I am 

sure you are aware of. The Chinese Communist Party has great interest in that region. We should have a great strategic interest in 

projecting our own relationship. 

I have been very happy, frankly, with the relationship that we 

have built with the Philippine government and the direction that 

is going, but I think we have a lot of opportunity there. 

Secretary Kritenbrink, could you speak to this in terms of your 

thoughts, and as you prepare the strategic document that you 

promised to Senator Romney, I would love to hear how this infrastructure piece may fit in. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, Senator Hagerty, first of all, thank you 

for your leadership on the Philippines example you mentioned. It 

is still one of the best textbook examples we have of a success 

story. 
33 

I would say what we are doing right now is we are focused especially with other partners on trying to catalyze investment in key 

infrastructure in the region. 

Certainly, the subsea cables is probably the place where we have 

been most active—the East Micronesia cable, work on the Google 

cable, and elsewhere. 

We have also partnered with Australia. We announced in October that we were going to co-finance maritime infrastructure in 

Kiribati including at Canton wharf and Charlie wharf. So, certainly, we are focused on the infrastructure issues, and again, giving countries options in the region. 

Second, to underscore what Assistant Secretary Ratner said, in the President’s fiscal year 2025 budget request there is a $4 billion 

discretionary request and a $4 billion mandatory funding request, 

and the mandatory funding in particular is designed to allow the 

United States to be able to fund hard infrastructure projects and 

to invest in what we call these strategic connectivity projects in the 

region. 

Senator HAGERTY. If you all could get back to me with a little 

more detail on that. I would be very interested to see—— 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, Senator. Thank you. 

Senator HAGERTY [continuing]. How your plan is unfolding. 

Thank you all. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you to the witnesses. 

I will do my questioning now and then call on Senator Young. 

I am a big fan of the AUKUS framework in the Indo-Pacific. I 

think this announced framework by President Biden of a couple 

years ago can be extremely powerful, going forward. 

I have some home state equities involved as well because the pillar one submarine portion of the deal will involve a lot of work at 

the shipyard in Newport News, Virginia. 

I want to tell a funny story about AUKUS that is sort of a thank 

you to this committee. 

Secretary Ratner, about 10 days before the Defense Committee 

marked up our NDAA in June, the Pentagon sent a group over to 

meet with me in the SCIF and said, you are the chairman of the 

Sea Power Subcommittee—we need to get all of this legislative language in the NDAA. Will you help us? 

And I said, no, I am not going to help you. And they said, wait 

a minute. You are an AUKUS supporter. I said, I am. Why will you 

not help us? Because none of this is jurisdictional in the Armed 

Services Committee. I cannot get it in the NDAA. It is all on the 

Foreign Relations Committee. 

We then worked together, great members on this committee. 

Senators Cardin, Senator Menendez, and others really helped get 

the AUKUS framework through the Foreign Relations Committee 

so that by the time the NDAA hit the floor we were able to attach 

the AUKUS legislative framework to the defense bill on the floor. 

And so I want to thank this committee for working very expeditiously to make that happen. Obviously, we are still in process in 

this way while the NDAA has been signed. We have a supplemental bill that is pending in the House that passed the Senate by 

a 70 to 29 vote, and the one piece of that supplemental that has 
34 

not proven controversial is the portion dealing with the AUKUS 

framework, the investment that needs to be made in the submarine 

industrial base, to make sure that we can match with our investment what the Aussies are putting in to grow an industrial base 

to enable us to complete this important part of the project. 

Secretary Ratner, just from the Pentagon’s standpoint, I would 

like you to talk about the importance of the AUKUS framework in 

terms of stability and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific because I do 

think we need to do more education of the American public and 

others about this. 

So talk about why this is such an important priority for the Administration. 

Mr. RATNER. Well, thank you, Senator. 

This is an absolute top priority insofar as our undersea capabilities are critical to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, and they are an 

area of U.S. overmatch, and it is essential that we keep it that 

way. And when we apply our allies and partners to that overmatch 

it is even more powerful deterrence. 

So maintaining our undersea advantage is going to be key to 

maintaining peace and stability in the region. The AUKUS legislation helps to do that. 

You mentioned submarine building. The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2025 would provide $4 billion toward the submarine industrial base and the national security supplemental on 

top of that, and that will be critical to keep pace with the challenge. 

Senator KAINE. Just one quick story about submarine building. 

The Navy has stood up a manufacturing Center of Excellence in 

Danville, Virginia, to train the submarine industrial base, and on 

my last visit to the center it was pretty heartwarming to walk into 

these classrooms and see not only U.S. shipbuilders from around 

the country, but also Aussies, Aussies who have been dispatched 

here from Australian companies to learn side by side with their 

American counterparts. 

And the other thing that I noticed is each of the classrooms I 

went into also included a number of Afghans, Afghans who served 

bravely with United States in Afghanistan. They moved to the 

United States. They are looking for a new career, and they have 

decided, I am going to be a shipbuilder. 

And watching the Aussies and the Afghans and the young people 

from Danville with all their conflicting accents learning side by 

side to become part of the U.S. submarine industrial base and the 

Australian submarine industrial base was really positive. 

Secretary Kritenbrink, the other piece of AUKUS is the pillar 

two, which means sort of anything else. Pillar one is about subs, 

but pillar two is focused on cybersecurity, AI, advanced technologies, innovation, and one of the opportunities there is for partnerships between research universities in the U.S., Australia, and 

the U.K., and innovative companies. 

My sense is in the same way that the U.S. has alliances that are 

strong and that that is seen by China as kind of threatening, we 

also have deep ties between universities in our country and Australia and the U.K. and other nations, and I think that is a kind 

of an alliance that is pretty powerful. 
35 

From the State Department standpoint looking at pillar two, 

what do you see as ways we can cooperate with Australia and the 

U.K. to find new, innovative technologies on which we can cooperate to promote stability in the region? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, I completely agree with the way that 

you framed it, the tremendous opportunities, I think, under pillar 

two as well for broader base technological cooperation, certainly 

among our three countries, as you have outlined, between our universities and our companies. 

And as you know, we have also indicated we are open to potentially cooperating with other countries in pillar two as well. So I 

think this is quite an exciting and strategically important area. 

Thank you. 

Senator KAINE. Well, if the big 12 can have 16 teams, then the 

Quad can have eight members or AUKUS can have nations whose 

names are not in the title. 

So I am going to now go to Senator Young. 

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Chairman, and I was really encouraged that you asked about pillar two of AUKUS. I have it right 

here, pillar two. That is what I also was going to follow up on, just 

emphasizing the importance of that piece of the AUKUS relationship. 

There has been a lot less attention focused, at least in the media, 

on pillar two, but I think the tech sharing opportunities between 

our research institutions and high tech companies are just—it is 

really exciting to me. So thank you to the State Department for 

your emphasis on implementing that. 

I would like to turn to the topic of illegal fishing activities. China 

has by far been the leading aggressor in illegal fishing throughout 

the region. 

It has affected the economies of each country that relies on this 

important industry. China, through their illegal activities, have diverted all manner of economic resources, and therefore, our armed 

forces have been doing their part to help. They have conducted missions to counter what we have come to call illegal, unreported, and 

unregulated, or IUU, fishing. 

Mr. Kritenbrink, what diplomatic efforts has the State Department been leading to challenge Chinese IUU fishing in the region, 

and has any notable progress been made especially on what we call 

shiprider agreements with our Coast Guard? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, thank you. Really important question, and that was where I was going to go first, that I think our 

Coast Guard has been most effective here in the shiprider agreements in particular. 

I do not have in front of me the list of all the countries that we 

have shiprider agreements with, but I think our Coast Guard’s 

presence in the region, cracking down on illegal fishing, especially 

through shiprider arrangements, helping countries in the region 

understand what is happening in their maritime domains and to 

defend their rights is probably the most important thing that we 

can do. But I could get back to you on those details. 

I would say, second, what we have done just across the board 

more broadly speaking is we have tried to increase partners’ mari-
36 

time domain awareness through the Indo-Pacific maritime domain 

awareness initiative. 

Again, the theory of the case is that when countries understand 

what is happening in their domains, they can better protect them. 

And then, third, I think the more we can do to publicize and 

shine a bright light on this activity. You are correct that we believe 

that the PRC is by far the country that carries out the vast majority of illegal fishing in ways that is really detrimental to the economies of the region. 

Senator YOUNG. Thank you. If you would kindly get whatever information you have. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir. 

Senator YOUNG. The list of shiprider agreements—— 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir. 

Senator YOUNG [continuing]. Would be a great start to the committee. We will take a look, please. 

And then by way of follow up, when the Chinese government 

does nothing to control its fishing fleets engaged in illegal fishing, 

maybe you can tell us how does the U.S. Government differentiate 

our adherence to international conventions on fishing and maritime 

boundaries? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. I am sorry, Senator. I did not catch the last 

part. My apologies. 

Senator YOUNG. When they respond—when they do absolutely 

nothing to control—— 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir. 

Senator YOUNG [continuing]. The fishing fleets that are engaged 

in this sort of illegal fishing, does that make it difficult to follow 

international conventions on fishing and maritime boundaries? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir, I understand. 

Yes, sir. So I really appreciate your question. I think there are 

two challenges. 

Yes, there is shiprider agreements and our other actions to try 

to help countries to control their maritime domains, and then there 

are also waters on the open sea that are overfished and over utilized in ways, again, that is detrimental to the region. 

So our effort there is, one, through shining a bright light on 

these issues, and again, second, trying to build the capacity of partners in the region to understand that in addition to our own operations. 

Senator YOUNG. Thank you. 

So staying on this topic, the Coast Guard is currently analyzing 

what resources they require to increase their presence and increase 

their operational tempo in the Western Pacific. 

This follows a directive that I secured in the recent Coast Guard 

authorization, and these findings should become available and reported to Congress and the State Department as we hit the end of 

this year. 

So can I have your commitment to review those findings as soon 

as they become available? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Absolutely, Senator, and can I say Coast 

Guard leadership in the Pacific has been absolutely tremendous? 

And when we did the second Pacific Island summit, one of the most 

effective events we had was at Coast Guard headquarters, and I 
37 

think our Pacific Island partners were really encouraged and impressed by the resources and capabilities we can bring to bear. 

Senator YOUNG. Thank you. We will look forward to those findings and also any counsel you might have about how this committee can be helpful and informed by those findings, doing whatever is needed to empower State and our Coast Guard to help address illegal fishing activities moving forward. 

Thank you so much, Chairman. 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator KAINE. Senator Van Hollen. 

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all 

of you for your testimony and your service, and I just want to say 

amen to Senator Young’s questions regarding maritime security 

and protecting fisheries. 

And I know a lot has been covered in this hearing already, and 

I just want to stress, and I know you all know this, that when we 

are dealing with China’s influence in the Pacific Island region, it 

cannot just all be no, do not work with China. In fact, quite the 

opposite. 

We need to provide a better alternative both in terms of a vision 

of the future but also material support. You cannot beat something 

with nothing. And again, I want to just encourage all of you to continue to use all the tools at our disposal—economic tools, whether 

the DFC or other agencies, to put forward proposals that support 

people in this region. 

Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I do have a specific question 

about Kiribati, and I know it has been referenced the—China’s police presence there. I also know there is an IT component, I understand, to their involvement. 

So one question is what are we doing to counter PRC influence 

in Kiribati, but the larger question is how can we anticipate these 

kind of challenges and not play whack-a-mole after they come up? 

In other words, how can we be proactive rather than just reactive? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, thank you. Fantastic question, really, 

and thank you for your leadership and support. 

I think the number one thing that we need to do is to be present, 

to be active in all of these countries, and to, as you said, offer alternatives. Specifically in the case of Kiribati our accredited Ambassador who is a resident in Fiji, Marie Damour, who I understand 

is visiting right now, again, to hear the needs of our friends in 

Kiribati and to determine the best way forward. 

I know our friends at the Millennium Challenge Corporation 

have a threshold compact of about $30 million, if I remember correctly, again, focused on education and building local capacity. 

I mentioned a little while earlier some of the work we are doing 

together with friends in Australia to refurbish the Canton wharf 

and another wharf there. 

And also we are following up on the agreement we have from 

Kiribati leadership to establish a U.S. embassy in Kiribati as well. 

So getting that permanent presence on the ground, working on all 

those alternatives from infrastructure to other areas across the 

board I think that is the best way. 
38 

Both with our friends in Kiribati but across the board in the Pacific we have to be present, we have to be active, and we have to 

bring alternatives to the table. We think our strategy is designed 

to do just that. 

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I appreciate that. In terms of the diplomatic presence, as you say, if we are not there on the ground, we 

are not going to be in the game, cannot offer proposals or engage. 

Can you just give a brief update on how we have expanded our 

diplomatic presence in the region and what more we need to do? 

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Thank you, Senator. 

We have identified four countries in which we want to establish 

new embassies. We have successfully done so in the Solomon Islands and in Tonga. We will be open imminently in Vanuatu, and 

then, as I said, we are working diligently to follow up on Kiribati 

and will need parliamentary approval for that. But we are working 

actively on that. 

In each instance of the two new embassies we have opened thus 

far, we opened an immediate presence very quickly, and now we 

are moving to build out that staff, build out the permanent facilities—the long term facilities in which our staff will be there, and 

then we are also working on the personnel side. 

To get opened quickly we basically had to find temporary duty 

personnel to get boots on the ground and plant our flag, and now 

we are following up with the full time staff and also together with 

this committee we hope to be nominating ambassadors to these 

new countries as well. 

But as you said, there is no substitute for presence, and I am 

confident we will be present in these four countries, and then we 

will build out that presence. I think it will make a huge difference 

and already is in the Solomons and Tonga. 

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Very good. Thank you. 

And I do have one last question on the implementation of COFA 

for you, Dr. Ratner. I know that Senator Duckworth raised this 

issue, and I think her focus with some of the work that AID is 

doing in the aftermath of passing funding for the Compacts of Free 

Association. 

On the defense side what kind of measures are you taking now 

that that has passed? 

Mr. RATNER. Senator, we obviously have a range of activities associated in terms of exercises and operations rotating through the 

compact states. In terms of major investments underway, we have 

a couple specific major posture initiatives there and posture sites. 

In RMI, Republic of Marshall Islands, hosts the Ronald Reagan 

Ballistic Missile Testing Site at U.S. Army garrison on Kwajalein, 

which is a really important location as it relates to space operations and space situational awareness. 

And then, of course, we have the TACMOR radar—the Tactical 

Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar—in Palau, which is going to 

give the department and the U.S. military unprecedented situational awareness over a huge swath of the Pacific. So really important posture initiatives underway there. 

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I appreciate it. Thank you. 

Thank you all. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
39 

Senator KAINE. We have been informed that Senator Cruz is on 

his way, and I am going to give him 2 minutes. So play quietly at 

your desks, and if he is here within 2 minutes then he will be up 

next, and then we will conclude the hearing. And if he is not, I will 

gavel us to a close. 

But I will say while we are waiting and those 2 minutes are running, we had an Armed Services Committee hearing right before 

this and two of the Armed Services members, Senator Ernst and 

Senator Hirono, had been quite involved in the CONVENE Act, 

which was very much focused on security agreements with the 

COFA nations. 

I was a co-sponsor of that. 

Senator Van Hollen, I think you were as well, and that CONVENE Act was largely included in the NDAA and when I told Senator Hirono that I was coming up to this hearing that was focusing 

upon the Pacific Islands and strategy and that it was to my recollection the first time that we have had a hearing on this topic in 

this committee during the time I have been on it, Senator Hirono 

was very glad and said it is about time. 

So there were some happy Armed Services Committee members 

knowing that this hearing was happening today, too. 

And the ranking member and I will now patiently wait for now— 

I think it is 62 seconds now—to see if Senator Cruz arrives. 

[Pause.] 

Senator KAINE. As we are counting down I will do the homework, 

which is there may be members of the committee that want to submit questions in writing, including Senator Cruz. 

We will keep the record of the hearing open until the close of 

business on Friday, March 15. If members do submit questions we 

would encourage you to respond promptly and thoroughly. 

There is a vote ongoing on the Senate floor right now and an important one with respect to our nominee to be ambassador to 

Haiti—a very timely one. And with that, though, and with the concurrence of the ranking member—— 

Senator RISCH. Is your guy coming? OK. He is in this building. 

Senator KAINE. OK. 

With the concurrence of the ranking member we will be slightly 

graceful to a colleague who is said to be in the building, so and we 

will wait just a bit longer. 

Mr. RATNER. Senator Kaine, do you have any more AUKUS jokes 

while we are waiting? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KAINE. I thought that story would be appreciated. It is 

a great initiative, and good work moving out on it so quickly. 

Mr. RATNER. Yes. Thank you so much for your support on that. 

That legislation was really critical. 

Senator KAINE. Australian sailors training with in the nuclear 

power program in South Carolina with U.S. sailors. To take a nation that only has—the only nuclear in Australia is medical isotopes, and to go from that to the ability to operate, maintain, and 

eventually build nuclear subs, the most complex items manufactured on the planet Earth, that is a lot of work. But it is going to 

be great work to be able to do together. 
40 

With that, I am going to decide that the hearing is now to be adjourned. 

With the thanks of the committee for your appearance we adjourn, and please do follow up on questions if they are submitted. 

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF MR. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

TOPIC: PRC INFLUENCE

There is rising concern among some Pacific Island nations regarding the growing 

influence of the PRC in the region. We’ve seen the PRC use economic inducements, 

threats and economic coercion, disinformation, and old-fashioned corruption in attempts to expand its foothold. Beijing’s influence extends beyond infrastructure 

projects and security agreements to PRC state engagement in the local media and 

information space. 

Question. Given very small media markets and limited journalistic capacity in the 

Pacific Islands region, what is the United States doing to promote a strong and professional media? How do our efforts compare to those of our strategic adversaries? 

Answer. The United States supports a free media in the Pacific Islands through 

access to credible sources of news, journalism, and media training opportunities, 

and by creating strong communities of practice. The State Department provides Pacific Islands journalists regular access to visiting U.S. officials and selects journalists to participate in media-focused exchange programs and trainings. 

The United States is working to build capacity through programs including 

USAID’s PROJECT Governance, which has provided financial and investigative 

journalism training for Pacific Islands reporters and media literacy courses for civil 

society organizations and academia. 

Through the Young Pacific Leaders’ initiative, the State Department offers workshops and other engagements for emerging Pacific leaders on a variety of civic leadership issues, including journalistic ethic and media literacy. 

Last year, the State Department launched the Digital Communication Network 

(DCN) in EAP that focuses on building networks within the Pacific Islands. The 

DCN aims to create a lasting impact by empowering a new generation of global 

voices to promote ideas in the digital space. 

The State Department also recently launched an initiative intending to strengthen balanced media environments in the Indo-Pacific. It will aim to provide free independent wire content to local media outlets and to build their capacity through 

training, equipment provision, mentoring, and network building. The goal of this 

program is to strengthen local media outlet resilience as to ensure that the sources 

available to them are diverse and accurate. 

Question. How are we countering the PRC’s growing influence in Pacific Island 

media markets? What more can we be doing to implement a pro-active public diplomacy strategy in the region? 

Answer. In addition to the activities described above to promote a free media in 

the Pacific Islands through access to credible sources of news, journalism, and 

media training opportunities, and by creating strong communities of practice, the 

State Department has doubled its number of academic exchange opportunities for 

Pacific Islands countries, including the U.S. South Pacific Scholarship Program, Fulbright, and the Global Undergraduate Exchange Program. We are working closely 

with interagency partners to coordinate messaging and promote the full breadth of 

USG assistance programming and other activities in the Pacific Islands region, including through human interest stories that will connect with communities across 

the Pacific. 

TOPIC: INFORMATION SECURITY

Outlets such as Radio Free Asia are attempting to expand its capacity to cover 

events in Pacific Island countries for their populations. 

Question. How important is the information space in the Pacific Islands region, 

and what is the Administration doing to support access to reliable, timely journalism and news in these places where the PRC is exerting its influence? 
41 

Answer. The information space is extremely important in the Pacific Islands region. The United States is working to build capacity through programs including 

USAID’s PROJECT Governance, through which we have provided financial and investigative journalism trainings in-region for Pacific Islands reporters in addition to 

media literacy courses for civil society organizations and academia. 

Last year, the State Department launched the Digital Communication Network 

(DCN) in EAP that focuses on building networks within the Pacific Islands. The 

DCN aims to create a lasting impact by empowering a new generation of global 

voices to promote ideas in the digital space. Since its establishment in 2015, the 

DCN has created a global network of over 10,000 digital communicators and 

influencers working together to provide accurate and authentic reporting, strengthen independent journalism, support civil society, and advance democratic values. 

The State Department also recently launched an initiative intended to strengthen 

balanced media environments in the Indo-Pacific. It will aim to provide free independent wire content to local media outlets and to build their capacity through 

training, equipment provision, and mentoring/network building. The goal of this program is to strengthen local media outlet resilience and make sure that the sources 

available to them are diverse and accurate. 

TOPIC: INCREASING U.S. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

The Administration has been committed to increasing our diplomatic presence in 

the region, including opening embassies in the Solomon Islands and Tonga, and is 

considering additional locations globally. However, the Department is not practiced 

at opening new embassies, and particularly not in small island states. As a result, 

it’s taken far too long for us to establish a presence in Honiara and Nuku’alofa. The 

template for U.S. embassies are large and medium sized embassies with state-ofthe-art security standards and room for a significant interagency compliment—not 

agile and quick-to-open ‘‘micro-missions.’’ 

Question. For U.S. interests in the Pacific Islands region, what is most important? 

To what do you attribute the delays in establishing the two new missions in the 

Pacific Islands region? Do we need to establish small traditional embassy, or is a 

‘‘micro-mission’’ approach more appropriate? 

Answer. Maintaining a robust and agile diplomatic presence and reinforcing U.S. 

credibility by living up to our commitments are most important in the Pacific Islands region. Enacting COFA-related legislation this year was a significant milestone in advancing these goals. EAP’s approach to the Pacific Islands region is guided by the National Security Strategy, Indo-Pacific Strategy and Pacific Partnership 

Strategy, the first U.S. strategy for the Pacific Islands. 

We opened two new missions in 2023: Embassy Honiara in January and Embassy 

Nuku’alofa in May. Our missions in Honiara and Nuku’alofa opened less than 1 

year after announcing our plans to open them. Consistent with the objectives of 

SECCA 2022, the Department rapidly processed SECCA waivers and OSPB exceptions to the maximum extent possible, enabling the opening of the missions and ensuring limited staff, per the OSPB exceptions, work from a safe and secure facility 

until the Department completes construction on longer-term lease-fit-out facilities. 

Although the Department has already established its presence in Honiara and 

Nuku’alofa under the existing opening process, we are developing the Micro Mission 

operating framework as a new embassy designation for select countries where the 

Department does not yet have an Embassy presence or where we envision the 

longer-term presence will remain small. The Micro Mission model has the potential 

to address some concerns around staff workload at small new missions. The Department is still developing the concept and has not implemented a Micro Mission model 

but will consider it for future missions. 

Question. What existing authorities is the Department exercising to accelerate the 

expansion of U.S. diplomatic personnel in the region? What additional authorities 

are needed? 

Answer. The Department has used SECCA 2022 authorities in opening new posts 

in Honiara, Solomon Islands, and Nuku’alofa, Tonga. As part of the ongoing implementation process, the Department also streamlined the SECCA waiver process, reducing approval times to 60–90 days. Seventeen SECCA waivers were processed in 

2023, more than any other year. An additional five have been processed as of February 2024. 

The Department used tools such as the streamlined SECCA waiver process to 

open embassies in Honiara and Nuku’alofa, putting staff on the ground quickly and 

safely. We are working toward the same approach for future embassy Port Vila, 

Vanuatu, which we plan to open later this year. 
42 

Question. What can we learn from your experience opening embassies in the Pacific Islands that can be applied to small missions being contemplated in other regions, such as South Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere? 

Answer. The Department continued to refine and expedite its new post opening 

process using lessons learned and best practices. This includes an accelerated site 

selection process, phased opening, SECCA 2022 flexibilities, and increased coordination with host governments. The Department is concurrently developing a new 

model (Micro Missions) for rapidly establishing smaller embassies, incorporating lessons learned from the recent new post openings in the Pacific Islands. 

TOPIC: PEACE CORPS

The U.S. has historically had a number of Peace Corps programs in the Pacific 

Islands, but that number has dwindled over the years for a variety of reasons. When 

I hear from our Ambassadors in the field, they all say that one of the issues our 

partners most frequently raise is to bring the Peace Corps back to their country. 

Question. What are our plans for expanding Peace Corps presence in the islands? 

What impediments currently exist to realizing these goals and what is State and 

the Peace Corps doing to work through them so that we can field volunteers? 

Answer. The Peace Corps currently operates posts in 13 countries in the Indo-Pacific: Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Samoa, Sri Lanka, 

Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Vietnam, and is in the process of reestablishing a presence in Palau, which will be supported by the Peace Corps/Philippines post. The Peace Corps recently welcomed back Volunteers to service in Fiji, 

Samoa, and Tonga and anticipates a return to Vanuatu later this year and to Palau 

in 2025. 

The Peace Corps has received many invitations to initiate or resume Peace Corps 

programming. Placing Peace Corps Volunteers in remote Pacific islands is both expensive and challenging. The Peace Corps considers invitations from host countries 

on an individual basis in the context of overall demand, conditions on the ground, 

and agency resources. There is significant demand from around the world for Peace 

Corps Volunteers, particularly in the field of English-language instruction, given the 

youth bulge. 

Acknowledging these challenges, the Peace Corps is exploring innovative ways to 

support countries around the world. The agency launched a Virtual Service Pilot 

(VSP), in which participants donate their time to provide virtual support to counterparts around the world. Even as Volunteers return to in-person service, the VSP has 

proven to be very successful, particularly in remote regions such as the Indo Pacific. 

In addition, last year the Peace Corps launched the Blue Pacific Youth Initiative, 

a collaborative, pan-Pacific network of programs and activities that mobilize young 

leaders in support of environmental resilience. 

The Peace Corps is a vital part of building strong people-to-people connections between the United States and the Pacific Islands. The agency has and continues to 

contribute to capacity building, increasing opportunities for youth, and supporting 

countries around the world to innovate and adapt to our much-changed world. 

TOPIC: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY/PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The Biden Administration has significantly increased attention to and investment 

in the Pacific Islands, including through the announcement of an annual fellowship 

called the U.S.-Pacific Institute for Rising Leaders. Because of our history, shared 

values, and strong diaspora ties, we get a disproportionate return on our people-topeople investments. 

Question. Given the remote and distributed nature of the Pacific Islands region, 

what are the most effective strategies for doing public diplomacy outreach? 

Answer. Because of our history, shared values, and strong diaspora ties, the 

United States benefits tremendously from its people-to-people programs. The State 

Department is working to increase its physical in-person presence and its number 

of exchange and cultural program offerings across the Pacific Islands region. The 

United States has doubled the number of academic exchange opportunities for Pacific Islands countries, including the U.S. South Pacific Scholarship Program, Fulbright, and the Global Undergraduate Exchange Program. 

Under the Young Pacific Leaders’ (YPL) initiative, the State Department has fostered new collaborations between the Pacific Islands and the United States by working with a growing alumni network. The YPL program connects the North Pacific— 

Palau, Guam, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, the 

Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Marshall Islands—to the South 

Pacific, where the United States has historically had a smaller physical presence. 
43 

YPL alumni have pioneered public diplomacy programs in areas where the United 

States lacks diplomatic presence. With additional funding, the Department could 

grow this network and establish a YPL Regional Think Tank for greater alumni engagement in addition to an annual YPL train-the-trainer program for alumni to 

maximize their impact in the region. 

The YPL brand is well-recognized in the region. Other governments, regional organizations, and private sector entities have approached YPL alumni for their expertise, knowledge, skills, and connections. Co-branding YPL with other U.S. Pacific 

programs and fellowships could enhance its reach and impact. Current co-branding 

opportunities include Oceania Professional Fellows Program, U.S.-Pacific Institute 

for Rising Leaders Fellowship (Johns Hopkins), Resilient Pacific Islands Leaders 

Fellowship (East-West Center), Tourism Professional Fellows (East-West Center), 

Pacific Islands Media Initiatives (East-West Center), Blue Pacific Youth Initiative 

(Peace Corps), SUSI, and Fulbright. 

Question. What more can we be doing to implement a proactive public diplomacy 

strategy in the region? 

Answer. We are working to establish Public Affairs Officer positions at each of 

our new embassies across the Pacific. The Public Affairs Officer for Honiara, Solomon Islands arrives in April 2024, and others are scheduled to arrive in the coming 

months. We are working closely with interagency partners to coordinate messaging 

and promote the full breadth of U.S. assistance programming and other activities 

in the Pacific Islands region, including, through human interest stories that will 

connect with communities across the Pacific. 

TOPIC: U.S. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE TOOLS IN THE PACIFIC

One of the most challenging aspects of working in the Pacific Island region is that 

is that, with a few notable exceptions, it is very challenging to incentivize U.S. investment in the region due to the distance, size and scale of the economies. There 

are challenges with cyber and digital connectivity, challenges with access to banking 

and finance, and challenges related to construction capacity and land availability. 

The PRC is active in these economies, but we have not figured out how to 

incentivize U.S. private sector investment. 

Question. As we look to reauthorize the Development Finance Corporation this 

year, how should we be thinking about encouraging finance and investment in the 

Pacific Islands region? In addition to the U.S. private sector, what more could we 

be doing to catalyze the private sectors of U.S. partners and allies? 

Answer. Investments made by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation underscore that the private sector, and not only PRC state-owned enterprises, can finance the world’s infrastructure needs as DFC provides a quality-based 

alternative to PRC financing. We are directing U.S. assistance to improve the investment environment for the private sector so that we can advance DFC’s investment capabilities across the Pacific. Currently, DFC’s investments have primarily 

been in Papua New Guinea, the region’s largest market, but DFC is working to expand its reach across the region, especially through DFC’s and USAID’s newly 

launched Microfinance Facility for the Pacific Islands and by utilizing partnerships 

with Australia, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan to identify co-investment opportunities. 

Additional authorities are needed for DFC to expand support for strategic private 

sector investment projects that, due to distance, size, or other barriers, cannot attract commercial interest in the region. The State Department also encourages Congress to consider urgent short-term authorities, including allowing development finance loans under certain conditions to support public infrastructure. We encourage 

Congress to consider modifying DFC country eligibility; for example, Palau and 

Nauru have gone in and out of the World Bank income classification in recent years 

due largely to their small population size (10–15,000 people), but the ‘‘high income’’ 

label does not reflect their actual level of development or government capacity. 

RESPONSES OF MR. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

It is clear that the Department needs to streamline and simplify the process for 

opening new embassies. We need people on the ground quickly, but also with the 

tools they need to get in the game. 

Question. Do you support an ‘‘embassy in a box’’ concept for small, remote posts? 

This would support new embassies regionally and waive certain processes and procedures to prevent small posts from being hamstrung by bureaucracy. 
44 

Answer. EAP fully supports exploring a broad spectrum of presence alternatives 

for small posts in remote locations. EAP also endorses initiatives to support embassies regionally and waive certain processes and procedures so that our people can 

arrive on the ground quickly and follow through on top U.S. foreign policy goals. 

Question. What are you doing to clear the red tape, so we don’t lose more ground 

to the Chinese? 

Answer. EAP is strategically shifting all post operational management responsibilities for new posts to the Manila Regional Support Service (MRSS). This shift 

in responsibilities enables diplomats based in these new posts to focus on competing 

with the PRC. The operational management responsibilities encompass functions 

such as human resources, financial systems, information systems, and general services (housing, vehicles and transportation, travel, warehouse management, and supplies). Currently, MRSS is supporting all the new embassies, and all management 

support will fully transfer to MRSS by September 30. 

Question. How is your bureau supporting getting our diplomats on the ground as 

soon as possible? 

Answer. Currently, the newly established embassies in Solomon Islands and 

Tonga have four diplomats on the ground—Solomon Islands have two diplomats on 

long-term temporary duty (TDY), and Tonga has one diplomat on long-term TDY 

and another who is the first U.S. Direct Hire assigned to Tonga. By the summer 

of 2024, Solomon Islands will have three U.S. Direct Hires on the ground and Tonga 

will have two. Among the three is the Public Affairs Officer, who is scheduled to 

arrive in Solomon Islands as early as next month, April. 

For future embassies in Vanuatu and Kiribati, EAP has been proactive in both 

sending long-term TDYers and staging U.S. Direct Hires in neighboring countries. 

For Vanuatu, there are currently two long-term TDYers. Additionally, one U.S. Direct Hire will be based in Papua New Guinea. As soon as the embassy in Vanuatu 

is opened, this person will be deployed to Vanuatu. For Kiribati, one U.S. Direct 

Hire is based in Fiji, and another will arrive this summer. As soon as the embassy 

in Kiribati is opened, both will be deployed to Kiribati. 

Question. Is EAP having any trouble attracting diplomats to these new posts? 

Answer. For this most recent bidding cycle, all seven available positions throughout the new posts were filled—three are for Solomon Islands, two are for Tonga, one 

is for Vanuatu, and one is for Kiribati. Those assigned to Vanuatu and Kiribati will 

stay in neighboring countries (Papua New Guinea and Fiji, respectively) until these 

embassies are opened. 

Among the seven are the Deputy Chief of Mission positions in Solomon Islands 

and Tonga. Each received four to five bidders. For the other five positions, which 

are mid-level, they also received multiple bidders. 

Question. What is EAP doing to support these new embassies so diplomats on the 

ground can focus on diplomacy and not bureaucracy? Please be specific. 

Answer. Manila Regional Support Service (MRSS) has made great strides in providing support for the new posts, ensuring that diplomats on the ground can focus 

on diplomacy. 

MRSS’s Human Resources (HR) section has already hired, onboarded, and is providing online training for 17 local staff in Solomon Islands and Tonga. MRSS H.R. 

is also in the process of advertising for local staff in Vanuatu. MRSS Financial Management section has already submitted the first budgets and financial targets for 

all the new posts. MRSS Information Systems has deployed Star Shield in Tonga 

and is preparing to deploy it to all the new posts to ensure connectivity to these 

far-flung posts and plans to purchase vehicles for all the new posts. 

TOPIC: ESTABLISHING NEW EMBASSIES

It is clear that the Department needs to streamline and simplify the process for 

opening new embassies. We need people on the ground quickly, but also with the 

tools they need to get in the game. 

My Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 (SECCA 

2022) provides State much-needed flexibilities to quickly stand up our overseas missions, which is especially useful in the Pacific Islands. 

Kiribati is only a 31⁄2 hour flight from Hawaii. Following Kiribati’s switch to recognize the PRC instead of Taiwan in 2019, the PRC has aggressively courted 

Kiribati elite, and Beijing is increasing security and police cooperation with 

Kiribati’s government. 
45 

Question. What is the status of PRC influence in Kiribati? Beyond getting permanent U.S. diplomats to Tarawa, what are we doing to provide a true alternative to 

China there? 

Answer. We continue to engage with the Government of Kiribati on our interest 

in opening a U.S. Embassy as a matter of priority. One U.S. Direct Hire in Embassy 

Suva is wholly dedicated to U.S.-Kiribati relations and travels to Kiribati regularly. 

This officer’s tireless work this February enabled the Coast Guard to conduct its 

first shiprider operation since 2017. 

We are also working to enhance our relationship with Kiribati through bilateral 

and multilateral cooperation on priority projects. Together with Australia and 

Japan, we are funding the East Micronesia Cable Project, which will support increased economic growth, drive development opportunities, and help improve living 

standards. At last year’s U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Summit, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Government of Kiribati signed a $29.1 million threshold 

program grant agreement to advance economic growth in Kiribati to promote safe, 

accessible, decent, and inclusive employment opportunities for Kiribati workers and 

empower youth. 

My Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 (SECCA 

2022) provides State much-needed flexibilities to quickly stand up our overseas missions, which is especially useful in the Pacific Islands. 

Question. Why hasn’t the Secretary followed the law and issued official guidance 

on implementing SECCA? Can you tell me exactly when we will see the Secretary’s 

guidance released? 

Answer. As part of its work toward full implementation of SECCA 2022, the Department issued interim implementation guidance in March 2023 that exempted 

posts rated low across the Security Environment Threat List (SETL) from SECCA 

setback-equivalence requirements and delegated authority to approve SECCA setback waivers for chanceries and consulates to the Under Secretary for Management, 

except for High Threat/High Risk posts. The Department remains committed to 

using the full spectrum of authorities afforded by SECCA 2022, to include establishing engineering equivalency design requirements to provide a commensurate 

level of blast protection at reduced setback distances. 

Question. How are you and the Department using SECCA to open embassies faster in the Pacific? 

Answer. To date, the Department has used SECCA 2022 authorities in opening 

new posts in Honiara, Solomon Islands; Troms, Norway; Victoria, Seychelles; and 

Nuku’alofa, Tonga. As part of the ongoing implementation process, the Department 

also streamlined the SECCA waiver process, reducing approval times to 60–90 days; 

in extremely urgent cases, such as Honiara and Nuku’alofa, approval was obtained 

within 35 days. Seventeen SECCA waivers were processed in 2023, more than any 

other year. An additional five have been processed as of February. 

The Department utilized tools such as the streamlined SECCA waiver process to 

open embassies in Honiara and Nuku’alofa prior to executing a lease fit out of the 

facilities, thus putting staff on the ground quickly and safely. We are working toward the same approach for Port Vila, Vanuatu. 

A key function of our new embassies in the Pacific Islands is to deepen U.S. ties 

with the people of those countries. But both Solomon Islands and Tonga lack consular services, meaning that people of those countries wishing to apply for a visa 

to travel to the U.S. need to go to other countries to do so—greatly increasing the 

frictions for business development, education exchange, and people-to-people connections. 

Question. When can the people of Solomon Islands and Tonga expect in-country 

consular services? 

Answer. We are committed to providing consular services as we continue to evaluate options to increase our presence and enhance services in Solomon Islands and 

Tonga, where we already provide periodic American Citizen Services. With multiple 

U.S. embassies opening in the Pacific Islands, the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Consular Affairs is evaluating how best to provide in-person nonimmigrant visa 

(NIV) services. We are committed to enhancing services, are actively exploring how 

best to do so, and have already begun offering in-country processing in Tonga for 

NIV applicants who qualify for interview waivers. 
46 

TOPIC: U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE FAS

Question. What kinds of U.S. assistance to support the development of National 

Security Councils in Micronesia and the Marshall Islands are being provided, as required under the CONVENE Act? 

Answer. The Department continues to engage closely with the governments of 

Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands on our interest in supporting them to stand up National Security Councils as entities that 

can help provide coordination and information sharing across a range of topics. Now 

that negotiations on most of the COFA-related agreements have been completed, we 

intend to prioritize this line of effort. 

Question. What support is State providing to the existing National Security Coordination office in Palau? 

Answer. The State Department supports Palau’s National Security Coordination 

office (NSCO) through the Global Defense Reform Program (GDRP), funded by the 

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Global Programs and Initiatives (PM/ 

GPI). In support of Palau’s National Security Strategy, this project aims to strengthen Palau’s maritime governance (including efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability) and improve maritime-related interagency coordination. Under GDRP, PM/ 

GPI sends an adviser to embed with the Department of Marine Law Enforcement. 

The Advisor works with NSCO, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) including the Office 

of the Attorney General, and the Bureau of Public Safety’s Division of Maritime Security & Fish and Wildlife Protection on the development and implementation of 

strategy and policies focused on maritime governance, maritime safety, maritime response and recovery, interagency cooperation and coordination, information sharing, 

and other objectives identified by the NSCO, the MOJ, and other maritime stakeholders. Since December 2020, the GDRP program has contributed to Palau’s increasing capability to detect and interdict illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing vessels, and detect illegal PRC undersea terrain and mineral surveying vessels. 

Among other things, the Advisor has developed a country action plan that will identify initiatives to strengthen Palau’s institutional capacity in maritime domain 

awareness. 

Topic: While the U.S. values its ties with all Pacific Islands, our relationships 

with the Freely Associated States are fundamentally different. Citizens from the 

FAS can live and work in the U.S. and serve in the U.S. military at very high rates. 

They also host U.S. troops and form part of our extended defense infrastructure. 

Now that we are shifting to implementation of the Compacts of Free Association, 

getting that right will be critical as we develop our ties with the FAS over the next 

20 years and seek to compete with an aggressive China. 

Question. How will State stand up the new Office of Freely Associated States? 

Answer. The Department of State has taken a number of measures to reflect the 

priority we place upon the relationship with Pacific Island nations writ large and 

with the Freely Associated States (FAS) specifically. The Office of Australia, New 

Zealand, and Pacific Affairs (ANP) within the Department’s Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs now has a Pacific bilateral team and a Pacific regional team to 

increase available resources that address this priority, which includes planning for 

the implementation of the latest Compact of Free Association-related agreements. 

ANP team members provide leadership including through membership on and staffing for the Joint Economic Management and Trust Fund Committees for the FSM 

and RMI, as well as the annual economic consultations with Palau. We intend to 

implement all the requirements in the Compact of Free Association Amendments 

Act of 2024, and the Department intends to focus resources and time to these issues. 

Question. What will State do to ensure that the FAS are given the dedicated attention they deserve, separate from our broader engagement with the Pacific Island 

Forum and other Pacific Island states? 

Answer. The United States remains strongly committed to the Compacts of Free 

Association (COFA) and related agreements with the Freely Associated States of the 

Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. 

In 2023, we finalized new Compact-related agreements with all three countries, 

which are key to maintaining the stability and prosperity of our closest Pacific Island neighbors and partners. I want to thank Congress for passing the associated 

funding, which demonstrates our commitment to the region and our ability to follow 

through on what we promise. 
47 

Extending Compact-related assistance is a critical component of the Administration’s Pacific Partnership, Indo-Pacific, and National Security Strategies. The 20- 

year duration and commitment of mandatory funding is reflective of our steadfast 

commitment to these strategically important friends and partners. 

Our focus is on bringing these new agreements into force and providing the Compact-related assistance, including through continuing efforts in the office of Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Islands in the EAP bureau as well as through the 

Interagency Working Group on the Freely Associated States. We continue to engage 

regularly and at a high-level with the Freely Associated States to demonstrate our 

longstanding commitment. 

TOPIC: ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT

Question. What are 2–3 concrete economic projects we are currently spearheading 

in the Pacific Islands, and what tangible effects are those projects having? 

Answer. We are working with a growing number of trusted likeminded government and private sector partners on undersea cable projects to provide Pacific Islands with vital and secure connectivity and digital infrastructure. These initiatives, 

which will have outsized economic benefits around the Pacific but especially in countries being connected to high-speed Internet for the first time, have demonstrated 

to our Pacific Islands partners that we can be responsive to their needs and provide 

a true alternative to the PRC. 

We are working with Australia to jointly fund port refurbishments in Kiribati, including Kanton Island. The projects will unlock key sources of economic growth for 

Kiribati and advance strategic connectivity with Kiribati’s trading neighbors. 

The United States is working to expand economic engagement in Tuvalu in areas 

that respond to key Pacific priorities, as identified by the islands themselves. We 

are working to help Tuvalu access quality internet infrastructure, develop community-level solutions to rising domestic fuel costs, and increase its resilience to economic coercion and sea-level rise. 

Fundamentally, we have proven that we can coordinate and pool funding with allies, likeminded partners, and private sector partners to provide a strong alternative 

to the PRC in the infrastructure space. 

Question. Which U.S. Government economic agencies are the most active in the 

Pacific Islands, other than State and USAID? 

Answer. The United States has adopted a whole-of-government approach to expand our influence in the Pacific Islands. The Departments of Treasury, Commerce, 

Transportation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Development Finance Cooperation, among others, have all made recent and important contributions 

to our Pacific Partnership Strategy. 

Recent contributions from USTDA, in particular, have accelerated U.S. assistance 

for infrastructure projects. As we work to secure additional funding for projects, 

USTDA’s project preparation work has allowed us to identify projects and take initial steps early in the development so that we can later find ways to support development of those projects with the private sector, pool funding with partners, or 

transfer the project to a trusted partner. 

Apart from economic agencies, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and DOD are also very 

active in the region. For example, USCG has shiprider agreements with 12 Pacific 

Islands countries. DOD engages in a variety of ways, most notably in the Freely Associated States, conducts training exercises with militaries in the region, and implements the State Partnership Program through the National Guard. 

Question. Are there any needed changes in authorities that would make it easier 

for the United States to increase economic and commercial engagement in the Pacific Islands? 

Answer. The mandate of the Development Finance Cooperation and our Export 

Import Bank underscore that only the private sector, and not PRC state-owned enterprises, will be able to finance the world’s infrastructure needs. We are directing 

U.S. assistance to improve the investment environment for the private sector so that 

we can deploy DFC and EXIM in additional markets in the Pacific. At present, DFC 

and EXIM assistance has primarily been in Papua New Guinea, the region’s largest 

market. 

However, additional authorities are needed to expand support for strategic economic projects that, due to distance, size, or other barriers, cannot attract commercial interest. The President’s fiscal year 2025 Out Compete China proposal requests 

the authorities and resources required to achieve vital national security interests. 

We also encourage Congress to consider urgent short-term authorities, including al-
48 

lowing development finance loans under certain conditions to support public infrastructure. Finally, we encourage Congress to consider expanding DFC eligibility to 

high income Pacific Islands countries; Palau and Nauru have gone in and out of this 

classification in recent years due largely to their small population size (10–15,000 

people), but the ‘‘high income’’ label does not reflect their actual level of development or government capacity. 

TOPIC: PRC POLICING PRESENCE

Question. Which policing agreements between the PRC and Pacific Island nations 

are of greatest concern to the United States, and why? 

Answer. We are concerned about the potential implications that security agreements, including on policing, with the PRC may have on the sovereignty and autonomy of Pacific Islands nations. 

This is due to the vague, opaque nature of such agreements, including the absence 

of knowing what was promised by supported governments, in exchange for PRC support. Additionally, such agreements allow for the PRC to increase its security and 

surveillance capabilities in countries where it has agreements, which actively facilitates PRC government efforts to repress members of ethnic and religious minority 

groups. Furthermore, since only three Pacific Islands countries have military forces, 

policing agreements with the PRC may serve as an entry point for the eventual establishment of dual-use facilities that would threaten U.S. national security. We do 

not believe importing PRC security forces or policing methods will help any Pacific 

Islands country, and our assistance provides an alternative. I would be happy to discuss potential security concerns pertaining to the PRC and specific countries in a 

classified setting. 

Question. Please provide a full accounting of all judicial and law enforcement 

training provided by the Department of State over the previous 3 fiscal years. 

Please include: Numbers broken down by Pacific Island country; illustrative examples of judicial and law enforcement training and their impact; any relevance to 

countering PRC inroads via policing agreements, if applicable. 

Answer. In the last 3 years, the Department of State has obligated over $34 million in INCLE-funded assistance to the judicial and law enforcement sectors across 

13 Pacific Islands countries. Most INCLE programs in the Pacific are regional efforts that cover multiple countries, allowing our programs to be more efficient and 

effective. Papua New Guinea received more than $9.1 million overall in bilateral 

INCLE programs over the last 3 years, the largest share among the Pacific Islands, 

due mainly to its status as a priority country identified in the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability under the Global Fragility Act. The rest of the 

Pacific Islands benefit from an overall $23 million in regional INCLE projects to advance the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which amounts to an average of $1.7 million per 

country over 3 years. 

An illustrative example includes U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) led trainings on maritime law enforcement that cover 13 Pacific Islands countries. Enabled by mobile 

training teams (MTT), funded by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (INL), this assistance has improved maintenance and operations of maritime assets, as well as increased enforcement capabilities, most notably when trainings are paired with USCG shiprider operations. One recent MTT in 

Vanuatu involved the successful boarding of several PRC-linked fishing vessels suspected of engaging in illegal, unregulated, or unreported fishing in February 2024. 

The USCG training and subsequent shiprider operations demonstrated to niVanuatu officials the severity of the PRC’s encroachment and may strengthen 

Vanuatu’s reported intent to remove long-term PRC police presence seeking to establish agreements with the Vanuatu Police Force. 

Question. Has the Department of State, in conjunction with other partners, considered providing policing services in any Pacific Island countries? 

Answer. The United States supports law enforcement training and capacity building programs in several Pacific Islands countries, as detailed above. Many such programs are coordinated closely with our likeminded partners and with regional security organizations. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), in general, does not utilize INCLE funding to directly fund police operations, salaries or associated services. INL-provided training 

and provision of equipment leads to improved police capacity and more efficient police operations, thereby enabling more sustainable and effective method of strengthening police, along with enhanced interoperability with U.S. Federal law enforcement and the police forces of likeminded partners. 
49 

Question. Since fall-out from the unrest in the Solomon Islands in 2022, have 

partners such as Australia and New Zealand been providing any policing services? 

Are there other nations that would be better placed to do so? 

Answer. The Solomon Islands International Assistance Force, comprised of police 

from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea, have been committed 

security partners on policing with Solomon Islands. They will stay in Honiara to assist with security until a prime minister is elected and a government is formed. Australia and New Zealand also have long-term policing capacity building programs in 

Solomon Islands. 

Question. Other than the public statements by Deputy Secretary Verma and others, how is the United States engaging with Papua New Guinea in light of news 

that China has offered a policing agreement to them? 

Answer. The United States has consulted with the government in Papua New 

Guinea to identify opportunities to pursue under the Defense Cooperation Agreement and shiprider agreement. Following a successful initial engagement in 2023 

to assess unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination hazards, the United States is 

facilitating Papua New Guinea’s request for more persistent conventional weapons 

destruction (CWD) programming to address UXO priorities and reduce illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Additionally, INL is actively negotiating 

a bilateral Letter of Agreement with the Government of Papua New Guinea, which 

would expand law enforcement and security assistance in PNG and establish an 

INL section at the U.S. Embassy in Port Moresby. 

RESPONSES OF MR. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

TOPIC: NAURU RECOGNITION OF CHINA

In January, Nauru switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, a 

significant move as Taiwan’s remaining allies in the Pacific now include the Marshall Islands and Palau. This diplomatic realignment underscores the intensifying 

competition between Taipei and Beijing for regional support and influence. In light 

of these developments, it becomes imperative to examine the implications of Nauru’s 

decision on the broader strategic objectives of the United States in the Indo-Pacific. 

Question. How does Nauru’s diplomatic shift from recognizing Taiwan to China 

affect the broader strategic interests of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, 

and what steps is the Administration taking to mitigate challenges? 

Answer.. The opaque inducements that Beijing offers to countries to switch diplomatic ties are extremely concerning. These deals are highly transactional in nature 

and are designed to benefit the PRC first and foremost. The PRC often makes promises in exchange for diplomatic relations that ultimately remain unfulfilled. Moreover, it is in the U.S. interest to encourage more countries to work closely with Taiwan because it is a force for good in the world. 

The United States offers alternatives consistent with Pacific Islands countries 

governments’ national priorities and the Pacific Island Forum’s 2050 Strategy for a 

Blue Pacific Continent. We are listening to the region and, working with our 

likeminded partners, responding to their asks. 

Question. Given the Compacts of Free Association with countries like the Marshall Islands and Palau, what measures is the Administration implementing to ensure the security and stability of these nations while safeguarding U.S. interests in 

the region? 

Answer. The United States remains strongly committed to the Compacts of Free 

Association and related agreements with the Federated States of Micronesia, the 

Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. 

For decades, our relationships with the Freely Associated States (FAS) have contributed to a secure, stable, and prosperous Pacific. Under the terms of the Compacts, we have full responsibility and authority for security and defense matters in 

or related to these three countries. 

In 2023, we finalized new Compact-related agreements with all three FAS, which 

are key to maintaining the stability and prosperity of our closest Pacific Island 

neighbors and partners. The 20-year duration and commitment of mandatory funding is reflective of our steadfast commitment to these strategically important friends 

and partners. 
50 

Question.. How can the United States address the financial vulnerabilities that is 

forcing Pacific islands to deepen relations with the PRC, especially with China being 

a main trading partner and source of investment and infrastructure for countries 

throughout the region? 

Answer. The United States is stepping up its efforts to help meet the most pressing infrastructural and economic challenges in the Pacific. Our efforts support increased economic growth, drive opportunities, and help to improve living standards. 

For example, we are enhancing secure, resilient digital connectivity, including 

through working with likeminded partners to support new undersea cables, working 

with private sector partners including Google and APTelecom. In the Freely Associated States, we provide annual grants for key infrastructure, including for schools 

and hospitals. Through the Pacific Islands Infrastructure Initiative, the U.S. Trade 

and Development Agency is supporting project preparation for a range of regional 

infrastructure and development projects. 

We are also supporting enabling environments and technical assistance on infrastructure for economic development. Through the U.S. government’s contribution to 

the IMF’s Pacific Technical Assistance Center, we are promoting macrofinancial stability and capacity, strengthening the resilience of Pacific Islands economies against 

economic shocks, and promoting inclusive growth. The United States also recently 

renewed our commitment to provide funding in connection with the Pacific Region 

Infrastructure Facility (PRIF), which provides regional technical assistance and capability building to support climate-resilient infrastructure development. 

TOPIC: CHINA-SOLOMON ISLANDS SECURITY AGREEMENT

In March 2022, the Solomon Islands and China signed a security agreement, ostensibly aiming in part to address ‘‘internal threats,’’ including protecting Chineseowned businesses in the country. In 2023, the two countries signed a deal on police 

cooperation as part of their comprehensive strategic partnership. 

Question. What tools is the United States utilizing to encourage the Solomon Islands’ commitment to continue working with the U.S. and Australia as security 

partners? 

Answer. The United States has significantly increased its engagement with Solomon Islands in recent years and continues to do so. We opened a new embassy in 

Honiara in January 2023 and are working to increase its staffing and grow its footprint in Solomon Islands. We have also engaged at a high level with the Government of Solomon Islands at the 2022 and 2023 U.S.-PIF Summits in Washington, 

DC, and in the region in 2023. 

The United States is expanding its cooperation with Solomon Islands on several 

areas of mutual interest, including unexploded ordnance (UXO) removal in coordination with the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, growing USAID presence in the 

country, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation signing a $20 million Threshold 

Agreement with the country in 2022. These tangible outcomes, which are coordinated with our likeminded partners, such as Australia, strengthen our bilateral ties 

with Solomon Islands and encourage ongoing cooperation. 

Pacific leaders have consistently said Pacific Islands countries have the capability 

and proven record of meeting the region’s policing and broader security needs. PIF 

members Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea have long been committed security partners on policing with Solomon Islands and continue to provide 

support via the Solomon Islands International Assistance Force. 

Question. What are the national security implications if China uses the agreement 

to establish a military foothold in the Solomon Islands? 

Answer. The Administration takes the PRC’s expansion of its overseas logistics, 

basing, and collection infrastructure extremely seriously. As the Department of Defense has assessed in its 2023 China Military Power Report, the CCP has tasked 

the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance its 

foreign policy goals. To respond to this challenge, the Department of State works 

closely with interagency partners, including the NSC, the Department of Defense, 

and IC to address this governmentwide priority. 

The Department of State maintains awareness of and takes action in response to 

proposed PRC military installations abroad in multiple regions of the world. The Office of China Coordination and regional and functional bureaus work collectively to 

address PRC efforts to gain access. We continue to engage at high levels with governments that are considering hosting PRC military installations and share information with them about the risks, and we coordinate with allies and partners to 

amplify those concerns. 
51 

TOPIC: U.S. INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY

In February 2022, the Administration published its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which 

includes the goal of promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific. However, this goal is 

unattainable with the PRC’s continued encroachment in the region through its diplomatic, economic, and military efforts. Analysts have consistently noted that Chinese foreign investment projects through their Belt and Road Initiative often carry 

heftier price tags than advertised, engaging in ‘‘debt-trap’’ diplomacy. Furthermore, 

many of these projects serve a dual purpose, as they provide the PLA’s air and 

naval forces potential centers of operation, expanding their capacity to position military resources in these countries. 

Question. How does China’s expanding influence in the region impact the U.S.’s 

goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific region? What steps is the Administration considering to prevent other nations from aligning with the PRC? 

Answer. We have seen a range of increasingly problematic behavior from the PRC 

in the broader region, including entering into opaque security arrangements with 

Pacific Islands countries, predatory economic activities including IUU fishing; environmental degradation; and investments that undermine good governance and promote corruption. 

Additionally, we do not believe importing PRC security forces will help any Pacific 

Islands country. We reiterate our concerns over the expansion of the PRC’s internal 

security and surveillance apparatus, which actively facilitates PRC government efforts to repress members of ethnic and religious minority groups. We are concerned 

about the potential implications that security agreements with the PRC may have 

on the sovereignty and autonomy of Pacific Islands nations. We will continue to engage with Pacific Island countries’ governments on these concerns. At the same 

time, we will continue to build on our strong relationship with the region, in response to the demand signals and priorities expressed by Pacific Islands countries. 

RESPONSES OF MR. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE RICKETTS

Topic: In April, the Solomon Islands will hold a general election that will be critical for the trajectory of the country. Under Prime Minister Sogavare, the Solomon 

Islands has strengthened its relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 

including switching its diplomatic recognition and establishing a comprehensive 

strategic partnership. This has concerningly led to a secret security pact and policing agreement with the PRC. The PRC is fully aware of what’s at stake in this election, and in the past, has resorted to bribes and other forms of malign influence to 

meddle in Solomon Islands affairs. 

Question. Are there actions that we or our allies and partners in the Pacific Islands Forum are taking to limit the PRC’s malign influence in these elections to ensure that they are both free and fair? 

Answer. We are coordinating closely with our likeminded partners to support free 

and fair elections in Solomon Islands. Australia and New Zealand are providing significant electoral support to the Government of Solomon Islands. USAID also plans 

to send elections observers to monitor conditions on the ground. 

The United States is also supporting a free media in Solomon Islands through 

support to local outlets to access credible sources of news, for example the Associated Press. 

Question. Are you concerned that Prime Minister Sogavare will utilize PRC security forces in the event of any unrest or to crack down on political opposition during 

or following the election? 

Answer. The Solomon Islands International Assistance Force (SIAF), composed of 

police from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea, will continue to 

operate in Honiara through June 2024 to assist with security for the national elections. These efforts by our likeminded partners should be sufficient to quell any potential unrest, mitigating the need for PRC assistance. 

We do not believe importing PRC security forces will help any Pacific Islands 

country. We reiterate our concerns over the PRC’s expansion of internal security 

and surveillance apparatus. 

Question. If so, what plans are we developing with our allies and partners in the 

region to address this contingency? 

Answer. We are coordinating closely with Australia and New Zealand, both of 

which are contributing contingents of police officers to the Solomon Islands Inter-
52 

national Assistance Force that will continue to operate in Honiara through June 

2024 to assist with security for the national elections. 

We continue to communicate to the Government of Solomon Islands our concerns 

over the expansion of the PRC’s internal security and surveillance apparatus. 

RESPONSE OF MR. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK TO A QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. What Pacific Islands countries does the United States Coast Guard have 

shiprider agreements with? 

Answer. In the Pacific, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has 12 bilateral 

maritime law enforcement ‘‘shiprider’’ agreements. These are with Cook Islands, 

Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, 

Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. USCG has C175 

authority to negotiate and conclude these agreements. 

Shiprider agreements are valuable tools for the United States to engage with Pacific Islands countries and are popular in the region. These agreements respond to 

a tangible need for Pacific Islands to better monitor their large EEZs to promote 

economically viable fisheries, enforce immigration and customs policies, and counter 

drug trafficking and transnational crime. 

RESPONSES OF MR. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM SCOTT

Topic: In 2022, China and the Solomon Islands signed a security pact granting 

China the right to conduct naval visits, logistical operations, and potentially station 

military forces in the Solomon Islands. This agreement has raised questions about 

the possibility of China establishing a military presence in the Solomons. 

Question. Which other Pacific Island nations are considering similar arrangements? 

Answer. The United States respects the right of nations to make sovereign decisions in the best interests of their people. Nevertheless, we are concerned about the 

potential implications that any security agreement with the PRC may have for any 

Pacific Islands nation’s autonomy, security, and data privacy. 

The PRC’s pattern of offering vague, confidential deals with little regional consultation has provoked public concern in the United States, in Pacific Islands countries, and around the globe. I would be happy to discuss potential security concerns 

pertaining to the PRC and specific countries in a classified setting in conjunction 

with my DoD colleagues. 

Question. What are China’s immediate strategic objectives, and how do these fit 

into its long-term strategy in the South Pacific region? 

Answer. The Indo-Pacific region faces mounting challenges, particularly from the 

PRC. The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological 

might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific. The PRC’s attempts 

to undermine international norms and standards span the globe, but they are most 

acute in the Indo-Pacific. 

As Secretary Blinken has said, the PRC is the only country with both the intent 

to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. That certainly holds true in the Pacific. 

Through foreign assistance, elite capture, and robust public messaging campaigns, 

the PRC has moved aggressively to assert itself in the Pacific Islands region. In addition, in recent years, three Pacific Islands countries have switched diplomatic ties 

from Taiwan to the PRC. And in 2022, Solomon Islands signed an unprecedented 

security agreement with the PRC, the details of which have not been publicly released. Of course, as we have often said, we are not in the business of forcing countries to choose—in the Pacific or anywhere else. But we want to ensure that countries in the Pacific have a choice, and the ability to make their own sovereign decisions, free from coercion. 

I would be happy to discuss this question in more depth in a classified setting. 
53 

RESPONSES OF MR. ELY RATNER TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Importance of the Pacific Islands to the U.S. Military: The Pacific Islands region 

is important to the U.S. military for a variety of reasons from force projection to 

transit and resupply—and the same is true for the PRC Navy and Coast Guard. 

Question. Why does the Department of Defense view the Pacific Island region as 

so strategic? What is at stake for the U.S. military if we do not maintain a relationship with these countries, who instead choose to work more closely with China? 

Answer. Peace, stability, and prosperity in the Pacific Islands are essential for advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Our defense posture in the Pacific Islands, ranging in levels of presence from a permanent footprint to rotational forces, 

is critical for U.S. military logistics, sustainment, and power projection. 

We know that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is using all tools available— 

including coercive economic and political measures—to advance its interests in the 

region. We are particularly concerned by PRC efforts to develop policing arrangements with the Solomon Islands, and increase the presence of PRC police elsewhere, 

like in Kiribati. These arrangements often lack transparency and could be used to 

undermine the sovereignty of Pacific Island nations. Importantly, the PRC likely 

seeks to use these arrangements to justify other destabilizing security activities in 

the region. 

Question. From the U.S. military side, given how few militaries there are in the 

region, what does our engagement with Pacific Island nations look like? 

Answer. There are three Pacific Island countries with militaries: Fiji, Tonga, and 

Papua New Guinea (PNG). We have regular exercises with these nations, these nations also participate in larger exercises alongside several partners, and other exercises routinely take place in the Pacific Islands. Finally, PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 

remains a hallmark of U.S. engagement in the region; the 19th iteration of the exercise concluded in January after the USNS MERCY hospital ship made stops in the 

Republic of the Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Palau, and the Federated States 

of Micronesia. 

In addition, we have robust security cooperation engagements with partners in 

the Pacific Islands. The Department of Defense State Partnership Program has 

partnered the State of Nevada with Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa; the State of Wisconsin 

with Papua New Guinea; and most recently, the State of Hawaii/Guam with Palau. 

These partnerships promote enduring people-to-people ties, military-to-military engagements, and important community projects. Meanwhile, security cooperation programs under 10 U.S.C. 333 have built partner capacity to address a range of issues 

in the Pacific Islands. 

Finally, our defense posture in the Pacific Islands region is critical for U.S. military logistics, sustainment, and power projection. Through the defense provisions of 

the Compact of Free Association, the Department retains the right to establish defense sites in the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), Palau, and the Federated 

States of Micronesia (FSM). RMI hosts the U.S. Army Garrison at Kwajalein and 

the Ronald Reagan Test Site. We are working to establish additional defense sites 

within the Compact States under this framework. In addition, we signed a landmark Defense Cooperation Agreement with Papua New Guinea in 2023, which will 

deepen bilateral security cooperation and strengthen the capacity of the Papua New 

Guinea Defence Force. 

Compact of Free Association Agreement (COFA): The Congress recently passed 

legislation that renews and fully funds the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) 

agreements with the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) 

and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). Text was ready for inclusion in last 

year’s NDAA, but an insistence of an offset in the House delayed its passage. The 

delay raised questions about U.S. commitment to the three COFA States and the 

region more broadly and served as an entry point for PRC encroachment. This is 

an exercise that we go through only once every 20 years, and it was a much smoother process this time than it was previously. 

Question. For the record and for colleagues that will be here in 20 years when 

these agreements come up for renewal again: could you explain the strategic value 

of the COFA agreements from DOD’s perspective? 

Answer. The U.S. Government has provided economic assistance to our partners 

in the Freely Associated States (FAS) for the last four decades; the majority of this 

assistance has been provided under the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) and 

related agreements between the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Republic of 

Palau (Palau), and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). This assistance sup-
54 

ports education, the environment, healthcare, and civilian infrastructure—and it 

provides a strong economic anchor that complements our defense and security partnership. Last year, the Administration reached agreements with the FAS partners 

that would extend U.S. economic assistance for an additional 20 years, and the enactment of the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024 marked one 

of the 118th Congress’ most significant achievements to advance U.S. strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Importantly, the Compacts ensure that the United States—and only the United 

States—can maintain a military presence in the FAS, and they allow FAS citizens 

to strengthen our All-Volunteer Force through dedicated military service in the U.S. 

Armed Forces. As part of these agreements, the U.S. military serves as the defense 

force for FSM, Palau, and RMI, which in return grant the United States assured 

access for our military operations, as well as sites for critical defense posture in the 

region. The Compacts also limit the access of third country militaries or their personnel, including would-be adversaries, from accessing FAS land, airspace, and territorial seas, securing a key area of the Indo-Pacific region. Crucially, citizens of the 

FAS serve in the U.S. Armed Forces at higher proportionate rates than most American States, and we are proud of and grateful for their service. 

Question. Would it be possible to replace the benefits we receive from this arrangement if our COFA agreements were to disappear in the future? How would 

this impact our broader national security interests? 

Answer. Failure to extend the economic assistance related to the Compacts would 

have had serious consequences for the economies and security of our FAS partners, 

our strategy in the broader Pacific Islands region, and, ultimately, our national security. Failure to renew the Compacts would have sent the wrong message not only 

to the Compact States, but to the broader Indo-Pacific region. It could have also 

aided PRC efforts to build ties with these countries by providing an alternative to 

lost U.S. assistance. The strategic value of our presence in this key geographic area 

cannot be replaced. 

U.S. Security Alliances in the Region: Beyond our partnerships with Pacific Island 

nations, our continued engagement with close allies in the Indo-Pacific, including 

Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, among others, establishes a broader security 

architecture that will maintain peace and stability in the region and deter PRC aggression. 

Question. Given the absorptive capacity of the islands, are we paying close attention to coordinating and scaling the assistance we provide? 

Answer. We are working with our regional partners—including Australia, France, 

Japan, and New Zealand—to synchronize our programming while continuing to emphasize the importance of right-sizing and sequencing our own security cooperation 

programs and activities in accordance with Pacific Island partners’ absorptive capacity. 

Question. What can we be doing more effectively with our partners to mitigate the 

PRC’s influence in the region? 

Answer. The Department is focused on strengthening the capacity of our Pacific 

Island partners, including in the areas of maritime domain awareness, maritime security, cybersecurity, humanitarian assistance/disaster response, and defense force 

professionalization. We are also coordinating with other likeminded partners in the 

region—including Australia, France, Japan, and New Zealand—to determine where 

we can complement each other’s unique authorities and capabilities to maximum 

strategic effect. Together, we are committed to advancing a shared regional vision 

for a free and open Indo-Pacific, including with our Pacific Island partners. 

RESPONSES OF MR. ELY RATNER TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

TOPIC: PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Question. How does our security agreement with Papua New Guinea support U.S. 

defense requirements, and how is implementation going? 

Answer. The Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) is a foundational agreement 

that enables the United States to greatly strengthen its security cooperation with 

Papua New Guinea (PNG) by modernizing and clarifying the commitments underlying our partnership. The DCA will deepen ties with PNG, strengthen cooperation 

between our forces, and help the United States more effectively support humani-
55 

tarian assistance and disaster relief and other regional crises. It also allows the Department of Defense to invest in infrastructure projects, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has conducted a site survey to scope potential requirements with plans for 

follow up surveys to establish requisite needs. The DCA will further allow us to increase the scale and scope of our joint exercises with PNG, including in conjunction 

with Australia. 

TOPIC: FAS NATIONAL SECURITY

Question. What is being implemented in terms of U.S. assistance to support the 

development of National Security Councils in Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, 

as required under the CONVENE Act? 

Answer. The Department of Defense is standing by to support the Department of 

State with implementation of the CONVENE Act as needed. DoD is a strong proponent of the establishment of ‘‘national security councils’’ or similar formal coordinating bodies in both the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands. 

Question. Relatedly, what support is the Department of Defense providing to the 

existing National Security Coordination office in Palau? 

Answer. In establishing the National Security Coordinator position in Palau, DoD 

offered resources through the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies to support the 

establishment of a National Security Policy, alongside the Department of State. DoD 

does not otherwise provide material or financial support to Palau for the National 

Security Coordination office, but, when appropriate, liaises closely with the office to 

coordinate on defense-related issues. 

While the U.S. values its ties with all Pacific Islands, our relationships with the 

Freely Associated States are fundamentally different. Citizens from the FAS can 

live and work in the U.S. and serve in the U.S. military at very high rates. They 

also host U.S. troops and form part of our extended defense infrastructure. Now that 

we are shifting to implementation of the Compacts of Free Association, getting that 

right will be critical as we develop our ties with the FAS over the next 20 years 

and seek to compete with an aggressive China. 

Question. As we begin working on implementing the renewed COFA agreements, 

what will the Department of Defense do to ensure that the FAS are given the dedicated attention they deserve, distinct from our broader engagement with the Pacific 

Islands? Are current U.S. military installations in the FAS adequately resourced? 

Answer. The Freely Associated States (FAS) are a priority for DoD because they 

are home to existing installations, like the U.S. Army Garrison at Kwajalein and 

the Ronald Reagan Test Site RMI. The exclusive access and strategic denial rights 

we enjoy in the FAS make them a focus for future defense site designation. We also 

implement security cooperation programming focused on the FAS, in addition to 

broader regional efforts. 

FAS citizens serve in the U.S. military at the highest rates per capita. When they 

return home, they often encounter serious problems in getting the care they were 

promised as veterans. 

Question. How does DOD work with Veterans’ Affairs to address those issues? 

Answer. DoD is grateful to citizens from the FAS who have or are currently serving in the U.S. Armed Forces. We have an obligation to ensure that those who wear 

the U.S. military uniform and other eligible DoD beneficiaries have access to care. 

For veterans not otherwise eligible to receive care from DoD, we respectfully refer 

your question to the Department of Veterans Affairs. 

China-linked organized criminal organizations are all over the Pacific Islands. 

Question. How can the Department of Defense assist the FAS to combat PRClinked organized crime, which often functions as an enabling force for strategic corruption? 

Answer. DoD provides support to the FAS as part of a broader, whole-of-government effort. This activity occurs primarily through Joint Interagency Task ForceWest programming. 

Question. How can Joint Interagency Task Force–West (JIATF-West), JAGs, or 

others from DoD work with the FAS to give them the legal tools they need to combat PRC strategic corruption? 

Answer. In carrying out its counter-drug mission, Joint Interagency Task Force– 

West (JIATF-West) supports U.S. law enforcement working with the FAS by providing both information related to criminal activity and capacity building efforts to 
56 

counter it. JIATF-West provides information support to counter-drug and related investigations to the FAS upon the request of a U.S. law enforcement agency. This 

information support furthers investigations by identifying maritime transit routes, 

container shipments of interest, and criminal networks. 

JIATF-West also bolsters the capability and capacity of law enforcement agencies 

in the FAS through partnerships with U.S. law enforcement and U.S. embassies. 

Over the past several years, for example, JIATF-West has facilitated counterdrugrelated courses for FAS law enforcement partners. 

JIATF-West also supports the Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), 

headquartered in Honiara, Solomon Islands, to support its 17 member nations with 

enhanced maritime domain awareness and information sharing. The FAS are members of the FFA and benefit from the enhanced maritime domain awareness that 

assists with countering illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing as well as any 

associated and other transnational organized crime. 

Question. Please describe the role the Department of Defense can play within the 

interagency in combating PRC political warfare in the Pacific Islands, with a particular emphasis on the FAS. 

Answer. DoD is working as part of a whole-of-government effort to strengthen relationships and people-to-people ties with our partners in the FAS, including 

through security cooperation programming. Beyond the FAS, in Papua New Guinea, 

Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, and soon in Palau, the DoD State Partnership Program supports 

an enduring U.S. presence focused on long-term relationships with eligible security 

forces of partner nations in Oceania. 

TOPIC: PRC DUAL-USE INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. What are the most concerning PRC dual-use infrastructure projects either completed or under development, from the perspective of the Department of Defense? 

Answer. The Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China underscores that the PRC seeks to expand its overseas logistics 

and basing infrastructure to sustain military power at greater distances. We also 

know that the PRC is very likely already planning for additional military logistics 

facilities to support power projection, and has considered Pacific Island countries for 

potential locations. Specifically, the PRC is likely considering locations in Vanuatu, 

Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands, using its growing defense relationships with these countries to advance its military logistics goals. 

The Department is also particularly concerned by policing arrangements offered 

by the PRC, which often lack transparency and seek to undermine the sovereignty 

of Pacific Island nations. These arrangements can also be used to justify destabilizing People’s Liberation Army security activities and access in the region. 

RESPONSES OF MR. ELY RATNER TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE RICKETTS

DEFENSE VULNERABILITIES OF GUAM

Guam is the westernmost part of the U.S. and houses Naval Base Guam—the 

Navy’s only submarine base in the western Pacific—as well as Anderson Air Force 

Base—which hosts strategic bombers and fighters. However, despite its importance, 

Guam remains surprisingly vulnerable. For decades, the PRC has developed both 

ballistic and cruise missiles that could strike Guam. While the U.S. has missile defense capabilities, there are still significant gaps in our ability to defend Guam 

against PRC cruise missiles. The threats don’t stop at just missiles—they also exist 

in the cyberspace. Last year, PRC state-sponsored hacking group, Volt Typhoon, targeted unnamed critical infrastructure organizations on the island, including those 

in the communications, maritime and government sectors. These cyberattacks could 

sabotage any U.S. response to a PRC invasion of Taiwan 

Question. What is the administration doing to ensure Guam is properly protected 

from all forms of PRC missile attacks? 

Answer. As the Missile Defense Review makes clear, Guam is a part of the United 

States and any missile attack on Guam or any other U.S. territory would be met 

with an appropriate response. The Department’s efforts include active missile defenses, enhanced regional deterrence and defense posture, ally and partner assurance measures, and increased readiness. 
57 

Question. What is the administration doing to strengthen the cybersecurity of our 

critical systems and infrastructure in Guam in the wake of these cyberattacks? 

Answer. Enhancing cybersecurity of critical systems and infrastructure on Guam 

is an important issue and a priority for the Department. The Department is diligently working across the U.S. Government to synchronize efforts. I can offer more 

details at a classified level. 

RESPONSE OF MR. ELY RATNER TO A QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM SCOTT

Question. Since fiscal year 2011, the Navy has been procuring two Virginia-class 

submarines annually to bolster its submarine fleet. However, the recent fiscal year 

2025 budget request includes plans for only one Virginia-class submarine. Please explain the reasoning behind this decision. 

Additionally, how will this impact our strategy to counter China’s growing naval 

capabilities? 

Answer. This decision directly supports U.S. strategy to maintain military advantages. The fiscal year 2025 budget is a strategy-driven budget that reflects the 

prioritization and significant investment of undersea warfare capabilities, and 

prioritizes reaching a production cadence of one Columbia-class and two Virginiaclass submarines (SSN) by fiscal year 2028. The President’s budget funds 9 SSNs 

across the 5-year budget and contains $11.4 billion in Submarine Industrial Base 

(SIB) funding to ensure the Navy, working with industry, can get SSNs on track 

by 2028. There are currently 14 SSNs in various stages of construction, of which 

6 are beyond their contracted delivery date. The President’s budget maintains advanced procurement funding to ensure stable and predictable work for smaller subcontractors. Not procuring a second SSN in fiscal year 2025 will help the SIB address the current backlog and will allow the U.S. SIB to produce at the level needed 

to enhance combat credible deterrence. 

RESPONSES OF MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. Building Climate Resiliency: The Pacific Islands are on the frontline of 

climate change, facing rising sea levels, increasing temperatures, and extreme 

weather events that threaten the very survival of its nations. Given the strategic 

significance of the region, U.S. engagement on climate change initiatives is also critical for bolstering regional stability and security. By working closely with Pacific Island nations, the United States can help build resilience against climate change impacts, while also strengthening alliances and fostering cooperation in a region increasingly influenced by geopolitical competition. 

Could you provide an overview of USAID’s strategies and initiatives aimed at addressing climate change in the Pacific Islands? 

How does this engagement support the U.S.’s broader objectives of enhancing regional resilience, securing alliances, and promoting stability in the face of evolving 

environmental and geopolitical challenges? 

Answer. The Pacific Islands’ vulnerability to threats from climate change rank as 

the region’s top priority and is a prevailing challenge to the region’s resilience and 

stability. Furthermore, the magnitude of the challenge requires that a broad and diverse network of partners, including host country governments, communities, development partners, and other organizations, join together to build the region’s climate 

resilience. USAID’s long-standing partnership with Pacific Island countries on climate and disaster preparedness is foundational to establishing an enduring and 

credible partnership with the region as well as supporting broader U.S. efforts and 

objectives in the region, including building the region’s long-term resilience and 

prosperity. 

For example, USAID is supporting Pacific regional organizations and initiatives 

that are led and owned by the region, such as Unlocking Blue Pacific Prosperity 

(UBPP). UBPP is driven by the Pacific Community (SPC), the region’s leading technical organization and aims to achieve 100 percent effective and sustainable ocean 

management, healthy and productive Pacific people with robust food systems, and 

fit-for-purpose financing to support sustained efforts. USAID is collaborating closely 

with SPC and Pacific leaders to coalesce development partners like Australia, 

Japan, South Korea, and Canada around the expanding initiative as well as bring-
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ing to bear our proven climate finance expertise and other assistance on coastal fisheries and food security. 

Recognizing that climate and disaster risks are the greatest existential threats to 

the Pacific, USAID has been partnering with countries in the region for more than 

a decade to build their resilience to climate impacts through a robust climate, environment, and disaster assistance portfolio. We have designed our programs to respond to the needs and priorities that Pacific Island leaders, civil society, and communities have identified. Among these include unlocking climate finance, and preventing ocean plastic pollution across the Pacific, and protecting Papua New Guinea’s vulnerable biodiversity and expanding their energy access. 

USAID is currently at the final stages of designing two new climate finance initiatives announced at the August 2024 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in 

Tonga. The activities will be: (1) a 5-year effort to help Pacific nations access and 

manage climate finance; and (2) a new Climate Finance Development Accelerator, 

aimed at partnering with the private sector in Fiji and Papua New Guinea to scale 

local climate solutions. These new initiatives will build on USAID’s track record of 

success under its now-closed Climate Ready activity, which mobilized over $562 million for adaptation projects from major international financial institutions like the 

Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment Facility, and the Adaptation Fund. 

USAID also supports local solutions and organizations through the Pacific American 

Fund, which provides small grants to locally led projects. 

Papua New Guinea is one of 17 ‘‘megadiverse’’ countries, containing approximately 7 percent of the world’s biodiversity and with forests covering approximately 

60 percent of the land and storing carbon. PNG is a Tier 1 country under USAID’s 

Biodiversity Policy, meaning it is among the highest priorities for Agency conservation investments. This ranking is based on the Global Environment Facility’s Global 

Benefits Index for Biodiversity and the list of globally significant ecoregions as determined by the World Wildlife Fund’s Global 200 list. USAID implements two bilateral biodiversity programs in PNG. USAID’s Lukautim Graun Program (LGP) aims 

to reduce threats to PNG’s rich biodiversity by focusing on the management of customary lands and waters in key biodiversity areas and strengthening local knowledge and capacity for greater conservation, governance, and livelihood development. 

USAID’s Sustainable Landscapes program is helping to reduce the drivers of deforestation that generate greenhouse gas emissions by strengthening landscape governance and providing sustainable economic alternatives. 

Through the global Clean Cities, Blue Oceans program, USAID is piloting localized approaches to address waste management challenges in the Federated States 

of Micronesia, Fiji, and PNG. USAID is implementing holistic strategies that address each step in the waste value chain—from production to end use—prioritizing 

the most inclusive, economically viable, and environmentally sustainable solutions. 

Question. Supporting Sustainable Fisheries: The economy and vitality of the Pacific Islands is inextricably linked to the health of their marine ecosystems, which 

support local economies, cultures, and livelihoods. Sustainable fisheries are essential 

for the food security and economic stability of Pacific Island nations. However, the 

threat of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, particularly activities 

attributed to PRC fishing fleets, undermines these objectives, leading to overfishing, 

habitat destruction, and significant economic losses. In this context, the United 

States’ engagement in promoting sustainable fisheries and combating IUU fishing 

is crucial. 

How does USAID’s programs foster sustainable fisheries management in the Pacific Islands? 

How does our work on fisheries management and maritime domain awareness tie 

into our larger objective of supporting Pacific Island nations sustain their diverse 

ocean ecosystems and counter the PRC’s and other countries’ IUU fishing? 

Answer. USAID partners with the Pacific Islands to counter illegal, unreported, 

and unregulated fishing by strengthening sustainable community-driven fisheries 

management and improving broader national and regional level fisheries protection. 

USAID’s OurFish OurFuture activity addresses the drivers of IUU fishing overfishing that are degrading coastal fisheries and biodiversity, negatively impacting 

community livelihoods, impacting food security for communities, and threatening 

maritime security and sovereignty in the region. The program uses a culturally sensitive and ecosystem-scale fisheries governance system through: (1) inclusive and 

transparent decisionmaking processes that are informed by traditional knowledge 

and science, and (2) increased stakeholder engagement with measures to address 

IUU fishing and other threats to ecosystem-level biodiversity. Additionally, USAID 

is strengthening the resilience and engagement of marginalized actors (e.g., women 

and youth) in sustainable coastal fisheries. 
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To combat IUU fishing, an area where we have seen increasingly problematic behavior by PRC, USAID is working with Pacific Island partner governments to increase their capacities for monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) of their fisheries. Through the Pacific Coastal Fisheries Management and Compliance activity, 

USAID supports fisheries agencies to have appropriate MCS programs with the capacity, training, and systems to support sustainable coastal fisheries co-management at all levels, improves coordination mechanisms with civil society to support 

local-level coastal fisheries co-management, and supporting the development of MCS 

frameworks, best practice guidelines, operating procedures, and training and outreach materials. 

USAID is also partnering with Pacific Island countries and the private sector, including Walmart, to expand investment in fisheries and dock-related infrastructure 

across the region so that local communities can benefit from sustainable use of their 

natural resources. USAID is helping to prepare Pacific International Inc. (PII), a 

private sector company in the Marshall Islands (RMI), to secure financing to expand 

its current dock infrastructure, which will allow RMI to land and offload tuna to 

supply Walmart stores under the Pacific Island Tuna initiative. Through leveraging 

the purchasing power of the private sector, this partnership has increased sustainable fishing practices, promoted improved monitoring, helped RMI adopt other sustainable practices throughout the supply chain, and ensured a continuing market 

for RMI fishers. To build on this work, USAID aims to leverage private sector resources to scale these efforts across other target countries in the region. USAID 

plans to organize a series of virtual roundtable discussions to convene public, private, and civil society stakeholders focused on supporting Pacific Island countries’ 

increased participation in the tuna fisheries value chain. 

Question. Branding and Communications on U.S. Assistance: The United States 

provides a lot of assistance per capita in the Pacific, including through multilateral 

channels, but we do a poor job of ‘‘taking credit’’ for the assistance that we provide. 

One way to address this is through updating our branding policy and deploying 

more effective communications strategies. 

How are we thinking about the issue of branding and communication in the context of the assistance that we provide in the Pacific Islands region? How does this 

shape the way that our assistance is perceived in the region? 

What should we be doing more, differently or better? 

Answer. To maximize visibility and amplify public acknowledgement of the re-establishment of USAID’s Pacific Islands Mission and the elevation of our presence 

in the Pacific, USAID has been prioritizing affirmative messaging that clearly communicates the tangible benefits of our development and humanitarian assistance at 

the government and community level. USAID is currently planning procurement for 

media products, unprecedented in their amplitude, that will reach multiple audiences across the Pacific. In addition, USAID has established staffing positions to expand our public outreach and communications across the region. 

RESPONSES OF MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. What are 2–3 concrete economic projects we are currently spearheading 

in the Pacific Islands, and what tangible effects are those projects having? 

Answer. Across the region, USAID is partnering with like-minded countries to deliver on Pacific priorities by leveraging our tools and pooled resources to provide viable alternatives to PRC investments. In Papua New Guinea (PNG), USAID is part 

of a multi-country partnership, alongside Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, that 

is supporting the Government of PNG to meet its goal of expanding access to electricity from 13 percent of the population in 2018 to 70 percent by 2030. USAID’s 

PNG Electrification Partnership (PEP) activity is facilitating new on- and off-grid 

household electricity connections, supporting the financial viability of the stateowned power authority, PNG Power Limited (PPL), and strengthening the institutional capacity of the newly established regulator, the National Energy Authority. 

Since 2020, USAID’s PEP activity has helped increase the number of people with 

electricity and improved energy services for more than a million people in PNG. 

In Palau, USAID has partnered with Australia and Japan to support the development of an undersea spur cable—Palau’s second—that will connect the country to 

the world’s longest undersea cable, increasing the internet bandwidth and extending 

connectivity to remote areas to spark greater economic growth. Additionally, USAID 

has partnered with Australia and Japan on the East Micronesia Cable, which will 

connect the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, and Nauru; and provide faster, 
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higher quality, and more reliable and secure communications to approximately 

100,000 people across the three countries. 

USAID is also partnering with Pacific Island countries to foster economic growth 

through tailored programs that deliver sustainable, tangible benefits to Pacific Islanders, providing a contrast to the PRC’s approach. In the Solomon Islands, USAID 

works with government and private sector partners to advance the country’s economic competitiveness and inclusiveness, with specific emphasis on developing the 

agribusiness sector and improving forest management. USAID’s largest bilateral activity in the Solomon Islands is the Strengthening Competitiveness, Agriculture, 

Livelihoods and Environment (SCALE) Program. Through SCALE, USAID has 

helped 40 community groups and organizations formally register and provided small 

grants to pursue locally identified environmental and livelihood activities. For example, the largest cocoa exporter in Solomon Islands is working with local farmers to 

extend their network into previously unserved areas, and public, private, and CSO 

partners have worked together to identify 11 agribusiness infrastructure projects 

across the pilot province. 

In Papua New Guinea, USAID worked to establish the latest American Chamber 

of Commerce (AmCham) in the region, AmCham Coral Sea, in 2022. As part of this 

initiative, USAID provided expert consultancy to help AmCham Coral Sea refine its 

mission, plot a strategic pathway, and design tailored services and solutions to bolster U.S. corporate engagement in the Pacific Islands. This partnership is aimed at 

bolstering sustainable economic growth, driven by the private sector. Through this 

initiative, we are promoting a development vision that empowers local and international businesses to play a pivotal role in regional development. 

Question. Which U.S. Government economic agencies are the most active in the 

Pacific Islands, other than State and USAID? 

Answer. The Pacific Islands face numerous constraints to economic growth including geographic distance, small economies, and dispersed populations, which requires 

a whole-of-government approach. 

USAID has been strengthening its partnership with interagency partners, including the International Development Finance Corporation, to bring to bear our unique 

tools in the Pacific Islands. USAID and DFC are helping micro, small, and medium 

enterprises (MSME) expand their access to financing critical to support and build 

their businesses. USAID and DFC are launching a flexible Pacific Microfinance Facility valued at up to $50 million to expand access to fair and competitive finance 

for MSMEs in the Pacific Islands. 

USAID has also utilized the Transaction Advisory Fund (TAF) to provide legal 

and technical assistance needed to ensure sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure development in the Pacific Islands. USAID implements TAF in 

close coordination with the interagency, including State, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and the Treasury Department. USAID is supporting the project 

management unit to lead the management and implementation of an undersea cable 

to Palau and legal advisory support for the East Micronesia Cable, which will connect the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, and Nauru. In the Marshall Islands (RMI), USAID is also using TAF assistance to help prepare a private sector 

company to potentially secure financing from the DFC to upgrade a dock. The 

project will allow RMI to increase its capacity to land and offload sustainably caught 

tuna as well as enable better catch documentation and enforcement of legal fishing. 

Question. Are there any needed changes in authorities that would make it easier 

for the United States to increase economic and commercial engagement in the Pacific Islands? 

Answer. For the Pacific Islands, there are no changes in authority needed. The 

only restrictions for fiscal year 2024 we are closely tracking are for PNG (Trafficking 

In Persons for which there is a waiver) and Nauru, which has a restriction on assistance for the central government and no waiver as it is in violation of § 7047(c) 

for recognizing the occupation of Georgian territories of South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia. 

RESPONSES OF MR. MICHAEL SCHIFFER TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy: In February 2022, the Administration published its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which includes the goal of promoting a free and 

open Indo-Pacific. However, this goal is unattainable with the PRC’s continued encroachment in the region through its diplomatic, economic, and military efforts. 
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How can the United States address the financial vulnerabilities that is forcing Pacific islands to deepen relations with the PRC, especially with China being a main 

trading partner and source of investment and infrastructure for countries throughout the region? 

Answer. Pacific Island countries (PICs) are vulnerable to PRC economic coercion 

given their limited economic diversification, vast geographic expanse, and dependency on loans and assistance. The United States offers attractive alternatives to 

PRC investment by strengthening collaboration between USAID and the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). For example, USAID and DFC 

launched a Pacific Microfinance Facility at the September 2023 U.S.-Pacific Islands 

Forum Summit. This facility will mobilize up to $50 million in loans, loan portfolio 

guarantees, and technical assistance to support the growth of micro, small, and medium enterprises across the region. By providing targeted financial support to these 

businesses, the initiative strengthens local economies, fosters inclusive growth, and 

enhances economic stability across the region, reducing economic dependency on the 

PRC. 

Additionally, USAID focuses on driving high-quality public and private sector investments into the fisheries sector, as this is a key source of economic benefit for 

numerous PICs. In the Marshall Islands, USAID and DFC are working to develop 

a fisheries dock infrastructure project at the Port of Majuro, which will allow RMI 

to derive more economic benefits as a part of the tuna value chain. USAID is providing business and financial advisory services to prepare a local Marshallese-owned 

company to potentially receive DFC financing to upgrade and expand their fisheries 

dock. USAID is working to identify additional opportunities to scale fisheries investment, so more PICs can participate in the lucrative global tuna trade. 

Through these investments, USAID is providing credible, competitive, and transparent financial alternatives and facilitating targeted investments in critical sectors, 

like fisheries, which build trust in U.S.-backed efforts and diminish the appeal of 

PRC’s often opaque and debt-laden investment practices. 

Question. How effective has the opening of the USAID/Pacific Islands Mission 

been in advancing the economic and social development goals of Pacific Island countries? 

Answer. Since opening the Pacific Islands Mission August 2023, USAID has been 

focused on building a lasting partnership with the region and individual countries 

by listening to and partnering with the region’s priorities laid out in the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. To do this, USAID has been expanding its physical presence and development programming. On presence, USAID anticipates growing to at least 51 positions by August 2025, with 30 positions under the Pacific Islands Mission and 21 positions under the Country Representative Office in Papua 

New Guinea. These new staff are critical as PICs value consistent, on-the-ground 

relationships as foundational to effective, long-term partnerships with governments, 

leaders, civil society organizations, and communities. 

USAID is already deepening relationships with key regional organizations like the 

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and the Pacific Community (SPC) and delivering on 

their requests for USAID support. For example, USAID has been supporting SPC’s 

Unlocking Blue Pacific Prosperity (UBPP) from the early days including by providing guidance, strategic planning, and utilizing our convening power to coalesce 

support among development partners for the initiative. At the August 2024 PIF 

Leaders Meeting in Tonga, USAID rallied Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to endorse a partner statement in support of Pacific-led initiatives like 

UBPP. This marked a significant step in uniting international support for Pacificled efforts to improve the lives of people across the Blue Pacific Continent, and it 

underscores that USAID is a trusted partner who listens to and prioritizes the region’s development aspirations and respects their values, culture, and traditions, 

which is a contrast to other actors like the PRC. 

In terms of programming, USAID focuses on the areas of climate resilience, sustainable fisheries, good governance, economic growth, access to transparent and 

high-standard infrastructure financing, digital connectivity, and health systems 

strengthening, which align to the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. 

Building the region’s resilience to the impacts of climate change remains among the 

top priorities given the region’s unique vulnerabilities. USAID has been responding 

to the region’s calls to scale up sustainable climate finance by mobilizing over $550 

million from various international funds to help Pacific Island governments and regional bodies receive accreditation to be able to access multi-donor funding resources 

that have historically been difficult to access given the complex application process 

and limited institutional capacity. 
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At the 2024 PIF Leaders Meeting, USAID announced the launch of two new complementary climate finance activities, which will build on our previous track record 

of success. The first is a new 5-year effort to help Pacific countries and regional institutions access and manage climate finance from a variety of sources, including 

multi-donor trust funds, bilateral donors, philanthropies, and the private sector. The 

second is a new line of effort through the USAID Climate Finance Development Accelerator to catalyze new partnerships with the private sector to scale up successful 

local solutions and approaches to climate change adaptation in Fiji and Papua New 

Guinea. 
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