III 

Calendar No. 700 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 562 

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to make an invaluable contribution 

to United States and international security, 50 years after it opened 

for signature on July 1, 1968. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 28, 2018 

Mr. MERKLEY (for himself, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Ms. WARREN, Mr. DURBIN, Ms. SMITH, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. BROWN, Mr. PAUL, 

Mr. COONS, and Mr. CARDIN) submitted the following resolution; which 

was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

NOVEMBER 29, 2018 

Reported by Mr. CORKER, with an amendment and an amendment to the 

preamble 

[Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert the part printed in italic] 

[Strike the preamble and insert the part printed in italic] 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Treaty on the 

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues 

to make an invaluable contribution to United States and 

international security, 50 years after it opened for signature on July 1, 1968. 


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•SRES 562 RS 

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT) opened for signature 50 years ago on 

July 1, 1968; 

Whereas the United States and former Soviet Union averted 

a catastrophic nuclear exchange during the October 1962 

Cuban Missile Crisis, which led to a series of bilateral 

and multilateral agreements to lessen the chance of nuclear war, including the NPT; 

Whereas President John F. Kennedy predicted in 1963 that 

as many as 25 countries would acquire nuclear weapons 

by 1970 absent a treaty to control nuclear weapons; 

Whereas the United States Senate provided its advice and 

consent to the NPT on March 13, 1969, with a vote on 

ratification of 83 to 15; 

Whereas the NPT has grown to include 191 State Parties, 

making an irreplaceable contribution to United States national and international security by preventing the spread 

of nuclear weapons; 

Whereas Article III of the NPT obligates each non-nuclear 

weapon state to the NPT to conclude a Safeguards 

Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) to verify treaty compliance, 174 of which are 

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements crafted to detect 

the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to nonpeaceful uses; 

Whereas the 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture 

Review affirms, ‘‘The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) is a cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation 

regime. It plays a positive role in building consensus for 

non-proliferation and enhances international efforts to 


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•SRES 562 RS 

impose costs on those that would pursue nuclear weapons 

outside the Treaty.’’; 

Whereas the success of the NPT has and will continue to depend upon the full implementation by all State Parties of 

the Treaty’s three mutually reinforcing pillars: nonproliferation, access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 

and disarmament; 

Whereas over the past half century, the United States has exhibited leadership in strengthening each of the NPT’s 

three pillars for the global good, including— 

(1) reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile of more 

than 85 percent from its Cold War heights of 31,225 in 

parallel with equally massive reductions of Russia’s stockpile through bilateral coordination; 

(2) cooperating with Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and 

Belarus—to facilitate the surrender of nuclear weapons 

on their soil after the fall of the Soviet Union—leading 

to each country’s accession to the NPT as non-nuclear 

weapons states; 

(3) providing voluntary contributions to the IAEA 

Peaceful Uses Initiative exceeded more than 

$320,000,000 since 2010 to help in the treatment of cancer and in other life-saving applications; and 

(4) extending deterrence to United States allies in 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan, 

and the Republic of Korea—which is an unmistakable 

demonstration of the United States commitment to collective security; 

Whereas heightened geopolitical tensions in recent years have 

made cooperation on nonproliferation and arms control 

issues with the Russian Federation more challenging; 


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•SRES 562 RS 

Whereas a range of actions by the Government of the Russian Federation has led to a deterioration in bilateral relations with the United States, including Russia’s brazen 

interference in the 2016 United States presidential elections, its violation of the Treaty between the United 

States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 

and Shorter-Range Missiles (commonly known as the 

‘‘INF Treaty’’), signed at Washington, DC, December 8, 

1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988, its illegal annexation of Crimea, its invasion of Eastern Ukraine, and 

its destabilizing actions in Syria; and 

Whereas within a difficult environment, preserving agreements that continue to contribute to United States and 

global security, particularly the Treaty between the 

United States of America and the Russian Federation on 

Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of 

Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly known as 

the ‘‘New START Treaty’’), is all the more essential, and 

that to that end, the Department of State confirmed in 

February 2018 that Russia had met New START’s Central Treaty Limits and stated that ‘‘implementation of 

the New START Treaty enhances the safety and security 

of the United States’’: Now, therefore, be it 

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened for signature 50 years ago on July 1, 

1968; 

Whereas the United States and the former Soviet Union averted a catastrophic nuclear exchange during the October 

1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which led to a series of bilatVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:22 Nov 30, 2018 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\SR562.RS SR562

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•SRES 562 RS 

eral and multilateral agreements to lessen the chance of 

nuclear war, including the NPT; 

Whereas President John F. Kennedy predicted in 1963 that as 

many as 25 countries would acquire nuclear weapons by 

1970 absent a treaty to control nuclear weapons; 

Whereas the United States Senate provided its advice and consent to the NPT on March 13, 1969, with a vote on ratification of 83 to 15; 

Whereas the NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970; 

Whereas the NPT has grown to include 191 States Party to the 

Treaty, making an irreplaceable contribution to international security by helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; 

Whereas Article III of the NPT obligates all non-nuclear weapon States Party to the NPT to conclude a Safeguards 

Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) to verify treaty compliance, 174 of which are 

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements crafted to detect the 

diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to non-peaceful uses; 

Whereas nuclear weapon States Party to the NPT have also 

concluded voluntary offer Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols with the IAEA; 

Whereas the 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review affirms, ‘‘The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) is a cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It plays a positive role in building consensus for 

non-proliferation and enhances international efforts to impose costs on those that would pursue nuclear weapons outside the Treaty.’’; 


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•SRES 562 RS 

Whereas the success of the NPT has and will continue to depend upon the full implementation by all States Party to 

the Treaty of the NPT’s obligations and responsibilities, 

which are derived from three mutually reinforcing pillars: 

nonproliferation, access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 

and disarmament; 

Whereas over the past half century, the United States has exhibited leadership in strengthening each of the NPT’s three 

pillars for the global good, including— 

(1) reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile by more 

than 85 percent from its Cold War heights of 31,225 in 

parallel with equally massive reductions of Russia’s stockpile through bilateral coordination; 

(2) cooperating with Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and 

Belarus—to facilitate the surrender of nuclear weapons on 

their soil after the fall of the Soviet Union—leading to 

each country’s accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear 

weapons state; 

(3) providing voluntary contributions to the IAEA to 

promote peaceful nuclear activities exceeding $374,000,000 

since 2010, including activities that help in the treatment 

of cancer and other life-saving applications; and 

(4) extending deterrence to United States allies in the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan, and 

the Republic of Korea—which is an unmistakable demonstration of the United States commitment to collective 

security; 

Whereas heightened geopolitical tensions in recent years have 

made cooperation on nonproliferation and arms control 

issues with the Russian Federation more challenging; 

Whereas a range of actions by the Government of the Russian 

Federation has led to a deterioration in bilateral relations 


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•SRES 562 RS 

with the United States, including Russia’s brazen interference in the 2016 United States presidential elections, its 

violation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 

Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles (commonly known as the ‘‘INF Treaty’’), 

signed at Washington, D.C., December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988, its use of a chemical nerve 

agent in an assassination attempt against Sergei Skripal 

and his daughter Yulia in the United Kingdom in March 

2018, its illegal annexation of Crimea, its invasion of 

Eastern Ukraine, its destabilizing actions in Syria, and 

its use of polonium to assassinate Alexander Litvinenko in 

the United Kingdom in November 2006; 

Whereas the actions undertaken by the Russian Federation in 

violation of the INF Treaty, including the flight-test, production, and possession of prohibited systems diminishes 

the contributions that the Treaty has made to security on 

the European continent; 

Whereas Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a March 2018 

speech, unveiled details of new kinds of strategic nuclear 

weapons under development, including hypersonic nuclear 

cruise missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic missiles, and 

multi-megaton nuclear torpedoes shot from drone submarines that may be accountable under the Treaty between 

the United States of America and the Russian Federation 

on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of 

Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly known as the 

‘‘New START Treaty’’); 

Whereas the Russian Federation erroneously claimed that the 

United States may have not reached New START Treaty 


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Central Limits by February 5, 2018, as is mandated by 

the Treaty; 

Whereas the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) is the 

appropriate forum for the Parties to engage constructively 

on any New START Treaty implementation issues that 

arise; and 

Whereas, within a difficult environment, preserving full compliance with agreements that may continue to contribute 

to the national security of the United States and to global 

security, particularly the New START Treaty, is all the 

more essential, and to that end, the Department of State 

confirmed in February 2018 that Russia had met New 

START’s Central Treaty Limits and stated that ‘‘implementation of the New START Treaty enhances the safety 

and security of the United States’’: Now, therefore be it 

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that— 

2 (1) any United States negotiated agreement 

3 with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

4 (DPRK) on denuclearization must require it to re5 turn to the NPT as a Party in good standing; 

6 (2) the United States must maintain support 

7 for the IAEA through its assessed and voluntary 

8 contributions and promote the universal adoption of 

9 the IAEA Additional Protocol; 

10 (3) the United States and its allies should pur11 sue diplomatic efforts to ensure that the Islamic Re12 public of Iran remains in compliance with the NPT, 

13 as the 2016 and 2017 Reports on Adherence to and 


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1 Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, 

2 and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments 

3 both affirmed; 

4 (4) the United States should enter into negotia5 tions on the extension of the New START Treaty 

6 until 2026, which would make any current or future 

7 Russian strategic systems of a range greater than 

8 5,500 kilometers accountable under the Treaty; 

9 (5) the United States should work to resolve 

10 Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty; 

11 (6) all countries who have yet to ratify the 

12 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, done at 

13 New York September 10, 1996, including the United 

14 States, should venture to create the conditions that 

15 allow for entry-into-force of the Treaty, and should 

16 observe a moratorium on nuclear testing until that 

17 time; and 

18 (7) the United States Government should con19 tinue to encourage opportunities for cooperation 

20 with other nuclear possessing states to reduce the 

21 salience, number, and role of nuclear weapons in 

22 global military strategies. 

23 That it is the sense of the Senate that— 


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1 (1) the United States should continue to encour2 age all States Party to the NPT to comply fully with 

3 the Treaty; 

4 (2) any United States negotiated agreement with 

5 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 

6 on denuclearization should require the DPRK to re7 turn to as a State Party to the NPT in good standing 

8 and full compliance with the Treaty; 

9 (3) the United States should maintain support 

10 for the IAEA through its assessed and voluntary con11 tributions and promote the universal adoption of the 

12 IAEA Additional Protocol; 

13 (4) the United States and its allies should pur14 sue diplomatic efforts to ensure that the Islamic Re15 public of Iran complies with the NPT and fully im16 plements the IAEA Additional Protocol; 

17 (5) the United States should— 

18 (A) consider whether to extend the New 

19 START Treaty, within the context of meaningful 

20 arms control that decreases the chances of 

21 misperception and miscalculation, avoids desta22 bilizing arms competition, and is verifiable and 

23 consistent with the security objectives of the 

24 United States and its allies and partners; 


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1 (B) assess whether Russia’s recently an2 nounced nuclear weapons should be accountable 

3 under the New START Treaty and raise the 

4 issue directly with the Russian Federation; 

5 (C) press the Russian Federation to engage 

6 constructively on compliance matters related to 

7 the New START Treaty, and also to take steps 

8 that provide greater transparency into Russia’s 

9 non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are not 

10 captured under any treaty and which are nu11 merically superior to those held by the United 

12 States and its allies; 

13 (D) begin negotiations with the Russian 

14 Federation on an agreement to address the mas15 sive disparity between the non-strategic nuclear 

16 weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation 

17 and of the United States and to secure and re18 duce non-strategic nuclear weapons in a 

19 verifiable manner; 

20 (E) begin an interagency process to discuss 

21 whether to extend the New START Treaty and 

22 the possibility of further engagement with the 

23 Russian Federation on strategic stability and 

24 other arms control and nonproliferation issues; 

25 and 


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1 (F) consider the consequences of the New 

2 START Treaty’s expiration in 2021 also in rela3 tion to the insights the Treaty provides into the 

4 location, movement, and disposition of current 

5 and future Russian strategic systems; 

6 (6) the United States strongly condemns the Rus7 sian Federation’s violations of the INF Treaty and its 

8 non-compliance with its other arms control commit9 ments and treaty obligations, and urges Russia to 

10 come back into full compliance; and 

11 (7) the United States Government should con12 tinue to encourage opportunities for cooperation with 

13 other states possessing nuclear arms to reduce the sa14 lience, number, and role of nuclear weapons in their 

15 national military strategies. 


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Calendar No. 700 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 562 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Treaty 

1968. 50 years after it opened for signature on July 1, tion to United States and international security, (NPT) continues to make an invaluable contribuon the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 

NOVEMBER 29, 2018 

Reported with an amendment and an amendment to the 

preamble 


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