United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 13, 2008

Decided September 16, 2008

Before

 MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

 ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

 JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08-1915

GREGORY JOHNSON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

TERRY L. McCANN, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern

Division.

No. 06 C 5352

Milton I. Shadur, Judge. 

O R D E R

Gregory Johnson, an Illinois prisoner, was convicted after a bench trial of first-degree murder

and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. The district court denied his petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, adopting outright the state’s reasons urging dismissal set forth in its

70-page response. Johnson now seeks a certificate of appealability, but because the district court

failed to analyze Johnson’s claims and articulate the reasons for its decision, we vacate the judgment

and remand the case with instructions that the district comply with the dictates of Circuit Rule 50. 

Johnson raised ten claims in his petition. The state, in its response, contended that eight were

procedurally defaulted and that the other two failed on their merits. The district court, noting that it

was a “major departure” from its usual practice, explained that it was accepting and adopting outright

the state’s reasons for dismissal because “extraordinary care had been devoted to all the issues.” The

district court offered no other reason for denying relief under § 2254.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08-1915 Page 2

The district court’s order does not comport with this circuit’s Rules. Circuit Rule 50 provides

that “[w]henever a district court resolves any claim or counterclaim on the merits, terminates the

litigation in its court (as by remanding or transferring the case, or denying leave to proceed in forma

pauperis with or without prejudice), or enters an interlocutory order that may be appealed to the court

of appeals, the judge shall give his or her reasons, either orally on the record or by written

statement.”

We have explained before that a district court who adopts a party’s brief outright as the

statement of reasons for granting summary judgment fails to fulfill its obligation under Circuit Rule

50. See Rakestraw v. United Airlines, Inc., 981 F.2d 1524, 1527 (7th Cir. 1992); Wienco, Inc. v.

Katahn Associates, Inc., 965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1992); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624,

626 (7th Cir. 1990). The same is true when the district court adopts a state’s response outright as the

basis for dismissing a § 2254 petition. As we have said, “[j]udicial adoption of an entire brief . . .

withholds information about what arguments, in particular, the court found persuasive, and why it

rejected contrary views.” DiLeo, 901 F.2d at 626. The district court’s order here falls short in this

regard. And the appropriate remedy for a violation of Rule 50 is to remand the case for compliance

with it. Sims v. Lucas, 9 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir. 1993).

 According, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND the case so that the district court may

set forth its reasons for dismissing Johnson’s § 2254 petition.