### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 26, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LEON JAM ES A ND ERS ON
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for William son Coun ty No. II-010-103 Tim othy L. Easter, Judge

No. M2004- 00965-CCA -R3-C D - F iled April 29, 2005

The a ppellant, L eon J ames Anderson, was indicted by the Will iamson CountyGra nd J ury for driving under the influence (“D UI ”), speeding , driving with a revoked li cense , and fourth offense DUI . The appellant wa s convicted by a j u ry o n t h e fi rs t three c ounts, and waive d his right to a jury for the fourth off ense D UI char g e. The trial court f ound the appe llant guilty

of fourth o ff

en s e DUI . The

app e lla nt w a s se nte nc e d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

to t wo (2 ) y e ars fo r the drivi ng un de r the inf lue nc e fo urth offe nse, thirty day s for speeding , and six months for driving on a re voked license , all to be serve d

concur rently . After

the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal e nsued. On a ppeal, the a

ppellant

c h a ll e n g e s th e s u f

f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e a n d c o n te n d s h is s e n te n c e is e xc e s s iv e

. Be cause the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the convictions and the sente nce is not excessive, we affirm the jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt . H ow e ve r, we re ma ndthe ma tte r t o th e tr ia l c ou rt fo r the lim ite d p ur

po se of cor rec ting e rror s in some of the judg ments.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t i s A ffirm e d and Re m ande d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W ELLES and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.
G. Kline Preston, IV, Nashville, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, L eon James Anderson.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; J ohn H. Bledsoe, Assis tant Attorney Gene ral; Ron Davis, District Attorney Gene ral, and Ge org ia Fe lner, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appellee , State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION

Fa ctual B ackg round

On September

28, 2002, at appr ox imately 5:30 a.m., Offic er Jackie Attkis son of the Te nn e sse e Hi g hw a y

Pa tr ol w a s w or

kin g statio na

ry ra da r on I -6 5 South in Willia mso n Coun ty a t mi le

mark e r 7 3. 3 wh e n he c loc ke d th e app e lla nt t ra ve lin g e ig hty -s e ve n ( 87 ) m ile s p e r h ou r i n a se ve nty (70) mile per

hour spee d zone. Office r Attkisson o b s er v ed the a ppellant cr oss the fog line as he

ro un de d a c ur ve wh e re he wa s p ark e d inhis patr ol c ar. Of fi c e r Attki sso n pu lle d on to the int e rs ta te behind the appe llant, started his monitoring camera , and followed the appellant off the e x it ramp at Concord Road. At this time, Offic er Attkiss on activate d his blue l ights. The appellant c rossed the fog line to the left as he trave led up the exit ramp, and came to a s t o p at the re d light at the int e rs e c tio n o f C on c or d Roa d and the e xit r a mp. Of fi c e r A ttkiss on didno t im me diate ly e xit hi s vehicle be cause he expected the appe llant to drive throug h the intersec tion and pull his vehicle off the ro a d o n th e ri ght sh oulde r. Whe n h e re a lize d th a t th e app e lla nt w a s n ot g oin g to m ov e his vehicle f rom the middle of the r oad, Of fi ce r At t kisson ex ited his vehicle a nd walked up to the

app e lla nt’ s d ri ve r’ s si de wi nd ow . O ff ic e r A ttkiss on de te c te d th e od or of a lc oh ol c omi ng fr om w ith in the vehicle . The a

ppellant admitted t o Offic er Attkiss on at t hat t ime that he had been working earlier in the evening for Budw eiser, and he admitted to drinking a couple of beer s prior to bei n g p u l l ed

over. The appella n t p r o d u c e d a M ic h ig a n d r iv e r ’ s li c e n s e to O f f ic e r A ttk is s o n

. Wh e n O f

f ic er Attkisson radioed the drive r’s lice nse in to dispatch, it came ba ck as r evoked. O ffice r Attkisson then reque sted that the appe llant exi t the vehicle to pe rform several field sobriety tasks. Offic er A ttkisson asked the appellant to pace ten (10) steps heel to toe, t urn around and then take ten ( 10) steps bac k to his original position. When attempting to complete the ta sk, Offic er A ttkisson not iced that the appellant could not touch hi s heel to his toe, and was unsure about hi mself when he turned on the te nthste p. Of

fi c e r A ttkiss on the n a sk e d th e app e lla nt t o s ta nd on on e le g wi th his fo ot e xten de d in front of him and c ount from one to thirty

. Offic er Attkiss on was mainly interested in whether the

ap p e l l a n t c o u l d c o u n t f

r o m o n e t o t h i r t y. T h e ap p e l l a n t w a s u n ab l e t o c o u n t f r o m o n e t o t h i r t y, p au s i n g a n d r e s t a

r t i n g s e v e r a l t i m e s , a n d w a s u n ab l e t o k e e p h i s f o o te l e v a t e d a s i n s tru c t e d

. L a s t l y, Offic er A ttkisson asked the appe llant to touch his fing er to his nose. The a ppellant was suc cessf

ul in performing the f

inal task as instructed.
At that time, Office r Attkiss on arr ested the a ppellant on suspicion of DUI , based on the results of the f

ield sobriety

tasks. The a

ppellant re fused to submit to a blood-alcohol test.

In J a n u ary o f

2 0 0 3 , t h e ap p e l l a n tw a s i n d i c t e d b y t h e W i l l i a m s o n C o u n t y

G r a n d J u r y

f o r D U I, speeding , driving with a revoke d driver’ s license, a nd DUI fourth off ense. The indictment indicated that the appellant had three prior DUI convictions - t wo on J uly 1, 1997 and one on Aug ust 24, 1999.A l t ho ugh not no t ed by ei t her part y , we ackno wl ed ge t hat t he judgm ent fo rms ref l ect t hat i n C o unt I t he 1

ap p el l ant w as co nvi ct ed of “D U I - 4th o f fense, ” a “ C l ass A m i sdem eano r” and sent enced t o s erve el even (11 ) mo nt hs

an d t w en ty-n in e ( 2 9 ) d a ys an d t ha t i n C o un t IV t he ap p ell an t wa s also c o nv i cted o f “D U I - 4 t h o f

fen se,” a “C l ass E fel ony ” a nd s ent enc ed t o s er ve el eve n ( 11 ) mo nt hs an d t wen t y

- ni ne ( 29 ) d ay s

. O bvi ous l y , t hi s i s i n conf l i ct wi t h t he t r i al

co urt ’ s st at em ent s at t he sent enci ng heari ng, s ent enci ng t he ap p el l ant t o t wo (2) y ears fo r f o urt h off

ense D U I and

s us pendi ng t he r emai nder of t he s ent enc e a f

t er t he s er vi ce of

180 day s

. As a g ene r al r ul e, w hen t her e i s a c onf l i ct bet we en t h e j u dg men t of c on v i ct i on a n d t h e t r an s cr i pt of t h e pr oce edi n g s , t h e t r an s cr i pt c o nt rols

. Sta t e v

. Cl ar k , 67 S .W .3 d 7 3 , 7 9 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . 2 0 0 1 ) (c iti n g S ta te v . M o o re , 8 1 4 S .W .2 d 3 8 1 , 3 8 3 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . 1 9 9 1 )) . W e det er mi n e t h at i n t h i s c as e t h er e i s n o r ea s on t o bel i ev e t h at t h e j u dg men t s re f l ec t an y t h i n g ot h er t h an a cl er i ca l er r or a n d,

a s a r e s u l t , w e h a v e i n d e e d r e l i e d o n t h e s e n t e n c e fo u n d i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t , a n d o u r o p i n i o n r e f l e c t s t h a t r e l i a n c e

. On

re m a n d , t h e trial c o u rt sh o u ld c o rr e c t t h e ju d g m e n ts to re flec t t h e p ro p e r se n te n c e

.

-3- At the jury tr ia l, the State int

ro du c e d th e te sti mon y

of Of fi c e r A ttkiss on . Du ri ng his testimony , Offic er A ttkisson opi ned that the a ppellant’s driving abili ty was im paire d due to t he fa ct that he had too much to drink. Office r Att kisson admitted on cross-e x amination that he wa s unawa re of the g uidelines established by t h e Na tional Highw ay

Traf fic Safe ty Administration for driving under the influence and that he failed to ask t he appellant if he had any phy sical impairments prior to a dmi nis te ri ng the fi e ld s ob ri e ty ta sk s. F urthe r, Of

fi c e r A ttkiss on adm ittedthat he didno t f ull y demonstra t e the one- leg g ed-stand te st by holding his own foot of f of the g round for

thirty (30)

se c on ds . H ow e ve r, Of

fi c e r Attkis so n mai ntaine d th a t he arr e ste d th e app e lla nt f or DU I ba se d o n h is perf ormanc e on the f

ield sobriety

tasks.
The jury found t he appellant g uilty of DUI , speeding and driving on a r evoked lice nse. The appellant waived his rig ht to a jury on the count of f ourth offe nse DUI

and, at the c onclusion of the jury trial, that count wa s submit t ed to the trial c ourt. The tria l court found the a ppellant g uiltyof fourth off ense D UI

.
At the sentenc ing he aring , the pre sentenc e re port listed the appellant’ s t h re e p ri or DUI of fe ns e s in a dd iti on to a

prior c on vic tio n f

or mis de me a no r v a nd a lis m w hic h in vo lve d a n auto mob ile

acc ident. David Pratt of the T ennesse e De partment of Probation and Parole testifi ed t h at he interviewe d the appe llant for the pur poses of c ompleti n g th e pre sentenc e re port and that the a ppellant did n o t s h o w remorse for his ac tions or show an appr eciation of the risk of driving under the inf lue nc e . A c c or din g to the tr a ns c ri pt, the tr ia l c ou rt se nte nc e d th e app e lla nt a s f oll ow s:

Th e app ro pria tes e nte nc e the n f or Cou nt I [DU I ] an d Co un t I V [f

ou rth o ff e ns e DUI ] wil l be two y ear s and a $3,000 f ine. 1 Th e mis de me a no r o ff

e ns e of sp e e din g , the app ro pria te se nte nc e is 2 0 d a y s. Approve the jury ’s fine of $50. An d th e app ro pria te se nte nc e fo r C ou nt I I I of drivi ng on a

re vo ke d li c e ns e is six months; approve the jury ’s fine of $375.

. . . . [T] he Court w ill suspend the two-y ear sentenc e in Count I afte r the s ervic e
o f 1 8 0 d a ys i n t h e W i l l i a m s o n C o u n t y J a i l

. B y s t a t u t e , t h e f i r s t 1 5 0 o f

t h o s e d a ys must be day

for day

.-4- T h e C o u rt wi l l o rd ert h att h e 3 0 d ay s b e s er v ed o n t h e s p ee d i n g. Six mon t h s wi l l b e on the driving on a revoke d will be suspended a fter the

se rv ic e of 30 day s. All sentence s will run curre ntly ; one with the other. As a c ondition of y our probation, [ appellan t ] , afte r y ou’ve se rved y our 180 day s in the Willi a mso n Cou nty Jail , y ou are re qu ir e d a s a c on dit ionof

pr ob a tio n to seek a lcohol treatment.

After the denia l o f a m o t i o n for ne w trial, this appea l ensued. On a ppeal, the a

ppellant challeng es the suff

iciency of the e vidence and his sentenc e.

Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e

The a ppellant ar g ues that the e vidence i s i n s u fficie nt to support a conviction for driving under the influence. Specifica lly , the appe llant arg ues that the only proof of fer ed at tria l was the “circumstantial evidenc e pro v i d ed b y T en n es s ee S t at e T ro o p erJ ac k i e A t t k i s s o n

. ” T h e S t at e c o u nters that the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support the c onviction.

When a def

endant challeng es the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, this Court is oblig ed to re view that claim ac cording to certain well-s et tled principles. A ve rdict of g uilty , rende red by a jury and

“ app ro ved by th e tria l ju dg e , a c c re dit s th e te sti mon y of the ” State ’s wi tne sse s a ndre so lve s a ll conflicts in the testimony

in favor of t he st ate. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994) ; State v. Har

ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992) . Thus, althoug h the ac cused is orig inally cloake d with a pre sumption of innocence , the jury verdic t of g uilty remove s this pre sumption “and repla ces it with one of g uilt.” State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 9 1 3 , 9 1 4 (Tenn. 1982). Henc e, on appe al, the burden of proof rests with the def

endant to demonstrate the insuffic iency of the c onvicting e vidence

. I d. Th e re le va nt q ue sti on the re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t a ns we r i s w he the r any ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have f ound the ac cused g uiltyof eve ry element of the offe nse bey ond a re asonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Ha

rris, 839 S.W.2d at 75. I n making this decision, we ar e to ac cord the State “the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence as well as all re asonable and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn there from.” See Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d at 914. As such, this C ourt is prec luded fr om reweig hing or

rec onsidering the evidenc e whe n evaluating the c onvicting pr oof. State v. Morg an, 929 S.W. 2d 38 0, 38 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ); State v. Matth e ws , 8 05 S.W. 2d77 6, 77 9 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1990). More over, we m ay not substit ute our own “ infere nces f or those dra wn by

the trier of fac t from circumstantial evidence .” Matthew s, 805 S.W .2d at 779. Further, que stions concerning the cr edibilityof the witnesse s and the weig ht and value to be g iven to evidenc e, as w ell as all fa ctual iss ue s r a ise d b y

su c h e vid e nc e , a

re re so lve d b y

the tr ie r o f f

a c t a ndno t the app e llate c ou rt s. State v. Pruett, 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990)

. A per son commits the offense of DUI when he is in phy sical control of an automobile and is under the influe nce of

an intox icant. Te nn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401. Viewing the evidenc e in a light most favor able to the State, t h e t es t i m o n yof the off icer reg arding the odor of a lcohol in the appellant’ s car , the appe llant’s own admiss ion that he dra nk a “c ouple of be ers” prior to leaving-5-

wo rk , a s w e ll a s th e vid e ota pe of the sto p an d the app e lla nt’ s perfo rm a nc e on the su bs e qu e nt f ie ld sobriety tasks all support a finding of g uilt on the charg e of D UI

. W e h av e determined that the evidenc e fully

supports the jury

verdic t. This issue is wit hout merit.

Sentencing
Next, the appellant challeng es hi s sentenc es as excessive. Specifica lly , the appe llant arg ues that the trial court erre d in apply ing enhanc ement factor ( 2) of Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-114, that the appellant had “a pr evious history of criminal convictions or criminal beha vior in a dd iti on to tho se ne c e ssa ry to e sta bli sh the app ro pria te rang e ” wh e n the app e lla nt h a d o nly a sin g le conviction for vandalism. The State contends that the trial court did not e rr i n s entencing the appellant to two (2) y ear s for fourth offense DUI

. The appellant has failed to cite any authority except to quote the lang uag e of Te nnessee Code Ann o t at ed s ection 40-35- 114(2) a nd has fa iled to support his contention with any arg ument other than a on e se nte nc e c on c lus ory state me nt that hi s “ on e c on vic tio n f or va nd a lis m is no t e no ugh to establish a so-c alled history for purposes of sentenc ing.” This issue is w aived. Tenn. Crim. App. R. 10(b).
Reg ardle ss of the waiver, this issue has no merit. “When revie wing sentenc ing issues . . . , th e app e llate c ou rt

sh a ll c on du c t a de no vo re vie w on the re c or d of su c h iss ue s. Suc h r e vie w s ha ll be conduc ted with a pre sumption that the determinations made by the court from which the a ppeal is t ake n ar e c or

re c t.” Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ). “ Ho we ve r, the pr e su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss which ac companies the trial court’s a ction is conditioned upon the aff irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial court consid er ed the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I n conducting our revie w, we must consider the defe ndant’s potential for

reha bilitation, the t rial and sentencing hearing e vidence , the pre -sentenc e report, the sentenc ing principles, sentenc ing alternative arg uments, the nature and cha rac ter of the offe nse, the enhancing and mi tigating factors, and the def endant’ s statements. Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 40-35-103( 5), -210( b); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. We are to also rec og nize that the defe ndant bea rs “the bur den of de monstrating that the sentenc e is improper.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

Tu rn ing mor e sp e c if

ic a lly to the fa c ts o f this c a se , th e de fe nd a nt w a s c on vic te d o f f ou rth offe nse DUI . Acc ording to Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 55-10-403(a )(1) , the fourth or subsequent convic tion for DUI is a Class E felony , punishable by

a fine of not le ss tha n three thousand dollars ($3,000) nor more tha n fi ft e e n th ou sa nddo lla

rs ($ 15 ,0 00 ); by c on fi ne me nt fo r not le ss tha n o ne hu nd re d f if ty (150) co n s ecutive day s, to be serve d day for day , nor more tha n the maxim um punishment authorized for the a ppropriate rang e o f a Class E fe lony ; and the court sh a ll p ro hib it the pe rs on fr om dri vin g a mot or ve hic le fo r a pe ri od of fi ve (5 ) y e ars

.W e n ot e t hat t he T enn es s ee Supre me C our t ha s det er mi ned t hat des pit e t he a b i l i t y of t r i al j udges t o s et 2

s en t en ce s a bov e t he p res u mpt i v e s en t en ce ba s ed on t h e f i n di n g of

e n h an ce men t f ac t or s n ei t h er fou n d by a j u r y or adm i t t ed by a def

endan t , T enn es s ee’ s s ent enc i ng st r uct ur e d oes not vi ol at e t he Si xt h A mendm ent and do es not conf l i ct wi t h t h e h ol di n g s of

B l ak el y v

. W as h i n g t on , ___ U

. S.

___ , 124 S. C t

. 2531 ( 2004) , U n i t ed St at es v

. B ook er , ___ U

. S.

__ _, 125 S. Ct

. 73 8 (2005 ) , or U ni t ed St at es v. FanFan , t he cas e c ons ol i dat ed wi t h B oo ker , becau s e “ t he R eform Act [of T enness ee] aut ho ri zes a di scr et i o nary , non-mand at o ry s ent enci ng p roce d ure and requir es t ri al judge s t o co nsi d er t he pri nci pl es of

s ent enc i ng an d t o eng age i n a qual i t at i ve ana l y s i s of enh anc ement and mi t i gat i ng f act ors

. . . al l of wh i ch

ser ve t o gui d e t ri al judg e s in e x e rc ising thei r di scr et i o n t o s el ect an ap p rop ri at e sent ence wit hi n t he range s et by t he L e g islatu re .” S ta te v. G o m e z , N o . M 2 0 0 2 -0 1 2 0 9 -S C -R 1 1 -C D , 2 0 0 5 W L 8 5 6 8 4 8 , at *2 7 (T e n n . A p r. 1 5 , 2 0 0 5 ).

-6- I n calc ulating the sentenc e for a Class E fe lony conviction, the pre sumptive sentence is the minim um in the rang e if ther e ar e no enhanceme nt or mitigating fac tors. Tenn. C o d e An n

. § 40-35-210( c). I f there are enhanc ing but no mitigating fac tors, the trial court may set the sentenc e above t he minimum , but stil l within the rang e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(d). I f both enha ncing and 2 mit igating f

actor s are prese nt, the trial court must start at the pr esumptive minimum , enhanc e the sentenc e within the ra ng e as appropriate for the enhancing fac tors, and then r educe the sentenc e as appropriate for the mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e). U ndisputably , the appe llant

was a Rang e I offe nder; thus, one y ear was the minimum sentenc e against which the trial court was to b a la nc e a ny

mit ig a tin g a nde nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s.
No particular we ight f

or ea ch fa ctor is pre scribed by the s tatute. S ee State v. Santiag o, 914 S.W .2d 116, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . The weig ht give n to eac h fac tor is left to the discre tion of the trial c ourt as long as it comports with the sentenc ing principles and purposes of our c ode and as long as its findings a

re supported by

the re cord. I d.

The trial c ourt found t he ex istence of enhanc ement factor (2), “the defe ndant has a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior i n addition to those nece ssary to establish the appropriate rang e.” T enn. C o d e Ann. § 40-35-114. Acc ording to the prese ntence report, the appellant had a conviction for vandalism involving an automobile acc ident. As a result, t h e t rial

c ou rt e nh a nc e d th e se nte nc e fr om o ne (1 ) y e ar t o tw o ( 2) y e ars . The tr ia l cou rt ma de it c le ar that it was not enhancing the appe llant’s sentenc e on the ba sis of the three p ri o r DUI ’s, but on the vandalism conviction. This Court has rec og nized that a single prior misdemea nor convic tion may support an enhanceme nt of the def endant’ s sentence , even when unrelated in nature to the curr ent char g e. See e .g ., State v. Wil lie Givens, No. M2000- 0 2883-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1400049 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 28, 2002). The a ppellant has failed to prove that the se ntence was improper. This issue is without merit.-7- Conclusion

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tria l c ou rt a nd re ma ndthe c a se to the trial court for the limited purpose of corr ecting the judg ments.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE