1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JONATHAN SOLOMON, 

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 22-3137 (JEB)

DECHERT LLP, et al.,

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jonathan “Jay” Solomon, former chief foreign-affairs correspondent for the Wall Street 

Journal, was no stranger to having his name appear in the news, although he was more 

accustomed to showing up in the byline than in the headlines. That all changed in June 2017, 

when a story broke accusing him of maintaining an improper business relationship with one of 

his sources, prompting the Journal to fire him. Plaintiff has brought this suit against multiple

individuals and businesses allegedly responsible for leaking his communications with that 

source. He claims that Defendants embarked on a campaign to discredit and silence him and are 

thus liable under a number of statutes, including the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 

Now that certain Defendants — including a prominent law firm — have been dismissed, 

those remaining are two groups of alleged hackers and one communications consulting firm and 

its employees. They now separately move to dismiss all of Solomon’s claims. As the Court 

agrees that the Amended Complaint does not adequately allege the elements of his federal 

causes of action, it will dismiss those counts and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over his state-law claims.
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I. Background 

At this stage, the Court sets forth the facts as pled in the Complaint, assuming them to be 

true. See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). They read 

in certain parts like a mashup of elements from international TV thrillers “The Bureau” and 

“Tehran.” Solomon was the chief foreign-affairs correspondent for the Journal’s Washington, 

D.C., bureau for nearly two decades, where he “covered national security and U.S. foreign 

policy.” ECF No. 47 (Am. Compl.), ¶ 11. Though a resident of the District, Solomon had 

postings in the Middle East and various regions of Asia. Id. 

 In 2013, he “broke news on a money laundering scheme designed to help Iran evade 

U.S. sanctions.” Id., ¶¶ 11, 34. His reporting was based on two types of sources. The first was 

a series of briefings by “American and Israeli intelligence officials,” from whom Solomon 

learned that Iran was attempting to circumvent American sanctions and launder money by 

having “three moneymen for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (‘IRGC’)” purchase 

various businesses within the Republic of Georgia. Id., ¶ 33. One of these transactions, and the 

one most critical to this case, involved a Georgian hotel sold to these moneymen by Sheikh 

Saud, the ruler of Ras Al Khaimah, one of the seven United Arab Emirates. Id. Solomon’s 

other source was Farhad Azima, an international businessman, whom Plaintiff describes as 

“critical” to his reporting. Id., ¶¶ 33, 37. Azima helped broker some of the above-mentioned 

transactions and “at the time was on good terms with Sheikh Saud.” Id., ¶ 33. 

 Following the publication of Plaintiff’s story, the Georgian government took swift action 

to prevent Iran from carrying out its unlawful scheme. It reportedly began requiring visas for 

Iranian nationals in July 2013 and also “froze 150 Iranian bank accounts in the country” around 

the same time. Id., ¶ 34. The U.S. Treasury Department also got involved, placing the three 
3 

IRGC moneymen on the sanctions list in early 2014. Id., ¶ 58. These counter-responses 

consequently prevented Sheikh Saud from selling his Georgian hotel, upending what appears to 

have been a lucrative deal and exposing him to potential legal penalties by the United States for 

sanctions evasion. Id., ¶ 34 Solomon believes that his reporting and the subsequent reaction it 

inspired led Saud to see him as a “person of concern” around this time. Id. 

 The people Saud was really worried about, however, were Azima and his purported coconspirators. The Sheikh came to suspect that Azima was working for and with, inter alia, 

Khater Massaad, the former CEO of Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority (RAKIA), as well 

as one of the Sheikh’s brothers to “remove [him] with the assistance of Abu Dhabi.” Id., ¶ 59; 

see also id., ¶ 60 (“[The Sheikh] identified Mr. Azima as . . . a significant threat.”). In an effort 

to “eliminate any threats they and/or others posed to his power,” Saud retained a team of 

lawyers from Dechert LLP that included David Gerrard and David Hughes. Id., ¶ 60. Under 

the guise of investigating fraudulent activity at RAKIA during Massaad’s tenure, the Dechert 

team allegedly embarked on shocking conduct far beyond the pale for attorneys. See id., ¶ 36 

(alleging that enterprise comprising Dechert lawyers engaged in “fraud, human rights abuses, 

kidnappings, torture, extortion,” and “attacks against the free press,” among other acts of 

intimidation). 

 Their opening act, according to Solomon, was the kidnapping and illegal detention of 

Jordanian businessman Karam Al Sadeq. Id., ¶¶ 61, 64. On September 2014, Al Sadeq was 

forcibly taken from his home and interrogated by Gerrard and Hughes. Id., ¶ 64. They sought 

to get Al Sadeq to (falsely) confess that Azima and his co-conspirators had committed various 

kinds of fraud against RAKIA and Sheikh Saud. Id., ¶¶ 68–69. Gerrard and Hughes allegedly 

threatened Al Sadeq and his wife, and they also kept him in solitary confinement at an 
4 

unofficial prison site to coerce him into giving up any information he had on Azima. Id., ¶¶ 64, 

67–68. Al Sadeq eventually broke and “signed statements confessing to his involvement in 

alleged fraud,” and he remains in jail today despite promises that he would be set free if he 

confessed. Id., ¶¶ 70–71. 

 Azima learned of this treatment of Al Sadeq later in 2014, and he tried to expose these 

“human rights abuses” and the Dechert lawyers’ role. Id., ¶ 73. It was at this point that Azima 

became the focus of the Dechert team’s efforts to protect Sheikh Saud and themselves from 

criticism. Id., ¶¶ 73–74. The team joined up with Defendants Andrew Frank and Amir 

Handjani — the president of KARV Communications, Inc. and a special advisor at KARV, 

respectively — to devise a plan to “go after” Azima. Id., ¶ 74. Initially, they planned to harm 

him by filing civil and criminal lawsuits against him to “cause him to incur significant financial 

damages” and by planting negative stories about him in the media. Id., ¶ 75.

 To this strategy was added the “hack and dump scheme” that is the crux of the case at 

hand. Id., ¶ 78. The scheme, in essence, was to hack Azima’s email accounts and post his 

communications with third parties elsewhere on the internet where agents of Dechert could 

retrieve them. The enterprise set up at least three separate teams to assist in this effort. (The 

reader may take comfort in knowing that, while it is important to detail the alleged scheme in 

this RICO case, keeping all the Defendants straight is not critical to the resolution of the 

Motion.) The first team, which included Defendants Nicholas Del Rosso and his company, 

Vital Management Services, Inc., was tasked with gaining access to Azima’s email account and 

dumping tranches of his data onto online locations that could then be accessed by the other 

teams. Id. To achieve this, Del Rosso hired a hacking firm that used “phishing and spearphishing emails” to eventually lure Azima into providing his login information. Id., ¶¶ 83–85. 
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That hacking firm, CyberRoot, is located in India. Id., ¶ 84. At some point in 2016, Del Rosso

was able to obtain “persistent access” to Azima’s email accounts and to his communications 

with Solomon. Id., ¶ 85. Either directly or indirectly, Saud and Dechert paid Del Rosso

substantial amounts for his work. Id., ¶ 81. 

 The next team, which included Defendant Amit Forlit and his companies, Defendants

SDC-Gadot and Insight Research and Analysis, LLC, worked with Gerrard purportedly to aid in 

investigating allegations of fraud at RAKIA. Id., ¶¶ 8, 78, 87. In reality, Forlit was to help 

Dechert lawyers “independently locate the hacked and dumped emails” and disclose their online 

locations to the law firm. Id., ¶¶ 87–88. Solomon speculates that Forlit was brought in to give 

Dechert and its lawyers “plausible deniability.” Id., ¶ 78. It appears that in August 2016, Forlit 

and his team did what they were hired to do, sharing a link to Azima’s data with Stuart Page, 

another team member, who then passed the link to Gerrard. Id., ¶ 97. This team, too, was paid 

handsomely for its work by Saud through “a variety of [Ras Al Khaimah] entities.” Id., ¶ 80. 

 The third team consisted of employees at NTi, “a firm recommended by” Del Rosso’s 

lawyer, and their job was to download Azima’s emails and provide them to the Dechert team. 

Id., ¶ 78. NTi eventually did download the data obtained from Azima’s account and gave it to 

Gerrard and his team, although the timing of these events is unclear. Id., ¶ 98. Solomon alleges 

that this firm was also “directly or indirectly paid by [Ras Al Khaimah] entities or Defendant 

Dechert” but does not provide any specifics on payments to this team. Id., ¶ 78. 

 After Del Rosso successfully gained access to Azima’s accounts, Gerrard met with 

Azima on July 2016 to “threaten[] him.” Id., ¶ 90. Azima returned the favor, vowing to go to 

Solomon with Dechert and Sheikh Saud’s “human rights abuses and racketeering activity.” Id.

¶ 90. Unfortunately for Solomon, “members of the enterprise” had become interested in taking 
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another look at the abortive sale of the Georgian hotel back in 2013 — a sale that Solomon, 

through his reporting, had a part in thwarting — around the time of this meeting. Id., ¶¶ 91–92. 

These unhappy coincidences, Solomon fears, made him a new target of Defendants’ efforts to 

silence the Sheikh’s critics. 

 His fears were quickly confirmed when, a few days after the meeting between Azima 

and Gerrard, Del Rosso dumped the data he had obtained onto blog sites accusing Azima of 

fraud. Id., ¶ 93. Among these was a blog that linked to “an entire confidential file . . . dedicated 

to Mr. Azima’s relationship with Mr. Solomon.” Id. This data tranche was entitled “Fraud 

Between Farhad Azima and Jay Solomon.” Id., ¶ 94. As if that were not enough, Defendants 

also shared this data tranche with Solomon’s employer at the time, the Wall Street Journal. Id., 

¶ 99. “[W]hen it posted and disseminated the stolen emails,” the enterprise “falsely 

implicate[d]” Solomon in “hundreds of millions of dollars of fraudulent transactions.” Id. 

Specifically, Defendants’ actions left the impression that Solomon had played a role in arms 

trafficking in the Middle East, working with others to instigate a coup against the royal family 

of Kuwait and agreeing to join a company established by Azima called Denx. Id., ¶¶ 101, 106. 

The communications between Solomon and Azima were also shared with other media outlets in 

order to “plant[] false and disparaging stories” about the dealings between the two. Id., ¶ 99. 

 In December of 2016, Solomon was confronted by lawyers from Dow Jones, the parent 

of the Journal, about the allegations against him relating to Denx. Id., ¶¶ 101–103. Plaintiff

denied the allegations but noticed that his employer nevertheless began treating him differently. 

Id., ¶ 104. For instance, it withdrew Solomon’s nomination for the Pulitzer Prize and “declined 

to accept a National Press Club award” he had won. Id. Despite this, Plaintiff remained at his 

job until June 2017, when an AP reporter published a story accusing him of “potentially being 
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party to a string of criminal activities in tandem with” Azima. Id., ¶¶ 104–05. The story mostly 

recounted the allegations described above, but they proved too much for the Journal. Id., ¶ 106. 

It consequently fired Solomon on June 21, 2017. Id.

 Defendants, however, were not done with Solomon and Azima. Between 2019 and 2020 

they published, or helped to publish, a number of articles describing the data obtained from 

Azima’s accounts. Id., ¶¶ 110–111. According to Plaintiff, these articles led to his losing out 

on a potential book deal because he was “blacklisted by the publishing industry due to the 

negative press.” Id., ¶ 114. They also cost him speaking engagements for the same reason, 

despite the fact that he had been giving speeches on international affairs regularly since 2017. 

Id., ¶ 115. 

 That was the end of it — or so Solomon thought. Recent and independent litigation 

between Azima and Defendants revealed the extent to which Defendants have attempted to 

cover up their alleged misconduct “over the last four years.” Id., ¶ 108. For example, they

adopted complex protocols for ensuring that there were no paper trails of Forlit’s reports on the 

hacking scheme. Id., ¶¶ 116–119. They also lied to American and British courts about how and 

from whom they got Azima’s data. Id., ¶¶ 125, 129. In July 2018, Hughes submitted a filing to 

a court in this district stating that an independent PR firm “innocently found” Azima’s data 

online. Id., ¶ 125. Then, in August 2018, Dechert stated in a D.C. Circuit brief that Azima’s 

data was “obtained via publicly available internet sources.” Id. During the proceedings before 

the district court, Dechert and Gerrard also hid until July 2021 the fact that Gerrard’s various 

firm-assigned mobile devices — some fifteen in total — were either lost or destroyed. Id., 

¶¶ 149–150. 
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 Across the pond, Dechert helped Stuart Page prepare a witness statement for a lawsuit 

between Ras Al Khaimah and Azima in which he attested that Madji Halabi, one of Forlit’s 

subcontractors, was the person who discovered Azima’s data online and notified Defendants 

about its existence. Id., ¶¶ 133–36. In a later witness statement filed in January 2022, Page 

recanted “most if not all of this testimony” and accused Gerrard and others of perjuring 

themselves. Id., 134 His corrected statement explained that he had negotiated with Forlit, who 

“was retained to perform certain hacking efforts.” Id., ¶ 43. Hughes, moreover, submitted a 

sworn statement in November 2018 stating that the data was obtained “from an unnamed 

individual who was not an agent” of Sheikh Saud. Id., ¶ 129. That “unnamed individual” was

Halabi, one of Forlit’s subcontractors, according to a December 2018 statement submitted by 

Hughes in the same U.K. proceeding. Id., ¶ 131. In their own witness statement, Del Rosso 

“denied any involvement in the hacking” and hid the identity of the Indian firm with whom he 

had contracted, CyberRoot. Id., ¶ 146. The English court presiding over the proceedings 

between Azima and Ras Al Khaimah recently found that this story of innocent data discovery 

was “not true,” though it believed that the “true facts” about how Azima’s data was obtained 

were not yet known. Id., ¶ 144. 

 Armed with this knowledge, Solomon filed this suit in October 2022. See ECF No. 1 

(Initial Compl.). After Defendants each independently moved to dismiss, Solomon filed an 

Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading here. See Am. Compl. This Complaint 

alleges nine counts against all of the Defendants: Count I (RICO violation), Count II (Computer 

Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) violation), Count III (Federal Wiretap Act (FWA) disclosure 

violation), Count IV (FWA use violation), Count V (DC Wiretap Act disclosure violation), 

Count VI (DC Wiretap Act use violation), Count VII (Tortious interference with business 
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relationships), Count VIII (DC-law civil conspiracy), and Count IX (Punitive damages). Id., ¶¶ 

180–268. 

While no settlement appears on the docket, Plaintiff has since voluntarily dismissed his 

claims against Defendants Dechert, Gerrard, and Hughes. See ECF No. 75 (Pl. Voluntary 

Dismissal). The remaining Defendants can be grouped as follows: (1) the Forlit Defendants 

(Forlit, SDC-Gadot, and Insight); (2) the Del Rosso Defendants (Del Rosso and Vital); and (3)

the KARV Defendants (KARV, Handjani, and Frank). They now move separately to dismiss 

Solomon’s Complaint in full under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See ECF Nos. 53 

(Forlit Defs. MTD), 54 (Del Rosso Defs. MTD), 56 (KARV Defs. MTD).

II. Legal Standard 

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a complaint fails to “state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Although “detailed factual allegations” are not 

necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 

quotations marks and citation omitted). In weighing a motion to dismiss, a court “may consider 

only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the 

complaint[,] and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis 

Xavier Parochial School, 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The court “must treat the 

complaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant [the] plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences 

that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 

1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) 

(internal citations omitted). It need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as 
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a factual allegation” or an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. 

Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 

286 (1986)). 

III. Analysis 

Before engaging with the merits, Defendants raise two threshold issues — venue and 

statute of limitations — which the Court will contend with at the outset. It next considers all of

Plaintiff’s federal causes of action. In doing so, it explains why each count attempts to fit 

square-peg allegations into round-hole statutes. As all thus fail to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, the Court will dismiss these counts and decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over what remains. 

A. Venue 

As an initial matter, the Del Rosso Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for 

improper venue. See Del Rosso Defs. MTD at 14. The Court need not linger here because 

Solomon did not respond to this challenge in his Opposition. See ECF No. 65 (Opposition); 

ECF No. 69 (Del Rosso Reply) at 7. He has accordingly conceded the point, and the Court will 

dismiss the various counts in this case as to these Defendants. See Wannall v. Honeywell, 775 

F.3d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a party files an opposition to a motion and therein 

addresses only some of the movant’s arguments, the court may treat the unaddressed arguments 

as conceded.”). Had Plaintiff successfully disputed this issue, moreover, the claims against the 

Del Rosso Defendants would still be dismissed for the reasons given below. 

B. Statutes of Limitations

Next up is the question of whether the applicable statutes of limitations bar the federal 

counts. Solomon filed this suit in October 2022. See Initial Compl. Defendants date the last
11 

possible accrual of his claims to June 2017, when he lost his job as a result of reporting on his 

hacked emails. See ECF No. 71 (Joint Reply) at 4; Am. Compl., ¶¶ 11–15. If that is correct, 

Plaintiff does not dispute that all of his claims would be untimely, assuming that no tolling is 

called for. Solomon points instead to the January 7, 2022, filing of Stuart Page’s witness 

statement in Azima’s U.K. proceedings — which revealed the identity and involvement of 

Forlit as well as key details about the hacking scheme — as the moment his claims sprung into 

being. See Opp. at 6, 8; Am. Compl., ¶ 43. Alternatively, he contends that even if they accrued 

earlier, they were tolled until that date because Defendants fraudulently concealed their alleged 

wrongdoing. See Opp. at 6–7, 10–11. Plaintiff also suggests that, at the very least, he may 

pursue RICO claims for the additional injuries he suffered as late as 2020, when new articles 

reported on his correspondence with Azima, prolonging and entrenching Solomon’s 

reputational damage. Id. at 15–16; Am. Compl., ¶¶ 110–15. The Court first examines the 

accrual of RICO and CFAA claims, moves onto their tolling, and concludes with the FWA. 

1. RICO and CFAA Accrual

RICO claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Agency Holding Corp. v. 

Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987). CFAA claims, conversely, must be 

brought “within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the date of the discovery of the 

damage.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). For claims under both statutes, the clock starts when the 

claimant discovers the injury, not necessarily when he discovers the other elements of the claim. 

See id.; Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000). 

The Court concludes that Solomon’s RICO and CFAA claims accrued no later than June 

2017, when he became aware of his glaringly obvious injury — namely, termination. That 

conclusion flows from the crystal-clear holding in Rotella, see 528 U.S. at 555 (“[D]iscovery of 
12 

the injury, not discovery of the other elements of a claim, is what starts the clock.”), and the 

equally unambiguous statutory text of the CFAA. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (claims accrue no 

later than “the date of the discovery of the damage”). In arguing otherwise, Solomon at times

conflates the accrual question with the tolling one. See Opp. at 9 (citing Richards v. Mileski, 

662 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). The Court will address those contentions in its subsequent 

tolling analysis.

Solomon also reads Rotella as holding that a plaintiff must know the identity of the 

perpetrators — which he allegedly did not until years after discovering his injury — for RICO

claims to accrue. For that reading, he relies on Rotella’s discussion of another case, United 

States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), which noted that “a plaintiff in possession of the critical 

facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury . . . is no longer at the mercy of” a 

defendant who holds all the facts. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 556 (quoting Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122). 

Plaintiff takes this quotation out of context, however. Rotella cited Kubrick in support of its 

categorical statement that “the justification for a discovery rule does not extend beyond the 

injury.” Id. at 555–56. If Kubrick preferred Solomon’s accrual rule, which is far from clear 

based on the quoted dicta, Rotella nowhere endorses it. See Robert L. Kroenlein Tr. ex rel. 

Alden v. Kirchhefer, 764 F.3d 1268, 1278 n.7 (10th Cir. 2014) (rejecting argument identical to 

Solomon’s).

It is true that Rotella did not confront the particular question posed here — viz., whether 

a plaintiff must know his perpetrators’ identities. It instead resolved a circuit split concerning 

whether knowledge of a pattern of RICO activity is necessary for accrual, concluding that it is 

not. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555–58. Still, the Court’s broad holding that “discovery of the injury, 

not discovery of the other elements of a claim, is what starts the clock,” cannot be squared with 
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Plaintiff’s interpretation. Id. at 555 (emphasis added); see also Kirchhefer, 764 F.3d at 1278 

(“[A] RICO victim need not have actual knowledge of exactly who committed the RICO 

predicate act resulting in the injury for a civil RICO claim to accrue.”). Solomon knew by June 

2017 that he had been the victim of a so-called hack-and-smear operation. See Am. Compl., 

¶¶ 17, 106–07 (acknowledging that when he was fired, he knew his emails had been hacked). 

That he did not know all of the details regarding the cause of that injury, a separate RICO 

element, is irrelevant under Rotella. As Plaintiff makes no separate arguments concerning the 

accrual of his CFAA claims, the Court will not ponder any further whether the clear text of 

§ 1030(g) leaves room for an exception when a plaintiff has not identified the wrongdoer behind 

his harm. 

2. RICO and CFAA Tolling

Coming up short on accrual, Solomon alternatively maintains that tolling saves his 

bacon. He asserts with some force that Defendants’ fraudulent concealment made him unaware 

of their identities. The Court agrees that even after a claim has accrued upon discovery of an 

injury, RICO is “subject to equitable principles of tolling.” Rotella, 528 U.S. at 560. 

“Fraudulent concealment . . . tolls the running of the statute of limitations” when “(1)

defendants engaged in a course of conduct designed to conceal evidence of their alleged wrongdoing and (2) the plaintiffs were not on actual or constructive notice of that evidence, despite 

(3) their exercise of diligence.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

(cleaned up). The CFAA’s statute of limitations is similarly tolled by a defendant’s fraudulent 

concealment. See Quick v. EduCap, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 3d 121, 143 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Fraudulent 

concealment is an ‘equitable doctrine [that] is read into every federal statute of limitations.’”)

(quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946)); Egilman v. Keller & Heckman, 
14 

LLP, 401 F. Supp. 2d 105, 111 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying fraudulent-concealment precedent in 

CFAA case). 

Defendants do not dispute that their actions as alleged would amount to fraudulent 

concealment. They maintain instead that because Solomon nonetheless had sufficient notice of 

his claim, tolling is not justified. See Joint Reply at 5–8. That rejoinder ignores a crucial gap in 

Solomon’s knowledge. In other words, the question is whether — his awareness of his injuries 

and some of those responsible aside — Solomon’s blindness to the involvement of all of the 

remaining Defendants tolls the statute of limitations for these counts. Although such blindness 

does not prevent accrual of these claims, it does toll the statute of limitations when a defendant 

is directly at fault for a plaintiff’s lack of awareness. See Solano v. Delmed, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 

847, 854 (D.D.C. 1991) (applying different standards for accrual and tolling). 

The notice required to defeat a tolling argument is “something closer to actual notice 

than the merest inquiry notice that would be sufficient to set the statute of limitations running in 

a situation untainted by fraudulent concealment.” Riddell v. Riddell Wash. Corp., 866 F.2d 

1480, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In addition, the Court “must probe a plaintiff’s knowledge to 

determine whether he was on notice of all possible defendants, and not just a subgroup, as well 

as the particular cause of action.” Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled 

in part on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 

507 U.S. 163 (1993). “[S]imply because a person knows he has been injured by one person 

cannot reasonably mean he should be held to know of every other participant.” Id. 

Defendants are correct that Solomon had actual knowledge by June 2017 that his 

communications with Azima had been hacked and released to his employer and the press. See

Am. Compl., ¶¶ 106–07. They are also correct that the 2017 complaint Azima filed here and 
15 

the press coverage of the same sufficiently put Plaintiff on notice that now-dismissed 

Defendants Dechert, Gerrard, and Hughes were involved in the alleged scheme. See Azima v. 

RAK Investment Auth., No. 16-1948, ECF No. 28 (Amended Complaint), ¶¶ 5, 23, 32, 35, 49, 

53 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2016) (implicating Dechert, Gerrard, and Hughes in hacking scheme); ECF 

No. 55 (Dechert MTD) at 15 n.4 (collecting articles published about Azima’s lawsuit); Joint 

Reply at 7 (citing collection of articles in Dechert MTD); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate 

Antitrust Litig., 2004 WL 7081446, at *1 (D.D.C. May 18, 2004) (holding that highly public 

lawsuits gave notice); Nader v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 567 F.3d 692, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(“[I]t would be strange if the Washington Post could discover facts about Nader’s life that he 

couldn’t reasonably discover himself, especially because, unlike the Post writers, Nader could 

have read about it in the paper.”). 

Yet, nothing in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint or in the public domain of which the 

Court may take judicial notice suggests that Solomon was on notice of the remaining 

Defendants’ involvement when his claims accrued. Particularly so as to Defendants Handjani, 

Frank, and KARV, who were never named in one of Azima’s lawsuits or identified in a witness 

statement. Solomon was not put on notice of Del Rosso and Vital’s involvement, moreover, 

until Azima filed suit against them in the Middle District of North Carolina on October 15, 

2020. Azima v. Del Rosso, No. 20-954, ECF No. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 1 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2020) 

(“Defendants Del Rosso and Vital oversaw and directed the hacking of Plaintiff Farhad 

Azima.”). The North Carolina suit was filed less than two years before Plaintiff filed his own 

suit on October 14, 2022, making all of Solomon’s claims against Del Rosso and Vital timely if 

the Court concludes that tolling is appropriate. Similarly, Solomon alleges that he was not on 

notice of Forlit, SDC-Gadot, and Insight’s role in the scheme until January 2022, when Page 
16 

filed an amended witness statement in the U.K. judicial proceeding intimating as much. See

Am. Compl., ¶ 43. Discovery might adduce additional facts about Solomon’s awareness of 

Defendants’ roles, but these are the only facts currently in play. At this point, therefore, tolling 

preserves Plaintiff’s claims.

One more related point of law deserves the Court’s attention. “[T]the relationship of the 

defendants, together with other facts, may establish as a matter of law that a reasonable plaintiff 

with knowledge of the misconduct of one coconspirator would have conducted an investigation 

as to the other.” Nader, 567 F.3d at 702 (cleaned up). In Nader, presidential candidate Ralph 

Nader alleged a conspiracy between the DNC, the Kerry presidential campaign, and groups that

brought frivolous ballot-access lawsuits to drain Nader’s campaign resources. Id. at 694–95. 

Nader’s awareness that the DNC was paying the lawyers bringing the frivolous suits put him on 

notice of his claims against the DNC. Id. at 702. The court further held that “given the 

relationship between the Kerry Campaign and the DNC at the time of the 2004 election, we 

cannot see how the campaign would have fallen outside the zone of reasonable suspicion.” Id. 

In Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1977), a government employee 

alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for giving congressional testimony. Id. at 222. The 

court held that Fitzgerald’s knowledge of claims against higher-level officials in the Air Force 

put him on notice of his claims against “lesser fry” in the Air Force whose “identity and 

participation were earlier unknown.” Id. at 229. By contrast, Fitzgerald was not on notice of 

his claims against a White House aide, who was “a person of influence in a different center of 

power.” Id. Together, Nader and Fitzgerald reveal that a plaintiff must make obvious 

inferences based on relationships between known and unknown defendants, but need not leap to 

conclusions where a connection between the bad actors is not readily discernible. 
17 

The Court cannot hold as a matter of law that Plaintiff was aware of an association 

between the bad actors he knew of and the Defendants moving to dismiss here. Considering 

what is pled in the Amended Complaint, the only public association between the relevant actors

was that Handjani had served as a Foreign Registered Agent for Ras Al Khaima. See Am. 

Compl., ¶ 6. Even assuming that a FARA filing would sufficiently alert Solomon without any 

media attention, the association does not suffice to put him on notice without further factual 

development. See Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1209 (“[B]ecause statute of limitations issues often 

depend on contested questions of fact, dismissal is appropriate only if the complaint on its face 

is conclusively time-barred.”) (emphasis added). In addition, Defendants point to no publicly 

known relationship between the known bad actors and the KARV or Forlit Defendants, so it 

cannot be said that Solomon should have discovered their role. The Court accordingly finds 

tolling of his RICO and CFAA claims warranted based on the facts as alleged in the Amended 

Complaint.

3. Federal Wiretap Act

Plaintiff contends that the same result should obtain for his Federal Wiretap Act count 

since “[a]t the time of [his] firing . . . , [he] believed that he [had been] hacked by Iran,” rather 

than Defendants. See Am. Compl., ¶ 107. The FWA statute of limitations, however, operates 

differently from RICO’s and the CFAA’s. FWA claims “may not be commenced later than two 

years after the date upon which the claimant first has a reasonable opportunity to discover the 

violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2520(e). In other words, “if the plaintiff had such notice as would lead 

a reasonable person either to sue or to launch an investigation that would likely uncover the 

requisite facts,” her FWA claims have accrued. Sparshott v. Feld Ent., Inc., 311 F.3d 425, 429 

(D.C. Cir. 2002). FWA claims, unlike RICO and CFAA claims, are not tolled by an allegation 
18 

of fraudulent concealment. Id. at 431 (“[W]here Congress has chosen a formula (‘reasonable 

opportunity to discover’) for a specific and obviously self-concealing crime such as 

wiretapping, we question whether it would make sense to suppose that fraudulent concealment 

could alter the test (as opposed to altering the underlying facts to which it is applied).”). 

The Circuit caselaw gives somewhat unclear guidance on whether a plaintiff must have 

an opportunity to uncover who caused her injuries for FWA claims to accrue. The leading case, 

Sparshott, explains in dicta that “[a] plaintiff need not even know the perpetrators of an illicit 

wiretapping if knowledge of the wiretapping itself would lead to discovery of the perpetrators.” 

311 F.3d at 430. It could thus be read to mean that an FWA claim does not accrue absent a 

likelihood of uncovering who had improperly listened in. 

Complicating that interpretation, however, Sparshott also cites with approval two cases 

that point in the opposite direction. First, it cites Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484 (9th 

Cir. 1984), and its holding that “[d]iscovery of the cause of one’s injury, however, does not 

mean knowing who is responsible for it.” Id. at 486; Sparshott, 311 F.3d at 430. In addition, 

Sparshott relies on Andes v. Knox, 905 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1990), which holds that FWA accrual 

occurs “when the claimant has a reasonable opportunity to discover the violation, not when she 

discovers the true identity of the violator or all of the violators.” Id. at 189; Sparshott, 311 F.3d 

at 430. Sparshott could, therefore, stand for the contrary proposition that a plaintiff need not be 

able to identify the wiretapper for accrual to occur. See, e.g., Directv, Inc. v. Thomas, 329 F. 

Supp. 2d 949, 952 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citing Sparshott in explaining that “a wiretap plaintiff 

need not know the identity of the specific violator” for purposes of accrual); Maddalena v. 

Toole, 2013 WL 5491869, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2013) (similar). 
19 

In short, the caselaw does not provide a straightforward answer on the accrual of 

Plaintiff’s FWA claim. It also does not fully contend with the particular circumstances of a 

plaintiff who, as here, has communications intercepted by shadowy private actors — as opposed 

to by the Government — which might make identification more difficult. The Court, 

accordingly, will not wade into such murky waters by taking a position on this issue. See Liff 

v. Off. of the Inspector Gen. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 156 F. Supp. 3d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2016), rev’d on 

other grounds, 881 F.3d 912 (2018) (declining to decide statute-of-limitations issue at motionto-dismiss stage because, in part, “the law appears sufficiently unsettled”); cf. Schubarth v. 

Federal Republic of Germany, 2020 WL 13065292, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2020) (“The 

timeliness of a claim is a nonjurisdictional threshold requirement.”) (cleaned up) (quoting Matar 

v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 910 F.3d 538, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2018)). This course is particularly 

prudent here, where the Court will dismiss the FWA count for other reasons, as discussed 

below. 

C. RICO

Turning to the merits, Plaintiff alleges in Count I that Defendants conspired in violation 

of RICO. That statute makes it illegal to conspire to commit certain enumerated offenses. It is 

unlawful for anyone “employed by or associated with any enterprise . . . to conduct or 

participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 

racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d); see also United States v. Eiland, 738 F.3d 

338, 360 (D.C. Cir. 2013). To articulate a RICO conspiracy, then, Solomon must allege that 
20 

Defendants participated in the “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of 

racketeering activity.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). 

For purposes of this Motion, it is particularly relevant that hacking and disseminating 

private information do not count as racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Plaintiff 

has nonetheless alleged four sets of predicate crimes that are cognizable under RICO: (1) the 

kidnapping and extortion of Al Sadeq; (2) money laundering in the form of payments to 

facilitate the enterprise’s activities; (3) obstruction of justice and wire fraud to cover up those 

activities; and (4) wire fraud associated with Defendants’ hacking operation and their 

subsequent dissemination of Azima’s emails. See Opp. at 31–49 (organizing offenses into 

roughly these categories).

In seeking dismissal, Defendants argue, among other things, that none of these alleged

RICO predicate offenses proximately caused his injuries. To the extent that wire fraud 

conceivably could have done so, they say, that offense is facially deficient as pled.

1. Proximate Cause

A RICO plaintiff must show that a RICO predicate act proximately caused his alleged 

injuries. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495; Greenpeace, Inc. v. Down Chemical Co., 808 F. Supp. 

2d 262, 269 (D.D.C. 2011). In elucidating RICO’s proximate-cause requirement, the Supreme 

Court has focused on the need for a “direct relationship” between the injury and the predicate 

act. Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992). A direct relationship does 

not exist where “a plaintiff . . . complain[s] of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited 

upon a third person by the defendant’s acts.” Id. at 268–69. Put differently, if “the conduct 
21 

directly causing the harm [is] distinct from the conduct giving rise to the [offense],” causation is 

overly attenuated. Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 11 (2010). 

Solomon’s first challenge is thus to link one of the alleged predicate offenses to his 

injuries — namely, his loss of employment and business opportunities. His pickings for this 

endeavor are slim. The kidnapping and extortion offenses have next to nothing to do with 

Solomon, and his injuries cannot reasonably be traced to them. Indeed, Plaintiff’s name does 

not appear once in his attestation of the kidnapping and extortion predicates. See Am. Compl., 

¶¶ 63–71. Even setting aside the lack of temporal proximity — the kidnapping took place in 

2014, nearly three years before Solomon was fired — Al Sadeq was allegedly kidnapped to 

obtain information about Azima, not Solomon. Id., ¶ 64. Any causal connection is so remote as 

to be nonexistent. 

The alleged money laundering boasts an only slightly more robust connection to 

Plaintiff’s injuries. Indeed, even in his Opposition, Solomon barely argues the causal link at all. 

He asserts without explanation that the “money laundering transactions were in furtherance of 

the scheme to defraud and deplatform,” which in turn “cognizably damaged Solomon.” Opp. at 

48; see also Am. Compl., ¶ 194. As Plaintiff’s contention recognizes, the payments from Ras 

Al Khaima to Defendants caused his injuries only to the extent that they promoted a “specified 

unlawful activity” that itself caused the injuries. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A). His argument 

on this score therefore rises and falls with his arguments as to the other predicate acts. 

Solomon next maintains that the alleged cover-up — including acts of both obstruction 

and wire fraud — injured him because it “caused [him] to be unable to take legal steps to restore 

his reputation.” Opp. at 55. That proposition is far too speculative to sustain. To start, 

reputational rehabilitation through legal action is an uncertain prospect. More importantly and
22 

as previously discussed, Solomon was on notice of key aspects of his claims and could have 

brought suit against Dechert, Gerrard, and Hughes much earlier. It was Solomon’s failure to do 

so, not Defendants’ cover-up, that caused any prolonged reputational damage worked by the 

delay in legal action. 

Last up are the remaining alleged acts of wire fraud, which present a closer question 

than the other malfeasance. The Court will follow Plaintiff’s lead in separating these acts into 

email procurement (the hacking) and email dissemination (the smearing). See Opp. at 33–37. 

The email-procurement fraud was not the direct cause of any injury to Solomon because that 

offense was perpetrated against Azima. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 78–79. It involved Azima’s

privacy and property, not Solomon’s. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268–69 (explaining that “harm 

flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant’s acts” do not 

create direct relationship). 

Solomon nevertheless insists that his injuries were the “foreseeable and intended result” 

of Defendants’ actions. See Opp. at 36. The Court has its doubts that harm to Plaintiff was a 

foreseeable result of the hacking, as there is no indication that Defendants had any inkling that 

they would uncover the emails in question by hacking Azima. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 37–38, 76–

77, 90 (recognizing that directions to look for communications with Solomon were given 

months after hacking scheme formulated). That aside, Solomon’s reliance on foreseeability is 

misplaced, as the direct-relationship test primarily governs in RICO claims. See Hemi Grp., 

559 U.S. at 11–12 (rejecting foreseeability inquiry); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 

451, 458 (2006) (holding defendant’s tax fraud did not bear direct relationship to competing 

business’s injury even though fraud could have facilitated defendant’s harmful price cuts). 

Moreover, “[t]he requirement of a direct causal connection is especially warranted where the 
23 

immediate victims of an alleged RICO violation can be expected to vindicate the laws by 

pursuing their own claims,” Anza, 547, U.S. at 460, and Azima has done just that in several 

lawsuits. See, e.g., Azima v. Del Rosso, No. 20-954 (M.D.N.C.); Azima v. RAK Investment 

Auth., No. 16-1948 (D.D.C.). 

That leaves Solomon with one remaining path to satisfying the causation element: the 

email-dissemination fraud. It is certainly true that his injury most clearly stems from 

Defendants’ broadcasting his emails to his employer and the press, but even that causal 

connection is not so simple because of intervening acts. Most notably, an AP reporter decided 

to publish a story about Solomon after he received the emails from Defendants. See Am. 

Compl., ¶ 105 (stating that reporter “received his information from the stolen emails” and 

proceeded to publish because he “was not placated” by Solomon’s denial of wrongdoing). 

Additionally, the Journal decided to fire Solomon once the accusations were publicized. Id., 

¶ 106. If the reporter’s and the Journal’s decisions are properly characterized as “the 

independent actions of third and even fourth parties,” Solomon’s chain of causation from email 

dissemination to injury is too attenuated to support his RICO claim. Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 15. 

The weight of the cases suggests that when a RICO predicate act — here, wire fraud — 

was not decisive in influencing a third party’s injurious action, that predicate act did not 

proximately cause the injury. In Hemi Grp., the fraudulent act indirectly deprived New York 

City of a list of consumers who owed the city cigarette sales taxes. Id. at 5–6. The Court held 

that consumers’ independent decisions not to pay those taxes despite their obligation to do so 
24 

were too far removed from the fraud to make out a RICO claim. Id. at 15. In other words, the 

consumers made an independent choice, even if one enabled by the fraud. 

By contrast, in Companhia Brasileira Carbureto de Calcio-CBCC v. Applied Industrial

Materials Corp., 887 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2012), the court found that fraudulent antidumping 

petitions filed with the International Trade Court proximately injured the plaintiff companies

because the ITC had relied on those petitions in reaching its decision to impose antidumping 

tariffs. Id. at 21–22. In so finding, the court emphasized that the ITC had reversed its ruling 

after learning of the fraud, showing the petitions to be the deciding factor in the ITC’s decision. 

Id. at 21. The court thus distinguished a very similar antitrust case in which “it was impossible 

to tell if the ITC would have imposed antidumping duties[] independent of the alleged antitrust 

wrongdoing.” Id.; see also Midland Export, Ltd. v. Elkem Holding, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 16, 167–

68 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“Defendants can be said to have ‘caused’ the ITC’s determination only to 

the extent that their alleged price fixing and the information they supplied actually influenced 

the ITC’s decision.”). Reading these cases together, a RICO predicate that merely facilitates an 

injurious act taken by a third party who acts out of her own interests and in her own judgment 

does not proximately cause the injury. 

Applying the foregoing cases, Plaintiff’s allegations do not make out proximate cause. 

The AP reporter’s decision to publish an article about Solomon was an exercise of independent 

journalistic judgment, much like the tax-evading cigarette consumer in Hemi Grp. and the ITC’s

overdetermined tariff decision in Midland. Reporters are not required to publish every scoop 

they encounter, nor do they typically publish entirely unverified stories. The AP reporter here 

published an article citing several sources in addition to the hacked emails, all of which 

confirmed the impression that Solomon had transgressed his ethical obligations. See Jeff 
25 

Horwitz, et al., Wall Street Journal Fires Correspondent Over Ethics Conflict, Associated Press 

(Jun. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/AWB6-BWVC (citing Journal’s statement that its 

investigation “concluded that Mr. Solomon violated his ethical obligations” and statements by 

two individuals involved in business dealings with Azima confirming that “Solomon was 

involved in discussing proposed deals with Azima”). He did so despite Solomon’s denials of 

wrongdoing, which he included in the article. Id. In light of the reporter’s “expertise and 

independent decision-making process,” Solomon has not sufficiently alleged that the emails 

were decisive in the AP’s decision to publish. Midland, 947 F. Supp. at 167. 

Nor did any of Defendants’ actions play a decisive role in the Journal’s decision to fire 

Solomon. Defendants’ only attempt to directly persuade the Journal to take such a step did not 

succeed. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 103–04 (alleging Solomon retained job after Journal received 

emails). It was only when the AP reporter made his own independent decision to pursue the 

story that the Journal cut Solomon loose. Id., ¶ 106. 

Although the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants “published or caused to be 

published” additional articles about him until 2020, including on “pay-to-play websites,” id., 

¶ 110, Solomon never argues in his Opposition that the proximate-cause analysis differs as to 

this allegation. See Opp. at 53–58. In any event, this generic term (“pay-to-play websites”) is 

too vague to get him over the line. Unlike the original AP article, which was published before 

the emails were otherwise public, see Am. Compl., ¶¶ 103, 105–06, Plaintiff provides no reason 

to conclude that these follow-on articles were not the work of journalists following Solomon’s 

story through prior publications, including his own 2018 article about the debacle. See Jay 

Solomon, How Hacked Emails and a Yacht in Monaco Ended My Career at the Wall Street 

Journal, Wash. Inst. Near E. Pol’y (Mar. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/MN2D-C277. Solomon’s 
26 

attribution of these articles to Defendants’ continued conspiracy finds no supportive allegations 

in the Amended Complaint, and the Court is not bound, even at this stage of litigation, to credit 

it unthinkingly. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alleged facts must be more than “consistent 

with” an inference of wrongdoing). The Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s RICO claim for 

lack of proximate cause. 

2. Wire Fraud

Even if the Court were to find that Solomon sufficiently alleges that the email 

dissemination proximately caused his injury, he would still run headlong into the separate 

obstacle that such dissemination does not amount to wire fraud. That is so for two reasons. 

First, he has not adequately alleged any false communications in connection with the 

dissemination of his emails. Second, he has not alleged that the hack-and-smear scheme had as 

its object money or property. 

a. False Statements

A RICO claim cannot rely on “wire fraud allegations [that] identify no false statements 

or misrepresentations.” Ambellu v. Re’ese Adbarat Debre Selam Kidist Mariam, 387 F. Supp. 

3d 71, 85 (D.D.C. 2019). To overcome this hurdle, Plaintiff offers several allegations 

concerning the putative falsehood of Defendants’ communications. He first contends that the 

emails were “organized to falsely convey to an innocent viewer that Solomon engaged in 

fraud.” Opp. at 33; see Am. Compl., ¶¶ 99. Solomon also leans on the fact that Defendants 

“disseminated the stolen emails under the heading ‘fraud.’” Am. Compl., ¶¶ 99. An allegation 

also appears in the Amended Complaint that Defendants “planted false and disparaging stories 

in the press alleging that Mr. Solomon was in the middle of hundreds of millions of dollars of 

fraudulent transactions.” Id. Because the Amended Complaint does not identify what false 
27 

information was disseminated beyond the emails, however, the Court understands this 

allegation to merely repeat the allegation that Defendants — by misleadingly packaging the 

emails and calling them evidence of fraud — encouraged news coverage of the story in that 

manner. Indeed, Solomon alleges that the AP reporter “received his information from the stolen 

emails,” not some other doctored evidence sent by Defendants. Id., ¶ 105. Most importantly, 

there is no allegation that the emails were altered in any way, leaving Solomon reliant on his 

packaging and labeling claims. 

Plaintiff’s misleading-packaging theory fails because it is not supported by any specific 

allegations as to how the emails were improperly curated, cherry-picked, or arranged. Under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), a complaint alleging fraud must “state the time, place and 

content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented, and what was retained or given up 

as a consequence of the fraud.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 216 F. Supp. 3d 146, 157 

(D.D.C. 2016) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). Solomon’s vague assertion of deceptive packaging 

cannot meet that higher-than-normal pleading standard. See Bates v. Nw. Human Servs., Inc., 466 

F. Supp. 2d 69, 91 (D.D.C. 2006) (noting Rule 9(b)’s requirement for complaint to specify “what 

fraudulent statements were made and in what context, . . . and the manner in which the statements 

were misleading”) (cleaned up). The thrust of Solomon’s claim is that because the emails showed 

that he never rejected Azima’s business propositions, they created the false impression that he was 

in fact in business with Azima. See Opp. at 33 (noting that “the communications reflected an array 

of illegal and unethical conduct . . . that may have been requested of Solomon, but in which he in 

fact did not engage.”). Perhaps that kind of misimpression would be actionable if Defendants had 

held back communications in which Plaintiff refused Azima’s offers. Absent that kind of 
28 

tampering, it appears that Solomon’s main quarrel is with himself for not creating a tidier paper 

trail.

That Defendants allegedly used the descriptor “fraud” when disseminating the stolen emails 

provides even less grist for Plaintiff’s accusation of wire fraud. Such a descriptor plainly amounts 

to an expression of opinion, which cannot form the basis of a wire-fraud claim. See Ctr. for Immigr. 

Stud. v. Cohen, 410 F. Supp. 3d 183, 190 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding nonprofit’s designation of 

plaintiff organization as hate group could not constitute RICO predicate act of wire fraud 

because opinion based). Indeed, the reporting on Solomon’s emails did not accuse him of fraud as 

that term would be understood by a lawyer, but of unethical behavior. See Horwitz, supra

(entitling article “Wall Street Journal fires correspondent over ethics conflict”) (emphasis 

added). As such, Defendants’ use of the term conveyed an opinion about the seriousness of 

Solomon’s misconduct, not a false statement about what he did or did not do. Because the upshot of 

Solomon’s argument is that Defendants “advanced a conclusion that was debatable, and that this 

expression of a flawed opinion harmed plaintiff’s reputation,” the Court finds no actionable 

misrepresentation occurred. Cohen, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 190. Defendants’ dissemination of 

Solomon’s genuine emails in this manner was therefore not fraudulent. 

b. Money or Property Objective 

Another flaw in Solomon’s resort to wire fraud as a RICO predicate is that only fraudulent 

activity with money or property as its object suffices. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343; Kelly v. United States, 

140 S. Ct. 1565, 1571, 1573 (2020) (“[P]roperty must play more than some bit part in a scheme: It 

must be an ‘object of the fraud.’”) (quoting Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 (2005)). 

Solomon alleges in the main that Defendants sought to “discredit,” “silence,” and “deplatform” him. 

See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 40, 191. Those goals have little to do with money or property. No doubt, a 

journalist’s platform also happens to be his means of making money. Still, a “fraud conviction 
29 

cannot stand when the loss to the victim is only an incidental byproduct of the scheme.” Kelly, 140 

S. Ct. at 1573. 

That is true even when the incidental property loss is an unavoidable consequence of the 

scheme. In Kelly, the Court gave the example of a practical joke in which the victim is induced to 

attend a nonexistent birthday party. Id. at 1573 n.2. The object of the scheme is merely to 

embarrass the victim. That he expends resources to get to the nonexistent party does not convert the 

scheme into one meant to deprive the victim of property. Id. Likewise, a scheme to discredit a 

journalist is not necessarily a scheme to cause him financial harm, even if that outcome inevitably 

flows from the scheme’s success. Several courts have held as much in cases involving an attack on 

a professional’s reputation that affects her livelihood. See Manax v. McNamara, 660 F. Supp. 657, 

658, 660 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (holding, in case involving “an alleged conspiracy to harm [a doctor’s] 

medical practice,” that scheme to defame doctor with damaging press coverage was “one to damage 

[his] reputation . . . and is in no way a ‘fraud’ on his tangible or intangible rights”); Kimm v. Lee, 

2005 WL 89386, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2005) (dismissing claim that “false information was 

transmitted via the wires and mails to harm [plaintiff lawyer’s] business and reputation”); cf. 

Frydman v. Verschleiser, 172 F. Supp. 3d 653, 660, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that defendant 

committed wire fraud by making misrepresentations directly to plaintiff’s business partners resulting 

in “lost contracts, loans, and leases,” rather than waging broader reputational battle). 

To be sure, Plaintiff also alleges that the scheme was intended to “harm . . . his business and 

his properties.” Am. Compl., ¶ 108. The Court will not credit that conclusory allegation about 

Defendants’ intentions, however, as it is belied by the fact that Defendants took aim at his good 

name, not at his bank account or any of his physical property. Plaintiff himself refers to his 

termination as “a direct result of the Defendants[’] intentional campaign to silence and deplatform” 

him rather than a goal of the scheme. See Opp. at 34; id. at 58 (“Defendants’ larger purpose . . . was 

to silence and deplatform Solomon.”). Elsewhere, he contends that “the goals and objectives of the 
30 

enterprise . . . were to neutralize the threats against [Ras Al Khaima] and the enterprise and cover up 

the enterprise’s illegal activities.” Id. at 55. Solomon’s boilerplate effort to satisfy the elements of 

wire fraud falls flat. 

Plaintiff offers one final allegation meant to demonstrate the money or property objective of 

the scheme. He claims that “[t]he affairs of the enterprise were intended to, and have in fact 

resulted in, great financial gain for the Defendants through, inter alia, millions of dollars for their 

criminal services.” Am. Compl., ¶ 182. In other words, Ras Al Khaima paid Defendants for their 

work. That allegation misses the mark. Wire fraud does not require that Defendants had money as 

their personal object in carrying out the scheme, as true as that may be. It requires that the scheme

have as its object money or property. See Kelly, 140 S. Ct. at 1573. Payments made by a coconspirator to other members of the conspiracy result in no net gain to the enterprise. Such 

payments cannot be repackaged as the scheme’s goal rather than a method of achieving its object. 

In sum, Solomon’s RICO cause of action stumbles on the proximate-cause requirement; as 

to wire fraud, the only RICO predicate even marginally causative of his injuries, the claim does not 

satisfy two required elements. As in tennis, two faults is enough; the Court need not consider 

Defendants’ additional arguments for dismissal. 

D. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 

Defendants next assert that Count II, which alleges a violation of the CFAA, is also 

deficient. A plaintiff bringing a civil action under the CFAA must show that he suffered 

“damage or loss” resulting from a violation of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g), and he must also 

allege one of five factors found elsewhere in the statute. See id. § (c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V). The only 

possibly relevant factor here is (c)(4)(A)(i)(I), which requires an allegation of “loss to 1 or more 

persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value.” “[L]oss, in turn, is 

defined ‘to include the costs of responding to a violation and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or 
31 

other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.’” Lightfoot v. Koonz, 

McKenney, Johnson & DePaolis LLP, 2022 WL 2176923, at *3 (D.D.C. June 16, 2022) 

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11)). As the Supreme Court has noted, the statutory definition of 

loss “focus[es] on technological harms” and is “ill fitted . . . to remediating ‘misuse’ of sensitive 

information.” Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1660 (2021); cf. Andrews v. Sirius 

XM Radio Inc., 932 F.3d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he CFAA is an anti-hacking statute, 

not an expansive misappropriation statute.”) (cleaned up). 

 Plaintiff’s theory of why he has alleged a cognizable loss is as follows: Defendants’ 

alleged hacking of Azima’s account caused Solomon harm because the communications 

between him and Azima, which were obtained from the latter’s account, were disclosed to 

Solomon’s employer. See Am. Compl., ¶ 212. This in turn caused Solomon “to lose his job 

and suffer damage to his property and business and reputation.” Id. The loss of his job and the 

hit to his reputation, in turn, caused him to lose out on publishing deals and speaking 

engagements. Id., ¶ 213. And since these losses “far exceed[] $5,000 in value,” Solomon 

maintains that he has adequately pled a cognizable loss. Id., ¶ 214. Defendants respond that 

this is not the kind of loss that the CFAA makes actionable. See Forlit Defs. MTD at 34; 

KARV Defs. MTD at 28–29; see also Joint Reply at 31–32 (CFAA “provides relief for only a 

narrow band of computer-related ‘losses’ that Plaintiff has not, and cannot, allege”). 

 Defendants have the better of the argument. Solomon certainly does not contend that his 

losses, including his lost revenue, were “incurred because of interruption of service.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1030(e)(11). Nor does he contend that his economic losses resulted from efforts to respond to 

the CFAA violation, such as “conducting a damage assessment” or “restoring the data, program, 

system, or information to its condition prior to the offense.” Id. This makes sense, since it was 
32 

Azima’s email account, not Solomon’s, that was allegedly accessed by Defendants. The real 

cause of Solomon’s woes, as the Court has already concluded, is not the hacking of Azima’s 

account nor even the subsequent disclosure of the communications between him and Azima, but 

a journalist’s decision to write an article about the communications. 

 Under the CFAA, however, Plaintiff’s loss must fall into one of the aforementioned two 

buckets to qualify as an actionable loss. See Psychas v. Dist. Dep’t of Transp., 2019 WL 

4644503, at *11 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2019) (holding that loss “must relate” to costs “incurred in 

connection with responding to a violation” or “incurred as a result of the interruption of 

services”); Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Carmicle, 846 F.3d 1167, 1174 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting 

agreement on this interpretation of “loss” between only Circuits to have addressed issue). 

Because Solomon claims neither “any losses incurred in responding to the alleged violation, nor 

. . . any losses incurred as a result of the interruption of services,” his CFAA cause of action 

cannot proceed. Psychas, 2019 WL 4644503, at *11; Lightfoot, 2022 WL 2176923, at *4 

(dismissing CFAA claim for similar reasons).

Plaintiff makes a final attempt to resist this conclusion by citing to a string of cases 

purportedly showing that “courts have found damage as reasonable costs to a victim.” Opp. at 

70. This argument does not move the needle for the simple reason that none of the cases he 

cites contradicts the understanding of “loss” adopted by “virtually every other district that has 

addressed this issue.” Psychas, 2019 WL 4644503, at *10. Take, for instance, EF Cultural 

Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Van 

Buren, 141 S. Ct. at 1653 n.2, 1655. There, the First Circuit concluded that “having to expend 

substantial sums to assess the extent, if any, of the physical damage” caused by the alleged 

CFAA violation counted as “loss.” Id. at 585. This kind of harm, though, is plainly covered by 
33 

the Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (covering “the cost of . . . conducting a damage 

assessment”), and bears no resemblance to Solomon’s alleged losses. Consider also I.M.S. 

Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 

The court there held that plaintiff had adequately pled a CFAA claim because it alleged that the 

unauthorized access by defendant “impaired” the integrity of its data and “forced [it] to incur 

costs of more than $5,000 in damage assessment and remedial measures.” Id. at 525–26. Once 

more, these harms fit comfortably within the statutory definitions of damage and loss and look 

nothing like the losses Solomon has alleged here, which were not incurred in response to or as a 

result of Defendants’ alleged hacking. Like the previous ones before it, this attempt comes up 

short. The Court, accordingly, will dismiss this count as well. 

E. Federal Wiretap Act

Next up is the Federal Wiretap Act. To state a claim under the FWA, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2520(a), Solomon must allege that Defendants “(1) intentionally (2) intercepted, endeavored 

to intercept or procured another person to intercept or endeavor to intercept (3) the contents of 

(4) an electronic communication (5) using a device.” Richards v. Duke Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 

222, 240 (D.D.C. 2007) (citation omitted). As courts in this district have previously explained, 

Plaintiff must also allege that the interception was “contemporaneous with the communication’s 

transmission.” McPherson v. Harker, 2021 WL 1820290, at *10 (D.D.C. May 6, 2021); 

Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 793 F. Supp. 2d 311, 329 

(D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he Wiretap Act is concerned with the contemporaneous interception of 

communications . . . .”). “In other words, these courts . . . hold that for information to be 

‘intercepted’ within the meaning of the Act, it must be accessed at the same time that the 
34 

communication is sent.” Henson v. Howard Univ., 2020 WL 619853, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 

2020). 

 Defendants contend that Solomon has not alleged that any acquisition of his emails 

occurred in real time. See Forlit Defs. MTD at 35–38; KARV Defs. MTD at 29–30. Plaintiff

retorts that the D.C. Circuit has never explicitly adopted the interpretation of “interception” that 

requires contemporaneity. See Opp. at 72. Even if that interpretation is correct, Solomon 

continues, the Amended Complaint “sets forth enough allegations that some . . . of the 

interceptions of the communications could have indeed occurred” contemporaneously. Id. at 

73. 

 Plaintiff’s first position can be quickly dispensed with. While it is true that the D.C. 

Circuit has never explicitly held that an “interception” must be contemporaneous with 

transmission to be unlawful under the FWA, courts in this district have so held. See

McPherson, 2021 WL 1820290, at *10; Gaubatz, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 329; Henson, 2020 WL 

619853, at *3. And “[a]ll of the circuit courts that have considered the issue have” similarly 

concluded that “the acquisition of a communication must be contemporaneous with its 

transmission in order for an ‘intercept’ to occur.” Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 628 (6th Cir. 

2016) (collecting cases). In any event, Plaintiff never offers a contrary interpretation of 

“interception,” much less one that would move the Court to deviate from the consensus on this 

issue. It will accordingly apply the same interpretation of “interception” that its colleagues 

have. 

 Moving to Plaintiff’s alternative contention, he acknowledges that he “did not expressly 

state in the [Amended Complaint] that the interceptions of the communications were 

contemporaneous with their transmission.” Opp. at 73. He nevertheless believes that his 
35 

allegations that Defendants had “persistent access” to Azima’s email accounts, see, e.g., Am. 

Compl., ¶ 85, permit an inference that some of his communications could have been acquired in 

real time. See Opp. at 72–73. Assuming that Solomon is not trying to amend his Complaint 

through his Opposition — which he cannot do, see Arbitraje Casa de Cambio S.A. de C.V. v. 

U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. Supp. 2d 165, 170 (D.D.C. 2003) — his argument still does not “raise 

a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. He never points to 

any one email communication between him and Azima that was intercepted in real time, a fact 

he readily admits. See Opp. at 73. Nor does he provide any additional facts, such as the date on 

which the intercepted communications were sent, that would allow an inference of 

contemporaneous acquisition. All he alleges is that the data containing his emails was obtained 

from Azima’s account at some point in 2016 and was published in August and September 2016. 

See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 76–77, 81, 84–85, 93. 

 The Complaint never explains what it means by “persistent” access, nor how Defendants 

retained such access to Azima’s accounts. And it similarly fails to describe how this supposedly 

continuous access is relevant to this case, since the data tranche that contained Solomon’s 

communications appears to have been accessed by Defendants in August 2016. See id., ¶¶ 97–

99. All that is left is an allegation that Defendants unlawfully acquired email communications 

that had already been transmitted and were stored in Azima’s account. Id. This is not the stuff 

of an FWA violation. See McPherson, 2021 WL 1820290, at *10 (concluding that defendant 

did not violate FWA because acquisition took place “only after transmission was completed”). 

The Court will thus dismiss these counts. 
36 

F. D.C. Law Counts 

Solomon also brings various counts under D.C. law. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 234–264. 

With the Complaint shorn of its federal claims, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over 

what remains, and it will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Federal district courts 

are given supplemental (or “pendent”) jurisdiction over state claims that “form part of the same 

case or controversy” as federal claims over which they have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(a). By the same token, they “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

[such] claim[s] . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(3). The decision of whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

where a court has dismissed all federal claims is left to the court’s discretion as “pendent 

jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see also Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 423 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005). When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, 

federal courts should consider “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” 

Shekoyan, 409 F.3d at 424 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 

(1988)). When all federal claims are eliminated before trial, however, those factors “will point 

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” CarnegieMellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7; see also Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 

48 F.3d 1260, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding the discretion set out in Carnegie-Mellon

“unaffected by the subsequent enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), in the Judicial Improvements 

Act of 1990”).

These factors weigh against retention here. The Court is dismissing all of the federal 

claims against Defendants, this case has not progressed in federal court past this Motion to 
37 

Dismiss, and the Court has developed no familiarity with the additional issues presented. Cf.

Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 595 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that 

district court appropriately retained pendent jurisdiction over state claims where it had “invested 

time and resources” in the case). The state-law counts will thus be dismissed without prejudice, 

and Plaintiff is free to file in the appropriate state or local court if he so desires.

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss in full. 

A separate Order to that effect will issue this day.

/s/ James E. Boasberg 

 JAMES E. BOASBERG

 Chief Judge 

Date: September 18, 2023