4 74/7-’f 31/22-

FAA RESPONSE TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

SYSTEM DEFICIENCIES

GOVERNMENT

Storage 'UMENTS 

<6N3 w /o

t h e u ie 4»^>\h?y

K A N S A S S T A T E U N IV E R Hearings

BE FO RE A

KSU LIBRARIES

□

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

HOUSE OF REPR ESEN TATIVES

NINE TY -FO UR TH CONG RESS 

SECOND SESSION

MAR CH 9 AN D 16, 1976

P rin te d fo r th e u se of th e C om m it te e on G o v ern m en t O p era ti o n s

• . ;oA rz a-: t u .qD

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINT ING OFFIC E 

WASHINGTON : 1976
V •*

A w

VvW ft. -hV

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OP ER A< TI9W I | ? Q ( j

JA C K BRO O KS, T exas , Ch air man

L. H. FO U N TA IN , North Carolina 

JOHN E. MOSS, California 

D A N T E B. F A S C E L L , Florida 

T O R B E R T H . M A CD O N A LD , Massachusetts 

WILLIAM S. M OORH EAD , Pen nsylvania 

WM. J. R A N D A LL , Missouri 

BE NJA MIN S. R O SEN TH A L, New Yo rk 

JIM W RIG H T, Texa s

F E R N A N D J. ST GERM AI N , Rhode Island 

F L O Y D V . H IC K S, Washington 

DO N FUQUA, Florida 

JOHN C O N Y E R S , Jr., Michigan 

B E L L A S. A B Z U G , New Yor k 

JA ME S V . STA N TO N , Ohio 

LE O J. R Y A N , California 

CA R D IS S CO LLIN S, Illinois 

JOHN L. B U R T O N , California 

R IC H A R D SO N P R E Y E R , North Carolina 

M IC H AEL H A R R IN G T O N , Massachusetts 

R O B E R T F. D R IN A N , Massachusetts 

EDW ARD M EZVIN SKY, Iowa 

B A R B A R A J O R D AN , Texas 

G LEN N EN G LI SH , Oklahoma 

E L L IO T T H. LE V IT A S, Georgia 

D A VID W. E VAN S, Indiana 

A N T H O N Y M O FFE TT , Connecticut 

AN DR EW M A G U IR E, New Jersey 

LE S A SP IN , Wisconsin

William M. Jones, Ge ner al Co un se l

John E. Moor e,.S ta ff Ad m inist ra to r

William H . C open ha ve r, As so cia te Co un se l

Lyn ne Higginboth am, Clerk

J. P. Carlso n, Minority Cou ns el

F R A N K H ORTO N , New Yo rk t

JOHN N. E R LE N B O R N , Illinois 

JOHN W. W Y D L E R , New Yo rk • 

C L A R E N C E J.'^ ftO WN; OB c<-J 3 H T 

G IL B E R T GUDF. ^Maryland C ;/'

P A U L N . M CC LO SK EY , Jr., California 

SAM S T E IG E R , Arizona 

G A R R Y BR OW N, Michigan 

C H A R LE S TH ON E, Nebraska 

A LA N ST EELM AN , Texas 

JO EL P R IT C H A R D , Washington 

ED WIN B. F O R SY T H E , New Jersey 

R O B E R T W. K A ST E N , Jr., Wisconsin 

W IL LI S D. GRADIS ON , Jr., Ohio

"J... , 1 .. . / t U : ?

. O T - J I . 1

Government Activ ities and Transportation Subcommittee

WM. J. R A N D A LL , Missouri, Ch air man

CA R D IS S CO LLIN S, Illinois C H A R LE S T H ON E, Nebraska

G LE N N E N G LIS H , Oklahoma ED WIN B. F O R SY T H E , New Jersey

B E L L A 8. A B Z U G , New Yo rk WIL LI S D. GRADIS ON , Jr., Ohio

R IC H A R D SO N P R E Y E R , North Carolina »

D A VID W. EVAN S, Indiana 

F L O Y D V . H IC K S, Washington 

LE S A SPIN , Wisconsin

E X OFF IC IO

JA C K B RO O K S, Texas F R A N K H ORTO N , New Yo rk

William G. L aw re nc e, A ct in g S ta ff Dir ector

Miles Q. R om ne y, Cou ns el

B ruce B utt erw ort h, Resea rch Ass ista nt

Marj orie A . E ag le, Clerk

Richard M; T em fe ro, Min or ity Pr ofes sion al S ta ff

'.J

(II)
C O N T E N T S

Hearings helcj on—

March 9____________________________________________

March 16__________________________________________ IZZIZZZ

Statement of—

Belanger, Raymond G., Director, Air Traffic Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation; accompanied 

by Dr. H. L. Reighard, Federal Air Surgeon; John F. Wubbolding, 

Chief, Air Traffic Division, Great Lakes Region; and John Ryan, 

Chief, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center____________

Randall, lion. Wm. J., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri, and chairman, Government Activities and Transportation Subcommittee: Opening statement______ ____ ___________

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by—

Belanger, Raymond G., Director, Air Traffic Service, Federal Aviation 

Administration, Department of Transportation:

Air traffic controllers discharged in the past years and causes

therefor____________________________________________

F -l daily briefing—preliminary analysis____________________

Pa ge 

1 

35

3, 36

1

31-32

12-13

(ill)

FAA RESPONSE TO AIR TRA FFIC CONTROL

SYSTEM DEFIC IEN CIES

TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 1976

H o u se of R e p r e s e n t a t iv e s,

G o v er n m en t A c t iv it ie s an d

T r a n spo r ta tio n S ubco m m it tee

of t h e C o m m it tee on G o v er n m en t O pe r a t io n s,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m., in room 

2203, Ray burn House Office Building, Hon. Wm. J. Randall (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Wm. J. Randall, Glenn English, 

Richardson Preyer, David W. Evans, Edwin B. Forsythe, and 

Willis D. Gradison, Jr.

Also present: William G. Lawrence, acting staff director; Miles Q. 

Romney, counsel; Bruce B utterworth, research assistant; Marjorie A. 

Eagle, clerk; and Richard M. Tempero, minority professional staff, 

Committee on Government Operations.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RANDALL

Mr. Randall. The subcommittee will come to order.

At 5:22 p.m. on November 26, 1975, two jumbo jets with 306 

people on board—an American Airlines DC-10 and a TWA Lockheed 

1011—were on a collision course near Carleton, Mich. Both aircraft 

were operating in instrument 'weather conditions under the control 

of Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center. The two aircraft 

were closing at a relative speed of nearly 1,000 miles per hour. Seconds 

before the seemingly certain impact, a radar controller noticed with 

disbelief the developing collision, and ordered the DC-10 to descend 

immediately. The two aircraft missed each other by between 20 and 

100 feet. Those passengers and flight atte ndants not strapped to 

their seats were pinned momentarily against the ceiling as the D C-10 

began its dive, and then came crashing down with tremendous force 

as the aircraft pulled up. This violent evasive manuever caused three 

persons to be injured seriously. Fortunately, there was no structural 

damage to the DC-10, and the injured received medical treatm ent 

after an emergency landing at Detroit. There were no deaths, but 

because there were serious injuries, this near midair collision is classified by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as an accident. Bu t more 

important, it was perhaps only one one-hundredths of a second away 

from being classified as a catastrophe.

(D
o

NTSB investigated the accident, and on Februa ry 25, 1976, released 

its aircraft accident report—No. 76-3. The Board determined that 

the probable cause of the accident was failure of the first radar controller to apply prescribed separation criteria. Rad ar controller 

No. 1 simply forgot the American DC-10 after it was handed off 

to him by the Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center. The NTSB 

found that there were no mechanical difficulties; it was human error, 

a human failure, pure and simple. There were no misunderstandings 

based on ambiguous terminology.

While the two aircraft were approaching each other, radar controller No. 1 had also undertaken certain secondary duties. Shortly 

thereafter, he was routinely relieved by radar controller No. 2. When 

he briefed controller No. 2, he did not mention the American DC—10. 

A conversation about the cloud ceiling which followed between 

several aircraft alerted the American pilot and controller No. 2. 

This prompted the latter’s immediate descent order.

This was w hat the FAA terms an air traffic control system error. 

This particular system error involved not machinery, but a simple 

human error of complacency and inattention. There is a danger tha t 

in this highly autom ated air traffic control system the controller 

can be lulled into complacency. This accident is, and should be, a 

startling reminder to FAA that no matter how automated the air 

traffic control system becomes, the controller must be continually and 

constantly alert. He must have a defensive and protective imagination 

for things that can go wrong. He should be continually suspicious.

We are here today to find out what the FAA is doing to instill this 

defensive and protective imagination into the minds of its controllers. 

WTe wan t to find out what the FAA is doing to prevent, or minimize 

the possibility of, another accident of this kind. How is it changing 

the environment in which controllers work to create more atte ntiv eness, and to prevent these errors from becoming catastrophic.

We are also here to question the FAA on its policy and practice 

with respect to the actual controllers who have contributed to a 

system error. We want to find out what the FAA’s response is to 

controllers who are determined to be careless or negligent beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

These general questions lead to some other questions about actions 

and decisions of supervisory personnel in the instan t accident case, 

specifically with respect to the prospective and actual resumption of 

ATC duties by radar controller No. 1.

Let the record very clearly and abun dantly show that we are not 

referring to anyone here by name. We reached that decision before 

we started this hearing, although the names of all these gentlemen 

have been published m any times.

So w*e are going to call him radar controller No. 1.

First: It is our understanding that sometime between the accident 

and the December 12-14 NTSB hearing deposition, the Chief of the 

Cleveland center—in response to a question from radar controller 

No. 1—told the controller that he could go back to his old position 

when he was ready. Was this offer consistent with the procedures 

set out in FAA handbooks and was it in the interest of public safety?

Second: We understand tha t after the NTSB hearing, the controller 

was monitored and eventually placed back on a radar position. The
3

FA A handbooks require appropriate disciplinary action where the 

involvement of the controller in the system error is one of carelessness 

or negligence beyond reasonable doubt. If carelessness beyond 

reasonable doubt is involved, was the retraining and reemployment of 

radar controller No. 1 appropriate action at a time when FAA had 

not yet established whether he had been careless beyond reasonable 

doubt.

Th ird : The controller eventually asked to be relieved of his duties 

because of nervous problems. Since these problems could have 

affected his work, we want to discuss the appropriateness of this 

action.

We question whether the actions taken by FAA following this 

accident were consistent with FAA policies and procedures in the 

FAA handbooks and orders supplied to the subcommittee.

We also wonder whether the actions taken in this case are representative of actions taken in others. These are the subjects we are 

here to explore. We hope this will be an informative discussion. We 

are all here to insure that the traveling public is not subjected to 

these kinds of frightening accidents again.

Departing from any previous considered remarks, the Chair wants 

to say that, what we are talking about here this morning is human 

lives. We came perilously close to losing 306 of them. We want to 

know what has been done about it.

We have with us Mr. Raymond G. Belanger, Director of the Air 

Traffic Service of the FAA D epartment of Transportation.

Will you give us your statement, Mr. Belanger, please.

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND G. BELANGER, DIRECTOR, AIR TRAFFIC

SERVICE, FEDERAL AVIA TION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. H. L. REIGHARD,

FEDERAL AIR SURGEON; JOHN F. WUBBOLDING, CHIEF, AIR

TRAFFIC DIVISION, GREAT LAKES REGION; AND JOHN RYAN,

CHIE F, CLEVELAND AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

I am Raymond Belanger, Director of the Air Traffic Service for the 

FAA. Accompanying me today are, on my right, Dr. H. L. Reighard, 

the Federal Air Surgeon; on my immediate left, Mr. John Ryan, 

Chief of the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center (AR TCC); 

and on my far left, Mr. John F. Wubbolding, Chief, Air Traffic 

Division, Great Lakes Region.

You have asked us to appear today to discuss the role of human 

factors in air traffic system errors. In addition, you have asked us to 

comment on the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) 

aircraft accident report on the near midair collision of November 26, 

1975.

The Administrator, Dr. John L. McLucas, appeared before this 

subcommittee last December to discuss the problem of near midair 

collisions. Dr. McLucas outlined the FAA program effort to prevent 

near midair collisions and emphasized in his testimony the upgraded 

and improved equipment the FAA has installed and would be 

developing.
4

As he indicated then, the conflict alert function is now operational 

at all en route centers. However, the Administrator pointed out, 

“Of course, whenever you have a system based on both automated 

and human factors, the possibility of human error is always present.”

Today, I would like to concentrate on the area of human factors in 

our air traffic control system.

As I am sure the subcommittee is aware, our air traffic control 

system is the most complex, and yet the safest, in the world. The 

FAA remains committed to making the system safer whenever 

possible.

An impo rtan t way to accomplish this objective is by studying and 

evaluating problems when they arise. We have initiated a comprehensive and effective program to coordinate our evaluations of 

system errors. These evaluations allow us to determine corrective 

action and remedial recommendations.

How this process works is set forth in FAA Order 8020.3A, the 

air traffic system error reporting program. A copy of this order has 

already been provided to the subcommittee staff, but I have another 

copy which I would be pleased to submit for the hearing record.

Mr. Randall. Will the gentleman suspend for a moment, please?

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Randall. On the record.

Proceed, sir.

Mr. Belanger. In the order, the FAA stated policy is, “ * * * that 

the only effective means of reducing error occurrence is to identify 

and correct the causes of the failure, human or otherwise, which lead 

to system errors.”

Before I describe in detail our procedures, I should explain what a 

system error is. A system error is an operational error in which a 

failure of the equipment, human, procedural, and/or other system 

elements results in less than the appropriate separation minimums. 

What is the proper minimum varies depending on the circumstances.

You should realize tha t system errors don’t equate to safety 

hazards. For example, suppose the specified minimum is 10 minutes 

flying time between two aircraft. However, the airspeed of one of the 

aircraft may vary slightly, and the aircraft are 9 minutes and 40 

seconds apart. This would technically be a system error. However, 

there is no hazard and safety has no t been derogated to a measurable 

degree. The minimums we establish leave a wide safety margin.

Let me now describe what happens after a system error has occurred 

under our procedures.

Operational errors or suspected errors tha t occur in Air Traffic 

Service facilities are immediately reported to both regional and 

Washington headquarters. Additionally, the chief of the facility 

immediately designates a team to analyze and reconstruct the actual 

or suspected error and telephone a preliminary analysis of their 

investigation to Washington headquarters within 6 hours of the 

occurrence.

The air traffic controllers who appear to be directly involved are 

temporarily relieved of operational duty immediately following 

discovery of the error. This initial removal is not considered to be 

disciplinary or punitive action. The removal is to permit the immediate 

preparation of facts and supporting data for facility investigation. In
5

the event human error was involved, the removal affords further 

protection.

Air traffic controllers thus relieved from operational duty remain 

relieved until facility supervisory personnel have determined the 

extent, if any, of the employee’s involvement.

If the employee was responsible for, or contributed to, an operational error, the following actions must be taken as a minimum 

prerequisite to reassignment to operational du ty :

First, a discussion with the employee including a detailed and 

complete review of the incident and circumstances atte nda nt to the 

occurrence.

Second, reevaluation of the employee on the position of operation 

to determine the necessity for additional training. If retraining is 

required, it will be conducted with emphasis on the weaknesses 

revealed during the investigation of the error.

Third, satisfactory completion of the two items above will be 

considered a recertification of control ability after a demonstration 

of skill level at least equal to that required for the appropriate portion 

of the sector/position checkout.

Disciplinary action, when warranted, will be taken consistent with 

penalties for offenses of comparable gravity found in FAA Conduct 

and Discipline Handbook 3750.4.

Mr. Randall. Will the gentleman suspend for a moment, please.

[Discussion off the record.}

Mr. Randall. Back on the record again.

Mr. Belanger. It will be taken, when warranted, without regard 

to possible adverse effects on the FAA position in any subsequent 

lawsuits, enforcement proceedings, or similar actions.

The facilities also establish System E rror Review Boards, charged 

with an indepth full-scale investigation of the incident. The review 

board is required to make their report within 15 working days of 

the occurrence. The facility chief must review the facility board’s 

findings and submit his concurrence with the board’s report or 

justify nonconcurrence.

Also, the facility chief will report the actions taken locally to 

prevent a recurrence.

The facility review board’s report, along with the facility chief’s 

comments, are reviewed a t the regional and Washington headquarters 

level. These reports are analyzed at both levels to identify trends. 

Additional action needed to preclude recurrence is then initiated.

Before moving on, I would like to touch on the frequency of systems 

errors. For the last 6 years we have compiled the following statistics.

I will read now the number of operations in the air traffic control 

system on an annual basis, and the number of system errors for that 

calendar year:

In 1970, the total traffic handled was 76,685,367; the errors reported, 

280.

In 1971, 75,385,434; system errors reported, 281.

In 1972, 75,318,448; system errors reported, 313.

In 1973, 79,902,785; system errors reported, 288.

In 1974, 80,832,595; system errors reported, 340.

In 1975, 83,579,971; system errors reported, 424.

60 -69 4,— 7i •2
6

In perhaps more understandable terms, tha t means a controller 

will be involved in an error every 42 years, or 1 error for every 2 million control instructions.

Most controllers never are involved in a system error.

The increase in system errors reported during 1975 is attributable, 

we believe, to the initiation of the aviation safety reporting program 

in May of last year. This program was discussed by Dr. McLucas last 

December.

Mr. Randall. Please suspend for a moment, please, sir.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Randall. All right. On the record.

Proceed, sir.

Mr. Belanger. I would like now to address the NTSB report on 

the near midair collision of last November.

Issued in conjunction with the repo rt was safety recommendation 

No. A-76-3. The NTSB recommended to the FAA tha t we distribute 

the report to all FAA air traffic control personnel and discuss it in our 

training program.

I can report to you, Mr. Chairman, that the FAA is in complete 

agreement with this recommendation. We are moving speedily to 

implement it. Specifically we are taking the following actions:

1. Information contained in the report has been included in the 

national training program conducted at Oklahoma City.

2. A videotape briefing aid is in production for distribution to all 

air traffic control facilities with video replay systems. A mandatory 

briefing will be given in every facility, as well.

3. Copies of the report will be distributed to all air traffic controller 

personnel.

There is one comment on the NTSB report I would like to make. The 

report speaks of the high percentage of human failures in the ATC 

system. I want to clarify any misconception. I believe the high percentage refers to the high percentage of system errors—about 93 

percent—involving human factors. It should not be understood tha t 

there is a significant percentage of human failures in the ATC system 

viewed overall as the statistics I provided earlier reveal.

You have also requested that we discuss the specific actions taken 

by the FAA as a result of this particular accident. I hope you appreciate tha t, while we share your desire tha t the facts be known, we 

wish to respect the privacy of the individuals concerned and the 

families. You have already covered that quite adequately, Mr. 

Chairman.

Mr. Randall. We will have some comment on that after a while.

Mr. Belanger. Radar controller No. 1 was found by the NTSB 

to have failed to apply the prescribed separation minima and to have 

been distracted by secondary duties. Rad ar controller No. 2 was his 

relief, and the controller who cleared the American Airlines aircraft 

for immediate descent.

After the near collision, radar controller No. 1 was temporarily 

relieved of duty to begin to write his reports of what had happened. 

He had previously scheduled annual leave over Thanksgiving and took 

the time off. When he returned, he did n ot work an operational sector, 

bu t was detailed to the training department.
7

After the NTSB hearing, he reported for duty and was assigned as 

the D man, the manual controller. He was under very close—over the 

shoulder—monitoring. He was supervised the way we would treat a 

developmental or controller-trainee. He progressed subsequently to 

the point where he began to work the radar-trac ker position, still 

under close supervision.

As his supervisors were satisfied with his performance, he was ultimately allowed to work independently with normal supervision. This 

occurred over a 3-week period. At this time, the controller indicated 

he had no problems associated with actually controlling traffic. In 

fact, his performance was errorless.

However, he indicated to his supervisors that, off duty, he was 

troubled by the accident and its aftermath.

Consultations were held with the assistant regional flight surgeon 

on duty at the Cleveland center. The controller was referred to a 

private physician and is presently on sick leave.

Radar controller No. 2 is back on regular duty.

Mr. Randall. Would the gentleman suspend for a moment.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Randall. Proceed, sir.

Mr. Belanger. I would like to generalize a bit about what is-, 

appropriate action to take vis-a-vis controllers involved in system, 

errors. As I stated earlier, they are infrequent; they might be characterized as random phenomena. Since they are so isolated, it is difficult to generalize about what disciplinary or remedial action is appropriate in any specific instance.

Each controller has a different history and different levels of experience. There can be no hard and fast rule tha t, say, two system errors 

in a 6-month period mandate that the air traffic controller’s certificatebe revoked.

There can be a variety of reasons why a controller gets involved 

in a system error. Some deficiencies in a controller’s performance are 

correctable by retraining. For example, a controller not able to work 

flawlessly in a high density center or tower may be transferred elsewhere where he can perform perfectly.

The point is that we examine each situation case by case. When 

I say we, I do not mean just the evaluation staff at FAA headquarters 

in Washington. It is the immediate supervisors of the controllers and 

their associates who can provide the best assessment of a controller’s 

ability to perform after involvement in a system error. They can most 

easily detect operational difficulties or behavioral changes.

Therefore, it is on the supervisor’s judgment that we rely most in 

deciding what is appropriate action. Disciplinary action is not taken 

in every case. However, an employee who deviates from prescribed 

standards and procedures through negligence or carelessness can 

expect appropriate disciplinary action.

Recognizing that we cannot eliminate human errors, we are working 

to minimize them. One way is to try to develop autom ated equipment 

that assumes the human tasks which are most likely to produce 

human error.

We have done th at by improving the radar equipment which identifies the radar target. Today, we have radar data processing where a 

computer puts the tags on the targets.
8

Another kind of approach which we can take is to minimize the 

risk tha t a hum an error will result in a system error. In other words, 

we can trv to catch the error before it goes too far and creates a safety 

hazard. This kind of system is illustrated by our conflict alert function.

The conflict alert program was designed to meet three objectives. 

The first and most importa nt was to alert the controller to a potential 

problem, which could result in a midair collision, in time for the 

controller to take action to avoid such an occurrence. It was also 

intended to alert the controller to a potential conflict between the 

two aircraft in time for instructions to be issued to the pilot and 

accomplished in a manner which does not require abru pt evasive 

action which might result in injury to passengers or aircraft damage. 

The third but lesser goal was to alert the controller in time to take 

action to prevent one aircraft from intruding into the protected airspace of another aircraft.

We believe tha t, had conflict alert been operational at the Cleveland 

center on November 26, 1975, the near collision between the airliners 

would not have taken place.

Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment on the 

role of the medical personnel of the FAA in minimizing human errors 

in our air traffic control system.

The medical effort begins with the development of selection criteria 

in terms of aptitude and emotional stability. It also involves prehire 

and annual comprehensive medical evaluations. In each of our air 

route traffic control centers we have an assistant regional flight 

surgeon who, among other things, is available for counseling and 

initial treatment of on-the-job illness or injury. This would include 

post-incident medical assistance as needed in individual cases.

In addition to the clinical approach which I have described, there 

is an FAA medical research program, a significant portion of which 

deals with the air traffic control system in areas such as controller 

stress, effects of shift rotation, improved selection criteria, effects of 

age on performance, causes of health change, and so on.

This concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.

My associates and I will try to address any questions you might 

have.

I would like to offer for the record the relevant FAA handbooks 

and manuals relating to air traffic system errors.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear.

Mr. Randall. Thank you, Mr. Belanger.

I think, as a starting point, you might tell us a little more about 

this conflict alert function which you say is now operational at all 

en route centers.

Mr. Belanger. Yes, sir. The conflict alert function is currently 

operational at all 20 domestic autom ated centers. At two of them, it 

is down to 18,000 feet. A t 16 centers, the function is down to 12,500 

feet. At the other two, it is down to the ground.

Mr. Randall. By functional, you mean it works above these 

different altitudes?

Mr. Belanger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. How many are above 12,500 feet?

Mr. B elanger. Sixteen.

Mr. Randall. That does not add up.
You have 16 at 12,500, and 2 down to the ground. Where are the 

other two?

Mr. Belanger. There are two centers that cover conflict alert 

from the ground up to infinity.

Mr. Randall. And you have 16 up to 12,500 feet.

Mr. Belanger. I have explained it poorly.

Sixteen of them cover from 12,500 feet above the ground up to 

infinity. In two, it is from 18,000 feet above the ground up to infinity.

Mr. Randall. Thank you.

You might enlighten us a little about what you mean by coverage.

Mr. Belanger. Those are the altitudes above which the function 

is operating.

Mr. Randall. Nothing below that?

Mr. Belanger. Th at is correct as far as conflict alert is concerned.

We are moving ahead to bring all 20 centers down to the ground; 

to cover from the ground on up.

Mr. Randall. In other words, you have only two at this point 

tha t will go all the way down to the ground?

Mr. Belanger. Th at is correct.

Mr. Randall. What must you do to give the others this same 

capability?

Mr. Belanger. It involves software programing for adap tatio n 

at each of the center sites.

Mr. Randall. What are you doing about that?

Mr. Belanger. We are moving ahead as quickly as we can.

Mr. Randall. You have quite a way to go on some of them here. 

You have the greater part of the distance to go yet.

Mr. Bellanger. Actually the air space where it is operating 

already constitutes the air space in which the majority of our traffic is.

Mr. Randall. En route?

Mr. Belanger. Th at is right—en route.

Mr. Randall. Do you have any intention of installing conflict 

alert in terminal control facilities?

Mr. Belanger. Yes. We have a research and development effort 

moving forward to provide the same program for the autom ated 

terminal facilities.

Mr. Randall. In this near collision on November 26, 1975, were 

any terminal facilities involved at all, or did all of this occur within, 

one en route center? Is that where the problem began?

Mr. Belanger. On the incident you are referring to-----

Mr. Randall. Accident, not incident.

Mr. Belanger [continuing]. Th at is correct.

Mr. Randall. No terminal facilities.

We have only had this subcommittee now in its second year, and as 

far as 1 know we have never been provided with any comprehensive 

map showing the jurisdiction of the various centers.

We went to Leesburg center a few years ago, and we have been down 

to one of the others—I believe you have an en route center somewhere 

in the Middle West. Is i t in Denver or in Kansas City?

Mr. Belanger. Yes. We have one in New York.

Mr. Randall. We would like to know where your dividing lines 

are—where the hand-offs of traffic between centers occur.

Mr. Belanger. We would be happy to provide this material.

Mr. Randall. I think you should provide it. So far as I know, it
10

has never been provided. Maybe it was in the past when Jack Brooks 

chaired this subcommittee. I do not know. I might indicate that Ja ck 

is intensely interested in these hearings, and personally asked that 

we proceed on this, and proceed diligently.

I think we need that map.

We have been led to believe th at this near collision occurred almost 

over Lake Michigan. They keep referring to it as Carleton, Mich.

W as it actually over the water?

Mr. Belanger. No, i t was not.

Mr. Randall. Where was it?

Mr. Belanger. I will defer to Mr. Ryan who can give yon a more 

precise location.

Mr. R yan. It occurred 23 miles west of Carleton.

Mr. Randall. What does tha t mean with respect to the b ound ary

of Lake Michigan? Was it close to that, or over it, or not?’ The press 

indicated that it was right over the lake.

Mr. Ryan. It was a misunderstanding. It was not.

Mr. R andall. Where is Carleton, Mich.?

, Mr. Ryan. It is approximately 60 miles east of Detroit. Bu t I 

think I can provide more information.

Mr. R andall. Sixty miles east of Detroit?

Mr. Ryan. Let me check i t out.

Mr. R andall. Th at’s all right.

We understand now from staff that you may have supplied us with 

a map of the jurisdiction of the Cleveland center. We- would Eke to 

have maps of the jurisdictions of all of these en route centers.

Mr. Belanger. We will be happy to provide that.

Mr. R andall. You referred, on page 2, to FAA Order 8020.3A. 

It is entitled the “Air Traffic System Error R eporting Program.”

You indicate you have supplied the subcommittee with tha t. One 

would almost have to hire a new staff to find out what you have in 

there, bu t I will ask you one or two questions.

Does that have anything at all to do with your new program that 

was instituted with NASA—the immunity program?

Mr. Belanger. No.

Mr. Randall. Is it coordinated with that? Is it a part of that?

Mr. Belanger. I t is a program tha t has been in existence within 

the FAA for m any years.

Mr. Randall. All right. For how many years?

Mr. Belanger. In various iterations—30 years.

Mr. Randall. I was interested in a comment that you made at 

the bottom of page 2, when you referred to system errors .You said that 

a system error is an operational error in which there is a failure of the 

equipment, or a human or procedural failure. And then you make a 

statement which you later try in several ways to qualify and correct : 

“You should realize that system errors don’t equate to safety hazards.”

If thev don’t, what do they equate to?

Mr. Belanger. They equate to a potential safety hazard. Ih ey 

occur when a controller does not maintain the prescribed separation 

minima set forth in our handbook.

Mr. Randall. Potential means simply tha t the accident did not 

happen through some providence of some kind ?

Mr. Belanger. No. It means tha t he could have taken an action 

to prevent it, but the required separation standards still did not exist.
11

Mr. Randall. Did not exist? The standards existed, surely.

Mr. Belanger. In other words, he did not maintain the separation 

required by the standards, but tha t does not mean that the hazard 

necessarily existed.

For example, our radar separation standards are 5 miles. The 

controller could have inadvertently had the aircraft 4 miles apart. 

There is nothing unsafe about aircraft 4 miles apart if it is done by 

intent.

Mr. Randall. You are talking about specified minimums there.

Mr. Belanger. Th at is right.

Mr. Randall. But you just made the statem ent, “You should 

realize tha t system errors don’t equate to safety hazards.” Th at is 

not quite altogether true, is it?

You used the word “potentia l.” You were just lucky tha t it didn’t 

happen?

Mr. Belanger. Not necessarily lucky.

Mr. Randall. Well, wasn’t it just lucky tha t someone was looking 

after them.

Mr. Belanger. There is a built-in buffer in the standards themselves th at permit a certain amount of leeway.

We recognize th at, if the controllers plan on 5 miles, they could well 

end up with 4 miles, bu t we classify it as a system error because they 

did not meet the standard that we prescribed.

Mr. Randall. You indicate that, after one of these accidents, the 

chief of the facility designates a team. Who is the chief of the facility? 

I assume you mean the one out in the region? Or it is you?

Mr. Belanger. In the air traffic control system, we have 800 individual facilities, th at is, flight service stations, towers, or centers.

Mr. Randall. In this particular matter, you are referring to the 

chief of the facility within whose jurisdiction an accident occurs.

Mr. Belanger. Wherever the occurrence was.

Mr. Randall. That would be Detroit, would it not?

Mr. Belanger. No; this would be the Cleveland center which has 

jurisdiction over tha t airspace.

Mr. Randall. All right.

Who is the chief of the Cleveland center? Is that Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Belanger. T hat is Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Randall. You say tha t he immediately designates a team to 

analyze and reconstruct the actual or suspected error and then telephones a preliminary analysis of their investigation to Washington 

headquarters within 6 hours of the occurrence. Is tha t right?

Mr. Belanger. The fact that there was an occurrence is phoned in 

immediately.

A preliminary analysis in more detail must be phoned in within 6 

hours.

Mr. Randall. All right. We would like to have a copy of that preliminary analysis.

Mr. Belanger. I do not have that in hand, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Randall. You are going to provide it for us?

WTe are putting it clearly on the record th at we want th at preliminary 

analysis.

Mr. Belanger. We certainly will provide it.

[The information referred to follows:]

13

JF K N TSB IN T E R V IE W E D T H E P IL O T O F A A-1 82

The pilot said he had been cleared to climb from FL330 to FL370. At FL350 

they were almost on top and could see stars at a 45 degree angle from horizon. 

When they spo tted t he stars th ey saw aircra ft n avigation lights—at th at momen t, 

the y were cleared to descend immediately. The Captain at first pushed the nose 

over slightly bu t the traffic began filling the windshield and he pushed the nose 

over harder. The traffic completely filled the windshield and pilot estimates they 

missed 20 to 100 feet. He descended from FL350 to FL330 in 30 seconds (4,000 

feet per minute).

Twenty-eight crew m embers/passengers were injured. Most of th e damage was 

from the second push over. The sea t belt sign was on—th ey were serving meals. 

10 stews injured, some passengers inju red th at slid ou t from under the ir sea t 

belt—some from flying objects. Pilot filed NMA C on ground.

TWA never saw the traffic.

N ea r-M iss P la ne H ad E a r lie r Sca re

Chicago (U PI)—The American Airlines jumbo jet th at almost collided with 

another plane nea r De troit Wednesday had scared an air controller at O’Hare 

Int ern ationa l Airport just hours earlier, the Federal Aviation Adm inistration 

said yeste rday.

An FAA investig ation of the Chicago incident showed the American plane got 

fairly close to ano ther aircra ft—b ut never so close th at there was any thing to 

worry about.

“The m inimum separation is 1,000 feet, and it (the distance between th e planes) 

was near the minimum,” an FAA spokesman said. “If it had been less, it would 

have been something to pursue fu rthe r.

“All th is hullabaloo would not have occurred if it hadn’t been for the near-miss 

in Michigan lat er,” the spokesman said.

The plane in question was American flight 182 from San Francisco to Newark, 

N.J., via Chicago. I t was piloted by C aptain C. A. Evy of New York.

According to a rep ort filed by a controller at O’Hare, flight 182 was given 

permission to begin a descent prior to landing, bu t th en was told to ascend again to 

6,000 feet because ano ther jet was in the way.

The controller said in his report the two planes came within 500 feet of each 

other. He said when he told flight 182 to return to 6,000 feet, the pilot responded, 

“ Descend to 3,000 fee t.”

The controller said he answered, “Negative, negative. Maintain 6,000 feet. 

The re’s traffic righ t in fro nt of you at 5,000 feet.”

The response from the pilot was, “I see the traffic at 5,000,” and the plane 

climbed back to 6,000 feet.

The FAA spokesman said tha t through ta pe recordings of th at conversation and 

a computer reconstruction of the traffic pattern at the time, it was determined 

the two planes nev er came closer tha n 1,000 feet of each other.

A few hours later, flight 182 had to make a sudden drop from 35,000 feet to 

33,000 to avoid colliding with a TWA jumbo jet 20 miles southwe st of De troit 

Metropo litan Airport.

Th at incident is und er investig ation by the National Tra nsp ortation Safety 

Board.

Mr. Randall. You say it has to be done within 6 hours, and 

that this was done within 6 hours of this particular incident?

Mr. Belanger. This particular situation was a little bit different 

in tha t it was declared an accident by the National Transportation 

Board which took the investigation and the analysis fundamentally 

out of our hands and into their hands.

Mr. Randall. Yes, we understand that. But, in the meantime, 

you still had to comply with your requirement here.

Mr. Belanger. Th at is correct.

Mr. Randall. We would like to know what you did.

You have this report, or will have it?

Mr. Belanger. We will have it.

6 9- 69 6— 71 •3
Mr. Randall. We are not going out to subpena things. We are 

just asking you to give it to us. We think you will.

Mr. Belanger. We certainly will.

Mr. Randall. On page 3, you say, “Air traffic controllers who 

appear to be directly involved are temporarily relieved of operational 

duty immediately following discovery of the error.”

The question of the Chair is, for how long do you temporarily 

relieve them?

Mr. Belanger. The relief from the operating position is as long 

as is required to determine what might be considered the probable 

involvement. If the controller has no involvement, it can well be tha t 

he is returned to duty. If he has direct involvement in the error, 

then he goes through what we term a recertification process.

Mr. Randall. In other words, temporarily does not mean anything. It just depends on how the facts develop? You do not have a 

standard timetable of any kind?

Mr. Belanger. The timetable is that he is taken off the position 

as soon as we can practically get relief available for him and we can 

sta rt investigating. The team comes out and star ts investigating the 

preliminary facts, and t ha t usually gives us an idea.

Mr. Randall. The team comes out from where, sir?

Mr. Belanger. The team is generated by the local facility. They 

have certain designated people who act in the investigative capacity 

for a situation of system error.

Mr. Randall. All right. Maybe this question should go to Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan, what did you do? What kind of team did you generate?

Mr. Ryan. Sir, on November 26, at approximately 7:30 in the 

evening, I was called by the assistant chief on duty at Cleveland center 

and advised tha t we had a possible system error and a possible accident as an American D C-10 was diverting to Detroit.

At tha t time, I left my home and reported to the Cleveland center 

and arrived at approximately a qu arter to 9. Prior to my arrival, the 

assistant chief in charge, who is the gentleman who is in charge of the 

total Cleveland center when I am not there—in other w’ords, the 

operational watch-standing group—had already mobilized the group.

Mr. Randall. Who is he? I don’t think we can get h urt by naming 

names here.

Mr. Ryan. Specifically the gentleman?

Mr. Randall. Yes.

Mr. Ryan. He was Stanley Levine.

Mr. Randall. What did he do?

Mr. Ryan. He mobilized what we call the go-team, which is a team 

supervisor; the assistant chief, Mr. Levine-----

Mr. Randall. Slow down. He mobilized a team.

Mr. Ryan. He mobilized the go-team.

The go-team consists of the area supervisor, of which there happen 

to be four on duty at all times except during the midnight watch.

Maybe I can explain this. At Cleveland center we have four basic 

areas of operation—A, B, C, and D.

Mr. Randall. Do these- areas radiate out from Cleveland?

Mr. Ryan. No.

Mr. R andall. It is an en route center, so you cut it up like a pie?

Mr. R yan. Similar to a pie.
15

The A area is essentially the Cleveland area.

1 he B area is a northeast section of Cleveland center which covers 

Buffalo and where we adjoin Boston.

The C area is essentially the Pittsburgh area.

The D area is essentially the Detroit area.

Mr. Randall. This gentleman, Mr. Levine, mobilized the go-team, 

and this go-team consisted of an area supervisor and who else?

Mr. Ryan. And a team supervisor.

Mr. Randall. Who else was on the team?

Mr. Ryan. Do you want their names?

Mr. Randall. No, I just want to know what they do and how 

many there were.

Mr. Ryan. We are talking about the two people, and we are also 

talking about-----

Mr. Randall. How many aie involved in the go-team?

Mr. Ryan. Three people; the assistant chief, the area supervisor, and 

the team supervisor.

Mr. Randall. In the order of rank, T suppose the area supervisor 

would be on top, wouldn’t he?

Mr. Ryan. The assistant chief is top.

Mr. Randall. The assistant chief of the whole facility?

Mr. Ryan. Right.

Mr. Randall. He is No. 2 to you?

Is tha t correct?

Mr. Ryan. Right.

Mr. Randall. Then you have got one of four area supervisors. 

Which area would tha t be?

Mr. Ryan. Area D.

Mr. Randall. That is the area supervisor.

Then you have a team chief. What does he do?

Mr. Ryan. We have 500 full performance controllers and approximately 80 controllers at Cleveland center at various stages of development. These controllers are divided into 49 different teams. Each team 

has a team supervisor, approximately 14 teams working each day and 

evening watch—one working the mids, and two off.

So we are talking about approximately 16 team supervisors on duty 

at Cleveland center at tha t time.

Mr. Randall. At which time? At the time of the accident?

Mr. Ryan. es, sir. Approximately 16 team supervisors of which 

four are designated on a part-time basis through rotation as being 

area supervisors.

Mr. Randall. All right.

You got to the center at perhaps a quarter of 9, I think you said. 

Your assistant chief had gone ahead with this so-called go-team.

Did you sit in on tha t, sir?

Mr. Ryan. I spoke with them, but their primary function is to get 

the preliminary information, for instance, statem ents from those 

personnel involved in the occurrence.

Mr. Randall. Please answer my question. Did you or did you not 

participate in the go-team activities?

Mr. Ryan. No, 1 did not.

I was briefed by the team on the activity tha t they had conducted.

Mr. Randall. But you are the boss there?
16

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Well, according to Mr. Belanger, we still have to 

have this report put in within 6 hours.

Did you get it in within 6 hours? Wha t happened to it?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir. After I was briefed by the go-team and they 

took the preliminary statements, we did within 6 hours call the 

required report in to headquarters in the region.

Mr. Randall. Who is that?

Mr. Ryan. It goes to the system command center in the FAA 

building.

Mr. Belanger. They work for me.

Mr. R andall. That'is what I thought. You are the titular head of 

the whole thing, are you not?

Mr. Belanger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. When did you look over the report?

Mr. Belanger. I looked it over the following morning. I received 

a telephone notification during the night, and I looked over the 

details in the morning.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Ryan, since you were on the spot, do you know 

if radar controller No. 1 was relieved right then and there?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. And he remained, so-called temporarily, relieved 

until when?

Mr. Ryan. Until December 14.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Belanger has testified tha t when any employee 

seems to be responsible for, or seems to have contributed to an operational error FAA must take the following actions as a minimum prerequisite to reassignment to any kind of operational du ty: a discussion 

with the employee, including the details and a complete review of the 

incident and circumstances. Who had this discussion and when did that discussion take place? 

Or who knows?

Mr. Ryan. I had the discussion with controller No. 1, and his 

assistant chief and his team supervisor were present.

Mr. Randall. When did you do that?

Mr. Ryan. This happened on December 11.

Mr. Randall. You did not get around to it until December 11? 

I thou ght the accident occurred on November 26.

Mr. Ryan. Sir, we had had preliminary discussions about the accident prior to th at. I n fact, on November 26, th at evening, I spoke with 

both controllers at which time they advised me about their involvement in the accident.

Mr. R andall. You now say this discussion occurred on November 26. You spoke then with the radar controllers. But you just got 

through telling us that the required discussion took place on December 1 f. Did you have any discussions in between?

You obviously did n ot do very much on November 26 because you 

did not get there until 9. This happened late in the day.

Wha t did you do on November 26?

Mr. Ryan. On November 26, I spoke with the two controllers.

Mr. Randall. No. 1 and No. 2?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir. I wanted to find out w hat had happened from 

them. I had already been briefed by the go-team.
17

Mr. Randall. Then your state ment was not quite correct. Did 

you, or did you not have this detailed instruction tha t night? lo u 

also say you had a discussion on December 11, Th at was your statement. Then you say that you had a talk with the two controllers on 

the 26th. You had a discussion both times?

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Chairman, if I might interrupt. I do not want 

to put words in Mr. Ryan’s mouth-----

Mr. Randall. I don’t want you to, Mr. Belanger. L et us interrogate 

Mr. Ryan, if you please.

f How long did you talk to these gentlemen on the 26th?

Mr. Ryan. Approximately 45 minutes.

Mr. Randall. You did not wait until December 11 to talk to 

them? You talked to them tha t night. That makes sense.

Mr. Ryan. Th at I did, sir. But 1 thought you meant in a more 

formal situation with the supervisors there where we went step by 

step in depth.

Of course, on the 26th I spoke with both of them. That was one 

of the primary reasons for me going to the center.

Mr. Randall. All right. Now we are coming down to it.

So you had a sort of formal hearing on December 11. Everybody 

got together—all the supervisors and everyone were there on the 11th?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Belanger, you can participate now, if you will.

Would you get out your handbook on FAA Conduct and Discipline 

and turn to 3750.4. I would like for you to read and detail the various 

disciplinary actions and when they are warranted, and talk about 

the penalties, if any, which should follow.

Are we all together on this? Is this page 17 of the document dated 

July 1, 1974?

Mr. Belanger. I believe we are.

Mr. Randall. The FAA order entitled “ Conduct and Discipline”?

Mr. Belanger. Yes.

Mr. Randall. The document was originally issued June 10, 1969, 

and was reprinted on July 1, 1974.

Mr. Belanger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. We are on page 17, is that correct?

Mr. Belanger. Th at is correct.

Mr. Randall. At the head of tha t, is the title, “Maintaining 

Discipline.”

Now we will see what we should read into the record.

I I think we can expedite this a little bit. This is true of just about

all implementations by the various bureaucracies—a complex implementation. We will try to simplify as best we can.

[ Are there two kinds of disciplinary actions—one informal and one

formal? And what is the dividing line between the two?

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

The written reprimand is the dividing line. The written reprimand 

constitutes formal action. Anything other than that, such as an oral 

reprimand-----

Mr. Randall. What was that? Moral?

Mr. Belanger. An oral reprimand.

Mr. Randall. The written reprimand is the dividing line.
18

Is that correct?

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. In other words, an oral reprimand is like patting 

him on the back of the hand—like saying, just do not do it again.

Mr. Belanger. I don’t like to categorize i t in tha t manner.

Mr. Randall. Of course, we cannot categorize in that way any 

error which jeopardizes 306 lives. But we are going to try to categorize 

the various disciplinary actions.

Mr. Belanger. An oral reprimand is less severe than a written 

reprimand.

Mr. Randall. About 30 pages into FAA Order 3750.4, entitled 

“Conduct and Discipline,” we finally get down, on page 6 of an 

appendix, to a left-hand column with the heading “ Nature of Offense.”

Then, from left to right the columns have the heading, first offense, 

second offense, th ird offense, and so forth.

In tha t far left-hand column, next to the Arabic numeral 17, 

there are these words: Negligent or careless work performance resulting in waste of public funds, damage to material, delay in production, injury or loss and then these words—or danger of loss to 

life.

Then, under tha t first offense column—and 1 am asking you to 

tell us if this is the section th at would apply to this accident—you have 

the words, “Written reprim and,” and then the words, “to removal.” 

I assume this means you can go all the way from issuing a written 

reprimand to removing the employee.

Is that correct? Are we talking about the right thing?

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. This is from page 6 of table 1 in appendix 2. There 

is a reference in the third paragraph of page 17 of the Conduct and 

Discipline Order that the penalties are listed in table 1 of appendix 2.

That is where we are at.

Mr. Belanger. That is correct. That would be the paragraph 

that is applicable.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Belanger, you startled us a little at the top of 

page 5 when you say that, after you get through with this facility 

review board, and have reviewed all the comments of the facility 

chiefs at the regional and Washington levels, reports are analyzed at 

both levels to identify trends.

What do you mean by “trends”? Are these good or bad trends?

Mr. Belanger. Unfortunately, the trends in identifying system 

errors are trends tha t caused the error. By identifying the cause, we 

hope to institute remedial action, primarily from the Washington 

office.

Mr. Randall. The trends in procedures?

Mr. Belanger. Th at is correct.

Mr. Randall. What procedures are these?

Mr. Belanger. The air traffic control manuals are filled with 

procedures on how you go about controlling traffic.

All through our system we also try to institute fail-safe procedures. 

For example, we found that errors in identification were being made 

at the handoff point. We instituted a national procedure tha t would 

require every sector internally to be identified.

Mr. Randall. Would you back up, for a moment, please?
19

You say the manuals are filled with procedures. That is certainly 

true. We found that right here. They are filled with regulations or 

procedures.

Mr. Belanger. Procedures on how to control traffic.

Mr. Randall. Then you made an interesting comment. You said 

you atte mpt to find fail-safe procedures.

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. When I asked you to slow down, you said “We 

found that many of the failures are at the handoff point.” Do you 

mean the handoff from en route to terminal?

Mr. Belanger. It could be en route from terminal internally 

within a sector, or sector to sector within a center, tha t the aircraft 

had been misidentified.

Mr. Randall. Th at is a new facet—from sector to sector within 

a center? Are you talking about the A, B, C, and D areas tha t Mr. 

Ryan referred to?

Mr. Belanger. We are talking about a procedure we had one time 

where a controller, as he handed off the aircraft to the next sector, 

would say for instance, that American 210 is entering the sector 

over Carleton. The controller would look on his scope and see the target 

there and say, “Roger, I have got him.”

Mr. Randall. Oh, you divide your en route centers into sectors. 

You even divide these areas—the A, B, C, and D areas—down into 

sectors?

Mr. Belanger. Yes; although we have only 20 centers in the system, we have about 800 sectors.

In this instance, the method we went about going in the fail-safe 

from a national procedure on that, was to require, we required the 

accepting controller to reidentify the aircraft even though the other 

controller told him who it was and where it was.

Mr. Randall. Yes; I understand.

Your testimony is tha t you believe one of the problems is in this 

handoff?

Mr. Belanger. No, I am using this as an example of a problem 

tha t we previously had.

Mr. Randall. You have solved that?

Mr. Belanger. Yes, we have.

That one is p retty well under control now.

I use this as an example of trends that we determine to exist and 

institute a national procedure to correct.

Mr. Randall. I asked how you identify trends and you said, in 

effect, that you try to identify where the problem is, and you say 

that it is at this handoff point.

Mr. Belanger. This was a problem that was in evidence at one 

time. We have corrected that.

Mr. Randall. For the record, it would be well for you to say how 

you corrected it.

Mr. Belanger. We corrected it by requiring the accepting controller, even though the releasing controller had told him who the 

airplane was and where it was, to reidentify it by having the pilot 

use his beacon or transfinder code return to use the ident feature.

In other words, even though the accepting controller saw a target 

and had been told by the releasing controller who the aircraft was,
20

where it was, the receiving controller had to confirm th at this identification was indeed this particular aircraft by communications with 

the pilot, now, instead of the other controller.

Mr. Randall. What you have just told us, Mr. Belanger, makes 

some sense. There is an indication tha t you are trying.

I have to say tha t after some of these things have happened—not 

merely the accident over Carleton, but there have been a sequence 

of them right in a row tha t has shaken the confidence of a lot of 

people when they are up in the air. We know. We have received a 

ton of mail expressing this fear. We w ant to know what the FAA is 

doing.

You say here tha t there is a requirement for a controller to reidentify an aircraft even after he has been told tha t he now has 

control over it.

But the important thing is tha t you do not rely solely on these 

controllers in the handoff. You also communicate with the pilot.

Mr. Belanger. We doublecheck with the pilot. The controller told 

the controller where the aircraft was, and we doublecheck with the 

pilot now.

I do not want to mislead you and say tha t this is something tha t 

has happened since tha t accident. I am using this as an illustration 

of a trend tha t we identified nationally, with respect to which we took 

corrective action.

Another problem we had that we identified as a national trend was 

that the relay of the altitude information—this was prior to the 

al ph a-n u meric-----

Mr. Randall. Prior to what, sir?

Mr. Belanger. Prior to the electronic read-out of the altitude.

Mr. R andall. Th at was not what you said the first time. The 

alpha—please repeat what you said the first time.

Mr. Belanger. Alpha-numeric.

Mr. Randall. The alpha-numeric.

Mr. Belanger. We found that sometimes the pilot was at an altitude different than had been transmitted to the next sector of the next 

center. Again, rather than accepting only the releasing controller’s 

word, we had to institute a national procedure where, on every contact, 

we had the pilot verify what altitude he was. So, again, we had a 

doublecheck.

Mr. Randall. Tha nk you.

Would the gentleman suspend, please?

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Randall. Back on the record.

Mr. Belanger, could it be said tha t you are the overall manager of 

the entire U.S. air traffic system? And, if not, who is?

Mr. Belanger. I have technical direction of the air traffic system 

within the United States. The immediate line authority of the facilities tha t are in each region rests with the regional director, and 

furth er delegated to the chief of the air traffic division, which is, in this 

case, Mr. Wubbolding of the Great Lakes.

My authority is in the technical direction only; tha t is, procedural. 

I have no line authority over any of the field facilities.

The Administrator has line authority over the regional director, 

but the technical direction of how we do business, how we go about it, 

what procedures we use, and things of that nature, rest with me.
21

Mr. Randall. Hew far have we decentralized this system? Mr. 

Wubbolding is at the Great Lakes regional office—is he the absolute 

boss over the whole system? Do you simply give him a few technical 

details? Have we decentralized the system to that point? Isn ’t there 

some FAA official managing the whole system other than simply 

giving technical direction? There has to be somebody up there.

Mr. Belanger. I would have to say tha t I am the one.

Mr. Randall. You are. You shouldn’t downgrade yourself and ju st 

say you are responsible for a few technological details. You are Mr. 

Ryan’s boss, aren’t you?

Mr. Belanger. No, I am not his boss.

Mr. Randall. Who is his boss? He doesn’t have any?

Mr. Belanger. The regional director in the Great Lakes region is 

his boss, and tha t regional director reports directly to the Administrator.

Mr. Randall. I was pointing a t Mr. Wubbolding. Is he the boss?

Mr. Belanger. He is the boss of the air traffic facilities in the Great 

Lakes region.

Mr. R andall. Oh, now we have a regional director of FAA, and he is 

the boss where this accident is concerned? This is what I am trying to 

find out. Who is he?

Mr. Belanger. Mr. John Cyroki is the regional director of the Great 

Lakes region.

Mr. Wubbolding is in charge of all the air traffic control facilities in 

the Great Lakes region.

Mr. Randall. He is the air traffic director right under Mr. Cyroki?

Mr. Belanger. Right.

Mr. Randall. We had a little experience up in J FK in connection 

with the Concorde. We went up there and we found out tha t you have 

one man who seemed to be running the whole thing. I guess he was a 

regional director like Mr. Cyroki.

Mr. Belanger. Yes.

Mr. Randall. A nice gentleman. He was involved in an accident 

right after that. Are we talking about the same one?

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. So is he the one who is really the head of all airtraffic control. And Mr. Wubbolding is responsible as far as air-traffic 

control is concerned?

Mr. Belanger. That is right.

Mr. Randall. Then you come down to folks like Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Wubbolding. I am Mr. Ryan’s supervisor.

Mr. Randall. All right.

On page 5, Mr. Belanger, when you mention the increase in system 

errors reported during 1975—you jumped from 340 to 424 with only 

3 million additional traffic miles. Are you talking about millions of 

miles here?

Mr. Belanger. No, those are millions of operations.

Mr. Randall. What is an operation, then?

Mr. Belanger. One aircraft movement—landing or takeoff—is 

movement of the aircraft. It has nothing to do with miles.

Mr. Randall. I see.

Mr. Belanger. How many aircraft flew.

Mr. Randall. In other words, these are individual planes?

G9-G96— 7i
22

Mr. Belanger. That is right.

Mr. Randall. I t is the same plane taking off and landing again and 

again in a lot of different places?

Mr. Belanger. Yes.

They are individual flights.

Mr. Randall. Anyhow, you jumped from 340 to 424 in 1 year?

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. Those were the system errors t hat were reported.

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. Do you have any knowledge of how many were 

not reported?

Mr. Belanger. No, I do not have any knowledge.

Mr. Randall. Does anybody? Obviously not, I guess.

Mr. Belanger. No.

Mr. Randall. That is where my question is leading to.

You say this increase is attribu table to the initiation of the aviation 

safety reporting program in M ay of last year.

Mr. Belanger. Yes. We believe tha t influenced the increase.

Mr. Randall. Dr. McLucas had been in here, and he had only 

been aboard for about a week or two, I think. Less than that, when 

he came here.

Are you talking about the immunity program here?

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. Let us talk a little about that.

Who is in charge of that?

Mr. Belanger. I am not in charge of that, but I am familiar with 

it and have an association with it.

Mr. Randall. Dr. McLucas did not tell us very much about it. 

He told us it was in existence. Who is the best witness to tell us about 

that?

Mr. Belanger. I believe I could probably do a p retty good job of 

explaining the program.

Mr. Randall. You are being modest. You know all about it, but 

you do not want to talk.

We are going to ask you a few questions.

Is this the program involving NASA?

Mr. Belanger. Yes, sir. I t is.

Mr. Randall. Is there some kind of a contractual relationship 

between you and NASA?

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. Then you are the man. You know what is going 

on.

Can you tell how many system errors NASA has reported? Is 

this part of the 424?

Mr. Belanger. The NASA program has not taken over as yet.

Mr. Randall. Oh? When are they going to? Are they running 

a little slow?

Mr. Belanger. I believe they begin in April.

Mr. Randall. It took them a year to get in gear?

Mr. Belanger. But the reporting program is still going on internally. It is being reported to a confidential group within the FAA. 

Th at is why I say I am not in charge of it. It is a small group reporting 

directly to the Administrator.
23

Mr. Randall. In other words, from May until April, some time 

a month or two from now, there has been a confidential FAA immunity program?

Mr. Belanger. That is right.

Mr. R andall. At least, we hope it has been confidential.

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. What is the name of th at small group?

Mr. Belanger. It is called the aviation safety reporting group.

Mr. Randall. Who is in charge of tha t group?

Mr. Belanger. The name of the gentleman in charge of the group is 

Mr. Youngren.

Mr. Randall. Who is he? Where did he come from and what has he 

been doing there?

Mr. Belanger. I am not completely familiar with his background, 

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Randall. II ow many are in this group? You say it is a small 

group.

Mr. Belanger. I believe there are five or six.

Mr. Randall. Is he the chairman of it?

Mr. Belanger, le s, I believe tha t is a reasonable description of 

his function.

That group has one representative from air traffic, a representative 

from flight standards, a representative from airports.

Mr. Randall. I know you are going to say tha t you do not have the 

information now, and I think tha t is justified because you did not know 

to what depth we are inquiring here. But we would like to know 

whether this big increase in reported errors during the time that 

you tell us about here, from some unspecified date in 1974 to some 

unspecified date in 1975, and this program was started in May—- —

Mr. Belanger. May of 1975.

Mr. Randall [continuing]. Was this big increase after the confidential reporting system was instituted?

Mr. Belanger. Yes, it was.

Mr. Randall. In other words, if you can guarantee confidentiality, 

and get it clear out of the department—you might get a lot of errors 

reported.

The Chair was personally involved in an incident tha t was never 

reported. We had to dig real hard over at O’Hare to find out what 

happened. We finally found out. But it liad not been reported at all 

anywhere in FAA.

Mr. Belanger, 1 guess one of the tilings we are trying to do this 

morning is to try to be as certain as possible tha t an accident of this 

kind does not happen again—a horrible accident like this.

The first thing we want to do is to find out who is responsible and 

what has been done with the person who was responsible, in accordance with your regulations.

But then I suggest again th at the other objective is to do everything 

we can to see tha t i t doesn’t happen again.

In your page 6, you say tha t you are in agreement with the recommendation of the National Ti an sport ation Safety Boa.d.

I want the record to show that the chairman of that board, after 

his preliminary investigation, called the chairman of this subcommittee 

at home and told me exactly what happened. We found out what
24

happened pre tty soon after it was over, because we felt we had an 

obligation and a responsibility to find out. Tha t is why we are having 

this hearing this morning, and we may have to have some more.

You say that you are in agreement with this National Tran sportation Safety Board report; that you are in complete agreement with 

NTSB recommendations and tha t those recommendations will be 

speedily implemented. Everything is fine up to this point. And you 

say that you are taking some followup actions.

One of these is tha t you have included the report in the national 

training program at Oklahoma City. We have been out there. We 

might have to go out there again. Last year they told us they were 

going to do some things, and the year has passed and they have not 

done any of the things tha t they told us they were going to do. N ot 

one thing.

Bu t that is not your problem.

Then you say you have a video tape that you are going to replay 

and distribute to all air traffic facilities, and tha t there will be a 

man datory briefing in every facility as well. We would like to know on 

what dates and in what centers tha t mandatory briefing will be, and 

who atten ds those briefings.

Mr. Belanger. That mandatory briefing should be taking place 

right now.

Mr. Randall. You mean it has not taken place before now?

Mr. Belanger. The oral one has already taken place. The video tape 

takes a little time to produce.

Mr. Randall. When did tha t briefing take place? Who listened to 

it, and at what places and what dates?

We want a little record to be sure t hat i t took place.

You say some of it has taken place now?

Mr. Belanger. Tt is either completed or is—■—■

Mr. Randall. That is what we want to know, if it has been 

completed now.

You are in total agreement with this document here, and you say 

you are going to do these three things.

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. I think you are to be complimented. on say you 

have instituted a mandatory briefing. But you indicate tha t some of 

the briefings are taking place now. This is quite a period of time. 

The recommendation was issued 2 or 3 weeks ago. That is not too bad.

Mr. Belanger. We went out with an immediate directive.

Mr. Randall. And you are doing it right now?

Mr. Belanger. I hope it is finished.

Mr. Randall. All right.

Mr. Belanger. Not the video tape, though. Th at takes more 

time.

Mr. R andall. I understand. I am talking about the mandatory 

briefing.

Have you had it at your center, Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan. Not since I left last Thursday.

Mr. Randall. Well, the 25th of February was when the order was 

issued. There was not any failure of communication, was there? 

Everybody got the order immediately, didn’t they?

Mr. Ryan. Mr. Chairman, I think the problem is the distribution 

of this report.
25

Mr. Randall. Wha t is the problem? Didn’t they get it to you?

Mr. R yan. Ordinarily, normal distribution is one or two to the 

facility. I believe Mr. Belanger had in mind tha t each controller 

should receive a copy. Th at would require massive distribution subsequent to February 25, and we just haven’t received our package 

yet.

Mr. R andall. You were not briefed at Cleveland w’hen you left 

last Thursday. We have not found any great shortage of Xerox 

machines, or 3M’s, or Thermofax. You could reproduce i t that way, 

if you had to, couldn’t you?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

As an interim measure, I received a 3-page copy of the safety information bulletin, I believe th at is what it was called. I t was issued by 

the National Transportation Safety Board. That was immediately 

copied and distributed to controllers to read. But it is not as comprehensive as this report.

In addition to the briefings conducted on this particular accident, 

it is a m atte r of standing practice in Cleveland center that, any time 

we have a system error, all the controllers are briefed on it—including, 

of course, those controllers involved.

In addition, at Cleveland center, we generated wdiat we call a 

system error awareness program in which every controller at Cleveland 

center spent 8 hours. This was an effort to heighten the awareness 

of the controllers to certain problems and trends that happened 

within Cleveland center, and those tha t we know of nationally we 

tried to bring it to their attention and go over other system errors 

that have happened.

All of these were started before the November 26 accident.

Mr. R andall. Th at is encouraging.

Mr. Belanger. At the national level, we did not wait for the 

NTSB report. We felt that more timely action would be appropriate, 

and we issued w hat we call a general notice to all facilities outlining 

certain good operating practices that they should follow, that the 

controllers should be briefed on and made aware of. Th at was issued 

on December 16.

Mr. Randall. Wh at did you do on December 16 now?

Mr. Belanger. We issued what we call a general notice to all 

facilities outlining certain good operating procedures and pitfalls 

th at they should look for, one of which, of course, was the one brought 

to light by the accident.

Mr. Randall. May we have a copy of that, sir, please?

Mr. Belanger. I believe your staff has a copy.

Mr. Randall. L et’s take a look at it. I guess we will have to do 

tha t later on.

Mr. Belanger, on page 6, you said that you want to clarify a misconception of the NTSB report. They refer to the high percentage 

of human failures in the air traffic control system. And you said, no, 

tha t is n ot right. You said, we believe the high percentage refers to 

the high percentage of system errors that involve human factors.

Mr. Belanger. I believe wha t I was disputing was t ha t there are, 

indeed, a high percentage of human failures in the system as opposed 

to the fact that a high percentage of the system failings are indeed 

human failings.
26

I hope we are both talking about the same thing.

Mr. Randall. I hope we are, too.

Mr. Belanger. Because we and the National Transportation 

Safety Board are talking about the same thing.

Mr. Randall. Aren’t we all talking about the same thing?

Mr. Belanger. Wha t I am talking about is the fact that, of the

errors or system failures th at occur, a very high percentage are human 

failings. Th at is not to be construed, in my opinion, that there are a 

high number of human failings in the system.

That sounds like double talk, but-----

Mr. Randall. 1 think we are getting pretty close to it. What is the 

difference between a human failure and a human factor?

Mr. Belanger. By human failing, I am saying that, if the controller 

makes one error for every 42 years of experience, I would not consider 

that a high human error rate.

Mr. Randall. No, it is not very high in 40 years. But it is still a 

human error, and tha t is what we are talking about. That is why 

we have got Mr. Ryan here this morning.

Mr. Belanger. So, what I am saying is, that, considering the 

total number of operations and control instructions, there are very 

few errors.

Mr. Randall. I just couldn’t let tha t go by without asking.

Now, on page 7, you say you agree with the National Transportation Safety Board report, tha t No. 1 failed to apply the prescribed 

separation minima and was distracted by secondary duties.

I do not think anyone has mentioned the secondary duties. What 

are they?

Mr. Belanger. I will defer to Mr. Ryan who is more familiar 

with the secondary duties.

Mr. Randall. Is this a Lear Jet you are talking about?

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Mr. Randall. What happened to the Lear Jet? He placed a lot 

of importance on this Lear Jet.

Mr. Ryan. The Lear Jet was handed off to Cleveland center by 

Chicago center, but it was not on the route of flight tha t we had 

planned tha t i t be on. And it was not on the route of flight tha t was 

indicated on its flight progress strip in Cleveland center.

At tha t time, Chicago center advised controller No. 1 tha t he had 

not updated the Lear Je t’s route of flight.

Mr. Randall. Chicago center told No. 1?

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Then controller No. 1 attem pted to update the route of flight by 

inpu tting a specific message into our computer at Cleveland center. 

He put the message in a number of times, and each time it 

was rejected.

Mr. Randall. Who is he?

Mr. Ryan. Controller No. 1.

Mr. Randall. Controller No. 1 was putting it into his own center 

computer and the message was being rejected.

Mr. Ryan. We believe tha t it was being rejected because of a 

format error on the part of controller No. 1.

Mr. Randall. Then you are saying something different from what 

we thought you were going to say. We thought you were going to 

say tha t this Lear Jet had completely departed from his flight plan.
27

Mr. Ryan. Sir, we know where the aircraft is. We have a radar 

handle on it. We are watching it.

Mr. Randall. That leads to another question.

Did Chicago tell Cleveland exactly what was going on? Was there 

good communication?

Mr. Ryan. Controller No. 1 perfectly understood the limitations 

with which he was accepting the handoff on the Lear Jet. In other 

words, he knew he had a function to perform to update.

Mr. Randall. So there was no failure of communications any- I where here?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir. He understood what his responsibilities were 

when he took the handoff on the Lear Jet.

You must remember that we were watching the Lear J et on radar. 

• He was in radar contact. He had an alpha-numeric tag. We knew

where he was going. We could see him. I t was merely an administrative 

function.

Mr. Randall. You knew where he was going, but he wasn’t going 

where he had said he was going.

Mr. Ryan. He was not going on the same route of flight as was 

previously planned.

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Chairman, the flight was initiated out of 

Chicago on a route different than originally planned.

The Chicago center told the Cleveland center controller No. 1 that 

the route was changed and was it all right with him. Controller No. 1 

said tha t was all right tha t he would take the aircraft on tha t route.

The next process was tha t controller No. 1 had to tell the computer 

tha t we were changing route. We knew it. The man knew it. Now we 

had to tell the computer.

Mr. Randall. You say you knew it. You mean Cleveland knew it?

Mr. Belanger. Both Cleveland and Chicago.

Mr. Randall. Both Cleveland and Chicago knew where the Lear 

Jet was?

Mr. Belanger. And where he was going. Yes.

Mr. Randall. Why was it tha t when No. 1 fed this information 

into his computer, it was rejected?

Mr. Ryan said a minute ago it was a format error?

Mr. Ryan. Yes

Mr. Randall. By whom?

Mr. Ryan. By controller No. 1.

Mr. Randall. Tell us what a format error is. His own computer at 

Cleveland rejected it?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Tell us about that.

Mr. Ryan. Each instruction given to the computer must be put in 

in a certain sequence using the correct computer terminology. In this 

case, we believe that the correct terminology for the aircraft destination was not entered properly.

Mr. Randall How do you know tha t is true?

Mr. Ryan. Through the inspection of the data analysis and reduction tool.

Mr. Randall. Everyone has to have their own terminology.

Mr. Ryan. It is a recording of all of the information tha t the 

computer has processed throughout the 18-hour period tha t it is up.
28

Mr. Randall. Somewhere deep in its brain it says, this is not it?

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Mr. Belanger. In this instance, the aircraft was going to an airport 

in Canada which has a four-letter designator as its destination. We 

have abbreviated identifiers for the various airports, and the ones in 

Canada use four-letter identifiers. The controller attem pted to use a 

three-letter identifier and the computer said, no, there is no such thing, 

try again.

Mr. Randall. No. 1 used three letters instead of four?

Mr. Belanger. Correct.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Ryan, Mr. Belanger said tha t after the near 

collision, controller No. 1 was relieved from d uty and began to write 

his reports of what had happened.

Mr. Belanger also told us No. 1 had previously scheduled annual 

leave over Thanksgiving, and took that time off.

When he returned, he did not work an operational sector but was 

detailed to a training department.

Mr. Ryan. The reason tha t he went to the training department 

was not for training or to train anyone else.

We are talking about his physical location as opposed to the actual 

duty.

Mr. Randall. That is just the way you describe it?

Mr. Ryan. Correct. We are no t implying that he was being trained 

or was training someone else.

Mr. Randall. It is ju st where he was?

Mr. Ryan. Correct, He was preparing for the National Transportatio n Safety Board hearing th at was scheduled for December.

Mr. Randall. You just had to let him be in someplace.

All right.

You say, though, Mr. Belanger, tha t after this hearing—and I note 

the word after—of the National Transportation Safety Board, he 

reported for duty. That is after the hearing? I t was before the report, 

but certainly after the hearing.

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Mr. Randall. And he was assigned as the D man. What does the 

“D ” stand for?

Mr. Ryan. That is a short term for the manual controller position.

He is the controller at a sector who communicates via land lines 

with other sectors and terminal facilities and other centers providing 

a non radar type of separation.

Mr. Belanger. There are three levels of skills required in a control 

function. The lowest level skill is the manual controller function.

Mr. Randall. All right, we will sta rt at the bottom. The “D” man 

is the manual controller.

Mr. Belanger. Right.

Mr. Randall. What is the next step up the ladder?

Mr. Belanger. The next step of skill requirement is the handoff 

position or tracker.

The final step is the radar control position.

Mr. Randall. He is the one who actually directs traffic?

Mr. Belanger. Th at is correct.

The manual controller, on the other hand, is basically coordinating 

the activity with other facilities.
29

What Mr. Ryan did is put him back in at the lowest level of skill in a 

close supervisory posture.

Mr. Randall. You said he was subject to close over-the-shoulder 

monitoring? Who was watching No. 1 carefully?

Mr. Ryan. His supervisor. And also those peer controllers working 

with him.

Mr. Randall. Peer controllers? You mean his equals?

Mr. Ryan. Yes; his equals on the crew.

Mr. Randall. But he was only on manual at this point?

Mr. Ryan. Y es.

Mr. Randall. Somebody was satisfied tha t his peiformance was 

all right. According to Mr. Belanger, he was then allowed to work 

independently with normal supervision. T hat is like supervision of any 

other controller?

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Mr. Randall. You say this occurred over a 3-week period? I think 

we are going to have to fit these dates together. When did he actually 

become a controller again?

Mr. Belanger said this close supervision, this over-the-shoulder 

supervision lasted 3 weeks. When did this period begin and end?

Mr. Ryan. The supervised period started on December 14 and 

continued through approximately Jan uary 4.

Mr. Randall. And t ha t was over-the-shoulder supervision?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Did radar controller No. 1 tell you on January 4 

tha t while he was off duty he seemed to be troubled about the accident 

and its aftermath?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. When did he tell you about th at?

Mr. Ryan. January 12.

Mr. Randall. W’hat did he do between January 4 and Ja nua ry 12?

Mr. Ryan. He worked at his regular control duties.

Mr. Randall. Do you go into the en route center?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir. 1 spend time out there every day.

Mr. Randall. I would hope you would. You are the boss of the 

whole thing, aren’t you? You walk around through the whole facility?

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Mr. Randall. Did you observe No. 1?

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Mr. Randall. From January 4 to January 12, he was performing 

his full duties?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. For 8 days.

Mr. Belanger, this is a hypothetical matter, and one on which you 

have testified and therefore a ma tter about which we are going to 

ask you.

In the middle of page 8, you say that there can be no hard-and-fast 

rule, tha t each controller has a different history and different level of 

experience.

We have been at the training center in Oklahoma City. We wrote a 

report. 1 expect you haven’t read our report about air traffic controllers, have you?

Mr. Belanger. Yes; I have.

6 9 -6 !) G— 7 6 -------5
30

Mr. Randall. We wonder sometimes if anybody ever reads them 

downtown.

You said that there can be no hard-and-fast rule. But w hat if there 

are two system errors in 6 months. The air traffic controller’s certificate 

should be revoked. There may be a variety of reasons for these errors. 

Some are correctable by retraining, but when there are two errors in 

6 months—how many chances are you going to give a controller? Th at 

is the question I am asking you.

Aren’t two errors in 6 months, or one in 3 months or 4 months—or two in a half year—too much? And are you actually going to give him 

another chance to make the same error over again?

Mr. Belanger. Two in 6 months would be a very serious thing. 

We would take a very, very hard look at a controller who had tha t 

record. You take a hard look at any controller who has a system error, 

and you take a particularly hard look at a repeater. There are not too 

many repeaters.

But the circumstance of the error can be so complicated. There 

could be other mitigating factors, and other contributory factors. 

What I am really saying is you have to look at each one on its own 

merit.

Mr. Randall. Th at is all right. But you say right here that even 

with two errors in 6 months, you still have some doubt abo ut whether 

that controller’s certificate should be revoked.

You say there is no fast rule, yet you just got through saying 

you think tha t two errors in 6 months is pretty serious.

Mr. Belanger. When I say “certificate revoked” in the sense of 

the statement, it means fundamentally the man is going to be fired 

or separated.

In actuality, each controller, once he makes a system error, is 

fundam entally withdrawn from duty. Technically his certificate is 

revoked until he proves tha t he can again control traffic.

In this context, when we say certificate revoked, we are speaking 

of a final action in which the man would no longer be employed. 

As if it is an automatic thing.

Mr. Randall. In private industry, in spite of any union agreemen t—maybe we will get to some of the union agreements later 

on in these hearings—whether it is the steelworkers, the autoworkers, 

or wherever it is, managers actually fire people, don’t they?

Mr. Belanger. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. You have indicated that, with civil service guarantees, we have just about reached a point in the system where it is 

hardly possible to fire anyone if they work for the Government. 

Are you not saying tha t there is no point at which a man should be 

fired?

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Chairman, we fire a great number of peoople, 

as a matter of fact.

Mr. Randall. I would like to know how many you fire. I would 

like that for the record.

And I would like to know how m any the FAA has fired over the 

years. Tell us where they were, and what you fired them for.

Mr. Belanger. It is mostly in the developmental process.

Mr. Randall. That is what our report was about.

1 guess you would call it firing.
31

Air. Belanger. We just say, you are no longer employed.

Mr. Randall. Th at is the way it ought to be, we believe.

It certainly is true with every Member of Congress. We have to 

be reemployed every 2 years. We face the electorate. We either do 

the job or we do not do it.

I want to know those who you have fired. I want to know how 

many you have fired and for what.

We will get into this union agreement later on, too.

Mr. Belanger. Th at is no problem. We will be happy to provide 

that.

[The information referred to follows:]

Question. Statistics concerning how many controllers have been fired over the 

years and for what causes?

Answer. Answering the question precisely as asked would tell only a very small 

portion of the story on how the Air Traffic System is purged of personnel incapable 

of controlling air traffic. In order to respond more fully, we have assembled data 

on all types of separations actions, e.g., removal (firings), resignations, etc. The 

removal category includes employees that were removed because of their inability 

to become full fledged air traffic control personnel. These removals occurred 

during the employee’s developmental stage, i.e., training. Likewise, the persons 

listed under the resignation category were those who resigned while in a developmental stage. The y elected to resign after having encountered difficulty in the 

training program.

Those listed under the category of transfers are employees who transferred to 

another agency and were lost from the FA A rolls. A substantial portion of these 

employees also failed the air traffic training programs. The “other” category is a 

combination of removals and resignation tha t occurred for reasons other than 

training failures, e.g., conduct, etc.

The significance of these statistics is the revelation that the air traffic control 

system is purged of personnel incapable of controlling air traffic prior to them 

acquiring full performance level status. This assures the integrity of the system 

and maintains the high level of safe ty evident in the few errors committed by 

control personnel.

■Calendar year 1968:

A. Removals________

B. Resignations............

C. Transfers.................

D. All others.................

Total separations.

Calendar year 1969:

A. Re movals............. .

B. Resignations............

C. Transfers....... .........

D. All o th ers .. .............

Total separations.

Calendar year 1970:

A. Removals________

B. Resignations............

C. Transfers.................

D. All others.................

Total separations.

Calendar year 1971:

A. Removals....... .........

B. Resignations______

C. Transfers________

D. All others.................

Total separations.

Term inals Centers

6 21

27 123

6 18

29 35

68 197

22 53

105 554

4 7

76 87

207 711

54 71

282 720

9 51

85 97

430 939

21 68

125 292

12 53

81 45

239 453

Combined
32

Terminals Centers Combined

Calendar* 1 year 1972:

A. Removals............................................................. . . . . ........... ................ 22 102

B. Resignations__ '......................................... ............. ................... .......... 80 233

C. Transfers....... ......................................................................................... 9 40

D. All oth er s. ......................................................................................... 116 65

Total sepa rations............................................................................... 227 440

Calendar year 1973:

A. Removals............................................................................................... 10 22

B. Res ign ations......................................................................................... 96 109

C. Tra ns fe rs ...... .......... 4 21

D. All oth ers ....................................................................... 18 41

Total separation s............................................................................... 128 193

Calendar year 1974:

A. Removals....... .............. 14 14

B. Re signations.......................................................................................... 71 111

C. Transfers....................................................................... 7 14

D. Al l others___________ 41 21

Total separations.............. ................................................................. 133 160

Calendar years 1968-74:

A. Removals__________________ 149 351 500

B. Resignations................................................... 786 2,152 2,938

C. Transfe rs............................................................ 51 204 255

D. Alt others............ ......................... ............. ..................................... 446 391 837

Grand to ta l.......................................................................................... 1,432 3,098 4,530

Mr. R andall. I would like to see the whole thing and see what 

part they might have had in this.

I was startled —tha t is the only way I can put it —at your testim ony 

on page 9. You start o ut by almost washing your hands of this whole 

November 26, 1975, accident, whether or not the boss down there 

is the regional director. You say it is the facility supervisor’s judgment 

that we must rely most upon in deciding what is the appropriate 

action to take.

This is ta ntam ount to saying there that you never review the case 

yourself. You are going to completely and totally rely on the facility 

supervisor. But on page 9 you also say tha t disciplinary action is not 

taken in every case. Th at is understandable.

But do you even consider disciplinary action in every case? Who 

considers it? There are all kinds of disciplinary action. A letter of 

reprimand can be issued. I think some controllers should be fired. 

There is no question about it, and I think there are many people in 

this country who feel the same way.

However, you tell us in your state ment t hat you rely totally on the 

facility supervisor’s judgment, and then you go on in your statement 

to say: However, an employee who deviates from prescribed standards 

and procedures through negligence or carelessness can expect appropriate disciplinary action.

This is how you try to qualify what you have just said.

Now we are talking about a deadly serious accident. I want to be 

sure tha t I understand you. Are you going to rely upon a facility 

supervisor’s judgment in deciding what action should be taken? 

Are you going to let it stop there?

Who is the supervisor? Mr. Ryan? Are you going to rely on his 

judgment? We are going to ask him about his judgment in putting 

this man back to work later on.
33

Are you going to rely on Mr. Wubbolding? Are you going to rely 

on Mr. Cyroki? Whom are you going to rely on?

Where do you stop? You tell us tha t you are going to leave it all 

up to the facility supervisor’s judgment. You are going to stop there. 

Isn ’t there some review?

Now this is my question. Who finally decided it was up to Mr. Ryan 

solely and totally and completely to determine whether this man 

should go back to work? Did anybody monitor—if you want to use 

that word—Mr. Ryan’s judgment?

Mr. Wubbolding. I was kept apprised all the way along of the 

* actions that were being taken, and I concurred with the actions of

Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Randall. You approved everything Mr. Ryan did?

» Mr. Wubbolding. Yes, 1 relied on his judgment and the supervisor’s

judgment with respect to the capabilities of the individual.

Mr. Randall. 1 ou relied on his judgment. Did you make an 

investigation of your own, sir?

Mr. Wubbolding. Yes, sir.

We had an individual who went over there.

Mr. Randall. Who was the individual?

Mr. Wubbolding. Daniel Schillaci.

Mr. Randall. I would like to have his report. Maybe we can hear 

from him, too.

Mr. Daniel Schillaci went over there? Went over where?

Mr. Wubbolding. He went over to Cleveland center from the 

Chicago office. He is from my evaluation staff.

He was not involved in all of these various decisions.

Mr. Randall. Where is his report?

Mr. Wubbolding. He assisted the facility in preparation of the 

material tha t we needed for the NTSB hearing.

Mr. Randall. Did he write a report?

Mr. Wubbolding. No report.

Mr. Randall. We do not know what he said? He jus t went over 

there?

Mr. R yan. He was a witness at the NTSB hearing on December 12.

Mr. Randall. We hear a call of the House.

We are going to have to adjourn at this point until the call of the 

Chair to pursue this m atter, which will probably not be possible in the 

remainder of this week because of other duties.

The subcommittee will adjourn, to reconvene subject to the call of 

the Chair, and you will all be notified. We will have you back.

| [Whereupon, at 12 noon, the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene

subject to the call of the Chair.]

i

FAA RESPONSE TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 

SYSTEM DEFICIENCIES

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 1976

H o u se of R e p r e s e n t a t iv e s,

G o v er n m en t A c t iv it ie s an d

T ra n spo rta tio n Subcom m it te e

of t h e C o m m it tee on G o v ern m en t Ope r a t io n s,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m., in room 

2247, Ray burn House Office Building, Hon. Wm. J. Randall (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Wm. J. Randall and Willis D. Gradison.

Also present: Miles Q. Romney, counsel; Bruce Butterw orth, 

research assistant; Marjorie A. Eagle, clerk; and R ichard M. Tempero, 

minority professional staff, Committee on Government Operations.

Mr. R andall . The Subcommittee on Government Activities and 

Transportation will convene.

I want to express my gratitude for the presence of the gentleman 

from Ohio for his presence to constitute a quorum as we commence 

this morning.

Last Tuesday, we had some of the gentlemen from the Federal 

Aviation Administration with us to discuss FAA’s response to an 

air traffic control system error involving human factors.

Our hearing was occasioned by certain actions of the FAA taken 

with regard to certain radar control operators involved in the November 26, 1975, near midair collision over Carleton, Mich.

Because of the call of the House, we did not have a chance last 

week to finish our questioning. Therefore, we have asked the FAA 

witnesses to reappear today so that we may continue.

Gentlemen, we welcome you back. We will proceed immediately 

with our questions.

We have with us again, Mr. Raymond G. Belanger, Director of 

the Air Traffic Service, Federal Aviation Administration. He is 

accompanied by Mr. John F. Wubbolding, chief, Air Traffic Division, 

Great Lakes Region, FAA, and Mr. John Ryan, chief of the Cleveland 

Air Route Traffic Control Center of the FAA.

Mr. Belanger, please. Would you join us for a moment?

We will go off the record for a moment.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. R a ndall. Back on the record.

Mr. Ryan, la st Tuesday Mr. Belanger placed considerable emphasis 

on the role which the Facility Review Board plays in determining 

the n ature and degree of controllers’ involvement in air traffic control 

syste m errors.

(35)
36

It is the un de rstand ing of the subcom mi tte e, and I wan t you to be 

sure you un de rstand wha t we are tal king ab ou t, th at in the m at te r 

of No vem ber 25, 1975, yo u never con ven ed a review bo ard to evalu ate 

this sys tem error.

Our quest ion to you at t his tim e is, why? Why d id you n ot convene 

suc h a board ?

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND G. BELANGER, DIRECTOR, AIR TRAFFIC

SERVICE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN F. WUBBOLDING,

CHIEF, AIR TRAFFIC DIVISION, GREAT LAKES REGION: AND

JOHN RYAN, CHIEF, CLEVELAND AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL

CENTER

M r. R yan . Sir, the circums tan ces surro undin g the No vemb er 26 

acc ident were uniq ue fo r me. We ma de the decision no t to convene the 

Sys tem Error Review Bo ard bec ause the Nationa l Tr an sp or tatio n 

Safet y Bo ard was conductin g an inv estig ati on and we did no t wa nt 

any res ults th at may have been co ntrary. Not th at they would have 

been, but it was their d etermination to ma ke, we felt, and we let them 

ma ke it.

Mr. R andall. Mr. Ry an , you pa rti ally answered the quest ion 

wh en y ou said it was unique.

Do you me an this was a uniqu e syste m err or or a uniqu e acc ident?

Mr. R yan. Yes, sir.

To h ave an a cciden t and wha t m igh t have been in itiall y deter mi ned 

to be a syste m error at the sam e tim e is unique.

Mr. R andall. You have no t made th at ve ry clear to us, sir. Th e 

fact th at it was uniqu e should have been all the more rea son to have 

conven ed the Rev iew B oard, should it n ot?

Mr. R yan. We did no t feel we should pre jud ge wha t the Nationa l 

Trans po rtation Sa fet y Boa rd ’s determ inati on s hou ld be.

Mr. R andall. Later on, did you no t pre jud ge wha t their decision— 

or someone else’s decision—was going to be when you pu t this 

con troller back to work?

Mr. R yan. No, sir.

M r. R andall. You m ust have h ad some seas on. We will get aro und 

to th at later .

B ut who—'when you say “w e”—m ade the decision no t to convene 

this Revie w Board ?

Mr. R yan. My self and the peop le in the Gre at L akes region.

Mr. R andall. WTho are tho se people?

M r. R yan. Th e op era tio ns bran ch chief.

M r. R andall. Sp ecifically w ho?

M r. R yan. Joseph B ossle tt.

Mr. R andall. Who is he? By “w e,” do you me an “I ,” you rself— 

Mr. Rya n— and Mr. Bo ssl ett? W ha t is M r. Bo sslett’s capacity, and 

who is he? Is h e with us tod ay?

Mr. R yan . No, sir.

I wou ld like to initially say , sir, th at the decision no t to have a 

Sys tem Error Rev iew Bo ard was mine, and th at thi s decision was 

con vey ed to Mr. Bo sslet t who, in thi s pa rti cu lar incide nt, is Mr. Wu bbolding’s age nt.
Mr. Randall. What do you mean by “agent” ?

Mr. Ryan. When air traffic control centers, air traffic control 

towers, flight service stations, generally deal directly with the operations branch in the regional office.

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Chairman, if I might-----

Mr. Randall. Mr. Belanger, let the gentleman testify, if you will, 

please. You can help him later on.

We are going ahead with Mr. Ryan, now, please.

Mr. Ryan, you conveyed the decision to Mr. Bosslett, who you say 

was Mr. Wubbolding’s agent?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Is Mr. Bosslett a subordinate of Mr. Wubbolding?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, he is.

In other words, the operations branch is the contact within the 

region for the air traffic control centers, towers, and flight service 

stations.

I do not deal on a day-to-day basis directly with Mr. Wubbolding.

Mr. Randall. But you could have, in a matte r of this importance?

Mr. Ryan. I could have.

Mr. Randall. Is there some barrier or some impediment so that 

you could not talk to him?

Mr. Ryan. No.

Mr. Randall. You put the matter on Mr. Bosslett’s lap and 

said, “Here it is.” And Mr. Bosslett said, “We are not going to do 

anything on the Review Board.”

Is tha t correct? Or are you going to take full responsibility?

Mr. Ryan. We have decided, once it was declared an accident, 

and that in fact the NTSB was going to conduct an investigation, we 

considered whether or not it would be proper for the FAA, or Cleveland 

center in particular, to conduct a System Error Review Board, which 

may have in fact prejudged what the NTSB, which was making a 

full investigation of the accident, would determine.

Mr. Randall. Now, Mr. Ryan, you were n ot precluded by regulations from having this Review Board. You were just afraid there 

would be a leak of some kind, that you could not control your own 

investigators?

Was tha t your reasoning?

Mr. Ryan. No.

Mr. Randall. You say that once it was declared an accident, 

“We had decided * * * a review board * * * would prejudge” ?

Mr. Ryan. Let us say it would be improper.

Mr. Randall. Which is it—prejudge or improper?

Mr. Ryan. Both.

Mr. Randall. I see.

I want to ask you to expand on both of those terms, 

lo u cannot prejudge an NTSB investigation. There is no way you 

could have prejudged it. They are going to make their own decision.

What I am going to try to show during these questions is tha t you 

did not do anything. You did not do anything except put the man 

back to work.

Is tha t not correct?

In your own mind, you just made the decision ex parte.

Isn’t that about it?
38

Mr. Ryan. The decision was made to put him back to work. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. But you did not make an inquiry as to whatever 

happened. There was no record made. Maybe you talked to him. 

I don’t know. We will get around to tha t later on.

You just simply put him back to work.

You say “prejudge” and “improper” or “inappropriate.” What 

was that other word?

Mr. Ryan. I said “improper,” but “inappropriate” is a b etter word.

Mr. Randall. Thank you.

Mr. Ryan, the next question I will ask you is whether you are 

familiar with the regulations of the FAA which require that you 

convene a review board, at some point.

Have you ever yet convened a review board up?

Mr. Ryan. Not on this accident. No.

Mr. Randall. Don’t the regulations require tha t you do that?

Mr. Ryan. No.

Mr. Randall. On what interpretation do you place that?

Mr. Ryan. Excuse me, sir, a moment.

Mr. Randall. Sure.

Mr. Belanger. May I interject a comment?

Mr. Randall. You are going to be given full opportunity, 

Mr. Belanger. Ju st bear with us a little while.

Maybe Mr. Wubbolding also would like to talk. But we will get 

around to him, too.

Mr. Belanger, since you want to contribute, I am going to ask you 

a question.

You testified last week that there was procedure requirement to 

establish a review board, which, at least according to the intent of 

your regulations down there—and whether you follow the inte nt of 

Congress or not is another matter—but according to the intent of 

your regulations, there should be an in-depth, full-scale investigation 

of an incident.

Whether this was an incident or an accident, or not—you testified 

last week that the Review Board is required to make their report 

within 15 working days of the occurrence.

Now your only loophole here is, that somebody made a decison 

tha t there was not going to be a review board.

Why was that decision made?

Mr. Belanger, if you didn’t have anything to do with this decision, 

you cannot answer my question. You told me a minute ago you didn’t 

have anything to do with this decision. But you wanted to contribute, 

so we are giving you a chance to do so.

Mr. Belanger. This gets a little murky at this point. As soon as 

the NTSB declared the incident to be an accident, their investigation 

preempts any investigation on the part of the FAA.

The NTSB statute says that once an occurrence is declared an 

accident, the NTSB will conduct the investigation unless they specifically ask us to conduct an accident investigation.

Mr. Randall. That is the point.

According to our counsel, and check me if I am in error, you have 

the latitude and probably the responsibility under regulations, to 

proceed with your own review board.
39

You are not going to tell the NTSB tha t they are wrong. But you 

still have the authority, and according to the regulations, the right, 

to convene a review board, regardless of whether as Mr. Ryan says, 

it would prejudice an NTSB investigation. It certainly wouldn’t 

prejudice if it wasn’t released. It would not have been improper to 

conduct some kind of a review board here.

There is no prohibition against review boards. Is there anything 

in the regulations that says you may not go ahead with a review board? 

I would like you to point it out to me, if you can find where it is.

Mr. Belanger. Title 7 of the Federal Aviation Act, section 701, 

part (f) refers to the use of the agency—tha t is, the Federal Aviation 

Administration Agency—“ * * * acts in investigations,” it says, 

“upon the request of the Board. The Secretary of T ransportation is 

then authorized----- ”

Mr. Randall. Which board, sir?

Mr. Belanger. The National Transportation Safety Board is 

authorized to make investigations with regard to aircraft accidents 

and report to the Board the facts, conditions, circumstances, thereof, 

and the Board is authorized to utilize these reports in making its 

determinations of probable cause under this title.

'The interpretation of this section is tha t .only on request of the 

Board is the FAA authorized to conduct an accident investigation. 

Therefore, to convene a review board would constitute an investigation of the accident with probable cause and findings, which, in 

our interpretation, could be contrary to the act inasmuch as the 

Board has not authorized us to conduct such an investigation.

We work side-by-side with the Board when they conduct their investigation.

Mr. Randall. We understand that, Mr. Belanger.

The Chair has had a few other responsibilities since la st Tuseday, 

but we have kept this very much in mind.

We are talking about two different things here.

The section you referred to is concerned with the probable cause of 

what happened.

We are talking about something else. We are talking about the 

negligence and the carelessness of the controller.

There is nothing to preclude you from reviewing tha t aspect of an 

accident.

Mr. Ryan. Sir, in 30 other cases since May of 1974, we have conducted System Error Review Boards.

Mr. Randall. Yes, and the National Transportation Safety Board 

tells us you routinely conduct parallel investigations.

Mr. Ryan. Right. And System Error Review Board-----

Mr. Randall. Did you say “right” ?

Was 1 right or wrong?

Mr. Ryan. Would you repeat what you said?

Mr. Randall. That the National Transportation Safety Board 

and the Review Board of FAA conduct parallel investigations many, 

many times.

Mr. Ryan. I don’t know tha t personally to be true.

Mr. Randall. 1 thought you said “righ t.”

Mr. Ryan. 1 do not know tha t to be personally^true.
40

Mr. Randall. You don’t know it?

Mr. Ryan. No.

Mr. Randall. Well, you do not know it to be untrue, then?

Mr. Ryan. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. You just don’t know.

Mr. Ryan. From my personal experience, I do not know tha t to 

he true.

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Chairman, we do not routinely conduct a 

parallel accident investigation with the Board. We will participate 

with the Board in their investigation.

Mr. Randall. Then, as far as the November 26 accident is concerned, and this is an important point—before you pu t radar controller 

No. 1 back to work, the FAA had not conducted a review of any kind.

Isn’t that right?

Mr. Ryan. The FAA did not have a System E rror Review Board.

Mr. Randall. J ust you and Mr. Bosslett made the decision?

Mr. Ryan. 1 certainly reviewed the facts.

Mr. Randall. And after that you made the decision. It did not go 

to a review board of any kind?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. You put the man back to work how long before 

the National Transportation Safety Board ever came in?

Mr. Ryan. He was pu t back to work following the National Tr ansportation Safety Board hearing on December 12.

Mr. Randall. I am not talking about the hearing. I am talking 

about the report.

Mr. Ryan. The report was issued at 6:30, February 25.

Mr. Randall. Th at is right.

No. 1 had gone back to work for how long? About 30 days from 

December 15?

Mr. Ryan. Approximately December 14. Not approximately— 

exactly December 14 until January 19.

Mr. Randall. Th at is the point I am trying to establish. I think 

we have tha t nailed down.

And there was no review board of any kind in your shop. J ust you 

and Mr. Bosslett?

Mr. Ryan. There was no System Error Review Board.

I would like to make a point, sir, th at System Error Review Boards 

do n ot recommend disciplinary action in any case.

Mr. Randall. The next question, then is, What do they exist for? 

They try to find the facts, don’t they?

Air. R yan. They try to determine probable cause so tha t system 

errors can be prevented.

Mr. Randall. They are charged with other responsibilities than 

the determination of probable cause. Check your regulations on that. 

If t ha t is not so, then there is a glaring omission here in both law and 

the regulations.

Probable cause is a factor. Probable cause is one subject of an 

investigation. But sooner or later you m ust determine whether or not 

there was negligence—or what degree of negligence and failure, omissions, carelessness, whatever you want to call it —there was.

When you put the gentleman back to work on December 15, there 

had been no conclusions of any carelessness or anything else.
41

Isn ’t th at true?

Mr. Ryan. On December 14.

Mr. Randall. Well, all right.

Right or wrong?

Mr. Ryan. I put him back to work on December 14.

Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. I am asking you—1 think we have it already on the 

record—there had been no review board? It was simply your decision, 

and Mr. Bosslett’s decision?

Mr. Ryan. Th at is correct.

After I attended the NTSB hearing, where all of the facts were 

revealed.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Ryan, I am trying to nail down the fact tha t 

the National Transportation Safety Board had not reached any 

conclusion when you atten ded those hearings

Mr. Ryan. Th at is correct, sir.

Mr. Randall. Thank you.

Mr. Wubbolding. May I-----

Mr. Randall. Just a minute, Mr. Wubbolding. We will get around 

to you.

We are trying to pick up one grain of sand at a time.

Mr. Ryan. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Randall. I have a question for you, Mr. Ryan.

Was it possible you made the decision in your own mind and 

heart and being that you were not going to convene this review board 

because somebody somewhere along the line had said that this is no 

longer an incident but an accident.

Was that your reasoning?

Mr. Ryan. Th at is partially true.

Mr. Randall. If that is your reasoning, isn’t the fact that it was 

an accident all the more reason for you to have convened a review 

board? I t is a much more serious matter than an incident.

Isn ’t th at right?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

It was much more serious.

Mr. Randall. Perhaps I can get at the tru th of this thing another 

way around.

Is every system error, whether you do not want to call it an accident 

or an incident, investigated by the National Transportation Safety 

Board?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. We are going to try very hard to find out how 

many system errors are never reported somewhere along the line— 

how many we never hear about. There are many, we believe personally. 

I was personally involved in one about a year ago. But there was 

never any record made of th at incident.

Mr. Ryan. May I make two points?

Mr. Randall. Go ahead.

Mr. R yan. No. 1, with regard to the Review Board and the National 

Transportation Safety Board, it would seem important that it be 

investigated, and, if in fact it was, it was a dual investigation. Is a 

dual investigation necessary if one can accomplish the same thing?
42

The second point is that, in section 7210.3(c), paragraph 426-----

Mr. Randall. Will you go a little slower—section 7210.3(c) of 

what?

Mr. Ryan. That is our Facility Management Handbook.

Mr. Randall. Are these regulations promulgated at FAA 

headquarters?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir. FAA.

Mr. Randall. Section 7210, (c) subsection 3?

Mr. Ryan. The book is section 7210.3(c). And it is paragraph 426.

Mr. Randall. Yes, I am with you.

Mr. Ryan. It says:

R etu rn to O pe ra tion al D ut y. Afte r pre lim in ar y in ve st ig at io n, em ploy ee s fo un d 

not resp on sibl e fo r contr ib uti ng to th e err or will be re tu rn ed to op er at io na l d uty 

w ithout any u rt h er ac tion .

If su bse quen t in -d ep th in ves tigat io n re ve al s th es e em pl oy ee s or ot he rs to be 

re sp on sibl e fo r or co ntr ib uti ng to th e er ro r, th e em ploy ee sh al l be re m ov ed from 

ope ra tion al d u ty in th e ac tion specified in 427 , an d, if appro pri at e, 431 sh all be 

ta ke n.

Afte r sa ti sf acto ry co mpl etio n of th e pr er eq uis ite in 427, an d th e ap pro pri ate 

su pe rv isor y pe rs on ne l ar e sa tis fied th a t wea kn esses ha ve be en co rrec ted, re tu rn 

th e sp ec ia list to op er at io na l d u ty un less th e spe cific case re qu ires oth er ac tio n.

Now I feel th a t----

Mr. Randall Will you just hold up there for a minute, until we 

get a chance to go back and read that.

Section 426 tha t you have referred us to states, and this is the 

regulation 1 am reading verbatim:

A fter pr el im in ar y in ve st ig at io n, em ploy ee s fo un d not re sp on sibl e fo r co n tr ib u tin g to th e er ro r will be re tu rn ed to oper at io nal d u ty w ithout any fu rt h er ac tio n.

This was November 26, 1975, wasn’t it?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. The preliminary investigation had to be vours. 

You said th at it was yours and Mr. B osslett’s. Or else you referred it to 

Mr. Bosslett.

Have you heard from Mr. Bosslett any more?

Mr. Ryan. It was my investigation.

Mr. Randall. Yes.

Evidently you found, or must have found—I do not want to put 

any words in your mouth; I am not trying to tell you what to testify 

to—but the facts are that, after your preliminary investigation, you 

returned radar controller No. 1 to duty; did you not?

Mr. R yan. After my preliminary investigation, I returned controller No. 2 to duty.

Mr. Randall. Did you not also return controller No. 1 to duty.

Mr. Ryan. On December 14, which is however many days—I guess it would be 19 days—from November 26—-prior to that, controller No. 1 had not been returned to duty.

Mr. Randall. We are just talking about time. You did return him 

to duty, whether you did it the next day or December 14—you did retu rn him to duty?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir, after applying the criteria in 427.

Mr. Randall. We will have to get down to paragraph 427; however, 

we are still on paragraph 426, however. I must ask you a few questions 

on 426. We believe there are several things that have not been done.
43

We are still on paragraph 426. The controller is returned to operational duty without any further action. Are you trying to say to us tha t 

the other action is taken under paragraph 427?

Mr. Ryan. No. It says:

If subseq ue nt in-d ep th inve stiga tio n rev eal s the se employees or othe rs to be 

responsi ble for or co nt ribu tin g to th e err or, th e em ployee shall be rem oved from 

op erati on al du ty in th e ac tio n specified in 427, and, if ap prop ria te, 431 sha ll be 

tak en.

It indicates that controller No. 2-----

Mr. Randall. All right. Let us try to be clear on the timing here.

Right here we are talking about the preliminary investigation. 

When did you make tha t preliminary investigation? When did it 

begin and when did it end?

Mr. Ryan. It was a continuing investigation. It began on November 26, at 8:45, for me.

Mr. Randall. When did you end it?

Mr. Ryan. In the case of controller No. 2-----

Mr. Randall. We are talking about controller No. 1, if you please.

Mr. Ryan. In this case, Mr. Chairman, I cannot separate the two 

because the investigation must reveal certain things, and certain 

actions were taken after certain stages of the investigation.

Mr. Randall. Now, Mr. Ryan, if we may interject this: From all 

the information tha t we have read, No. 2 was somewhat of a hero. 

No. 2 was the man who saved the lives of these people, wasn’t he? 

He was someone to be given the laurel, salute, and accolade.

No. 1 was the one who nearly cost the lives of these passengers.

Isn’t that the conclusion which was already reached by the National 

Transportation Safety Board?

Mr. Ryan. No.

Mr. Randall. No? You are shaking your head.

Is th at not the conclusion they reached?

Mr. Ryan. No—I guess what I am saying is tha t you are paraphrasing what the report says, and I am n ot sure tha t you are paraphrasing exactly what the report said.

Mr. Randall. Oh. You are now saying tha t the report did not 

say that?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir. I am not saying it.

Mr. R andall. You are asking us now about No. 2, bu t I want to 

ask you about No. 1, because that is the man you put back to work. 

Tha t is where the negligence and the carelessness was involved.

This is the conclusion. On the last page—just before it was signed.

Th e Nati on al Tra ns po rtat io n Safet y Bo ard deter mi nes th at th e probable 

cau se of this ne ar collision was th e failure of th e ra da r con tro ller—

They do not call him by name; they don’t call him radar controller 

No. 1—

To ap ply pre scrib ed sepa ratio n crite ria whe n he first bec am e aware of a po tentia l traffic conflict, which necessita ted an ab ru pt collision avoid anc e ma neuver. 

He also allowed secondary dutie s to int erfere with th e tim ely detec tio n of th e 

impending traffic conflict when it was dis pla yed cle arly on his rad ars cope. Contrib ut in g to th e accid ent was an inc om ple te secto r brie fing du rin g th e cha nge of 

controlle r per son nel —a bo ut one minute before the accid ent.

The Chairman of the NTSB told the chairman of this subcommittee tha t what happened was that the man simply got up and
44

went to dinner or someplace—wherever he went—and that he never 

said anything to the man who relieved him about the situation.

Did you dig into that?

Mr. Ryan. That is not exactly the way it happened.

Mr. Randall. No?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. But you have never convened a review board of 

any kind. You do not have anything in writing, any repo rt like this, 

do you?

Mr. Ryan. Sir, I can make a preliminary investigation without 

having a review board.

Mr. Randall. We understand tha t, but did you ever reduce it to 

writing?

You say you gave something to Mr. Bosslett. You didn’t call him 

on the telephone, did you?

Mr. Ryan. Yes. I called him on the telephone.

Mr. Randall. But you never reduced anything to writing?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. Not up to this time?

Mr. Ryan. Not with regard to why or why not a System Error 

Review Board was conducted.

Mr. Randall. Doesn’t it occur to you tha t this is a m atte r of such 

transcending importance involving the lives of 306 people and that 

there should have been some conclusion in writing by yourself?

Mr. Ryan. What I am saying is, I do not have a piece of paper tha t 

testifies to the fact that Mr. Bosslett and myself agreed—like a memo 

for the record—on such and such a date tha t we would not conduct a 

System Error Review Board.

However, I cannot say categorically tha t someone on my staff did 

not have discussions with the evaluations branch in the region, and 

may have, in fact, made a memo for the record stating tha t very fact.

Mr. Randall. Bu t you are the boss, are you not? You are the man?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. You are the one making the decision?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. My staff just called my attention to the fact tha t 

you say this conclusion of the National Transportation Safety Board 

is not correct.

You say you do not agree with this finding—the one I read into 

the record. We will have it read back, if you like. Or I will read it again.

You said tha t is not right—that i t is not true.

Mr. Ryan. Excuse me, sir-----

Mr. Randall. Will the reporter read back what the gentleman said. 

He said this wasn’t the whole story, or this was not exactly like it was. 

What was his answer after I finished reading it?

[The portion from page 21, line 19, through page 22, line 16, was 

read.]

Mr. Randall. The review by our reporter indicates that the Chair 

had finished reading the NTSB’s determination of probable cause and 

then related portions of a telephone call he had received from the 

NTSB Chairman about the time this accident occurred. Maybe it was 

supplemental, maybe we are going to have the National Transportation Safety Board in here and interrogate them.
45

The Chair simply stated that, whether or not it is included in the 

NTSB report, and no matter how you word it—whether it was an 

incomplete sector briefing or something else—No. 1 got up and left 

and went to lunch or to dinner, as the case may be, and did not say 

anything to No. 2 who relieved him.

You can comment on t hat as you please.

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

No. 1 was relieved by No. 2, who received a briefing.

Mr. Randall. You are disagreeing with the-----

Mr. Ryan. I am not getting into any great detail about the details 

of the briefing. What I am disagreeing with is tha t No. 1 got up and 

went to unch. Because No. 1 remained.

Mr. Randall. That is an established fact, isn’t it?

Mr. Ryan. No. No. 1 was there when it happened.

When the accident happened, he was not-----

Mr. Randall. Well, ju st a minute—then he must have come back.

Mr. Ryan. He was not plugged in. In other words, he had unplugged 

from the sector—pulled his headset out. He was standing there talking to No. 2. He remained there with No. 2, not operating the position, 

but in tha t area.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Ryan, did he or did he not go to lunch?

Mr. Ryan. I think the words are tha t he was relieved for a lunch 

break. It did not say where he went.

Mr. Randall. But he did not leave?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. In other words, you are saying the facts are tha t 

No. 1 never left at all?

Mr. Ryan. That is correct. He was relieved from his position and 

he was not working the radar position any longer.

Mr. Randall. Was he looking at the radar scope? You should be 

knowledgeable of this. You say you conducted your own investigation. 

Was he looking at the radarscope while all this was going on?

Mr. Ryan. He said he was having a conversation with the manual 

controller, who was the man sitting right next to the radar controller.

Mr. Randall. In other words, this thing is even worse than it 

seemed because No. 1 was standing there. He didn’t leave at all? No. 

1 didn’t leave at all?

Mr. Ryan. Not tha t I know of.

Mr. Randall. Well, you said you conducted a pre tty good investigation. Do you know whether he left or not?

Mr. Ryan. He did not leave.

He was relieved; he did not leave.

Mr. Randall. He didn’t go.

But he was relieved to go to lunch?

Mr. Ryan. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Randall. But he didn’t leave?

Mr. Ryan. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. That is what you are saying?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Did you read the depositions taken by the National 

Transportation Safety Board? 1

1

 Tr ans cript of deposition proc eeding: “National Trans portation Safety Board. In the 

ma tter o f: The investigation involving AA182 appro ximately 27 miles west of Carleton, 

Mich., VORTAC, on November 26, 1975, at appro ximately 0023 Gmt. Docket No. 1-0024. 

Cleveland, Ohio, December 12, 1975.” A copy is in the subcommittee files.
46

Mr. R yan. No, sir.

Mr. R andall. You have n ot rea d them?

Mr. R yan. No sir, bu t I was the re.

I was at the hearing.

Mr. R andall. I un de rst an d th at , but have you had a cha nce to 

review the m since the n? Hav e you rea d the m over since the n?

Mr. R yan. No, sir. I nev er received any copies

Mr. R andall. You mean the FAA has no t rece ived an y copies 

of this?

Mr. R yan. No, sir. I did no t receive any copies.

Mr. R andall. Don ’t you think it was im po rtan t to rece ive a 

copy? Ar en’t you going to be que stioned somewhere dow n the line?

We are going to h ave a h vp othetic al case for you in a m inu te or two.

If the re had been a collision, ins tea d of a near-collisio n, you certainly would have had an op po rtu nity to read them ; wo uld n’t you, 

sir?

Mr. R yan. Yes, sir. If I had received one, I wou cl be glad to read 

it.

Pos sibly beca use I did no t tes tify, I did no t receive a dep osition, 

or copies of them.

Mr. R andall. We will come bac k to some of these things in 

a minute.

Now I am going to give you the hy pothe tic al case I was talkin g 

about. You will, of nec essity, have to follow us ra th er closely. We 

will repe at it, if need be.

Le t us alt er the sequence of No vemb er 26 a little.

Assu me th at the two aircraft are flying com pie tely in the cloud s. 

Assu me th at rada r con troller No. 2 only notices the ne ar midair 

collision aft er it had occurre d. In othe r words they cam e perilously 

close to a horrib le catas tro phe.

He re are these two planes passing in the clouds and at nig ht. This 

is a hy po theti cal case.

Assume th at ra da r con troller No. 2 c ame on du ty and had just seen 

this ne ar collision of pe rhaps 500 feet, aft er it ha d occ urred. He just 

shook his head and said , “M y God, we could have killed all these 

people.”

Then, assume th at , ju st o ut of luck or Pro videnc e, whe n the two aircraft passed perilou sly close to eac h othe r within a few hu ndred feet 

of eac h other, th ey were no t even aware of i t ; the y wen t on to the ir 

destinations. Th e record shows th at the TW A L - 1011 we nt on to 

Los Angeles. Th ey di dn ’t kno w how close the y had come to all bein g 

killed un til they ha d lan ded in Los Angeles.

Here are two planes closing at sp eed of over 1,000 m iles per hour an d, 

wh eth er th ey pass withi n 20 fee t or 50 feet or 500 fee t of each oth er, 

the f ac t of the m at te r is th at th at is a system error. Is th at c orre ct?

Mr. R yan. Yes, sir.

Mr. R andall. You he ard the hypothe sis. You say th at is a sys tem 

error?

Mr. R yan. Yes, sir.

Mr. R andall. At this poin t, are you prepare d to say w hether or not 

th at would co ns titute a hu man erro r?

Mr. R yan. I t would appea r, from the fac ts as you ha ve related it, 

th at you said th at the two airpla nes passed withi n 200 fee t------
47

Mr. Randall. Or 500 feet.

Mr. Ryan [continuing]. And they were IF R and the pilots did not 

see each other. I don’t believe you stated a reason why they passed. 

Was there a radar failure?

Mr. Randall. It is up to you to say what kind of a failure i t was. 

This is a hypothetical case.

Mr. Ryan. Okay, sir. Then, with the facts you have given me, I 

cannot make a determination whether it was a human failure, equipment failure, or a procedural failure.

Mr. Randall. Well then, let us assume it is a human error.

Mr. Ryan. Okay. The assumption is than tha t it is a human 

failure.

Mr. Randall. We are on the top of the case now.

What actions would you take in response to this type of system 

error?

Mr. Ryan. Do you mean insofar as a System Error Review Board?

Mr. Randall. Yes. What would you do? You are the boss out 

there. Assume this incident happened in Cleveland center airspace.

Mr. Ryan. I would certainly have a System Error Review Board, 

because it would appear, from the information tha t you have given 

me, tha t it was not an accident, and consequently the National 

Transportation Safety Board would not investigate it, and I would 

have a System Error Review Board as I would in any other system 

error.

Mr. Randall. But you did not have one in this accident, did you?

Mr. Ryan. That is right, because NTSB was investigating.

Mr. Randall. Because you were afraid it was going to upset the 

National Transportation Safety Board in some way.

Mr. Ryan. The NTSB was investigating it. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. At this point, Mr. Ryan, you say you have never 

received a copy of their deposition?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. Don’t you feel you are entitled to one?

Mr. Ryan. I would like to have one.

Mr. Randall. Couldn’t you get Mr. Belanger or Mr. Withholding 

to give you one?

Mr. Wubbolding, will you take the responsibility to see tha t he gets 

one?

Mr. Wubbolding. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Ordinarily, shouldn’t he have one?

Mr. Wubbolding. No, we do not normally get them. I have not 

seen them myself, either.

Mr. Randall. You are chief of the entire Great Lakes region 

are you not?

Mr. Wubbolding. Yes, sir. We got a copy of the National Transportation Safety Board-----

Mr. Randall. You are the chief of the Great Lakes region?

I believe it was William James—a psychologist of pretty good 

reputation—who said, the only good definition of intelligence is the 

ability to benefit from experience.

Don’t you think you might be able to benefit by some of this 

experience if you disseminate this report a little bit?
48

Mr. Wubbolding. Yes, sir. We have disseminated the report. However, we have n ot-----

Mr. Randall. Did you get an original copy?

Mr. Wubbolding. Yes, sir. We have got an original copy of the 

report. Are you speaking of the specific deposition?

Mr. Randall. I am speaking of the report of the deposition. 

A report which would draw some lessons from this accident. We want 

to try to learn a little bit from our experience, that is all. It is very 

simple: We want to see that this does not happen again.

Mr. Ryan. Mr. Chairman, we have a copy of the report.

Mr. Randall. That is what I asked you. You do have it, then?

Mr. Ryan. I am sorry. You asked if we had a copy of the depositions, which is this transcript.

Mr. Randall. The transcript, yes.

Mr. Ryan. This is the transcript. And this is the report.

Mr. Randall. You say you have a copy of a report, but not a copy 

of the transcript of the deposition?

Mr. Ryan. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Wubbolding, do you have a copy?

Mr. Wubbolding. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. You have never received one?

Mr. Belanger. There is only one copy in the agency, as far as I 

can determine.

We went up to the NTSB of the Washington headquarters and obtained it, and tha t is the only copy tha t I am aware of. I t happens to 

be right here. Mr. Ryan has it in his hand.

Mr. Randall. We have been fortunate to get one. We are going to 

make good use of it before we are through with this matter.

Perhaps it is n ot a very interesting and romantic matter, but we 

are going to dig into it and find out what happened and who is to 

blame for it.

There has got to be somebody somewhere along the line of FAA who 

is derelict other than radar controller No. 1.

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir, may I read something from the NTSB in the 

matter of American 182, November 26?

Mr. Randall. Is this in your deposition?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. What page are you reading from?

Mr. Ryan. Page 28.

Mr. Randall. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Ryan. It is line 15. They are querying controller No. 1, the 

NTSB, and they said:

Did you leave the immediate vic inity of the Wayne secto r aft er you were relieved?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Is there any partic ula r reason why you did not leave the immediate 

area?

Answer. No.

Question. Well, how did you occupy yourself immediately after you were relieved and before you left the area?

Answer. I spoke to the Detroit rada r man.

Question. Well, did you r conversation with the De troit rada r m an concern any 

matter of a control natur e or was it just a personal conversatio n?

I could go on, bu t I think the point I am trying to make is that the 

man did not leave the sector after having been relieved.

On page 30, line 14:
49

Question. I mean while you were still in the sector even though you had been 

relieved and had not left the area. I am just wondering if the controller who 

relieved you communicated with you? Did he say anything to you at the time or 

after he cleared flight to descend immediately?

Answer. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. Whether the information tha t No. 1 went to lunch 

was accurate or inaccurate he was still standing around there. You 

read here, tha t he communicated with Detroit. He was standing there 

looking over radar controller No. 2’s shoulder. Don’t you think he 

was responsible for doing something even if he was just an interested 

bystander?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. But he didn’t do it.

He was standing right there. Apparently he did not go to lunch. 

At least not right away.

I think perhaps we should have radar controller No. 1 in here, and 

maybe radar controller No. 2 also.

Is No. 1 well now, or is he ill? What is his situation?

Mr. Belanger. He is ill, sir.

I think we should apprise you, Mr. Chairman, of the medical 

status of controller No. 1. As I understand it, he has applied for and is 

in the process of receiving an approval of medical retirement.

Mr. Randall. All right.

Let us go back to our hypothetical case for a minute or two, Mr. 

Ryan.

You have been at the Cleveland center for cpiite a while, haven’t 

you?

Mr. Ryan. I have been in Cleveland center since May of 1974.

Mr. Randall. That is not too long.

I thought you had been there for several years.

Have you been in other control centers?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. How long were you in those others?

Mr. Ryan. I was in Washington center from 1956 until 1973 with 

14 months out in Vietnam, in Saigon.

Mr. Randall. I’ve been down there three or four times myself.

You were over here a t National Airport?

Mr. Ryan. No; out at Leesburg.

Mr. Randall. The one in Virginia?

Mr. Ryan. Yes; at Leesburg.

Mr. Randall. As you look back over those years of service, can 

you reconstruct in your own mind how many cases similar to our 

hypothetical case t hat we gave you a moment ago you know about?

Mr. Ryan. If you are talking about a situation where one aircraft 

is climbing through another-----

Mr. Randall. Tha t is right—coming a t another.

Mr. Ryan [continuing]. In which the controller notices he has 

just had what he believes is a system error and reports it, there have 

been numbers of them. I wouldn’t even speculate on them.

Mr. Randall. I understand there have been a lot of them.

How many would you estimate?

You were there at Leesburg from 1956 on. In other w’ords, you 

have had this same type of job since 1956?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.
50

Mr. Randall. On the one hand we hear the Administrator and all 

the folks down at FAA say, “ Don’t worry about anything—everything 

is all right.” We have got so many millions of miles tha t we clock up 

right. And that is an impressive statistic.

But you have told us tha t there have been a lot of these instances. 

Can you say whether there have been 20, 30, or 40 in the years you 

have been there?

Mr. Ryan. I guess you would have to make a determination on what 

is “a lot,” but I have seen those types of incidents occur.

Mr. Randall. Were they dangerously close?

Mr. Ryan. I have seen those types of incidents occur, and of course 

in the case of 500 feet that you mentioned, if you wanted to make a 

judgment on whether tha t is dangerously close, my judgment-----

Mr. Randall. If you can look out a window and see your counterpart in the other window pretty well—you can almost tell what color 

suits they have on, can’t you, at 500 feet?

Mr. Ryan. I think you said underneath 500 feet.

Mr. Randall. All right—less than 500 feet.

Mr. Ryan. In my judgment, 500 feet is not necessarily dangerously 

close, b ut tha t is my particular judgment.

The separation below 29,000 feet is 1,000 feet separation. In other 

words, that would be less tha n legal separation. And, in the incident 

that you mentioned to me, that would be a system error.

Mr. Randall. What is legal separation?

Mr. Ryan. One thousand feet vertically below flight level 290 

below 29,000 feet.

Mr. Randall. Just a minute. One thousand feet below what?

Mr. Ryan. One thousand feet vertical separation at altitudes 

29,000 feet and below.

Mr. Randall. What about above 29,000 feet?

Mr. Ryan. Above 29,000 feet, it would be 2,000 feet vertical 

separation.

In other words, if you had an aircraft at 29,000 feet, the closest 

that an aircraft above him could be would be 31,000 feet.

Mr. Randall. That is vertical separation.

Wha t about lateral separation?

Mr. Ryan. In radar data processing, or in the narrow band mode, 

which all domestic centers are in, when they are operating in RDP, 

it is 5 miles separation—5 nautical miles horizontally. No less than 

5 nautical miles.

Mr. Randall. Do you have only the two regulations or the two 

parameters? You have one vertical—1,000 feet up to ceiling 29, and 

then 2,000 above. Then you have a lateral separation of no less than 

5 nautical miles?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir. What tha t amounts to is, if you don’t have 

1,000 feet, in other words, you have two aircraft at the same altitude, 

you cannot have less than 5 miles. If you have 1,000 feet vertical 

separation-----

Mr. Randall. Would you back up a little bit? We have a long 

way to go on this. We are going to have some hearings coming down 

the road in a couple weeks on a m atte r pre tty much similiar to this. 

Let us just interrogate a little and figure out some of these things.

You have two airplanes at what level?
51

Nlr. Ryan. In other words, you either need lateral or vertical 

separation.

Mr. Randall. All right.

Now tell me about the two airplanes you started to speak of.

Mr. Ryan. OK. If you have 1,000 feet separation vertically in 

altitude, it is n ot necessary to have the 5 miles. If you do not have 

it—if you have less than the vertical separation which is 1,000 feet, 

then you must have at least 5 miles horizontal or lateral separation.

Mr. Randall. You are saying that one cancels out the other. Is 

that right?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir. In effect.

Mr. Randall. On November 26, everything had been canceled 

out. They were coming right toward each other.

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Do you have some sort of a sliding scale of this 

lateral and vertical separation criteria?

You say that if you have 1,000 feet vertical separation, it is not 

necessaiy to have 5 miles lateral separation. I thought you said there 

was a firm requirement to maintain the 5 miles lateral separation.

Mr. Ryan. If you have the 5 miles, then you do no t need vertical 

separation.

In other words, you can take two aircraft at 29,000 feet-----

Mr. Randall. Oh—it is the other way around. If you have got the 

lateral, you can forget about the vertical.

Is that it?

Mr. Ryan. If you have got the vertical, you can forget about the 

lateral.

In other words, there are two types of separation.

Mr. Randall. I follow you.

Mr. Ryan. The two are vertical and lateral. You must have one 

or the other.

Mr. Randall. Thank you. That has been helpful.

You never did give us any kind of a best estimate you may have 

of how many of these incidents there have been, but you said there 

have been a lot.

Can you recall whether there were 100, 50, or 75? You have been 

around a long time. You surely know whether you have one or two or 

three a year—or four, five or six a year?

Mr. Ryan. I cannot remember back to 1956 how many there might 

have been.

Mr. Randall. L et’s just go back a few years. How many have you 

had in the last year or two?

Mr. Ryan. I can tell you how many we have had at Cleveland 

center.

Mr. Randall. We’d be glad to know.

Mr. Ryan. All right, sir. In 1976, we had two system errors. In 

1975, we had 20 system errors. In 1974, we had 12 system errors.

Mr. Randall. I think we may have to look a t what you mean by 

system errors.

Wha t do you mean by system errors?

Mr. Ryan. When we have violated the appropriate minima. When 

there was less than the necessary separation.

Mr. Randall. We violated—who do you mean by “we”?
52

Mr. Ryan. I am talking about Cleveland center.

Mr. Randall. Whom did you report those to?

Mr. Ryan. Sir, if you will, I can read the exact definition.

Mr. Randall. Can you tell me who you reported those to?

Mr. Ryan. The procedure following a system error is tha t we call 

it in immediately to the regional communications center and then to 

Washington. Then, within 6 hours, we have to give a verbal report 

to the system command center in Washington, D.C., which further 

relays t hat to Mr. Belanger.

Mr. Randall. A verbal report is very good. When do you finally 

get around to doing a written report?

Mr. Ryan. Within 15 days of the incident.

Mr. Randall. A verbal report within 6 hours, and a written one 

in 15 days.

Mr. Ryan. Within 15 days we are to convene a System Erro r 

Review Board.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Belanger knows all about these, don’t you?

Now we come back to that review board again, don’t we?

You always convene a review board, except when you have something really serious.

I am not trying to put words in your mouth, but you just did not 

do it in this serious matter.

Mr. Ryan. Somebody else was doing it.

Mr. Randall. Staff has suggested we ask you how many of these 

errors that you ju st reported to us—2, 20 and 12 over for these various 

years—how many of them were human errors.

Mr. R yan. Sir, I do no t have the exact information on how many 

were, bu t the majority of them were.

I would not say tha t 100 percent of them were, bu t I can find out 

exactly how many of them were hum an errors.

Mr. Randall. Perhaps we have been looking too much at one incident here. Perhaps we should look at the wider picture.

If there were human system errors, then, after we follow this section 

of FAA handbook 7210 3C through paragraph 426, Return to Operational Duty, and paragraph 427, Additional Training, we finally get 

down to paragraph 431, Disciplinary Action. Mr. Belanger, we would 

like you to submit information going back to 1970 or perhaps farther 

back than that. You have records of disciplinary actions taken in those 

years, haven’t you?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. I want to follow through and see what steps you 

took in these human system errors. Was the controller involved always 

relieved of his duties? Or did the controller just go on happily ever 

after? I want to know what happened in all of these system eriors. 

How many times was there any disciplinary action taken or reprimand 

issued?

Did anyone in FAA do anything other than just say everything is 

all right, and we’ll st art all over again?

Mr. Ryan. I can tell you in speaking for Cleveland center that of 

1974, in the 12 system errors there was 1 letter of reprimand issued 

and the remaining were——■
53

Mr. Randall. Only one letter of reprimand out of all the human 

system errors that you have just mentioned?

Mr. Ryan. In 1974, there were 12 system errors. We issued one 

letter of reprimand, and the remaining system errors—or the people 

involved, 1 do not know the exact number of people—were issued 

oral reprimands.

Mr. Randall. You told the controller, just do no t do it again or 

something like that. Is that right? Is that an oral reprimand?

Mr. Ryan. You could characterize it that way.

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Chairman, I think we should-----

Mr. R andall. I don’t want to talk to you about this, Mr. Belanger. 

I want you to assemble this data. They are all recorded in your office 

aren’t they?

Mr. Belanger. Tha t is right.

Mr. Randall. I want you to give us the records you have down 

there at air traffic. We are going to find out what is being done to 

those controllers who are careless and negligent. Are you simply 

saying, be good, and don’t do it any more?

In the military there is an individual personnel file called the 201 

file. In the military, you very jealously try to keep your “201” file 

clear of a record of disciplinary ma tters of any kind because you might 

want to be promoted some day.

All of your controllers want to be promoted, don’t they? They all 

want to become supervisors or something like that. Isn’t tha t how 

they come up through the ranks?

Mr. Ryan. I can’t speak for all wanting to become supervisors, but 

tha t is an avenue of progression.

Mr. Randall. Maybe they do not want to become a supervisor.

Mr. Ryan. Some of them do not.

Mr. R andall. All right.

I think we need to see what has been done in the past within FAA, 

Mr. Belanger. Perhaps we are devoting too much time to the November 26, 1975, accident. But this is a very serious matter on 

November 26.

I am not sure what has been done in this case except that radar 

controller No. 1 has been worrying about what almost happened. 

You say he has become ill. Is that right?

Mr. Belanger. Yes.

Mr. Randall. We are not trying to harass radar controller No. 1. 

We are trying to learn something about the accident to see tha t 

such an accident does not happen again, and to insure tha t FAA has 

done something about it.

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Chairman, I would like to explain what does 

happen when a system error occurs and when we have identified the 

fact tha t it was a human error. 1 say tha t humans do make mistakes. 

We are not perfect. What we try to do is cut down the probability.

On an average, a controller makes an error every 42 years or 2 

million control instructions, I am sorry, but they do make them. 

They are human beings. They do make mistakes—not intentionally. 

Very, very rarely is it done by inte nt or carelessness. These are not 

things tha t happen very often.

Our business is a very serious business. We have people’s lives in 

our hands. I have seen controllers who have made a system error
54

immediately end up in the washroom heaving their guts out. Th at’s 

how seriously we take this business.

What we do as a responsible management group is, when a men has 

made a system error, we immediately decertify him; he is no longer 

able to control traffic.

lie then has to go through a recertification process. In other words, 

his job is on the line. I t is not a suspension or a reprimand. It is his 

job that comes up on the line. He has to re-prove himself.

Mr. Randall. You say this is now a routine procedure.

Mr. Belanger. Yes, sir. For every system error that a man is involved in, he is fundamentally decertified in his abilty to control 

traffic, and he has to re-prove himself.

Mr. Randall. He has to re-prove himself, you say, every time he 

is involved in a system error?

Mr. Belanger. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Belanger, you can stand off and look at this 

accident of November 26 in a fairly objective manner, can’t you?

You were not out there—'not right down at the nitty-gritty level.

Do you think that from November 26 until December 14, controller 

No. 1 had an opportunity to re-prove himself?

Mr. Belanger. No, sir. As I understand the process at Cleveland 

Center, he was placed on the operating position under close supervision, and in tha t facet he re-proved himself.

Mr. R andall. I did not ask you tha t question.

You look at this from a distance. Do you think that 2 weeks was 

enough time?

You say he was decertified? If you decertify somebody, you have 

got to recertify him.

Mr. Belanger. Tha t is correct.

Mr. Randall. Who recertified No. 1? Did Mr. Ryan? Did he ever 

decertify him?

You said this is true in every system error, didn’t you? You just 

finished saying this?

Mr. Belanger. That is the procedure tha t takes place in a system 

error.

Mr. Randall. Well, a system error in this case is a human error, 

isn’t it?

Mr. Belanger. That is generally correct.

Mr. Randall. All right.

There are a lot of things that are missing here.

Mr. Belanger. The technique of recertification can take many 

facets. It depends on the error—what the man did.

We have verbal communication—the “nine” or “five” type of thing 

where you misunderstood what someone said.

This is a typical sort of error in communications. Five and nine 

are words tha t sound alike. We deal a lot in numbers. A man might 

have thought another man said five when he said nine.

That type of an error is a little harder to cure. So it depends just on 

what the circumstances were.

But one of the techniques for recertification is to place the man on 

the operating position, under immediate supervision, until tha t supervisor in fact is satisfied tha t he can perform the job in an adequate, 

safe ma nner.
55

This is w hat I understand took place.

Mr. Randall. In your exposition a minute ago you also said that 

after this decertification had taken place there has to be a recertification, and then you used the words “re-prove himself.”

Mr. Belanger. Th at is correct.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Belanger, you have been around a long while. 

Mr. Ryan has been around since 1956. You must have watched many 

of these decertification-recertifications. Does a 2-week recertification 

process seem a reasonable time in a m atte r of this importance?

Mr. Belanger. Yes, I think so. He was not in a recertification 

process those 2 weeks. I do not want to mislead, as I understand the 

details.

He went into the recertification process after the 2 weeks. He was 

in a cooling off period.

Mr. Randall. But he went right back on his old job, didn’t he?

Mr. Belanger. Under recertification.

Mr. Randall. We are going to let Mr. Ryan testify. He knows that.

Did n’t he go right back on his old job?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

You cannot be recertified in a vacuum. For instance, let’s talk about 

November 26 to December 14.

As f testified last Tuesday, I explained—and 1 can go back to the 

actual details—what controller No. 1 was doing on each and every day 

up to and including December 14. B ut he had not returned to controlling traffic before December 14.

Mr. Randall. But he went back to work on December 14. He had 

not yet been recertified. You were just giving him a trial again. 

Is that right?

Mr. Ryan. I think what we are saying is, how does one be recertified?

Mr. Randall. He was right back on his old job, wasn’t he?

Mr. Ryan. That is the only way to be recertified. Or, not the only 

way, but tha t is one way to be recertified.

Mr. Randall. Don’t you think it might have been wise to place 

him on another job and see how he does there? But you p ut him right 

back on his job, didn’t you, on December 14?

Mr. Ryan. Right. Under supervision.

Mr. Randall. What kind of supervision? Was somebody looking 

over his shoulder?

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Chairman, I would not consider anyone 

recertified until he had demonstrated on the actual control position 

his ability to control traffic. 1 would no t accept a classroom controltype thing. I would like him to go under supervision and demonstrate 

his capability with aircraft. I would not go by some classroom thing.

Mr. Randall. That makes sense.

Did you get any reports from the supervisors, Mr. Ryan?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. From your boss out there? Did you get any reports 

from these supervisors who were watching No. 1?

Mr. Ryan. Tes, sir. And I got reports from some almost every day 

that he was working.

Mr. Randall. Almost every day, bu+ not every day?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir.
56

Sir, I would like to mention, to go back to 427 again, that it talks 

about, in 427(b), a reevaluation of the employee on the position/ 

positions to determine the necessity for additional training.

Mr. Randall. We have many more questions to ask you.

Staff has just suggested a question tha t has to do with the handbook.

You have had conversations with rad ar controller No. 1? You talked 

with him all the time, didn’t you?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, I talked with him often.

Mr. R andall. I pondered the thought of putting you under oath, 

and then we decided against it.

1 want you to be sure to recall this.

Did you, at any time, say to radar controller No. 1 that he could 

return to his old position when he felt ready?

Think about that. Did you tell him he could do th at?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, I did.

Mr. R andall. When did you tell him that?

Mr. R yan. We had many discussions between November 26 and the 

time that he went back to work which was December 14, which happened to be a Sunday.

But it seems to me that particular statement—you are asking me 

when I made that particular statement—I believe it was made either 

December 11 or December 12.

Mr. Randall. You told him that some time before December 14?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

When I mean go back to work. I mean going back to begin the recertification process in order to build his confidence and for me to----- -

Mr. Randall. I now refer you to the NTSB deposition transcript 

on page 38. This involves radar controller No. 1.

Someone with the National Transportation Safetv Board asks 

No. 1:

Question. Have you been performing your control duties in a regular manner in 

your work with the shifts and the sectors in the normal routine manner since the 

date of the accident?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Is there any particular reason why you have not?

Answer. Just of my own choosing until this was over.

Question. Just a matte r of personal choice?

Answer. Yes, sir.

How does tha t fit in with the comment tha t you just made tha t he 

could go back when he felt ready?

Did you leave i t all up to him even after a statement like this by 

No. 1 that he did not want to go back? Did you pu t him back anyway?

Is that right?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir; I do not think tha t is right.

Mr. Randall. All right. What is it then?

Mr. Ryan. I t says, is there any particular reason why you have not? 

And he says, just of my own choosing. I think your question was, if 

he did not want to go back—■—

Mr. Randall. But you said to him, what he told you—there is 

another place in the deposition where you told him he could return 

when he felt ready. Isn’t that right?

You said a minute ago that you said it.

Mr. Ryan. Tha t is right.
57

I do not understand what the question is.

Mr. Randall. The question is, at the bottom of page 38, No. 1 

said th at he ju st did n ot want to return until the whole thing was over.

Did you listen to him; did you talk with him about that?

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Mr. Randall. You p ut him back, though, on December 14?

Mr. Ryan. Yes; because he said then that he wanted to go back 

to work.

Mr. Randall. Some time after he made this statement, he said 

he wanted to go back?

Mr. Ryan. Tha t is correct.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Ryan , you are the man who p ut him back to 

work, aren’t you?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. You must have reached the conclusion that he 

was ready?

You said you have not read these depositions, but you say you 

were present at the hearing. In your mind, you must have concluded 

that he was ready even before he felt he was ready.

Mr. R yan. It is a kind of chicken and egg situation.

In other words, I would be ready to sta rt recertifying controller 

No. 1 as soon as possible following November 26. I would be ready 

to sta rt that recertification process if, in fact, controller No. 1 was 

willing to go to work.

I did not want to force controller No. 1 into a situation that might 

damage his confidence and further upset him.

In a conversation I had with him, I said, I want you to be a valuable person at Cleveland center. I want you to go back to work. 

I want you to gain your confidence. I think tha t, the sooner you go 

back to work, the bet ter off you will be. Bu t I do not w ant to force 

you into this situation prematurely and sooner than you wish to 

go back.

He told me at that time, “Let us wait until after the hearing, and 

then I think I would like to go back to work.” Because the hearing 

was an unknown to him, how strenuous it would be, how deep it 

might be, how traumatic it might be for him, how much it might 

upset him—because he was upset already.

Mr. Randall. Of course, we all have sympathy with this controller 

who was upset. But we are also talking about putting a man back 

who was so upset that he could imperil lives again.

You want to restore this man, and that is worthwhile.

Bu t don’t you believe tha t, of greater, more dominant and paramount importance, is the possibility th at this accident could be repeated by this same controller who is obviously nervous? And yet 

you p ut him back on December 14.

Mr. Ryan. Sir, if I do not go through a process of determining 

whether he is competent and whether he has regained confidence, 

then I will never put him back.

There must be some procedure to go through to determine if, in 

fact, the gentleman will ever work traffic again. I cannot make an 

unequivocal state ment that, “You’ll never go back and work. Th at 

is it for you, controller No. 1.”
58

I have to determine, No. 1, what caused the accident? Was it an 

inadvertent action on his part? How must I, in protecting the integrity 

of the air traffic control system, while still trying to play a human 

role w ith the controller involved—how I can get him back to work 

and still protect the integ rity of the system. There has got to be a 

procedure to do that, and, in fact, that is described in paragraph 427, 

which is the one tha t I used.

I could not make an unequivocal statement and say, “You are 

never going back.” What would this be based on? I couldn’t do that, 

sir.

Mr. R andall. The sequence here is rather important.

You never convened a System Erro r Review Board because you 

thought the National Transportation Safety Board was going to do 

the job. They apparently did do the job and they made some pre tty 

strong findings.

I assume you would have some respect for those findings at this 

point, wouldn’t you, with respect to whether he went back to work 

or not? At this point?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Let me make a point about a System E rror Review Board, when a 

system error occurs. We go back to paragraph 426: “After preliminary 

investigation, employees found not responsible for contributing to 

the error.” Here I am talking about a preliminary investigation tha t 

can take place right now. In other words, if things are obvious, 

within an hour or two following the incident that happened, for an 

obvious type of error. You say, “You are no t involved because I can 

tell that right off the bat.” I can put that gentleman right back to 

work, if, in fact, he is not somehow so upset and would rather not 

work.

Now, I am talking about somebody who is involved. I have made 

a preliminary decision that he is involved. It is not necessary for me 

to wait 15 days until I convene a System Erro r Review Board to 

find out w hat they say before I go into some kind of a recertification 

process. A recertification process and retraining is not considered to 

be disciplinary action.

If I, as a facility chief, determine tha t a controller has contributed 

to an operational error, I can sta rt his recertification immediately.

Mr. Randall. Apparently, Mr. Ryan, you are the one man, or 

you are the jury or the judge or the prosecutor, you are responsible 

for making these decisions out there. You say you passed it over to 

Mr. Bosslett.

I am impressed by what you can do preliminarily. You say you 

were there. You say you went down there that night.

Mr. Ryan. Yes.

Mr. Randall. The facts are, that you must have thought, some 

place along the line, there was some gross negligence or carelessness 

or you would not have removed the man right then and there. Or 

why did you remove him?

The question is this: When, if ever, did you make a determination 

tha t this radar controller No. 1 was, on the one hand, careless or 

negligent through omissions, or th at he was not negligent and careless? 

And when did you make tha t determination? There is the key to this 

whole thing.
59

Mr. Ryan. In the case of determining whether or n ot disciplinary 

action is warranted, or what type, in the case of controller No. 1, I 

would like to read something to you from the same handbook.

Mr. Randall. I am not asking you what the handbook says. I 

am just asking you when you made a decision. You do not have to 

read the handbook. Did you make a decision th at radar controller No.

1 was negligent, or no t negligent? Which was it?

Mr. Ryan. I made a decision that it was not negligent. I made tha t 

decision.

Mr. Randall. You made that decision?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Before the National Transportation Safety Board 

or anyone else had acted or made any findings? You said you did not 

want to interfere with their investigation.

Mr. Ryan. No, sir. I did not say that I made it before then. I 

said tha t I made it.

I said tha t I made a decision that the action was not negligent; 

tha t controller No. 1 was not negligent.

Mr. Randall. You have certainly read the report. You have the 

NTSB report. Would you stand on your decision today in the face of 

their report?

Mr. Ryan. Do you mean, do I continue to have the opinion tha t 

I stated?

Mr. Randall. Yes. In the face of their hearing and report.

Mr. Ryan. Sir, I could not make a formal disposition of disciplinary action prior to February 25 at 6:30 because I am told here, in 

the case of an accident or incident resulting in an NTSB investigation, 

tha t it may be necessary to delay disciplinary action until the termination of the investigation or hearing.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Ryan, we are not talking about disciplinary 

action. You may or may not get around to that sometime. But at 

some point you reached the conclusion that this man was not negligent 

or careless.

You concluded that he was not.

Is that right?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. When did you finally reach that conclusion?

Mr. Ryan. I do not have any specific date tha t I reached that 

particular conclusion.

Mr. Randall. You must have reached it before December 14 

when you put him back to work.

Mr. Ryan. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. Did you put him back to work without determining 

whether or not he was careless or negligent?

Mr. Ryan. Is there a basic assumption on the part of the chairman 

that disciplinary action must take place prior to a controller being 

returned to an operational position?

Mr. Randall. I would not call that an assumption. I think it would 

be a good procedure.

Mr. Ryan. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. You would not pu t a man back who had been grossly 

negligent.

Mr. Ryan. No, sir. That is not the procedure.
60

Mr. Randall. What is the assumption then?

The Chair is not making any assumption. The Chair is simply 

looking at this case in an ordinary, commonsense manner, and it seems 

tha t you should not put a man back to work who has been careless or 

negligent—particularly where the resulting accident involves 306 

lives.

That is why we have asked you to testify Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan. It was my determination that he was not careless and 

negligent. But, supposing he was, and if, in fact, I decided to give 

him a 30-day suspension, or a 10-day, or a 3-day, or whatever disciplinary action was necessary, this would in no way mean tha t he 

would remain in some limbo status not working a position until I had 

enacted the disciplinary action.

This is because through an appeal process it could be months 

before I would ever get the action started.

In other words, after it had been approved, grievances might be 

filed.

Mr. Randall. We understand tha t, as far as Civil Service is 

concerned, it is almost impossible to fire someone any more. You have 

got all the appeal procedures.

We are not talking about these procedures. We are talking about 

why you put the man back to work. And you did.

We all know that they have all these appeal procedures. Everybody 

knows tha t.

I am asking you tha t one question again—when did you reach the 

conclusion th at he was not negligent or careless after November 26?

Mr. Ryan. After December 12.

Mr. Randall. After he was back?

Sometime between the 12th and the 14th? Or sometime after 

December 12?

Mr. Ryan. Sometime after December 12.

In other words, based on the indep th hearing conducted by the 

NTSB, where all the information came out, I had made my decision 

subsequent to December 12.

Mr. Randall. There had been no hearing at tha t date. When you 

asked him if he felt ready, and when he said, “no; he didn’t think so,” 

there had been no hearing at tha t point.

Mr. Ryan. Sir, it appears t hat we are back to the same assumption 

that, whether or n ot I intended to take disciplinary action, whether 

the man was careless or negligent, it seems to be the feeling on the 

part of the chairman tha t I should not return him to duty if, in fact, 

I am going to take disciplinary action.

Mr. Randall. I think tha t is a fair and good belief to harbor. Yes; 

I do. And I will ask you, Mr. Ryan, have you ever yet taken any 

disciplinary action of any kind against radar controller No. 1.

Mr. Ryan. No, sir.

Mr. Randall. No letter of reprimand, no oral reprimand, nothing 

at all?

Mr. Ryan. Let us go back to the circumstances involving the 

departure of controller No. 1 from Cleveland center.

Mr. Randall. Departure? When he became ill?

Isn ’t th at right?

Mr. Ryan. That is right. He became ill.
61

Since January 20-----

Mr. Randall. And we all feel sorry for liim. We all do, honestly. 

Believe me.

I am just asking what you have done, not what he did. He just got 

sick. Isn’t that right?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Up to this point, what have you done?

Mr. Ryan. You are asking me what have I done with regard to-----

Mr. Randall. As far as any conclusions. In other words, Mr. 

Ryan, do you still hold to your view tha t there was no negligence or 

carelessness even after reviewing the National Transportation Safety 

Board report?

Mr. Ryan. Sir, to repeat, I do not believe tha t controller No. 1 

was careless or negligent.

No. 2, it is rathe r a moot point now, in tha t the person will never 

return to work.

Whether to take disciplinary action of a lesser degree than carelessness or negligence—to suspend him or issue him a letter of reprimand 

or an oral reprimand is a moot point when the gentleman is never 

coming back to work. What is it tha t I am disciplining him for? He is 

not a member of Cleveland center except to be on the rolls and be 

paid. He has been permanently-----

Mr. Randall. He is still being paid, though, isn’t he?

Mr. Ryan. He is permanently disqualified under the provisions of 

Public Law 92-297.

Mr. Randall. What does that call for?

Mr. Ryan. It is called the second career act.

I do not know if you have our handbook 3410.11(a)?

Mr. Randall. You say he was permanently disqualified under this?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir. Permanently medically disqualified.

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Randall. Yes, Mr. Belanger?

Mr. Belanger. Could we go off the record a minute, and, if you 

desire, you can p ut this on the record.

Mr. Randall. Yes.

We will go off the record for a minute.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. R andall. Back on the record.

This is no criticism of you, Mr. Ryan. I t is ju st the case th at, somewhere along the line, someone has not done what he should do, and 

tha t is something tha t needs to be corrected.

You said this gentleman was not careless or negligent. You say tha t 

in the face of this report, is tha t correct?

Even the National Transportation Safety Board conclusions have 

not changed your mind?

[Mr. R yan shakes his head.]

Mr. Randall. Say yes or no. We cannot tell if you only nod your 

head.

Mr. Ryan. No, they have not changed my mind. There weren’t 

any surprises in the report.

Mr. Randall. A hypothetical case.

Have you ever put anything in writing—but I guess nothing has 

ever been written about this anywhere; it has all been verbal.
62

Mr. Ryan. There is an accident report.

. Mr. Randall. What about Mr. Bosslett? Did you ever give anything 

to Mr. Bosslett after you made your decisions?

Surely Mr. Bosslett has something in writing? Where is Mr. Bosslett 

located?

Mr. Ryan. In Chicago, in the Great Lakes region.

Mr. Randall. Is Mr. Bosslett over Mr. Wubbolding?

Mr. Wubbolding. No: Mr. Bosslett works for me.

Mr. Randall. Underneath you? All right.

Surely you put your determination of carelessness or negligence 

in writing. Did you ever put that in writing?

Mr. Ryan. Well, sir, it would be rather strange to put something 

in writing tha t somebody wasn’t careless or negligent.

If he was careless or negligent-----

Mr. Randall. It was a pretty important matter, though, wasn’t 

it?

Mr. Ryan. If he was careless or negligent, or if I proposed disciplinary action, or if I had taken it, of course tha t would be in writing.

Mr. Randall. I will ask you this: If you determined a man to be 

careless and negligent, would you ever put him back to work before 

taking disciplinary action?

In other words, you must have reached a conclusion tha t he was 

not careless and negligent because you put him back to work.

Mr. Ryan. We are back to-----

Mr. Randall. No. This is a hypothetical question.

Mr. Ryan. In answer to your question—if I found someone to be 

careless and negligent-----

Mr. Randall. You would not put him back to work?

Mr. Ryan [continuing]. I would recertify him.

In other words, I would have to put him back on a working position 

the way tha t Mr. Belanger explained earlier to see if he can control 

airplanes.

Mr. Randall. Would you let him work before you took disciplinary 

action even if he was careless or negligent?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. If you can do tha t under your regulations, then 

we have hit the jackpot.

If you find tha t a controller is careless or negligent, and you can 

put him back to work without taking disciplinary action, perhaps 

tha t is what these hearings are all about. Th at is the important point. 

Th at is the most I can say at this time.

Do you think you have the authority to put him back to work 

even after you find him negligent and careless—you can put him 

right back on the job?

Mr. Ryan. Recertify him.

Mr. Randall. Well—back to work, isn’t he?

Mr. Ryan. Operating under supervision.

If in the recertifying-----

Mr. Randall. Under whatever qualifications or considerations, he 

has gone back to work.

Mr. Ryan. If, in the recertification process, we found out tha t 

certain deficiencies have been revealed, then we take appropriate 

retraining action.
63

You mentioned before tha t you understood about the length of 

time with appeals, grievances, and what have you, it would take 

before I may actually be able to initiate the disciplinary action in 

question.

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Chairman, you have Mr. Rvan in somewhat 

strange territory. Carelessness or negligence in our business is a very 

serious charge.

Mr. Randall. I would hope so.

Mr. B elanger. The number of times this occurs is very infrequent. 

I cannot think of anyone who has had that type of charge. We consider 

that total dereliction of duty—something almost akin to criminaltype conduct.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Belanger, you are beginning to talk like we 

thought you should.

Negligence must be almost criminal? Those are your words?

Mr. Belanger. That is correct. A determination of carelessness or 

negligence is not taken lightly.

Mr. Randall. The record is very clear that in this case it was taken 

lightly, apparently.

Mr. Belanger. Mr. Ryan did not determine tha t there was carelessness or negligence. The familiarity or the exposure to this type of 

improper action on the part of our employees is very rare.

1 do not believe that Mr. Ryan has had any exposure or any experience with that type of conduct.

Mr. Randall. Th at is why we are asking these questions.

The staff has some questions for you.

Mr. Romney. Mr. Belanger, following up on this point, you had 

indicated tha t Mr. Ryan had, prior to this time, indicated tha t in 1974 

there was 1 letter of reprimand and there were 12 oral reprimands.

In each, was there a prior finding of negligence or carelessness?

Mr. Belanger. I will defer to Mr. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan. In the case of the letter of reprimand, the wording—I 

am doing this off the top of my head so I do not have the exact words— 

as I recall was th at the gentleman who got the reprimand was careless.

Mr. Randall. He was what?

Mr. Ryan. He was careless.

Mr. Randall. Yes. And what else?

[Mr. R yan shakes his head.}

Mr. R omney. Wha t about the oral reprimands?

Mr. Ryan. No carelessness or negligence there.

Mr. R omney. This is a form of disciplinary action. Is 

that not correct?

My question is, is disciplinary action contingent upon a prior finding of negligence or carelessness?

Mr. Ryan. No.

Mr. Romney. I recall that you indicated, or Mr. Belanger indicated, that, in our testimony last week, when we were referring to the 

Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration 

order entitled, “Conduct and Discipline, No. 37 50 .4, ” reprint July 1, 

1974, we had referred to page 6 of the appendix, item 17, the “Nature 

of the Offense”—this was appendix 2—at the bottom of this page:

Is the offense negligent or careless work performance resulting in waste of 

public funds, damage to materials, delay in production, injury or loss or dang er of 

loss of life?
64

Then the penalties prescribed for such an offense would be: “Written reprimand to removal,” “ 10 days suspension to removal,” or 

“removal.”

In your testimony, Mr. Belanger, you indicated tha t this paragraph 17 is applicable.

Would you elaborate on that, and particularly since, in this case, 

we did have a performance which resulted in injury to the passengers 

aboard one of the aircraft.

Mr. Belanger. Wha t I said was that the paragraph would be 

the one we would apply to a system error if the man were found to 

be careless or negligent. Mr. Ryan state s in his opinion he did not 

find tha t there was evidence of carelessness or negligence.

I do not know if I am answering your question.

Mr. Romney. Therefore, you have indicated tha t, in the cases 

of an oral reprimand, you do not have to find carelessness or 

negligence?

Mr. Belanger. Th at is an informal disciplinary action, not a 

formal action.

If you recall our testimony the other day, the chairman asked where 

the dividing line was on formal disciplinary actions. It begins with 

a letter of reprimand.

Mr. R omney. Can you give me an example of a case of negligence 

or carelessness that would not qualify in this case, and compare 

tha t with the case that we are concerned with today in the November 26 incident?

Mr. Belanger. Are you asking me what I would consider an example of negligence or carelessness in terms of control procedures?

Mr. Romney. Yes.

Mr. Belanger. I would consider a man negligent if he were talking 

about the Redskins football game or this or that or the other thing 

instead of paying attention to his duties, I would consider the man did 

not apply proper procedure. I do not mean separation procedures. We 

have ground rules and letters of agreement—-you shall not enter my 

air space unless you get approval; you will fly at the correct altitude 

for this direction of flight. If the controller were to violate one of those 

rules of the road, I would consider that either careless or negligent. 

Yes, sir.

Mr. Romney. Do you have the standard for a definition for carelessness and negligence which is understood by you and by the personnel 

involved in a case like this?

Mr. Belanger. No, I do not. Th at is very difficult to articulate 

on. It is a judgmental factor on the part of the supervisor and the 

people doing the investigating.

Mr. Romney. What is the meaning of carelessness or negligence? 

What definition do you use?

Mr. Belanger. I cannot give you a legal definition. I am not a 

lawyer or a judge.

Mr. Romney. Would you not say that it is important tha t there 

be a standard or a definition which you can use?

Mr. Belanger. There is no substitute for judgment. The judgment 

is, was the man endeavoring to do the job in the proper manner? 

Was he adhering to the proper procedures? Was he or was he not 

derelict in his duties? Was he goofing off or not?
65

It is a judgmental factor, and I do not know how to put a definition 

on it.

Mr. Romney. There are definitions for the terms, are there not?

Mr. Belanger. The definition in the dictionary, I am sure, it is 

equally ambiguous.

Mr. R omney. Le t’s listen to one. Let’s listen to a dictionary which 

probably would be used by someone concerned with this case. Le t’s 

listen to a law dictionary’s definition of this.

Black’s Law Dictionary:

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided 

by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would 

do. Or the doing of something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do.

They go on :

The term refers only to that legal delinquency which results whenever a man 

fails to exhibit the care which he ought to exhibit whether it be slight, ordinary, 

or great.

In another law diction ary:

Negligence is a word of broad significance which may not be readily defined 

with accuracy: The lack of due diligence or care; a wrong characterized by the 

absence of a positive intent to inflict injury but from which injury, nevertheless, 

results. In the legal sense, a violation of the duty to use care.

The legal definition and the nonlegal definition may be two different 

things in some people’s minds. They perhaps are in the minds of some 

courts.

I am trying to pin down the fact tha t, if you, as a supervisor, need 

to make a determ ination of negligence, you do not have to have a 

standard of what t ha t negligence constitutes.

Mr. Belanger. The sta ndard I would use would be-----

Mr. R omney. Excuse me. Is there one tha t is independent of your 

own mind?

Mr. Belanger. No. There is not.

It is a judgment of the supervisor involved as to whether the man 

was or was not negligent based on the particular case, and the procedures expected, and the actions he would or should take under 

normal conditions.

Mr. Randall. But, Mr. Romney, Mr. Belanger did not have to 

make tha t decision. Mr. Ryan had to make tha t decision.

You have read two of three definitions there.

Counsel is leaning over there trying to assist the witnesses.

What we are talking about is the degree of care taken by the 

controller. Was i t slight, or was there lack of care? What happened?

I have read this National Transportation Safety Board report, 

and they found that there was a lack of care.

We are asking you, Mr. Ryan, what kind of a standard did you 

apply, when you made your determination of carelessness or did you 

apply any standards at all? Did you apply a definition of negligence?

You have heard the definition. You said he was not careless or 

negligent, didn’t you?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Don’t you think it is well to have learned something from this—to have some kind of definition? Has anyone provided you with a definition of carelessness or negligence?
66

There is information that there may be some claims by those who 

were injured. At this point, we do no t know whether the Government 

is involved in liability or no t. But, assuming that the Government is 

involved in liability and is liable for these injuries, and, some place 

along the line, unless you pay them off in full, everything they are 

asking, there is going to be a jury consideration.

Some finder of fact is going to say whether it was carelessness or 

negligence or not. Somebody is going to have to have a definition 

in court some day. Th at is all we are talking about here.

With that preface, Mr. Ryan, I will ask—did you apply any 

measure in your own mind, a definition of negligence, or any kind of 

a standard?

Mr. Ryan. Webster’s dictionary.

Mr. Randall. You looked it up in the dictionary?

Mr. Ryan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Randall. Before you reached the conclusion?

Mr. Ryan. I wanted the definition of what carelessness is.

Mr. Randall. You went to Webster’s dictionary and looked it 

up. What did you find?

Mr. Ryan. I do no t have the dictionary with me now, but I recall 

I looked i t up.

Mr. Romney. Did you find inattention? Inattentive?

Mr. Ryan. I think these are all ma tters of degree.

For instance, it says carelessness or negligence. I do not believe 

that carelessness and negligence are of the same degree. Carelessness 

seems to be a cut below negligence.

Then there are things that are a c ut below carelessness. There are 

many synonyms for carelessness with which I do not necessarily agree.

Mr. Romney. But you did not find carelessness?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir. I think it was an in advertent error.

The gentleman was conducting the business that he is paid for—• 

that is, the business of a controller. In the case of trying to make 

that input message on the Lear Jet, he became caught up in that.

Mr. Romney. You did not find, then, that the controller was 

inatte ntive?

Mr. Ryan. No, he was attentive at what he was doing.

Mr. Romney. And you did not find that he did n ot use due care?

Mr. Ryan. It would be hard for me to say that he used due care.

Mr. Romney. How can you square this with the finding of probable 

cause which the chairman has read for the record earlier in the hearing?

Mr. Ryan. Do you mean, does my conclusion as to whether he 

is careless or negligent—do they equate with what the NTSB has said?

The NTSB was very careful not to say, I believe anything about 

carelessness or negligence. I am not so sure that they may be their 

terms that they try not to use at all times. I am not sure.

Mr. Romney. Can we be sure here? Is it their function to find carelessness or negligence?

Mr. Ryan. I do not know whether it is their function, under 

probable cause, I do not know whether they would use those words, 

carelessness or negligence. I don’t know. Maybe they avoid them 

purposely. I do not know.

Mr. Romney. It appears tha t the finding of the National Transportatio n Safety Board is that controller No. 1 became preoccupied.
67

Mr. Ryan. Y es.

Mr. Romney. Wha t I am suggesting is th at becoming preoccupied 

is an element of carelessness.

Would you agree?

Mr. Ryan. It depends on what he was preoccupied with.

Mr. Romney. If you were preoccupied with something tha t diverted 

you from your primary duty?

Mr. Ryan. In an embellishment on Mr. Belanger’s example—if I 

were preoccupied with talking about my golf game and consequently 

an accident or system error occurred, I would say tha t that was 

negligence. I t was careless.

If I am preoccupied in doing the duty for which I am being paid to 

do—in this particular case trying to put an input message in on a Lear 

Jet—then I mu st say t hat tha t is preoccupation of a different kind and 

of a lesser degree, if preoccupation, in fact, is careless.

I think that is w hat your point is.

Mr. Romney. At the time that he was relieved, and briefed controller No. 2, he did not mention the potential conflict.

Mr. Ryan. No, he did not.

Mr. Romney. Would you call that inattentiveness, or would you 

call tha t preoccupation? How would you characterize that?

Mr. Ryan. It is hard for me to characterize it. We are getting 

into----- *

Mr. Romney. Would this be carelessness?

Mr. Ryan. No, it would not be carelessness.

Mr. Randall. It would n ot be carelessness? Did I understand you 

correctly? Is that your answer?

Mr. Romney. Yes, th at was his answer—tha t it would n ot be.

Mr. Ryan. I could make some speculations from the report, although perhaps I should not. But I am talking about Mr. 

Romney’s-----

Mr. Randall. We are talking about the same thing.

Mr. Ryan. We are talking about preoccupation.

Mr. Randall. Radar controller No. 1 is watching the Lear Jet. 

He does not see the two scheduled airlines about to collide in the sky.

You say that is not carelessness or negligence?

Mr. Ryan. That is correct.

Mr. Randall. We will carry this line of questioning just a little 

further, Mr. Ryan.

This gentleman, radar controller No. 1, did not say anything about 

the impending collision, did he? T hat is, when he left, when he turned 

control of his sector over to No. 2?

Mr. Ryan. No, sir. He did not mention it in the briefing.

Mr. Randall. Doesn’t that indicate some carelessness or negligence right there? Or don’t you believe tha t is an example of carelessness or negligence?

Mr. Ryan. No, I do not.

I think we have to talk about the reasons behind why certain actions 

are done.

Mr. Randall. Th at is consistent with what you have said. But 

it does not make much sense, in the judgement of the Chair, to find a 

controller not careless or negligent when he doesn’t tell the relieving 

controller what is going on, and simply walks off.
68

That is not negligence or carelessness, in your judgment?

Mr. Ryan. Th at is correct.

Mr. Tempero. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Randall. Yes, Mr. Tempero.

Mr. Tempero. Let us change the fact of the situation just slightly. 

Let us say th at controller No. 1 was not relieved, that controller No. 1 

continued to try to put the Lear Je t into the system, and those two 

blips on the screen had merged and the planes had both gone down.

What would your considered opinion be in that case? Would there 

have been any carelessness or negligence involved?

Mr. Ryan. What was the reason that the two airplanes ran together. Was he preoccupied?

Mr. Tempero. The very situation we have here now, except he 

continues tor be preoccupied with what we have been told is a secondary duty.

He was not relieved. He continued to try to make the computer 

take the Lear Jet rerouting. In that process there was a collision. 

Not just an accident. A collision.

Wha t is your analysis of the responsibility of controller No. 1? 

Does his preoccupation become careless and negligent now?

Mr. Belanger. Let us——•

Mr. Randall. Let Mr. Ryan answer the question, please.

• Mr. Ryan. We would have the same situation but with a different 

outcome.

We are saying now, because the outcome is different, the judgment 

as to whether the person was careless or negligent would then be 

different.

Mr. Tempero. I think the point we are trying to make is your definition of carelessness and negligence is inadequate. As I understand 

it, the controller has to be—I believe the words were “goofing off.” 

I believe those were Mr. Belanger’s words.

The point we are trying to make here is carelessness and negligence 

carry with them the connotation of the reasonableness of a prudent 

man carrying out given responsibilities.

What you are saying is your definition of carelessness and negligence 

do no t include that. You are saying that, if the controller is “goofing 

off,” or reading a paper or drunk, then he is careless or negligent.

What we are trying to say is, taking the facts of a given situation 

into consideration, if a man does not perform given duties within the 

parameters that a reasonable man could be expected to perform those 

duties, he may be careless and negligent.

Wha t we are asking you to do is to think very seriously about that, 

and, in fact, if this is true throughout the FAA system, I would suggest the FAA should think very carefully about what this reasonable 

man prudently does.

Forgetting this particular situation, and talking just generally, I 

think this is a very important concept and it cannot go unnoticed. 

Certainly, if you ever go to court on one of these, it would not go 

unnoticed.

Mr. Belanger. If you have asked a general question, I guess it 

would be permissible for me to answer?

Mr. Randall. We want Mr. Ryan to respond after a while, too.
69

Mr. Belanger. Getting back to the case in point, I do not know 

how you equate these things.

If we were to go around and look at the case, the facts are that 

controller No. 1, in all probability, forgot he had a potential conflict. 

Why he forgot, I do not know. Because he became involved in the 

other situation?

He forgot. The question is, did he forget because he was careless or 

negligent? The Board did not say those words. It says, he failed to 

apply separation.

You ask, if he stayed on the position, w hat would have happened? 

If he was aware of it, he would have done something.

Somewhere along the line, he forgot about it.

Mr. Tempero. We agree he forgot. The crucial question is, was he 

careless and negligent because of his act of forgetting. In other words, 

was he careless and negligent in the sense of a reasonable and prudent 

man acting in the same situation.

Mr. Belanger. Do you mean that, any time a man forgets something, he is careless or negligent?

Mr. T empero. No, what 1 am saying is, was he careless or negligent 

because he forgot; was he careless and negligent in the sense of a reasonable and prudent man acting in the same situation?

Mr. Belanger. I agree tha t th at determination has to be made.

Mr. Tempero. Th at is the determ ination that Mr. Ryan had to 

make in the end.

Mr. Randall. All of us are responsible for our conduct. It we 

forget to pay a bill on time, we’re going to get a penalty of some kind. 

It is th at way all through life. We are responsible for our forgetfulness 

or else we pay for it in every facet of life. Th at is the responsibility 

of every one of us.

The fact is that this gentleman forgot to do something, as the 

counsel made the point very well; therefore was he careless or negligent 

when or because he forgot?

Yet none of these matters was apparently taken into consideration, 

because the conclusion was reached tha t he was not careless or 

negligent.

I do not know w hat is going to happen to all these claims against 

FAA, bu t you will be mighty fortunate if you don’t go to court on all 

of these.

I do not know who is responsible here. Th at is a legality we are not 

involved in. Somebody is going to make you stat e why you reached 

this conclusion, and what standard you applied in reaching it.

Are there any further questions?

Mr. Tempero, Mr. Romney, or Mr. Butterworth, do you have 

questions?

Mr. Romney. Mr. Belanger, we have been talking about forgetfulness as an element in this debate on what constitutes carelessness.

We should also keep in mind that, in this case, as the National 

Transportation Safety Board concluded, controller No. 1 made some 

assumptions that certain flight paths would be maintained and that 

he tho ught that, in the view of those assumptions, he could control it.

The making of an assumption, it seems to me, is a positive act. It 

does no t involve forgetfulness.
70

Was he justified in making those assumptions with the result that 

forgetfulness—which could happen to anyone—could have interposed 

itself and created this extraordinarily hazardous situation? Was he 

justified in making those assumptions?

Mr. Belanger. I think the techniques he was using were commonplace techniques used throughout the system.

Mr. Romney. I asked you the question, was he justified in making 

those assumptions?

Mr. Belanger. I would have to refresh myself on what the two 

assumptions were?

Mr. R omney. L et me read on page 6 of the NTSB report:

Ra dsr controller stated that, when he accepted the handoff of American 182, 

he realized there might be a traffic conflict between that flight and TWA 37. 

However, his previous experience tha t day had shown tha t several flights climbing 

eastbound out of Chicago to flight level 370 had been leveling off a considerable 

distance west of where the incident later occurred. He though t that, by keeping 

an eye on the situation, he would be able to turn the aircraft in case the required 

separation criteria would not be met.

I am using the language of the National Transportation Safety 

Board’s safety recommendation forwarded to the Administrator. 

The concept of making certain assumptions is mentioned. 1 will 

read here from the safety recommendation A76-3:

He (meaning radar controller No. 1) assumed that by monitoring the situation, 

he would know in time if the anticipated separation did not materialize. Thereafter, he became preoccupied with secondary duties which could have been 

relegated to the manual controller.

Is this forgetfulness?

Mr. Belanger. No, that is not forgetfulness.

I would say that is poor judgment on his part.

Mr. Randall. What was counsel’s question again?

Mr. R omney. We are making an affirmative assumption that these 

two aircraft would continue along what he though to be their paths, 

and whether, in making these assumptions, this was forgetfulness. 

Mr. Belanger said no.

Mr. Randall. Mr. Belanger said no. Mr. Ryan did not say anything about it.

Here is a question for you, Mr. Ryan.

Did you make any assumptions before you reached your conclusion 

that No. 1 was not careless and negligent? Did you make any assumption about his forgetfulness?

The minority counsel developed a very important line of questioning. 

Obviously there was an element of forgetfulness here. There is no 

question about that. There cannot be.

Did you take all that into consideration when you reached, your 

conclusion?

Mr. Ryan. I took into consideration the fact that he became preoccupied doing his job.

Mr. Randall. All right. Bu t in so doing, he forgot about the 

two scheduled airlines on a collision course. He fixed all his attention 

on rerouting the Lear Jet.

Mr. Ryan. Th at is right.

Mr. Randall. It was, or it was not, forgetfulness. I t has to be one 

of the two. Did you take that into consideration?
71

Mr. Ryan. I would like to say that it was not necessary for the 

controller to assume anything, since all the information necessary 

for him to separate the airplanes is displayed on the scope.

In other words, he was not operating in the dark assuming nothing 

was going to happen.

Mr. Randall. He was looking a t the computer keyboard when he 

rerouted the Lear Jet. But the question is whether he was looking at 

these two aircraft coming together?

Mr. Ryan. Obviously, he was not looking at it at the time he 

should have been looking at it because he would have noted the 

altitudes.

Mr. Randall. All right. You have said that. You have concluded 

that tha t was no t carelessness or negligence.

Mr. Ryan. Th at is right.

Mr. Belanger. I think Mr. Rvan agrees with me. We are not 

trying to defend the controller in that he used poor judgment and 

poor control techniques. He did.

Mr. Tempero. Mr. Belanger, I personally believe, and I speak 

only for myself, the answers you and Mr. Ryan are giving are completely consistent with current FAA philosophy of what constitutes 

carelessness and negligence.

What I think we are trying to say to you is that you may very 

well no t have an adequate definition of carelessness and negligence, 

and, for tha t reason, it would behoove the FAA to carefully study how 

they make a determ ination of exactly what is carelessness and 

negligence.

For example, in my own definition, if somebody is goofing off and 

something happens, tha t might very well be extreme carelessness or 

gross negligence. Somebody could be careless and negligent if lie 

failed to meet the standard of the prud ent man reasonably carrying 

out his duties.

Mr. Belanger. I concede that you are undoubtedly correct, and 

that there is undoubtedly an area that it would be worthwhile to 

explore in greater depth.

Mr. Randall. It is not only worthwhile to explore, it is imperative 

that it be explored. It is of the very essence of importance. I think 

you would agree if you ran into a lot of lawsuits here, because you 

would find out how important it is.

Are there any more questions of these witnesses? We m ay have to 

take anoth er look a t this one of these days. We have another line of 

i questioning that we have not even started on yet.

There is a rollcall vote on the floor of the House, and we will have 

to get over there.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us. We will be in touch with 

you later on.

Mr. Belanger. I would like to say, we appreciate being here. 

You have given us a lot of food for thought. There is no question 

about it.

Mr. Randall. Maybe not much. Only time will tell whether we 

have given you enough. We have a lot of other things to ask you 

about.

Thank you all very much.
72

The subcommittee is adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call 

of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

o

I

I