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KEEPING OUR SKIES SECURE: 

OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov 

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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman 

ROGER WICKER, Mississippi 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

GARY PETERS, Michigan 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire 

CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada 

JON TESTER, Montana 

NICK ROSSI, Staff Director 

ADRIAN ARNAKIS, Deputy Staff Director 

JASON VAN BEEK, General Counsel 

KIM LIPSKY, Democratic Staff Director 

CHRIS DAY, Democratic Deputy Staff Director 

RENAE BLACK, Senior Counsel 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on September 5, 2018 ....................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 3 

Statement of Senator Wicker .................................................................................. 13 

Statement of Senator Cantwell .............................................................................. 15 

Statement of Senator Udall .................................................................................... 18 

Article dated February 20, 2018 from Government Executive entitled 

‘‘TSA’s Facial Recognition Pilot Program May Make Travel Worse for 

Ethnic Minorities’’ by Rosie Spinks ............................................................. 18 

Statement of Senator Peters ................................................................................... 20 

Statement of Senator Hassan ................................................................................. 23 

Statement of Senator Sullivan ............................................................................... 25 

Statement of Senator Markey ................................................................................. 28 

Statement of Senator Inhofe ................................................................................... 31 

Statement of Senator Lee ....................................................................................... 32 

Statement of Senator Gardner ............................................................................... 35 

WITNESSES

Hon. David Pekoske, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, 

U.S. Department of Transportation .................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. David Pekoske by: 

Hon. Deb Fischer .............................................................................................. 41 

Hon. Bill Nelson ............................................................................................... 42 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 42 

Hon. Brian Schatz ............................................................................................ 43 

Hon. Edward Markey ....................................................................................... 44 

Hon. Tom Udall ................................................................................................ 49 

Hon. Tammy Baldwin ...................................................................................... 50 

Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto .......................................................................... 53 

Hon. Jon Tester ................................................................................................ 61 

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KEEPING OUR SKIES SECURE: 

OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:22 a.m. in room 

SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Thune, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Thune [presiding], Nelson, Wicker, Cantwell, 

Udall, Peters, Hassan, Sullivan, Markey, Inhofe, Lee, and Gardner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, good morning and welcome back, Admiral 

Pekoske. 

I want to begin by thanking you and the men and women of the 

TSA for the vital job that you do. That’s probably something we 

don’t say often enough. At the same time, I want to encourage you 

to continue improving, and that’s the spirit that underpins our 

oversight hearing today. 

Over two years ago, the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act 

of 2016, or FESSA, was enacted into law. It included multiple provisions from my Airport Security Enhancement and Oversight Act 

designed to reform and refocus TSA’s efforts. 

Two years after enactment, however, some important mandates 

contained in FESSA remain outstanding, including updated regulations to enhance airport and airline employee access controls. 

I look forward to hearing an update on implementation of these 

measures. As threats to aviation continually evolve, we must ensure that TSA is able to test, procure, and deploy new technologies 

to counter those threats. 

Recent advancements in computed tomography, biometrics, and 

credential authentication technologies empower TSA to enhance its 

layers of security and better respond to potential vulnerabilities. 

Nevertheless, TSA has had difficulty testing and deploying these 

technologies to airports in a timely manner as well as adequately 

communicating and adhering to its long-term technology investment plan, which makes it challenging for security technology 

manufacturers to do their part in supporting the agency’s needs. 

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TSA must provide certainty in its equipment procurement plans 

to enable the consistent rapid deployment of advanced security 

technologies. 

This past Labor Day weekend, an estimated 16 and a half million passengers were predicted to travel through our nation’s airports, which is a new record for that particular holiday travel period. 

With so many passengers requiring screening at airport checkpoints, we’re reminded of the importance of the PreCheck Program 

to pre-vet and expedite screening for low-risk travelers so that public airport areas are less vulnerable and TSA can focus on screening passengers who are higher-risk. 

Unfortunately, TSA has not significantly increased its pre-check 

enrollment numbers in recent years and has not yet offered expanded services and options for travelers to make enrollment easier as required under FESSA. 

On the whole, however, TSA continues to lead the world in creating a secure global aviation environment. In the last year, TSA 

has issued security directives for airports with commercial flights 

to the United States aimed at countering threats related to personal electronic devices, powders, and air cargo. 

Since these security directives were announced, many countries 

have successfully implemented enhanced security screening protocols and some countries, including the United Kingdom, have followed the TSA’s lead with similar directives, raising the global 

standard for aviation security, ensuring safer international travel. 

We want to ensure that TSA remains a global security leader 

and sets the standards for the rest of the world. The TSA Modernization Act, which I authored along with Senators Nelson, 

Blunt, and Cantwell, would help the agency do so by addressing 

the issues I’ve mentioned here today. 

I’m hopeful that we can enact this reauthorization bill in the 

coming weeks as part of our FAA reauthorization effort. 

Before concluding my remarks, I want to note the words of a 

man who led this Committee for many years. In April of 2000, 

months before the attacks of 9/11, he said the following in prepared 

remarks for an Aviation Security hearing, and I quote: ‘‘I am certainly aware that aviation security is a complex and difficult undertaking and any system involving humans is going to have flaws. 

Every effort must be made to increase awareness and performance. 

You can be sure that Osama bin Laden and others like him will 

continue to target Americans and American interests.’’ 

Those words were by then Chairman John McCain and they not 

only demonstrated a remarkable foresight but still hold true in 

many ways even though the names of those who want to do us 

harm have changed. 

It is also a reminder of the legacy and impact of our friend and 

colleague who as Chairman helped craft legislation establishing the 

TSA and stabilizing the airline industry in the wake of the horrific 

events of 9/11. 

As we near the 17th Anniversary of these attacks, we are soberly 

reminded once again of how important the TSA’s work is and of all 

your agency does to keep the traveling public secure. 

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With that, I reiterate my thanks to the Administrator for being 

here and will turn to Ranking Member Nelson for his opening remarks. 

Senator Nelson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. And those comments sound just like John 

McCain, who had an extraordinary insight into matters of national 

security. 

As the Chairman said, we want to get TSA attached to the FAA 

bill and the TSA Modernization Act this Committee passed last October focused on improving security at airports by authorizing an 

increase in the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program. 

Expanding the use of explosive detection K–9 teams, which every 

TSA officer that I talk to says that’s the most effective, and expediting the deployment of security screening equipment. 

We hope that this bill will help the TSA grow its pre-check program, which has been successful but continues to struggle with enrollment. I look forward to your updates. 

I also hope that we can shine some light on TSA’s Quiet Skies 

Program, which has been in the news recently. Along with Senator 

McCaskill, we sent you a letter last week asking for clarification 

about this program. It’s important for us to know the program’s details, and I believe it’s imperative that we have a discussion on the 

ways that TSA is responding to the emerging threat, as you and 

I, Admiral, discussed, of 3-D printed guns. 

As we have had that discussion, there’s a great concern about the 

danger that these weapons pose to getting through the screening 

equipment. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Admiral Pekoske, as always, great to have you here, and thank 

you again to you and the many folks who work with you and for 

you at the TSA to keep our traveling public safe. 

But welcome, and we look forward to your remarks. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID PEKOSKE, ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Nelson and distinguished Members of this Committee. Thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your and Ranking Member Nelson’s 

opening comments, particularly with regards to Senator McCain. I 

also appreciate both of your leadership in support of TSA. 

First and foremost, let me acknowledge the outstanding men and 

women of TSA. It has been my privilege to serve as the Administrator to the over 63,000 dedicated professionals that provide security for millions and millions of travelers every day. 

On behalf of this team, I thank you for your support enabling 

TSA to accomplish a mission so critical to the safety, security, and 

economic well-being of the American people. 

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I appreciate the Committee’s work on the TSA Modernization Act 

that may be included with the FAA Reauthorization Act. They will, 

these Acts—the TSA Modernization Act, will certainly strengthen 

our ability to execute our mission. 

And I also appreciate, sir, you and your staff’s input to the new 

TSA Strategy and Administrator’s Intent. 

As you noted, we will mark the 17th Anniversary of 9/11 next 

Tuesday. The threat today is no less concerning than it was immediately following 9/11. It is somewhat different. It’s more diffuse. It 

has evolved and to meet the mission of protecting the Nation’s 

transportation systems, we must evolve with the threat, and you 

have seen us do that over the past year. 

Let me highlight just a few of our many accomplishments. 

First, we’ve significantly improved security here at home, both in 

aviation and surface transportation security. You mentioned the 

development of the CT, CAT scan technology at our checkpoints. 

We have made significant progress in bringing the CT capability to 

our checkpoints. 

We are in the final phases of operational testing and evaluation 

as I speak. That program remains on track and I am very pleased 

so far with the results. 

With respect to K–9 teams, we have very much valued the additional layer that canines provide to our security. They provide an 

excellent deterrence and detection and I’m happy to report that between this time last year and today, we have increased the number 

of deployed K–9 teams at our security checkpoints by 41 percent. 

That’s a very significant improvement and, in fact, our throughput 

results over the busy summer travel season reflects the addition of 

those K–9 teams, and I’ll talk about that in just a second. 

We have also recently published the Pipeline Security Guidelines. I’m very focused, as you know, on surface transportation security. These guidelines were put together in great collaboration 

with the industry and have raised the security profile on the pipeline industry. 

As you mentioned, sir, we have also raised the global baseline for 

aviation security. We implemented our measures, thanks to the authority that you’ve provided in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and this was done in full cooperation with our industry 

and international partners. 

And all the while, passenger growth continues to increase by 

about 4 percent per year. We just had our busiest summer travel 

season on record and just to think about a number, if you would, 

please, we screened over a quarter billion people through our security checkpoints here domestically between Memorial Day and 

Labor day this past Monday, and our passenger throughput was 

well within the norms for both pre-check and standard lay-in passengers. 

We also have recently received some very positive FEVs or Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Results that were contributed to 

by the TSA workforce. 

I’m happy to report that TSA was up in every single FEVs category. The greatest improvement in our FEV scores was with the 

Federal Air Marshal Service and this represents, in my view, continued steady progress in both workplace morale and job satisfacVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:57 Dec 04, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\57581.TXT JACKIE
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tion. That will continue to have my focus, I know it has your focus, 

and we owe it to respond to the input that our workforce has provided to us. 

Two current issues that I’d like to address upfront with the Committee, the first is the incident at Seattle-Tacoma International 

Airport on August 10, which involved the theft of an aircraft. 

There are multiple investigations underway, including one by 

TSA. None of those investigations are yet complete, but once they 

are complete, we will review the results and then determine whether or not changes are needed. 

On the Quiet Skies Program, this program is not a new program 

but it is an intelligence-driven risk-based rules program that has 

been in place since 2011. Privacy impact statements have been 

filed and updated and there is, I assure you, strong oversight of 

this program from the department. 

I am confident that it has reduced risk for nearly seven years, 

and I would note that we’re fortunate to have the Air Marshal capability supporting this program and I am proud of the professionalism of the Federal Air Marshal Service, and I would state unequivocally that we have the best Air Marshal Service in the world. 

Our Air Marshals are a critical element of aviation security. 

Much of the Quiet Skies Program, as you can appreciate, is security-sensitive information and the intel that supports it is classified. I am always available to answer your questions on SSI or classified matters in closed session. 

As I look to the future, I see several things immediately on the 

horizon: continued technology infusion throughout TSA, a refreshment of our Insider Threat Programs, continued K–9 Program 

growth, enhanced air cargo security, the integration of the TSA 

PreCheck Program and Customs and Border Protections Global 

Entry Program, and the publishing of regulations and guidelines 

for surface transportation security. 

Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, Members of the 

Committee, I appreciate your oversight and support. My overarching goal is very simple, three simple words, better security 

faster, and I need your help to achieve this. 

And, finally, were it not for your support of my confirmation, I 

would not have had this opportunity to serve and I thank you all 

for your confidence in me. 

Sir, before I conclude my opening statement, I would like to introduce two members that are new to TSA over my left shoulder. 

Both are supervisory transportation security officers. 

I have brought uniformed officers into TSA Headquarters because when I arrived, I saw none, and uniformed officers represent 

the vast majority of the TSA workforce. 

The first is Supervisory Transportation Security Officer Charles 

Meador from Anchorage Airport and the second Supervisory Transportation Security Officer Cavel Malcolm from LaGuardia Airport. 

So we’ve gone from coast to coast but Charles sits in my front office, Cavel will in about 6 months, and they’re there for our direct 

input and they participate in all of our policy discussions. 

I will bring and am soliciting at this point in time, one of our 

Federal Air Marshals also into the front office, because I want the 

frontline workforce to be right by my side and to have a view and 

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to have input into how we develop policy and procedures inside 

TSA. 

So this concludes my opening statement, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pekoske follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID P. PEKOSKE, ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Good morning Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished 

Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to testify about 

the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the work we are doing to 

keep our transportation system secure despite persistent threats. TSA appreciates 

the support of this Committee as we carry out our vital security mission. We are 

grateful for the constructive relationship TSA enjoys with each Member and are confident, that if enacted, the TSA-related provisions potentially to be included within 

H.R. 4, the FAA Reauthorization Act, will further strengthen the Agency’s ability 

to execute its mission. 

Next week, the entire nation will reflect upon the 9/11 attacks. While aviation security operations have advanced significantly in 17 years, we still face determined 

adversaries. The threat to aviation remains high and terrorists remain intent on attacking civil aviation. We also cannot ignore the real threat to the surface transportation system, as evidenced by the 2017 attacks in New York City, London, Paris, 

and Barcelona. Last month’s vehicular attack outside of London’s House of Parliament and the intentional crashing of an airplane in the vicinity of the SeattleTacoma airport are recent reminders of the types of dangers we face every day. 

We must remain vigilant in continually assessing vulnerabilities, identifying 

threats, and mitigating risks while ensuring massive volumes of passengers and 

commodities can move securely and efficiently through the transportation ‘‘system 

of systems.’’ That system is the lifeblood of our economy and way of life and one 

that requires all stakeholders to help protect it. 

Since being confirmed as Administrator a little over a year ago, I have spent a 

significant amount of my time at the front lines of TSA, engaging with employees 

at all levels of the organization, and meeting with our partners. I have visited many 

airports; numerous transit infrastructure venues, to include train stations and operation control centers; met with rail, pipeline, and motor carrier operators and owners; and traveled abroad to gain greater perspective regarding the security challenges we face and to advance discussions on how we continue to raise the global 

baseline for transportation security. 

Securing the Nation’s transportation system requires the collective efforts of all 

segments of our society; it is not something that the government can accomplish 

alone. As such, I recognize the critical importance of partnering with and actively 

including as many of our stakeholders in the process of developing transportation 

security solutions. This is why I value the opportunity to engage with stakeholders 

directly as well as through the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), the 

DHS Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Committee’s Transportation Systems Sector Coordinating Council, and other forums. In fact, later this month I will 

participate in a roundtable discussion with pipeline operators and government partners in Alaska to discuss the important topic of pipeline security. 

In all of my encounters, I have observed a deep commitment to our shared mission to protect the Nation’s transportation system to ensure freedom of movement 

for people and commerce. This dedication is critically important because we face 

both multiple determined adversaries and a threat environment that remains complex, diverse, and persistent. 

I am honored to be leading the 63,000 dedicated professionals who make up TSA’s 

workforce, share our core values of integrity, respect, and commitment, and provide 

security for millions of Americans using our transportation systems each and every 

day. I am also focused on ensuring we are prepared to address today’s risks and 

tomorrow’s threats. This challenge is compounded by increased user demand on the 

transportation system and passenger expectations for customized and seamless travel experiences. As it relates to air travel, my first year at TSA was the busiest in 

TSA history—with extremely busy spring and summer travel periods. 

Compared to the 771 million passengers screened in 2017, we are projected to 

screen more than 800 million passengers and crew this year. Of note, TSA has managed the nearly four percent annual passenger growth experienced over the last few 

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years while only increasing the size of its Transportation Security Officer workforce 

at roughly half that rate each year as a result of funding limitations, which has impacted both training and morale. We have worked as efficiently as possible, are introducing more capable equipment (e.g., computed tomography (CT) screening systems), and are updating approaches for recruiting, retaining, and developing our 

personnel. 

TSA’s continued success is contingent on our ability to rise to the challenge of 

outmatching a dynamic threat to our aviation and surface transportation systems. 

To be effective and efficient in a changing environment, TSA must continuously reevaluate how it uses its resources and performs its mission. 

First, quintessential to using our resources as effectively as possible is understanding where they can best be directed to address the greatest level of risk. TSA 

uses several risk-based programs, including QUIET SKIES, to inform a series of 

operational actions—such as whether to conduct enhanced screening at the checkpoint and when to assign Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) coverage. These riskbased programs are critically important for our security. They are intelligence-based 

and designed to identify individuals who may pose a higher risk, so that TSA can 

take action to mitigate these security risks. We aggressively employ procedural and 

privacy safeguards and have robust review procedures within TSA and with the 

DHS Privacy Office, 

Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and Office of the General Counsel. TSA’s 

intelligence-driven risk-based programs rely on passenger provided data and do not 

use race, color, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or parental status as a basis 

for operational decisions. 

Second, every year as part of the Federal budget process, TSA is charged with 

considering ways to create operational efficiencies. For example, as part of that deliberative process for the Fiscal Year 2020 budget request, TSA was required to respond to various budget scenarios and explain how limited resources would be allocated based on proposed funding levels. The possibility of eliminating security 

screening at low volume airports was one of many options discussed as part of the 

budget development process. Internal consideration of that option, however, did not 

constitute a decision. In fact, TSA decided not to propose that strategy for further 

consideration by the Department or Administration. 

In short, we must not only continue to work hard, but we must also work smarter 

and more strategically. This is why it was a priority for me to issue guidance within 

my first year to explain to our work force, Congress, and our stakeholders how TSA 

would continue to improve the execution of our mission into the future. I did so via 

the publication of my ‘‘Administrator’s Intent’’—a document that lays out my priorities for the Agency and is intended to be updated periodically—and the 2018–2026 

TSA Strategy. Together, these structured documents ensure strategic alignment and 

a greater level of transparency. 

The TSA Strategy ensures our focus on capability innovation and threat-informed, 

information-driven operations. My Administrator’s Intent explains how we will execute the strategy between now and 2020. The TSA Strategy and my Administrator’s 

Intent detail the three main strategic priorities for the organization and how we will 

accomplish them. Both are posted on our website for public review and transparency. The first priority is to improve security and safeguard the transportation 

system. Our second is to accelerate action. And the final priority is to commit to 

our people. These priorities reflect my focus on preserving frontline operations, 

quickly transitioning to new technologies, and creating efficiencies to optimize limited resources. 

Improve Security and Safeguard the Transportation System 

TSA’s operational environment requires robust partnerships and effective security 

operations across all modes of transportation. We strive to strengthen our operational approach through a proficient and professional workforce, more effective detection capabilities, enhanced intelligence and vetting, and better communication 

and coordination with stakeholders. 

Simultaneously, we also strive to improve the passenger experience. 

For more than a year and in response to the evolving international aviation 

threat, TSA has mandated enhanced security requirements for all commercial 

flights to the United States. Those measures include enhanced screening of passengers and electronic devices and heightened security standards for aircraft and 

airports. These new security measures have been implemented at 280 last points 

of departure airports in over 105 countries. These airports service approximately 

180 U.S. and foreign airlines transporting an average of 375,000 passengers on 

2,100 flights daily. 

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In addition to raising the baseline for passenger aviation security, TSA has 

worked closely with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to ‘‘raise the bar’’ 

for cargo operations by requiring the use of the Air Cargo Advance Screening program for cargo on all flights destined for the United States. This allows CBP and 

TSA to target potential U.S. bound cargo before it is loaded aboard an aircraft, 

based on threat reporting, for a higher level of screening. As threats continue to 

evolve, TSA, in cooperation with partners world-wide, will work to improve intelligence sharing and standardize best practices, while also pursuing technological security advancements. 

Domestically, TSA is also strengthening and expanding our security screening 

procedures and capabilities to address the dangers we face. We are working to expand participation in our TSA Pre✓® program through improved marketing and 

partnership. For instance, since January 2018, TSA announced that TSA Pre✓® expedited screening program would include eligible customers of certain airlines in addition to those already participating. The number of airlines participating in TSA 

Pre✓® stands at 54 domestic and international carriers representing more than 90 

percent of passengers traveling to or within the U.S. TSA is also working with CBP 

to identify ways that we can better leverage and align the two DHS Trusted Traveler programs, Global Entry and TSA Pre✓®. 

To manage risk and resources more effectively, TSA is exploring ways to further 

segment the passenger screening process through innovative applications of its 

screening capabilities, including passenger screening canines. As a result of increased appropriations, TSA has been able to procure additional canines from domestic and international sources to build the capacity needed to implement this option more broadly. Efforts like this will be designed to make the screening process 

more efficient, match procedures with level of risk, and improve the passenger 

screening experience. In short, TSA is striving to provide better security, faster. 

Just as it is the case for passengers, knowing more about aviation workers and 

the air carrier population is a critical component of understanding the security risk 

associated with potential insider threats. TSA’s implementation of FBI’s RAP Back 

services, which provides recurrent vetting for those populations and automatic notification to airports and air carriers of new criminal activity, began in May 2016 at 

two airports and with one carrier. Today, RAP Back services have expanded to 132 

airports and two airlines. 

In addition to our aviation passenger screening mission, we continue to oversee 

the security of the surface transportation system. The interconnected, varied, and 

expansive scope of the surface transportation system creates unique security challenges that are best addressed by system owners and operators. TSA’s approach to 

surface transportation security reflects this reality and focuses on providing system 

owners and operators Federal support through communication, coordination, and 

collaboration. On a daily basis, TSA assists surface stakeholders through conducting 

vulnerability assessments, analyzing security programs across the surface sector, 

from pipelines, to mass transit, to freight rail, to over-the-road bus entities, providing training and exercise support, executing collaborative law enforcement and 

security operations, and sharing intelligence information. 

Additionally, TSA strives to keep pace with the fast-moving advancement of security technologies to address current and evolving threats by looking at emerging 

technologies, including from outside the transportation environment, to assess their 

potential applicability to the surface transportation environment. We work closely 

with surface transportation owners and operators to develop and deploy technology 

solutions to advance transit security through collaborative operational test beds for 

different modes of transportation (mass transit, highway motor carrier, pipeline, 

and freight rail). While TSA does not procure the technology for surface transportation operators and owners, our efforts are designed to assist with development of 

their technology requirements, to represent them in government technology forums, 

and to help inform their acquisition decision making process. 

A good example of the results of this process received national attention recently. 

On August 14, 2018, Los Angeles County Metro announced that it had become the 

first transit system in the country to purchase passenger screening technology capable of detecting weapons and explosive devices on passengers. TSA and L.A. Metro 

had been testing the equipment since last year. The same detection system has also 

been tested by Amtrak at Penn Station in New York City and New Jersey Transit 

at Newark Penn Station in New Jersey. This technology would have been able to 

detect the improvised explosive device on the individual that attempted a suicide 

attack while walking from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey bus terminal to the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority train last year. 

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Accelerate Action 

TSA is building a culture of innovation that can anticipate and rapidly counter 

the changing threats across the transportation system. Rapid development and deployment of technical or non-material solutions will enable TSA to continuously improve operations. 

TSA’s Innovation Task Force, in partnership with stakeholders, has accelerated 

efforts to advance security technology. This year we expanded the use and testing 

of CT screening systems in numerous airports. We are grateful for the support of 

Congress, as well as CT equipment donated by American Airlines, that has enabled 

us to announce plans to expand testing of CT systems this year. Computed tomography technology allows TSA officers to more easily identify potential threats and 

in the future may eliminate the need for passengers to remove liquids, electronics 

and food items from carry-on passenger bags. This technology will significantly enhance the effectiveness of TSA’s security screening process while also improving the 

passenger experience. As such, the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2019 calls for 

deployment of CT systems nationwide beginning in 2019. I appreciate your support 

of this important technology enhancement. 

TSA has also continued to work with airport and airline partners to deploy Automated Screening Lanes (ASL) to more airports. The ASLs are designed to improve 

the checkpoint screening process for travelers, including the ability for multiple passengers to divest their belongings at the same time. To date, thanks to Congressional support as well as donations from our airline and airport partners, there are 

over 140 lanes at more than a dozen airports, with additional deployments scheduled this year. 

Additionally, TSA has made significant advancements with the deployment of biometric and identity technology to improve security and strengthen the identification 

process. We continue to test and expand the use of Credential Authentication Technology (CAT), which allows us to validate the security features of a passenger’s 

photo ID and match the information from the ID against our Secure Flight vetting 

system. Credential Authentication Technology is a cornerstone technology for TSA. 

Testing of CAT, which started with 17 systems at seven airports, has expanded to 

42 active systems at 13 airports and we expect to award a contract in January 2019 

for an additional 294 systems. 

Finally, TSA has conducted tests of facial recognition technology at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Last month, TSA conducted further testing, in collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), at the Tom Bradley International Terminal at LAX. During the most recent testing, TSA used CBP’s traveler 

vetting systems to match facial images of international outbound passengers to 

photos in U.S. Government systems, such as photos obtained from passports or visa 

applications or taken at time of entry to the U.S., to verify a passenger’s identity. 

This technology could help TSA improve identity validation and verification, an essential component of intelligence- and risk-based screening. Such was the case last 

month, where the CBP facial recognition technology we are currently testing was 

used to identify an individual at Dulles airport trying to enter the U.S. using a passport other than his own. 

Through embracing emerging technologies, leveraging agile processes, and continued collaboration efforts, TSA is positioning itself to keep pace with industry partners while advancing security across all modes of transportation. To that end, TSA 

has taken steps to formalize a strategic management process that aligns strategy 

and policy to operations by leveraging risk assessment capabilities to inform budgeting and investment decisions. 

Commit to Our People 

The most critical element impacting our ability to keep the transportation system 

secure is our workforce. TSA is wholly committed to its people and recognizes that 

our strategic success depends upon how well we attract, hire, train, develop, promote, and equip our workforce at all levels of the organization. Over the past two 

years, TSA has seen the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) Employee Engagement Index increase by seven points. In fact, TSA’s 2018 FEVS results that we 

just received several weeks ago reflect improvement on every index. We are encouraged by this progress and hopeful that the actions we are currently taking will continue these very positive trends. 

Our workforce is comprised of professionals from many disciplines within TSA, to 

include Transportation Security Officers, FAMS, inspectors, vetting experts, international representatives, and mission support personnel. Earlier this summer, TSA 

announced a new comprehensive career progression plan for frontline employees. 

This plan is designed to foster career growth and reflect an expanded investment 

in our Transportation Security Officers. 

10 

Through defined career paths and standardized processes, TSA will provide greater transparency and opportunity to recognize, reward, and promote those who consistently excel in their role. 

Complementing this effort, TSA is implementing a new Annual Proficiency Review process that focuses on improving and sustaining Transportation Security Officers’ ability to correctly perform security screening procedures through receiving 

real time feedback based on observations in a live screening environment. This approach represents a shift from performance remediation to a coaching model. 

Concurrent with its Career Progression Plan, TSA is also working to institutionalize TSA training and a development roadmap for our workforce. Through 

these efforts, TSA is focused on making its outstanding cadre of Transportation Security Officers and Inspectors even more effective and proficient in carrying out 

their mission. 

As a further reflection of TSA’s commitment to facilitate leadership development 

at all levels of the workforce and effective communication throughout our ranks, I 

recently created two Advisor positions on my direct staff that are being filled by a 

Supervisory Transportation Security Officer and a FAM. The role of these two leaders is to provide frontline input directly to me on policies, procedures, and initiatives. Whenever there is a major decision within TSA that impacts the frontline 

screening workforce, these TSO and FAMS advisors will be part of the discussion. 

Conclusion 

The future to which TSA aspires is ambitious. It requires accountable leadership. 

It requires the unique contributions of all members of our dedicated TSA workforce. 

It requires close collaboration with our partners to transform transportation security 

together on behalf of the American people. Noting such, I am confident that with 

the continued support of Congress and all of our stakeholders, TSA is well positioned to achieve the goals outlined in its Strategy. 

Since TSA’s inception, it has functioned with the motto ‘‘Not on My Watch.’’ This 

has served as a powerful call to action for TSA but one that, not by intent, was limited. As security of our Nation’s transportation system is a common objective for all 

segments of our society, it is one that is best achieved through a shared and complementary effort between government, industry, and the public. In short, to secure 

all modes of our transportation system requires an ‘‘All Hands On Deck’’, collaborative approach. Consequently, TSA has adopted a new creed reflective of this fact. 

TSA hopes that its new motto, ‘‘Not on Our Watch’’, will serve as a reminder of the 

collective effort, commitment and vigilance we must all share to protect our Homeland. 

Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to serve in 

this capacity along with the dedicated men and women of TSA. I look forward to 

your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral, and we thank the members 

of your team for the great work that they do and encourage you 

to keep it up. 

There are constantly-evolving threats and we have to stay ahead 

of the bad guys. So thank you for all your efforts in that regard. 

Admiral, as I noted in my opening remarks, two years ago we 

had required TSA to update its rules on access controls and on vetting requirements for airport employees with access to secure areas 

of an airport. 

As you know, TSA has yet to issue even a Proposed Rulemaking 

for the vetting rulemaking and decided to take other action and not 

issue a rulemaking to update access control requirements. 

These requirements were centerpieces of FESSA designed to improve security by requiring TSA to consider adding more disqualifying criminal offenses and a longer look-back period for individuals seeking access to secure airport areas. 

What is the current status of TSA’s efforts to implement each of 

these directives and why have they been so delayed? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, thank you for your question, and implementing the regulations is amongst our highest priorities and with 

11 

respect to the vetting requirements for employees with site requirements, we do plan to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking coming up in the first part of Calendar Year 2019. 

With respect to the access control issues, as we looked at the requirements in law, it’s our view that those access control issues 

don’t require new regulation, that we can do it within our existing 

regulatory regime. 

We have put out for comment a change to the Airport Security 

Plans and got a lot of comments back on the first round. We’re 

about to issue the second round for comment in the next couple of 

days, but given the issues that we’ve seen with inside or across the 

board, Seattle-Tacoma one very recent example, this is a very high 

priority of mine. 

With respect to the TSA PreCheck Program, pre-check actually 

is growing quite a bit. We added 1.8 million pre-check registrants 

over the past year, so that’s about a 30-percent growth. That’s pretty healthy. I’m not satisfied yet, though, where we’re at. We have 

about seven million registrants in TSA pre-check. 

Part of what we’re looking at, as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, is this integration of CBP’s global entry in TSA precheck, particularly from an enrollment standpoint and also from an 

ease of marketing, ease of communication with the traveling public 

and so we’re going to put a lot of effort because I would like to see 

many more passengers in our Trusted Travel Programs, either 

Global Entry or TSA PreCheck. 

The CHAIRMAN. TSA is currently preparing to undertake significant new technology acquisitions, including computed tomography 

or CT units, for more effective 3-D screening of carry-on bags and 

long-delayed credential authentication technology units for more 

accurate verification of travel identities. 

Given past delays associated with the testing and evaluation of 

some of these technologies, could you please update the Committee 

with the current timeline for the roll-out and full deployment of CT 

and CAT as well as TSA’s next steps? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. CT is on track. In fact, you know, a year 

ago, we really didn’t have much of a CT program in place whatsoever and so in the course of a year, we have gotten to the point 

where we have five vendors actively participating in the process, 

going through operational test and evaluation, four of the five 

going through OT&E. 

I’ve been out to airports. We have 13 airports around the country 

right now that have those CT systems in place. I’ve watched them 

in operation. They are a significant enhancement in security effectiveness and I’ve also watched passengers actually self-align behind 

the CT machines because it’s a better passenger experience. Passengers are not required to take as many things out of their carryon bags. 

We expect to be in the position to have awarded the initial contract for CT in the first quarter of 2019, sir, which is on the original schedule that we had established. So that project is on schedule. I expect to see roughly 200 CT machines procured over the 

course of the next year. 

12 

With respect to CAT or the Credentialed Authentication Technology, we do have CAT deployed in a number of airports around 

the country and that has been very, very successful. 

CAT essentially does an automatic validation of a credential that 

a passenger provides to the first officer in the checkpoint and then 

automatically queries our Secure Flight database as that passenger 

is standing there, and for a passenger with the current credential 

authentication technology, that passenger will not need to have a 

boarding pass. So there’s a passenger benefit to this and also a security benefit to us. 

We have in our Fiscal Year 2019 budget funds requested for 300 

more CAT machines and we intend to deploy those as rapidly as 

we can. The CAT machines individually are relatively inexpensive. 

They’re about $15,000 apiece, but for me that’s a really good investment for what it provides for better security and for passenger convenience. 

The CHAIRMAN. We also understand TSA is developing a biometrics roadmap, and my question is have industry stakeholders or 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection been consulted in the design 

of the roadmap? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. The roadmap is in final draft form. I expect that we will sign that out very, very shortly and certainly all 

of our interagency partners, including the Office of Biometric Identity Management in DHS, have been involved in this. We reached 

out to partners external to TSA and got their input, as well. 

The roadmap is in my view a very good one. It sets a path ahead 

for us with biometric technology and recognizes the fact that as 

TSA, we don’t need to repeat the lessons that CPB has already 

learned with biometrics. We should benefit from what they have already demonstrated. 

As we speak, there is a demonstration project going on at the 

Tom Bradley International Terminal at LAX Airport that combines 

the CBP Biometric Exit Program with entrance into the TSA Security Line. So this is all an effort to integrate programs the best we 

can and to save taxpayer money in the process. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you see CAT intersecting with biometric solutions? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, I do. There is a corollary to CAT called 

BAT, everything’s an acronym, and that’s Biometric Authentication 

Technology, and we will continue to move forward on that, as well. 

As you know, sir, we have a registered traveler partner CLEAR 

that works with us that provides biometric identification for their 

customers and then we have CBP that has biometric capability, 

plus our own in TSA with this Biometric Authentication Technology. So part of the reason for the roadmap is to put a path 

ahead for those three programs. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator NELSON. If you don’t present a boarding pass, what do 

you present? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. You present your driver’s license, sir, or your passport, and then when it queries—what the system does is it validates the credential of the—the authenticity of the credential, rather, and then it pulls the information from the credential off autoVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:57 Dec 04, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57581.TXT JACKIE
13 

matically. So it will pull your name, your date of birth, and your 

gender, and then while you’re standing there, it queries the Secure 

Flight database. 

Secure Flight database will come back and tell us which flight, 

at what time, and which terminal, and also give us a risk assessment for that passenger. It’s a huge step forward. 

Senator NELSON. You are testing that in Miami and I have seen 

that. Very good. 

Well,—— 

Senator WICKER. Amen. 

Senator NELSON.—the big question is so much of TSA is trying 

to protect us on an airplane and now with 3-D guns and despite 

the court injunction about a thousand of those plans have been 

uploaded and downloaded. What are you going to do? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. We’ve looked at this issue very carefully 

and I appreciate the conversation you and I had a couple of weeks 

ago. 

Our officers at the checkpoints are skilled in identifying 3-D 

weapons. We can see them on the existing X-ray technology we 

have. The CT technology makes it even better because with the CT 

technology, you get that 3-dimensional view. It’s much easier to 

discern what an object is and so what we’ve done is we’ve certainly 

trained our officers to use the existing technology to the best of our 

advantage to detect these 3-D printed weapons, but also work forward with the technology solution that enhances our capability. 

Senator NELSON. And the CT technology is the replacement for 

the metal detector? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. No, sir. The CT technology is the replacement for 

the existing X-ray machines. The AIT, and the acronyms, I know, 

can be confusing, the AIT is the replacement eventually for the 

walk-through metal detector. 

Senator NELSON. Right. But the conveyor belt, that’s an X-ray? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. And so it’s the CT that would detect then a 

bulge of plastic which could be a 3-D gun? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. And what’s your time table for replacing the 

older technology with the new? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. So with the X-ray technology, sir, so that’s what 

your carry-on bag goes through, that X-ray technology, we’re in 

operational test and evaluation for that new CT or computed tomography technology or typically called CAT scan. We should begin 

a large-scale purchase of those systems beginning in the first quarter of Calendar Year 2019. 

With the AIT technology, which is the walk-through, the machine 

you put your hands over your heads, we are working very hard to 

upgrade the software with that technology to provide additional 

visibility into what a person might have on their person. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Wicker. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI 

Senator WICKER. Mr. Administrator, thank you for being with us. 

14 

I appreciate the fact that Senator Nelson would ask about the 

Miami Airport and we are all interested in our large major airports. I think also, I think, across the board on both sides of the 

dais, we’re interested in our medium-size airports and I have a 

question about a couple of them. 

Let’s start with Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers Airport in Jackson, 

Mississippi. They’ve got particular design problems. They have two 

concourses, but right now they have only one screening line for 

each concourse. This prohibits them from having TSA PreCheck 

which is quite an inconvenience. 

Now the airport is being proactive. They have expansion plans, 

$1.5 million, to add one processing lane at each concourse. Here’s 

our problem. We don’t have an assurance from your agency that 

they will staff and provide the necessary resources for these additional lanes which are going to be done based on a local $1.5 million expansion plan. 

So can you work with us on that, and can you commit your agency’s support to provide the necessary resources after we’ve done 

this new project? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, I can absolutely commit to working with 

you on that, and I’m sure the Federal Security Director at that airport is already very much involved in the process. 

As you may know, sir, every year we look at where our resources 

are allocated and adjust those resource allocations based on what 

we see as throughput and so our primary metric is passenger 

throughput going through that particular airport, but we also have 

a desire to continue to enhance the TSA PreCheck brand and part 

of that process is to make sure that we have more predictable 

hours for PreCheck lanes to be open and closed, and where we do 

have the capability to expand the PreCheck footprint, we’d very 

much like to do that. 

I would also add that thanks to the work we’ve done with a lot 

of the airlines, we have more and more airlines signing up all the 

time for TSA PreCheck. So it’s more available to passengers in 

Jackson if they’re using a certain carrier. It’s more likely than not 

they can use PreCheck with that carrier. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. Let’s talk about then 

passenger throughput, which is important, but I hope you can see 

also that there are other factors that are available and pertinent 

in determining the amount of, say, baggage scanners that an airport gets and particularly if you’re a medium-size airport and you 

try to expand and getting more airlines in and successfully doing 

so, if you’ve got to use last year’s throughput numbers, it’s a handicap in attracting the additional business. 

So do you have any ideas about how TSA can adjust its formula 

to take into account other factors, such as stakeholder input, facility design, past costs incurred by the airport itself, as well as customer convenience? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, and we consider all those factors, and actually when we look at throughput projections—— 

Senator WICKER. So it’s not totally bound by this one—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. That’s correct. 

Senator WICKER.—statistic? 

15 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. No, we look at the whole picture. We also 

look at, you know, does an airport have steady stream load 

throughout a day or is it just focused on certain parts of the day. 

That changes how we staff because we might go to more part-time 

employees, for example, in that regard, and so I can assure you 

that we collaborate very closely with the airports and if there is 

any issue, I’ll take a look at Jackson myself, to make sure that 

we’re taking a very close look at that to ensure that the airport investment is going—you know, that we’re partnered with them very 

closely on that. 

Senator WICKER. OK. Now one other thing, when there’s a security incident that TSA can’t completely handle at an airport, local 

law enforcement has to come in, and we have a program called 

Law Enforcement Officer, LEO, Reimbursement Program, and 

there’s a proposal coming out of the Budget Office to substantially 

cut funding for this reimbursement program. 

What can TSA do to mitigate the burden on small airports that 

are going to have to use these local law enforcement people but 

don’t have the revenue streams to reimburse the local law enforcement personnel? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Senator, we rely on law enforcement across the 

board, large airports, small airports, to provide a security presence 

at our checkpoints, and I will tell you that they are invaluable in 

providing that service to my officers at the checkpoint. 

Senator WICKER. You’ll concede that this LEO Reimbursement 

Program is part and parcel to that? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, I would. The Airport Security Plan requires the airports to provide security at the checkpoint. The Law 

Enforcement Reimbursement Program was designed to support 

work above and beyond what the Airport Security Plan requires. 

With the Airport Security Plan proposal to reduce the funds 

going to law enforcement agencies around the country, it’s a tough 

choice. You know, we don’t have the top-line budget that—you 

know, a budget is always a constrained document, by and large, 

and you have to make some tough choices in that and that was one 

of the very difficult choices that we made. 

But, you know, that budget is still up for congressional review 

and I know it’s ready to go to a conference committee. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much and thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Cantwell. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for 

holding this important hearing, and thank you for mentioning the 

secure briefings and having several of them. I think this is something that’s very important to our Committee and I hope we continue to do them. 

Some of this is the larger Homeland Security but I think our efforts to move our borders overseas that Senator Collins and I 

worked with Homeland on has been a great solution in stopping 

some people from coming to the United States and so there are 

16 

many aspects to this aviation security and so we appreciate the 

fact that we can have secure briefings to talk about many of these 

elements. 

Administrator Pekoske, thank you so much for being here and I 

very much appreciate your prioritizing your challenges at the agency and what you’re working on. I appreciate that very much, appreciate the 41-percent increase in the K–9 activity. 

For us at Sea-Tac, being one of the fastest-growing airports in 

the country, the amount of demand this K–9 flexibility both in 

more canines, particularly at high season time, and more canines 

through the flexibility you’re giving to airports, I just can’t speak 

enough about. This is not just the speed of moving people through 

TSA lines, this is a layer of security that cannot be underestimated 

and so appreciate it and so appreciate that they are also in the 

outer terminal of the airport and doing good work, too, because 

that is a line of defense and very much appreciated. 

You mentioned the incident at Sea-Tac where an air-ground service agent was involved with the theft of a plane and I definitely 

want to recognize the air traffic controllers and the military and 

the first responders who handled this situation so well. We appreciate it. 

The incident, though, raises questions about our layers of security. My understanding is your—obviously there are lots of people 

involved here. There are airlines, there are airports, there’s TSA, 

and your main responsibility as it relates to airports are the security plans and reviewing the security plans of airports, is that correct? Is that a good characterization of your role here and responsibility? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, ma’am, but we’re also responsible for overall 

security and that’s really why—and we have a number of investigations underway. I want to see what those investigations say from 

a fact set. 

I would also reassure you that we’ve done a lot already on this 

issue. As soon as the incident happened—and we do this all the 

time, if something happens in a particular airport, we telegraph to 

all of our Federal Security Directors throughout the entire system 

so that they can work with their airline and airport partners in 

their locations to make sure we don’t have a copycat issue, that we 

close up or put additional eyes on whatever vulnerability might 

have existed. 

The other thing that we have done is, you know, I have a great 

Aviation Security Advisory Committee and I appreciate the authorities that you have given me with respect to the ASAC. 

They have helped me immeasurably in my year in this position. 

I have asked the ASAC several times in several different ways to 

look at the insider issues. So I expect to get another report back 

from the ASAC sometime toward the end of the year. 

The final thing that I would just like to recognize is the industry 

initiative here. The airlines and the airports have gotten together 

and formed a work group so that they can share across their peers 

in the system best practices with respect to aircraft and airport security and they’ve agreed to feed their best practice input into our 

ASAC deliberations. 

So there’s an awful lot of work being done on this insider issue. 

17 

Senator CANTWELL. So currently, right now, TSA has already implemented interim measures to help prevent copycat events from 

happening? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Senator, we haven’t changed any measures. What 

we’ve done is we’ve highlighted the incident and provided some additional detail to our Federal security directors so that they’re particularly alert for this particular incident and then, as we get the 

investigative information in and look at the facts, we’ll determine 

whether or not some changes are needed to procedures. 

Senator CANTWELL. And I get that that’s both interim and longterm and appreciate the—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Right. 

Senator CANTWELL.—fact that you’re going through that investigative process or that there are several organizations going 

through that investigative process and will continue to get information. 

So, OK, on that point, one of the things that I’m always amazed 

about obviously coming from both an aviation and a technology 

state is that, you know, things like flight radar or flight aware, 

even, you know, you can stand on the shores of Puget Sound and 

get information about various—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Right. 

Senator CANTWELL.—vessels going through our waterways. 

As we look at Next Gen, why not have better situational awareness on all ground planes or all airport assets? Why is that not 

going to be part of the array in the future so that you actually 

know where every asset is on the airport and whether it should be 

or should not be being moved, given that you could have some data 

and information about that? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, Senator, that is part of the review that’s 

being done. As you mentioned, there are several investigations underway. There’s one with TSA, one with the Federal Bureau of Investigations, certainly one with the Port Authority of Seattle, and 

also one with the National Transportation Safety Board, and, you 

know, we collaborate very closely with each other on those investigations so that we can look at things, the technologies that might 

be available to help us at low or no-cost to provide that situational 

awareness for something that may be occurring that you don’t necessarily have visual eyes on but you may have technology eyes on. 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, I definitely encourage us to look at 

those. I’m pretty sure this is where we’re going with Next Gen anyway because Next Gen is about moving all the assets cost effectively through the system as expeditiously. 

As you were saying, that it’s not just security but also the efficiency of how we move things through the system and having that 

level of efficiency of knowing where everything on the ground is 

and where it’s going and whether it should be moved or not be 

moved or is part of a repair plant, whatever the information is. 

I know that in past discussions here in the Committee, a lot of 

people think that’s going to actually help us moving aircraft 

through the system on the ground because of the level of congestion 

that exists. So why not capitalize on that data and information and 

use it to our advantage on the security side, as well? So you’re look 

at those details? 

18 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, ma’am, along with our partners. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. 

Senator Udall. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate you 

holding this hearing and, Administrator Pekoske, thank you for 

your efforts to keep us safe in our travels. 

And this hearing is very important in terms of oversight, as you 

recognized, the oversight Congress does and today, I’d like to focus 

on TSA’s use of facial recognition technology. 

TSA claims this technology will streamline the security process 

but it is unclear how these technologies will impact efficiency and 

whether this software treats all travelers and all Americans equally in practice. 

A recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology study showed 

that facial recognition software can have an error rate as high as 

35 percent for dark-skinned women. If a TSA agent was wrong a 

third of the time, they’d be considered ineffective at their job. 

So why would we want to implement technology that can be inaccurate for a large segment of the population? 

An ACLU test of one major facial recognition technology found 

that it falsely identified 28 members of Congress to arrest photos 

of people accused of crimes. Those 28 members were disproportionately people of color, including Civil Rights Hero John Lewis, and 

even included a member of this Committee, our law-abiding colleague, Senator Markey, who sits right here on my right. 

Additionally, we don’t know whether the impact of this technology on the privacy of American travelers. Overseas, we’re seeing 

authoritarian nations, like China, roll out facial recognition technology in public on a massive scale to surveil its population. 

As TSA considers scaling up this technology, I would urge you 

to halt full implementation until there is clear transparency into 

its effects this technology is having on our travelers. 

In February of this year, the Government Executive published an 

article titled ‘‘TSA’s Facial Recognition Pilot Program May Make 

Travel Worse for Ethnic Minorities,’’ and, Mr. Chairman, I’d like to 

enter this into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The Government Executive article follows:] 

Government Executive—February 20, 2018 

TSA’S FACIAL RECOGNITION PILOT PROGRAM MAY MAKE TRAVEL WORSE

FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES

By Rosie Spinks 

You’d be hard pressed to find a traveler who would describe getting through security at Los Angeles International Airport as an orderly or peaceful experience. Even 

when the threat level is deemed moderate, long lines, stringent security, and barking security agents are more or less the norm. 

But as of this week, the Transportation Security Administration is trying to 

streamline the experience, with an opt-in pilot program using biometric facial recognition technology, which is aimed at verifying and matching a passenger’s identity 

to their travel documents. It’s intended to automate the often repetitive and human 

19 

error-prone process of verifying a passenger’s boarding pass and passport several 

times over before boarding. The pilot project is being run at the boarding gate—documents will also be manually checked during the test program to ensure no security 

lapses—in a partnership with British Airways, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

and LAX’s Tom Bradley International terminal. 

According to industry intelligence agency CAPA Centre for Aviation, the plan is 

in keeping with President Donald Trump’s wider aims to tighten border security 

measures. Though the technology existed before he took office—similar programs 

have been tested or are in use in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and at 

Washington Dulles airport in 2015 and New York’s JFK in 2016—Trump has expedited implementation, despite the technology’s so-called ‘‘teething problems.’’ 

Whether you are a fan of Trump’s policies to tighten border security or not, there 

is certainly a case to be made that biometric boarding could eventually be a boon 

for all travelers who dislike what CAPA colorfully calls the ‘‘slow, mundane, intrusive, unfashionable and irritating’’ process of airport security. If implemented at its 

highest capability, passengers theoretically wouldn’t have to hold onto and flash 

their travel documents at multiple points throughout an airport visit. 

That could one day mean no more panicking that you’ve forgotten your passport 

or boarding pass—because your face would be all you need. 

In addition, costly snafus like All Nippon airway’s ‘‘flight to nowhere’’ in December—when the plane had to make a U-turn because it had inadvertently allowed 

a non-ticketed passenger to board—would be less likely. Indeed, data from air travel 

IT and communications firm SITA shows that passengers are generally a fan of 

technology-enabled travel, with 57 percent reporting they would use biometrics for 

their next trip. Thus, passenger satisfaction is often positioned as the reason for the 

technology. 

But there’s a huge caveat. Where the technology currently stands, face recognition 

doesn’t work the same for everyone. As CAPA noted, ‘‘face recognition software is 

not so good at identifying ethnic minorities when most of the subjects used in training the technology were from the majority group.’’ In addition, commonplace accessories or personal effects like hats, scarves, facial hair, long hair, heavy make-up 

or even low resolution images and poor lighting mean the current technology may 

perform inaccurately. 

Given those limitations, it’s not hard to imagine a whole host of ways that biometric security could make travel more seamless for one set of travelers, and an even 

larger headache for others. Whether it’s being asked to remove cultural dress such 

as head or face coverings, someone who’s undergone corrective or plastic surgery, 

or having an ID photo that’s not in CBP’s database, there are number of scenarios 

in which ethnic minority, non-American, or heavily ornamented travelers could find 

biometric boarding the opposite of seamless. 

The CBP reports that the technology is 97.5 percent accurate, and has aspirations 

to roll it out at all U.S. airports within four years. While the technology still has 

a way to go, the desired end point for some in the industry is for airport security 

to be able to focus on ‘‘finding bad people, not bad objects.’’ 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. And this seems to suggest that facial 

recognition does not work the same for everyone, and the article 

quotes the Center for Aviation saying, ‘‘Face recognition software 

is not so good at identifying ethnic minorities when most of the 

subjects used in training the technology were from the majority 

group.’’ That’s the end of the quote there. 

Other factors that seem to affect the accuracy are facial hair or 

makeup, scars. Given these limitations, it’s hard not to imagine a 

whole host of ways that biometric security could make travel more 

seamless for one set of travelers and an even larger headache for 

others. 

Can you guarantee that no population of U.S. travelers will be 

disproportionately inconvenienced, harassed, or discriminated 

against by this new TSA technology? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, Senator. Thank you for your comments and 

I promise to you and to the entire Committee that I will carefully 

look at all those studies as we proceed forward with facial recognition biometrics in general, and the goal here is not to disproporVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:57 Dec 04, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57581.TXT JACKIE
20 

tionately affect any aspect of our population. So we will be very, 

very careful and completely transparent with all of you as we move 

forward. 

I would also mention—— 

Senator UDALL. Have you looked at these specific studies that 

I’ve talked about and mentioned? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I haven’t read them—sir, I haven’t read them in 

detail, but I’m aware that they’re out there. 

But, sir, the other thing I just wanted to mention to you is, you 

know, as we’re registering new PreCheck passengers, so if somebody comes in and says, hey, I’m not currently a PreCheck passenger, they’re going to register, let’s say, in two or three months 

from now, we are capturing their facial biometric with their permission but we also capture a print, so we have two biometrics, 

and so, you know, there is a potential that the multiple biometrics 

that would be in a database, voluntarily given by a passenger, 

could begin to—you know, if that issue persists as the technology 

is developed, could provide a remedy for it. 

Senator UDALL. Yes. Do you know if the technology that the TSA 

is using was tested on enough people of different genders and 

ethnicities so that it does not have the inherent bias that many of 

these technologies have? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. So we’re using the technology that U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection has developed. I have not looked specifically 

at those test results but will, based on your comments. 

Senator UDALL. OK. Thank you very much. I have a number of 

other questions but based on all the Members that are here, I’d like 

to put them in the record and work with you to make sure you get 

timely answers to them. 

Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, and I’d be most happy, sir, you know, 

your schedule permitting, to come up and chat with you about 

some of this. 

Senator UDALL. Happy for you to do that. Thank you. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Peters. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pekoske, it’s good to have you here and thank you for your 

service every day in this very important job that you have. 

I want to take a moment and follow up on some questions that 

Senator Wicker asked you regarding expanding airports and how 

TSA resources are allocated to meet those growing needs. 

In Michigan, we have the Gerald R. Ford International Airport 

in Grand Rapids and they just completed the first phase of really 

a major transformation project which included an update to the 

checkpoint footprint that can accommodate seven active TSA 

screening lanes but, unfortunately, the local TSA only has equipment and staffing to operate six of those lanes. 

The Gerald R. Ford Airport, as you may know, is actually the 

second fastest-growing commercial airport in the United States 

21 

right now and so it’s absolutely critical that they have TSA staffing 

necessary for West Michigan and have already made substantial 

investment to make that happen. 

So I know you answered the question in terms of your process, 

the staffing and looking at throughputs and making that analysis, 

but my question is how often do you look at that? 

You mentioned annual, but it seems to me if an airport has just 

completed an expansion, has just brought in additional aircraft as 

a result of that, there needs to be some sort of expedited process. 

If you could walk me through that, I’d appreciate it. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question and really, you 

know, working with airports very closely, as we do, we review the 

designs for any checkpoint modifications that an airport is going to 

make before those designs are even approved and moved forward. 

So I’m pretty certain that our Federal Security Director was involved in that from the beginning and, you know, as we look at our 

algorithms for how we staff our checkpoints throughout the system, 

we would have that information in advance. 

So I’ll go back and look specifically at the Gerald Ford staffing 

issues, but, you know, we don’t really wait for a project to be complete and then decide how we’re going to deal with the staffing. We 

usually do that as soon as the plans are put in place and plan our 

way through because, as you know, the budget process generally 

takes two years to provide new resources for new capability. 

Senator PETERS. Well, good, and I appreciate you looking at that 

and we’d love to follow up with your office as to the status of that 

and what we might expect in the future, depending on what you 

find. 

You also mentioned your desire to expand PreCheck and that’s, 

of course, important, increased throughputs, so we can get more 

people through these lines. 

One process is having offsite and onsite periodic enrollment 

events but those events, as you know, are usually completely 

booked and the airports that I’ve heard from say that permanent 

in-airport enrollment centers would be enormously helpful in order 

to increase it. 

So my question is how does the TSA currently pick where to set 

up enrollment sites? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. So the way we do it is we target in our PreCheck 

enrollment frequent flyers because those are the ones that will benefit most by the investment in PreCheck and for us, candidly, from 

a managing the throughput issue, we benefit most if frequent travelers are in PreCheck, as well. 

We’ve looked at many, many ways to make the enrollment process as easy as we possibly can. We have mobile enrollment vehicles 

that travel around the country, based on demand, and enroll people 

as, you know, just basically driving up to the front of an airport 

and enrolling people right there if there is no enrollment center at 

the airport. 

The other thing that I mentioned that’s really important to this 

whole process is in our work with Customs and Border Protection 

to try to integrate the Global Entry and PreCheck Programs. 

22 

Right now, we each have our own set of infrastructures that 

manage—you know, I have mine that manages TSA. CBP has 

theirs that manages Global Entry. 

We will have more capacity when we bring these programs closer 

together and one of the first things you’ll see, sir, is a universal 

portal. So passengers just go to one place and it kind of steps you 

through the different criteria you have for your own travel and will 

recommend a solution that might be best for that passenger, but 

the whole idea is to make a better investment of the dual systems 

we have right now by integrating them together. 

Senator PETERS. You mentioned your desire to expand the program. There is currently not a cap on the program, is that correct? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. No, sir. 

Senator PETERS. Do you think there will ever be an eventual 

need for a cap or do you believe that the program will be able to 

continue for the foreseeable future? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. No, sir. I think the program will be able to continue for the foreseeable future. If you think about, you know, we 

have seven million people right now in the TSA PreCheck Program, 

probably another six or seven million in CBP’s Global Entry, so 

let’s say a total of 14 or 15 million passengers. 

On any given day, on a busy day in the summer, for example, 

we had 2.5 million people go through our security checkpoints. So 

I just see continued growth in the PreCheck Program which is good 

for security and it’s good for passenger experience. 

Senator PETERS. Yes. In response to some earlier questions, principally from Senator Nelson, you talked about 3-D printed firearms 

and your efforts to make sure you’re protecting us from those firearms. 

My question to you is, what about international coordination? 

Are there other countries preparing for this threat, and are they 

taking measures to ensure that they are not trafficked in it on 

flights or used onboard to harm passengers, particularly those that 

may be heading towards the United States, and what are some of 

the lessons we can learn from what you’re seeing around the 

world? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. We coordinate very closely with our partners around the world, particularly our FVEY partners, with respect to threat information and exchange, and then also some of 

our other key partners in Europe, in the Middle East, and in Asia. 

I’ve traveled extensively to have personal relationships with my 

key partners around the globe. We do a very good job, I think, of 

sharing best practices and, in fact, we’re trying to get to the point 

where we can more integrate our standards of performance so that, 

for example, as we’re—you know, the CT technology that I mentioned earlier that we’re deploying in our checkpoints is also being 

deployed at other airports around the world. 

We’re sharing to the maximum extent we possibly can and vice 

versa with our test results, so that we don’t relearn, but we’re also 

trying to see where we can merge standards of technology development so that there’s more of a seamless, there’s more of a similarity in security around the globe to be part of the process. 

We’re also very active participants in ICAO and ICAO has a 

Global Aviation Security Plan that’s quite good and we are very 

23 

strongly advocating, as are our key partners, to continue to advance the criteria in the Global Aviation Security Plan so that globally we get better all the time. 

Senator PETERS. Great. Thank you. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Peters. 

Senator Hassan. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MAGGIE HASSAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator HASSAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning, Administrator Pekoske, it is so good to see you. Thank you again for 

your service to TSA and as a member of the Coast Guard. We are 

very lucky to have you. 

I wanted to follow up a little bit on a related line to what Senator Peters was just talking about. It was just about a year ago 

that you testified before this Committee as a nominee to be the 

TSA Administrator, and I asked you to look into the adequacy of 

our foreign partners in addressing insider threats. 

In particular, I asked you to provide your assessment of whether 

countries with airports that served as last points of departure into 

the United States were sufficiently screening their airport workers 

for terrorist threats. 

So kind of three questions here. At the time you committed to 

looking into the matter, so, first, have you since investigated it, 

and, two, in your view, are our allies and aviation partners in foreign countries doing enough to screen their workers, and, finally, 

are any of these allies specifically allowing TSA and the Federal 

Government to screen their workers against United States counterterrorism databases? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, ma’am, and I remember our conversation, and 

I have looked very closely into the insider threat issue. 

In fact, if I look across the entire spectrum of what TSA does 

with respect to security, there are two that are going to be a key 

focus over the coming years, not that they’re not a focus already. 

One is insider, the other is cargo security. 

On the insider piece, I have discussed this extensively with my 

international partners and, as you know, we do have standards of 

performance for insider that are established by ICAO. The countries agree to abide by and we audit their compliance with those 

standards for all last point of departure airports. So there is an active look, an active auditing process in place in doing that. 

I would submit that, given what we’ve seen around the world, I 

don’t think any of us are really doing enough here and that’s why 

I’ve asked the ASAC, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, to 

take another look at this and that’s why it’s always an active topic 

of discussion amongst our key international partners because I 

think we can all do better with it. 

Some countries do have very, very good programs and I’ve stated 

publicly several times in international fora that the United States 

can learn from other countries’ experience. You know, we never 

stand for the proposition that ours is always the best in every single aspect. There are other examples out there that we should 

learn from and we are doing that. 

24 

Senator HASSAN. OK. That is good to hear. Are they allowing 

TSA and the Federal Government to screen their workers against 

our counterterrorism databases? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I’m sorry. That last question. 

Senator HASSAN. Yes. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Not that I am aware of, Senator, and that goes to 

specific country law and practices. So I’m not aware of them using 

our vetting systems for their airport workers at this point. 

Senator HASSAN. Well, I think what I would suggest, and we can 

further discuss this, is that they allow us to vet their workers 

against our database, so giving us the information about their 

workers would seem to me to be a way that we don’t have to get 

into necessarily their systems but we want enough from them to 

get into our systems, right? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, and thank you for that clarification, and we 

actually have engaged in some conversations with a key partner on 

doing that with respect to cargo, as well. 

Senator HASSAN. OK. Well, thank you. I would look forward to 

following up with you on that. 

I also wanted to ask you about another conversation we had during your nomination hearing. Congress was considering the President’s Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request at that time and there had 

been a cut in funding for the Viper Teams and the Law Enforcement Reimbursement Program. 

Many members, including myself, asked you at that hearing 

about whether you supported cutting these programs that help secure the public areas of airports, and at the time you pledged to 

thoroughly review the cost-benefit analysis of those proposed cuts. 

Now fast forward several months to the release of the President’s 

Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request, and TSA, now under your leadership, again proposed the elimination of the Viper Teams and the 

Law Enforcement Office Reimbursement Program, which you spoke 

about a little bit ago, but the request in the budget, in the 2019 

budget, certainly signals your support for cutting the only Federal 

programs that would help to secure the public areas of airports, the 

same public areas that have previously been targeted by ISIS and 

Al Qaeda. 

So now you are beginning your second year as TSA Administrator. There are reports that have also surfaced about TSA pondering proposals to eliminate screening all together for 150 smaller 

airports. 

These proposals suggest that TSA is trying to pull back its resources from a large number of airports all across the country. If 

true, that’s really an alarming trend. While terror groups, like ISIS 

and Al Qaeda, have suffered some defeats on the battlefield, they 

still pose an extraordinary threat to our homeland and to our aviation system, making these cuts all the more concerning. 

So can you please share with us your unclassified analysis of the 

terror threat to the homeland that TSA is using to justify these 

cutbacks? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, ma’am, and a couple comments. First on 

VIPR, as I testified in my confirmation hearing, I’ve testified since 

then in other committee settings that I’m a strong supporter of the 

VIPR Program. It has value. I like the program. The men and 

25 

women who staff our VIPR Operations are largely Federal Air Marshals and they do an outstanding job. 

VIPR were particularly critical for us in hurricane response because in some locations they were the security in airports for a period of time. So it’s a very, very valuable program. 

Senator HASSAN. Right. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I also, as I stated earlier, I very much strongly 

support Law Enforcement Reimbursement Program. I value what 

our law enforcement partners bring to the security checkpoint and 

we’re better for their presence there. 

This all rolls up into what can you afford and if you have to 

make some reductions, where would you make them, because the 

budget is not unlimited, and so these are very difficult choices that 

we had to make but it does not in any way, shape, or form signal 

anything but strong support for those programs. 

The other part of this, if I could just for a second,—— 

Senator HASSAN. Yes. 

Mr. PEKOSKE.—is that these programs recognize the fact that 

there is some existing capability at the state and local level. So if 

you reduce VIPR, for example, it’s not like the capability that’s provided by the overall community is completely gone. 

Senator HASSAN. So I appreciate that answer and I know I’m 

going over here, so I will wrap up, but please understand that what 

we expect from you is to stand up for the security needs—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Right. 

Senator HASSAN.—for our airports, for our homeland, and the notion that we would cut back after other priorities, like big tax cuts 

have been provided, is really astonishing to me. 

I will also tell you that state and local governments are already, 

most of them, very extended themselves and this is a Federal function to keep our airports safe. You said that a lot of the help you 

get from the reimbursement program really goes hand-in-hand 

with TSA and is critical to its mission, which is a Federal mission. 

So I would look forward to having further discussions with you. 

I think you need to be standing up for these programs and refusing 

to cut them, unless you have security information or intelligence 

information that tells us we don’t need them anymore. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, ma’am. If I can just add one piece of this because I didn’t answer your question on low-volume airports, we are 

not reducing our presence at low-volume airports. In fact, quite the 

contrary, I think we need to improve our security profile at smaller 

airports and so the reports that we were going to pull away from 

150 airports around the country, that’s not what we’re doing. 

Senator HASSAN. Good. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hassan. 

Senator Sullivan. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Admiral, welcome, and I want to reiterate the Chairman’s opening statements. 

I think you and your team are doing a really good job. You don’t 

always get that enough and it’s, you know, obviously not perfect, 

26 

but when you think about how far we’ve come from 9/11 and standing up a brand-new Federal agency, I’m glad to see you got your 

frontline workers—particularly someone from Alaska—but, you 

know, all of us, we travel a lot. I try to get home every weekend, 

and I always take the time to compliment your team in Alaska because I think they do outstanding work and it’s not easy work. It’s 

not perfect, but I just want to thank you and please pass that on 

to all of the members of TSA because I agree with what the Chairman said at the outset here. 

Let me ask an issue that I know it’s not completely in your lane, 

but it’s a really important one to so many of us, and that’s TSA 

working with local law enforcement on drug interdiction issues. 

Like most states, Alaska’s experiencing a lot of problems with addiction and the related crime. Fentanyl obviously is a big one. 

We’re hopefully going to pass the STOP Act here, which is going 

to put more resources into stopping fentanyl coming in from China. 

That is actually remarkable that the Chinese could stop that, if 

they wanted to right now. It’s a Communist state. I was in China 

several months ago and I asked them to stop sending fentanyl 

that’s killing our citizens. 

But what are you doing or what can you do with local law enforcement to help? You know, we have small communities in Alaska, many of which are only served by airports, not even roads. So 

we know when drugs—a lot of times when drugs are coming in. 

Are there things that you can do more or you have ideas for 

maybe agencies that aren’t in your—it’s not your jurisdiction but 

the Post Office and others. I’m sure you get this question a lot. It’s 

actually a very important one. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question and really thanks 

for your comments, as well. 

I agree wholeheartedly with your comments on the workforce, as 

I mentioned in my opening statement, and I’m really proud to lead 

these 63,000 professionals that do amazing work every single day, 

not just in the United States but around the globe. 

With respect to drug interdiction, sir, you’re right, that is not a 

TSA mission per se. We do discover drugs in our screening process 

at security checkpoints, but our procedure is to turn that contraband over to local authorities and local authorities typically handle 

that very well for us. 

Your question really relates to when there is no local authority, 

how can we help? The only thing I could think of off the top of my 

head with respect to TSA, sir, is with our VIPR Teams, they do 

supplant some local requirements. So, in other words, if we have 

a VIPR Team operating in Anchorage, for example, that might free 

up some Alaska State Police to go somewhere else for a period of 

time and that’s the way we could indirectly assist with this. 

Our requirement for VIPR is that they perform their mission 

around transportation centers, of course, because it is TSA. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask you another question that relates 

to my state, but it also relates nationally, in that TSA at one time 

had a Cargo Division. I know it’s complex with regard to how cargo 

operates, how you screen it, but it’s also a big security issue. Cargo 

hubs in my state are very big. 

27 

What are you doing on that, and what are you looking at in the 

future with regard to cargo screening as a security measure? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. I spent a significant amount of time with 

the major cargo carriers in this country. I’ve learned an awful lot 

in my visits with them, spent an entire day with most, and we recently established a Cargo Division in TSA Headquarters. 

I mentioned earlier that that’s a key area of focus for me and I 

need to have an organizational structure that focuses on that, as 

well, and I want to provide an easy point of contact for the cargo 

industry inside TSA Headquarters. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask a final question. It’s not necessarily related as much to my state but certainly out here, you 

know, every time I’ve gotten on a train, like a passenger train on 

the East Coast, I always kind of, you know, sense that this is a 

pretty soft target. 

What are you doing? I mean, there doesn’t seem to be a lot of 

kind of visible presence from somebody who wanted to do damage 

to our commuter train system, particularly, you know, Amtrak and 

those high-volume areas on the East Coast. What are you doing on 

that, and do you need help from Congress on an area that to me 

seems, like I said, pretty vulnerable? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. We have very good relationships with the 

operators of major rail systems around the country, and I’ve spent 

significant amount of my time, my personal time in understanding 

these issues. 

We regularly provide intelligence updates to our rail partners, as 

we do across the entire surface transportation spectrum. 

Senator SULLIVAN. And is that relationship good? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, I think that relationship is outstanding, and 

for a number of the major systems, we also support their Explosive 

Detection K–9 Program. So those canines, a portion of them at 

least, are provided for and trained by TSA, and we also certify 

them every year. So there’s a very good relationship back and forth 

between the major rail carriers in the country, in my view. 

Senator SULLIVAN. So you are not concerned about that as a vulnerability? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I’m concerned about it as a vulnerability. I’m concerned about, you know, any vulnerability to a transportation system and certainly, as we’ve seen instances occur around the world, 

that that is very much a target, and I know the owners and operators of those systems very much feel that way, as well, and Amtrak 

in particular has a very robust, in my view, police presence and, 

you know, as I’ve seen before I came into this position, as I traveled up the Northeast Corridor, I would typically see Amtrak Police 

Officers on trains that I was on, not every single one but on a fairly 

regular basis, and the whole idea is to provide—you can’t cover 

every transit, which you can’t, is to provide that unpredictability of 

when you’re going to be there. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. 

Senator Markey. 

28 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pekoske, recent reports have revealed concerning details 

about your agency’s previously undisclosed Quiet Skies Program. 

Under the program, Air Marshals monitor American travelers 

who aren’t suspected of any crime and aren’t on any watch list. 

Mr. Pekoske, I want to learn more about what exactly the TSA 

is monitoring. Does the TSA monitor whether Americans go to the 

bathroom during flights? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Sir, the Quiet Skies Program is not a new program. It has been in existence since about 2011. 

Senator MARKEY. Right. Does the TSA monitor whether Americans go to the bathroom during flights? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Sir, we place Federal Air Marshals on flights 

where some Quiet Sky selectees may be passengers—— 

Senator MARKEY. So yes or no? Do you monitor? 

Mr. PEKOSKE.—and part of their presence to mitigate the risk of 

a Quiet Skies passenger—— 

Senator MARKEY. Yes or no? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, yes. 

Senator MARKEY. Does the TSA monitor what Americans eat or 

drink on a flight? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. We don’t monitor—I would not use the term ‘‘monitor.’’ We observe. This is a law enforcement mission. 

Senator MARKEY. So the answer is yes? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. They observe. Yes, sir. 

Senator MARKEY. Does the TSA follow Americans after they’ve 

deplaned and are walking to their car or taxi? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. 

Senator MARKEY. Yes. So, again, the American public does deserve to know the extent to which they are being surveilled. Again, 

we are talking about Americans who aren’t on any watch list and 

aren’t suspected of any crimes. 

Who at TSA determines what passengers land on the Quiet Skies 

list? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Quiet Skies is an intelligence-based risk assessment program, sir, that’s operated by rules and so the rules set are 

reviewed continuously and changes to those rules can only be approved by myself or my deputy. 

Senator MARKEY. OK. Once you gather information about flying 

Americans, where is the data stored and who has access to that information? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. The data is stored in our intelligence office and 

our intelligence professionals have access to the information. 

Senator MARKEY. It’s limited to them? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Right. 

Senator MARKEY. What do you do with the information about innocent Americans? Do you delete it immediately? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. With respect to an individual who would be a 

Quiet Skies selectee, based on rules, based on intelligence, if, after 

a certain period of time,—— 

Senator MARKEY. What is the period of time? 

29 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I can’t reveal that in open session, sir, but there 

is a period of time. It is short. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, if they haven’t done anything wrong, why 

is it not immediately? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. We, by our rules, want to see a certain number of 

encounters before they’re removed from that program. 

Senator MARKEY. Even if you’ve already determined that they’re 

innocent? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. We would not have made that determination—— 

Senator MARKEY. Once you’ve determined that they’re innocent, 

do you—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. We would—— 

Senator MARKEY.—then delete it immediately? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Sir, once we determine—I wouldn’t use the term 

‘‘innocent’’ either. Once we determine that they don’t present a 

risk, an additional risk to security, then they are removed from the 

Quiet Skies Program. Those records are retained for 2 years. 

Senator MARKEY. Two years? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. 

Senator MARKEY. Even though they’re innocent Americans. They 

haven’t—you don’t have any reason to have—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Sir, I wouldn’t say that. I would say that it’s a 

rules-based program that assesses risk. People that are selected for 

Quiet Skies, based on patterns of travel, in our view, informed by 

intelligence, represent more risk than other passengers do. 

Senator MARKEY. Right. But having surveilled them and not 

able—and not having any evidence which has been developed, it 

just seems to me that they do have a right to the presumption of 

innocence. 

I’m also concerned that the Quiet Skies Program may not pass 

constitutional muster. Mr. Pekoske, does TSA take into account 

characteristics, like a traveler’s name, when determining who to 

monitor? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. We take into consideration a traveler’s record. We 

do not take into consideration a traveler’s race or religion. 

Senator MARKEY. So identifiers, like race or religion or their 

name, can clearly be used as proxies for race and religion. Monitoring travelers based on these criteria raises pressing concerns 

about the constitutionality of the Quiet Skies Program. 

So you are saying that you do not use race, religion, or the traveler’s name in determining who to monitor? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. We don’t use race or religion, sir. We do, of course, 

use the traveler’s name because that’s part of the reservation data. 

Senator MARKEY. Right. But is a traveler’s name used to create 

a suspect category just because of the traveler’s name and with no 

other information gathered about him or her, with the exception of 

the name? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. No, sir, it wouldn’t be the name all by itself. It 

would be the name and other criteria. 

Senator MARKEY. All right. The American public also deserves to 

know whether other agencies, besides TSA, are involved here. 

Does the White House or Department of Justice have any involvement with this program? 

30 

Mr. PEKOSKE. This program is part of a privacy impact assessment that has been published on the DHS website for years and 

we do use the travel vetting system that Customs and Border Protection employs. 

Senator MARKEY. So does the White House or Department of 

Justice have any involvement in this program? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Involvement meaning what, sir? 

Senator MARKEY. Are they participating—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Awareness? 

Senator MARKEY. Yes. Are they participating in this program? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. The White House, to my view, is not participating 

in the program. 

Senator MARKEY. OK. The Department of Justice, do they have 

any involvement with the program, the Department of Justice? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. This is a law enforcement program. Department of 

Justice may, in certain circumstances, but it wouldn’t be based just 

on Quiet Skies. 

Senator MARKEY. Air Marshals have recently come forward and 

voiced doubts about the Quiet Skies Program, which they say saps 

their ability to do more vital law enforcement work. 

Approximately how many people has TSA monitored so far under 

the program? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Sir, I don’t have those numbers right in front of 

me. I’d be happy to provide them to you for the record because we 

do record those numbers. 

Senator MARKEY. Could you give me a range? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I would say, you know, in Quiet Skies, with the 

Air Marshal involvement, it’s in the thousands of passengers. 

Senator MARKEY. OK. Of those, how many were American citizens? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I don’t have that information off the top of my 

head. 

Senator MARKEY. How many individuals surveilled under the 

Quiet Skies Program have been arrested or prosecuted? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I don’t believe anybody has been arrested or prosecuted. However, people that are in the Quiet Skies Program have 

eventually been determined to be part of a larger selectee pool, 

based on what the Quiet Skies Program—— 

Senator MARKEY. I appreciate that, but no one has been arrested 

or prosecuted yet,—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. No, sir. 

Senator MARKEY.—and how many threats has the program foiled 

thus far? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. The program is a prevention program designed to 

mitigate risks onboard aircraft and so, you know, like many of our 

prevention programs, there’s no particular plot that has been foiled 

as a result. 

Senator MARKEY. So it hasn’t foiled any threats yet? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator MARKEY. OK. And without knowing more, the program 

appears like a huge waste of taxpayer dollars and infringement on 

our privacy. This is a vast program that actually takes Americans 

and puts them into a suspect category and thus far there’s no eviVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:57 Dec 04, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57581.TXT JACKIE
31 

dence that it has produced anything that would, in fact, enhance 

the safety of the American flying public. 

So from my perspective, it is something that you should seriously 

reconsider because to me it just does look like a huge waste of taxpayer dollars. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Markey. 

Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM INHOFE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’ve got a couple of things that come from personal experience, 

and we had a discussion before this Committee about the K–9 Program and how effective it has been and some of the problems with 

it. 

Well, it has been very effective in Oklahoma. In fact, the Oklahoma City’s Will Rogers World Airport, we had a canine that was 

working and was reassigned to DFW. Now immediately after it was 

reassigned and we have all the documentation on this, all of a sudden we had waiting times for passengers increase immediately 

after that. 

Now I know that the Homeland Security has in their appropriation bill, which we’re working through right now, has an additional 

$10 million to fund more dogs and I think in your written testimony, you talked about some enhancements to that program. 

Tell me what is going on right now with that program. It has 

been very successful in Oklahoma. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. Thanks for your comments, and I agree 

it has been very successful. In fact, it has been so successful we 

want to continue to increase the number of K–9 teams that are 

available throughout the system and so we’ve seen about a 41-percent increase in the number of K–9 teams available at airports between today and this time a year ago, so a very significant increase 

there. 

We have also increased the capacity at our K–9 Training Center 

down in San Antonio, Texas, so we can train 50 more teams per 

year. So that’s quite a significant increase in capacity—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. 

Mr. PEKOSKE.—at that training center. 

The final thing I’d mention to you, Senator, is that, as you may 

know, we have our Passenger Screening K–9s, which were operated 

by TSA handlers, and then we have our Law Enforcement K–9 Program, which are TSA canines trained at the TSA K–9 Training 

Center but with local law enforcement officers being the handlers. 

We’ve offered to local law enforcement authorities the opportunity for them to up-train their canines in that program to the 

passenger screening standard that involves about four or five 

weeks of additional training at our K–9 Training Center and today 

we’ve had five law enforcement agencies agree to do that. So that 

again increases our capacity at the screening checkpoints. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Well, as we rebuild that program, keep 

Oklahoma in mind. Will you do that? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, will do. 

32 

Senator INHOFE. All right. The other problem that I had is the 

search problem. I know you guys have the capacity to help with 

that and just as an example, if I take the early flight coming from 

Tulsa, Oklahoma, to Washington, you don’t have a direct flight, if 

you could help us get a direct flight, I’d appreciate that, too, but 

if you get there for the early flight, which is about 6 o’clock in the 

morning, I mean, it’s about a block long you’re waiting in there. If 

you come back an hour later, there’s nobody there. 

Now what is your capability of handling the surges, and do you 

have a program that might help with that type of thing? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, and that’s one of the big challenges in the 

checkpoint screening because you do run into surges early in the 

day and early in the evening, large volumes of passengers trying 

to get through, and sometimes we’re constrained by the infrastructure at the airport. We just can’t put any more screening lanes in 

the existing footprint of the airport. 

We do use canines to help alleviate that,—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, yes. 

Mr. PEKOSKE.—but one of the things, sir, with the canines is that 

canines are terrific at detection and deterrence both, and I want to 

make sure that as we deploy canines, we just don’t deploy them 

during surge periods because an adversary can gain that system on 

us and just look and observe when we deploy canines and then if 

they’re concerned about the canine capability, which they should 

be, then they would try to go through it at an off time and so we 

want to make sure that we kind of roll out that canine capability, 

but—— 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. 

Mr. PEKOSKE.—we do pay very close attention to the surge issues 

and try to bring as much—as many officers as we can in for the 

checkpoint to speed the passengers through. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, yes. Well, that makes sense. Well, you’re 

doing a great job. Keep it up. All right. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Thank you. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Lee. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral, for 

being here with us today. 

Currently, there are 22 airports in the United States that participate in the TSA’s Screening Partnership Program, or SPP, which, 

of course, allows the TSA to have oversight over screening services 

conducted not by Federal employees but by private screening personnel through a private screening service security company of 

some sort. 

Now in 2015, when the General Accountability Office produced 

a report, it reported that contract award prices for private screeners within the SPP Program carried an average of 11 percent in 

savings compared to the TSA’s own cost estimate for Federal 

screening. 

33 

So as TSA considers better operational changes to more effectively allocate taxpayer dollars and ultimately make TSA more effective at fulfilling its mission, which is making the American people safer, is the SPP a viable option? Is that an attractive option? 

If so, why? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Sir, the SPP remains an option for any airport 

that wants to, what we call, opt-in to the SPP Program. 

What they do is they just indicate a desire to participate in that 

program and then we within a very short period of time, 30 to 60 

days, engage with them and help them work through the process 

of becoming an SPP airport. 

SPP is a contract that TSA manages with a set of about 10 or 

12 vendors and then we basically do a task order bid for that particular airport because every location has different costs and different structure to it and then once we get those bids in, we award 

it to the best value bidder. So it’s a fairly quick process for airports. 

Senator LEE. And ultimately that’s your judgment call, not 

theirs? In other words, you review the bids, including the TSA 

being one of the bidders? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. The TSA is—if they opt to SPP, we are not one 

of the bidders, but the cost, sir, can’t be more than what we’re currently—— 

Senator LEE. Right, right. 

Mr. PEKOSKE.—using for Federal service, and I do want the airport authorities to have visibility into that process. 

Senator LEE. Got it. Now the 2015 GAO report, as I understand 

it, also acknowledged that in that cost assessment that you run 

through, it’s not necessarily an apples-to-apples comparison because it doesn’t take into account some of the costs that are borne 

not by the TSA specifically, but are nonetheless borne by the Federal Government. 

Shouldn’t be that be an apples-to-apples comparison? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. That’s a very hard apples-to-apples comparison, as 

you can imagine,—— 

Senator LEE. Sure. 

Mr. PEKOSKE.—to be able to make and it really—— 

Senator LEE. But the GAO was able to acknowledge that, you 

know, there was this lag that should enable you to at least get closer, shouldn’t it? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. It’s easy to acknowledge a gap and very hard to 

figure out the metrics to close that gap. 

The other thing, sir, is, from a TSA perspective, for those nonTSA expenditures, that does not come out of my budget and so, you 

know, what TSA looks at is what is the TSA budget requirement 

for SPP and not letting the SPP cost exceed the Federal cost for 

TSA. 

Senator LEE. Sure. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. But you’re right. There is a larger Federal cost 

that is very hard to quantify. 

Senator LEE. You can understand why, as a member of the U.S. 

Senate, I’d be concerned about costs that extend farther than your 

agency. I mean, as long as this is a cost comparison, you can understand why I would want it to incorporate costs to the Federal 

Government generally? 

34 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, I understand the concept. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEE. So things like retirement, other things that might 

be backfilled by the Federal Government, sure, it’s complex, but 

those can be estimated, can’t they? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. They can be estimated. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEE. And so are you willing to look at that and take 

steps to work toward more of an apples-to-apples comparison? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. That is certainly something that, you know, I’m 

sure when we got the GAO report, which I believe was issued before I got into this position, so I haven’t read it in detail, I’m sure 

TSA did a review, but I need to be careful personally because I’m 

recused from SPP issues for another year. So I can’t directly get involved in that. 

Senator LEE. OK. I understand that, but would you agree as a 

general matter that within the SPP, private screeners ought to be 

evaluated on an equal even playing field within an apples-to-apples 

comparison with TSA services? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, I would always agree with apples to apples. My concern, though, as an agency would be would the costs 

to the agency be higher in that regard. 

Senator LEE. Would the costs to the agency be higher—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Right. 

Senator LEE.—if they went with a private screener? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. That’s correct. In other words, because I’m trying 

to manage a budget. 

Senator LEE. Sure, sure. OK. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask one 

more question, I see my time’s expiring. 

In both 2015 and 2017, the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Inspector General revealed some very alarming fail rates that documented how auditors from the IG’s Office were able to consistently 

evade airport security screeners while they were carrying in 

banned items. 

Can you tell me what changes you’ve incorporated in order to 

stop this dangerous trajectory and to reverse it? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. I think the trajectory has been reversed 

and I’ve paid very close attention, as you would expect me to, to 

those IG audits, and I said in my response to the IG audit that I 

agreed with their results and that we would take steps to close the 

vulnerabilities that they identified. 

I would also add that we do our own red team or covert testing 

out of TSA Headquarters and we continue to do tests on the system 

to see what changes we’ve made and what kind of improvements 

have resulted from that. 

But to get to some of the changes, first and foremost, the CT 

technology, I mean, you know, as I look at this problem, there are 

kind of three ways you can address it. You can put better technology out there which we sorely need. You can change your procedures, and you can provide better training for your officers. 

One of the things that I have consistently stated is that those 

test results are not a reflection on officer performance. They’re a 

reflection on technology procedures and training that systematically needs to be provided by the agency. 

So with technology, we’ve got the CT technology. As I mentioned, 

operational test and evaluation right now, very, very promising reVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:57 Dec 04, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57581.TXT JACKIE
35 

sults from that that will be a game changer for us from a security 

perspective in the checkpoints. 

We are also looking at other technologies for on-body anomaly 

detection, for example, in the checkpoint. For procedures, we 

changed our procedures at the very end of last summer and so you 

may have seen this as you travel, sir, where the officers ask you 

to take more things out of your carry-on bag. That was a very deliberate change on our part that significantly enhanced security 

from the end of last summer all the way through the present day, 

and while we did have a temporary slow-down in throughput at our 

checkpoints, once passengers got used to it and once our officers got 

used to it, we’ve seen no change year over year, and then we’ve 

placed a significant emphasis on training for our officers, so that 

it’s more face-to-face, less computer-based. So I think we’re making 

progress there, sir. 

Senator LEE. I’m pleased to hear that. You can understand why 

I’d be concerned about that, not only for the safety itself but also 

as we hear from constituents. I’ve lost track of how many constituents have come to me themselves in tears talking about seeing 

their daughters, their sons subjected to invasive groping searches. 

Then when they read about reports like this one indicating lapses 

in security, they become even more upset about seeing their daughter groped. 

So I hope we can increase the security and do so in a way that 

respects the dignity of each American as he or she travels. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, Senator, and as you can appreciate that’s an 

equally uncomfortable operation for our officers, and I don’t think 

any of our officers groped any passengers. They’re following the 

procedures that we put in place. 

Senator LEE. With all due respect, I’ve seen it happen. I’ve seen 

that happen to my own family members. They’ve been groped. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Well, if the officers are following the standard operating procedure, that should not happen, but I would make a key 

point for you, Senator, and it goes right back to technology. 

The reason why those pat-downs occur is because a machine detected an anomaly. What I look at a lot is the false alarm rate on 

those machines and that’s something that we need to address and 

we need to put more effort towards and we are doing that. 

Senator LEE. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lee. 

Senator Gardner. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Pekoske, for your time and testimony today and your service to our 

country, and I know we’ve had many conversations about Denver 

International Airport. I think they’re in the process of about a $3 billion renovation effort, expanding their gates, redoing the Great Hall, and making 

some other improvements to their security system, of course, which 

you are partnering with them and working with them very closely 

on, and I’m grateful for that. So thank you for that. 

36 

I also want to commend the folks over at Denver International 

Airport for the excellent trolling they’re doing on Twitter right now. 

Part of the construction signs that they have, of course, if you live 

in Denver, if you’ve watched some late night comedy, they talk 

about the work camps underneath DIA, the horse outside of DIA 

that they’ve nicknamed ‘‘Blucifer’’ and some other conspiracies at 

DIA. 

If you go through the airport now, you see the construction signs. 

You’ll see signs like ‘‘Construction or Cover-up? What are we 

doing? Planning for the end of the world.’’ So this is a pretty great 

troll effort by DIA right now on social media. 

Mr. Pekoske, following up on the testimony, you talked a little 

bit about efforts to analyze and develop emerging security technology. 

In 2016, Congress, this Committee, authorized and passed legislation called the SCREEN FAST Act, which I introduced and sponsored. This bill established pilot programs at airports for the purpose of implementing innovative screening checkpoints to bolster 

security, passenger throughput and other things. 

Thank you very much to TSA for utilizing the pilot program to 

test and implement new technologies, like the automated screening 

lanes and now 3-D bag scanners, at the checkpoint. 

We’ve seen airlines, like DIA, stepping up, taking the initiative, 

prioritizing screening equipment, to the purchasing of equipment, 

and it’s my understanding that TSA and DHS are working on a 

program that would allow their partner organizations to purchase 

security equipment and then gift it to TSA. 

Could you provide an update on that process? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. First, thanks for your comments and I 

would just like to commend DIA. I think they’re doing a terrific job 

in moving the checkpoint up to the mezzanine level, addressing a 

security issue in and of itself with having a mezzanine, and their 

great partnership with us along the way, and we do have the authority in law to accept gifts of equipment and that’s what DIA is 

doing. 

They’ve agreed to purchase equipment and then they will gift it 

over to TSA and that’s really a great solution because the airport 

is able to get technology that they’re willing to purchase in place 

much faster than if we had to go through a Federal procurement 

process. 

I would also note, too, that the automated screening lanes in particular has allowed us to—you know, the fact that airlines and airports have been able to gift those to TSA will allow us to skip some 

steps or very much shorten some steps in our Federal acquisition 

process. 

So when we get into a large-scale acquisition for the rest of the 

system, we will benefit from all of the testing and evaluation, the 

manning studies, and everything else that has been done on that 

gifted equipment. 

What I would ask is that what we can’t do right now is we cannot accept as a gift payment for services that TSA provides and a 

number of airports, for example, have hotels that are right in the 

airport and they would like to put a screening lane right at the 

hotel entrance. 

37 

We would like to see that, too, because that actually helps us 

manage throughput to some degree. They can gift us the equipment, but they cannot reimburse us for the services to provide a 

separate screening lane, and we’ve asked for that to be considered 

as part of the TSA Mod Act. 

It would very much parallel but would not apply to the central 

checkpoint but would very much parallel authorities that Customs 

and Border Protection has and so, you know, I would just, you 

know, recognize the work of the airports, the airlines, our Innovation Task Force, to really kind of push the envelope and say, hey, 

how can we really embed technology, use the private sector capability to buy things quicker and put it in place so the passengers 

can see the immediate benefit of all that. 

I would tell you, sir, that with the CT, huge improvement in security, huge improvement in convenience. ASL, same comments, 

and so it has really been a really good program. 

Senator GARDNER. So thank you and so the TSA Mod Act is 

where you’ve requested that language and working with—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. For reimbursement, yes, sir, and we’ve worked 

with our industry partners on that to make sure that they—you 

know, that was language they could live with, as well, and I think 

we’re in a good place there. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gardner. 

Back to Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

I want to turn to facial recognition. TSA recently began taking 

pictures of American faces at a Los Angeles International Airport 

security checkpoint in collaboration with Customs and Border Protection, yet dating back to 2017, Senator Mike Lee and I had already called on the Department of Homeland Security, which includes both TSA and CBP, to implement formal rules to address 

important concerns with biometric technology at U.S. airports. 

Number One: Americans need to be able to opt out of facial recognition. Number Two: We need to ensure the security of traveler 

data. Number Three: We need to prevent any racial bias in the 

technology. Those are the concerns that Senator Lee and I have. 

In response to our letter, DHS promised to not expand the program until it completed a formal rulemaking to put privacy rules 

on the books. Yet, DHS continues to expand the program. 

I know how problematic facial recognition can be. The ACLU recently used Amazon’s facial recognition software to see who of the 

535 Members of Congress who matched with a criminal database. 

Well, 28 of us did, including me, Congressman John Lewis, and 26 

others. So there are problems here. 

So, Mr. Pekoske, can you commit here to completing a formal 

rulemaking to address these issues before expanding TSA’s use of 

biometric technology? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Well, Senator, we are simply prototyping the biometrics in partnership with CBP and we are using CBP’s technology. We’re using CBP’s testing and we have an updated privacy 

impact assessment for that prototype. 

We don’t have any plans at this point for a formal program expansion. We just want to see how it works and passengers—— 

38 

Senator MARKEY. Will you commit to completing a formal rulemaking to address these issues before expanding TSA’s use of biometric technology? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Sir, I will defer to the Department of Homeland 

Security, which is overseeing the overall biometric effort of the 

components. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, I am very disappointed, you know, that 

you and your agency will not commit to ensuring that these fundamental protections aren’t in place through a formal rulemaking before you move forward. 

The American people deserve to have a set of guidelines which 

are put in place in order to protect their privacy. I already personally have had a mistake made with regard to facial recognition, a 

United States Senator. 

Now it’s one thing for a United States Senator or Congressman. 

We can protect ourselves. But for an ordinary person of color in our 

country, that can cause real problems for them, and I just think 

that a formal rulemaking is the absolute prerequisite that your 

agency should engage in and I would like you again to make a commitment that you would do it. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Sir, what I will commit to, without hesitation, is 

that whatever systems we put in place will provide equitable treatment for all. 

Senator MARKEY. No. We need a formal rulemaking. We need a 

formal rulemaking. This just can’t be informal and a set of—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Well, I think the larger thing, though, sir, is, are 

we concerned about privacy rights for passengers? Absolutely. Are 

we concerned with equity across all passengers? Absolutely. But 

where I might disagree is the method to get there. 

Senator MARKEY. OK. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. But the concept—— 

Senator MARKEY. But we need a formal rulemaking. This is too 

important not to. 

And, finally, there’s a proposal to cut screening at 150 smaller 

airports in response to budgetary constraints. I find that very unfortunate in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Two of the 

planes were hijacked from my congressional district. We lost 150 

people on those two planes from Massachusetts. 

Congress established the September 11 Security Fee to help finance the cost of securing the Nation’s aviation transportation system. 

Regrettably, the 2013 Congress began diverting approximately 

one-third of the revenue generated by these security fees for deficit 

reduction. 

Administrator Pekoske, would dedicating all of the revenue generated by the security fee help TSA provide basic aviation security 

and modernize their systems to address emerging threats? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Well, sir, just a factual correction, if I could. We 

have no plans to reduce screening at any airport in the United 

States whatsoever. In fact, we have plans to enhance security at 

low-volume airports. 

Senator MARKEY. So you’re saying this report that 150 small airports, there is going to be a cut in screening is erroneous? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. It’s wrong. 

39 

Senator MARKEY. It is wrong? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. It’s wrong. 

Senator MARKEY. It’s not going to happen? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. No, sir. 

Senator MARKEY. OK. Well, I am glad to hear that and just to 

make sure that that’s the case, I’m introducing with Senator 

Blumenthal today The FASTER Act, which would ensure that none 

of these fees are diverted and that we’ll just make that policy once 

and for all. The FASTER Act, Funding for Aviation Screeners and 

Threat Elimination and Restoration Act. In fact, it’s my legislation 

in 2007 that passed in the 9/11 bill that requires for the screening 

of all cargo that goes on all passenger planes in America. That was 

a six-year battle by me to get that law on the books to screen. 

So any retreat on this is absolutely unnecessary if one-third of 

the security funding is being diverted just to deficit reduction and 

not to the security of the passengers who are flying in our country. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. None whatsoever. In fact, further investment in both low-volume airports and cargo screening, and, sir, 

just a request from me for you to consider at your convenience. I 

would like to come and talk with you about Quiet Skies because 

I think some of the issues that you’ve raised, I could help provide 

more information to give you more context to that program because 

it is a very, very valuable program in my view, and I can’t go 

through the details in this setting but I would very much like to 

have that conversation with you, if you’re available. 

Senator MARKEY. OK. And, again, I would love to have that conversation in my office. I’m relying now on Air Marshals who are 

telling us that they just don’t think it’s worth the money. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. But in a large organization, you’re going 

to have some people that have a different point of view. I would 

take a look at the intelligence information first. 

Senator MARKEY. I do appreciate that but thus far there has 

been no evidence that it has thwarted any attacks whatsoever, and 

I think that’s—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. 

Senator MARKEY.—the relevant—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, but there is evidence that it has transitioned some passengers identified in Quiet Skies to the known or 

suspected terrorist list, significant numbers. It is successful, and I 

would love to have that conversation with you. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you for your generosity. 

The CHAIRMAN. It sounds like you guys need to have that conversation, and I, too, raised with Admiral Pekoske when there was 

reporting about reductions at low-volume airports and he assured 

me that that wasn’t the case. That was like many other things that 

sometimes make it into the press, something that had not been 

agreed upon or implemented or anything like that. So we appreciate that. 

And when it comes to the biometric stuff, Senator Markey’s often 

confused with Brad Pitt. So it’s really important that we make sure 

that we get this right. 

40 

We’ll keep the hearing record open and ask members to submit 

questions and if you could, Admiral, respond to those as quickly as 

possible, keep the hearing record open for two weeks. 

But we appreciate you being here and your responsiveness and 

we’ll look forward to working with you and your team to again ensure that Americans who travel here at home or abroad have the 

absolute top-level safety precautions put in place. 

So thank you again, and with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(41) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DEB FISCHER TO

HON. DAVID PEKOSKE

Question 1. I have heard from airports across Nebraska that their passenger traffic has been increasing. To support that increase in traffic, airports from Eppley Airfield in Omaha to the Western Nebraska Regional Airport in Scottsbluff need additional TSA staff to maintain security and address longer wait times. How is TSA 

working with airports in Nebraska to ensure they have a sufficient number of TSA 

security officers to meet their needs? 

Answer. Strong passenger traffic growth is a challenge being faced by the majority 

of our airports nationwide. Each year, the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) evaluates the staffing requirements at each airport, with a heavy focus on individual airport growth rates. These passenger traffic increases are applied to our 

staffing model, which was validated as part of a Government Accountability Office 

review, and airport staffing allocations are adjusted appropriately. The President’s 

budget request for Fiscal Year FY 2019 includes 717 Full Time Equivalents (FTE) 

for volume growth within TSA over current levels, and the Nebraska airports were 

allocated an additional 8 percent in staffing for the upcoming year. In particular, 

Eppley Airfield (OMA) received a 23 FTE (12 percent) increase in allocated staffing 

for FY 2019. 

Additionally, many of the airports in Nebraska, similar to other airports across 

the country, have seen an increase in Transportation Security Officer (TSO) attrition as the U.S. economy improves with additional job opportunities and competitive 

wages. This has been the case in OMA, where employment competition from both 

private sector employers and positions within the Federal Government that offer 

more traditional work schedules have resulted in attrition. To offset this impact, 

TSA recently put in place a retention incentive for OMA to help retain existing employees and attract new TSO applicants. TSA has also expanded our statewide recruitment efforts beyond traditional advertising venues by concentrating on digital 

and social media advertising to ensure we reach the broadest applicant pool. This, 

along with attending in person and virtual job fairs and working with local workforce offices to create our own employment events, is helping promote TSA’s employment opportunities in the smaller communities. TSA’s Recruitment and Hiring staff 

stays in close contact with the local TSA airport staff members to identify other opportunities to promote TSO position openings. 

Question 2. General aviation is particularly important in a rural state like Nebraska. TSA has received 19 recommendations in the past several years from the 

Aviation Security Advisory Committee to reform security programs related to general aviation. These recommendations cover a variety of issues, such as vetting for 

flight training candidates and compliance requirements. Can you provide an update 

on TSA’s work to respond to the Aviation Security Advisory Committee’s recommendations on general aviation security? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) concurred with 13 of 

the 19 recommendations put forth by the Aviation Security Advisory Committee’s 

General Aviation Sub-Committee and non-concurred with the others after careful 

consideration and for reasons specific to each recommendation. Of the recommendations with which TSA concurred, six have been closed and the appropriate action 

taken. Of the seven recommendations which remain open, five are related to flight 

training candidates that are in the process of rulemaking. 

The remaining two open recommendations relate to ‘‘Twelve Five’’ operators. 

Unlike General Aviation, which is largely unregulated by TSA, each operator of 

an aircraft with a certificated takeoff weight of more than 12,500 lbs. (i.e., ‘‘Twelve 

Five’’); in scheduled or charter service; carrying passengers or cargo or both; and not 

regulated by TSA under a full security program, partial security program, or full 

call-cargo security program is regulated by TSA under the Twelve Five Standard Security Program. See 49 CFR 1544.101(d). Many General Aviation stakeholders who 

42 

serve on the ASAC General Aviation Subcommittee are also Twelve Five stakeholders and have advanced their recommendations through the General Aviation 

Subcommittee and will be addressed at the next meeting on December 12, 2018. 

As required by section 1952(d) of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. 

115–254, TSA will provide a Report to Congress by February 3, 2019 regarding the 

implementation of certain recommendations that were submitted by the ASAC and 

with which the Administrator has concurred. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. BILL NELSON TO

HON. DAVID PEKOSKE

Question. Mr. Administrator—There has been reporting in the media on allegations from several years ago that Federal Air Marshals at Orlando International 

Airport were encouraged to racially profile African-American travelers. I received 

TSA’s statement disputing these allegations. 

Can you ensure this committee that you have thoroughly reviewed these allegations and that TSA is not racially profiling today? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) takes all allegations 

of profiling seriously and is committed to treating all travelers with dignity, courtesy, and respect. TSA thoroughly reviewed the allegations that were reported in the 

media regarding the profiling of African American travelers at Orlando International Airport and can assure the Committee that TSA is not racially profiling 

passengers. 

TSA is dedicated to operating our programs in compliance with Federal laws, executive orders, and directives. TSA follows a 2013 policy statement, titled ‘‘The Department of Homeland Security’s Commitment to Nondiscriminatory Law Enforcement and Screening Activities’’ and, as applicable, the 2014 Department of Justice 

‘‘Guidance for Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Regarding the Use of Race, Ethnicity, Gender, National Origin, Religion, Sexual Orientation, or Gender Identity.’’ 

All TSA employees, including Federal Air Marshals, must complete mandatory 

‘‘multicultural awareness’’ training on an annual basis. This training provides guidance to help employees better understand different religions and cultures. Additionally, all Federal Air Marshals must annually complete a training module called, 

‘‘Guidance Regarding the Use of Race for Law Enforcement Officers.’’ 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

HON. DAVID PEKOSKE

Question 1. Passenger wait times are on the rise at airports across the country. 

Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP) has made significant investments 

to modernize and streamline its security checkpoints to address this trend, but a 

significant portion of the efficiency gains resulting from these investments are being 

lost due to the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) staffing reductions. 

While the number of MSP passengers increased by 12 percent last year, TSA reduced its screeners by 9 percent. Administrator Pekoske, on September 4, 2018 I 

sent you a letter on the need to address recent increases in checkpoint wait times. 

What is TSA doing to ensure airports have the staffing they need to capitalize on 

new investments to improve security? 

Answer. As the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deploys new technology, such as Automated Screening Lanes (ASL) and Computed Tomography (CT), 

staffing models are updated and airport staffing allocations are adjusted appropriately. TSA’s staffing allocation process uses a proven methodology that was reviewed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in Fiscal Year (FY) 

2017 without any resulting recommendations. This process ensures that each airport’s staffing levels are based on their unique operating characteristics. TSA works 

closely with the airports and airline industry to ensure staffing models are updated 

to reflect changes to airport configurations, equipment, and flight trends. As 

changes occur that affect national staffing requirements, TSA works closely with 

other DHS elements such as the DHS Chief Financial Officer, as well as the Office 

of Management and Budget to ensure those requirements are represented in our 

budget requests. For example, the FY 2019 budget request supports an additional 

717 Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) to support increased passenger loads. 

Question 2. The last time we faced extended wait times at MSP, I invited former 

TSA Administrator Neffenger to see the lines first-hand and worked with him to 

bring in more K–9 teams. These K–9 teams have proven very effective in expediting 

passenger screening and reducing wait times. The Senate FAA reauthorization bill 

43 

that passed the Senate Commerce Committee in June 2017 includes provisions that 

would promote and expand the use of explosive detection K–9 teams. What operational benefits do these teams provide and does TSA currently have the capacity 

to meet demand for these K–9 units? 

Answer. Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) teams are an effective and versatile 

tool within the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) multi-layered security process. They also serve as a highly visible deterrent against criminal and terrorist threats. TSA is able to deploy PSC teams at passenger security checkpoints 

in a manner that not only helps mitigate the explosives threat to aviation, but also 

helps mitigate the threat to the security checkpoints themselves. 

TSA has significantly increased the capacity for training canine teams at our Canine Training Center (CTC) in San Antonio, Texas. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 TSA 

trained 250 canines, while in FY 2017 and FY 2018 TSA trained 300 canines each 

year. We are on track to meet all FY 2019 projected canine requirements provided 

by the operators by training 350 canines, as well as continuing to increase capacity 

for anticipated future growth. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BRIAN SCHATZ TO

HON. DAVID PEKOSKE

Question 1. TSA is conducting pilots to use biometrics data collection for identifying and screening passengers. 

How is TSA informing travelers about what information is being collected in these 

pilots? Can travelers opt out of facial recognition? If so, how does the traveler’s experience differ from those who do not opt out? How does TSA independently test 

the accuracy and potential bias of algorithms that are used for any face recognition? 

Answer. As part of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on biometric technology pilots, 

CBP has provided general notification of the biometric pilots to travelers through 

airport signage, through Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), published on 

www.dhs.gov/privacy and through program information readily available on 

www.cbp.gov. TSA has coordinated with CBP on providing these notices. For joint 

pilots conducted with CBP, travelers can opt out of facial recognition technology 

used in the pilot programs. Persons who choose not to participate undergo regular 

manual identity verification procedures using their travel documents. 

TSA currently does not have its own facial matching system. We are evaluating 

CBP’s facial matching system—Traveler Verification Service (TVS)—for potential 

use at TSA checkpoints. CBP and other DHS partners are working to ensure the 

accuracy of any biometric services provided to TSA. 

CBP is working with DHS Science and Technology Directorate to continue to develop and refine methods to analyze differences in matching performance (e.g., age, 

gender, and citizenship) based on the available data garnered through biometric 

entry-exit operations. CBP is also moving towards formalizing a partnership with 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Although CBP’s currently 

available data does not at present demonstrate any significant difference in match 

rate between age, gender, or citizenship, CBP will continue to work with its partners to develop methods to address any performance variations within the system. 

Question 2. The number of guns brought into our airports is growing. Last year, 

TSA confiscated nearly 4,000 guns from security checkpoints—an increase of 17 percent from 2016. Based on information provided by your staff that number will go 

even higher this year. Do you believe that the presence of these weapons is a threat 

to the safety of the traveling public and to our aviation industry? What actions is 

TSA taking to prevent loaded guns from entering our airports in the first place? 

What more can be done? 

Answer. Yes, the presence of weapons of any kind, including firearms, continues 

to remain a threat to the safety of the traveling public and to the aviation industry. 

As such, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) remains vigilant in its 

mission to protect the Nation’s transportation systems and is committed to ensuring 

items on our Prohibited Items list do not enter the sterile area of an airport or cabin 

of any aircraft. 

TSA new hire and recurrent training curriculum addresses firearms via classroom 

lecture, x-ray image training, and checkpoint labs and simulations. Image training 

uses both threat and non-threat items to assist officers in detecting guns (both 

standard construction and 3D printed, as well as assembled and disassembled) and 

gun parts (including magazines, loose ammo, firing pins, etc.). In addition, TSA collaborates with external Government partners, including USSS, ICE, CBP, and ATF, 

44 

to share intelligence information with regards to guns and guns parts to further enhance training and awareness for Officers and Supervisors. 

Further, TSA’s Public Affairs Office has taken several steps to inform travelers 

that firearms are not permitted past airport checkpoints. 

• TSA partners with airports to post signs in the airport terminal that alert travelers that firearms are not permitted past airport checkpoints. Additionally, 

TSA posts signs at checkpoints with the same message. 

• TSA maintains a detailed webpage dedicated to inform travelers of the proper 

way to travel with firearms and ammunition. https://www.tsa.gov/travel/ 

transporting-firearms-and-ammunition 

• TSA produced a video that demonstrates the proper way to travel with firearms. The video is posted on TSA’s website and YouTube: https://www.tsa.gov/ 

videos/travel-tips-traveling-firearms# 

• TSA has a free downloadable app called ‘‘My TSA’’ that has a useful feature 

called ‘‘Can I bring?’’ A traveler can enter the name of the item (i.e., gun, rifle, 

pistol) and find out right away if it cannot go into a carry-on bag or if there 

are special instructions for proper transport. 

• TSA’s homepage has the same feature, entitled ‘‘What can I bring?’’, in the 

upper right-hand corner of its home page. A traveler can enter the name of the 

item (i.e., gun, rifle, pistol) and find out right away if it cannot go into a carryon bag and if there are special instructions for proper transport. https:// 

www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/all 

• TSA operates its own social care program, which enables a traveler to send a 

question to @AskTSA on Twitter and Facebook Messenger about security policies and procedures. Travelers may also send a photo of an item to find out if 

the item is permitted in carry-on or checked baggage. @AskTSA operates 365 

days a year. 

• TSA has a customer call center with representatives available every day of the 

year to answer questions from travelers at 1–866–289–9673. The TSA Contact 

Center representatives are available 8 a.m. to 11 p.m. ET weekdays; and 9 a.m. 

to 8 p.m. on weekends and holidays. 

• TSA issues a weekly blog post that features a rundown of firearm discoveries 

and other interesting finds to bring public attention to the fact that guns are 

not to be brought to checkpoints and that TSA officers will detect firearms if 

they are brought to checkpoints (visit https://www.tsa.gov/blog). 

• TSA Public Affairs leverages its social media following to educate travelers on 

what not to bring to the checkpoint, including firearms and other weapons. 

Photos, videos, and information about firearms are available on TSA’s 

Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. 

• TSA issues a year-end summary of gun catches on its blog and it gets national 

media attention every year. 

• TSA spokespeople across the country conduct media events at airports regularly, during which they discuss and demonstrate the proper way to travel with 

firearms stressing that passengers should not bring guns to checkpoints. These 

events typically garner significant local coverage in the cities and towns where 

they/are conducted. 

• The TSA Public Affairs Office also issues local news releases on a daily basis 

about firearm catches to bring awareness about the criminal and civil penalties 

to which travelers are subject if they bring a firearm to the checkpoint. 

Lastly, the TSA Public Affairs Office established a group this past spring to explore additional ways to message the public about the firearm regulations. The 

group is working to develop an awareness campaign on firearm travel. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. EDWARD MARKEY TO

HON. DAVID PEKOSKE

Question 1. How many individuals have been monitored under the Quiet Skies 

program? Of that total number, how many are American citizens? 

Answer. The response to the question includes Sensitive Security Information and 

can be briefed upon request. 

Question 2. How many individuals have been subject to Special Mission Coverage 

(SMC) under Quiet Skies since SMCs were initiated under this program in March 

2018? Of that total, how many are American citizens? 

45 

Answer. The response to the question includes Sensitive Security Information and 

can be briefed upon request. 

Question 3. At the hearing, Administrator Pekoske stated that the Quiet Skies 

program has ‘‘transitioned some passengers identified in Quiet Skies to the known 

or suspected terrorist list.’’ Please detail how many individuals monitored under the 

Quiet Skies program have been added to this list, and what precisely the list is. 

What percentage of all individuals monitored under the Quiet Skies program have 

been added to this list? Were these individuals added to this list specifically because 

of information gathered about them under the Quiet Skies program? Administrator 

Pekoske and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) spokespersons have 

stated that the Quiet Skies program surveillance missions have identified no threats 

or activity meriting follow-up action. How are these statements consistent with the 

fact that Quiet Skies selectees have been added to a terrorist watch list? Please explain why someone who does not merit follow up action can also exhibit behavior 

that places them on a terrorist watch list. 

Answer. Quiet Skies is a risk-based, intelligence driven program to mitigate the 

threat from higher risk travel, not a surveillance program. Quiet Skies relies on an 

analysis of current intelligence reporting to develop rules that identify a small portion of the traveling population as higher risk to determine whether those passengers should receive enhanced screening. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not nominate individuals to the Terrorist Screening Database 

(TSDB) on account of matching a Quiet Skies rule, and would not share Quiet Skies 

matches with other agencies such as the Terrorist Screening Center unless suspicious activity is noted during the passenger’s travel. Individuals must meet specific criteria in order to be nominated to the TSDB. The nomination of a subject to 

the TSDB is separate from and independent of Quiet Skies. 

TSA analyzed data on passengers who matched Quiet Skies rules over a period 

of time and preliminarily found that passengers over that time period who matched 

a Quiet Skies rule were subsequently added to the TSDB—for reasons independent 

of their match to a Quiet Skies rule—at a higher rate than all other passengers. 

This data shows that Quiet Skies, which is based on timely intelligence, is identifying travelers who are higher risk and who are unknown to the Federal Government or only partially identified at the time of the travel resulting in a Quiet Skies 

match. TSA can provide specific information regarding passengers identified by 

Quiet Skies who were later added to the TSDB in a classified briefing. 

Question 4. According to a TSA document published in the Boston Globe, ‘‘Effective Tuesday, March 13, 2018, OLE/FAMS will initiate SMC on flights carrying 

Quiet Skies Selectees.’’ What prompted this decision? Why was the program initiated on this date? Was there an incident or specific issue that promoted the decision? If so, what? What are the Quiet Skies rules and criteria for selection for SMC? 

On what intelligence is Quiet Skies mission coverage based? How does TSA choose 

who from the Quiet Skies selectee list to assign teams of Federal Air Marshals 

(FAMs) for SMC? Are all Quiet Skies selectees monitored in flight under SMC? 

Answer. Quiet Skies is an intelligence-driven, risk-based program designed to 

identify higher-risk patterns of travel. Quiet Skies rules are based upon current intelligence regarding threats to aviation security within the homeland. Explaining 

specific Quiet Skies rules and criteria for selection for Special Mission Coverage 

(SMC) requires conveyance of Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and classified information, which we can provide in a briefing in a secure setting. As part of its review of scheduling priorities, the Federal Air Marshal Service sought to improve the 

degree to which Federal Air Marshal deployments are based upon intelligence-informed risk analysis, and to add the unique law enforcement capabilities of the Federal Air Marshal Service to ensure aviation security where intelligence indicated 

higher risk associated with a particular flight. 

For additional detail regarding the Federal Air Marshal Service Concept of Operations, including priorities and rationales for SMC assignments, we recommend a 

private briefing in a secure setting. 

Question 5. Is there a minimum age for individuals monitored under the Quiet 

Skies program? Could a four-year-old child be the target of a Quiet Skies SMC assignment? 

Answer. The response to the question includes Sensitive Security Information and 

can be briefed upon request. 

Question 6. Please describe the selection process and intelligence collection and retention policies for the Silent Partner program. Who does this program target and 

what rules are used to select targets? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) bases Silent Partner 

rules on current intelligence indicating a current credible threat to aviation security 

46 

or the Homeland, as assessed by TSA Intelligence and Analysis. TSA relies upon 

intelligence provided by the Intelligence Community (IC) to identify potential 

threats of concern to TSA. TSA uses its authorities, experience, and expertise in 

evaluating threats to transportation security to create the Silent Partner or Quiet 

Skies rules that are used to identify higher risk passenger itineraries based on terrorist travel, trends. The specific rules are sensitive and would need to be provided 

in a closed briefing. 

TSA retains specific information pertaining to the passenger’s travel for a limited 

period of time, in accordance with established record retention schedules (two years 

for TSA Intelligence and Analysis Silent Partner/Quiet Skies program, seven years 

for Secure Flight records reflecting that an individual was selected for enhanced 

screening as a Silent Partner or Quiet Skies match and five years for Federal Air 

Marshal Service after action reports). TSA maintains these records for appropriate 

follow-up when there is suspicious activity during travel and for the purposes of 

evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress, and litigation. TSA’s operation of Silent Partner and Quiet Skies are reviewed on a routine basis by the 

DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the DHS Privacy Office, and the 

DHS Office of General Counsel. 

Question 7. At the hearing, Administrator Pekoske stated that intelligence collected during Quiet Skies SMC assignments is kept for two years after determining 

the passenger in question is cleared as a threat. According to investigations published in the Boston Globe, FAMs submit two types of reports to TSA after they 

complete Quiet Skies missions. Are there different conditions or guidelines governing the collection, retention, sharing or accessing of information in these two 

types of reports? 

Answer. Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) do not engage in intelligence collection and 

do not submit two reports. As a law enforcement officer, a FAM will look for suspicious behavior by engaging in observation of a Quiet Skies passenger and other 

passengers to ensure the security of the aircraft. These observations are not part 

of any larger investigation into a passenger. A FAM will either report that no suspicious activity was observed, or will document suspicious activity observed in an 

after-action report. In either case, the rules governing the retention of FAM reports 

are the same, which require a retention period of five years. TSA has begun the 

process of reducing the retention period of reports following Quiet Skies missions 

for which no suspicious activity was observed. 

TSA retains specific information pertaining to the passenger’s travel for a limited 

period of time in accordance with established record retention schedules. This includes retention by TSA’s Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) Silent Partner/ 

Quiet Skies program for two years, seven years for Secure Flight records reflecting 

that an individual was selected for enhanced screening as a Silent Partner or Quiet 

Skies match and five years for Federal Air Marshal Service after action reports). 

TSA maintains these records for appropriate follow-up when there is suspicious activity during travel and for the purposes of evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress, and litigation. This data is accessible to TSA personnel solely 

for one or more of these particular purposes. TSA, including both TSA I&A and the 

Federal Air Marshal Service, does not share this information unless it is necessary 

to accomplish one of these purposes (e.g., sharing Quiet Skies information with the 

Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program when necessary to resolve a redress application). 

Question 8. Why does TSA retain data about individuals cleared as a threat for 

two years? What is this data used for and what happens to it for those two years? 

What individuals and what agencies can access, copy or modify this data and under 

what circumstances? 

Answer. Following the attempted detonation of an explosive device onboard flight 

253 from Amsterdam to Detroit by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in 2009, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) conducted a review of the existing threats 

to aviation security and determined that it needed to mitigate the risk to commercial aviation posed by unknown or partially known potential terrorists. Quiet Skies 

does not identify passengers as known threats. Quiet Skies relies on an analysis of 

current intelligence reporting to identify a small portion of the traveling population 

as higher risk to determine whether those passengers should receive enhanced 

screening for a defined number of flights or period of time. In accordance with established records retention schedules, TSA’s Intelligence and Analysis Silent Partner/ 

Quiet Skies program retains data about Quiet Skies passengers for two years for 

the purposes of evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress, and litigation, Secure Flight records reflecting that an individual was selected for enhanced 

screening as a Silent Partner or Quiet Skies match are retained for seven years and 

47 

Federal Air Marshal Service after action reports are retained for five years. This 

data is only accessible to TSA personnel for carrying out one of those specific purposes. TSA does not share this information unless suspicious activity is noted during 

travel or is necessary to accomplish a specific purpose (e.g., sharing Quiet Skies information with the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program when necessary to resolve a redress application). To date, TSA does not share 

information it retains about Quiet Skies passengers except as consistent with the 

purposes described above. TSA’s operation of Silent Partner and Quiet Skies are reviewed on a routine basis by the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 

the DHS Privacy Office, and the DHS Office of General Counsel. 

Question 9. TSA documents indicate that individuals selected for Quiet Skies SMC 

remain on this list for up to 90 days or 3 encounters, whichever comes first. After 

they are monitored on flights for this amount of time, they are then removed from 

the list and their information is removed from the database, TSA has stated. Please 

explain how this time-frame is consistent with the two-year time-frame Administrator Pekoske referenced at the hearing. 

Answer. The Quiet Skies program identifies higher risk passengers for enhanced 

screening, and automatically precludes an individual from receiving additional scrutiny based on the same Quiet Skies rule after the passenger has been encountered 

for a defined number of times or period of time, whichever comes first. The specific 

number of encounters and the period of time under which an individual may receive 

additional scrutiny on account of matching a Quiet Skies rule is Sensitive Security 

Information. This automated preclusion is built into the program in order to limit 

impact on passengers. At the end of the defined period of time, TSA’s Intelligence 

and Analysis office retains specific information pertaining to the passenger’s travel 

for two years in accordance with established record retention schedules for the purposes of evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress and litigation 

and, in accordance with established records retention schedules, Secure Flight 

records reflecting that an individual was selected for enhanced screening as a Silent 

Partner or Quiet Skies match are retained for seven years and Federal Air Marshal 

Service after action reports are retained for five years. 

Question 10. Is information about Quiet Skies targets who have been cleared as 

threats ever accessed by anyone at any agency or organization inside or outside government after the two-year period? 

Answer. Quiet Skies passengers are not identified as known threats. Quiet Skies 

relies on an analysis of current intelligence reporting to identify a small portion of 

the traveling population as higher risk to determine whether those passengers 

should receive enhanced screening for defined number of flights or period of time. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) retains Quiet Skies passenger 

data in accordance with established record retention schedules. TSA uses the information for appropriate follow-up when there is suspicious activity during travel and 

for the purposes of evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress, and 

litigation. TSA does not share this information unless it is necessary to accomplish 

a specific purpose (e.g., sharing Quiet Skies information with the Department of 

Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program when necessary to resolve a 

redress application). 

Question 11. Administrator Pekoske has stated that ‘‘intelligence professionals’’ 

have access to data collected during Quiet Skies SMC missions. Who exactly is considered for this purpose an ‘‘intelligence professional,’’ and are these individuals all 

TSA employees? Do employees of any other agencies have access to information 

about Quiet Skies targets? 

Answer. ‘‘Intelligence professionals’’ refers to Transportation Security Administration (TSA) personnel within TSA’s Intelligence and Analysis office who fall within 

the intelligence series job classification. These individuals are responsible for reviewing all current and relevant information to ensure that Quiet Skies rules remain valid, based upon current intelligence, and participate in the redress process 

for individuals affected by Quiet Skies. Since TSA’s Federal Air Marshal Service 

began mission coverage using Quiet Skies information to inform its mission deployments in March 2018, all information provided back to TSA intelligence analysts by 

the Federal Air Marshal Service has been for the purposes of evaluating whether 

the passenger is of low risk and should be removed from Quiet Skies. TSA does not 

share information about passengers identified for additional scrutiny by Quiet Skies 

outside of the agency unless suspicious activity is noted during travel, or as necessary for the purposes of evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress, and litigation. 

Question 12. Is there any way in which Quiet Skies SMC is carried out differently 

than non-Quiet Skies missions such as SMC targeting subjects of active FBI terVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:57 Dec 04, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57581.TXT JACKIE
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rorism investigations? Is information collected about targets of these different types 

of missions stored differently? 

Answer. There are differences between how Federal Air Marshals carry out Quiet 

Skies Special Mission Coverage (SMC) and non-Quiet Skies SMCs. Those differences 

are considered Sensitive Security Information. However, the information obtained is 

stored in the same manner, regardless of the type of SMC. For more information, 

we recommend a private briefing in a secure setting. 

Question 13. What agencies and individuals were involved in initiating SMC of 

Quiet Skies selectees? What agencies and individuals were made aware of this decision? Was anyone at the White House or Department of Justice involved in the initiation of Quiet Skies SMCs or notified about this initiation? 

Answer. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) new Concept of Operations 

(CONOPS) that expands FAMS SMC deployments to include Quiet Skies missions 

was approved for implementation by the TSA Administrator on February 20, 2018 

to improve the deployment CONOPS based on risk. The CONOPS was briefed to 

DHS leadership and relevant offices, the Office of Management and Budget, and 

Congressional Committees, including the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee. The new FAMS CONOPS took into account recommendations 

from Inspector General reports, congressional oversight, and internal assessments. 

The implementation of the new CONOPS further mitigates the risk presented by 

passengers onboard the aircraft. 

Question 13a. What agencies or officials at the Federal or state level are currently 

involved in the Quiet Skies program? More specifically, what agencies or officials 

can recommend someone for monitoring under Quiet Skies or Silent Partner programs, or any other kind of SMC? What agencies or officials can request or otherwise gain access to information gathered during the missions? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) bases Quiet Skies 

rules on current intelligence indicating a current credible threat to aviation security 

in the Homeland, as assessed by TSA Intelligence and Analysis. TSA relies upon 

intelligence provided by the Intelligence Community (IC) to identify potential 

threats of concern to TSA. Although the IC provides intelligence to TSA regarding 

threats to aviation security and the homeland, the IC does not provide recommendations to TSA about the creation of Silent Partner or Quiet Skies rules or the identification of passengers for additional scrutiny through Silent Partner or Quiet Skies. 

Indeed, no agency recommends any person for inclusion within Silent Partner or 

Quiet Skies. TSA uses its authorities, experience, and expertise in evaluating 

threats to transportation security to create the Silent Partner or Quiet Skies rules 

that are used to identify higher risk passenger itineraries. TSA may coordinate with 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which assists in the operation of Quiet Skies 

through TSA’s use of ATS–P, regarding TSA’s rules to ensure the effective operation 

of Quiet Skies. CBP does not recommend that any person or group of persons be 

identified for additional scrutiny by TSA through Silent Partner or Quiet Skies. Information about Quiet Skies may be shared within the Department of Homeland Security for redress, litigation, and oversight purposes, and with the Department of 

Justice for litigation purposes. 

TSA does not collect intelligence through Silent Partner or Quiet Skies. TSA does 

not provide activity reports completed by the Federal Air Marshal Service to other 

external Federal agencies or internal DHS components unless suspicious activity is 

noted during travel. 

Question 14. At the hearing, Administrator Pekoske stated that ‘‘in certain circumstances’’ the Department of Justice may be involved in the Quiet Skies program. 

Please elaborate and detail any involvement of Department of Justice personnel in 

the Quiet Skies program. 

Answer. The Department of Justice does not have regular involvement in the 

Quiet Skies program. If a Federal Air Marshal notes suspicious activity or other 

conduct that appears to violate Federal law, the Federal Air Marshal Service may 

refer the activity or conduct to the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation, regardless of whether the person has been identified by Quiet Skies or not. 

To date, the Federal Air Marshal Service has not referred any Quiet Skies information to the Department of Justice. The Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) may share Quiet Skies information with the Department of Justice for litigation purposes as appropriate. 

Question 15. Administrator Pekoske publicly responded, ‘‘To my view, no,’’ when 

asked if the White House is involved with the Quiet Skies Program. Please elaborate. Does the White House have any involvement in the Quiet Skies program? 

Answer. In a January 7, 2010 memorandum responding to the December 25, 2009 

attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253, President Obama concluded that imVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:57 Dec 04, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57581.TXT JACKIE
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mediate actions must be taken to enhance the security of the American people. Following this direction, and in coordination with interagency partners, TSA designed 

and implemented the Silent Partner program, leveraging capabilities already in use 

by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and subsequently, the related Quiet Skies 

program. The White House does not direct any person be included within Silent 

Partner or Quiet Skies or otherwise have any involvement in the operation of Quiet 

Skies. TSA’s allocation of funding for Silent Partner and Quiet Skies has been a consistent element of TSA’s budget, which is submitted through interagency budgeting 

processes. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. TOM UDALL TO

HON. DAVID PEKOSKE

Question 1. Customs and Border Protection reports that the facial recognition 

technology is 97.5 percent accurate. This percentage seems to be dramatically higher 

than what is expected given the reported faults of the technology for ethnic populations and women and children. Does TSA keep its own statistics on accuracy of 

this technology in real world practice? What documentation about the accuracy of 

the technology will TSA share with this committee to be transparent about how this 

technology is performing? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently does not 

own a facial matching system. We are evaluating U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) facial matching system—Traveler Verification Service (TVS)—for potential use at TSA checkpoints. CBP and other Department of Homeland Security partners are working to ensure the accuracy of any biometric services provided to TSA. 

As of September 1, 2018, CBP has processed 600,000 travelers departing the 

United States from 15 airports and 1.7 million passengers arriving into the United 

States at 14 airports. The biometric match rate for departing travelers is 97 percent 

and for arriving travelers is 95 percent. 

CBP is working with DHS Science and Technology Directorate to continue to develop and refine methods to analyze differences in matching performance (e.g., age, 

gender, and citizenship) based on the available data garnered through biometric 

entry-exit operations. CBP is also moving towards formalizing a partnership with 

the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Although CBP’s currently 

available data does not currently demonstrate any significant difference in match 

rate between age, gender, or citizenship, CBP will continue to work with its partners to develop methods to address any performance variations within the system. 

Question 2. Customs and Border Protection has aspirations to roll out the technology at all U.S. airports within four years. That kind of expedited time frame is 

concerning, especially considering all of the questions about the accuracy of the 

technology and who might get caught up in the program’s inadequacies. How quickly does the TSA plan to expand the program from the current pilot? Is TSA hoping 

for the same expedited time frame? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not yet defined a 

timeline for the development and deployment of its biometrics capability. TSA’s collaboration with CBP on a series of operational technology pilots is one of a series 

of efforts that TSA is engaged in to inform future requirements and acquisitions 

strategy for any biometrics capability. The results of the TSA–CBP pilot program 

testing will inform but not necessarily determine TSA’s timeline. 

Question 3. Will there be increased reporting to this committee and the public as 

the pilot program expands? 

Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is committed to informing 

Congress and the public of its development and exploration of biometric technologies. We will continue to engage on a regular basis with Congress to inform 

them of our progress with biometrics, including TSA and U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) collaboration on biometric technology pilots. TSA is working to 

schedule a Biometrics Roadmap briefing with the Senate Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation in mid-November. 

Question 4. It is important for the data collected through the facial recognition 

program not to be abused. There seems to be a lack of transparency about how TSA 

will store this data and how widely the information stored will be shared. Travelers 

have a right to know what our government is doing with their sensitive biometric 

data. What protections exist to ensure that U.S. citizens biometric data and this 

technology is not abused? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not have its own 

facial matching system. TSA is collaborating with CBP on pilot programs testing the 

50 

use of CBP’s Traveler Verification System (TVS), a cloud-based matching service, at 

TSA security screening checkpoints to compare photographs voluntarily provided by 

international travelers at the checkpoint against a gallery of previously captured 

photographs (e.g., visa or passport photographs etc.). TSA does not collect or store 

photographs in TSA systems. Matching and storage of biometric data by the TVS 

system is conducted by CBP, in accordance with applicable privacy and information 

management requirements. For example, CBP has developed and posted for public 

availability, updates to the Privacy Impact Assessment for TVS, to address each 

phase of the pilot program with TSA, including the handling and protections for personally identifiable information collected using facial recognition technology at the 

checkpoint. 

Question 5. How will the TSA plan to address the privacy concerns associated 

with deploying biometrics? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is committed to protecting the privacy rights of individuals’ subject to TSA security procedures and 

safeguarding personally identifiable information (PII) collected by TSA in accordance with Federal laws, regulations and DHS policies. TSA follows the eight DHS 

Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP) of transparency, individual participation, purpose specification, data minimization, use limitation, data quality and integrity, security, and accountability and auditing, to analyze the collection of PII 

necessary to fulfill TSA’s transportation security mission and to determine how TSA 

can best provide privacy protections to information collected under these principles. 

Before TSA implements any biometric-enabled technology as part of its standard 

security procedures, TSA will develop and make publicly available applicable Privacy Impact Assessments. Following from FIPPs, as described above, the PIA will 

address the privacy risks of deploying biometrics and how TSA plans to mitigate 

these risks. TSA will share the PIA with the traveling public to ensure awareness 

of any privacy risks inherent in the use of biometrics. 

Question 6. At full implementation, what is the projected cost for a full implementation of the facial recognition program? If the cost will be split with CBP, please 

explain this breakdown. 

Answer. TSA is also working with other DHS elements, including the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM),to conduct an independent business case 

analysis for different population segments that TSA services. This analysis is expected to begin in Q1 FY19. Currently, TSA screens up to 2.5M passengers a day, 

with volume increasing year over year. With such volume, TSA will not likely have 

a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ biometrics solution to include all the various populations that we 

screen. Therefore, a business case analysis that articulates the cost-benefits of deploying biometrics capability to different populations would be critical to design the 

appropriate solution architecture and governance framework. TSA is also leveraging 

and strengthening existing security partnerships within the Department (such as 

CBP, OBIM, etc.) and aviation security stakeholders on biometrics, working to clearly articulate public and private sector roles and responsibilities in the context of applicable laws and regulation. 

Because TSA has not established what a complete facial recognition solution 

would look like at this time, full costs for TSA‘s implementation of biometric final 

operating capability (FOC) are unknown. While the costs are unknown, the benefits 

are clear. On the basis of pilots conducted to date, TSA anticipates that biometric 

solutions will enhance security effectiveness, capture operational efficiencies, and 

improve the passenger experience, but additional study is needed. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. TAMMY BALDWIN TO

HON. DAVID PEKOSKE

Question 1. I remain concerned by the potential dangers posed by the lack of adequate in-flight security measures whenever pilots unlock flight deck doors, including 

to get food, sleep, or use the lavatory. It is my understanding that a veteran Air 

Marshal has raised concerns internally with DHS, TSA and Federal Air Marshal 

Service (FAMS) officials regarding the threats to aviation security posed by the potential use of weaponized synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl or carfentanyl, and socalled rush attacks. What steps are TSA and FAMS taking to combat the potential 

use of weaponized synthetic opioids to attack pilots when flight deck doors are unlocked? 

Answer. The tactical mission statement of the Federal Air Marshal Service is to 

ensure the security of the flight deck, protect the integrity of the aircraft, and the 

safety of the crew and passengers. 

51 

To increase awareness and a Federal Air Marshal’s (FAMs) ability to combat 

opioid and chemical attacks, training courses and materials were made available to 

FAMs. TSA most recently provided training to Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) in early 

2018 to increase awareness and ability to combat opioid and chemical attacks. In 

February 2018, TSA provided a Fentanyl Awareness presentation, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Fentanyl Awareness video, and a DEA Fentanyl Briefing 

Guide for First Responders. All armed LE/FAMS personnel received this training by 

July 31, 2018. As threats evolve, TSA updates training materials to address the current threats. 

Additionally, TSA published advisories in August and September 2017: Emergency Response to Chemical or Biological Threats Against Aircraft, Acid Attack 

First Aid, Small Scale Poisons and Toxins, and a presentation on the Chemical and 

Biological Threats to Aircraft. In June 2016, the TSA issued a Training Advisory 

to the LE/FAMS workforce to ensure review of a DEA produced training video regarding the safety issues related to Fentanyl exposure. The TSA continues to work 

with the DEA and other agencies to update training materials commensurate with 

the current threat. 

Question 2. What steps are being taken to combat potential rush attacks when 

flight deck doors are unlocked? Do you believe that current safety protocols related 

to rush attacks are effective? 

Answer. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has the primary regulatory 

authority over flight deck doors. Under the Aviation and Transportation Security 

Act, TSA works with the FAA on actions or activities that may affect aviation security or air carrier operations. 49 U.S.C. 114 (f) (13). 

The FAA issued a final rule on August 15, 2007 (Flightdeck Door Monitoring and 

Crew Discreet Alerting Systems), requiring a means for flight crews to visually monitor the door area outside the flightdeck and requiring that flight attendants have 

a means to discretely notify the flight crew of suspicious activity or security 

breaches in the cabin. See 72 FR 45629; 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) part 

121. The current safety protocol in 14 CFR Section 121.584(a)(1) states that prior 

to the flight deck door opening the flight crew must ensure ‘‘the area outside the 

flight deck door is secure.’’ 

Question 3. Do you believe that physical secondary barriers should be installed 

on all aircraft to prevent successful rush attacks? 

Answer. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has the primary regulatory 

authority over flight deck doors, and in 2015, published an Advisory Circular addressing the issue of secondary cockpit barriers on all commercial aircraft by developing guidance on onboard procedures to safeguard the flight deck when the flight 

deck door is unsecured during flight. The Advisory Circular listed three acceptable 

methods of secondary flight deck security: (1) installation of physical secondary barriers; (2) use of improvised non-installed secondary barriers; and (3) human secondary barriers (flightcrew members). At the present time, FAA subject matter experts have informed TSA that FAA does not require commercial aircraft to install 

secondary barriers, but they report that all aircraft carriers are in voluntary compliance with the Advisory Circular. Additionally, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 

requires TSA, in consultation with the FAA to complete a threat assessment to identify any safety or security risks associated with unauthorized access to the flight 

decks on commercial aircraft and any appropriate measures that should be taken 

based on the risks. 

In order to assess the landscape of existing information on the issue of secondary 

barriers on commercial aircraft, on July 15, 2018, TSA tasked the Aviation Security 

Advisory Committee (ASAC) with conducting an assessment of secondary barriers. 

TSA has asked that the ASAC: 

• Consult with the FAA with respect to activities or actions taken concerning air 

carrier operations that may affect the ASAC’s assessment; 

• Review documents and literature on secondary barriers such as circulars, white 

papers, and reports; 

• Evaluate the types of secondary barriers that are currently installed and in use 

onboard commercial passenger aircraft and/or are available to install onboard 

aircraft; 

• Evaluate the security risk of not having a secondary barrier and provide a cost 

benefit analysis should such barriers be required; and 

• Include the number of passenger airlines currently using a secondary barrier 

or are considering the use of secondary barrier onboard their aircraft. 

52 

TSA anticipates receiving the report shortly, and will carefully review the ASAC’s 

findings to determine appropriate next steps, if any. 

Question 4. I remain concerned by the lesser Federal civil service rights and protections afforded to Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) compared to the rest of 

the TSA workforce. This unequal treatment of TSOs is the result of TSA deviating 

from the statutory framework-set out in Title 5 U.S. Code-governing Federal civil 

service, including labor-management relations. 

The following is a list of labor rights and standards that apply to the Federal 

workforce: 

Neutral Merit Systems Protection Board review of personnel decisions, including adverse actions. 

A negotiated grievance/arbitration procedure with Federal Labor Relations Authority and U.S. Court oversight. 

Statutory civil rights (protections under the Rehabilitation Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Equal Pay Act). 

The Fair Labor Standards Act, including enforcement by the Wage and Hour 

division of the U.S. Department of Labor. 

The Back Pay Act (5th Amendment right to Due Process against wrongful taking, including back pay awarded due to an agency’s unjustified personnel action). 

For each of the following categories of TSA employees, please tell me whether the 

aforementioned labor rights and standards apply and, if they do not, please tell me 

why not and whether in your judgment, the effectiveness of the category of employees in question would be improved by applying such labor rights and standards. 

Federal Air Marshals 

Cargo Inspectors 

Criminal Investigators 

Executive Assistant 

Truck Driver 

Telecommunications Specialist 

Budget Analyst 

Accounting and Civilian Pay Technician 

Contract Specialist 

Administrative Assistant 

Screening Manager 

Transportation Security Officer 

Why does TSA extend the aforementioned labor rights to a minority of its employees and limit or deny rights to the majority that work as TSOs? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has unique requirements because of its mission to protect the Nation’s transportation systems and ensure the freedom of movement of people and commerce. TSA was established by 

Congress as an excepted service agency under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) in 2001. ATSA gives TSA the flexibility required to complete its 

security-based mission and be responsive and agile in managing a workforce while 

responding to an emerging threat or national emergency. Under ATSA, there are 

two categories of TSA employees for purposes of personnel management. For nonscreener employees, ATSA provides that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

personnel management system applies, subject to modifications by the TSA Administrator. Like FAA, TSA non-screener employees are not covered by Title 5, with the 

exception of a few specific provisions such as veterans’ preference, whistleblower 

protections, labor management relations, anti-discrimination, suitability, compensation for work injury, retirement benefits, unemployment compensation, and insurance coverage and MSPB appeal rights. For the screening workforce, the Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), ATSA vests authority and responsibility for all final 

employment actions with the TSA Administrator. 

TSA has implemented many policies and procedures for the entire workforce, both 

screening and non-screening employees, that are similar to Title 5 through TSA’s 

Management Directives and other human capital policies. For example, TSA employees, including TSOs, are covered by TSA policies on Premium Pay (overtime, 

night pay differential, split shift differential, etc.) and Back Pay. In addition, 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Rehabilitation Act have been applied to the TSA workforce 

53 

1The data available for the MSPB does not separate adverse actions from other types of appeals (e.g., reduction in force, performance, retirement) when reporting percentage of cases overturned, mitigated, and upheld. However, adverse actions make up approximately 40 percent of 

the appeals cases reported. Source: Table 2, Disposition of Appeals Decided in the Regional and 

Field Offices, by Type of Case, p. 14, MSPB Annual Report for FY2017. 

since TSA’s inception. Further, TSA complies with Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission regulations and guidance. Please note that TSO applicants and TSOs 

must still meet the statutory requirements of the position, including physical and 

medical requirements, as set forth in ATSA. 

As stated above, the TSA Administrator has the authority and responsibility for 

all final employment actions for the screening workforce. TSA’s labor framework for 

the non-supervisory screening workforce is designed to be implemented in the context of how to best achieve TSA’s critical security mission and not adversely impact 

the resources and agility necessary to protect the security of the traveling public. 

The non-screening workforce (all positions listed above except TSO positions) may 

appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), as MSPB appeal rights are 

covered under the specific, limited Title 5 provisions noted above. However, the 

screening workforce (TSO positions) may appeal adverse actions to an impartial internal board, the TSA Office of Professional Responsibility Appellate Board (AB). 

The AB is independent from Security Operations, the office in which the screening 

workforce resides. On average, the AB process is quicker than the MSPB process. 

In addition, the AB overturns and mitigates a higher percentage of cases than the 

MSPB.1

There are two areas for which Congress acted to grant two exceptions permitting 

screening workforce appeals to MSPB: 1) application of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) to the screening workforce, and 

2) enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act to afford all TSA 

employees coverage for discrimination, whistleblower retaliation, and certain other 

forms of retaliation. 

Question 5. What percentage of the TSA workforce is employed in the TSO classification? 

Answer. 77.2 percent of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) workforce is employed in the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) classification. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO

TO HON. DAVID PEKOSKE

Question 1. As you know, McCarran International in Las Vegas is among the busiest airports in the world. So obviously safety is a huge priority for them, and to ensure that passengers can travel in and out of our great state they convey that canine teams are a huge success in assisting them with screenings. However, they 

have expressed some concerns about delays in getting their canine teams because 

of the training is not completed on time. This is a very important program for 

McCarran, so we need to ensure that it continues to operate is a way that is useful 

and efficient. Given the challenges the TSA has in training canines, have you been 

able to identify any improvements to the overall status and future of the program? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has significantly increased the capacity for training canine teams at our Canine Training Center in San 

Antonio, Texas. Since 2015, the Canine Training Center has increased production 

by 57 percent (from 200 to 350) to meet operational requirements and is continuing 

to increase capacity for future growth. In the past months, four additional Las 

Vegas Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) handler teams have graduated from training and are now operationally deployed. This brings LAS’s total number of PSC 

teams available for duty to 11. In FY19, LAS is scheduled to receive two additional 

teams to their authorized allocation, bringing the total number of PSC teams working at LAS to 13. 

Question 2. Both of the major airports in Nevada, McCarran and Reno-Tahoe, 

have emphasized the importance of the TSA staffing exit lanes as well as ensuring 

that there is proper reimbursement for our the service of our law enforcement officers. You may remember I asked about you about this issue during your nomination 

hearing before the committee, when proposed budget cuts would have cut this staffing, and you replied that you weren’t involved in the decision but would review 

them. Now fully entrenched in your position, do you think it would be a wise decision to cut the ability of the TSA to staff these lanes? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently staffs exit 

lanes by utilizing its existing checkpoint resources as mandated by the Bipartisan 

54 

Budget Act of 2013. TSA will continue to staff exit lanes as required by law, to include Las Vegas, McCarran, and Reno-Tahoe. 

Staffing exit lanes does not require the specialized skills of TSA’s Transportation 

Security Officers. We believe moving those TSOs from exit lanes to screening positions is better for both safety and efficiency. TSA also plans to work with airports 

on implementing exit lane technology solutions, such as double doors with monitoring systems, which are also more effective and efficient than monitoring by staff. 

Question 3. In your testimony you note that ‘‘every year as part of the Federal 

budget process, TSA is charged with considering ways to create operational efficiencies.’’ It’s vital that the Federal Government operate efficiently and we work to 

reduce the deficit, but often times in this administration this language has meant 

proposing to gut agencies without any thought as to how they will continue to perform their important missions, like keeping our skies safe. For example, in the 

President’s FY 2017 budget proposal he eliminated the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program, which pays our law enforcement professionals for keeping 

our airports secure. Can you please describe how you’ve been advocating internally 

for the resources you need to maintain effectively addressing the agency’s mission? 

Answer. TSA is committed to being a responsible steward of taxpayer dollars as 

we pursue our mission to protect the Nation’s transportation systems. As part of the 

annual budget process, program reviews are performed as well as a select number 

of internal studies. Each are designed to provide TSA leadership with information 

to identify areas in need of funding or potential savings. TSA crafts its budget and 

advocates for resources in accordance with the Administration’s priorities and program requirements to best fulfill its mission through negotiations with DHS and 

OMB. 

Question 4. In Nevada we have a great group called Gender Justice Nevada which 

has talked with me about some of the security screening issues they’re having at 

airports. In June of this year, Representatives Jayapal and Kennedy wrote a letter 

to you about this, which they cite a survey in which 43 percent of transgender individuals reported having had negative experiences passing through TSA. This includes false alarms, intimate pat-downs, and intrusive personal questions. My understanding is that TSA has looked at both potential software and hardware improvements to its advanced imaging technology to make traveling more comfortable 

for these individuals. Can you describe what is being done in the screening process 

to make it more inclusive, both from a technical and training perspective? Is there 

a timeline for when travelers will be able to notice some of these changes? 

Answer. From a technical perspective, you are correct that we would like to update Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) software to improve the screening experience for transgender individuals. The Transportation Security Administration’s 

(TSA) Acquisition Program Management office is analyzing the AIT market, encouraging development of gender-neutral algorithms that also improve threat detection 

and decrease false alarms. 

TSA is committed to ensuring all travelers are treated with respect and courtesy 

and that screening is conducted without regard to a person’s race, color, sex, gender 

identity, national origin, religion or disability. TSA recognizes the concerns that 

some members of the transgender community may have with certain security 

screening procedures at the Nation’s security checkpoints. 

To ensure all our employees understand how to screen transgender passengers, 

TSA has added a module in its Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Basic Training 

Program focused on transgender awareness. This course places a heavy emphasis 

on respecting privacy when interacting with a traveler who self-identifies as 

transgender. 

In addition, TSA offers a series of webinars, which are available on-demand 

through our Online Learning Center. These webinars focus on transgender etiquette 

and sensitivity in security screening, and feature guest speakers from TSA’s Multicultural Coalition, such as Gender Justice Nevada, the National Center for 

Transgender Equality, Kristin Beck, Lady Valor, Equality Florida, and former Federal Air Marshal Veronica Pickell. Also, when feasible, our Civil Rights & Liberties 

Ombudsman and Traveler Engagement (CRL/OTE) office delivers in-person civil 

rights and liberties training to officers at airports across the country, which includes 

a discussion of communicating with, and screening, transgender passengers. During 

2018, CRL/OTE conducted onsite training at Denver International Airport, Newark 

International Airport, Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Phoenix Sky 

Harbor International Airport, Tucson International Airport, San Francisco International Airport, and Philadelphia International Airport. 

55 

1 Category X is an airport where screening is performed and the number of annual 

enplanements is 5 million or more and international enplanements of 1 million or more. 

Question 5. What is the best way for this population to report some of these concerns when they are the victim of some of this, frankly, rude and discriminatory behavior? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has multiple avenues 

for individuals to report concerns about their screening experience. The TSA Contact 

Center (TCC) is the main portal for individuals to communicate concerns with the 

Agency. The TCC can be reached by phone at (866) 289–9673 (Federal Relay 711). 

Information is available in multiple languages and agents are available from 8 a.m. 

to 11 p.m. ET on weekdays, and 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. on weekends and holidays. The 

TCC can also be e-mailed at TSA-ContactCenter@tsa.dhs.gov. In addition, we encourage individuals to ask to speak with the Supervisory Transportation Security 

Officer at the screening checkpoint to discuss their concerns. 

Question 6. When you were nominated for this position, you highlighted workforce 

engagement as a specific challenge and priority of yours. I appreciate that you specifically highlighted some of these issues in your testimony, but how is this process 

going? What specific metrics are you using to measure any improvement? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is showing a promising upward trend in morale over the past two years. This data is based on the 

Employee Engagement Index (EEI) of the Office of Personnel Management’s Federal 

Employee Viewpoint Survey. TSA experienced a seven-point increase in this index 

in the two year period. We are making improvements in all the indices comprising 

the EEI—including satisfaction levels regarding topics, such as Leader’s Lead, Supervisors, and Intrinsic Work Experience. 

Airports are a particular sub-element within TSA driving the overall improvement 

in EEI. Our 2018 results indicate that 70 airports improved their EEI by at least 

10 points while 58 airports had an EEI of 65 percent or higher. Additionally, LE/ 

FAMS improved their EEI by 6 points this year. 

To help further the progress we have made on the EEI, we recently conducted 

a study to analyze the drivers of airports and offices with the highest employee engagement survey scores. We are using the lessons learned from this study to replicate them enterprise-wide and help worksites with lower morale improve in key 

areas that drive employee satisfaction and morale, such as creating a supportive environment, empowering employees, and open communication. 

In addition, I have spent a lot of time on the road visiting our frontline workforce, 

traveling to almost all of our Category X 1 airports within my first year. We’ve also 

created a new Uniformed Advisors position in our Front Office to allow our Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) to engage with senior leadership. 

Question 7. There are various improvements that are needed to improve the morale and retention of these workers we pay to train and need to be our first level 

of defense. What was the attrition rate prior to your arrival? What is it now? 

Answer. 

Attrition Rates for Transportation Security Officers Prior to Administrator Pekoske’s Arrival 

(Year to date attrition as of Pay Period 15 of 2017: July 23–August 5, 2017) 

Full Time Attrition Rate 12.42% 

Part Time Attrition Rate 29.53% 

Total Attrition Rate 15.92% 

Attrition Rates for Transportation Security Officers as of 

(Year to date attrition as of Pay Period 17 of 2018: August 19–September 1, 2018) 

Full Time Attrition Rate 13.92% 

Part Time Attrition Rate 28.60% 

Total Attrition Rate 16.74% 

We are continually analyzing our attrition rates, why individuals separate, and 

ways to increase satisfaction in the Agency in order to retain our employees and 

56 

continue to meet our critical mission. We are also further developing initiatives, including improved employee recognition and career development opportunities as 

well as exploring incentives to improve satisfaction in the workforce. 

In August 2018, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) implemented 

Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Career Progression, which allows TSOs, depending on operational need, to remain at their home airport for approximately 2 

to 6 months before attending Transportation Security Officer—Basic Training Program (TSO–BTP) at the TSA Academy to potentially address attrition among new 

TSOs. The program is designed to show new hires the specific steps and timelines 

for advancing their career at TSA. 

On an encouraging note, TSA saw a reduction in the attrition rate during the first 

180 days of being hired for those attending TSO Basic Training at the Academy in 

2016 versus those who received their initial training at field airports through the 

New Hire Training Program. 

Question 8. In your nomination hearing last June, we discussed the TSA workforce, and my hope you’d be an advocate on behalf of the staff. You noted that that 

was a ‘‘key aspect of my job’’ and that you planned ‘‘to invest an awful lot of time 

in developing relationships within TSA, understanding what they deal with day in 

and day out. . .and how TSA can best support them.’’ So how has that process been 

going, and what have they expressed to you? 

Answer. Since becoming Administrator I have made it a goal to get out and interact with the workforce as much as possible. By the end of my first year as Administrator, I was able to visit all Category X airports in the United States with the exception of one, and that visit is scheduled for early 2019. I have managed to visit 

numerous other airports and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) facilities 

in that time as well. Those travels have helped me better understand the operational aspects of TSA and they have afforded me the opportunity to engage with 

our employees across the country. I make it a point to have engagements with the 

workforce at every location visited, which includes the opportunity for the employees 

to share feedback directly with me. This practice will continue as long as I am privileged to hold this position. I have also held Town Halls at our Headquarters location–simultaneously broadcast to the field–and encourage all employees to submit 

questions in person or electronically. It is also a priority to be as responsive as possible to those employees who e-mail me personally. I have found that our employees 

are not shy in letting me know about their thoughts and concerns, and I listen, no 

matter what way they choose to communicate with me. 

In the coming months we will utilize our crowdsourcing functionality known as 

Idea Factory to pulse the entire TSA community on various topics. The Idea Factory 

is a way of hearing what is most important to the workforce. It is a mechanism for 

our workforce to be heard, to submit ideas, based upon their frontline experiences, 

that they feel will improve and strengthen TSA. 

In August, we brought on two Supervisory Transportation Security Officers 

(STSOs) from the field, one from Anchorage, AK, and one from New York City, to 

act as Uniformed Advisors to the Administrator. Additionally, I plan to bring on a 

Federal Air Marshal Advisor in the coming months. The Uniformed Advisor role is 

a one-year detail position, and we intend to continue this role, rotating in new Uniformed Advisors each year so we get a diverse field of candidates with varied background and experience. We have tasked the current Uniformed Advisors to come up 

with a process for a feedback loop for the front office that we believe will pay extensive dividends in making policy and procedures that are heavily informed by the 

field. The intent will be communications out to the field on items that would be of 

interest to our front line employees, but also an opportunity for our workforce to 

reach into the front office of TSA. I believe by building on the relationships between 

Headquarters and field employees, and increasing two-way communication, this will 

lead to higher job satisfaction and lower attrition rates. 

Further, being exposed to frontline employee’s thoughts and concerns is the only 

way to ensure that we make informed policy decisions for the workforce and for the 

traveling public, and this is a top priority for my time here. These efforts, among 

others, will advance TSA’s strategic priority to commit to our people. 

Question 9. During July TSA rolled out the TSO Career Progression Program, in 

part to address career advancement, training, and hopefully morale among the 

Transportation Security Officer workforce. Career advancement, access to training 

and a boost in morale are very welcome, especially by the TSO workforce. Under 

the career progression program, new hires receive a pay raise after the completion 

of initial training. This is not available to incumbent TSOs. In addition, incumbent 

TSOs were not included in a 5 percent 2014 pay raise for new TSOs. In a sense, 

TSOs with experience on the job and commitment to aviation security have missed 

57 

out on two 5 percent pay increases. Are TSOs who complete trainings under the career progression program ensured a promotion or raise? How will the TSO workforce 

be eligible for promotions under your framework? 

Answer. In 2014, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) increased the 

entry-level pay for newly hired D Band Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) by 

five percent, and also increased the minimum rate for TSOs who are promoted to 

the E Band. At that time, we provided an increase to all current D Band and E 

Band TSOs in order to keep their pay comparable to TSOs who would be hired after 

implementation of those new minimum salary rates. 

The TSO Career Progression program, which went into effect on August 5, 2018, 

is a strategic and comprehensive approach which establishes a clearly defined and 

transparent career path with pay increases tied to enhanced skills and training for 

the TSA frontline workforce. TSOs hired after the implementation of the Career 

Progression program and incumbent TSOs hired before the program’s implementation will be paid the same amount once they reach the E Band, which is five percent 

over the minimum rate of our E Band. The difference is that pay adjustments and 

the promotion to E Band for these two groups of employees are staged at different 

points in their career. While TSOs hired after August 5, 2018 will receive a five percent pay adjustment after successfully completing required training and being employed for six months, TSOs hired before August 5, 2018 will be eligible for promotion to the E band one year after being on board, which is likely sooner than 

their Career Progression counterparts depending on timing of Career Progression 

training completion. Additionally, TSA implemented an On-the-Job Training (OJT) 

Coach program for which certified OJT Coaches, selected from among high-performing E Band TSOs (regardless of hire date), are eligible to receive an incentive 

of $300 per quarter. 

The Career Progression program will be further developed to address progression 

beyond the TSO position and into the Lead TSO, Supervisory TSO, and Transportation Security Manager positions. We also exploring a similar Career Progression 

pay adjustment opportunity for E Band TSOs who acquire specific skills or complete 

training courses. In order to maintain pay comparability with TSOs hired prior to 

the implementation of Career Progression, we will provide this same opportunity to 

all E Band TSOs. 

Question 10. You also stated in your testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee that the issue of TSO pay is not one of your authority, but ‘‘the ability with respect to funding to pay workers.’’ Did the FY 2019 TSA budget request 

include a request for additional funding to cover a TSO pay raise, and if not, why? 

Answer. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

budget includes annualization for the FY18 pay raise, but does not include a request 

for additional funding to cover a pay raise for any TSA employee, including Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). 

Question 11. Mr. Administrator—in questions for the record after your last appearance, you described challenges in attracting and retaining the workforce within 

TSA. One area you focused on was the compensation available to your employees. 

Can you explain where you are as far as a competitive wage and what you’re doing 

to work within your position to advocate for improvements or increases to the compensation package you need to maintain the best of your labor force? 

Answer. We have initiated and are evaluating various options to address compensation issues, particularly for the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce. 

In August 2018, we rolled out the TSO Career Progression initiative, a strategic 

and comprehensive approach that established a clearly defined and transparent career path for the TSO workforce with pay increases and promotions tied to enhanced 

skills and training. Additionally, we implemented an On-the-Job Training (OJT) 

Coach program for which certified OJT Coaches, selected from among high-performing E Band TSOs, are eligible to receive an incentive of $300 per quarter. Peerto-peer coaching is a fundamental component of mission success and this new model 

recognizes and rewards TSOs who seek additional training and acquire additional 

security and leadership skills. 

We have also identified approximately 70 geographic areas for the use of targeted 

retention incentives for TSOs. Some of these are carry-overs from incentives that 

were in effect during the previous Fiscal Year, while others are additions. The incentive rates for Fiscal Year 2019 became effective on October 1, 2018. We will 

evaluate the labor market conditions throughout the year and may add localities to 

the list of retention incentive locations, or may adjust the amount of the incentives, 

as needed. 

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We are also taking an in-depth look at vacancy and attrition rates for both our 

screener and non-screener workforce to determine whether pay rate adjustments 

may be necessary, and what is possible within current budget constraints. We plan 

to make a determination on a way forward during FY19. 

Question 12. Because you highlighted the competition you have with staff leaving 

for other posts within the Federal Government, so we need to analyze what can be 

done to increase their professional satisfaction, in those cases, for individuals we’ve 

paid to train and develop. You noted some of this in your testimony, but do you feel 

that’s sufficient to adequately staff this priority agency? 

Answer. We are continually analyzing our attrition rates, why individuals separate, and ways to increase satisfaction in the Agency in order to retain our employees and continue to meet our critical mission. We are also continually developing 

initiatives, including improved employee recognition and career development opportunities such as our recent launch of Career Progression for our Transportation Security Officers, as well as exploring incentives to improve satisfaction in the workforce. In addition, I’ve recently asked our senior leaders to review their local Federal 

Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) results and create action plans that lead to tangible improvements in employee satisfaction across TSA. 

Question 13. You raise the Employee Viewpoint Survey Employee Engagement 

Index in your testimony. Specifically you note an increase in the TSA by seven 

points. Where does that leave in you the overall ranking with in the Federal Government? And as you note the increase, looking at the 2018 results, as well as previous years, what do you read from these results as the top three challenges to your 

agency’s workforce satisfaction viewpoint, because as you know, the TSA has also 

ranks very poorly in the nonpartisan rankings for the ‘‘Best Places to Work in the 

Federal Government?’’ 

Answer. Although the 2018 government-wide report has not been released yet by 

the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), we do know that our scores are below 

the government average. However, it is interesting to note that within TSA, headquarters employee scores match the government average at 68 percent positive responses on the Employee Engagement Index, a key metric on the OPM Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS). Airports and Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshals scores are still below the government average, but they have made notable 

progress this year. 

The Best Places to Work in the Federal Government rankings for 2018 have not 

been released yet, but our preliminary FEVS scores from OPM improved on the 

three items the Partnership for Public Service uses to calculate their annual 

rankings: 

2016 2017 2018 

I recommend my organization as a good place to work. 37% 43% 47% 

Considering everything, how satisfied are you with your job? 46% 53% 54% 

Considering everything, how satisfied are you with your organization? 32% 40% 43% 

According to our survey scores for 2018, our most challenging areas are consistent 

with those of previous years: 

• Leaders Lead: Employee perceptions of the integrity of leadership, as well as 

leadership behaviors such as communication and workforce motivation; 

• Collaborative Management: Management styles that promote and support collaborative communication and teamwork in completing projects and accomplishing goals/objectives; and 

• Performance Recognition and Reward: Providing incentives to, and recognition 

of, employees for their performance, and acknowledging employee contributions 

to the agency’s mission. 

Leaders Lead, at 44 percent positive, has shown notable improvement in the past 

two years, improving by four points since 2017 and by 10 points since 2016. We continue to focus on these areas and monitor our progress. 

Question 14. You’ve noted that in an attempt to ‘‘facilitate leadership development 

at all levels of the workforce’’ you have created two Advisor positions on your direct 

staff. I couldn’t agree more with you about the need to get create input from staff 

at all levels and the need to create an atmosphere for mentorship and leadership 

development. Now, are these standing positions within your office, or will you be 

rotating those individuals to sit in these positions to help generate an on-going deVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:57 Dec 04, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57581.TXT JACKIE
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velopment process and generating an ever changing dialogue with more of your subordinates? 

Answer. Establishing a position for a Uniformed Advisor to the Administrator was 

one of my initial goals as the TSA Administrator. This past summer, we posted an 

announcement to the field, looking for a Supervisory Transportation Security Officer 

(STSO) to serve as a Uniformed Advisor to my office. In fact, in recognition of the 

positive effects this role could have within TSA, we also sought a Uniformed Advisor 

for our Security Operations office, as well. In August, we brought on two STSOs 

from the field, one from Anchorage, and one from New York City, to fill these two 

details. 

The Uniformed Advisor role is a one-year detail position, rotating in new Uniformed Advisors each year, so we get a diverse field of Advisors with varied backgrounds and experience. These Advisors have jumped right in and began participating and advising on policy from Day One of their details. 

The current Uniformed Advisors are creating a feedback loop process that we believe will pay extensive dividends in making policy and procedures that are heavily 

informed by the field. The intent of the process is ensuring that we get communications widely disseminated to the field on items of interest to our front-line employees, but also ensuring there is an opportunity for our front-line employees to communicate back to the TSA Front Office. 

Additionally, I plan to add a Federal Air Marshal Advisor to my office in the coming months. The Federal Air Marshal Advisor selection and detail term will mirror 

the process used for the Uniformed Advisor positions. 

We are very excited about these roles and the opportunities they offer for making 

more informed decisions for all employees, as well as the traveling public. 

Question 15. What else are you doing to create a sense of potential upward mobility in your workforce, and giving them a platform to provide you more direct input 

from all levels within the agency? 

Answer. In addition to Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Career Progression, 

the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)’s Human Capital office is developing an agency-wide career mapping system that will enable employees to map a 

progressive career ladder of job opportunities within TSA, as well as view skills, 

abilities, competencies, recommended training, and developmental activities necessary to advance from one position to another. The first iteration of the system, 

which is anticipated to be available in 2019, will include maps for TSOs, Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshals (LE/FAMs), and certain support positions (e.g., 

Human Resources Specialist, Financial Specialist, Program Specialist). 

The Administrator also holds periodic employee town halls at headquarters—in 

addition to the employee engagements he conducts during his field site visits. During his headquarters events, he dedicates more than half of the time to Q&A, which 

includes a polling feature that any employee can access, whether they physically attend the town hall or not. The poll allows employees to not only answer questions 

the Administrator’s staff publishes, but it also allows people to ask their own questions of the Administrator. Many dozens of questions were submitted during the latest town hall (September 25). As many questions were answered as time allowed. 

As in the past, all questions will be grouped and answered; and the answers will 

be published on a dedicated SharePoint page for all employees to access. 

Question 16. During our conversation at your last appearance in this committee 

on surface transportation security, you noted that you believed TSA needed ‘‘to look 

at our risk quotient overall within the transportation system and then allocate the 

resources where we the see the greatest risk.’’ That was in January. Have you made 

progress on this priority that you flagged, and where do we stand on it? And how 

are you incorporating this analysis into your budget formations? 

Answer. As part of our upcoming budget planning process, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) analyzed each proposed initiative and evaluated them 

within a risk-metric system. The analysis showed TSA has an appropriate alignment with the level of risk identified by the Agency; meaning, we are successfully 

investing more funding (75 percent) to those areas we have determined to be of the 

most significant risk; less funding (10 percent) in those areas we have assessed to 

be of lower risk; and some funding (15 percent) in those areas we are willing to accept additional risk in order to be successful. 

Question 17. In your testimony you noted that ‘‘TSA is also working with CBP 

to identify ways that we can better leverage and align the two DHS Trusted Traveler programs, Global Entry and TSA PreCheck.’’ Please describe what that coordination looks like for the Nevadans I know who travel, as well as the millions we 

bring into our state every year. 

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Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) are working towards finding efficiencies between the 

various Trusted Traveler Programs, including TSA Pre✓® and CBP Global Entry. 

TSA Pre✓® and CBP Global Entry leadership are focusing on ways to increase 

security effectiveness, leverage resources to create cost savings, and enhance the 

traveler experience. Currently, TSA and CBP are examining integration of publicfacing messaging and enrollment activities, such as a joint landing page for all 

trusted traveler programs. We anticipate a six month’s level of effort for completion 

of the Landing Page once the task has been prioritized by both Components. We 

are still assessing the other efforts. 

Question 18. As we’ve discussed multiple times, I’m a big proponent of innovation 

when it can be done safely and effectively. Now, you noted in your testimony that 

TSA is conducting ‘‘tests of facial recognition technology at JFK Airport.’’ Can you 

walk me through how that testing has been going, whether you’ve seen any specific 

concerns related to the implementation of this technology related to traveler’s race? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) have launched a series of operational technology pilots to 

evaluate the use of facial recognition technology that CBP developed called the 

Traveler Verification Service (TVS). 

Phase I, which was voluntary for passengers, was completed in November 2017 

at John F. Kennedy International Airport. It explored the feasibility of using TVS 

at the TSA checkpoint; no TSA Standard Operating Procedure was altered. The 

technology was used in parallel to the standard TSA identification verification process in order to see whether CBP’s facial matching system could be scaled up to handle the volume of passengers through a TSA checkpoint. The scalability and responsiveness of CBP’s system when stressed with TSA passenger volume justified TSA– 

CBP moving to the next phase of the pilot program. 

Phase II, initiated in August 2018 at Tom Bradley International Terminal at Los 

Angeles International Airport, which is also voluntary, uses TVS to verify the identity of passengers when there is a positive match, in lieu of the manual processes 

currently performed by the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) at the Travel Document Checker (TDC) stations. Phase III, which is still under development, may 

allow data sharing between CBP and TSA systems to test potential automation of 

certain TDC manual functions to reduce the need for travelers to present a boarding 

pass and/or physical identification to TDC. These pilots aim to test whether this 

technology is a viable way to improve TSA operations, achieve efficiencies, and 

streamline the passenger experience by bringing biometric capabilities to the TSA 

checkpoint. 

TSA currently does not own a facial matching system. We are evaluating CBP’s 

facial matching system—TVS—for potential use at TSA checkpoints. According to 

CBP, its presently available data does not currently demonstrate any significant difference in match rate through TVS between age, gender, or citizenship. CBP and 

other DHS partners are working to ensure the accuracy of any biometric services 

provided to TSA. 

CBP should be consulted for additional information regarding the capabilities of 

its biometric systems. 

During the hearing, several of your colleagues raised concerns about this issue 

and cited studies that had been done on the topic of biometrics and race. In an effort 

to fully understand the concerns I have asked my team to research the mentioned 

studies to make sure we are mindful of their findings as we move forward in our 

pilots with CBP. 

CBP is seeking to enter into an interagency agreement with NIST to provide 

verification and validation for CBP’s face recognition system. NIST will examine the 

technology, methodology, and data from the biometrics pilot programs that have 

been based on the Traveler Verification Service (TVS) that CBP has built. In parallel, CBP and TSA have regular joint-technical team meetings to discuss the solution architecture and governance related to the further expansion and integration 

of biometrics technology between CBP and TSA, including analysis of matching data 

in testing and operational environments. 

As we have specifically stated in the recently published TSA Biometrics Roadmap, 

we will be deliberate, intentional, and transparent as it tests and deploys biometrics-based identification verification capability. TSA will adopt a ‘‘privacy by design’’ mindset that incorporates privacy considerations into each phase of biometric 

solution development (design, build, implement). 

To address the Privacy considerations embedded in TSA pilots with CBP, DHS/ 

CBP have issued Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA), available at www.dhs.gov/privacy; TSA contributed in the PIA for CBP–TSA Technical Demonstration Phase II, 

issued in August 2018. Additionally, CBP has issued program information, such as 

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Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on www.CBP.gov; there are Public signage is 

available at pilot sites; and U.S. Citizens can request not to participate in biometric 

pilots and seek an alternative means of verifying their identity and documents. 

Question 19. If you can, what are the current tangible logistical benefits of the 

use of this technology, and what are the ongoing challenges? 

Answer. Facial recognition technology will increase security by allowing the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to verify the identity of passengers 

more reliably and will improve the travel experience by enabling more passengers 

to get through the checkpoint more quickly. 

Aviation travel volume is increasing rapidly year after year. The summer of 2018 

was TSA’s busiest summer to date. Between the Wednesday before Memorial Day 

from until the Tuesday after Labor Day, we screened 253 million–more than a quarter of a billion—travelers and nearly 165 million pieces of checked baggage. 

A challenge to throughput is the need to ensure identity verification, a crucial security layer at this key entry point to the screening process, and deployment of TSA 

resources to address potential security threats. Today, Transportation Security Officers and airline employees manually compare the passenger in front of them to their 

photo identification to verify their identities for bag drop and checkpoint screening. 

Technological solutions for biometric verification can provide automation to improve 

the accuracy and speed of identity verification, making the passenger experience 

faster and more seamless without any negative impact on security. 

Facial recognition technology has several potential benefits for TSA’s processes: 

it can be self-service, facilitative, and incorporate anti-tampering countermeasures. 

These features can reduce reliance on physical travel documents. 

We recognize the potential benefits of these new technologies and are monitoring 

their development with the goal of using biometrics to reduce the need for passengers to physically present identification documents to verify their identity. 

Question 20. Have you begun to make any kind of determinations on the cost benefit of implementing more of this technology? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working with the 

Office of Biometric Identity Management, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the 

Science and Technology Directorate, and appropriate industry stakeholders to conduct an independent business case analysis for different population segments that 

TSA services. This analysis is expected to begin in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 

2019. As TSA will not likely have a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ biometrics solution for all the 

various populations that it screens, a business case analysis that articulates the 

costs and benefits of deploying different available types of biometrics capabilities to 

different populations is critical to design the appropriate solution architectures and 

governance frameworks. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JON TESTER TO

HON. DAVID PEKOSKE

Question 1. How is TSA working with small and rural commercial service airports 

to identify specific challenges pertaining to airport access control measures and surveillance technologies and implement best practices? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working with small 

rural airports to overcome challenges with access control, surveillance technologies, 

and best practices in several ways. The following highlights a few initiatives specifically focused on rural airports: 

• In July 2015, TSA issued the Airport Security Design Guidelines, which offers 

several recommendations on the use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). This 

document is intended to bring to the attention of the airport planning, design, 

and engineering community the serious security concerns that must be considered for incorporation into an airport design at the earliest possible planning 

stage, in order to bring the most efficient and cost-effective security solutions 

to bear. The Guidelines are available for small airports to use when considering 

new or upgrading existing surveillance systems. 

• In October 2017, TSA shared with industry a List of Effective Measures from 

Airport Vulnerability Assessments developed after completing airport assessments of perimeter and access controls to support voluntary initiatives to mitigate vulnerabilities. Approximately 145 small and rural airports were included 

in the assessments. 

• TSA continues to provide National Safe Skies Alliance evaluations and reports 

on varying topics regarding access control and surveillance testing for airports 

to provide insights into technologies being tested without the individual investVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:57 Dec 04, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57581.TXT JACKIE
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ment from a small airport. National Safe Skies Alliance, Inc. (Safe Skies) is a 

non-profit organization that works with airports, government, and industry to 

maintain a safe and effective aviation security system. Safe Skies’ core services 

focus on helping airport operators make informed decisions about their perimeter and access control security. Safe Skies evaluations and reports are available for small and rural airports to use when considering new or upgrading existing access control and surveillance systems. National Safe Skies Alliance 

posted guidelines regarding airport security design in April, 2017 on their public website. 

In addition, TSA looks at the environmental and demographic needs of small airports when considering demonstration activity through work within its Innovation 

Task Force (ITF). Through ITF’s work, TSA is better positioned to refine a longterm investment strategy, inform future requirements and refine potential solutions 

with a ‘‘system of systems’’ approach. ITF approaches technology demonstrations 

with the understanding that no two airport environments are alike, and has the 

ability to complete demonstrations at specialty sites such as small airports. The TSA 

Innovation Task Force supports TSA’s mission to foster innovation by working with 

key stakeholders to identify and demonstrate emerging solutions that increase security effectiveness and efficiency, improve passenger experience and the flow of commerce, and deliver solutions that secure the freedom of movement throughout the 

Nation’s transportation systems. 

In addition to these initiatives, TSA initiated several changes to its security program requirements and recommendations related to access media, watch list vetting, and security of identification documents. Rural and small airports are being 

directly consulted on the impact of these requirements. TSA can provide a secure 

briefing on these issues upon request. 

Question 2. The Horizon Air incident displayed in full view an issue that is normally out-of-sight to the general public—threats to aviation security by insider employees. Presently, TSA conducts background checks and airports rely upon TSA’s 

findings from those background checks when determining whether or not to issue 

a Security Identification Area (SIDA) badge. Does TSA know when an airport revokes a SIDA badge? If yes, what is the process for TSA being notified? If no, how 

does TSA prevent the situation where an employee whose SIDA badge has been revoked at one airport, lands a job at a different airport and is issued a new SIDA 

badge? 

Answer. Yes, airports are required to notify the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) when they revoke a Security Identification Area (SIDA) badge for 

cause, electronically through TSA’s Vetting System. TSA is in the process of establishing a national database of revoked badges that should be operational in Fiscal 

Year 2019. This aligns with Congress’ intent, as reflected in Section 1934 of 

H.R. 302, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. 

Question 3. Regarding revoked SIDA badges, does TSA have a nationwide database of employees whose SIDA badges have been revoked? If not, is TSA planning 

to establish such a database? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the process of establishing a database of individuals whose SIDA badges have been revoked for 

cause, which may be operational in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019, depending on whether 

notice and comment is necessary. TSA intends to complete its analysis and determination regarding notice and comment requirements by the end of Q2 FY19. This 

database would be for use by airports and would align with Congress’ intent, as reflected in Section 1934 of H.R. 302, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. 

Question 3a. What issues would need to be addressed in any guidelines for managing the database’s content (e.g., duration of data retention, deletion, mistaken 

identity)? 

Answer. We must work with the airports to establish the parameters that govern 

when it is appropriate to list an individual in the database, what information should 

be included, privacy protections to prevent unauthorized disclosures, procedures to 

prevent errant listings, and appropriate redress procedures to remove listings that 

are determined to be incorrect. Some considerations involve: 

• The need to create new data inputs to distinguish revocation based on voluntary 

separation, 

• Disqualifying offenses, 

• Suitability determinations by airports unrelated to transportation security, and 

• The length of time for which an individual’s information should be retained in 

such a database and other privacy considerations. 

63 

Question 3b. Would TSA issue draft rules for public comment? 

Answer. TSA continues to analyze this issue to determine what, if any, notice and 

comment opportunity must be afforded. Whether database input is mandatory or 

voluntary, as well as the database content, will inform this analysis. TSA intends 

to complete its analysis and determination regarding notice and comment requirements by end of Q2 FY19. 

Question 4. How would TSA ensure the database’s validity while safeguarding individuals’ privacy? What role would the Department of Homeland Security play in 

the establishment of this database or in its data validation? 

Answer. As with all Transportation Security Administration (TSA) systems, we 

implement U.S. Department of Homeland Security directives and guidance on information technology standards to ensure the protection and accuracy of an individual’s information. This includes establishing parameters that govern when it is appropriate to list an individual in the database, what information should be included, 

privacy protections to prevent unauthorized disclosures, procedures to prevent errant listings, and appropriate redress procedures to remove listings that are determined to be incorrect. 

Question 5. With regard to passenger screening technologies, TSA has prioritized 

deployments of various checkpoint security systems, such as Advanced Imaging 

Technology whole-body scanners and now Computed Tomography scanners for 

carry-on bags, to the Nation’s largest airports. Are there any innovative strategies 

that TSA is exploring or implementing to address the various challenges of applying 

cost-effective passenger and baggage screening at smaller airports? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) looks at a diverse 

range of solutions across a variety of metrics and measures that apply to smaller 

airports. TSA engages and collaborates with transportation security equipment 

(TSE) stakeholders (such as, original equipment manufacturers, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate, national laboratories, academia, and industry) in part to address the overall physical footprint of TSE in 

order to accommodate smaller-sized airports. 

As part of its efforts to develop and mature TSE technology for future procurements, TSA is committed to defining cost-effective system requirements with multiple hardware configurations. These efforts seek to accommodate the types of space 

and staffing constraints, such as those common in small airport environments, within the broader context of maintaining operational efficiencies and security effectiveness. 

TSA is also exploring innovative screening capabilities (e.g., remote screening), 

which will reduce overall costs, including TSE and staffing, for checkpoint screening. 

Remote screening offers the opportunity to build and operate a centralized image 

interpretation room that allows a single security officer to oversee multiple carryon screening lanes, thus reducing the number of operators required to fully staff a 

lane. In addition to screening equipment, TSA also understands the crucial needs 

of staffing and scheduling in the small airport environment and is identifying solutions that will alleviate local staffing and scheduling burdens for a more integrated 

and comprehensive system. 

Question 6. Has TSA investigated new software products that utilize deep learning and computer vision technology to enhance current and future screening machines? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) actively engages industry, national laboratories, and academic partners to develop and test advanced 

algorithms based on deep learning for automated threat detection. To date, these 

efforts have provided us with a path forward for automated prohibited items detection in carry-on baggage for both current Advanced Technology and future Computed Tomography systems, as well as shown enhancements for explosives detection 

and false alarm reduction in both carry-on and checked baggage screening. Future 

plans include further applications of machine learning to passenger and baggage 

screening systems, as well as security system optimization. 

Question 7. Earlier this year, TSA withdrew its long-delayed rulemaking proposal 

on security for large general aviation aircraft (known as the Large Aircraft Security 

Program or LASP). What is TSA doing to work with the general aviation community 

(including general aviation airports, fixed-base operators, and aircraft owners and 

pilots) to strengthen security measures and access controls to general aviation facilities and aircraft, particularly large business and private jets? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues to work 

with the general aviation (GA) community and industry partners to strengthen security measures and awareness surrounding general aviation operations. The GA 

64 

subcommittee of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee collaborates regularly to 

offer suggestions to enhance GA security. 

TSA partnered with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association to develop the Airport Watch program. Similar to the If You See Something, Say Something® campaign, it encourages pilots, airport employees, and associated personnel to take an 

active role in securing GA facilities and aircraft. The program promotes a hotline 

(866 GA SECURE) to report security concerns in the GA environment. This hotline 

is answered by TSA personnel on a 24/7 basis. 

TSA also published Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airport Operators 

and Users which was developed jointly with the GA community. The document provides suggested security enhancements for GA airports including lighting, fencing, 

access control, closed circuit television, etc. It also covers associated areas such as 

fixed base operators and fuel storage facilities. The full document can be found at: 

https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/2017_ga_security_guidelines.pdf 

Question 8. What are some of the unique characteristics of general aviation that 

have made it so challenging to move forward with these security regulations? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is not moving forward 

with this rulemaking for three primary reasons: (1) an assessment of the relative 

risk associated with general aviation operations; (2) feedback from the industry; and 

(3) alignment with the Executive Orders related to regulatory costs and regulatory 

reform. 

First, TSA regularly assesses the risk of the aviation sector and has determined 

that the risk from GA aircraft is relatively low. Unlike commercial aviation, most 

GA aircraft are operated by recreational pilots or serve as corporate aircraft. The 

low risk is attributed to the fact that passengers and crew are typically family, 

friends, and/or business colleagues. Thus, the familiarity of the passengers would 

generally result in identifying bad actors and preventing them from boarding. The 

low risk evaluation also considers that GA operations often involve small aircraft 

with minimal fuel and passenger loads, which are less likely to do the kind of harm 

that commercial operations can cause. Finally, GA operators do not fly with the 

same frequency as commercial flights, which further reduces the opportunities for 

these operators to do harm. 

Second, in a rulemaking proceeding TSA initiated several years ago, more than 

7,000 pilots, aircraft operators, airports, aviation workers, individuals, Members of 

Congress, aviation associations, and civic organizations provided comments objecting 

to the proposed regulations. The overwhelming majority of commenters asserted 

that the rulemaking would increase costs and other burdens unnecessarily, and 

would lead small airport and aircraft operators to go out of business, causing loss 

of employment. Also, the commenters noted that they did not support TSA issuance 

of regulations absent a statutory mandate. 

Third, in January 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders (EOs) related 

to regulatory reform. EO 13771 directs all Federal agencies to eliminate two regulations for every one regulation the agency implements and ensure that any new regulatory action has a $0 net cost. 

In consideration of all of these factors, TSA decided not to pursue a rulemaking 

and issued a notice in March 2018 to withdraw the notice of proposed rulemaking. 

Should TSA determine the threat to or from general aviation has increased, the 

agency has authority to take appropriate action. This action can be taken quickly, 

as it was in 2001 when general aviation operations were prohibited at Ronald 

Reagan National Airport (DCA), or through notice and comment rulemaking. 

Question 9. What alternative approaches can strengthen general aviation security 

in the future? 

Answer. TSA continues to work with the general aviation (GA) community and 

industry partners to strengthen security measures and awareness surrounding general aviation operations. The GA subcommittee of the Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee collaborates regularly to offer suggestions to enhance GA security. 

TSA partnered with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association to develop the Airport Watch program. Similar to the If You See Something, Say Something® campaign, it encourages pilots, airport employees, and associated personnel to take an 

active role in securing GA facilities and aircraft. The program promotes a hotline 

(866 GA SECURE) to report security concerns in the GA environment. This hotline 

is answered by TSA personnel on a 24/7 basis. 

TSA also published Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airport Operators 

and Users which was developed jointly with the GA community. The document provides suggested security enhancements for GA airports including lighting, fencing, 

access control, closed circuit television, etc. It also covers associated areas such as 

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fixed base operators and fuel storage facilities. The full document can be found at: 

https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/2017_ga_security_guidelines.pdf 

Question 10. In January 2016, TSA centralized the training of its security officers 

under the TSO Basic Training program by sending staff to Glynco, Georgia for two 

weeks of training that includes standard operating procedures, threat detection, and 

the use of screening equipment. Has there been a measurable difference of performance by TSOs since the Basic Training program was instituted? What metrics is 

TSA using to measure performance? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses the industry 

standard Kirkpatrick Evaluation Model to determine the effectiveness of its training, which includes the Transportation Security Officer Basic Training Program 

(TSO–BTP) at the TSA Academy in Glynco, Georgia. We have complete data for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. A Level 1 Kirkpatrick evaluation refers to the immediate feedback from students participating in the course, and the Level 1 data has been overwhelmingly positive. In addition, Human Capital’s 2017 Employee Engagement Survey revealed that overall morale was 11 percent higher for TSO–BTP graduates 

when compared to their peers trained at local airports. Organizational commitment, 

which is a measure of an individual’s attachment to the organization, was also 12 

percent higher for TSO–BTP graduates, and overall satisfaction was 13 percent 

higher. 

A Level 2 Kirkpatrick evaluation refers to transferred knowledge, which is measured at the end of training or a segment of training. For TSO–BTP, that means a 

Job Knowledge Test and an Image Interpretation Test (IIT). To meet operational 

needs, some local new-hire training was conducted at airports during FY 2017. We 

were therefore able to look at Level 2 data, comparing the results of traditional newhire training at the airports with TSO–BTP at the TSA Academy. Initial IIT results 

show that TSO–BTP students trained at the TSA Academy achieved passing rates 

that were higher than those of TSOs trained locally. 

Question 10a. In your estimation, when will TSA have enough data to show 

whether attrition at TSA slowed as a result of this Basic Training program? 

Answer. Attrition is a complex problem and factors outside of training become 

more important the longer an employee is with the organization. Two factors outside 

of training which can affect attrition are pay and the economy. 

Noting the importance of these factors and the difficulty linking attrition to a single training event, TSA did see positive results in the population of new hires attending TSO–BTP at the TSA Academy. According to data collected in 2016, graduates from TSO–BTP showed lower attrition rates within their first 180 days of employment, when compared to new hires trained at field airports. Within this 180- 

day period, the attrition rate for new hires attending TSO–BTP at the TSA Academy in 2016 was 12.76 percent, while the attrition rate for field trainees was 15.66 

percent. This approximately three-percent difference indicates a positive trend in 

the first six months for students receiving a standardized, Academy-delivered basic 

training program. 

TSA has also implemented TSO Career Progression, which allows TSOs, depending on operational need, to remain at their home airport for approximately two to 

six months before attending TSO–BTP at the TSA Academy. The timing shift is intended to increase operational capacity at the airports, help ensure career fit prior 

to further training investment, and potentially address attrition among new TSOs. 

TSA also has implemented TSO Career Progression, which allows TSOs, depending on operational need, to remain at their home airport for approximately two-to 

six-months before attending TSO–BTP at the TSA Academy to potentially address 

attrition among new TSOs. 

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