Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 139 / Monday, July 21, 2014 / Proposed Rules 42241 

4See 79 FR 34621, June 18, 2014. 

5See 77 FR 25577, May 1, 2012. 

6The FAQs can be found at http://www.fca.gov/ 

about/businessplanning-diversity.html. 

7See FCA News Release, May 8, 2014; http://

www.fca.gov. 

I. Advisory Votes on Senior Officer 

Compensation 

Comment: Farm Credit East 

commented that § 611.410, which 

addresses non-binding advisory votes 

on senior officer compensation, should 

be repealed as it raises legal liability 

issues for System directors. Farm Credit 

East stated further that the regulations 

are unnecessary and burdensome. 

FCA Response: On June 9, 2014, the 

FCA Board approved a final rule to 

remove non-binding, advisory vote 

provisions 4 and repeal this regulation. 

J. Inconsistent Interpretations of 

Regulations and Guidance 

Comment: The Council noted a 

concern regarding Agency 

interpretations of existing regulations. 

The Council stated that in many cases 

the guidance provided by the FCA with 

respect to regulations is helpful, but in 

some cases the Agency confuses ‘‘other 

guidance’’ with adopted regulations. 

The Council stated that one area System 

institutions report inconsistent 

interpretations by examiners is the 

requirement for System institution 

Human Capital Plans under 

§ 618.8440(b)(7). Another concern noted 

by the Council relates to Federal 

Financial Institutions Examination 

Council (FFIEC) guidance. The Council 

stated that the FCA often makes 

reference to guidance from the FFIEC 

but considers it voluntary. The Council 

asserted that if the FCA references 

FFIEC guidance, it would be more 

appropriate to go through the proper 

procedures for adopting the guidance 

formally. 

FCA Response: The FCA appreciates 

this feedback on its regulatory and 

examination activities. We agree that 

inconsistent interpretations of our 

regulations or guidance can create 

confusion and can be burdensome to 

institutions. We are committed to 

working to reduce any inconsistencies 

that may exist. To address the specific 

issue with respect to the Human Capital 

Plans required by § 618.8440(b)(7),5 we 

hope that FCA’s ‘‘Frequently Asked 

Questions (FAQ) on Operating and 

Strategic Business Planning for 

Diversity and Inclusion’’ will help 

reduce inconsistencies in interpretation 

of those requirements.6 Questions 4 

through 10 of the FAQs address Human 

Capital Plans. The Office of 

Examination is working diligently to 

ensure a consistent examination 

approach to these provisions. 

The FFIEC is a formal interagency 

body empowered to prescribe uniform 

principles, standards, and report forms 

for the Federal examination of financial 

institutions. Its members include the 

Board of Governors of the Federal 

Reserve System, the Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation, the National 

Credit Union Administration, the Office 

of the Comptroller of the Currency, and 

the Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau. While the FCA is not a FFIEC 

member, it does publish interagency 

regulations with some of the FFIEC 

members, and it shares common goals 

including uniformity in the regulation 

of, and safety and soundness in, 

financial institutions. FFIEC guidance, 

unless adopted by FCA, is not 

mandatory for FCS institutions, 

although the guidance can be useful as 

an example of a best practice for FFIEC 

member institutions. FCA commits to 

better communicating what references 

are requirements for compliance, 

guidance or best practices in its 

examination and supervision, policy 

development, and legal functions. 

K. Obsolete References 

Comment: The Council pointed out 

that FCA regulations at §§ 615.5206, 

615.5208, and 630.20(g)(3)(i)(A) contain 

references to the Financial Assistance 

Corporation and those obsolete 

references should be removed. 

FCA Response: The FCA has proposed 

removing two of the obsolete references 

in its proposed rule on Regulatory 

Capital, Implementation of Tier 1/Tier 2 

Framework and will remove the 

remaining obsolete reference in the final 

rule or another rulemaking.7

III. Future Efforts To Reduce 

Regulatory Burden on System 

Institutions 

As noted above, we will consider 

some of the regulatory burden issues 

raised in separate regulatory projects. 

We will continue our efforts to remove 

regulatory burden. However, we will 

maintain those regulations that are 

necessary to implement the Act and are 

critical for the safety and soundness of 

the System. Our approach is intended to 

enable the System to continue to 

provide credit to America’s farmers, 

ranchers, aquatic producers, their 

cooperatives and other rural residents. 

Dated: July 11, 2014. 

Dale L. Aultman, 

Secretary, Farm Credit Administration Board. 

[FR Doc. 2014–16695 Filed 7–18–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6705–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Parts 417, 431, and 435 

[Docket No.: FAA–2014–0418; Notice No. 

14–05] 

RIN 2120–AK06 

Changing the Collective Risk Limits for 

Launches and Reentries and Clarifying 

the Risk Limit Used To Establish 

Hazard Areas for Ships and Aircraft 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to amend 

the collective risk limits for commercial 

launches and reentries. Under this 

proposal, the FAA would separate its 

expected-number-of-casualties (Ec) 

limits for launches and reentries. For 

commercial launches, the FAA proposes 

to aggregate the Ec posed by the 

following hazards: Impacting inert and 

explosive debris, toxic release, and far 

field blast overpressure. The FAA 

proposes to limit the aggregate Ec for 

these three hazards to 1 × 10¥4. For 

commercial reentries, the FAA proposes 

to aggregate the Ec posed by debris and 

toxic release, and set that Ec under an 

aggregate limit of 1 × 10¥4. Under the 

FAA’s proposal, the aggregate Ec limit 

for both launch and reentry would be 

expressed using only one significant 

digit. 

The FAA also proposes to clarify the 

regulatory requirements concerning 

hazard areas for ships and aircraft. The 

proposed rule would require a launch 

operator to establish a hazard area 

where the probability of impact does not 

exceed: 0.000001 (1 × 10¥6) for an 

aircraft; and 0.00001 (1 × 10¥5) for a 

water-borne-vessel. 

DATES: Send comments on or before 

October 20, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number FAA–2014–0418 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30; U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
42242 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 139 / Monday, July 21, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

1See 14 CFR 401.5 (definitions of expendable 

launch vehicle, reusable launch vehicle, and 

reentry vehicle). 

2See, e.g., Commercial Space Transportation 

Licensing Regulations, Final Rule (Launch 

Licensing Rule), 64 FR 19586, 19605 n.11 (Apr. 21, 

1999). 

3 Id. 

4 Id. 

5 Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch, 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Launch NPRM), 65 

FR 63922, 63981 (Oct. 25, 2000). 6 Id. 

7See Licensing and Safety Requirements for 

Launch, Supplemental Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (Launch SNPRM), 67 FR 49456, 49461 

(July 30, 2002). 

8 Id. at 49463. 

9 Id. at 49461. 

10 Id. 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://www.regulations.gov, including 

any personal information the 

commenter provides. Using the search 

function of the docket Web site, anyone 

can find and read the electronic form of 

all comments received into any FAA 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), 

as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov at any time. 

Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to the Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

action, contact Rene Rey, AST–300, 

Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone (202) 267–7538; email 

Rene.Rey@faa.gov. 

For legal questions concerning this 

action, contact Alex Zektser, AGC–250, 

Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–3073; email Alex.Zektser@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules on 

commercial space transportation safety 

is found in Title 49 of the United States 

Codes, section 322(a), which authorizes 

the Secretary of Transportation to carry 

out the Commercial Space Launch Act 

of 1984, as amended and re-codified at 

51 United States Code (U.S.C.) Subtitle 

V—Commercial Space Transportation, 

ch. 509, Commercial Space Launch 

Activities, 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923 (the 

Act). The Act authorizes the Secretary of 

Transportation and thus the FAA, 

through delegations, to oversee, license, 

and regulate commercial launch and 

reentry, and the operation of launch and 

reentry sites as carried out by U.S. 

citizens or within the United States. 51 

U.S.C. 50904, 50905. The Act directs the 

FAA to exercise this responsibility 

consistent with public health and safety, 

safety of property, and the national 

security and foreign policy interests of 

the United States. 51 U.S.C. 50905. 

Section 50901(a)(7) directs the FAA to 

regulate only to the extent necessary, in 

relevant part, to protect the public 

health and safety and safety of property. 

The FAA is also responsible for 

encouraging, facilitating, and promoting 

commercial space launches and 

reentries by the private sector. 51 U.S.C. 

50903. 

I. Background 

This rulemaking addresses the risks 

associated with commercial space 

launch and reentry. Launch is 

conducted using expendable launch 

vehicles (ELVs) and reusable launch 

vehicles (RLVs). Reentry is conducted 

with RLVs or other reentry vehicles. An 

ELV is a launch vehicle whose 

propulsive stages are flown only once. 

An RLV is a launch vehicle that is 

designed to return to Earth substantially 

intact and, therefore, may be launched 

more than one time or that contains 

vehicle stages that may be recovered by 

a launch operator for future use in the 

operation of a substantially similar 

launch vehicle. A reentry vehicle is a 

vehicle designed to return from Earth 

orbit or outer space substantially intact, 

and includes a reentering RLV.1

Parts 417, 431 and 435 of Title 14 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations (14 

CFR) limit the collective risk posed to 

the public by commercial launches and 

reentries by, among other things, 

limiting the expected number of 

casualties (Ec). These Ec regulations are 

based primarily on Ec limits that the 

United States (U.S.) Air Force imposed 

on launches from federal launch ranges 

at the time the FAA began establishing 

Ec limits.2 In addition to imposing Ec

limits on risk posed by launches and 

reentries to collective members of the 

public, these regulations also impose 

separate limits on the risk posed by 

these operations to individual members 

of the public. 

A. Launch Risk Limits of an ELV 

The FAA’s limitations to collective 

risk associated with commercial 

launches of ELVs are set out in part 417. 

Section 417.107(b) applies to all 

commercial ELV launches, and it allows 

a launch operator to initiate the flight of 

an ELV only if the collective risk to the 

public is within: (1) An Ec limit of 30 

× 10¥6 for impacting inert and 

impacting explosive debris; (2) an Ec

limit of 30 × 10¥6 for toxic release; and 

(3) an Ec limit of 30 × 10¥6 for far field 

blast overpressure. 

The FAA first used an Ec limit of 30 

× 10¥6 in 1999, when, as part of a 

rulemaking to regulate ELV launches 

from Federal launch ranges, the FAA 

adopted the U.S. Air Force’s public risk 

Ec limit of 30 × 10¥6 to limit the risk 

associated with debris.3 At that time, 

the FAA only applied the Ec limit to the 

hazard caused by vehicle debris.4

Subsequently, the FAA proposed to 

extend the 30 × 10¥6 Ec limit to all 

commercial ELV launches, which would 

be regulated by part 417.5 In its part 417 

NPRM, the FAA initially proposed to 

limit to 30 × 10¥6 the combined risk 

posed by debris, toxic release, and far 

field blast overpressure.6

The FAA received a number of 

comments objecting to this proposal, 

arguing that the proposed aggregate 30 

× 10¥6 Ec limit for debris, toxicity, and 

far field blast overpressure was too 

low.7 In response to these comments, 

the FAA considered regulating the 

hazards of toxicity, debris, and far field 

blast overpressure under a single Ec

limit, but ultimately set the limit at a 

higher level than the proposed 30 × 

10¥6.8 In support of this approach, the 

FAA noted that ‘‘a risk assessment that 

determines the total risk due to all 

hazards associated with a single launch 

would be an ideal approach.’’ 9

However, the FAA ultimately rejected 

this approach, reasoning that a higher Ec

limit ‘‘would have been difficult to 

justify in the absence of historical data 

on which to base it.’’ 10 The FAA also 

noted that aggregating the Ec posed by 

toxicity, debris, and far field blast 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 139 / Monday, July 21, 2014 / Proposed Rules 42243 

11 Id. at 49462. 

12 Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch, 

Final Rule, 71 FR 50508, 50516 (Aug. 25, 2006). 

13See id. at 50542; 14 CFR 417.107(b)(2). 

14 Launch Licensing Rule, 64 FR at 19635. 

15See ‘‘A History of the Use of the Risk 

Acceptability Criterion, 30 × 10¥6 Casualties per 

Launch’’, ACTA Inc., Presented to the Committee 

on Launch Range Safety (May 24,1999). 

16National Space Policy of the United States of 

America, at 10 (June 28, 2010) http://

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_

space_policy_6-28-10.pdf. 

17NASA has now concluded the COTS program, 

and has entered into a new arrangement with 

SpaceX for future missions to the International 

Space Station. 

18 51 U.S.C. 50905(b)(3); 14 CFR 404.5(b). 

19Waiver of Acceptable Mission Risk Restriction 

for Reentry and Reentry Vehicle, 75 FR 75619 (Dec. 

6, 2010). 

20 Id. 

21See id. 

overpressure would be problematic 

because: (1) Conservative methodology 

for estimating the Ec for toxicity, debris, 

and far field blast overpressure used 

assumptions unique to each hazard; and 

(2) toxicity, debris, and far field blast 

overpressure cause injury in different 

ways, and thus, it was difficult to 

normalize the injuries caused by these 

hazards in a manner that would allow 

them to be added together.11

As a result, the FAA decided to retain 

the 30 × 10¥6 Ec limit that was being 

used by the U.S. Air Force. In order to 

address the commenter’s concerns, in 

the final rule, the FAA separated the 

three hazards of toxicity, debris, and far 

field blast overpressure and placed each 

under its own Ec limit of 30 × 10¥6.12

In addition, the rule imposed a separate 

Ec limit of 1 × 10¥6 on risk to individual 

members of the public posed by each of 

these three hazards.13

B. Risk Limits of Reentry Vehicles 

The FAA’s risk limitations for 

launches and reentries of RLV’s and 

other reentry vehicles are found in parts 

431 and 435. Part 431 governs the 

launch and reentry of one type of a 

reentry vehicle: A reusable launch 

vehicle (RLV). Section 431.35(b)(1) 

prohibits the combined Ec of the launch 

and reentry of an RLV from: (1) 

Exceeding 30 × 10¥6 for vehicle or 

vehicle debris impact hazards to the 

collective members of the public; and 

(2) exceeding 1 × 10¥6 for vehicle or 

vehicle debris impact hazards to 

individual members of the public. 

Part 435 governs the launch and 

reentry of all other types of reentry 

vehicles. Section 435.35 subjects reentry 

vehicles to the RLV Ec limitations of 

§ 431.35(a) and (b) for the combined risk 

associated with launch and reentry. 

The FAA did not apply separate Ec

limits to the launch and reentry of 

reentry vehicles because separate limits 

could have resulted in a launch Ec of 30 

× 10¥6 and a reentry Ec of 30 × 10¥6, 

which, the FAA noted, would have 

resulted in a total Ec of 60 × 10¥6. 14

Accordingly, the FAA rejected 

commenters’ requests to set the launch 

and reentry of an RLV and other reentry 

vehicle under separate Ec limits. 

C. New Developments In Implementing 

Risk Limits 

Recent developments have led the 

FAA to review its collective risk limits. 

In 2010, the U.S. Air Force, after 

conducting over 5,000 launches under a 

30 × 10¥6 Ec limit, increased its 

collective-risk Ec launch limit from 30 × 

10¥6 per hazard to 100 × 10¥6 for the 

aggregate public risk associated with 

debris, toxicity, and far field blast 

overpressure combined. The U.S. Air 

Force’s new Ec standards also apply a 

separate Ec limit to reentry, limiting 

reentry risk to an Ec to 100 × 10¥6 for 

the aggregate public risk associated with 

debris, toxicity, and far field blast 

overpressure. In addition, in 2010, the 

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) also revised its 

risk acceptability policy to limit the 

aggregate risk for launch to 100 × 10¥6

for each mission. NASA’s revision also 

sets the aggregate risk for reentry under 

a separate 100 × 10¥6 Ec limit. Before 

this revision, NASA launched over 100 

ELVs under an Ec of 30 × 10¥6 for each 

hazard.15

Because the FAA’s current Ec limits 

are based on a U.S. Air Force limit that 

both the U.S. Air Force and NASA, after 

considerable experience, have now 

rejected, the FAA believes that its 

existing collective risk limits may no 

longer be appropriate. In addition, as 

discussed below, experience has led the 

FAA to conclude that its current Ec

limits create an obstacle to NASA’s 

implementation of the National Space 

Policy. 

In 2010, President Obama issued a 

National Space Policy that directed U.S. 

government departments and agencies 

to purchase and use commercial space 

capabilities and services to the 

maximum practical extent when such 

capabilities and services are available in 

the marketplace and meet United States 

Government requirements.16 Pursuant 

to this policy, NASA expanded its use 

of the Commercial Orbital 

Transportation Services (COTS) 

program, which utilized commercial 

space operations to accomplish NASA 

missions. The COTS program was 

designed to stimulate efforts by the 

private sector to demonstrate safe, 

reliable, and cost-effective space 

transportation to the International Space 

Station. 

As part of its COTS program, NASA 

entered into a Space Act Agreement 

with Space Exploration Technologies 

Corporation. (SpaceX). This agreement 

required SpaceX to launch and reenter 

a reentry vehicle with the goal of 

ultimately reaching the International 

Space Station (ISS). SpaceX conducted 

two missions under the COTS 

program.17 NASA also entered into an 

agreement with Orbital Sciences 

Corporation (Orbital) with a similar goal 

of reaching the ISS. In addition to 

launches under the above programs, 

SpaceX has also recently performed a 

mission to launch a scientific research 

satellite for NASA into orbit. 

The first ISS mission occurred in 

2010, when SpaceX launched and 

reentered the first commerciallylaunched reentry vehicle into orbit. 

SpaceX’s vehicle included systems that 

mitigated the risk associated with the 

launch and reentry of that vehicle. In 

spite of these mitigations, the Ec for 

vehicle debris from the combined 

launch and reentry of SpaceX’s vehicles 

exceeded the 30 × 10¥6 limit imposed 

by § 431.35(b)(1)(i), which applies to 

reentry vehicles through § 435.35. 

Because the Ec for vehicle debris would 

have exceeded the Ec limits, SpaceX 

applied to the FAA for a waiver. 

In order to grant a waiver, the FAA 

had to determine whether, among other 

things, the grant would jeopardize 

public health and safety or safety of 

property,18 and concluded that, in spite 

of the mission’s total Ec of 47 × 10¥6, 

SpaceX’s mission would not jeopardize 

public health and safety or safety of 

property.19 The FAA issued SpaceX a 

waiver from § 431.35(b)(1)(i).20 The 

FAA’s determination relied on the fact 

that, when viewed separately, the 

launch had an Ec under 30 × 10¥6 and 

the reentry also had an Ec under 30 × 

10¥6. The FAA treated the launch and 

reentry as separate events because 

SpaceX’s reentry vehicle would perform 

a health check after completing a 

launch, and the results of the health 

check would be used to determine 

whether to commence reentry. This 

health check was an intervening event, 

as contemplated in the original 

rulemaking,21 and allowed the FAA to 

treat launch and reentry as separate 

events. SpaceX’s mission was 

successful, and resulted in no harm to 

members of the public. 

SpaceX’s second COTS mission 

occurred in 2012, when SpaceX 

launched and reentered another reentry 

vehicle that also exceeded the FAA’s Ec


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42244 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 139 / Monday, July 21, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

22Section 417.203(d) states, in part, that the 

‘‘FAA will accept a flight safety analysis used by 

a Federal launch range without need for further 

demonstration of compliance to the FAA. . . .’’ 

23Waiver of Acceptable Risk Restriction for 

Launch and Reentry, 77 FR 24556 (Apr. 24, 2012). 

24The reentry portion of the waiver analysis for 

SpaceX’s 2012 mission summarily adopts the 

reasoning set out in the waiver for SpaceX’s 2010 

mission. 

25 Id. 

26A copy of this waiver can be found in the 

docket for this rulemaking. 

27Waiver to Space Exploration Technologies 

Corporation of Acceptable Risk Limit for Launch, 78 

FR 52998 (Aug. 27, 2013). 

28See 14 CFR part 417, Appendix A. 

limits. The U.S. Air Force,22 pursuant to 

§ 417.203(d) requirements, estimated Ec

for debris from SpaceX’s 2012 launch to 

be between 98 × 10¥6 and 121 × 10¥6

at the time that SpaceX applied to the 

FAA for launch and reentry licenses. 

Even though these Ec numbers exceeded 

the 30 × 10¥6 Ec limits of parts 417 and 

431, after the FAA examined the details 

of SpaceX’s vehicle and mission plans, 

the FAA concluded that SpaceX’s 

launch would not jeopardize public 

health and safety or safety of property.23

A major factor in the FAA’s 

determination was that the low end of 

the Ec estimate, 98 × 10¥6, which 

included significant conservatism, was 

lower than the 100 × 10¥6 Ec limit used 

by the U.S. Air Force. 

Also for the waiver, the FAA 

examined SpaceX’s reentry and 

concluded the reentry would not 

jeopardize public health and safety or 

safety of property because, if the reentry 

was viewed separately from launch, the 

Ec for reentry was under 30 × 10¥6.24

Accordingly, the FAA again issued 

SpaceX a waiver from the 30 × 10¥6 Ec 

limits.25 SpaceX’s 2012 mission was 

ultimately successful and harmed no 

member of the public. 

The third ISS mission was conducted 

by Orbital and took place in 2013. The 

launch phase of this mission had a farfield-blast-overpressure Ec that exceeded 

30 × 10¥6

. The FAA granted a waiver to 

the Ec limits for this mission relying on 

the fact that the Ec for debris, toxic 

release, and blast overpressure 

combined would not exceed the 100 × 

10¥6 Ec limit used by the U.S. Air 

Force.26 This mission was ultimately 

successful and harmed no member of 

the public. 

Finally, in 2013, SpaceX conducted a 

mission in which it launched a research 

satellite into space for NASA. The farfield-blast-overpressure Ec for the 

launch phase of this mission exceeded 

the FAA’s 30 × 10¥6 limit, but was 

within the 100 × 10¥6 limit used by the 

U.S. Air Force. Relying on the fact that 

this Ec would not exceed the limits used 

by the U.S. Air Force, the FAA found 

that this mission would not jeopardize 

public health and safety and the safety 

or property, and granted SpaceX a 

waiver from the Ec limitations.27 This 

mission was ultimately successful and 

harmed no member of the public. 

The FAA expects that future missions 

flown under contract with NASA to the 

ISS may present a collective risk that is 

similar to the risk presented by the 

SpaceX and Orbital ISS missions. This 

is because the collective risk posed by 

these missions is driven in large part by 

the flight path from the United States to 

the ISS that must be taken during 

launch. This flight path is expected to 

remain unchanged, and as such, the risk 

associated with these missions is 

unlikely to change significantly in the 

near future. The FAA also expects a 

significant number of other future 

commercial launches and reentries, 

such as SpaceX’s research satellite 

mission, to exceed the existing Ec limits. 

This is because commercial space 

transportation is a relatively new 

industry, and the probability of failure 

of a new ELV or RLV is relatively 

high.28 This high probability of failure 

often results in higher Ec estimates. 

The FAA’s existing collective risk 

limits are no longer appropriate because 

the U.S. Air Force has rejected the Ec

standard on which these limits were 

based after operating over 5,000 

launches under the 30 × 10¥6 Ec

collective-risk standard. NASA has 

likewise rejected the 30 × 10¥6 Ec

standard after operating approximately 

129 launches under that standard. Based 

on this change in position by two 

agencies with significant launch and 

reentry risk experience and based on its 

own experience of having to issue Ec

waivers, the FAA has concluded that its 

existing Ec limits regulate more than is 

necessary to protect public health and 

safety and safety of property. 

Accordingly, the agency now seeks to 

change its collective risk limitations for 

launch and reentry in a manner that 

would maintain public safety and be 

less burdensome on the regulated 

parties and the FAA. 

II. Overview of Proposed Rule 

The FAA proposes to change its 

collective risk limits for launch and 

reentry to more closely match the Ec

standard currently used for government 

missions by the U.S. Air Force and 

NASA in a manner that properly 

addresses the level of uncertainty that 

exists in Ec calculations. For all 

launches, regardless of vehicle type, the 

FAA proposes to aggregate the risk 

posed to the collective members of the 

public from the following hazards: (1) 

Impacting and inert explosive debris, (2) 

toxic release, and (3) far field blast 

overpressure. The proposed rule would 

prohibit an aggregate Ec of these three 

hazards from exceeding 1 × 10¥4. 

Because of the uncertainty in Ec

calculations, this Ec limit would be 

expressed using only one significant 

digit. 

For all reentries, for the reasons it 

provided in the SpaceX waivers, the 

FAA proposes to split up launch and 

reentry risk limits for collective 

members of the public so that launch 

and reentry no longer have to take place 

under a single Ec limit for both 

activities. Launches of RLV’s and other 

reentry vehicles would be governed by 

the proposed launch limit of 1 × 10¥4

for all three hazards. 

Reentries would be subject to a 

separate 1 × 10¥4 Ec limit that would 

account for the aggregated risk posed by 

vehicle debris and toxic release. While 

the existing reentry risk limits do not 

require an operator to account for risks 

arising out of a toxic release, the next 

generation of reentry vehicles could 

present significant toxicity dangers to 

the public. Accordingly, the FAA 

proposes to establish a risk limit for this 

reentry hazard. In addition, due to the 

uncertainty associated with the Ec

calculations, the 1 × 10¥4 reentry Ec

limit would be expressed using one 

significant figure in the same manner as 

the launch Ec limit. 

The FAA also proposes to clarify the 

regulatory requirements of part 417 

concerning hazard areas for ships and 

aircraft. Section 417.107(b) currently 

requires a launch operator to establish 

aircraft and water-borne vessel hazard 

areas ‘‘that provide an equivalent level 

of safety’’ to the hazard areas provided 

for launch from a federal launch range. 

Under proposed section 417.107(b)(4), 

a hazard area for aircraft would satisfy 

part 417 if the probability of impact 

with debris capable of causing a 

casualty on any given aircraft in the 

vicinity of that hazard area did not 

exceed 0.000001 (1 × 10¥6). Under 

proposed section 417.107(b)(3), a hazard 

area for water borne vessels would 

satisfy part 417 if the probability of 

impact with debris capable of causing a 

casualty on any given water borne 

vessel did not exceed 0.00001 (1 × 

10¥5). 

This proposed rule would achieve a 

quantified net benefit by eliminating the 

costs associated with waivers for 

commercial space launches with an 

aggregate Ec between 90 × 10¥6 and 149 

× 10¥6 and for reentries with a debris 

Ec exceeding 30 × 10¥6. The resulting 

savings for both the industry and the 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 139 / Monday, July 21, 2014 / Proposed Rules 42245 

29See 14 CFR 417.107(b)(2). 

30See 14 CFR 431.35(b)(1)(ii) and 435.35. 

31Letter to Christopher H. DeMars, Orbital 

Sciences Corporation, from Kenneth Wong, 

Manager, AST Licensing and Evaluation Division 

(Dec. 13, 2013). A copy of the FAA’s waiver denial 

letter may be found in the docket. 32Launch SNPRM, 67 FR at 49461. 

33See id. 

34 Id. 

35 In the rationale for its decision not to aggregate 

the risk posed by toxicity, debris, and blast 

overpressure, the FAA also stated that it would be 

difficult to normalize among these three hazards. 

That part of the FAA’s rationale is discussed below. 

36NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8715.5A 

(Sep. 17, 2010). A copy of this document may be 

found in the docket. 

37See ‘‘Aggregate Data’’ (2014), which may be 

found in the docket. 

FAA with an estimated mid-point 

would be approximately 695,754 

($456,699 present value at a 7% 

discount rate). The lower and the higher 

estimates are approximately $0.3 

million and $1 million ($283,619 and 

$688,866 present value at a 7% discount 

rate), respectively. This proposed rule 

would also result in the unquantified 

benefit of expanding launch capability 

by avoiding mission delays and scrubs. 

The costs of this proposed rule, if any, 

are minimal. 

III. Discussion of the Proposal 

A. Maintaining the Status Quo on Risk 

Limits to An Individual Member of the 

Public 

Launch and reentry are each governed 

by two separate Ec limits: (1) An Ec limit 

on risk posed to the collective members 

of the public; and (2) a limit on risk 

posed to an individual. Although the 

specific numerical limits for collective 

and individual risk are different, they 

currently function under a similar 

regulatory structure. Specifically, 

individual risk limits prohibit the 

launch risk to an individual from 

exceeding an Ec of 1 × 10¥6 for each 

hazard (debris, toxic release, and far 

field blast overpressure) for launch of an 

ELV vehicle.29 For reentry of an RLV or 

other reentry vehicle, the pertinent 

regulations prohibit the risk to an 

individual from exceeding an Ec of 1 × 

10¥6 per mission.30

To date, the FAA has had to issue a 

waiver to the collective Ec limit for 

every commercial space operation that 

sought to reach the ISS. In contrast, the 

FAA has never had to issue a waiver to 

the limits on risk posed to an 

individual. To date, the FAA has only 

had to consider one request for a waiver 

from the individual risk limits, and the 

FAA denied that request, stating that 

‘‘[u]nlike public risk, individual risk can 

almost always be mitigated through 

reasonable means.’’ 31 Because the FAA 

has never needed to waive the limits 

governing risk to an individual, the FAA 

proposes no changes to its limits on 

individual risk. Moreover, the FAA’s 

current individual risk limit is 

consistent with the U.S. Air Force and 

NASA’s standards. 

The FAA invites comment on this 

issue, and on whether the limits 

governing risk to an individual should 

be changed in light of the changes 

proposed by this NPRM to the Ec limits 

governing risk to the collective members 

of the public. 

B. Aggregation of Launch Hazards and 

Setting An Ec Limit At 1 × 10¥4

Turning to the Ec limits governing risk 

to the collective members of the public, 

part 417, which governs the launch of 

ELVs, prohibits ELV launches from 

exceeding the following collective Ec

limits: (1) A limit of 30 × 10¥6 for 

impacting inert and explosive debris; (2) 

a limit of 30 × 10¥6 for toxic release; 

and (3) a limit of 30 × 10¥6 for far field 

blast overpressure. Proposed section 

417.107(b)(1) would state that an ELV 

launch operator may initiate the flight of 

a launch vehicle only if the total risk 

associated with the launch to all 

members of the public, excluding 

persons in water-borne vessels and 

aircraft, did not exceed an expected 

average number of 0.0001 casualties (Ec≤ 

1 × 10¥4). The total risk would consist 

of the risk posed by impacting inert and 

impacting explosive debris, toxic 

release, and far field blast overpressure. 

As it currently requires, the FAA would 

determine whether to approve public 

risk due to any other hazard associated 

with the proposed flight of a launch 

vehicle on a case-by-case basis. Again, 

as it currently requires, this Ec criterion 

would apply to each ELV launch from 

lift-off through orbital insertion, 

including each planned impact, for an 

orbital launch, and through final impact 

for a suborbital launch. 

As discussed above, during the 

rulemaking that created the part 417 Ec

limits, the FAA wanted to set debris, 

toxicity, and far field blast overpressure 

under a single aggregate Ec limit, noting 

that such a limit would be ‘‘ideal.’’ 32

This is because, in setting collective risk 

limits, what matters is the number of 

people who could be seriously injured 

by a launch rather than the number of 

people who could be injured by a 

specific hazard. For example, under 

current Ec limits, an ELV that has an Ec

of 30 × 10¥6 for toxicity, an Ec of 30 × 

10¥6 for debris, and an Ec of 30 × 10¥6

for far field blast overpressure would be 

allowed to initiate launch without a 

waiver. For this ELV, the total Ec posed 

by the three hazards would be 90 × 10¥6

(30 × 10¥6 for toxicity + 30 × 10¥6 for 

debris + 30 × 10¥6 for far field blast 

overpressure). Conversely, an ELV with 

an Ec of 31 × 10¥6 for debris and an Ec

of 0 for toxicity and far field blast 

overpressure would not be allowed to 

launch under current regulations 

because its debris Ec would exceed 30 

× 10¥6. Thus, in this example, an ELV 

with total average expected serious 

injuries of 90 × 10¥6 would be allowed 

to launch under the existing regulations, 

while an ELV with significantly lower 

total average expected serious injuries of 

31 × 10¥6 would not be allowed to 

launch simply because of the manner in 

which those potential injuries are 

caused. 

Because, as the above example shows, 

the existing regulatory approach does 

not properly limit the total number of 

expected average injuries, the FAA 

noted during the part 417 rulemaking 

that this was not the ideal regulatory 

approach.33 However, the FAA was 

ultimately forced to settle for this 

approach because at the time, the FAA 

did not have historical data on which to 

base a higher Ec limit,34 which would 

have been necessary in order to 

aggregate the risk posed by toxicity, 

debris, and blast overpressure.35

The FAA now has the requisite 

historical data. In 2010, the U.S. Air 

Force, after conducting over 5,000 

launches under the 30 × 10¥6 Ec limit 

that formed the basis for the FAA’s Ec

regulations, has recently changed its 

limits as a result of its operational 

experience. The U.S. Air Force now 

uses an Ec limit for launch of 100 × 10¥6

and an Ec limit for reentry of 100 × 

10¥6. Each of these limits applies to the 

combined risk posed by toxicity, debris, 

and far field blast overpressure. 

Similarly, in 2010 NASA, after 

conducting approximately 129 launches 

under an Ec standard of 30 × 10¥6, also 

changed its requirements to aggregate 

the risk posed by toxicity, debris, and 

far field blast overpressure under an Ec

limit of 100 × 10¥6.36 The FAA did not 

have the benefit of the U.S. Air Force 

and NASA’s 2010 changes in position 

during its part 417 rulemaking. 

In particular, at this time there have 

been over 100 U.S. launches and 

reentries where the predicted risks to 

people on the ground significantly 

exceeded 100 × 10¥6 Ec, all without any 

casualties as expected. For example, 

debris risks from the 135 space shuttle 

launches and reentries routinely 

exceeded 100 × 10¥6 Ec. Specifically, all 

of NASA’s 21 37 post–Columbia 

launches exceeded 100 × 10¥6 Ec on 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
42246 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 139 / Monday, July 21, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

38NASA and the FAA employ different 

definitions of the public. Under FAA definitions, 

persons on Kennedy Space Center merely to view 

the launch without a mission role would qualify as 

members of the public and be part of a risk analysis. 

39SeeAggregate Data 

40See RTI International, Titan IV B–30 

Downrange Risks. A copy of this document may be 

found in the docket. 

41The elevated risks associated with those Titan 

launches were deemed acceptable by the U.S. Air 

Force based on rules that allowed a Range 

Commander to accept collective risks from launch 

involving ‘‘national need’’ that exceed the normal 

risk criteria. See Common Risk Criteria Standards 

for National Test Ranges (RCC) 321–07, § 1.4(c) 

(2007). 

42 77 FR at 24556 

43See Launch SNPRM, 67 FR at 49465 

(explaining how Ec is calculated). 

44 Id. at 49462. 

45 Id. at 49462. 

46Ec calculations that are based on realistic 

assumptions will result in lower Ec totals than Ec

calculations that are based on conservative 

assumptions. As such, it would behoove license 

applicants to use realistic rather than conservative 

Ec assumptions in their calculations. 

47See Launch SNPRM, 67 FR at 49461. 

Kennedy Space Center property,38 and 

at least 9 of those exceeded 30 × 10¥6

Ec for members of the public outside of 

Kennedy Space Center. In addition, 20 

post–Columbia re-entries exceeded 100 

× 10¥6 Ec to the public by at least a 

factor of three. 

The U.S. Air Force also approved at 

least two Titan IVB launches that 

exceeded 100 × 10¥6 Ec either due to 

debris, toxics, or far field blast 

overpressure hazards. For example, in 

1998, the U.S. Air Force successfully 

launched a Titan IV B–1239 mission 

with an Ec of about 200 × 10¥6 Ec due 

to far field blast overpressure hazards in 

the launch area. Another example 

occurred in 2005 when the U.S. Air 

Force approved a government launch of 

the Titan IV B–30 mission with a 

predicted debris risk between a factor of 

1.5 to 3 above 100 × 10¥6 Ec attributable 

to downrange overflight.40 Neither of 

these missions harmed members of the 

public.41

The FAA has already begun to rely on 

the U.S. Air Force’s new Ec limits as 

part of its collective-risk analysis. For 

example, in its analysis of SpaceX’s 

proposed 2012 launch, the FAA 

estimated that the launch would result 

in a debris Ec ranging from 98 × 10¥6

to 121 × 10¥6. However, even though 

these Ec totals were over the FAA’s 30 

× 10¥6 Ec limit, the FAA ultimately 

concluded that SpaceX’s launch would 

not pose a danger to persons or property 

because the low end of the Ec estimate 

(98 × 10¥6) was lower than the 100 × 

10¥6 Ec limit that is now being used by 

the U.S. Air Force.42 The FAA has also 

heavily relied on the U.S. Air Force’s 

standards in granting the three other 

waivers described above. 

Accordingly, because the government 

launches on which the FAA waivers 

were based provide the FAA with the 

historical data necessary to select a 

higher Ec limit, the FAA proposes to 

revise part 417 to aggregate the 

collective risks posed by toxicity, 

debris, and far field blast overpressure 

associated with commercial ELV 

launches. Under the FAA’s proposal, 

the risks posed by toxicity, debris, and 

far field blast overpressure to the 

collective members of the public would 

continue to be calculated separately for 

each hazard. The final Ec totals for these 

hazards would then be aggregated and 

rounded (as discussed more fully below) 

so that they are expressed using only 

one significant digit. 

Aggregating the risks posed by 

toxicity, debris, and far field blast 

overpressure should not present the 

problems regarding conservatism and 

normalizing across hazards that the 

original rulemaking discussed. This is 

because the Ec calculations for toxicity, 

debris, and far field blast overpressure 

only count the injuries that qualify as 

Level 3 or higher on the Abbreviated 

Injury Scale (AIS) of the Association for 

the Advancement of Automotive 

Medicine.43 The AIS is an anatomical 

scoring system that provides a means of 

ranking the severity of an injury and is 

widely used by emergency medical 

personnel. Within the AIS system, 

injuries are ranked on a scale of 1 to 6, 

with Level 1 being a minor injury, Level 

2 moderate, Level 3 serious, Level 4 

severe, Level 5 critical, and Level 6 a 

non-survivable injury. Even though 

toxicity, debris, and far field blast 

overpressure may cause injuries in 

different ways, the meaning of the Ec

results for these three hazards 

fundamentally do not differ. This is 

because the Ec total for each hazard 

determines how many injuries that are 

AIS Level 3 or higher a particular 

hazard would cause. 

In its original rulemaking, the FAA 

treated conservatisms in calculations as 

a reason not to assess the risk of a 

combination of hazards.44 The FAA was 

concerned that aggregation of the risks 

posed by toxicity, debris, and blast 

overpressure could be problematic 

because assumptions that are unduly 

conservative for one hazard may not be 

unduly conservative for calculating the 

Ec of another hazard. For example, when 

assessing the risks posed by far field 

blast overpressure, the conservative 

approach, in the absence of data 

detailing true locations, would be to 

assume all the population was located 

inside buildings and thus exposed to the 

danger of flying glass. When assessing 

the risk posed by a release of toxic 

substances, on the other hand, the 

conservative approach would be to 

assume that at least a portion of the 

exposed population was outdoors, thus 

increasing the likelihood of harm from 

the release.45

This concern may be allayed by the 

use of realistic assumptions, and by 

recognizing that the use of AIS Level 3 

provides a basis for normalizing across 

all three hazards. Using realistic 

assumptions,46 as well as the AIS 

framework discussed above, a license 

applicant may account for a person’s 

location at the time of the launch or 

reentry and determine the extent of 

possible injuries that person could 

sustain as a result of the operation. 

Regardless of which hazard caused 

injuries to the person, that person 

would have to be injured at AIS Level 

3 or higher in order for the injury to be 

considered serious for Ec analysis 

purposes. Because the AIS analysis used 

in Ec calculations looks at the severity 

of an injury and not how an injury is 

caused, the FAA does not anticipate 

problems normalizing Ec calculations in 

order to aggregate the serious injuries 

that could be caused by debris, toxic 

release, and far field blast overpressure. 

Even if an applicant based its hazardspecific Ec calculations on conservative 

assumptions, the error from aggregating 

those assumptions would be minimal. 

This is because ‘‘[c]onditions that are 

conducive to driving up the risk 

associated with one hazard usually 

make another hazard less significant.’’ 47

For example, the 2012 SpaceX launch 

had a debris Ec ranging from 98 × 10¥6

to 121 × 10¥6, a toxicity Ec that was less 

than 10 × 10¥6, and a far field blast 

overpressure Ec of essentially 0. If these 

numbers were added together, any 

uncertainty caused by the addition 

would not have a significant effect on 

the resulting total because most of that 

total Ec was caused by a single hazard 

(debris) that was calculated using a 

single set of assumptions. In any case, 

as discussed above, the Ec for all three 

hazards is calculated using the same 

AIS Level 3 standard thus allowing a 

launch operator to focus on the severity 

of an injury instead of how an injury is 

caused. This normalizes calculations 

across all the hazards and allows the 

serious injuries caused by the hazards to 

be aggregated regardless of the 

assumptions that underlie the estimates 

of those injuries. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 139 / Monday, July 21, 2014 / Proposed Rules 42247 

C. Use of One Significant Digit for 

Launch and Reentry Ec Limits 

Proposed sections 417.107(b)(1), 

431.35(b)(1) and 435.35 would express 

the proposed risk limit as one 

significant digit, as an Ec limit of 1 × 

10¥4. In selecting a limit under which 

to set the aggregated risk posed to the 

collective members of the public by 

toxicity, debris, and far field blast 

overpressure, the FAA considered the 

100 × 10¥6 Ec limit that is now being 

used by the U.S. Air Force. To date, the 

FAA has employed two significant 

digits. In exploring whether it had a 

basis to employ three significant digits, 

the FAA had to explore the advisability 

of employing more than one in the first 

place. Due to the uncertainties 

associated with Ec calculations, which 

are discussed more fully below, the 

FAA proposes to employ one significant 

digit. 

Significant digits are used to express 

a measure of mathematical certainty. 

Thus, trailing zeroes are significant only 

if they are used to express a measure of 

precision. For example, assume a person 

has a height of 168 centimeters, and this 

person wants to express his height as 

168.000 centimeters. The three trailing 

zeroes in 168.000 would be significant 

only if the person had his height 

measured by a device capable of 

measuring that height to the thousandth 

place. In that instance, the zeroes would 

convey that the device determined that 

this person’s height, as measured to the 

thousandth place, is exactly 168.000 

centimeters. Otherwise, if the three 

trailing zeroes are not being used to 

convey this message, they are not 

significant and should be removed so as 

to not convey a false measure of 

precision. 

An Ec limit of 100 × 10¥6 would be 

0.000100 if expressed as a decimal. 

There are two trailing zeroes in this 

number (0.000100), implying that the Ec

is measured to the millionth place of 

precision. However, due to the 

modeling uncertainties associated with 

one of the variables in calculating Ec,

namely, the probability of failure 

discussed below, the FAA proposes to 

use only one significant digit as the final 

expression of Ec results. 

As discussed above, the purpose of 

significant digits is to identify the 

number of digits after the decimal that 

reflect the level of precision in a 

numerical result. The number of digits 

in a properly prepared and formally 

formatted numerical result indicates the 

level of precision of that result; more 

digits indicate higher level of precision, 

fewer digits indicate lower level of 

precision. The last significant digit 

reported indicates that the result comes 

from empirical data to within +/¥ 1 of 

the reported number. That is, if the last 

significant digit reported is a 4, then the 

reader can confidently assume that the 

value is closer to 4, and not 3 or 5. For 

complex mathematical calculations, the 

numerical input (or intermediate 

calculation) with the fewest significant 

digits establishes the number of 

significant digits that can be reported 

legitimately in the final numerical result 

(where legitimate means that the 

certainty of the final result is properly 

reflected.) When using scientific 

notation to report a numerical result, 

every digit reported is considered 

significant. For example, the number 30 

× 10¥6 is not the same as 3 × 10¥5 in 

the sense that the first number has 2 

significant digits and the second has 

only 1 significant digit. 

Examining how many significant 

digits should be used to express Ec

limits, we note that there are two types 

of uncertainty associated with 

calculating Ec: Aleatory and epistemic 

uncertainty. Aleatory uncertainty is the 

randomness in the occurrence and 

consequences of an accident, and 

epistemic uncertainty represents the 

uncertainty in the ability of the model 

to compute the true point value of risk. 

Aleatory uncertainty is the result of 

inherently random processes: the 

uncontrollable variability of real events 

even under tightly controlled 

conditions. Aleatory uncertainty is due 

to the randomness inherent in the 

occurrence and consequences of an 

accident. For risk analysis, improved 

modeling cannot reduce aleatory 

uncertainty. A key example of aleatory 

uncertainty arises out of the prevailing 

weather conditions for a launch risk 

analysis. The true Ec is dependent upon 

the prevailing weather conditions 

during launch, and no amount of 

analysis will reduce the variability 

associated with weather conditions. The 

uncertainty in the true Ec due to weather 

conditions is substantial for a typical 

baseline launch risk analysis that 

represents the weather conditions in a 

given month based upon historical data, 

and assumes that a launch is equally 

likely under any of those weather 

conditions. The uncertainty in the true 

Ec for a day of launch risk analysis is 

much smaller, but the weather input 

data will still produce some variability 

in the Ec due to errors and variability in 

the weather measurements and 

forecasts. There are numerous other 

sources of aleatory uncertainty in an Ec

analysis, and there are different ways 

these aleatory uncertainties can be 

accounted for. These aleatory 

uncertainties may include: the natural 

variations in the normal and 

malfunction trajectories, population and 

sheltering characteristics (e.g. between 

day and night), the velocities induced 

during break-up, the aerodynamic 

properties of the debris, and the yield 

from an explosive impact. All of these 

aleatory uncertainties directly influence 

the predicted consequence of a failure, 

and thus the Ec estimate. 

Epistemic uncertainty is the result of 

the uncertainty in some of the model 

input parameters, the potential 

influence of unknowns and the 

approximate nature of the model itself. 

The model and its input parameters 

require data or knowledge that are not 

known perfectly and can only be 

estimated, creating model inadequacies 

that produce systemic uncertainty, 

referred to as bias, in determining the 

correct answer. The probability of 

failure is typically the greatest source of 

epistemic uncertainty for a launch or 

reentry risk analysis. The probability of 

failure uncertainty is so significant 

because: (1) It is typically the dominant 

source of uncertainty in the overall Ec

associated with a launch or reentry of a 

new vehicle, (2) the probability of a 

failure has the most direct influence on 

public risks posed by a launch or 

reentry (especially during those phases 

of flight where public risk is the 

greatest), and (3) it is present regardless 

of the hazard involved (i.e. debris, 

toxics, or far field blast overpressure). 

Given the fact that even a structural 

fatigue test result is best modeled using 

a probability distribution, the 

probability of failure for a system as 

complex as a launch or reentry vehicle 

is often shrouded in substantial 

uncertainty, particularly for a new 

vehicle. 

The FAA has examined multiple 

analyses performed to quantify the 

uncertainty in launch and reentry risk 

analyses for various circumstances, 

including those where the risks are 

predominantly in the launch area, 

where a flight safety system is used, and 

those due to down range over-flight of 

large land masses where a flight safety 

system would not likely be activated. 

The uncertainty assessments examined 

the uncertainty in the Ec results due to 

all sources, epistemic and aleatory, and 

the results of these sensitivity studies 

quantified the uncertainties related to 

both the probability of the launch risk 

and the consequence of the launch risk. 

The results of these uncertainty analyses 

show that, even for relatively mature 

vehicles, the inability to determine the 

true probability of failure generally 

creates too much uncertainty to justify 

more than one significant digit in the Ec

results for launch or reentry. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
42248 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 139 / Monday, July 21, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

48Reentry Rule, 64 FR at 19635. 

49 Id. 

50See 75 FR at 75621 and 77 FR at 24558. 

51 75 FR at 75621. 

Furthermore, the results demonstrate 

that there is generally enough aleatory 

uncertainty alone to make a second 

significant digit in the reported Ec

illegitimate, even if there was no 

uncertainty with all the critical input 

data such as the probability of failure 

and debris catalogs. Thus, considering 

both the aleatory uncertainty and the 

epistemic uncertainty in launch and 

reentry risk analyses, the calculation of 

a most likely Ec must be reported with 

caution so as not to overstate the 

confidence levels associated with the 

result. The magnitude of uncertainty in 

Ec results computed with current stateof-the-art models demonstrates that no 

more than one significant digit should 

be used. Any more than one significant 

digit in the Ec result implies greater 

certainty in that digit, and greater 

confidence in that digit by the safety 

community, than can be justified. 

The FAA notes that there could be 

instances in which the use of more than 

one significant digit is justified. 

However, at this time, the FAA does not 

have sufficient data to set a generallyapplicable regulatory Ec limit using 

more than one significant digit. 

Accordingly, at this time, the FAA 

proposes an Ec limit on collective risk 

to the public that uses only one 

significant digit. Once more data 

become available, the FAA may revisit 

this issue in a future rulemaking. 

The way that the FAA’s onesignificant-digit proposal would work in 

practice is that the Ec for each hazard 

would be calculated as it is now 

calculated. Those Ec values could then 

be added together, any known double 

counting would be corrected, and the 

result would be rounded to the closest 

significant digit. For example, take a 

launch that has the following Ecs: a 

debris Ec of 9 × 10¥5, a toxicity Ec of 9 

× 10¥6, and a far-field blast 

overpressure Ec of 5 × 10¥5. When the 

Ecs for these three hazards are added 

together, the total is 149 × 10¥6, or 

equivalently 1.49 × 10¥4, at least until 

the overall level of certainty is 

accounted for. This number would then 

be rounded so that it is expressed using 

only one significant digit. Thus, 1.49 

would be rounded to 1, and the 

resulting total Ec would be 1 × 10¥4. 

Consequently, the hypothetical launch 

discussed here would comply with of 

the 1 × 10¥4 aggregate Ec standard that 

the FAA proposes to apply to the 

collective risk associated with ELV 

launches. 

Conversely, if the Ec results for the 

hazards associated with an ELV launch 

were such that they totaled to 151 × 

10¥6, this total would be rounded to an 

Ec of 2 × 10¥4 in order to be expressed 

using one significant digit. In that 

scenario, the launch would violate the 

proposed 1 × 10¥4 aggregate Ec standard 

for risk to the collective members of the 

public. 

The FAA notes that its proposed 

aggregate Ec limit of 1 × 10¥4 is more 

stringent than the total Ec of some of the 

safely-conducted NASA and U.S. Air 

Force launches that have been discussed 

above. As such, the FAA invites 

comments as to whether the aggregate Ec

limit should be set at a level that is less 

stringent than 1 × 10¥4 and what the 

reasons for such an increase would be. 

Also, if the Ec limit is set at a level that 

is less stringent than 1 × 10¥4, should 

additional restrictions be added to the 

regulations in order to compensate for 

the additional public risk caused by the 

higher Ec limit? 

D. Splitting Up Launch and Reentry Ec

for Reentry Vehicles 

The FAA also proposes to separate the 

Ec limits for launch and reentry of all 

reentry vehicles rather than applying a 

single risk limit, as it does now, to both 

phases of a mission. The FAA’s risk 

limits for reentry can be found in 

§§ 431.35(b)(1) (for RLVs) and 435.35 

(for all other reentry vehicles). Both 

sections impose the same Ec limits 

because § 435.35 requires compliance 

with the RLV Ec limitations of § 431.35. 

The collective risk limit imposed on 

reentry-vehicle operations applies to 

launch and reentry combined, which 

means that the debris risk from a launch 

added to the debris risk from the 

ensuing reentry may not exceed an Ec of 

30 × 10¥6. The regulations do not apply 

separate risk limits to launch and 

reentry conducted as a single mission 

because at the time of the original 

rulemaking, the FAA wanted to ensure 

that the accumulated mission risk did 

not exceed an Ec of 30 × 10¥6.48 The 

FAA reasoned that setting RLV launch 

and reentry under separate Ec limits 

could have resulted in a total mission Ec

of 60 × 10¥6 (a launch Ec of 30 × 10¥6

+ a reentry Ec of 30 × 10¥6). However, 

the FAA acknowledged there could be 

circumstances where it would be 

appropriate to separate launch from 

reentry risk, such as where different 

operators were involved and could be 

apportioned allowable risk thresholds, 

or where intervening events or time 

made reentry risks sufficiently 

independent of launch risks as to 

warrant separate consideration.49

Assigning a single risk limit to launch 

and reentry combined is neither 

necessary nor justifiable. Under 

§ 417.107(b), a mission that does not 

include a reentry (which would usually 

be conducted with an ELV-only vehicle) 

may be initiated with a debris Ec to the 

collective members of the public of 30 

× 10¥6. However, if a mission that 

included a reentry was to be launched 

in the same manner, carrying a reentry 

vehicle as a payload, that mission 

would be unable to commence a reentry, 

as its 30 × 10¥6 launch Ec would ‘‘use 

up’’ all of the Ec allotted for the 

combined launch and reentry mission. 

Thus, in order to be able to initiate a 

reentry, a reentry vehicle is required to 

be launched under a more stringent Ec

standard than other payloads. Stated 

another way, under current regulations, 

a launch without a reentry is subject to 

a less stringent Ec limit than a launch 

that includes a reentry because the 

reentry-less launch does not have to 

budget any of the allowable Ec toward 

reentry risk. 

Parts 431 and 435 currently combine 

launch and reentry under a single Ec

standard because when the FAA 

promulgated the regulations governing 

reentry, proposed reentry vehicles were 

primarily envisioned as reusable launch 

vehicles, which are both a launch and 

reentry vehicle. As a result, the FAA did 

not have experience with missions in 

which launch and reentry functioned 

independently of each other. As it 

turned out, the first reentry vehicle the 

FAA ultimately licensed was not an 

RLV but a capsule, which is only a 

reentry vehicle. The capsule’s reentry 

highlighted that the decision-making 

behind the reentry was sufficiently 

independent to require separate 

consideration and thus its own risk 

assessment. 

This is also shown by the FAA’s 

waiver analysis of SpaceX’s 2010 and 

2012 missions, which noted that after 

launch, SpaceX’s vehicle would perform 

a health check, and that the results of 

this health check would determine 

whether the vehicle would initiate a 

reentry.50 For both missions, the FAA 

found the health check made the 

collective risk associated with launch 

and reentry ‘‘sufficiently independent to 

warrant separate consideration . . .’’ 51

Both the 2010 and 2012 SpaceX waivers 

examined the launch of each mission 

under a separate 30 × 10¥6 Ec limit than 

the reentry for that mission. 

SpaceX is not alone in performing 

independent checks. Section 

431.43(e)(1) requires all operators to 

conduct a health check before 

commencing a reentry. This 

requirement is in § 431.43(e)(1), which 


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states that an RLV operator must 

‘‘[m]onitor and verify the status of 

safety-critical systems before enabling 

reentry flight,’’ shows that launch and 

reentry are sufficiently independent to 

warrant separate consideration. 

A number of other factors support 

setting launch and reentry risk 

separately. As an initial matter, reentry 

is independent from launch because the 

two are separate events. A launch may 

not always be successful, and a single 

risk limit that encompasses both launch 

and reentry makes reentry risk 

calculations unnecessarily dependent 

on the probability of failure associated 

with launch. Separating launch and 

reentry risk criteria is the preferred 

approach because under a separate 

reentry risk limit, the reentry would 

have to meet the risk criteria assuming 

that the launch had succeeded. 

In addition, a reentry trajectory does 

not have to be finalized, at the earliest, 

until launch concludes. For example, a 

reentry vehicle could have multiple 

viable reentry trajectories, and the 

operator of that vehicle would not have 

to pick one of those trajectories until the 

vehicle was ready to commence reentry 

after launch had already taken place. In 

that scenario, it would not make sense 

to limit the operator’s reentry decision 

by an event that had already taken place 

(the launch), which the operator could 

not affect after it had occurred. 

In addition, launch and reentry could 

be handled by different entities. For 

example, one company (Company 1) 

could launch a reentry vehicle operated 

by another company (Company 2). Just 

like in the previous scenario, it would 

not make sense to limit Company 2’s 

decisions regarding its reentry based on 

a launch that had already taken place. 

We note that launch and reentry are 

also distinct because they generally pose 

risks to distinct populations, and the 

tolerable level of collective risk is 

logically correlated with the nature and 

size of the exposed population. A 

general difference between the nature of 

the populations exposed to launch and 

reentry risks is that launches generally 

expose fewer people that are near the 

launch site or under the launch 

trajectory, but reentry risks are often 

widely distributed over populations that 

dwell within the latitudes bounded by 

the orbital inclination. 

As discussed above, the U.S. Air 

Force and NASA, both of which have 

significant operational experience 

administering collective risk limits, 

recently set launch and reentry under 

separate Ec limits of 100 × 10¥6. This 

decision by the U.S. Air Force and 

NASA also supports the FAA’s proposal 

to assign separate Ec limits to launch 

and reentry. The specific Ec limits that 

the FAA proposes are discussed in the 

next section. 

We note, however, that the proposed 

rule would assign separate the Ec limits 

to launch and reentry only for reentry 

from orbit. The FAA proposes to leave 

unchanged the requirement that 

suborbital launches and reentries are 

subject to a single launch Ec limit that 

encompasses the entire operation from 

launch through final impact. The FAA 

invites comments on whether the Ec

limit for the launch and reentry of 

suborbital reentry-vehicle operations 

should be separated in the same manner 

as the Ec limit for reentries from orbit. 

E. Including Toxicity in the Reentry Ec

Limits of Parts 431 and 435 and 

Harmonizing That Part With Part 417 

Sections 431.35 and 435.35 govern the 

Ec associated with the operation of 

reentry vehicles. The FAA proposes to 

change the structure of these regulations 

as follows. As discussed above, the Ec

associated with a licensed launch would 

be regulated separately from reentry. For 

launch, the FAA proposes to harmonize 

the Ec launch requirements for ELVs and 

reentry vehicles by setting the Ec launch 

limit for reentry vehicles under the 

same aggregate 1 × 10¥4 limit that this 

proposal would apply to ELV launches 

under part 417. This launch limit would 

regulate the aggregate risk associated 

with toxicity, impacting inert and 

explosive debris, and far field blast 

overpressure. In addition, just like the 

aggregate Ec launch limit that governs 

ELVs under part 417, the aggregate Ec

launch limit that governs reentry 

vehicles under parts 431 and 435 would 

be expressed using only one significant 

digit. Using this approach, the Ec

associated with a licensed launch would 

be regulated the same way regardless of 

what vehicle or payload was used in the 

launch. 

With regard to reentry, §§ 431.35 and 

435.35 currently account only for the 

risk posed by debris to the collective 

members of the public. This proposed 

rule would clarify that, just like launch, 

the debris regulations for reentry 

encompass both impacting inert and 

explosive debris. The FAA is also 

proposing to require a launch operator 

to also account for the risks of toxic 

release. While there have not been past 

instances of a reentry where toxicity risk 

was above a minimal level, the FAA is 

concerned about missions that are being 

planned for the near future involving a 

reentry vehicle touching down on land 

during a reentry. These types of 

missions may require a reentry vehicle 

to carry a substantial load of fuel during 

reentry, which would significantly 

increase the risk of toxic release posed 

by the reentry. For example, the FAA 

performed a sensitivity study on the 

release of a reentry vehicle’s propellants 

during reentry and found that a ground 

release of the propellants is the worst 

case scenario for a toxic release, as 

opposed to venting the propellant 

during reentry or the vehicle exploding 

during reentry and releasing all of its 

propellant into the atmosphere at a high 

altitude. In other words, the study 

results demonstrated an inversely 

proportional relationship between 

altitude release and the casualty area, 

where the higher the altitude release, 

the lower the casualty area. The two 

methods of dispersion considered for a 

ground release were a ‘‘Hot Spill’’ 

method, which is where a propellant 

tank explodes on impact and releases a 

toxic vapor cloud and a ‘‘Pool 

Evaporation’’ method, which is where a 

propellant tank ruptures on impact and 

leaks out the propellant, forming a 

liquid pool. Because of the possible risk 

posed by these types of missions and 

methods of toxic dispersion, the FAA is 

proposing to add toxic releases to the Ec

limit governing reentry. No current 

reentry vehicles have the capability of 

reentering to land, so the FAA seeks 

comment on the necessity of this 

proposal. 

The U.S. Air Force and NASA have a 

total reentry Ec limited to a 100 × 10¥6

limit. However, as discussed above, Ec

calculations currently contain a level of 

uncertainty that generally prevents them 

from being accurately expressed using 

more than one significant digit. 

Accordingly, the FAA proposes to set 

the reentry Ec limit for collective risk to 

1 × 10¥4 expressed using a single 

significant digit. This reentry limit 

would govern the aggregated risk posed 

by vehicle debris and toxic release. 

F. Hazard Areas 

The FAA also proposes to clarify the 

existing limits on probability of impact 

for ships and aircraft. This proposed 

clarification would not constitute a 

change from what is currently required. 

Specifically, § 417.107(b)(3) and (4) 

currently require the launch operator of 

an ELV to implement and establish ship 

and aircraft hazard areas that provide an 

equivalent level of safety to that 

provided by ship and aircraft hazard 

areas implemented for launch from a 

federal launch range. This provision 

memorializes the level of safety that was 

provided by hazard areas for launches 

from a federal launch range in 2006, 


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52As of the date of this writing, December 2013, 

federal launch ranges have not changed the 

pertinent standards from what they used in 2006. 53Common Risk Criteria Standards for National 

Test Ranges (RCC) 321–07 (2007). 54Common Risk Criteria Standards for National 

Test Ranges (RCC) 321–02 Supplement at 3 (2002). 

55Common Risk Criteria Standards for National 

Test Ranges (RCC) 321–07 at 5–49. 

56See pages 3–3 and 3–4 of Range Commanders 

Council Risk Committee of the Range Safety Group, 

Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges, 

RCC 321–07, White Sands Missile Range, New 

Mexico, 2007. 

57 GRA study can be found in the docket. 

58This limit is specified in 14 CFR 431.35, which 

applies only to reusable launch vehicles. However, 

14 CFR 435.35 incorporates and applies 14 CFR 

431.35 to all reentry vehicles. 

when the FAA issued § 417.107(b)(3).52

Because the current provision does not 

specify a specific federal launch range, 

a launch operator could arguably pick 

an equivalent hazard-area level of safety 

from amongst the federal launch ranges. 

While each federal launch range has 

its own safety criteria for hazard areas, 

the federal launch range with the least 

burdensome limit for hazard areas 

imposes a probability of impact (Pi) 

limit of 1 × 10¥6 for aircraft hazard 

areas and a Pi limit of 1 × 10¥5 for 

water-borne-vessel hazard areas.53

Currently, § 417.107(b)(3) and (4) 

permits a launch operator to set a 

hazard-area level of safety that is 

equivalent to the one used by federal 

launch ranges with the least 

burdensome hazard area limit. 

Accordingly, the FAA proposes to make 

transparent the criteria for establishing 

hazard areas, which are that an aircraft 

Pi, may not exceed 1 × 10¥6 and a waterborne vessel Pi may not exceed 1 × 

10¥5. 

The FAA’s proposal would define Pi

as probability of impact with debris 

capable of causing a casualty. This is 

because the federal launch ranges 

defined Pi in this manner in 2006. 

Specifically, an 1E¥6 probability of 

impact was the criterion used by the 

Eastern Range in 2002 54 and that same 

criterion was used in 2007.55 The 2007 

version of the RCC 321–07 made clear 

that the ship and aircraft protection 

criteria in use by U.S. ranges are ‘‘based 

on the probability of impact with ‘debris 

capable of producing a casualty’ for 

ships and aircraft’’.56 This is an 

important clarification because some 

debris fragments are too small to 

threaten the safety of people onboard 

aircraft or ships. 

IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

A. Regulatory Evaluation 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Order 12866 and 

Executive Order 13563 direct that each 

Federal agency shall propose or adopt a 

regulation only upon a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the 

intended regulation justify its costs. 

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) requires 

agencies to analyze the economic 

impact of regulatory changes on small 

entities. Third, the Trade Agreements 

Act (Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits agencies 

from setting standards that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. In 

developing U.S. standards, the Trade 

Act requires agencies to consider 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis of 

U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–4) requires agencies to prepare a 

written assessment of the costs, benefits, 

and other effects of proposed or final 

rules that include a Federal mandate 

likely to result in the expenditure by 

State, local, or tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector, of 

$100 million or more annually (adjusted 

for inflation with base year of 1995). 

This portion of the preamble 

summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the 

economic impacts of this proposed rule. 

In conducting these analyses, the FAA 

has determined that this proposed rule: 

(1) Has net benefits that justify the 

minimum costs; (2) is not an 

economically ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ as defined in section 3(f) of 

Executive Order 12866; (3) is not 

‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (4) 

would not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities; (5) would not create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States; and (6) 

would not impose an unfunded 

mandate on state, local, or tribal 

governments, or other private sectors by 

exceeding the threshold identified 

above. 

Department of Transportation Order 

DOT 2100.5 prescribes policies and 

procedures for simplification, analysis, 

and review of regulations. If the 

expected cost impact is so minimal that 

a proposed or final rule does not 

warrant a full evaluation, this order 

permits that a statement to that effect 

and the basis for it be included in the 

preamble if a full regulatory evaluation 

of the cost and benefits is not prepared. 

Such a determination has been made for 

this proposed rule. These analyses are 

summarized below. 

Parties Potentially Affected by This 

Rulemaking 

• Satellite and RLV owners 

• License applicants for launches and 

reentries 

• Commercial space transportation 

suppliers 

• The Federal Aviation Administration 

and the general public 

Principal Assumptions and Sources of 

Information 

• Benefit-Cost Analysis for the 

collective risk limits during launches 

and reentries (GRA study 2013 by GRA, 

Incorporated 57). 

• As discussed below, the principal 

assumption underlying the proposed 

rule is that the acceptable public risk of 

launch or reentry mission is an expected 

casualty Ec value of 1 × 10¥4 or less. 

• FAA Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation forecast of suborbital 

launches using subject experts’ 

judgment. 

• FAA Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation estimation of the 

commercial space industry hours 

related to waiver applications. 

• All monetary values are expressed 

in 2012 dollars. 

• Projected impacts for a 10-year 

period from 2013 to 2022. 

Cost-Benefit Analysis 

Under current regulations, the FAA 

prohibits the expected casualty (Ec) for 

each physically distinct source of risk 

(impacting inert and explosive debris, 

toxic release and far field blast 

overpressure) from exceeding 30 × 10¥6

or an expected average number of 

0.00003 casualties per launch. The 

aggregate Ec equals the sum of these 

risks, i.e., (30 × 10¥6) + (30 × 10¥6) + 

(30 × 10¥6), for a total of 90 × 10¥6. 

However, launches currently are not 

subject to this single aggregate Ec limit. 

If there is a reentry using an RLV or 

other reentry vehicle, an additional 

regulatory provision becomes 

applicable, which prohibits the 

combined Ec of the launch and reentry 

from exceeding 30 × 10¥6 for impacting 

debris.58

Under this proposal, the FAA would 

separate its expected casualties (Ec) for 

launches and reentries. The proposed 

rule would adopt an aggregate Ec

requirement for a launch not to exceed 

1 × 10¥4 posed by the following 

hazards: (1) Impacting inert and 

explosive debris, (2) toxic release, and 

(3) far field blast overpressure. The FAA 

also proposes a separate aggregate Ec

requirement for a reentry not to exceed 

1 × 10¥4 posed by the hazards of debris 

and toxic release. 

An Ec value of 1 × 10¥4

mathematically equals 100 × 10¥6, 

which is the Ec value currently used on 


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59AST/FAA launch data as of Feb 1, 2013, 

excluding 21 failed launches. This data can be 

found at http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/

headquarters_offices/ast/launch_license. See also 

Appendix A in GRA study, which can be found on 

the docket for this rule. 

60 GRA Study 2013, Table 5–7, by GRA 

Incorporated. 

61Aerospace engineer wage rate ($79.85 per hour) 

was based on GRA Study, 2013, Appendix C, Table 

Continued 

federal ranges for civil and military 

launch and reentry missions. However, 

because the proposed aggregate Ec limit 

would use only one significant digit in 

the format of 1 × 10¥4, this proposal 

would, in effect, allow a commercial 

launch or reentry with an aggregate Ec

limit up to 149 × 10¥6 under current 

calculations to proceed without 

requiring the applicant to seek an FAA 

waiver. This is because 149 × 10¥6

rounds down to 1 × 10¥4 when 

expressed using only one significant 

digit. 

Based on analysis of the historical 

data, the FAA found the proposed 

criteria are supported by the commercial 

mission experiences and post-mission 

safety data available since 1989. The 

FAA’s launch data indicated during this 

time there were 45 suborbital launches 

and 193 orbital launches, for a total of 

238 launches.59 At least four of these 

launches used an Ec that was allowed to 

go above the existing 30 × 10¥6 Ec

limits. However, none of these launches 

resulted in any casualties or other 

adverse impacts on public safety. 

As discussed in the preamble above, 

the FAA believes managing the 

precision of rounding digits below and 

above the Ec limit is imprecise for 

administering launch or re-entry 

licenses given the uncertainties 

associated with the probability of failure 

variable that goes into an Ec calculation. 

By using only one significant digit, the 

proposed Ec limit for launch would 

become slightly less restrictive than the 

three existing launch Ec limits combined 

(i.e., 90 × 10¥6). The regulatorycompliance difference between 90 × 

10¥6 and 149 × 10¥6 falls under an 

accepted safety margin because the level 

of imprecision associated with Ec

calculations means that there is no 

substantive difference between these 

two Ec figures. However, changing the 

regulations to use only one significant 

digit would improve efficiency by 

providing some flexibility to the 

government and license applicants in 

the launch approval process. In 

addition, using a single Ec limit that 

applies to an aggregate risk in place of 

three separate hazard-specific Ec

limitations would further increase 

efficiency. As a result, the proposed rule 

would maintain a level of safety for 

commercial launches commensurate 

with the current level of safety 

associated with civil and military 

counterparts, but would be cost 

relieving by eliminating some waiver 

processes necessary under the current 

regulations as discussed below. 

The proposed criteria would also 

separately address the public risk limits 

of toxic release and inert and explosive 

debris risks for reentry operations by 

establishing public safety requirements 

similar to the ones used at the federal 

launch ranges. Based on current 

practices of administering reentry 

licenses, the FAA found it was 

unrealistic and unnecessary to 

administer reentry licenses with a strict 

Ec limit of 30 × 10¥6 for the 

combination of launch and reentry 

debris hazards. Aggregating Ec limits of 

toxic release and debris risks, the 

proposed Ec limit for reentry would be 

commensurate with the current safety 

requirements applied to civil and 

military reentries, and more 

conservative than past federal launch 

ranges’ practices that gave waivers to 

allow non-commercial reentry missions 

to proceed with Ec risks on the order of 

1× 10¥3. 

The proposed rule would merely 

revise reentry Ec limits of toxic release 

and debris risks to be close to the 

current reentry licensing practice, on 

which we assess the current economic 

baseline of the revised Ec limits. The 

FAA expects that the nominal increase 

in the debris Ec limit on reentry 

proposed in this rule will impose no or 

minimal societal costs. This is because, 

while the FAA has not been asked to 

grant a waiver in which Ec for reentry 

would exceed 30 × 10¥6, the FAA has 

historically issued a number of waivers 

to commercial launches that allowed 

those launches to exceed the regulatory 

Ec limits as long as those launches did 

not exceed the 100 × 10¥6 Ec limits 

imposed by the federal ranges. The FAA 

has also issued waivers to two 

commercial reentries that allowed the Ec

for those reentries to be considered 

separately from the Ec for launch. While 

the FAA, as part of its waiver process, 

has not yet had to consider whether a 

reentry operation should be issued a 

waiver to exceed the 30 × 10¥6 Ec limit 

on reentry, the FAA expects that its 

launch waiver analysis would apply 

equally to reentry operations. 

Consequently, the FAA anticipates that 

many of the reentry operations that 

would be affected by this rule may be 

eligible for an FAA waiver in the 

absence of this rule. The only impact 

that this rule will have on those 

operations is to eliminate the need to 

seek an FAA waiver. Accordingly, any 

change to risk on reentry made by this 

proposed rule would be nominal at 

most. 

With regard to toxic release risks, by 

applying the revised Ec value of 1 × 

10¥4 to toxic release risks during a 

reentry operation, the proposed rule 

would provide an incremental margin of 

safety to the public that does not exist 

under the current rule. However, from a 

technical perspective, toxic release risks 

for reentry vehicles are expected to 

remain a minor factor in Ec calculations, 

because the toxic release requirement 

would affect only those vehicles that 

intend to return to land rather than the 

ocean. The propellant load for a 

reentering reentry vehicle will generally 

be minimal because most of the 

propellant will have been used during 

the mission. The FAA believes that this 

portion of proposed criteria pertaining 

to reentries of the next generation of 

vehicles would not raise costs to the 

commercial space transportation 

industry. Therefore, the FAA believes 

this proposed requirement has minimal 

costs and positive benefits. The FAA 

requests comments with regard to the 

minimal cost determination. 

The proposed changes in the risk 

limits would apply to all three hazards 

combined rather than to each individual 

hazard. In addition, the proposed 

changes would theoretically permit 

launches or reentries without seeking 

waivers as long as the aggregated risks 

would not exceed 0.000149 expected 

casualties per launch or re-entry 

mission (i.e., 149 × 10¥6). Both the 

commercial space transportation 

industry and the government would 

have savings attributable to less 

paperwork by avoiding some waiverapplication process expenses. 

Based on historical records of requests 

and previous FAA-issued waivers from 

the current Ec limits, the FAA 

anticipates that an additional 38 waivers 

from the current Ec limits will be 

necessary from 2013 to 2022 in the 

absence of this rule.60 If this rule is 

finalized as proposed, the FAA expects 

that these 38 waivers will not be 

needed. Thus, this rule would result in 

savings for both the industry and the 

FAA, as the industry would not have to 

expend resources to request waivers and 

the FAA would not have to expend 

resources to evaluate waiver requests. 

The industry cost ranges from $4,472 

for 56 hours to $12,776 for 160 hours of 

aerospace engineering time to prepare 

and submit the necessary 

documentation to the FAA for 

approval.61 Multiplying the forecasted 


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C–3. The FAA’s Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation provided the estimation of the 

commercial space industry hours related to a 

waiver application. 

62The FAA calculated this estimation of the 

agency’s expenditure and hours related to 

processing a waiver application. 

38 waivers for the 10-year period by the 

lower and upper bound costs yields cost 

savings ranging from $169,936 to 

$485,488. The range estimates for the 

FAA’s cost savings are based on the 

costs of FAA personnel time ranging 

from $4,530 for 58 hours to $14,841 for 

190 hours 62 to process each waiver 

request. This range is related to the 

characteristics of the individual launch 

or reentry request. Multiplied by the 

forecasted 38 waivers granted, the total 

estimated savings of FAA personnel 

time to review requests and issue 

waivers range from $172,140 to 

$563,958. The resulting savings for both 

the industry and the FAA with an 

estimated mid-point would be 

approximately $695,754 ($456,699 

present value at a 7% discount rate). 

The lower and the higher estimates are 

approximately $0.3 million and $1 

million ($283,619 and $688,866 present 

value at a 7% discount rate), 

respectively. 

The proposed rule may also result in 

cost-saving by reducing launch delays 

and mission scrubs. The FAA currently 

does not have sufficient data to quantify 

these savings, but believes the possible 

reduction of launch delays and mission 

scrubs may increase the overall capacity 

of the U.S. space transportation 

industry. Accordingly, the FAA seeks 

comments on cost-savings that could be 

generated by this proposed rule through 

reduced launch delays and mission 

scrubs. 

In summary, the proposed rule would 

maintain safety levels for commercial 

space transportation commensurate 

with the current requirements applied 

to civil and military launches and reentries. In addition, the proposed rule 

would result in net quantified benefits 

for both industry and government. The 

net benefit would be achieved by 

avoiding costs pertaining to applying 

and granting waivers with Ec limits 

between 90 × 10¥6 and 149 × 10¥6. 

Further, related industries may also 

benefit by avoiding unnecessary mission 

delays and scrubs. The FAA requests 

comments with regard to this 

determination. 

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a 

principle of regulatory issuance that 

agencies shall endeavor, consistent with 

the objectives of the rule and of 

applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and 

informational requirements to the scale 

of the businesses, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation. To achieve this principle, 

agencies are required to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions to assure that such proposals are 

given serious consideration.’’ The RFA 

covers a wide-range of small entities, 

including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small 

governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a rule will have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. If 

the agency determines that it will, the 

agency must prepare a regulatory 

flexibility analysis as described in the 

RFA. However, if an agency determines 

that a rule is not expected to have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities, 

section 605(b) of the RFA provides that 

the head of the agency may so certify 

and a regulatory flexibility analysis is 

not required. 

The FAA expects many small entities 

would benefit from this proposed rule 

because the proposed revisions to the 

current rule are cost-relieving and do 

not cause any segment of industry to 

incur compliance costs. Therefore, the 

FAA certifies that the proposed rule 

would not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. The FAA solicits comments 

with regard to this certification and 

requests that supporting documentation 

be supplied. 

C. International Trade Impact 

Assessment 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. 

L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies 

from establishing standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Pursuant to these Acts, the 

establishment of standards is not 

considered an unnecessary obstacle to 

the foreign commerce of the United 

States, so long as the standard has a 

legitimate domestic objective, such as 

the protection of safety, and does not 

operate in a manner that excludes 

imports that meet this objective. The 

statute also requires consideration of 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis for 

U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed 

the potential effect of this proposed rule 

and determined that the rule would not 

impose obstacles to foreign commerce, 

as foreign exporters would not have to 

change their current export products to 

the United States. 

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed 

rule that may result in an expenditure 

of $100 million or more (in 1995 

dollars) in any one year by State, local, 

and tribal governments, in the aggregate, 

or by the private sector; such a mandate 

is deemed to be a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action.’’ The FAA currently uses an 

inflation-adjusted value of $151 million 

in lieu of $100 million. This proposed 

rule does not contain such a mandate; 

therefore, the requirements of Title II of 

the Act do not apply. 

E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the 

FAA consider the impact of paperwork 

and other information collection 

burdens imposed on the public. The 

FAA has determined that there would 

be no new requirement for information 

collection associated with this proposed 

rule. 

International Compatibility 

In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

conform to International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO) Standards and 

Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. The FAA 

has determined that there are no ICAO 

Standards and Recommended Practices 

that correspond to these proposed 

regulations. 

Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA 

actions that are categorically excluded 

from preparation of an environmental 

assessment or environmental impact 

statement under the National 

Environmental Policy Act in the 

absence of extraordinary circumstances. 

The FAA has determined this 

rulemaking action qualifies for the 

categorical exclusion identified in 

paragraph 312f of NEPA and involves 

no extraordinary circumstances. 

Executive Order Determinations 

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this proposed 

rule under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The 

agency has determined that this action 

would not have a substantial direct 

effect on the States, or the relationship 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 139 / Monday, July 21, 2014 / Proposed Rules 42253 

between the Federal Government and 

the States, or on the distribution of 

power and responsibilities among the 

various levels of government, and, 

therefore, would not have Federalism 

implications. 

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations 

That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use 

The FAA analyzed this proposed rule 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The 

agency has determined that it would not 

be a ‘‘significant energy action’’ under 

the executive order and would not be 

likely to have a significant adverse effect 

on the supply, distribution, or use of 

energy. 

Additional Information 

A. Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. The agency also invites 

comments relating to the economic, 

environmental, energy, or federalism 

impacts that might result from adopting 

the proposals in this document. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the proposal, explain 

the reason for any recommended 

change, and include supporting data. To 

ensure the docket does not contain 

duplicate comments, commenters 

should send only one copy of written 

comments, or if comments are filed 

electronically, commenters should 

submit only one time. 

The FAA will file in the docket all 

comments it receives, as well as a report 

summarizing each substantive public 

contact with FAA personnel concerning 

this proposed rulemaking. Before acting 

on this proposal, the FAA will consider 

all comments it receives on or before the 

closing date for comments. The FAA 

will consider comments filed after the 

comment period has closed if it is 

possible to do so without incurring 

expense or delay. The agency may 

change this proposal in light of the 

comments it receives. 

Proprietary or Confidential Business 

Information: Commenters should not 

file proprietary or confidential business 

information in the docket. Such 

information must be sent or delivered 

directly to the person identified in the 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

section of this document, and marked as 

proprietary or confidential. If submitting 

information on a disk or CD ROM, mark 

the outside of the disk or CD ROM, and 

identify electronically within the disk or 

CD ROM the specific information that is 

proprietary or confidential. 

Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), if the FAA is 

aware of proprietary information filed 

with a comment, the agency does not 

place it in the docket. It is held in a 

separate file to which the public does 

not have access, and the FAA places a 

note in the docket that it has received 

it. If the FAA receives a request to 

examine or copy this information, it 

treats it as any other request under the 

Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 

552). The FAA processes such a request 

under Department of Transportation 

procedures found in 49 CFR part 7. 

B. Availability of Rulemaking 

Documents 

An electronic copy of rulemaking 

documents may be obtained from the 

Internet by— 

1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking 

Portal (http://www.regulations.gov); 

2. Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies Web page at http://

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or 

3. Accessing the Government Printing 

Office’s Web page at http://

www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html. 

Copies may also be obtained by 

sending a request to the Federal 

Aviation Administration, Office of 

Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or 

by calling (202) 267–9680. Commenters 

must identify the docket or notice 

number of this rulemaking. 

All documents the FAA considered in 

developing this proposed rule, 

including economic analyses and 

technical reports, may be accessed from 

the Internet through the Federal 

eRulemaking Portal referenced in item 

(1) above. 

List of Subjects 

14 CFR Part 417 

Launch and reentry safety, Aviation 

safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Rockets, Space 

transportation and exploration. 

14 CFR Parts 431 and 435 

Launch and reentry safety, Aviation 

safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Rockets, Space 

transportation and exploration. 

The Proposed Amendment 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

proposes to amend chapter III of title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations as follows: 

PART 417—LAUNCH SAFETY 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 417 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. 

■ 2. In § 417.107, revise paragraphs 

(b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(4) to read as 

follows: 

§ 417.107 Flight safety. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(1) A launch operator may initiate the 

flight of a launch vehicle only if the 

total risk associated with the launch to 

all members of the public, excluding 

persons in water-borne vessels and 

aircraft, does not exceed an expected 

average number of 0.0001 casualties (Ec≤ 

1 × 10¥4). The total risk consists of risk 

posed by impacting inert and explosive 

debris, toxic release, and far field blast 

overpressure. The FAA will determine 

whether to approve public risk due to 

any other hazard associated with the 

proposed flight of a launch vehicle on 

a case-by-case basis. The Ec criterion 

applies to each launch from lift-off 

through orbital insertion, including each 

planned impact, for an orbital launch, 

and through final impact for a suborbital 

launch. 

* * * * * 

(3) A launch operator must establish 

any water borne vessel hazard areas 

necessary to ensure the probability of 

impact (Pi) with debris capable of 

causing a casualty for water borne 

vessels does not exceed 0.00001 (1 × 

10¥5). 

(4) A launch operator must establish 

any aircraft hazard areas necessary to 

ensure the probability of impact (Pi) 

with debris capable of causing a 

casualty for aircraft does not exceed 

0.000001 (1 × 10¥6). 

* * * * * 

PART 431— LAUNCH AND REENTRY 

OF A REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE 

(RLV) 

■ 4. The authority citation for part 431 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. 

■ 5. In § 431.35, revise paragraph (b)(1) 

to read as follows: 

§ 431.35 Acceptable reusable launch 

vehicle risk. 

* * * * * 

(b) * * * 

(1) To obtain safety approval, an 

applicant must demonstrate the 

following for public risk: 

(i) The risk to the collective members 

of the public from the proposed launch 

meets the public risk criteria of 

§ 417.107(b)(1) of this chapter; 

(ii) The risk level to the collective 

members of the public, excluding 

persons in water borne vessels and 

aircraft, from each proposed reentry 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
42254 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 139 / Monday, July 21, 2014 / Proposed Rules 

does not exceed an expected average 

number of 0.0001 casualties (Ec criterion 

of 1 × 10¥4) from impacting inert and 

explosive debris and toxic release 

associated with the reentry; and 

(iii) The risk level to an individual 

does not exceed .000001 probability of 

casualty per mission (individual risk of 

Ec ≤ 1 × 10¥6). 

* * * * * 

PART 435—REENTRY OF A REENTRY 

VEHICLE OTHER THAN A REUSABLE 

LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV) 

■ 6. The authority citation for part 435 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. 

■ 7. Revise § 435.35 to read as follows: 

§ 435.35 Acceptable reusable launch 

vehicle risk. 

To obtain safety approval for reentry, 

an applicant must demonstrate the 

following for public risk: 

(a) The risk to the collective members 

of the public from the proposed launch 

meets the public risk criteria of 

§ 417.107(b)(1) of this chapter; 

(b) The risk level to the collective 

members of the public, excluding 

persons in water borne vessels and 

aircraft, from each proposed reentry 

does not exceed an expected average 

number of 0.0001 casualties (Ec criterion 

of 1 × 10¥4) from impacting inert and 

explosive debris and toxic release 

associated with the reentry; and 

(c) The risk level to an individual 

does not exceed .000001 probability of 

casualty per mission (individual risk of 

Ec ≤ 1 × 10¥6). 

Issued under authority provided by 49 

U.S.C. 106(f) and 51 U.S.C. 50904–50905 in 

Washington, DC, on June 25, 2014. 

George C. Nield, 

Associate Administrator for Commercial 

Space Transportation. 

[FR Doc. 2014–16928 Filed 7–18–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Coast Guard 

33 CFR Parts 100 and 165 

[Docket No. USCG–2014–0540] 

RIN 1625–AA08, AA00 

Special Local Regulations for Marine 

Events and Safety Zone, Patapsco 

River; Baltimore, MD 

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes to 

establish temporary regulations in 

certain waters of the Patapsco River. 

This action is necessary to provide for 

the safety of life on navigable waters 

before, during, and after the ‘‘Baltimore 

Air Show,’’ which consists of aerial 

practices, performance demonstrations 

and air shows. The event, scheduled as 

part of the Star-Spangled 200 activities 

at Baltimore, Maryland, will be held 

over certain waters of the Patapsco River 

from September 11, 2014, through 

September 14, 2014. This action will 

restrict vessel traffic in portions of the 

Patapsco River during the event. 

DATES: Comments and related material 

must be received by the Coast Guard on 

or before August 20, 2014. The Coast 

Guard anticipates that this proposed 

rule will be effective from September 

11, 2014 through September 14, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

identified by docket number using any 

one of the following methods: 

(1) Federal eRulemaking Portal: 

http://www.regulations.gov. 

(2) Fax: 202–493–2251. 

(3) Mail: Docket Management Facility 

(M–30), U.S. Department of 

Transportation, West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590– 

0001. Deliveries accepted between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except federal holidays. The 

telephone number is 202–366–9329. See 

the ‘‘Public Participation and Request 

for Comments’’ portion of the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section 

below for further instructions on 

submitting comments. To avoid 

duplication, please use only one of 

these three methods. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If 

you have questions on this rule, call or 

email Mr. Ronald Houck, U.S. Coast 

Guard Sector Baltimore, MD; telephone 

410–576–2674, email Ronald.L.Houck@

uscg.mil. If you have questions on 

viewing or submitting material to the 

docket, call Cheryl Collins, Program 

Manager, Docket Operations, telephone 

(202) 366–9826. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Acronyms 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FR Federal Register 

NPRM Notice of proposed rulemaking 

A. Public Participation and Request for 

Comments 

We encourage you to participate in 

this rulemaking by submitting 

comments and related materials. All 

comments received will be posted 

without change to http://

www.regulations.gov and will include 

any personal information you have 

provided. 

1. Submitting Comments 

If you submit a comment, please 

include the docket number for this 

rulemaking, indicate the specific section 

of this document to which each 

comment applies, and provide a reason 

for each suggestion or recommendation. 

You may submit your comments and 

material online at http://

www.regulations.gov, or by fax, mail, or 

hand delivery, but please use only one 

of these means. If you submit a 

comment online, it will be considered 

received by the Coast Guard when you 

successfully transmit the comment. If 

you fax, hand deliver, or mail your 

comment, it will be considered as 

having been received by the Coast 

Guard when it is received at the Docket 

Management Facility. We recommend 

that you include your name and a 

mailing address, an email address, or a 

telephone number in the body of your 

document so that we can contact you if 

we have questions regarding your 

submission. 

To submit your comment online, go to 

http://www.regulations.gov, type the 

docket number [USCG–2014–0540] in 

the ‘‘SEARCH’’ box and click 

‘‘SEARCH.’’ Click on ‘‘Submit a 

Comment’’ on the line associated with 

this rulemaking. 

If you submit your comments by mail 

or hand delivery, submit them in an 

unbound format, no larger than 81⁄2 by 

11 inches, suitable for copying and 

electronic filing. If you submit 

comments by mail and would like to 

know that they reached the Facility, 

please enclose a stamped, self-addressed 

postcard or envelope. We will consider 

all comments and material received 

during the comment period and may 

change the rule based on your 

comments. 

2. Viewing Comments and Documents 

To view comments, as well as 

documents mentioned in this preamble 

as being available in the docket, go to 

http://www.regulations.gov, type the 

docket number (USCG–2014–0138) in 

the ‘‘SEARCH’’ box and click 

‘‘SEARCH.’’ Click on Open Docket 

Folder on the line associated with this 

rulemaking. You may also visit the 

Docket Management Facility in Room 

W12–140 on the ground floor of the 

Department of Transportation West 

Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS