DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CHIQUITA LASHAE MCGEE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-1022

[May 10, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, 

Indian River County; Dan L. Vaughn, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

312018CF000330A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Cynthia L. Anderson, 

Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anesha Worthy, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Chiquita McGee appeals the sentences imposed for exploitation of an 

elderly or disabled adult of $50,000 or more, and scheme to defraud a 

financial institution, and she argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction 

to enter a restitution order after she filed her notice of appeal. The state 

correctly concedes error. See Marro v. State, 803 So. 2d 906, 907 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2002) (“A trial court does not have jurisdiction to hold a restitution 

hearing or enter an order of restitution after a notice of appeal has been 

filed.”) (quoting K.D. v. State, 779 So. 2d 468, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000))). 

The trial court did not announce a specified amount of restitution at 

sentencing, but the restitution orders entered after McGee filed her notice 

of appeal imposed specified amounts of restitution. If the trial court’s postappeal order merely memorialized its oral ruling, the court would have had 

jurisdiction to enter the order. See V.U.B. v. State, 189 So. 3d 303, 304 

(Fla. 2d DCA 2016). But, as we explain below, that is not what occurred.

McGee argues that the trial court is not permitted to reenter the 

restitution order on remand, but we disagree. After holding a restitution
2

hearing, the trial court announced McGee’s sentence, a prison term 

followed by probation with the condition that she pay restitution. The 

court announced it would enter a separate order for restitution, and it also 

announced that restitution would be paid in equal monthly installments. 

Eleven days later, and consistent with its oral pronouncement, the court 

entered a written order of probation providing as a condition of probation 

that McGee “will make restitution” to the victim named in the forthcoming 

restitution order and in the amount specified in that order, in equal 

monthly installments, “until the obligation is paid in full.” The court 

apparently reserved jurisdiction to enter a more detailed order of 

restitution. See Albury v. State, 779 So. 2d 423, 424 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) 

(recognizing that “no magic words are required” to reserve jurisdiction to 

impose restitution). McGee filed her notice of appeal, and afterward, the 

court issued restitution orders specifying the amounts owed to the two 

victims.

Under these circumstances, the court is permitted to reenter the 

restitution orders on remand. See V.U.B., 189 So. 3d at 304 (remanding 

for trial court to conduct another restitution hearing and to again impose 

restitution where a partial restitution hearing had been held but the 

hearing was continued, and V.U.B. filed a notice of appeal before the 

hearing could be concluded).1

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

MAY, CIKLIN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

1 The trial court does not need to hold another restitution hearing, as a full 

hearing was already held.