1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 07 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt he Re po rte ro f De ci sio ns fo r t he co nveni e nce of t he reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s DAN F O RT H v . MINN ESOTA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COUR T OF MINNESOTA No. 06–8 27 3. Ar g u ed Oc tober31, 200 7—Dec ided Febr uar y20, 2008 Afterthis Cour t announc ed a “new r u le” forev aluatingthe r e liabili tyo f

testi m on ial st atemen t s inc r imin a l c a se s, see Crawfordv. Washi n g
ton , 541 U. S. 36, 68– 69, pet i tion ersou gh tstate pos t c o n v ic tionr e lief, ar g u ingthat he was entit led to a new tr ial bec a use ad mit t ingthe v i c tim’ s t a ped interv iew at his tr ial v iolated Crawford’s rul e . The Min

nesota trial and appeal s co urts conclude d that Crawforddid not ap

ply retroactively under Tea guev. Lane , 489 U. S. 2 8 8

. Th e State Su pr eme Cou r t agr eed, an d also c o n c lu ded th at s tate c o u r ts ar e n o t free to give a decis i on of this Court a nnouncing anew c o ns titutional rule of criminal procedure broader r e tr oac t iv e applic ati o nth anth at given bythis Court. Held: Tea g ue does not c o nstr ain the author ityof stat e c o ur ts to giv e b r oa der effectt onew r u les of crim i nal procedure than isrequired by th at opin ion

. Pp. 4–27.

(a) Crawford a nnoun ced a“new rule”—a s defined b y Teague— b e ca us e it s res u lt“ w as not dictat edby precedent exis tingat the time the defendant’ s c o nv ic tion bec a me final,” Teagu e , 489 U. S., at 30 1 (plurality opin ion). It was n ot, however, a rule “of [this Court’s] own devising” or the product of it s own views ab o ut s o und policy, Craw

ford, 541 U. S., at 67. Pp. 4–6.

(b) The Cour t fir s t adop ted a “r etr o ac tiv i t y” stand a r d in Linkletter
v. Walker , 381 U. S. 618, 6 29, bu t la terr ejec t ed th at stan dar d for ca s e s pending on dire ctre vi ew, Griffithv. Kentucky , 479 U. S. 314, an d onfeder a l h abeas r e v i ew, Tea guev. Lane , 489 U. S. 28 8. Un der Teagu e, new constitutionalrules of criminal procedure may not be appliedretroactively to case s on federal h abeas review unless they plac e c e r t ain pr imar yin div idu al c o n d u c t bey o n dth e States’ powerto proscribe or are “watershed” ru les of criminal procedure

. Id., at 31 0 (plu r a lityopin ion)

. Pp. 6–11

.2 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Sy llabu s (c) Neither Li nklette rno r Teagu eexplicitly or impli c itly con

strained the State s ’ authority to pr ovide re medies for a broader range of c onstitutio n al v i ola t ions than are red r essable on fe deral habe as. And Teagu e makes c leartha tit s r u le was tailor e d to the feder a l ha

b e a s context and thus ha d no b e a r ing onwhether S t a t es could pro

vide b r oa der relief in t h eir own po stconviction proceedings. Nothing inJu stic e O ’ Con n o r ’ s g e ner a l n o n r etr o ac tiv ityr u le disc u ssioni n Teagu e asser t s orev en inti mate s tha the r definition of the class eligi

ble forr e lief u n dera n e w r u le sh ou ld in h ibit th e au th or ityof a st ate ag en c yorstat e c o u r t to ex te n da n e w r u le’ s ben e fitto a br oaderc las s t h a ns h e defined. Her opinion a l s oclearly indica t e s tha t Teague ’s g e ner a l nonr etr o ac tiv ityr u l ewas an ex erc ise of this Cour t’ s power to inter pr e t the feder a l habeas sta t ute. Sinc e Teag ueis based onstatu

tor yauthor ity that ex tends onlyto feder a l c o ur ts apply i nga feder a l sta t u t e, it c a n n o t be r e ad as impos in ga bin d in goblig ationonstat e courts. The o p inion’s text a n d reason ing also i llustra te that the rule was me ant to applyonly to feder a l c o ur ts c o nsider inghabeas pet i

t i ons cha llenging s t a t e-courtcrim i na l convict i ons . The federa l int e r est in uniform ity in the application of federal law does not outweigh the general principle that States are in dependent so vereigns with plenar yauthor ityto make a n d enforc e the i r own laws as long as they do not infringeon federal co nstitu t ion al g u ar an tees. Th e Teag ue rule was intended to li mit fe der a l c o ur ts’ author ityto ov er turn sta t e c o n v ic t ions not to limi ta sta t e c o ur t’ s authorityto gr ant r e lief forv iola

tions of new constitutiona ll a w r u les whe nreviewing its own State’ s convictions

. S u b s eq uent ca se s confirm this view. See, e.g., Bea r dv. Banks , 542 U. S. 406, 41 2. Pp. 11–1 8.

(d) Neither Michiga nv. Payne , 412 U. S. 47, n o r Am erican Tru c k

ing As s n s. , In c. v. Smith , 496 U. S. 16 7 , c a st dou b t onth e stat e court s ’ a u t h or it y t oprovide b r oa der rem e dies for federa l cons t i t u tion al v iolat io n s th anman dated by Teagu e . Pp. 18–24.

(e) No federal rule, either i m plicitly announced i n Teag u e , or in s o m eot her s o urce o f federa l la w, pr ohibits State s from giving broader ret r oa ct ive eff e ctt onew rule s of criminal procedure. Pp. 24–26. 718 N. W. 2d 4 51, r e v e r s ed an d r e man ded.

S TEVENS , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which S CALIA , S OUTER , T HOMAS , G IN SB U R G , B REYER , a n d ALITO , JJ., joi n ed. R OBERT S , C. J., filed a dissenting opinion , in which K ENNEDY , J., joined._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt

NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma l revisi onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–8 27 3
STEP HEN DANFORT H , PETITIONER v. M I NNESOTA ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COUR T OF MINNESOTA [Febr u ar y20, 200 8] J USTICE S T EVEN Sdelivered the opi nion of the Court. New constitutional rules anno unc ed by this Court tha t place certain kinds of primary in dividual conduct beyo nd the power of the States to proscribe, as well as “wate r shed” rules of criminal procedure, must be applied in all future trial s, all cases pending o n direct review, and all federal habeas corpus proceedin gs. All other new rules of criminal procedure must be applied in futu re trials and i n cases pending on direct review, but may not provide th e basis for a federal collateral a ttack on a state-court convic

tion. This is the substance of the “ Te aguerul e ” described by Justice O’Connor i nher plurality opinionin Tea g uev. Lane , 489 U. S. 288 (1989). 1 The question in this case is whether Teag ue constr ains the authority of st ate courts t o

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1 Although Te ag u ewas a pl urality opinio n that drew s u pport from only four Me mbers of the Cour t, the Te ague rule wa s a ffirm ed a n d applied bya major ityof the Court short l y thereafter. See Penryv. Lynaugh , 492 U. S. 302, 31 3 (19 89) ( “ Bec a u s e Pen r yis befor eu s on colla t e ra l review, wem u s tdet e rm ine, a s at h res h old m a tt er, whet h e r gra n ting him the relief hes eeks would crea t e ane w rule. Und e r Teagu e , new rules will not be applied orannounced in cases on collat

eral review unless they fal linto one of two exceptions” (citation an d inter n al quota t ion mar k s om itted)).2 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt give broade r effect to n e w rules of criminal pr ocedure tha n is required by that opi nion. We have never s uggested th at it does, and now hold that it does not. I In 1996 a Minnesota jury found petitioner Stephen Danforth guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. See Min n. Stat. §609.342, subd. 1(a) (1994). The 6-year-old victim did not testify at trial, but the ju ry saw and heard a videotaped interview of the child. O n appeal from his conviction, Da nforth argued that the tape’s admission vio l ated the Sixth Amendment’s guaran

tee that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the a ccused shall enjoy the r i ght . . . to be co nfronted with th e witnesses against him.” Applyi ng the rule of admissibility set forth in Ohiov. Roberts , 448 U. S. 56 (1980), t he Minnes o ta Court of Ap peals concluded thatt he tape “ w a s sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evid ence,” and affirmed th e conviction. Sta t ev. Danforth , 573 N. W. 2d 369, 375 (1997). Th e conviction became f i nal in199 8 when the Minnesota Supreme Court deniedreview an d petitioner’s time for filing a writ of certiorari elapsed. See Caspa riv. Bohlen , 510 U. S. 383, 390 (1994). After petiti oner’s convicti on had become fin al, we an

nounced a “new rule” for evaluating the reliability of testimonialstatements in crimina l cases. In Cra wfordv. Washin gton , 541 U. S. 36, 68–69 (2004), we held that where testimonial statements ar e at issue, “the only in

dicium of reliability sufficien t to satisfy constitutional demands is the on e th e Consti tution actually prescribes: confrontation.” Shortly thereafter, petitionerfiled a state postconviction petition, in which he argued that h e was entitl ed to a new trial because the admission of the taped interview violated the rule an nounced in Cra wford. Applying th e standards set forth in Tea g ue, the Minnesota trial court and th e3 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that Cra wforddid not apply to petitioner ’s case. The State Supreme Court granted re view to co nsider two arguments : (1) that the lower courts erred in holding that Cra wford did not apply retroactivel yunder Te ague;and (2) that the state court was “f ree t o apply a b r oader retr oactivity s t andard than that of Tea g ue ,” and should apply the Crawfordrule t o petitioner’s case even if federa l l a w did not req u ire it to do so. 718N. W. 2d 451, 455 (2006). The court rejected both arguments. Ibid. With respect to the second , the Minnesota court held that our decisions in Michiganv. Payne , 412 U. S. 47 (1973), American Truck ing Assns., Inc. v. Smith , 496 U. S. 167 (1990), and Teagu e itself establish thatstate courts are not free to give a S upreme Court decision announcin g a new constitutional rule of crim i nal procedure broader retroactive application than that gi ven by this Court. 2 The Minnesota Court ackn owledged that other state courts had held t hat Tea g uedoes not apply to state postconvic

tion procee dings, 3but concluded that “we are not free to

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2 The rele vant passage in the Mi nnesota Supreme Court opinion sta tes:

“Dan for t harg u es th at Teaguedictates the limits o f retroactive applica t ion of new rules only in federal habeas corpus proceedings and does not lim it the retroactive applica t ion of new rules i n statepostco n viction procee dings

. Da nforth is in correc twhen he a s s e rt s t h a t s t a t e courts are f r e e to givea Supreme Courtdecis i on of fe dera l cons t i t u tional crimin a l procedure broader re troactive appl ica t ion than tha t given by the Supreme Court. .

. . In light of Paynean d Am erican Tr uck

ing Asso ciatio ns , we cannotapply s t ate retr oactivity principles when deter m iningthe r etr oac t iv i t yof a ne w rule of feder a l c o nstitutiona l criminal proce d ure if theSupreme Co urt has already provided relevant feder a l pr in c i ples.” 718 N. W

. 2d 451, 456 ( 200 6).

3 See, e.g., Da ni elsv. State , 56 1 N. E. 2d 4 8 7 , 489 (In d. 19 9 0 ); State ex rel. Taylorv. Whitley , 606 So. 2d 1 292, 1 296–1 297 (La. 19 92); Statev. Whitfield , 107 S. W. 3d 253, 266– 26 8 (M o. 2003); Colwell v. St a t e , 118 Nev

. 807, 816–81 9, 59 P. 3d463, 47 0– 471 (200 2) (per cu r i am ); Cowell v. Leapley , 458 N. W. 2d 514, 517 –5 18 (S. D. 1990).4 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt fashion ourown stand ard of retr oactivity fo r Cra wford .” 718 N. W. 2d, at 455–457. Our recentdecision in Whortonv. Bockting , 549 U. S. ___ (2007) , makes clear that the Minnesota court correc t ly concluded that federal law does not requirest ate courts t o apply the holding in Cra wford to cases that were final when that case was d e cided. Nevertheless, we granted certiorari, 550 U. S. ___ (2007), to consid er whether Tea g ueor any other f e deral rule of law prohibitsthem from doing so. 4 II We begin with a comment on the source of the “new rule” announced in Crawfor d

. F o r much of our Nation’s history, federal constitutio nal rights—such as the Sixth Amendment confronta t ion right at issue in Cra wford— were not binding on the States. Federal law, in fact, imposed no constraints on the procedures that state courts could or should followin imposin gcriminal sanctions on their citizens. Neither the Federal Constitution as origi

nally ratified nor any of the Amendments added by th e Bill of Rights in 1791 gave this Co urt or any o t her federalcourt powerto review the fairness of state criminal proce

dures. Moreover, before 1867 th e statutory authority of federal district courts to issu e writs of habea s corpus did not extend t o convicted criminals in state custo d y. See Ac t of Feb. 5, 1 867, ch. 28, §1, 14 Stat. 385. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment radicall y changed th e federal courts’ relationship with state courts. That Amendment, one of the post-Civil War Reconstruc

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4 We note at the outset that t h is case does not present the questions wh eth e rState s ar e r e qu ir edto a ppl y “watershed” rules in state po stconviction proceedings, whether the Te ag uerule a pplies to cas e s br ou gh t u n der 28 U. S. C. §225 5 (200 0 ed ., Su pp. V), or wh eth e rCon

gres s ca n a l t e r t h e r u les of ret r oa ct ivit y b ys t a t ut e. Accordin gly, we express no opi n ion on these issues.Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) 5 Opinion of theCourt tion Amendments rat i fied in 1868, is the source of this Court’s power to decide whet her a defenda nt in a sta t e proceeding received a fair trial— i. e. , whether his depriva

tion of libe rty was “without due process of law.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, §1 ( “ [N]or shall any State deprive an y person of li fe, liberty, or pr operty, without due process of law”). In construing that Amendment, we h ave held that it imposes minimum standards of fairness on the State s, and requires state criminal trials to provide defendan ts with prote c tions “implicit in the concept of ordered lib

erty.” Pa lko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937). Slowly at first, and then at an ac celerating pace in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the Court held that safegu ards afforded by the Bill of Rights—including a defen d ant’s Sixth Amendment right “to be conf ronted with the witnesses against him”—are incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are therefore bindin g upon the States. See Gideonv. Wainw r ight, 3 72 U. S. 33 5 (1963) (applying the Si xth Amendment right to counsel to the States); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403 (1965 ) (holding that “the Sixt h Amendment’s right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a funda

mental right and is ma de obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment”). Ou rinterpreta tion of th at basic Sixth Amendment righ t of co nfrontation has evolved over the years. In Crawfor d we accept ed the petitioner’s argument that the interpr e tation of the Sixth A m endment right to co n frontation that we had previously endorsed in Roberts , 448 U. S. 56, ne eded reconsideration because it “stray[ed] from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.” 541 U. S., at42. We “turn [ed] to the historical background of the Clause to understand its meaning,” id., at 43, and relied primarily on leg al develop ments that had occurred prior to the adoption of the Sixth A m endment to derive the correct inte rpretation. Id., at 43–50. We held that th e6 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt “Constituti o n prescribes a procedure for determining the reliability of testimony in crimina l trials, an d we, no less than the state courts, l ack au thori t y to replace it withon e of our own devising.” Id., at 67. Thus, our opinion in Cra wfor d announced a “ne w rule”—as t hat term i s defined in Tea g ue—because the result in th at case “ w a s not dictatedby prece d ent existing at the time the defendant’s co nviction became final,” Tea g ue , 48 9 U. S., at 301 (plurality opinion). It was not, however, a rule “of our own devising” or the pr oduct of our own views about soun d policy. III Our decision today must also be understood against the backdrop of our somewhat co nfused and confusing “retro

activity” ca ses decided inthe ye ars between 1965 and 1987. Indeed, we note at the outset that th e very word “retroacti vity” is misleading be cause it speak s in tempo r al terms. “Retroactivit y” suggests th at when we declare that a new const i tutional rule of criminal procedur e is “nonret

roactive,” we are implying that th e right atissue was not in existence prior to the date t he “new r ule” was a n nounced. But this is incorrect. As we ha v e already ex

plained, the source of a “new ru le” is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to cr eate new r u les of law. Accordin gly , the underlying righ t necessarily pre-exists our articul ation of the new rule. What we are actual l y determining when we assess the “retroac tiv i ty” of a ne w rule is not t he temporal scope of a newly announced right, but whether a violation of the right that occ u rred prior to the announ cement of t he new rul e will entitle a crimina l defendant to the relief sought. 5

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5 It may, therefore, make more sense to speak in terms of the “re

dressab ility” o f violations of new rule s, rather than the “retroactivity” of su c hru les. Cf. Am eri can T r uck i ng Ass ns ., Inc. v. Smith , 496 U. S. 167 , 201 (1 99 0) (S CALIA , J ., co nc urrin gin j u d g m e nt) (“ The v e ry f r a m ing o f7 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt Originally, criminal defendants whose convictions were final were entitled to fe deral habeas relief only if the court that rende r ed the ju dgment un der which they were in custody lac k ed ju risdic tion to do s o . Ex p arte Watkin s , 3 Pet. 193 (1830); Ex pa rte Lange , 18 Wall. 16 3, 176 (1874); Ex parte Si ebold , 100 U. S. 371, 3 76–377 (1880). 6 In 1915, the realm of violation s for which federal habeas relief would be av ailable to state prisoners was expanded to include state proceedings that “deprive[d] the accused o f his lif e or l iberty without due process of la w.” Frankv. Mangum , 237 U. S. 309, 335 (191 5). Inthe early 1900’s, however, s uch relief was only gr anted whenthe constit u tional viola t ion was so serious that it effecti vely rendered the convicti on void for lack of ju risdiction. Se e, e.g., Moore
v. Demp sey , 261 U. S. 86 (1923) (mob dom i nation of a trial); Mooneyv. Ho lo han , 294 U. S. 103 (1935) (per cu

riam)(k nowing use of perjured te stimony by the prosecu

tion); Waleyv. Johnston , 316 U. S. 101 (1942) (per curiam ) (coerced gui l ty plea). 7

—————— the issue th at we purport to decide tod a y—whether our decision in [ Am erica n Tr u ck i ng Assn s., I nc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 2 6 6 (198 7),] sh al l ‘apply’ retroactively—presupposes [a n inco rrect] view of ourdecis i ons as creating the law, as oppo sed to declari n g

wh at th e law alr e adyi s ” )

. Unfortunately, it would likely create, rathe rtha na llevia t e, conf us ion to change o u r te rminology at this point. Accordingly, we will continue t o utilize the existing vocabulary , despite its s h ortcomings.

6 Alth ou ghour post-1 86 7 c a se s r e flec te d a “softening” of the concept of jur isdic tion to embr ac e c laims that the sta t ute under which thepeti

tioner had be en convi c ted was uncon stit utional or tha tthe detentio n was b a sedon an illegal l y i m posed sente n ce, the Courtadhered to t h e bas icr u le th a th abe as was u n av a ilab le t or e v iew c laims of c o n s tit u tional er r o rthat didnot g ot othe tr ial c o ur t’ s jur i sdic tio n . See Bator , Finality in Cri m inal Law an d Federa l Habeas Corpus for State Prison

er s, 76 Harv . L. Rev

. 441, 471, 4 8 3 –48 4(196 3); Har t , Th e Su pr eme Cou r t 1958 Te r m , For e wor d: Th e Time Ch ar t of th e Ju stic es, 73 Harv . L. Rev

. 84, 103–1 04 (1 959).

7 “[I]n Waleyv. Joh n sto n , 316 U. S. 101 (1942), th e Cou r t open lydis

carded the co ncept of juris d iction—by then more [of] a fiction than8 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt The seriali ncorporation of the Amendments in the Bill of Rights during the 1950’s an d 1960’s imposed more constitutional obligations on the S t ates and created more opportunityfor claims that individuals were being con

victed wi th out due process and held in violation of the Constitution. Neverth eless, until 1965 the Court conti n ued to const r ue every constitu tional error, inc l uding newly announced ones, as en titling state prisoners to relief on federal habeas. “New” consti tutional rules of crimina l procedure were, witho ut discussion or analysis, routinely applied to cases on h abeas review. See, e.g
. , Jacksonv. Denno , 37 8 U. S. 36 8 (1964); Gideon, 37 2 U. S. 33 5; Eskrid gev. Washing t o nBd. of Prison Terms and Paroles , 357 U. S. 214 (1958) (per curi am)

. In Linkletter v. Walk er , 381 U. S. 618 (1965), the Court expressly c o nsidered the issue of “retroacti v i ty” for the first time. Adopting a practical ap proach, we held that th e retroactive effect of each new rul e should be determined on a case-b y-case basis by exami ning the purpose of t he rule, the reliance of the States on the prior law, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive appli

cation of the rule. Id., at 629. Applying tho s e consider a tions to the exclusiona ry rule announced in Mapp v. Oh io , 367 U. S. 643 (1961), we held that the Mapp rule would not be given retroactive effe ct; it would not, in other words, be applied to conviction s that were final before the date of the Mapp decis i on. 8 Linkletter , 381 U. S., at 636–

—————— anything else—as a touchstone of the availab ility of federal habea s r e v i ew, an d ac kn owledg ed th at su c hr e v i ew is av ai lab l e forc l aims o f disr eg ar d of the c o nstitutional rights of the accus e d . . . .” Wainwri ghtv. Sykes , 433 U. S. 72, 79 (19 7 7 ) (in t er n a l qu otationmar k s o m itted).

8 Linklett eraro s e in the conte x t of a deni al of federal habeas relief, so its holding was “necessaril ylimitedto convictions w h ich ha d b e co me final bythe ti me Mapp

. . . [was ] rendered.” Johnsonv. New Je rs ey , 384U. S. 7 19, 73 2 (1 96 6). We n o ted in Linklette r that Mapp was being applied to cas es that were s t ill pending o ndirect revie wat the ti me it
w a s dec ided, so th e issu e b e for eu s w a s ex pr esslylimi t ed to “w h e th er9 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt 640. During the next four years, application of theLinklette r standard produced stri kingly di ver g ent results. As Justic e Harlan pointed out in his classic dissent in Desis tv. United Sta t es, 394 U. S. 244, 257 (1969), one new rule was applied to all cases subject to d i rect revie w , Tehanv. United Sta t es ex re l. Sh ott, 382 U. S. 406 (1966); another to all cases in which tri als had not yet commenced, John

sonv. Ne w Jers ey, 384 U. S. 719 (1966); another to all cases in which tainted evidence had not ye t been intro

duced at tr ial, Fuller v. Alask a, 393 U. S. 8 0 (1968) (p er curiam); and still others only to the party involved in the case in wh ich the new rule was announced and to a l l future cases in which the proscri bed official conduct h a d not yet occurred, Stov all v. Denn o, 388 U. S. 293 (1967 ); DeS t efano v. Woods, 39 2 U. S. 631 (1968) (percuriam). He reasonably questioned whether su ch decisions “may pro p erly be con s idered the legitimate produc ts o f a cour t o f law, rather than the commands of a sup e r-legislature. ” 394 U. S., at 259. Justice Ha rlan’s dissent in De si st , buttressed by his even more searching separate opinion in Mackeyv. United Sta t es , 401 U. S. 667, 675 (1971) (opinion concurring i n judgments in part and dissenting in part), and scholarly criticism, 9laid the groundworkfor the eventual demise of the Linkletter standa r d. In Griffithv. Ken t ucky , 479 U. S. 314 (1987), the Court rejected as “unprincipled and inequ i

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—————— the exclusionary principle enunciated in Mapp appl ie s to st ate c o u r t convictions which had beco me final befo re rendition o f our opinion.” 381 U. S., at 622 (footn o te omitted)

. S h ortly thereafter, howeve r, we held that the three-pronged Linklette ran aly s is sh ou ld be appl ied bo t h to convictionsthat were final before rendition of our o p inions and to ca s e s t h atwere s t ill pending on directreview. S ee John son, 384 U. S., at 73 2; Stovall v. De nno , 388 U. S. 293 (19 6 7 ). 9 See, e. g. , Haddad, “Retroact ivity Shou ld be Rethough t”: A Call for th e En d of th e Lin k letterDoc t r i n e , 60 J. C r im. L., C. & P. S. 417 (196 9)

.10 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt table,” the application of the Link letterstandard to cases pending on direct revi ew. In Teague , Justi ce O’Conno r reaffirmed Griffi th’ s rejection of the Linkletterstandard for determi ning the “retroactive” applicability of new rules to state con victions tha twerenoty e t final and rejected th e Linkletter s t andard fo r cases pending on federal habeas review. Sh e adopted ( w ith a sign ificant modification) the approach a dvocated b yJusti ce Harlan forfederal collat

eral review of final state judgments. Justice O’C onnor endorsed a general rule of nonretroac

tivity forca ses on collateral review, statingt hat “[u]nless they fall within an exception to the gener al rule, ne w constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which h ave become final b e for e the new rules are announced.” 489 U. S., at 310 (plurality opinion). The opinion defined t w o exceptions: rules th at render type s of primary conduct “ ‘beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,’ ” id. , a t31 1, and “watershed” rules that “implicate the fundamental fairness of t he trial,” id. , at 311, 312, 313. 10 It is clear that Linkletter and th en Teagu econsidered what consti tutional violations m a yb e r e m e d i e do nf e d e r a l habeas. 11 They did not define the s c ope of the “new” con

stitutional rights the m selves. Nor, as we shall explain, did Linkletter or Tea gu e(or anyof the other cases relied upon by respondent and the Minnesota Supreme Court) speak to th e entirely separate question wheth e r Sta t es ca n provide remedies for vio l ations of th ese rights i n their own postconviction proceedings.

——————

10 Rules of t h e form er t y pe “a re m o re a ccura t e ly cha r a c t e rized a s su bst a n t iv e r u les n o t su bjec t to [ Tea gue ’ s ] bar .” Schrirov. S u mmerlin , 542 U. S. 34 8, 352, n

. 4 (2004 ).

11 Simil a r l y , Joh n son , and Grif fithv. Kentucky, 47 9 U. S. 314(19 87), defined the sc ope of consti tutional viol atio ns that would be remediedo n direct appeal.11 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt IV Neither Linkletter no r Teag uee x plicitly or implicitly constrained the authority of the States to p r ovide reme

dies for a broader ran g e of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas. Linkletter spo k e in broad terms about th e retroactive applicability of new rules to state convictions thathad become final prior to our announ cement of t he rules. Al though Linkletteraros e on federal habeas, the opinion did not rely on that proce dural posture as a factor in its holding or analysis. Ar

guably, the r efore, the approach it established might ha ve been applied with equal force to both federa l and state courts revi ewing final state conv ictions. Bu t we did n o t state—and the state courts did not conclude—that Linklet

ter imposed such a limitation on the States. 12 A year after deciding Linkletter , we granted ce rtiorari in Johnsonto address the retroact i vity of th e rules an

nounced in Escobedov. Illinois , 37 8 U. S. 478 (1964), an d Mirandav. Arizona , 3 84 U. S. 43 6 (1966). Applying the standard a nnounced in Linkletter , we held th at those rul e s should be applied only to trials that began after the re

spective dates of thos e decision s; t hey were given no retro

-

——————

12 The dis s e ntis correctt h a ta tle as t one “though tful leg a l sc holar” believ e d th at Linklette rdid preclude State s from applying new consti

t u t i ona lrules m o re b r oa dly t h a nour ca s e s req u ired. Po s t , at 4 (c itin g Mis h kin, Fore word: The Hi gh Court, T h e Great Writ, and the Due Pr oc ess of Time an d Law, 79 Harv . L. Rev

. 56, 91, n

. 132 (1965 )). Notab l y , this c o mment wa s made in the c o ntex t of an att a c kon Linklet

ter’s prospective approach as inc o nsistent with the idea that judg es ar e
“b o u n db yab o d yo f f

i x e d , o v e r r i d i n gl a w . ” M i s h k i n , 7 9 H a rv . L

. R e v . , at 62. Moreo v er, the footnote cited by the dissent concludes with a sta t ement tha t“ t he r e serv ation to th e states of the power to app l y [new rules] to a ll co nvictions, .

. . is .

. . the preferable p a ttern.” Id., at 91, n

. 132. Ina ll e v en ts, ev enif Linklette rand its progeny rested on th e assump tion t h at “new r u les” of c o nstitut i onal law did not ex ist unti l a nnoun ced b ythis Court, th a tviewof the law was rejected when we endorsed Justi c e Harlan’s an alysis of retroactivity.12 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt active effec tbeyond th e parties in Mirandaan d Escobed o themselves. 13 Notably, the Oregon Supreme Court decided to give retroactive effect to Escobedo despite our holding in John

son. I n State v. Fai r , 2 63 Ore. 383, 502 P. 2d 1150 (1972), the Oregoncourt noted that it was continuing to apply Escobedor e troactivelyand correc t ly stated t hat “we ar e free to cho o se thedegree of re troactivity or prospectivit y which we b e lieve appropriate to t he particul ar rule und er consideration, so long as we giv e federal c o nstitutional rights at le ast as broad a scope as the United Sta t es Su

preme Court requires.” 263 Ore., a t387–388, 502 P. 2d, a t 1152. Ins o holding, t he Oregon court cited our language in Johnsonthat “ ‘States are still entirely free to effectuate under their own law stricter standa r ds than th ose we have laid down a n d to appl y those standards in a b r oader range of cases than is required by this decision.’ ” 263 Ore., at 386, 502 P. 2d, at 11 51 (quoting Johnson , 384 U. S., at 733). 14

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13 Th at same y e ar , we similar l yden i edret r oa ct ive effectt ot h e rule a nnoun ced in Griffi nv. California , 380 U. S. 609 (19 65), pr oh ibiti n g prosecutorial comment on the defend ant’ s failur eto test ify

. See Tehan
v. Unite dStates ex rel . Shot t , 382 U. S. 40 6 (1 966). Sh o r tlyth er eafter , in a case involving a Griffin er r or, we held forthe fir s t time that ther e ar e some c o nstitutionaler r o r s thatdo not r e quir e the automa ticr e v e r sal of a conviction. Chap manv. Califo rnia , 386 U. S. 18, 22 (1 96 7)

. Both Shottan d Chapman protected the State of California from a potential l y massive exodus of state prisone r s because their prosecutors and judges had routinely co mmented ona defendant’ s failur eto testify

.

14 Althoughthe plain meanin g of this language in Jo hnso n is th at a sta t e c r e atin git s ow nsu b s t a n t iv e st an da r d s c a nbe as g e n e r o u s w ith t h eir ret r oa ct ive effecta s itwis h es , cou r t s a n d com m e nt a t ors b o th befor ean d aft e r Teag uev. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 ( 1 9 89), c ited th is l a n guage in support of the proposition th at sta te c o u r ts “ mayapplyn e w cons t i t u t i ona l s t a n da rds ‘in ab r oa der ra nge of ca s e s t h a nis req u ired’ byth[is] Cour t’ s dec i sion not to apply the standards retroactively.” Colwell v. Sta t e , 118 Nev

. 8 07, 8 18, 59 P. 3d 46 3, 4 7 0

– 471 (20 02) (per curiam );see a lso St ith , A Con t r a st of State and Federal Court Author

-13 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt Like Linkletter , Teag uearose on federal habeas. Unlike in Linkletter , however, this proce d ural posture was not merely a background fact in Te a g ue . A clo s e reading of the Te agueopinion makes clear that the rule it estab

lished was tailored to the unique c o ntext of federal habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States co uld provide bro ader relief in thei r own postconviction proceed

ings than required by that opinion. Bec ause the c ase before us now does not involve either of the “ Tea g ue ex c ep tions,” it is Justice O’Connor’s discussion of the general rule of nonretroactivit ytha tmer i ts the following th ree comments. First, not a word in Jus tice O’Connor’s discussion—or in either of the opinions of Justice H arlan that provided the blueprint for her entire analysis—asserts or even inti

mates that her definition of the class eligible for relief under a new rule shou ld inhibit t he authority of any sta t e agency or s t ate court t o extend th e benefit of a new rule to a broader class than she defined. Second, Justice O’Conn o r’s op inion clearly indicates that Tea g ue ’s ge neral rule of nonretroactivitywa s an exerci se of this Court’s po wer to inte rpret the federal habeas stat

ute. Chapter 153 of Title 28 of the U. S. Code gives federal courts the authority to grant “writs of habeas corpus,” bu t leaves unr esolved ma ny important question s about th e scope of available relief. This Court has int e rpreted th at congressional silence—along with the statute’s command to dispose of habeas petitions “as law and justice require,” 28 U. S. C. §2243—as an authorization to adjust the scope

—————— ityto Gr an t Habea s Rel i ef, 38 V a l. U. L. Rev

. 421, 44 3 (200 4). Th ir ty y e ar s afterd e c idin g Statev. Fair , the Orego nSupreme Court “di s av owed” th is an aly s is ba se d on our de cisions in Oregonv. Hass , 4 20 U. S. 714 (1 9 75), an d Am erican T r u c k i n g

As sns ., In c. v. Smith , 496 U. S. 167. Pa gev. Palmateer , 336 Or e. 37 9, 84P. 3d 1 3 3 (2 004). A s we explain infra , at 19, 20, i t s r e lian c e onth o s e c a se s wa s mispl a c e d, an d it s decis i on t o cha n gecou r se was therefore misguided.14 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt of the writin accor d a nce withequitable and pru d ential considerations. See, e.g., Br echtv. Abrahamson , 507 U. S. 619 (1993) (harmless-error standa r d); McCleskeyv. Zan t , 499 U. S. 467 (1991) (abuse-of-the-writ bar to relief); Wain wri ghtv. Sykes , 433 U. S. 72 (1977) (procedural default); Stonev. Powell , 428 U. S. 465 (1976) (cognizabil

ity of Fourth Amend m ent claims). Teagu e is plainly grounded i n this auth o rity, as th e opinion expressly situ

ated the rule it announced in thi s line of cases adjustin g the scope of federal habeas re lief in accordanc e with equi

table and prudential considerations. 489 U. S., at 308 (plurality opinion) (ci t ing, inter alia , Wai n wrigh tan d Stone). 15S i n c e Tea g ueis based on statutory authority

——————

15 S u b s eq uent decis i ons have cha r a c terized Teagu ein a similar fash

ion. See, e.g. , Brecht , 507 U. S., at 63 3, 634 ( s t a tin gt h at “indefin i n g the scope of th e writ, we look first to the c onsiderations underlying our h abeas ju r isp r u den c e,” an d iden tify in g Teagu eas ane x ample). An d in div idu al Ju stic es h av e beeneven more explicit. See Day v. McDo nough , 5 47 U. S. 1 98, 214 ( 2 0 06) (S CALIA , J., dis s e nting) (des crib

ing, i n ter alia , th e Tea gueru le as h av in g been“c r e ated byth e h abeas courts themselves, in the exercise of their traditional equitable discre

tion . . . beca us e [it was ] seen as necessary to protect the interests of com i t ya n d fina lit y t h a tfedera l colla t e ra l review of s t at e crim i nal proceedings necessarily im plicates ”); Withrow v. Willi ams , 507 U. S. 680, 6 99 ( 1 9 9 3 ) (O’ C on n o r , J., c o n c u r r i n gin par tan d di ss en tin ginpar t) (listing Teague as one il lustration of the pr inciple that “federal courts exercis i ng t h e i r hab e a s powers m a y refus et ogra n trelief on cert a i n cla i ms b e ca use of ‘prudentia l concer ns ’ s u c ha s eq uity a n d federa lism”); 507 U. S., at 7 18 (S CALIA , J ., con c ur ringinpa rt and dissenting in part) (sta tingthat Teagu e an d oth e r“g ateway s th r o u ghwhic ha h abea s petitioner must pass before proceedin gto the mer its of a c o nstitution al c l aim” ar e “g r o unded in the equitab l e disc r e tion of habeas c o ur ts” (in t er n a l qu ot ationm a r k s a n d br ac kets o m itted)); Teague , 489 U. S., at 3 1 7 (Whit e , J

. , concu rrin ginpa rt a n d conc urrin gin j u dg m e nt) (cha ra c ter i zing Teagu eas a deci sion“construing the reach of the habeas corp us s t atutes ” a n d contra s t ing i twith Griffit h , which “appear[s] to have c o n s titu tion alu n der pin n ing s”); 489 U. S., at 3 3 2 –33 3 (Br e n n a n , J., dissenting) (characterizing Teagu e as an u n w arr a n ted c h an g ein“[th is Cour t’ s] interpr e tation of the fe der a l h abeas st atu t e”); see also Mackey
v. Uni ted Stat es, 401 U. S. 667, 68 4 (19 7 1 ) (Har lan , J., c o nc u r r in gin15 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt that exten d s only to federal courts applyi ng a feder al statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts. Third, the text and reasoning of Justice O’Connor’s opinion al s o illustrate that the rule was meant to appl y only to federal courts consid ering habeas cor p us petitions challenging state-cour t criminal convictions. Justice O’Connor made numerous references to the “Great writ” and the “writ,” and ex pressly stat ed that “[t] he relevant frame of reference” for dete rmining the appropriate retro

activityrul e is defined by “th e purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is m ade availab l e.” 489U. S., at 306 (plurality opinion). Moreover, she justified the general rule of nonr etroactivityin pa rt by reference to comity and respect for the finalit y of state convictions. Federalism and comity considerations are unique to federal habe as review of state convictions. See, e. g., St a t ev. Precios e , 1 29 N. J. 451, 475, 609 A. 2d 1280, 1292 (1992) (explaining that comityand federalism co ncer ns “simply do not apply when this Court reviews procedu r al rulings by our lower courts”). If anything, considerations of comi ty militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habe as relief to a broader class of individuals than is required by Teag ue . And while finality is, of course, implicated in the context of state as well as federal habeas, fin ality of state convictions is a stateinterest, not a federal one. It is a matter that States should be free to evaluate, and weigh the impor

tance of, when prisone r s held in s t ate custody are seek ing a remedy f o r a violation of federal rights b ytheir lower courts. The dissent correctl y p o ints out that Te agu ewas also grounded in concerns over uniformity and the inequity inherent in the Linkletter approach. There is, of course, a

—————— judgments in part and di ssenting in part) (describing th e problem of
r e tr oac t iv ityas “a pr oblem a s to the sc ope of the habeas wr it”).16 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt federal interest in “reducing th e inequity of haphazard retroactivity standards and disu niformity in the applica

tion of federal law.” Post , at 12. This interest in unifor m ity, however, does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovere igns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal con s titutional guarantees. The funda

mental interest in federalism t hat allows individual States to define crimes, punishments, rules of evidence, and rules of criminaland civil procedure in a variety of differen t ways—so long as they do not violate the Federal Constitu

tion—is not otherwise limited by any genera l, undefined federal interest in unif o rmity. Nonuniformity is, in fact, an unavoidable realityin a feder alist system of govern

ment. Any State could surely have adopted the rule of evidence de fined in Crawford under state law even if tha t case had never been decided. It should be eq ually free to give its citi zens the benefit of our rule in any fashion that does not off e nd federal law. It is thus a bundantly clear that th e Tea g ue ru le of nonretroactivit ywas fashi o ned to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into sta t e criminal proceedings. It was intended to limit the author

ity of feder a l courts to overturn state convict i ons—not t o limit a state court’s authority to g r ant relief for violations of new rules of constitutionallaw when reviewing its own State’s conv ictions. 16

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16 The lowe r fed eral courts have also applie d the Tea gue r u le to mo

t i ons t ova cate, s e tas ide, or cor r ectafedera l s e nt ence purs ua ntt o28 U. S. C. §2255 (2000 ed., Su pp. V). Mu ch of th e r e ason in gapplic able to applica t ions f or writs of habeas co rpus filed purs ua nt to §22 5 4s e ems equally appl icable in the cont ext of §2255 motions. See United Stat esv. Hayman , 342 U. S. 205 (19 5 2 ) (ex plain in g th at § 225 5 wa s en ac ted as a functiona leq uiva lent for h ab e as corpus to a llow federa l pris oners to b r ing acolla t e ra l a t ta ck in the cou r tt h a t im pos e d t h e sent ence ra t h e r th ana c o u r t th at h a ppen e d to be n e arth e pr ison).17 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt Our subseq uent cases, which cha r acterize the Tea g ue rule as a s t andard li miting only the scope of federal ha

beas relief, confirm tha t Teag uespeak s only to the conte x t of federal h abeas. See, e.g., Be ardv. Banks , 5 42 U. S. 40 6, 412 (2004) (“ Te ague ’s nonretroact i vity p r inciple acts as a limitation on the powe r of federalcourts to grant habea s corpus relief to state pr isoners” (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, an d brackets omitted)); Cas p ar i , 510 U. S., at 38 9 (“The [Tea gue] nonret roactivity p r inciple preventsa fed

eral court from granti ng habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner based on a rule announ ced after h i s conviction and sentence became final”). It is also noteworthythatfor many years followin g Tea g ue , sta t e courts almost univ e rsally understood the Tea g ue rul e as binding only fe deral habeas courts, not state courts

. See, e.g., Cowell v. Le a p le y , 458 N. W. 2d 514 (S. D. 1990); Preciose , 1 29 N. J. 45 1, 609 A. 2d 1280; State ex rel. Sch m elzer v. Murphy , 201 Wis. 2d 246, 256–257, 548 N. W. 2d 45, 49 (1996) (choosin g of its own volition to adopt the Tea g ue rul e ); but s e e Statev. Egelhoff , 272 Mont. 114, 900 P. 2d 260 (1995). 17 Commentators were similarly confident that Tea g ue ’s “restrictions appl[ied] only to fed e ral habeas cases,” leaving States free to “de

termine whether to follow the federal courts’ rulings on retroactivit yor to fashion rules which respond to the unique con c erns of th at state.” Hutton, Re troactivity in the States: The Impact of Tea g uev. Lane on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 Ala. L. Rev. 421, 423–424, 42 2– 423 (1993). In sum, the Te agu edec i sion limits the kinds of constitu

tional viola t ions that will entitle an individual to relief on

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17 Today, the m a jority of stat e courts still r e ad Teagu e t h i s w a y . A s far as we can tell, only three State s—Minnesota, Oregon, and Mon

tana—have ad opted a contrary view. See Page , 336 Or e. 379, 84P. 3d 133; Egelhoff , 272 M o n t . 114 , 900 P. 2d 260

.18 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt federal hab eas, but does not inany way limit the authority of a state court, whe nreviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation that is deemed “nonretroactiv e ” under Te ague
. V The State contends that two of our prior decisions— Michiganv. Payneand Ameri can Truckin g

A ssns., Inc. v. Smith—cast doubt on state courts’ authority to provide broader remedies for federal co ns titutional violations tha n mandated by Te ague. We disagree. A In Michiganv. Pa yne , 412 U. S. 47, we cons idered the retroactivit yof the rule proh ibiting “vindicti v e ” resentenc

ing that had been a nnounced in our opin ion in Nor t h Carolinav. Pearce , 395 U. S. 711, 723–726 (1969). 18R e l y ing on the approach se t forth in Li nkletter an d Stovall, we held that the Pearce rule did notapply because Payne’s resentencing had occurred prior t o Pearce ’ s d a t e o f d e c i

sion. 19We therefore re versed the judgment o f the Michi

gan Supreme Court, which had applied Pearceret r oac -

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18 In Pea r ce , we held: “[W]henever aj u dge impos e s a more s e vere s e ntence upon adefenda n t aftera n e w tr ial, th e r e aso n s forh is doin gso mu st af fir m ativ elyap pear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concern

ingidentifiab l e c onduc t on the par t of t h e defenda n toccurrin ga f t e r t h e time of the original sentencing pro c eeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentenc e is based mu st be made p a r tof the r e c o rd, so that the c o nstitutiona lle gi timac yof the increased sentence may be fully re viewed on appeal.” 395 U. S ., at 726.

As the c o ncurrenc e pointed out, so me State s already provided equiva

lent or broader protection agai ns t vindictive s entencin g
. S ee id

. , at 733 –7 34, n

. 4 (opin i onof Douglas, J.).

19 Given the fact that Payne’s appealwas s t ill pending on that date, howeve r, the res u lt would have b een dif f erent and the views of th e dissenting Ju stices would h ave preva iled if the case had been decide d a f

t e r our decis i on in Te ag ue .19 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt tively, and remanded for further p r oceedings. At first blush the fact that we rev e rsed the judgment of the Michigan court a ppears to lend support to the vi e w that state courts may not give greater retroac tive effect to new rules announced by this Court than we express l y authorize

. But, as our opinion in Payne note d, the Mich i

gan Supre m e Court had applied the Pearce rule retroac

tively “ ‘pending clarification’ ” by this Court. 412 U. S., a t 49. As the Michigan Court expla i ned, it had applied the new rule in the case b e fore it in order to give guidance t o Michigan trial courts concerning what it regarded as an ambiguity in Pearce’ s new rule. 20 The Michigan Court did not purpor tto make a definiti ve ruling on the retroacti vit y of Pear ce; n o r did it pu rport to ap ply a broad e r state rul e of retroactivity than required byfederal law. Our opinion in Payne did not require the Michigan Supre m e Court t o modify its disposition of the case; it simply remanded for further p r oceedings after providi n g the clar ification tha t the Michiga n Court sou ght. Mostsignificantly, other tha n

——————

20 The relevantfootnote in the Mi chigan Supreme Cou r t’s opinion explained: “The United S t ate s Supreme Co urt ha s not yet decided whether Pearce is to be app lie d retroactively. Al thoughthe Cour t twic e gr anted c e r t io

rari to consid er the questio n , in ea c hc a se th e w r it w a s su b s equ e n t l y dismi ssed as improvidently granted. Moo nv. Ma rylan d , cer t gr ant e d (196 9), 39 5 U S 97 5, writ dis m issed(1970), 398 US 319; Odom v. United States , ce rt granted (1970), 399 U S 90 4, writ dism is sed (1970), 4 00 U S 23. We dec l i n e to pr edic t the high Cou r t’ s an sw erto the question of Pearce ’ sretroa ctive or prospective a pplic ati o n , bu t we wil l apply Pearce in the present case in order to instru c tour tr ial c o ur ts a s to the M i c h i

gan interpretation of an ambiguous portion of Pearce , di sc u ssed Infra , pending clarification by the Un ited State s Supreme Court.” Pe o p lev. Payne , 386 M i c h . 84, 90 –91 , n . 3, 191 N. W. 2d 375, 37 8, n

. 2 (1 97 1) (citations o m it ted). See a l so Reply Brief f or Petitioner in Mic h iganv. Payne , O. T. 197 2, No. 71– 100 5, p. 4 (“Peoplev Payne , 386 M i c h84, 191 N W 2d 3 7 5 (19 71) ex pr esslywith h e ld r u lin gonth e r e tr oac t iv i t y of Pearcebutapplie d i tt o Paynet oins t ructt he lower cou r t s in Michiga n” )

.20 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt the fact th at the case was remanded for further proce e d

ings, not a word in our Payne opinion suggests that the Court inten d ed to proh ibit state courts from a p plying ne w constitutional standards in a broader range o f cases than we require. 21 Notably, at least some state co urts contin ued, after Payne , to adopt and apply broader standards of retroactiv

ity than re quired by our decisions. In Pennsylvania v. McCormick , 359 Pa. Super. 461, 470, 519 A. 2d 442, 447 (1986), for example, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania chose not to follow this Court’ s nonretroactivity holding in Allen v. Ha rdy , 478 U. S. 255 (1986) (per cu riam)

. The Pennsylvania court correctly ex pl ained that our decision was “not binding auth o rity [in part] because neither the federal northe state constitu tion dictate whi c h decisions must be given retroactive e ffect.” 359 Pa. Super., at 470 , 519 A. 2d, at 447. B In America n Truckin g

Assns., In c. v. Smi t h , 496 U. S. 167, petitioners challenged the constituti onality of an Arkansas s t atute enacted in 1983 that imposed a dis

criminatoryburden on interstate truc k ers. While their suit was pending, this Court decla r ed a virtu ally identical Pennsylvania tax unconstitutional. See Ame r ican Truck

ing As sns., Inc. v. Sc heine r , 483 U. S. 266 (198 7). Shortl y thereafter, the Arkans as Supreme Court struck down th e Arkansas tax at issue. The primary issue in Smith was whether petitioners were entitledto a refund of taxes that were assessed before the date of our decision in Scheiner.

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21 See Am erica n Truck i n g

As s n s., In c. v. Smit h , 496 U. S., at 21 0, n

. 4 (S TEVENS , J., dis s e nting) (“Paynedoes not stand forthe expansive proposition th at federal l a w limit s th e rel i ef a State may provide, but only for t h em o re na rro w pr opos it ion t h at as t at e court ’ s decis i on t h at a par t ic ular r e medyis c o nstitution a lly required is itself a feder a l question”).21 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt The Ar kan s as Court held that petitioners were not entitled to a refund because our decision in Scheiner di d not apply retroactivel y . Fo ur Members of this Court agreed. The plurality opinion con c luded that federal law did not pro vide petitioners with aright to a r e fund of pr eScheiner ta x payments because Scheiner di d not apply retroactivel yto invali date th e Ar kansas ta x p r ior to i t s date of deci sion. FourMembers of this Cou rt dissented. The dissen t ing opinion argued that the case actually raised both the substantive question whether the ta x violated the Commerce Clause of t he Federal Constitution and the remedial question whether, if so, the petition ers were entitled to a refund. The dissent con c luded as a matter of federal law that the ta x was inval i d during t h e years before Scheiner , and that pe titioners were entitled to a decisionto that effec t

. Whetherpetitioners should get a refund, however, the dissent deemed a mixed question of state and federal law that should be decided by the state court in the first instance. J USTICE S CALIA concur red with th e plurality’s judgmen t because he disagreed with the substantive rule announced in Scheiner, but he did not agree with the pl urality’s re a soning. Af ter statin g that his views on retr oactivitydi

verged from the plurality’s “ina funda m ental way, ” J USTICE S CALIA explai ned: “I share [th e dissent’s] perception that prospective de

cisionmaking is incompatible with the jud i cial role, which is to say wha tth e law is, not to p r escri be wha t [the law] shall be. The very frami ng of the is sue that we purpor tto decide t o day—whet her our dec i sion in Scheiner shall ‘apply’ retroactiv e ly—presup p oses a view of our decisions a s crea ting the law, as opposed to decla r in g what the law already is. Su ch aview is contrary to that unders t anding of ‘the judicial Power, ’ U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1, which is not only the com

-22 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt mon and traditional one, but which is the only one that can ju stify courts in denying force and effect to the unconstitutional en actments of duly elected legis

latures, see Marburyv. Madison , 1 Cranch 137 (1803)—the very exerci se of judicia lpower asserted in Scheiner

. To hold a governmental Act to be unconsti

tutional is not to announce that weforbid i t , but that the Consti t u tionforbids it; and when, as in this case, the constitutionality of a state st atute is pla c ed in is

sue, the qu estion is n o t whether some decisio n of ours ‘applies’ in the way that a law applies; the qu estion is whether th e Constitution, as interpreted in that deci

sion, inval i d ates the s t atute. Since the Con stitution does not ch ange from year to year; since it does not conform to our decisions, but ourdecisions are sup posed to conform to it; the notion that our int e rpreta

tion of the Constitution in a particular decision could take prospective form does not m ake sense. Either enforcemen tof the statute at issuein Scheiner(which occurred be fore our decision there) was unc onstitu

t i o n a l , o ri tw a s n o t ; i f i tw a s , t h e ns o i s e n f o r c e m e n t of all id entical statutes in other States, whe t her oc

curring bef o re or after our decision; and if it was not, then Schein er was wro n g, and the issue of whether to ‘apply ’tha tdecision needs no further attention.” American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith , 496 U. S., at 201. Because J USTICE S CALIA’s vote rested on his disagreement with the su bstantive rule announ ced in Scheiner —ra t her than withthe retroactivity an alysis in t he dissenting opinion—there were actually five votes supporting the dissent’s views on the retroactivit yissue. Accordingly, i t is the dissent rather th an the plur ality that s hould inform23 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt our analysis of the issu e before us today. 22 Moreover, several years later, a majority of this Cour t explicitly adopted the Smithdissent’s reasoning in Harp e r v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation , 509 U. S. 86 (19 93). H a rper , like Smith , involved a request for a refund of taxes paid before we declared a similar M i chigan tax unconstitu

tional. We held that the Virginia tax at issu e in Harpe r was in fact invalid—even before we declare dthe similar tax unconstitutional—but that this did not necessarily entitle the petitioners to a full refund. We explained that the Constit ution required Vir ginia to “ ‘pro vide relief con

sistent with federal due process principles,’ ” 509 U. S., at 100 (citing American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S., at 18 1), but tha t“ ‘aSta t e found to have imposed an impermissibly discri minatory tax retains flexibility in responding to this dete rmination’ ” under the due process clause, 509 U. S., at 10 0 (citing M cKesson Cor p . v. Divi sion of Alcoholic Bev era ge s and Toba cc o, Fla. Dep t . of Busin e s s Regulation, 496 U. S. 18, 39–40 (1990)). We left to the “Virginia courts this question of state law and the pe r formance of other tas k s pertaining to the c r afting of a ny appropriate remedy.” 509 U. S., at 102. An d we specifi

cally noted that Vi rginia “ ‘is free to choose which form o f relief it will provide, so long as that relief satisfies the minimum f e deral requirements we have outlined.’ ” Ibid. (citing McK esson , 496 U. S., at 51 –52); see also 509 U. S., at 102 (“Sta t e law may provide relief beyond the demands of federal due process, but under no circumstances may i t confine petitioners to a lesser remedy” cita tions omitted)). Thus, to th e extent th at these civil retroact i vity deci

sions are r e levant to the issue before us t o day, 23they

——————

22 While the opinions discusse d at gr ea tlen gt hour ea rlie r ca s e s ra is

ing retroactivity issues, non e of th em su g g e sted th a t fe der a l laww o u ld prohibit Arka nsas from ref unding the tax e s at i ssu e if it w a n t edto do so.

23 The petitioners and th e dissen t er s in Am erican Tru c k i ng Assn s.,24 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt support our conclusion that the remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations o f the Federal Constitution is primarily a question of state law. Federal law simply “sets certain minimum requirements that States must meet but may exc eed in providing appropriate relief.” American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith , 49 6 U. S., at 1 78–179 (plurality opinion). They provide no support for the proposition that fe deral law places a limit on state authority to provide remedies for federal constitu

tional violat ions. VI Finally, while the State acknowledges that it may gran t its citizens broader protection than the Federal Constitu

tion requires by enacting appropriate legislation or by judicial interpretation of its own Constitution, it argues that it may not do so byjudi cial misconstructio n of federal law. Orego nv. Hass , 420 U. S. 714 (1975)—like our early decisions in Ablemanv. Booth , 21 How. 506 (1859), and Tarbl e’s Ca se , 13 Wall. 397 (1872)—provides solid support for that proposition. But the States that give broader retroactive effect to t h is Co urt’s new rules of criminal

—————— Inc. v. Smit h relied heavily on separate op in ion s au th or ed byJu stic e Har lan , an d onth e Cour t’ s then-rece n t o p inion in Grif fith, 479 U. S

. 314, su ppor t i n gth e pr opositionth at an e w c o n s titu tion al h o ldin g should be appl ied not only i ncases th at had not y e t been tr ied, but also in all cases s t ill pending o ndirect revie w. The plurality, howeve r, declined to follow Griffit hbecause of its vi ew that “there are important distinctions between the re troactiv e appl ication of civil and criminal dec i sions thatmake the Griffith rational e far less co mpelling in the c iv il sph e r e .” 496 U. S., at 1 97. Wh ile Ju stic e Har l anwou ld pr obabl y disagr ee w ithth e su g g e sti o nth at the d i stinction be t w een civil and crim i na l ca s e s provided a na ccept ab l e b a s is for refu s i ng t ofollow Griffit h in the Am erican T r uck i ng As s ns. , Inc. v. Smith litiga t ion, see Mack ey, 401 U. S., at 683, n

. 2 (opin ionc o nc u r r in ginju dg men t s inpar t and dissenting in part), if rel evant, that sa me di stinc t ionwould make i t appropriate to disregard th e plurality’s op inion in Amer ican Tr uck i ng Ass n s. , In c. v. Smithin this case.25 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt procedure do not doso by mi sconstruing the feder al Tea g ue standard. Rather, they have developed sta t e law to govern r e troactivityin stat e postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Whi t field , 107 S. W. 3d 253, 268 (M o. 2003) (“[A]s a matter of state law, this Court chooses not to adopt the Teagueanalysis . . .” ). The issu e inthis ca se is whether there is afederal rule, either i m plicitly an

nounced in Tea g ue , or i n some other source of federal law, that prohibits them from doing so. The absence of any precedent for the claim that Teag ue limits state collateral review cour ts’ authorit yto provid e remedies for federal constitutio nal violations is a sufficien t reason for c o ncluding that there is no such rule of federal law. That conclusion is confirmed by several additional considerations. First, if there is such a federal rule of law, presumably the Su pre m acy Clause in Article V of th e Federal Constitution would require all state entities—not just state judges—to complyw i t hi t

. W e h a v e h e l d that States can waive a Te aguedefense, during the course of litigation, by expressl y choosing not to rel yon it, see Collinsv. Youngblood , 497 U. S. 37, 41 (1990 ), or by fail

ing to raise it in a timely manner, see Schiro v. Farley , 510 U. S. 222, 228–229 (1994). It would indeed b e anomalou s to hold that state legislat ures and executives are not bound by Teag ue , bu t that state courts are. Second, th e State ha s not identified, and we cannot discern, the source of o u r authorit yto promulgate sucha novel rule of federal la w. While we have a m ple authority to control the administration of justice inthe feder al courts—pa r ticularly in their enforcement of federal legis

lation—we have no comparable supervisory authority over the workof state judges. Johnsonv. Fankell , 520 U. S. 911 (1997). And whil e there are federal interests tha t occasionallyjustify this Court’s d e velopmentof common

-26 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA Opinion of theCourt law rules of federal law, 24our normal role is to interpret law created by others and “not to prescribe what it sha ll be.” Americ a n Tru c kin g

Assn s., Inc. v. Smi t h , 496 U. S., a t 201 (S CALI A , J., concurring in judgment). Just as constitu

tional doubt may tip th e scales in favor of one constructio n of a statute rather thananother, so does uncertainty abou t the source of authority to im pos e a federallimit onthe power of state judges to remedy wrongful state convictions outweigh any possible policy arguments favoring the rule that respondent espous es. Finally, the dissent contends that t he “end result [of this opinion] is startling” because “two crimina l defendants, each of wh om commit t ed the sa me crime, at the sam e time, whose convictions became final on the same day, and each of whom raised an identical claim at the same time under the Federal Constitution” could obtain different results. Post, at 1. Th is assertion ignores the fact tha tth e two hypoth etical crim i nal defendants did n o t actually commit the “same cri me.” Theyviolated di fferent stat e laws, were tried in an d by differe nt state sovereigns, and may—for m any reasons—be subj ect to differe nt penalties. As previou s ly noted, such nonuniformity is a necessary consequenc e of a feder alist system of government. VII It is important to keep in mind that our jurisprudenc e concerning the “ret r oactivity” of “ n ew rules” of constitu

tional law is primaril y conc erned, not with the question whether a constitutional viol ation occurred, but with th e

——————

24 See Boylev. United Te chn o logiesCorp. , 487 U. S. 500, 504 (19 88) (“[W]e have he ld that a few areas, involving ‘uniquely fede ral interests, ’ ar e so c o mmit t ed bythe Constitution andlaws of the United States to federal control thatst ate la w is pr e-emp t ed and repl aced, where nece s s a ry, b yfedera l la w of acont entpres crib e d .

. . b yt h e court s—s o-ca lled ‘federal common law’ ” (c it a t ion omi tted)) ; United Stat esv. Kimbell Foods, Inc. , 440 U. S. 7 1 5 (19 79); Banco Na cional de Cubav. Sabbatin o , 376 U. S. 39 8 (196 4).27 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt availability or nonavailability of remedies. The former is a “pure question of federal law, our resolution of whic h should be applied uniformly throu ghout the Nation, while the latter is a mixed question of state and federal law.” American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith , 496 U. S., at 205 (S TEVENS , J ., dissentin g). A decision by this Court that a ne w rule does not apply retroactivel yunder Teag uedoes not imply that there was no right an d thus no violation of that righ t atthe time of trial—only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas cou rts. It is fully consistent with a government of laws to recognize that the finality of a judgment may bar relief. It would be quite wr ong to assume, however, tha t the question whether constituti onal violations occurred in trials cond ucted befor e a ce rtain date depe nds on how much time was required to comp lete the appellate process. Accordin gly , the judg ment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is reversed, and the ca se is remanded for fur

ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. A s was true in Michiganv. Payne, the Minnesota Court is free to rein state its ju dgment disposing of th e petitionf o r state postconviction relief. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–8 27 3
STEP HEN DANFORT H , PETITIONER v. M I NNESOTA ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COUR T OF MINNESOTA [Febr u ar y20, 200 8] C HIEF J UST I CE R OBER T S , with whom J USTICE K ENN E DY joins, dissenting. Some of ou r new rulings on the meaning of the United States Con s titution apply re troact i vely—to ca ses already concluded—and some do not. This Court has h e ld that the question whether a particular ruli ng is retroactive is itself a question of federal law. It is bas ic that whe n it comes to any such q uestion of federal law, it is “the province an d duty” of thi s Court “to say what t h e law is.” Marburyv. Madison , 1 Cranch13 7, 177 (1803). Sta t e courts are the final arbiters of their own state la w; this Cou rt is the fin al arbiter of federal law. State courts are therefore bound by our rulings on whether our cases construingfederal law are retroact i ve. The majority contravenes these bedrockpropositions. The end result is star tling: Of two criminal defendants, each of wh om commit t ed the sa me crime, at the sam e time, whose convictions became final on the same day, and each of whom raised an identical claim at the same time under the Federal Constitution, one may be execute d while the other is set free—th e first despite being correct on his cla i m, and the second beca use of it. T hat result is contrar yto the Sup r emacy Clause and the F r amers’ deci

sion to vest in “one supreme Court” the responsibility and authority to ensure the uniform ity of federal l a w. Because the Constitution requires us to b e more jealous of that2 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g responsibility and auth o rity, I respectfully dissent. I One year a fter Teag uev. Lan e , 4 89 U. S. 28 8 (1989)— our leading modern pr ecedent on retroactivit y

— Teag ue ’s author explained: “The determination whethe r a constitutional deci

sion of this Court is ret r oactive .

. . is a matterof fed

eral law. When ques t ions of sta t e law are at issue, state courts generally have the authority to determine the retroact i vity of their own decisions. The r e troac

tive applicability of a constitutional decision of this Court, however, ‘is every bit as much of a federal question a s what pa rticula r federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, wh at they guarantee, and whether they have been d e nied.’ ” America n Truckin g

A ssns., Inc. v. Smith , 49 6 U. S. 167, 177–178 (1990) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.) (quoting Chapmanv. California , 386 U. S. 18, 21 (196 7); cita

tion omitted)). For thatre ason, “we h a ve cons istently required that s t ate courts adhe re to our retroactivi ty decisions.” 496 U. S., a t 178 (citing Michiganv. Payne , 4 12 U. S. 47 (1973), and Arsenaul tv. Mass ach u setts , 393 U. S. 5 (1968) (per c u riam)). Ev en more rec e ntly, we held that the “Supremac y Clause does not allowfederal retroactivity d o ctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contraryapproach to retroactivit yunder sta t e law.” Ha rperv. Vi rginia Dept. of Taxation , 5 09 U. S. 86, 100 (1993) (citation omitted). Indeed, about the only point on which our retroactivit y jurispruden c e has been consistent is that the retroactivit y of new federal rules is a question of federal la w binding on States. Th e Court’s contrary hol d ing is based on a mis

reading of our precedent and a misunderstanding of the nature of retroactivit y generally.Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) 3
R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g A As the Court correc t lypoints out, before 196 5 we took for granted the proposition that all federal c o nstitutional rights, incl uding righ t s that rep r esented a break fro m earlier precedent, would be gi ven f ull retroacti ve effect on both direct and collateral review. That all changed with Linkletter v. Walke r , 381 U. S. 618 (1965). In that case, a Louisiana prisoner brought a federal habeas petition arguing that illegally seized evidence was introduce d against him at trial in violation of Mapp v. Oh io , 367 U. S. 643 (1961). Mapp , however, had beendecided after his conviction became final. Wegranted certiorari to decide whether th e Mapp ru le “operates retrospectively upon cases finally decided in the period prior to Mapp .” 381 U. S., at 61 9–620. In answering this question, we bro k e from our pa st pra ctice of assuming full ret r oactivity, hold

ing that “we are neith e r require d to apply, nor prohibited from apply i ng, a decision retrospectively.” Id. , at 629. Our analys is turned entirely on the nature and scope of the particul a r constitut i onal right at issue: “[W]e must .

. . weigh the merits and demerits [of retroactiv e application] in each case by looking to the pri o r history of the rule in question, its purpose a n d effect, a n d whetherretrospecti ve operation will further or retard its operation.” Ibid. U n der this framework, we held that Mapp wou l d apply only prospectively. 381 U. S., at 639–640. The next year, we decided Johnsonv. New Jersey , 384 U. S. 719 (1966). Joh nsonwas a direct app e al from the New Jersey Supreme Court’s denial of statecollateral relief. The precise question in J o hnsonwas whether t h e rules announced in Escobedov. Illinois , 378 U. S. 47 8 (1964), and Mirandav. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966), would apply to state prisoners whose convictions had become final before those case s were decided. In holding that Escob e doand Mirandashould apply only prospec

tively, 384 U. S., at 732, we imported Linkletter’s mode of4 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g retroactivity analysis into revi ew of state postconviction proceedings, 384 U. S., at 726–727. Finally, in Stovall v. Denno , 388 U. S. 293 ( 1967), we a nnounced that, for pur

poses of retroactivity a nalysis , “no distinction is justified between convictions now final, as in the instant case, a nd convictions at various stages of trial and direct review.” Id. , at 300. Thus, by 1 967, the Linkletteranalysis was applied in review of criminal convictions, whether final or not. No matter at what stage of proceed ings this Court considered a retroactiv i ty question, the issue was decided with refer

ence to the purposes and prac tic al impact o f the precis e federal right in question: “E achconstitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own dis t inct functi ons, its own back g round of precedent, and its own impact on the ad

ministration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine [to decide the retroactivit yissue] must inevitably vary with t h e [constitutional] dictate involved.” Johnson , supra , at 72 8. Because the question of retroa ctivit ywas so tied up with the nature and purpose of the underlying federal constitu

tional right, it would have been surprising i f any of ou r cases had suggested that Sta t es were free to apply ne w rules of federal constitutionallaw retroacti vely even whe n we would not. As one of the morethoughtful legal schol

ars put it i n discussing the effect of the Linkletteranalys is on state collateral review, “[i]f a s t ate gave relief in such a case on the exclusive authority of Mapp , unde rthe ra tion

ale of the Linkletter opinion it would presumably have been revers ed.” Mishk i n, Fo reword: The High Court, The Great W r it, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Re v. 56, 91, n. 132 (1965). Our prece d ents made clear that States could give greater substantive protection under their own laws than was available under f e deral law, and could give whatever retroactive effect to tho s elaws they wished. As the Court5 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g explained in Johnson , “[o]f course, States are still entirel y free to effe ctuate under their own law stricter standards than those we have laid down and to apply those sta n dards in a broader range of cases than is required by this decision.” 384 U. S., a t733. The clear implication of this statement was that States could apply their own retroac

tivity rules only to new substant ive rights “under their own law,” not to new federal rules announ ced by this Court. Thus, contr a ry to the Court’s vie w , our early retroacti v ity cases no where sugg ested that t he retroacti vity of new federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure was anything other than “a matter of federal law.” Daniel v. Louisiana , 420 U. S. 3 1, 32 (1975) (percuri a m )

. I ti s n o surprise, then, that wh en we held that a parti cular righ t would not apply retro actively, th e language in our opin

ions did notindicate that our decisions were optional. See, e.g. , Fuller v. Alaska , 3 93 U. S. 80, 81 (1968) (per cu riam) (the rule announced in Leev. Florida , 39 2 U. S. 37 8 (1968), “ is to be appliedonly to trials in which the evidence is sought to be introduc e d after the date of [ t h at] decision” (emphasis added)). And, of cours e , when we found that a state court erred in holding that a particular right should not apply r e troactively , the state court was bound to com

ply. See, e.g. , Kitchensv. Smith , 401 U. S. 847 (1971) (per curiam) ; M c Connell v. Rhay , 393 U. S. 2, 3–4 (1968) (per curiam) ; A rsenaul tv. Massa chuse tts , 393 U. S. 5, 6 (196 8) (per cu riam )

. Although nothing in our decisions suggested that sta t e courts could determine the re troactivity of new federal rules according to their own light s, we had n o opportunit y to confront the issue h e ad on until Michiganv. Payne , 41 2 U. S. 47 (1 973). 1 I n Payne , the defendant had argue d

——————

1 Payne c a me to us on dir e c t appeal, but a s noted, su pr a , at 4, we did not at the tim edisting u ish between direc ta ppea la n d colla t era l review6 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g before the Michigan S upreme Court tha this resentencing violated the rule we h ad announced in North Carolinav. Pearce , 395 U. S. 711 (1969). In considering this question, the state court noted t hat this Court had “no tyet decide d whether Pe arceis to be applied retroactively .” Peoplev. Payne , 386 Mich. 84, 90, n. 3, 191 N. W. 2d 375, 378, n. 2 (1971). Nevertheless, without so much as citing any fed

eral retroactivityprec edent, the court de c i ded that it would “app ly Pea rcein the present case in order to i n struct ourt r ial courts as to the Michigan interpretation of an ambiguous portion of Pearce . . . , pending clarification by the United States Supreme Court.” Id., at 91, n. 3, 19 1 N. W. 2d, at 378, n. 2. We granted certiorari in Payne on ly on the q uestion of retroactivit y , anddeci ded that Pe a r ceshould not appl y retroactivel y . In reversing th e contrary decision of th e state court, our language was not equivocal: “Since the resentencing hearing in this casetook place approximate l y two years before Pearce was decided, we h o ld that th e Michigan Supreme Court erred i n applying its proscrip

tions here.” 412 U. S., at 57. The majority argues that Paynedid not preclude States from applying retroacti vity ru les different from those we announced; rather, the argume nt goes, the Michigan Supreme Court simply elected to follow the federal retro

activity rul e , “pending clarification.” See ante , at 18–20. That is certainly a possible readin g of Payne , but not th e most plausible one. Th e Michigan Supreme Court did not purportto r e st its decis i on to apply Pea rceret r oactively on the federal Linkletter analysis, an d this Court’s reversal is most reasonably read as requiring state co urts to app l y our federal retroactivit ydecision s . N o t ab l y , t h i s i s n o tt h e first time Members of this Court have debated the mean

ing of Payne , with Tea g ue ’s autho r explainin gthat Payn e

—————— for purposes of retroactivity.7 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g supports th e proposition that “we have consistently re

quired that state courts adhere to our retroactivity deci

sions,” Am erican Tru c king , 496 U. S., at 178 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J .), and the author of today’s opinion disagreeing in diss ent, see id. , a t210, n. 4(opinionof S TEVE NS , J

. ). But whi c hever wa y Payneis read, it either offers no support for the majorit y ’s position, because the state courtsimply applied feder al retroactivity rules, or flatly rejec t s the maj o rity’s posi tion, because the state court failed to apply f e deral retr oactivity ru les, and was told by this Court that i tmust. Meanwhile, Justice Ha rlan had begun dissenting in ou r retroactivit ycases, pressing the view that new rules a n nounced by the Court should be ap plied in all cases not yet final, without regard to the analysis set forth in Linkletter

. See Desi stv. UnitedStates , 394 U. S. 244, 256–269 (1969); Mackeyv. United S t a t es , 401 U. S. 667, 675 –702 (1971 ) (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part). In Griffi thv. Kentucky , 4 79 U. S. 31 4 (1987), we abandoned Linkletter as it applied to cases still on direct review andadopted J ustice Harl an’s view in such cas e s. Noting tha tnonretroactivityon direct appe al “violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication” and that “s e lective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same,” 47 9 U. S., at 32 2, 323, we h e ld that “a new rule for the condu c t of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to al l cases, sta t e or fede ral , pending on direct re view or notye t final,” id ., at 328 (emphasis added). Just as in previous cases, Griffi thby its terms bound state courts to apply ou r retroactivit ydecisions. Two years after Griffithwas decid e d, we gran ted certio

rari in Ya te sv. Aiken , 484 U. S. 2 11 (1988). In that case, a South Ca rolina state habeas court had deci ded that our decision in Franci sv. Franklin , 471 U. S. 307 (1985), should notbe applied retroactive ly. If the authority o f8 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g state court s to apply their own retroactivit yrules were well establi s hed under our precedents—as the majority would have it, see ante , at 6–12—this case should have been easilydecided on the ground that whate v er the fed

eral retroactivity rule, the State c o uld adopt its own rule on the retr oactivity of newl y ann ounced federal constitu

tional standards. Instead, the State argued to this Court “that we should adopt Justi ce Harlan’s theory th at a newly announced constitutional rule should no t be applied retroactively t o cases pending on collateral review unless” the rule meet s certain crit e ria—the flip side of Justice Harlan’s view about cases on directreview th at we hadacceptedin Griffi th

. 484 U. S., at 215. Under that a p proach, th e State argued, Fran cis would not be applied retroactivel y on collateral review. 484 U. S., at 215. In response, we discussed Justice Ha rlan’s “dist i nction between direc t review and collateral r e view.” Ibi d

. W ef o u n d , h o w e v e r , that it was “not necess ary to determine whether we should

. . . adopt J u stice Harl an’s reasoning as to the retroacti vit y of cases a nnouncing new cons titutional rules to cases pending on collateral review,” id. , at 215–2 16, becaus e Franci sdid not announ ce a new rule. This Court went on, however, to address South Caro

lina’s alternative argu ment—thatit “has the authority to establish th e scope of its ow n habeas corpus proceedings,” which would allow it i n the case before the Court “ t o r e fuse to apply a new rule of federal constitutional law retroactivel yin such a proceeding.” 484 U. S., at 217

. This argument should sound familiar—whatever the federal retroactivity ru le, a State may establish its own retroactivit yrule for its own collateral proceedings. This Court reject ed that pro p osition, not only because it did not regard Fra ncisas a n e w rule, bu t also because the sta t e court did not “plac[e] any limit o n the issues that it will entertain in collateral proceedings.” 484 U. S., at 218. As9 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g this Court explained, if the state court “con s ider[s] the merits of the federal claim, it has a duty to gr ant the relief that federallaw requir e s.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Given all th is, the pres ent case sh ould come out the way it does only if Tea g ue changed the nature of retroactivity as a creatu r e of federal law binding on the States, and adopted the argument rejected in Yate s—that when it comes to retroactivit y , a State “has the authority to estab

lish the scope of its own habeas corpus proceedings.” Tea g uedid no such thing. B In Teague , we complet e d the project of confo r ming our view on the retroactivity of new rules of criminal proc e dure to those of Just ice Harlan. Justice O’Connor’s p l u rality op ini o n posedthe prob lemby not i ng, with mor e than a bit of understat ement, thatthe “ Linkletterretroac

tivity standard has not led to c o nsistent r e sult s.” 4 89 U. S., at 302. In light of these concerns, andbecause of “ ‘the important distinction bet w een dir e c treview and collat e ral r e view,’ ” id. , at 307 (q uoting Yates , supra , a t 215), we generally adopted Justic e Harlan’s approach to retroactivit y on collat e ral r e view , 489 U. S., at 310 , ju st as we hadpreviously adopte d his approach on direct review in Griffith

. The Linkletter ap proac hto retroactivity was thus over

ruled in fav o r of the Ha rlan approa ch in t w o st eps: Griffi th and Te agu e . There i s no dispute that Griffithis full y binding onStates; a new rule “is to be ap plied retroac

tively to all cases, state or federal , pending on direct re

view or not yet final.” 479 U. S., a t328 (emphasis added). Tea g ueis simply the other side of the coin, and it too should be binding in “all cases, state or federal.” The fact that Linkletter was ov erruled in two stages rather tha n one shou ld not lead to a different result. Indeed, Te ague did n o t purport to distinguish between10 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g federal and state collateral review. Justice O’Connor’s opinion not e d that “in Ya tes v. Ai k e n , we were asked to decide whether the rule announced in Francis v. Franklin , should be applied to a defendant on collateral review at the time that case was decide d,” b u t that we were able to decide the case on alternative grounds. 489 U. S., at 3 07 (citations omitted). This citation of Yate s—astate habeas case—makes clear that Teagu econ t emplated no difference between retroactivit yof new federal rules in state and federal collateral proceedings. Thus, our unqualified holding—that “[u]nless they fall within an exception to th e general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal proce

dure will not be applicable to those cases which have become fin al before the new rules are ann ounced,” 489 U. S., at 31 0—is enough to decide this case. Moreover, the reasons the Te agu eCourt provided fo r adopting J u stice Harl an’s view a pply to s t a t e as well as federal collateral review. The majority is quite right tha t Tea g ueinv o ked the interest in comity between the stat e and federal sovereigns. Id. , at 308. But contrar yto th e impression conveyed by the majority, there was more to Tea g ue tha nthat. Teaguealso relied on the interest in finality: “Application of consti tutional rules not in exis

tence at th e time a conviction became final seriously un

dermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of m uch of its deterrent e f

fect.” Id. , at 309. Th e Court res p onds by fl atly stating that “finality of state convictions is a sta t ein terest, not a federal one. ” Ante , at 15. But while it is certainly true that finality of state convicti ons is a state i nterest, that does mean it is n o t als o a f e de ral one. After all, our deci

sion in Griffith made finality the t o uchstone for retroacti v ity of new federal rules, and bou n d States to that judg

ment. See 479 U. S., at 328 (new rules are “to be applied retroactivel yto all cases, sta t e or f e deral , pendi ng on direct11 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g review or not yet final” (emphasis added)). It is quite aradical pro p osition to assert that this Court has nothin g to say about an in terest “essential to the operation o f our criminal justice system,” without which “the crimin al law is deprived of much of i t s deterren t effect,” whe n the question is wheth e r this inte rest is being undermined by the very rules of federal c o nstitutional procedure that we are charge d with expounding. A State alone may “evaluate, and weighth e importance of” finality interests, ante , at 15, when it decides which substantive rules of criminal procedure st atelaw affords; it is quite a leap to hold, as the Court does, that they alone can do so in the name of the Federal Constitution. Tea g ue was also basedon the ine quity of the Linklette r approach to retroactivit y . After noting that th e disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants led us in Grif

fithto adopt Justice Harlan’s vi ew for cases on direct appeal, the Court then explained that the “Linkletter standard al so led to u nfortunate disparity i n the treat

ment of similarly situated defendants on collateral re

view.” 489 U. S., at 30 5. See also id. , at 316 (the Court’s new approa ch to retroa ctivity “avo ids the inequity result

ing from the uneven a p plication of new rules to similarl y situated defendants”). This interest in reducing the inequity of haphazard retroactivity standards and disu niformity in the applica

tion of federal law is q uite plainlya predominantly federal interest. Indeed, it was one of the main reasons we cite d in Griffithfor imposing a uniform rule of retroactivi t y upon sta t e c o urts for ca ses on direct appeal. An d, more to the point, i tis the very interestthat anim ates the S u premacy Cl ause and our role as the “one supreme Court” charged with enforcing it. Justice Sto r y, writingfor the Court, noted nearly t w o centuries ago that the Constitution requires “ uniformityof decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all12 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g subjects within [its] purview.” Ma r t i nv. Hu nter ’s L ess e e , 1 Wheat. 304, 347–348 (1816). I ndeed, the “fundamental principle” of our Constituti on, as Justice O’Connor once put it, is “that a singl e sovereign’s law should be applied equally to all.” Our Ju dicial Federalism, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1985). States are free to announ ce their own state-law rules of criminal procedure, and to apply them retroactivel yin whatever manner they like. That is fully consistent with the pri nciple that “a single sovereign’s la w should be a p plied equa lly to al l.” But the Court’s opinion invites just the sort of disuniformity in federal law that the Supremacy Clause was meant to prevent. The same determination of a fed e ral cons titutional violation at the same stage in the criminal process can result in freedom in one State and loss of liberty o rlife in a neighboring State. 2 The Court’s opinion a llow s “a single sovereign’s law”—the Federal Constitution , as interpre ted bythi s Court—to be applied differently in every one of the several

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2 The Cour t points out that the defe n d an ts insu cha c a se ar e differ

ently situatedbecause they violatedthe laws of and were tried i n different State s . Ant e , at 26. Bu t dispar a t e tr eatmen t u n d ersu bstan

tiv e lydiffer e nt st ate laws i s someth ing we expectin our f e dera l s y s t em ; dispar a t e tr ea tment underthe same Fed e r a l Consti tut i on is qui t e a differ e nt matt er .

The major i ty also points out tha tthe r u l e announc ed in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (19 87)—th a t fu ll r e tr oac t iv e applic ationen ds with the conclusion of direct appe al—creates i t s own disuniformity, bec a u s e fin a li tytu r n s on h o w qu ic kly a State br in g s its dir e c tappeals to a close. An t e , at 27. Th e same poin t was r a ised byth e Griffi t h dissen t er s, 47 9 U. S., at3 3 1 –33 2 (opin i on of Wh ite, J.), an d r ejec t ed a s per t inent by the major i tyi nthat c a se, id. , at 327–3 2 8 . Th e disu n i

for m itythat t h e major ityemphasiz e s tod a y and the dissenters empha

sized in Griffithis a neces s a ry cons eq uence of our having chos en a relatively clear rule—finalit y—to delineate the line bet w een f u ll retro

activity and presumptive nonr etr o ac tiv ity

. The r e lev a nt point is that whatever inequity arises from the Griffi thr u le, it is bas ed ona balan c in gof c o sts an d ben e fits th a t this Court—not 5 0 different s o vereigns— has performed.13 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g States. Finally, from Linkletter through J o hnsonto Tea g ue , we have always emphasized that determining whether a new federal right is retroactive turn s on the nature of the substantive federal rule at issue. See Linkletter , 381 U. S., at 629 (in deciding re troactivity, we “loo[k] to the pri o r history of the rule in q uestion, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operatio n will further or retard its operation”); Johnson , 384 U. S., at 728 (“Each constitu

tional ruleof crimin al procedure has its own disti nct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which thes e factors c o mbine [to decide the retroactivi t y issue] mus tinevitably vary with the dictate involved”); T

e ag ue, s u pra , at 311– 315 (deciding whether rule is appli

cable to cases on collateral review turns on whether the rule “places ‘certain kinds of pri m ary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,’ ” and wheth e r the rule is an “abso

lute prerequisite to fundamental fairness that is ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ ”)

. That is h o w we dete r mine retroactivity—by carefully examining the underlying federal right. See, e.g. , Whortonv. Bockting , 549 U. S. ___, ___–___ (20 07) (slip op., at 11–14); Schriro v. Summerlin , 542 U. S. 348, 353–35 4 (2004); Sa wy er v. Smit h , 497 U. S. 227, 243–245 (1990); Penryv. Lynaugh , 492 U. S. 30 2, 318–319 (1989). When this Court decid e s that a particular righ t shall no t be applied retroactivel y , but a s t ate court fi nds that it should, it is at least in part becaus e of a differ e nt assess

ment by the state court of the nature of the underlying federal right—something on wh ic h the Constitution gives this Court the final say

. The nature and scope of the ne w rules we a nnounce directly dete rmines whether they will be applied retroacti v e ly on collateral revi ew. Toda y’s opinion sta nds for the unfounded proposition that while14 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g we alone have the final say in expounding the former, we have no control over the latter. II The Court’s holding is not only based on a misreading of our retroac t i vity cases, but al so on a misunderstanding of the nature of retroacti vity gene rally. The m a jority’s deci

sion is grounded on the erroneous view that retroactivity is a remedial question. See ante , at 26–27 (“It is impor

tant to keep in mind that ou r juris p rudence co ncerning th e ‘retroactivity’ of ‘new rules’ of constitutional law is p r imar

ily concern e d, not with the question whether a constitu

tional viol ation occurred, but with the availability or nonavailability of remedies”). But as explained in the lea d opinion in American Truckin g

—penned by the author of the lead opinion in Teague—it is an “error” to “equat[e] a decision notto apply a rule re troac tively with the judicial choice of a remedy.” 496 U. S., at 1 94 (plurality opinion o f O’Connor, J .). As Justi ce O’Connor went on to emphasize, “[n]or do t h is Court’s retroa cti vity de cisions, whether in the civil or criminal sphere, support the .

. . a ssertion that our retroac tivity doctr ine is a remedial principle.” Ibid. “While application of the princip l es of retroactivity ma y have remedial effects, they ar e not themselves remedial principles.

. . . A decision defining the operative conduct or events that will be adjudicated under old law does not, i n itself, specify an appropriate remedy.” Id. , at 195. See also Lemonv. Kurtzman , 411 U. S. 192, 199 (1 973) (plural

ity opinion) (describing the question of ret r oactivity a s “whether we will apply a new cons titutional rule of crimi

nal law inreviewing judgments of conviction obtain ed under a prior standard,” and co ntrasting this with the question of the “appropriate scope of fed e ral equitable remedies”). In other wo rds, when we ask wh ether and to what ex

tent a rule will be retroactively applied, we are asking15 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g what law—new or old

—will apply. As we h ave expressly noted, “[t]he Teaguedo ctrine .

. . does not involve a special ‘remedial’ limitation on the pr inciple of ‘retroactivity’ as much as it reflects a limitation inherent in t he principle itself.” Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hy de , 51 4 U. S. 749 , 758 (1995). The foregoing prompt s a lengthy rejoinderfrom the Court, to th e effect that it is wrong to view retr oactivity a s a federal choice-of-law question rather thana remedial one. That view, we ar e told, was rejected by five Justices in American Trucking and then by the Court in Harp e r . Ante , at 20 –24. But the proposition on which five Mem

bers of the Court a gre ed in American Trucking , and tha t the Court adopted in Harpe r , was that the Griffithrule of retroactivity—that is, that newly announced constitu

tional decisions shouldappl y to all cases on direct re view—should apply to civil cases as well as c r iminal. See American Trucking , 49 6 U. S., at 201 (S CALI A , J., concu r ring in judgment) (“I share J USTICE S TE VEN S ’ percep t ion that prospe ctive decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say wha tthe la w is , not to pre scribe what it shall be” ) ; id. , at 212 (S TEVE NS , J., dissent

ing) (“Fundamental notions of fairness and legal process dictate that the same rules should be applied to all similar cases on direct review”); Harp er , 509 U. S., at 97 (“Wh en this Courtapplies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, t hat rule is the controlling inter p retation o f federal law and must b e given full retroacti ve effect in all cases still open on direct review”). Neither J USTICE S CALIA’s conc urrence in Americ a n Truckin g co mbined with the dissent, nor the Court’s opi n ion in Har p er , resolved that retr oactivity was a remedial question. That is why, the year after American Tru c king was decide d, t w o of th e Justices in today ’ s m ajority could explain:16 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g “Since the question is whether th e court sho uld apply the old rule or the new one, retroactivity is properly seen in the first instance as a matter of choice of law, ‘a choice .

. . between t he principle of forward opera

tion and th at of relati on backward.’ Grea t Northe rn R. Co. v. S unburst Oil & Refining Co. , 287 U

. S. 358, 364 (1932). Once a rule is found t o apply ‘backwa r d, ’ there may then be a further issue of remedies, i.e. , whether the party pre v ailing under a new rule shou ld obtain the same relief that would have been awarded if the rule had been a n old one. Subject to possible constitutional thresholds, the rem e dial inquiryis one governed b ystate la w , at least where the case origi

nates in state court. See Americ an Tru c kin g

Assn s., Inc. v. Smith , 496 U. S. 167, 210 (1990) (S TE VENS , J., dissenting). But the anteceden tchoice-of-law question is a federalone wherethe rule at issue its e lf derives from federal law, co nstitu tionalor otherwise. See Smith , sup r a , at 177–178 (plurality opinion).” James B. Beam Di stillin g Co. v. Geor gia , 501 U. S. 529, 534– 535 (1991) (o pinion of S OUTER , J., joined by S TEVEN S , J.) (citation omitted; emphasis added). And Harper certainly did not view the retro activity o f federal rules as a remedial question for s t ate courts

. Quite the contrar y : Har p erheld thatthe “Su p rema cy Clause does not allowfederal retroactivity d o ctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contraryapproach to retroactivity under sta t e law,” 509 U. S., at 100 (citatio n omitted), and expressly treated r e troactivityand remed y as separate questions, id

. , at 100–102. The majority explains that when we annou nce a new rule of law, we are n o t “ ‘ cr eatin g

the law,’ ” but rathe r
“ ‘ declarin g

what the law already is.’ ” Ante , at 21 (quotin g American Trucking , su pra , at 201 (S CALI A , J., concurrin g in judgmen t)). But thi s has nothing to do wi th the ques

-17 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g tion before us. The po int may lea dto the co nclusion that nonretroactivity of our decisions is improper—the position the Court has adopted in both criminal and civil cases on direct revie w—but eve r yone agrees that full retroactivit y is not required on collateral review. Itnecessarily follows that we mu st choose whether “new” or“old” law applies to a particularcategory of cases. Suppose, for ex ample, that a defendant, whose conviction became fina l before we announced our decision in Crawfordv. Was h ington , 541 U. S. 36 (20 04), argues (correctly) on collateral review that he was con victed in vi olation of both Cra wfo rdand Ohi o v. Roberts , 44 8 U. S. 56 (1980), the case that Crawfor d ove r ruled. Under our decision in Whortonv. Bockting , 54 9 U. S. ___ (2007), the “new” rule announced in Cra wfor d would not apply retroac tively to the defendant. But I take it to be uncontroversial thatthe defendant would never

theless get the benefit of the “old” rule of Roberts , even under the view that the rule notonly is bu t always h as been an incorrect rea d ing of the Constitution. See, e.g. , Yat es , 484 U. S., at 218. Thus, the question whether a particular federal rule will appl y retroactively is, ina very real way, a choice between new and old law. The issue in this case is who should decide. The proposition that th e question of retroacti vity—t ha t is, the choice between new or old law in a parti cular case— is distinct from the question of remedies has several im

portant implications f o r this cas e . To b e gin with, wh at

ever intuitive appeal may lie in the majority’s stateme nt that “the re medy a sta t e court ch ooses to pr ovide its citi

zens for violations of t he Fede ral Constitution is primarily a question of state law,” an te , a t2 4, the state ment misses the mark. The relevant inquiry i s not about remedy; it is about choice of law—new or old. There is no reason to believe, eit her legally or intu itively, that States shoul d have any a uthority over this question when it comes to which fed e ral constitut i onal rules of criminal procedure t o18 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g apply. 3 Indeed, when the ques t ion is what federal rule of deci

sion from this Court should apply to a partic ular case, no Court but this one—which has the ultimate authority “to say what the law is,” Marbury , 1 Cranch, at 177—should have final s ay over the answer. See Harpe r , supra , at 10 0 (“Supremacy Clause does not allow federal retroactivit y doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a cont rar y approach to retroactivi ty under st ate law” (citation omit

ted)). This is enough to rebut the proposition that there is no “source of [our] aut hority” to bind state courts to follow our retroact i vity decisions. Ante , at 26. Retroactivity is a question of federal law, and our final authority to construe it cannot, a tthis point in the Nati on’s history, be reasona

bly doubted. Principles of federalism prot ect the prerogative of States to extend greater righ ts under th eir own laws than a r e available u nder federal law. The question here, however, is the availability of protection under the Federal Consti

tution—specifically, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixt h Amendment. It is no intrusion on the prerogatives of the States to recognize that it is for this Court to decide such a question of federal law, and that our decision is binding on the States under the Supremacy Clause. Consider th e flip side of the question before u s today: I f a Sta t e int e rprets its own constit ution to pr ovide prote c tion beyond that available under the Federal Constitution, and has ruled that this interp ret a tion is notretroactive ,

——————

3 A federal court applying state law under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304U. S. 6 4( 193 8), follows sta t e c h oic e -of-law r u les a s well, see Klaxon Co. v. Sten tor Elec. Mf g. Co. , 313 U. S. 48 7 , 496 ( 194 1). I tis n o tfr ee to follow its ownfederal rule simply be cause the issue arises in federal c o ur t. Bythe same token, ast ate c o ur t c o nsider inga feder a l c o nstitu

t i ona lcla i m on colla t e ra l review sho u ld follow the federal rule o n whether new o rold law applies

. It is not free to follow its own state-law view on the question simply becaus e the issue arises in state court.19 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g no one would suppose that a federal court could hold otherwise, and gran t relief und er state law that a sta t e court would refuse to grant. The result should be the same when a state court is aske d to give retro active effect to a right u n der the Federal Co nstitution that this Cour t has held is not retroactive. The distinction between retroactivity an davailable remedies highlights th e fact tha t the majorit y ’s assertion “that Tea g ue ’s genera l rule of nonretroactivity was a n exercise of this Court’s po wer t o interpret the federal habeas statute,” ante , at 13—eve n if correct—is neither here nor there. 4 While Congress has substantial control over federal courts’ ability to grant relief for violations of the Federal Constitution, the Constitution gives us the responsibili ty to decide what its provisions mean. An d with that r e sponsibility necessarily comes the authority t o determine the scope of those provisions—when they apply and when they do not. This proposition—and the importance of the distinction between retroactivit yand available remedies—were con

firmed when we considered the availabilit y of federal collateral review of sta t e convictio ns under th e Antiterror

ism and Ef fective Death Penalty Act of 19 96 (AEDPA). See 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). Whatever control Congress has over f e deral courts’ ability to grant postconviction remedies, the availabil i ty or scope of those re medies has no bearing on our decisions aboutwhether new or old la w should apply in a pa rticular case. That is why, afte r

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4 The major i ty ’s asser t ion, howev e r, is a bit of an overstate m ent. Teagu e wou ld be anodd for mof statu t or yin ter pr e tation ; 28 U. S. C

. §225 4 i s c i te d on c einpass in g , 489 U. S., a t2 98, an d §2 2 43—th e sta t u t e that the Cour t believ e s Teaguewas inter preting—is not c i ted at all. As s u pportfor it s propos it ion, the Courtcit e s s e vera l ca s e s having not h i n g to do with r e tr oac t iv ity , and numerousconc urri ng a n d dis s e nting opinions that did not c o mm and a major i t y . See ante , at 1 4

– 15, an d
n . 15.20 DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g AED PA’s p a ssage, we view the Te agueinquiry as distinct from that under AEDPA. See Hornv. Ban k s , 536 U. S. 266, 272 (2002) (per c u riam)(“While it is of course a nec essary prerequisite to f e deral habeas relief that a prisone r satisfy the AE DPA s t andard of review se t forth in 28 U. S. C. §22 54(d), .

. . none of our post-AEDPA cases have suggested that a writ of habeas corpus should automati

cally issue if a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA s t andard, o r that AEDPA relieves courts from the res p onsibility of addressing properly raised Tea g ueargum e nts”). The majority to day views the issue as simply one of what remedies a State chooses to apply; our cases confirm that the question whether a federal decision is retroactive is one of fede ral law distinct from the issue o f available remedies. Lurking behind today’s decision is of course the questio n of just how free state c o urts are to define the retroactivit y of our decisions interpreting the Federal Constitution. I do not see any basis in the majority’s logic f o r concluding that States are free to hold our decisions retroactive when we have held they are not, but n o t free to hold that th ey are not when we have held they are. Under the majority’s reasoning, i n either case the availability of relief in state court is a question for those co urts to evaluate independ

ently. The majority c arefullyreserves that question, s e e ante , at 4, n. 4, confir ming that the majority regards it as open. Nor is there anything in toda y’s decision suggesting tha t States coul d not adopt more nuanced approaches to retro

activity. F o r example, suppose we hold that the Six t h Amendment right to be repres ent e d by particular counsel of choice, recently announced in United S t ates v. Gonzalez

Lopez , 548 U. S. 140 (2006), is a new rule that does not apply retro actively. Under th e majority’s rationale, a state court could decide that it nonetheles s will apply Gonzalez-L opez retroactively, butonly if the defendant21 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)

R OBERTS , C. J., dissen tin g could prove prejudice, or so me other criterion we had rejected as irrelevant in defi ning the substantive righ t. Under the majority’s logic, t hat would not b e a misapplica

tion of our decision in Gonzalez-L opez —which specifically rejected an y required showing of prejudice, id. , at 147 – 148—but simply a state decision on the scope of available remedies instate court. The possible permutations—from State to S t ate, and federal right to federal right—ar e endless. * * * Perhaps all this will be dismiss e d as fine parsing of somewhat arcane preceden ts, over whichreasonable judges may disagree. Fair enough; but I would hope that enough has been said at least t o refute th e majority’s assertion that its concl usion is dictated byour prior cases. This dissen tis compell e d not simp ly by disagreement over how to read those cases, but b ythe fundamental issues at stake—our role under the Constitution as the final arbiter of federal law, both as to its mea ning and its reach, and the accomp anying dut yto ensure the uniformity of tha t federal law. Ste p he n Danfo rth’s co nvi c tion be came fin al before the new rule i n Cra wfo rd was a nnoun ced. In Whort o nv. Bock

ti ng , 549 U. S. ___ (200 7), we held that Crawford shall not be applied retroa ctiv el y on coll ate r al revie w . Tha tshoul d be the end o f the matte r . I respectfully dissent.