UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee. 

v. 

MARTIN PENA ASTORGA, 

 Defendant - Appellant, 

No. 21-2026 

(D.C. No. 2:19-CR-02747-KG-1) 

(D. N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, EBEL, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Defendant Martin Astorga’s wife drove him to Colorado Springs to pick up 

fentanyl and heroin. He later pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute controlled 

substances. The district court sentenced him to 136 months in prison, after applying 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1’s aggravating-role enhancement. The district court further 

prohibited Defendant from associating with his co-conspirators—including his 

wife—while on supervised release. Defendant appeals both the application of the 

enhancement and the supervised-release condition. 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 21, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we 

affirm the district court’s application of the § 3B1.1 enhancement but vacate its 

supervised-release condition restricting Defendant’s contact with his wife and 

remand for reconsideration. 

I. 

On May 17, 2019, Defendant agreed over the phone to sell Alejandra Gomez 

$50–60 of narcotics and met her at a Pic Quik station in Las Cruces, New Mexico, to 

complete the sale. Eleven days later, Gomez texted Defendant that someone wanted 

a “big one” and that she could “grab the cash” for Defendant. Defendant again told 

Gomez to meet him at the Pic Quik. After Gomez left the parking lot, Las Cruces 

Police stopped her. Gomez tried to run away, but officers stopped her and found 5.6 

grams of methamphetamine in her sock. The officers released her without 

questioning to preserve the ongoing investigation. 

On May 31, 2019, Defendant called Joanne Dunlap, his sister-in-law, to tell 

her that he planned to stop by her house at 4:00 P.M. to pick up the package he had 

sent there. Defendant had sent her address to his supplier so that the supplier could 

mail him heroin and fentanyl. In exchange, he offered to pay Joanne for letting him 

use her address. That same day, Drug Enforcement Administration agents 

coordinated with the United States Postal Inspection Service (“USPIS”) to intercept 

packages directed to Joanne’s house. USPIS intercepted one package. Executing a 

federal search warrant, agents searched the package and found eight ounces of heroin 

and 500 fentanyl pills. Later that afternoon, agents observed Defendant at Joanne’s 

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house and saw Joanne check her mailbox fifteen minutes later. A few minutes later, 

Defendant left. That evening, Defendant talked to his wife, Jesse Dunlap, on the 

phone and told her that, like last time, the package might be delayed. 

By June 13th, Defendant still had not received the package, so he asked his 

supplier if he could pick up the package in Phoenix. Eventually, his supplier agreed 

to have Defendant pick up 600 fentanyl pills in Colorado Springs. So on June 19th, 

Defendant and Jesse began driving from New Mexico to Colorado Springs. Jesse 

drove while Defendant directed her where to go. When they arrived at the arranged 

address, an unknown female walked up to the white pick-up truck and handed Jesse a 

white plastic bag through the driver’s side window. Defendant and Jesse 

immediately left the parking lot after the transaction. As they entered New Mexico, 

agents coordinated with state police to conduct a traffic stop. During the stop, the 

officer detected an odor of marijuana and searched the vehicle, finding the plastic bag 

containing 124.6 grams of heroin and 480 fentanyl pills in Jesse’s purse. Jesse 

admitted to the officers that the bag belonged to her and that it contained heroin. 

Police released Jesse and Defendant and told them that the district attorney’s office 

would review the evidence. Immediately afterward, Defendant told his supplier that 

the police seized the heroin and fentanyl during the traffic stop and that Jesse took 

the blame for it. 

Nearly two years later, Defendant pleaded guilty to several counts of 

distributing fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamine, and conspiracy to distribute 

controlled substances. Because the district court determined Defendant supervised 

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Jesse, Joanne, and Gomez, it applied the aggravating-role enhancement under 

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) to Defendant’s sentence, making his guideline imprisonment 

range 151 to 188 months. But after considering the factors under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) and Defendant’s good-faith attempt to assist the government, the district 

court varied downward and sentenced Defendant to 136 months’ imprisonment 

followed by a five-year supervised-release term. As a supervised-release condition, 

the district court prohibited Defendant from having any communication or contact, 

direct or indirect, with any co-defendant or co-conspirator—including his wife, 

Jesse—without his probation officer’s permission. Defendant timely appealed his 

sentence. 

II. 

We review the district court’s decision to apply the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement 

for clear error. United States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201, 1211 (10th Cir. 1999) 

(citing United States v. Cruz Camacho, 137 F.3d 1220, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 1998)). 

Clear error exists when the record does not support the factual finding or if, after 

considering all the evidence, we have a definite and firm conviction that the district 

court made a mistake. United States v. Lozano, 921 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir. 2019) 

(citing United States v. Zar, 790 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 2015)). But when the 

district court’s account of the evidence is plausible based on the entire record, we 

will not reverse even if we are convinced that we would have weighed the evidence 

differently. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985). In other 

words, when two permissible views of the evidence exist, “the factfinder’s choice 

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between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing United States v. Yellow Cab 

Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949); Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 

844 (1982)). Thus, we give “great deference to the district court’s application of the 

Guidelines to the facts.” Lozano, 921 F.3d at 946 (quoting United States v. Eaton, 

260 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir. 2001)). 

Defendant raises two issues on appeal: whether the district court wrongly 

applied the aggravated-role enhancement under § 3B1.1(c) to Defendant’s sentence 

and whether the district court violated Defendant’s fundamental right to familial 

association by forbidding contact with his wife without his probation officer’s 

permission while on supervised release. He raises a substantive and procedural 

challenge to each issue and concedes that he did not raise the procedural challenge to 

the first issue or any challenge to the second issue below. Thus, we review 

challenges that Defendant raises for the first time for plain error. Under the plainerror standard, Defendant “must demonstrate: (1) an error, (2) that is plain, meaning 

clear or obvious under current law, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that 

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

United States v. Kearn, 863 F.3d 1299, 1305 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States 

v. Piper, 839 F.3d 1261, 1265–66 (10th Cir. 2016)). 

III. 

We first address whether the district court erred substantively by applying the 

aggravating-role enhancement under § 3B1.1(c) to Defendant’s sentence before 

determining whether it erred procedurally by failing to adequately explain its 

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application of § 3B1.1(c). Last, we consider whether the district court wrongly 

restricted Defendant’s right to associate with his wife as a condition of his supervised 

release. 

A. 

1. 

The district court did not clearly err when it applied § 3B1.1(c)’s aggravatingrole enhancement to Defendant’s sentence. The Sentencing Guidelines direct a 

district court to increase a defendant’s sentence by two levels “[i]f the defendant was 

an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.1(c). To determine whether this enhancement applies to a defendant’s 

conduct, a court should consider: 

the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of 

participation in the commission of the offense, the 

recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger 

share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation 

in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope 

of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and 

authority exercised over others. 

§ 3B1.1 cmt. 4. “In considering these factors, the sentencing court should remain 

conscious of the fact that the gravamen of this enhancement is control, organization, 

and responsibility for the actions of other individuals[.]” United States v. Anderson, 

189 F.3d 1201, 1211 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Torres, 53 F.3d 1129, 

1142 (10th Cir. 1995)). A defendant qualifies as a “supervisor” when he has 

“exercised any degree of direction or control over someone subordinate to him.” 

Lozano, 921 F.3d at 948 (quoting United States v. Backas, 901 F.2d 1528, 1530 (10th 

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Cir. 1990)). So for the enhancement to apply, Defendant “need only manage or 

supervise one participant.” United States v. Gonzalez Edeza, 359 F.3d 1246, 1248–

49 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Cruz Camacho, 137 F.3d at 1224). 

Here, the presentence report’s offense-level computation provided for a twolevel increase under § 3B1.1(c) for Defendant’s role in the offense as an organizer, 

leader, manager, or supervisor. Defendant objected to that portion of the PSR 

because his dealing with Gomez did not qualify him for the enhancement. At the 

sentencing hearing, the district court clarified that the Addendum to the PSR 

specified that Defendant’s interaction with Jesse and Joanne Dunlap, along with 

Gomez, supported the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement. The district court noted that there 

was no dispute as to the facts and determined that Defendant’s supervision of Jesse, 

Joanne, and Gomez justified the enhancement. Defendant argues the district court 

clearly erred in applying § 3B1.1(c) here because the facts do not show he acted as 

anyone’s supervisor. He also contends no evidence exists to show that he exercised 

control or organizational authority over Jesse, Joanne, or Gomez. 

But Defendant need only have supervised one participant to qualify for the 

enhancement—and the record amply supports that he supervised Jesse. See Gonzalez 

Edeza, 359 F.3d at 1248–49 (citing Cruz Camacho, 137 F.3d at 1224). Defendant’s 

testimony at the sentencing hearing revealed that Jesse had no contact with 

Defendant’s supplier because she does not speak Spanish; she drove Defendant to 

Colorado Springs because he does not have a driver’s license; and she knew where to 

go and when to leave because Defendant told her. 

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Still, Defendant argues that Jesse was not his subordinate, only his wife; that 

no evidence shows she accompanied him to Colorado Springs because he ordered her 

to; and that her participation was too isolated to establish a supervisor-subordinate 

relationship. Defendant also cites out-of-circuit authority to argue that § 3B1.1’s 

intent is not to punish providing another person with information. Defendant’s 

argument fails, however, because our precedent provides that someone qualifies as a 

“supervisor” under § 3B1.1 if he exercised “any degree of direction or control over 

someone subordinate to him.” Lozano, 921 F.3d at 948 (quoting Backas, 901 F.2d 

at 1530). The evidence shows that Defendant directed Jesse when and where to go as 

she drove him to pick up the drugs in Colorado Springs. Because any degree of 

control or direction is sufficient, the record supports the district court’s conclusion 

that Defendant functioned as a supervisor under § 3B1.1. And we have already 

determined that “a single criminal endeavor” may trigger §3B1.1’s enhancement– 

“sustained criminal conduct is not necessary.” United States v. Marquez, 833 F.3d 

1217, 1223 (10th Cir. 2016). Thus, the district court did not clearly err when it 

applied § 3B1.1(c)’s aggravating-role enhancement to Defendant’s sentence. 

2. 

Regardless of whether the district court erred by applying the enhancement, 

Defendant urges us to reverse because the district court failed to adequately explain 

why it applied the enhancement. But Defendant did not raise this procedural 

complaint before the district court. When a party does not raise a legal theory before 

the district court, we consider it forfeited on appeal, and will reverse only if the 

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district court plainly erred. Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 

(10th Cir. 2011) (“To show plain error, a party must establish the presence of 

(1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”). 

For purposes of our analysis, we will assume the district court did not 

adequately explain the factual basis supporting the enhancement; 1 and that its failure 

to do so satisfies prong one and two of our plain error test. 

But to prevail, Defendant must also show that the error affected his substantial 

rights. “[T]o show that an error affected his substantial rights, [Defendant] must 

establish a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Marquez, 833 F.3d at 1221 (quoting United 

States v. Uscanga–Mora, 562 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 2009)). And “[i]n the 

context of sentencing enhancements, if ‘[t]he defendant . . . received a sentence 

merited by the evidence . . . we cannot say . . . that, but for the claimed error, the 

defendant’s sentence would have been any different.’” Id. (quoting Uscanga-Mora, 

562 F.3d at 1295). 

Defendant’s position fails at this step. Here, as demonstrated by our 

conclusion that the evidence showed Defendant directed Jesse, Defendant received a 

1

 We have held that “a district court ‘must make specific findings and advance 

a factual basis to support an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.’” Marquez, 

833 F.3d at 1221 (quoting United States v. Chisum, 502 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 

2007)). And “even if the record overwhelmingly supports the enhancement, 

appellate fact-finding cannot substitute for the district court’s duty to articulate 

clearly the reasons for the enhancement.” Id. (quoting Chisum, 502 F.3d at 1242). 

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sentence merited by the evidence. So, “we cannot say—as we would have to in order 

to reverse his sentence for plain error—that [Defendant’s] substantial rights were 

violated.” Id. at 1223; United States v. Gehrmann, 966 F.3d 1074, 1083–85 

(10th Cir. 2020) (third prong of plain error not satisfied where evidence supports 

application of enhancement.). Thus, Defendant’s procedural challenge fails, and we 

need not consider the remaining prong. 2

B. 

Defendant next argues that the district court wrongly restricted his right to 

associate with his wife as a supervised-release condition: procedurally because the 

district court failed to make the particularized findings necessary to support that 

restriction and substantively because the record has no sufficient findings to support 

such a restriction. Defendant raised neither argument below, so we review both 

challenges to the condition for plain error. We conclude the district court plainly 

erred by failing to make particularized findings justifying the condition. 

“A district court has broad discretion to impose conditions on supervised release.” 

United States v. Burns, 775 F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. 

Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 2011)). “But when a court imposes a special 

2

 Defendant’s position fails for another reason as well. In assessing whether an 

appellant has met its burden of establishing prong three of our plain error test, we have 

been clear that the party seeking relief must do more than advance a bare assertion that 

the outcome in the district court was somehow affected by the district court’s insufficient 

statement of reasons. See United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 

2008). With respect to Jesse, Defendant offers only a two-sentence conclusion that no 

evidence supports the enhancement. This is precisely the type of conclusory argument 

we have held insufficient to demonstrate an impact on a party’s substantial rights. 

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condition that invades a fundamental right or liberty interest, [it] must justify the 

condition with compelling circumstances.” Id. (citing Mike, 632 F.3d at 696). 

A defendant has a fundamental right to familial association. United States v. Lonjose, 

663 F.3d 1292, 1303 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Smith, 606 F.3d 1270, 

1283–84 (10th Cir. 2010)). That right includes spouses. See Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 

1544, 1548 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, a district court may only impose special conditions 

interfering with a defendant’s right to associate with his spouse in compelling 

circumstances after making particularized findings. See Burns, 775 F.3d at 1222. 

Here, as a condition of supervised release, the district court prohibited Defendant 

from having any communication or contact, indirect or direct, with any codefendant or 

co-conspirator, including his wife, Jesse. The court noted that before Defendant had any 

contact with Jesse, or anyone else involved in this conspiracy, he would need his 

probation officer’s permission. But this discussion only described the condition without 

explaining the need for it. 

Later, Defendant’s counsel expressed concern and asked if the parties could soften 

their attitude toward communication between Defendant and Jesse. The district court 

acknowledged that Defendant and his wife should be able to communicate with each 

other with permission from the probation officer. The court explained it imposed a 

restriction because any co-conspirators should not be able to communicate if it could be 

furthering a conspiracy. But explaining the utility of prohibiting co-conspirators from 

communicating does not justify the need for interfering with Defendant’s spousal 

relationship. The district court committed plain error by failing to make particularized 

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findings justifying the need for the condition. See Burns, 775 F.3d at 1223 (“An error is 

plain if it is ‘clear and obvious under current law.’” (quoting United States v. Brown, 

316 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 2003))). 

The government concedes the district court failed to make particularized findings 

justifying the condition limiting Defendant’s contact with Jesse—fulfilling the first two 

plain-error prongs—and advocates remanding to the district court for reconsideration of 

the condition. The government also concedes that the record allows a reasonable 

probability that the outcome would have been different had the court made such 

findings—satisfying plain error’s third prong—and that this possibility also carries 

Defendant’s burden under plain error’s last prong. Thus, we determine the district court 

committed plain procedural error by failing to make particularized findings explaining 

the need for restricting Defendant’s contact with his wife and “remand for 

reconsideration of the supervised-release condition requiring [Defendant] to obtain 

permission from the probation office before he can contact [his wife].” Burns, 775 F.3d 

at 1225.3 

In sum, we affirm the § 3B1.1(c) aggravating-role enhancement of Defendant’s 

sentence but vacate the supervised-release condition restricting Defendant’s contact with 

his wife and remand for reconsideration. 

3

 Because we vacate the supervised-release condition restricting Defendant’s 

contact with his wife based on the district court’s plain procedural error and remand 

for reconsideration, we do not reach Defendant’s substantive challenge that the 

record contains insufficient findings to justify the condition. 

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AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED. 

Entered for the Court 

Joel M. Carson III 

Circuit Judge 

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