### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00 035 -CR

Jo se Edwar d Vi lla go m e z , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY , 119TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. B -06 -05 61- S , HO NORAB LE B ARB ARA L. WALTH ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt Jos e Ed wardVi ll agome z pl eadedguil ty to po sse ssi ng

mor e tha n f ou r g ra ms of coc aine with intent to deliver, and the trial court assessed his punishment at twelve y ear s in prison
as ca lled for in a ple a ag ree ment. See Te x. He a lth& Sa fe ty Cod e Ann. § 4 81 .1 12 (a) , ( d) (We st Supp. 2009). I n a sing le issue, appe llant contends that the c ou rt er re d by overr uling his pre trial motion to s uppress e vidence . We overrule this contention and aff irm the conviction. A t rial cour

t’s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewe d for a n abuse of

discretion. State v. Dixon , 20 6 S
. W
. 3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). This means that the rulingwill be
u p h e l d i f i t i s r e a s o n a

b l y s u p p o rt e d b y t h e r e c o r d an d i s c o r r e c t u n d e r an y a

p p l i c a b l e l e g a l t h e o r

y. Id . The trial c ourt is the sole trier of fac t and judg e of the cre dibilit y of the witnesse s and the we ight to be g iven their testimony
. State v. Ro ss , 3 2 S. W.3 d 8 53 , 8 55 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Guzman
v . S tat e , 9 55 S.W. 2d

85 , 8 9 ( Te x. Cr im . App . 1 99 7) . We g ive the tr ia l c ourt a lmo st c omp le te2

defe renc e in deter

mining historical f

acts, but w e revie w de novo the trial court’s application of the law to those fa cts. Car

mo uc he v . S

tate , 10 S.W .3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Be cause the trial court did not make finding s of fac t, w e re view the e vidence in the light most favor able to the
c ourt ’s ru lin g and

a ssume the c ourt ma de fi nd ing s tha t are su pp or te d b y the re c or d a

nd bu ttr e ss i ts conclusion. Id . at 327-28.

Th e pr inc ipa l w itn e ss a

t the su pp re ssi on he ari ngwa s D e pa

rtme nt o f P ub lic Sa fe ty trooper Jack McCre a. McCre a testified that he wa s assig ned to the De partment’s c ommercia l motor vehicle e nforc ement division a nd cer tified to c onduct commer cial motor vehic le inspections. On the morning of F ebrua

ry 23, 2006, McCrea

stopped a truc k-trac tor and tra iler on U.S
. Hi gh wa y 277. McCrea said that he a cted pur suant to transportation co d e s ec t i o n 644.103, which author izes the detention of ve hicles that ar e subjec t to commerc ial vehicle safety standards. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 6 44 .1 03 (We st Su

pp . 2 00 9) ; se e als o Uni te d S tates v . F or t , 248 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that war

rantless stop and inspec tion of commerc ial vehicle pur suant to section 644.103 was
v al i d u n d er re gu l at o ry ex ce p t i o n t o wa rr an tre qu i re m en t , ci t i n g New Y ork v. Burge r , 482 U.S. 691 (1987)) . McCrea

testified that he be lieved at t h e t ime that the truck a nd trailer w ere commerc ial vehicles subject to detention under the statute. He e x plained, “[I ]n m y experience and tra ining the dual tandems on the tra iler sig nify 20,000 pounds g ross vehicle weig ht rating and I knew that the tr u c k w a s o v e r 6 , 0 0 0 p o u n d s g r o s s v e h ic le w e ig h t r a ti n g , w h ic h in tu r n ma d e it o v e r

the 26,000-p o u n d

thr e s h o ld

th a t w e h a v e to h a v e in o r d e r to r e g u late anin tr a s tate
. . . c o mmercia l motor vehicle.”3 Appellant wa s the driver

of the truck. The trailer ha d a flat bed, and it was c arr y ing a f ar m t r a c to r , a f o u r - w h e e le r , an d

to o l b o xe s . M c Cr e a

te s ti f ie d th a t a f te r s to p p in g th e tr

u c k and trailer, he looked for the vehicle identification num ber (VI N) plate on the t railer

in order to c onfirm its weig ht rating
. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 501.032 (West 2007) (re quiring that serial number be af fix ed to ca

rriag e or ax le of tra iler). This was rele vant bot h to confirm the of fice r’s be lief that the tr uc k an d tra ile r we re c omm e rc ia l veh ic le s and to d e te rm ine wh e the r a

pp e lla nt w a s r e qu ir e d to have a commerc ial driver’ s license. Se e id . § 52 2. 01 1 ( sp e c if yingwh e n co mme rc ia l li c e ns e
re qu ir e d) , § 52 2. 04 1 (c omm e rc ia l lic e ns e c la ssi fi c a tio ns ) ( Wes t 20 07 ). As he wa s c on du c tin g thi s ins pe c tio n, Mc Cr e a

no tic e d th a t th e tr

uc k a nd tr a ile r h a d f

arm lic e ns e plate s. Mc Cr e a c ou ld n ot f

ind the re qu ir e d V I

N p late on the tr a ile r, so he a sk e d a pp e lla nt t o follow him to the Department’s office in San Ang elo “so we could conduc t a furthe r investig ation to try to identify

the trailer .” Appe llant ag ree d to do this. On t he way to the office, McCrea ran a chec k to determine if appellant had a criminal history and lea rned that he had be en convic ted for the unlawful possession of a

firea rm by a fe lon. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. § 46.04 (West Supp. 2009). Appel la n t w a s ar r e s te d a t t h e D e p artm e n t’ s o f

f ic e w h e nh e a dmi tt e d

h a v in g a r if le an d a h an d g un in t he tr uc k. Duri nga

se arc h in c ide nt t o th a t arr e st, c oc a ine wa s f ound in a pp e lla nt’ s p oc ke t. Appellant also testified at the hear ing. H e said that his fathe r had re cently purcha sed the trailer . His father

had also purc hased t h e t ra ct o r and four-whe eler loaded on the tr ailer. Appellant testified that he had bee n hired by his fathe r t o transport these items to his father’ s ranc h
near Del Rio.McCrea testified that it was later de termined that the lice nse plate on the trailer ha d been issued 1 for a differ ent vehicle . I t was also dete rmined that the truc k and tra iler we re not be ing use d for fa rm ingpurp os e s. 4

Appellant conte nds that the s top and detention we re unla wful bec ause the tr uc k- tr a c tor

and tr a ile r he wa s d

ri vin g we re fa

rm ve hic le s e xemp t f

ro m c omm e rc ia l mo tor

ve hic le safe ty standards, a

nd thus ex empt from beingstopped for inspec tion under sec tion 644.103. Appellant’s a

rg ument is premised on the pre sence of the far m lice nse plates on the tr

uck and tr ailer. The fa rm license plates indicated that the truck a nd trailer ha d been r eg istered a s far m vehicles. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 502.163 (West 2007) ( authorizing r egi s t ra t ion of
commerc ial vehicle a s far m vehicle if owner will use it f or cer tain limit ed purposes). But a s McCrea testified, farm license plates are commonly misused: “[W ]e catch the m all the time, people running far m tag s and it’s not a leg itima t e farm oper ation.” Ap pe lla nt c ite s n o a

uth or ity to s up po rt

his 1 contention that the prese nce of the far m plates alone e stablished that the truck a nd trailer w ere not
commerc ial vehicles subjec t to reg ulation, detention, and inspec tion.

For the purpose of

Texas commerc ial motor vehicle sa fety standards, a “c ommercia l motor vehicle” operated intrastate ha s the meaning assig ned by section 548.001 of t he tra nsportation
co de. Id . § 644.01(1) ( West S upp. 2009). Unde r that def inition, a “commerc ial motor vehicle” means “ a self- propelled or towed vehic le [having a combin ed gro s s weig ht rating of more tha n 26,000 pounds], ot her tha n a fa rm vehic l e wi t h a g ross weig ht, reg istered we ight, or g ross weig ht ratingof less than 48,000 pounds, that is used on a public hig hway to transport passe ng ers or car g o.” Id
. § 548.001(1)( A). Unde r this definition, a “fa rm vehicle ” has the meaningassig ned by the fe dera l motor car rier sa fety regulations. Id
. § 548.001(5). The fede ral motor ca rrier safe ty regulations are5

found in the Code of F eder al Reg ulations. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 390.1-.37 (2008) . These r egulations do no t sp e c if

ic a lly de fi ne “ fa

rm ve hic le ,” bu t th e y

do c on ta in t

he se pe rt ine nt d e fi nit ion s:
Fa rm v e hic le dr iv e r means a person who dr ives only

a commercial motor ve hic le that is

— ( a ) C o n t r o l l e d

an d o p e r a t e d b y a f ar m e r a s a p r i v a t e m o t o r

c ar r i e r o f p r o p e rt y; (b) B eing used to transport e ither— (1) Ag ricultural pr oducts, or (2 ) F arm

ma c hin e ry , f

arm su pp lie s, or bo th, to o r f

ro m a fa rm ; (c) Not being used in the oper ation of a f or-hire motor car

rier; (d) Not c arr

y ing ha zardous materia ls . . . ; and (e ) B e ingus e d w ith in 1 50 a ir -m ile s o f t he fa rm e r’ s f arm . Farmer means a ny person who operates a far m or is directly

involved in the cultivation of land, cr ops, or livestock which— (a) Are owned by

that person; or (b) Ar e under

the direc t control of that per son.

. . . Fo r- hir e m o tor

c arrie r means a

person e ng ag ed in the tra

nsportation of g oods or passe ng ers f

or compe nsation.

. . . Pr i v a tem o to r

c arrie r mea ns a per so n wh o p rov id es t rans po rt ati on of pr op e rt y or passe ng ers, by

commerc ial motor vehicle, a nd is not a for-hir e motor ca rrier
. Id . § 390.5. Thus, deter mining whe ther t h e truc k and tra iler we re f arm ve hicles for

regulatory purposes re quired more than mere ly looking f

or t h e fa rm license plates. I nstead, it requir ed the office r to deter

mine whether

the vehicles w ere being used as f arm ve hicles within the meaningof t h e p er t i n en ts t at u es an d

re gu l at i o n s . Vi ew i n g t h e e v i d en ce i nt h e l i gh tm o s tfa v o rab l e t o t h e r u l i n g, the trial cour

t could find that McCrea was justified in his initi al belief that appellant’ s truck and6

trailer ha d a g ross weig ht r ating exceeding 26,000 pounds and we re, at least tentatively , commerc ial vehicles. Thus, the initial stop for inspection was a uthorized by

section 644.103. The subse quent detention due to the a

bsence of the re quired VI N on the t ra i l er d i d not exceed the pur poses of the initial st op, and the discove ry of the unlaw ful wea

pons during that detention war rante d appellant’ s
arr e st. Th e c oc a ine wa s la wf ull y fo un d d ur ingthe se arc h in c ide nt t o th a t arr e st. Appellant’s sing le issue is overr uled and the judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: De cembe r 8, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh