16United States v.Marks, et al.Nos. 98-6044/6048/6216III. CONCLUSIONThe judgment of the district court isAFFIRMED.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0124P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0124p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________UNITEDSTATES OFAMERICA,Plaintiff-Appellee,v.JAMESD.MARKS(98-6044),MAURICENAVARROBROOKS(98-6048),ROBERTLEEAGUON(98-6216),Defendants-Appellants.;>1Nos. 98-6044/6048/6216Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.No. 97-00024—Thomas B. Russell, District Judge.Argued: January 25, 2000Decided and Filed: April 6, 2000Before: NELSON, SUHRHEINRICH, and GILMAN,Circuit Judges._________________COUNSELARGUED:Armand I. Judah, Louisville, Kentucky, MichaelL. Boylan, Louisville, Kentucky, Vincent F. Heuser, Jr.,Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellants. Terry M. Cushing,2United States v.Marks, et al.Nos. 98-6044/6048/6216ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Louisville,Kentucky, for Appellee.ON BRIEF:Armand I. Judah,Louisville, Kentucky, Michael L. Boylan, Louisville,Kentucky, Vincent F. Heuser, Jr., Louisville, Kentucky, forAppellants. Terry M. Cushing, David J. Hale, ASSISTANTUNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, Louisville, Kentucky, forAppellee._________________OPINION_________________SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. Defendants MauriceNavarro Brooks, James Marks, and Robert L. Aguon appealtheir jury convictions and sentences on multiple counts ofbank robbery, armed bank robbery, and carrying a firearmduring a crime of violence. Defendants raise seven issues.I. BACKGROUNDBrooks committed nine armed bank robberies in and aroundLouisville, Kentucky, from July through December 1996.Nine people were charged with either participating directly inthe robberies or with assisting the principals at differenttimes. Marks allegedly participated in seven of the robberiesbut was convicted of only six. Aguon participated in the lasttwo robberies.Brooks, Marks, Aguon, and Bernard Williams committedthe ninth robbery on December 20, 1996. As they wereleaving the bank, a Louisville police officer drove into thebank parking lot. The four robbers split into pairs. Brooksand Williams fled in Williams’ car but were arrested after ahigh speed chase. Immediately after Brooks’ arrest, he askeda police officer how much time he would get and commentedthat the officer did a “good job.”Meanwhile, Marks and Aguon entered a nearby flower shopwhere Marks called his stepmother for a ride and bought herNos. 98-6044/6048/6216United States v.Marks, et al.15proceedings, competency examinations, and other proceduralmatters.See18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).Aguon raised the Speedy Trial Act issue on the morning oftrial and asked the court to dismiss the case against him,which the court denied. After admitting that he filed motionsand requests for his own benefit that would have tolled theSpeedy Trial Act, Aguon simply asserts that “the delay inbringing him to trial was a violation of the act . . . .”(Aguon’s Brief at 18). Aguon does not specify which part ofthe delay violated the Speedy Trial Act.In this case, the district court made several Speedy Trialfindings: (1) after Brooks moved to continue the originalsentencing date, (2) after change in counsel for a codefendant,(3) after the district court granted Defendants’ motions towithdraw their pleas, and (4) after the district court severedAguon and Myles’ trial from Brooks and Marks’ trial. Thedistrict court found that the case as to Aguon and Myles wascomplex because of the withdrawal of the plea, the severanceorder, and the Government’s difficulty in compelling thetestimony of Defendants who were already sentenced.Defendants withdrew their guilty pleas on March 17, 1998,which became the day of their indictment for Speedy TrialAct purposes.See18 U.S.C. § 3161(i);United States v.Bond, 956 F.2d 628, 630 (6th Cir. 1992). Brooks and Markswere tried on May 19, 1998, and Aguon’s trial was severed onthe same day. Aguon’s trial started July 6, 1998. However,the district court first decided Aguon’s motion to suppress thetestimony of witnesses with plea agreements.Most of the delay was caused by Defendants changing theirpleas and filing pretrial motions, all of which Aguon appearsto admit. As to the other delays, the district court madeappropriate findings to exclude the delays. Accordingly, thedistrict court did not err in denying Aguon’s motion todismiss under the Speedy Trial Act grounds.14United States v.Marks, et al.Nos. 98-6044/6048/6216To suppress evidence of a pretrial identification, adefendant must first show that the procedure wasimpermissibly suggestive. If a defendant shows this, then thedistrict court must evaluate the totality of the circumstancesto determine whether the identification was reliable.SeeLedbetter v. Edwards,35 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir. 1994);seealso United States v. Causey,834 F.2d 1277, 1286 (6th Cir.1987).The district court reviewed the photographic array beforethe trial and concluded that the photographic lineup was notimpermissibly suggestive. During the trial, the court requiredthe Government to voir dire the witness from the flower shopoutside the presence of the jury to establish a foundation forher testimony about her pretrial identification of Aguon.During the voir dire, the witness testified that she was shownthe photographic lineup, filled out an identification sheet, andsigned it, indicating her identification of Aguon. The witnessessentially repeated this testimony for the jury. Theinvestigating police officer testified that he used standardprocedures.Because Aguon failed to demonstrate that the procedureutilized by the Louisville Police Department was undulysuggestive, the testimony and evidence of the pretrialidentification of Aguon was properly admitted.G. Speedy Trial Act.Aguon claims that the delay of overtwo years in trying him violates the Speedy Trial Act.TheCourt reviews the district court’s interpretation of the SpeedyTrial Actde novoand its factual findings for clear error.SeeUnited States v. Carroll,26 F.3d 1380, 1390 (6th Cir. 1994).The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant’s trial beginwithin seventy days of the filing date of the indictment orarraignment, whichever is later.See18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).However, the seventy-day rule is subject to excludableperiods of delay for consideration of motions, pretrialNos. 98-6044/6048/6216United States v.Marks, et al.3a stuffed animal. She picked them up at the florist and drovethem to her home. Later, an employee of the florist alsofound a bag of money on the premises. A few days after therobbery, the flower shop employees identified Marks andAguon from standard photographic lineups. However, oneemployee could not identify Aguon.After leaving the Marks’ home, Marks and Aguon traveledto Oklahoma where they stayed with William Hayes. Hayeslater testified that Marks and Aguon said that they robbed abank.Marks and Aguon were apprehended and arraigned onMarch 19, 1997. Brooks was arraigned on March 26, 1997.The court scheduled trial for all three defendants for May 19,1997. Before trial, Defendants filed several motions. Aguonmoved for discovery, to suppress photographic identification,to sever, and to enlarge time to file additional motions.Marks also moved for discovery and to sever both defendantsand offenses. The district court judge denied the motions tosuppress, sever, and for discovery.After Brooks’ original counsel withdrew on April 23, 1997,Brooks' new attorney moved to continue the trial, which thedistrict court rescheduled to August 18, 1997. The districtcourt also made Speedy Trial Act findings. On July 16, 1997,the case was reassigned to another district judge. Brooks thenmoved to sever, to suppress evidence, and to exclude two ofhis prior statements. Aguon also moved to exclude hisstatements when he was arrested and to suppress thephotographic lineup identification. The district court deniedall these motions.On August 18, 1997, the morning of trial, Marks, Brooks,and Aguon agreed to plead guilty to all counts and tocooperate completely and fully in the ongoing investigation ofthe nine bank robberies. The plea agreements were forspecific sentences under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure11(e)(1)(C). If Defendants failed to cooperate fully, the4United States v.Marks, et al.Nos. 98-6044/6048/6216Government could move for relief from the agreement. Thedistrict court accepted the pleas and set sentencing for eachDefendant for November 7, 1997.On October 22, 1997, the Government moved to continuethe sentencing because Defendants had not completed theircooperation under the plea agreements. Marks objected to thecontinuance. Defendants Brooks and Marks responded thatthey were dissatisfied with their plea agreements and movedto withdraw their guilty pleas. After the district court advisedBrooks and Marks of their possible sentences, theyreconsidered and maintained their guilty pleas. The districtcourt reset Defendants’ sentencing to February 2, 1998.In early December, 1997, Codefendant James Myles,previously a fugitive, was arrested. His trial was set forMarch 26, 1998. The Government again moved to continueDefendants' sentencing because Marks and Brooks wouldboth testify against Myles. The district court reset thesentencing of Brooks, Marks, and Aguon to April 3, 1998.On February 27, 1998, Brooks, Marks, and Aguon jointlymoved pro se to set aside their plea agreements. Theyclaimed that the Government threatened their family andfriends with prosecution if Defendants did not accept the pleabargains and that their defense counsel constantly pressuredthem to accept the plea agreements. On March 17, 1998, thecourt heard Defendants’ motion and received testimony. Thecourt rejected their claims of coercion, finding their profferedtestimony not credible. The court also denied Defendants’motions for new counsel. At the hearing, the Governmentalso stated that it would offer Defendants’ incriminating postplea statements made while they were cooperating with theGovernment. The district court allowed Defendants towithdraw their pleas, made Speedy Trial Act findings, and settrial for May 18, 1998.Before trial, Brooks, Marks, and Aguon renewed severalmotions and also moved to suppress their incriminating postNos. 98-6044/6048/6216United States v.Marks, et al.13exchange for truthful testimony is not an illegal witnessgratuity. This court’s opinion inWareunequivocallyforecloses defendants’ argument.Warewas decided on December 3, 1998. Defendantssubmitted their proof briefs in late January of1999, nearlytwo months later. They do not mentionWare. Instead, theyexcoriate the government for its use of “bribed testimony”that was “illegally obtained”—as ifWarehad never beendecided. During all of the time between the submissions oftheir proof briefs in January of 1999 and oral argument inJanuary of 2000, counsel never acknowledged, as permittedby Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,thatWarehad been decided and that their argument wasforeclosed as a result.At oral argument, counsel admitted that they knew aboutWare, but did not cite it in their briefs because they were “notsure where it would go in the appellate process.” Presumablythis meant that they hoped (unrealistically, in our view) thateither this court en banc or the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates would overturnWare. BecauseWareis a publisheddecision of this court directly contrary to Defendants’position, it should have been disclosed.SeeMODELRULES OFPROFESSIONALCONDUCTRule 3.3(a)(3) (“A lawyer shall notknowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in thecontrolling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directlyadverse to the position of the client and not disclosed byopposing counsel”); Rule 3.3(b) (providing that this dutycontinues “to the conclusion of the proceeding.”).F. Photographic Identification.Aguon claims that thedistrict court improperly admitted evidence that a witnessidentified him in a photographic array. This Court reviews adistrict court's factual findings in a motion to suppressevidence for clear error and its conclusions of lawde novo.See United States v. Williams,962 F.2d 1218, 1221 (6th Cir.1992).12United States v.Marks, et al.Nos. 98-6044/6048/6216Allen,160 F.3d 1096, 1106 (6th Cir. 1998);United States v.Hudson,53 F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir.1995).Brooks and Marks did not renew their motions to sever atthe conclusion of the trial and, thereby, waived the issue forappeal. However, even if the issue were preserved, thedistrict court did not abuse its discretion because Brooks andMarks failed to show “compelling, specific, and actualprejudice.”See Sherlin,67 F.3d at 1215. Defendants’defenses were not mutually exclusive. Further, Brooks andMarks did not show that the jury was unable to “separate andtreat distinctively evidence relevant to each particulardefendant.”Medina,992 F.2d at 587. In fact, the juryacquitted Marks of his alleged role in the seventh robbery, ascharged in Counts 20, 21, and 22 of the indictment, whileconvicting Brooks of his role in the same robbery. Clearly,the jury did separate and distinguish the evidence betweenBrooks and Marks. Accordingly, we affirm the districtcourt’s denial of Brooks’ and Marks’ motions to sever.E. Purchased Testimony.Defendants claim that thetestimony of cooperating witnesses who received favorableplea bargains in exchange for their promises of truthfultestimony should have been excluded because theGovernment’s inducement of this testimony violated thefederal witness anti-gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2).They rely on the Tenth Circuit’s decision inSingleton v.United States, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding thatprosecutors’ offers of favorable plea agreements in exchangefor truthful testimony against accomplices or coconspiratorsviolate the statute and must be excluded), which was vacatedby the en banc Tenth Circuit within two weeks of the date itwas filed and ultimately repudiated.See Singleton v. UnitedStates, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (en banc),cert. denied, 119S. Ct. 2371 (1999). InUnited States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414(6th Cir. 1998),cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1348 (1999), thiscourt, like every other circuit to have considered the issue,rejected the Tenth Circuit panel’s analysis and concluded,among other things, that a prosecutor’s offer of leniency inNos. 98-6044/6048/6216United States v.Marks, et al.5plea statements. The Government moved to admit thestatements, which the district court granted. The courtconcluded that the exclusionary provision for statementsmade during plea discussions did not apply to post-pleastatements and that Defendants’ post-plea statements wereotherwise voluntary and, therefore, admissible.The court also found joinder of Brooks, Marks, Aguon andMyles proper under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.The district court denied Brooks’ motion to suppress his postarrest statement, “How much time am I going to get for this?”because Brooks did not show that the statement wasinvoluntary. The district court denied Aguon’s motion tosuppress a photographic identification of him by an employeeof the flower shop. Finally, the district court denied Marks’s,Brooks’s, and Aguon’s objections to the Government’sintention to introduce evidence of prior bad acts.On May 19, 1998, the morning of trial, the courtreconsidered severance and severed the trial of Aguon andMyles from the trial of Brooks and Marks, with appropriateSpeedy Trial Act findings. Brooks and Marks were triedbeginning May 19, 1998, and convicted on May 29, 1998.Marks was sentenced to 1875 months, and Brooks wassentenced to 2722 months. The court later corrected theirsentences underUnited States v. Sims,975 F.2d 1225 (6thCir. 1992), and reduced them by 480 months to 1395 monthsand 2242 months respectively.On July 6, 1998, the morning of trial, Aguon moved tosuppress the testimony of witnesses who testified pursuant toplea agreements, which the court denied. Aguon also movedto suppress his post-plea statements to the FBI claiming thatthey were not voluntary. After taking testimony, the courtdenied the motion. The jury convicted Aguon on all counts.The district court sentenced Aguon to 438 months.6United States v.Marks, et al.Nos. 98-6044/6048/6216II. DISCUSSIONA. Suppression of Post-plea Incriminating Statements.Defendants contend that their post-plea statements shouldhave been excluded. This Court reviews factual findingsabout a confession for clear error, but reviews the ultimatequestion of voluntarinessde novo.See United States v.Wrice,954 F.2d 406, 410-11 (6th Cir. 1992).Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) treats theinadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and relatedstatements:Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidenceof the following is not, in any civil or criminalproceeding, admissible against the defendant who madethe plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:(A) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;(B) a plea of nolo contendere;(C) any statement made in the course of any proceedingsunder this rule regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or(D) any statement made in the course of plea discussionswith an attorney for the government which do not resultin a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty laterwithdrawn.Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6).After Defendants entered their plea agreements, FBISpecial Agent Wight spoke to the Defendants with theirdefense counsel either present or informed of the interview.The court cautioned Defendants about the possible admissionof their post-plea statements when they moved to withdrawtheir pleas.Nos. 98-6044/6048/6216United States v.Marks, et al.11and that the district court erred by not instructing the jury thatthey were permitted—but not required—to find that bankslocated in Louisville are also located in the Western Districtof Kentucky, it is difficult to imagine any error that would bemore clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.The Government also established through the testimony ofbank employees in both trials that the banks were federallyinsured. In Aguon’s trial, the Government also submittedcertificates of insurance for the banks from the FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). At trial, none of theDefendants challenged the federally insured status of thebanks.This Court has held similar evidence as sufficient proof ofa bank being federally insured.SeeUnited States v. Wood,780 F.2d 555, 556-57 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that theunrebutted testimony of a bank security officer wassufficient).See alsoUnited States v. Harris,165 F.3d 1062,1066 (6th Cir. 1999);United States v. Rowan,518 F.2d 685,692-93 (6th Cir. 1975). Considering this evidence in the lightmost favorable to the Government, we find that there wassufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonabledoubt that the robbed banks were federally insured.Accordingly, we reject this claim of error.D. Severance.Defendants Brooks and Marks claim thattheir joinder was prejudicial to their defenses. To prevail ona claim of misjoinder, a defendant must show compelling,specific, and actual prejudice from the misjoinder ofdefendants or offenses.See United States v. Sherlin,67 F.3d1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995);United States v. Epley,52 F.3d571, 578 (6th Cir. 1995);United States v. Medina,992 F.2d573, 587 (6th Cir. 1993). This Court reviews denial ofseverance motions for abuse of discretion.See Zafiro v.United States,506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993);Sherlin,67 F.3d at1215. A motion to sever must be renewed at the close ofevidence to be preserved for appeal.See United States v.10United States v.Marks, et al.Nos. 98-6044/6048/6216508 U.S. at 137. The Sixth Circuit has upheld similarmandatory minimum sentences involving firearms.See,e.g.,United States v. Duerson,25 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1994) (157months for robbery with short barrel shotgun). Accordingly,we find that Brooks’ and Marks’ sentences did not violate theEighth Amendment.C. Proof of Venue and Federal Insurance.Defendantsclaim that the Government did not prove the elements ofvenue and the federally insured status of the robbed banks.Brooks and Marks moved for acquittal at the close of proofsarguing that the Government failed to prove the venueelement. Aguon, however, did not raise this issue at the closeof the Government’s proof and thus failed to preserve it forappellate review.See United States v. English, 925 F.2d 154,156 (6th Cir. 1991).Brooks and Marks argue that even though the jury waspresented with evidence that the robbed banks were locatedin Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky, no witness everspecifically testified that the banks were located in theWestern District of Kentucky. The district court took judicialnotice that Louisville is part of the Western District ofKentucky. Brooks and Marks argue that this was improperbecause Rule 201(g) of the Federal Rules of Evidencerequires district courts in criminal cases to instruct the jury“that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive anyfact judicially noticed.”We are not persuaded. For one thing, 28 U.S.C. § 97(b)specifically provides that “[t]he Western District [ofKentucky] comprises the counties of . . . Jefferson . . . [and]Court for the Western District shall be held at . . .Louisville. . . .”. Thus, we seriously doubt whetherLouisville’s presence in the Western District of Kentucky isa “fact” of which the court needed to take judicial notice. Buteven if it were an issue of fact, it is certainly not one aboutwhich jurors could rationally disagree. Therefore, evenassuming for the sake of argument that it was an issue of fact,Nos. 98-6044/6048/6216United States v.Marks, et al.7In this case, the district court found that (1) Defendants’admissions, which the Government wanted to admit, weremade after Defendants’ plea agreements had been finalizedand entered, and (2) the plea negotiations did not extendbeyond their signing and filing. The court concluded thatFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) did not applybecause the statements were not made during the pleadiscussions.Defendants rely onUnited States v. Brooks, 536 F.2d 1137(6th Cir. 1976), andUnited States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791(5th Cir. 1977), for the proposition that statements made tolaw enforcement officers pursuant to a plea agreement then ineffect are statements “made in the course of plea discussions.”Their reliance is misplaced. Congress amended Rule 11(e)(6)in 1979; it did so in part to abrogate decisions such asBrooksandHerman, because they manifested what Congress thoughtwas a too-broad view of the plea negotiation process.SeeUnited States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 421 (3d Cir. 1985)(“Prior to its amendment, the rule provided for the exclusionof ‘statements made in connection with, and relevant to, anyof the foregoing pleas or offers.’ . . . Some courts construedthis rule liberally. . . . The legislative history of the 1979amendments manifests congressional disapproval of broadjudicial constructions of the previous language, and therevision of the rule appears to have been designed specificallyto avoid the result inHermanand other cases reaching similarresults.”). The Third Circuit inSebetichspecificallyidentifiedBrooksas one of the “other cases reaching similarresults.”Id. Rule 11(e)(6)(D) now renders inadmissible onlystatements that were “made in the course of plea discussionswith an attorney for the government. . . .” FED.R.CRIM.P.11(e)(6)(D) (emphasis added). FBI agents cannot negotiateplea agreements with defendants, so statements thatdefendants make to them are not “made in the course of pleadiscussions.”See Sebetich, 776 F.2d at 422 (rejecting thearguments that self-incriminating statements made to a localpolice chief were protected by Rule 11(e)(6) because, amongother reasons, the police chief was not an “attorney for the8United States v.Marks, et al.Nos. 98-6044/6048/6216government.”). In any event, statements made after a pleaagreement is finalized are not “made in the course of pleadiscussions.”See United States v. Watkins, 85 F.3d 498, 500(10th Cir. 1996);United States v. Lloyd, 43 F.3d 1183, 1186(8th Cir. 1994);United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 685(D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Excluding testimony made after—andpursuant to—the agreement would not serve the purpose ofencouraging compromise”).Defendants made their statements to the FBI agent afterthey negotiated their plea agreements and pleaded guilty.Accordingly, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6)does not apply, and their statements were admissible.Nevertheless, even if Rule 11(e)(6) applied, admission of thestatements was harmless error.SeeFed. R. Crim. P. 52(a);Milton v. Wainwright,407 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1972). Therewas testimony from other participants in the robberies thatDefendants robbed the banks and also other circumstantialevidence that would support Defendants’ conviction.Defendants did not show that, in the absence of theirconfessions, the evidence was insufficient.Aguon also claims he entered the plea agreement and gavea confession because he was coerced. Generally, voluntarystatements are admissible.See Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S.436, 478 (1966). The test for voluntariness is whether theconfession was the product of free and rational choice.SeeUnited States v. Murphy,763 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir.1985).If a defendant was subject to objectively coercive activity thatovercame his free will, a defendant's statement cannot be usedagainst him.See United States v. Rigsby,943 F.2d 631, 635(6th Cir. 1991). Determining the voluntariness of a statementrequires an analysis of the totality of all the circumstances.See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973);McCall v. Dutton,863 F.2d 454, 459 (6th Cir.1988); 18U.S.C. § 3501(b).In the present case, the district court held a suppressionhearing on the morning of trial and received testimony fromNos. 98-6044/6048/6216United States v.Marks, et al.9Aguon, his girlfriend, and Special Agent Wight. The postplea statements were made in the presence of or with theknowledge of Defendants’ attorneys. The district court didnot believe Aguon’s testimony that he was coerced because ofthe alleged threatened prosecution. Accordingly, the courtfound that Aguon’s statements were not coerced. We findthat Aguon has not shown that the district court’s factualfindings were clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm theruling of the district court that admitted Defendants’ post-pleaincriminating statements.B. Length of Sentences.Defendants Brooks and Marksclaim that the length of their sentences amounts to cruel andunusual punishment. Brooks and Marks essentially challengethe proportionality of the mandatory sentencing provision. Aconstitutional challenge to a sentence is a question of law andreviewedde novo.See United States v. Lloyd,10 F.3d 1197,1220 (6th Cir. 1993).Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) requires enhanced consecutivesentencing for its violation.See Deal v. United States,508U.S. 129, 132-133 (1993). The Supreme Court hasdetermined that strict proportionality between a crime and itspunishment is not required.SeeHarmelin v. United States,501 U.S. 957, 959-960 (1991) (upholding Michigan's penaltyof life imprisonment without parole for possession of morethan 650 grams of cocaine). The Sixth Circuit has adoptedthe “narrow proportionality principle” ofHarmelin.SeeUnited States v. Hopper,941 F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir. 1991).Consequently, only an extreme disparity between crime andsentence offends the Eighth Amendment.See id.In this case, no disparity exists between the multiple crimesand the sentence in the cases of Brooks and Marks. Brookscommitted nine armed bank robberies within six months.Marks participated in six of the robberies. In a case involvingsimilar facts, the Supreme Court held that a 105-year sentencefollowing conviction of six armed robberies with attendantconvictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is not unjust.See Deal,