alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
In The Matter Of: 

SERVED: OCTOBER 9, 2014 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Docket No. FAA-2013-0716 

TYLER PENNYWITT 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Case No. 2012S0150128 

Respondent 

NOTICE OF HEARING LOCATION 

On December 13, 2013, an Order Setting Litigation Dates and Procedures was filed, 

which noted that the location of the Hearing would be provided by separate Notice to the parties. 

On June 27, 2014, an Order Reserving Motions, Setting Deadlines for Filing 

Supplemental Materials, and Continuing the Hearing was filed. 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Hearing in this case, set to begin on December 9, 

2014, at 9:00a.m., will be held at the following location: 

United States Tax Court 

Bryan Simpson U.S. Courthouse 

Courtroom # 6A 

300 North Hogan Street 

Jacksonville, FL 32202 

The Hearing begins at 9:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time. Please allow time to pass 

through security. Brief cases, purses, packages, and the like will be x-rayed. All individuals must 

present government issued identification to enter the courthouse. 

Attachment: Service List 
SERVICE LIST 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence A venue, S. W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1 0001 

Mr. Christopher R. Stevenson 

Complainant's Counsel 

Office of the Regional Counsel, AS0-7 

Southern Region 

Federal Aviation Administration 

P.O. Box 20636 

Atlanta, GA 30320 

TEL: 404-305-5200 

FAJ(: 404-305-5223 

Mr. Tyler Pennywitt 

Respondent 

4483 Hanover Park Drive 

Jacksonville, FL 3 2224 

TEL: 904-252-1356 

F AJ(: 904-928-0909 

Judge J.E. Sullivan 

U.S. Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

ONE COPY 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-6941 

FAJ(: 202-366-7536 

FDMS No. FAA-2013-0716 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2Wl000, Washington, 

DC 20591, Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.
#### Janice K. RODES, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. 4996.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

March 20, 1981.

Janice K. Rodes, pro se.

David Mannheimer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, and Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

OPINION

Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CON-NOR, BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ.

*310PER CURIAM.

In March, 1979, Janice Rodes attempted to turn left from a public highway near Palmer into her driveway. When she began her turn she could see a distant vehicle moving toward her at a normal rate of speed. Unfortunately, while Rodes’ truck was blocking the oncoming lane her engine stalled, and before she could get it started the vehicle she had seen collided with her truck. When a state trooper arrived at the accident scene, he cited Rodes for failing to yield on a left turn, in violation of 13 AAC 02.125. Rodes was convicted following a trial before the district court in Palmer, and her conviction was affirmed by the superior court. She has appealed again, claiming numerous errors in her trial.

We do not need to address all of Rodes’ claims, since we accept the state’s concession of error on a dispositive point. 13 AAC 02.125 reads, in relevant part:

> *Vehicle Turning Left.*A driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left ... into an alley, private road, or driveway from a highway shall yield the right-of-way to a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction upon that highway so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. ...

The state concedes that the vehicle that collided with the Rodes was not an “immediate hazard” within the meaning of the regulation. It suggests that “immediate hazard” should be defined as a vehicle situated so near and traveling so fast that there is danger of a collision if the vehicle turning left does not yield.1 We believe that this is a sound definition.2

The order of the superior court affirming Rodes’ conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court with instructions to remand to the district court for dismissal of the complaint.

1

. The state derives its suggestion from 10 AAC 40.010(43) (formerly 10 AAC 10.270), which defines right-of-way as “the right of one vehicle or pedestrian to proceed in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian approaching under circumstances of direction, speed and proximity which give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the other.”

2

. We also adopt the state’s suggestion that road conditions and visibility be considered in determining whether another vehicle is an “immediate hazard.” *See generally Doubek v. Greco,*7 Ariz.App. 102, 436 P.2d 494 (1968); *Reed v. Green,*90 Idaho 526, 414 P.2d 445 (1966); *Pennington v. McLean,*16 Ill.2d 577, 158 N.E.2d 624 (1959); *Smith v. Gallegos,*16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 19

- 0734

_________________ WILLIAM SCOTT ROGERS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Pl aint iffs and Appellants,

v. LEWIS & CLARK COUNTY, LEWIS & CLAR K COUNTY SHERIFF ’ S OFFICE, LEO C. DUTTON in his capacit y as Lewis & Clark Count y Sheriff, JASON GRIMMIS, in his capacit y as Lewis & Clark County Undersheriff and former Captain for the Lewis & Clark County Detent io n Center, ALAN HUGHES, in his capacit y as Captain for the Lewis & Clark Detention Center, JOHN and JANE DOES 1 through 50, in their capacit y as Em

pl oy ees of the Lewis & Clark County Detenti on Center,

Defendants and Appellees. O R D E R

_________________ 

### Pursuant to th e Inter

nal Operating Rules of this Court, this cause is classified for submission on briefs to a five

- justice panel of this Court. The Clerk is directed to provide a copy hereof to all counsel of r ecord and to the Honorable Mi cha e l F. McMahon , District Judge

. For the Court,

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

July 15 2020

07/15/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0734
#### Barbara HINCHEE, Petitioner, v. SECURITY NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.

No. 5277.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

March 13, 1981.

*822Jeffrey H. Roth, Jensen, Harris & Roth, Anchorage, for petitioner.

Walter H. Garretson, Garretson & Jarvi, Anchorage, for respondent.

Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CON-NOR, BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ.

OPINION

MATTHEWS, Justice.

Petitioner and her husband own a condominium in Hawaii as tenants by the entirety. Petitioner owes a debt to respondent, Security National Bank, which has been reduced to judgment. The bank moved for an order requiring petitioner to apply her interest in the condominium toward satisfaction of the judgment. In response to the motion the court entered an order restraining petitioner from disposing of her interest in the condominium and referred the question of how her interest should be applied to the judgment to the standing master of the court.

Under Hawaiian law,1 real property held in a tenancy by the entirety may not be sold or alienated by one spouse only and is not subject to levy and execution for the debt of one spouse. *Sawada v. Endo,*57 Haw. 608, 561 P.2d 1291, 1295-96 (1977). Therefore petitioner does not have the right to sell or mortgage her interest in the condominium without her husband’s consent.

The power of the superior court to compel a party to convey land located outside of Alaska in aid of a judgment is not to be doubted.2 However, the court when doing so can neither grant to the party to whom the order is directed an ownership incident which she does not possess nor increase her estate at the expense of others holding interests in the property. Any order forcing petitioner to convey her interest in the condominium to the bank, or to alienate it for the benefit of the bank, would be necessarily inconsistent with her estate *823therein as defined by Hawaiian law and would therefore be invalid.

The order of the superior court is REVERSED.

1

. The law of the situs of real property establishes the incidents of ownership to it. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, Introductory Note § 223, at 7 (1971); *Hardy v.*Hardy, 250 F.Supp. 956, 960 (D.C.D.C.1966).

2

. *Fall v. Eastin,*215 U.S. 1, 8, 30 S.Ct. 3, 6, 54 L.Ed. 65, 69 (1909); *Schaheen v. Schaheen,*17 Mich.App. 147, 169 N.W.2d 117, 118 (1969).
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION OF
PRESIDENT


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350




In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Blackhawk Capital Group
BDC, Inc. (the "Company") for the quarter ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Craig A.
Zabala, as President of the Company, hereto certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:




1.           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Act of 1934; and




2.           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:   August
13, 2009





/s/ Craig A. ZabalaCraig
      A. ZabalaPresident(Principal
      Executive Officer)





A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906,
has been provided to Blackhawk Capital Group BDC Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-10880

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ISRAEL ANDRADE-FAVELA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:15-CR-46-1

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Israel Andrade-Favela pleaded guilty to illegal reentry. The district 

court departed above the guidelines range of 21 to 27 months and sentenced

him to 72 months of imprisonment to run consecutively to a 45-year state 

sentence and a 24-month revocation sentence. He challenges the substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 30, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-10880 Document: 00514011798 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/30/2017
No. 16-10880

2

We assume that Andrade-Favela preserved his challenge to the 

reasonableness of the upward departure. The district court’s decision to depart 

on the basis of Andrade-Favela’s history of repeated illegal entries and the 

serious nature of his state conviction advances the objectives of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2) and is justified by the facts of the case. The extent of the departure

is further justified by Andrade-Favela’s state conviction and the deference 

owed to the district court. Thus, Andrade-Favela fails to show that the district 

court abused its discretion in departing. See United States v. Zuniga-Peralta, 

442 F.3d 345, 346-48 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Saldana, 427 F.3d 298, 

309-16 (5th Cir. 2005).

Andrade-Favela did not preserve his challenge to the reasonableness of 

the consecutive sentence. The consecutive nature of the sentence was 

authorized by statute and the Sentencing Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a); 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) & comment. (n.4(A), (C)). He fails to show that the district 

court erred, much less plainly erred, in imposing a consecutive sentence, 

particularly in light of the deference owed to the district court. See Puckett v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 

736 (1993); United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 

2008); United States v. Candia, 454 F.3d 468, 472-73 (5th Cir. 2006).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 16-10880 Document: 00514011798 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/30/2017
IV

107TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. CON. RES. 401

Recognizing the heroism and courage displayed by airline flight attendants

each day.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 9, 2002

Mr. YOUNG of Alaska (for himself, Mr. MICA, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. LIPINSKI,

and Mr. EHLERS) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which

was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Recognizing the heroism and courage displayed by airline

flight attendants each day.

Whereas over 100,000 men and women serve as airline flight

attendants in the United States;

Whereas flight attendants dedicate themselves to serving and

protecting their passengers;

Whereas flight attendants are responsible for customer service aboard an aircraft;

Whereas flight attendants react to dangerous situations as

the first line of defense of airline passengers;

Whereas safety and security are a flight attendant’s primary

concerns;
2

•HCON 401 IH

Whereas flight attendants evacuate aircraft in emergency situations;

Whereas flight attendants defend passengers against hijackers, terrorists, and abusive passengers;

Whereas flight attendants handle in-flight medical emergencies;

Whereas flight attendants perform routine safety and service

duties on board an aircraft;

Whereas 25 flight attendants lost their lives aboard 4 hijacked flights on September 11, 2001;

Whereas 5 flight attendants helped prevent United Airlines

Flight 93 from reaching its intended target on September

11, 2001;

Whereas flight attendants provided assistance to passengers

across the United States who had their flights diverted

on September 11, 2001;

Whereas on December 22, 2001, flight attendants helped

subdue attempted shoe bomber, Richard Reid, who attempted to kill all 185 passengers and 12 crew members

on board American Airlines Flight 63; and

Whereas on February 7, 2002, flight attendants helped prevent Pablov Moreira, a Uruguayan citizen, from breaking

into the cockpit during United Airlines Flight 855 from

Buenos Aires to Miami: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That Congress—

3 (1) expresses profound gratitude to airline

4 flight attendants for their daily service to make air

5 travel safe;
3

•HCON 401 IH

1 (2) honors the courage and dedication of flight

2 attendants;

3 (3) expresses support for the flight attendants

4 who displayed heroism on September 11, 2001, and

5 to all flight attendants who continue to display her6 oism each day; and

7 (4) directs the Clerk of the House of Represent8 atives to send a copy of this resolution to a family

9 member of each of the flight attendants killed on

10 September 11, 2001.

Æ
**Exhibit
      32.1**


**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of **Design Source, Inc.** (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended **June
      30, 2008** as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),
      I, Peter Reichard, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
      Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
      the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
      the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated:
      August ___, 2008.




/s/
                Peter ReichardPeter
                Reichard, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
                Officer
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

 

GMHCOMMUNITIES TRUST

 

CERTIFICATIONSREQUIRED BYRULE 13a-14(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

 

----

 

                I,Bradley W. Harris, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of GMHCommunities Trust, a Maryland real estate investment trust (the “Company”),hereby certify that, to my knowledge:

 

                (1)           The Company’s periodic report on Form10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2004 (the “Form 10-Q”) fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,as amended; and

 

                (2)           The information contained in the Form10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.

 

 

*              *              *

 

 

 

 
| /s/ Bradley W. Harris                               |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Bradley W. Harris                                   |   |
| Senior Vice President   and Chief Financial Officer |   |

 

Date: December 15, 2004
**CERTIFICATIONS**
I, Thomas Kirchner, certify that: 

  1) I have reviewed this quarterly report onForm 10-QSB of FalconTarget, Inc.;  

  2) Based on my knowledge, this quarterlyreport does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made,not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterlyreport;  

  3) Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in thisquarterly report, fairly present in all material respects thefinancial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterlyreport;  

  4) The registrant’s other certifyingofficers and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:  

  a) Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to bedesigned under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared; 

  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presentedin this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the periodcovered by this report based upon such evaluation; and  

  c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal controls over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarterthat has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and  

  5) The registrant’s other certifyingofficers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation,to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee ofregistrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent function):  

  a) All significant deficiencies andmaterial weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controlswhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation and  

  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role inthe registrant’s internal controls over financial reporting. 

Date: May 15, 2008

By:   /s/   Thomas Kirchner 

    Thomas Kirchner

    Chief Executive Officer
* Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION - NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 01-1056

IN RE DEBORAH MILLS AND PETER MILLS,

Debtors,

DEBORAH MILLS, PETER MILLS,

Appellants,

v.

J. SCHWARTZ MOTOR;

Consolidated Defendant-Appellee,

HARMON LAW OFFICE; FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP.;

SALEM FIVE CENTS SAVINGS BANK,

Appellees,

TIMOTHY P. SMITH,

Trustee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,

Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Daniel A. Laufer, on brief for appellants.

David M. Rosen, with whom Harmon Law Offices, P.C. were on brief

for appellees.
-2-

August 9, 2001
-3-

Per Curiam. The panel affirms the decision of the district

court based on the reasoning therein. Mills v. Harmon Law Offices, et

al., Civ. No. 00-109-JD, Op. No. 2000 DNH 227 (D.N.H. Oct. 23, 2000)

(order). All motions currently pending regarding appellants' reply

brief are denied as moot.
#### ROYAL KREST CONSTRUCTION, INC., Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Oceanview Homeowners Association, and the Concerned Residents Against Safety Hazards, Appellees.

No. 6647.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Nov. 5, 1982.

Jeffrey H. Roth, Jensen, Harris & Roth, Anchorage, for appellant.

Robert A. Breeze, Rose & Breeze, Anchorage, for appellees.

Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, CONNOR, MATTHEWS and COMPTON, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This is the second time this attorney’s fees dispute has been before the court. In *Royal Krest Construction, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage,*640 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1981), we reversed an award of fees in the amount of $3,500 since it was made pursuant to Civil Rule 82 rather than Appellate Rule 508. The case was remanded because under Appellate Rule 508 attorney’s fees need not be awarded as a matter of course, as they are under Civil Rule 82. 640 P.2d at 134.

The superior court concluded that an award of fees was appropriate under Appellate Rule 508. Having concluded that an award was called for under Appellate Rule 508, the court awarded precisely the same amount of attorney’s fees as it had previously awarded.

Royal Krest appeals again, contending that the superior court abused its discretion in awarding fees in the amount it did, and that an appropriate award would be $500 to $700.

According to the affidavit of Oceanview’s attorney on the administrative appeal, 64.15 hours were required for the appeal. The award of $3,500 thus comes to less than $>5 per hour. Royal Krest does not contend that the amount of time spent by Ocean-view’s counsel was excessive, nor does it contend that $55 per hour is an unreasonable fee or that it amounts to substantially full compensation for Oceanview’s actual fees.

We therefore hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding appellees $3,500 in attorney’s fees pursuant to Appellate Rule 508.

AFFIRMED.