United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 22-20163 

____________ 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Margil Reyna, Jr., 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:15-CR-564-2 

______________________________ 

Before Smith, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.

Stephen Higginson, Circuit Judge: 

Reyna appeals the district court’s written judgment imposing the 

“standard” conditions of supervised release. Because the district court satisfied the oral pronouncement requirement and its written judgment did not 

conflict with its oral pronouncement, we AFFIRM. 

I. 

Margil Reyna, Jr., pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to 

conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise. Reyna waived the 

preparation of a presentence report (PSR), and the district court determined 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

September 8, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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that a PSR was not necessary. The district court proceeded to sentencing 

directly after taking Reyna’s guilty plea. Pursuant to the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea 

agreement, Reyna was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment and 5 years 

of supervised release. As part of his supervised release term, the district court 

stated that Reyna was “subject to the standard conditions.” Reyna’s written 

judgment included a list of the fifteen “standard” conditions of supervision 

listed in the Southern District of Texas’s standing order. Reyna timely 

appealed. 

II. 

Reyna challenges solely the district court’s imposition of the standard 

conditions of supervised release. Reyna argues that the list of fifteen 

“standard” conditions of supervised release in his written judgment should 

be vacated because they were not orally pronounced at sentencing. The 

government contends that no such conflict exists between the oral 

pronouncement and the written judgment because the district court satisfied 

the pronouncement requirement by orally adopting the district’s standing 

order through its shorthand reference. 

As an initial matter, the parties disagree as to the standard of review. 

In United States v. Martinez, our court explained that when “a defendant 

objects to a condition of supervised release for the first time on appeal, the 

standard of review depends on whether he had an opportunity to object 

before the district court.” 47 F.4th 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Alexander 

Martinez”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The 

opportunity to object exists–and thus a district court satisfies the 

pronouncement requirement–when the court notifies the defendant at 

sentencing that conditions are being imposed.” Id. at 367 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). If the defendant had the opportunity to object, 

we review for plain error; however, if the defendant did not, we review for 

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abuse of discretion. See id. at 366. Therefore, we cannot resolve the 

disagreement as to the appropriate standard of review until we determine 

whether the district court satisfied the oral pronouncement requirement. 

III. 

Due process requires that the district court orally announce any 

conditions for supervised release that are not mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(d), see United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2020) (en 

banc); however, “oral pronouncement does not mean that the sentencing 

court must recite the conditions word-for-word.” United States v. Grogan, 

977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2020). To satisfy the oral pronouncement 

requirement, the district court may, among other things, reference a list of 

recommended supervised release conditions from a court-wide or judgespecific standing order. Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560-63 & n.5. 

Since our court’s en banc decision in Diggles in 2020, we have 

elaborated on the notice required to comply with a defendant’s due process 

rights. For example, in United States v. Vargas, we affirmed a district court’s 

imposition of the standard conditions listed in a court-wide standing order 

where the court stated that “the Court’s mandatory, standard, and special 

conditions to be outlined momentarily” would be imposed. 23 F.4th 526, 527 

(5th Cir. 2022). We affirmed on the grounds that, “it should have been clear 

to defense counsel in this case that the ‘standard’ conditions of supervised 

release mentioned by the sentencing judge were the same standard 

conditions referenced in Vargas’s PSR and set forth in the Western District’s 

standing order.” Id. 

After briefing closed in this case, our court issued United States v. 

Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292 (5th Cir. 2023). In Baez-Adriano, the district 

court orally imposed “[t]he standard and mandatory conditions of 

supervision” at the sentencing hearing, despite the PSR listing no conditions 

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of supervised release. Id. at 296. The written judgment contained the 

standard and mandatory conditions as set forth in the Western District of 

Texas’s standing order. Id. at 297. Baez-Adriano appealed and argued that 

the district court did not properly pronounce at sentencing the standard and 

mandatory conditions. Id. 

Our court held, “[I]f the conditions imposed in the written judgment 

match those in the standing order, a district court need only orally reference 

the standard conditions to satisfy the pronouncement requirement. In that 

instance, a simple reference to ‘standard conditions’ is sufficient.” Id. at 301. 

Our court elaborated, “[W]hen the [district] court imposes standard 

conditions of supervised release sourced from a standing order, the PSR’s 

inclusion or exclusion of said conditions is irrelevant.” Id. Accordingly, our 

court held that the district court satisfied the pronouncement requirement. 

Id. at 301, 304 (affirming the judgment, but urging that sentencing judges 

highlight standard conditions as a best practice). 

Here, like in Baez-Adriano, the district court made a shorthand 

reference to the “standard” conditions of supervised release when imposing 

its sentence. The written judgment in both cases mirrored the standard 

conditions as listed in that district’s standing order, but neither defendant 

had the benefit of a PSR containing the “standard” terms of supervised 

release. 

In supplemental letter briefing to this court, Reyna concedes some 

similarity between his case and Baez-Adriano; however, he argues that the 

expedited sentencing in his case and the absence of a PSR indicate that the 

oral pronouncement requirement was not met. The distinction put forth by 

Reyna—the absence of a PSR in Reyna’s case as compared to a PSR silent on 

the terms of supervised release in Baez-Adriano’s case—is irrelevant. As our 

court explained in Baez-Adriano, the district “court’s reference to and oral 

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imposition of the court-wide standard conditions . . . is dispositive.” 74 F.4th 

at 301. If whether a PSR includes the standard conditions is “irrelevant” 

where the district “court imposes standard conditions of supervised release 

sourced from a standing order,” id., it follows that the absence of a PSR is 

irrelevant in that same context. In fact, Reyna’s case may be simpler to 

resolve than Baez-Adriano’s as Reyna could not have been under the 

misimpression that the district’s “standard” conditions of supervised 

release would not be imposed because they were not contained in his PSR. 

Reyna also contends that the expedited sentencing—held 

immediately after re-arraignment—left “little opportunity to discuss” the 

implications of the various aspects of the sentencing hearing. The district 

court docket reflects that on March 9, 2023, the district court set the rearraignment and sentencing hearing to be held simultaneously on March 14, 

2023. While this schedule was compressed, there is no indication in the 

record or in the briefing that trial counsel felt unprepared to handle the 

sentencing hearing or was unable to communicate with his client. Moreover, 

the docket reveals no objection by either party to this schedule. 

The Southern District of Texas’s standing order provided advance 

notice of the standard conditions of supervised release, which the district 

court then orally adopted via shorthand reference at the sentencing hearing. 

The written judgment listed the standard conditions of supervised release 

contained in the district’s standing order. Based on our precedent, the 

district court satisfied the oral pronouncement requirement. Baez-Adriano, 

74 F.4th at 301. Because Reyna did not object during the sentencing hearing, 

plain-error review applies. See Alexander Martinez, 47 F.4th at 366. 

Reyna, who argues that our review is for abuse of discretion, did not 

brief the four plain-error prongs. See United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 

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F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). 

We discern no error in the district court’s oral imposition of the 

standard conditions of supervised release contained in the district’s standing 

order, which mirror the conditions then listed in the written judgment. 

Furthermore, even if we assume the first three prongs of the plain-error test, 

Reyna has not met his burden in demonstrating that any claimed error 

affected “the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135; United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th 

Cir. 2012). 

AFFIRMED. 

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