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S1-1/6 DISCUSSION OF

SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

GOVERNMENT

Storage

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON•

SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 13, 1961

[No. 6]

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Astronautics

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

fr, WASHINGTON : 1961

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REFERENCE ce,

LIBRARY

DEPARTMENT

‘i4TTAI4 l‘s
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS

OVERTON BROOKS, Louisiana, Chairman

GEORGE P. MILLER, California

OLIN E. TEAGUE, Texas

VICTOR L. ANFUSO. New York

JOSEPH E. KARTH, Minnesota

KEN HECHLER, West Virginia

EMILIO Q. DADDARIO, Connecticut

WALTER H. MOELLER, Ohio

DAVID S. KING, Utah

THOMAS G. MORRIS, New Mexico

BOB CASEY, Texas

WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri

JOHN W. DAVIS, Georgia

WILLIAM F. RYAN, New York

JAMES C. CORMAN, California

CHARLES F. DIICANDER, Executive Director and Chief Counsel

Dr. CHARLES S. SHELDON II, Technical Director

SPENCER M. BERESFORD, Special Counsel

Pinup B. YEAGER, Special Consultant

JOHN A. OARSTARPREN, Jr., Chief Clerk

FRANK R. HAMMILL, Jr., Counsel

RICHARD P. HINES, Staff Consultant

HOWARD J. SILBERSTEIN, Staff Consultant

RAYMOND WILCOVE, Staff Consultant

C. OTIS FINCH, Assistant Clerk

JOSEPH W. MARTIN, ht., Massachusetts

JAMES G. FULTON, Pennsylvania

J. EDGAR CHENOWETH, Colorado

WILLIAM K. VAN PELT, Wisconsin

PERKINS BASS, New Hampshire

R. WALTER RIEHLMAN, New York

JESSICA McC. WEISS, New York

CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio

RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH, Indiana

ALPHONZO E. BELL, JR., California
CONTENTS

Statement of— 

Dryden, Page Dr. Hugh L., Deputy Administrator, NASA Webb., Hon. James E., 5

Administrator, NASA 1

DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1961

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS,

"Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the

caucus room, Old House Office Building, Hon. Overton Brooks (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. This morning we are meeting in the caucus room.

The acoustic properties however are not very good in this room. Because of the events of the last few days we expect a large audience,

and we thought it would be more comfortable for some of our friends,

especially the press, radio, and television people, to meet here. We

look forward to the day when we will have our permanent quarters

in the New New House Office Building.

This morning we have back with us Mr. James E. Webb, the Administrator of NASA. I think it would be very proper to begin this

morning by asking Mr. Webb for any statement he would like to make

in reference to the recent Soviet man-in-space shot. We have received a lot of information from the press and over the radio. Perhaps you, Mr. Webb, have some slant or some additional information

that this committee doesn't have. I know every member of the committee is interested in that. We will be happy to hear from you,

Mr. Webb.

STATEMENT BY HON. JAMES E. WEBB, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL

AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Mr. WEBB. Mr. Chairman, I have no particular statement to make.

I think this committee is thoroughly familiar with all of the events

and decisions that have resulted in the program which the United

States has been following, both with respect to man-in-space and

with respect to the other areas of scientific exploration and research

which are embodied in our 10-year program.

I think you know, and perhaps the committee will recognize that

in the efforts which began about 4 a.m. yesterday, and which culminated in the appearance I made at 7 :45 yesterday morning on television_, my effort was to let the country see that by the processes of our

own Government we had instituted a program that was a step-by-step

movement in the field of space exploration with each step building on

the other, that it was a solid program, based on careful evaluation of

all the factors involved, that it had yielded very great scientific

knowledge on which further efforts could be made, and that I thought

1
2 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

it was very important for everyone concerned to evaluate what the

Soviets have done as against the yields from our own program.

I think I might say this morning that I had a very short statement

prepared which I would like to simply read to the committee. It is a

schedule of the activities in maimed space flight programing by

both the Soviet Union and the United States. The first date in this

schedule is November 3, 1957, when Sputnik II was launched. It was

an orbital device with dog Laika and with evidence of the program

being well underway. The weight of this device was 1,100 pounds.

Approximately 1 year later on October 7, 1958 the Project Mercury

team was organized in the United States, 6 days after the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration came into being. Then on

September 9, 1959, Big Joe, the first major Mercury launching took

place. It was a suborbital launching with a weight of 2,500 pounds.

The next event May 15, 1960, was a Soviet Union spaceship, one

with a dummy astronaut. It was an orbital device. Weight 10,000

pounds. On August 19, 1960, spaceship No. 2 was launched by the

Soviet Union with two dogs. An orbital device recovered. Weight

10,000 pounds.

On December 1, 1960, spaceship No. 3 carrying two dogs; was an

orbital device, was not recovered, and the weight, 10,000 pounds.

December 19, 1960, Mercury Redstone shot No. 1; was a suborbital

flight; recovered. Weight 2,500 pounds.

On January 31, 1961, the second Mercury Redstone shot; a suborbital flight; the chimpanzee Ham was recovered; weight 2,500

pounds. On February 21, 1961, the Mercury Atlas No. 2 suborbital;

recovered. Weight 2,500 pounds.

March 9, 1961, the Soviet spaceship No. 4 with a dog; orbital; recovered. Weight 10,000 pounds.

March 25, 1961, spaceship No. 5 with a dog; orbital, recovered.

Weight 10,000 pounds.

April 12, 1961, spaceship No. 6. Manned, orbital, recovered.

Weight 10,000 pounds.

. I think, Mr. Chairman, it is important to recognize that when on

November 3, 1957, Sputnik II was launched, an orbital device, weight

1,100 pounds, it was clear to everyone that a number of years of work

had already been accomplished and the results spoke for themselves

in the launching of Sputnik No. II. We proceeded in our governmental processes to consider all of the factors, and decide 1 year later

to launch Project Mercury. Project Mercury has been considered by

this committee many, many times. You know the program and

schedule.

It has proceeded. It is going to give us the technology, the knowledge, the understanding of manned flight which we need to make the

next step. I am greatly encouraged that when I came to this program, first considered it, examined the forward things that were

necessary, that our new President, President Kennedy saw the urgency

of proceeding with the space program. He made it clear in his submission to this committee that we should up the Saturn 0-2 program

and the other efforts to perfect the operation for manned space

flight. That is the matter before this committee in H.R. 6029. We are

here to proceed with the evidence of that. The first presentation is to

be by Mr. Low and will show the Apollo vehicle which is a part of
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

our 1962 program, is one of the most important vehicles to be launched

by the larger rockets made possible by the increased funds in the

booster program recommended by this administration.

I should like to say, since you have referred to the events of the

last few days, that I have tried to make the program of the United

States clear, have tried to show it was a solidly based, step-by-step

program, based on a long period of effort in this field. I would like to

say that if this committee and the Congress does confirm the judgment of the President that these programs should be stepped up, or

if it provides even further resources beyond, that as Administrator of

this program I will take every step necessary to carry out the decision

that is made and to do everything possible to realize the maximum

rate of progress from the resources provided.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Webb. Your statement shows an awareness of the present situation and of the desire of

the American people that we move from second into first position

in the exploration of space. I would like to ask you this: Several

years ago, 2 years ago I believe, Dr. von Braun told this committee

it would take us 5 years to overtake the Russians and to leapfrog

them. Now our Mercury program as I understand it, has scheduled

an astronaut in orbit by the end of this year. Does that schedule indicate to you that we are catching up with the Russians or does it

bear that interpretation?

Mr. WEBB. I think, sir, that the increases that were recommended

by President Eisenhower in the 1962 budget which he submitted, and

as further augmented by the increases recommended by President

Kennedy, will permit,to move forward steadily to close the space

that has existed between us and the Russians in the large-lift capacity

rocket field. I believe, sir, with respect to other phases of our program, and I am sure you realize that my acquaintance with this program now is somewhat less than 2 months, but I am convinced from

what I have studied about it, and all of the factors that have come

out of the review of this program, that our effort is a solidly based

program in the interest of the United States, designed to accomplish

those things which are most in our interest scientifically.

The CHAIRMAN. We, of course, are aware of the fact that we have

been behind the Soviet Union and this committee has done its best to

let the American people know that we have been behind the Soviet

Union in the big booster program. But we want to be reassured—

and I recognize that you have only been in your present position for

2 months—and the public wants to be reassured that we are overtaking the Soviet Union in the development of large thrust boosters.

That we are catching up.

Mr. WEBB. There is a sense of real urgency in this program. The

decision that has come to you from President Kennedy to proceed

with the devices necessary to carry into space the kind of vehicle

you see here in the Apollo. Up until that recommendation came

before this committee, the basic policy of the executive branch was

to do further careful study before proceeding with the heavy expenditures involved in this effort. The question of how rapidly you

pursue this policy decision is a matter that needs to be throughly

considered in every phase of our Government. Certainly you can

proceed faster than the funds recommended by President Kennedy.
4 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

I believe that in the total merit of our program as evaluated

against the objectives of the United States, it is a solidly based program. I believe it assures steady, rapid progress on an urgent basis

toward the objectives that we have.

As to whether the Russians are going to now come forward with

a very much larger booster capacity is a matter that I do not know.

If you speak of it in terms of catching up with their booster ca.

pacity, I simply am unable to tell you what they may do with their

next line of boosters. We do have, I believe, here, Mr. Chairman, a

program to build the large rockets that will permit us to do the work

that we have in mind in our 10-year program.

The CHAIRMAN. You are adviser for this committee. We are happy to have you, Dr. Dryden, and all of you men from NASA.

Dr. WEBB. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We want to know, however, if our national space

program, as outlined to us, we will do the job of overtaking the

Soviets. I am not happy in having to use that expression. I would

much prefer to say, 'Let's drive ahead with our program without

reference to any other foreign power." That would be much more

pleasant to all of us.

Mr. WEBB. I would say, sir, if you cast me in the role of adviser

to the committee, that this program is not designed to try to match

precisely what the Soviets may do. It is designed to meet the

needs that we have here in the United States. It is designed to show

the kind of results to the world of which we as a nation can be

proud. I think that you must bear in mind that if we do deliberately set out to compete on a point by point basis for the effect of our

prestige as a nation, this involves a different kind of decision than

the solid urgent prosecution of a 10-year program.

The CHAIRMAN. As long as we are -behind the Soviet Union in

reference to the man-in-space program, we are concerned with our

development which will put us in the forefront. I will ask you one

more question and then I am going to recognize the other members

of the committee.

I am impressed by the idea of a national booster program. Do

your recommendations in the fiscal year 1962 budget provide for

the development of a truly national booster program which will give

us, at the earliest possible moment, a booster capable of carrying the

payloads and having the thrust capability to accomplish the major

space missions?

Mr. WEBB. My answer is "No," they do not provide the resources

to provide a national booster program at the earliest possible moment. They do provide a solid rate of progress on an urgent basis.

They provide the funds for the Saturn C-2 program. They provide

the funds for going forward with the Rover program. They provide the funds for going forward with the F-1, single-chamber million-and-a-half-pound-thrust engine which can then be clustered for

very large lift capacity.

But I cannot say to you, sir, that they provide all of this at the

earliest possible moment.

I would say, Mr. Chairman, that the decision which we all have to

face as a nation is whether we now expect to proceed as we did in

connection with the atomic bomb, with a substantial number of

•
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 5

efforts going on in parallel, with all of the resources that may be

required to do this. We have based this program on completing one

step, evaluating it, using that knowledge to make the next step.

Now we are aiming at certain specific events which will permit a

demonstration of the progress that we have made. For instance, in

1964 we have several shots aimed at the exploration of Mars and

Venus because that is the particular time when these two planets will

be in position to make those demonstrations and gain that knowledge.

We have keyed our program to a number of very specific objectives

and the most advantageous method of accomplishing them. We have

not keyed it to an all-out effort, on a crash basis, to provide maximum

life capacity at the earliest possible moment.

I can assure you, sir, this is not a slowly paced program. It is a

vigorous program. It will take a great deal of effort to achieve what

is envisaged in this program. It is providing the resources to go

forward with the 10-year program.

The resources that have been recommended by this administration

implement the 10-year program. There was a short fall with respect

to the previous recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. We are glad to have you here. I would like to comment before I begin questioning that I do not believe that, overall,

the United States is behind the Soviet Union. I don't concede that

point.

Mr. WEBB. NOT do I, sir.

Mr. FuuroN. I do feel they are ahead of us in certain spectacular

fields. Further, I think they have a sense of urgency that exceeds ours in the United States. My first question is this: We have been hearing

that the Soviets are ahead of us in the big bc)oster program, that is, in the size of their boosters. We are planning a manned orbital flight that requires three orbits because it is necessary for our tracking and

telemetry equipment to make sure where the flight is before we can bring the man down.

Now, the Soviets have already orbited a man and he has only experienced one orbit. That, to me, has a tremendous bearing on the

state of the art of our tracking and telemetry, guidance and control capabilities. If they already have the guidance, the tracking ability, the capability to initiate reentry, and safely land the maimed capsule within the Soviet Union after only one orbit, then it would seem to me that the United States is behind both in tracking and telemetry, as well as in guidance and accuracy.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. WEBB. I prefer for a man more knowledgeable than I, Dr.

Dryden, to comment, I will if you insist.

Mr. FTJLTON. Either one.

STATEMENT OF DR. HUGH L. DRYDEN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,

NATIONAL AIR SPACE AGENCY

Dr. DRYDEN. Mr. Fulton, according to the best knowledge I have which came from direct conversation with Professor Sedov, the So- viets have an extensive tracking system over the great land mass of the Soviet Union.

68490-61--2
6 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

According to his description of the process it is identical with that

which we use in Mercury. As the vehicle comes around at the end of

its first pass the tracking stations transmit their data in real time to

a computing center where the path at that moment is computed.

On command, in their case, at the time calculated by this ground

computing machine, they send a signal by radio which fires the retrorocket in order to bring the vehicle down in a general area.

I think the principal difference, although I do not know exactly

how many ship tracking stations the Soviets may have

Mr. FULTON. They said there were two, I believe.

Dr. DRYDEN. I think the difference is we have preferred to track

the vehicle throughout the complete trajectory rather than simply

waiting from the knowledge obtained—for example, at Canaveral

when the vehicle is inserted into orbit and simply waiting until it

comes around again over the United States to pick it up for this final

decision.

So far as I know, the equipment, the methods are identically the

same. The early press reports and some of the press reports now

speak of the Soviet spacecraft coming down in a predetermined

area.

The predetermination is made by the computing machine after they

have received the data on the tracking. It is not set in advance to

come at a specific spot.

Mr. FULTON. Why is it that they can do this in one orbit while we

have to have three orbits?

Dr. DRYDEN. We can terminate our flight at the end of the first

orbit, or in fact if for any reason 

Mr. FULTON. Then why have three orbits

Dr. DRYDEN. Why have three orbits?

Mr. FULTON. Why have you planned three?

Dr. DRYDEN. The spacecraft was designed to be capable ultimately

of 18 orbits so that we could get experience at zero gravity over a

full day. In one you get 90 minutes. In three orbits you get 4/12

hours. We think knowledge of what happens in 41/2 hours is more

valuable than what happens in 90 minutes.

I might also say, just call to mind, that the early spacecraft experiments of the Russians were brought down after several orbits. For

reasons unknown to us. Their later tests were run with a single orbit

and their final mission was run with a single orbit.

Mr. FULTON. On the day before this flight, you were before our

committee. Some of us were concerned that the Russians were about

ready to put a man in space. We were very concerned. We had the

comment of a British magazine which some of us questioned as to its

authenticity. But, when you were here you said that you would not

base your opinions on the time when the Soviets would put a man

in orbit or in space on taxicab drivers' rumors.

As a matter of fact, I have since learned that the Central Intelligence Agency had the exact time and date and knew ahead of time

when this man was going into orbit from the Soviet Union.

I don't understand that. Aren't you people in close touch with

the CIA? You don't have to base things on taxicab drivers' rumors.

The peculiar thing about it is it went off right at the very time

it was expected.
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 7

Dr. DRYDEN. Mr. Fulton, you will recall the story was that the Soviets had orbited the man in three orbits on Friday evening.

Mr. FULTON. That was a newspaper story. I am asking why didn't

you have the Central Intelligence Agency schedule on it. It was very

accurate.

Dr. DRYDEN. I gave you all the information that was available to

me when I answered the question. The fact that the Soviets did

not orbit a man on Friday evening—I quoted a story in the morning

paper which attributed this account of the three orbits on Friday night to a taxicab driver. We have,I think, all of the information

that is available in the Government. When I appeared before the committee at the first meeting of this session, in discussing the Venus shot, I think I said at that time that the Russians had the capability of putting a man in space at any time and had had that ability for

some time in the past.

I did not know the exact date when they would. To the best of

my knowledge our Government did not know the exact date in advance. They did not know of the event until it actually happened.

The day finally came when the Soviets did put a man in space, as

we have been predicting for a very long time.

Mr. FULTON. The question then is this: I would like each of you

to answer this "Yes' or "No." Are we in a race or in competition with the Soviet Union, or aren't we? I have been asking that question here for years of U.S. officials and I can't get one of them to say that

we are in any race or competition.

Dr. DRYDEN. I think I have testified that we are in a broad compe- tition with the Soviet Union, but we are not in an event-by-event race. Mr. FULTON. How do you say, Mr. Webb?

Mr. WEBB. Let me ask you when you approved the budget for this

year under which we are operating, what was your view about this? Mr. FULTON. I believe we are in a race, and I have said many times, Mr. Webb, "Tell us how much money you need and we on this committee will authorize all you need."

We have heard from scientist after scientist here, that there is no need for any more money for our research and development because

we can't go any faster. I want it faster.

May I ask you this: If you in NASA have a sense of urgency why aren't your people working more than 40 hours a week on the Mercury program? Why aren't there three shifts? Why isn't the project going around the clock? Why aren't you paying time and a half overtime, or triple time? Why is it that down at Huntsville there is

a 40-hour week as usual?

When you talk about the 10-year program, which you solidly sup- port, and the urgent prosecution of a 10-year program that is in a

different context than I am. I am tired of being second to the Soviet Union. I want to be first. I think it is a good peaceful competition.

I don't think there is anything wrong with it.

Why don't we have overtime? Why aren't these programs running right around the clock?

Mr. WEBB. I would say to you, sir, every part of the Mercury

program is moving forward on an urgent basis.

Mr. FULTON. Why aren't there three shifts?
8 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

Mr. WEBB. With respect to any part of this program that begins

to fall behind, where one step that is necessary to provide the information on which you move to the next step shows that further work

is necessary, that immediately goes on an overtime or triple-shift

basis. So the program is proceeding on an urgent basis and there is

overtime involved in the program.

Mr. FULTON. Are there three shifts on now at Huntsville? I have

no information on that.

Dr. DRYDEN. Huntsville does not need three shifts for its part in

the Mercury program.

Mr. FULTON. What is holding it back?

Dr. DRYDEN. At the cape the Mercury program is on a three-shift

basis 7 days a week. At McDonaldMr. FULTON. What is holding it back?

Dr. DRYDEN. There is nothing holding us back. We are moving as

rapidly as we know how to move.

Mr. WEBB. The bottleneck, the place where you need to take the

next step most urgently is at Cape Canaveral. That is on a threeshift basis.

Mr. FULTON. Aren't these three astronauts ready to go up and take

the risk?

Mr. WEBB. Do you want me to delegate to you my responsibility

for ordering the first shot? There are very, very important matters

beyond the feelings of one man that he may be ready. I have had

letters from several American citizens who said they would like to

come and make the first shot now. That is not the basis of an orderly

program by the U.S. Government.

Mr. FULTON. When is your suborbital downrange shot planned?

Mr. WEBB. I don't think I can give you a firm date on that. We

are going to make that fairly soon. But the specific date is a matter

that will be determined as we go along with the things that are necessary to reach a decision that you are ready to go. I can't be sure a

countdown would start and not have to be stopped.

Mr. FULTON. A general target date when would that be?

Mr. WEBB. Early in the next month.

Mr. PurizoN. What would be a general target date for the

Mr. WEBB. Toward the end of this year.

Mr. FULTON. Is there any way you can shorten that time by extra

money?

Mr. WEBB. We are hurrying it with every bit of urgency that is

logical, that is aimed at achieving the purposes of the program. I

do not believe additional funds at this stage when this program is in

its final stages are needed to do the work that we will expect to do

before we make this flight.

Mr. FULTON. There is no extra money that we can now give you

to accelerate the Mercury program, nor was there any real need, Dr.

Dryden, in the last 6 months or a year? You are doing everything

you could?

Dr. DRYDEN. You cannot hurry the events of the next 2 months. If

we need money for Mercury, we will take it from funds that we now

have at the expense of something else.

Mr. FULTON. Why don't you come to us immediately? I am sure

the chairman and I will recommend everything you need.
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 9

Dr. DRYDEN. I am saying if we need more money than is available

now, we will program it from other funds. That can be replaced by

coming to you at a later date and obtaining the money some months

from now.

Mr. FULTON. Do you gentlemen realize you have the responsibility

of the way the capitalistic system looks to the world on its efficiency

and on its progress in scientific development? Do you gentlemen

realize that this may have an effect at the bargaining table with

the Soviet Union on places like Laos?

Dr. DRYDEN. Very much so.

Mr. WEBB. The answer is "Yes." I would say also as an official of the Government you have responsibility in this. We all do in mov- ing the kind of way that the United States needs to move in this effort.

Mr. FULTON. Don't you think the Soviet Union having the first

man in space gives them a tremendous advantage at the bargaining

table and on foreign policy in the world?

Dr. DRYDEN. I agree.

Mr. FULTON. This has placed immense strength then in Soviet hands.

Dr. DRYDEN. This was accomplished by their earlier beginning as 

i we have discussed many times before. And while money s in part

a substitute for time, it is not a complete substitute.

Mr. FULTON. We have $3 million for solid fuels in the current 1961 budget. We have $68 million for liquid fuels. By how much are you going to increase the solid fuel budget? We have had testimony and

we have talked with contractors who say they can give us several million pounds thrust within 18 months. We don't have to wait for the Centaur II. What are you going to do?

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt there to say that the committee is going to have some witnesses on that particular point. We won't perhaps have a separate hearing. We have announced repeatedly we

are going to do it. It would seem to me that we could put all of that testimony, more or less, in one spot in the record.

Mr. FULTON. Are you going to emphasize solid fuels as well as liquid, is really the point of my question. Because I want to move ahead on many fronts and have alternatives.

Mr. WEBB. The answer is "Yes." We are going to emphasize them. I think I should add, Mr. Chairman this point: If you want a paral- lel development in solid propellant technology to the Saturn develop- ment, you have to have two programs with the expense involved. The Saturn program is on a time schedule to give us the big rocket capacity that we need to meet the events in our schedule.

Mr. FULTON. When?

Mr. WEBB. There are a number of events that come here. With respect to solid propulsion, there has been no solid evidence to date that the lift capacity, the big rocket capacity that we need for this

program can be provided any sooner by solid propellants than we can provide it with Saturn.

Mr. FULTON. There is only $3 million of research funds allocated for solid fuels development. I don't think anybody can make the statement that that is not correct. I think we haven't put the research in. I certainly want to see it increased immediately. We have people
10 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

assuring us that in 18 months they will be able to produce solid

rockets in excess of the Saturn.

Mr. WEBB. I will stand by my statement. I would like to point

out I opened this meeting by saying as Administrator of this program if the committee wishes to add resources to the program I will

see that they are spent with the maximum efficiency and to achieve a

maximum rate of progress. I started by saying that.

Mr. FULTON. Give us a plan for that and I will support it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Dr. Webb, or Dr. Dryden 

Mr. -WEBB. Not "doctor" for me, sir.

Mr. MILLER. I think 

Mr. WEBB. I don't want to sail under false colors.

Dr. DRYDEN. Call US both "Mr."

Mr. MILLER. I notice we have put 23 Discoverers and about 10

Explorers into space. This is about the ratio between this type of

satellite as compared with those sent in orbit by the Soviets, nearly

10 to 1.

Although it is spectacular to put a man in orbit first, we have to

know the environment of the earth, if we are going to capitalize on

it and put it to proper use; is that correct?

Mr. WEBB. Yes, sir.

Mr. MILLER. Do you think that any Nation is ahead of us in obtaining the basic data of the environment of the earth in order to

plan for the proper use of space and outer space for the welfare of

mankind?

Mr. WEBB. No, sir. On the contrary, I believe we have more complete knowledge and information than is available. I may say, sir,

that we have pursued the policy laid down in the act passed by Congress to make this information that comes out of this civilian peaceful space exploration program available broadly. So in a sense what

we know is known all over the world. But what we have achieved

has added to the store of knowledge far beyond what others have

done.

Mr. MILLER. Do you subscribe to that, Dr. Dryden?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes ; I do.

Mr. MILLER. Do you feel as a scientist this is just as basically important, if not more important, as being the first to send a man around

the world?

Dr. DRYDEN. It has the greatest value to mankind. The significance in manned-space exploration is a continuing effort over a long

period, just as it has been in aeronautics. The flight of one airplane

does not constitute the exploration of the air.

Mr. MILLER. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very

much. I want to congratulate you upon your accomplishments, and

I for one think you are doing a good job.

Mr. WEBB. Thank you.

Mr. MILLER. I speak not for the committee, but myself personally.

Mr. WEBB. We are working hard, Mr. Miller.

The CHAIRMAN. MT. ChellOWeth.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Mr. Webb and Dr. Dryden, I share Mr. Miller's

feeling also that you are doing a good job. But we have lost this race

to first orbit a man and I am a little disturbed, and of course very
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 11

disappointed. Dr. Dryden, how long have you been in this space

effort?

Dr. DRYDEN. I have been in aeronautics and the events leading up

to space for too long to count, 43 years. In space itself we began to

get into space seriously in 1946 when we began to talk about the

X-15 airplane type of approach.

Mr. CHENOWETH. I mean the space effort, when we are more interested 

Dr. DRYDEN. I have been with the space agency from the beginning.

Mr. CHENOWETII. Doctor, you recognize the fact that we have

lost this race and we were very anxious to win it.

Mr. DRYDEN. It was lost on the day—before the space agency was

founded.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Give us a little explanation of that statement.

Dr. DRYDEN. It has been already outlined in detail by Mr. Webb.

In 1954 the Soviets began their serious effort in space with the appointment of a governmental body to outline the program. In this

country NASA was formed in 1958. By 1957 as you have heard the

Soviets had orbited a dog.

Mr. CHENOWETH. In other words, we were a little late in getting

started in the race?

Dr. DRYDEN. We were late.

Mr. CHENOWETH. We gave them this advantage that we could not

quite overcome?

Dr. DRYDEN. We had the hope that we might be able to make progress. We didn't know what difficulties they would have, what difficulties we would have. We have had the hope, which is now shattered, that we might be first.

Mr. CHENOWETII. When did we first get into this race, to put a

man in orbit?

Dr. DRYDEN. The Mercury project was started a few days after

NASA was formed, in October 1958. The first contract was signed

in January 1959.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Since we have been in the race, and been training these astronauts, do you know of anything that we have overlooked? Has there been a lack of money, lack of energy here, lack

of devotion to certain principles?

Dr. DRYDEN. I do not know of anything that we have overlooked.

We had the problem of having a booster which was a little bit small

for the job to be done with the conventional margins in engineering

construction. So that we had to develop new structures of adequate

strength. We had to develop new instrumentation to stay within the

weight limits. The progress has been the normal progress for an

engineering undertaking of this complexity. Such experiences as

have not been brought before the American public have been the common accompaniment of every military weapon development. But

military weapon developments have been carried forward in complete

security. This program has been carried forward with complete information on every detail, of every failure in the eyes of the American public. It has not differed from what has gone before. It is the

first time the difficulties of such an undertaking were brought before

the public eye.
12 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

Mr. CHENOWETH. Did we lose the race because the Soviets were

ahead of us in developing larger thrusts and we were not able to

catch up with them?

Dr. DRYDEN. I have some question whether starting 4 years later

you can make up 4 years in 2 years.

Mr. CHENOWETH. If we had the thrust, would we have had the man

in orbit before the Soviets?

Dr. DRYDEN. I am not sure, because what you are asking is whether

when one is 4 years ahead of us you can make up the 4 years in 2

years or 3 years.

Mr. CHENOWETH. If we had the same thrust as the Soviets,

wouldn't we have the man in orbit before the Soviets?

Dr. DRYDEN. This is pure speculation. There is some possibility

we could have. Many of our problems would have not been the

same.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Mr. Webb, I was a little disappointed that you

mentioned, in your response to a question from Mr. Fulton, that you

thought it might be the end of this year before we get our man in

orbit. Do you think we can improve on that at all? This is a matter of tremendous importance to the American people and the people

of the world. We don't want to spare any effort to get this man in

space.

Mr. WEBB. We are sparing no effort. The timing requires a solution of each problem that you face before you take the next step. I

think the view of the United States of doing it in this way may be

more important than to skip a step and be sorry that you had. But

I do not believe, sir, that we can depart from the schedule of things

we regard as necessary to be done before we order this flight.

Mr. CHENOWETH. You don't want to give the committee any definite .

timetable! You don't want to commit yourself to the end of the

year? Can that be flexible; would the situation be a little more

favorable than it is right now?

Mr. WEBB. There are certain problems to be solved. We have

underway the solution and the experimental proof of the solution.

We want to see the experimental proof before we take the next step.

Mr. CHENOWETH. You recognize the loss we have suffered. But

we can recoop some of that prestige, some of that influence by moving this just as rapidly as we can. If we move into it quickly I

think you will recover much of the damage that has been done.

Dr. DRYDEN. May I say one word on this point, Mr. Chenoweth.

We have had the experience with this committee of giving you the

most favorable scheduled dates assuming there are no problems. We

have had many discussions of the so-called slippage. It is quite true

if everything went absolutely favorably, we ran into no difficulties,

the date that you might put down would be somewhat earlier than

toward the end of the year. We are realistic. We know what does

happen in these programs. We are trying to give you as best we can

an estimate of the approximate time.

Mr. CHENOWET11. I hope that the conditions will be just as favorable as you hope.

Dr. DRYDEN. If we have favorable conditions it will be a little

earlier; if we have bad conditions it will slip over a little into next

year.
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 13

Mr. WEBB. We are caught here in a bit of a trap. In order to put

the maximum effort forward we set a target date for our people to

work toward. We don't want to give them a set schedule so we set

the target at the earliest time we think it is possible to achieve it.

When you ask us for a target date, we have to give you that target date.

We are setting our sights at 125 percent of what is really possible

in order to get the maximum efforts. You must realize the dates are

set for the purpose of getting the effort and that we recognize ourselves in setting the dates that the effort called for may not actually

beat that specific date.

Mr. CHENOWETH. It is possible, say within the next 2 or 3 months

that this even may occur?

Mr. WEBB. Not 2 or 3 months, sir. I would say by the latter part

of this year, perhaps in December or early next year.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Anfuso.

Mr. ANFUSO. Mr. Webb, first of all, I want to state that what I am

going to say will not be critical of you personally 

Mr. WEBB. I will not take it as such.

Mr. ANFUSO. I know that; nor Dr. Dryden for whom I have the

highest respect. I know you, Mr. Webb, have broad shoulders, that

you know how to take and give it, too. I witnessed that this morning.

The reason I am going to make this statement is because I received

a telephone call this morning from a Rome reporter that this orbiting

of man into space worries them there in Europe. They fear that the

next step is going to be a landing on the moon for military purposes

and not peaceful purposes. Here is my statement, Mr. Webb: The

difficulty we face today is that the American people have been kept

ignorant on national defense and at times even intentionally deceived.

In a dictatorship the people can be regimented into action. That is

not so with the democracy where the people will not budge unless

they fully understand the facts.

Without an enlightened American public, our country and the rest

of the world is doomed. Let us look back a bit. America went into

World War II with the P-40 as our best fighter plane. The Zero

made mincemeat out of it. The P-40's we sent to England were

never uncrated. Our pilots used the English Spitfires instead. Although we started in World War II wrong we had time to change

our position. In the next war this luxury will be denied to us.

The enemy will strike immediately at the heart of our Nation with

the devastating- weapons they now have at their command. While we

still have a retaliatory power in our Strategic Air Command, some

experts say if the Russians strike first our retaliatory power will only

be a post mortem force.

Let us remove the cloak of secrecy from the American people as

President Kennedy tried to do in his inaugural speech. The facts

will not frighten them. They will only make them mad, and then we

will get the proper action here in Washington. After all, we are not

fooling anybody because the Soviets know more about our defense

posture than some of our experts.

To properly alert our people I am ready to call for a full-scale

congressional investigation. I want to see the country mobilized to a

wartime basis because we are at war. I want to see our schedules cut

in half. I want to see what NASA says it is going to do in 10 years

68490-61-3
14 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

done in 5. I want to see some firsts coming out of NASA, such as the

landing on the moon which I know can be done if we go into immediate development of a solid fuel booster. I was told by reliable experts only yesterday that you can never accomplish this feat with a,

liquid booster because you can not cluster and get the proper payloads.

I would like to have you remember that the only way we can deter

the Soviets is by showing our strength and by letting the world

know by propaganda what we have. And finally, Mr. Webb, I don't

want to—in other words, what I am trying to get at, Mr. Webb, is

this: You are new in this field. You are energetic; you are honest.

You are a good man. I don't want you to merely follow a program

already established for you. With the energy and foresight of the

Kennedy administration, I believe that we can mobilize and put ourselves on a wartime basis and we can reach new frontiers first.

Will you comment on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to comment on the statement?

Mr. WEBB. Yes; I was.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say this, if other members have statements I suggest that we make the statements on the floor. I have a

statement here in my pocket. I decided that the proper place for a

statement was on the floor of the House. I am going to make it as

soon as it convenes.

Of course, the gentleman prefers to take that time out of his time.

Mr. WEBB. I think I should say a word or two, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANFITSO. I am not going to ask any other questions. I am taking it out of my time, Mr. Webb.

Mr. WEBB. I think it was Lincoln who said "In this Nation public

sentiment is everything," Mr. Anfuso. "Without it nothing can succeed; with it nothing can fail."

I cannot be sure of the precise quotation. I think that is true. I

think it is extremely important and one of the most significant features

of the NASA program is that it is an open program, that the Space

Act requires an exploration for peaceful purposes. It requires us to

disseminate, to the scientific community and to the public at large the

results of our work, research, and effort.

I think it is true as you have indicated that in previous occasions

when we found ourselves in difficulty the American ingenuity came

forward and provided some solution. You mentioned the Zero and

its relation to our fighters. A number of our boys invented the scissors where we put two planes together and if a Zero was on the tail

of, one, they came together, departed, and came together and which

one he was on the tail of, the other shot him down.

We have been able to invent ingenious solutions which put us in a

position to move ahead. I would like to say with respect to your comments on the military side, I am in the closest touch with Secretary

McNamara. One of the reasons I was late this morning, he and I had

an important matter to settle together before I could come here.

I do not think I am the proper person to speak on the military

program or the implications of your suggestion for an investigation.

I would like to say though that in connection with the space proaram

'

on instructions of President Kennedy we are working in the

Closest relationship with the leaders in our military establishments
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 15

which include not only Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary, Mr.

Gilpatric, and his Director of Research, Mr. York, but also with people like Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert, and the other

services. So there is no part of our program that is suffering from an

inadequate relationship with the Defense Department.

I just make one last observation, and I hope I am not doing too

much of this on your time. It does seem to me what we are doing

here in the United States is having a good hard look at how a great

Nation faces a great problem. This is not simply a matter of a recommendation by the executive branch which you will then take and

pass by lightly, that you are performing a great service here in providing a thorough examination publicly of the issues which must be

decided in which we all must participate in a thoroughly responsible

way. The President has submitted to you a program based on his

evaluation of the total requirements of this Government. This submission is in accordance with the law passed by Congress requiring

him to submit the entire program of the U.S. Government, evaluated

in his own way by his own criteria.

It also provides that you have the freest opportunity to modify

this program, to change it, to endorse it. If subsequent information

comes into play as we have seen as a result of the events of the last

few days, then you obviously have to take that into account.

Mr. ANFITSO. Mr. Webb, will you take it upon yourself to oppoint

a committee or make a study with the best experts you can obtain to

see how we can cut down this 10-year program, to see whether or not

we can cut it down to 5 or to 6 years, to see how we can reach the moon

faster? I sincerely believe that you are going to have to need a tremendous booster to get the kind of a payload necessary to make a

landing on the moon and then return. I am told by pretty reliable

experts, that I will give to you, that you can't do it with a liquid

booster because you can't cluster a liquid booster.

Mr. WEBB. I will make the study, not necessarily through a committee. I think it might be worthwhile to say for the committee

that when I was asked to take this job I asked both the President and

the Vice President who spoke to me, if I was here to carry out a program already preconceived. They both said "No," I was to apply my

best judgment. When we had finished the budget review, I was satisfied that the President and his associates, including the Vice President, had given us a full, fair, adequate opportunity to present all of

the facts, all of the things that we wanted to put forward for consideration.

At the end of that time the President did say to me, not in the open

session, but later, that he recognized this as the first step in a new

relationship and that he regarded this as the best that could be done

at the time, considering all of the factors that were involved, but he

did not wish this to be the end of the thing. He wished me to give

it the most careful consideration, particularly in the criteria we would

use for the 1963 budget.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Van Pelt.

Mr. VAN PELT. Mr. Webb, yesterday the President made reference

to a commission or committee that he appointed January 10. Were

you a member of that committee?
16 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

Mr. WEBB. No, sir; I was not. I am not sure which committee you

refer to. I was not appointed to any committee on the 10th of

January.

Mr. VAN PELT. It pertained to the space program.

Mr. WEBB. No, sir I was not.

Mr. VAN PELT. Have you seen any reports or heard any reports on

that?

Mr. WEBB. Can you identify the Committee?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think you refer to the Committee that is usually

known as the Wiesner Committee, a task group appointed by the

President before his inauguration.

Mr. WEBB. Yes; I am familiar with the fact that such a Committee existed. I have seen one of the reports of this Committee which

was handed to me personally by Dr. Wiesner. I have discussed it

with him.

Mr. VAN PELT. Has this committee seen that report? Is it available to us, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. We asked that the report be filed in the record.

Do you know whether or not it has been filed?

Counsel says he believes it has.

Mr. FULTON. You are talking of the Wiesner report 

The CHAIRMAN. The Wiesner report. Of course I have seen it, because it has been published. Everybody has seen it. There is a,

military report which the committee asked for and which was authorized to be filed in the record.

Mr. VAN PELT. I want to say this, Mr. Webb, and Dr. Dryden.

I can't concur with some of the international opinions. I am not concerned with what the people of Laos think about the events of the last

2 days, or the people in the Congo. I am as concerned, as I realize

from your statements this morning you are, what would happen to

the opinion abroad, in the world, and this country, if there was a malfunction with our man going into a shot or into orbit.

Mr. WEBB. I appreciate that, particularly since I have to make the

decision at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Karth.

Mr. KARTH.: Mr. Webb, I don't think any of us, even in our most

shallow moments, could blame you or hold you responsible for anything that has happened recently in the space effort. I think we

recognize that the United States and the Soviet Union have proceeded

along two different lines of attack. The Soviets have pretty much

rifled their program, if I may use the word, as opposed to the United

States shotgunning their effort.

We have been interested in many programs and I think the Soviets

have been interested primarily in putting a man in space.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Karth, some of the members can't hear you

very well. That is one of our problems here, the acoustics. If you

will speak a little louder, I think we can hear you.

Mr. KARTH. I think the United States should be thinking of rifling

certain portions of their 10-year program more than they have probably thought about in the past. I might say I am not necessarily

impressed with this 10-year paper program that was devised a year

and 6 months ago. I feel very strongly about the fact, and I know

that many members of this committee feel strongly about the fact,
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 17

that with a breakthrough or two this 10-year program could become

as obsolete as that Zero airplane that you and Mr. Anfuso were talking about a few moments ago.

This is our concern. Our concern is that every effort be made to

follow up those ideas that have been expressed before this committee

where significant breakthroughs can be made, and we feel quite

frankly that one of those significant breakthroughs can be made as

a result of, No. 1, a large solid propellant booster, and No. 2, a speedup

of the 8-hour-day, 40-hour-week work program.

As late as yesterday Mr. Welsh testified, and prior to his appearance, many others had testified before the committee, to the

effect that we are not short on technology, that we are not short on

scientific resources, that we are not short on know-how and proceed

with this program at a much speeded up rate. What we are short on

is effort. This is another phase of the committee's interest.

I am sure, Mr. Webb, it is a phase of yours, too. I don't think we

have been talking about or thinking about paralleling a solid propellant booster along with the liquid propellant booster in the Saturn

program. If what the solid propellant people say is a fact, then I

think by the end of this year it should be proven either true or false

if we make the effort in this field. At that point I think we would

no longer have to parallel the two programs but we could eliminate

one or the other and then proceed on the basis that a breakthrough

either had been made or had not been made.

Mr. WEBB. This will require some research funds to make the proof

that you are describing.

Mr. KARTH. Yes, sir. I am extremely disappointed that those research funds have not been provided in this budget. My question,

Mr. Chairman, would be this: Have you or do you intend to recommend that we make every effort to investigate whether or not the

claim of the solid propellant people that they can provide a severalmillion-pound-thrust engine in the next 18 months is or is not true

fact?

Mr. WEBB. I favor making every reasonable effort to determine

that. I am a little troubled with an absolute categorical statement

of every possible effort. I added "possible," you did not. Certainly

every reasonable effort to determine these matters I will favor.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say to the gentleman the committee is

going to make every reasonable effort, too.

Mr. KARTH. Mr. Chairman, my point is that this is the only way

I think that we, if we are in a race with the Soviet Union—and most

of us agree we are—we can leapfrog not only the Soviet program but I

might say to you in all sincerity, leapfrog our own program. This

is equally important.

So I again would like to encourage you and Dr. Dryden and the

NASA people to make every effort with the administration and

Bureau of the Budget 

Mr. WEBB. We will take your admonition very seriously.

Mr. KARTH. In order to succeed in this endeavor.

Mr. WEBB. We will bear that carefully in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

Mr. Bass? ,
18 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

Mr. BASS. I want to direct my first question to Dr. Dryden. Referring back to your colloquy with Mr. Fulton concerning this Soviet

shot, am I to assume that you have independently checked out and

proven out exactly what the Soviets have claimed they have accomplished in this shot?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think if you talk about independent evidence, you

may recall the President issued a statement stating that the spacecraft

was tracked after it left the Soviet land mass, but not by NASA

stations. This is the solid fact that you are talking about. We have

had no observers there who saw the return of the capsule or the man

taken out of the capsule or anything of that sort. It is our past experience with the Soviets that the statements that they have made of

this kind have been correct.

Mr. WEBB. May I say there, all the information available to the

U.S. Government tends to confirm the announcement that they have

made.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield at that point? I am.

wondering if you could supply us with the information you have available as to what occurred Friday when there were so many rumors over

there? The London Daily Worker came out with a press story, and

yet apparently nothing happened. What is behind all of that?

Dr. DRYDEN. This we do not know. The statement I made to you

was correct. We would have known had there been a satellite in orbit.

There was not a satellite in orbit on Friday night. The Soviets, of

course, do not now claim to have had a satellite in orbit on Friday

night.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they make an effort on Friday?

Dr. DRYDEN. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. BASS. Dr. Dryden do I assume from what you say that we did

track this vehicle on Wednesday?

Dr. DRYDEN. On Tuesday morning, wasn't it?

Mr. WEBB. I don't think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to add to the

statement made by the President. If you want a closed session with

respect to information of this kind, certainly we would accommodate

you.

The CHAIIi1VIAN. If the gentleman feels that some security would be

violated, why, we will ask, and I know the questioner will withdraw

his question.

Mr. WEBB. The point I wanted to make as strongly as I can: There

is no information available in the Government that would tend to

refute the announcement made by the Soviets. Indeed, what we

have confirms what they have said. I think this is the point that perhaps you were trying to establish.

Mr. BASS. Yes, I wondered if you were just taking the Soviets at

their word, or whether you had some solid information that would

confirm their claim. I won't ask you to violate security.

Mr. WEBB. I am answering: All the information we have does confirm what they have said.

Mr. BASS. I would like to say this to Dr. Dryden and Mr. Webb. I

join with the feeling expressed by Mr. Van Pelt that it would be disastrous if you were panicked by this committee into hurrying up this

Mercury program which might increase the chances of failure. The

Soviets have accomplished their manned orbit shot. Whether we orbit
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 19

a man in 3 or 5 months or this year or the early part of next year in

my opinion is nowhere nearly as important as preparing a solid base

from which you can reasonably be assured of success. And speaking

for myself, 1 think you have shown a proper sense of urgency in proceeding with this space program.

Mr. WEBB. Thank you very much, sir. I think that what we really

need to show the world is that we do all things in this way, that is, a

solid procedure that will give us the best opportunity to accomplish

the results in the way of scientific research, exploration, and concrete

results. If it happens that we can proceed rapidly enough to demonstrate our leadership in dramatic ways we certainly are not unhappy

about that.

But nevertheless the other vision of a nation proceeding in a solid,

orderly way to do the things it sets out to do I think also is important.

Mr. BASS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HECHLER. Mr. Webb, I think the greatest contribution that I

could make in furthering the sense of urgency is to let you and your

associates get back to work. So I have no questions.

Mr. WEBB. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say you had no questions?

Mr. HECHLER. You understood correctly.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Riehlman.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have no particular question, but

1 certainly want to commend Mr. Webb and Dr. Dryden for the manner in which they have presented their case, not alone to the committee

but to the American people. I had the opportunity to observe your

presentation yesterday morning, Mr. Webb. I think it was done in a

manner which would give to the people confidence in what we were

trying to do despite recognizing the fact that we probably have lost

this opportunity to be first in putting a man into orbit. I think your

explanation to the people was excellent in this respect, that we are not

second in all the phases of exploration of space, and we do not expect

to stay in that position. We are moving forward. There are many

different programs in being today that are thought little about and

which must be brought to the attention of the American people. Although recognizing the fact that this event is a propaganda instrument in the hands of our potential enemy, it is important that we do

everything we can to expedite this program. I want to assure you and

the administration that I shall support any program that you bring

before this committee to expedite it if you think it can be done. Otherwise I think you should stay in the position you are in. I want to ask

this one question and then I am through.

On Monday you came before the committee with Dr. Dryden and

presented your budget. This budget was based on the best estimate

the new administration can make of its needs for the fiscal year ahead

of us, am I correct in that?

Mr. WEBB. That is right, in comparison with all the other needs of

the Nation.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. In view of that fact, may I say to you that if the

administration needs more money and can use it wisely, I have faith

and confidence in both of you, Dr. Dryden and Mr. Webb, that you

will come to this committee. I hope that we are not going to be in a

position of frustration just because this has been a first and that we
20 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

are going to do something that will interfere with other programs

that we hope over a period of the next few years will catapult us into

a position of complete leadership in this field.

Mr. WEBB. Let me say, Mr. Riehlman, I appreciate your personal

compliment. This is a completely new role for me. I have always

been a professional man helping leaders in the public eye, doing their

work, and I suddenly find myself in the public eye. I have done the

best I could. With respect to the question of resources, I think it is

known in this committee the chairman asked me a question with

respect to solid propellants as to what we had requested of the Bureau;

obviously those of us concerned with this program see our own immediate needs and interests. We did present them to the President.

He gave us a full opportunity to make the presentation. He asked

the right questions. He reached the decision in the light of his

responsibilities which are broader than ours. We brought his recommendations to this committee. It is too early to know whether or not

he will send another suggestion or message to this committee.

I simply can say that this is a matter that as we proceed with hearings on this bill we are going to be with you, before you and we will

make a full and honest disclosure of what we believe to be fair and

right.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. You are going to constantly keep an eye on programs and where you find there is a lag and you need additional

funds, you are going to come back here and 

Mr. WEBB. Yes, sir; we will. We will go to the President under

the requirements of the Budget and the Accounting Act of 1921.

Mr. RrEimmAN. I am sure he is just as interested as a man could

be.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Daddario.

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Dryden, our 10-year space program which was established about a year ago is the basis upon which

we will weld together our country's assets in order to build up our

capabilities and to use our resources to attain our ends in space. I

would like to know from you how our 10-year program compares

today with the program as first established? Has there been slippage

in it?

If there is, I would like to know why the slippage exists, and if

there has been any acceleration, I would like to know where we are

doing more now than you thought we might a year ago.

Mr. WEBB. May I say a word there, Mr. Daddario. The 10-year

program as I have understood it in the time I have looked at this

program was a basis for proceeding with work. It was a planning

basis for resources, asking for funds. The program was not completely

funded nor has it yet been completely funded? So when you speak of

slippage, I think you want to consider whether or not you are considering actual flights against a program which was basically for requesting resources to do work.

Dr. DRYDEN. To answer your specific question would take a detailed

analysis. I do not have all the facts in my head. I might say this:

At the time the first 10-year program was formed we had less than I

year's experience. This has been revised once. I think the schedul-
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 21

ing and pricing in the second revision have profited from the benefit of the additional year's experience.

It is quite true that the tendency in all of these programs, seen

years in advance, is an optimistic one. The costs are usually higher than you see in the early stages and at times somewhat lower. Some target dates have been moved forward. I think it should not be con- sidered by the committee as having too much validity beyond the im- mediately following year.

When we opened the hearings I think we went over the target dates that were established for 1960 and the one which did slip from that

year was the manned flight that we hoped to get before the end of 1960. There was also a new element in the program which we had not had in the original 10-year plan which led to the Pioneer V flight. expect this to be. I think your longer range look is the basis for requesting the general magnitude of resources.

As Mr. Webb has said, this plan has never been funded in its en- tirety, as laid down. I think what you want to take a particular look at in the plan is what is in there for the next year. This is based on plans which are pretty definite. We are continuously in the process of evaluating plans—can we move this particular thing forward in our

program, what will it take to do it, what possibility is there of perhaps diverting, not diverting, I have used the wrong word before a congres- sional committee—reprograming funds from an activity that may be less urgent than one which is more urgent.

Do we need to start the process that Mr. Webb has described of re- questing funds to submit to the Congress? This is more or less a

continuous process. It is quite true that as has been mentioned I think this has been brought out by the statement made, that it is quite possible, if you look at things which are planned 10 years ahead, that developments in the meantime are going to make this completely obsolete.

You hope there will be breakthroughs which will bring landing on the moon very much earlier. We hope that this kind of thing will develop. So that our 10-year plan then is the guide for projection. We have projected as you know that to carry on the program that we are now doing in its natural development. We are, after all, still young. Many of the programs are not yet on the high point of their funding curves. The budget under the present planning will rise as vve have told you to about $2 billion in a few years, just in the same general activity.

If we wanted to add some of the things that have been talked about it may go to $2.2 billion

'

$2.5, or some higher number.

You have mentioned the solid-propellant program. We can start that program with a relatively small amount of money. To carry on the program to a vehicle to put objects in space with a solid propellant booster, as I 'think we have mentioned in some circles, I don't know whether here or not, the total cost of the space vehicle, number of launchings gets to be in the order of a half billion dollars. So that when we start down this road we can start it with a very small amount of money, and we expect to do it incidentally, but whether we can continue to maintain the approvals that are necessary to carry forward this funding to the higher levels that are needed in
22 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

the future is a matter that I can't answer. You carry a share of the

responsibility in that with us.

Mr. DADDARIO. I believe, Dr. Dryden, we ought to have a broadbased program. I am concerned that on the one hand I heard from

you and others that we are doing everything we can, and then I hear

from Mr. Welsh, as I did yesterday, that he believes we have all the

resources necessary but that we have not made the effort necessary.

1 get concerned whether terminology is used to becloud the issue. If

the Soviets have orbited something will a big payload capacity,

our answer always is that we can do more in a smaller payload capacity. If they do it in one orbit we will do more by doing it in

three orbits.

There is always a play on words which, in my opinion does not

cloud over the fact that what we do need to do—and what I have not

as yet seen—has been to tie together the resources which this country

has available to achieve these ends. I hear engineers and scientists

constantly say we can do more. Mr. King has recently pushed hard

on the needs for a solid booster development.

People in that area of research say if we did this we could leapfrog.

Yet there doesn't seem to be any urgent feeling this is what we ought

to do. My only concern in bringing up these questions is that within

the 10-year program there ought to be higher goals. We ought to do

more. You should demand more of us and certainly, if you do and if

you spell out what you need, we will do everything we possibly can

to support you.

Mr. WEBB. May I say there, Mr. Chairman

'

we certainly are anxious

to get all of the information that we can. As a matter of fact Mr.

King came to my office. The Director of the Budget and Dr. Wiesner,

the President's science adviser, met there also and we had a thorough

discussion of about 2 hours of the material he presented. I would like

for you not to have the impression that we are oblivious of some of

these things.

Mr. DADDARIO. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. I don't mean to

be critical. Yet it is always very easy to explain away what we are

not doing. I have the feeling that the philosophy of our program

toward space is guided by the weakness of our program rather than

by the strength of our country.

Mr. WEBB. Might I make one other observation about this longrange programing. You see you run into surprises. Really you are

out in an unknown area and what you thought was there isn't always

there. You find hazards. It is a hostile environment for man. I

feel sure that the basis of the 10-year plan—it certainly has to be

modified because we have found a lot of radiation problems that were

not known at the time the plan was formed.

You have to take account of the new knowledge that you gain from

the conduct of the program.

Mr. DADDARIO. I have confidence as you review this plan you will

come up with the revisions necessary, and you will make the demands

from which such a program will be built. I am sure that before

this goes too much further we can expect this from you.

Mr. WEBB. I am going to work hard at it.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point I want to say I have been asked to

indicate what the committee has in mind to do. Our present plan
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 23

is not to meet this afternoon because there is a bill on the floor. The present plan is to meet tomorrow morning. This is going to require some revisions in plans. I don't want to cut anybody off. We have, I think, a motion picture, don't we, here in connection with your testimony?

Mr. Low. I have several charts and a model that I would like to discuss.

The CHAIRMAN. Charts that you will flash on that screen? Mr. Low. We have.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know whether we will be able to get this room tomorrow. We haven't applied for it. I want everybody to know about it now. When we finish here today we have two more witnesses to be heard. We have Mr. Low and we have Dr. Seamans. Mr. Low has partially completed his testimony. He will finish it and Dr. Seamans will follow him.

Mrs. Weis?

Mrs. WEIS. I would like to ask one short question of Mr. Webb. And also I would like to suggest that there is a silver lining in every cloud, Mr. Webb. It must be very refreshing to be before a com- mittee that is anxious to give you more money than you seem to want. Mr. WEBB. We certainly appreciate this committee.

Mrs. WEI& We seem to be confronted with a propaganda device, a

contest that the Soviets have won. It seems to me to make little difference whether we get the man off, the ground in 2 months or 6

months. Inasmuch as this is a propaganda victory for the U.S.S.R., have you given any thought to pushing ahead or leapfrogging on a

communications satellite? There is an opportunity to electrify the world by speaking to Hong Kong via a satellite. That is the kind of dramatic accomplishment we are looking for.

I understand we are ahead in those fields. Are you giving any thought to pushing a program in an entirely different field which would certainly outshine the Soviets?

Mr. WEBB. Let me say, Mrs. Weis, the Project Mercury program is designed to give us increased knowledge. It is not simply to have a man orbit the earth and bring him back. What we are after is the 

are 

knowledge on which further work can be done in this field. We going to proceed in a logical orderly way to have this experience, test out experimentally the equipment, and get the return and use that effectively.

With respect to the communications satellite, I think I indicated at our last meeting that a great deal of activity is underway in the Government here. We are making very rapid progress, I think, to- ward those policy decisions that must underlie the decision as to precisely what the next steps are. I indicated to you that we had seven proposals from industry for the construction of an experimental satellite. I indicated further that the Federal Communications Com- mission has called for a public inquiry, I think it is May 1 or before May 1, for information to come in from all people in industry that would settle such complex questions as nondiscriminatory access to channel frequencies, many of the factors that are of vital significance to the industry use of this.

Again, I, myself, at least in the state of my present knowledge, would not favor bypassing the things that are really necessary to do
24 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

this job right, to realize its potential for increasing the communications resources and capacity of this Nation and the world in order to

simply put something into orbit that could demonstrate a technique.

I think again these are very expensive. I think it is $24 or S29

million—between $20 and $30 million in the budget we are now presenting to you in connection. with the communications satellite. This

indicated the magnitude of effort that is quite large.

I may say further in this field we have already negotiated arrangements with the British and French to conduct at their own expense

the facilities and the program from their standpoint. All of this is

going forward. I may disappoint you in saying that if we could put

up one tomorrow, that would demonstrate a capacity to communicate,

we probably wouldn't do it.

Mrs. WEIS. I wouldn't ask you, Mr. Webb.

But it occurred to me, with the questions asked here and the present

discussion, that there is a sense of urgency and there is a need to

step things up as fast as possible. It occurred to me that the communications satellite development was a very, very good field to

accelerate, and from the point of view of stepping it up just as rapidly

as you can to get a working system—not necessarily the prototype—

up there, something that really works. You might in your planning

say that this is an area where we can push harder.

Mr. WEBB. I have an engagement at 2 o'clock with the president

of one of the most interested companies in this field.

The OHAIRMAN. Mr. Moeller.

Mr. MOELLER. Mr. Chairman, two statements, three questions, and

an observation. First, I would like to say, Mr. Webb and Dr.

Dryden, that both of you are being subjected here to some discomfitures this morning, I am sure. I would for one like to say, Mr.

Webb, that after 2/12months, you have a terrific grasp of your

obligations.

Mr. WEBB. Thank you.

Mr. MOELLER. I personally feel, in the testimony you have given

us in the past, although we are disappointed in what has happened,

that your dedication, your integrity, your vital concern for this program will Pull us through in the long run.

Dr. DRYDEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. MOELLER. The questions. Let the chips fall where they will.

Since 1958, Dr. Dryden, have you been aware of any halting, any

detaining of your program because of decisionmaking, particularly

by those above you?

Dr. DRYDEN. No; I do not know of any halting of the space program. I think Mr. Webb has observed before that all of my people

will tell you they would like to have more money. This is a common

complaint, if you like, in any agency. Those of us who have the

responsibility within the agency and those in the Executive Office

have tried to come to reasonable recommendations and conclusions.

We have presented the point of view of the agency and other factors

have been introduced into the consideration at higher levels.

We have had an ample opportunity to talk about the issues, the

pros and cons, and we have given an explanation of those cases where

it would seem that all we ask could not be given.
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 25

Mr. MOELLER. We have had plenty of money. We have had the

technical know-how. It has not been because of faulty decisions. We

have to charge all of these things to the fact that they got a start

of 4 years on us 

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. MOELLER. Has NASA—or either of you could answer it—

has NASA asked approval for a program that could produce a 3-million-pound-thrust booster, say, in the next 18 months? We have

had witnesses here who have declared this could be done. Have you

asked for such a program?

Dr. DRYDEN. Not at the present time; no, sir. We have before us

for consideration, arrived within recent weeks, proposals from the

companies that you have described.

Mr. MOELLER. We will need something of this sort if we intend to

get to the moon and back. We will have to have it real soon if we

intend to do it.

Dr. DRYDEN. This is one of the avenues and perhaps the best

avenue.

Mr. MOELLER. The third question: Are you able to tell us how

much of the Soviet budget is applied toward its space efforts by

comparison with what we currently are spending on our space programs?

Dr. DRYDEN. I have no idea and don't know how to evaluate this.

Mr. WEBB. I think it is fair to say that the Soviet effort, insofar

as we know it, is integrated with their military effort in a quite different way than we have prepared this separate type of effort. It

is very difficult to evaluate the total level. Certainly it is not inconsiderable.

Mr. MOELLER. I don't know if this is an old one or not. While we

were discussing this great issue this morning I noticed one of the

retrorockets fall off the Apollo.

Mr. WEBB. May I say one word there. I do believe it is fair to

say that at the level of funding which these programs carried in the

budget, submitted in January, and with the level of effort that is apparent from the activities of the Soviets, we would have been

trailing them in the spectacular events for an extended period. We

still would have been conducting a very solid scientific exploration

program, but I do not believe we would have been doing very many

of any of the so-called spectacular flights. I think that is a fair

statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mosher.

Mr. MOSHER. Just one brief question, Mr. Chairman. NASA, as

we all know, works completely in the open. When NASA has a

failure, the whole world knows about it. The one failure above all

others that we don't want to have is the loss of the astronaut. Is

there any reason to believe

'

any solid reason to believe, that the Soviet

Union has had such a loss? Have they made any attempts that have

been made and failed with a man?

Dr. DRYDEN. Not that we know of. In the table that Mr. Webb

gave you at the beginning we did not list the two known failures of

test vehicles. One case in which a retrorocket was fired and went

into higher orbit. The second case with the dogs aboard where it

entered too steep and burned up and the dogs were lost. These are
26 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

two failures which have been in the press. There may have been

others.

Mr. MOSHER. You have no reason to believe that the Soviets have

lost a man?

Mr. WEBB. We have no reason to believe that.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no reason not to believe it, though?

Mr. WEBB. If you want to state it that way, that is right. We

simply don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. King.

Mr. KING. Mr. Webb, you made reference a moment ago to a meeting that was held between yourself and myself. I think in fairness

to you that the record might show the circumstances of that meeting.

I am very proud of it. The meeting was held at my request. You

were there. Dr. Dryden and other members of your staff. Mr. David

Bell, Director of the Budget was there. Dr. Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President was there.

I have written a letter to President Kennedy about this. I assume

that the presence of Mr. Bell and Dr. Wiesner was at least in part the

result of the letter that I had written and perhaps also some overtures that you made. May I say that no one could have been more

graciously and sympathetically treated than I was. You gave me all

the time necessary to go into this as much as I was able.

I believe as a result of the meeting we did discuss the ways and

procedures that could be followed to reduce perhaps any areas of difference, if there be areas of difference, between NASA and this committee with regard to the use of solid-fuel propellants.

I am very grateful for that meeting. May I say that everything

that I said to you at the time of that meeting I still believe and even

stronger, if possible. I think the events of the last 48 hours have underlined, at least they have to me, the importance of moving ahead as

quickly and as vigorously as possible on all fronts consistent, of

course, with reason and judgment. But still that we must move forward vigorously and pursue every possible avenue that will enable

us to overtake the Soviets.

My second observation: There has been a lot of discussion about

whether we should follow our own program consistent with our own

national needs or whether we are conscious of being in a race with

the Soviets with the avowed objective to beat them or overtake them.

These alternatives are presented as though they were inconsistent one with the other. I feel we should do both. I agree that we

should pursue a national policy consistent with our own needs and

that merely trying to overtake the Russians might, in some areas,

actually reduce the scope of our own activities. We might want to go

much faster than the Russians and we shouldn't be limited by their

speed.

So I agree we should have our own program. But in addition to

that,I feel strongly that we are also in a very real contest with the

Russians. I don't see how we could avoid it. The battlelines, I hope

friendly battlelines, have been drawn. There is no question about it.

I hope it is a friendly contest, and will remain that way. But it is

a very real one. As has been brought out by Mr. Fulton and others,

our standing in the eyes of the Nation very definitely goes up or

down depending on how we come out in this contest.
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 27

Maybe we don't like it, but it is a fact that we cannot ignore. We

are in a game in which there are no prizes for second place as far as

I can see. Everybody knows about Charles Lindbergh but who in

this room knows who made the second flight across the Atlantic

Ocean? I am very sorry myself that one of our own men did not

have that honor. This man Gagarin, is that his name, is the one

that will go down in the history books. More power to him, but I

would have wished devoutly it could have been one of our own men.

I agree with Dr. Dryden that we probably had the cards stacked

against us 21/2 or 3 years ago when we first started because of this

4-year lag.

I would like to say we should have those twofold objectives. We

should not consider the one to be inconsistent with the other. I

think we should move forward vigorously and again with particular

emphasis on solid-fuel development.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. Chairman, I would like to observe Mr. King is

both an eloquent and effective advocate of any cause he undertakes.

He lacked neither of those qualities when he appeared on behalf of

the solid-propellant program. I would like to say in respect to his

second statement, I do believe the program President Kennedy has

approved and which is now before your committee provides a level

of funding under which all of the so-called spectacular flights will

not be made by the Soviets. I think it is possible and is indeed

the essence of the great national decision before us whether we consider this level is adequate.

I appreciate the opportunity that your committee gives us to make

this clear. This is not a decision that I will submit to you as one

individual trying to fix the policy of the Government. It is a responsible procedure whereby we are to give you the facts. The ultimate

decision must embrace many factors, comparisons with other needs

and indeed judgment of those of you who are elected by the people

as well as our advice from the executive branch, our recommendations

as to what fits into the total national interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Roudebush.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEBB. I would like to ask you a quick question. I wonder

about higher pay for scientists in Government service. I wonder if

we were able to raise the rank, raise the salary range, would you

be able to appeal to more scientific minds to assist you in the program?

It was reported to me by Mr. Mosher that he recently visited the

Plum Brook site in Ohio and he was informed they were unable to

appeal to a lot of fine people, engineers and scientists, because of the

pay grade.

Dr. DRYDEN. The Civil Service Commission has recently approved

a grade for nuclear scientists at Plum Brook. You put your finger

on a very difficult problem. In this particular instance, the problem is that the laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission are operated under the contract and the pay scales, particularly at the higher levels, are considerably in excess of civil service scales and even,

in general, of the scales that we can set within the Government under

the special authority which we are given.

That is a Government-wide problem. Through the action of this

committee we have an advantage as compared with other Government

•
28 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

departments and they look at us enviously to be able to meet a little

more of the gap than they are able to meet. I do not know if pay

-is the total solution of anything.

We get people into our program because of their interest in the

technology. In the particular case you mention, there are specific

points of competition which have given us a little problem. The Civil

Service Commission has been cooperative to do what they could to

remedy the situation.

Mr. WEBB. We are perhaps in a more favored position with respect

to this matter than many other Government departments. Certainly

something needs to be done in this direction. It is not completely

solved.

Mr. ROCIDEBUSH. Do you intend to make some recommendations to

this committee?

Mr. WEBB. I am not sure of the correct forum. I have taken administrative action on this matter within the period I have been in

office within the agency.

I expect to take the action that is appropriate to the problem. I am

not sure it means a request to this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Casey.

Mr. CASEY. Dr. Dryden we were 4 years behind when we started

on the space program. We were about 6 months behind the first

Sputnik?

Dr. DRYDEN. October to January; yes, sir.

Mr. CASEY. Four months?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think SO.

Mr. CASEY. Has that same timelag been imminent with relation to

our other efforts? We haven't made the moon shot. I understand

that.

Dr. DRYDEN. We have suffered from this fact that by the Soviets

going ahead with a large booster for intercontinental missiles with

a heavier and earlier, in a way, atomic weapon, whereas we went

along waiting until the size of the weapon had been reduced. To that

extent the Soviets have a great advantage in space. When NASA

was started we did, and as soon as we clearly had the responsibility

for superboosters with the transfer of the Saturn project to us, we

have put'into the repair of this deficiency something like a third of

our total budget.

In fact, in the budget before you there is $421 million dealing with

the development of vehicles. These developments have not been before the public eye except for those who have visited Huntsville or

who have looked at pictures of the Saturn under construction in the

shops or the test stand at Canaveral.

In the meantime, we have been doing those things which we could

do with the tools which we then had. This has been a very broad

program, as has been said.

You have mentioned the moon shot. This has been an area in

which the tools available to us have simply not been good enough to

do the job. Of course, you may say why did we try to do it at all.

We try to do the things that we could do, and in some cases we undertook to do them when we thought the chances were perhaps a little

bit on the low side.
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 29

As we have gained experience of 2 years and the effects of the money

that this committee has put into the program during those 2 years,

these achievements are growing.

We will be exploring the moon with vehicles that we know the

prospects are very good for.

Mr. CASEY. Do you have any knowledge of whether the Soviets

can put a chunk of metal on the moon? Are they advancing with

reference to exploratory vehicles on the moon?

Do you have any knowledge about that?

Dr. DRYDEN. We have no specific knowledge. I believe at Florence,

Italy, the other day, there was a general statement made about what

the Soviets are doing next. It comprised all the categories that

you can think of, satellites sputniks as he calls it, to study the environment around the earth; further investigations of the moon;

further manned flights. This doesn't tell us too much about what

their immediate program is likely to be.

Mr. CASEY. Are we going to be more than 4 months behind on the

manned flights?

Dr. DRYDEN. Man's landing on the moon?

Mr. CASEY. You are talking about 

Dr. DRYDEN. We have mentioned a time around the end of this

year. This is April. That is about it; yes.

Mr. CASEY. It would be more than 4 months?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. CASEY. As far as the spectacular is concerned, we are not leap- frogging very fast.

Dr. DRYDEN. You must remember, as we mentioned, the second sputnik had a dog in it. The satellite experiments were backed up by a program over a number of years before this which was directly aimed at the manned-flight program.

Mr. CASEY. We may be behind in the spectacular, but you are of the opinion that for the practical use that is, scientific data, ac- quisition of scientific data, exploration of outer space, and peaceful

means such as worldwide communications, weather predictions, and

so forth—

Dr. DRYDEN. The Soviets so far have done nothing like Tiros. They have done nothing directly for applications to communications.

As far as communications technology, we were able to communicate 22 million miles. They have lost contact with their Venus probe

at a few million miles. In space science generally we feel we have,

gone a much further distance in more detail, more richness of knowledge that the Soviets have gone.

Mr. CASEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Randall.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, we don't have much time left. I

will try to ask for some time on the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. I will try to cooperate.

Mr. RANDALL. We are in second place. I will never forget the re- action back in civilian life—you feel you are not in civilian life when

you are in Congress—I remember the reaction in 195'T. The people

were stunned and awed.
30 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

I held a State office at that time in a veterans organization and

the people said, "What are we going to do about it?"

I expect the same feeling exists today.

There are two viewpoints that I have heard this morning. One

is "spare no horses on a crash program" and the other is, "make great

haste but with our speed always under control."

For my part, I want to share the view of others. We may be in

second place, but if we make a failure here, we will be in worse than

second place. We will look amateurish.

You testified, Dr. Dryden, a while back that we were not ori a twoshift basis. Is that correct?

Dr. DRYDEN. I said three shifts at the Cape. McDonnell as a

whole is not on a three-shift basis.

Mr. RANDALL. Do you plan to change it all over?

Mr. WEBB. In respect to the Mercury *gram whenever overtime or two- or three-shift basis is required in an area that is giving trouble, we will proceed to put it into effect. As to the entire

space program, the program that is presented to you is not based

on a two- or three-shift basis.

Mr. RANDALL. Do you think the whole program should be on a

three-shift basis?

Mr. WEBB. It is what you get for the money you spend.

Mr. RANDALL. There seemed to be a question of solid propellant

versus liquid propellant. As far as I know, we only have the word

of the contractors, manufacturers. I want to add the observation that

we can't take a very good look at their assertions on $3 million and I

think it should be increased.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ryan.

Mr. RYAN. I am sure you gentlemen do not intend to dismiss these

feats of the Soviets as merely spectacular, that you expect to make

every effort to surpass the Soviets. What concerns me is that from

the man-in-space flight the other day the Soviets have gained knowledge and will again be ahead of us in the understanding of the effects

on man in this environment.

Mr. WEBB. You just say, having performed in flight with a man in

it, they know more about what happens to a man in space than we do.

We are -proceeding with the Mercury program so we will have access

to knowledge and technology that gives us a solid foundation of understanding of the problems that exist there. We have no knowledge

with respect to what their program is beyond the one-man operation.

Mr. RYAN. I take it you would not have the capacity to put a laboratory in space along the linesMr. WEBB. I would not.

Dr. DRYDEN. I think when I testified before, I pointed out the

existence of this booster capacity. It gives the Soviets the ability

to do a great many feats very soon. In fact, they have been working

on the preparatory work. A manned space laboratory may be coming

soon. We don't know.

The one thing is that the Soviets have not done everything all at

the same time. There is no doubt that they do have the booster capacity to do a manned space laboratory as far as the booster capacity

is concerned.
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 31

Mr. RYAN. To gain knowledge of the radiation belt, or Whatever—

Dr. DRYDEN. To begin some biological knowledge by that means.

Mr. RYAN. Do you believe it is possible in any way for us to step

up this program so we can be the first country to the moon with a

man?

Dr. DRYDEN. In the money which is in the Apollo project, there

are funds to investigate not with a manned laboratory, of course, but with other vehicles the biological problems in space.

This is what we can do right now.

Mr. HECHLER (presiding). Are there further questions?

Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. You have spoken of the 10-year program. There has been some slight indication that it would be accelerated. By how much could it be accelerated and what would be the added cost?

Mr. WEBB. I don't think you can answer that kind of question, Mr. Fulton. One suggestion that your committee has been very interested in is the paralleling of the Saturn development with a solid propel- lant device that would give either the equivalent capacity or a greater lift capacity.

There is certainly the order of magnitude of such a project as Dr. Dryden has indicated would be on the order of a half billion dollars.

There is also a serious question I am told by the scientists as to whether

or not you would actually accomplish the lift capacity required to do the work we have in mind any faster than you will with the Saturn

program. There is a program beyond Saturn. We have labeled it

Nova as an expression of an idea of a very large capacity vehicle. We have requested additional funds in that area this year.

The F-1 engine is to go forward at an accelerated rate if you approve our proposals. I would think that the solid-propellant research might well be aimed at this large lift capacity vehicle beyond Saturn. This is a completely preliminary view

'

and what the cost of such a

thing would be is a matter that would be extremely difficult to guess

at this time. There are very large numbers that people use. Some

people use a number as high as $40 billion to land a man on the moon.

Others say half that amount.

I don't believe that I could give you, from the experience I have had, anything that I would feel I wanted to be wedded to in terms

of an estimate here of another revision of the 10-year program. I

think that there are certain additions that might well be made.

Mr. FULTON. The next Venus shot, and the most favorable location

of Venus, would occur probably in June 1962. What are your plans

for a Venus shot? Are you going to make that a target date?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. Mr. Webb mentioned the 1964 dates as two of

the dates in the long-range plan for the Venus shots.

As Mr. Fulton says, the next chance is in 1962.

Mr. FULTON. Can you accelerate from the 1964 date and make it

1962?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes. We have plans for trying at Venus in 1962. This will be in the early stages of the development of the Centaur

vehicle. We have not labeled it that in our long-range plan because

just as the earlier shots at the moon—the assurance that you will do this is in the high numbers. We do have it scheduled, yes.
32 DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT

Mr. FULTON. You are moving your schedule for placing a deep

probe, then, in the vicinity of Venus from 1964 up to 1962?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. The next question is on the delay that may have occurred in the program that put us behind the Soviets in developing

a large booster.

I think that to amplify further we didn't start our booster development program only 21/2 years ago, as Dr. Dryden has said. We

started in 1946 and started well. On that I must compliment the

first Secretary of Defense. So that in 1946 and 1947 our programs

progressed very well. However, in 1948 there were delays that occurred because of money. And by 1950 it was canceled.

Then it was begun again in 1953. By 1954 and 1955 we had established special committees for rocket development. Then we began

to accelerate the program beginning in 1956.

That has been the whole history and pattern of our booster development under both the Truman and the Eisenhower administration.

It has been very popular and then not so popular, funded and then

not so funded, or not funded very much. That has been the history

all the way through, Dr. Dryden.

Dr. DRYDEN. There have been fluctuations in the support of that

program.

Mr. FULTON. That has been the operation all the way through and

we cannot point to any particular year and say that was when we

were delayed, isn't that right?

Dr. DRYDEN. I don't think you can select any individual or group

or any year as you suggest, Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. Then the question is on our scheduling. When do

you expect a Centaur flight?

Dr. DRYDEN. I believe at present it is October 1961.

Mr. FULTON. Next, when would we expect to have a space platform orbiting?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think the number that we have said is the 1965-66

time period; 1965 optimistically if everything goes well 1966—

Mr. FULTON. On a space platform which might be either an observatory or a laboratory, when would either of those be planned in our

10-year schedule?

Dr. DRYDEN. I think that kind of development has to start in the

1963 budget at the latest.

Mr. FULTON. You would commence it in the 1963 budget?

Dr. DRYDEN. At the latest I would say.

Mr. Framoisr. On the communications satellite, or when would you

begin some practical use of Echo or a passive satellite?

Dr. DRYDEN. I do not know when there would be an operational

system on Echo—

Mr. F-crurox. When would you begin it?

Dr. DRYDEN. The Echo program, getting a satellite which will

have a long lifetime, the firings will be completed, I believe, in 1962.

When these are up, it is possible to use them for communication, for

anybody who wants to.

Mr. FULTON. When could we have a practical satellite weather system in operation?

Secondly, a worldwide satellite relay system?
DISCUSSION OF SOVIET MAN-IN-SPACE SHOT 33

And, thirdly, worldwide television?

When would we have those?

Dr. DRYDEN. That, of course, gets beyond the responsibilities assigned to NASA. People have made guesses that run all the way

from 3 to 7 or 8 years. We are not in the position to estimate the

costs of a communications system.

We are at the present time engaged in studies of the operating

meteorological system.

Mr. FULTON. This accomplishment by the Soviet Union of putting

a man in space is actually an accomplishment for the human race as

well, isn't it?

Dr. DRYDEN. Yes, it is.

Mr. FULTON. Then why don't we be broadminded. I would like to

ask the President to invite Maj. Yuri Gagarin to come over to this

country. Let's be generous and openminded about it. Let's honor

him and give him every just due. Why not give him a ticker-tape

reception in New York or Washington?

Dr. DRYDEN. It is a matter for other persons to decide. The President has sent him congratulations, and also the astronauts.

Mr. FULTON. May I, through you, Mr. Webb, ask the President to

invite him to come to this country and give him the honor he is entitled to?

Mr. WEBB. I wonder why you want me to communicate that?

Mr. FULTON. I happen to be a Republican and you look like a very

sympathetic channel of communication.

Mr. WEBB.II will certainly give consideration to this.

I think your position in the Congress may be more important than

you realize.

Mr. FULTON. You are very kind. I would like to make such a request, that he be brought here as a guest of the American people.

Thank you.

Mr. HECHLER (presiding). Thank you, Mr. Webb, and Dr. Dryden,

for your appearance and cooperation.

The committee stands adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m.:the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, April 14, 1961, on a different subject.)

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