alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

MARVIN JEAN-MICHEL,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-1617

[March 28, 2019]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Samantha Schosberg 

Feuer, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 2009CF014593CMB, 2010CF000318AMB, 

and 2010CF000501AMB.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Jessica A. De Vera, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. 

Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GERBER, C.J., GROSS and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
H. Con. Res. 74 Agreed to May 9, 2001

One Hundred Seventh Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,

the third day of January, two thousand and one

Concurrent Resolution

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. USE OF CAPITOL GROUNDS FOR NATIONAL PEACE OFFICERS’ MEMORIAL SERVICE.

The National Fraternal Order of Police and its auxiliary shall

be permitted to sponsor a public event, the 20th annual National

Peace Officers’ Memorial Service, on the Capitol Grounds on May

15, 2001, or on such other date as the Speaker of the House

of Representatives and the Committee on Rules and Administration

of the Senate may jointly designate, in order to honor the law

enforcement officers who died in the line of duty during 2000.

SEC. 2. TERMS AND CONDITIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The event authorized by section 1 shall be

free of admission charge to the public and arranged not to interfere

with the needs of Congress, under conditions to be prescribed by

the Architect of the Capitol and the Capitol Police Board.

(b) EXPENSES AND LIABILITIES.—The National Fraternal Order

of Police and its auxiliary shall assume full responsibility for all

expenses and liabilities incident to all activities associated with

the event.

SEC. 3. EVENT PREPARATIONS.

Subject to the approval of the Architect of the Capitol, the

National Fraternal Order of Police and its auxiliary are authorized

to erect upon the Capitol Grounds such stage, sound amplification

devices, and other related structures and equipment, as may be

required for the event authorized by section 1.

SEC. 4. ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS.

The Capitol Police Board shall provide for enforcement of the

restrictions contained in section 4 of the Act of July 31, 1946

(40 U.S.C. 193d; 60 Stat. 718), concerning sales, advertisements,

displays, and solicitations on the Capitol Grounds, as well as other
H. Con. Res. 74—2

restrictions applicable to the Capitol Grounds, with respect to the

event authorized by section 1.

Attest:

Clerk of the House of Representatives.

Attest:

Secretary of the Senate.
#### Joe Lee PEPPERS v. STATE.

CR-92-0633.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 18, 1993.

Clyde Baker, Guntersville, for appellant.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Norbert Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PATTERSON, Judge.

The Appellant, Joe Lee Peppers, was indicted in a three-count indictment, charging two counts of sodomy in the first degree, § 13A-6-63, and one count of sexual abuse in the first degree, § 13A-6-66. He was convicted by a jury on all three counts and was sentenced as a habitual offender with two prior felony convictions to life imprisonment on each sodomy count and to 10 years’ imprisonment on the sexual abuse count. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. He appeals, raising one issue.

Peppers contends that the state failed to prove the two prior felony convictions used to enhance his sentence. We agree. A review of the record reveals that the evidence offered by the state to prove the two prior felony convictions for burglary and larceny failed to show that he was convicted of both crimes.

For this reason, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to hold a new sentencing hearing to determine whether the appellant has been convicted of one or two prior felonies. If the court determines that Peppers was convicted of two prior felonies, then the sentence should stand. However, if the court finds that Peppers was convicted of only one prior felony then, the court should resentence Peppers accordingly.

The trial court shall take all action directed in sufficient time to permit the circuit clerk to make a proper return to this court at the earliest possible time within 60 days of the release of this opinion.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

All Judges concur.
Subject to Change

USDA Fruit & Vegetable Industry Advisory Committee 

Virtual Meeting Agenda

Wednesday, January 25, 2023

10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time

Schedule at a Glance: January 25

This administrative meeting is being convened to discuss general Federal Advisory Committee 

operations for newly appointed representatives, hold elections, receive updates from USDA offices,

and perform a series of administrative actions.

Call to Order

Welcome | Introductions | Remarks

Presentations from USDA Offices

Agricultural Marketing Service

Risk Management Agency 

Food and Nutrition Service

Public Comments 

Lunch 

Federal Advisory Committee Operations Overview 

Executive Seat Elections | Chair + Vice Chair + Secretary 

Subcommittee Assignments 

Closing | Other Business 

Adjourn 

Virtual Format for Administrative Meeting

The FVIAC DFO or Chair calls the meeting to order, chairs the meeting, and adjourns the meeting.

Public Comments

Written comments deadline is 11:59 p.m. ET, Wed., January. 11, 2023 via www.regulations.gov. 

Oral comments deadline is 11:59 p.m. ET, Wed., January. 11, 2023 via Zoom Registration Link. 

Registration Details

Register in advance for this webinar

https://www.zoomgov.com/webinar/register/WN_9tjRLHfhRzqGZzGfSkkI_g

Meeting Minutes

The FVIAC Chair must certify meeting minutes within 90 days.

FVIAC Web Page

https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams/facas-advisory-councils/fviac
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 7237** 

JOSE LUIS MACIAS , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v. BUTCH JACKSON , Respondent

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh
. Terrence W. Boyle , District Judge. ( 5:09

- hc

- 02102

- BO )

Submitted : November 18, 2010 Decided: December 2, 2010

Before SHEDD and AGEE , Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per c uriam opinion
. Jose Luis Macias, Appellant Pro Se. Mary Carla Hollis, Assistant Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE , Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM : Jose Luis Macias seeks to appeal the district court ’ s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (2006)
. A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “ a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. ” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstratin g that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court den ies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independe ntly reviewed the record and conclude that Macias has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presen ted in the materials3 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process. DISMISSE D
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTION

November 7, 2008 Revision

Cause number: 01-14-00874-CV

Style: In the Interest of R.R.H., M.D.J., and M.K., Children

Date motion filed*: April 22, 2015

Type of motion: Unopposed Motion to Amend Appellant’s Brief

Party filing motion: Appellant

Document to be filed: Appellant’s amended brief

Is appeal accelerated? Yes

If motion to extend time:

Original due date:

Number of prior extensions: Current Due date: 

Date Requested:

Ordered that motion is:

 Granted

If document is to be filed, document due: May 1, 2015

 The Court will not grant additional motions to extend time

 Denied

 Dismissed (e.g., want of jurisdiction, moot)

 Other: _____________________________________ 

The motion is granted. Appellant’s amended brief is ordered filed by no later

than 5:00 p.m. on May 1, 2015. No extensions will be granted.

Judge's signature: /s/ Chief Justice Sherry Radack

 for the Court

Panel consists of ____________________________________________

Date: April 27, 2015
#### In the Matter of the Application of Frank G. LANDRUM, Jr., For Writ of Habeas Corpus. Frank G. LANDRUM, Applicant, v. C. J. BAKER, Estelle Baker, Samoa McHatton and Charles McHatton, Respondents.

No. 51779, 52062.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

March 24, 1981.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1981.

Gary Payne, Atoka, Harry Bickford, Ard-more, Elton Cox, Canyon, Tex., for applicant.

Dan Little and Lyn Abies, Madill, for respondents.

MEMORANDUM DECISION BY ORDER

On Certiorari to this Court from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Div. No. 1, applicant Landrum urges, inter alia, the trial court was without jurisdiction to make an order for child support in an action commenced in habeas corpus, and points out a direct conflict in Oklahoma on this question between *Ex parte Kelly, Okl., 261 P.2d 452 (1963),*and *Ex parte Yahola, Okl., 180 Okl. 637, 71 P.2d 968 (1937).*

The holding in *Kelly*was based in part on the Court’s erroneous conclusion that this particular question had never been decided in Oklahoma. By so doing, the Court overlooked our earlier holding in *Yahola,*which directly recognized the jurisdiction of the court in a habeas corpus action to order child support. Accordingly, we expressly overrule *Kelly*in favor of the better reasoning expressed in *Yahola*which is in accord with the holding of *Alford*v. *Thomas, Okl, 316 P.2d 188 (1957).*

Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 18 Received in Senate (RDS)]

  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 18

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 31, 2001

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
     Providing for an adjournment of the House of Representatives.

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That when the House adjourns on the

legislative day of Wednesday, January 31, 2001, it stand adjourned 
until 2 p.m. on Tuesday, February 6, 2001.

            Passed the House of Representatives January 31, 2001.

            Attest:

                                                 JEFF TRANDAHL,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### In re the MARRIAGE OF Samuel J. SAIZ, Appellee, and Mary E. Saiz, n/k/a Mary E. Bonner, Appellant.

No. 80CA1175.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

July 9, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 6, 1981.

No appearance for appellee.

C. J. Berardini, Denver, for appellant.

ENOCH, Chief Judge.

In this *ex parte*appeal, Mary E. Bonner (the mother) appeals an order of the district court that she pay $150 per month in child support. We affirm.

A decree of dissolution was entered on May 3,1977. Pursuant to that decree, Samuel Saiz (the father) was granted custody of the two children of the marriage. The *1021court incorporated in its decree of dissolution a settlement agreement of the parties that provided in part that the mother would contribute “in a reasonable manner to the support of the children.” Subsequently, and apparently without court involvement, the parties orally agreed that $50 per month was reasonable support.

In March 1980, the father filed a “motion for child support,” alleging “[t]hat conditions have substantially changed since the prior Orders of Court . . . and that the lack of child support orders is presently unconscionable.” This motion was heard by a judge other than the one who entered the original orders.

The court determined that, from the time of the dissolution decree to the time of the hearing, the mother’s gross income had increased from approximately $700 per month to $1,376 per month. The father’s gross income had increased during the same time from $1,100 per month to approximately $1,410. The court found, however, that circumstances were not changed so substantially as to make the prior order of child support unconscionable. Nevertheless, the court found “that $50 per month is not reasonable child support any longer, although it may well have been at the time of the agreement” and ordered the mother to pay $150 per month in child support.

The mother contends that the court erred by awarding $150 without first finding, pursuant to § 14-10-122, C.R.S. 1973, that circumstances were so substantially changed sines the time of the original order as to make that order unconscionable. We disagree.

The original court order, while recognizing the mother’s duty to support, did not set “an amount” of child support using the criteria of § 14-10 — 115, C.R.S. 1973. The court’s present determination that $150 per month is reasonable support is the first determination by the court of an amount to be paid in conformance with the requirements of § 14-10-115, C.R.S. 1973. Accordingly, the court was not required to follow the modification of child support requirements under § 14-10-122, C.R.S. 1973, but rather, was governed by the criteria for entering an original order of support.

There being no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount to be paid, we affirm its order of support.

PIERCE and TURSI, JJ., concur.
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-14-00123-CR

CHARLES RAY MILLER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 8th District Court

Hopkins County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1423720

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In cause numbers 06-14-00120-CR through 06-14-00129-CR, Charles Ray Miller appeals 

from ten separate convictions for indecency with a child by contact. Miller has filed a single 

brief in which he raises an issue common to all of his appeals. Miller argues that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel during the punishment phase of his trial. 

We addressed this issue in detail in our opinion of this date on Miller’s appeal in cause 

number 06-14-00120-CR. For the reasons stated therein, we likewise conclude in this matter that 

Miller failed to demonstrate (1) that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ); Ex parte Imoudu, 284 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009).

Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: December 11, 2014

Date Decided: December 12, 2014

Do Not Publish
From: Halford Nancy (NORALNM) [mailto:Nancy.Halford@noralinc.com] 

Sent: Wednesday, July 17, 2013 6:22 PM 

To: Putney, David 

Cc: Robuck, Steve (NORALINC); Jones Mark (NORALNM); Backfisch Don (NORALNM) 

Subject: ICR data 

The Excel files and the pdf report were uploaded today to the site you mentioned below. I will be sending a CD 

in the mail to you as well. Please let me know if you need anything else. 

Nancy Halford 

Environmental Chemist 

Noranda (NYSE NOR) 

office: 573-643-2361 x2184 

email: nancy.halford@noralinc.com 

website: http://www.norandaaluminum.com

p. 1 of 1
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Kai Xiong, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Keyarch Acquisition Corporation
(the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly
presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Date: March 30, 2022 | By: | /s/ Kai Xiong                       
|-------------------- | --- | ------------------------------------
|                     |     | Kai Xiong                           
|                     |     | Chief Executive Officer and Director
|                     |     | (Principal Executive Officer)       



I, Jing Lu, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Keyarch Acquisition Corporation
(the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly
presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Date: March 30, 2022 | By: | /s/ Jing Lu                                                   
|-------------------- | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------
|                     |     | Jing Lu                                                       
|                     |     | Chief Financial Officer                                       
|                     |     | (Principal Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)



This certification accompanies the Form 10-K to
which it relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any
filing of Keyarch Acquisition Corporation under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-K), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
#### Jimmy Jones SCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 87-1968.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Oct. 19, 1988.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Louis G. Carres, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Carolyn V. McCann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm but certify the following questions as issues of great public importance:

> 1. Is that portion of Chapter 87-110, Laws of Florida, which amends section 921.001(5), Florida Statutes, applicable to appellate review of sentences imposed for offenses committed prior to July 1, 1987?

> 2. Upon a revocation of probation because of the commission of a subsequent criminal act, may the conviction for the subsequent criminal act be utilized as a *1069justification for departing from the sentencing guidelines?

ANSTEAD, LETTS and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 10.20


 


	THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REDACTED. CERTAIN IDENTIFIED INFORMATION HAS BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THIS EXHIBIT BECAUSE IT IS BOTH NOT MATERIAL AND IS OF THE TYPE THAT YOU TREAT AS PRIVATE, PROPRIETARY, OR CONFIDENTIAL AND IS OTHERWISE SENSITIVE TO THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KADIR MCCOY
,
Defendant Below

– Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE
,
Plaintiff Below

– Appellee. § § No. 221 , 2019 § § § § Court Below

– S uperior Court § of the State of Delaware § § Cr. ID 1501018069 (N ) § §

Submitted: June 24 , 201 9 Decided: June 25 , 201 9

Before STRINE , Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN , Justices

.
O R D E R
Upon consideration of the Rule to Show Cause and the appellant’s response,

it appears to the Court that:

(1) On May 21, 2019, Kadir McCoy filed a notice purporting to appeal

from an order of the Superior Court dated May 8, 2019

. McCoy did not attach a

copy of the order from which he filed the appeal. After a review of the Superior

Court docket revealed that no final order had been entered on May 8, 2019, the Clerk

of the Court issued a notice to McCoy to show cause why this appeal should not be

dismissed.

(2) On June 24, 2019, in response to t he notice to show cause, McCoy filed

a letter with the Court arguing his appeal should not be dismissed because a court of2

law has not considered the merits of his motion for postconviction relief. McCoy’s
filing is unresponsive to the Court’s notice to s how cause. A review of the Superior
Court docket further reveals that McCoy’s motion for postconviction relief filed on

January 17, 2019, remains pending in the Superior Court. If the Superior Court
denies McCoy’s motion for postconviction relief, he may then appeal to this Court

for a review of that final judgment.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
, under Supreme Court

Rule 26(b), that the appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura Justice