1

 The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States Magistrate Judge for the

District of Minnesota, to whom the case was referred for decision by consent of the

parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2990

___________

Kathy S. Van Vickle, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner *

of Social Security, *

*

Appellee. * 

___________

Submitted: March 14, 2008

Filed: August 21, 2008

___________

Before BYE, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Kathy Van Vickle appeals the judgment of the district court1

 upholding the final

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security to deny her application for disability

insurance benefits. We affirm.
-2-

I.

On October 23, 2003, Van Vickle filed an application for disability insurance

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Van Vickle claimed that she could

not work because she suffered from seronegative rheumatoid arthritis (adult Still’s

disease), fibromyalgia, cervicalgia (neck pain), and degenerative disc disease, which

caused her extreme fatigue and prevented her from sitting, standing, or walking for

long periods of time. The regional commissioner denied Van Vickle’s application

initially and again on reconsideration. She then requested a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which was held on August 18, 2005.

At the hearing, Van Vickle testified that she quit her previous job as a social

worker, primarily because of the pain in her neck and back. She claimed that she

could not sit for longer than twenty minutes without “fidgeting.” Van Vickle also

claimed that she suffered from “extreme fatigue,” although she did not mention

fatigue as a reason she stopped working. Van Vickle further testified that she suffered

from side effects from her medications. In particular, she testified that methotrexate,

which she took every Wednesday for her Still’s disease, made her so nauseous that she

could not work on Wednesday and sometimes on Thursday.

A vocational expert testified that a person of the same age, who possesses the

same education and past work experience as Van Vickle, could work as a social

worker even if the person was limited to (1) lifting and/or carrying ten pounds

occasionally, and less than ten pounds frequently, (2) standing and/or walking with

normal breaks for a total of two hours in an eight hour work day, (3) sitting with

normal breaks for a total of six hours of an eight hour work day, and (4) changing

position between sitting and standing every thirty minutes. The vocational expert

testified, however, that if the person needed to change position every twenty minutes

or take a day off each week for medical problems, as Van Vickle had testified, the

person could not be gainfully employed.
-3-

Following the five-step evaluation process set forth in 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(a)(4), the ALJ determined that Van Vickle was not disabled. At steps one

through three, the ALJ found that Van Vickle was not engaging in substantial gainful

activity, that the combination of her impairments was severe, and that her impairments

did not meet or equal a listed impairment. At step four, the ALJ found that Van

Vickle was not disabled because she retained the residual functional capacity (RFC)

to perform her past relevant work as a hospital social worker as it is typically

performed in the national economy. Specifically, the ALJ found that Van Vickle had

the RFC to “lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds

frequently, stand and/or walk (with normal breaks) for a total of about 2 hours in an

8-hour workday, if allowed to change positions every thirty minutes, [and] sit (with

normal breaks) for a total of about 6 hours in an 8-hour work day, if allowed to change

positions every thirty minutes.”

The ALJ found that Van Vickle’s “medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms,” but that her “statements

concerning the intensity, duration and limiting effects of these symptoms were not

entirely credible.” The ALJ noted that his RFC finding was consistent with Van

Vickle’s daily activities and the reports of three treating and examining physicians.

The ALJ specifically mentioned that he found Van Vickle’s testimony of her problem

with ongoing fatigue to be in conflict with the medical opinions of Van Vickle’s

doctors, the lack of medical support indicating an ongoing problem with fatigue, and

Van Vickle’s reported daily activities. Although Van Vickle testified at the hearing

that she suffered from side effects from her medication, the ALJ noted that Van Vickle

had not reported such significant side effects to her doctors.

Van Vickle petitioned the Appeals Council for review. She submitted new

evidence, including a report from Lisa Neubauer, an occupational therapist, who

opined that Van Vickle was “performing below the sedentary physical demand level.”

Neubauer reported that Van Vickle’s “maximum weight handling is between 5 and 10
2

We have noted on several occasions that consideration of evidence submitted

only to the Appeals Council when evaluating the decision of an ALJ is a “peculiar task

for a reviewing court,” Riley v. Shalala, 18 F.3d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1994), and others

have urged us to reconsider the practice. See Eads v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and

Human Servs., 983 F.2d 815, 817-18 (7th Cir. 1993). “But we do include such

evidence in the substantial evidence equation,” Mackey v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 951, 953

(8th Cir. 1995), and of course this panel must follow circuit precedent.

-4-

lbs,” and that her “[s]itting tolerance . . . is limited at between 10 and 20 minutes with

repositioning.” The Appeals Council considered the new evidence, but denied review

because it “found that the information [did] not provide a basis for changing the

[ALJ]’s decision.” Upon denial of the request for review, the ALJ’s decision became

the final decision of the Commissioner. Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th

Cir. 1992). 

The district court upheld the Commissioner’s decision. On appeal, Van Vickle

argues that there is not substantial evidence on the record to support the ALJ’s adverse

credibility finding, and that the case should be remanded in light of the new evidence

presented to the Appeals Council.

II.

We review the district court’s decision de novo, and will affirm if the

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a

whole, including the new evidence that was considered by the Appeals Council.

Cunningham v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2000); Nelson v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d

363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992).2

 “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable

mind would accept as adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision.” Young v.

Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000). We consider evidence that “supports as

well as detracts from the Commissioner’s decision, and we will not reverse simply
-5-

because some evidence may support the opposite conclusion.” Hamilton v. Astrue,

518 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).

Van Vickle argues on appeal that substantial evidence does not support the

ALJ’s finding that her testimony was not entirely credible. An ALJ may discount a

claimant’s subjective complaints if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole.

Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 802-03 (8th Cir. 2005); Polaski v. Heckler, 739

F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). “Where adequately explained and supported,

credibility findings are for the ALJ to make.” Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th

Cir. 2000). Although Van Vickle challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination as

a whole, she takes specific issue with the findings by the ALJ that she can sit for up

to thirty minutes without changing position (Van Vickle testified that she needed to

change position every twenty minutes), that she does not have significant side effects

from her medication (she testified that she had to miss work one day per week because

one of her medications made her nauseous), and that her subjective complaints of

extreme fatigue were not entirely credible. 

There is substantial evidence on the record to support the ALJ’s finding that

Van Vickle can sit for thirty minutes without changing position. Although Van Vickle

testified that she had to change position every twenty minutes or she would be

“fidgeting,” she also testified that she rides in her car for twenty to thirty minutes and

can “push” herself to ride an hour. Two of Van Vickle’s treating physicians, Dr.

Kristi Arel and Dr. Sunny Kim, reported that Van Vickle should change positions

every thirty minutes. The report from Neubauer, the occupational therapist, takes a

different view. Neubauer states that Van Vickle’s sitting tolerance is ten to twenty

minutes. But the fact that Van Vickle can point to some contradictory evidence in the

record does not lead to a conclusion that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by

substantial evidence. In certain circumstances, an ALJ may determine that an

occupational therapist’s opinion outweighs the opinion of a treating physician, such

as where the occupational therapist “has seen the individual more often than the
3

 Citing Sloan v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 883, 889 (8th Cir. 2007), Van Vickle argues

that we should remand her case to the ALJ to consider Neubauer’s report in light of

SSR 06-3p, which was published after the ALJ’s ruling. SSR 06-3p clarifies how the

agency considers opinions from sources, such as occupational therapists, who are not

“acceptable medical sources.” In Sloan, the ALJ considered evidence from a medical

source that was not an “acceptable medical source,” but gave it “little weight.” 499

F.3d at 887. After the ALJ’s decision, the SSA published SSR 06-3p, which states

that “an opinion from a medical source who is not an ‘acceptable medical source’ may

outweigh the opinion of an ‘acceptable medical source,’ including the medical opinion

of a treating source.” We remanded for the ALJ to consider whether the new policy

affected the prior decision. Id. at 889. In this case, the ALJ did not consider

Neubauer’s report at all, because it was not created until after the ALJ made his

decision. Thus, the new Social Security ruling is not inconsistent with the ALJ’s

analysis.

-6-

treating source.”3

 Social Security Ruling (SSR) 06-3p, 71 Fed. Reg. 45,593, 2006 WL

2329939 (Aug. 9, 2006). Here, however, there is no evidence that Neubauer saw Van

Vickle more than once, while Drs. Arel and Kim saw Van Vickle on several

occasions. Thus, it would be entirely appropriate for an ALJ to give more weight to

Van Vickle’s treating doctors’ opinions. Riley v. Shalala, 18 F.3d 619, 622 (8th Cir.

1994).

The ALJ’s determination that Van Vickle’s medications do not create any

significant side effects that prevent her from working is also supported by substantial

evidence. Van Vickle testified that while she was still working, she was home sick

each Wednesday because she felt so nauseous from taking methotrexate. The reports

from Dr. Paul Florell, who treated Van Vickle’s Still’s disease, tell another story. For

example, on May 5, 2003, Dr. Florell notes that Van Vickle had “a couple mouth sores

or nasal sores from the methotrexate,” but there was no mention of nausea in the

report. In addition, Dr. Florell notes that he told Van Vickle that she could stop taking

the methotrexate for two weeks, but that she decided to “continue with it,” because the

medication was “not bothering her that much.” On June 20, 2005, Dr. Florell noted

that Van Vickle worried that the methotrexate was “bothering her bladder,” but again,
-7-

there is no mention of nausea. The only evidence on the record that methotrexate

made Van Vickle nauseous, aside from her own testimony, is a report of Dr. Florell

from March 18, 2005, in which he notes that “[Van Vickle] is now on tablet

methotrexate because they can’t get the liquid, at this time, for her injections. It does

make her a little bit more nauseated, but she has to put up with that for right now.”

Aside from nausea, Van Vickle also disagrees with the ALJ’s assessment that

the side effects from her medications (occasional blurred vision, fatigue, nausea,

diarrhea, nose and mouth sores, and bladder problems), are not significant. Some of

the evidence in the record simply contradicts her testimony. For example, on June 20,

2005, Dr. Florell notes that Van Vickle did not have a history of diarrhea from her

medications. And though some of the other side effects may have caused discomfort,

Van Vickle has not indicated that they are significant in the sense that they prevent her

from working as a social worker. Most of the evidence to which Van Vickle points

regarding her fatigue (which she claims is both a side effect of medication and a

symptom of her illnesses) is from before the alleged onset date of disability. In fact,

Van Vickle claims that she has had an ongoing fatigue problem since December 1998.

Van Vickle nonetheless worked until April 2003. Thus, despite suffering from what

she calls “extreme fatigue,” Van Vickle continued working for over four years. In

addition, at the hearing, Van Vickle said that she stopped working mostly because of

her neck and back pain. When asked specifically why she quit her job as a social

worker, Van Vickle did not mention fatigue, or any other side effect of medication.

Van Vickle bears the burden to prove that her disability prevents her from performing

her past work. Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004). The ALJ

concluded that Van Vickle’s medication side effects are not significant enough to

prevent her from working, and that her subjective complaints in general are

inconsistent with the record. This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. 

 Finally, Van Vickle argues that the ALJ misread Dr. Arel’s report, and that the

mistaken reading was a factor in the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that Van Vickle could
-8-

perform her past work as a social worker. In her hand-written report, it appears that

Dr. Arel wrote that Van Vickle “may walk, but still will require frequent rest ([no]

prolonged walking).” (A.R. at 287) (emphasis added). The ALJ read this statement

to say that Van Vickle “may work, but still will require frequent rest.” Reading the

report to say “work” rather than “walk,” the ALJ thought Dr. Arel was suggesting that

Van Vickle needed “frequent naps” during the workday. He found that this assertion

was not supported by the record. Assuming that the ALJ misread Dr. Arel’s report,

we see no prejudice to Van Vickle. The ALJ did not rely on his belief that Dr. Arel

thought Van Vickle could work. In fact, the ALJ noted that later in her report, Dr.

Arel stated that Van Vickle’s condition prevented her from sustaining gainful

employment. The ALJ correctly noted, however, that the ultimate conclusion of

whether Van Vickle could sustain gainful employment is a question for the

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1); see also Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d

801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[T]reating physicians’ opinions are not medical opinions

that should be credited when they simply state that a claimant can not be gainfully

employed, because they are merely opinions on the application of the statute, a task

assigned solely to the discretion of the [Commissioner].” (internal quotations

omitted)). The ALJ properly considered the physical limitations that Dr. Arel placed

on Van Vickle, and actually adopted them. There is no indication that the ALJ would

have decided differently had he read the hand-written notation to say “walk” rather

than “work,” and any error by the ALJ was therefore harmless. See Renfrow v. Astrue,

496 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007); Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544-45 (7th Cir.

2008); Schow v. Astrue, 272 F. App’x 647, 651 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008).

* * *

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

 _____________________________