U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

57–589 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024

EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FEDERAL 

PROTECTIVE SERVICE: ARE FEDERAL BUILDINGS SECURE? 

(118–66) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 23, 2024 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-transportation?path=/ 

browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/transportation 
(ii) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri, Chairman 

RICK LARSEN, Washington, Ranking Member 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

MIKE BOST, Illinois 

DOUG LAMALFA, California 

BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

JENNIFFER GONZA ́LEZ-COLO ́ N, 

Puerto Rico 

PETE STAUBER, Minnesota 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota 

JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

TROY E. NEHLS, Texas 

TRACEY MANN, Kansas 

BURGESS OWENS, Utah 

RUDY YAKYM III, Indiana 

LORI CHAVEZ-DEREMER, Oregon 

THOMAS H. KEAN, JR., New Jersey 

ANTHONY D’ESPOSITO, New York 

ERIC BURLISON, Missouri 

DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin 

BRANDON WILLIAMS, New York 

MARCUS J. MOLINARO, New York 

MIKE COLLINS, Georgia 

MIKE EZELL, Mississippi 

JOHN S. DUARTE, California 

AARON BEAN, Florida 

CELESTE MALOY, Utah 

KEVIN KILEY, California 

VINCE FONG, California 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, 

District of Columbia 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

JARED HUFFMAN, California 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

GREG STANTON, Arizona, 

Vice Ranking Member 

COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas 

SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas 

JESU ́ S G. ‘‘CHUY’’ GARCI ́A, Illinois 

CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts 

MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington 

TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana 

PATRICK RYAN, New York 

MARY SATTLER PELTOLA, Alaska 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

VAL T. HOYLE, Oregon 

EMILIA STRONG SYKES, Ohio 

HILLARY J. SCHOLTEN, Michigan 

VALERIE P. FOUSHEE, North Carolina 

CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO, Pennsylvania 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

DINA TITUS, Nevada, Ranking Member 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

JENNIFFER GONZA ́LEZ-COLO ́ N, 

Puerto Rico 

LORI CHAVEZ-DEREMER, Oregon, 

Vice Chairman 

ANTHONY D’ESPOSITO, New York 

DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin 

MIKE EZELL, Mississippi 

CELESTE MALOY, Utah 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio) 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, 

District of Columbia 

SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, 

Vice Ranking Member 

TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JARED HUFFMAN, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington (Ex Officio) 
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CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... v 

STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE 

Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic Development, 

Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, opening statement .............. 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from the State of Nevada, 

and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 

Buildings, and Emergency Management, opening statement .......................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, opening statement ....................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

WITNESSES 

David Marroni, Director, Physical Infrastructure Team, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, oral statement ................................................................. 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Richard K. Cline, Director, Federal Protective Service, Management Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, oral statement ...................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, U.S. General Services 

Administration, oral statement ........................................................................... 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Post-Hearing Response to Hon. Garret Graves’ Request for Information from 

Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, U.S. General Services Administration .............................................................................................. 48 

APPENDIX 

Questions to Richard K. Cline, Director, Federal Protective Service, Management Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, from Hon. Scott 

Perry ...................................................................................................................... 51 

Questions to Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, U.S. 

General Services Administration, from Hon. Scott Perry ................................. 56 

(v) 

1 NAT’L ARCHIVES, General Records of the Federal Works Agency, (July 2024), available at 

https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/162.html#:∼:text=History%3A 

%20FWA%20established%201939%20to,FEAPW)%3B%20the%20WPA%3B%20and. 2SHAWN REESE, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (RS22706), THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE AND CONTRACT SECURITY GUARDS: A STATUTORY HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS, (Aug. 20, 2009), available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS22706/15. 3GSA, Who We Are, (July 2024), available at https://disposal.gsa.gov/s/whoweare. 

JULY 19, 2024 

SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER 

TO: Members, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, 

and Emergency Management 

FROM: Staff, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and 

Emergency Management 

RE: Subcommittee Hearing on ‘‘Examining the Effectiveness of the Federal 

Protective Service: Are Federal Buildings Secure?’’ 

I. PURPOSE 

The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency 

Management of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will meet on 

Tuesday, July 23, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. ET in 2167 of the Rayburn House Office 

Building to receive testimony at a hearing entitled, ‘‘Examining the Effectiveness of 

the Federal Protective Service: Are Federal Buildings Secure?’’ The purpose of the 

hearing is to examine the Federal Protective Service’s (FPS) protection of Federal 

buildings, focusing on a United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

study which will be released at the hearing. Members will receive testimony from 

the United States General Services Administration (GSA), the FPS, and the GAO. 

II. BACKGROUND 

THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

FPS authority to protect Federal buildings can be traced back to the Federal 

Works Agency (FWA), an agency that was established under President Franklin 

Roosevelt with the purpose of consolidating the functions of other agencies dealing 

with public works into one organization.1 In 1948, Congress authorized the FWA to 

appoint uniformed guards to police public buildings.2 The FWA was dissolved in 

1949, with all of its responsibilities then being integrated into GSA, an agency 

founded that same year through the Federal Property and Administrative Services 

Act (P.L. 81–152) to take over all real property authorities in the Federal Government.3 GSA continued carrying out the same responsibilities held by the FWA until 

1961 when Congress authorized the GSA Administrator to appoint non-uniformed 

guards, in addition to the already-serving uniformed guards, to conduct investigations, enforce Federal law, and make arrests without a warrant for offenses com-
vi 

4SHAWN REESE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., (RS22706), THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE AND CON- TRACT SECURITY GUARDS: A STATUTORY HISTORY AND AURRENT STATUS, (Aug. 20, 2009), available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS22706/15. 5DHS, FPS, Who We Are, (last updated June 17, 2024), available at https://www.dhs.gov/whowe-are. 6 Id. 

7 Id. 

8FPS, FY 2025 BUDGET IN BRIEF, (2024), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 

2024-03/2024l0311lfyl2025lbudgetlinlbrief.pdf. 9GAO, GAO–21–311R, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: PROJECTED OUTCOMES OF THE NEW

FEE STRUCTURE ON TENANT AGENCIES’ COSTS (2021), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/ 

gao-21-311r.pdf. 10FPS, FY 2025 BUDGET IN BRIEF (2024), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 

2024-03/2024l0311lfyl2025lbudgetlinlbrief.pdf. 11DHS, FPS, Operations, (last updated June 17, 2024), available at https://www.dhs.gov/fpsoperations. 12 E-mail from FPS Congressional Affairs to Staff, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure 

(Apr. 24, 2024, 10:22 a.m. EST) (on file with Comm.). 13 Id. 14 Examining the Security of Federal Facilities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 118th Cong. (Nov. 29, 2023) (statement of Richard K. Cline, 

Director, FPS). 15See Michael Brick, Man Crashes Plane Into Texas I.R.S. Office, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2010), 

available at https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19crash.htm; FBI, Oklahoma City Bombing, (July 2, 2024), available at https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing; Andrew Welsh-Huggins & Patrick Orsagos, Man who tried to breach FBI office killed after standoff, AP, (Aug. 11, 2022), available at https://apnews.com/article/fbi-cincinnati-armed-manb4701596a0eb9770e3b29e95328f5704. 16SHAWN REESE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., (R43570), FEDERAL BUILDING AND FACILITY SECURITY: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, (last updated Mar. 6, 2017), available at https:// 

crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43570/10. 17 Andrew Welsh-Huggins & Patrick Orsagos, Man who tried to breach FBI office killed after 

standoff, AP, (Aug. 11, 2022), available at https://apnews.com/article/fbi-cincinnati-armed-manb4701596a0eb9770e3b29e95328f5704; see also Associated Press, Woman taken into custody after 

armed standoff at FBI building in Seattle, authorities say, AP, (June 12, 2024), available at 

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/woman-taken-into-custody-after-armed-standoff-at-fbibuilding-in-seattle-authorities-say; Ryan Young et. al., Police ID suspect after vehicle crashes into 

gate at the Atlanta FBI field office, CNN, (Apr 2, 2024), available at https://www.cnn.com/2024/ 

04/01/us/vehicle-rams-gates-of-fbi-field-office-in-atlanta/index.html. 

mitted on Federal property.4 These law enforcement responsibilities came together 

in 1971, when GSA formally established the FPS as a Federal law enforcement 

agency to encompass those responsibilities and authorities.5 Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107–296) 

FPS was transferred to the then newly created Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS).6 Currently, FPS is housed within the DHS Management Directorate, but the 

agency was previously housed under both the National Protection and Programs Directorate and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.7

FPS is responsible for the protection and security of approximately 9,000 GSA 

leased and owned facilities, divided into 11 regions Nationwide.8 FPS is entirely 

funded by the fees it charges to its customer agencies (GSA and tenant agencies) 

for the utilization of FPS services.9 The estimated budget for FPS for Fiscal Year 

(FY) 2024 is $2.2 billion.10 FPS has more than 1,300 employees, including Law Enforcement Officers, Security Specialists, Special Agents, and Mission Support 

Staff.11 However, FPS has only 881 law enforcement positions filled, despite a total 

authorized number of 1,140.12 FPS additionally oversees more than 15,000 contract 

guards or Protective Security Officers (PSOs).13

FPS’ role in protecting Federal buildings is not limited to providing a uniformed 

presence in those buildings, but also includes maintaining and managing the contracts with companies employing the contract guards for Federal facilities, conducting risk assessments of buildings, and providing recommendations to GSA and 

tenant agencies on any security improvements needed for particular buildings.14

RECENT INCIDENTS AT FEDERAL BUILDINGS

Federal buildings have long faced a variety of threats, ranging from planes being 

crashed into them, to car bombings, to attempted and active shooters.15 It is the 

duty of FPS officers and PSOs to intercept these threats to protect the safety of Federal employees and the public.16 Recently, FBI field offices have faced several attempted breaches, including an incident in August of 2022, when PSOs contracted 

by FPS prevented an armed man from breaching the Federal Bureau of Investigation office located in Cincinnati, Ohio.17 The man would be later shot and killed by 
vii 

18 Id. 19WABI News Desk, Man shot after entering Augusta federal building with knife and physically assaulting guard, FBI says, WABI5, (Apr. 20, 2022), available at https://www.wabi.tv/ 

2022/04/20/police-presence-augusta-post-office/. 20 Id. 21FPS INCIDENTS REPORT, FPS, (July 21, 2020), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 

files/2024-02/24l0202lfps-incidentlreports.pdf. 22 Id. 23The Latest Man who fired at Texas courthouse just graduated, AP, (June 17, 2019), available 

at https://apnews.com/article/14fea70091344c74b328557e3bf474fb. 

24 Examining the Security of Federal Facilities: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 118th Cong. (Nov. 29, 2023) (statement of Richard K. Cline, 

Director, FPS). 25Press Release, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Two Defendants Charged with Murder and Aiding and 

Abetting in Slaying of Federal Protective Service Officer at Oakland Courthouse Building, (June 

16, 2020), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-defendants-charged-murder-and-aiding-and-abetting-slaying-federal-protective-service. 26GAO, GAO–10–341, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE’S CONTRACT GUARD PROGRAM REQUIRES

MORE OVERSIGHT AND REASSESSMENT OF USE OF CONTRACT GUARDS (2010), available at https:// 

www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-341.pdf. 27 Id. 28 Briefing from Staff, GAO, to Staff, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (June 5, 2024, 

11:00 a.m. EST). 

non-FPS police officers after engaging in a violent shootout with the officers.18 Prior 

to this incident, FPS has been involved in addressing a variety of violent attacks 

directed at Federal buildings, and in just the past five years, these attacks include: 

• On April 20, 2022, a man armed with a knife entered the Edmund S. Muskie 

Federal Building in Augusta, Maine, and assaulted a guard employed by FPS.19

The man was subsequently shot by another FPS guard who was on duty in the 

building.20

• On July 21, 2020, FPS officers defended and protected the Federal Courthouse 

located at 100 SE 3rd Ave. in Portland, Oregon.21 At the time, numerous violent 

protesters were attempting to attack and enter the building, using methods including striking officers with blunt objects and setting off fireworks in the vicinity of the entrance.22

• On June 17, 2019, a man opened fire outside the Earle Cabell Federal Building 

in Dallas, Texas was shot and killed in an exchange of gunfire with FPS officers 

who responded to the incident.23

Due to the nature of their mission, FPS officers and PSOs are constantly putting 

their lives at risk to protect Federal property, with seven sworn FPS officers and 

three PSOs having died in the performance of their duties throughout FPS’ history.24 The most recent death in the line of duty occurred in May of 2020, when 

David Patrick Underwood, a PSO contract officer, was shot and killed by an assailant while protecting the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building and United States 

Courthouse in Oakland, California.25

III. CHALLENGES FACING THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE 

Over the years, GAO has conducted a number of investigations and issued a series of reports that identified key challenges and problems with respect to the FPS. 

Key problems that those reports have identified are: 

• Fake bomb components, knives, and guns were secreted past security in a number of cases. Penetration testing conducted by the GAO and the FPS revealed 

serious deficiencies in building security.26

• FPS has struggled to ensure that contract guards have the training they need, 

including active shooter training. FPS’ paper-based system for auditing the required certifications and training records of contract guards resulted in a lack 

of quality control over whether guards were qualified and trained to protect 

Federal buildings.27

• The systems FPS uses to track its contract guards have faced significant challenges. Some Federal tenant agencies have been forced to temporarily close 

their offices because of a lack of guard coverage.28
viii 

29GAO, GAO–23–105361, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: MORE COLLABORATION ON HIRING

AND ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE INFORMATION NEEDED (2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/ 

assets/d23105361.pdf. 30GAO, GAO–23–105649, FEDERAL FACILITIES: IMPROVED OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED FOR SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS (2023), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/820/819849.pdf. 31GAO, GAO–12–434, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: BETTER DATA ON FACILITY JURISDICTIONS NEEDED TO ENHANCE COLLABORATION WITH STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (2012), 

available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-434.pdf. 32GAO, GAO–22–106177, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: MANY APPROVED SECURITY REC- OMMENDATIONS WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED AND PRELIMINARY WORK SUGGESTS LAW ENFORCE- MENT DEPLOYMENTS HAVE INCREASED (2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/ 

d23105361.pdf. 33Letter from Rep. Scott Perry, Subcommittee Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, et. al. to Kris Cline, Director, FPS, (Mar. 6, 2024) (on file with Comm.); Letter from 

Rep. Scott Perry, Subcommittee Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, et. al. to 

the Honorable Robin Carnahan, Administrator, GSA, (Mar. 6, 2024) (on file with Comm.). 34 Id. 35 Id. 36Letter from Kris Cline, Director, FPS to Rep. Scott Perry, Subcommittee Chairman, H. 

Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, et. al. (May 29, 2024) (on file with Comm.). 37 Id. 38 Id. 39Letter from Peter DeFazio, Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, et. al. to 

Gene Dodaro, Comptroller General, GAO, (Aug. 18, 2022) (on file with Comm.). 40 Briefing from Staff, GAO, to Staff, H. Comm. On Transp. and Infrastructure (June 5, 2024, 

11:00 a.m. EST). 

• FPS has historically faced challenges in managing its human capital. In 2019, 

FPS was moved under DHS’ Management Directorate to address some of those 

concerns; however, FPS has continued to face staffing shortages.29

• Facility security assessments used to evaluate the vulnerabilities at Federal facilities are often ignored. Additionally, the tenant agencies are not held accountable for failing to implement FPS’ recommended security measures.30

• Agreements and partnerships with local law enforcement to respond to incidents 

on Federal property were lacking. State and local law enforcement agencies, 

which may be called to respond to a Federal building, often were not aware 

whether they could even respond to and enter a Federal building.31

• FPS Law Enforcement Officers (LROs) are spread too thin, and FPS’s non-core 

responsibilities have increased. LRO’s have been increasingly deployed to protect 

Federal facilities during protests. Additionally, LRO’s have also been called on 

to assist DHS with activities not related to FPS’s core mission.32

IV. RECENT COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT OVER THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE 

SERVICE 

On March 6, 2024, Subcommittee Chairman Perry, along with Subcommittee 

Members Chavez-DeRemer and Ezell, sent letters to the Director of FPS and the 

GSA Administrator.33 The letters outlined how in recent years, ‘‘the rise in crime, 

drug abuse, and homelessness has created further challenges to the protection of 

Federal buildings and the safety of those that work and visit them.’’ 34 The letter 

also raises concern with regard to how increasing crime rates may be creating more 

empty and unused Federal building space.35 On May 29, 2024, FPS provided an interim response to the letter.36 According to FPS, from 2019 to March 21, 2024, there 

have been 6,929 arrests/citations related to crimes in or around Federal buildings 

or involving Federal workers or visitors to Federal buildings, with 964 of those arrests consisting of assaults.37 In FY 2023, compared to FY 2022, FPS experienced 

a 138 percent increase in demonstrations at Federal properties, an 84 percent increase in violations of building rules and regulations, an overall 24 percent increase 

in assault on government employees, and a 13 percent increase in the number of 

inappropriate communications directed towards government employees.38 To date, 

FPS and GSA have provided responses that are not complete responses to the letters. 

V. GAO’S RECENT EXAMINATION OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE 

In the 117th Congress, the Committee requested that GAO conduct a review of 

the physical security of Federal buildings guarded by FPS.39 At this Subcommittee 

hearing, GAO will release the findings of that report. GAO focused on two key 

areas: (1) how effective are the PSOs in detecting prohibited items, and (2) how FPS 

has used data systems to improve oversight of the PSOs.40 GAO focused on building 
ix 

41 Id. 42 Id. 43 Id. 44 Id. 45 Id. 46 Id. 47 Id. 48 Id. 

with public-facing activities.41 GAO found some improvement in FPS’s ability to detect prohibited items including knives, batons, and pepper spray.42 To test this, 

GAO conducted 27 instances of covert testing and reviewed the covert testing done 

by FPS that included improvised explosive device (IED) components and firearms.43

Both sets of results aligned with an average detection 50 percent of the time.44 The 

poorest results were in Washington, D.C.45 GAO noted some improvement since the 

last covert testing in 2009.46

Lastly, the GAO report also found that despite an investment of nearly $30 million in new tracking and management systems, FPS still has no meaningful way 

to monitor if a guard is not at post or has completed needed certifications and training—it remains largely paper-based.47 This lack of tracking has raised specific concerns with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which at times had to close 30 of 

their tax centers because an FPS guard failed to report to their post.48

VI. CONCLUSION 

While FPS has made some improvements in detecting prohibited items like knives 

and pepper spray during covert testing, significant challenges still remain with 

FPS’s protection of Federal buildings. Most notably, despite spending millions of dollars on new electronic tracking and management systems, the majority of tracking 

is still paper-based. This lack of effective tracking has only exacerbated the existing 

staffing shortage within the FPS and contract workforce. In short, the findings of 

the recent GAO report leave significant room for improvement for FPS. 

VII. WITNESSES 

• Mr. David Marroni, Director, Physical Infrastructure, United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

• Mr. Richard ‘‘Kris’’ Cline, Director, Federal Protective Service, United States 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

• Mr. Elliot Doomes, Public Buildings Service Commissioner, United States General Services Administration (GSA) 

(1) 

EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 

FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: ARE FEDERAL BUILDINGS SECURE? 

TUESDAY, JULY 23, 2024 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC

BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2167 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry (Chairman of the 

subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. PERRY. The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 

Buildings, and Emergency Management will come to order. 

The Chair asks unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to declare a recess at any time during today’s hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

The Chair also asks unanimous consent that Members not on the 

subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at today’s 

hearing and ask questions. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

As a reminder, if Members wish to insert a document into the 

record, please also email it to DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for the purposes of an opening 

statement for 5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

Mr. PERRY. Before I begin, I first want to thank the dedicated 

personnel of the Federal Protective Service who work to protect 

Federal workers and visitors to Federal facilities across our great 

country. Over the years, there have been FPS law enforcement and 

contract guards who have made the ultimate sacrifice to protect 

workers and visitors in Federal buildings. 

Since 2019, there have been nearly 1,000—1,000—assaults at 

Federal facilities and nearly 7,000 arrests. Because of this, it is 

critically important that the FPS law enforcement officers and the 

thousands of contract guards known as protective service officers, 

or PSOs, have what they need to do and complete their job. Given 

the importance of this issue, the committee requested that GAO re-
2 

view building security and, more specifically, conduct covert tests 

similar to the work done by GAO in 2009. 

Today’s hearing will examine the findings of GAO’s work and the 

current state of protection of our Nation’s Federal buildings. 

FPS officers, along with more than 14,000 PSOs, are responsible 

for the protection of and the security at approximately 9,000 facilities, the majority of which are owned or managed by GSA. FPS law 

enforcement officers manage the PSOs, ensure they are properly 

trained, are at their post, and respond when needed to any incident. However, there have been ongoing challenges that impact the 

ability of law enforcement to do their jobs. 

Recently, there have been increasing rates of crime, drug use, 

and homelessness across the country that are impacting the safety 

of those who work and visit Federal facilities. For example, the 

United States Department of Health and Human Services office in 

San Francisco advised some Federal employees to work from home 

in light of conditions at the Federal building. 

Earlier this year, Representatives Chavez-DeRemer, Ezell, and I 

sent letters to the Director of FPS and the GSA Administrator to 

assess how the increasing levels of crime, drug abuse, and homelessness have impacted the protection of Federal buildings and the 

safety of those that work and visit them. The letter also raised concerns regarding how increasing crime rates may be leading to more 

empty and unused Federal building space. This is all happening 

while FPS is understaffed, with 259 law enforcement positions currently left unfilled. 

Additionally, in its recent work, GAO revealed that while there 

has been some improvement since building security testing in 2009, 

the success rate in identifying prohibited items, on average, is only 

50 percent. I think we can do better. 

Compounding these challenges, the tools FPS needs to effectively 

manage the PSOs don’t work. As GAO found in their latest report, 

the new data systems used by FPS law enforcement to oversee 

their contract guards or PSOs have significant flaws. Despite 

spending nearly $30 million of taxpayer funds on new electronic 

systems, FPS struggles to know if a guard is at their post or not, 

or if that guard even has the qualifications needed to detect dangerous weapons. This lack of reliable data tracking has raised concerns with customer agencies like the Internal Revenue Service 

and the Social Security Administration. 

And further, this lack of reliability has impacted the accessibility 

of services to the taxpayer. The idea that the IRS had to close 30— 

30—of their Taxpayer Assistance Centers and the SSA closed over 

500 locations for full days because a contract guard failed to report 

to their post is absolutely, completely unacceptable. 

The GAO has issued report after report for years now on many 

of these issues, yet FPS has not yet resolved them. I look forward 

to hearing from our witnesses today on these issues and thank for 

them for being here. 

[Mr. Perry’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 
3 

†https://transportation.house.gov/components/redirect/r.aspx?ID=484010-71706684 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress 

from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management 

Before I begin, I first want to thank the dedicated personnel of the Federal Protective Service (FPS), who work to protect federal workers and visitors to federal 

facilities across our country. Over the years there have been FPS law enforcement 

and contract guards who have made the ultimate sacrifice to protect workers and 

visitors in federal buildings. 

Since 2019, there have been nearly 1,000 assaults at federal facilities and nearly 

7,000 arrests. Because of this, it is critically important that the FPS law enforcement officers and the thousands of contract guards, known as Protective Service Officers or ‘‘PSOs’’, have what they need to do their job. Given the importance of this 

issue, the Committee requested that GAO review building security and, more specifically, conduct covert tests similar to the work done by GAO in 2009. 

Today’s hearing will examine the findings of GAO’s work and the current state 

of FPS’ protection of our nation’s federal buildings. 

FPS officers, along with more than 14,000 PSOs, are responsible for the protection 

of and security at approximately 9,000 facilities, the majority of which are owned 

or managed by GSA. FPS law enforcement officers manage the PSOs, ensure they 

are properly trained, are at their post, and respond when needed to any incident. 

However, there have been ongoing challenges that impact the ability of FPS law enforcement to do their jobs. 

Recently, there have been increasing rates of crime, drug use, and homelessness 

across the country that are impacting the safety of those who work and visit federal 

facilities. For example, the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ office in San Francisco advised some federal employees to work from home ‘‘in 

light of the conditions at the federal building.’’ 

Earlier this year, Representatives Chavez-DeRemer, Ezell, and I sent letters to 

the Director of FPS and the GSA Administrator † to assess how the increasing levels 

of crime, drug abuse, and homelessness have impacted the protection of federal 

buildings and the safety of those that work and visit them. The letters also raised 

concerns regarding how increasing crime rates may be leading to more empty and 

unused federal building space. This is all happening while FPS is understaffed with 

259 law enforcement positions left unfilled. 

Additionally, in its recent work, GAO revealed that while there has been some 

improvement since building security testing in 2009, the success rate in identifying 

prohibited items on average is only 50 percent. 

Compounding these challenges, the tools FPS needs to effectively manage the 

PSOs don’t work. As GAO found in their latest report, the new data systems used 

by FPS law enforcement to oversee their contract guards or PSOs have significant 

flaws. Despite spending nearly $30 million of taxpayer funds on new electronic systems, FPS struggles to know if a guard is at their post or not, or if that guard even 

has the qualifications needed to detect dangerous weapons. This lack of reliable data 

tracking has raised concerns with customer agencies like the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA), and further this lack of reliability has impacted the accessibility of services to the taxpayer. The idea that the 

IRS had to close 30 of their Taxpayer Assistance Centers and the SSA closed over 

500 locations for full days because a contract guard failed to report to their post is 

unacceptable. 

GAO has issued report after report for years now on many of these issues, yet 

FPS has not yet resolved them. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today 

on these issues and thank them for being here. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair now recognizes the ranking member, Ms. 

Titus, for 5 minutes for her opening statement. 
4 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DINA TITUS OF NEVADA, 

RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this 

important hearing. Thank you to our witnesses. Some are very familiar. They have been here before, and they always provide us 

with excellent information in a very professional way. 

It is very important to talk about the Federal Protective Service 

and all that they do to keep us safe in our Federal buildings, especially important in my district in Las Vegas, where we had the 

shooting at the Lloyd George Federal Courthouse. That was a number of years ago, but a security guard was killed there, and we 

never forget that. 

As the chairman said, you all are tasked with protecting more 

than 9,000 owned and leased facilities, and responsible for keeping 

those workplaces safe for people who work there, people who are 

contractors, people who come and visit, or who conduct business 

with those Government agencies. So, ensuring that you have the 

resources you need to keep people and property safe and secure 

while you are facing a wider range and growing number of threats 

is really critical to keeping our Government functioning and serving the public. 

In recent history, we have seen dangerous situations and threats 

posed to our Federal buildings. These have included plane crashes, 

car bombings, active shooters, you name it. It has practically happened there in a Federal building, and you need to be prepared to 

address any of these situations and more. 

Currently, DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 

Agency—CISA—heads the Interagency Security Committee which 

sets those standards that need to be met by our Federal facilities. 

And based on these standards, then the FPS can identify risks and 

recommend actions to mitigate those risks, including additional resources you might need such as screening equipment and security 

cameras. 

Among my many concerns is that, even though the FPS has sent 

thousands of these assessments to Federal agencies, many of their 

recommendations have just been ignored, and it is apparent that 

there are a number of vulnerabilities that could have been, but 

need to be, addressed. 

In reading the testimony of Mr. Marroni, I found it shocking to 

know that when the GAO conducted covert tests to test some of 

these vulnerabilities, FPS contract guards were unable to detect 

weapons ranging from batons to multipurpose tools with knives in 

half of the tests. Half of the tests. And what is more concerning is 

then when the FPS conducted its own covert testing, this time with 

firearms and components for making explosive devices, the detection rate was almost the same. So, this is just unacceptable and not 

good for anybody involved. 

I appreciate very much the work of the FPS and its contractors, 

and the potential harms that they face every day because they are 

on the front line. But these exposures have to be addressed, and 

that is why I am interested in hearing from you all just what the 

extent of the problem is, how we can address it, what resources you 
5 

might need, and what changes in policy we should perhaps put forward. So, thank you for joining us, and I look forward to the hearing. 

[Ms. Titus’ prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Nevada, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 

Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today to 

discuss the state of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the security of our federal buildings. 

As the law enforcement agency tasked with protecting the more than 9,000 GSA 

owned and leased facilities, the FPS is responsible for keeping these workplaces safe 

for the thousands of federal employees and citizens who visit every day. 

Ensuring the FPS has the resources it needs to keep people and property secure, 

while facing a wide range of threats, is critical to keeping our government functioning. 

In recent history, we have seen the dangerous situations and threats posed to federal buildings including plane crashes, car bombings and active shooters, and the 

FPS needs to be prepared to address any of these situations and more. 

Currently, DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) heads 

the Interagency Security Committee which sets the security standards that need to 

be met by federal facilities. Based on these standards, the FPS can identify risks 

and recommend actions to mitigate those risks, including through additional resources such as screening equipment and security cameras. 

Among my many concerns is that even though the FPS has sent thousands of 

these assessments to federal agencies, many of their recommendations are ignored, 

and it’s apparent that as a result there are numerous vulnerabilities that need to 

be addressed. 

In reading the testimony of Mr. Marroni, it is shocking to know that when GAO 

conducted covert tests to test some of these security vulnerabilities, FSP contract 

guards were unable to detect weapons ranging from batons to multipurpose tools 

with knives in half of the tests. What’s more concerning is that when the FPS conducted its own covert testing, this time with firearms and components for making 

improvised explosive devices, the detection rate was almost identical. 

I appreciate the work of the FPS and its contractors, and the potential harms they 

face every day, but these exposures are unacceptable which is why I look forward 

to today’s hearing so we can learn more on the extent of the problem and where 

changes should be made. 

I thank the witnesses for joining us today, and I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Larsen, for 

5 minutes for an opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Thank you, subcommittee Chair 

Perry and subcommittee Ranking Member Titus, for calling today’s 

hearing on Federal buildings. I want to thank our witnesses today. 

Commissioner and Director, I appreciate you once again making 

time to discuss Federal facility issues with the subcommittee. And 

Director Cline, I recognize you have very heavy demands on your 

time and attention, so, I appreciate your participation, as well. 

Prior to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in 

Oklahoma City, the Federal Government had no established approach to security for federally owned or leased facilities. Immediately following the bombing, President Clinton directed the DOJ 
6 

to assess the vulnerability of Federal facilities to terrorist attacks 

and to develop recommendations for minimum security standards. 

Despite agencywide coordination and the establishment of the 

Interagency Security Committee process, the ISC process, Federal 

facility security has remained on the Government Accountability 

Office’s high-risk list for the past 21 years. 

In 2022, a GAO study found that from 2017 through 2021, FPS 

made more than 25,000 security recommendations at nearly 5,000 

Federal facilities. So, while Facility Security Committees approved 

27 percent of those recommended countermeasures, most of those 

countermeasures were not implemented. 

The FPS has other significant challenges. Hiring and retaining 

law enforcement staff has been difficult. IT systems developed specifically to track and to verify guard training and certifications are 

not reliable. Entry access points are not always staffed, and GAO’s 

covert testing program has found that contract guards did not consistently detect prohibited items when screening bags. 

Also of concern is a heightened risk of political protests at Federal facilities around the country and the use of drones near Federal facilities and high-profile public events. 

So, this hearing is taking place at a particularly important time 

of political and social unease, and I hope today’s witnesses will 

share their ideas for improving the security of Federal buildings 

and the safety of the employees who work there. 

And with that, I want to thank the chair and yield back. 

[Mr. Larsen of Washington’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure 

Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Perry and Subcommittee Ranking Member 

Titus, for calling today’s hearing on the security of federal buildings. 

Thank you, also, to our witnesses. Commissioner Doomes and Director Marroni, 

I appreciate you once again making time to discuss federal facility issues with the 

Subcommittee. Commissioner Cline, I recognize that you currently have heavy demands on your time and attention, so I appreciate your participation today. 

Prior to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, 

the federal government had no established approach to security for federally owned 

or leased facilities. 

Immediately following the bombing, President Clinton directed the Department of 

Justice to assess the vulnerability of federal facilities to terrorist attacks and to develop recommendations for minimum security standards. 

Despite agency-wide coordination and the establishment of the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) process, federal facility security has remained on the Government Accountability Office’s High-Risk list for the past 21 years. 

In 2022, a GAO study found that from 2017 through 2021 FPS made more than 

25,000 security recommendations at nearly 5,000 federal facilities. While facility security committees approved 27 percent of the FPS recommended countermeasures, 

most of those countermeasures were not implemented. 

The FPS has other significant challenges. Hiring and retaining law enforcement 

staff has been difficult. IT systems developed specifically to track and verify contract 

guard training and certifications are not reliable. 

Entry access points are not always staffed, and GAO’s covert testing program has 

found that contract guards did not consistently detect prohibited items when screening bags. 

Also of concern is a heightened risk of political protests at federal facilities around 

the country and the use of drones near federal facilities and at high profile public 

events. 
7 

This hearing is taking place at a particularly important time of political and social 

unease. 

I hope today’s witnesses will share their ideas for improving the security of federal buildings and the safety of the employees who work there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentleman. I now welcome our 

witnesses and thank them for taking the time to be here today, 

some of you more familiar than others, but I am still going to go 

through the process of explaining our lighting system to our witnesses, maybe for the benefit of everybody else here. 

There are three lights in front of you. Green means go, yellow 

means you are running out of time, and red means please conclude 

your remarks. 

The Chair asks unanimous consent that the witnesses’ full statements be included in the record. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record of today’s 

hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in 

writing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record remain 

open for 15 days for any additional comments and information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today’s hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

As your written testimony has been made part of the record, the 

subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes. 

With that, Mr. Marroni, you are recognized for 5 minutes for 

your testimony, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID MARRONI, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; RICHARD K. CLINE, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL 

PROTECTIVE SERVICE, MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND ELLIOT 

DOOMES, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE, U.S. 

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID MARRONI, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. MARRONI. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member 

Titus, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here 

today to discuss FPS’s efforts to secure about 9,000 Federal facilities and oversee the more than 13,000 contract guards who protect 

those buildings and their occupants nationwide. 

The security of Federal facilities has been a longstanding area of 

concern. Our work has highlighted several persistent challenges 

over the years. In particular, we have identified weaknesses in how 

contract guards detect and prevent prohibited items from entering 

Federal buildings. We have also identified significant and ongoing 

problems with the data systems FPS uses to oversee its security 

program. These challenges are a key reason that Federal real prop-
8 

erty management remains on GAO’s high-risk list after more than 

20 years. 

Continuing threats to Federal facilities make it absolutely critical for FPS to successfully resolve these issues. Doing so will best 

ensure that the men and women who protect these buildings have 

the training and tools they need to carry out their mission. 

At this committee’s request, we have been reviewing how FPS is 

doing in addressing some of these persistent challenges. We focused 

on two areas: first, how effective contract guards are at detecting 

prohibited items; and whether FPS data systems have improved 

agency oversight of its contract guard program. While our final report will not come out until the fall, the bottom line is clear: FPS 

continues to face significant challenges on both fronts. 

In terms of detecting prohibited items, our investigators conducted 27 covert tests at 14 Federal buildings earlier this year. 

During those tests, they attempted to bring bags into the buildings 

with prohibited items like pepper spray, batons, and a multipurpose tool with a knife. The FPS contract guards detected those prohibited items about half of the time. However, the other half of the 

time the items got through. 

While we only did a small number of tests, our results are consistent with the results of FPS’s own more extensive covert testing 

program. These results are cause for concern. To FPS’s credit, they 

have several reform efforts underway that aim to improve the detection of prohibited items. For example, FPS is redesigning the 

initial training course for contract guards, and it is also working 

to identify common causes of covert test failures to better target potential remedies. These are positive steps. However, continued attention and sustained action in this area will be important. 

As for the data systems FPS uses to oversee its contract guard 

program, we found significant problems that continue what has 

been a very longstanding challenge for the agency. For example, 

FPS’s Post Tracking System, which is meant to be the system of 

record for ensuring that every post is staffed by a qualified guard, 

was initially piloted in 2018. However, after 6 years, it has yet to 

be fully implemented in any region. As a result, FPS still requires 

contractors to use an old, paper-based system for billing and guard 

verification, which creates double work. 

Moreover, the system continues to have significant technology, 

data reliability, and interoperability problems, and has not delivered on its promised capabilities. The stubborn and ongoing problems with this and other FPS data systems undermine the agency’s 

productivity and its oversight of contract guards. 

In conclusion, the security of Federal facilities remains a highrisk area. FPS and the contract guards it oversees play an essential role in ensuring the safety of those who work in and visit Federal buildings. If the persistent challenges I have described today 

are to be resolved, FPS will need to pay sustained attention to 

these issues and take deliberate action. By doing so, the agency 

will be able to best ensure the security of FPS protected facilities 

going forward. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. I will be 

happy to take any questions you may have. 

[Mr. Marroni’s prepared statement follows:] 
f 

9 

Prepared Statement of David Marroni, Director, Physical Infrastructure 

Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office 

FEDERAL FACILITY SECURITY: PRELIMINARY RESULTS SHOW THAT CHALLENGES

REMAIN IN GUARD PERFORMANCE AND OVERSIGHT

HIGHLIGHTS

Why GAO Did This Study 

Federal real property has been on GAO’s High-Risk List since 2003, in part due 

to threats to federal facilities. Past attacks on federal buildings demonstrate that 

the security of federal facilities remains a high-risk area. FPS, within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for protecting thousands of federal facilities. FPS employs contract guards at 2,500 federal facilities at a cost of almost $1.7 

billion in fiscal year 2024. 

This testimony discusses the preliminary results of an ongoing GAO review that 

focuses on (1) how effective FPS contract guards are at detecting prohibited items 

and FPS’s efforts to improve detection, and (2) stakeholders’ views on whether FPS 

data systems have improved oversight of the contract guard program. 

To determine the effectiveness of FPS guards in detecting prohibited items, GAO 

conducted 27 covert tests at a nongeneralizable sample of 14 federal facilities and 

analyzed data from FPS’s covert tests. To obtain stakeholders’ views on FPS’s data 

systems, GAO reviewed information on the systems and interviewed stakeholders, 

including FPS officials, federal tenants, guard unions, and security guard companies. 

GAO provided a draft of this statement to FPS. FPS determined that some information was law enforcement sensitive. We withheld that information from this 

statement and incorporated other comments as appropriate. GAO plans to complete 

its work and issue a report on these issues by the end of the year. 

What GAO Found 

To secure federal facilities and protect employees and visitors, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) manages and oversees more than 13,000 contract guards, whose 

duties include controlling facility access and screening visitors to detect prohibited 

items. To determine if FPS was effectively protecting federal facilities, GAO investigators conducted 27 covert tests at 14 selected federal buildings in early 2024. 

During these tests, GAO investigators had a prohibited item—a baton, pepper 

spray, or a multi-purpose tool with a knife—inside a bag that they attempted to 

bring into the building. FPS contract guards failed to detect prohibited items in 

about half of GAO’s tests. 

FPS conducts its own covert tests, the results of which were consistent with 

GAO’s tests. While FPS determined that the specifics of its testing program are law 

enforcement sensitive, FPS officials said they have several reform efforts underway 

to improve contract guards’ detection of prohibited items. Those efforts include (1) 

redesigning the initial training course for contract guards, (2) increasing on-the-job 

training, and (3) collecting covert testing data to identify common causes of covert 

test failures. 

Stakeholders identified data system challenges that undermine FPS’s productivity 

and oversight of contract guards. FPS developed data systems to improve oversight 

of the contract guard workforce in response to previous GAO recommendations. The 

Post Tracking System, initially piloted in 2018, was expected to be the system of 

record for ensuring that every post was staffed by a qualified guard for the correct 

time frames, but it has yet to be fully implemented in any region. In addition, stakeholders said the system continues to face technology, data reliability, and interoperability challenges and has not delivered the promised capabilities. This negatively 

affects the productivity of FPS’s oversight efforts, according to stakeholders. Some 

FPS officials also said they do not use the reports for billing the government because the data are inaccurate or incomplete. Consequently, even in areas that have 

deployed the system, FPS continues to use an old paper-based system for billing and 

oversight tasks. 

Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our work on security 

at Federal Protective Service (FPS) facilities, in two areas: (1) detection of prohibited items by the guards who work under contract with FPS, and (2) FPS’s oversight 
10 

1For the purposes of this statement, we call Protective Security Officers ‘‘contract guards.’’ 

2The Managing Federal Real Property area was added to GAO’s High-Risk List in 2003 and 

remained on the most recent update to the High-Risk list in 2023. See GAO, High-Risk Series: 

An Update, GAO–03–119 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003) and High-Risk Series: Efforts Made 

to Achieve Progress Need to Be Maintained and Expanded to Fully Address All Areas, GAO–23– 

106203 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2023). 3GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That 

Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities, GAO–08–914T (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 18, 

2008); GAO, Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Assess Risk and Better Manage Contact Guards at Federal Facilities, GAO–12–739 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2012); GAO, Federal 

Protective Service: More Collaboration on Hiring and Additional Performance Information Needed, GAO–23–105361 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2022); GAO, Federal Facilities: Continued Oversight of Security Recommendations Needed, GAO–24–107137 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 29, 2023). 4Prohibited items used in the covert tests met the specifications of prohibited items listed in 

the following federal standard, Interagency Security Committee, Items Prohibited in Federal Facilities, An Interagency Security Committee Standard, (Washington, D.C.: 2022). In some cases, 

we conducted multiple tests at the same facility, which means that the number of tests is larger 

than the number of facilities tested. We conducted multiple tests in all high-risk facilities, and 

in one low-risk facility, to test the ability of contract guards to detect different types of prohibited items. We attempted to smuggle one type of prohibited item during each test. 5 Interagency Security Committee, The Risk Management Process: An Interagency Security 

Committee Standard, (Washington, D.C.: 2021). The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), 

housed within DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, is responsible for developing federal security policies and standards to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security 

in, and protection of, civilian federal facilities. The ISC was established in 1995 under Executive 

Order 12977 to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security in and protection of federal 

of Protective Security Officers (i.e., contract guards).1 For 21 years, managing federal real property has remained on GAO’s High-Risk List, in part due to threats to 

federal facilities.2 Past attacks on federal facilities include the April 1995 bombing 

of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, in which 168 people 

died. More recent attacks—which were stopped by FPS contract guards—include a 

2019 shooting at a Dallas federal facility, a 2021 shooting at a Social Security Administration facility, and an armed attempt to breach security at the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cincinnati Field Office in 2022. 

FPS is within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is responsible for protecting about 9,000 federal facilities. FPS spent almost $1.7 billion on contract 

guards, which represented more than 76 percent of its budget, in fiscal year 2024. 

FPS officers and more than 13,000 contract guards control access to facilities, conduct access point screenings to detect prohibited items, and respond to safety and 

security emergencies. 

In our past work, we identified several challenges to the security of federal buildings. In covert tests conducted in 2009, we carried components of improvised explosive devices into federal facilities, undetected by FPS guards. In 2010, we reported 

that in FPS’s internal covert testing, FPS guards identified prohibited items in 18 

of 53 tests. We found these security vulnerabilities were potentially caused by insufficient training for guards and FPS’s failure to maintain a comprehensive system 

to ensure that guards were appropriately trained. Other challenges included staffing 

levels, human capital management, and inconsistent guidance about how and when 

guard inspections should be performed. We have made a number of recommendations to FPS to help address these issues, some of which FPS has implemented. 

Given the potential threats, it is imperative that FPS provides its more than 

13,000 contract guards the training they need to secure federal facilities and protect 

employees and visitors. However, we have identified guard training and oversight 

weaknesses since 2008.3

My testimony today provides our preliminary observations from our ongoing review of security at federal facilities and FPS oversight of contract guards. My statement focuses on (1) how effective FPS contract guards are at detecting certain types 

of prohibited items at selected federal facilities and FPS’s efforts to improve detection, and (2) stakeholders’ views on whether FPS data systems have improved oversight of the contract guard program. In reviewing a draft of this statement, FPS determined that some information was law enforcement sensitive. We withheld that 

information from this statement. In the coming months, we plan to finalize our review and issue a final report, which may include a restricted version. 

To determine how effectively FPS guards detected and excluded prohibited items 

from being brought into selected federal facilities, we conducted 27 covert tests by 

attempting to bring prohibited items (specifically, a knife, a baton, and pepper 

spray) into a nongeneralizable sample of 14 federal facilities.4 The Interagency Security Committee Standard for determining facility security levels outlines several 

factors facility managers should use, including the facility’s population and facility 

size. Facility security levels range from level 1 (lowest risk) to level 5 (highest risk).5
11 

facilities in the United States occupied by federal employees for nonmilitary activities. Executive 

Order 12977, Interagency Security Committee, 60 Fed. Reg. 54411 (Oct. 19, 1995), as amended 

by Executive Order 13286, Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions, in Connection 

With the Transfer of Certain Functions to the Secretary of Homeland Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 

10619 (March 5, 2003). Executive Order 14111, Interagency Security Committee, issued in November 2023 supersedes Executive Order 12977. Executive Order 14111, 88 Fed. Reg. 83809 

(Nov. 27, 2023). 6FPS is funded through fees it charges agencies for its services and does not receive a direct 

appropriation from the general fund of the Treasury. 7 In 2023, we recommended the Department Homeland Security improve its oversight ability 

to assess countermeasure implementation; GAO, Federal Facilities: Improved Oversight Needed 

for Security Recommendations, GAO–23–105649 (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2023). 8GAO–23–105361. 

9FPS charges federal agencies additional fees for agency and building specific services beyond 

basic security, such as contract guards and security patrols. 

These facilities had varying levels of security and screening procedures, in part because of their security level. We selected these federal facilities based on several factors, including public access, location, size, and the number of federal tenants in the 

facilities. 

We also analyzed FPS data from fiscal years 2020 to 2023 about the outcomes of 

FPS internal covert tests. We assessed the reliability of the data by reviewing FPS 

guidance and processes for safeguarding and checking the data for accuracy and 

completeness. When we found discrepancies such as missing data or data entry errors, we brought them to FPS’s attention and worked with FPS to correct the discrepancies before conducting our analyses. 

To collect stakeholders’ views on whether FPS data systems have helped address 

challenges with overseeing the contract guard program, we interviewed FPS officials, federal tenant agencies, unions, and security guard companies about system 

capabilities that support contract guard oversight. We also observed the operation 

of the systems and reviewed agency policies and guidance related to oversight efforts. Specifically, we reviewed FPS guidance and documentation on several data 

systems to determine their purpose and the information used by agency officials. 

The ongoing work on which this statement is based is being conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 

to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We conducted our related investigative work in accordance with investigation standards prescribed by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 

and Efficiency. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis 

for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

BACKGROUND

FPS Responsibilities 

FPS conducts physical security, law enforcement, and contract guard oversight activities at federal facilities across the country, a majority of which are under the 

custody or control of the General Services Administration (GSA).6

• Physical security activities. FPS develops individual facility security assessments to identify and assess threats to and vulnerabilities for about 9,000 facilities. FPS then recommends appropriate countermeasures, such as security 

equipment, to address those threats and vulnerabilities.7

• Law enforcement activities. FPS’s law enforcement activities include patrolling 

facilities, responding to incidents, conducting criminal investigations, and making arrests.8

Contract guard oversight. FPS manages and oversees contract guards for various federal agencies at roughly 2,500 of the overall facilities it protects.9 In its 

oversight role, FPS monitors vendor-provided training, manages the contracts 

of vendors who provide contract guards, and conducts other oversight activities, 

such as post visits and post inspections. For example, FPS officials review the 

operational readiness of contract guards at posts by conducting post visits, during which they evaluate the contract guard’s knowledge of post orders and operational readiness requirements. 
12 

10For fiscal year 2024, FPS was authorized for 1,692 positions, according to FPS officials. 11GAO–23–105361. 

Staffing 

In fiscal year 2024, FPS employed about 1,260 staff across 11 regional offices and 

headquarters.10 The FPS workforce consists of law enforcement and non-law enforcement staff (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Federal Protective Service Law Enforcement and Non-Law Enforcement Staff 

Law enforcement staff include inspectors and criminal investigators. Non-law enforcement staff provide business support such as staff training, contract management, human capital services, and information technology.11 Both types of FPS staff 

provide oversight to over 13,000 contract guards. 

The FPS Protective Security Operations Division is responsible for contract guard 

oversight. Figure 2 depicts staffing shortages among personnel who provide oversight to contract guards. 

Figure 2: Selected FPS Protective Security Operations Division Program Staffing 

Note: FPS officials said additional headquarters and regional officials also play a role in providing oversight 

of the contract guard workforce but are not depicted in the above graphic. 

FPS Inspectors, Contracting Officer Representatives (COR), and Business Operation Managers (BOM) are responsible for managing contract guards. Inspectors 

conduct monthly post inspections, Contracting Officer Representatives verify guard 

training and certification monthly, and Business Operation Managers oversee con-
13 

12 Business Operation Managers provide oversight and monitoring over COR programs for 

FPS regions including budget, financial planning, revenue management, and acquisition. 13GAO–23–105361. 14GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service’s Ability to 

Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, GAO–09–859T (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 8, 2009). 15GAO–12–739. 16GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service’s Contract Guard Program Requires 

More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contact Guards, GAO–10–341 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 13, 2010). 17GAO–12–739. 18GAO–12–739. 

tract administration.12 Contract guard vendors are responsible for training and documenting training and certifications in FPS systems. 

In 2022, we reported FPS employed roughly 1,300 staff for fiscal year 2021, which 

reflected a staffing shortage of 21 percent.13 FPS has 409 vacant positions, as of 

July 2024. 

Contract Guard Responsibilities 

Approximately 13,000 contract guards control access to about 2,500 federal facilities. Contract guards’ responsibilities include screening at access points to prevent 

the entry of prohibited items, such as weapons and explosives, and responding to 

emergencies involving facility safety and security. 

Prohibited Items 

The Interagency Security Committee, of which FPS is a member, issued the Items 

Prohibited in Federal Facilities, An Interagency Security Committee Standard, which 

establishes a baseline list of prohibited items that includes firearms, dangerous 

weapons, or explosives because those items are designed, redesigned, used, intended 

for use, or readily converted to cause injury, death, or property damage. The Interagency Security Committee’s Items Prohibited in Federal Facilities Standard notes 

that prohibited items also include any item banned by any applicable federal, state, 

local, or tribal ordinance. According to this standard, the list of prohibited items applies to all facility occupants, contractors, and visitors. 

In some cases, the list of prohibited items is broader than what is legal to carry 

in the locations where federal facilities are located. For example, carrying pepper 

spray for self-defense purposes or pocketknives with a blade over certain lengths 

might be otherwise legal within a particular jurisdiction, but they are on the Interagency Security Committee’s baseline list of items generally prohibited inside federal facilities. According to FPS officials, if an individual attempts to enter a federal 

facility with a prohibited yet otherwise legal item, the individual must remove the 

item from the property. Contract guards are authorized to detain individuals who 

refuse to comply with the contract guard’s request to remove the item, according to 

FPS. FPS officials said that if an individual attempts to enter a federal facility with 

an illegal item, contract guards are authorized to seize the item; it is up to FPS 

personnel to issue a citation or arrest the individual if necessary. 

Data Systems 

We have found longstanding challenges with the data systems FPS uses to oversee contract guards. 

• In 2009, we reported that FPS was using the Contracting Guard Employment 

Requirements Tracking System to monitor and verify contract guard training 

and certifications. However, the system was not fully reliable.14 This system 

was replaced later that year by the Risk Assessment and Management Program 

(RAMP).15

• In 2010, we recommended that FPS verify the accuracy of guard certification 

and training data in RAMP.16

• In 2012, we reported that RAMP, which was expected to improve FPS employees’ administrative worktime efficiency, was no longer used after 3 years due 

to system issues.17 FPS replaced this system with an interim vulnerability assessment tool, the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool. This tool enabled FPS 

to conduct facility security assessments, but the program did not allow for oversight of the contract guard program. We recommended FPS address the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool’s limitations and develop and implement a new 

comprehensive and reliable system for contract guard oversight.18
14 

19GAO, Federal Protective Service: Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge, GAO– 

14–623T (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2014). 20Prohibited items used in the covert tests met the specifications of prohibited items listed 

in the following federal standard, Interagency Security Committee, Items Prohibited in Federal 

Facilities, An Interagency Security Committee Standard (Washington, D.C.: 2022). We packed 

each prohibited item in a backpack. 

• In 2014, we found that FPS continued to lack a comprehensive and reliable contract guard management system.19

As part of its efforts to address two of our recommendations from these reports, 

FPS developed two separate data systems to conduct contract guard oversight: the 

Post Tracking System and the Training and Academy Management System. FPS 

also developed PostNow to provide post data for contract guards. See table 1 for information on selected FPS data systems. 

Table 1: Selected Federal Protective Service (FPS) Data Systems 

Data System System Users System Purpose Implementation Time Frame 

The Post Tracking 

System.

Contract guard vendors, 

FPS employees.

Verifies individual contract guard 

identities and requisite qualifications to staff for a specific post.

FPS expects all security contractors 

to be using the system in accordance with contractual terms by the 

end of fiscal year 2024. 

PostNow ................. FPS employees .................. Provides post data including type 

of post, type of security required, 

and assigned Contracting Officer 

Representative.

Fully implemented. 

The Training and 

Academy Management System.

Contract guard vendors, 

FPS employees.

Tracks and maintains documentation for all required contract 

guard training and certifications.

FPS expects this system to be fully 

implemented by calendar year 

2025. 

Source: GAO analysis of FPS information. GAO–24–107599 

CONTRACT GUARDS REGULARLY FAILED COVERT TESTS AT SELECTED FACILITIES, BUT

FPS HAS EFFORTS UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE THE DETECTION OF PROHIBITED ITEMS

Contract Guards Did Not Detect Prohibited Items about Half the Time in Covert 

Tests 

Our covert testing. In 13 of the 27 tests we conducted at selected locations, FPS 

contract guards did not detect the prohibited items we were attempting to smuggle 

into the facility. During our covert tests, our investigators had a prohibited item— 

specifically, a knife, a baton, or pepper spray—inside of a bag that they were bringing into the facility.20 See figure 3 for a photo of a contract guard who successfully 

detected one of those prohibited items. 
15 

Figure 3: Contract Guard Detecting a Prohibited Item During GAO’s Covert Testing 

FPS Has Several Efforts Underway to Improve Detection of Prohibited Items 

FPS has several reform efforts underway to improve contract guards’ detection of 

prohibited items. These efforts include (1) redesigning the initial training course for 

contract guards, (2) adding more frequent opportunities for on-the-job training, and 

(3) collecting information about common causes of covert test failures. 

Redesigning the initial training course for contract guards. FPS is in the process 

of redesigning its National Weapons Detection Training Program (NWDTP) course, 

according to an FPS official. The NWDTP is a 16-hour course that trains guards 

how to screen individuals at facility entrances and how to use tools—such as X-ray 

machines and metal detectors—to detect prohibited items. According to an FPS official, during the redesign process they reviewed industry standards, academic research about guards’ use of screening tools, and leading screening practices that 

other federal agencies and the private sector have implemented. An FPS official said 

they plan to incorporate what they have learned into the updated course to ensure 

that guards are receiving the training they need to effectively detect prohibited 

items. According to an FPS official, they expect the updated course to be piloted by 

the end of fiscal year 2025. 

Adding more frequent opportunities for on-the-job training. To supplement the 

NWDTP training, FPS developed an on-the-job training program to provide contract 

guards with more frequent learning opportunities. In 2023, FPS added a requirement for inspectors to conduct an on-the-job training at every screening post at least 

once annually. In addition, vendors must provide 2 hours of on-the-job training 

every 60 days for all contract guards who work at screening posts. 

According to officials, FPS designed on-the-job trainings to reinforce NWDTP 

strategies and to provide contract guards with regular practice detecting prohibited 

items. FPS presents these trainings as learning opportunities; they are not covert 

tests. The on-the-job training kit includes several items that can be used in various 

training scenarios, such as a non-functioning firearm, a knife with a blade that is 

longer than 3 inches, and an inert pipe bomb. Inspectors use the items in the kit 

to evaluate guards’ ability to accurately detect specific prohibited items, and to provide feedback if the guard has difficulty identifying the item. FPS is evaluating the 

effectiveness of its on-the-job training program and plans to use those findings to 

improve the program. 

Collecting covert testing data. FPS also regularly conducts covert testing to evaluate contract guards’ ability to detect prohibited items. FPS’s testing results were 

consistent with our results. However, FPS determined that the specifics of the tests 

were law enforcement sensitive. 

FPS currently compiles an internal covert testing database that houses information about the results of internal covert tests, causes for failures, and the types of 

remediation required when guards fail covert tests. However, based on our preliminary analysis, information in the database is inconsistent or insufficient in the following areas: data entry, information provided about root causes of failures, and information provided about remedial training for contract guards. 
16 

21 Although ‘‘human factor’’ is the most common cause, three other causes appear in the data 

set: ‘‘training/process/technique’’ (15 percent), ‘‘equipment’’ (1 percent), and policy/post orders 

(0.4 percent). 22GAO, High-Risk Series: Efforts Made to Achieve Progress Need to Be Maintained and Expanded to Fully Address All Areas, GAO–23–106203 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2023). 23GAO, Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Assess Risk and Better Manage Contract 

Guards at Federal Facilities, GAO–12–739 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2012). 24GAO–23–106203. 

• Data entry. In our preliminary analysis of FPS data, we found that FPS staff 

enter covert test data inconsistently. For example, similar outcomes of similar 

tests are recorded differently (some appear as ‘‘pass’’ and some as ‘‘fail’’), narrative descriptions have inconsistent levels of detail, and labels for test scenarios do not always match the narrative descriptions. FPS agreed that additional data quality checks could catch data entry errors and improve the accuracy of the data in the dataset. In addition, FPS acknowledged that providing 

consistent levels of detail in the narrative descriptions would help FPS staff better determine the root causes for failures and appropriate corrective actions to 

address those failures. 

• Root cause. According to our preliminary analysis of FPS data, the most common cause FPS listed in the dataset provides insufficient information about the 

root cause of a failure to detect a prohibited item. Specifically, when contract 

guards fail covert tests, FPS listed ‘‘human factor’’ as the cause more than 80 

percent of the time.21 When ‘‘human factor’’ is listed as the cause, we found 

multiple instances when the narrative description indicated the cause could be 

more accurately described as being due to the following: equipment issues, 

guards’ failure to conduct secondary screenings properly, guards’ failure to notify officials after detecting prohibited items, or other factors. According to FPS 

officials, ‘‘human factor’’ is too broad to identify the root cause of the failure or 

proactive steps that could prevent similar failures in the future. FPS acknowledged that updating the term ‘‘human factor’’ could provide more specific information about the cause of the failure. However, according to FPS, it will take 

time and additional resources to update the dataset. 

• Remedial training. In our preliminary analysis of FPS data, we found that vendors assigned remedial training for similar failures inconsistently, in part because the root cause of the failure is not clearly identified in the dataset. For 

example, the types of assigned remedial training—and the duration of that 

training—varied when guards failed to detect improvised explosive devices during FPS covert tests. Some guards received explosive detection remedial training that was clearly aligned with the failure, some received unrelated training 

that focused on screening sensitive areas of the body, and some were required 

to retake the entire NWDTP course, only part of which is directly related to detection of improvised explosive devices. In explaining the variation, FPS officials 

told us that they do not dictate the type of remedial training that vendors 

should provide. Instead, FPS allows vendors to determine what type of training 

they will provide for their guards. 

Our forthcoming report will further address these issues. 

STAKEHOLDERS IDENTIFIED DATA SYSTEMS CHALLENGES THAT UNDERMINE FPS’S

PRODUCTIVITY AND OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACT GUARDS

In response to our prior recommendations, FPS developed two systems to oversee 

its contract guard workforce.22 We previously recommended that FPS develop and 

implement a comprehensive and reliable system to provide oversight and verify that 

contract guards are current on all training and certification requirements.23 We reported in April 2023, that the Post Tracking System and the Training and Academy 

Management System were neither completely implemented nor interoperable.24 According to FPS officials we interviewed, the two systems FPS developed are unable 

to communicate with each other and have data reliability and technology challenges. 

In some cases, agency, union, and security guard contractors said these systems 

have not delivered promised capabilities and negatively affect the productivity of 

FPS’s oversight efforts. Our forthcoming report will further address these issues. 

Post Tracking System (PTS) 

Under development since 2013 and initially piloted in 2018, PTS was expected to 

be the system of record for ensuring that every post was staffed by a qualified guard 
17 

25FPS defines a post as a defined security function (e.g., X-ray, magnetometer, Wand) for a 

guarded location. 26FPS data provided covered the week ending on May 26, 2024. 27The five systems are the Training and Academy Management System, Integrated Security 

Management System, Modified Infrastructure Survey, PostNow, and the Procurement Request 

Information System Management. In previous PTS manuals, PostNow was referred to as PostX. 

Federal Protective Service. Federal Protective Service Post Tracking System, User Manual for 

Administrator Contracting Officer Representatives (COR), Version 3.5. (Washington, D.C. Dec. 

28, 2023). 

for the correct time frames in every FPS—protected facility.25 More specifically, PTS 

was to facilitate signing in and out of the guard post, remotely verify that guard 

posts are staffed as required, and track guard certifications to ensure that qualified 

and cleared guards staff FPS posts. PTS was also expected to verify billing for guard 

contracts and report prohibited items that are detected. PTS was intended to interface with other agency systems (see fig. 4). 

Figure 4: Federal Protective Service (FPS) Systems That Inform the Post Tracking System 

The nationwide deployment of PTS is ongoing; however, the system is not fully 

functional in any region because of technology, data reliability, and interoperability 

issues identified by FPS and security guard contractor officials. According to FPS 

data, 61 security guard contracts require deployment of PTS. FPS plans to add 

these requirements to additional contracts by the end of fiscal year 2024. However, 

PTS usage by regions and contractors varies, and PTS is not the system of record 

for any guard contract according to FPS officials. More specifically, some FPS regional officials said PTS utilization is never higher than 60 percent and can fall as 

low as 20 percent systemwide due to functional challenges. In April and May of 

2024, FPS reported average daily utilization percentages for guards standing post 

per contract ranging from zero to 95 percent for 61 contracts. Of those 61 contracts, 

FPS reported most contracts had utilization percentages less than 75 percent.26

Consequently, even in areas that have deployed PTS, FPS continues to require use 

of its old paper-based system for billing and guard verification. 

FPS and security guard contractor officials identified several challenges that continue to prevent PTS’ successful deployment: 

• PTS interoperability. According to the PTS Manual, the system is populated 

with data from five systems with information on training, security clearances, 

facilities, post responsibilities from contracts, and contractor information.27

However, an FPS official said PTS does not have full automated interoperability, requiring FPS staff to manually upload data from each of the five systems. Several regional FPS officials and security guard contractors said this effort causes delays and extra administrative work. Furthermore, officials noted 

that because PTS relies on manual uploading data, PTS is not operating with 

the real-time data needed to inform FPS officials whether contract guards are 

qualified to stand post. In addition, several FPS officials said that PTS is not 

a user-friendly system for exporting the information needed to support oversight 

capabilities. Contract guards can enter detected prohibited item reports in PTS; 

however, the information cannot be exported to other FPS systems. These reports are required weekly from each FPS region. One FPS official told us that 
18 

28PostNow is a system that provides information on FPS contract guard posts, responsibilities, type of security required, expenditures, facility number, and duty hours. It was initially 

developed as a stand-alone financial system to track expenses by post and was not intended to 

be used for other FPS databases. 29Federal Protective Service, Federal Protective Service Post Tracking System, Protective Security Officer Vendor Guide, Version 3.0. (Washington, D.C. May 4, 2022). 

it takes 2 to 3 days each week to meet the requirement because the reports 

must be manually entered into another FPS system. 

• PTS technology issues. FPS officials told us that security guard contractors routinely inform them that PTS does not allow qualified guards to sign into the 

system due to technology issues with guard identification cards, vendor-supplied 

equipment, or Internet connection problems. Security guard contractors said 

that their guards become frustrated by the myriad of problems and give up on 

using the system. There is an FPS Help Desk to help with tech issues; however, 

FPS officials said that PTS is used infrequently and continues to require security guard contractors to complete paper forms to document guard posts and 

work hours as an ongoing workaround. 

When multiple posts exist in one facility, FPS may set up a single post where 

contract guards sign in using PTS. However, according to a security guard contractor, the system sometimes crashes or stops working when multiple contract 

guards sign in or out around the same time. For example, one security guard 

contractor official said it is common for multiple contract guards to stand in line 

waiting to sign in or out creating a long delay during shift changes. Furthermore, the company official said that if the contract guard cannot sign out by 

the time their shift ends, the company pays overtime; an additional cost the 

company did not anticipate. 

• PTS data reliability. FPS officials we interviewed identified numerous errors in 

PTS’s underlying data, such as inaccurate descriptions of post requirements. 

Also, officials said the manual upload of data from multiple data systems into 

PTS can cause errors. For example, FPS is manually uploading information into 

PTS from another FPS system, PostNow, to indicate which posts need guard 

coverage and to outline the required guard qualifications for each post.28 However, several FPS regional officials told us that due to a lack of guidance or 

standards, the aggregated information causes errors once uploaded to PTS. FPS 

officials said these errors can incorrectly flag contract guards as not qualified 

to stand post. Furthermore, this information must then be corrected by FPS officials, which is a time-consuming process. 

Several FPS guard contractors we interviewed said they could not use PTS to 

document contract guards’ time and attendance because the data are unreliable—too often they cannot connect to the server, or the system will not allow 

a contract guard to sign in due to a technical issue. A Help Desk provides support for technical issues, but all the security guard contractors we interviewed 

said they instead rely on the legacy paper process and their own company software to track time and attendance for contract guards. Furthermore, some FPS 

officials we interviewed said they do not use the reports from PTS because the 

data are inaccurate or incomplete for billing verification. According to security 

guard contractors we interviewed, FPS has not requested security guard contractors’ feedback on deficiencies or evaluated deficiencies within the system. 

These officials said they continue to spend valuable time and resources troubleshooting technology issues. Two guard contractors said that they needed to assign additional IT specialists to exclusively troubleshoot PTS issues, further increasing costs for a system that they have no plans to use as the system of 

record. 

Due to the technology issues discussed in this section, FPS officials told us that 

PTS has not yet delivered on promised capabilities. According to the PTS Vendor 

Guide, the system should automate oversight of contract guards, including automatically and remotely monitoring guard posts in real time to ensure that the post 

is staffed as required by qualified and cleared guards.29 However, officials told us 

that PTS cannot remotely verify that guard posts are staffed based on real-time 

data. Tenant agency officials that have FPS contract guards protecting their facilities said that real-time information could inform FPS, security guard contractors, 

and tenant agencies. This in turn would allow them to reallocate resources to address a shortage of contract guards in specific locations. 
19 

30SSA officials estimated in the last three years, there were approximately 15,000 hours that 

posts were unguarded by FPS contract guards. 

For example, officials from two tenant agencies—Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 

and Social Security Administration (SSA)—expressed frustration with the lack of 

contract guards available to stand post at federal facilities. • IRS officials said that they do not receive timely communication about how 

guard shortages affect their facilities, often learning weeks later that posts were 

not staffed from local IRS agency officials. IRS officials said these guard shortages have caused problems, security vulnerabilities, employee delays, and increased traffic due to closed entrances. Since fiscal year 2022, IRS officials reported they closed 30 Taxpayer Assistance Centers for a full day because of the 

lack of contract guards. IRS officials said that real-time information on post 

staffing and better communication would have allowed them to take proactive 

steps to limit such problems. 

• SSA officials also said that FPS has been unable to provide a sufficient number 

of contract guards in the last 3 fiscal years, resulting in 510 offices that were 

closed for several hours or a full day.30 Consequently, contract guard shortages 

negatively affected the agency’s ability to serve the public, specifically vulnerable populations that needed assistance. 

FPS officials said that open posts are due to security guard contractors hiring insufficient personnel to meet contract guard requirements to meet regional needs. 

However, security guard contractors said they face challenges in recruiting, training, and retaining contract guards. According to FPS officials, they prioritize open 

posts and address this issue with security guard contractors through corrective action plans. 

Training and Academy Management System (TAMS) 

FPS implemented TAMS in 2019 to allow FPS personnel to track, monitor, and 

verify training records for FPS’s contract guard workforce. Also, contract guard companies use TAMS to enter and update guard training and certification information, 

along with supporting documentation, such as electronic copies of training and certification records. FPS staff conduct oversight of guard training using TAMS. According to some FPS officials, TAMS is an improvement over the previous process, 

which did not provide a consolidated source for guard training records. However, 

other FPS officials have found the database inefficient in completing tasks because 

of data reliability and technology issues. While the system has been in use for more 

than 5 years, FPS officials said TAMS guidance and directives remain in draft form. 

FPS officials said the guidance and directives will be submitted to the policy review 

process by the end of fiscal year 2024. • TAMS data reliability. Stakeholders identified data issues that affect the quality of data in TAMS, including missing data for contract guards and a lack of 

controls to verify that vendors provided guards with required training. According to FPS headquarters, regional, and union officials, because TAMS depends 

on contractors to upload training records, that information could be susceptible 

to human input errors or manipulation. FPS officials cannot use this database 

independently to verify the accuracy of the training data for contract guards. 

Union and FPS officials said they still need to collect additional data from security guard contractors to have a complete picture of compliance with training 

requirements. For example, FPS reported 13,377 active contract guards in 

TAMS as of April 2024, but TAMS’ training records do not reflect the necessary 

levels of training or documentation for all contract guards on staff. 

FPS officials said there were various reasons for not having training records for 

all 13,377 active contract guards. One reason is that security guard contractors 

had not entered all the records into TAMS. Another reason is that all contract 

guards had not yet completed the training courses and not all courses are mandatory. Furthermore, following our covert testing, we requested training records 

for the contract guards at the facilities that did not detect our prohibited items. 

FPS officials said they could not provide training records for some contract 

guards who were on duty during the time of our covert testing. FPS officials 

could not identify the appropriate contract guards on post based on PTS 

records, which identify the contract guards on duty. Officials said that since 

PTS has not been deployed to all guard contracts, they could not identify the 

names of the contract guards from PTS. Consequently, they could not collect the 

training and certification records for those contract guards in TAMS. FPS officials said if GAO had provided the names of the contract guards at the covert 

testing locations, they could have provided the training records for those con-
20 

tract guards. We did not gather the names of individual guards during our covert testing, since the purpose of the audit was to review FPS efforts to improve 

detection and data systems, not to investigate individual guard performance. 

• TAMS system design. When conducting required quarterly training audits, FPS 

officials must access different parts of TAMS to confirm contract guard training 

requirements are met. This process is inefficient because it increases the time 

needed to complete each audit for thousands of contract guards. Some FPS staff 

said this design flaw makes it more time-consuming and difficult to use TAMS 

than traveling to the contractor’s site to audit training files by hand, as they 

did before TAMS. 

• An agency official said that while TAMS can collect a lot of information, it 

is poorly organized, affecting the system’s performance and speed. For example, agency officials must confirm that contract guards have completed X-ray 

screening training, which produces a three-page report. According to a regional official, after running so many reports, the system runs out of storage 

space, and TAMS administrators must develop another file folder to save new 

reports. As a result, agency officials said they had to search five or six file 

folders to verify training information. Regional officials said it may take days 

to find pertinent information with a sluggish computer program. 

• Several regional officials also mentioned that completing their work efficiently 

is difficult because the program is not user-friendly. An FPS official who was 

responsible for implementing TAMS in FPS said (1) the system was not intended for its current use of documenting all training requirements and (2) 

there are limits to how much the system can be modified for current FPS 

needs. While FPS officials have not addressed issues identified by stakeholders, FPS officials told us they are working to develop initiatives to capture technological best practices and enhance TAMS. 

In conclusion, as the agency responsible for protecting thousands of federal facilities nationwide, FPS relies heavily on more than 13,000 contract guards. Failure to 

keep prohibited items out of federal facilities can compromise the safety of the people who work in and visit them. Moreover, threats to federal facilities persist even 

as FPS is experiencing a shortage of staff to provide oversight for the contract guard 

workforce. Therefore, it is essential that FPS improve the guards’ success rate in 

detecting prohibited items and provide oversight of the contract guard workforce. 

Again, we plan to finalize our review of FPS’s efforts to improve detection and data 

systems and issue a report later this year. 

We shared a draft of this statement with FPS, the Department of Treasury, the 

GSA, and the Social Security Administration. FPS provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated as appropriate. The remaining agencies informed us that 

they had no comments. 

Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and Members of the Subcommittee, this 

completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions 

that you may have at this time. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Marroni. 

Mr. Cline, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your testimony, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD K. CLINE, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE, MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. CLINE. Good morning, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member 

Titus, and distinguished members of this subcommittee. My name 

is Kris Cline, and I have the privilege of serving as the Director 

of the Federal Protective Service, or FPS. 

I have served my country for the last 42 years in the Army and 

as a career civil servant, and I am honored to be here today to represent the outstanding men and women of our agency, and to discuss the critical mission of FPS, as well as the state of Federal facility security. I am pleased to be sitting alongside our partners 

from GSA, with whom we have an excellent and longstanding part-
21 

nership, and the GAO, who provides impartial and independent reviews and recommendations for improving the operations of the 

agency. 

FPS is a Federal law enforcement agency of 1,642 Federal employees, including 1,140 Federal law enforcement officers and approximately 14,000 contract Protective Security Officers, or PSOs. 

FPS protects approximately 8,500 Federal facilities located in every 

State and Territory. We protect the Federal Government’s infrastructure, employees, contractors, and members of the public seeking Government services, from incidents ranging from terrorist attacks to prohibited items in Federal facilities. 

Our most visible countermeasure is our contract PSOs, who are 

the front line of security at our Federal facilities. Our PSOs stand 

post at thousands of Federal facilities across the Nation, and are 

in daily contact with Federal employees and visitors. They conduct 

a variety of security functions such as visitor screening operations, 

roving patrols, and control center operations. FPS personnel conduct oversight inspections, on-the-job training, covert security tests, 

and administrative audits of the PSOs. Our contract PSOs work 

diligently to prevent dangerous items from entering Federal facilities. Every year, PSOs detect and prevent hundreds of thousands 

of prohibited items from entering Federal facilities. In the last 

year, more than 2,000 firearms were prevented from entering Federal facilities. 

Our dedicated Federal law enforcement officers and PSOs put 

their lives at risk every day to accomplish our mission. Over the 

last several years, our PSOs have been instrumental in stopping 

attacks at Federal facilities, placing themselves between an 

attacker and those we protect. Our law enforcement officers and 

PSOs have been shot, stabbed, and physically assaulted while performing their duties. Just 2 weeks ago, one of our PSOs was injured when an individual intentionally drove into him at a Federal 

facility in south Florida. I spoke with this PSO last week, and I am 

happy to report that he is recovering from his injuries. 

Since our inception in 1971, FPS has lost seven law enforcement 

officers in the line of duty. Since 2015, three PSOs have sacrificed 

their lives protecting Federal employees. Over the past few years, 

we have seen a significant increase in crimes at Federal facilities 

and, more importantly, threats to Federal civil servants. Last year, 

we noted a 29-percent increase in disorderly conduct incidents, an 

84-percent increase in violations of Federal facility rules and regulations, and a 24-percent increase in assaults on Government employees. 

During this dynamic threat environment, we have increased our 

vigilance and coordination with Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners and stakeholders, and are prepared to respond 

quickly should a threat be identified. We are also working closely 

with GSA as co-leads of the Government Services and Facilities 

Sector, established under National Security Memorandum 22, 

which was issued in April of 2024. We firmly believe that our partnership under the Government Services and Facilities Sector will 

enhance the sector’s security posture and resilience through enhanced collaboration and information exchange. 
22 

During today’s hearing, you are going to hear about additional 

improvements needed in the oversight and management of our PSO 

program. I am taking deliberate corrective actions to address 

GAO’s findings, in addition to our routine program management 

improvement activities. However, make no mistake, it is our top 

priority to keep Federal facilities and employees safe. And every 

FPS employee and PSO is dedicated to public safety and security, 

and will continue to stand ready to protect our homeland. 

I would like to thank this subcommittee for your interest in the 

security of Federal facilities and allowing me the opportunity to 

testify on this critical role that the Federal Protective Service performs every day to ensure our Nation’s overall security. FPS is and 

will continue to make a difference, providing a safe and secure 

work environment at our protected facilities across the Nation. I 

look forward to addressing any questions you may have. 

[Mr. Cline’s prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Richard K. Cline, Director, Federal Protective 

Service, Management Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) regarding FPS’s critical mission to protect and secure federal government employees and the facilities 

in which they work. 

My name is Kris Cline, and I was appointed as the Director of FPS in January 

2023. As Director, I am the Senior Law Enforcement Officer responsible for the protection of a nationwide portfolio of buildings, grounds, and properties that are 

owned, occupied, or secured by the Federal Government, as well as the persons on 

those properties. FPS is a recognized, award-winning leader in law enforcement and 

facility protection. It is my immense honor to lead the agency’s great men and 

women, and I am inspired by their dedication, innovation, and achievements every 

day. 

Security of federal facilities is an important subject, and I am pleased to join the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) and General Services Administration 

(GSA) for today’s hearing. GAO’s continued efforts to review our programs and identify recommendations that improve the security we provide are invaluable. Similarly, GSA is a critical partner in our shared vision of a safe and secure federal 

workforce. No matter how many times we get things right, it only takes one successful attempt by our adversaries to negate our efforts, which is why FPS relies on our 

federal law enforcement officers, armed contract security guards we call Protective 

Security Officers (PSOs), technology, training, and partnerships to detect and deter 

crime and keep people safe. 

FPS HISTORY

In 1790, six ‘‘night watchmen’’ were hired to protect government buildings in our 

newly designated nation’s capital. Over time, a network of security guards evolved 

and was known as the U.S. Special Police. In 1971, the ‘‘Federal Protective Service’’ 

was established within GSA. FPS was transferred to DHS on March 1, 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq) in recognition 

of its role in securing the homeland. FPS now resides under the Management Directorate within DHS Headquarters. FPS is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and 

it is organized across the nation into three zones and 11 regions for command and 

control and mission execution. 

FPS has a presence in every U.S. state and territory and is charged to protect 

more than 8,500 federal, non-military facilities and more than 1.4 million people 

who daily work, visit, or conduct business at these facilities. Our mission serves 66 

federal agencies, ensuring safe work environments for federal employees performing 

essential duties that impact day-to-day lives of Americans. FPS continually adapts 
23 

to meet threats, working with our federal, state, and local partners to ensure complete security coverage and efficient communication to protect people and property. 

FPS AUTHORITIES

FPS has broad law enforcement authorities and jurisdiction to prevent, investigate, mitigate, and protect against threats to federal property and people on federal grounds. Section 1706 of the Homeland Security Act, 40 U.S. Code § 1315, 

grants FPS traditional police powers, including the authority to enforce federal laws 

and make arrests. In certain circumstances, FPS enters into agreements and utilizes other federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities and laws to protect 

federal property more fully. 

The Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security with the statutory authority to counter credible threats from unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Within DHS, this authority was granted to FPS, 

the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Secret 

Service. Authorized actions include detecting, identifying, monitoring, and tracking 

UAS; disrupting control of UAS; seizing or exercising control of UAS; or confiscating 

UAS. DHS’s current Countering UAS (C–UAS) authority is set to expire on October 

1, 2024. Any lapse in DHS’s current C–UAS authority would entail serious risks for 

our homeland security and FPS’s missions. Specifically, FPS would have to cease 

existing C–UAS operations. Congressional action is required to prevent any lapse 

in C–UAS authority on October 1, 2024. 

FPS WORKFORCE

FPS is allocated 1,642 positions to execute our expansive mission. Of these, 1,140 

are sworn federal law enforcement officers who perform vital functions, including 

enforcement of federal laws and regulations, conducting investigations into crimes 

and threats, conducting comprehensive security assessments to identify 

vulnerabilities at federal facilities, developing and implementing protective countermeasures, leading explosives detection canine teams, and providing uniformed police 

presence and response in support of the DHS and FPS missions. Our law enforcement officers risk their lives every day. Notably, amid the February 21, 2024, mass 

shooting during the Kansas City Chiefs Super Bowl parade, FPS law enforcement 

officers, assigned to protect nearby federal buildings, selflessly ran toward the gunshots, and detained two armed suspects to protect the public. 

Whether protecting U.S. Courthouses, Social Security Administration customer 

service centers, and all types of federal facilities in between, the level of dedication 

to our country’s security comes with great sacrifice. Seven sworn FPS officers have 

died in the performance of their duties since FPS’s formation. These tragedies serve 

as a stark reminder that the men and women who wear the FPS uniform are prepared to sacrifice all in service to our country and government, and we must ensure 

they are supported in every way possible to respond to and prevent threats against 

our nation’s people, property, and institutions. FPS also employs more than 500 professional staff who provide essential mission functions, such as: intelligence analysis; human capital, financial, contractual and information technology management; 

security training; and additional disciplines. 

RESPONDING TO THE CURRENT THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Over the past year, we saw increased incidents at federal properties involving 

arson, burglary, robbery, larceny, motor vehicle theft, assault on government employees, and threats to harm government employees. Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 saw a 

138 percent increase over FY 2022 in demonstrations at federal properties, a 19 percent increase in alarm response incidents, a 29 percent increase in disorderly conduct incidents, an 84 percent increase in violations of building rules and regulations, 

a 24 percent increase in assault on government employees, and a 13 percent increase in the number of inappropriate communications directed towards government 

employees. 

We remain focused on harnessing efforts to counter these ever-evolving threats to 

federal facilities and keeping people safe. In FY 2023, FPS investigated 362 threats 

that led to seven convictions, 25 arrests, and 10 citations for federal, state, and municipal penal code violations, U.S. District Court Notices of Violations, and criminal 

charges under Title 18 of the U.S. Code. To effectively operate in the current environment and moving into the future, FPS is emphasizing innovation and reinforcing 

our standards of excellence. We elevated our criminal intelligence capabilities by 

providing real-time operational intelligence and are sharing law enforcement intel-
24 

ligence with our officers and PSOs as well as with federal, state, and local partners 

to create an added layer of operational protection and insight. 

SECURING FEDERAL FACILITIES

FPS utilizes a layered approach to protect and secure federal facilities across the 

Nation, including our territories. 

Facility Security Assessments (FSAs) represent a cornerstone of our layered approach to comprehensive security. Our inspectors are rigorously trained to identify 

and mitigate potential facility vulnerabilities. Working with security specialists, 

countermeasure experts, and FPS leadership, our inspectors provide detailed reports 

to Facility Security Committees (FSC) and facility tenants as our expert recommendations for adequate building security and coverage. FPS designed and implemented the Modified Infrastructure Security Tool, or MIST, which is a certified 

and industry recognized, award-winning assessment program, to support evaluation 

and identification of potential threats at FPS-secured locations. Using both our inspectors’ institutional knowledge and MIST’s high-performance capabilities ensures 

our assessments are a trusted resource for providing our customers with the best 

possible security enhancement recommendations. In FY 2023, FPS made 4,102 recommendations to add or upgrade countermeasures at FPS-protected federal facilities. FPS also assisted the U.S. Marshals at Federal Courthouses nationwide during 

many high-profile judicial proceedings. 

As with our relationship with GSA, FPS works closely with DHS’s Interagency Security Committee (ISC), the organization that creates standards for security measures at federal facilities. Having a membership role on the ISC gives FPS access 

to and support from other leaders in the government security industry. In fact, Executive Order 14111 names the FPS Director as a permanent voting member of the 

ISC. 

While FPS’s recommendations address security enhancements, the ISC Risk Management Process requires the agency or agencies to accept and implement received 

FPS recommendations. GAO issued a report in May 2023, examining FPS customer 

agencies’ perspective on why they do not consistently implement recommended security measures to improve security at FPS-protected facilities. FPS continues to look 

for new strategies to support customer agencies and various FSCs responsible for 

making security countermeasure decisions that take into account risks associated 

with not implementing FPS security recommendations. One example of our approach is through evolving the FSA processes and associated training to enable our 

staff to develop more detailed cost estimates for recommended security measure improvements. 

We are also working with GSA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

to implement the April 2024 GSA order requiring occupant agencies in GSA’s federally owned facilities to provide funding to maintain and update Visual Surveillance 

Systems (VSS) and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and to correct deficiencies 

identified by FPS of these two systems. The GSA order also requires all agencies 

that are part of an FSC in a multi-occupant facility, and the occupant agency in 

a single-occupant facility, to fund their portion of the purchase, installation, and replacement of VSS and IDS through a security work authorization agreement with 

FPS. In consultation with GSA, FPS identified and prioritized GSA-controlled federally owned facilities for FPS to implement VSS and IDS updates or new installation 

projects. We believe the order will enhance the security of the buildings we protect 

and those who work at and visit those facilities. Working with GSA, FPS developed 

a five-year plan to conduct these installation projects at 467 facilities, and work is 

underway now to start procurement actions on 43 projects during first quarter of 

FY 2025. 

Our most visible countermeasure are our armed contracted PSOs, who are in 

daily contact with our federal facility customers and visitors and are the front line 

of security in federal facilities. As such, PSOs put their lives at risk to accomplish 

FPS’s mission. In recent years, FPS contracted PSOs were instrumental in thwarting attacks at several facilities, notably the FBI Cincinnati Field Office in Cincinnati, Ohio, in August 2022; the Edmund S. Muskie Federal Building in Augusta, 

Maine, in April 2022; and a Social Security Administration office in Norfolk, Virginia, in February 2021. Sadly, FPS has lost three PSOs in the line of duty since 

2015, all of whom were tragically killed protecting federal facilities and employees. 

FPS oversees a PSO program that utilizes more than 90 contracts and is valued 

at $1.4 billion. Through this program, FPS works closely with commercial security 

vendors across the country to staff and train approximately 15,000 PSOs at 6,600 

security posts. PSO vendors, as with many other industries, experience challenges 

in fully staffing their contracts resulting in open posts. Our manning analysis indi-
25 

cates FPS PSOs are on-post and available approximately 99.7 percent of scheduled 

post hours; however, we are sensitive to the concerns of all unstaffed requirements 

particularly when a service agency cannot open due to security gaps. In these instances, FPS is assessing the impact and alternative solutions, including having an 

FPS Officer take on those responsibilities. 

In addition to manpower availability, FPS must also verify and validate the quality of PSO services being delivered. To achieve this, FPS conducts a variety of compliance checks to provide oversight of the PSO program and individual contracts. 

Post visits and inspections provide an opportunity for FPS law enforcement officers 

to provide on-the-job training to PSOs in various aspects of their duties. Post inspections are formal inspections of PSOs and PSO posts to ensure contractual compliance. FPS continues to implement the Post Tracking System to automate and create 

efficiency for FPS and PSO vendor personnel. 

FPS manages a National Weapons Detection Program to teach PSOs how to utilize technical countermeasures to screen personnel and packages for dangerous 

weapons and explosives. Since January 2024, FPS PSOs have prevented more than 

346,000 dangerous and prohibited items (e.g., firearms, bladed items, club-like 

items, flammable items, and disabling chemicals) from entering federal facilities, 

but it is equally important to determine where prohibited items may not be detected 

by a PSO. To validate a PSO’s capability to detect weapons and explosives, FPS employees operate a Covert Security Testing (CST) Program. These tests are conducted 

randomly and examine the ability of the PSOs to detect prohibited items from entering the buildings. Test results are shared with PSO vendors who are required to 

take appropriate steps to retrain personnel when necessary. FPS also reviews the 

CST data to look for trends to improve the program nationally. Further, as new 

threats are identified, updated guidance and requirements are built into the program to drive continuous improvement. 

FPS FUNDING

FPS does not receive a direct appropriation—the agency is entirely funded by the 

fees charged to the federal departments and agencies we protect to conduct our mission. There are three components to the fees charged to our customers: 1) a Basic 

Security Fee, which is the primary source of funding for FPS operations, and provides funding for statutory and regulatory service requirements from activities associated with law enforcement, threat management and information sharing, protective and criminal investigations, and risk management; 2) agency-specific fees for 

security services performed for an individual customer through Security Work Authorization (SWA) agreements, as well as other reimbursable activities; and 3) 

building-specific fees for security services to implement and maintain security requirements specifically designed for a particular facility. 

CONCLUSION

FPS continues to demonstrate its capabilities to deter and respond to threats directed toward federal employees, visitors, and facilities. As the law enforcement 

agency responsible for securing these sacred governmental institutions, FPS personnel must maintain constant vigilance to ensure the continuity of the U.S. Government and our great country. I am very proud of all that FPS has accomplished 

in its rich 53-year history, and while there are ways to improve what we are doing, 

I know our talented and committed workforce will always ensure we are ready to 

meet our mission. 

I would like to acknowledge and thank the distinguished members of this Subcommittee for allowing me the opportunity to testify today, and I am pleased to answer your questions. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Cline. 

Mr. Doomes, as you know, you are now recognized for 5 minutes 

for your testimony. You should almost get a time card in this place, 

I think. Good morning, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF ELLIOT DOOMES, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC 

BUILDINGS SERVICE, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. DOOMES. Good morning, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member 

Titus, Ranking Member Larsen, and other members of the sub-
26 

committee. My name is Elliot Doomes, and I am the Commissioner 

of GSA’s Public Buildings Service. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss safety and security in Federal facilities. My testimony today will highlight some of GSA’s roles and 

responsibilities in keeping Federal facilities secure. 

Executive Order 12977 established the Interagency Security 

Committee following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 

Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. The ISC was established to improve governmentwide coordination of security initiatives, and to 

address the need for increased security and protection, particularly 

in buildings housing Federal employees. The ISC also created 

standards for security measures at Federal facilities. 

Recognizing that we must balance protections for our Federal 

employees and contractors while keeping buildings accessible to the 

public, GSA has been an active participant in the development of 

these security standards, working with the Interagency Security 

Committee and other Federal partners. GSA’s Office of Mission Assurance was established to integrate security, continuity, and readiness expertise within the agency and with critical stakeholders. 

In addition to OMA, the Public Buildings Service is continuously 

working with customer agencies to identify the best space to meet 

their mission needs, including physical security. GSA’s physical security responsibilities include working with our security partners 

and tenant agencies to reduce the risk in GSA facilities. To provide 

these services, GSA works with tenant agencies in the planning 

stage of projects to ensure that its space has the proper security 

requirements to meet its missions needs. 

The ISC risk management process requires individual agencies, 

or the Facility Security Committee in multitenant facilities, to select the appropriate security countermeasures to achieve the highest level of protection, as determined by the facility security assessment. Although tenant agencies can select optimal countermeasures for their facilities, FPS and GSA are responsible for ensuring security countermeasures equipment conforms with ISC 

standards, as well as repairing and replacing security countermeasures. 

GSA has a longstanding partnership with FPS, which provides 

law enforcement and related security services for Federal buildings 

in all aspects of security. The Administrative Office of the United 

States Courts and the United States Marshals Service also serve 

as partners to deliver security services to the Federal judiciary and 

courthouses. To codify these partnerships, GSA currently has memorandums of agreement with FPS, the Administrative Office of the 

U.S. Courts, and the United States Marshals Service outlining 

roles and responsibilities for security at GSA-controlled facilities, 

as applicable. 

FSCs are another way that GSA remains engaged in the decisionmaking process with FPS and tenant agencies to review building security. Facility Security Committees composed of and governed by the tenants in multitenant facilities hold the responsibility of addressing facility-specific security issues, including improving the implementation of security countermeasures recommended by FPS. When FPS completes an assessment and recommends security countermeasures for implementation, those rec-
27 

ommendations go to the FSC for funding approval and implementation. If FSC does not approve the funding, those countermeasures 

go unimplemented, and the agencies in that individual building accept the security risk. 

GSA and FPS do consider certain minimum security standards 

for every Federal facility, and those can evolve over time. For instance, GSA recently collaborated with FPS, the ISC, and the Office of Management and Budget to implement an April 2024 GSA 

order making security camera and alarm systems part of the baseline minimum security standards for GSA federally owned facilities. 

GSA has also been working to enhance security at courthouses 

around the country in light of recent incidents. GSA is working in 

concert with the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts to modernize 

courthouse infrastructure, including building hardening such as replacing or adding break-resistant glass. And to date, GSA has received $15 million in fiscal year 2022 and $12.5 million in fiscal 

year 2023 for the Judiciary Capital Security Fund to complete 

these projects. There are currently 67 courthouses undergoing this 

program, with 36 projects in the design stage and ready for construction. 

GSA is also using landscape architecture to serve as perimeter 

security measures to discourage potential crime on or around our 

Federal facilities. Landscape architecture can provide natural barriers at Federal sites that prevent hiding places and restrict unwanted pedestrian access to building facades. This can be accomplished through the use of dense plantings, walls, fencing, topography, or other means. These features eliminate the need for separate, standalone security elements, saving money and making the 

areas around the facilities more aesthetically pleasing and inviting 

to visitors. 

To conclude, ensuring the safety of building occupants is paramount at GSA, and we take such matters seriously at all times. 

With congressional support of the fiscal year 2025 budget request 

and legislative proposals, GSA will be one step closer to modernizing our Federal footprint, which will advance key security priorities in our facilities. Through continued partnership with agencies 

like the FPS, GSA will continue providing support to ensure security at every Federal facility across the country. 

Thank you for your time today, and I look forward to answering 

any questions that you may have. 

[Mr. Doomes’ prepared statement follows:] 

f 

Prepared Statement of Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings 

Service, U.S. General Services Administration 

INTRODUCTION

Good morning Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and members of the Subcommittee. My name is Elliot Doomes and I am the Commissioner of GSA’s Public 

Buildings Service (PBS). Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to 

discuss safety and security in federal facilities. My testimony today will highlight 

some of GSA’s roles and responsibilities in keeping federal facilities secure. 

GSA has custody and jurisdiction of more than 1,600 federally-owned and 6,500 

leased facilities across the nation. Over one million federal workers, contractors and 

visitors access GSA-controlled facilities regularly to interact with the government. 
28 

We take security at federal facilities seriously, and work closely with partners such 

as the Federal Protective Service (FPS), U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and others 

to ensure the safety of tenant agency personnel, contractors and visitors. 

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ISC 

Executive Order 12977 established the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 

1995. The ISC was established to improve government-wide coordination of security 

initiatives, and to address the need for increased security and protection, particularly in buildings housing federal employees. The ISC also created standards for security measures at federal facilities. 

On November 27, 2023, President Biden signed Executive Order 14111 (Interagency Security Committee) to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security and 

protection of buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by federal employees or federal contractor workers for nonmilitary activities. As a result, increased security standards continue to be developed to protect federal employees 

and contractors in all federally-occupied space. Regardless of whether GSA owns or 

leases a facility, a Facility Security Level (FSL), ranging from Levels 1–5, establishes the baseline level of protection and may warrant a specific countermeasure 

in the federal facility. 

Recognizing that we must balance protections for our federal employees and contractors while keeping buildings accessible to the public, GSA has been an active 

participant in the development of these security standards working with the Interagency Security Committee and other federal partners. GSA’s Office of Mission Assurance (OMA) was established to integrate security, continuity and readiness expertise within the agency and with critical stakeholders. OMA provides services for 

all GSA staff, and GSA’s owned and leased public buildings. These services include: 

(1) managing the vetting process for GSA employees (2) determining employee suitability for covered positions and (3) fitness determination for GSA contractors. In 

addition to OMA working to ensure safety and security for GSA employees and contractors, the Public Buildings Service (PBS) is continuously working with customer 

agencies to identify the best space to meet their mission needs, including security. 

GSA’s goal is to provide a safe building environment allowing agencies to focus on 

their mission needs to ensure their employees, contractors and the visiting public 

are able to conduct their business. 

GSA’S ROLE IN ENSURING BUILDING SECURITY

GSA’s physical security responsibilities include working with our security partners and tenant agencies to reduce the security risk in GSA facilities. In order to 

provide these services, GSA works with tenant agencies in the planning stage of 

projects, resulting in proposed security requirements for new construction, renovation and leased space projects to ensure that its space has the proper security requirements to meet its mission needs. Because every facility has unique security 

and accessibility requirements, and tenant agencies have varying mission needs, the 

ISC risk management process requires individual agencies, or the Facility Security 

Committee (FSC) in multi-tenant facilities, to select the appropriate security countermeasures to achieve the highest level of protection, as determined by the Facility 

Security Assessment. Although tenant agencies can select optimal countermeasures 

for their facilities, FPS and GSA are responsible for ensuring security countermeasure equipment conforms with ISC standards, as well as repairing and replacing 

security countermeasures. 

In addition to partnering with FPS, GSA also has a robust partnership with The 

U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) to deliver security services for the federal court system. Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) outline roles and responsibilities to provide law enforcement and related security services at federally-owned and leased facilities under the jurisdiction, custody or control 

of GSA. 

A MOA between GSA and FPS expands on 6 U.S.C. § 232, detailing roles and responsibilities of each agency in order to protect federal facilities and grounds. While 

FPS is largely responsible for providing security, law enforcement and criminal investigations at federal facilities, the FPS also coordinates with GSA on crime prevention and security awareness training for GSA’s tenant agencies and employees. 

GSA also coordinates with FPS when FPS performs routine vulnerability assessments that are submitted to FSCs. 
29 

ROLE OF THE FACILITY SECURITY COMMITTEE

FSCs are another way that GSA remains engaged in the decision making process 

with FPS and tenant agencies to review building security. FSCs, composed of and 

governed by the tenants in multi-tenant facilities, hold the responsibility of addressing facility-specific security issues, including approving the implementation of security countermeasures recommended by FPS as noted in building security assessments. When FPS completes an assessment and recommends security countermeasures for implementation, those recommendations go to the FSC for funding approval. When the FSC approves funding for countermeasures, FPS or GSA, as applicable depending on the nature of the countermeasure, can move forward with implementation. However, if an FSC does not approve the funding, those countermeasures go unimplemented, and the agencies in that individual building accept the 

security risk. If an FSC makes the decision not to approve or provide funding for 

a countermeasure, the decision is documented. 

GSA and FPS consider certain minimum security standards for every federal facility, and these can evolve over time. For instance, GSA recently collaborated with 

FPS, the ISC and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to implement an 

April 2024 GSA order, making security camera and alarm systems part of the baseline minimum security standards for GSA’s federally-owned facilities. The GSA 

order also requires tenant agencies in GSA’s federally-owned facilities to provide 

funding to maintain and update Video Surveillance Systems and Intrusion Detection 

Systems (IDS), and to correct deficiencies identified by FPS. GSA is confident that 

this order and the continued collaboration with FPS, OMB and tenant agencies will 

improve the security of GSA’s federally-owned facilities. 

IMPLEMENTING SECURITY STANDARDS AT FEDERAL FACILITIES

At owned and leased facilities as appropriate, GSA provides space for control 

rooms, screening stations, guard booths and other similar space, serving the security 

and infrastructure needs of tenant agencies. When recommended in the FSA and 

funded by the FSC, GSA provides physical security infrastructure, like vehicular 

barriers, exterior security specified doors, exterior and building common area security specified locks, HVAC security items, security specific exterior lighting, physical 

access control systems, security specified garage doors, security fencing and gates, 

and blast-resistant countermeasures. In these cases GSA also provides advanced notification of situations such as scheduled building maintenance that will affect the 

operation of building security equipment. For leased facilities, GSA follows ISC 

standards issuing leasing guidance and instructions for competitive lease procurements. 

Security implementation can vary greatly depending on factors like the location 

of a property, size of the facility and the tenant agency’s mission. A FSL, ranging 

from Levels 1–5, is determined from five factors, based on mission criticality, symbolism, facility population, facility size and threats to tenant agencies. The FSL establishes the baseline level of protection and as the FSL increases, additional security measures, such as increased setbacks, site planning, facade hardening, and 

structural measures to prevent progressive collapse may be necessary. Setback requirements can result in agencies seeking space outside of urban areas and additional land acquisition costs for new facilities. GSA refers to ISC standards to determine if security barriers are needed based on the FSL. Currently GSA’s security 

barrier inventory consists of over 14,000 security barriers of various types, providing 

tenant agencies with appropriate options to meet their facility needs. 

GSA also responds to feedback on ways to improve building security by participating in each facility’s FSC or coordinating with a single occupant agency in its 

jurisdiction. For example, at a federal facility in California, there were concerns that 

illegal drug activity was taking place in the federal plaza after hours. In response 

to this and as a result of extensive community outreach efforts, a perimeter fence 

and locking gate were constructed at the perimeter of the plaza and operationally 

the site closes to the public during non-working hours. 

GSA CHILD CARE CENTERS

GSA child care centers are designed to keep children safe within the center, to 

safeguard them from outside intruders, and to protect them from hazards, consistent with the established risk management process. GSA works with FSCs and 

sponsoring agencies to maintain security standards for child care centers in GSAcontrolled facilities. Child care center entrances are secured at all times and parents, guardians and child care staff have immediate access through an electric 

strike release with a keypad or card reader. GSA provides electronic security sys-
30 

tems for child care centers, including video surveillance systems (VSS) at all entrances and exits, including the playground area. 

GSA partners with FPS during the assessment process to identify security risks 

in child care centers based on the ISC risk management process appendix C. GSA 

uses these assessments to develop security mitigation projects. Typical projects include the installation, repairing, or replacing cameras, fences, blast protection and 

security countermeasures to safeguard child care centers from intruders. In FY 2022, GSA was appropriated $15 million for the Child Care Special Emphasis Program. The program is addressing the most important projects, and sought to 

reduce risks in the maximum number of child care centers in our inventory. Twenty-six projects received funding across 10 regions. As part of GSA’s FY 2025 budget 

request, GSA is seeking $14.25 million to continue funding this Special Emphasis 

Program to expedite action to enhance security at all child care centers in GSA controlled buildings to the applicable security standards. GSA is committed to ensuring 

child care centers are maintained in safe locations that meet applicable security 

standards. 

SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS

Courthouse Hardening 

In light of recent incidents, and continuing threats to our U.S. Courthouses, GSA 

is working in concert with the Administrative Office of the Courts to modernize 

courthouse infrastructure, including building hardening. Building hardening 

projects include; replacing or adding break-resistant glass or glass coverings for pedestrian-accessible windows, hardening exterior doors with break-resistant glass or 

glass coverings, roll-down gates, and other capabilities, installing magnetic automatic door locks that can be engaged by security officers at their guard stations and 

from the control room, and installing temporary or permanent barriers and fencing, 

where appropriate, to protect the perimeter of the facility. GSA received $15 million in Fiscal Year 2022 and $12.5 million in FY 2023 from 

the Judiciary Capital Security Fund. There are currently 67 courthouses receiving 

funding through this program, with 36 projects in the design stage and ready for 

construction. Two projects are finalizing construction in Portland, OR and San Francisco, CA. 

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 

GSA is also working to design exterior landscapes that serve as perimeter security 

measures to discourage potential crime on or around our federal facilities. Good site 

design considers security in the overall landscape visioning. Landscape architecture 

can provide natural barriers at federal sites that can prevent hiding places without 

obstructing security cameras. Good landscape architectural design can also restrict 

unwanted pedestrian access adjacent to building facades. This can be accomplished 

through the use of dense plantings, walls, fencing, topography, or other means. 

These features eliminate the need for separate standalone security elements like 

continuous rows of bollards or planters, potentially saving money and making the 

areas around facilities more aesthetically pleasing and inviting to visitors. 

While security features such as bollards, planters, or jersey barriers can be important security measures, they can also be an eyesore in communities; they often clash 

with local streetscape standards and can impede pedestrian access and connectivity. 

GSA is working with designers to provide a better first impression at federal facilities while still enhancing security. An example of this was the modernization of the 

Columbus, New Mexico Land Port of Entry (LPOE), delivered in 2019, where a depressed stormwater management facility was used as an effective barrier between 

vehicular traffic and the main port building. 

CONCLUSION

Ensuring the safety of building occupants is paramount at GSA, and we take such 

matters seriously at all times. With Congressional support of the FY 2025 budget 

request and legislative proposals, GSA will be one step closer to modernizing our 

federal footprint, which will advance key security priorities in our facilities, particularly those in our child care centers. Through continued partnership with agencies 

like FPS, GSA will continue providing support to ensure security at every facility 

across the country. Thank you for your time today and I look forward to answering 

any questions you may have. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, thank all of you for your testimony, and we 

would normally turn to questions right now. But as you can see, 
31 

we are being informed that there will be a series of votes occurring 

on the floor starting now. So, at this time, the committee will stand 

in recess, subject to the call of the chair. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. PERRY. The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 

Buildings, and Emergency Management will reconvene the previously recessed hearing. 

Sorry for the delay. The Chair now yields himself 5 minutes for 

questioning. Director Cline, the FPS has spent $30 million on tracking and 

management systems. I mean, it blows my mind. I feel like—probably just buy some off-the-shelf management system. It can’t be the 

only one that is trying to track your employees. But the cost is 

probably actually more than that. But can you give us a date when 

these systems will be fully up and running so that your law enforcement officers can do their jobs better and manage the PSOs? 

Thank you. 

Mr. CLINE. Thank you, Chairman Perry. 

So, the Post Tracking System began development back in 2018/ 

2017 timeframe, and it was designed to allow the PSOs to utilize 

their PIV card, their Personal Identification Verification card, to 

log in and enter a PIN number. And at the time, we also asked for 

a thumbprint for 100 percent, three-factor authentication. We have 

allowed that to incrementally grow more than it needed to. We 

need to get back to the basics of the intention of the Post Tracking 

System. We want it to tie to our isthmus, our suitability program, 

to make sure the guards are fully certified, their background investigation is up to date. 

And also TAMS, our Training and Academy Management System. TAMS was designed for law enforcement. We are adding PSO 

records to that, and now we are blending the two together. So, I 

have recently assigned a senior advisor to take responsibility for 

this program. We have also directed the assignment of acquisition 

people, because this is an IT-based system—acquisition people to 

embed with the Post Tracking System team to continue the development of it. And we are prepared to initiate a tiger team to review 

the entire aspects of the Post Tracking System as soon as the GAO 

report is finalized. 

But we have already started to get this corrected, sir. Putting the 

right people in the right box to fix this, it is not a hard thing to 

fix, but it takes the people with the right responsibilities and the 

right—— 

Mr. PERRY [interrupting]. So, is there a particular region? And 

is there a timeframe where we can see some successful—you know, 

I get the mission creep, I get you want to use it for a lot of things, 

like do one thing right and then figure out the rest from there. But 

you’ve got to do one thing right. 

Mr. CLINE. Absolutely, sir. The Post Tracking System is being 

deployed by region, so, we have 11 regions. On one contract, we are 

98 percent deployed. Other contracts, we are zero percent deployed. 

And there are a variety of reasons, sir. It is no excuse, but there 

are connectivity issues, but—this is a cellular-based tablet that 

they are using to sign in. Connectivity issues, there are firewall 

issues—— 
32 

Mr. PERRY [interrupting]. So, what do you project is the first region, and when they are going to be able to utilize it effectively? 

Mr. CLINE. So, PSOs are using it now, but it is not being fully 

implemented—— 

Mr. PERRY [interposing]. Right. 

Mr. CLINE [continuing]. On any of our guard contracts. To give 

you a date, sir, I need to dive back into this to give you an exact 

date. I would have to get back to you—— 

Mr. PERRY [interrupting]. Well—— 

Mr. CLINE [continuing]. With that information. 

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. As a guy who served in uniform, the 

troops pay attention to what the commander is looking at. 

Mr. CLINE. Right. 

Mr. PERRY. So, you tell me what you are looking at, give me a 

date so—you have got a suspense date so we can all get there, we 

can know what the expectation is, and know when you are going 

to get there. 

Director, of the Law Enforcement Authority of FPS is section 

1315 of title 40, United States Code. The authority is vested in the 

DHS Secretary, who can and has delegated the authority outside 

of the FPS in the past. There have been reports—and this is what 

I am trying to verify—that Homeland Security Investigations, or 

HSI, was involved in security for former President Trump’s rally in 

Butler, Pennsylvania. Is FPS’s law enforcement authority delegated 

to HSI? 

Mr. CLINE. No, sir. 

Mr. PERRY. OK. So, that is just a blanket answer. It is not delegated, so, we don’t need to care who oversees it because you are— 

it is not being delegated. 

Mr. CLINE. Right. Exactly, sir. We have not delegated this authority to anyone in DHS right now. 

Mr. PERRY. Do you know if it has been—can you provide a list 

of the delegations in the past of FPS authority? 

Mr. CLINE. Yes, sir. So, just off the top of my head, sir, so, during 

the summer of 2020, we coordinated with the Department to receive additional assistance from ICE, primarily ERO, the Border 

Patrol, primarily their tactical teams, the Federal Air Marshals, 

just to assist us in the protection of Federal facilities during the 

summer of 2020. Those delegations, we monitor those. We train the 

officers and agents on that delegation in what they can and can’t 

do based on that authority. But there is a time that goes along 

with that, and all those have ended a year ago. 

Mr. PERRY. OK. If you could, please, in the remaining time that 

I have, if you could at some point here—next 60 days or something—put a list together of when that delegation happened, when 

it started, who it was with, and when it ended. We want to make 

sure that we have a full view of how that has been used in the 

past, who has used it for what duration, and so on and so forth. 

You obviously understand that unresolved rumors with something 

so consequential as what happened in Butler are not good for the 

country, your agency, or the general public’s viewpoint of things. 

So, we would like to make sure that that is cleared up. 

Mr. CLINE. Absolutely. 
33 

Mr. PERRY. And with that, the Chair now recognizes the ranking 

member, Ms. Titus from Nevada. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Cline, after the assassination attempt on the former 

President, there was a lot of talk about drones and the Secret Service not using the drones, but the shooter did use the drones. FPS 

has counter-UAS authorities, thanks to an extension in the recent 

FAA bill. I wonder if you can tell us how you all use drones, and 

if the fact that this runs out pretty soon in October, will that make 

a difference in how you are able to or what you would like to do 

with the use of drones? 

Mr. CLINE. Absolutely, ma’am. Our counterdrone program is essential for the safety and security of our Federal facilities. This is 

6 U.S.C. 124(n), the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018. And 

you are correct, ma’am, it does expire 1 October. We request that 

that be extended or made into full legislation. 

We utilize that. We have a mobile system that we utilize when 

we work with the Marshals Service to protect a high-risk trial that 

is going on at a courthouse. The most recent one was in Brunswick, 

Georgia, for the Ahmaud Arbery civil rights trial that was held 

there. We put up our system, we mitigated seven drones that were 

there. Most of them were from news media trying to get a closeup 

of the family. But we were able to mitigate those. 

The mobile kit is very valuable for us. We can move that to 

courthouse to courthouse, and use it wherever we need it. We do 

have counter-UAS permanently implemented at a covered asset 

here in DC 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and we have eight personnel that man that system. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, good. Thank you. Then we need to do what we 

can to extend that authority, right, come October? 

Mr. CLINE. I am sorry, ma’am. 

Ms. TITUS. I said then we need to do what we can to extend that 

authority. 

Mr. CLINE. Absolutely, ma’am. 

Ms. TITUS. All right, thank you. Another question I have is that 

in May of 2023, the Department of Homeland Security issued a National Advisory System Bulletin, and it warned—and this is 

quotes—‘‘The United States remains in a heightened threat environment. In the coming months, factors that could mobilize individuals to commit violence include their perceptions of the 2024 general election cycle and legislative or judicial issues.’’ 

Now, that bulletin expired in November 2023. Do you know why 

it wasn’t extended, and should it be extended? 

And if it was in place, how would that make a difference with 

the way you operate? 

Mr. CLINE. Thank you, ma’am. So, the NTAS did expire September 2023—or, I am sorry, November 2023. In September of 

2023, the 2023 Homeland Threat Assessment was put out. And I 

believe that Homeland Threat Assessment covered a wider variety 

and audience than the NTAS did. And I believe that is why the 

NTAS was expired, to allow the new Homeland Threat Assessment 

to replace it. 
34 

Ms. TITUS. So, you think that covers it adequately, we are not 

facing some problem with the upcoming election because this isn’t 

in place? 

Mr. CLINE. I think we are in a very dynamic threat environment 

right now, ma’am, you saw last Saturday. I mean, it continues 

throughout the country, different issues, different grievances that 

people have for one reason or another. I think, we are—for FPS, 

we are operating under this environment and prepared to respond 

as necessary, but I think that the reason that it was allowed to expire is because the Homeland Threat Assessment took it over. 

Ms. TITUS. OK. Well, thank you. 

Mr. Marroni, when you talked about some of your studies of 

weapons that got through, and some of the way the guards on the 

scene missed some of this, I don’t want to criticize the people who 

were there, but did you look at turnover, and did you look at the 

notion of if benefits were better for some of these guards, morale 

might be better and you wouldn’t have turnover and you might 

have better results in the long run? 

Mr. MARRONI. So, we didn’t look at that. We didn’t look at the 

causes behind the failures to detect that half of the items we tried 

to get through. That is an important piece of the analysis. FPS 

does have a more extensive covert testing program, where they try 

and get at the causes for testing failures, and that is important. 

That is—you need that data and to look at what are the root 

causes of why we are having this failure rate so they can remediate 

it. 

Ms. TITUS. And does that have to do with turnover, or not adequate benefits for the people who are there? 

Mr. MARRONI. I don’t know. 

Ms. TITUS. Mr. Cline, do you want to talk to that? 

Mr. CLINE. So, ma’am, the contract guard program, 14,000; Federal facilities across the country, right now at this minute there are 

6,250 guard posts that are open. A guard is standing at that post. 

If a vendor gets a new contract, and they are now paying $1 more 

per hour, then our PSOs will leave to go—I mean, it is—— 

Ms. TITUS [interposing]. Yes. 

Mr. CLINE [continuing]. And it is a constant churn to keep them 

in one place. 

We renew contracts, there are 5-year contracts that are renewed 

every year, based on their performance that we have indicated in 

their Contract Performance Appraisal Rating System, CPARS. 

Whether they are going to be renewed or not is something that we 

work through. 

But it is a competitive, very competitive market. It is just like 

the market for hiring law enforcement. We are all fighting for the 

same person between all of our agencies. And it is very similar 

with the PSO program, because a guard company will have a new 

contract and they are going to start doing what they can to pull— 

especially if they meet all the training requirements. There are a 

number of requirements they have to meet for us. If they meet 

those requirements and this person gets a new contract, they are 

going to do what they can to hire them over. They don’t have to 

train them. 

Ms. TITUS. Salary, benefits—— 
35 

Mr. CLINE [interposing]. Yes. 

Ms. TITUS [continuing]. Retirement. 

Mr. CLINE. Exactly. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. 

Mr. PERRY. The gentlelady yields. The chairman recognizes the 

gentlelady from Utah, Ms. Maloy. 

Ms. MALOY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been sitting here 

listening, thinking how Americans expect to be safe in Federal 

buildings, and that is what you are tasked with. But we have got 

some holes here that need to be addressed. We have got some problems that need to be addressed. And to that end, I am going to 

yield the remainder of my time to Chairman Perry so he can follow 

up on the rest of the questions that he has. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Representative Maloy. 

Mr. Marroni, in your testimony you highlighted incidents where 

contract guards failed to be at their post, and as a result, both the 

IRS and the Social Security Administration had to close offices that 

serve the public. I know that both of those are critical in the district that I am honored to represent, and I hear regularly claims 

from constituents—my bosses—about their anger and their irritation about not being able to get their problems resolved for one reason or another. Nobody is at work, or they can’t get a return phone 

call, or whatever, and this is part and parcel of that. 

Can you detail whether FPS was immediately aware of when a 

guard was not at his or her post? 

And can you further describe exactly what happened in these incidents? 

Mr. MARRONI. So, they were not in these situations, not instantly 

aware, not in real time. And that was part of the issue, is that the 

tenants—SSA, IRS—didn’t know what was going on. FPS didn’t 

have that information in real time, either, which is a problem because then you can’t mitigate, you can’t come up with a solution 

quickly. 

In theory, PTS, the system we have talked about previously, 

could—was supposed to provide the capability remotely for FPS to 

see if these posts are being staffed. That would be an important capability, because then you could say, OK, this post isn’t there, let’s 

reach out to the vendor. Let’s tell IRS and SSA. Let’s figure out are 

there mitigations we can do. 

Mr. PERRY. And then, Director Cline, look, it is hard to fix a 

problem that you don’t know exists, right? You are wherever you 

are. Like you said, there are thousands of buildings across the 

country. Whether it is in the district I represent or somebody else’s, 

if you don’t know it is happening, you can’t address it. But at the 

same time, it has to be addressed. 

And so, I am wondering. What are the steps taken to eliminate 

the problem? And surely, everybody must have known when you 

set the system up that sooner or later this eventuality is possible, 

right? And you have got to have, like, a backup. That is obvious. 

So, where do we stand? 

Mr. CLINE. Yes, sir. So, typically, right now—so, the Post Tracking System is designed to notify us when someone is not on post. 

We are not there yet. So, the system we put in place—you mentioned the Social Security Customer Service Centers and the IRS 
36 

Tax Assistance Centers. They won’t open unless one of our PSOs 

is there, because they want to make sure there is security there. 

And if the office manager goes to the office and is waiting on the 

PSO to show up and they don’t, they will contact us and say, ‘‘Your 

PSO isn’t here.’’ We immediately coordinate with the vendor: What 

is going on? Where is your backup? Where is your other person? 

At the same time, now we are dispatching our law enforcement officers to respond to that location to either work to open the facility 

with the law enforcement officer there while we get a PSO on post, 

or get the PSO there immediately. 

It is not the final solution, but it is what we put in place now 

until—— 

Mr. PERRY [interrupting]. Yes, obviously, you need to fix in the 

meantime. 

Commissioner Doomes, was GSA aware of these occurrences, 

these failings, if so-called? 

And if so, is GSA engaged with FPS to ensure that the use of 

GSA facilities going forward is not impacted by the lack of security? 

Have you been involved in the process? 

Mr. DOOMES. Thank you for that question, Congressman. 

We do have a memorandum of agreement with the Federal Protective Service and an ongoing relationship where we share information with them about who is in the building, who our leasing facility manager is, as well as they are sharing information with us 

about incident reports. 

When there is an incident in a building, the PSOs are often the 

first responders, and they are working with the Facility Security 

Committee and the tenant agencies to understand what the threat 

is, and whether there has been an incident, and whether there 

needs to be additional countermeasures. So, our Office of Mission 

Assurance is working on a consistent and regular basis with the 

Federal Protective Service. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. Well, we have got to solve this problem, 

right? These offices can’t go—they can’t remain closed for lack of 

security. And so, we will probably look for kind of a review maybe 

after 6 months to see how that is working as we wait on other 

things, the other system, to come online more fully. 

Director Cline, an average 50 percent success rate in the covert 

testing is not really a success by anybody’s measure. The FBI Director continues to sound the alarm. I am sure you know that terror threats are at an all-time high. Crime and drug abuse is out 

of control in many places. FPS law enforcement officers and contract guards are the first line of defense at these Federal facilities. 

And unfortunately, as you know, some have lost their lives. I can’t 

imagine the numerous altercations on a probably regular basis. 

Can you talk just briefly about training, upgraded training, and 

then detecting threats and what they are advised to do when these 

things happen? 

Mr. CLINE. Thank you, sir. So, first, we can talk about threats 

and how they go about detecting those. 

All the guard contractors are required to have radio communications to communicate to our dispatch centers. So, when an incident 

occurs, or there is a threat, or there is a suspicious vehicle, what-
37 

ever it may be, they immediately notify our dispatch center and an 

officer is dispatched to that location. In some instances, it may be 

a city, county, or State officer, based on where our local police officer is staffed. But they have a process to use to report that type 

of activity. 

Sir, like you mentioned, the PSOs are the first line of defense. 

They are the ones who are getting shot, getting run over, getting 

stabbed on a daily basis. Their training—let’s focus on their National Weapons Detection Training Program, how they detect prohibited items in screening. Right now, it is a 16-hour training program that teaches them how to detect items in an x ray machine, 

and there is an 8-hour training program for the magnetometer. 

We have our Training and Professional Development Directorate 

working with academia to enhance that training to make sure that 

we are teaching adults how to properly detect that equipment. Our 

equipment is not much different than TSA’s equipment. We are 

going to have our folks go to the TSA Academy and find out how 

they do their training. Is it something that we might be able to leverage, or at least get lessons learned from how they do it? 

We know we need to increase our ability to detect prohibited 

items. A big priority for us right now is to get this fixed. I mentioned before they are detecting 400,000 prohibited items a year. 

But as was pointed out by the GAO, we are missing items that are 

prohibited, that they should pick up. We are actively working to 

enhance our training program, and then to get them through the 

training to make things better for the screening. 

Mr. PERRY. Ms. Maloy’s time has long since expired. The Chair 

now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Larsen from Washington. 

Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. Cline, the IG recommended after the 2020 Portland riots 

that there be an implementation of a process to improve preparedness for multicomponent response, including recommendations for 

FPS. Have you implemented any of those recommendations? 

Mr. CLINE. Yes, sir. So, there are three recommendations. The 

first two have been implemented. The last one is a policy, a directive on our approach to public order. That policy is with the Department for review and signature, so, that has gone through now. 

A lot of lessons learned out of Portland. Our approach to civil disorder, the training that we have conducted to all of our employees 

now to redesign our approach has all been completed. We are just 

waiting on now the policy to be signed. And that policy will be for 

all of DHS, not just FPS. 

Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Thanks. Ranking Member Titus 

mentioned the counter-UAS, and you discussed it. And I think it 

is very important to have the coordination. In fact, the leadership 

of this committee, of the Homeland Security Committee, and the 

Judiciary Committee have a joint bill to extend those authorities 

through 2028, including, if I am not mistaken, to extend FPS authorities and expand them. 

Mr. CLINE. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. And I don’t want to ask you a softball question to say can you tell us how great that is, but can you 

tell us how great that is? 
38 

No, can you explain to this committee a little bit why FPS needs 

those expanded authorities, and how do you use them? 

Mr. CLINE. So, sir, we think it is critical for our protection efforts 

of our Federal facilities. 

I did mention that we have implemented a 24/7 counter-UAS operation at a covered asset, a high-risk covered asset here in DC. 

And every day, that system is picking up drones. Typically, it is 

someone playing with a drone they got for their birthday or for 

Christmas. But there have been times when our folks have electronically mitigated those drones, and brought them down, and 

took control of those. Without that ability to do this, not only would 

our facilities be vulnerable, but a number of other facilities that 

have the authority right now to implement that: Secret Service, 

Coast Guard, CBP. If we all lose that authority, then I think there 

are a lot more vulnerabilities that we would have to deal with. 

Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Yes. Commissioner Doomes, how 

has the underfunding of the Federal Building Fund impacted your 

ability to implement security standards that the ISC developed? 

Mr. DOOMES. Thank you for that question, Ranking Member Larsen. 

The underfunding of the Federal Building Fund makes it difficult 

for us to optimize and modernize the portfolio. If we had fewer 

buildings, we think FPS might be able to secure those fewer buildings that are better utilized. We have been missing about $1 billion 

a year for the last decade. We have proposed in fiscal year 2024 

and 2025 a fix for the Federal Building Fund that would allow us 

to spend all of the revenue that came in and to accelerate the modernization of our portfolio. 

Over the last 4 fiscal years, we have shed 8 million square feet 

of space, and that is with it being underfunded. But if we were able 

to get this fixed in the fiscal year 2025 legislative proposal, we 

could continue to shed space on a faster basis, get higher utilization at our buildings, and, frankly, give the Federal Protective 

Service fewer buildings that they have to actually defend and secure. 

Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Thanks. 

Director Cline, back to you. During the break, we chatted a little 

bit about the Paris Olympics coming up starting Friday, the L.A. 

Olympics in 2028. But in between, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico— 

but mainly U.S.—is hosting the 2026 World Cup. And the way it 

is described is that it is a Super Bowl in every city—in every host 

city—for, like, 3 straight weeks. You are talking about 85,000 to 

90,000 people attending events, attending the event, plus maybe 

half of that outside each of the venues in large cities like Seattle 

and L.A. and others. 

Tell me it is on your radar. Tell me you are part of the planning 

team for the security in these cities, and that we can at least know 

that FPS is on top of this. 

Mr. CLINE. Thank you, sir. So, the planning efforts continue for 

these events. 

I mean, they are all large events. Counter-UAS will be instrumental. Our focus, of course, will be the Federal facilities that are 

in the cities where those events will take place. We are planning 
39 

and preparing for deployments of officers and agents to increase 

the protection efforts at those facilities. 

Just like we did last week in the RNC, all of our coordination efforts are in conjunction with the Secret Service as the lead for the 

NSSE-type event. We make sure that we are at the command post, 

we are working with all the partner agencies that are there. But, 

obviously, our focus is Federal facilities, but we also maintain 

awareness of what is going on within those locations. 

Planning efforts have already started, sir, and they are looking 

at who has the counter-UAS capability to go to all these locations. 

If we lose that authority, then obviously we lose the ability to do 

counter-UAS operations. But it has started. The DHS Special 

Events Working Group is already digging into it and preparing for 

those events. 

Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Fair enough. 

Thanks, I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Oregon, Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. 

Mrs. CHAVEZ-DEREMER. Thank you. I want to first thank Chairman Perry, Chairman Graves, and this committee for their support 

in helping me pass two bills through the House this past March: 

the FOCUS Act and the Impact of Crime on Public Building Usage 

Act. 

The GSA’s Public Buildings Service exists to provide safe and effective workspace for Federal employees across more than 100 Federal agencies at the best value for taxpayers. The Federal Oversight of Construction Use and Safety, or FOCUS, Act would make 

commonsense reforms to the GSA’s real estate practices through information sharing between agencies and Congress, consolidating 

unused office space, reducing real estate costs, and saving taxpayers’ dollars. 

With the new post-pandemic world we are now living in, it is 

time we review why taxpayers are paying for empty Federal office 

spaces, especially when, under this administration, there is now a 

work-from-home preference. Mr. Doomes, a recent tour of several 

Federal buildings this month by my committee staff revealed how 

few people are in many of their Federal buildings. Do you agree 

there is a need to review GSA real estate for consolidations and 

space reductions? 

Mr. DOOMES. Thank you for that question, Congresswoman. 

What I will tell you, I agree that we should be reducing the footprint, and we should be optimizing and modernizing and get better 

utilization in our Federal buildings. And I appreciate any and all 

efforts in that direction. 

Mrs. CHAVEZ-DEREMER. Thank you. In addition to the letter that 

Chairman Perry led to the GSA and FPS, my other bill that passed 

the House echoes the letter’s concern and aims to address them. 

The Impact of Crime on Public Building Usage Act requires the 

GAO to study the impact of crime, including the use of fentanyl 

and other illicit drugs, on workers’ utilization of these public buildings. It also requires the GSA to submit a report to Congress on 

the impacts and costs associated with building operations related 

to crime and public safety in and around those Federal buildings. 
40 

Mr. Marroni, you submitted testimony identifying challenges 

that undermine FPS’s productivity and oversight of contract guards 

at Federal buildings leading to instances of prohibited items entering buildings undetected. In this report, did you at all consider 

fentanyl or other illicit drugs having entered these public buildings 

due to the contract guard failures? 

Mr. MARRONI. That was not a part of our study. We looked at 

weapons that were being brought in, but not at illicit drugs. 

Mrs. CHAVEZ-DEREMER. Mr. Doomes, has concern of increased 

fentanyl use, crime, and homelessness negatively impacted the 

safety at Federal buildings? 

And if so, does the GSA have a concrete plan to address those 

concerns and keep our Federal workers safe? 

Mr. DOOMES. I appreciate that question, Congresswoman. 

What I will tell you is that GSA is always concerned about the 

tenants that are coming into our buildings, as well as the American 

citizens that come to receive services in Federal buildings. 

Earlier this year, the Administrator of GSA issued a new minimum level of security for federally owned facilities where we said, 

if it is a GSA facility, we are going to have video security, as well 

as an alarm system on every building. And what I will say is that 

security in these buildings is not static. It is constantly evolving. 

And we are working with our partners at the Federal Protective 

Service. 

So, we understand that there is a need, that there is a problem, 

and we continue to work with the FPS, who has the primary responsibility for securing these Federal buildings. 

Mrs. CHAVEZ-DEREMER. So, to follow up on that ‘‘minimum 

level,’’ is technology replacing the contract guards? 

Mr. DOOMES. No, it is there to complement that. 

Mrs. CHAVEZ-DEREMER. Complement. OK. 

Mr. Cline, I do appreciate the attention that FPS is giving to ensuring Federal facilities are safe places to work as we deal with 

ever-changing threats. As part of these ever-changing threats, has 

FPS considered the rising antisemitic threats to Federal workers 

from pro-Hamas sympathizers, or possibly peer-to-peer antisemitic 

threats to the individuals’ safety? 

Mr. CLINE. Thank you ma’am. 

So, we have a lot of demonstrations at Federal facilities. FPS was 

built in 1971 as part of GSA due to the large-scale demonstrations 

that were taking place in our country at that time. We deal with 

demonstrators on a daily basis. It is a First Amendment-protected 

activity. Normally, outside of DC, the Federal facility with the big 

flag in front represents the United States Government. And that is 

where people tend to demonstrate. 

We have had a 14-percent increase in demonstrations from last 

year to this year. Since October 7th, 652 demonstrations at our 

FPS-protected facilities. Some have included some level of violence, 

graffiti, breaking some windows, some attempted arsons, but all 

the demonstrations we approach the same way. It doesn’t matter 

the topic, it doesn’t matter the issue. We are there to protect the 

Federal facilities, to ensure that the employees can come and go. 

We have had some instances in the last 6 months where the 

demonstrators were blocking entrances, and we coordinated with 
41 

the tenants in the building to make avenues of exit if they needed 

to leave, but we primarily just sheltered the building in place for 

an hour until the demonstration was over. 

It is something we focus on every day. This week here in DC, you 

know what is occurring tomorrow, the joint session of Congress. We 

have about 100 of our law enforcement officers here in town because Federal facilities are on each side of the Capitol that we are 

responsible for protecting, and we want to make sure that the demonstrations don’t get out of hand. 

Mrs. CHAVEZ-DEREMER. Thank—— 

Mr. CLINE [interrupting]. We did work with the Federal tenants 

in those buildings, and recommended maximum telework, not to 

bring people in to be confronted. 

Mrs. CHAVEZ-DEREMER. Thank you, Mr. Cline. I am sorry, I see 

my time has gone past. 

So, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman. The Chair now 

recognizes the gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Commissioner Doomes, we continue to miss your excellent work 

as a staffer on Capitol Hill. So, welcome. 

In November 2023, GSA announced plans to dispose of 23 properties, including 2 in the District of Columbia: the Daniel Webster 

School and the DHS Nebraska Avenue Complex. In April 2024, 

GSA announced plans to dispose of the Liberty Loan Building in 

DC. What is the status of those dispositions? 

Mr. DOOMES. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

What I want to give an update to is on the Webster School, the 

Liberty Loan Building, as well as the Nebraska Avenue Complex, 

because we have heard the imperative from this committee to move 

forward on disposing of underutilized property. 

So, in terms of the Webster School, that facility has already been 

reported excess. Federal screening and the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance screening have already taken place. Right now, we 

are screening for a possible public benefit conveyance. We expect 

that those application deadlines for those uses are on August 15 

and August 16. If there is no application in that timeframe, we will 

move forward on a private sale. We have worked closely with the 

Department of Homeland Security in order to put in some security 

covenants that will run with the land, but that disposal is moving 

forward. 

In terms of the Liberty Loan Building, that asset has also been 

reported excess. And right now, we are engaged in due diligence activities such as environmental and title work. In March of 2025, we 

expect the employees in that building to be moved out of that 

building to a different location. And after those due diligence activities are finished, the Federal screening will commence, and we will 

move forward with that on a private sale, as well. 

In regards to the Nebraska Avenue Complex, this is where we 

are looking for some help from Congress. We are trying to finish 

the consolidation of the Department of Homeland Security at the 

West Campus. Right now, there is one agency component left on 

the Nebraska Avenue Complex, the Intelligence and Analysis Unit. 
42 

We are working very closely with the Department of Homeland Security to put together a housing plan for that agency. While we are 

waiting for that, so that we can move that agency off the Nebraska 

Avenue Complex, I have directed the Assistant Commissioner of 

Dispositions to begin work with the District of Columbia to start 

the small area planning necessary for the Nebraska Avenue Complex because we think that is going to generate the best return for 

taxpayers. The District of Columbia has spoken loudly and definitively about what the use is for the Nebraska Avenue Complex, 

and therefore, generating a greater return for taxpayers. 

So, all three of those disposals are moving forward. But the Webster School is the furthest along, then the Liberty Loan, and we are 

planning for the Nebraska Avenue Complex disposal. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you for that statement. Given that the Webster School has been vacant since the 1980s, Chairman Perry and 

I introduced a bill to direct GSA to dispose of the property by December 31, 2025. The House passed the bill. The Senate Committee 

on Environment and Public Works passed the bill, and it is now 

pending on the Senate calendar. I hope the Senate will pass it 

soon. 

I thank the subcommittee for holding this critical hearing on protecting Federal employees and Federal buildings. 

I want to take a step back to discuss balancing security and public access to public property in a democracy. Since 2000, I have introduced the United States Commission on an Open Society with 

Security Act, which would create a commission to investigate how 

we can maintain public access to public property while actively responding to substantial security threats. The impetus for this bill 

was the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Its importance grew after 

the terrorist attacks on September the 11th, 2001, and it has 

reached a peak urgency since the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol 

on January 6, 2021. 

The succession of tragic events endured by our Nation has led to 

a series of sweeping security increases that are deemed both necessary and temporary in the moment but create lasting security infrastructure and practices that are difficult to dismantle on our 

open, democratic society. What we thought would be temporary infringements on our open society have turned into permanent restrictions on how citizens interact with each other and our democratic institutions. We must acknowledge and accept that we have 

entered an era of constant domestic and institutional threats, requiring ever-higher levels of security for our people and public 

spaces. 

However, because emergencies typically dictate security decisions, essential decisions on the proper balance between security, 

individual rights, and freedoms enjoyed in an open society have 

been repeatedly deferred. My bill would ensure that these longoverdue discussions take place in a public forum with experts 

drawn from across the spectrum. To date, security planning has 

been delegated almost exclusively to security intelligence and military experts. Although their input is indispensable, they cannot be 

expected to consider matters outside their expertise. 

To strike a better balance that gives sufficient importance to our 

democratic traditions, we must invite experts from diverse fields to 
43 

do the same. Therefore, the commission would be composed not 

only of security, intelligence, and military experts, but also experts 

from such fields as business, architecture, technology, law, city 

planning, art, engineering, philosophy, history, sociology, and psychology. 

I urge the committee to take up this bill, and I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentlelady as I channel my 

inner Garret Graves reasonableness. And now the Chair recognizes 

the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Ezell. 

Mr. EZELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having 

this hearing today for us, and thank you all for being here today. 

This hearing comes at a very crucial time. As we deal with the 

assassination attempt on former President Trump, securing our 

Federal buildings is paramount. The Federal Protective Service 

must have the capability to respond and make decisions in the interest of security, and these decisions cannot be based on political 

bias. 

When I was a sheriff and an officer, recruiting, retention, and 

training was always at the top of my mind. However, these issues 

seem to have gotten only worse here over the last few years. The 

manpower challenges the FPS is facing, coupled with the difficulties faced by vacant buildings, the rise of homelessness, and drug 

abuse is deeply concerning. That is why I sent a letter, along with 

subcommittee Chairman Perry and Congresswoman ChavezDeRemer, expressing concern and demanding answers to this. 

Director Cline, you stated in response to the letter, ‘‘FPS experienced a 138-percent increase in demonstrations and an overall 24- 

percent increase in assault on Government employees.’’ If you 

could, expand on this a little bit, and how has this impacted the 

health and safety of our law enforcement personnel and Protective 

Security Officers since 2020. 

Mr. CLINE. Thank you, sir, I appreciate the question. 

First, the Protective Security Officers—the number of increased 

assaults that we have indicated, 85 to 90 percent of those are on 

either our uniformed police officers or our contract Protective Security Officers. And it typically occurs at an entrance or at a screening station when someone is just not happy with what is going on 

there, or they are not happy with a benefit that was either denied 

or reduced by a Government agency. 

Recruiting and retention is huge for us. We are competing in the 

same market as everyone else. I took over as the Director a year 

and a half ago. We had almost 500 vacancies. We are down to 409 

vacancies today, and we continue to chip away at this. By the end 

of next month, we will have an additional 67 new employees on 

board. We have five new police officer training classes scheduled 

for next year. We just offered 45 tentative job offers at the DHS 

job fair out in Dulles a couple of weeks ago. And based on the 

shortage of staff that I have, we recently implemented a retention 

incentive to keep our current workforce with us until we get 

through the entire election cycle. You have seen what type of activity we have. 

Mr. EZELL. Right. 

Mr. CLINE. We have got an election coming up, we have got a 

certification, we have got an inauguration. I need to keep as many 
44 

people as I can on board until I can fill those current vacancies, 

and then we can get rid of the retention incentive. 

Mr. EZELL. Thank you. 

Mr. CLINE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. EZELL. I was even more surprised to learn that, despite your 

agency’s recommendations to improve security, they often go ignored. In the time that we live in, we cannot afford to have lax security as we head towards November. In response, I, along with my 

colleague from Louisiana, Troy Carter, introduced the Federal Protective Service Reform Act, which requires each agency to provide 

a written reason as to why they did not implement FPS recommendations. 

Mr. Cline, do you believe that receiving similar responses will 

help you better protect your Federal buildings? 

Mr. CLINE. Thank you, Congressman. Absolutely. Your introduction of your bill, the Senate-side introduction of a similar companion bill, GSA’s recent order requiring the implementation of the 

video surveillance systems and the intrusion detection systems at 

GSA-owned facilities, and then the new ISC Executive order is 

really going to strengthen our position and strengthen the requirement for those agencies to fund the implementation of those countermeasures. 

Mr. EZELL. Thank you. 

Mr. Marroni, you stated in your testimony, during your covert 

testing, approximately 50 percent of prohibited items in Federal 

buildings went undetected by FPS. Even so, 80 percent of the time, 

FPS blamed a human factor as the cause. While FPS has implemented several changes since this test, what do you think accounts 

for contract guards missing this inexcusably large percentage of 

hazards? 

Mr. MARRONI. So, there could be a number of reasons. ‘‘Human 

factor’’ is a pretty broad term. That could mean the person has 

been trained appropriately, but they just didn’t carry out the techniques like they should have. It could mean there is an equipment 

issue. It could mean they didn’t report properly in the system, and 

so, the data is not entirely correct. 

So, what is important there is for FPS to take deliberate actions, 

as they have already started to do, to figure out what are these 

issues, what are the root causes of items getting through at this 

rate, and then taking actions to address those specific issues. So, 

the data is a first step. The next step is to figure out what are the 

root causes. 

Mr. EZELL. Very good. Do you think hiring more Federal agents, 

rather than contracting guards, will help with the accountability 

issue? 

Mr. Cline. 

Mr. CLINE. I am sorry. The beginning of your question? 

Mr. EZELL. Yes, yes. I have been responsible in my lifetime as 

a sheriff and as a chief of police of being in charge of making sure 

a building was secure. I always had full-time, State-certified law 

enforcement officers under my control and my staff. Nothing 

against security officers, but a lot of times these security officers 

do not have arrest authority like a police officer or a certified officer. 
45 

So, my concern is that we have officers in place to protect a 

building or whatever it may be. They don’t have arrest authority, 

so, that poses another issue. I would—and I know I am kind of 

talking a little bit about my feelings about this, but it is very important that we start looking at full-time certified officers to maybe 

transition into these part-time positions so that they can have the 

full authority that they need to get the job done. So, if you could, 

just talk about that a minute. 

Mr. CLINE. Certainly, sir. That is a discussion we have had in 

the past. We mentioned before our contract PSOs. If another guard 

company takes another contract and they are offering $0.50 more 

per hour, or $1 more per hour, then we are probably going to lose 

that person to go to the other. It is a higher paying job. 

So, first, we have got some legislation we have pursued that 

would give our Protective Security Officers a little bit more of our 

authority, our Federal authority. Right now—you are correct, sir— 

they can only detain. They have the authority—— 

Mr. EZELL [interposing]. Right. 

Mr. CLINE [continuing]. To detain someone, not arrest them. The 

legislative proposal that we put forward would allow a couple of 

things. 

First, it would allow us to cross State lines with those PSOs. So, 

a good example is Superstorm Sandy in New York. We needed to 

bring in more PSOs to protect FEMA sites where they were bringing in equipment. We wanted to bring them in from Philadelphia, 

Pittsburgh into New York. We had to get approval from the State 

attorney general’s office to waive that licensing requirement to 

bring them in as armed guards. This legislative proposal we have 

submitted would allow us to delegate some Federal authority so we 

don’t have to go and ask for approval to cross State lines. 

Secondarily, this new legislative proposal will also allow the Protective Security Officer to pursue an active shooter. Right now, 

they are licensed by the State. They can man a post. That is their 

duty assignment. In theory, they don’t have the ability to run and 

respond to an active shooter. They would. We all know that no one 

is going to stand by while someone is getting shot. But this new 

authority will allow us to train them on offensive tactics to go and 

pursue an active shooter event. 

But I agree with you, sir. We have looked at and continue to look 

at the possibility. Do we Federalize some of this, some of the PSO 

functions? It is a big program, but we are considering what next 

steps to take to make it better. 

Mr. EZELL. Thank you sir. 

And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA [presiding]. The gentleman’s time, 

plus an additional 3 minutes and 41 seconds, have expired. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. I want to thank you all for being here 

today. 

Mr. Marroni, I appreciate the work that the GAO has done to 

help identify some of these concerns to the Congress. I am curious 

about a few things. You all have done similar work at airports. And 

as you know, there are airports that have private contract security. 

Have you seen similar concerns or failures at airports at a rate 
46 

that may exceed TSA, meaning private contractors failing at a 

higher rate than TSA? 

Mr. MARRONI. So, we certainly have done work at the TSA. I am 

not your best expert on that, but I can get better—— 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA [interrupting]. OK, all right. I tell you 

what. We will follow up with a question for the record there. 

Mr. MARRONI. Yes. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. So, you are not here to necessarily 

say that the contracting officers are the problem then, is—— 

Mr. MARRONI [interrupting]. Right. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK. Let me ask you this question. 

How many failures would it take for us to have a potentially catastrophic incident? 

Mr. MARRONI. Well, one failure could potentially—— 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA [interrupting]. That is right, one failure. And what you evaluated was nearly a 50-percent failure rate. 

So, another question—and I am not a math whiz, but as I recall, 

there was an assessment that was done by, I believe, GSA—and 

Mr. Doomes can correct me—that found that 17 of 24 Federal 

buildings in the Washington, DC, area had occupancy rates of 

lower than 25 percent, some as low as 9 percent. 

So, let me say it again. I am not a math whiz, but if we actually 

consolidated the Federal space and shrunk the footprint that was 

required to be secure, would it be easier to better protect a smaller 

footprint? 

Mr. MARRONI. It would certainly cost less. And it potentially—if 

you have a smaller amount of facilities to do, the shortage issues 

that Director Cline has discussed might be less of an issue. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Mr. Cline, would you agree with that? 

Mr. CLINE. I would agree, sir. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK. So, I just want to make note that 

that is something that we need to be more aggressive about in addition, obviously, to helping you fill your vacancies. 

Mr. Cline, have you seen any trends where the private contractors are less successful at providing security, compared to your own 

officers? 

Mr. CLINE. No, sir. So, our law enforcement officers don’t do the 

screening operations, x ray, mag, visitor check. It is done by the 

contract PSOs. Our responsibility is to oversee that, and to conduct 

on-the-job training, conduct compliance of contract staff. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK, let me ask you to probably go a 

little bit outside of your scope then. What about CSOs for some of 

the Federal courts? Have you seen where the Federal employees 

that are working for the Marshals Service have a higher rate of 

success, compared to the private contractors? 

And if you don’t know, that is a fine answer. 

Mr. CLINE. I don’t know, sir. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK, OK. I would just ask Mr. 

Marroni and Mr. Cline if you could both look into that question and 

follow back up with us, as well. Mr. Marroni, that would be the second one for you. 

And then lastly for Mr. Cline, I assume that you are the contractor to these private security companies, is that correct? 
47 

Mr. CLINE. They are on contract from the Federal Protective 

Service. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK. Is there any type of performance 

requirement to where taxpayers would actually save money as a result of these folks not doing their job? 

Mr. CLINE. Yes, sir. So, when a PSO fails a covert test, we are 

deducting the hours that PSO has stood that post from the payment to the vendor. It takes a while to get that processed. There 

are a lot of hands involved in that pot. 

And it is the same with an open post. The chairman mentioned 

Social Security Customer Service Centers and IRS Tax Assistance 

Centers. When the vendor fails to post a PSO at that post, which 

is called an open post, we don’t pay the vendor for those hours that 

were left open. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. So, I just want to make sure I understand before you get too far down. 

So, number one, you are not paying them during the periods 

when they are not there, which makes sense. 

Mr. CLINE. Exactly, sir. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. But then you are also saying that you 

are not paying them during the periods when they failed. 

Mr. CLINE. When they failed. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK, so—but you are not doing anything to extrapolate out—for example, Mr. Marroni’s team found 

that nearly 50 percent of the time, these folks are failing. So, you 

are not extrapolating that out and saying we are cutting half of 

your funding, correct? 

Mr. CLINE. That is correct, sir, because it is multiple contracts 

that were in place when the GAO—and same with us when we do 

our—— 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA [interrupting]. You do see the concern 

that I am highlighting, though. 

Mr. CLINE. Yes, sir. Absolutely. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK, all right. I do think that we need 

to be thinking about a remedy there, because there needs to be a 

performance—if people aren’t performing, they shouldn’t be paid. 

And all the people that work on our team, they know that. I say 

it every week. We don’t pay them to sit there, we pay them to perform. And I think that is really important because, if they are failing 50 percent of the time when his teams are testing them, they 

are probably failing 50 percent of the time. 

Mr. CLINE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. And I think we need to look at that. 

Mr. Doomes, it is good to see you again. We just need to get you 

a permanent seat here with a permanent nameplate. I hope you 

and your family are doing well. Again, good to see you again. Back 

to our dialogue about the footprint, and just—it would be easier to 

secure a smaller footprint, especially if it is not being needed because that way we save taxpayer money on the excess of space. We 

also can help Mr. Cline secure a smaller space by allowing him to 

focus on what truly needs to be protected, as opposed to vacant office buildings. Would you concur that that makes sense? 

Mr. DOOMES. Congressman, I agree, and that is why in fiscal 

year 2025, we made a request for a $425 million space optimization 
48 

program where we would be able, for the first time ever, to front 

the cost of furniture, fixtures, and equipment, and the move costs 

so we can move agencies out of buildings where they aren’t fully 

utilizing into a building where we can get a higher level of utilization rate, which is why it is so important that we get full funding 

on the Federal Building Fund. 

We have done a pretty decent job of reducing the footprint over 

the last 4 fiscal years. We have gotten rid of 8 million square feet. 

We could do more if we have the money. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Mr. Doomes, you can understand, I 

am sure, my initial reaction when you said you needed money to 

save space. I am thinking that that seems a little bit backwards, 

in that it seems like saving space would actually result in cost savings. Can you help me understand, if we were to invest $425 million, what type of cost savings we would see over what period? Just 

a rough order of magnitude. 

Mr. DOOMES. I believe we can save—I think the number is $6 billion over 10 years. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. $6 billion over 10 if we—and again, 

ballpark, I am not going to hold you to it, but just a ballpark range. 

Mr. DOOMES. Well, I will follow up with a precise number, sir. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK, great, great. I would appreciate 

that. 

f 

Post-Hearing Response to Hon. Garret Graves’ Request for Information 

from Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, U.S. General Services Administration 

The FY 2025 Optimization Fund has the potential to yield $1 billion in long-term 

federal taxpayer savings, if invested as proposed. GSA continues to identify projects 

that represent strong investment opportunities for the federal taxpayer. 

If GSA was provided full access to the annual revenues and collections deposited 

in the Federal Buildings Fund (FBF), GSA would be able to reduce the backlog of 

projects, deferred maintenance, and needed repairs that have accumulated as a result of chronic underfunding over the past 13 fiscal years. 

If the current funding levels remain, deferred maintenance, currently at $4.6 billion, is expected to exponentially increase. Since we cannot maintain our buildings 

sufficiently when needed, PBS has to delay repairs, which ultimately costs the government more money. As noted by the GAO in its November 2023 report, ‘‘Federal 

Real Property: Agencies Should Provide More Information about Increases in Deferred Maintenance and Repair,’’ GAO estimates that ‘‘inflation from fiscal years 

2017 through 2022 effectively eroded the purchasing power of maintenance and repair funding by about 26 percent, particularly in the past several years. Put another 

way, $1 million in funding in fiscal year 2022 would only accomplish what $740,313 

would have accomplished in fiscal year 2017. These inflationary effects make it challenging to complete ongoing and deferred maintenance projects, placing further constraints on agencies’ ability to address their DM&R backlogs.’’ 

Additionally, modernizing federally owned facilities will enable GSA to consolidate 

and reduce the Federal Government’s heavy reliance on space leased from private 

lessors, which will provide cost avoidance many times over. Since 2018 through the 

end of 2023, GSA has achieved over $7.7 billion in lease cost avoidance. GSA will 

be able to maximize lease cost avoidance with full access to the FBF. 

Furthermore, GSA conservatively estimates that we could save at least $40 million per year if our prospectus threshold was increased to $10 million from the current $3.926 million to construct, alter or acquire federally owned facilities or to lease 

space. This higher threshold will allow GSA to more quickly tackle routine projects, 

which will reduce repair costs, shorten delivery times, and support agencies’ mission 

needs more effectively. 
49 

Mr. DOOMES. But just for clarification, we can not only sell buildings, I mean, move people out of buildings where they are underutilized, we can turn around and sell those buildings, and we have 

got a pretty good track record. We put up 25 buildings for sale in 

November 2023, or announced that we were moving them through 

the disposition process. We have got a great track record with the 

Volpe Project, where we disposed of 10 acres and built on the other 

4 acres and used the value there. And we are looking for other 

projects like that across the Nation. 

So, we are going to have to spend money in order to save money, 

but we have the track record, and we can provide you more details—— 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA [interrupting]. The rough order of 

magnitude of savings that you noted seems like it would be more 

than worth it, and I look forward to receiving your followup on 

that. 

Last question, Mr. Doomes. If there is an agency I don’t like, 

could I get you to just get rid of their space, and then that way 

we can deal with them that way? Would that work? 

Mr. DOOMES. I can’t recommend that course of action. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Thank you, Mr. Doomes. 

I want to thank Ranking Member Titus’ patience as I went a little overboard, as well as a couple of others. 

Ms. Titus, Ranking Member Titus, do you have any followup or 

closing? 

Ms. TITUS. No. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK, great. So, I yield back, and I 

don’t think there are any further questions from the subcommittee. 

And so, that does conclude our hearing for today. 

I would like to thank each of the witnesses. As you know, the 

record remains open. There are some questions for the record that 

we have dialoged here, as well as others that will be submitted. 

But I appreciate you being here today. 

And the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(51) 

1Dep’t of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) Surveillance Technologies, (Jan. 24, 2022), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022l0.pdf; Office of Inspector 

General, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Management Alert—FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS 

Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1), (Nov. 2, 2020), 

available at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-11/OIG-21-05-Nov20.pdf. 2Letter from Sen. Josh Hawley, to the Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t 

of Homeland Security, (July 19, 2024), available at https://www.hawley.senate.gov/wp-content/ 

uploads/2024/07/Hawley-Letter-to-Mayorkas-on-whistleblowers-re-assassination-attempt-onTrump.pdf. 3 Examining the Effectiveness of the Federal Protective Service: Are Federal Buildings Secure? 

Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency 

Management, of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 118th Cong. (July 23, 2024) 4Dep’t of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) Surveillance Technologies, (Jan. 24, 2022), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022l0.pdf; Office of Inspector 

General, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Management Alert—FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS 

Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1), (Nov. 2, 2020), 

available at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-11/OIG-21-05-Nov20.pdf. 

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS TO RICHARD K. CLINE, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE

SERVICE, MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY, FROM HON. SCOTT PERRY

Question 1. The law enforcement authority for FPS is section 1315 of title 40, 

United States Code. That authority is vested in the DHS Secretary, who can, and 

has, delegated the authority outside of FPS.1 There have been reports that Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) was involved in security for former President 

Trump’s rally in Butler, Pennsylvania.2 During the hearing, you indicated that FPS’ 

law enforcement authority is not delegated to HSI. You further indicated that the 

authority is not delegated to ‘‘anyone in DHS right now.’’ 3 In the past, entities outside FPS within DHS were delegated authority under 40 U.S.C. §1315.4

Question 1.a. Please provide a list of past delegations of FPS law enforcement authority under 40 U.S.C. § 1315 to entities outside of the FPS, and dates and details 

as to when those delegations were rescinded. 

ANSWER. As background, 40 U.S.C. § 1315 authorizes the Secretary of Homeland 

Security to designate employees of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) as officers and agents for the purpose of protecting federal property and people on the property. This authority is found at 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1). Additionally, 

40 U.S.C. § 1315 authorizes the DHS Secretary to delegate 40 U.S.C. § 1315 authority for the protection of specific buildings to another federal agency where, in the 

Secretary’s discretion, the Secretary determines it necessary for the protection of 

that building. This authority is found in Historical and Statutory Notes to 40 U.S.C. 

§ 1315. 

Past authority to designate DHS employees under 40 U.S.C. § 1315 occurred in 

situations where the Federal Protective Service (FPS) did not have law enforcement 

resources to protect certain FPS-protected federal facilities and property. In the 

past, employees of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration’s Federal 

Air Marshal Service have been cross-designated with 40 U.S.C. § 1315 jurisdiction 

and police powers for specific FPS protected facilities and property. Homeland Security Investigations law enforcement personnel were not cross-designated under 40 

U.S.C. § 1315 for former President Trump’s rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, and there 

are no current cross-designations in place within the Department. 

The Secretary delegated 40 U.S.C. § 1315 authority to two entities within DHS: 

the Office of the Chief Security Officer and FPS. Additionally, authority to designate 
52 

employees of another federal agency outside of DHS was delegated to the Under 

Secretary for Management and the delegation process is the responsibility of FPS. 

There were 26 past delegations of law enforcement authority issued to four departments that have been rescinded. Some of those delegations were originally 

issued by the General Services Administration, which was the parent agency of FPS 

prior to the establishment of DHS. 

Law enforcement delegations are issued for specific locations. Often, as one delegation for a location expires, another one is issued for the same location. As such, 

over time, there are multiple delegations associated with the same locations. 

Department and Total # Delegations Rescind 

Date(s) Location(s) 

U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) (8) ..... 1. 9/16/08 

2. 12/3/10 

3. 11/28/11 

4. 12/1/12 

5. 11/27/13 

6. 10/27/18 

7. 12/9/20 

8. 7/10/23 

100 Bureau Dr, Gaithersburg, MD; 325 

Broadway St, Boulder, CO; The Table Mountain Field Site & Radio Quiet Zone, Plateau 

Rd/N 39th St, Longmont, CO 

U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) (4) ..... 1. 3/18/13 Hoover Dam, NV 

2. 2/16/15 

3. 2/8/18 

4. 10/11/22 Chemawa Indian School, OR 

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) (8) ............ 1. 10/1/93 J Edgar Hoover Bldg. 

2. 9/30/98 J Edgar Hoover Bldg., Main Justice Bldg. 

3. 8/10/99 J Edgar Hoover Bldg., Main Justice Bldg., 

Lincoln Place (VA), Control Data (MD) 

4. 7/26/17 J Edgar Hoover Bldg., FBI Field Office 

5. 12/9/20 J Edgar Hoover Bldg., FBI Field Office, FBI 

Field Office Automobile Maintenance Facility 

6. 12/15/22 J Edgar Hoover Bldg., FBI Field Office, FBI 

Field Office Automobile Maintenance Facility 

7. 12/1/14 FBI Field Office, MO 

8. 9/30/99 Bicentennial Bldg., DC 

U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDT) (6) 1. 10/13/88 Internal Revenue Service location in WV 

2. 10/31/93 

3. 7/7/97 

4. 12/9/20 

5. 5/11/18D 

6. 4/23/20 

US Mint and Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) six locations in DC, NY, PA, KY, 

CO, and CA 
53 

5Dep’t of Homeland Security briefing materials for Staff of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (July 2015), Delegations of Authority (on file with Comm.). 6GAO, Federal Real Property: Preliminary Results Show Federal Buildings Remain Underutilized Due to Longstanding Challenges and Increased Telework, GAO–23–106200 (July 13, 2023), 

available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106200. 7 Id. 8 Examining the Effectiveness of the Federal Protective Service: Are Federal Buildings Secure? 

Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency 

Management of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 118th Cong. (July 23, 2024) (statement of Mr. David Marroni, Director, Physical Infrastructure, GAO). 

Question 1.b. In 2015, FPS authority had been delegated to 21 departments and 

agencies outside of DHS.5 Are there currently delegations of FPS authority outside 

of DHS? If so, please provide a list of such delegations, including to which other departments and agencies. If not, please provide the dates of when such delegations 

were rescinded. 

ANSWER. There are currently eight delegations of law enforcement authority 

issued to departments outside of DHS. Seven are renewals of prior delegations for 

the same locations. 

• DOC (1)—renewal 

° 100 Bureau Dr, Gaithersburg, MD 

° 325 Broadway St, Boulder, CO 

° The Table Mountain Field Site & Radio Quiet Zone, Plateau Rd/N 39th St, 

Longmont, CO 

• DOI (1)—renewal 

° Chemawa Indian School, OR 

• U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (3)—renewal 

° Bethesda and Poolesville Locations, MD 

° National Cancer Institute at Ft. Detrick, MD 

° Rocky Mountain Laboratory, MT 

• DOJ (1)—renewal 

° J Edgar Hoover Bldg., Washington, DC 

° FBI Washington Field Office NW, Washington, DC 

° Automobile Maintenance Facility, Washington, DC 

° 26 Federal Plaza Floors 20–29, New York, NY 

° 290 Broadway Floors 8–10, New York NY 

° 2400 Schuster Dr., Hyattsville, MD 

° 395 Patriots Plaza Floors 3–4, Washington, DC 

° 375 Patriots Plaza Floors 3–10, Washington, DC 

° 355 Patriots Plaza, Washington, DC 

• USDT (1)—renewal—US Mint and BEP facilities 

° BEP—three locations in MD, DC, and TX. 

° US Mint—six locations in DC, NY, PA, KY, CO, and CA 

• U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)—1—new 

° Location in Bannister Federal Complex, MO. 

Question 2. Last year, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report highlighting how much space is being wasted at empty Federal buildings.6 For 

example, GAO’s review of headquarters buildings in D.C. revealed that 17 of the 24 

buildings had a 25 percent or less occupancy rate, with some as low as 9 percent.7

FPS spent almost $1.7 billion on contract guards—76 percent of FPS’s budget in Fiscal Year 2024.8

Question 2.a. What is the average cost to protect a Federal building? 

ANSWER. The average annual cost of protecting a federal building is $176,490 regardless of occupancy rate. This reflects the total cost for all of FPS services divided 

by the total building count of 10,088. Tables 1 and 2 below provide greater detail 

explaining this average cost. 

Question 2.b. Provide a breakdown of the average costs of protecting a Federal 

building. 

ANSWER. Determining the average cost per building requires an assessment of 

FPS’s building portfolio for all services. For example in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, there 

were a total of 10,088 buildings with operating expenses for FPS protective services 

recorded against these properties; 3,023 of these buildings specifically had Protective Security Officers (PSO) support as a form of protective service; and 672 of the 

10,088 buildings had Technical Countermeasures (TCM) support. The tables below 

show various combinations and associated average costs. 
54 

9FPS Operating Expenses: 

• Salaries and Benefits for the federal staff; 

• Protective Services for Law Enforcement Operations, Investigations, Criminal Intelligence, 

Information Sharing, K–9 Operations, MegaCenter Operations, Critical Incidents and Special Security Operations, Fleet, and Facilities; 

• Equipment for Law Enforcement including, firearms, body armor, protective eyewear, body 

cameras, dash cameras, and personal protective equipment; 

• Training for Law Enforcement including entry-level training, Law Enforcement advanced 

and refresher training, Law Enforcement standards and certification training, and administrative training; • Agency-wide support for Policy and Planning, Acquisition Management, Personnel Security 

(Background Investigations and Adjudications), Homeland Security Presidential Directive12 (HSPD–12), Budget, Finance; and Revenue, Environmental Compliance, Workforce Planning (Human Capital), and Information; and • Technology, Facilities and Fleet Management, Logistics, and other business support services. 

PSO: A nationwide program that provides professionally trained and certified contractor security guards stationed onsite at FPS-protected federal facilities. PSOs are trained in the protection of life and property and are certified in the use of firearms, batons, magnetometers, and 

X-ray machines. 

TCM: TCM constitutes capabilities or services that provide technical and subject matter expertise to the design, implementation, and operations and maintenance of TCM projects and 

equipment at FPS-protected federal facilities. 10Facilities with $0 in costs are included in response to the request. However, FPS did not 

provide services to these specific buildings and therefore no costs were incurred during the covered period. 

Table 1: Breakdown of Average Cost per Program, Project, or Activity (PPA) 

FPS PPA 9 FY 2023 Total 

Cost Per PPA 

Building 

Count per 

PPA 

Average Cost 

Per PPA 

Operating Expenses ............................................................ $460,635,526 10,088 $45,661.73 

Protective Security Officers ................................................ $1,301,976,955 3,023 $430,690.36 

Technical Countermeasures ................................................ $17,824,420 672 $26,524.43 

Totals .............................................................................. $1,780,436,901 10,088 

Table 2: Average Cost per Building by Scenario 

Scenario 

Combined 

Average Costs 

from Table 1 

Operating Expenses Only ............................................................................................................ $45,661.73 

Operating Expenses + Protective Security Officers ................................................................... $476,352.09

Operating Expenses + Protective Security Officers + Technical Countermeasures .................. $502,876.52 

Question 2.c. Provide the costs associated with protecting the 24 headquarter 

buildings identified in GAO’s 2023 report, including a breakdown by building, for 

the last full fiscal year. 

ANSWER. The following table provides the details requested for the 24 Agency 

Headquarters Buildings identified in GAO’s 2023 report. 

Table 3: FY 2023 Buildings Costs by Category 

Building Data FY 2023 Cost by Building 10

Building 

Code Agency Address/Name Operating Expenses PSOs TCMs Total Cost Per Building 

DC0459 Multi-Tenant 1300 Pennsylvania 

Ave NW/Ronald 

Reagan Building.

$1,015,007.95 $32,382,098.43 $578,946.65 $33,976,053.03 
55 

Table 3: FY 2023 Buildings Costs by Category—Continued 

Building Data FY 2023 Cost by Building 10

Building 

Code Agency Address/Name Operating Expenses PSOs TCMs Total Cost Per Building 

DC0003 U.S. Department of Agriculture.

1400 Independence 

Ave SW/Whitten and 

South Buildings.

$126,477.51 $– $– $126,477.51 

DC0013 Multi-Tenant 1401 Constitution Ave 

NW/Herbert Hoover 

Building.

$125,777.09 $– $56,480.40 $182,257.49 

VA0919 U.S. Department of Defense.

4825 Mark Center 

Drive, Alexandria, VA/ 

The Mark Center.

$– $119,652.94 $– $119,652.94 

DC0010 Multi-Tenant 400 Maryland Ave 

SW/ Lyndon Baines 

Johnson Building.

$244,639.03 $3,645,311.44 $48,763.12 $3,938,713.59 

DC0093 DOE ............ 1000 Independence 

Ave SW/Forrestal 

Building.

$153,557.88 $– $– $153,557.88 

DC0115 HHS ............ 200 Independence Ave 

SW/Humphrey Building.

$95,447.79 $– $27,301.32 $122,749.11 

DC0031 Multi-Tenant 301 7th Street SW / 

7th and D Streets.

$376,986.19 $3,336,233.10 $39,588.84 $3,752,808.13 

DC0092 U.S. Department of 

Housing and 

Urban.

451 7th Street SW / 

Robert C. Weaver 

Building.

$133,057.81 $10,386,472.40 $48,761.52 $10,568,291.73 

DC0023 DOJ ............. 950 Pennsylvania Ave 

NW/Robert Kennedy 

Building.

$69,983.80 $– $– $69,983.80 

DC0116 U.S. Department of 

Labor.

200 Constitution Ave 

NW/Frances Perkins 

Building.

$228,662.15 $– $52,343.40 $281,005.55 

DC0046 Multi-Tenant 2201 C Street NW / 

Harry S. Truman 

Building.

$89,835.01 $– $52,343.40 $142,178.41 

DC0020 Multi-Tenant 1849 C Street NW / 

Stewart L. Udall 

Building.

$70,162.96 $– $38,721.72 $108,884.68 

1500DC USDT ........... 1500 Pennsylvania 

Ave NW/Treasury 

Building.

$– $– $– $– 

DC0687 U.S. Department of 

Transportation.

1200 New Jersey Ave 

SE/William T. Coleman Jr. Building.

$33,957.50 $– $– $33,957.50 

DC0007 Multi-Tenant 810 Vermont Ave / VA 

Admin Building.

$270,820.38 $2,713,667.02 $29,251.32 $3,013,738.72 
56 

Table 3: FY 2023 Buildings Costs by Category—Continued 

Building Data FY 2023 Cost by Building 10

Building 

Code Agency Address/Name Operating Expenses PSOs TCMs Total Cost Per Building 

DC0028 Multi-Tenant 1200 Pennsylvania 

Ave NW/William J. 

Clinton Building.

$370,961.48 $3,185,632.74 $75,129.17 $3,631,723.39 

DC0021 Multi-Tenant 1800 F St. NW / No 

Name.

$542,043.54 $3,868,930.82 $20,078.64 $4,431,053.00 

DC0369 National 

Aeronautics 

and Space 

Administration.

300 E Street SW / 

Mary W. Jackson 

Building.

$36,857.99 $– $– $36,857.99 

VA1413 National 

Science 

Foundation.

2415 Eisenhower Ave 

/ No Name.

$269,033.39 $3,149,276.95 $46,370.88 $3,464,681.22 

MD0199 

#1.

MD0254 

#2.

Multi-Tenant 11555 Rockville Pike, 

Rockville, MD / White 

Flint Buildings #1 & 

#2.

$577,853.86 $6,776,656.92 $– $7,354,510.78 

DC0082 Multi-Tenant 1900 E Street NW / 

Theodore Roosevelt 

Building.

$211,083.45 $– $– $211,083.45 

DC0365 Multi-Tenant 409 3rd St. SW / No 

Name.

$243,066.38 $2,783,424.59 $20,078.64 $3,046,569.61 

MD1295 Social Security Administration.

1500 Woodlawn Dr, 

Baltimore, MD / Arthur J. Altmeyer 

Building.

$39,495.62 $– $– $39,495.62 

Total ............................................................. $5,324,768.77 $72,347,357.35 $1,134,159.02 $78,806,285.14 

QUESTIONS TO ELLIOT DOOMES, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS

SERVICE, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, FROM HON. 

SCOTT PERRY

Question 1. In your testimony, you highlighted special emphasis programs to enhance security for childcare centers and at courthouses. What are the estimated 

total costs across GSA’s inventory of needed security upgrades? 

ANSWER. GSA is committed to ensuring the safety of our tenants and visiting public. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, GSA received $15 million to address identified 

vulnerabilities for childcare centers to fund 26 projects throughout GSA’s inventory. 

The President’s FY 2025 Budget also includes a request for an additional $14.25 

million to continue addressing these security vulnerabilities. 

The Judiciary Capital Security Program (JCSP) received $15 million in FY 2022 

and $18.5 million in FY 2023. The President’s FY 2025 Budget Request includes $30 

million for Judiciary Capital Security. To date, this program has received over $120 

million since FY 2012. GSA is currently estimating a funding need of $130.5 million 

for four JCSP-prioritized projects and plans to study an additional three locations. 

Cost estimates for the three additional locations will be developed as the studies 

progress. 

The GSA and Federal Protective Service are working closely to identify security 

costs associated with the upgrade of electronic countermeasures over the next 5 

years. This will be a significant investment that will be funded by the tenants in 

each facility identified. 
57 

1Megan Cassidy, Crime is so bad near S.F. Federal building employees are told to work from 

home, officials said, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, (Aug. 14, 2023), available at https:// 

www.sfchronicle.com/sf/article/drugs-crime-nancy-pelosi-federal-building-18292237.php. 

Question 2. Crime in many areas has increased, impacting the use of Federal 

buildings. For example, last year, HHS’s office in San Francisco advised its employees to stay home because of the public safety issues at their building.1 Is GSA, as 

landlord, tracking incidents when crime rises to a point that use and occupancy of 

GSA Federal buildings is impacted? What steps has GSA taken to address these 

issues? 

ANSWER. GSA partners closely with FPS, the Department of Justice’s U.S. Marshals Service, and others to ensure the safety of occupant agency personnel and visitors within facilities under GSA’s jurisdiction, custody or control. FPS tracks incidents related to crime in areas where Federal buildings are located. 

The GSA Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings Service require that all 

Federal buildings must comply with the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) 

standards for non-military facilities as published in the ISC Risk Management process. GSA works closely with FPS to administer the ISC process, especially as it relates to the evaluation of Federal facilities. The ISC requires that every Federal facility be evaluated based on assessment factors and assigned a Facility Security 

Level (FSL). The security level determines the specific countermeasures recommended for the facility. These factors include the mission and criticality of the 

tenant agencies, possible threat to those agencies, and the facility’s size, symbolism, 

and population. As part of this assessment process, FPS reviews crime statistics for 

the area around the facility and includes that information in their determination 

of the appropriate level of countermeasure to implement. 

Specifically for the Speaker Nancy Pelosi Federal Building, GSA, in coordination 

with FPS, employs a number of security protocols to ensure the building is safe. 

These protocols include FPS Protective Security Officers patrolling the building and 

stationing at secure checkpoints. GSA coordinated with FPS to have additional FPS 

officers onsite during commute times in the morning and late afternoon to enhance 

the safety of employees coming to and leaving from the building. GSA also placed 

temporary fencing in three strategic areas around the building to further increase 

security. 

GSA leadership continues to meet with FPS biweekly, and GSA conducts a bimonthly safety and security meeting with the Facility Security Committee representatives from all Federal tenant agencies at the Speaker Nancy Pelosi Federal 

Building. The meeting is coordinated with Federal and local law enforcement to 

share actions in the neighborhood aimed at improving conditions and increasing 

neighborhood safety awareness through programs such as the City of San Francisco’s 311 Community Ambassadors Safety Escort program. Further, when appropriate, GSA contracts with the Mid Market Community Benefit District to hire additional San Francisco Police Department officers to patrol the civic center area. Lastly, GSA has awarded a design contract to investigate additional ways to enhance 

the physical security around the perimeter of the building. 

Æ