2024 ANNUAL REPORT

( 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA

ANNUAL REPORT

2024

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 2024

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.cecc.gov

( 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA

ANNUAL REPORT

2024

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 2024

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

Available via the World Wide Web: https://www.cecc.gov

u.s. government publishing office

55–649 pdf washington : 2024
CON

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey, Chair

BRIAN MAST, Florida

MICHELLE STEEL, California

RYAN ZINKE, Montana

ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa

JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts

JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania

ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon

Senate

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Co-Chair

ANGUS KING, Maine

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

LAPHONZA R. BUTLER, California

MARCO RUBIO, Florida

TOM COTTON, Arkansas

STEVE DAINES, Montana

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

UZRA ZEYA, Department of State

MARISA LAGO, Department of Commerce

THEA MEI LEE, Department of Labor

DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK, Department of State

DAFNA H. RAND, Department of State

Piero Tozzi, Staff Direct

Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Direct

(ii)
(III)

S U M M A R Y O F C O N T E N T S

Page

Section I. Contents................................................................................................. v

Section II. Executive Summary ........................................................................ 1

Section III. Respect for Civil Liberties .......................................................... 46

Chapter 1—Freedom of Expression ................................................................ 46

Chapter 2—Civil Society .................................................................................. 64

Chapter 3—Freedom of Religion ..................................................................... 78

Section IV. Rule of Law in the Justice System ........................................... 97

Chapter 4—Criminal Justice ........................................................................... 97

Chapter 5—Access to Justice ........................................................................... 113

Section V. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process .................... 122

Chapter 6—Governance .................................................................................... 122

Section VI. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in

Persons ................................................................................................................. 134

Chapter 7—Ethnic Minority Rights ................................................................ 134

Chapter 8—Status of Women .......................................................................... 142

Chapter 9—Population Control ........................................................................ 155

Chapter 10—Human Trafficking ..................................................................... 168

Section VII. Worker Rights ................................................................................ 179

Chapter 11—Worker Rights ............................................................................. 179

Section VIII. Other Thematic Issues ............................................................... 191

Chapter 12—Public Health .............................................................................. 191

Chapter 13—The Environment ........................................................................ 201

Chapter 14—Business and Human Rights .................................................... 212

Chapter 15—North Korean Refugees in China ............................................. 226

Chapter 16—Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism ................................... 234

Section IX. Tibet .................................................................................................... 241

Chapter 17—Tibet ............................................................................................. 241

Section X. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ....................................... 256

Chapter 18—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ...................................... 256

Section XI. Hong Kong and Macau ................................................................. 275

Chapter 19—Hong Kong and Macau .............................................................. 275

Section XII. Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally ............ 289

Chapter 20—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally ............... 289

Section XIII. Additional Views of Commission Members ......................... 300

(V)

Section I. Contents

Page

Section II. Executive Summary ........................................................................ 1

A. Statement from the Chairs ..................................................................... 1

B. Overview .................................................................................................... 3

C. Key Findings ............................................................................................. 9

D. Political Prisoner Database ..................................................................... 25

E. Political Prisoner Cases of Concern ....................................................... 27

F. General Recommendations to Congress and the Administration ........ 32

G. Commission Activity (July 2023–October 2024) ................................... 44

Section III. Respect for Civil Liberties .......................................................... 46

Chapter 1—Freedom of Expression ................................................................ 46

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 46

B. Freedom of the Press ............................................................................... 48

C. Detention and Imprisonment of Journalists ......................................... 49

D. In-Person Protest and Assembly ............................................................. 50

E. PRC Control over the Internet ............................................................... 51

F. Entertainment, History, and Literature ................................................. 54

G. Academic Freedom ................................................................................... 55

Chapter 2—Civil Society .................................................................................. 64

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 64

B. Introduction ............................................................................................... 65

C. Charity Law .............................................................................................. 65

D. Status of Social Organizations ............................................................... 66

E. Protests ...................................................................................................... 68

F. Suppression of Civil Society .................................................................... 69

Chapter 3—Freedom of Religion ..................................................................... 78

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 78

B. Introduction ............................................................................................... 80

C. International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom ....................... 80

D. Regulatory and Policy Developments ..................................................... 81

E. Buddhism (non-Tibetan), Taoism, and Folk Religion ........................... 82

F. Islam ........................................................................................................... 83

G. Christianity—Catholic .............................................................................. 84

H. Christianity—Protestant .......................................................................... 86

I. Falun Gong ................................................................................................. 87

J. Other Religious Communities .................................................................. 88

Section IV. Rule of Law in the Justice System ........................................... 97

Chapter 4—Criminal Justice ........................................................................... 97

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 97

B. Introduction ............................................................................................... 98

C. Arbitrary Detention .................................................................................. 98

D. Extrajudicial Detention ............................................................................ 98

E. Abuse of Criminal Provisions ................................................................. 101

F. Torture and Abuse .................................................................................... 102

G. Death in Custody ..................................................................................... 103

H. Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location ............................. 104

I. Denial of Counsel and Family Visits ...................................................... 104

J. Legal Developments .................................................................................. 105

Chapter 5—Access to Justice ........................................................................... 113

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 113

B. Introduction ............................................................................................... 114

C. Judicial Transparency .............................................................................. 114

D. Revision of the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law ................. 114

E. Constitutional Enforcement ..................................................................... 115

F. Petitioning System as Part of the Grassroots Governance Network .. 115

G. Persecution of Petitioners ........................................................................ 116

H. Persecution of Legal Professionals ......................................................... 117
VI

Section V. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process .................... 122

Chapter 6—Governance .................................................................................... 122

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 122

B. Introduction ............................................................................................... 123

C. Government’s Subservience to Party Formalized ................................. 123

D. Security as Overarching Mode of Governance ...................................... 123

E. Amended Regulations on Political Inspection ....................................... 124

F. Administrative Enforcement That Runs the Grid of Control .............. 125

G. Grid Management as Social Control Tool ............................................. 125

H. Ideological Control in Education ............................................................ 126

I. Politicization of Culture ............................................................................ 127

J. Continued Lack of Transparency ............................................................ 128

Section VI. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in

Persons ................................................................................................................. 134

Chapter 7—Ethnic Minority Rights ................................................................ 134

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 134

B. Party and Government Policy toward Ethnic Minorities .................... 135

C. Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture .............................................. 135

D. Constraints on Language and Ethnic Identity in the IMAR ............. 136

E. Mongols Fleeing China Face Transnational Repression ...................... 137

Chapter 8—Status of Women .......................................................................... 142

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 142

B. Authoritarian Misuse of Women’s Rights Promotion and Discourse .. 143

C. Suppression of Civil Society Advocacy and Association ....................... 144

D. Party Control of Elite Women’s Political Participation ........................ 146

E. Eight Years In: Weak Implementation of the PRC Anti-Domestic

Violence Law ............................................................................................... 147

Chapter 9—Population Control ........................................................................ 155

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 155

B. PRC Coercive Population Policies ........................................................... 156

C. Population Decline and Official Responses ............................................ 157

D. Disenchantment with the Pro-Natal Policy ........................................... 159

E. Continuing Effects of the One-Child Policy .......................................... 160

Chapter 10—Human Trafficking ..................................................................... 168

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 168

B. China’s Human Trafficking and Forced Labor Obligations under

International Law ...................................................................................... 169

C. Recent State Department Reporting on Human Trafficking

Activities in China and Macau ................................................................ 169

D. Forced Labor in the Seafood Industry ................................................... 170

E. Forced Labor in and from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous

Region .......................................................................................................... 171

F. Cross-Border Trafficking ........................................................................... 172

G. Domestic Trafficking ................................................................................ 173

Section VII. Worker Rights ................................................................................ 179

Chapter 11—Worker Rights ............................................................................. 179

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 179

B. Introduction ............................................................................................... 180

C. Worker Strikes and Protests ................................................................... 180

D. Labor Actions by Sector .......................................................................... 181

E. Continued Suppression of Labor Rights Advocates .............................. 182

F. Hukou System Continues to Exacerbate Migrant Worker Precarity .. 183

G. All-China Federation of Trade Unions: Rhetoric Emphasizes

Nationalism over Worker Rights .............................................................. 185

H. Worker Rights in the Gig Economy ....................................................... 185

I. 996, Excessive Overtime, and Age Discrimination ................................ 186

Section VIII. Other Thematic Issues ............................................................... 191

Chapter 12—Public Health .............................................................................. 191

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 191

B. COVID-19 .................................................................................................. 192

C. Anticorruption Campaign against the Healthcare Sector ................... 194

D. Ongoing Concerns about Organ Donation and Transplant in China 195

E. Mental Health Treatment: Forcible Commitment for Some,

Inadequate Resources for Those in Need ................................................ 195

Chapter 13—The Environment ........................................................................ 201

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 201

B. PRC Government Actions and Legal Developments ............................ 202
VII

Page

Section VIII. Other Thematic Issues—Continued

C. Climate Change ........................................................................................ 203

D. Environmental Advocacy in the PRC .................................................... 205

E. Impact of the PRC’s Dams ...................................................................... 206

F. The PRC in the South China Sea .......................................................... 206

Chapter 14—Business and Human Rights .................................................... 212

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 212

B. Introduction ............................................................................................... 214

C. Corporate Involvement in Human Rights Abuses in the XUAR ........ 214

D. Companies’ Role in Government Data Collection and Surveillance .. 216

E. Companies’ Role in Censorship and Removals ..................................... 218

F. Impact of PRC Legislation on Doing Business in China ..................... 219

Chapter 15—North Korean Refugees in China ............................................. 226

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 226

B. Introduction ............................................................................................... 227

C. Repatriation of North Korean Refugees from China to the DPRK ... 227

D. Heightened Surveillance and Control at the Border ........................... 228

E. Trafficking of North Korean Women in China ..................................... 229

F. North Korean Workers in China ............................................................. 229

G. Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents .................................. 230

Chapter 16—Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism ................................... 234

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 234

B. Surveillance ............................................................................................... 235

C. Artificial Intelligence ................................................................................ 236

D. Malign Influence ....................................................................................... 236

Section IX. Tibet .................................................................................................... 241

Chapter 17—Tibet ............................................................................................. 241

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 241

B. Status of Negotiations between the Chinese Government and the

Dalai Lama or His Representatives ........................................................ 242

C. Self-Immolations ....................................................................................... 242

D. Religious Freedom for Tibetans .............................................................. 242

E. Hundreds of Tibetans Detained after Protests against Dam

Threatening Villages and Monasteries .................................................... 244

F. Continuing Restrictions on Access to Tibetan Areas ............................ 246

G. Restrictions on the Freedom of Expression and the Free Flow of

Information ................................................................................................. 246

H. Language and Cultural Rights ............................................................... 248

Section X. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ....................................... 256

Chapter 18—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ...................................... 256

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 256

B. International Criticism of China over Human Rights Violations in

the XUAR .................................................................................................... 258

C. Officials’ Comments on ‘‘Stability Maintenance’’ and

Counterterrorism Signal Repression ........................................................ 258

D. Rate of Imprisonment Disproportionately High for Turkic Muslims ..... 259

E. Forced Labor Involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR Residents ........... 262

F. Population Control Measures Reduce Uyghur Birth Rates ................. 263

G. Congressional Hearing Sheds Light on Organ Harvesting ................. 263

H. Freedom of Religion ................................................................................. 264

I. Official Policies Violate Uyghurs’ Right to Maintain Their Own

Language and Culture ............................................................................... 265

J. Transnational Repression of Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims ..... 266

Section XI. Hong Kong and Macau ................................................................. 275

Chapter 19—Hong Kong and Macau .............................................................. 275

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 275

B. Introduction ............................................................................................... 276

C. Institutional Reform to Increase Party Control .................................... 276

D. Article 23 Legislation ............................................................................... 276

E. Erosion of Fundamental Freedoms ........................................................ 277

F. Judicial Independence ............................................................................... 280

G. Prison Abuse ............................................................................................. 281

H. Transnational Repression ........................................................................ 281

I. Freedom of Religion .................................................................................. 283

J. Universal Periodic Review ........................................................................ 283

K. Travel Advisories for Hong Kong and Macau ...................................... 284
VIII

Page

Section XII. Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally ............ 289

Chapter 20—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally ............... 289

A. Findings ..................................................................................................... 289

B. Transnational Repression ........................................................................ 290

C. Extraditions to China .............................................................................. 293

D. Malign Influence ....................................................................................... 294

E. Efforts to Impede U.N. Human Rights Bodies ..................................... 295

Section XIII. Additional Views of Commission Members ......................... 300
IX

——————————

The Commission’s executive branch members have participated in 

and supported the work of the Commission. The content of this An- nual Report, including its findings, views, legal determinations, and 

recommendations, does not necessarily reflect the views of individual 

executive branch members or the polices of the Administration.

The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 18 to 0.†

†Voted to adopt: Representatives Smith, Mast, Steel, Zinke, Nunn, McGovern, Wexton, and Sa- linas; Senators Merkley, King, Duckworth, Brown, and Daines. Executive Branch Commissioners 

Zeya, Lago, Lee, Kritenbrink, and Rand.

Voted to abstain: Senators Rubio, Cotton and Sullivan.

Not Voting: Representative Wild and Senator Butler (Sen. Butler resigned from the Senate as 

of December 8, 2024).

1

II. Executive Summary

Statement from the Chai

This reporting year the Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China (CECC, or Commission) focused on ongoing human rights 

abuses by the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly with regard 

to forced labor which runs throughout supply chains; the complicity 

of American and other Western corporations in such human rights 

abuses; and the PRC’s efforts to deflect international criticism of its 

human rights record and to reinterpret international human rights 

norms.

The CECC continued to oversee implementation of the Uyghur 

Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), a signature piece of legislation that originated with the CECC Chairs and Ranking Members 

that has arguably been the most impactful law this century in terms 

of forcing companies to modify their behavior in order to be compliant with a human rights standard and curbing corporate subsidization of the CCP’s tyranny.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), consistent with encouragement from the Chairs, expanded the number of entities for 

which importation into the United States is prohibited by the UFLPA during the reporting year, exercising an underutilized tool contained in the legislation. The Chairs nonetheless continue to urge 

DHS to do more in this regard and anticipate that the CECC will 

continue to push this issue in the next Congress.

Beyond forced labor, the CECC focused on complicity by U.S. and 

foreign corporations with CCP oppression. This scrutiny included 

the actions of one American corporation in particular, Thermo Fisher Scientific, whose DNA sequencers had been used by police in the 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibet to compile DNA databases of Uyghurs and Tibetans, and could be used for organ transplantation amidst allegations of forced organ harvesting in the PRC.

The Commission also looked at the role of social audits in allowing corporations to give themselves a clean bill of health when it 

came to supply chains. These audits are intended to provide assurances that supply chains are free of forced labor and other concerns. 

But because of the lack of transparency and accountability, in reality such audits are often faulty and serve to obscure and whitewash 

corporate conduct and complicity.

The PRC’s efforts to exert its influence in the U.N. system to 

alter international human rights norms could be seen during the 

PRC’s Universal Periodic Review by the United Nations Human 

Rights Council at the beginning of 2024. The session saw the U.S. 

and like-minded countries raise questions about a series of human 

rights abuses, including the crushing of press freedom in Hong Kong 

and the forced repatriation from China of North Korean citizens, 

but also an almost equal number of nations glossed over violations 

of human rights or even endorsed some of the PRC’s rights-abusing 

policies and praised its economic development achievements.

Yet even in areas where the PRC has acceded to global standards, 

such as on the environment, its actions show non-compliance.  The 

PRC remained the world’s leading emitter of carbon dioxide, while 
Executive Summary

2

squelching environmental protests and detaining those who sought 

to raise concerns.

We believe that the work of the Commission and its dedicated 

staff is constructive in the effort to document the PRC’s massive 

failures to comply with international human rights standards. We 

reaffirm our commitment to challenge those in government and the 

corporate world who would look the other way on violations of fundamental human rights in order to secure short-term political or 

economic gains.

For behind all the statistics of human rights abuses—black numbers on a white page—lie individuals, who have been deprived of 

rights that we take for granted. It is for these individuals to whom 

we dedicate our Annual Report, this year and every year.

Sincerely,

Representative Chris Smith Senator Jeffrey A. Merkley

Chair Co-Chair
3

Overvie

In a series of hearings and other activities during this 2024 reporting year, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China 

(CECC) exposed the ongoing presence of forced labor in corporate 

supply chains and U.S. Government procurement sources; revealed 

how “audit washing”—the use of social compliance auditing firms to 

claim certification that factories and supply chains in the People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) are free of forced labor and other human 

rights violations—evades genuine scrutiny of supply chains; and 

sought greater use of mechanisms to combat importation of goods 

made with forced labor, such as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA).

In short, the CECC sought to shine a light on the subsidization 

of tyranny.

This theme was amplified at the first hearing of the reporting 

period, entitled Corporate Complicity: Subsidizing the PRC’s Human Rights Violations. It examined how multinational businesses, 

once considered a vanguard of the concept that economic integration 

would spur political liberalization in China, sometimes find themselves at risk of being complicit in human rights abuses in China in 

order to maintain access to the China market. The hearing named 

names, including the National Basketball Association, Raytheon, 

and Boeing.

Another revelatory public-facing event was an October 2023 hearing focused on forced labor in the PRC’s deep-sea fishing and fish 

processing industries, featuring research from The Outlaw Ocean 

Project detailing harsh conditions and minimal pay with minimal 

regard for safety.

The hearing, entitled From Bait to Plate: How Forced Labor in 

China Taints America’s Seafood Supply Chain, also included testimony that U.S. Government food procurement programs purchased 

some US$200 million worth of seafood over a five-year period from 

tainted Chinese sources, including fish served on U.S. military bases 

and through the National School Lunch Program.

It appears that such government procurement may violate three 

U.S. laws—Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (banning all goods 

produced with forced labor), the UFLPA (banning goods made with 

Uyghur forced labor), and the Countering America’s Adversaries 

Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA (banning goods made by North 

Korean forced labor). In light of this, CECC Chair Chris Smith and 

Co-Chair Jeff Merkley sent two letters to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and other Cabinet secretaries asking that federal agencies take steps to comply 

with the laws, improve interagency coordination to stop imports of 

seafood made with forced labor, and to require that procurement 

officials at the relevant agencies ensure that such tainted seafood 

does not make its way to the plates of service members, veterans, 

and schoolchildren.

The CECC Chairs also encouraged robust implementation of the 

UFLPA, including an expansion of the “Entity List” of companies 

using forced labor in violation of the UFLPA, by the Forced Labor 

Enforcement Task Force (FLETF). The FLETF is chaired by DHS 

Under Secretary for the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans Robert 
Executive Summary

4

Silvers and includes CECC Commissioner Thea Lee, Deputy Undersecretary for International Affairs at the Department of Labor. The 

FLETF has made seafood a high-priority sector for enforcement and 

added a seafood company, Shandong Meijia Group, to the Entity 

List.

The Commission also scrutinized forced labor in electric vehicle 

(EV) supply chains in a hearing entitled From Cobalt to Cars: How 

China Exploits Child and Forced Labor in D.R. Congo. It examined 

how child and forced labor in the Democratic Republic of Congo 

(D.R.C.) taints the extraction of cobalt, a metal that is a critical 

component in lithium-ion batteries used in EVs and other modern 

devices, including cell phones. Chinese entities control 80 percent of 

the cobalt output from the D.R.C., which has roughly four-fifths of 

the world’s cobalt supply.

The hearing revealed not only forced and child labor in the sourcing of cobalt but accompanying environmental degradation. These 

concerns led CECC Chair Smith to introduce legislation designed to 

address this issue, including the China’s Odious and Brutally Atrocious Labor Trafficking (COBALT) Supply Chain Act, H.R. 6909, 

and the Stop China’s Exploitation of Congolese Children and Adult 

Forced Labor through Cobalt Mining Act, H.R. 7981, which passed 

out of the House Ways and Means Committee in April 2024.

Forced labor at the other end of the cobalt supply chain—the production of batteries in China—was among the examples referenced 

in a hearing on the widespread practice of “audit washing,” entitled Factories and Fraud in the PRC: How Human Rights Violations 

Make Reliable Audits Impossible. In practice, these audits serve as a 

fig leaf to cover up rather than expose human rights abuses, leading 

to a false impression in corporations’ public shareholder reports that 

their supply chains are free of forced labor.

In a well-documented case, German automaker Volkswagen, in addition to committing import violations under the UFLPA, used Uyghur forced labor to build a test track in Turpan municipality, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Observers have warned 

of the high risk of forced labor at a Volkswagen joint venture factory 

in the XUAR’s Urumqi municipality. Giving insight into a deception 

endemic to the audit industry, auditors at the audit firm Löning Human Rights & Responsible Business publicly distanced themselves 

from an audit that had allowed Volkswagen to claim in December 

2023 that there was “no indication of any human rights violations 

or wider issues around working conditions.”

Of further concern, PRC authorities amended laws in part to discourage compliance with U.S. or foreign laws designed to promote 

responsible business practices. Such laws include the onerous Counterespionage Law that took effect in July 2023, and the PRC Law on 

Guarding State Secrets that took effect in May 2024. These legislative actions renewed concern, including in the business community, 

about potential arbitrary enforcement, as the laws provide a legal 

basis for preventing individuals from leaving China. This past year, 

PRC authorities imposed exit bans on two foreign businessmen under opaque circumstances: a senior executive from American risk 

advisory firm Kroll and a senior Hong Kong-based banker from Japanese financial services group Nomura Holdings.
Executive Summary

5

The repressive atmosphere that has accompanied Xi Jinping’s 

tenure as Chinese Communist Party General Secretary now extends 

to Hong Kong, where a pall has descended upon the once-active civil 

society as space for free expression and the exercise of civil and political rights in the special administrative region recedes.

The façade of an alternative system of political governance that 

was promised to last 50 years by the PRC signatories to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and guaranteed by the Basic Law—

Hong Kong’s mini-constitution—has withered away, as Hong Kong 

becomes nearly indistinguishable from any other neon-lit city on the 

Chinese mainland. Indeed, Hong Kong officials may now be more 

zealous than their mainland counterparts in enforcing national security laws. Coupled with convictions in the “Hong Kong 47” case, 

the trial of Jimmy Lai—business leader, champion of press freedom, 

and paragon of faith-based conscientious objection—underscores 

how civil rights are no longer protected, despite the traditional 

pomp displayed by wig-bedecked Hong Kong judges.

Likewise, the Hong Kong legislature’s passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (also known as “Article 23” legislation) signaled that its government was mimicking central government state security initiatives—including the PRC’s 2015 National 

Security Law and the 2024 legislation on protecting state secrets—

reinforcing the chilling effect of the National Security Law that the 

central government imposed on the special administrative region in 

2020. Expanding the scope of existing national security legislation, 

Article 23 continued to diminish the space for mediating institutions, a trend exemplified by recent events such as the closure of 

a Cantonese-language advocacy group whose founder’s home was 

raided without a warrant in August 2023 and the relocation of Radio Free Asia outside of Hong Kong.

 YouTube exemplified corporate acquiescence by removing the 

Hong Kong protest anthem “Glory to Hong Kong” from its platform 

in Hong Kong, ostensibly in compliance with a court injunction. 

The Chairs wrote to executives at YouTube and its parent company Google asking that the anthem be restored to the platform on 

the grounds that the injunction violated international human rights 

principles.

Another area of Commission inquiry and activity was transnational repression, the topic of a September hearing entitled Countering 

China’s Global Transnational Repression Campaign, which featured 

Canadian parliamentarian Michael Chong, who himself had been 

a target of transnational repression due to his policy positions in 

support of Uyghurs.

One of the most shocking examples of Chinese Communist Party 

(CCP) transnational repression on American soil occurred in November 2023 during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 

Leaders’ Summit in San Francisco, attended in person by Communist Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping. Those 

who came to peacefully protest ongoing human rights abuses in the 

PRC—from colonialist policies in Tibetan regions, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and the XUAR, to the mass relocation of 

populations due to environmentally problematic damming projects—

were met by organized pro-CCP counter-protesters who surrounded 
Executive Summary

6

the protesters and used “metal rods, flagpoles, closed umbrellas and 

pepper spray” to batter those seeking to exercise their fundamental 

rights, much of which was caught on video.

In December, the CECC Chairs held a press conference with activists who described the violence they experienced or witnessed 

protesting the summit, including Hong Kong Democracy Council’s 

Anna Kwok, Human Rights in China’s Zhou Fengsuo—who spoke 

of coordination between the attackers and the PRC’s San Francisco 

consulate—Students for a Free Tibet’s Pema Doma, the Uyghur 

American Association’s Elfidar Iltebir, and alleged beating victim 

Kaiyu Zhang.

The CECC Chairs subsequently wrote Attorney General Merrick 

Garland asking for a thorough investigation of the assaults at the 

APEC Summit by apparently CCP-aligned actors, and of the online 

intimidation of activists, inquiring as to the adequacy of law enforcement’s response and calling for protection of peaceful protesters’ civil rights.

Hong Kong activists abroad—including U.S.-based Kwok, Frances Hui, and Joey Siu, the latter also a U.S. citizen—were victims 

of transnational repression by the Hong Kong government. In addition, Chinese dissidents in the United Kingdom were surveilled by 

three men, including the office manager of the London Hong Kong 

Economic and Trade Office (HKETO); the three men were arrested 

by British authorities for their role in the surveillance.

CECC Chair Smith, Co-Chair Merkley and Ranking Members McGovern and Rubio introduced legislation to authorize the President 

to revoke the privileges and immunities of HKETOs and prohibit 

federal agencies from cooperating with HKETOs’ efforts to whitewash their record, on the grounds that special status for HKETOs 

is no longer merited following Hong Kong’s loss of autonomy and 

the role they play as additional propaganda and spy outposts of the 

PRC.

The Commission also witnessed the long-arm of transnational 

repression in Laos and Spain, where PRC authorities sought the 

forcible repatriation of critics of the Chinese Communist Party and 

government.

Human rights attorney Lu Siwei—who had angered the Chinese 

government by representing other rights lawyers and advocates and 

by offering to represent 12 Hong Kong dissidents who tried to flee to 

Taiwan in 2020—was detained in Laos by Lao authorities, presumably at the behest of PRC government actors.

Despite public and private interventions by the U.S. Government 

and like-minded countries pointing out the obligations of the government of Laos under international law—including an intervention 

by the CECC Chairman—Laos apparently buckled to pressure from 

the PRC, refouling Lu in September 2023.

A similar outcome was averted in Spain, where a prominent member of the Church of Almighty God, Li Yanli, whom Spanish authorities had slated for deportation, was able to file an eleventh-hour 

asylum application to delay her refoulement. As pointed out in Li’s 

asylum application, new religious movements such as the Church 

of Almighty God, or “Eastern Lightning,” and Falun Gong are often 

targeted in China for persecution and subjected to defamation.
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7

Organ harvesting was the subject of a CECC hearing during the 

reporting period entitled Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—

What More Must Be Done? The hearing examined claims that Falun 

Gong adherents were early targets of this heinous practice and that 

predominantly Muslim Uyghurs in the XUAR have also been subject to this toxic form of human exploitation.

Questions raised at the hearing implicated an American corporation, Thermo Fisher Scientific, in the supplying of DNA kits to 

PRC police, allegedly facilitating the collection of biometric data for 

political identification and racial profiling, potentially qualifying the 

kits for U.S. export controls on the technology. One hearing witness 

said that the DNA kits could have implications for organ transplantation.

Relatedly, in response to the targeting of the Uyghur population, 

Chair Smith introduced with former CECC Commissioner Tom 

Suozzi a House companion bill, H.R. 8124, to Senators Rubio and 

Merkley’s Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act, calling for a strategy to deter and disrupt forced organ harvesting in 

the XUAR. In addition, the U.S. State Department’s 2024 Trafficking 

in Persons Report contained a section entitled “Trafficking in Persons for the Purpose of Organ Removal” as a highlighted “Topic of 

Special Interest.”

In a February 2024 hearing, the Commission looked at how the 

PRC defiantly disregarded criticism of its human rights record at its 

review under the U.N. Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic 

Review (UPR). The PRC’s marshalling of support from friendly governments and nongovernmental organizations was documented by 

CECC analysis that looked at the large number of pro-PRC submissions from UPR stakeholders. As one witness noted, “China’s actions 

over the last decade show that the PRC has become intent on using 

its presence in the U.N. to alter international human rights norms 

and rewire the system in ways that will make it easier for states 

to escape scrutiny of their human rights records.” This assessment 

can be seen as an extension of the vision outlined in the leaked 

document called the “Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere,” or more colloquially, “Document Number Nine,” written in 2013 at the beginning of Xi Jinping’s General Secretaryship 

and circulated among PRC leadership. Among its objectives was the 

strengthening of Party resolve in combating “universal values,” or 

the view of people who “believe Western freedom, democracy, and 

human rights are universal and eternal.” The witness concluded 

that “China is strongly motivated to continue this assault on the 

U.N. human rights regime because the ideals enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights present an existential threat to 

the CCP’s continued one-party rule.”

Likewise, at the United Nations and in its engagement with 

developing nations, the PRC has long put forward the concept of 

a “Community of Shared Future for Mankind” that prioritizes a 

state-centered approach to human rights, while subordinating the 

individual rights of its citizens to the matter of national interest.

This should drive home the magnitude of the challenge of monitoring and seeking accountability for human rights violations by 

the People’s Republic of China. Chinese Communist Party leaders 
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maintain that the rights that the people of China should be able to 

enjoy are those confined to an interpretation of human rights that 

serves the Party’s political interests, rather than to the full range to 

which they are entitled under international human rights law and 

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This Commission remains committed to the principle that the people of China are entitled to the same rights as any other people in the world, and we will 

continue to report on the PRC’s failure to respect both their rights 

and the underlying notion that they are allowed to have such rights.
9

Key Finding

Freedom of Express

• This reporting year, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

continued to restrict online and in-person expression, censoring 

various forms of artistic, literary, historical, and entertainment 

content, in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights (UDHR), and China’s Constitution.

• Freedom House’s 2024 Freedom in the World report scored 

China 0 out of 4 for “free and independent media,” and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked China 172 out of 180 countries and territories in its World Press Freedom Index.

• The Chinese Communist Party continued to use Chinese 

news media as its mouthpiece to provide the Party’s version of 

the news, signal and amplify policy priorities, and shape public 

opinion. Journalists at Party and state-run news outlets faced 

increased political pressure and censorship this past year to adhere to the Party line.

• Party efforts to control news media also continued to reach 

beyond China’s borders. One program that expanded this past 

year was that of international communication centers (ICCs)—

local and regional media groups within China acting as centers 

for external-facing propaganda.

• Authorities continued to harass, surveil, and restrict foreign 

journalists. The annual survey of the Foreign Correspondents’ 

Club of China in 2024 revealed that foreign reporters face significant obstacles in China.

• This past year, many journalists, other media professionals, 

and “citizen journalists”—non-professionals who publish independently to circumvent official restrictions—remained in detention, prison, or subject to bail conditions as a result of their 

reporting. RSF again ranked China “the world’s largest prison 

for journalists,” as nearly a quarter of all journalists detained 

worldwide are in Chinese jails. Currently detained or imprisoned journalists include Huang Xueqin, Yang Zewei, and 

Shangguan Yunkai.

• This past year, Freedom House ranked China the “world’s 

worst abuser of internet freedom” for the ninth year in a row. 

The PRC’s Ministry of Public Security declared 2024 a “year of 

special operations against online rumors,” targeting influencers 

and content creators who “stage photos maliciously or fabricate 

rumors” about politically sensitive issues.

• Government agencies implemented new regulations and pressured internet companies to tighten restrictions on online expression, including mandating “real name” registration for popular users.

• Authorities continued to harass, detain, and imprison people 

who participated peacefully in protests, demonstrations, and 

other gatherings, including demonstrations against opaque handling of school deaths and the demolition of Tibetan villages 

and monasteries.
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• The PRC intensified its efforts to exert control over educational and research institutions, impeding the free exchange of 

information and hindering international academic collaboration.

Civil Socie

• During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, the Chinese 

Communist Party and government continued their efforts to 

control, co-opt, or dismantle civil society.

• In December 2023, the National People’s Congress Standing 

Committee passed a series of amendments to the People’s Re- public of China (PRC) Charity Law of 2016. The amended law 

states that charity work must “uphold the leadership of the Chi- nese Communist Party,” requires that charities report on any 

cooperation with foreign organizations, and makes it more diffi- cult for registered organizations to assist unregistered organiza- tions, many of which work in sensitive areas, with fundraising.

• PRC authorities continued to push for the consolidation of 

Party and government control over social organizations (SOs), 

co-opting SOs to serve their policy priorities and objectives.

• The Party and government continued to target so-called “illegal social organizations” (ISOs) through a coordinated effort at 

both the central and local levels. The Ministry of Civil Affairs, 

along with 10 other departments, launched a six-month-long 

“special campaign” in June 2023 that aimed to crack down on 

ISOs, with 1,100 organizations censured in 2023, according to 

official media.

• During the January 2024 session of the U.N. Human Rights 

Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government’s human rights record, the PRC sought to “game” the process, using channels established for independent civil society 

participation to promote entities influenced or controlled by the 

government.

• Despite government efforts to comprehensively deter public dissent, Chinese citizens continued a pattern of organizing 

ad hoc protests during the reporting year, often gathering in the 

hundreds or thousands to protest perceived injustices.

• The Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court sentenced women’s rights advocate Sophia Huang Xueqin to five years in 

prison, and labor rights advocate Wang Jianbing to three 

years and six months, on June 14, 2024 on charges of “inciting 

subversion of state power.”

• During the reporting year, the Party and government detained 

or sentenced rights advocates involved in democracy efforts, including a former public security officer and those involved with 

the China Human Rights Watch group.

• During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, PRC author- ities continued to suppress lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 

and questioning (LGBTQ) advocacy groups, limit public space 

for LGBTQ-identifying persons to associate, and censor expressions of LGBTQ identity.
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Freedom of Religi

• During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, the Chinese 

Communist Party and  government enacted legal provisions 

that strengthened control over religious practices, including the 

Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities 

and the PRC Patriotic Education Law. Since 2018, the Chinese 

Communist Party and government have issued several key pro- visions to tighten control over religious activities.

• The five state-recognized religious bodies overseeing Bud- dhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Protestant Christianity, and Islam, 

each published updated Five-Year Plans for “sinicization.” Indi- viduals and religious sites were promoted as “models” of sinici- zation.

• During this reporting year, the Commission observed the 

Chinese government’s efforts to “sinicize” Taoism, emphasizing 

Party control and alignment with Party ideology rather than 

religious identity. The government also continued to exert pressure on Buddhism to use historical reinterpretation to promote 

religious subordination to the Party.

• The Party cracked down on folk religious practices that it 

views as potentially undermining its authority.

• During this reporting year, four Catholic bishops were conse- crated with mutual approval from both PRC authorities and the 

Holy See, the only appointments made since 2021, while about 

40 dioceses remained without leadership. Authorities continued 

to hold Catholic clergy in detention or forcibly disappear them 

due to their refusal to join the Christian Council of China, in- cluding Catholic Bishop Shao Zhumin of the Diocese of Wen- zhou in Zhejiang province.

• The PRC government continued its campaign to remove Islamic architectural elements from mosques or demolish them. 

These policies target Hui Muslims and aim to eradicate reli- gious and cultural distinctiveness while promoting assimilation 

with Han Chinese culture. Experts commented that this year 

marked the conclusion of the nationwide mosque “sinicization” 

campaign, as the last major mosques in China lost their Arabicstyle features.

• The Party exerted pressure on Hong Kong religious communities to conform to the “sinicization” policies of mainland China, including through continual trips between mainland China 

and Hong Kong. Experts on religious freedom and belief also 

noted the threat posed to the confidentiality of the Sacrament 

of Penance with the enactment of the Safeguarding National 

Security Ordinance.

• PRC authorities continued to violate Protestants’ religious 

freedom through detention of leaders of unregistered churches, 

surveillance of activities and participants, and use other legal 

tools to control and punish church leaders. Authorities contin- ued to order the removal of crosses and other Christian symbols 

from church buildings.

• During this reporting year, PRC authorities continued to 

monitor, detain, and imprison Falun Gong practitioners, Church 

of Almighty God members, and others for being members of 
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“evil cults” (xiejiao, 邪教). In March 2024, the Commission held 

a hearing in which witnesses expressed concerns about possible 

forced organ removal from religious and ethnic minorities in 

China, including Falun Gong practitioners.

Criminal Justic

• The criminal justice system remained a political instrument 

used for maintaining social order in furtherance of the Chinese 

Communist Party’s authoritarian rule. The government punishes criminal acts, but it also targets individuals who pursue 

universal human rights, particularly when they independently 

organize or challenge the Party’s authority.

• Government officials arbitrarily detained religious practitioners, ethnic minorities, and rights advocates, including 

through extralegal means such as “black jails” and psychiatric 

facilities, or through criminal prosecution under offenses such 

as “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” or crimes endangering state security. Some detainees reported being mistreated 

or tortured. After entering the formal legal process, defendants 

sometimes faced prolonged pretrial detention, closed trials, and 

delayed sentencing.

• Reports of detainees being denied counsel and family visits, 

especially in political cases, continued to emerge. In the case of 

rights lawyer Lu Siwei, for example, officials denied a meeting 

request by the lawyer retained by Lu’s wife on grounds that 

the government already had appointed counsel for him. The 

unilateral appointment was said to be intended to allow the 

government to have full control over the proceedings in order 

to secure a conviction.

Access to Justic

• While China’s Constitution recognizes certain universal hu- man rights, the court system continued to lack any legal chan- nel through which citizens can assert or protect these consti- tutional rights, thus failing to fulfill the obligation to provide 

enforceable legal remedies for rights violations committed by 

government officials.

• As courts in China slowed the rate of uploading judicial documents to the publicly accessible database, the Supreme People’s 

Court announced the creation of a parallel database that is accessible only to judicial personnel. This development prompted 

concerns that authorities planned to phase out the public-facing 

database, thereby reducing judicial transparency, which would 

have the effect of undermining the rule of law and judicial credibility.

• Developments this past year indicate that the petitioning system has been weakened. The petitioning system, is an extrajudicial channel through which citizens file grievances involving official misconduct, is being assimilated into the grassroots 

governance system overseen by the newly established Chinese 

Communist Party organ called the Social Work Department. 

One of the department’s missions is to implement the “Fengqiao Experience,” which is a way to exert granular social and 
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political control through neighborhood committees and other 

grassroots-level organizations.

• Petitioners continued to suffer retaliation from local officials 

who tried to suppress exposure of their wrongdoing. Mistreatment experienced by petitioners included criminal prosecution, 

forcible commitment to a psychiatric hospital, arbitrary detention, and torture.

• Rights lawyers likewise suffered mistreatment, including 

criminal prosecution, for their legal work. After completing 

their sentences, lawyers typically have their law license revoked 

and are subjected to surveillance, restrictions on domestic and 

international travel, repeated forced relocation, and punishment 

of their family members, such as denial of education. As a United Nations special rapporteur pointed out, preventing lawyers 

from fulfilling their legal duties to their clients may “open the 

door to systematic violations of the right to a fair trial and 

equality before the law” in certain kinds of cases.

Governanc

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to be an au- thoritarian Party-State that increasingly sought to exert com- prehensive ideological control. Central authorities implemented 

Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s ex- pansive notion of national security through legislative acts, po- tentially making repressive measures more enduring. Amended 

laws extended secrecy requirements to non-classified material 

under the vague and expansive concept of national security, exposing travelers and businesspersons to the risk of arbitrary 

enforcement.

• With a stated goal of improving administrative efficiency, local governments created “comprehensive administrative enforcement” units. These units, however, serve as a grassroots-level 

mechanism of social control under the grid system, which is 

a Party-devised method of managing and surveilling citizens. 

Local governments hired large numbers of grid workers and 

tasked them with non-political community services, as well as 

political duties including disseminating propaganda, surveilling, 

and collecting personal information of residents.

• With laws requiring political education, Party offices merged 

with college administrative offices to allow for more direct control over academic institutions’ delivery of political indoctrination to students. Political topics that became a requirement this 

past year included patriotism, Party history, and national de- fense.

• As Party propaganda emphasized “culture building” as a way 

to reduce ideological risks by unifying people’s beliefs, authorities implemented policies that aimed at erasing ethnic cultures 

to promote a single Chinese nationality. Such policies included 

replacing Uyghur buildings with ones that reflect Chinese culture, banning Mongolian-language instruction in schools, and 

punishing advocacy for the Tibetan language.

• Despite official rhetoric promoting constitutional enforcement, 

citizens continued to lack judicial or administrative means to 
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assert their rights as enumerated in the PRC Constitution. At 

the same time, the government concealed or manipulated public 

data, undermining citizens’ right to meaningfully participate in 

civic affairs.

Ethnic Minority Rig

• During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, Party and government officials championed the “integration” of ethnic minorities, continuing the implementation of policies contravening the 

rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and other ethnic minorities to maintain their own languages and cultures.

• Reports indicate that authorities had altered, destroyed, or 

closed large numbers of mosques serving Hui communities in 

an effort to “sinicize” these communities and restrict their religious freedom, particularly in Gansu province and Ningxia Hui 

Autonomous Region. In February 2024, Radio Free Asia (RFA) 

reported that officials in Nagu town, Tonghai county, Yuxi municipality, Yunnan province, had installed pagodas in place of 

the dome and minarets they demolished the previous year at 

the local Najiaying Mosque. Authorities also replaced the Arabic-style dome and minarets on the Grand Mosque in Shadian 

subdistrict, Gejiu city, Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan, with a pagoda rooftop and pagoda towers.

• Officials in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) 

continued to implement policies suppressing the use of Mongolian as a language of instruction in schools. In September 2023, 

authorities largely completed the transition to a region-wide policy, begun in 2020, of enforcing instruction in Mandarin Chinese 

for all subjects from kindergarten through senior high school.

• Mongols originally from the IMAR who sought refuge in Mongolia reportedly experienced transnational repression from PRC 

authorities, against a backdrop of PRC pressure on Mongolian 

authorities to prevent criticism within Mongolia of the PRC’s 

actions in the IMAR.

Status of Wom

• Women’s rights were the subject of recommendations during 

the fourth Universal Periodic Review of the People’s Republic 

of China’s (PRC) compliance with international human rights 

norms in January 2024. With legal provisions weakly implemented in China, rural and urban women are at risk of losing 

property rights, face gender discrimination at work, are vulnerable to gender-based violence, and have limited access to justice.

• At the October 2023 National Women’s Congress, officials emphasized building families and the nation, and the role of the 

All-China Women’s Federation in promoting family values to 

promote population growth.

• The Commission continued to monitor official harassment 

and detention of women’s rights advocates, as well as women 

harassed and detained for political advocacy and religious belief. These included: Huang Xueqin, Ye Haiyan, Rei Xia, Wu 

Qin, Xu Qin, and Tang Hui.
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• So-called “everyday feminism” is on the rise in China, but 

the overall environment for feminist advocacy in China is highly restricted in the wake of crackdowns on independent and 

grassroots civil society advocates and organizations, suspicion 

of women’s public participation, and the censorship of feminist 

websites and social media.

• Women’s political empowerment in China remains low, according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report. Scholarly analysis published this past year concluded that 

the Party’s “commitment to gender equity and its quota policy 

have failed to integrate women meaningfully into the inner circles of power so that Chinese politics remains largely gendered.”

• A State Council assessment of the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law in August 2023 highlighted problems with implementation, such as a minimal use of mandatory reporting in cases 

of children harmed by domestic violence, the low number of protection orders and warnings issued by local courts and public 

security bureaus, the vulnerability of women with disabilities, 

inadequate funding, and a lack of legal knowledge among frontline personnel.

Population Contr

• The Chinese Communist Party and government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to apply a birth limit 

policy, which violates international standards by seeking to control family size. An expert commented that the PRC three-child 

policy instituted in 2021, which permits and seeks to incentivize 

families to have up to but no more than three children, is a 

project to “[reassert] Party-State control over [the] population.”

• The pro-birth policy has not resulted in population growth, 

however, and PRC population trends are similar to those in 

other East Asian countries. The National Bureau of Statistics 

of China’s 2023 data revealed that the population declined in 

China for the second year in a row and that the total number 

of births in China declined for the seventh year in a row.

• Young people’s reluctance to marry and have children has 

been linked to a variety of factors, including the high cost of 

raising children in China, economic precarity, and gender inequality.

• Party leaders emphasized the importance of population growth 

during official speeches and events this past year. Pro-birth and 

marriage messaging was featured in official propaganda, municipal governments’ financial incentives, and judicial opinions. 

Measures passed in September 2023 incentivized childbirth for 

military personnel. Some legislative proposals focused on supporting women’s rights in the workplace.

• The legacy of the one-child policy (1980–2015) continues to 

have an impact on Chinese society, including human trafficking 

for the purpose of marriage and the commercial sex trade. Data 

published this past year showed on average, boy-preference for 

couples having a third child, with 133 boys born for every 100 

girls, across China.
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• Chinese authorities’ enforcement of population control policies has contributed to increasing socio-economic precarity for 

China’s elderly population, including an underfunded pension 

system and the inability of adult children to provide traditional 

care for their elderly parents.

Human Traffick

• The Outlaw Ocean Project, the New Yorker, and the Environmental Justice Foundation separately identified practices 

indicating forced labor in the Chinese seafood industry. The 

reporting found that International Labour Organization (ILO) 

indicators of forced labor were present onboard Chinese fishing 

vessels and that Turkic and Muslim workers from the Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and North Korea were likely subjected to forced labor in the seafood processing industry.

• Forced employment and poverty alleviation policies involving 

Turkic Muslims from the XUAR continued during the reporting year, and they are set to continue at least through 2025. 

Reports found that gold and aluminum were likely tainted by 

forced labor involving Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims from 

the XUAR, and witnesses at a Commission hearing found that 

audits were unreliable when investigating instances of forced 

labor in and from the XUAR.

• Scamming organizations in Southeast Asia, including many 

run by Chinese nationals, continued to force individuals from 

China and other countries to work in compounds carrying out 

online scam operations targeting people around the world.

• In a March 2024 hearing held by the Commission, witnesses expressed concern that large-scale collection of the DNA of 

Uyghurs and others in the XUAR could be used to match organs 

for forced removal. Forced organ removal is considered a form of 

human trafficking by the U.N.

Worker Rig

• The recorded number of strikes and labor protests in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) increased in 2023 for the first 

time since the peak of a “strike wave” that ended in 2016. The 

increase can primarily be attributed to the demand for money owed for back wages. A slowing economy has led to factory 

closures, causing bosses to leave without paying out back wages. This has contributed to a tenfold increase in the number 

of factories that experienced strikes between 2022 and 2023. 

Construction workers were denied pay as a tightening in the 

housing market led to the closure of or slowdown of work at 

construction sites. Police continued to suppress strike activity 

after being called in to disrupt at least 181 strikes in 2023.

• China’s repression against labor rights activists has continued. In June of 2024 a court in Guangzhou municipality, Guangzhou province sentenced labor rights activist Wang Jianbing

to three years and six months in prison. Additionally, in the first 

half of 2023, police were called in to 82 strikes, and detained 

workers at 7 of the strikes. The continued harassment of whistleblowers such as Lu Yuyu and Tang Mingfeng, even after 
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their release from prison, highlighted the difficulties faced by 

those who try to tell the truth about labor conditions in China.

• A system of normalized forced overtime among white-collar 

workers persisted despite China officially having an eight-hour 

workday, with the workweek not allowed to exceed 44 hours. 

In the technology industry, workers are expected to participate 

in an overtime practice referred to as “996,” from 9 a.m. to 9 

p.m., six days a week. This overtime practice dovetails with age 

discrimination, as workers over 35 are perceived as unable to 

handle these long hours and are therefore subject to hiring discrimination.

• Inequality continues to be systematized through the hukou or 

household registration system. Urban hukou holders continue 

to be able to access considerably more benefits than rural hukou holders and migrant workers. In December 2023, the World 

Bank released a report that documented the unequal treatment 

of rural and urban residents when it comes to access to pensions sufficient to maintain a worker during retirement.

• The PRC continues to deny its workers the right to unionize. 

The official, Party-controlled union, the All-China Federation of 

Trade Unions (ACFTU), continues to be the sole representative 

of workers. In 2023, the ACFTU held its 18th Congress, during 

which it signaled further consolidation and centralization under 

the leadership of Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.

Public Heal

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities’ response 

following the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, and throughout the COVID-19 pandemic has been 

characterized by a lack of transparency and problematic reporting. In October 2023, the government considered draft revisions 

to the PRC Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious 

Diseases, including amendments that would strengthen reporting of infectious disease outbreaks within China.

• During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, PRC authorities continued to suppress criticism of the Chinese Communist Party and government about the PRC’s response to the 

COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic and have promoted a narrative of “success”.

• Several Chinese citizens based in Shanghai municipality 

faced official harassment and detention in connection with their 

efforts to document the COVID-19 pandemic and protest harsh 

lockdown measures including: Chen Pinlin, Ji Xiaolong, Rei 

Xia, and Zhang Zhan.

• Although there have been sporadic efforts to punish corruption in the healthcare sector in the past, during this reporting 

year, Xi Jinping’s anticorruption “battle” engulfed the sector in 

a nationwide crackdown.

• The State Council passed new “Regulations on Human Organ 

Donation and Transplantation” that were presented as a means 

to strengthen oversight and management of the organ allocation and distribution system. A group of transplant surgeons 

and ethicists expressed skepticism that the PRC had ended 
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abuses in its organ transplant system, noting China’s failure 

to adhere to WHO Guiding Principles—including a lack of accountability, allegations of forced organ harvesting, and falsified 

data on organ transplantation.

• PRC authorities continued to use forcible psychiatric commitment as a tool of political control and repression in China, 

according to a Chinese nongovernmental organization including 

in the cases of: Wu Yanan, Wang Yuping, and Song Zaimin.

The Environme

• China remained the world’s leading emitter of carbon dioxide 

(CO2) emissions in 2023. China’s CO2 emissions continued to 

grow in January and February of 2024, followed by a 3-percent 

decrease in March, the first decline since the discontinuation of 

the zero-COVID policy in the country.

• International media and observers detailed trends in 

China’s coal sector that may impede the country’s progress towards meeting its 2025 targets under the Paris Agreement.

• At the 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference 

(COP28), China did not sign on to the Global Renewables and 

Energy Efficiency Pledge. Experts speculate that China chose 

to refrain from signing in part due to the pledge’s references to 

phasing out fossil fuels and coal.

• Extreme weather events that observers have linked to climate change affected cultural heritage, food and water security, 

and public health in China. 2023 was described as the country’s 

“historic warmest year,” and July 2024 as “the hottest single 

month in the history of observation.”

• PRC authorities repressed environmental advocates. This past 

year, officials detained environmental advocate and blogger Hu 

Nengke, known as “Hu Laoshi” (Teacher Hu), for exposing corruption committed by officials in Gushi county, Xinyang municipality, Henan province, which included allowing companies to 

violate environmental regulations. In addition, PRC authorities 

deployed armed police to peaceful protests in Anqing municipality, Anhui province and detained more than 1,000 Tibetans for 

voicing their opposition to the Kamthog (Gangtuo) hydropower 

dam in Derge (Dege) county, Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.

• The PRC’s dams, island-building initiatives, and giant clam 

harvesting contributed to environmental degradation in the IndoPacific region.

Business and Human Rig

• Companies that do business in, source from, or work with 

companies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 

are at risk of complicity in human rights abuses being committed by the Chinese Communist Party and government. Reports 

of corporate involvement in mass atrocities in the XUAR implicate the apparel, automotive, mining, seafood, solar, tomato, and 

tourism industries.

• Reports and congressional testimony continued to highlight evidence of the unreliability of social compliance audits 
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conducted in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially 

in the XUAR. In December 2023, German car manufacturer 

Volkswagen commissioned Löning Human Rights & Responsible Business to conduct an audit of its joint venture factory in 

the XUAR. Although the automaker claimed the audit found no 

signs of forced labor, human rights experts and advocates raised 

concerns that social compliance audits are neither equipped nor 

designed to accurately identify state-imposed forced labor in the 

region.

• Chinese and international technology companies are linked 

to the Chinese government’s data collection, surveillance efforts, 

and censorship. Reports from this past year found the following:

○ Accelerated Nuclear DNA Equipment, with the support 

of Chinese security equipment vendor Beijing GAC World 

Trade, sold DNA testing machines to public security bureaus across China.

○ Chinese biotechnology firm WuXi AppTec transferred a 

client’s data and intellectual property from the U.S. to China without consent.

○ PRC authorities censored content on Apple’s App Store 

by directly requesting that Apple remove specific apps, by 

setting complex rules for app developers, and by creating 

localized versions of select apps to restrict access to global 

versions, among other tactics.

○ Google’s YouTube blocked access to more than 30 videos of the popular pro-democracy protest anthem “Glory to 

Hong Kong” for viewers in Hong Kong.

• Recent PRC legislation expanded the scope of laws authorizing government control of information, prompting businesses to 

self-censor or take other precautionary measures. The Commission observed businesses implementing heightened precautionary measures, including 1) encouraging use of burner phones; 

2) withdrawing operations from China; 3) limiting access to international databases; and 4) working from home.

• As of May 2024, the U.S. State Department’s China Travel Advisory warns travelers about the “arbitrary enforcement of local 

laws, including in relation to exit bans, and the risk of wrongful 

detentions.” According to reporting from September 2023, Chinese authorities blocked a senior executive from American risk 

advisory firm Kroll and a senior Hong Kong-based banker from 

Japanese financial services group Nomura Holdings from leaving mainland China.

North Korean Refugees in Ch

• Shortly after the border reopening in the summer of 2023, 

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began to repatriate North 

Korean refugees, many of whom were women. In October 2023, 

the PRC government facilitated the return of 500 to 600 North 

Korean refugees. International condemnation followed, and 

concerns were raised this past year at the United Nations by 

the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and by the Republic of Korea (South Korea) government, among others.
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20

• Despite Chinese authorities’ continual denials, there have 

been reports of abuse and torture of North Korean refugees who 

were repatriated since the border reopening. According to media 

reports, seven female refugees who were repatriated in October 

2023 died due to serious human rights violations that occurred 

at two detention sites in the DPRK, including at least one case 

of reported suicide.

• North Korean workers dispatched from North Korea to earn 

foreign currency in China are overwhelmingly women and are 

vulnerable to sexual abuse and exploitation. Despite recent 

media reports and an international outcry over human rights 

violations in seafood processing plants, Chinese companies employed additional workers, defying international sanctions banning the hiring of workers from North Korea.

• North Korean trafficking victims, mostly women who had 

been residing in China before the outbreak of coronavirus dis- ease 2019 (COVID-19), remain highly marginalized. Chinese 

authorities denied them access to essential healthcare and so- cial services. The number of North Korean women being traf- ficked into China has decreased due to strict border controls. In 

a couple of cases heavy sentences were meted out for trafficking 

of North Korean women.

Technology-Enhanced Authoritarian

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to rely on 

a National Anti-Fraud Center (NAFC) app to collect data and 

access personal information, monitor online activity, and po- tentially aggregate data for surveillance. While use of the app 

is prevalent across China, the Tibet Autonomous Region was 

a focal point for surveillance, leading individuals to engage in 

self-censorship, reducing cultural expression, and reinforcing 

control and conformity.

• Chinese leader Xi Jinping proposed the Global Artificial In- telligence Governance Initiative, which emphasizes sovereignty 

while potentially limiting human rights. Domestically, the Chi- nese government has issued regulations that further ensure 

that artificial intelligence (AI) is aligned with Chinese Commu- nist Party values, and Chinese academics have posited a need 

to guard against “Western values.”

• Chinese entities demonstrated competency in using AI to create social media content aimed at manipulating public opinion. 

First Voice, an opinion unit of Chinese state-owned media outlet China Global Television Network (CGTN), used AI to generate a series of animated videos on X and YouTube, called “A 

Fractured America,” showing fake strikes and riots happening 

across America because of income inequality and a lack of ac- countable democracy. Meanwhile, a research report revealed the 

first use of an AI-generated human by a Chinese company in an 

influence campaign.

• An online propaganda and disinformation operation employing a network of social media accounts (or “bots”) linked to the 

Chinese government, called “Spamouflage,” continued to make 

posts on social media favorable to the Chinese government and 
Executive Summary

21

hostile to opinions contrary to PRC policy. The Canadian government attributed the posting of “thousands” of comments in 

English and French on Facebook and X accounts of Members of 

Parliament to the operation.

Tibe

• The Commission did not observe any interest from People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) officials in resuming formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama’s representatives, the last round of 

which, the ninth, was held in January 2010.

• The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to control, the religious practices of Tibetans, the majority of whom practice Tibetan Buddhism. As part of the broader policy of “sinicizing” 

religion, PRC authorities in Tibetan areas issued prohibitions 

on forms of religious worship, including during important religious events or around the times of politically sensitive anniversaries, limited access to religious institutions and places of 

worship, including Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and temples, 

and otherwise unduly restricted Tibetans’ freedom of religion 

and belief. The PRC continued to assert control over the process 

of selection and recognition of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated 

teachers, including the Dalai Lama.

• The Commission did not observe reports of Tibetan selfimmolations occurring during the 2024 reporting year, the second year since 2021 in which no self-immolations were reported 

to have occurred.

• PRC authorities maintained a system of residential boarding 

schools in Tibetan areas that observers fear could constitute 

a serious threat to Tibetan society and the intergenerational 

transmission of culture and language.

• Large-scale protests broke out in February 2024 in Derge 

(Dege) county, Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 

Sichuan province, due to official plans for construction of a 

hydroelectric dam on the Drichu (Jinsha) River that will submerge at least two villages and six monasteries, one of which, 

Wontoe Monastery, contains well-preserved 13th-century murals. Security personnel detained approximately 1,000 Tibetans 

in connection with the protests; many were later released, but 

local authorities escalated surveillance and monitoring of local 

communities in the following months.

• In contravention of international human rights standards, 

officials punished residents of Tibetan areas for exercising 

protected rights, including the expression of religious belief, 

expressing criticism of PRC policies, and sharing information 

online. Notable cases this past year included those of writer 

Pema, a monk and teacher at Kirti Monastery, who in a lone 

protest held a portrait of the Dalai Lama and called for the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet and religious freedom for Tibetans; 

Semkyi Drolma, detained for her participation in discussion 

groups about Buddhism on the social media platform WeChat, 

and later sentenced to one year and six months in prison for 

“leaking state secrets”; and Tenzin Sangpo, a senior monk at 
Executive Summary

22

Derge’s Wontoe Monastery detained in February 2024 as part 

of the anti-dam protests.

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re

• Research published this past year indicated that the rate of 

imprisonment for Turkic and Muslim individuals in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was disproportionately high compared to China’s overall prison population. According to analysis published by the Uyghur Human Rights Project 

(UHRP) in April 2024, based on official figures, Uyghurs and 

members of other non-Han Chinese ethnic groups in the XUAR 

constituted 34 percent of the number of people estimated to be 

formally imprisoned in China, although these groups make up 

only one percent of the country’s population. UHRP’s analysis 

estimates that members of ethnic minority groups in the XUAR 

are formally imprisoned at more than 47 times the rate of Han 

Chinese people in the region, with 1 in every 26 ethnic minority 

XUAR residents imprisoned.

• During this reporting year, authorities in the XUAR maintained a system of forced labor that involved Turkic and Muslim 

individuals, shifting from a system involving former mass internment camp detainees to one that generally involves people 

who have not been detained. According to observers, officials 

use forced labor programs to tighten political and social control 

over Uyghur and other communities in the XUAR. Official data 

show that authorities planned to transfer at least one million 

“surplus laborers” through the “poverty alleviation” program 

in 2023—a figure that did not include all types of forced labor 

transfers—and that this figure included a significant increase 

in the number of cross-provincial labor transfers.

• New regulations took effect this reporting year in the XUAR 

that tightened limits on the religious practices of Muslim residents in the region. In December 2023, the XUAR People’s 

Congress amended the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA), which took effect on 

February 1, 2024. The revised regulations focus on the need to 

“sinicize” religious practices and venues, in line with government efforts to “sinicize” religious worship nationwide in recent 

years, and tighten restrictions on the establishment, construction, and renovation of places of worship. Human Rights Watch 

wrote that according to the text of the revised RRA, “[r]eligious 

venues are to be, effectively, training grounds that promote the 

values of the Chinese Communist Party to the people.”

• Reports emerged this past year showing that Chinese authorities have continued implementing policies that infringe upon 

Uyghurs’ rights to maintain their own language and culture. In 

June 2024, Human Rights Watch published research findings, 

which it produced together with the Norway-based organization 

Uyghur Hjelp, showing that between 2009 and 2023, Chinese 

officials had changed the names of more than 600 villages traditionally inhabited by Uyghurs into names that removed their 

cultural or religious significance. In September 2023, three U.N. 

special rapporteurs issued a press release expressing “grave 
Executive Summary

23

concern” over reports of a “significant expansion” of the boarding school system in the XUAR. The three experts expressed 

concern over the fact that the boarding schools into which 

Uyghur children are placed provide little to no instruction in 

the Uyghur language, and that these children are pressured to 

speak and learn only Mandarin Chinese.

Hong Kong and Mac

• As the Chinese Communist Party and government increasingly interfered with Hong Kong’s affairs in violation of the “one 

country, two systems” principle, the Hong Kong government 

continued to implement various repressive policies purportedly 

to protect national security. The arbitrary application of national security laws has led to the imprisonment of dissidents and 

activists, further eroding fundamental freedoms in the city.

• Ongoing criminal prosecution on charges involving national 

security and sedition against individuals who peacefully exercised their rights included news media executives Jimmy Lai

and Chung Pui-kuen, human rights lawyer Chow Hangtung, and student activist Joshua Wong Chi-fung.

• Hong Kong police issued warrants of arrest on at least 13 

exiled activists and offered rewards for information leading to 

their arrest. These individuals advocated for democratic reform 

and for imposing financial sanctions on Hong Kong and People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) officials who perpetrated human rights 

violations. A group of United Nations (U.N.) experts expressed 

serious concern over the case, saying that the Hong Kong government was punishing people for political speech.

• Some foreign judges on Hong Kong’s highest court resigned, 

with one of them explaining the factors that had profoundly 

compromised the rule of law: 1) The National Security Law severely limited judges’ freedom of action; 2) the National People’s Congress Standing Committee could overturn judges’ decisions; and 3) authorities were intent on quashing even peaceful 

dissent.

• The Hong Kong government’s application to order unspecified 

social media companies to take down a popular protest song 

was granted by an appellate court, which reversed a lower court 

that denied the application based on protection of civil liberties 

considerations.

• Annual vigils commemorating the violent suppression of the 

1989 Tiananmen protests were no longer held. In past years, 

authorities initially denied applications to hold the vigils on 

public health grounds. More recently, no such applications have 

been made because the organizing group dissolved after its core 

leaders became political prisoners.

• Allegations emerged this year of physical and sexual violence 

taking place at a juvenile detention facility. Prison guards reportedly abused political prisoners and sometimes did so using 

other inmates as proxies. Avenues through which abuse could 

be reported were ineffective because abusers exploited security 

camera blind spots and victims were too afraid to step forward 

publicly to file complaints.
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24

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Gl

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued a multifaceted 

campaign of transnational repression against Hong Kongers, Ti- betans, Uyghurs, journalists, Chinese university students, and 

others to stifle dissent and intimidate individuals in emigrant 

and diaspora communities. Examples include the issuance of 

HK$1,000,000 (US$127,600) bounties on 13 overseas activists, 

intelligence-gathering efforts in diaspora communities, and the 

harassment of China-based relatives of overseas targets.

• The PRC’s transnational repression efforts were observed 

leading up to, during, and after the November 2023 Asia-Pacific 

Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in San Francisco, Cali- fornia.

• This reporting year, the Commission observed reports of PRC 

authorities forcibly repatriating overseas Chinese citizens Lu 

Siwei and Yang Zewei, also known as Qiao Xinxin, through 

extrajudicial means.

• The PRC targeted foreign politicians and governments by 

attempting to influence democratic elections and shape public 

opinion abroad about the Chinese Communist Party and government, including in Canada, the Solomon Islands, and Taiwan.

• PRC authorities continued to make efforts to influence processes and procedures within the U.N. system to limit public 

awareness of China’s human rights abuses in the international 

community. This past year, reports detailed the PRC’s efforts to 

influence and impede the U.N. Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and several U.N. Special Procedures.
25

Political Prisoner Datab

The Commission’s 2024 Annual Report provides information about 

Chinese political and religious prisoners 1 in the context of specific 

human rights and rule-of-law abuses. Many of the abuses result 

from the Chinese Communist Party and government’s application of 

policies and laws. The Commission relies on the Political Prisoner 

Database (PPD), a publicly available online database maintained 

by the Commission, for its research, including the preparation of 

the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database as a resource 

to prepare summaries of information about and support advocacy 

for political and religious prisoners for Members of Congress and 

Administration officials. The Commission invites the public to read 

about issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections 

of this Annual Report and to access and make use of the PPD at 

https://www.ppdcecc.gov.

The Commission seeks to provide users with prisoner information 

that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members aim to 

provide objective analysis of information about individual prisoners and about events and trends that drive political and religious 

imprisonment in China, and work on an ongoing basis to create, 

maintain, and update records of political and religious imprisonment in the PPD. Each record describes the type of human rights 

violation by Chinese authorities connected to the prisoner’s detention. These include, among others, violations of the right to peaceful 

assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and freedom 

of expression, including the freedom to advocate for peaceful social 

or political change and to criticize government policy or government 

officials.

When the PPD was first launched, the Dui Hua Foundation, based 

in San Francisco, and the former Tibet Information Network, based 

in London, shared their extensive experience and data on political 

and religious prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the database. The Commission relies on its own staff research for prisoner information, as well as on information provided 

by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), groups that specialize in 

promoting human rights and opposing political and religious imprisonment, and other public sources of information.

POLITICAL PRISONERS

Overview. As of June 30, 2024, the PPD contained 11,199 records of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of those, 2,764 

records were considered “active detentions,” referring to records of 

political and religious prisoners currently known or believed to be 

detained or imprisoned, or under coercive controls. There were 8,435 

records of prisoners who are known or believed to have been released, who were executed, who died while imprisoned or soon after 

release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there are considerably more cases of current political and religious detention in 

China than are contained in the PPD.

Ethnic Group. Of the active detentions, 1,693 contained information on the prisoners’ reported or presumed ethnicity. Of those, 

790 were Tibetan, 502 were Uyghur, 309 were Han, 35 were Kazakh, 
Executive Summary

26

27 were Mongol, and 9 were Hui. Of the 1,071 prisoners without 

recorded ethnicities, many were likely Han.

Religion. Of the 2,764 records of prisoners known or believed to 

be detained, 1,686 contained information on the prisoner’s religious 

affiliation. 678 were Tibetan Buddhists, 497 were Falun Gong practitioners, 245 were Muslim, 86 were Protestants, 22 were adherents 

of Mentu Hui, 18 were Jehovah’s Witnesses, 17 were Yi Guan Dao 

members, 36 were members of the Church of Almighty God (also 

known as Eastern Lightning), and 15 were Catholic.

Sex. Of the 2,764 records of prisoners known or believed to be detained, 1,710 were of male prisoners, 761 were of female prisoners, 

and 293 records did not contain information on the prisoner’s sex.

Sentencing. Of the 2,764 records of prisoners known or believed 

to be detained, 1,441 pertain to individuals serving prison sentences. 

Of those 1,441 prisoners, 1,347 were serving fixed-term sentences, 

63 were serving life sentences, 24 were sentenced to death with a 

two-year reprieve, and 7 were sentenced to death.

Place of Detention. The table below shows the number of active 

detentions in each province-level administrative division:

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 

Region 611 Hunan province 45

Sichuan province 397 Jiangxi province 42

Tibet Autonomous Region 244 Shanxi province 39

Guangdong province 171 Jilin province 39

Qinghai province 153 Shaanxi province 36

Gansu province 86 Shanghai municipality 26

Liaoning province 84 Yunnan province 26

Heilongjiang province 84 Fujian province 25

Beijing municipality 81 Zhejiang province 20

Shandong province 73 Chongqing municipality 19

Hong Kong SAR 72 Ningxia Hui Autonomous 

Region 17

Henan province 67 Tianjin municipality 13

Hebei province 66 Guizhou province 12

Anhui province 57 Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 

Region 10

Hubei province 53 Hainan province 1

Jiangsu province 49 Macau SAR 0

Inner Mongolia Autonomous 

Region 46
Executive Summary

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Political Prisoner Cases of Con

Members of Congress and the Administration are encouraged to 

consult the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) for cred- ible and up-to-date information on individual prisoners or groups of 

prisoners. The Cases of Concern in the Commission’s 2024 Annual 

Report highlight a small number of individuals whom Chinese au- thorities have detained or sentenced for peacefully exercising their 

internationally recognized human rights. Members of Congress and 

the Administration are urged to advocate for these individuals in 

meetings with Chinese Communist Party and government officials. 

For more information on these cases and other cases raised in the 

Annual Report, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database.

Name

PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of June 30, 2024)

Wang Jianbing

王建兵

2021-00517

Sophia Huang 

Xueqin

黄雪琴

2019-00454

Date of Detention: September 19, 2021

Place of Detention: Guangzhou Municipal No. 1 PSB Detention Center in Guangdong province

Charge(s): Inciting subversion of state power

Status: Wang: sentenced to three years and six months; 

Huang: sentenced to five years

Context: On September 19, 2021, public security authorities in Guangzhou took into custody journalist and gender 

rights advocate Sophia Huang Xueqin and labor rights 

advocate Wang Jianbing. Authorities placed Huang and 

Wang under “residential surveillance at a designated location”—a form of incommunicado detention that leaves detainees vulnerable to torture and abuse—and formally arrested them on October 27 for “inciting subversion of state 

power.” Authorities held Wang in solitary confinement for 

five months and did not permit him to meet with his lawyer. In September 2023, the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court tried Huang and Wang in a closed hearing and 

sentenced them on June 13, 2024.

Additional Information: Wang worked on rural development, youth education initiatives, advocacy on behalf of 

persons with disabilities, and labor rights, and is a strong 

supporter of China’s #MeToo movement. The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention deemed his detention 

arbitrary in 2022. Authorities previously detained Huang 

on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” 

possibly in connection with her coverage of sexual harassment in China and her reporting on the 2019 pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong.
Executive Summary

28

Name

PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of June 30, 2024)

Yu Wensheng

余文生

2014-00387

Xu Yan

许艳

2023-00110

Date of Detention: April 14, 2023

Place of Detention: Yu: Suzhou No. 1 PSB Detention 

Center; Xu: Suzhou No. 4 PSB Detention Center

Charge(s): Picking quarrels and provoking trouble

Status: Detained, awaiting trial

Context: On April 14, 2023, police in Beijing municipality detained lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife, activist Xu 

Yan, as they headed to a meeting with European Union 

diplomats. The next day, police verbally read a criminal 

detention notice to their son saying that both were held on 

suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” but 

did not provide a written copy. Police reportedly stationed 

personnel in Yu and Xu’s home with their son and told 

their lawyers that Yu did not want a lawyer, and that Xu 

had chosen two others. On May 21, Yu’s brother reported 

that authorities had formally arrested Yu and Xu but had 

not given him an arrest notice or allowed him to photograph one. He also said that police warned lawyers not to 

represent the couple.

Additional Information: Authorities previously detained 

Yu from 2014 to 2015 in connection with his support for 

pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, and from 2018 to 

2022 he served a four-year prison sentence for “inciting 

subversion of state power” due to his advocacy of political 

reform.

Tonyee Chow 

Hang-tung

鄒幸彤

2021-00514

Date of Detention: June 4, 2021

Place of Detention: Tai Lam Centre for Women, Hong 

Kong SAR

Charge(s): Inciting others to join an unauthorized assembly; inciting subversion of state power; failure to comply 

with notice to provide information

Status: Detained

Context: On June 4, 2021, Hong Kong police arrested Tonyee Chow Hang-tung, alleging that she had incited others 

to join a candlelight vigil commemorating the 1989 Tian- anmen protests, which police had declined to authorize on 

public health grounds. Police released her on bail but arrested her again on June 30, accusing her of inciting others 

to join an unauthorized assembly on July 1, the anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover. Chow is a rights lawyer and 

was previously vice chair of the NGO Hong Kong Alliance 

that organized June 4th vigils annually. In September, 

police arrested Chow and several other Hong Kong Alliance members for failing to surrender documents relating 

to the organization’s operations, additionally charging her 

with “inciting subversion of state power” under the National Security Law (NSL). Chow has been sentenced to 

a total of 22 months in prison for two charges relating to 

unauthorized assembly. In December 2022, the Hong Kong 

High Court overturned a 15-month sentence related to the 

unauthorized assembly, but in January 2024, the Hong 

Kong Court of Final Appeal overturned the acquittal. In 

May 2024, Chow was arrested under the provisions of the 

new Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (“Article 

23” legislation) for publication of seditious materials.

Additional Information: In May 2023, the U.N. Working 

Group on Arbitrary Detention held that Chow’s detention 

was arbitrary and called on Hong Kong authorities to release her.
Executive Summary

29

Name

PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of June 30, 2024)

Xu Qin

徐秦

2016-00015

Date of Detention: February 9, 2018

Place of Detention: Yangzhou Municipal PSB Detention 

Center in Jiangsu province

Charge(s): Inciting subversion of state power

Status: Sentenced to four years

Context: Police in Gaoyou city, Yangzhou, detained veteran rights defender Xu Qin in February 2018 on suspicion 

of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” in apparent 

connection with her advocacy on behalf of other rights advocates, including detained lawyer Yu Wensheng. In March, 

police placed Xu under “residential surveillance at a designated location” and accused her of “inciting subversion 

of state power.” After releasing Xu on bail in September, 

authorities maintained her bail conditions for three years. 

In November 2021, she was taken back into custody and 

formally arrested for “inciting subversion.” Xu’s lawyer 

reported that in June 2022, she was paralyzed and in a 

wheelchair. The Yangzhou Intermediate People’s Court sentenced her in March 2024 to four years in prison.

Additional Information: A former Communist Party 

member, Xu was detained previously in 2016 in connection 

with a planned gathering of petitioners in Beijing municipality. Xu has been a member of the rights defense organizations China Human Rights Watch and Rose China, 

whose founder, Qin Yongmin, is serving a 13-year prison 

sentence for his democracy advocacy.

Yang Zewei

杨泽伟

2023-00171

Date of Detention: May 31, 2023

Place of Detention: Hengyang Juvenile PSB Detention 

Center in Hengyang municipality, Hunan province

Charge(s): Inciting subversion of state power

Status: Formally arrested, awaiting trial

Context: On May 31, 2023, Chinese police officers, in cooperation with Laotian police officers, abducted free speech 

activist Yang Zewei, also known as Qiao Xinxin, from his 

home in Vientiane, Laos. On July 7, 2023, Hengyang police formally arrested Yang for “inciting subversion of state 

power” and held him at the Hengyang Juvenile PSB Detention Center.

Additional Information: Yang Zewei worked as a journalist for outlets such as Radio Free Asia before moving to 

Laos. In March 2023, he launched an online campaign to 

advocate against internet censorship in China.
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30

Name

PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of June 30, 2024)

Lu Siwei

卢思位

2021-00269

Date of Detention: July 28, 2023

Place of Detention: Xindu District PSB Detention Center

Charge(s): Illegally crossing the border

Status: Released on bail, awaiting trial

Context: On July 28, 2023, authorities in Laos detained 

Lu Siwei, a disbarred Chinese rights lawyer, near the Thai 

border as he was traveling from China via Thailand to the 

United States, where his wife and daughter live. In September, Lao officials transferred Lu back to the custody of 

PRC officials, who detained him on suspicion of “illegally 

crossing the border” and held him at the Xindu District 

PSB Detention Center in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan 

province. On October 28, 2023 authorities released Lu on 

bail pending trial.

Additional Information: Lu Siwei has represented clients including rights lawyers and advocates and offered to 

work for one of 12 Hong Kong activists detained in August 

2020 while attempting to flee to Taiwan. In 2017 he called 

on the National People’s Congress to investigate torture 

allegations among individuals detained in the 2015 “709” 

crackdown on rights lawyers and advocates. In January 

2021, Sichuan authorities disbarred Lu, and in May 2021 

he was banned from leaving China.

Pema

པདྨྨ་

白玛

2024-00106

Date of Detention: March 26, 2024

Place of Detention: Unknown location believed to be in 

Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, 

Sichuan province

Charge(s): Unknown

Status: Detained

Context: Pema, a monk and teacher at Ngaba’s Kirti Monastery, was detained on March 26, 2024, after a solo protest 

in which he held a portrait of the Dalai Lama and called 

for the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet and religious freedom 

for Tibetans. Following Pema’s detention, police stepped up 

restrictions in the area around Kirti Monastery and inquired into Pema’s contacts from his WeChat account.

Rahile Dawut

راھىلە داۋۇت

热依拉·达吾提

2018-00552

Date of Detention: December 2017

Place of Detention: Unknown location in the Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)

Charge(s): Unknown charge related to endangering state 

security

Status: Sentenced to life imprisonment

Context: Uyghur ethnographer Rahile Dawut disappeared 

in December 2017 and was believed to have been held in 

a mass internment camp. In July 2021, sources confirmed 

that she had been sentenced to prison on unknown charges. 

Later reporting confirmed that she had been tried in 2018 

and sentenced to life imprisonment on a charge related 

to “endangering state security” and that the XUAR High 

People’s Court rejected her appeal. Friends and other observers suggested that authorities may have detained her 

due to her efforts to preserve Uyghur culture and heritage, 

or due to her foreign connections. She formerly taught at 

Xinjiang University and is well regarded for her scholarly 

research on traditional Uyghur culture.
Executive Summary

31

Name

PPD Record No. Case Summary (as of June 30, 2024)

Lang Dongyue

郎东月

2024-00071

Date of Detention: December 14, 2021

Place of Detention: Zhangjiakou PSB Detention Center

Charge(s): Unknown

Status: Sentenced to nine years

Context: On December 14, 2021, police took into custody 

Falun Gong practitioner Lang Dongyue in Huailai county, 

Zhangjiakou municipality, Hebei province. Police initially 

detained her in a police station and later transferred her 

to the Zhangjiakou PSB Detention Center in early 2021. In 

or around July 2023, the Xuanhua District People’s Court 

in Zhangjiakou sentenced Lang to nine years in prison and 

imposed a fine of 15,000 yuan. The Zhangjiakou Intermediate People’s Court later rejected Lang’s appeal.

Additional Information: Authorities had previously detained Lang at least five times beginning around 1999, 

during which time she was reportedly subjected to torture.

Zhou Songlin

周松林

2024-00125

Date of Detention: November 30, 2023

Place of Detention: A PSB detention center in Hefei municipality, Anhui province

Charge(s): Fraud

Status: Detained

Context: On November 30, 2023, public security officials 

in Hefei municipality, Anhui province, raided the homes 

of leaders and staff of the unregistered Ganquan Church. 

Fourteen individuals from the church initially were taken 

into custody, and while most were released shortly thereafter, among those criminally detained was the church’s 

pastor, Zhou Songlin. Authorities criminally detained him 

and four others on suspicion of “fraud.”

Additional Information: In recent years, PRC authorities 

have used “fraud” charges against unregistered churches, 

effectively criminalizing churches’ offerings-based funding 

structures.

Notes to Section II—Political Prisoner Database

1The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual detained or imprisoned for exercising their human rights under international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, 

freedom of association, and freedom of expression, including the freedom to advocate for peaceful 

social or political change, and to criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is 

illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners documented in the PPD were detained or 

imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by China’s Constitution and 

law, or by international human rights standards, or both. Chinese security, prosecutorial, and 

judicial officials sometimes seek to distract attention from the political or religious nature of 

imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner under the pretext of having 

committed a generic crime. In such cases, defendants typically deny guilt, but officials may at- tempt to coerce confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of evidence are 

poor. A defendant may authorize someone to provide their legal counsel and defense, as the PRC 

Criminal Procedure Law guarantees in Article 33, yet officials may deny the counsel adequate 

access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel’s access to evidence, and not provide the 

counsel adequate time to prepare a defense.
32

General Recommendations to Congr

and the Administratio

The Commission makes the following recommendations for actions by the Administration and Congress.

Enforce Forced Labor Import Restrictions. Congress and the 

Administration should provide sufficient resources to enforce laws 

prohibiting the importation of goods produced with forced labor, including the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA; Public 

Law No. 117-78); enable the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force 

(FLETF) to expand the UFLPA’s “Entity List,” and for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to hire analysts with Chinese 

language skills. In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Employ available funds for technologies to assist in UFLPA 

enforcement, such as DNA traceability and secure supply chain 

mapping tools, and software, to better analyze packages entering the U.S. via the de minimis duty-free shipping loophole;

○ Focus enforcement efforts on small-parcel imports that enter 

the United States under the de minimis threshold, including by 

considering placing e-commerce sites like Temu on the UFLPA 

“Entity List” as some reportedly operate in China not only as 

online marketplaces, but as vertically integrated manufacturers 

and retailers responsible for sourcing goods;

○ Continue to expand the UFLPA “Entity List” aggressively so 

that importers have clear guidelines for supply chain management and better understand which companies are employing 

labor within, and transferred from, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR);

○ Direct the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department 

of Agriculture, and other federal agencies to end procurement 

of seafood processed in the Chinese provinces of Liaoning and 

Shandong, given evidence that such processed seafood is tainted 

by the forced labor of Uyghurs and North Koreans;

○ Issue clear guidelines through the Office of Management and 

Budget’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy directing all federal agencies to prohibit procurement of goods made with forced 

labor, particularly seafood processed in China;

○ Expand the ability of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Trade 

Fraud Task Force to investigate and prosecute international 

trade-related crimes, particularly those committed by entities 

violating the UFLPA in high-priority enforcement sectors or 

by entities seeking to obscure forced labor in existing supply 

chains, including through the transshipment of goods; and

○ Encourage foreign governments and legislatures to adopt 

their own national legislation or regulations modeled on the 

UFLPA; and

• Congress should—

○ Pass legislation amending the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 

Chapter 4) to reform, reduce, or eliminate the de minimis 

threshold for duty-free shipments into the United States to 

prevent companies from circumventing the import restrictions 

required by the law;
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33

○ Consider legislation to expand the “rebuttable presumption” 

under the UFLPA that goods were made with forced labor to 

high-priority enforcement sectors beyond the XUAR, including 

1) the fishing sector to target Chinese maritime fleets engaged 

in “illegal, unregulated, or unreported” fishing and 2) the importation of lithium-ion batteries made with cobalt mined and 

processed using forced or child labor. Congress should pass H.R. 

6909 and H.R. 7981 (118th Cong.), both of which address labor 

abuse in the cobalt mining industry;

○ Consider legislation or other legislative action to require certification that federal vehicle purchases are free of parts made 

with forced labor or containing materials mined with forced or 

child labor, including by providing complete supply chain mapping for the vehicles and their parts;

○ Consider passing legislation, such as the Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act (H.R. 4840), to require issuers of securities 

to publicly disclose their supply or production chain related to 

the XUAR or to companies involved in labor transfers involving 

Uyghurs or other persecuted groups; and

○ Seek from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 

information about whether issuers of securities are violating 

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to disclose the 

material impacts of their links to the XUAR or with entities 

employing the forced labor of Uyghurs.

Pursue Accountability for Atrocity Crimes. Congress should 

pass the bipartisan Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act (S. 1770/H.R. 8124) and the Uyghur Policy Act of 2023 

(H.R. 2766) because the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to commit atrocities, including genocide, against Uyghur and 

other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

(XUAR). The Administration should fund programs to document and 

preserve evidence of atrocity crimes committed in the XUAR and 

more robustly use existing sanctions authorities found in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (Public Law No. 116-145) to hold 

PRC officials accountable for atrocity crimes. In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Create a Special Coordinator for the XUAR within the U.S. 

State Department whose task would be to enlist the cooperation 

of allies and partners in addressing atrocities; seek the release 

of Uyghurs detained who have family members living outside of 

the PRC; elevate enforcement of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and coordinate 

public diplomacy efforts to counter PRC propaganda globally;

○ Request an open debate or an Arria-formula briefing at the 

U.N. Security Council on the situation in the XUAR;

○ Raise the U.S. State Department’s Travel Advisory for the 

XUAR to “Level 4” to reduce the possibility of Americans enabling atrocity crimes, such as through state-chaperoned and 

-managed tourism excursions.

○ Ensure that export controls prohibit U.S. companies from assisting Chinese companies engaged in digital or biometric surveillance that aids in the commission of atrocity crimes in the 

XUAR; and
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34

○ Strengthen programs of public diplomacy globally to highlight the PRC’s atrocities, including by expanding the Uyghur 

Service of Radio Free Asia and by supporting projects of the 

Voice of America, the National Endowment for Democracy, the 

International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute; and

• Congress should—

○ Pass legislation to extend expiring sanctions authorities including those found in H.R. 8366 (118th Cong.) and the Uyghur 

Human Rights Policy Reauthorization Act of 2024 (S. 4465).

○ Require the Director of National Intelligence to submit a 

report assessing the impact of the PRC’s atrocities on region- al security, global supply chains, refugee flows, and its global 

propaganda efforts and including a detailed evaluation of the 

PRC’s digital and biometric surveillance architecture; the entities owned or operated by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC); the spread of facial recognition and 

other biometric surveillance tools globally; and the products and 

supply chains dependent on XUAR-sourced goods and products;

○ Direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury to issue a report 

on the impact of sanctions enforcement on the XPCC, which was 

sanctioned under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Public Law No. 114-328);

○ Provide sufficient funding for personnel at the Department 

of the Treasury and the Department of State to more effectively gather information and vet sanctions eligibility of suspected 

perpetrators of atrocities;

○ Consider legislation that would create a public archive of information documenting the Uyghur genocide and other atrocities for future atrocity accountability efforts;

○ Require the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to add all PRC police and public security entities to the BIS Entity List, in order to prohibit them 

from purchasing U.S. biotechnology products for the mass forced 

collection of biometric data that could be used for state surveillance, particularly in Tibetan and Uyghur regions; and

○ Consider legislation that would deny tax-exempt status for 

non-governmental organizations that fail to publicly report 

holding interest in any Chinese entity identified as engaged in 

forced organ harvesting, gross violations of human rights, human trafficking, or forced labor.

Defend Human Rights in Hong Kong. The Administration 

should employ more robustly the sanctions authorities found in the 

Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (Public Law No. 116-

76) and the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law No. 116-149) to 

target specifically government officials, prosecutors, judges, police, 

and other individuals complicit in the arbitrary detention of political 

prisoners and the dismantling of Hong Kong’s autonomy. In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Expand programs that support human rights and internet 

freedom in Hong Kong and provide legal support for democracy 

activists;
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35

○ Expand investigative journalism projects to preserve the 

flow of independent news and information from Hong Kong 

and create academic residency programs for Hong Kong journalists and executives whose news and media outlets were 

shuttered due to abuse or threats under the National Security Law;

○ Remove barriers for Hong Kong residents applying for U.S. 

visas, including by extending Priority 2 refugee status for those 

fearing political persecution, and publish a plan to address the 

long-term status and treatment of Hong Kong residents in the 

United States;

○ Coordinate sanctions and messaging about political prisoners 

in Hong Kong with the United Kingdom and other like-minded 

nations to amplify the impact of diplomatic efforts; and

○ Brief Congress regularly on U.S. diplomatic advocacy for political prisoners in Hong Kong, including Jimmy Lai, Joshua 

Wong, Chow Hang-tung, Gwyneth Ho, Claudia Mo, Benny Tai, 

and Lee Cheuk-yan; and

• Congress should—

○ Direct the Department of the Treasury to report on the finan- cial institutions restricting Hong Kongers from accessing their 

financial assets and impose sanctions, particularly for those fi- nancial institutions found to be acting at the behest of the Hong 

Kong government;

○ Pass the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (HKETO) 

Certification Act (S. 490) to remove the diplomatic privileges 

given to Hong Kong’s three offices in the United States;

○ Pass the Safeguarding Internet Freedom in Hong Kong Act 

(S. 3114) to develop and deploy firewall circumvention and other 

tools to protect democracy and rights activists online;

○ Pass S. 3177/H.R. 6153 (118th Cong.) to provide for a review 

of sanctions with respect to Hong Kong regarding officials re- sponsible for undermining democracy, human rights, and due 

process protections of Hong Kong citizens;

○ Extend the prohibition on sales of certain crowd control 

equipment and munitions to the Hong Kong police, as laid out 

in H.R. 8366 (118th Cong.); and

○ Extend sanctions authorizations for the Hong Kong Human 

Rights and Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2024 (S. 4467).

Protect North Koreans in China. Congress should pass the North 

Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2023 (S. 584/H.R. 

3012) to authorize the work of the Special Envoy for North Korean 

Human Rights and institute programs to help protect North Korean 

refugees and victims of human trafficking. In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Seek a report from the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the vulnerabilities faced by North 

Koreans living and working in China; the obstacles faced by 

the UNHCR in gaining access to North Koreans in China; and 

whether these obstacles violate the PRC’s obligations under the 

1951 U.N. Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the 1984 
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36

U.N. Convention Against Torture, and other international human rights covenants;

○ Direct the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to identify 

and stop U.S. imports, particularly of processed seafood, from 

Chinese companies that employ North Korean labor, as such 

imports are prohibited by the Countering America’s Adversaries 

Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA; Public Law No. 115-44);

○ Use the authorities available in the North Korea Sanctions 

and Policy Enhancement Act (Public Law No. 114-122), including sanctions and the freezing of financial assets, for any 

person or company in the PRC that employs North Korean 

labor;

○ Require the U.S. Director of National Intelligence to report on 

the amount of foreign currency earned by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from North Koreans working in China, 

the companies where they are employed, and the goods produced for export, including what goods enter the U.S., Canada, 

and Mexico; and

○ Expand U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) broadcasting 

of uncensored news and information to the North Korean people through Voice of America and Radio Free Asia and direct 

USAGM to issue a report on its reach and impact on North 

Koreans living and working in China and Russia.

Mainstream Human Rights Diplomacy. The Administration 

should mainstream human rights diplomacy by issuing a policy di- rective to require that the critical mission strategies of all U.S. Gov- ernment entities interacting with the PRC contain human rights, 

internet freedom, and democratic governance goals. In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Ensure that human rights and democracy programs at the 

U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development emphasize 1) the funding of projects working to 

ensure access to justice, 2) conserving and expanding the space 

for an independent civil society, and 3) labor rights, freedom of 

association, and the freedom of religion in China. Grants should 

continue to go to third-party entities outside of the PRC working on these issues; and

• Congress should—

○ Replace the now-shuttered Open Source Fund with a new 

federal entity that will translate and maintain collections of 

important open-source Chinese-language materials from the 

PRC and provide access to all government-sponsored research 

projects.

Defend Threatened Cultures and Languages. Congress should 

fund programs to assist communities facing threats to their cultural and linguistic heritage including Uyghurs, Mongols, and Hong 

Kongers. The Administration should fund education, exhibitions, 

and research  on ethnic and religious communities currently living 

within China and leverage the funding authorized by the Tibetan 

Policy and Support Act of 2020 (Public Law No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 

3119) to help sustain the religious, linguistic, and cultural identity 

of Tibetan communities.
Executive Summary

37

Protect Tibet and Tibetans Globally. Congress should extend 

the report required by the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (Public 

Law No. 115-330). Members of Congress should interact regularly 

with the leaders of the Central Tibetan Administration and with 

parliamentarians globally to build international coalitions to defend 

human rights in Tibet, protect Tibetan refugees in Nepal and elsewhere, and promote the resumption of PRC-Tibetan dialogue. The 

Administration should actively counter PRC disinformation on Tibet 

as required by the Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act (Public Law No. 118-70). In addition, the Administration 

should use its voice, vote, and influence at the U.N. Human Rights 

Council to seek investigation into mass relocations of Tibetans, the 

forced placement of Tibetan children in colonial boarding schools, 

and the health and whereabouts of the Panchen Lama and his parents.

Condition Access to U.S. Capital. Congress should strengthen 

disclosure and auditing requirements to ensure that American investors are not wittingly or unwittingly funneling capital to PRC 

companies that the U.S. Government has identified as national security threats or human rights abusers. Congress should prohibit investment in companies and their subsidiaries sanctioned by the U.S. 

or included on key U.S. Government blacklists, including the UFLPA 

“Entity List,” and those included in Withhold Release Orders and 

the Findings Dashboard related to forced labor. In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Build on Executive Order No. 14105, “Addressing United 

States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies 

and Products in Countries of Concern,” and restrict U.S. investment in areas related to technologies used for mass biometric 

surveillance or other human rights abuses, particularly those 

used to perpetuate atrocities; and

○ Direct the Department of Commerce to develop a comprehensive digital database that allows businesses and investors to 

easily ascertain which PRC entities the U.S. Government has 

sanctioned or listed for engaging in human rights abuses or for 

posing a threat to U.S. national security or more generally to 

American citizens; and

• Congress should—

○ Consider legislation to prevent PRC companies’ access to U.S. 

capital markets if they are under human rights sanctions and 

mandate that the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 

delist from stock exchanges any entities on the UFLPA “Entity 

List” or entities that have broader connections to the importation of goods made with forced labor or child labor; and

○ Seek a Government Accountability Office study on whether 

the SEC is sufficiently enforcing the reporting requirements 

found in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Holding 

Foreign Companies Accountable Act (Public Law No. 116-222) to 

ensure that issuers of securities disclose any transactions with 

PRC companies that have been placed on the Treasury Department’s Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List (NS-CMIC List), the Commerce Department’s Entity 
Executive Summary

38

List and Unverified List, or those implicated in forced labor or 

sanctioned for human rights abuses; and

End Forced Organ Harvesting. Congress should pass the Stop 

Forced Organ Harvesting Act of 2023 (S. 761/H.R. 1154) to expand 

annual reporting by the U.S. Department of State on forced organ 

harvesting globally and should require the Director of National Intelligence to issue a report on whether forced organ harvesting and 

“organ tourism” activities were used by the PRC in the XUAR to 

advance policies that amount to genocide. In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Use existing authorities to deny U.S. visas to physicians and 

researchers from China known to be involved in forced organ 

harvesting activities prior to 2015 and announce such decisions 

publicly;

○ Sanction individuals or entities found to have been engaged 

in forced organ harvesting or illegal organ trafficking in the 

XUAR after 2015 and add them to the Department of the Trea- sury’s “Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons 

List,” which would prevent financial transactions with U.S. companies or research institutions;

○ Use State Department rewards programs to seek credible 

evidence that will deter and disrupt the market for illegally 

procured organs and hold accountable those responsible for the 

practice of forced organ harvesting;

○ Investigate whether federal funding has been provided to 

Chinese entities involved in unethical organ transplantation 

practices, including those that violate human subject research 

protections outlined in the Common Rule and the National In- stitutes of Health’s (NIH) policy on human subject protections 

and publicly announce the prohibition of such entities from re- ceiving future NIH and National Science Foundation grants;

○ Build alliances with partners at the U.N. Human Rights 

Council to investigate concerns raised by U.N. human rights experts and by the Independent Tribunal into Forced Organ Harvesting from Prisoners of Conscience in China, which concluded 

that forced organ harvesting from executed prisoners, political 

prisoners, and ethnic and religious minorities, sponsored or 

sanctioned by the PRC, constituted crimes against humanity:

○ Promulgate regulations prohibiting federal insurers from re- imbursing patients for either seeking organ transplantation in 

the PRC or seeking immunosuppressant or other transplant 

aftercare subsequent to receiving an organ transplant in the 

PRC; and

○ The Administration should keep the PRC and Macau on the 

Tier 3 blacklist required by the Trafficking Victims Protection 

Act (Public Law No. 106-386) as long as they remain a significant source and destination for sex and labor trafficking, including human trafficking for the likely purpose of organ removal.

Advocate for Political Prisoners. Members of Congress and Administration officials, at the highest levels and at every opportunity, 

should raise political prisoner cases in meetings with PRC officials. 

Experience demonstrates that consistently raising individual prisoner cases and the larger human rights issues they represent can 
Executive Summary

39

result in improved treatment in detention, lighter sentences or, in 

some cases, release from custody, detention, or imprisonment. Members of Congress are encouraged to consult the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database for reliable information on cases of political 

and religious detention in China and Hong Kong, and to “adopt” 

individual prisoners through the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission’s “Defending Freedoms Project.” In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Create a Special Advisor for Political Prisoners position within the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor to develop and coordinate diplomatic strategies to 

gain the release of political and religious prisoners; to end the 

PRC’s unacceptable use of “exit bans”; and to serve as a resource to former political prisoners living in the United States 

seeking guidance on the safety of planned travels abroad and 

medical and psychological care.

Strengthen International Organizations. Congress should require a strategy from the Administration to counter the PRC’s 

expanding reach in international organizations and U.N. Treaty 

Bodies to ensure that the governance structures of entities like 

the International Telecommunication Union, the International 

Labour Organization, INTERPOL, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the World Health Organization meet the 

highest standards of transparency, accountability, and reform; uphold universal human rights; and address pressing transnational 

challenges. In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

United Nations and other multilateral bodies to—

○ Reform the process of suspending the right of membership in 

the United Nations Human Rights Council for Member States 

that commit gross and systemic violations of internationally 

recognized human rights;

○ Reform or replace the U.N. Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, which too often denies consultative status to 

civil society organizations critical of the PRC or other authoritarian governments;

○ Take action at the U.N. Human Rights Council to protect Chinese human rights defenders, environmental activists, journalists and citizen-journalists, and civil society organizations that 

publicly expose the failure of the PRC to live up to its responsibilities and obligations under international law, and seek input 

from these groups for upcoming treaty reviews, including by the 

Committee against Torture; and

○ Within the context of state obligations under the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, work on ways 

to ban the use of chaining and other inhuman and abusive 

treatment of people with disabilities in the PRC.

Support Victims of Torture and Atrocities. The Administration 

should accelerate processing times for current refugee and asylum 

cases and ensure that the expansion of the annual cap on refugees 
Executive Summary

40

admitted to the United States is used to increase the protection and 

resettlement of those fleeing PRC persecution. In addition,

• Congress should—

○ Ensure that sufficient funding is available for psychological 

and medical support for victims of genocide and crimes against 

humanity, including in countries of first asylum, through programs authorized by the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 

(Public Law No. 102-256), and consider expanding such services 

to victims of transnational repression; and

○ Consider legislation to assist in civil litigation efforts of trafficking victims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 

(Public Law No. 106-386) to hold accountable entities responsible for the labor trafficking of Uyghurs and other persecuted 

groups.

Defeat Digital Authoritarianism. The Administration should 

create an initiative to counter the PRC’s information control 

strategies, bringing together relevant U.S. Government agencies, 

the private sector, and congressional leaders to help people in 

the PRC circumvent the “Great Firewall,” and curtail the PRC’s 

development and deployment of surveillance and censorship tools 

globally. In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Issue a report on the implementation of the “China Censorship Monitor and Action Group,” as provided under 22 U.S.C. 

§3363, and its integration and impact on the U.S. Government’s 

response to digital authoritarianism. Included in the report 

should be an assessment as to whether resources are sufficient 

to address the PRC’s censorship and intimidation of American 

citizens and legal residents;

○ Use the “Countering PRC Influence Fund” to—

○ Build the capacity of independent investigative journalists 

and civil society organizations in countries with Belt and Road 

Initiative projects to expose corruption, malign influence tactics, 

and environmental, social, and governance risks; and

○ Strengthen cybersecurity measures to safeguard activists, 

dissidents, and human rights organizations from Chinese government digital surveillance and hacking attempts and ensure 

that all diaspora groups know about the cybersecurity tools and 

training available through the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency; and

○ Require any social media and online content providers oper- ating in the United States to disclose—

○ When they actively enable censorship or surveillance on their 

own accord or at the request of the PRC; and

○ When they distribute content or accept payments from entities linked to the PRC that push propaganda or disinformation 

about U.S. policy or politics; and

○ Expand resources for the Open Technology Fund and other internet freedom entities within the U.S. Agency for Global 

Media to distribute proven and effective anti-censorship tools 

globally and provide media literacy to help users circumvent 

China’s “Great Firewall”; and
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41

• Congress should—

○ Require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce to submit a report detailing whether U.S.-origin technology is used by the PRC to engage in internet censorship 

or mass digital and biometric surveillance or to advance 

atrocities, including genocide, in the XUAR. Included in the 

report should be an assessment of whether new export control authorities are needed to prevent the malign use of such 

technology;

○ Assess whether the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s (USAGM) 

current content is an effective counter to Chinese Communist 

Party global information manipulation and consider ways to 

expand and target U.S. Government efforts in countries and 

regions where PRC propaganda and influence operations are 

prevalent challenges to U.S. interests in democratic governance 

and the protection of human rights; and

○ Amend the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization 

Act of 2018 (Public Law No. 115-232, §§1701–1728) to trigger 

a Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States review of any foreign company seeking to acquire U.S. assets controlling or collecting biometric information of Americans and 

coordinate such screening processes with allies.

End Transnational Repression. Congress should pass the Transnational Repression Policy Act (S. 831/H.R. 3654) to provide resources and additional authorities for U.S. law enforcement agencies and 

the State Department to constrain the PRC’s ability to commit acts 

of transnational repression in the U.S. by training personnel to better recognize and combat transnational repression, hiring Federal 

Bureau of Investigation staff with appropriate language skills for 

its threat intake portal, and imposing targeted sanctions on individuals conducting harassment and intimidation operations on U.S. 

residents. In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Build on the 2024 G7 Foreign Ministers’ statement on “Digital and Transnational Repression” and create ongoing coordination exercises to share strategies and intelligence, and collaborate on responses, including sanctions, for entities engaged in 

transnational repression;

○ Create a set of standards that 1) evaluates all foreign digital 

platforms, such as WeChat, for their potential to facilitate espionage or transnational repression while operating in the United 

States and 2) signals to foreign governments and actors that 

using such platforms to surveil or intimidate U.S. residents or 

companies or curtail their free speech will incur a significant 

cost, including U.S. sanctions;

○ Consider extending psychological and social support available 

under the Torture Victim Protection Act (Public Law No. 102-

256) to exile and diaspora communities targeted by transnational repression efforts; and

○ Advocate within multilateral organizations for establishing 

independent mechanisms to monitor, report, and respond to 

transnational repression, including by establishing a U.N. Spe-
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42

cial Rapporteur for transnational repression, given the global 

scale of the problem; and

• Congress should—

○ Direct the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and all 

relevant federal agencies to submit an annual report assessing U.S. Government efforts to address transnational repression 

at home and abroad, and including a detailed account of law 

enforcement training and coordination, criminal prosecutions 

and sanctions, public diplomacy efforts, consultations with diplomatic allies and civil society, efforts to support victims, and a 

description of emerging threats or at-risk individuals or communities, among other things; and

○ Seek from the Department of Justice a report on whether 

there are gaps in U.S. law that limit the DOJ’s ability to counter 

transnational repression and whether legislation is needed to 

criminalize acts of transnational repression.

Confront the Challenge of Malign Influence Operations. The 

Administration should end operations of the United Front Work Department and PRC security agencies in the United States, including 

the operation of “police stations,” also known as ‘‘service stations,” 

by the PRC Ministry of Public Security and subordinate branches in 

the United States. In addition,

• The Administration should—

○ Ensure that allies and partners are regularly briefed on 

the findings produced by the Foreign Malign Influence Center 

(FMIC) within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;

○ Expand the “Protected Voices” initiative at the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide resources for U.S. residents to 

protect themselves from PRC propaganda, intimidation, and cyberattacks;

○ Require U.S. educational institutions, think tanks, and other 

non-governmental organizations to publicly report all foreign 

gifts, grants, contracts, and in-kind contributions that exceed 

$50,000 as part of their annual tax filings to maintain non-profit status;

○ Support educational and cultural exchange programs, including restoration of the Fulbright exchange program in China and 

Hong Kong in targeted academic fields and the preservation of 

scholarship and exchange programs for Tibetans, as a valuable 

resource; and

○ Establish an interagency body, headed by the State Department, that gathers and shares information, with Congress and 

allies and partners, about the PRC’s malign influence and propaganda efforts globally and reports publicly on its findings.

• Congress should—

○ Create an interagency group, led by the Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, that produces a public database to assist universities, foundations, think 

tanks, film production companies, publishers, non-governmental 

organizations, and state and local governments in conducting 

due diligence on potential business or academic partners in 

China, and in identifying PRC-based entities with connections 
Executive Summary

43

to the United Front Work Department, intelligence and public 

security agencies, the Communist Party, and entities involved in 

the PRC’s civil-military fusion program;

○ Require the FMIC to issue publicly available reports on the 

impact of the PRC’s malign influence operations and propaganda efforts throughout the world, including in Africa, South 

America, Central America, the Pacific Islands, and the Caribbean on the national security, human rights, and economic interests of the United States;

○ Update and expand the requirements of the Foreign Agents 

Registration Act (FARA; 22 U.S.C. §§611–621) to cover individuals and other entities lobbying on behalf of government entities, 

businesses, or organizations working on behalf of educational 

or scientific pursuits in the PRC and ban lobbying on behalf of 

entities affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army, the Ministry of State Security, or others complicit in egregious human 

rights abuses;

○ Expand Mandarin language training in U.S. high schools and 

colleges, for example, through the U.S.-Taiwan Education Initiative; and

○ Require DHS to detail efforts to protect diaspora communities 

and human rights organizations from cyberattacks and provide 

intrusion detection software and training for any cybersecurity 

tools they distribute.
44

Commission Activity (July 2023–October 20

Hearings

• Corporate Complicity: Subsidizing the PRC’s Human Rights 

Violations (July 2023)

• Countering China’s Global Transnational Repression Campaign (September 2023)

• From Bait to Plate: How Forced Labor in China Taints America’s Seafood Supply Chain (October 2023)

• From Cobalt to Cars: How China Exploits Child and Forced 

Labor in the Congo (November 2023)

• The PRC’s Universal Periodic Review and the Real State of 

Human Rights in China (February 2024)

• Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must 

Be Done? (March 2024)

• Factories and Fraud in the PRC: How Human Rights Violations Make Reliable Audits Impossible (April 2024)

• Tiananmen at 35: the Ongoing Struggle for Human Rights 

and Democracy in China (June 2024)

• Bringing Home Americans Detained in China (September 

2024)

Commission Analysis

• Ongoing Challenges Faced by Persons with Disabilities in the 

People’s Republic of China (December 2023)

• UPR Stakeholders’ Submissions Flooded with PRC-Sympathetic Reports (January 2024)

Letters

• Chairs Ask Milwaukee Tool about Reported Forced Labor in 

Its Supply Chain (July 2023)

• Chairs Seek Meeting with U.N. High Commissioners to Avert 

North Korean Refugee Crisis (August 2023)

• Chairs Call for the Release of Ilham Tohti on the Ninth Anniversary of His Sentencing (September 2023)

• Chairs Ask NBA and NBPA for Stance on Forced Labor and 

Freedom of Expression (October 2023)

• Chairs Seek Export Controls on Technology Used for Mass 

Biometric Data Collection in Tibet (October 2023)

• Chairs Ask Homeland Security Department to Restrict U.S. 

Imports of Seafood from China (October 2023)

• Letter to Costco and ADI Raises Concerns about Sale of 

Hikvision and Dahua Products (November 2023)

• Chairs Send Letter to Attorney General Seeking Investigation of Violence at APEC Summit (December 2023)

• Chairs and House CCP Select Committee Leadership Seek 

Sanctions for Hong Kong Officials Involved in Bounties (December 2023)

• Chairs Nominate Four Champions of Peace and Freedom for 

Nobel Peace Prize (February 2024)

• Xinjiang: Chairs Write to Travel Companies and U.S. State 

Department Concerning the Whitewashing of Atrocities (March 

2024)
Executive Summary

45

Letters (Continued)

• Chairs Say Illegal PRC Seafood Imports Must Be Stopped 

(March 2024)

• Hong Kong: CECC Chairs and Select Committee Leadership 

Express Opposition to Article 23 Legislation (March 2024)

• Commissioners Urge State Department Action to Disrupt Il- legal Organ Trade in the PRC (May 2024)

• Chairs Ask Google to Restore Censored Hong Kong Protest 

Anthem (June 2024)

• Chairs and Select Committee Leadership Urge Sanctions for 

Hong Kong Officials Eroding Rule of Law and Rights Protec- tions (July 2024)

• Commissioners Ask USMCA Trade Representatives to Take 

Additional Steps to Stop Forced Labor (September 2024)

• Chairs Urge President to Seek the Release of Americans De- tained in China (October 2024)

Other Commission Events

• Press Conference to Highlight Victims of Violence and Harassment at APEC Summit (December 2023)

• Press Conference on Passage of Article 23 in Hong Kong 

(March 2024)

• Staff Director’s Remarks on Technological Dimensions of 

Transnational Repression and Election Interference at the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China Summit in Taipei, Taiwan 

(July 2024)
46

III. Respect for Civil Liberties

Freedom of Express

Findings

• This reporting year, the PRC continued to restrict online and 

in-person expression, censoring various forms of artistic, liter- ary, historical, and entertainment content, in violation of the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and China’s Constitution.

• Freedom House’s 2024 Freedom in the World report scored 

China 0 out of 4 for “free and independent media,” and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked China 172 out of 180 countries and territories in its World Press Freedom Index.

• The Chinese Communist Party continued to use Chinese 

news media as its mouthpiece to provide the Party’s version of 

the news, signal and amplify policy priorities, and shape public 

opinion. Journalists at Party and state-run news outlets faced 

increased political pressure and censorship this past year to adhere to the Party line.

• Party efforts to control news media also continued to reach 

beyond China’s borders. One program that expanded this past 

year was that of international communication centers (ICCs)—

local and regional media groups within China acting as centers 

for external-facing propaganda.

• Authorities continued to harass, surveil, and restrict foreign 

journalists. The annual survey of the Foreign Correspondents’ 

Club of China in 2024 revealed that foreign reporters face significant obstacles in China.

• This past year, many journalists, other media professionals, 

and “citizen journalists”—non-professionals who publish independently to circumvent official restrictions—remained in detention, prison, or subject to bail conditions as a result of their 

reporting. RSF again ranked China ‘‘the world’s largest prison 

for journalists,” as nearly a quarter of all journalists detained 

worldwide are in Chinese jails. Currently detained or imprisoned journalists include Huang Xueqin, Yang Zewei, and 

Shangguan Yunkai.

• This past year, Freedom House ranked China the “world’s 

worst abuser of internet freedom” for the ninth year in a row. 

The PRC’s Ministry of Public Security declared 2024 a “year of 

special operations against online rumors,” targeting influencers 

and content creators who “stage photos maliciously or fabricate 

rumors” about politically sensitive issues.

• Government agencies implemented new regulations and pressured internet companies to tighten restrictions on online expression, including mandating “real name” registration for popular users.

• Authorities continued to harass, detain, and imprison people 

who participated peacefully in protests, demonstrations, and 

other gatherings, including demonstrations against opaque han-
Freedom of Expression

47

dling of school deaths and the demolition of Tibetan villages 

and monasteries.

• The PRC intensified its efforts to exert control over educational and research institutions, impeding the free exchange of 

information and hindering international academic collaboration.
48

Freedom of Express

Freedom of the Press

PARTY CONTROL OF THE MEDIA

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, international observers continued to report harsh conditions for press freedom in 

China. Freedom House’s 2024 Freedom in the World report scored 

China 0 out of 4 for “free and independent media,”1 and Reporters 

Without Borders ranked China 172 out of 180 countries and territories in its World Press Freedom Index.2 These conditions continue 

to violate Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 3—which China has signed but not ratified,4

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),5

and Article 35 of China’s Constitution.6

The Chinese Communist Party (Party) continued to leverage Chinese news media as a mouthpiece to amplify policy priorities and 

shape public opinion.7 The Party reinforced its media control by 

promoting “Xi Jinping Thought on Culture,” which was introduced 

at the October 2023 National Conference on Propaganda, Ideology 

and Culture.8 One expert cautioned that Party General Secretary 

Xi Jinping’s thoughts on culture should be understood as “leveraging culture to legitimize a one-party authoritarian dictatorship 

under an emerging cult of personality,” rather than a tilt toward 

a “cultural renaissance.”9 In November 2023, the award ceremony 

for the annual China Journalism Awards exemplified this ideolog- ical adherence, honoring media outlets for “positive propaganda” 

reflecting “Xi Jinping Thought on Culture.”10 Awardees included 

a China Central Television (CCTV) documentary on China’s “great 

achievements” in human rights, a People’s Daily article condemning 

former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, 

and a Xinhua piece praising Xi Jinping’s accomplishments.11 In 

July 2023, in order to increase Chinese journalists’ understanding 

of the Party’s press doctrine, the All-China Journalists Association 

(ACJA) released a new app12 which was similar to the 2019 propaganda app “Study Xi, Strong Nation” that facilitated the study of 

Xi Jinping’s precepts.13

Journalists at Party and state-run news outlets faced challenges from political pressure and censorship this past year. In March 

2024, local security personnel obstructed and manhandled journalists from CCTV and China Media Group during a video broadcast 

at a fatal gas explosion site in Yanjiao township, Sanhe city, Langfang municipality, Hebei province.14 The incident triggered online 

criticism and commentary about press freedom in China, especially 

since the reporters worked for Party outlets.15 The Party-affiliated 

ACJA released a rare statement supporting press freedom, prompting Sanhe city officials to publicly apologize.16 A February 2024 Wire 

China article based on interviews with current and former employees of Sixth Tone—a state-run English-language outlet known for 

covering sensitive social issues—revealed intensified censorship under Sixth Tone’s new management that includes requirements for 

editors to comply more strictly with Party guidelines and a directive 

to publish “at least one positive story a week.”17
Freedom of Expression

49

CONTROL OVER CHINA’S IMAGE ABROAD

Party efforts to control news media also continued to reach beyond China’s borders.18 One program that expanded this past year 

was that of international communication centers (guoji chuanbo 

zhongxin, 国际传播中心 or ICCs)—provincial and local media groups 

within China acting as centers for external-facing propaganda.19 In 

June 2024, the China Media Project reported that 23 provincial-level ICCs had been established.20 Several ICCs, such as the Yunnan 

International Communication Center for South and Southeast Asia, 

focus on targeting specific geographical regions, though all are 

tasked with strengthening the Party’s “voice in the international 

arena.”21 Other efforts to “tell China’s story well”22 abroad expanded as well, including in Africa.23 In October 2023, the China Media 

Group announced the launch of the China-Africa Media Action Initiative, which has gained the support of at least 50 African media 

organizations, and is aimed at developing content covering China’s 

Belt and Road Initiative.24 Such efforts appear to garner desired 

effects for the Party, as seen in research published this year revealing that a similar media partnership between CCTV and Brazilian 

outlet BandNews TV has helped the PRC “gain agency to reshape 

[China’s] image and counter hegemonic narratives.”25 [For more information on Chinese foreign media influence efforts, see Chapter 

20—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]

Detention and Imprisonment of Journalists

This past year, many journalists, other media professionals, and 

“citizen journalists”26—non-professionals who publish independently to circumvent official restrictions—remained in detention, prison, 

or subject to bail conditions as a result of their reporting. Reporters 

Without Borders again ranked China ‘‘the world’s largest prison for 

journalists,” as nearly a quarter of all journalists detained worldwide are in Chinese jails.27 Examples include:

• Sophia Huang Xueqin. In June 2024, the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court sentenced #MeToo journalist Huang 

Xueqin to five years’ imprisonment and four years’ deprivation of political rights for “inciting subversion of state power.”28 Public security officials in Guangdong province detained 

Huang in September 2021 in connection with her reporting on 

pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong and sexual harassment of women journalists.29

• Yang Zewei. In June 2023, Chinese and Laotian authorities 

detained free-speech activist and reporter Yang Zewei, also 

known as Qiao Xinxin, at his exile home in Vientiane, Laos.30

Yang disappeared from public view until resurfacing in August 

2023 in a detention center in Hengyang municipality, Hunan 

province, facing charges of “subversion of state power.”31 A former 

Radio Free Asia reporter, Yang founded Ban the Great Firewall 

(BanGFW) to circumvent internet censorship.32 Yang’s detention 

underscores China’s increasing cross-border policing efforts.33

[For more information on the PRC’s long-arm law enforcement 

operations, see Chapter 20—Human Rights Violations in the 

U.S. and Globally.]
Freedom of Expression

50

• Shangguan Yunkai. On January 5, 2024, a district court in 

Ezhou district, Hubei province sentenced renowned anti-corruption investigative journalist Shangguan Yunkai to 15 years 

imprisonment.34 Charges included “selling counterfeit medicine,” “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” “fraud,” “false 

imprisonment,” and “bigamy.”35 Shangguan exposed official corruption, leading to investigations of hundreds of local officials 

and members of criminal organizations.36 This track record has 

prompted widespread speculation that Shangguan’s detention 

and sentencing constitute political retaliation.37

Formerly detained journalists faced severe harassment from authorities even after being released, including one fatality, in the case 

of Sun Lin. In November 2023, state security officials in Nanjing 

municipality, Jiangsu province, raided freelance journalist Sun Lin’s 

apartment and beat him to death, days after he re-posted videos of 

anti-Xi Jinping protests at the November 2023 APEC Summit in 

San Francisco.38 Authorities also held advocate Zou Wei in detention for nine days for publicly demanding more information about 

Sun’s death.39 They warned Sun’s family members and supporters 

to “keep quiet or face persecution.”40

CONDITIONS FOR FOREIGN JOURNALISTS

This past year, authorities continued to harass, surveil, and restrict foreign journalists. The annual survey of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (FCCC) in 2024 revealed that foreign 

reporters face conditions in China that “rarely or never [meet] international reporting standards.”41 Also in this year’s survey, a majority of respondents were unwilling to be quoted out of concern for 

potential retaliation—a recent development indicative of the shrinking space for press freedom in China.42 The FCCC noted a 6 percent 

increase in trips and interviews canceled due to official interference, 

compared to 2022.43 Such trends can be seen in reported examples 

this year, including that of a correspondent and a cameraman from 

the Dutch public broadcaster Nederlandse Omroep Stichting being 

harassed, beaten, and obstructed by local officials while covering 

a demonstration outside a bank in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan 

province.44

In-Person Protest and Assembly

Authorities continued to harass, detain, and imprison people who 

participated peacefully in protests, demonstrations, and other gatherings, violating Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the ICCPR.45 While the 

number of protests remains unclear, Freedom House documented 

over 1,600 “dissent events” between July and December 2023.46

Throughout the past year, protesters demonstrated in response to a 

variety of issues, such as China’s economy, unpaid wages, retirement 

pay, religious persecution, waste management, and more.47 Examples include:

• School deaths. In December 2023, the death of Yang Liuyang, a 14-year-old student at Yuhuayuan Senior High School 

in Ningling county, Shangqiu municipality, Henan province, 

sparked widespread protest.48 The school initially reported an 
Freedom of Expression

51

“accident” as the cause of death, but Yang’s family discovered 

signs of torture on his body.49 The school withheld video footage, 

and the local government further claimed the incident was a 

suicide.50 The opaque handling of this case fueled public anger, 

prompting over 10,000 people to gather within three days.51

Officials attempted to quell the unrest by blocking highways, 

detaining participants, ordering locals to stay away from the 

school, and cutting internet access to the county.52

• Tibetan dam. Residents of Derge (Dege) county, Kardze 

(Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, 

gathered beginning in mid-February 2024 to protest a government dam project in the region that would destroy six Buddhist 

monasteries and force the relocation of two villages.53 Authorities shut down the protests using water cannons, pepper spray, 

and tasers 54 and detained more than 1,000 Tibetan monks and 

other ethnic Tibetans.55 A month after the demonstrations, police continued to check social media accounts for evidence of 

past involvement in the protests or communications about them 

as grounds for detention.56 [For more information on Tibetans 

and the Gangtuo dam, see Chapter 17—Tibet.]

• Halloween. During Halloween 2023 in Shanghai, several individuals donned costumes criticizing recent policies,57 costumes 

including COVID-19 quarantine enforcers, unemployed college 

graduates, a surveillance camera, and Winnie the Pooh.58 Police 

detained or began inviting individuals “to tea”59 weeks after the 

event.60 The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) later 

ordered China’s major social media platforms to censor such 

costume content for violating “the core values of socialism.”61

Rei Xia, one of the individuals at the celebration, was detained 

for 28 days for wearing blank sheets of paper clipped to her 

clothes referencing the 2022 White Paper protests.62 She was 

previously detained for 37 days for exposing the mistreatment 

of female protesters in Shanghai during the White Paper protests.63

PRC Control over the Internet

This past year, Freedom House ranked China ‘‘the world’s worst 

abuser of internet freedom” for the ninth year in a row.”64 The 

PRC’s Ministry of Public Security declared 2024 a “year of special 

operations against online rumors”65 and reportedly targeted influencers and content creators who “stage[d] photos maliciously or 

fabricate[d] rumors” about politically sensitive issues such as the 

COVID-19 pandemic or natural disasters.66 According to an April 

2024 article published by the South China Morning Post, authorities 

detained over 1,500 individuals, penalized about 10,700 people, and 

“debunked” more than 4,200 rumors.67 In January 2024, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) reported the details of its 2023 

national internet cleanup campaign, claiming it had eliminated 259 

mobile applications, shut down 14,624 websites, and instructed service providers to close 127,878 accounts.68 Local police intensified 

spot checks of citizens’ phones this year for apps circumventing 

the Great Firewall.69 Sources reported being forced to download an 

“anti-fraud” app that continuously tracks the user’s activities.70 [For 
Freedom of Expression

52

more information on the PRC’s regulatory controls over the internet, 

see Chapter 16—Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism.]

Government agencies implemented new regulations and pressured internet companies to tighten restrictions on online expression. Examples include:

• “Hurt Feelings” ban. An August 2023 amendment proposal 

to the Public Security Administration Punishment Law aims to 

punish Chinese citizens for “hurting the feelings of the Chinese 

people.”71 The vaguely worded law bans “items or remarks that 

contain sentiments . . . detrimental to the spirit of the Chinese 

nation,” potentially criminalizing actions ranging from wearing 

clothes deemed offensive to the Party to online complaints.72

Legal experts worry that this ambiguity grants authorities unchecked enforcement power.73 The amendment states that violators could face fines of up to 5,000 yuan (US$680) or 15 days 

in jail.74 The online community criticized the amendment’s arbitrary nature,75 submitting over 110,000 suggestions on the 

National People’s Congress (NPC) website in the first two weeks 

alone 76—an unusually high number of responses.77

• Self-Media regulations. The CAC intensified its efforts to 

restrict “self-media” in July 2023 by requiring all social media 

platforms and websites to strengthen self-media management.78

Wei-feng Tzeng, assistant professor at the Graduate Institute 

of China Studies at Tamkang University in Taiwan, suggested 

that these regulations stem from officials’ worry about potential 

public unrest following increased self-media activity during recent accidents and disasters.79 In April 2024, the CAC launched 

another two-month campaign targeting five categories, including “self-directed fakery,” “no-holds-barred hyping of social hot 

points,” “use of generalizations to set the topic,” “generating of 

personas that go against public order and morals,” and “indiscriminate dissemination of ‘new yellow journalism.’”80

• Social media “real names.” Likely prompted by the CAC’s 

“self-media” requirements, in October 2023, social media platform Weibo implemented new regulations requiring that most 

popular users display their real identities, including name, gender, IP location, and professional and educational background.81

Initially targeting users with over one million followers, Weibo 

expanded the policy to those with more than 500,000 followers.82 Other prominent Chinese social media platforms, such as 

WeChat, Douyin, Zhihu, Xiaohongshu, and Kuaishou, adopted 

similar requirements after Weibo, mandating public disclosure 

of legal names for top users.83

CENSORSHIP

This past year, authorities and social media platforms censored 

online discussions and public expression related to topics that generated criticism or contradicted official policy or positions. Examples 

include:

• Li Keqiang. Following former Premier Li Keqiang’s sudden 

death in October 2023, authorities intensified censorship in order to restrain online discussion and public grief.84 Li, often 

viewed as having been “sidelined” by Xi Jinping,85 had symbol-
Freedom of Expression

53

ized support for reform policies.86 His passing sparked expressions of frustration toward the government and especially Xi’s 

handling of the economy.87 Weibo censored sensitive posts that 

included Li’s name, his famous phrases, and a love song used as 

a coded criticism of Xi.88 Authorities monitored and restricted 

public gatherings,89 rushed mourners in Beijing municipality 

and Hefei municipality, Anhui province,90 and removed tributes 

in other cities.91 Police stopped several artists commemorating 

Li’s death in Shanghai.92 Authorities at some universities also 

warned university students against organizing commemorations, fearing potential protests.93 This crackdown highlighted 

the politically sensitive nature of leaders’ deaths in China.94

• “Two Sessions.” Censorship intensified before and during 

China’s annual meetings of the legislative body, the NPC, and 

the advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 

Conference (CPPCC) (“Two Sessions”) in March 2024,95 continuing a trend seen during major political events.96 Astrill, a 

popular virtual private network service for foreigners, reported significant disruptions to its services in the days leading up 

to the Two Sessions,97 while Chinese search platforms blocked 

“sensitive” terms and discussions about representation and Xi 

Jinping.98 PRC authorities also canceled the traditional Premier’s press conference held at the end of the Two Sessions,99

which eliminated a rare opportunity for the media to directly 

engage with China’s second-in-command.100 Censors removed 

news reports and comments discussing this cancellation and its 

implications, further tightening control over public discourse.101

• Economic commentary. This past year, the PRC cracked 

down on economic commentary.102 One expert noted that this 

wave of censorship particularly targeted “sensitive” topics such 

as income inequality, youth unemployment, and poverty among 

elders.103 In December 2023, a week after Party leaders announced a renewed effort to “strengthen public opinion guidance on economic affairs,” Weibo warned users against posting 

negative content about the economy 104 and censored prominent 

economic commentators’ analyses.105 [For more information on 

censorship of discussions about the Chinese economy, see Chapter 14—Business and Human Rights.]

• Taiwan’s election. Chinese social media platforms suppressed discussion of Taiwan’s January 2024 general election.106

Weibo blocked the hashtag “#TaiwanElection” after it reached 

number 11 on Weibo’s “hot list.”107 One observer also noted 

that a number of online comments praising Taiwan’s electoral 

process were censored.108 When the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson criticized the election results on Weibo, online 

commentators mocked China’s own political system in response, 

prompting a shutdown of the comments section.109

• Emergency reporting. PRC officials often censor public 

outrage following fatal disasters.110 In one example this past 

year, a deadly fire at a rural Henan province elementary boarding school killed 13 boys, sparking online criticism of safety 

measures and censorship.111 As the online community mourned 

the students and expressed frustration at the government and 
Freedom of Expression

54

media’s silence, censors removed the fire-related hashtag from 

Weibo’s “hot topic” list and deleted online discussions about the 

incident.112

• “Teacher Li.” The PRC’s censorship apparatus reaches beyond China’s borders, as evidenced by this year’s targeting of Li 

Ying (pseudonym Teacher Li) and his followers. Based in Italy, 

Li gained fame in 2022 for sharing censored news, including 

White Paper protest footage on X.113 In February 2024, Li reported that authorities questioned at least 200 people in three 

months for following him on social media.114 Li warned his 1.6 

million followers to unfollow him because Chinese police were 

reportedly combing through his followers to interrogate them 

about their internet usage.115 Li lost 200,000 followers within 

days.116 Other Chinese advocates on X and YouTube also lost 

followers, likely due to fear of government harassment.117 [For 

more information on the transnational repression of Chinese 

advocates and the PRC’s repression of free speech abroad, see 

Chapter 20—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]

Entertainment, History, and Literature

This past year, Chinese authorities continued to censor, suppress, 

and detain people for various forms of literary, historical, and entertainment content that did not conform to the Chinese Communist 

Party line. The following examples illustrate the government’s efforts to enforce multimedia censorship:

• Chongzhen Emperor book. In October 2023, the distributors of a reprint of the historical biography The Chongzhen 

Emperor: Diligent Ruler of a Failed Dynasty announced it was 

being recalled due to an unspecified “printing problem,”118 and 

the hashtag #Chongzhen was censored on Weibo.119 Some speculated the recall was due to the title and cover design which 

read, “The diligent ruler of a failed dynasty, Chongzhen’s repeated mistakes were the result of his own ineptitude,” which 

could be interpreted as a criticism of Xi Jinping.120

• Sci-Fi awards. In February 2024, a report revealed that several authors critical of the PRC government were excluded from 

the Hugo Awards finalist reviews in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, despite receiving enough nominations to be included for consideration.121 Documents show the administrators 

flagged politically sensitive content to “determine if it was safe 

to put it on the ballot,” later claiming that they tried to adhere 

to PRC law.122 Babel by R. F. Kuang, an episode of the Netflix 

drama The Sandman, and author Xiran Jay Zhao were among 

those excluded and marked as “not eligible.”123 These exclusions raised concerns about censorship and self-censorship for 

international awards in science fiction and fantasy writing.124

• Migrant worker documentary. In January 2024, NetEase 

News released a documentary highlighting the harsh living conditions of migrant workers in China titled Working Like This for 

30 Years.”125 Within one day of its publication, the documentary 

disappeared from the internet, and the social media platform 

Weibo removed discussions and a hashtag relating to it.126
Freedom of Expression

55

• Uyghur filmmaker. Uyghur filmmaker Ikram Nurmehmet appeared in October 2023 at the Urumqi Intermediate 

People’s Court facing accusations of “separatism” and “terrorism,” though his friends and family allege that his time studying abroad in Türkiye and frequent portrayal of Uyghurs in his 

work are the underlying causes.127 Being denied family visits 

and legal counsel of his choice, Ikram Nurmehmet testified at 

trial that he had never joined any terrorist group and that he 

was tortured and forced to incriminate himself.128 Authorities 

barred Ikram Nurmehmet’s family from seeing him from his 

May detention to his October court appearance.129 [For more 

information on the PRC’s persecution of Uyghurs, see Chapter 

18—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.]

35th Anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Protests

On the 35th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Chinese 

authorities intensified censorship efforts in mainland China and Hong 

Kong. PRC internet censors routinely scrubbed references to the anniversary throughout the reporting year.130 In April 2024, authorities 

sentenced 1989 student leader Xu Guang to four years in prison for 

demanding acknowledgment of the violent suppression of the Tiananmen 

protests and holding a sign at a local police station demanding redress 

two years earlier.131 Xu reportedly suffered torture and other forms of 

mistreatment while detained.132 In an effort to prevent any commemorations on the anniversary of the violent suppression of the protests 

this reporting year, authorities in Beijing municipality deployed checkpoints and increased security leading up to June Fourth.133 In Hong 

Kong, police arrested seven people in May 2024, including already-detained Chow Hang-tung, for “exploit[ing] an upcoming sensitive date,” 

in connection with Facebook posts commemorating June Fourth.134 [For 

more information on the erosion of freedom in Hong Kong, see Chapter 

19—Hong Kong.]

Globally, activists organized assemblies and vigils to commemorate the 

1989 Tiananmen protests’ anniversary.135 At a June 2024 hearing held 

by the Commission, witnesses spoke about the legacy of the 1989 protests and how a new generation of rights advocates are pushing for human rights in China.136 Testifying at the Commission’s hearing, former 

student leader at the 1989 Tiananmen protests Zhou Fengsuo tied recent 

advocacy work back to the 1989 protests, stating, “[t]he fight didn’t stop 

then—for most of us, it was only the beginning of our journey.”137

Academic Freedom

The PRC intensified its efforts to exert control over educational 

and research institutions, impeding the free exchange of information 

and hindering international academic collaboration.

• Patriotic Education Law. The National People’s Congress 

Standing Committee adopted the PRC Patriotic Education Law 

in October 2023, which took effect on January 1, 2024.138 The 

law mandates the inclusion of state-directed ideological content 

throughout all sectors of society, but especially focuses on students,139 by requiring all to study “Xi Jinping Thought on So-
Freedom of Expression

56

cialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” in schools 

as part of mandatory ideological and political education.140 The 

law includes a list of offenses including “undermining the dignity” of the national anthem, flag, and emblems as well as “denying acts of aggression.”141

• University professors. China continues to clamp down on 

academic freedom by punishing university professors for doing 

research or lecturing on sensitive topics. Examples include:

○ Uyghur professor. In September 2023, the Dui Hua 

Foundation reported that acclaimed Uyghur professor 

Rahile Dawut is serving a life sentence for “endangering 

state security.”142 Detained in December 2017, Dawut, a re- nowned ethnographer, was teaching at Xinjiang University 

College of Humanities and founded the Ethnic Minorities 

Research Center.143 Her disappearance was first reported 

in 2018.144 She was sentenced and imprisoned in 2021, 

though her life sentence was not confirmed by a Chinese 

government source until this year.145 Considered a lead- ing scholar of traditional Uyghur culture, Dawut is one of 

more than 300 intellectuals, artists, and writers believed 

to be detained in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

as part of an official Chinese state-sponsored campaign to 

assimilate Uyghurs into Chinese culture and “[promote] 

ethnic harmony.’’ 146 [For more information about the PRC’s 

persecution of Uyghurs, see Chapter 18—Xinjiang Uyghur 

Autonomous Region.]

○ Economics professor. In August 2023, the Guiyang In- termediate People’s Court in Guizhou province sentenced 

Yang Shaozheng, an economics professor, to four years and 

six months in prison on the charge of “inciting subversion 

of state power,” a crime of “endangering state security.”147

Yang’s research and reporting on Party and government 

personnel costs to the Chinese taxpayer was linked to his 

detention.148 Yang lost his job at Guizhou University’s Institute of Economics in November 2017 due to government 

orders and was later investigated by police and secretly 

detained, likely also for promoting his research detailing 

Party and state personnel costs.149

• U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Burns accused Chinese authorities of undermining people-to-people academic, cultural, or other forms of exchange through intimidation and “suppression of 

American diplomatic activities.”150 He reported 61 instances 

of Chinese authorities intimidating individuals attending U.S. 

Embassy public events in China, since November 2023.151 Am- bassador Burns also highlighted Chinese authorities’ efforts to 

obstruct Chinese students from studying in the U.S. by rescinding invitations to diplomatic staff promoting American colleges 

at university fairs in China and pressuring participants to with- draw from U.S.-funded exchange programs.152
57

Notes to Chapter 1—Freedom of Expression

1Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report: China,” accessed August 5, 2024.

2Reporters Without Borders, “China,” World Press Freedom Index 2024, accessed May 3, 2024. 

Bahrain, Vietnam, Turkmenistan, Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, Syria, and Eritrea ranked 

below the PRC, respectively. 3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) on December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19. 4United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights, accessed May 1, 2024. 5Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 19. 6中华人民共和国宪法 [PRC Constitution], passed and effective December 4, 1982, amended 

March 11, 2018, art. 35. 7Frederik Kelter, “Media Feel Pressure to Tell ‘Positive’ China Story as Party Tightens Grip,” 

Al Jazeera, April 4, 2024; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report

(Washington: May 2024), 51; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2018 Annual Report

(Washington: October 2018), 66–68. 8“深入学习贯彻习近平文化思想—论贯彻落实全国宣传思想文化工作会议精神” [Deeply study and 

implement Xi Jinping’s Thought on Culture—on implementation of the spirit of the National Conference on Propaganda, Ideology, and Culture], People’s Daily, October 11, 2023. Although Party 

media announced “Xi Jinping Thought on Culture” as a new official phrase in October 2023, its 

foundations can be traced to speeches given by Xi Jinping around prior official Party conferences 

called “National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conferences.” David Bandurski, “Xi Jinping’s 

Cathedral of Pretense,” China Media Project, October 13, 2023. 9David Bandurski, “Xi Jinping’s Cathedral of Pretense,” China Media Project, October 13, 2023; 

Jamestown Foundation, “David Bandurski,” accessed August 5, 2024. 10David Bandurski, “China’s Press Under Xi Jinping Thought,” China Media Project, November 

22, 2023. See also David Bandurski, “Xi Jinping’s Cathedral of Pretense,” China Media Project, 

October 13, 2023. 11David Bandurski, “China’s Press Under Xi Jinping Thought,” China Media Project, November 

22, 2023. 12“The ‘Everything App’ for China’s Journalists,” China Media Project, July 4, 2023. 13David Bandurski, “The Dawn of the Little Red Phone,” China Media Project, February 13, 

2019; Rita Liao, “A Government Propaganda App Is Going Viral in China,” TechCrunch, February 

1, 2019. 14David Bandurski, “The Ugly Politics of Media Obstruction,” China Media Project, March 14, 

2024; “Police Prevent State Media from Reporting on Yanjiao Explosion: ‘The Party Muffled Its 

Own Mouthpiece,’” China Digital Times, March 15, 2024. 15David Bandurski, “The Ugly Politics of Media Obstruction,” China Media Project, March 14, 

2024; “Police Prevent State Media from Reporting on Yanjiao Explosion: ‘The Party Muffled Its 

Own Mouthpiece,’” China Digital Times, March 15, 2024. 16Simina Mistreanu, “Chinese City Officials Issue a Rare Apology after Authorities Harass 

Journalists on Live TV,” Associated Press, March 14, 2024; John Feng, “China Gas Explosion 

Death Toll Rises Amid State Media Scandal,” Newsweek, March 14, 2024; “Police Prevent State 

Media from Reporting on Yanjiao Explosion: ‘The Party Muffled Its Own Mouthpiece,’” China 

Digital Times, March 15, 2024. 17Rachel Cheung, “Tone Deaf,” Wire China, February 25, 2024; Frederik Kelter, “Media Feel 

Pressure to Tell ‘Positive’ China Story as Party Tightens Grip,” Al Jazeera, April 4, 2024. See also 

“Words of the Week: ‘Handing Someone a Knife,’ and the Flattening of Sixth Tone,” China Digital 

Times, February 28, 2024. 18For information on such efforts in prior reporting years, see, e.g., Sarah Cook, ‘‘China’s Foreign PR Enablers,’’ Diplomat, June 27, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 

2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 46–7. 19Dalia Parete and David Bandurski, “What Does It Mean to Understand China?,” China Me- dia Project, January 4, 2024. 20David Bandurski, “More Local Centers for Global Propaganda,” China Media Project, June 

12, 2024. 21Dalia Parete and David Bandurski, “What Does It Mean to Understand China?,” China Me- dia Project, January 4, 2024. 22The phrase “telling China’s story well” was first introduced by Xi Jinping in August 2013 

at a National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference and has been repeatedly promoted by 

Party officials in the decade since to encourage Chinese media and other groups to “strengthen 

and innovate external propaganda.” “Telling China’s Story Well,” China Media Project, April 16, 

2021; Jian Xu and Qian Gong, “‘Telling China’s Story Well’ as Propaganda Campaign Slogan: 

International, Domestic and the Pandemic,” Media, Culture & Society (March 13, 2024). 23“Xi Exports His Personal Podcast, CMG Launches New China-Africa Media Initiative [updated],” China Digital Times, October 26, 2023. 24“Xi Exports His Personal Podcast, CMG Launches New China-Africa Media Initiative [updated],” China Digital Times, October 26, 2023. 25Pablo Sebastian Morales and Paulo Menechelli, “Communicating the Authentic China: Part- nership Agreements and the Use of Chinese Sources and Voices by Brazilian Media,” Chinese 

Journal of Communication, April 2, 2024, 2–3, 11–13; “China’s State Media Cooperation with 

Brazilian Media Yields Soft Power Gains,” China Digital Times, April 4, 2024. 26See, e.g., Yumeng Luo and Teresa M. Harrison, “How Citizen Journalists Impact the Agendas 

of Traditional Media and the Government Policymaking Process in China,” Global Media and 

China 4, no. 1 (2019): 72, 74.
Freedom of Expression

58

27Reporters Without Borders, “RSF’s 2023 Round-up: 45 Journalists Killed in the Line of Duty 

Worldwide—A Drop Despite the Tragedy in Gaza,” December 14, 2023. 28Helen Davidson, “China #MeToo Journalist Sentenced to Five Years in Jail, Supporters 

Say,” Guardian, June 14, 2024; Amnesty International, “China: ‘Malicious’ Conviction of #MeToo and Labour Activists Shows Beijing’s Growing Fear of Dissent,” June 14, 2024. According 

to The Guardian, the court also fined Huang 100,000 yuan (approximately US$14,000). For 

more information on Huang Xueqin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2019-00454. 29Huang Chuan, “黃雪琴、王建兵被控「煽顛」案,羈押兩年今首在廣州開庭” [Huang Xueqin 

and Wang Jianbing accused of “inciting subversion,” in detention for two years, trial held in 

Guangzhou first thing], Initium, September 22, 2023; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “CHRD 

Condemns Unjust Trial of Journalist Huang Xueqin and Labor Activist Wang Jianbing,” September 22, 2023. 30Gao Feng, “Chinese Activist Missing from Vientiane after Launching Anti-Censorship Campaign,” Radio Free Asia, June 13, 2023; Safeguard Defenders, “Disappearance of Chinese Critic in 

Laos, Feared Kidnapped,” June 19, 2023. For more information on Yang Zewei, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00171. 31Guo Feng, “Activist Qiao Xinxin Arrested for Subversion in China After Laos ‘Disappearance,’” Radio Free Asia, August 14, 2023. 32Guo Feng, “Activist Qiao Xinxin Arrested for Subversion in China After Laos ‘Disappearance,’” Radio Free Asia, August 14, 2023. 33Safeguard Defenders, “Disappearance of Chinese Critic in Laos, Feared Kidnapped,” June 

19, 2023. 34Rights Defense Network, “湖北反腐记者上官云开被判处重刑15年 同案近20人” [Hubei anti-corruption reporter Shangguan Yunkai was sentenced to 15 years in prison, along with nearly 

20 others], January 6, 2024; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Chinese Anti-Corruption Journalist Shangguan Yunkai Sentenced to 15 Years,” January 12, 2024. According to RDN, Shangguan Ziwei, Shangguan Yunkai’s daughter, was also detained, but released half a year later for 

cooperating with the authorities. Shangguan Yunkai was also fined 380,000 yuan (approximately 

US$53,000). For more information on Shangguan Yunkai, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner 

Database record 2023-00281. 35Rights Defense Network, “湖北反腐记者上官云开被判处重刑15年 同案近20人” [Hubei anti-corruption reporter Shangguan Yunkai was sentenced to 15 years in prison, along with nearly 

20 others], January 6, 2024. 36Gao Feng and Gu Ting, “Chinese Police Detain Celebrity Anti-Corruption Journalist for Selling Ointment,” Radio Free Asia, April 26, 2023; Cheng Jun, “反腐记者上官云开遭重判15年:一场

对舆论监督的政治迫害” [Anti-corruption reporter Shangguan Yunkai was sentenced to 15 years 

in prison: political persecution for supervising public speech], Jinri Zhiyi, January 5, 2024. 37Gao Feng and Gu Ting, “Chinese Police Detain Celebrity Anti-Corruption Journalist for Selling Ointment,” Radio Free Asia, April 26, 2023; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Chinese Anti-Corruption Journalist Shangguan Yunkai Sentenced to 15 Years,” January 12, 2024; Reporters 

Without Borders, “China: Investigative Journalist Shangguan Yunkai Sentenced to 15 Years in 

Prison on Trumped-Up Charges,” January 9, 2024; Cheng Jun, “反腐记者上官云开遭重判15年:

一场对舆论监督的政治迫害” [Anti-corruption reporter Shangguan Yunkai was sentenced to 15 

years in prison: political persecution for supervising public speech], Jinri Zhiyi, January 5, 2024. 38Reporters Without Borders, “Beaten to Death by State Security: RSF Shocked by Gruesome 

Murder of Independent Journalist in China,” November 21, 2023; Rights Defense Network, “南京

著名异议人士孙林先生疑遭南京玄武分局国保殴打致死” [Mr. Sun Lin, famous dissident from Nanjing, suspected of being beaten to death by the Xuanwu branch of Nanjing’s domestic security], 

November 18, 2023; Gu Ting, “Nanjing Dissident Journalist Sun Lin Dies after Police Raid on 

Home,” Radio Free Asia, November 21, 2023. For more information on Sun Lin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2008-00617. 39Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “邹巍被谈话维稳并警告不得离开杭州” [Zou Wei was talked 

to for stability maintenance and warned not to leave Hangzhou], March 18, 2024. 40Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “邹巍被谈话维稳并警告不得离开杭州” [Zou Wei was talked 

to for stability maintenance and warned not to leave Hangzhou], March 18, 2024; Rights Defense 

Network, “为南京异议人士孙林“被死亡”发声,杭州异议人士邹巍被捕被抄家” [Because of speaking out on behalf of Nanjing dissident Sun Lin, Hangzhou dissident Zou Wei detained and home 

is raided], November 21, 2023; Kai Di, “Nanjing Police Detain Activist Who Spoke Out about Sun 

Lin’s Death,” Radio Free Asia, November 22, 2023. For more information on Zou Wei, see the 

Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00252. 41Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, Masks Off, Barriers Remain: The Post-COVID Reporting Environment in China 2023, April 8, 2024, 1. 42Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, Masks Off, Barriers Remain: The Post-COVID Reporting Environment in China 2023, April 8, 2024, 12. 43Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, Masks Off, Barriers Remain: The Post-COVID Reporting Environment in China 2023, April 8, 2024, 2–3. 44Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, “FCCC Statement on Harassment of Reporters in 

Chengdu,” March 1, 2024; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Dutch Journalist Sjoerd den Daas 

and Camera Operator Detained by Chinese Police while Covering Protest,” March 5, 2024. 45 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) on December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 19–21. 46Freedom House, “China Dissent Monitor,” Issue 5 (July–September 2023), 1; Freedom House, 

“China Dissent Monitor,” Issue 6, October–December 2023, 1. 47Freedom House, “China Dissent Monitor,” Issue 5 (July–September 2023), 1; Freedom House, 

“China Dissent Monitor,” Issue 6, October–December 2023, 1; China Labour Bulletin, “China La-
Freedom of Expression

59

bour Bulletin Strike Map Data Analysis: 2023 Year in Review for Workers’ Rights,” January 31, 

2024. 48Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “河南宁陵县中学生疑似被虐杀案后续” [Follow-up to the 

suspected torture and murder of a middle school student in Ningling County, Henan], January 4, 

2024; Human Rights in China, “Thousands Protest 14-Year-Old’s Mysterious Death and Subsequent Coverup,” December 29, 2023. 49Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “河南宁陵县中学生疑似被虐杀案后续” [Follow-up to the 

suspected torture and murder of a middle school student in Ningling County, Henan], January 4, 

2024; Human Rights in China, “Thousands Protest 14-Year-Old’s Mysterious Death and Subsequent Coverup,” December 29, 2023. 50Human Rights in China, “Thousands Protest 14-Year-Old’s Mysterious Death and Subsequent Coverup,” December 29, 2023. 51Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “河南宁陵县中学生疑似被虐杀案后续” [Follow-up to the 

suspected torture and murder of a middle school student in Ningling County, Henan], January 

4, 2024. 52Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “河南宁陵县中学生疑似被虐杀案后续” [Follow-up to the 

suspected torture and murder of a middle school student in Ningling County, Henan], January 

4, 2024. 53Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “Exclusive: More than 100 Tibetans Arrested over Dam 

Protest,” Radio Free Asia, February 22, 2024. 54“More Than 100 Arrested Following Dam Protest in Tibetan Region of Sichuan Province,” 

China Digital Times, February 23, 2024; Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “Exclusive: More than 

100 Tibetans Arrested over Dam Protest,” Radio Free Asia, February 22, 2024. 55Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “Exclusive: More than 100 Tibetans Arrested over Dam Protest,” Radio Free Asia, February 22, 2024; Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “China Arrests More 

than 1,000 Tibetans Protesting Dam Project,” Radio Free Asia, February 23, 2024. 56Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “After Protest, Tibetan Monastery Leader and Village Official Sent to Detention Center,” Radio Free Asia, March 7, 2024. 57Wang Yun, “Shanghai Halloween Party-Goers Take Aim at Leaders through Cosplay,” Radio 

Free Asia, November 1, 2023; Isabelle Qian and Agnes Chang, “Shanghai’s Halloween Party, a 

Rare Chance for Chinese to Vent in Style,” New York Times, November 21, 2023; Wenxin Fan, 

Rachel Liang, and Shen Lu, “For China’s Halloween of Discontent, He Went as a Surveillance 

Camera,” Wall Street Journal, November 1, 2023. 58Party censors ban references to Winnie the Pooh online in China due to his reported resemblance to Xi Jinping. Wang Yun, “Shanghai Halloween Party-Goers Take Aim at Leaders through 

Cosplay,” Radio Free Asia, November 1, 2023. 59“Inviting to tea” is a euphemism used to refer to questioning by Chinese police. Gu Ting, 

“Shanghai Police Detain Young People over Halloween Cosplay Photos,” Radio Free Asia, November 20, 2024. 60 Isabelle Qian and Agnes Chang, “Shanghai’s Halloween Party, a Rare Chance for Chinese 

to Vent in Style,” New York Times, November 21, 2023; Gu Ting, “Shanghai Police Detain Young 

People over Halloween Cosplay Photos,” Radio Free Asia, November 20, 2023. 61Gu Ting, “Shanghai Police Detain Young People over Halloween Cosplay Photos,” Radio Free 

Asia, November 20, 2023. 62Xiao Yu, “原声带·夏巢川 :白纸运动后,我在看守所地狱般的日子” [Original Soundtrack · 

Xia Chaochuan: My hellish days in the detention center after the White Paper Movement], Voice 

of America, May 3, 2024. 63Xiao Yu, “原声带·夏巢川 :白纸运动后,我在看守所地狱般的日子” [Original Soundtrack · 

Xia Chaochuan: My hellish days in the detention center after the White Paper Movement], Voice 

of America, May 3, 2024. 64Freedom House, “China” in Freedom on the Net 2023: The Repressive Power of Artificial Intelligence, accessed June 28, 2024. 65He Chunzhong, “公安部决定将2024年作为打击整治网络谣言专项行动年” [The Ministry of 

Public Security has decided to designate 2024 as the year for special action to combat online 

rumors], China Youth Network, December 12, 2023. 66Xinlu Liang, “Chinese Police Arrest Over 1,500 for Online Rumors in Campaign Targeting 

Influencers, Bloggers, and Live-streamers,” South China Morning Post, April 16, 2024. 67Xinlu Liang, “Chinese Police Arrest Over 1,500 for Online Rumors in Campaign Targeting 

Influencers, Bloggers, and Live-streamers,” South China Morning Post, April 16, 2024. 68Freedom House, “Navalny’s Death, Australian Writer Sentenced, Chinese Hackers’ International Effort (February 2024),” China Media Bulletin, no. 177, February 2024; Cyberspace Administration of China, “网信系统持续推进网络执法 查处各类网上违法违规行为” [The network 

information system continues to promote network law enforcement and investigate various online 

violations], January 31, 2024. 69Qian Lang, “China Steps Up Checks for People Bypassing the ‘Great Firewall,’” Radio Free 

Asia, March 26, 2024. 70Qian Lang, “China Steps Up Checks for People Bypassing the ‘Great Firewall,’” Radio Free 

Asia, March 26, 2024; Gu Ting, “China Recruits Thousands to Monitor its Citizens’ Words and 

Deeds,” Radio Free Asia, October 17, 2023. 71Pak Yiu, “China Seeks to Criminalize ‘Hurting the Feelings’ of Its People,” Nikkei Asia, September 8, 2023; Hsia Hsiao-hwa, “‘Hurting the Feelings of the Chinese People’ Could Be Punished 

by Jail Time,” Radio Free Asia, September 7, 2023. 72Hsia Hsiao-hwa, “‘Hurting the Feelings of the Chinese People’ Could Be Punished by Jail 

Time,” Radio Free Asia, September 7, 2023. 73Pak Yiu, “China Seeks to Criminalize ‘Hurting the Feelings’ of Its People,” Nikkei Asia, September 8, 2023.
Freedom of Expression

60

74Hsia Hsiao-hwa, “‘Hurting the Feelings of the Chinese People’ Could Be Punished by Jail 

Time,” Radio Free Asia, September 7, 2023; Pak Yiu, “China Seeks to Criminalize ‘Hurting the 

Feelings’ of Its People,” Nikkei Asia, September 8, 2023. 75Ryan Ho Kilpatrick, “A Law to Protect China’s Feelings,” China Media Project, September 

14, 2023. 76Yuxiao Shan and Denise Jia, “Cover Story: Personal Freedom Vies with Deterrence in Public 

Security Law Revamp,” Caixin, September 18, 2023. 77“Xi Jinping Builds a 21st-Century Police State: A Draft Law Gives Rank-and-File Officers 

New, Arbitrary Powers,” Economist, September 14, 2023. 78Wang Zhijun and Zhu Jiang, “强观察|整治‘自媒体’乱象 ‘13条’束紧监管‘紧箍咒’”

[Strong Observation | ‘‘13 Articles’’ strengthens supervision and is a ‘‘tightening course’’ to rectify 

the chaos of “self-media”], People’s Daily, July 15, 2023; Wang Xu, “自媒体新规 为打假还是防

止‘李老师’?” [New rules for self-media: To combat fake information or to prevent ‘‘Teacher 

Li’’?] Radio Free Asia, July 10, 2023. 79Gao Feng, “China’s Internet Regulator Cracking Down on Grassroots Online Posts,” Voice of 

America, July 14, 2023. 80David Bandurski, “Shades of Yellow,” China Media Project, April 24, 2024. 81“The Tyranny of Full Openness,” China Media Project, October 20, 2023; Oiwan Lam, “New 

Policy Requires Chinese Influencers to Display Their Personal Information on Weibo,” Global 

Voices, October 23, 2023; Caiwei Chen, “The End of Anonymity on Chinese Social Media,” Rest of 

World, November 21, 2023. 82Gu Ting, “微博要求大V账号展示实名 时政新闻成审核重点” [Weibo requires Big V accounts 

to display their real names; current political news becomes the focus of review], Radio Free Asia, 

October 16, 2023. 83Caiwei Chen, “The End of Anonymity on Chinese Social Media,” Rest of World, November 

21, 2023. 84Amy Hawkins, “China Seeks to Stifle Public Grief for Former Premier Li Keqiang,” Guardian, 

October 30, 2023; “Minitrue: Beware of ‘Overly Effusive Comments’ on Late Premier Li Keqiang,” 

China Digital Times, October 27, 2023. 85Sun Yu and Joe Leahy, “‘Other Leaders Are Corrupt’: Li Keqiang Mourning Poses Challenge 

for Beijing,” Financial Times, October 31, 2023; David Bandurski, “Sidelined in Death, as in Politics,” China Media Project, November 1, 2023. 86Sun Yu and Joe Leahy, “‘Other Leaders Are Corrupt’: Li Keqiang Mourning Poses Challenge 

for Beijing,” Financial Times, October 31, 2023; Li Yuan, “Chinese Mourn the Death of a Premier, 

and the Loss of Economic Hope,” New York Times, November 1, 2023. 87Li Yuan, “Chinese Mourn the Death of a Premier, and the Loss of Economic Hope,” New York 

Times, November 1, 2023. 88Wenhao (@ThisIsWenhao), “People across China have been mourning, openly and quietly, the 

death of the country’s former premier Li Keqiang . . .,” X, October 30, 2023, 6:50 p.m.; Wenhao 

Ma, “China Blocked Online Appreciations After Death of Li Keqiang, Top Official Linked to Reform,” Voice of America, October 30, 2023; Li Yuan, “Chinese Mourn the Death of a Premier, and 

the Loss of Economic Hope,” New York Times, November 1, 2023. 89Amy Hawkins, “China Seeks to Stifle Public Grief for Former Premier Li Keqiang,” Guardian, 

October 30, 2023; “Translation, On Li Keqiang: ‘We’ll Toast His Memory Together,’” China Digital 

Times, November 1, 2023. 90Christopher Bodeen and Ken Moritsugu, “Chinese Gather and Lay Flowers Despite Heavy 

Security as Former Premier Li Keqiang Is Laid to Rest,” Associated Press, November 2, 2023; 

“‘He Understood Me’: Death of China’s Former Premier Sparks Mourning—And a Way to Air 

Frustration with Xi Era,” CNN, November 8, 2023. 91“‘He Understood Me’: Death of China’s Former Premier Sparks Mourning—And a Way to Air 

Frustration with Xi Era,” CNN, November 8, 2023. 92 John Ai, “Beijing Censors Messages of Condolence for Li Keqiang,” AsiaNews, October 30, 

2023. 93William Zheng, “Chinese University Students Told to Avoid Private Memorial Events for 

Former Premier Li Keqiang,” South China Morning Post, October 28, 2023. 94“Minitrue: Beware of ‘Overly Effusive Comments’ on Late Premier Li Keqiang,” China Digital Times, October 27, 2023; William Zheng, “Chinese University Students Told to Avoid Private 

Memorial Events for Former Premier Li Keqiang,” South China Morning Post, October 28, 2023; 

“‘He Understood Me’: Death of China’s Former Premier Sparks Mourning—And a Way to Air 

Frustration with Xi Era,” CNN, November 8, 2023. Zhou Enlai’s death in 1976 sparked massive 

memorials that expressed public discontent with the Cultural Revolution. Similarly, Hu Yaobang’s 

passing in 1989 ignited student protests across China, culminating in the violent suppression of 

the 1989 Tiananmen protests. 95Christian Shepherd and Lyric Li, “China’s Biggest Political Confab Is About to Begin. What 

Are the Two Sessions?,” Washington Post, March 4, 2024; Wang Yaqiu, Freedom House, “Article 23 

Passes in Hong Kong, US House Passes TikTok Bill, Tibetans Detained over Dam Protest (March 

2024),” China Media Bulletin, no. 178, March 2024; “【敏感词库】两会敏感词:人大代表谁、龙颜

大悦、心腹王小洪” [[Sensitive Lexicon] Sensitive words during the Two Sessions: Who represents 

the National People’s Congress, the emperor is pleased, confidant Wang Xiaohong], China Digital 

Times, March 4, 2024; “China Tightens Grip over Internet during Two Sessions Meetings,” Hong 

Kong Free Press, March 10, 2024. 96Kai Di, “China’s Stability Maintenance System Kicks into High Gear on ‘Sensitive Dates,’” 

Radio Free Asia, March 16, 2024. 97“China Tightens Grip over Internet during Two Sessions Meetings,” Hong Kong Free Press, 

March 10, 2024.
Freedom of Expression

61

98“【敏感词库】两会敏感词:人大代表谁、龙颜大悦、心腹王小洪” [[Sensitive Lexicon] Sensitive words during the Two Sessions: Who represents the National People’s Congress, the emperor 

is pleased, confidant Wang Xiaohong], China Digital Times, March 4, 2024. 99Chun Han Wong, “China Drops Only Regular Press Briefing by a Senior Leader,” Wall Street 

Journal, March 4, 2024. 100Arthur Kaufman, “China’s ‘Two Sessions’ in Progress, but Premier Will Not Meet the Press,” 

China Digital Times, March 5, 2024. 101Arthur Kaufman, “China’s ‘Two Sessions’ in Progress, but Premier Will Not Meet the Press,” 

China Digital Times, March 5, 2024. 102Sarah Cook, Freedom House, “Economic Censorship, Hong Kong Targeting Exiles, Global 

Government Hacks (July 2023),” China Media Bulletin, no. 172, July 2023. 103Sarah Cook, Freedom House, “Economic Censorship, Hong Kong Targeting Exiles, Global 

Government Hacks (July 2023),” China Media Bulletin, no. 172, July 2023. 104Sarah Zheng, Lucille Liu, Josh Xiao, and Jing Li, “China’s Weibo Asks Bloggers to Avoid 

Badmouthing the Economy,” Bloomberg, December 14, 2023. 105See, e.g., Edward White and Hudson Lockett, “China Censors Financial Blogger as Economic 

Recovery Falters,” Financial Times, June 27, 2023; “Censorship of Frank Economic Discussion 

and ‘Ten Questions about the Private Economy,’” China Digital Times, December 15, 2023; “Sun 

Liping’s ‘Three Simple Points’ about Reviving the Economy Deleted from WeChat,” China Digital 

Times, March 4, 2024. 106“Netizen Voices: ‘So a General Election Doesn’t Represent Mainstream Public Opinion?,’” 

China Digital Times, January 16, 2024. 107“Netizen Voices: ‘So a General Election Doesn’t Represent Mainstream Public Opinion?,’” 

China Digital Times, January 16, 2024; “【敏感词库】“台湾选举”、“台湾大选”、“2024台

湾大选”及“冻蒜”” [[Sensitive Lexicon] ‘Taiwan Election’, ‘Taiwan Election’, ‘Taiwan Election 

2024’ and ‘Frozen Garlic’], China Digital Times, January 14, 2024; Alexander Boyd, “Weibo Censors Hashtags ‘Taiwan Election,’ ‘Frozen Garlic,’ More,” China Digital Times, January 16, 2024. 108Yaqiu Wang (@Yaqiu), “I’m seeing quite some censorship of comments praising Taiwan’s 

election (not the result) . . .,” X, January 13, 2024, 12:43 p.m. 109Freedom House, “Taiwan Election, Jimmy Lai’s Trial, US-Based Chinese Student Convicted 

of Stalking (January 2024),” China Media Bulletin, no. 176, January 2024. 110Li Yuan, “When Tragedy Strikes in China, the Government Cracks Down on Grief,” New 

York Times, August 14, 2023. 111‘‘‘Thirteen Lives Don’t Even Merit a Hashtag’: Scant Media Coverage of Henan Dorm Fire 

Provokes Ire Online,” China Digital Times, January 26, 2024. 112“‘Thirteen Lives Don’t Even Merit a Hashtag’: Scant Media Coverage of Henan Dorm Fire 

Provokes Ire Online,” China Digital Times, January 26, 2024. 113Lee Heung Yeung and Gu Ting, “Police Haul in China-Based X Followers of Citizen Journalist Mr Li,” Radio Free Asia, February 27, 2024; Dake Kang and Huizhong Wu, “Two Chinese 

Bloggers in Exile Warn that Police Are Interrogating Their Followers,” Associated Press, February 

26, 2024; Shen Lu, “How a Chinese X User in Italy Became a Beijing Target,” Wall Street Journal, 

March 6, 2024. 114Shen Lu, “How a Chinese X User in Italy Became a Beijing Target,” Wall Street Journal, 

March 6, 2024. 115Lee Heung Yeung and Gu Ting, “Police Haul in China-Based X Followers of Citizen Journalist Mr Li,” Radio Free Asia, February 27, 2024. 116Dake Kang and Huizhong Wu, “Two Chinese Bloggers in Exile Warn that Police Are Interrogating Their Followers,” Associated Press, February 26, 2024; Shen Lu, “How a Chinese X User 

in Italy Became a Beijing Target,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2024. 117Shen Lu, “How a Chinese X User in Italy Became a Beijing Target,” Wall Street Journal, 

March 6, 2024. 118“Xi Parallels Suspected behind Withdrawal of Book on Ill-Fated Chongzhen Emperor,” China 

Digital Times, October 18, 2023. 119“Xi Parallels Suspected behind Withdrawal of Book on Ill-Fated Chongzhen Emperor,” China 

Digital Times, October 18, 2023. 120“Xi Parallels Suspected behind Withdrawal of Book on Ill-Fated Chongzhen Emperor,” China Digital Times, October 18, 2023; Chen Zifei, “China Bans Book on Last Ming Emperor after 

Comments Link It to Xi,” Radio Free Asia, October 19, 2023. 121Chris M. Barkley and Jason Sanford, “The 2023 Hugo Awards: A Report on Censorship and 

Exclusion,” File770 (blog), February 14, 2024. See also Amy Hawkins, “Science Fiction Awards 

Held in China under Fire for Excluding Authors,” Guardian, January 24, 2024. 122Chris M. Barkley and Jason Sanford, “The 2023 Hugo Awards: A Report on Censorship and 

Exclusion,” File770 (blog), February 14, 2024. See also Amy Hawkins, “Authors ‘Excluded from 

Hugo Awards over China Concerns,’” Guardian, February 15, 2024. 123Chris M. Barkley and Jason Sanford, “The 2023 Hugo Awards: A Report on Censorship and 

Exclusion,” File770 (blog), February 14, 2024. 124Chris M. Barkley and Jason Sanford, “The 2023 Hugo Awards: A Report on Censorship and 

Exclusion,” File770 (blog), February 14, 2024; Yaqiu Wang, Freedom House, “Taiwan Election, 

Jimmy Lai’s Trial, US-Based Chinese Student Convicted of Stalking (January 2024),” China Media Bulletin, no. 176, January 2024; Alexandra Alter, “Some Authors Were Left Out of Awards 

Held in China. Leaked Emails Show Why,” New York Times, February 17, 2024; Alex Colville, 

“When Science Fiction Meets Political Fact,” China Media Project, February 22, 2024. 125Yaqiu Wang, Freedom House, “Taiwan Election, Jimmy Lai’s Trial, US-Based Chinese Student Convicted of Stalking (January 2024),” China Media Bulletin, no. 176, January 2024; “【404

视频】网易新闻| 纪实短片:如此打工三十年” [[404 Video] NetEase News | Documentary Short 

Film: Working like this for thirty years], China Digital Times, January 9, 2024.
Freedom of Expression

62

126Yaqiu Wang, Freedom House, “Taiwan Election, Jimmy Lai’s Trial, US-Based Chinese Student Convicted of Stalking (January 2024),” China Media Bulletin, no. 176, January 2024; “【404

视频】网易新闻| 纪实短片:如此打工三十年” [[404 Video] NetEase News | Documentary Short 

Film: Working like this for thirty years], China Digital Times, January 9, 2024. 127 Jessie Lau, “Uyghur Film-Maker Claims He Was Tortured by Authorities in China,” Guardian, November 8, 2023. For more information on Ikram Nurmehmet, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2024-00172. 128 Jessie Lau, “Uyghur Film-Maker Claims He Was Tortured by Authorities in China,” Guardian, November 8, 2023.

129 Jessie Lau, “Uyghur Film-Maker Claims He Was Tortured by Authorities in China,” Guardian, November 8, 2023.

130“Mass Censorship on 35th Anniversary of Tiananmen Massacre,” China Digital Times, June 

4, 2024; Alex Wu, “Tiananmen Square Massacre: CCP Censors Commemoration as 35th Anniversary Marked,” Epoch Times, April 17, 2024, updated April 20, 2024; Amy Hawkins, “Chinese 

Censors Block ‘Tiananmen’ Image of Athletes Hugging,” Guardian, October 3, 2023; “A Hug Becomes Unlikely Tiananmen Censorship Flashpoint [updated],” China Digital Times, October 3, 

2023; “【立此存照】吴艳妮在杭州亚运会与队友拥抱“8964”,央视新闻换图” [For the record] Wu 

Yanni hugged her teammates at the Hangzhou Asian Games [showcasing] ‘‘8964,’’ CCTV News 

changed the picture’’], China Digital Times, October 3, 2023. In October 2023, Chinese social 

media platforms reportedly censored photos of Chinese hurdlers Lin Yuwei and Wu Yanni at the 

19th Asian Games due to an unintended reference to the June 4th violent suppression of the 1989 

Tiananmen protests. CCTV News initially published the image but later removed it, while Weibo 

censored posts that shared the photo. 131Human Rights Watch, “China: Closing Off Memory of Tiananmen Massacre,” June 2, 2024. 132Human Rights Watch, “China: Closing Off Memory of Tiananmen Massacre,” June 2, 2024. 133Ken Moritsugu and Kanis Leung, “Silence and Heavy Security in China and Hong Kong 

Mark 35th Anniversary of the Tiananmen Crackdown,” Associated Press, June 5, 2024. 134Amnesty International, “Hong Kong: Arrests under New National Security Law a ‘Shameful Attempt’ at Suppressing Peaceful Commemoration of Tiananmen Crackdown,” May 28, 2024; 

Hans Tse, “Hong Kong National Security Police Make 7th Arrest under New Security Law,” Hong 

Kong Free Press, May 29, 2024; Human Rights Watch, “China: Closing Off Memory of Tiananmen 

Massacre,” June 2, 2024; Kenji Kawasee, “Tiananmen, 35 Years On: Hong Kong Muzzled as World 

Marks June 4 Crackdown,” Nikkei Asia, June 4, 2024; Hong Kong Police Force, “Police National 

Security Department Mounts Enforcement Action,” May 28, 2024; Hong Kong Police Force, “Police 

National Security Department Continues Enforcement Action,” May 29, 2024. 135“35th Tiananmen Anniversary Commemorated around the World,” China Digital Times, 

June 5, 2024. 136Tiananmen at 35: The Ongoing Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Christopher Smith, Chair of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, U.S. Representative). 137Tiananmen at 35: The Ongoing Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Zhou 

Fengsuo). 138中华人民共和国爱国注意教育法 [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, effective January 1, 2024; “China Adopts Patriotic Education Law,” Xinhua, October 24, 2023. 139 John Dotson, “CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 1: The PRC’s New ‘Patriotic Education Law,’” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, December 15, 2023, 11; 中华人民共和国爱

国注意教育法 [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, effective January 1, 

2024, art. 12. 140Hsia Hsiao-hwa, Gu Ting, and Chingman, “Planned Chinese Law Would Mandate the Study 

of ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ in Schools,” Radio Free Asia, June 27, 2023; 中华人民共和国爱国注意教育

法 [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, effective January 1, 2024, arts. 3, 6.

141Ryan Ho Kilpatrick, “Legislating Love for the Ruling Party,” China Media Project, June 30, 

2023; 中华人民共和国爱国注意教育法 [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, 

effective January 1, 2024, art. 37. 142Dui Hua Foundation, “Life Sentence for Professor Rahile Dawut Confirmed,” September 21, 

2023. For more information on Rahile Dawut, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2018-00552. 143Dui Hua Foundation, “Life Sentence for Professor Rahile Dawut Confirmed,” September 21, 

2023. 144Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “Star Scholar Disappears as Crackdown Engulfs Western 

China,” New York Times, August 10, 2018. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2018 Annual Report (Washington: October 2018), 276. 145Dui Hua Foundation, “Life Sentence for Professor Rahile Dawut Confirmed,” September 21, 

2023; Lily Kuo, “China Sentences Uyghur Academic to Life in Prison in Xinjiang,” Washington 

Post, September 22, 2023. 146Lily Kuo, “China Sentences Uyghur Academic to Life in Prison in Xinjiang,” Washington 

Post, September 22, 2023. 147Gu Ting, “China Jails Economics Professor Who Highlighted Government’s Personnel Costs,” 

Radio Free Asia, August 31, 2023. Rights Defense Network, “著名民主人士、原贵州大学教授杨绍

政被以煽动颠覆国家政权罪判刑4年6个月” [Yang Shaozheng, a well-known democracy activist and 

former professor at Guizhou University, was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months in prison for 

inciting subversion of state power], August 31, 2023. For more information on Yang Shaozheng, 

see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2022-00008. 148Gu Ting, “China Jails Economics Professor Who Highlighted Government’s Personnel Costs,” 

Radio Free Asia, August 31, 2023.
Freedom of Expression

63

149China Change, “Economics Professor Expelled for ‘Politically Harmful’ Expressions, Including Estimate of Staggering Cost to Maintain the Communist Party Apparatus,” August 21, 2018; 

Gu Ting, “China Jails Economics Professor Who Highlighted Government’s Personnel Costs,” Ra- dio Free Asia, August 31, 2023. 150 Jonathan Cheng, “In Rare Rebuke, U.S. Ambassador Accuses China of Undermining Diplo- macy,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2024. 151 Jonathan Cheng, “In Rare Rebuke, U.S. Ambassador Accuses China of Undermining Diplo- macy,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2024. 152 Jonathan Cheng, “In Rare Rebuke, U.S. Ambassador Accuses China of Undermining Diplo- macy,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2024; Jonathan Cheng, “China Rejects U.S. Ambassador’s 

Accusation That Beijing Is Undermining Diplomacy,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2024.
64

Civil Socie

Findings

• During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, the Chinese 

Communist Party and government continued their efforts to 

control, co-opt, or dismantle civil society.

• In December 2023, the National People’s Congress Standing 

Committee passed a series of amendments to the People’s Re- public of China (PRC) Charity Law of 2016. The amended law 

states that charity work must “uphold the leadership of the Chi- nese Communist Party,” requires that charities report on any 

cooperation with foreign organizations, and makes it more diffi- cult for registered organizations to assist unregistered organiza- tions, many of which work in sensitive areas, with fundraising.

• PRC authorities continued to push for the consolidation of 

Party and government control over social organizations (SOs), 

co-opting SOs to serve their policy priorities and objectives.

• The Party and government continued to target so-called “illegal social organizations” (ISOs) through a coordinated effort at 

both the central and local levels. The Ministry of Civil Affairs, 

along with 10 other departments, launched a six-month-long 

“special campaign” in June 2023 that aimed to crack down on 

ISOs, with 1,100 organizations censured in 2023, according to 

official media.

• During the January 2024 session of the U.N. Human Rights 

Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese government’s human rights record, the PRC sought to “game” the process, using channels established for independent civil society 

participation to promote entities influenced or controlled by the 

government.

• Despite government efforts to comprehensively deter public 

dissent, Chinese citizens continued a pattern of organizing ad 

hoc protests during the reporting year, often gathering in the 

hundreds or thousands to protest perceived injustices.

• The Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court sentenced women’s rights advocate Sophia Huang Xueqin to five years in 

prison, and labor rights advocate Wang Jianbing to three 

years and six months, on June 14, 2024 on charges of “inciting 

subversion of state power.”

• During the reporting year, the Party and government detained 

or sentenced rights advocates involved in democracy efforts, including a former public security officer and those involved with 

the group China Human Rights Observer.

• During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, PRC author- ities continued to suppress lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 

and questioning (LGBTQ) advocacy groups, limit public space 

for LGBTQ-identifying persons to associate, and censor expres- sions of LGBTQ identity.
65

Civil Socie

Introduction

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, the Chinese Com- munist Party and government continued their efforts to control, coopt, or dismantle civil society.1 Under Party General Secretary and 

President Xi Jinping, the Party and government have pursued a 

multi-pronged approach to civil society organizations—officially re- ferred to in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as social orga- nizations (SOs) 2—in which SOs are either deployed or crushed in 

service of the prevailing political agenda. PRC authorities have in- creasingly succeeded in these efforts; in 2024, Human Rights Watch 

concluded that “there is no independent civil society [in China],” 

and furthermore that “even small pockets of freedom [have been] 

eliminated.”3 To this end, the Commission observed government ef- forts to encourage and tightly regulate charitable activity (which it 

relies on to support its provision of social services) while targeting 

and detaining rights defenders, advocates for democracy, labor, women’s rights, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning 

(LGBTQ) rights, and others attempting to participate in independent civil society. While the PRC pursues this domestic strategy, it 

has also sought to diminish the voices of independent Chinese civil 

society in international organizations, an approach on stark display 

at the PRC’s Universal Periodic Review in January 2024. Despite 

these comprehensive efforts to constrain association, PRC citizens 

have repeatedly pursued ad hoc collective action in response to catalyzing events, to seek remedy for perceived injustice, or to express 

discontent.

Charity Law

In December 2023, the National People’s Congress Standing Com- mittee passed a series of amendments 4 to the PRC Charity Law of 

2016 (hereafter “the Law”) 5 in a likely attempt to address perceived 

flaws in the original legislation, according to experts and stakeholders in the charity sector.6 The 2016 Law constituted what two civil 

society scholars describe as the “closest legislation to a basic law 

on social organisations,”7 and aimed to harness SOs for the benefit of the Chinese Communist Party and government while tightly controlling their operations.8 Because the Law was widely seen 

as failing to achieve these goals,9 and in response to developments 

that have taken place since the Law was promulgated,10 the 2023 

amendments focused primarily on the registration and management 

of charitable organizations, rules for charitable trusts, fundraising 

related to emergencies, and the use of internet platforms for fund- raising and crowdfunding.11

The amended Law reportedly targeted the stagnant growth of 

charitable organizations,12 removing at least one barrier to registration13 and directing government agencies to provide tax incentives 

to groups that register.14 However, the revisions also impose new 

burdens on charitable groups, including requiring that they report 

on any “collaboration carried out with foreign organizations and individuals,”15 consistent with Xi-era policies circumscribing foreign 

activity and foreign ties.16 Additionally, if a registered charitable 
Civil Society

66

organization with public fundraising credentials cooperates with 

a non-credentialed group, it must, as summarized by one analyst, 

“scrutinize, disclose information on, and oversee” the organization.17

According to a prominent not-for-profit industry association, this 

type of collaboration was one of the ways that unregistered SOs, 

often working in sensitive areas, were able to fundraise online, and 

the amendments will likely have the effect of further marginalizing 

these groups.18

In a change that several analysts have characterized as notable,19

the amendments added language to the Law stating that “charity work must adhere to the leadership of the Chinese Communist 

Party,”20 reflecting the growing importance of Party identity in 

SOs 21 and the Party’s preeminence in setting the agenda for charity work.22 While in the draft amendments this language was placed 

at the beginning of Article 5, which encourages those engaged in 

charitable activities to adhere to socialist core values and promote 

“traditional [Chinese] virtues,”23 in the final version the amendment 

was placed at the beginning of Article 4, which stipulates that such 

work “must not violate social morals” or “endanger national security,” among other warnings, explicitly linking Party leadership with 

guarding national security.24

Status of Social Organizations

AUTHORITIES EXPAND CONTROL OVER SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

The PRC government continued to push for the consolidation of 

Chinese Communist Party and government control over social organizations (SOs), seeking to influence SOs to serve official policy objectives.25 According to official media reports, the Central Social Work 

Department, established in March 2023, asserted that strengthening 

guidance on social work and advancing Party-building within new 

SOs are “key tasks” for 2024.26 Furthermore, Liu Zhenguo, Director 

of the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ (MCA) Social Organization Administration Bureau, called for the consolidation of the Party’s “overall 

leadership over the work of social organizations” in April 2024, asserting that these organizations are key to the Party’s grassroots organization building.27 In one instance during the Commission’s 2024 

reporting year, Guizhou province authorities hosted Party-building 

training for SOs, with more than 260 people participating.28

The PRC government has also invested in registered SOs to help 

augment its provision of social services, illustrating PRC authorities’ 

intent to deploy SOs where useful to its policy goals.29 In April 2024, 

the MCA issued the “Implementation Plan for Central Finance Support for Social Organizations to Participate in Social Service Projects in 2024,” that aimed to support projects in “key areas.”30 The 

MCA announced that it approved support for 95 projects as part of 

this implementation plan in June 2024.31

SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS DEEMED “ILLEGAL”

Chinese authorities have continued to pursue and eliminate socalled “illegal social organizations” (ISOs) (groups that do not seek 

to register with the MCA, are denied approval, or are explicitly 

banned), through a coordinated effort at both the central and local 
Civil Society

67

levels.32 In August 2023, the MCA provided updates about a sixmonth-long “special campaign” launched with 10 other departments 

in June 2023 that aimed to crack down on ISOs.33 A coordination 

mechanism was established at the ministerial level as part of the 

special campaign to “combat and rectify” ISOs, while local governments established coordination mechanisms within their respective 

regional civil affairs departments.34 In an interview with Chinese 

state media, officials from the MCA’s Social Organization Management Bureau said in August 2023 that the crackdown was necessary 

to maintain “social harmony and stability.”35 The officials said that 

during the first two months of the campaign, the government “significantly reduced” the number of ISOs and “greatly squeezed” the 

space for ISOs to operate.36 In January 2024, Chinese state media 

claimed that the PRC government cracked down on over 1,100 ISOs 

in 2023.37 The PRC government also carried out a public awareness 

program as part of the special campaign that notified 960 million 

mobile phone users nationwide to beware of “illegal activities” via 

text message and posted propaganda in more than 500,000 buildings, as well as over 200 subways, high-speed railways, airports, and 

other locations.38 Furthermore, 164 ISO websites and applications 

were shut down, and public security forces detained more than 160 

suspected criminals as part of the campaign.39 The MCA also announced in May 2024 that it planned to accelerate the application of 

new technologies such as artificial intelligence, as well as continue 

to “increase the intensity of investigation and elimination” of the 

organizations.40

Efforts to Undermine Independent Civil Society Participation

at the Universal Periodic Review

During the January 2024 U.N. Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Chinese government’s human rights record, 

the Commission identified PRC government efforts to undermine the role 

of independent civil society groups in the UPR process. As part of what 

experts have described as a broader effort to “game” the UPR,41 the PRC 

used channels established for the participation of civil society and other 

stakeholders 42 to promote entities influenced or controlled by the government in order to avoid an objective and transparent assessment of its 

human rights practices, a tactic that is inconsistent with the founding 

principles of the UPR process.43 Advocacy groups and observers have 

pointed out the distorting effect of these entities’ participation in the 

stakeholder component of the UPR mechanism,44 with a representative 

of one international human rights group saying that the PRC mobilizes 

civil society groups to “flood the zone” with positive reports, in order to 

“whitewash its abuses.”45 In addition, observers, including those present 

in Geneva during the UPR, described PRC efforts to intimidate, silence, 

and exclude independent civil society organizations and rights defenders 

from proceedings,46 including by photographing Tibetans, Uyghurs, and 

others in attendance.47 According to one source, the PRC mission to the 

U.N. also made an official request that the U.N. block “anti-China separatists” from attending the UPR, and “urged” the U.N. to block groups it 

considered to be “anti-China” from holding sideline events.48
Civil Society

68

Efforts to Undermine Independent Civil Society Participation

at the Universal Periodic Review—Continued

U.S.-based organization China Digital Times found that “the number 

and percent of ‘civil society’ organizations” registered in mainland China 

included in the summary report—the document that aggregates stakeholder submissions and summarizes them for the purpose of informing 

the UPR49—have increased with each UPR cycle, totaling 73 in 2024, 

up from 25 in 2013, while the percent of all NGO submissions from organizations registered in mainland China increased from 40 percent in 

2013 to 55 percent in 2024.50 It is difficult to determine the degree to 

which the Chinese Communist Party or government controls each organization registered in the country, yet the legal regime governing all 

civil society groups in the PRC requires political conformity and subjects them to robust government supervision.51 Given the constraints 

under which mainland-registered civil society groups operate,52 and the 

reprisals faced by independent civil society actors who have attempted 

to participate in the UPR,53 some observers have concluded that many 

groups submitting stakeholder reports cannot be considered independent 

and are thus more likely to amplify PRC human rights narratives.54

Two of these “civil society organizations,” which have been directly linked 

with Party and government agencies, also held sideline events in Geneva 

promoting the PRC’s development-focused human rights framework.55

[For more on PRC attempts to influence the January 2024 session of 

the UPR, see Chapter 20—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and 

Globally—Efforts to Impede U.N. Human Rights Bodies, and the Commission’s staff report, “UPR Stakeholders’ Submissions Flooded with 

PRC-Sympathetic Reports.”]

Protests

The Chinese public continued to organize ad hoc protests during 

the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, often gathering in the hundreds or thousands in response to perceived economic or criminal 

injustice. For example, thousands of retirees in multiple cities across 

the PRC joined demonstrations related to pensions and other benefits.56 Some protested following health insurance reforms that resulted in lowered incomes, while over half of documented retiree 

protests in 2023 involved retired civilian teachers whose petitioning 

through official channels had achieved inconsistent results.57 Additionally, in December 2023, over ten thousand people attended a 

protest in Shangqiu municipality, Henan province, over authorities’ 

response to a student’s death.58 While officials announced that the 

death was a suicide, the family and other advocates believed the 

student was beaten and/or tortured, possibly leading to his death.59

This large protest over school safety occurred amid numerous other 

student deaths of a similar nature, with members of the public demanding transparency and accountability from police and schools.60

In at least two cases during this reporting year, authorities disallowed or censored public expressions of mourning, such as laying flowers at the area of a student’s death61 or sharing photos or 

videos online of makeshift memorials at the entrance to a school 

where 10 middle-school girls and their coach were killed in a roof 
Civil Society

69

collapse.62 Authorities worked to conceal issues as they arose, declining to address citizens directly, while aiming to reduce social 

mobilization.63 [For more information about the PRC’s repression of 

freedom of assembly, see Chapter 1—Freedom of Expression.]

Suppression of Civil Society

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, PRC authorities 

continued to suppress human rights advocacy and civil society ac- tivity through arbitrary detention, surveillance, and other means. 

Official suppression included the following cases targeting individ- uals the government believed to have organized or participated in 

group activity officials deemed threatening:

• Sophia Huang Xueqin and Wang Jianbing. The Guang- zhou Intermediate People’s Court in Guangzhou municipali- ty, Guangdong province, sentenced women’s rights advocate 

Sophia Huang Xueqin to five years in prison, and labor rights 

advocate Wang Jianbing to three years and six months, on June 

14, 2024.64 Their trial began in September 2023, two years after they were detained in Guangzhou for “inciting subversion 

of state power.”65 Prosecutors accused the two of using foreign 

communications apps to organize gatherings at Wang’s residence, and said the purpose of the gatherings was to incite “dissatisfaction” with the PRC government.66 They also participated in foreign NGOs’ training sessions on non-violent activism.67

• Xu Qin. On March 29, 2024, the Yangzhou Intermediate 

People’s Court in Yangzhou municipality, Jiangsu province, sentenced Xu to four years in prison and deprived her of political 

rights for two years for “inciting subversion of state power.”68

The Yangzhou Intermediate People’s Court had issued a notice 

in November 2023 stating that Xu’s trial would be postponed 

until February 2024, reportedly for the eleventh time since she 

was detained.69 Since her detention in November 2021, Xu’s 

lawyer and family members have repeatedly expressed concerns 

about her health, due to several serious health conditions.70

Xu is a former Party member and co-founder of China Human 

Rights Observer with Qin Yongmin.71 Mao Shanchun, another former Party member and activist from Hubei province 

who joined China Human Rights Observer, was detained on 

January 31, 2024, prior to Hubei’s provincial “Two Meetings.”72

• Cheng Xiaofeng. In July 2024, on the eve of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Party Central Committee, the Hetang 

branch of the Zhuzhou Public Security Bureau in Zhuzhou municipality, Hunan province, detained Cheng Xiaofeng for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”73 Domestic security protection personnel contacted Cheng to warn him that he was not 

permitted to go out around June 4, 2024.74 Despite this warn- ing, he visited Shuangfeng county to pay tribute at the grave 

of Ouyang Jinhua and to attend a June 4th commemorative 

gathering that included a former student protester.75 Cheng 

formerly worked in the Zhuzhou Public Security Bureau as a 

criminal police officer and resigned to pursue civic activities.76
Civil Society

70

Status of LGBTQ Persons

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, PRC authorities continued to suppress lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning 

(LGBTQ) advocacy groups, limit public space for LGBTQ-identifying persons to associate, and censor expressions of LGBTQ identity. Because 

the PRC does not recognize LGBTQ persons as a distinct identity or 

class, PRC law does not enumerate protections against discrimination on 

the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.77 PRC officials at the 

United Nations have stated during treaty body reviews that designating LGBTQ persons as a protected class in the Chinese legal context is 

unnecessary, since China’s law “protects the lawful rights of all citizens 

as equals, and prohibits any form of discrimination.”78 Nevertheless, 

international human rights monitoring groups have characterized the 

situation for LGBTQ persons as continuing to deteriorate,79 with Outright International, a prominent LGBTQ rights advocacy organization, 

referring to PRC authorities’ treatment of LGBTQ persons and groups 

as constituting a “sea of repression,” and noting that LGBTQ organizing 

has become “almost impossible.”80 Suppression of LGBTQ groups and 

expression related to LGBTQ identities reflects an overall tightening of 

the environment for civil society organizing and for members of communities perceived as posing a challenge to the Chinese Communist Party 

and government, such as unregistered religious groups, feminists, and 

rights defenders.81 [For more on Party and government targeting of unregistered religious groups and feminists, see Chapter 3—Freedom of 

Religion and Chapter 8—Status of Women.]

Violations of LGBTQ Groups’ and Individuals’ Freedom of Expression

Authorities have directly and indirectly targeted public expression of 

LGBTQ identity and online platforms serving the LGBTQ community.82

On Qixi (七夕), known as China’s Valentine’s Day, in August 2023, Chinese social media platform WeChat shut down the accounts of a number 

of feminist and LGBTQ-related groups, banning them permanently, in 

the second such round of online closures in two years.83 According to 

feminist activist Li Tingting, known as Li Maizi, WeChat banned the 

groups Beijing Lala Salon, a “queer women’s center”; Wandouhuang, 

a feminist artist’s platform; the Flying Cat Brotherhood, a gay men’s 

group; Transtory, a transgender account; Ace, a group for asexuals; and 

the group Outstanding Partners.84 Other sources said that the WeChat 

accounts for TransBrotherhood China, Beijing Lesbian Centre, and the 

Beijing branch of Trueself, formerly Parents and Friends of Lesbians and 

Gays, were also shut down.85 While WeChat’s parent company, Tencent, 

shut down the accounts likely deemed objectionable, U.S.-based civil society leader and rights advocate Lu Jun said that Tencent must have 

done so in response to an administrative order from PRC authorities.86
Civil Society

71

Status of LGBTQ Persons—Continued

The shutdown and subsequent ban of LGBTQ-oriented WeChat groups 

followed on the heels of several prominent instances of local entities targeting public displays of LGBTQ identity, with an apparent emphasis on 

rainbow clothing and products. In August 2023, concertgoers reported 

being stopped by security guards at the entrance to Taiwan-based singer Chang Hui-mei’s (known as A-Mei) concert in Beijing municipality 

for wearing clothing with rainbow symbols.87 Officials also removed the 

LGBTQ-themed song “Rainbow” from A-Mei’s setlist.88 In an apparent 

repeat incident, authorities in Changsha municipality, Hunan province, 

removed an LGBTQ-themed song from the setlist of Taiwan-based singer Jolin Tsai; according to Radio Free Asia, citing social media reports, 

Tsai had previously been prevented from using a rainbow spotlight at 

a concert in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province.89 In another instance of censorship targeting rainbow displays, an influencer on 

Weibo,90 the popular Chinese microblogging platform, claimed that Starbucks had removed pride merchandise emblazoned with rainbows at a 

store in Qinhuangdao municipality, Hebei province, and surrounding cities after he shared photographs of the merchandise at the Qinhuangdao 

store.91

Also during this reporting year, Shanghai municipality lesbian bar 

Roxie announced that it would close due to “forces beyond our control,” 

a known euphemism for official pressure 92 and similar to the reason 

given by the Beijing LGBT Center when it announced its closure in May 

2023.93 An Australia-based commentator on LGBTQ issues 94 attributed 

the closure unequivocally to state repression, saying it reflected the prevailing trend in Chinese politics.95

Despite censorship and official pressure, data from the China Dissent 

Monitor (CDM) reported by Nikkei Asia showed that China’s LGBTQ 

community has maintained some level of organized and/or public resistance, with CDM documenting at least 34 instances of resistance in the 

first half of 2023.96 In its coverage of the data, Nikkei Asia noted that 

the actual number of incidents could be higher.97
72

Notes to Chapter 2—Civil Society

1Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 

72–79; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 79–87. 2 International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, “Legal Snapshot: Pending NGO Legislative/Regulatory Initiatives, Amended Charity Law,” Civic Freedom Monitor: China, updated September 

3, 2024. 3Human Rights Watch, “China: Events of 2023,” in World Report 2024, 2024. 4National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华

人民共和国慈善法》的决定 [National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision on Amending the PRC Charity Law], passed December 29, 2023, effective September 5, 2024. PRC government sites have not posted an updated version of the Law following passage of the amendments 

in December 2023, but the amendments and their location are outlined in the Decision, and the 

2016 Law can be found at 中华人民共和国慈善法 [PRC Charity Law], passed March 16, 2016, 

effective September 1, 2016. See also the following unofficial translation, with the amendments 

incorporated, in “Charity Law of the PRC (2024),” translated in China Law Translate, January 

5, 2024. 5中华人民共和国慈善法 [PRC Charity Law], passed March 16, 2016, effective September 1, 

2016. For coverage of the law at the time of its passage, see Congressional-Executive Commission 

on China, 2016 Annual Report (Washington: October 6, 2016), 225–26. 6He Yiting, National People’s Congress, 关于《中华人民共和国慈善法(修订草案)》的说明 [Explanation of the draft amendment to the PRC Charity Law], December 29, 2023; Changhao Wei, 

“December 2023: Overview of New Amendments to China’s Criminal Law & Charity Law,” NPC 

Observer Monthly, NPC Observer, January 19, 2024; Mark Sidel, “Rebooting China’s Charity 

Law,” USALI Perspectives, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law 2, no. 25 

(June 23, 2022): 2–3. 7Holly Snape and Wang Weinan, “Towards a Command Civil Society?,” Made in China Journal, 

November 13, 2023. 8Holly Snape, “Cultivate Aridity and Deprive Them of Air: Altering the Approach to Non-State 

Approved Social Organisations,” Made in China Journal 6, no. 1 (January–April 2021): 57–58; 

Mark Sidel, “Rebooting China’s Charity Law,” USALI Perspectives, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New 

York University School of Law 2, no. 25 (June 23, 2022): 1–2. 9Holly Snape, “Cultivate Aridity and Deprive Them of Air: Altering the Approach to Non-State 

Approved Social Organisations,” Made in China Journal 6, no. 1 (January–April 2021): 56–57; 

Mark Sidel, “Rebooting China’s Charity Law,” USALI Perspectives, U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New 

York University School of Law 2, no. 25 (June 23, 2022): 1–2. 10Changhao Wei, “December 2023: Overview of New Amendments to China’s Criminal Law & 

Charity Law,” NPC Observer Monthly, NPC Observer, January 19, 2024; International Center for 

Not-For-Profit Law, “Legal Snapshot: Pending NGO Legislative/Regulatory Initiatives: Amended 

Charity Law,” Civic Freedom Monitor: China, updated September 3, 2024. Both Wei and the ICNL 

attribute the focus on emergency public fundraising to COVID-19. 11National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华

人民共和国慈善法》的决定 [National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision on Amending the PRC Charity Law], passed December 29, 2023, effective September 5, 2024; Changhao 

Wei, “December 2023: Overview of New Amendments to China’s Criminal Law & Charity Law,” 

NPC Observer Monthly, NPC Observer, January 19, 2024. 12 International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, “Legal Snapshot: Pending NGO Legislative/Regulatory Initiatives, Amended Charity Law,” Civic Freedom Monitor: China, updated September 3, 

2024; Mark Sidel, “Rebooting China’s Charity Law,” U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law 2, no. 25 (June 23, 2022, 2; Mandy Zuo, “China’s Revised Charity Law Lacks 

Incentives to Spur Donations Despite ‘Common Prosperity’ Drive,” South China Morning Post, 

January 8, 2024. 13National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华

人民共和国慈善法》的决定 [National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision on Amending the PRC Charity Law], passed December 29, 2023, effective September 5, 2024, sec. 3; Changhao Wei, “December 2023: Overview of New Amendments to China’s Criminal Law & Charity 

Law,” NPC Observer Monthly, NPC Observer, January 19, 2024. 14National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《

中华人民共和国慈善法》的决定 [National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision on 

Amending the PRC Charity Law], passed December 29, 2023, effective September 5, 2024, sec. 

14; Changhao Wei, “December 2023: Overview of New Amendments to China’s Criminal Law & 

Charity Law,” NPC Observer Monthly, NPC Observer, January 19, 2024. 15National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华

人民共和国慈善法》的决定 [National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision on Amending the PRC Charity Law], passed December 29, 2023, effective September 5, 2024, sec. 4; Changhao Wei, “December 2023: Overview of New Amendments to China’s Criminal Law & Charity 

Law,” NPC Observer Monthly, NPC Observer, January 19, 2024. 16Yuanyue Dang, “China Charities to Be Overseen by Police, Spy Agencies under Proposed 

Law Change,” South China Morning Post, October 26, 2023. While Dang’s article comments on 

the draft law rather than its final version, the final version also contains language requiring that 

charities report collaboration with foreign entities, and connects this to the broader policy environment under Xi Jinping. International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, “Legal Snapshot: Pending 

NGO Legislative/Regulatory Initiatives, Amended Charity Law,” Civic Freedom Monitor: China, 

updated September 3, 2024. Chief among these Xi-era policies directed at foreign entities is the 

Law on the Management of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities in Mainland 

China (Foreign NGO Law). For recent CECC coverage of the Foreign NGO Law, see Congressional-
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Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 81–82. For 

coverage of the law at the time of its passage, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 

2016 Annual Report (Washington: October 2016), 226–27. 17Changhao Wei, “December 2023: Overview of New Amendments to China’s Criminal Law & 

Charity Law,” NPC Observer Monthly, NPC Observer, January 19, 2024; National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国慈善法》的决定

[National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision on Amending the PRC Charity Law], 

passed December 29, 2023, effective September 5, 2024, sec. 6. 18 International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, “Legal Snapshot: Pending NGO Legislative/Regulatory Initiatives, Amended Charity Law,” Civic Freedom Monitor: China, updated September 

3, 2024. 19 International Center for Not-For-Profit Law, “Legal Snapshot: Pending NGO Legislative/Regulatory Initiatives, Amended Charity Law,” Civic Freedom Monitor: China, updated September 3, 

2024; Yuanyue Dang, “All China Charities to Be Overseen by Police, Anti-Spying Agencies under 

Proposed Revisions to 2016 Law,” South China Morning Post, October 26, 2023; Mandy Zuo, 

“China’s Revised Charity Law Lacks Incentives to Spur Donations Despite ‘Common Prosperity’ 

Drive,” South China Morning Post, January 8, 2024; Wang Qiang, “热点 | 新修改的慈善法有哪

些重点和亮点内容” [Hot topic | What are the key points and highlights of the newly amended 

charity law?], People’s Court News and Media Agency, reprinted in China Development Brief, 

January 2, 2024. 20National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华

人民共和国慈善法》的决定 [National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision on Amending the PRC Charity Law], passed December 29, 2023, effective September 5, 2024. To see an unofficial translation of the new amendments incorporated into the Charity Law, see “PRC Charity 

Law,” translated in China Law Translate, January 5, 2024. 21Holly Snape and Wang Weinan, “Towards a Command Civil Society?,” Made in China Journal, November 13, 2023. For more information on Xi-era efforts to centralize the role of the 

Chinese Communist Party in social organizations, see Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 72–73; Congressional-Executive Commission 

on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 79–80. 22Holly Snape and Wang Weinan, “Towards a Command Civil Society?,” Made in China Journal, November 13, 2023. For more information on the preeminence of the Chinese Communist 

Party in setting the agenda for charitable work, see Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 74; Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 84. 23“慈善法(修正草案)今起公开征求意见丨附原文对照” [Charity Law (draft amendments) solicitation for public comment opens today | original text provided for comparison], People’s Daily, 

reprinted in China Medical Foundation, October 27, 2023. See also the following unofficial translation: “Charity Law Draft Amendments,” translated in China Law Translate, October 31, 2023. 24National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华

人民共和国慈善法》的决定 [National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision on Amending the PRC Charity Law], passed December 29, 2023, effective September 5, 2024. PRC government sites have not posted an updated version of the Law following passage of the amendments 

in December 2023, but the amendments and their location are outlined in the Decision, and the 

2016 Law can be found at 中华人民共和国慈善法 [PRC Charity Law], passed March 16, 2016, effective September 1, 2016, arts. 4, 5. See also the following unofficial translation, with the amendments incorporated, in “PRC Charity Law,” translated in China Law Translate, January 5, 2024. 25Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 72, 74. 26Li Yumei, “新组建的中央社会工作部今年有哪些重点工作?” [What are the key tasks of the 

newly established Central Social Work Department this year?], CCTV News, February 22, 2024; 

“中共中央 国务院印发 ‘党和国家机构改革方案’”[The Central Committee of the Communist 

Party of China and the State Council issued the “Plan for the Reform of Party and State Institutions”], Xinhua, March 16, 2023. For more on the establishment of the Central Social Work Department, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: 

May 2024), 73, 124. 27“民政部社会组织管理局(社会组织执法监督局)局长刘振国:牢牢把握高质量发展首要任务做好

新时代社会组织登记管理工作”[Liu Zhenguo, Director of the Social Organization Administration 

Bureau (Social Organization Law Enforcement Supervision Bureau) of the Ministry of Civil Affairs: Firmly grasp the top priority of high-quality development and do a good job in the registration and management of social organizations in the new era], China Social News, April 19, 2024, 

reprinted in Fujian Civil Affairs. 28Guizhou Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, “贵州省社区社会组织党的建设培训在贵阳举

行” [Party-building training for community social organizations in Guizhou Province was held 

in Guiyang], November 30, 2023. 29“民政部办公厅印发 ‘2024年中央财政支持社会组织参与社会服务项目实施方案’” [The General Office of the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the “2024 Implementation Plan for Central Financial Support for Social Organizations to Participate in Social Service Projects”], China Social 

News, April 21, 2024, reprinted in Heilongjiang Civil Administration Information Net; Ministry 

of Civil Affairs, “民政部办公厅关于发布2024年中央财政支持社会组织参与社会服务项目立项名单的通

知” [Notice from the Office of the Ministry of Civil Affairs about the release of the 2024 List 

of Approved Projects for Social Organizations to Participate in Social Service Projects], June 15, 

2024. For a discussion of how the Chinese Communist Party and government have directed charities and charitable giving to fill gaps in welfare and social service provision, see CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 74.
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30“民政部办公厅印发‘2024年中央财政支持社会组织参与社会服务项目实施方案’” [The General 

Office of the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the “2024 Implementation Plan for Central Financial 

Support for Social Organizations to Participate in Social Service Projects”], China Social News, 

April 21, 2024, reprinted in Heilongjiang Civil Administration Information Net. 31Ministry of Civil Affairs, “民政部办公厅关于发布2024年中央财政支持社会组织参与社会服务项

目立项名单的通知” [The General Office of the Ministry of Civil Affairs released the 2024 Central 

Fiscal Notice on the List of Projects Supporting Social Organizations to Participate in Social 

Service Projects], June 15, 2024. 32For more on illegal social organizations, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 

2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 73. 33Ministry of Civil Affairs, “民政部社会组织管理局负责同志就2023年打击整治非法社会组织专项

行动有关问题答记者问” [The responsible officials of the Social Organization Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs answered reporters’ questions on the Special Campaign to 

Crack Down on Illegal Social Organizations in 2023], August 18, 2023; “2023年社会组织十件大

事” [Ten major events for social organizations in 2023], Guangdong Provincial Social Organization Comprehensive Information Service Platform, January 17, 2024. 34Ministry of Civil Affairs, “民政部社会组织管理局负责同志就2023年打击整治非法社会组织专项

行动有关问题答记者问” [The responsible officials of the Social Organization Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs answered reporters’ questions on the Special Campaign to 

Crack Down on Illegal Social Organizations in 2023], August 18, 2023. 35Ministry of Civil Affairs, “民政部社会组织管理局负责同志就2023年打击整治非法社会组织专项

行动有关问题答记者问” [The responsible officials of the Social Organization Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs answered reporters’ questions on the Special Campaign to 

Crack Down on Illegal Social Organizations in 2023], August 18, 2023. 36Ministry of Civil Affairs, “民政部社会组织管理局负责同志就2023年打击整治非法社会组织专项

行动有关问题答记者问” [The responsible officials of the Social Organization Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs answered reporters’ questions on the Special Campaign to 

Crack Down on Illegal Social Organizations in 2023], August 18, 2023. 37“2023年共处置非法社会组织1100多家” [In 2023, more than 1,100 illegal social organizations 

were dealt with], People’s Daily, January 18, 2024; Gao Lei, “我国去年依法处置非法社会组织1100

多家” [Last year, more than 1,100 illegal social organizations were dealt with in accordance with 

the law in our country], Xinhua, January 17, 2024. For reference, according to one estimate, as 

of 2022, there were “around 892,000 social organizations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs and its local bureaus.” Council on Foundations, “Nonprofit Law in China,” updated January 

2024, accessed December 4, 2024. 38“2023年共处置非法社会组织1100多家” [In 2023, more than 1,100 illegal social organizations 

were dealt with], People’s Daily, January 18, 2024; Gao Lei, “我国去年依法处置非法社会组织1100

多家” [Last year, more than 1,100 illegal social organizations were dealt with in accordance with 

the law in our country], Xinhua, January 17, 2024. 39“2023年共处置非法社会组织1100多家” [In 2023, more than 1,100 illegal social organizations 

were dealt with], People’s Daily, January 18, 2024; Gao Lei, “我国去年依法处置非法社会组织1100

多家” [Last year, more than 1,100 illegal social organizations were dealt with in accordance with 

the law in our country], Xinhua, January 17, 2024. 40Ministry of Civil Affairs, “民政部推进常态化打击整治非法社会组织工作” [The Ministry of 

Civil Affairs promotes regular crackdowns on illegal social organizations], May 29, 2024. 41Tenzin Pema and Tenzin Dickyi, “China ‘Gamed’ UN Human Rights Review, Experts Say,” 

Radio Free Asia, January 29, 2024. Others have called it “manipulation” or “gaslighting.” See, 

e.g., Sophie Richardson and Rana Siu Inboden, “Beijing Is Pouring Resources into Its UN Human 

Rights Review—All to Prevent Any Real Review from Taking Place,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, 

January 22, 2024; David Bandurski, “Human Rights Heist at the United Nations,” China Media 

Project, February 16, 2024; Amnesty International, “China Attempts to ‘Gaslight’ International 

Community at UN Human Rights Review,” January 23, 2024. 42U.N. Human Rights Council, Resolution 5/1, Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, adopted June 18, 2007, A/HRC/RES/5/1, para. 15(c); Sophie Richardson and 

Rana Siu Inboden, “Beijing Is Pouring Resources into Its UN Human Rights Review—All to 

Prevent Any Real Review from Taking Place,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, January 22, 2024. 43Sophie Richardson and Rana Siu Inboden, “Beijing Is Pouring Resources into Its UN Human 

Rights Review—All to Prevent Any Real Review from Taking Place,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, January 22, 2024; “China Rallies Friends, Stifles Human Rights Criticism at U.N. Universal Periodic 

Review,” China Digital Times, January 26, 2024; David Bandurski, “Human Rights Heist at the 

United Nations,” China Media Project, February 16, 2024; U.N. Human Rights Council, Resolution 

5/1, Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, adopted June 18, 2007, A/

HRC/RES/5/1, paras. 15(c), 27(a). 44Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Briefing Paper: Strategies for Making China’s 4th 

UPR Effective in Stopping Atrocity Crimes,” December 15, 2023; David Bandurski, “Human 

Rights Heist at the United Nations,” China Media Project, February 16, 2024; “China Rallies 

Friends, Stifles Human Rights Criticism at U.N. Universal Periodic Review,” China Digital 

Times, January 26, 2024; Sophie Richardson and Rana Siu Inboden, “Beijing Is Pouring Resources into Its UN Human Rights Review—All to Prevent Any Real Review from Taking 

Place,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, January 22, 2024; Parth Sharma, “Going GONGO: How Chinese Civil Society Groups Influence the UN,” Insights (blog), Young Australians in International Affairs, September 28, 2023. The resolution outlining the UPR mechanism says that 

information provided by stakeholders should be “credible and reliable” and its outcome should 

include “an assessment undertaken in an objective and transparent manner of the human 

rights situation in the country under review.” U.N. Human Rights Council, Resolution 5/1, 
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Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, adopted June 18, 2007, A/

HRC/RES/5/1, paras. 15(c), 27(a). 45Maya Wang (@wang_maya), “Beijing’s been trying to turn this process on its head to whitewash its abuses. It does this by . . .,” X, January 22, 2024, 6:15 p.m. 46Amnesty International, “China Attempts to ‘Gaslight’ International Community at UN Human Rights Review,” January 23, 2024; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “CHRD Encouraged 

by Civil Society Mobilization and Commends Countries That Sought to Hold China Accountable 

at UN Human Rights Review,” January 24, 2024; Students for a Free Tibet (@SFTHQ), “Today, 

China flooded Geneva with state-sponsored NGOs to take up all the seats inside the UPR Room. 

They attempted to cut in line and photograph Tibetans and Uyghurs . . .,” X, January 23, 2024, 

10:06 a.m. See also Sophie Richardson and Rana Siu Inboden, “Beijing Is Pouring Resources into 

Its UN Human Rights Review—All to Prevent Any Real Review from Taking Place,” ChinaFile, 

Asia Society, January 22, 2024. 47Students for a Free Tibet (@SFTHQ), “Today, China flooded Geneva with state-sponsored 

NGOs to take up all the seats inside the UPR Room. They attempted to cut in line and photograph Tibetans and Uyghurs . . .,” X, January 23, 2024, 10:06 a.m.; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “CHRD Encouraged by Civil Society Mobilization and Commends Countries That Sought 

to Hold China Accountable at UN Human Rights Review,” January 24, 2024. 48“China Rallies Friends, Stifles Human Rights Criticism at U.N. Universal Periodic Review,” 

China Digital Times, January 26, 2024. 49Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Human Rights Council, Summary of Stakeholders’ Submissions on China, A/HRC/WG.6/45/CHN/3, November 20, 2023. 50“China Rallies Friends, Stifles Human Rights Criticism at U.N. Universal Periodic Review,” 

China Digital Times, January 26, 2024. 51Ministry of Civil Affairs, “‘十四五’ 社会组织发展规划” [“14th Five-Year” Plan for the 

Development of Social Organizations], issued October 8, 2021, secs. 1, 2(2), 3(2, 4); Shawn Shieh, 

“The 14th Five Year Plan for Social Organizations and the Future of Civil Society in China,” 

NGOs in China (blog), January 4, 2022. 52Shawn Shieh, “The 14th Five Year Plan for Social Organizations and the Future of Civil 

Society in China,” NGOs in China (blog), January 4, 2022. 53Vincent Ploton and Sarah M. Brooks, International Service for Human Rights, “China and 

the U.N. Treaty Body System,” December 2022, 15. 54“China Rallies Friends, Stifles Human Rights Criticism at U.N. Universal Periodic Review,” 

China Digital Times, January 26, 2024; Sophie Richardson and Rana Siu Inboden, “Beijing Is 

Pouring Resources into Its UN Human Rights Review—All to Prevent Any Real Review from 

Taking Place,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, January 22, 2024. A Commission analysis of stakeholder 

submissions evaluated the independence of PRC-based organizations who submitted “PRC-sympathetic” reports to the UPR Working Group, based on several criteria related to the role of the 

Chinese Communist Party in a given organization. The analysis concluded that, of the 41 PRCbased organizations that submitted sympathetic reports, over half did not qualify as independent. 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “UPR Stakeholders’ Submissions Flooded with 

PRC-Sympathetic Reports,” January 30, 2024. 55David Bandurski, “Human Rights Heist at the United Nations,” China Media Project, February 16, 2024. 56Freedom House, “China Dissent Monitor 2023,” Issue 5 (July–September 2023), December 

14, 2023. 57Freedom House, “China Dissent Monitor 2023,” Issue 5 (July–September 2023), December 

14, 2023. 58Lei Shihong, “China, Another Schoolboy Dies Mysteriously, Thousands Protest,” Bitter Winter, 

January 10, 2024; Human Rights in China, “Thousands Protest 14-Year-Old’s Mysterious Death 

and Subsequent Coverup,” December 29, 2023. 59Lei Shihong, “China, Another Schoolboy Dies Mysteriously, Thousands Protest,” Bitter Winter, 

January 10, 2024; Human Rights in China, “Thousands Protest 14-Year-Old’s Mysterious Death 

and Subsequent Coverup,” December 29, 2023. 60Chen Tao, “Zhang Xinwei: Another Mysterious Death of a High School Student Sparks Protests,” Bitter Winter, February 14, 2024; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “宁波十六岁女生疑因校

园霸凌跳楼身亡” [Ningbo 16-year-old girl jumps to death due to school bullying], April 24, 2023. 61Chen Tao, “Zhang Xinwei: Another Mysterious Death of a High School Student Sparks Protests,” Bitter Winter, February 14, 2024; Spotlight on China (@spotlightoncn), “On March 6, nearly 

two months after the Zhang Baoshan incident, there were still a large number of police officers 

around the village, and the whereabouts of Zhang Xinwei’s family were still unknown  . . .,” X, 

March 15, 2024, 8:33 a.m. 62Li Yuan, “When Tragedy Strikes in China, the Government Cracks Down on Grief,” New York 

Times, August 14, 2023. 63Freedom House, “China Dissent Monitor 2024,” Issue 6 (October–December 2023), February 

20, 2024. 64Dui Hua Foundation, “Prisoner Updates 2024 #7, Part I,” accessed September 18, 2024; 

Rights Defense Network, “获刑5年的女权活动家黄雪琴、获刑3年6个月的劳工行活动者王建兵已经正

式向广东高院提起上诉” [Women’s rights activist Huang Xueqin, who was sentenced to five years 

in prison, and labor activist Wang Jianbing, who was sentenced to three years and six months 

in prison, have formally appealed to the Guangdong High Court], July 3, 2024. For previous 

Commission reporting on the cases of Sophia Huang Xueqin and Wang Jianbing, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 51–52, 203; 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 

2022), 56, 83. For more information on Sophia Huang Xueqin, see the Commission’s Political 
Civil Society

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Prisoner Database record 2019-00454. For more information on Wang Jianbing, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00517. 65Dui Hua Foundation, “Prisoner Updates 2024 #5,” accessed June 13, 2024; Chen Zifei, “Concerns Grow over Treatment of Detained #MeToo Activist after She ‘Fires’ Attorney,” Radio Free 

Asia, September 20, 2022; Index on Censorship, “Journalism 2022,” October 28, 2022; Reporters 

Without Borders, “2022 Round-up: Journalists Detained, Killed, Held Hostage and Missing,” accessed November 7, 2024, 7. 66Dui Hua Foundation, “Prisoner Updates 2024 #5,” accessed June 13, 2024; Chinese Human 

Rights Defenders, “China: Immediately Release #MeToo Activist and Fellow Civil Society Advocate,” September 21, 2021. 67Dui Hua Foundation, “Prisoner Updates 2024 #5,” accessed June 13, 2024. 68Rights Defense Network, “江苏人权捍卫者徐秦被以所谓‘煽动颠覆国家政权罪’判刑4年徐秦当

庭表示上诉,” [Jiangsu human rights defender Xu Qin was sentenced to four years in prison for 

so-called “inciting subversion of state power,” Xu Qin said in court she would appeal], March 29, 

2024. For previous coverage of Xu Qin’s case, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 

2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 29. For more information on Xu Qin, see the 

Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00015. 69Dui Hua Foundation, “Prisoner Updates 2023 #12,” accessed November 23, 2023. 70Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Xu Qin (徐秦),” accessed November 18, 2024. 71Dui Hua Foundation, “Prisoner Updates 2023 #12,” accessed November 23, 2023; Yaqiu Wang, 

“Members of Petitioners Group ‘Rose China’ Detained,” China Change, January 18, 2016. For 

more information on Qin Yongmin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2004-

02138. 72Dui Hua Foundation, “Prisoner Updates 2024 #3,” accessed February 23, 2024. For more 

information on Mao Shanchun, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2024-

00160. 73Qian Lang, “湖南异议人士程晓峰涉寻衅滋事遭刑事拘留” [Hunan dissident Cheng Xiaofeng 

was detained on suspicion of picking quarrels and provoking trouble], Radio Free Asia, July 8, 

2024. 74“中国多地异议人士收监控‘被旅游’维稳经费窘迫” [Dissidents in many parts of China are 

under surveillance; funds for “forced travel” stability maintenance are tight], Radio Free Asia, 

May 31, 2024; Qian Lang, “六四35周年祭 当局如临大敌” [35th Anniversary of June 4th: Authorities are on high alert], Radio Free Asia, June 4, 2024. 75Rights Defense Network, “湖南株洲民主人士程晓峰被以涉嫌寻衅滋事罪刑事拘留” [Zhuzhou, 

Hunan democracy activist Cheng Xiaofeng was detained on suspicion of picking quarrels and 

provoking trouble], July 8, 2024; Qian Lang, “六四35周年祭 当局如临大敌” [35th Anniversary of 

June 4th: Authorities are on high alert], Radio Free Asia, June 4, 2024; Qian Lang, “湖南异议人

士程晓峰涉寻衅滋事遭刑事拘留” [Hunan dissident Cheng Xiaofeng was detained on suspicion of 

picking quarrels and provoking trouble], Radio Free Asia, July 8, 2024. 76Qian Lang, “湖南异议人士程晓峰涉寻衅滋事遭刑事拘留” [Hunan dissident Cheng Xiaofeng was 

detained on suspicion of picking quarrels and provoking trouble], Radio Free Asia, July 8, 2024. 77The PRC has stated this position as a part of several of its most recent U.N. treaty body reviews, including the January 2024 Universal Periodic Review. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China (Advance version), A/

HRC/56/6/Add. 1, May 31, 2024, 2–3. For statements made during the PRC’s third CESCR review, 

see United Nations Office in Geneva, “5th Meeting, 73rd Session, Committee on Economic, Social 

and Cultural Rights (CESCR)” [Video file], U.N. Web TV, February 15, 2023, 1:06:17–1:08:04, 

1:17:29–1:18:29; U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Implementation of the 

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Third Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant—China, Replies of China to the 

List of Issues in Relation to Its Third Periodic Report, E/C.12/CHN/RQ/3, May 11, 2022, para. 

12. For statements made during its ninth CEDAW review, see United Nations Office in Geneva, 

“1978th Meeting, 85th Session, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 

(CEDAW)” [Video file], U.N. Web TV, May 12, 2023, 2:07:32; U.N. Committee on the Elimination 

of Discrimination against Women, Replies of China to the List of Issues and Questions in Relation to its Ninth Periodic Report, CEDAW/C/CHN/RQ/9, March 9, 2023; U.N. Committee on the 

Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Ninth Periodic Report Submitted by States Parties 

under Article 18 of the Convention—China, CEDAW/C/CHN/9, December 16, 2020. For a detailed 

discussion of PRC representations at the U.N. of Chinese law pertaining to the rights of LGBTQ 

persons, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: 

May 2024), 77. 78U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China (Advance version), A/HRC/56/6/Add. 1, May 31, 2024. For statements made during 

the PRC’s third CESCR review, see United Nations Office in Geneva, “5th Meeting, 73rd Session, 

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)” [Video file], U.N. Web TV, February 15, 2023, 1:06:17–1:08:04, 1:17:29–1:18:29; U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 

Rights, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 

Third Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant—

China, Replies of China to the List of Issues in Relation to Its Third Periodic Report, E/C.12/

CHN/RQ/3, May 11, 2022, para. 12. For statements made during its ninth CEDAW review, see 

United Nations Office in Geneva, “1978th Meeting, 85th Session, Committee on the Elimination 

of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)” [Video file], U.N. Web TV, May 12, 2023, 2:07:32; U.N. 

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Replies of China to the List of 

Issues and Questions in Relation to its Ninth Periodic Report, CEDAW/C/CHN/RQ/9, March 9, 

2023; U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Ninth Periodic Report Submitted by States Parties under Article 18 of the Convention—China, CEDAW/C/CHN/9, 
Civil Society

77

December 16, 2020. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report

(Washington: May 2024), 77. 79Human Rights Watch, “China,” in World Report 2024: Events of 2023, 2024; Outright Inter- national, “The Global State of LGBTIQ Organizing: The Right to Register and the Freedom to 

Operate, 2023,” September 2023, 48–52. 80Outright International, “The Global State of LGBTIQ Organizing: The Right to Register and 

the Freedom to Operate, 2023,” September 2023, 27, 52. 81“Why the Communist Party Fears Gay Rights,” Economist, May 25, 2023. These groups are 

often said to pose a threat because of their supposed connections to potentially subversive foreign 

groups, practices, or ideas. 82Gu Ting, “Chinese Censors Shut Down Key LGBTQ+ Social Media Accounts,” Radio Free 

Asia, August 24, 2023; Yitong Wu and Chingman, “Rainbow Symbols, LGBTQ+ Anthem Banned 

from Taiwan Singer A-Mei’s Beijing Gig,” Radio Free Asia, August 9, 2023; 李老师不是你老师 (@

whyyoutouzhele), “网友投稿 8月5号,张惠妹北京演唱会 大量‘彩虹元素’被审核 现场《彩虹》

这首歌被替换 . . ..” [Netizen submission: On August 5, at Chang Hui-mei’s Beijing concert, a 

large number of “rainbow elements” were censored and the song “Rainbow” was replaced on the 

spot . . ..] X, August 6, 2023, 6:51 a.m. 83Gu Ting, “Chinese Censors Shut Down Key LGBTQ+ Social Media Accounts,” Radio Free 

Asia, August 24, 2023; Human Rights Watch, “China,” in World Report 2024: Events of 2023, 2024; 

Phoebe Zhang, “Chinese LGBTQ Organisations Find Creative Ways to Survive Crackdown and 

Closures,” South China Morning Post, September 3, 2023. For Commission coverage of WeChat 

shutting down LGBTQ groups in 2021, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 

Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 85. 84Gu Ting, “Chinese Censors Shut Down Key LGBTQ+ Social Media Accounts,” Radio Free 

Asia, August 24, 2023; Human Rights Watch, “China,” in World Report 2024: Events of 2023, 2024; 

Phoebe Zhang, “Chinese LGBTQ Organisations Find Creative Ways to Survive Crackdown and 

Closures,” South China Morning Post, September 3, 2023. 85Phoebe Zhang, “Chinese LGBTQ Organisations Find Creative Ways to Survive Crackdown 

and Closures,” South China Morning Post, September 3, 2023; Human Rights Watch, “China,” in 

World Report 2024: Events of 2023, 2024. 86Gu Ting, “Chinese Censors Shut Down Key LGBTQ+ Social Media Accounts,” Radio Free 

Asia, August 24, 2023. 87“China Fans Barred from Wearing Rainbows at Gay-Friendly Show,” Bloomberg, August 7, 

2023; 李老师不是你老师 (@whyyoutouzhele), “网友投稿 8月5号,张惠妹北京演唱会 大量‘彩虹元

素’被审核 现场《彩虹》这首歌被替换 . . ..” [Netizen submission: On August 5, at Chang Huimei’s Beijing concert, a large number of “rainbow elements” were censored and the song “Rainbow” was replaced on the spot . . ..] X, August 6, 2023, 6:51 a.m. 88Yitong Wu and Chingman, “Rainbow Symbols, LGBTQ+ Anthem Banned from Taiwan Singer 

A-Mei’s Beijing Gig,” Radio Free Asia, August 9, 2023; 李老师不是你老师 (@whyyoutouzhele), “网友

投稿 8月5号,张惠妹北京演唱会 大量‘彩虹元素’被审核 现场《彩虹》这首歌被替换 . . ..” [Netizen submission: On August 5, at Chang Hui-mei’s Beijing concert, a large number of “rainbow 

elements” were censored and the song “Rainbow” was replaced on the spot  . . ..] X, August 6, 

2023, 6:51 a.m. 89Hsia Hsiao-hwa, “LGBTQ+-Themed Song Is Removed from Jolin Tsai’s Changsha Gig,” Radio 

Free Asia, September 6, 2023. 90Darius Longarino (@DariusLongarino), “Weibo influencer w/ 337K followers claims that after 

bringing attention to @Starbucks Pride merchandise in a Qinhuangdao Store, the products there 

and in other stores were taken down and even confiscated.,” X, August 9, 2023, 10:14 a.m. 91Zhengzhi de Lei ge (@正直的磊哥), “这个事解决了,事发城市以及周边城市相关产品全部下架并

且被查扣。各地相关产品也会陆续被处理 . . ..” [This matter has been resolved, the related products have been removed and seized from the city where the incident took place and surrounding 

areas. Related products everywhere will be successively dealt with . . ..], Weibo, August 8, 2023. 92“Roxie, One of China’s Few Lesbian Bars, Closes Its Doors,” Economist, June 27, 2024; Jing- hua Qian (@qianjinghua), “It was an honour to be part of this community and I will pour out a 

libation tonight,” X, June 15, 2024, 11:26 a.m. 93 James Palmer, “LGBTQ Spaces Are Shrinking in China,” Foreign Policy, May 16, 2023. For 

more on the closure of the Beijing LGBT Center, see Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 78. 94Ko-fi, “Jinghua Qian,” accessed November 18, 2024. 95 Jinghua Qian (@qianjinghua), “This is state repression, for sure, and it’s part of a broader 

conservative turn in Chinese politics . . .,” X, June 15, 2024, 1:06 p.m. 96Pak Yiu, “China LGBTQ Community Hangs Tough in Dissent amid Repression,” Nikkei Asia, February 20, 2024. 97Pak Yiu, “China LGBTQ Community Hangs Tough in Dissent amid Repression,” Nikkei Asia, 

February 20, 2024.
78

Freedom of Religi

Findings

• During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, the Chinese 

Communist Party and government enacted legal provisions 

that strengthened control over religious practices, including the 

Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities 

and the PRC Patriotic Education Law. Since 2018, the Chinese 

Communist Party and government have issued several key legal provisions to tighten control over religious activities.

• The five state-recognized religious bodies overseeing 

Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Protestant Christianity, and 

Islam, each published updated Five-Year Plans for “sinicization.” Individuals and religious sites were promoted as “models” 

of sinicization.

• During this reporting year, the Commission observed the 

Chinese government’s efforts to “sinicize” Taoism, emphasizing 

Party control and alignment with Party ideology rather than 

religious identity. The government also continued to exert pressure on Buddhism to use historical reinterpretation to promote 

religious subordination to the Party.

• The Party cracked down on folk religious practices that it 

views as potentially undermining its authority.

• During this reporting year, four Catholic bishops were consecrated with mutual approval from both PRC authorities and the 

Holy See, the only appointments made since 2021, while about 

40 dioceses remained without leadership. Authorities continued 

to hold Catholic clergy in detention or forcibly disappear them 

due to their refusal to join the Christian Council of China, in- cluding Catholic Bishop Shao Zhumin of the Diocese of Wen- zhou in Zhejiang province.

• The PRC government continued its campaign to remove Is- lamic architectural elements from mosques or demolish them. 

These policies target Hui Muslims and aim to eradicate reli- gious and cultural distinctiveness while promoting assimilation 

with Han Chinese culture. Experts commented that this year 

marked the conclusion of the nationwide mosque “sinicization” 

campaign, as the last major mosques in China lost their Arabicstyle features.

• The Party exerted pressure on Hong Kong religious communities to conform to the “sinicization” policies of mainland 

China, including through continual trips between mainland 

China and Hong Kong. Experts on religious freedom and belief 

also noted the threat posed to the confidentiality of the Sacra- ment of Penance with the enactment of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance.

• PRC authorities continued to violate Protestants’ religious 

freedom through detention of leaders of unregistered churches, 

surveillance of activities and participants, and use other legal 

tools to control and punish church leaders. Authorities continued to order the removal of crosses and other Christian symbols 

from church buildings.
Freedom of Religion

79

• During this reporting year, PRC authorities continued to 

monitor, detain, and imprison Falun Gong practitioners, Church 

of Almighty God members, and others for being members of 

“evil cults” (xiejiao, 邪教). In March 2024, the Commission held 

a hearing in which witnesses expressed concerns about possible 

forced organ removal from religious and ethnic minorities in 

China, including Falun Gong practitioners.
80

Freedom of Religi

Introduction

During the 2024 reporting year, the Commission observed persistent violations of religious freedom by the Chinese Communist 

Party and government, aimed at consolidating their systemic control 

over religious practitioners and communities. Authorities undertook 

such efforts on multiple levels by including a provision in the sweeping PRC Patriotic Education Law addressed to religious groups and 

institutions; issuing restrictive new regulations governing religious 

sites; launching individualized Five-Year Plans for the “sinicization” 

of all five state-sanctioned religious bodies; and harshly repressing 

unregistered religious believers and communities. The Party and 

government also leveraged technology-enhanced censorship and 

surveillance tools, alongside more traditional methods of community-based monitoring, to maintain control over religious practitioners 

and groups and to identify individuals and content deemed to be 

threats.

International and Chinese Law on Religious Freedom

International law protects the right to form, hold, and change beliefs without restriction while allowing limited constraints on their 

outward manifestation in the presence of select justifications.1 The 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) codify these 

principles.2 Article 36 of China’s Constitution guarantees “freedom of 

religious belief” and protects “normal religious activities” but leaves 

“normal” undefined, allowing the government to stipulate what constitutes “normal” and to circumscribe religious activity beyond what 

is codified under the UDHR and ICCPR.3

Since 2018, the Party and government have issued several key 

legal provisions to tighten control over religious activities, including:

• Revised Regulations on Religious Affairs (2018).4 These 

regulations significantly expanded oversight of religious communities, encompassing activities, schools, religious instruction, 

and international engagement.5 Many provinces and regions 

subsequently issued supplementary regulations, further intensifying control over religious groups.6

• Measures for the Administration of Religious Personnel (2021).7 These measures empowered the National Religious 

Affairs Administration (NRAA) to exert greater control over religious leaders.8 The measures mandated the creation of a database 9 of recognized religious personnel who must demonstrate 

loyalty to the Chinese government by embracing socialism and 

supporting Communist Party leadership.10 The measures emphasize resistance to foreign religious influence,11 explicitly prohibiting Chinese clergy from accepting positions with foreign 

religious groups or institutions without authorization, or engaging in “any other act that violates the principle of [Chinese] 

self-determination.”12

• Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious 

Information Services (2022).13 These measures impose strict 
Freedom of Religion

81

regulations on online religious content. They require all groups 

to register before posting religious material and prohibit foreign entities from disseminating such content within China.14

The measures also ban a wide range of content deemed to undermine national unity and social stability, or promote extremism, terrorism, separatism, or religious fanaticism, among other 

types of content.15

Regulatory and Policy Developments

During the 2024 reporting year, the Party and  government en- acted regulations that strengthened control over religious practices. 

On September 1, 2023, the NRAA implemented new Measures for 

the Management of Venues for Religious Activities, superseding the 

2005 version.16 These measures impose rigorous controls on reli- gious sites, mandating that all activities align with Party leader- ship, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s ide- ology, and socialist values.17 They also require the establishment of 

study groups to promote Party doctrine, further advancing the Party’s agenda of religious “sinicization” (zhongguohua, 中国化), characterized in part as strengthening religious believers’ allegiance to the 

“great motherland, the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the Chinese 

Communist Party, and socialism with Chinese characteristics.”18

The PRC Patriotic Education Law, issued in October 2023, further 

constrains religious freedom in China.19 While only one article directly addresses religious groups,20 the National Joint Conference of 

Religious Groups issued guidelines in January 2024 that significantly impact these communities.21 These guidelines assert the primacy 

of the Chinese government over religion, declaring that the authority of the state supersedes religious authority and that state law 

trumps religious rules.22 The PRC Patriotic Education Law mandates that all religious institutions engage in patriotic education, 

emphasizing national consciousness and adherence to socialism.23

The law compelled various religious communities, including Hui 

Muslims 24 and Christians,25 to integrate patriotic elements into 

their practices by holding meetings to study the law and promoting 

nationalist songs and sermons.26

Five-Year Plans Launched for the Sinicization of Religion

Following the completion of the first Five-Year Plans for sinicization 

in 2022,27 PRC authorities continued to advance policies promoting sinicization, as demonstrated in several high-level speeches.28 In his March 

2023 government work report at the National People’s Congress, Premier 

Li Qiang reaffirmed the Party’s commitment to religious sinicization, 

emphasizing the adaptation of religions to China’s socialist society.29 In 

December 2023, Wang Huning, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, met with the National Committee of 

the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China 

(TSPM) and Christian Council of China (CCC) conference, urging them 

to implement stringent management practices and promote patriotism, 

cultural appreciation, loyalty to the Party, and “socialism with Chinese 

characteristics.”30
Freedom of Religion

82

Five-Year Plans Launched for the Sinicization of Religion—

Continued

With the new Five-Year Plans, individuals and religious sites were promoted as “models” of sinicization. In May 2024, the TSPM and CCC hosted a seminar to explore Protestant theologian T.C. Chao (Zhao Zichen) 

as a model for sinicization of Christians.31 Similarly, in September 2023, 

Islamic Association of China (IAC) president Yang Faming held up the 

Jinling School of Islam as a model of sinicization during a speech at the 

Jinjue Mosque in Nanjing municipality, Jiangsu province.32 According 

to one PRC-based scholar, disciples of the Jinling School sought to “affirm the commonality of Islamic and Chinese cultures.”33 Reporting on 

Yang’s speech, Bitter Winter, an online magazine that reports primarily 

on religious repression in China, claimed that the IAC was simplifying 

the Jinling School of thought in order to justify the government’s recent 

efforts to remove Arabic-style elements from mosques.34

The Party signaled its intention to maintain its program of sinicization 

by issuing new Five-Year Plans for sinicization of Protestant Christianity and Catholicism in China for the years 2023 to 2027.35 The sinicization plan for the Party-run Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association 

made no mention of the Pope, the Sino-Vatican Agreement, or the Holy 

See, among other topics of significance to the Catholic Church in China, whereas mentions of Xi Jinping and “Chinese characteristics” are 

found several times.36 As one expert observed, this conveys the sense 

that the Sino-Vatican Agreement “counted for nothing.”37 The new FiveYear Plan for Protestants calls for the integration of “core socialist values” into Christian theology.38 One scholar noted that this new document 

emphasizes political loyalty to the Party much more than the previous 

Five-Year Plan.39

The Taoist Association of China40 and the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) have also released sinicization plans. In 2022, BAC launched 

its “Five-Year Work Plan for Deepening the Sinicization of Buddhism in 

China (2023–2027).”41 While the full text remains undisclosed, the BAC 

president announced in February 2024 that it would integrate patriotic 

education into Buddhist sinicization efforts.42

Buddhism (non-Tibetan), Taoism, and Folk Religion

The Chinese government continues to impose sinicization efforts 

on Taoism and Buddhism, despite the indigenous nature of the former and the previous promotion of the latter as a model for successful sinicization.43 These initiatives prioritize Party supremacy and 

employ historical reinterpretation in order to promote religious subordination.44 In September 2023, the “Buddhist Educational Affairs 

and Teaching Style Work Training Course” held at Mount Wutai in 

Wutai county, Xinzhou municipality, Shanxi province, emphasized 

the imperative for Buddhist monks and devotees to “thoroughly 

study and implement” Xi Jinping’s teachings and the spirit of the 

20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.45 During 

the training, BAC President Shi Yanjue highlighted Xi’s 2021 speech 

advocating for Marxism as an “interpretive tool for religious history 

and doctrine.”46 The Party-controlled “Fahua Dojo” Buddhist group 

produced a video featuring members in Red Army uniforms per-
Freedom of Religion

83

forming a song that merged Xi Jinping quotes with Buddhist concepts.47 One publication characterized this as “one of the furthest 

steps taken by the movement of ‘Sinicization of Buddhism’ in recent 

years.”48 The Fahua Dojo further reinforced this alignment by posting over 20 videos dedicated to the 20th Party Congress on their 

website.49 [For more information on religious freedom for Tibetan 

Buddhists, see Chapter 17—Tibet.]

During this reporting year, the Commission observed the Chinese 

government’s efforts to “sinicize” Taoism, emphasizing Party control 

and alignment with Party ideology rather than religious identity.50

In July 2023, the Taoist Association of China organized “Taoism 

on the Sea: The First Forum on the Theory and Practice of Sinicization of Taoism,” featuring speeches from high-ranking officials 

and workshops promoting Party loyalty and socialist ideology.51 The 

workshops demonstrated patriotic educational activities that participants could bring back to their temples, such as lessons in the 

history of the Party and of the United Front, as well as Taoist painting, and recommended that in calligraphy classes teachers should 

encourage students to produce works that showcase “thoughts of 

loving the Party, the country, and socialism.”52 Bitter Winter noted 

the “absurd[ity]” of sinicizing Taoism if the term means different 

faiths adapting to Chinese culture and traditions, highlighting that 

the real purpose of the sinicization of religion is to make religions 

“propaganda mouthpieces for the Party.”53

Simultaneously, the Party has cracked down on folk religious 

practices that it views as potentially undermining its authority. 

For example, when a viral video showed a woman praying at a site 

commemorating 11th-century magistrate Bao Zheng in Kaifeng municipality, Henan province after her attempt to petition authorities 

failed, local officials began to surveil worshippers, “identify[ing] 

those who pray loudly or cry,” according to one source.54 Petitioners 

have reportedly come to revere Bao for his stance against injustice 

and corruption, and authorities may view devotion to Bao as a tacit 

form of criticism.55

Islam

During the 2024 reporting year, the Commission observed the 

PRC’s use of sinicization policies targeting Hui Muslims, aiming to 

eradicate religious and cultural distinctiveness while promoting assimilation with Han Chinese culture. The government continued its 

campaign to remove Islamic architectural elements from mosques 

or demolish them.56 Authorities demolished and rebuilt Xiguan 

Mosque in Lanzhou municipality, Gansu province;57 replaced a 

dome and minarets demolished last year with pagodas at Najiaying Mosque in Nagu town, Tonghai county, Yuxi municipality, Yunnan province;58 and replaced the dome and minarets of the Grand 

Mosque in Shadian subdistrict, Gejiu city, Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan, with a pagoda rooftop and pagoda 

towers,59 stripping these mosques of traditional Islamic architectural features.60 The Grand Mosque in Shadian has served as one of 

the most significant centers of worship for Hui Muslims, known as 

“the Mecca of the Hui.”61 Fearing protest, officials went to residents’ 

homes in Shadian, asking them to sign a letter agreeing “not to take 
Freedom of Religion

84

pictures of and not to post on social media news about the mosque 

alteration work.”62 When rebuilding the Grand Mosque, authorities 

reportedly installed surveillance cameras inside the mosque’s prayer 

hall over the objections of the mosque management committee.63

Experts commented that the reconstruction of the Najiaying and 

Grand Mosques marked the conclusion of the nationwide mosque 

sinicization campaign as the last major mosques in China lost their 

Arabic-style features.64

A November 2023 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) revealed 

a significant reduction in the number of mosques in Ningxia and 

Gansu provinces, both with significant Hui Muslim populations, 

through a process of “consolidation.”65 Maya Wang, HRW’s acting 

China Director, asserted that authorities have closed, destroyed, 

and repurposed mosques as “part of a systematic effort to curb the 

practice of Islam in China.”66 Scholars who focus on Hui Muslims 

estimate that authorities have shuttered approximately one-third of 

Ningxia’s mosques since 2020.67

PRC authorities also tightened restrictions this past year on Muslims’ observance of Ramadan. Authorities in Yuxi municipality, Yunnan, issued prohibitions on the observance of Ramadan, including 

banning minors from fasting.68 The notice was issued in the year 

following the widespread protests that took place over authorities’ 

planned removal of the Najiaying Mosque’s dome and four minarets.69 [For more information on Uyghur, Hui, and other Muslims in 

the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and other locations, please 

see Chapter 7—Ethnic Minority Rights and Chapter 18—Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region.]

Christianity—Catholic

The 2018 Sino-Vatican Agreement established a mechanism for 

bishop appointments mutually recognized by the PRC government 

and the Holy See.70 Despite many experts claiming unsatisfactory results, the Holy See provisionally renewed the agreement in 

2022 to maintain dialogue.71 As the agreement approaches renewal in October 2024, its effectiveness remained questionable, 

particularly regarding the “underground” Catholic Church.72

Critics argue that Chinese authorities seek a state-submissive 

Church, which would jeopardize its Catholic identity.73 While 

some scholars have emphasized the agreement’s potential for creating stability and unity,74 the past six years have largely been 

seen as producing disappointing results.75 During this reporting 

year, only four bishops were consecrated with mutual approval, 

the only appointments made since 2021,76 while around 40 dioceses remain without leadership.77 Authorities have continued to 

hold Catholic clergy in detention or forcibly disappear them due 

to their refusal to join the Party-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), including Bishop Shao Zhumin of the Diocese 

of Wenzhou in Zhejiang province.78

In July 2023, the Holy See formally appointed Bishop Shen 

Bin to the  Diocese of Shanghai,79 three months after the Party-controlled Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China (BCCCC) unilaterally installed him.80 In May 2024, the Holy 

See made another overture to China by inviting Bishop Shen to 
Freedom of Religion

85

speak at a high-level conference at the Vatican to commemorate 

the landmark First Council for China held in Shanghai in 1924.81

This was the first time a bishop from mainland China attended a 

Vatican conference.82 Bishop Shen rebuked Western missionaries 

for their “superior” attitudes while “protect[ing] foreign powers” 

in China’s history, defended Chinese authorities’ policies toward 

the Catholic Church, and advocated for the sinicization of Catholicism in China, urging patriotism and alignment with Chinese 

society and culture.83

In September 2023, during Pope Francis’s visit to Mongolia, PRC 

authorities limited Chinese Catholics’ access to the Pope, despite the 

Pope telling Chinese Catholics to be “good citizens.”84 No mainland 

bishops were present in Mongolia to welcome Pope Francis.85 Authorities also detained at least two individuals who had organized 

a pilgrimage.86 Many of the Chinese Catholics who were able to 

attend were afraid to speak to reporters or wore face masks the 

entire time to conceal their identity out of fear of punishment back 

in China.87

Chinese authorities used “fraud” charges against Catholic religious leaders in 2023. A court punished Father Joseph Yang Xiaoming, a Holy See-approved Catholic priest, for “conducting religious 

activities by deception  . . . under the guise of a religious cleric,” 

and reportedly for refusing to join the Party-controlled CPA.88 Yang 

received an administrative punishment that included an “order to 

cease his (priestly) activities,” the confiscation of more than 28,000 

yuan (US$4,000), and a fine of more than 1,500 yuan (US$210).89

Despite being used against leaders of unregistered Protestant 

churches in the past,90 “fraud” charges against Catholic clergy have 

been uncommon.91 Catholic News Agency claimed that Yang’s case 

reveals that the database for Catholic clergy launched in May 2023 

is “a pretense to strong-arm obstinate clerics into registering with 

state-sanctioned religious bodies.”92

Religious Freedom Violations in Hong Kong

The Party exerted pressure on Hong Kong religious communities 

to conform to the sinicization policies of mainland China, including 

through continual trips between mainland China and Hong Kong. In 

August 2023, China Central Television documented and interviewed a 

delegation of Hong Kong Islamic organizations who visited the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in order to dissuade the public of 

its belief in the existence of ethnic tensions, forced labor, or mass internment camps.93 The interviews, shown with a Mandarin voiceover, 

showcase the chairman of the Islamic Union of Hong Kong, Azizul 

Rahman Suffiad, and others claiming that “the ethnic minority compatriots in Xinjiang are very happy and joyful, fully enjoying religious 

freedom and are well-respected.” 94
Freedom of Religion

86

Religious Freedom Violations in Hong Kong—Continued

In September 2023, a delegation of Hong Kong clerics and religious 

sisters visited the Diocese of Beijing where they reportedly had discussions with the National Religious Affairs Administration of the United 

Front Work Department and the CPA and BCCCC.95 In November 2023, 

Archbishop Joseph Li Shan visited Hong Kong at the invitation of Cardinal Stephen Chow Sau-yan of the Diocese of Hong Kong, marking the 

first official visit by the head of the Catholic Church in China.96 In April 

2024, a delegation of the Diocese of Hong Kong made a second trip to 

mainland China, one year after Cardinal Chow traveled to Beijing municipality, following nearly three decades in which the Diocese of Hong 

Kong had not made an official visit to China.97

In October 2023, St. John’s Anglican Cathedral Church displayed the 

PRC national flag inside the church, and the Kowloon Mosque and Islamic Center held a flag-raising ceremony of the PRC flag.98 Commentators suggested that the display and veneration of the PRC national flag 

by religious communities in Hong Kong may become what is expected.99

Furthermore, with the enactment of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance, experts on religious freedom and belief noted the threat 

posed to the confidentiality of the Sacrament of Penance, known as “Confession.”100 The Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong said that the legislation 

would not affect the confidentiality of Confession, but Ronny Tong, an 

advisor to the city leader, said that religious professionals are not exempt 

from the requirement to inform authorities of anyone who committed 

“treason” even if revealed during Confession.101 Paul Lam Ting-kwok, 

Hong Kong’s Secretary of Justice, said that it would be “very difficult” to 

make exemptions for religious leaders, although an exemption was made 

for legal professionals.102 The new law stipulates that failing to disclose 

to authorities within a reasonable time information on individuals suspected of committing treason could be punished with up to 14 years in 

prison.103 [For more information on the ongoing suppression of civil society in Hong Kong, see Chapter 19—Hong Kong and Macau.]

Christianity—Protestant

PRC authorities continued to violate Protestants’ religious freedom through suppression of church services, detention of leaders 

of unregistered churches, and surveillance of activities and participants.104 Officials continued to employ “fraud” charges against 

unregistered “house” churches and networks.105 Ongoing legal proceedings highlighted the use of this charge to suppress unregistered 

religious activities, including:

• Ganquan Church. Authorities in Hefei municipality, Anhui 

province, detained members of Hefei’s Ganquan Church in November 2023 and held five, including Pastor Zhou Songlin106

and Elder Ding Zhongfu,107 on suspicion of “fraud.”108 Two 

properties, bought by the church congregation to host worship 

services and to avoid being forced to relocate, could be used as 

the basis for fraud charges against the leaders.109

• Living Stone (also known as Cornerstone) Reformed 

Church. In April 2023, authorities in Yuhui district, Bengbu 

municipality, Anhui, detained Pastor Wan Changchun,110 El-
Freedom of Religion

87

der Xue Shaoqiang,111 Cao Binting,112 and Wan Chunqin113

of Living Stone Reformed Church on suspicion of “illegal business activity”; in May 2023, authorities formally arrested the 

four and changed the charge to “fraud.”114 In January 2024, the 

Yuhui procuratorate indicted the four on the same charge.115

• Green Pastures (Qingcaodi) Reformed Church. In April 

2024, the Jingyang District People’s Court in Deyang municipality, Sichuan province, sentenced Elders Hao Ming116 and 

Wu Jiannan117 of Deyang’s Green Pastures Reformed Church 

to three years in prison, suspended for five years, for “fraud.”118

Chinese authorities have used fraud charges to target church 

funding structures and to project a veneer of criminality onto 

normal religious activities such as collecting donations.119

Authorities also used other legal tools to control and punish 

church leaders. After releasing Pastor John Cao Sanqiang following a seven-year prison term, authorities prevented Cao from accessing vital government-issued documents, including his national 

identification card and hukou, a household registration permit necessary for access to public services.120Authorities imprisoned Cao 

in 2017 on the charge of “organizing others to illegally cross the 

border” in connection with his missionary and relief work traveling 

between China and Burma (Myanmar).121 While Cao—who is both 

a Chinese national and U.S. permanent resident—was in prison, his 

Chinese passport expired, and without official documents, he was 

unable to renew it.122

This past year, PRC authorities continued to order the removal 

of crosses and plaques inscribed with Christian phrases including 

“Jesus” and “Christ” from church buildings.123 For example, in July 

2023, the Taizhou Religious Affairs Bureau in Taizhou municipality, 

Zhejiang province, reportedly sent notices to local churches requiring 

signs reading “love the Chinese Communist Party, love the country, 

and love the religion” and “uphold the sinicization of religion” to be 

displayed.124 The Shinian Church in Taizhou displayed a hammer 

and sickle, the Party emblem, at its entrance.125

Falun Gong

PRC authorities continued to monitor, detain, and imprison Falun 

Gong adherents in connection with their practice of Falun Gong.126

Authorities often detain Falun Gong practitioners for violating Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law, which criminalizes “organizing 

and using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.”127 The 

Falun Gong-affiliated website Minghui reported the deaths of dozens 

of Falun Gong practitioners due to mistreatment while in custody 

and more than a thousand cases of Falun Gong practitioners being 

harassed or sentenced by authorities.128 Falun Gong practitioners 

are often detained multiple times over the course of years, including 

the following individuals:

• Hou Lijun. In May 2023, the Wanbailin District People’s 

Court in Taiyuan municipality, Shanxi province, sentenced Hou 

Lijun to 10 years in prison.129 In June 2023, authorities sent 

Hou to a prison in Jinzhong municipality, Shanxi province,130

and reportedly tortured him by beating him, forcing him to sit 

on a small stool for long periods of time, and depriving him 
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88

of sleep and basic necessities.131 Hou went on a hunger strike 

in protest and in January 2024, authorities transferred Hou to 

a PSB hospital in Taiyuan after he became gravely ill.132 The 

prison administration denied his family permission to visit him 

at the hospital.133 Authorities previously detained Hou in 2000 

and in 2002.134

• Lang Dongyue. Around July 2023, the Xuanhua District 

People’s Court in Zhangjiakou municipality, Hebei province, 

sentenced Lang Dongyue to nine years in prison and imposed 

a fine of 15,000 yuan (US$2,100) after authorities had detained 

her at least five previous times for an aggregate total of 10 

years starting in 1999.135

• Wang Yanming. After multiple previous detentions, public 

security officials in Daqing municipality, Heilongjiang province, 

detained Wang Yanming in June 2023, claiming that surveillance cameras recorded him hanging up Falun Gong posters, 

and he was subsequently sentenced on September 25, 2023, to 

three years and six months in prison and fined 20,000 yuan 

(US$2,900).136

In testimony provided at a Commission hearing in March 2024, 

experts expressed ongoing concerns about the possible forced remov- al of organs from religious and ethnic minorities in China, including 

Falun Gong practitioners.137 [For more information on forced organ 

removal, see Chapter 12—Public Health.]

Other Religious Communities

The Commission documented religious freedom violations against 

communities outside the five officially regulated religions. While the 

Chinese government previously tolerated some unregulated groups 

such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, it designated 22 others, including Falun Gong and the Church of Almighty 

God (CAG), as “evil cults” (xiejiao, 邪教).138 Authorities regularly 

prosecute adherents under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law.139

According to a report by CAG, the government significantly increased detention and sentencing of CAG members in 2023.140 Authorities sentenced thousands of CAG members to imprisonment, 

and several members died as a result of mistreatment while in custody.141 In June 2023, authorities reportedly detained more than 

1,000 CAG members in Zhejiang province in a single day.142

Persecution extended beyond listed “cults.” In December 2023, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) advised Taiwanese members 

of Yiguan Dao, a salvationist religion, against traveling to mainland 

China, warning that authorities may detain them for crimes under Article 300, among other potential charges, despite the group’s 

absence from any cult lists.143 MAC further stated that an individual had been detained in China for bringing in books promoting 

vegetarianism.144
89

Notes to Chapter 3—Freedom of Religion

1Paul M. Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 19, 24, 203–4. 2Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights (ICCPR), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 

entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 18. Article 18 of the ICCPR upholds a person’s right to “have 

or adopt a religion or belief” and the “freedom . . . to manifest [that] religion or belief in worship, 

observance, practice and teaching.” Article 18 also prohibits coercion that impairs an individual’s 

freedom to freely hold or adopt a religion or belief. See also Declaration on the Elimination of All 

Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted and proclaimed 

by U.N. General Assembly resolution 36/55 of November 25, 1981. China has signed and stated its 

intent to ratify the ICCPR, which obligates China to refrain in good faith from acts that would defeat the treaty’s purpose. State Council Information Office, “国家人权行动计划 (2016–2020年)”

[National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016–2020)], September 29, 2016, sec. 5; United 

Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted 

May 23, 1969, entry into force January 27, 1980, art. 18. 3中华人民共和国宪法 [PRC Constitution], passed and effective December 4, 1982, amended 

March 11, 2018, art. 36; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by 

U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948; International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 

16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976. 4State Council, 宗教事务条例 [Regulations on Religious Affairs], issued November 30, 2004, 

amended June 14, 2017, effective February 1, 2018, art. 2. For more information on the impact of 

the updated Regulations on Religious Affairs, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China, 2020 Annual Report (Washington: December 2020), 111–12. 5American Center for Law and Justice, “Analysis on China’s Revised Regulations on Religious 

Affairs,” accessed October 23, 2024; Brent Fulton, “New Religious Regulations to Take Effect in 

February,” ChinaSource (blog), September 13, 2017. 6For more analysis on the individual provincial and regional Regulations, see, e.g., Martin 

Lavička, “A New Round of Restrictions Further Constrains Religious Practice in Xinjiang,” 

ChinaFile, April 19, 2024; “法律法规” [Laws and regulations], National Religious Affairs Administration (website), accessed October 23, 2024. From 2019 to 2024, 30 provinces and regions 

have published their own additional regulations. See, e.g., National Religious Affairs Administration, 新疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务条例 [Regulations on Religious Affairs of the Xinjiang Uyghur 

Autonomous Region], passed December 22, 2023, effective February 1, 2024; National Religious 

Affairs Administration, 辽宁省宗教事务条例 [Regulations on Religious Affairs of Liaoning Province], passed on November 14, 2023 and effective on January 1, 2024; National Religious Affairs 

Administration, 黑龙江省宗教事务条例 [Regulations on Religious Affairs of Heilongjiang Province], 

passed November 2, 2023, effective on January 1, 2024; National Religious Affairs Administration, 宁夏回族自治区宗教事务条例 [Regulations on Religious Affairs of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region], passed August 2, 2023, effective on October 1, 2023. 7National Religious Affairs Administration, 宗教教职人员管理办法 [Measures for the Administration of Religious Personnel], effective May 1, 2021. 8Mingzhi Chen, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Factsheet: China,” October 2021, 1; Martin Lavicka and Julie Yu-Wen Chen, “New Measures for Governing Religions 

in Xi’s China,” China Report 59, no. 3 (August 15, 2023): 267–68; Massimo Introvigne, “Enter the 

‘Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy’: Be Afraid, Be Very Afraid,” Bitter Winter, February 11, 2021; BarnabasAid, “Chinese Government’s Tight New Regulations for Ministry Include 

Database of Church Leaders,” February 19, 2021. 9National Religious Affairs Administration, 宗教教职人员管理办法 [Measures for the Administration of Religious Personnel], effective May 1, 2021, art. 33. 10National Religious Affairs Administration, 宗教教职人员管理办法 [Measures for the Administration of Religious Personnel], effective May 1, 2021, art. 3. 11National Religious Affairs Administration, 宗教教职人员管理办法 [Measures for the Administration of Religious Personnel], effective May 1, 2021, arts. 6.5, 12.3. 12National Religious Affairs Administration, 宗教教职人员管理办法 [Measures for the Administration of Religious Personnel], effective May 1, 2021, art. 12.3. 13National Religious Affairs Administration et al., 互联网宗教信息服务管理办法 [Measures for 

the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services], passed December 3, 2021, effective March 1, 2022, art. 20. 14National Religious Affairs Administration et al., 互联网宗教信息服务管理办法 [Measures for 

the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services], passed December 3, 2021, effective March 1, 2022, arts. 6, 7. 15National Religious Affairs Administration et al., 互联网宗教信息服务管理办法 [Measures for 

the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services], passed December 3, 2021, effective March 1, 2022, art. 14.1. 16National Religious Affairs Administration, 宗教活动场所管理办法 [Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities], passed June 29, 2023, effective September 1, 2023; 

United Front Work Department of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “国家宗教事

务局负责人就《宗教活动场所管理办法》答记者问” [State Administration of Religious Affairs official answers reporters’ questions on the “Measures for the Management of Religious Activity 

Venues”], July 31, 2023. 17National Religious Affairs Administration, 宗教活动场所管理办法 [Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities], passed June 29, 2023, effective September 1, 

2023, art. 3.
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18National Religious Affairs Administration, 宗教活动场所管理办法 [Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities], passed June 29, 2023, effective September 1, 2023, 

arts. 30, 36; Carsten T. Vala, “The 2023 Regulations for Religious Activity Site Registration,” 

ChinaSource (blog), February 12, 2024; “习近平在全国宗教工作会议上强调 坚持我国宗教中国化方

向 积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应 李克强主持 栗战书王沪宁赵乐际韩正出席 汪洋讲话” [At 

the National Conference on Religious Work, Xi Jinping stressed: Persevere on the path of [China’s] sinicization of religion and actively lead religion in the adaptation of religion with socialism], Xinhua, December 4, 2021. 19中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法 [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, effective January 1, 2024. 20中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法 [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, effective January 1, 2024, art. 22. 21United Front Work Department of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, “全国性宗

教团体联席会议学习宣传贯彻爱国主义教育法” [The National Joint Conference of Religious Groups 

studied, publicized and implemented the Patriotic Education Law], January 8, 2024. 22Zimo Hu, “China: Guidelines Instruct Religions How to Implement the New Patriotic Education Law,” Bitter Winter, January 12, 2024. 23中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法 [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, effective January 1, 2024, art. 22; Matthew Santucci, “China’s New ‘Patriotic Education Law’ Places 

Further Limits on Religious Instruction,” Catholic News Agency, November 8, 2023. 24Wenyan Ma, “‘Prove Your Love for the Party’: Hui Muslims Submitted to ‘Patriotic Education,’” Bitter Winter, January 25, 2024. 25ChinaAid Association, “Sunday Church Service Turns into Communist Party Performance,” 

November 26, 2023. 26Wenyan Ma, “‘Prove Your Love for the Party’: Hui Muslims Submitted to ‘Patriotic Education,’” Bitter Winter, January 25, 2024; ChinaAid Association, “Sunday Church Service Turns into 

Communist Party Performance,” November 26, 2023. 27Buddhist Association of China, “坚持佛教中国化方向五年工作规划纲要(2019–2023)”

[Outline of the Five-Year Work Plan for Adhering to the Direction of Sinicization of Buddhism 

(2019–2023)], July 24, 2019; China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee, “推进我国基督教中国化五年工作规划纲要(2018–2022)” [Outline of the Five-Year Plan 

for Promoting the Sinicization of Christianity in China (2018–2022)], December 2017, reprinted 

in China Law Translate, June 18, 2019; Islamic Association of China, “坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化

方向五年工作规划纲要(2018-2022)” [Outline of the Five-Year Work Plan for Adhering to the 

Sinicization of Islam in China (2018–2022)], reprinted in China Law Translate, May 31, 2019; 

China Taoist Association, “《坚持道教中国化方向五年工作规划纲要(2019–2023年)》颁布” [Issuing the “Outline of the Five-Year Work Plan for Adhering to the Sinicization of Taoism in China 

(2019–2023)”], November 14, 2019; Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and Chinese Catholic 

Bishops’ Conference, “推进我国天主教坚持中国化方向五年工作规划(2018–2022)” [Outline of 

the Five-Year Work Plan for Promoting the Sinicization of Catholicism in China (2018–2022)], 

reprinted in China Law Translate, August 8, 2019. 28State Council, “政府工作报告” [Government work report], March 12, 2024; Zhao Bing, “王

沪宁会见中国基督教第十一次代表会议代表” [Wang Huning meets with representatives of the 11th 

China Christian Conference], People’s Daily, December 24, 2023; Min Junqing, “杨发明会长应邀

出席第三届江苏省伊斯兰教坚持中国化方向论坛” [President Yang Faming was invited to attend the 

3rd Jiangsu Province Forum on Adherence to Sinicization of Islam], Islamic Association of China, 

September 7, 2023; 29State Council, “政府工作报告” [Government work report], Xinhua, March 12, 2024. 30Zhao Bing, “王沪宁会见中国基督教第十一次代表会议代表” [Wang Huning meets with representatives of the 11th China Christian Conference], People’s Daily, December 24, 2023; Amber 

Wang, “China’s Christian Groups Told to Ensure ‘Strict’ Oversight of Religion as Communist 

Party Controls Tighten,” South China Morning Post, December 24, 2023. 31Chen Jiameng, “鉴往知来 笃信力行” [Learn from the past to know the future, moving 

forward with faith], China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement Online, May 

10, 2024; John Zhang, “Seminar on T.C. Chao’s Theological Thought, Sinicization of Christianity 

Conducted in Huzhou,” China Christian Daily, May 13, 2024. 32Min Junqing, Islamic Association of China, “杨发明会长应邀出席第三届江苏省伊斯兰教坚持中

国化方向论坛” [President Yang Faming was invited to attend the 3rd Jiangsu Province Forum on 

Adherence to Sinicization of Islam], September 7, 2023; Ma Wenyan, “China Promotes a ‘Confucianized’ Approach to the Holy Quran,” Bitter Winter, September 21, 2023. For more information 

on the Sinicization plan for Islam, see Islamic Association of China, “深入推进我国伊斯兰教中国

化五年工作规划纲要(2023–2027年)” [Outline of the Five-Year Work Plan for Deeply Promoting 

the Sinicization of Islam in China (2023–2027)], reprinted in Shaanxi Islamic Association Online, 

December 11, 2023. 33Wei Wang, “On the Historical Background and Ideological Resources of the Confluence of 

Islam and Confucianism,” Religions 13, no. 8 (August 2022): 748. 34Wenyan Ma, “China Promotes a ‘Confucianized’ Approach to the Holy Quran,” Bitter Winter, 

September 21, 2023. 35“深入推进我国基督教中国化五年工作规划纲要(2023–2027年)” [Outline of the Five-Year 

Work Plan for Further Promoting the Sinicization of Christianity in China (2023–2027)], China 

Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement Online, December 21, 2023;“深入推进我国

天主教中国化五年工作规划纲要(2023–2027年)” [Outline of the Five-Year Work Plan for Further 

Promoting the Sinicization of Catholicism in China (2023–2027)], Catholic Church in China, December 25, 2023. 36Gianni Criveller, “Beijing and the Holy See: Positive Signs Tempered by Heavy Silence,” 

AsiaNews, February 12, 2024.
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37Gianni Criveller, “Beijing and the Holy See: Positive Signs Tempered by Heavy Silence,” 

AsiaNews, February 12, 2024. 38Carsten T. Vala, “Official Protestant Groups Plan Next Five Years of Sinicization,” 

ChinaSource (blog), April 3, 2024. 39Carsten T. Vala, “Official Protestant Groups Plan Next Five Years of Sinicization,” 

ChinaSource (blog), April 3, 2024. 40Chinese Taoist Association, “深入推进我国道教中国化五年工作规划纲要(2023–2027年)” 

[Outline of the Five-Year Work Plan for Further Promoting the Sinicization of Taoism in China 

(2023–2027)], December 14, 2023. 41 International Campaign for Tibet, “Buddhist Association of China Takes a Leading Role in 

China’s Attempts to Control and Forcibly Reshape Tibetan Buddhism,” May 29, 2024. 42 International Campaign for Tibet, “Buddhist Association of China Takes a Leading Role in 

China’s Attempts to Control and Forcibly Reshape Tibetan Buddhism,” May 29, 2024. 43See, e.g., Zhao Zhangyong, “New Campaign for ‘Sinicization of Buddhism’ Starts in China,” 

Bitter Winter, September 14, 2023; Council on Foreign Relations, “Religion in China,” updated 

May 15, 2024; Juping Yang, “The Sinicization and Secularization of Some Graeco-Buddhist Gods 

in China” in The Global Connections of Gandhāran Art, eds. Wannaporn Rienjang and Peter 

Stewart (Summertown, Oxford: Archaeopress Publishing LTD, 2020), 238, 243–46. See also Zhao 

Zhangyong, “CCP Uses Lingyan Temple History to Insist Buddhism Should Be ‘Sinicized,’ Too,” 

Bitter Winter, June 19, 2024. For past Commission coverage of Chinese authorities’ treatment 

of Buddhism and Taoism, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 90–91; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 

Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 100–101; Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 98–99. 44See, e.g., Zhao Zhangyong, “New Campaign for ‘Sinicization of Buddhism’ Starts in China,” 

Bitter Winter, September 14, 2023; Zhao Zhangyong, “CCP Uses Lingyan Temple History to Insist Buddhism Should Be ‘Sinicized,’ Too,” Bitter Winter, June 19, 2024; Nathan VanderKlippe, 

“How China Is Turning Religion into Another State-Controlled Tool to Support Its Communists 

Ideals,” Globe and Mail, June 30, 2021; Weishan Huang, “The Sinicization of Buddhism and Its 

Competing Reinventions of Tradition,” in The Sinicization of Chinese Religions: From Above and 

Below, ed. Richard Madsen, Religion in Chinese Societies 18 (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 65, 67, 69, 83; 

Ian Johnson, “China’s New Civil Religion,” New York Times, December 21, 2019. 45Zhao Zhangyong, “New Campaign for ‘Sinicization of Buddhism’ Starts in China,” Bitter Winter, September 14, 2023.

46Zhao Zhangyong, “New Campaign for ‘Sinicization of Buddhism’ Starts in China,” Bitter Winter, September 14, 2023; “原创 佛教文化艺术馆藏品赏鉴(21):书法即心法也,品味演觉法师墨韵”

[Appreciation of the original collections of the Buddhist cultural and art exhibit (21): Calligraphy 

and meditation, view the work of Master Yanjue], Sohu, December 6, 2021;“习近平在全国宗教工

作会议上强调 坚持我国宗教中国化方向 积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应 李克强主持 栗战书王沪

宁赵乐际韩正出席 汪洋讲话”[At the National Religious Work Conference, Xi Jinping emphasized 

that China should adhere to the direction of sinicization of religions and actively guide religions 

to adapt to the socialist society. Li Keqiang presided over the conference. Li Zhanshu, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, and Han Zheng attended. Wang Yang made a speech], Xinhua, December 4, 2021. 47Chen Tao, “Sinicizing Buddhism: Buddhists Dressed in Red Army Uniforms Sing the ‘New 

Internationale,’” Bitter Winter, July 26, 2023; Britannica, “People’s Liberation Army,” accessed 

November 2, 2024. The “Red Army” was the military of the Chinese Communist Party prior 

to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 when it was renamed “People’s 

Liberation Army.” 48Chen Tao, “Sinicizing Buddhism: Buddhists Dressed in Red Army Uniforms Sing the ‘New 

Internationale,’” Bitter Winter, July 26, 2023. 49Chen Tao, “Sinicizing Buddhism: Buddhists Dressed in Red Army Uniforms Sing the ‘New 

Internationale,’” Bitter Winter, July 26, 2023. 50He Yuyan, “Even Taoists Are Being ‘Sinicized’: Shanghai Hosted the ‘First Forum on Sinicization of Taoism’” Bitter Winter, August 8, 2023. 51He Yuyan, “Even Taoists Are Being ‘Sinicized’: Shanghai Hosted the ‘First Forum on Sinicization of Taoism’” Bitter Winter, August 8, 2023. 52He Yuyan, “Even Taoists Are Being ‘Sinicized’: Shanghai Hosted the ‘First Forum on Sinicization of Taoism’” Bitter Winter, August 8, 2023. 53He Yuyan, “Even Taoists Are Being ‘Sinicized’: Shanghai Hosted the ‘First Forum on Sinicization of Taoism’” Bitter Winter, August 8, 2023. 54Wang Yichi, “The CCP vs Bao Zheng, Patron Saint of the Petitioners,” Bitter Winter, March 

29, 2024. 55Wang Yichi, “The CCP vs Bao Zheng, Patron Saint of the Petitioners,” Bitter Winter, March 

29, 2024. 56For more information about previous efforts to remove Arabic-style domes and minarets from 

mosques, see, e.g., “How China is Tearing Down Islam,” Financial Times, November 27, 2023; Ma 

Wenyan, “Gansu: World-Famous Xiguan Mosque Is Also ‘Sinicized,’” Bitter Winter, September 

18, 2023; Amy Hawkins and Elena Morresi, “Last Major Arabic-style Mosque in China Loses Its 

Domes,” Guardian, May 25, 2024; Ruslan Yusupov, “Sinicising Islam in China: The Story of a 

Mosque,” Made in China Journal, January 18, 2024; Chen Tao, “Sinicization Attacks Mosques in 

Beijing as Well,” Bitter Winter, August 21, 2023; Chen Tao, “‘Sinicization’ Galore: ‘Arabic’ Features 

Removed from Mosques, Hospitals, Restaurants,” Bitter Winter, July 11, 2023; Haiyun Ma and 

I-wei Jennifer Chang, “The Last Minarets of Yunnan: China’s Hui Muslims in the Cross Hairs 

of Xi’s New Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, September 6, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 92, 147–49; Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 101, 163–64.
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57Liu Quan, “中共拆改兰州西关清真寺 穆斯林信仰自由政策落幕” [The Chinese Communist 

Party demolished and renovated the Xiguan Mosque in Lanzhou and ended the policy of freedom 

of belief for Muslims], Voice of America, September 13, 2023. 58Gu Ting, “Yunnan Mosque Gets Pagodas and Party Slogans in Chinese Makeover,” Radio Free 

Asia, February 21, 2024; Amy Hawkins and Elena Morresi, “Last Major Arabic-style Mosque in 

China Loses Its Domes,” Guardian, May 25, 2024. 59Amy Hawkins and Elena Morresi, “Last Major Arabic-style Mosque in China Loses Its 

Domes,” Guardian, May 25, 2024; Ruslan Yusupov, “Sinicising Islam in China: The Story of a 

Mosque,” Made in China Journal, January 18, 2024. 60Amy Hawkins and Elena Morresi, “Last Major Arabic-style Mosque in China Loses Its 

Domes,” Guardian, May 25, 2024. 61Ma Guangyao, “The ‘Sinicization’ of the Grand Mosque of Shadian Has Started,” Bitter Winter, July 22, 2023.

62Ruslan Yusupov, “China Is Taking a Wrecking Ball to Famous Mosques,” Foreign Policy, July 

31, 2023. 63Amy Hawkins and Elena Morresi, “Last Major Arabic-style Mosque in China Loses Its 

Domes,” Guardian, May 25, 2024. 64Amy Hawkins and Elena Morresi, “Last Major Arabic-style Mosque in China Loses Its 

Domes,” Guardian, May 25, 2024. 65Human Rights Watch, “China: Mosques Shuttered, Razed, Altered in Muslim Areas,” November 22, 2023. 66Human Rights Watch, “China: Mosques Shuttered, Razed, Altered in Muslim Areas,” November 22, 2023. 67Human Rights Watch, “China: Mosques Shuttered, Razed, Altered in Muslim Areas,” November 22, 2023. 68Ke Lin, “China Tightens Restrictions during Ramadan,” Voice of America, April 2, 2024; 

Ruslan Yusupov, “Beijing’s Crackdown on Islam Is Coming for Kids,” Foreign Policy, June 17, 

2024; Ma Guangyao, “Yuxi, Yunnan: Ramadan Fasting Prohibited to Minors and Party Members,” 

Bitter Winter, April 8, 2024; Amy Hawkins and Elena Morresi, “Last Major Arabic-style Mosque 

in China Loses Its Domes,” Guardian, May 25, 2024. 69For more information on the clashes over the planned mosque demolition, see Amy Hawkins, “Protesters Clash with Police in China over Partial Demolition of Mosque,” Guardian, May 

30, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 92, 148–49. 70“New Bishop Ordained in China,” Vatican News, September 8, 2021. For more on the SinoVatican Agreement, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report

(Washington: March 2022), 101–2. 71Gianni Criveller, “A Second Renewal of the Agreement on Episcopal Appointments Announced,” AsiaNews, October 22, 2022; Francis X. Rocca, “The Vatican’s Gamble with Beijing Is 

Costing China’s Catholics,” Atlantic, May 14, 2024. Analysts have attributed the dissatisfaction 

to the Party-controlled Chinese Catholic Bishops’ Conference (affiliated with the official Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association) unilaterally appointing bishops in apparent violation of the 

agreement. The text of the agreement has not been made public, so it cannot be determined 

definitively whether the appointments constitute violations of the agreement, but the Vatican has 

indicated in its statements and official interviews that the content of the agreement governs the 

appointment of bishops. For more on the Sino-Vatican Agreement, see Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 101–2. 72Rome Reports, “Vatican’s Agreement with China Will Be Renewed at the End of the Year,” 

Catholic Weekly, June 24, 2024; Francis X. Rocca, “The Vatican’s Gamble with Beijing Is Costing 

China’s Catholics,” Atlantic, May 14, 2024. 73Francis X. Rocca, “The Vatican’s Gamble with Beijing Is Costing China’s Catholics,” Atlantic, 

May 14, 2024. 74Francis X. Rocca, “The Vatican’s Gamble with Beijing Is Costing China’s Catholics,” Atlantic, 

May 14, 2024. 75Francis X. Rocca, “The Vatican’s Gamble with Beijing Is Costing China’s Catholics,” Atlantic, 

May 14, 2024; Gerard O’Connell, “Interview: The Future of Vatican-China Relations, and Whether 

the Agreement on Bishops Has Paid Off,” America: the Jesuit Review, July 19, 2022. 76Francis X. Rocca, “Vatican-China Rapprochement Resumes with Bishop Consecrations,” Wall 

Street Journal, January 29, 2024; “Minbei, Fujian, Sees China’s Third New Episcopal Ordination,” 

AsiaNews, January 31, 2024; Holy See Press Office, “Resignations and Appointments, 15.07.2023,” 

July 15, 2023; Holy See Press Office, “Resignations and Appointments, 25.01.2024,” January 25, 

2024; Holy See Press Office, “Resignations and Appointments, 31.01.2024,” January 31, 2024; 

Holy See Press Office, “Resignations and Appointments, 22.06.2024,” June 22, 2024; Gerard 

O’Connell, “Interview: The Future of Vatican-China Relations, and Whether the Agreement on 

Bishops Has Paid Off,” America: The Jesuit Review, July 19, 2022. 77Francis X. Rocca, “The Vatican’s Gamble with Beijing Is Costing China’s Catholics,” Atlantic, 

May 14, 2024. 78“保定教区一神父和平信徒‘失踪’” [Baoding Diocese priest and layman “disappeared”], 

AsiaNews, May 16, 2024; “Bishop Shao of Wenzhou Arrested Again,” AsiaNews, January 3, 2024. 

For more information on Bishop Shao Zhumin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2005-00232. 79Holy See Press Office, “Resignations and Appointments, 15.07.2023,” July 15, 2023. 80“Pope Approves Shanghai Bishop Appointment After the Fact,” Al Jazeera, July 15, 2023; 

“Chinese Bishop Shen Bin Transferred to Shanghai, Holy See Learns of Move from Media,” Vatican News, April 4, 2023; “天主教上海教区举行主教就职仪式” [Catholic Diocese of Shanghai 

holds ceremony for installation of bishop], Catholic Church in China, April 4, 2023; “Shen Bin 
Freedom of Religion

93

New Bishop of Shanghai: ‘Unilateral’ Appointment, Vatican Agreement Broken,” AsiaNews, April 

4, 2023; U.S.-China Catholic Association, “A New Bishop for Shanghai,” April 6, 2023; “New Bishop of Shanghai Set for Tomorrow: Bishop Shen Bin in Pole Position,” AsiaNews, April 3, 2023; 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 93. 81Nicole Winfield, “Vatican Makes Fresh Overture to China, Reaffirms That Catholic Church 

Is No Threat to Sovereignty,” Associated Press, May 21, 2024; Matthew Santucci, “It’s Been 100 

Years Since the Catholic Church’s First Council in China,” EWTN Vatican, May 15, 2024. 82 Joseph Shen Bin, “Vatican—Bishop Shen Bin: Rooted in China, To Open New Horizons for 

the Proclamation of the Gospel,” Agenzia Fides, May 21, 2024; Nicole Winfield, “Vatican Makes 

Fresh Overture to China, Reaffirms That Catholic Church Is No Threat to Sovereignty,” Associated Press, May 21, 2024; “Historic First: Chinese Bishop Addresses Vatican Conference,” Inside the 

Vatican Magazine, July 1, 2024; See also Courtney Mares, “Bishop of Shanghai Defends China’s 

Religious Freedom Record at Vatican Conference,” Catholic News Agency, May 22, 2024. 83 Joseph Shen Bin, “Vatican—Bishop Shen Bin: Rooted in China, To Open New Horizons for 

the Proclamation of the Gospel,” Agenzia Fides, May 21, 2024; Giorgio Bernardelli, “上海教务会

议与中国化:沈斌的讲话” [Shanghai Academic Affairs Conference and sinicization: Shen Bin’s 

speech], AsiaNews, May 21, 2024; “Historic First: Chinese Bishop Addresses Vatican Conference,” 

Inside the Vatican Magazine, July 1, 2024. 84“Pope Addresses Catholics in China during Mongolia Visit,” Union of Catholic Asian News, 

September 4, 2023. 85Nicole Winfield and Saruul Enkhbold, “Pope Gives ‘Noble’ Chinese People a Shoutout at Mass 

in Mongolia in Bid to Warm Ties,” Washington Post, September 3, 2023; Gerard O’Connell, “Chinese Catholics among Those Who Welcome Pope Francis during Mongolia Visit,” America: The 

Jesuit Review, September 2, 2023. 86“Pope Addresses Catholics in China during Mongolia Visit,” Union of Catholic Asian News, 

September 4, 2023. 87Gerard O’Connell, “Chinese Catholics among Those Who Welcome Pope Francis during Mongolia Visit,” America: The Jesuit Review, September 2, 2023; Jason Horowitz, “When It Comes to 

China, Pope Francis Keeps Criticism in Check,” New York Times, September 4, 2023. 88“Priest Convicted of ‘Fraud’ for Refusing to Register with the Patriotic Association,” Asia

News, September 8, 2023. 89“Priest Convicted of ‘Fraud’ for Refusing to Register with the Patriotic Association,” Asia

News, September 8, 2023. 90See, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: 

May 2024), 94–95; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 103. 91ChinaAid Association, “Bishop Convicted for Not Joining Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association,” September 13, 2023. 92Matthew Santucci, “Chinese Priest Convicted of ‘Fraud’ for Refusal to Recognize State-Sanctioned Church,” Catholic News Agency, September 15, 2023; “China Launches Database of Christian, Muslim Clergy,” Union of Catholic Asian News, May 24, 2023. 93“[新疆新闻联播]香港伊斯兰教团体代表团参访新疆” [[Xinjiang News Network] Hong Kong 

Islamic Group Delegation Visits Xinjiang], CCTV, August 22, 2023. 94“[新疆新闻联播]香港伊斯兰教团体代表团参访新疆” [[Xinjiang News Network] Hong Kong 

Islamic Group Delegation Visits Xinjiang], CCTV, August 22, 2023. In the video, Azizul Rahman 

Suffiad is known by his Chinese name, Shi Hui. 95Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, “Chronology of Leading Events in the Diocese of Hong 

Kong—2023”; Beijing Center (@TheBeijingCenter), “天主教香港教区内地交流参访团访问TBC” 

[Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong exchange delegation to the mainland visits TBC], WeChat, September 29, 2023; Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, “Hostile Take Over: The CCP 

and Hong Kong’s Religious Communities,” January 30, 2024, 21. 96Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, “Chronology of Leading Events in the Diocese of Hong 

Kong—2023”; Kanis Leung, “The Head of China’s State-Backed Catholic Church Begins Historic 

Trip to Hong Kong,” Associated Press, November 14, 2023. 97“Card Chow in Guangdong: New Bridge with Catholics in Mainland China,” AsiaNews, May 

3, 2024; For more information on the increasing exchanges between the mainland and Hong 

Kong, see also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: 

May 2024), 94. 98“HK’s Oldest Church Displays Chinese Flag Ignoring Criticism,” Union of Catholic Asian 

News, October 2, 2023; Lee Yat Yin, “Patriotic Flag Ceremonies at Hong Kong Mosque ‘Shock’ 

Believers,” Radio Free Asia, October 29, 2023. 99Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023, 9, 11–12. See also Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong 

Foundation, “Hostile Take Over: The CCP and Hong Kong’s Religious Communities,” January 30, 

2024, 24–25. 100Benedict Rogers et al., Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, “Sixteen International Experts Express ‘Profound and Grave Concerns’ about Looming Threat to Religious Freedom and Sacrament of Penance in Hong Kong,” March 13, 2024; Luke Coppen, “Hong Kong Bill 

Threatens Confessional Seal, Warn Advocates,” Pillar, March 13, 2024; Benedict Rogers, “Hong 

Kong’s ‘Article 23’ is an Implicit Threat to the Sacrament of Penance,” Union of Catholic Asian 

News, March 12, 2024, reprinted in Hong Kong Watch, March 12, 2024; Instrument A305 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (Instrument A305). 101Kanis Leung, “How Will a New National Security Law Affect Different Walks of Life in Hong 

Kong?,” Associated Press, March 19, 2024; Matthew Santucci, “Hong Kong’s Draconian National 

Security Law Won’t Affect Seal of Confession, Diocese Says,” Catholic News Agency, March 15, 

2024.
Freedom of Religion

94

102Matthew Santucci, “Hong Kong’s Draconian National Security Law Won’t Affect Seal of Confession, Diocese Says,” Catholic News Agency, March 15, 2024; Safeguarding National Security 

Ordinance (Instrument A305), art. 12.3. 103Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (Instrument A305), arts. 12.1, 12.2; Kanis Leung, 

“How Will a New National Security Law Affect Different Walks of Life in Hong Kong?,” Associated 

Press, March 19, 2024; Ellen Teague and Patrick Hudson, “Hong Kong’s New Security Law Cause 

for ‘Grave Concern,’” Tablet, March 14, 2024; William Yiu, “Hong Kong’s Article 23 Law: Catholic 

Diocese to Preserve Integrity of Confession, City’s Top Cleric Says,” South China Morning Post, 

March 29, 2024. 104ChinaAid Association, “ChinaAid’s Annual Persecution Report 2023: January–December 

2023,” March 1, 2024; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report

(Washington: May 2024), 94–95; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual 

Report (Washington: November 2022), 103–4; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 

2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 103–4. 105ChinaAid Association, “ChinaAid’s Annual Persecution Report 2023: January–December 

2023,” March 1, 2024, 42–49; See also ChinaAid Association, “Crime of Fraud: A New Era of 

Persecution against Christians by the Chinese Communist Party,” January 26, 2024. 106For more information on Zhou Songlin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2024-00125. 107For more information on Ding Zhongfu, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2024-00126. 108Huizhong Wu, “Christian Group and Family Raise Outcry over Detention of Another ‘House 

Church’ Elder in China,” Associated Press, December 20, 2023; ChinaAid Association, “Pastor 

Zhou Songlin and Elder Ding Zhongfu’s Wives Publicly Appeal for Their Innocence,” January 

16, 2024; ChinaAid Association, “‘This Is Actually Political Persecution’: Detained Pastor Zhou 

Songlin Responds to Church Conflict,” May 16, 2024. Earlier that month, church members found 

cameras hidden inside Ganquan Church. See, e.g., “Surveillance Cameras Installed in Christian 

Churches,” Bitter Winter, May 1, 2018; Dominic J. Nardi, “Religious Freedom in China’s High-Tech 

Surveillance State,” U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, September 2019, 1–3; 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 

103. In recent years, PRC authorities have installed surveillance cameras at places of worship 

across the country. 109ChinaAid Association, “安徽合肥甘泉教会周松林牧师、丁中福长老的妻子公开呼吁丈夫无罪”

[The wives of Pastor Zhou Songlin and Elder Ding Zhongfu of Ganquan Church in Hefei, Anhui, 

publicly appeal for their husbands’ innocence], January 3, 2024. 110For more information on Wan Changchun, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2023-00114. 111For more information on Xue Shaoqiang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2024-00111. 112For more information on Cao Binting, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2024-00112. 113For more information on Wan Chunqin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2024-00113. 114Rights Defense Network,“安徽蚌埠活石归正教会教案进展通报(2024年5月10日)” [Progress 

bulletin on case of Bengbu, Anhui’s Living Stone Reformed Church (May 10, 2024)], May 10, 

2024; Qian Lang and Liu Bangyu, “中国地方当局加强监控家庭教会” [Local authorities in China 

strengthen monitoring of house churches], Radio Free Asia, May 14, 2024. 115ChinaAid Association, “Bengbu Cornerstone Reformed Church Christians Prosecuted on 

Fraud Charges,” January 21, 2024; Rights Defense Network, “安徽蚌埠活石归正教会教案进展通

报(2024年5月10日)” [Progress bulletin on case of Bengbu, Anhui’s Living Stone Reformed 

Church (May 10, 2024)], May 10, 2024; Qian Lang and Liu Bangyu, “中国地方当局加强监控家庭

教会” [Local authorities in China strengthen monitoring of house churches], Radio Free Asia, 

May 14, 2024. 116For more information on Hao Ming, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2022-00042. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 103. 117For more information on Wu Jiannan, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2022-00043. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report

(Washington: November 2022), 103. 118ChinaAid Association, “Verdict Announced: Elder Hao Ming and Wu Jiannan Found Guilty 

of Fraud,” April 18, 2024; Rights Defense Network, “四川省德阳市秋雨青草地归正教会郝鸣长老和

武见男长老案宣判:均被判刑3年缓刑5年” [Verdict announced for Elder Hao Ming and Elder Wu 

Jiannan of Qiuyu Qingcaodi Reformed Church in Deyang municipality, Sichuan: Both sentenced 

to 3 years in prison, suspended for 5 years], April 10, 2024. The court also ordered Hao and Wu 

to pay fines of 30,000 yuan (US$4,200) each. 119ChinaAid Association, “律师两次申请会见德阳秋雨青草地教会武见男长老均遭拒” [Lawyer 

requested meeting with Elder Wu Jiannan of Qiuyu Qingcaodi Reformed Church in Deyang 

municipality twice, was rejected both times]; January 22, 2022; ChinaAid Association, “Verdict 

Announced: Elder Hao Ming and Wu Jiannan Found Guilty of Fraud,” April 18, 2024. See also 

ChinaAid Association, “Crime of Fraud: A New Era of Persecution against Christians by the 

Chinese Communist Party,” January 26, 2024. 120Huizhong Wu, “A Chinese Pastor Is Released after 7 Years in Prison, Only to Find Himself Unable to Get an ID,” Associated Press, March 25, 2024; CJ Wu, “‘I Knew I Would Pay a 

Price for My Faith’: China Releases Missionary after Seven Years,” Christianity Today, May 

10, 2024; ChinaAid Association, “Pastor John Cao: I Have Committed the Crime of Fraud,” 

May 3, 2024.
Freedom of Religion

95

121Huizhong Wu, “A Chinese Pastor Is Released after 7 Years in Prison, Only to Find Himself 

Unable to Get an ID,” Associated Press, March 25, 2024. 122Huizhong Wu, “A Chinese Pastor Is Released after 7 Years in Prison, Only to Find Himself 

Unable to Get an ID,” Associated Press, March 25, 2024. 123Gao Zhensai, ChinaAid Association, “快讯: 浙江省温州市洞桥教会教堂十字架面临被政府强

拆” [Newsflash: Dongqiao Church in Wenzhou municipality, Zhejiang province, is facing cross 

demolition by government], August 1, 2023; Gao Zhensai, ChinaAid Association, “安徽省淮南

市谢家集区望峰岗基督教堂收到拆除十字架通知” [Wangfenggang Christian Church in Xiejiaji district, Huainan municipality, Anhui province, received notice to remove cross], March 8, 2024; 

Gao Zhensai, ChinaAid Association, “浙江要求所有宗教活动场所设置‘爱党、爱国、爱教’‘及坚持

宗教中国化’标语,温岭一官方教会加码:门牌附加中国共产党党徽“镰刀锤头‘标志’” [Zhejiang 

requires all religious venues to install slogans “love the Party, love the country, love religion” and 

“uphold the sinicization of religion”; one official Wenling church goes further: Put Chinese Communist Party “hammer and sickle” emblems on doorplates], July 3, 2023. For more information on 

past cross removal, see, e.g., “Chinese Province Seeks to Ban Crosses on Church Roofs,” Guardian, 

May 8, 2015; Ian Johnson, “Decapitated Churches in China’s Christian Heartland,” New York 

Times, May 21, 2016; Lu An, “Crosses Removed from Over 250 Churches in Anhui Province,” 

Bitter Winter, June 9, 2020; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report

(Washington: March 2022), 104. 124Gao Zhensai, ChinaAid Association, “浙江要求所有宗教活动场所设置‘爱党、爱国、爱教’

及‘坚持宗教中国化’标语,温岭一官方教会加码:门牌附加中国共产党党徽“镰刀锤头‘标志’”

[Zhejiang requires all religious venues to install slogans “love the Party, love the country, love 

religion” and “uphold the sinicization of religion”; one official Wenling church goes further: Put 

Chinese Communist Party “hammer and sickle” emblems on doorplates], July 3, 2023. 125Gao Zhensai, ChinaAid Association, “浙江要求所有宗教活动场所设置‘爱党、爱国、爱教’

及‘坚持宗教中国化’标语,温岭一官方教会加码:门牌附加中国共产党党徽“镰刀锤头‘标志’”

[Zhejiang requires all religious venues to install slogans “love the Party, love the country, love 

religion” and “uphold the sinicization of religion”; one official Wenling church goes further: Put 

Chinese Communist Party “hammer and sickle” emblems on doorplates], July 3, 2023. 126For past Commission coverage of PRC authorities’ efforts to crack down on Falun Gong 

using Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 95–96; Congressional-Executive Commission 

on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 104–5; Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 104–5. 127中华人民共和国刑法 [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, 

amended December 29, 2023, effective March 1, 2024, art. 300. 128“Fourteen Falun Gong Practitioner Deaths Due to Persecution Reported in November 2023,” 

Minghui, December 17, 2023; “Reported in 2023: 6,514 Falun Gong Practitioners Arrested or 

Harassed for Their Faith,” Minghui, January 17, 2024; “Reported in 2023: 208 Falun Gong Practitioners Die in the Persecution of Their Faith,” Minghui, January 9, 2024. 129“Shanxi Man Gets Ten Years Without a Trial, in Serious Condition after Two-Month Hunger 

Strike,” Minghui, July 3, 2023; “被迫流离失所20年 侯利军被劫持到山西男子监狱” [Forced to flee 

for 20 years, Hou Lijun was abducted to Shanxi men’s prison], Minghui, June 11, 2023; “In Prison 

for His Belief, Shanxi Man in Life-Threatening Condition due to Hunger Strike and Torture,” 

Minghui, January 11, 2024. For more information on Hou Lijun, see the Commission’s Political 

Prisoner Database record 2024-00174. 130“In Prison for His Belief, Shanxi Man in Life-Threatening Condition Due to Hunger Strike 

and Torture,” Minghui, January 11, 2024; Rights Defense Network, “获刑12年的山西太原市法轮

功学员侯利军监狱遭残酷迫害 生命危急” [Falun Gong practitioner Hou Lijun, who was sentenced 

to 12 years in prison in Taiyuan municipality, Shanxi, was brutally persecuted in prison and his 

life is in danger], January 11, 2024; “被迫流离失所20年 侯利军被劫持到山西男子监狱” [Forced 

to flee for 20 years, Hou Lijun was abducted to Shanxi men’s prison], Minghui, June 11, 2023. 131“法轮功学员侯利军狱中遭迫害 生命危急” [Falun Gong practitioner Hou Lijun was persecuted in prison and his life is in danger], Epoch Times, January 11, 2024. 132“In Prison for His Belief, Shanxi Man in Life-Threatening Condition Due to Hunger Strike 

and Torture,” Minghui, January 11, 2024. 133Rights Defense Network, “获刑12年的山西太原市法轮功学员侯利军监狱遭残酷迫害 生命危

急” [Falun Gong practitioner Hou Lijun, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison in Taiyuan municipality, Shanxi, was brutally persecuted in prison and his life is in danger], January 11, 2024. 134Rights Defense Network, “获刑12年的山西太原市法轮功学员侯利军监狱遭残酷迫害 生命危急” 

[Falun Gong practitioner Hou Lijun, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison in Taiyuan municipality, Shanxi, was brutally persecuted in prison and his life is in danger], January 11, 2024; “

法轮功学员侯利军狱中遭迫害 生命危急” [Falun Gong practitioner Hou Lijun was persecuted in 

prison and his life is in danger], Epoch Times, January 11, 2024. 135Rights Defense Network, “维权网:中国大陆在押政治犯、良心犯月度报告(2024年1月31日)

第100期(共 1682人)(四)” [Rights Defense Network: Monthly report on political prisoners 

and prisoners of conscience detained in mainland China (January 31, 2024) no. 100 (total 1,682 

persons) (4)], January 31, 2024; “郎东月” [Lang Dongyue], Minghui, accessed October 24, 2024. 

For more information on Lang Dongyue, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2024-00071. 136Rights Defense Network, “获刑3年6个月的大庆法轮功学员王彦明的案情及简历” [The case 

and background of Daqing Falun Gong practitioner Wang Yanming, who was sentenced to 3 years 

and 6 months in prison], February 8, 2024; “大庆法轮功学员王彦明被构陷到检察院” [Daqing 

Falun Gong practitioner Wang Yanming was framed and sent to the procuratorate], Minghui, 

September 1, 2023; “大庆第十采油厂王彦明被非法判刑三年半” [Wang Yanming, who worked at 

Daqing No. 10 Oil Production Plant, was illegally sentenced to three and a half years in prison], 
Freedom of Religion

96

Minghui, February 7, 2024; “王彦明” [Wang Yanming], Minghui, accessed October 24, 2024. For 

more information on Wang Yanming, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2024-00059. 137Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, Hearing of the Con- gressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Matthew Robert- son, Doctoral candidate, Australian National University (Canberra) and co-author, “Execution 

by Organ Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,” American Journal of Trans- plantation); Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, Hearing of 

the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (submitted testimony of 

Cynthia Sun, Researcher, Falun Dafa Information Center). 138Edward A. Irons, “China’s Blacklist of Forbidden Religions—The Chinese Communist Party’s 

War on Religious Liberty,” Foref Europe (blog), October 15, 2018. See also Ministry of Public Secu- rity, “公安部关于认定和取缔邪教组织 若干问题的通知” [Notice of the Ministry of Public Security 

on Several Issues Concerning the Identification and Prohibition of Cult Organizations], China21.

org, April 30, 2000; Dui Hua Foundation, “Identifying Cult Organizations in China,” July 10, 2014.

139Edward A. Irons, “China’s Blacklist of Forbidden Religions—The Chinese Communist Party’s 

War on Religious Liberty,” Foref Europe (blog), October 15, 2018; 中华人民共和国刑法 [PRC Crim- inal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 29, 2023, effective 

March 1, 2024, art. 300; Dui Hua Foundation, “Detailed Court Statistics on Article 300, Part II,” 

June 4, 2020. 140 Jiang Tao, “CCP Launches 3-Year ‘Tough Battle’ Against The Church of Almighty God,” 

Bitter Winter, April 2, 2024; Church of Almighty God, “2023 Annual Report on the Chinese Com- munist Government’s Persecution of the Church of Almighty God,” February 7, 2024; Jiang Tao, 

“Post-COVID Purge: Over 2,100 Church of Almighty God Members Arrested in Two Provinces,” 

Bitter Winter, September 7, 2023. 141Church of Almighty God, “2023 Annual Report on the Chinese Communist Government’s 

Persecution of the Church of Almighty God,” February 7, 2024. 142Church of Almighty God, “2023 Annual Report on the Chinese Communist Government’s 

Persecution of the Church of Almighty God,” February 7, 2024; Jiang Tao, “China: New Massive 

Wave of Persecution Against the Church of Almighty God,” Bitter Winter, August 11, 2023. 143Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of Taiwan, “兩岸大事記: 民國112年”[Mainland policy 

and work: Year 112 of the Republic of China], December 26, 2023; 中华人民共和国刑法 [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, amended December 29, 2023, effective 

March 1, 2024, art. 300; Yu-fu Chen and Shelley Shan, “‘New China Laws Risky for Taiwanese,’” 

Taipei Times, June 11, 2024; Zhao Zhangyong, “Taiwan’s Yiguandao Believers Arrested as ‘Cultists’ when Visiting China,” Bitter Winter, January 5, 2024. 144Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of Taiwan, “兩岸大事記: 民國112年两” [Mainland policy and work: Year 112 of the Republic of China], December 26, 2023; Li Yawen, “一貫道信徒

被關押 陸委會:沒必要不要前往大陸” [An Yiguan Dao believer was detained. Mainland Affairs 

Council: There is no need to go to the mainland], Central News Agency, December 26, 2023.
97

IV. Rule of Law in the Justice System

Criminal Justic

Findings

• The criminal justice system remained a political instrument 

used for maintaining social order in furtherance of the Chinese 

Communist Party’s authoritarian rule. The government pun- ishes criminal acts, but it also targets individuals who pursue 

universal human rights, particularly when they independently 

organize or challenge the Party’s authority.

• Government officials arbitrarily detained religious prac- titioners, ethnic minorities, and rights advocates, including 

through extralegal means such as “black jails” and psychiatric 

facilities, or through criminal prosecution under offenses such 

as “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” or crimes endan- gering state security. Some detainees reported being mistreated 

or tortured. After entering the formal legal process, defendants 

sometimes faced prolonged pretrial detention, closed trials, and 

delayed sentencing.

• Reports of detainees being denied counsel and family visits, 

especially in political cases, continued to emerge. In the case of 

rights lawyer Lu Siwei, for example, officials denied a meeting 

request by the lawyer retained by Lu’s wife on grounds that 

the government already had appointed counsel for him. The 

unilateral appointment was said to be intended to allow the 

government to have full control over the proceedings in order 

to secure a conviction.
98

Criminal Justic

Introduction

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, PRC officials continued to use the criminal justice system and various other forms 

of detention to arbitrarily detain individuals. As of June 2024, the 

human rights monitoring group Rights Defense Network documented 1,714 cases of active detentions, which it estimated to be a small 

fraction of the total number of political and religious prisoners in 

China.1

Arbitrary Detention

Authorities’ use of arbitrary detention, including through extralegal or extrajudicial means, did not abate during this reporting 

year.2 The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention considers 

a detention arbitrary if 1) it has no legal basis, 2) it is used to 

suppress the exercise of universal human rights, 3) the detainee’s 

due process rights are violated, 4) asylum seekers or refugees are 

subjected to prolonged detention, or 5) the detention is discriminatory on grounds such as religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and 

political opinion.3 Arbitrary detention violates international human 

rights standards 4 and China’s Constitution, which prohibits unlawful deprivation or restriction of a person’s liberty.5 All forms of arbitrary detention are prohibited under international law, including 

“detention within the framework of criminal justice, administrative 

detention, detention in the context of migration and detention in the 

health-care settings.”6

Extrajudicial Detention

ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE

Reports of enforced disappearance continued to emerge this past 

year.7 Enforced disappearance is any form of deprivation of a person’s liberty carried out by the government or with its acquiescence, 

followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention or to disclose the 

detainee’s whereabouts.8 Examples are as follows:

• In September 2022, petitioner Tao Hong disappeared after she had started an investigation into the death of a fellow 

rights defender, who she suspected was killed by the local government.9 Tao remained missing as of June 2024.10

• In November 2022, online broadcaster Li Qianwei disappeared in Zhejiang province while he was on the road trying to 

locate a missing high school student, who was later found dead 

under unclear circumstances.11 Family members reported Li’s 

disappearance, but police refused to investigate.12 Li’s whereabouts remained unknown as of January 2024.13

• In September 2023, Tan Hua disappeared when she went to 

Hangzhou municipality, Zhejiang province, to advocate for her 

mother’s right to her pension.14 Tan’s mother, Hua Xiuzhen,

also disappeared shortly after she demanded that authorities 

release Tan.15 Their whereabouts were unknown until December 2023 when Hua returned home and revealed that they had 

been in detention for nearly a hundred days.16
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BLACK JAILS

The informal term “black jail” refers to buildings such as hotels 

and training centers that government officials or their agents use to 

detain people.17 These extralegal detention facilities operate under 

different names, including “assistance and service centers” or “legal 

education centers.”18 Their existence and use have no legal basis, 

and people detained in such sites—many of whom are petitioners 19

and Falun Gong practitioners 20—do not know when they will be 

released and do not have any procedural protection.21

Physical abuse reportedly took place at some black jails. Rights 

advocate Wan Wenying, for example, was arbitrarily detained multiple times in connection with her support for a protest.22 During 

a recent detention in September 2023, which took place in a hotel 

room in Shanghai municipality, Wan’s captor reportedly knelt on her 

and beat her, resulting in at least two broken ribs.23 In another example, authorities detained petitioner Ye Zhong a total of 16 times 

in Beijing municipality and Fuzhou municipality, Fujian province, 

between October 2016 and May 2023.24 These detentions took place 

at various facilities, including villas, a hospital, and a residential 

unit, and their duration ranged between 1 and 52 days.25 Ye suffered beating and torture during these detentions.26

PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES

Forcibly committing individuals without mental illness to psychiatric facilities (bei jingshenbing, 被精神病) for acts such as expressing 

political opinions or grievances against the government continued 

during this past year,27 despite domestic legal provisions prohibiting 

such abuse.28 In particular, the U.N. Principles for the Protection of 

Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health 

Care provides that a “determination that a person has a mental 

illness shall be made in accordance with internationally accepted 

medical standards” and must not be based on “political . . . or any 

other reason not directly relevant to mental health status.”29

Human rights organization Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch (CRLW) 

reported six politically motivated cases of forcible commitment to psychiatric facilities that took place in 2023.30 While the number of reported cases decreased from that of 2022, this does not necessarily reflect 

an actual reduction in this form of arbitrary detention, since PRC authorities enforce strict censorship of such data.31 CRLW also observed 

that the central and local government failed to give sufficient attention 

to the proper implementation of the PRC Mental Health Law during 

the decade since the law was enacted.32

Two incidents reported this past year underscore the lack of protections in the process of involuntary commitment in China.33 In 

one case, a husband and wife from Xi’an municipality, Shaanxi province, had each other involuntarily committed to psychiatric facilities 

in 2022 and 2023 due to domestic disputes.34 The husband was institutionalized against his will for 80 days, and was forcibly medicated and subjected to electric shock treatment.35 The wife reported 

that in the three days she was hospitalized, she was “tasered, straitjacketed, forced to take medication and undergo electroconvulsive 

therapy  . . ..”36 Hospital staff said they began treatment and carried out coercive measures based not on diagnoses they had made 
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but on representations made by each spouse that the other posed 

a risk of harming others, although neither of them were mental 

health professionals.37 After being released, both spouses separately 

obtained mental health assessments, which indicated that they did 

not have any mental health issues that would require involuntary 

commitment.38 In another case, the death by suicide of a 62-year-old 

man whose son had him involuntarily committed in Zhangjiajie municipality, Hunan province, similarly raised concerns about the right 

to refuse treatment.39 Commitment to a psychiatric facility may be 

considered illegal confinement unless the patient has consented to 

treatment or has been adjudged by a court to be fully or partially 

incapacitated, according to two legal practitioners.40

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION

Chinese authorities continued to suppress freedoms—such as 

protest,41 movement,42 and religion43—through administrative detention,44 which is among several types of administrative penalties 

authorized by the PRC Public Security Administration Punishment 

Law and the PRC Administrative Penalty Law,45 and referenced in 

about 90 domestic laws and regulations.46 Some political detainees 

are subjected to further criminal detention and prosecution after 

completion of administration detention.47 Examples are as follows:

• In August 2023, authorities detained Christian Chen Wensheng at the airport in Shanghai municipality as he prepared 

to leave China to evangelize abroad.48 After sending him back 

to his place of origin in Hengyang municipality, Hunan province, 

police ordered him to serve 15 days of administrative detention, 

and later criminally detained him on the charge of “organizing 

or providing financial support to an unlawful gathering.”49 In 

June 2024, the Shigu District People’s Court in Hengyang sentenced Chen to one year and seven months in prison.50

• In September 2023, authorities ordered rights defender Wang 

Mo to serve 10 days of administrative detention for the third 

time in three months.51 Beginning in 2014, Wang had been repeatedly subjected to administrative and criminal punishment 

in connection with his efforts to advocate for others’ rights and 

promote democracy.52

RETENTION IN CUSTODY

The PRC Supervision Law (Supervision Law) 53 authorizes the 

National Supervisory Commission (NSC) and its local branches to 

investigate suspected official misconduct using methods including 

“retention in custody” (liuzhi, 留置), which allows the NSC and its 

local branches to hold individuals for up to six months without legal 

representation.54 The law applies to “Communist Party members or 

public sector personnel—virtually anyone working directly or indirectly for the government.”55 In the past year, there likely has been 

an uptick in the use of liuzhi in the private sector, according to 

incomplete statistics reported by a China-based business firm.56 Between January and May 2024, authorities reportedly enforced coercive measures, including liuzhi, on executives from 14 publicly traded companies for “suspected bribery,” among other reasons.57 Some 

analysts speculated that the crackdown was politically motivated, 
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as the government tried to assign blame for the economic downturn 

and create optimal conditions for rolling out its economic policies.58

Individuals retained in custody are held incommunicado and some 

reported being tortured. A notable case was that of Wang Liang, vice 

president of China News Service.59 In November 2023, Wang was 

sentenced to 13 years and 6 months in prison based on allegations 

of corruption.60 After sentencing, Wang, through his lawyer, filed a 

complaint in which he alleged that government investigators forced 

him to confess by torturing him during retention in custody between 

May and November 2022.61 Wang reported that officials broke his 

toe bone, subjected him to prolonged interrogation, deprived him of 

water and sleep, prohibited him from moving while sitting down, 

and threatened to withhold his wife’s cancer medication.62 About 

three weeks after filing the complaint, the lawyer told a newspaper 

that despite being assured by the Discipline Inspection Commission 

in Yunnan province that it would transfer the case, he had not been 

contacted by any government agency about the matter.63

Abuse of Criminal Provisions

PRC authorities continued to suppress the exercise of universal 

human rights through the use of criminal charges.64 Commonly applied criminal charges include the following:

• Crimes endangering state security is a category of 12 

offenses that carry a maximum sentence of life imprisonment 

and possibly the death penalty and have been lodged against 

government critics and rights lawyers.65 Court judgments for 

this type of case are not disclosed,66 and some defendants are 

tried in closed proceedings.67 For example, Uyghur scholar Rahile Dawut was tried for “separatism” in a closed proceeding in 

December 2018.68 The life sentence imposed on her was not announced through official channels and did not surface until September 2023.69 Advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch 

have characterized Dawut’s detention as arbitrary.70

Amendment of the PRC Counterespionage Law

A recent development of note is the amendment of the PRC Counterespionage Law (effective July 1, 2023), which expanded the law’s application.71 Thereafter, the Ministry of State Security (MSS) published 

an article explaining the circumstances under which a person would 

be subject to investigation, which range from refusal to cooperate with 

investigators, to foreigners’ failure to leave the country or relocate at 

the request of state security agencies, and other non-espionage activities that could “endanger state security.”72 The MSS also published 10 

example cases involving alleged espionage, including the case of Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor.73 Western governments, 

however, generally viewed their detention as an act of “hostage diplomacy,” in which the PRC government tried to exert pressure on the Canadian government for the release of a PRC citizen.74 In addition, PRC 

authorities alleged that they had uncovered U.S.- and U.K.-led espionage 

activities, but they did not provide the information needed to authenticate their claims.75
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Amendment of the PRC Counterespionage Law—Continued

The enforcement of the amended Counterespionage Law contributed to 

a reduction in business travel to China due to data and personal security concerns.76 Authorities also applied the amended law against tourists and scholars visiting China, including Chinese scholar Fan Yuntao,

who disappeared after returning to China from a teaching position in 

Japan.77

• Picking quarrels and provoking trouble. Authorities 

used “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” under Article 293 

of the PRC Criminal Law to punish individuals, including petitioners and rights advocates.78 Chinese legal experts describe 

this criminal charge as a “pocket crime,” in that it is “so broadly 

defined and ambiguously worded that prosecutors can apply it 

to almost any activity they deem undesirable, even if it may not 

otherwise meet the standards of criminality.”79 In August 2023, 

the Supreme People’s Court published a study about how this 

article was implemented in Zhejiang and Fujian provinces.80

Admitting that the charge’s wide application was a problem, 

the authors of the study identified several contributing factors, 

including a lack of clarity in the scope of the offense, officials’ 

inconsistent understanding of the offense’s applicability to petitioning, and the practice of sometimes treating administrative 

violations as criminal offenses.81 Some observers said that the 

study would have limited impact without legislative amendments and judicial reforms.82 In March 2024, a group of lawyers selected 10 representative human rights cases of 2023, the 

majority of which involved the “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” charge, departing from similar annual selections of 

past years, where the majority of cases involved endangering 

state security charges.83

• Other Criminal Law provisions. Authorities continued to 

charge members of religious communities and spiritual movements with “organizing and using a cult organization to undermine implementation of the law” under Article 300 of the PRC 

Criminal Law.84 In addition, authorities accused individuals of 

other criminal offenses, including “gathering a crowd to disturb 

social order”85 and “illegal business activity,”86 when in fact the 

individuals were engaged in activities protected under international human rights standards.87 [For more information on the 

PRC’s repression of religious groups, see Chapter 3—Freedom 

of Religion. For more information on the repression of freedom 

of speech and assembly in China, see Chapter 1—Freedom of 

Expression.]

Torture and Abuse

In observing the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, the United Nations reiterated the principle that “Torture is 

a crime under international law. According to all relevant instruments, it is absolutely prohibited and cannot be justified under any 

circumstances.”88 However, reports indicate that the practice of 
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torture and abuse of detainees continued in China, a violation of 

the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which China is a signatory.89

Examples are as follows:

• Multiple reports of the torture and abuse of Falun Gong practitioners emerged this past year,90 including the case of Li Lizhuang, who was serving a 10 years and 8 months prison term 

at the Hulan Prison in Harbin municipality, Heilongjiang province, when he was abused.91 Prison officials, sometimes using 

other inmates as proxies, reportedly beat Li, pepper sprayed 

and electrocuted his face and sensitive areas, deprived him of 

sleep, and forced him to wear a straitjacket.92

• Petitioner Xie Junbiao reported that when he was held at 

the Shuangliu PSB Detention Center in Chengdu municipality, 

Sichuan province, he suffered retaliation for complaining about 

the lack of drinking water by protesting in front of a security 

camera.93 The guard overseeing the cell falsely accused Xie of 

misconduct and used that as justification for carrying out different forms of abuse, including shackling Xie’s hands and feet and 

binding the shackles with handcuffs over 13 days, rendering 

him unable to sleep or to stand up straight.94

Death in Custody

According to reports, custodial torture was confirmed or suspected 

to have led to death, as in the following cases:

• In November 2023, the Kuitun City People’s Court in Yili 

(Ili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, sentenced eight police officers to between 3 and 

13 years in prison for extracting a confession from Sun Renze

using violence that resulted in his death in November of 2018.95

The officers were on a special task force established in January 2018 as part of the anti-crime campaign called “Specialized Struggle to Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate 

Vice” (Saohei Chu’e Zhuanxiang Douzheng, 扫黑除恶专项斗争).96

Pressuring Sun to confess, the police officers transferred him to 

another detention facility; the facility’s director requested that 

the security camera be turned off during Sun’s interrogation.97

The officer responsible for the camera, however, secretly disobeyed the request, and the video recording became evidence 

that showed Sun being subjected to various kinds of torture 

within a seven-hour period, which included stripping off his 

clothes, binding him to an interrogation chair, suspending him 

on a metal frame while weighing down his abdomen, electrocuting him, and suffocating him using water and wet towels over 

10 times, each lasting up to 16 minutes.98 Sun ultimately was 

rendered unconscious and died after 43 days.99 After the incident, police claimed that Sun had choked while drinking water, 

and some involved officers produced fabricated video evidence to 

conceal their actions.100 At trial, the court strictly limited the 

number of audience members allowed to attend the proceeding, 

and an investigative media report on the case was taken down 

shortly after publication.101
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• In December 2023, police in Nyemo (Nimu) county, Lhasa 

municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region, detained ethnic Tibetan university student Tsedron and later informed her family 

that she suddenly fell and could not stand up again.102 Tsedron 

died in a hospital about two weeks later in January 2024.103

Given that Tsedron was healthy before the detention and that 

authorities denied the family’s repeated requests to view her 

body, some speculated that her death was caused by police brutality.104 Other individuals whose death involved possible torture included rights defenders Ye Zhong and Sun Lin.105

Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location

Chinese authorities continued to abuse the form of detention known 

as “residential surveillance at a designated location” (RSDL), which 

the PRC Criminal Procedure Law reserves for situations where the 

detainee does not have a permanent residence or if the case involves 

state security or terrorism.106 The law does not provide for the right 

to family visits, requiring only that the family be notified of the 

fact of the detention within 24 hours if possible; it does not require 

the disclosure of the detention location.107 The law further subjects 

counsel visits to approval by the investigation unit.108 A group of 

U.N. experts deemed RSDL “analogous to incommunicado and secret 

detention and tantamount to enforced disappearance,” all of which 

heighten the risk of torture and abuse.109 Given the measure’s lack 

of effective oversight and legal certainty, some experts have called 

for it to be abolished.110

Reports emerged this past year showing examples of PRC authorities’ misuse of RSDL. For example, public security officials in Nantong municipality, Jiangsu province, detained petitioner Zhu Peijuan under RSDL on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking 

trouble” when she was en route to Beijing municipality to file a 

complaint about alleged corrupt practices by Nantong officials.111

The crime she was charged with, however, was not a statutory basis 

for the application of RSDL, and Zhu’s husband underscored the 

fact that she had a permanent residence, further claiming that the 

detention was retaliatory in nature.112 In another example, citizen 

journalist Ou Biaofeng, whom authorities in Hunan province detained for “inciting subversion of state power,” told his wife that 

he suffered torture during RSDL in 2020 and that he was asked 

to make video recordings saying that public security officials had 

treated him well.113

Denial of Counsel and Family Visits

The Commission observed cases in which Chinese authorities denied detainees the right to counsel and family visits in violation of 

international law.114 While domestic legal provisions permit counsel 

and family visits, they do not describe such visits as rights.115 In 

particular, the PRC Criminal Procedure Law does not provide for 

family visits per se but permits visitation only if the family member is acting as a defense representative.116 The law likewise circumscribes counsel visits during the investigation phase if a case 

involves state security, requiring prior permission by relevant authorities.117
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For example, officials at the Xindu District PSB Detention Center 

in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province, denied a request made 

by a lawyer to meet with Lu Siwei, on grounds that Lu already 

was represented by government-appointed legal counsel.118 Lu, a 

rights lawyer, had had his license revoked, apparently for providing 

legal representation in politically sensitive cases. He tried to flee 

China and travel to the United States via Southeast Asia to reunite 

with his family,119 but Lao authorities intercepted him in July 2023 

and repatriated him to China, where he faced criminal prosecution 

for leaving the country unlawfully.120 The lawyer mentioned above, 

who made the meeting request, was retained by Lu’s wife, who had 

not been informed that the government had already appointed Lu 

counsel.121 A U.S.-based Chinese lawyer opined that the motivation 

behind the government’s unilateral appointment of counsel was to 

gain complete control over the legal process to secure a conviction.122

Legal Developments

Recent legal developments of note affecting the criminal justice 

system include the following:

• In December 2023, the National People’s Congress Standing 

Committee amended the PRC Criminal Law, in part to bring 

sentencing ranges for bribe-giving more in line with those for 

bribe-taking.123 The amendment also provides for enhanced sentencing for certain types of bribery, including bribery committed 

by public servants, and bribing officials in specified sectors such 

as work safety and food and drug regulation.124

• In April 2024, the Ministry of State Security issued two sets 

of procedural rules for its enforcement operations, one for administrative cases and the other for criminal cases.125 In an 

administrative investigation, which can become the basis of a 

criminal prosecution, a suspect is required to speak to investigators, thereby presenting a conflict with the right to remain 

silent (i.e., the right against self-incrimination) under the PRC 

Criminal Procedure Law.126 The rules also encompass conduct 

completed outside of China and authorize officials to search 

electronic devices,127 raising concerns over violation of the privacy rights of international travelers and the PRC government’s 

extension of its “long-arm jurisdiction.”128

• In May 2024, the Supreme People’s Court and four other official bodies issued the “Opinion on Lawfully Punishing Obstinate ‘Taiwan Independence’ Offenders” for Committing or Inciting Separatism, effective June 21, 2024.129 The document lays 

out criteria under which activities promoting “Taiwan independence” may constitute the crime of “separatism” under Article 

103 of the PRC Criminal Law, as well as factors relevant to 

sentencing.130 It also specifies that the death penalty is appli- cable and that absconders are subject to in absentia proceed- ings.131
106

Notes to Chapter 4—Criminal Justice

1Rights Defense Network, “维权网:中国大陆在押政治犯、良心犯月度报告(2024年6月30日)第

105期(共 1714人)” [Rights Defense Network: Monthly report on political prisoners and prisoners of conscience detained in mainland China (June 30, 2024) no. 105 (total 1714 persons)], 

June 30, 2024. 2Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 

2022), 117. 3See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its 78th session, (19–27 April 2017), A/HRC/

WGAD/2017/5, July 28, 2017. 4Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 9; International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry 

into force March 23, 1976, art. 9. 5中华人民共和国宪法 [PRC Constitution], passed and effective December 4, 1982, amended 

March 11, 2018, art. 37. 6U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Deliberation No. 11 on 

Prevention of Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty in the Context of Public Health Emergencies, May 

8, 2020, para. 7. 7“台湾八旗文化总编疑在中国失联 陆委会表关注” [Chief editor of Taiwan Baqi Culture believed to have been disappeared in China, Mainland Affairs Council expressed concerns],” Radio 

Free Asia, April 20, 2023. 8Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by U.N. 

General Assembly, A/RES/47/133 of December 18, 1992; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of 

the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Addendum, Best Practices on 

Enforced Disappearances in Domestic Criminal Legislation, A/HRC/16/48/Add. 3, December 28, 

2010. 9Rights Defense Network, “被中共当局强迫失踪10个月的江苏张家港市维权人士陶红的案情和简

历” [Facts and background of the case of Tao Hong, rights defender from Zhangjiagang city, 

Jiangsu, forcibly disappeared by the Communist government], July 9, 2023. 10Rights Defense Network, “维权网:中国大陆在押政治犯、良心犯月度报告(2024年6月30日)第

105期(共 1714人)” [Rights Defense Network: Monthly report on political prisoners and prisoners of conscience detained in mainland China (June 30, 2024) no. 105 (total 1714 persons)], 

June 30, 2024. 11Rights Defense Network, “早期关注胡鑫宇死亡案的网络主播李前伟被强迫失踪已近3个月 家属

报案警方不予立案” [Online broadcaster Li Qianwei, who was among the earliest to pay attention 

to the case of Hu Xinyu’s death, was forcibly disappeared for nearly three months; family filed a 

report but police refused to open a case], February 12, 2023; Chen Pinjie, “失踪八十天 警方称胡

鑫宇有‘厌学情绪’家属难接受” [Missing for 80 days; family finds it hard to accept police’s claim 

that Hu Xinyu “was feeling tired of school”], Radio Free Asia, January 4, 2023. 12Rights Defense Network, “早期关注胡鑫宇死亡案的网络主播李前伟被强迫失踪已近3个月 家属

报案警方不予立案” [Online broadcaster Li Qianwei, who was among the earliest to pay attention 

to the case of Hu Xinyu’s death, was forcibly disappeared for nearly three months; family filed a 

report but police refused to open a case], February 12, 2023. 13Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “李前伟Li Qian Wei,” January 24, 2024. 14Rights Defense Network, “中国大陆疫苗受害者、人权捍卫者谭华及其母亲华秀珍遭强迫失踪近

百天后获释” [Tan Hua (rights defender and victim of vaccine from mainland China) and her 

mother released after being forcibly disappeared for nearly a hundred days], December 23, 2023. 15Rights Defense Network, “中国大陆疫苗受害者、人权捍卫者谭华及其母亲华秀珍遭强迫失踪近

百天后获释” [Tan Hua (rights defender and victim of vaccine from mainland China) and her 

mother released after being forcibly disappeared for nearly a hundred days], December 23, 2023. 16Rights Defense Network, “中国大陆疫苗受害者、人权捍卫者谭华及其母亲华秀珍遭强迫失踪近

百天后获释” [Tan Hua (rights defender and victim of vaccine from mainland China) and her 

mother released after being forcibly disappeared for nearly a hundred days], December 23, 2023. 17“中国黑监狱大观” [Overview of black jails in China], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019. 18“中国黑监狱大观” [Overview of black jails in China], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019. 19See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “王蓉文进京上访被带回后关进黑监狱” [Wang 

Rongwen returned and detained in a black jail after going to Beijing for petitioning], February 

22, 2024. 20See, e.g., “2023年山东至少1713名法轮功学员遭中共迫害” [In Shandong, over 1713 Falun Gong 

practitioners were persecuted by the Chinese Communist Party in 2023], February 17, 2024. 21“中国黑监狱大观” [Overview of black jails in China], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2019. 22Rights Defense Network, “上海维权人士万文英女士被关黑监狱一个半月” [Shanghai rights 

defender Ms. Wan Wenying detained in black jail for a month and a half], November 16, 2023. 23Rights Defense Network, “上海维权人士万文英女士被关黑监狱一个半月” [Shanghai rights 

defender Ms. Wan Wenying detained in black jail for a month and a half], November 16, 2023. 24Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “叶钟控告黑监狱迫害人权” [Ye Zhong complains about 

black jails’ role in abuse of human rights], July 30, 2023. 25Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “叶钟控告黑监狱迫害人权” [Ye Zhong complains about 

black jails’ role in abuse of human rights], July 30, 2023. 26Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “叶钟控告黑监狱迫害人权” [Ye Zhong complains about 

black jails’ role in abuse of human rights], July 30, 2023. 27Yanxi Mou and Dinah Gardner, Safeguard Defenders, “Drugged and Detained: China’s Psychiatric Prisons,” 2022; Liya Su, “Warring Couple in China Send Each Other to Mental Hospitals, Shocking Public and Raising Fears over Lax Rules for Psychiatric Admission,” South China 

Morning Post, July 1, 2023; Shou Yi, “马上评|一个千万富翁之死:精神病院是否存在收治漏洞?”
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107

[Urgent opinion | The death of a millionaire: Are there loopholes in admission procedures at 

psychiatric hospitals?], Paper, August 25, 2023. 28中华人民共和国精神卫生法 [PRC Mental Health Law], passed October 26, 2012, effective May 

1, 2013, arts. 27, 29, 30, 32, 75(5), 78(1); Supreme People’s Procuratorate, 人民检察院强制医疗执行

检察办法(试行) [Measures on the Examination of Implementation of Compulsory Medical Treatment by People’s Procuratorates (Trial)], issued May 13, 2016, effective June 2, 2016, arts. 9, 12. 29Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of 

Mental Health Care, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 46/119 of December 17, 1991, 

principle 4(1), (2). 30Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch “2023年中国精神健康与人权(被精神病)年终报告” [2023 

year-end report on mental health and human rights (forcible commitment to psychiatric facilities)], March 14, 2024. 31Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch “2023年中国精神健康与人权(被精神病)年终报告” [2023 

year-end report on mental health and human rights (forcible commitment to psychiatric facilities)], March 14, 2024. 32Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch “2023年中国精神健康与人权(被精神病)年终报告” [2023 

year-end report on mental health and human rights (forcible commitment to psychiatric facilities)], March 14, 2024. 33Miao Qiaoying, “夫妻先后把对方送精神病院,究竟谁‘有病’?是否涉嫌非法拘禁?” [A couple sent each other to psychiatric hospitals, so who is actually “ill”? Is there any suspicion of illegal detention?], Huashang Daily, reprinted in The Paper, June 27, 2023; Liya Su, “Warring Couple 

in China Send Each Other to Mental Hospitals, Shocking Public and Raising Fears over Lax 

Rules for Psychiatric Admission,” South China Morning Post, July 1, 2023; Shou Yi, “马上评|一

个千万富翁之死:精神病院是否存在收治漏洞?” [Urgent opinion | The death of a millionaire: Are 

there loopholes in admission procedures at psychiatric hospitals?], The Paper, August 25, 2023. 34Liya Su, “Feuding Couple in China Force Each Other into Psychiatric Care, Shocking Public,” 

South China Morning Post, July 1, 2023; Miao Qiaoying, “夫妻先后把对方送精神病院,究竟谁‘有

病’?是否涉嫌非法拘禁?” [A couple sent each other to psychiatric hospitals, so who is actually 

“ill”? Is there any suspicion of illegal detention?], Huashang Daily, reprinted in The Paper, June 

27, 2023; Lyric Li, “A Husband Was Committed to a Psych Ward. Then He Committed His Wife.,” 

Washington Post, June 29, 2023; Ye Zhanhang, “Xi’an Husband and Wife Force Each Other into 

Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment,” Sixth Tone, June 28, 2023. 35Liya Su, “Warring Couple in China Send Each Other to Mental Hospitals, Shocking Public 

and Raising Fears over Lax Rules for Psychiatric Admission,” South China Morning Post, July 

1, 2023; Miao Qiaoying, “夫妻先后把对方送精神病院,究竟谁 ‘有病’?是否涉嫌非法拘禁?” [A 

couple sent each other to psychiatric hospitals, so who is actually “ill”? Is there any suspicion of 

illegal detention?], Huashang Daily, reprinted in The Paper, June 27, 2023. 36Lyric Li, “A Husband Was Committed to a Psych Ward. Then He Committed His Wife.,” 

Washington Post, June 29, 2023; Miao Qiaoying, “夫妻先后把对方送精神病院,究竟谁‘有病’?是

否涉嫌非法拘禁?” [A couple sent each other to psychiatric hospitals, so who is actually “ill”? Is 

there any suspicion of illegal detention?], Huashang Daily, reprinted in The Paper, June 27, 2023. 37Liya Su, “Warring Couple in China Send Each Other to Mental Hospitals, Shocking Public 

and Raising Fears over Lax Rules for Psychiatric Admission,” South China Morning Post, July 

1, 2023; Miao Qiaoying, “夫妻先后把对方送精神病院,究竟谁‘有病’?是否涉嫌非法拘禁?” [A 

couple sent each other to psychiatric hospitals, so who is actually “ill”? Is there any suspicion of 

illegal detention?], Huashang Daily, reprinted in The Paper, June 27, 2023. 38Liya Su, “Warring Couple in China Send Each Other to Mental Hospitals, Shocking Public 

and Raising Fears over Lax Rules for Psychiatric Admission,” South China Morning Post, July 

1, 2023; Miao Qiaoying, “夫妻先后把对方送精神病院,究竟谁‘有病’?是否涉嫌非法拘禁?” [A 

couple sent each other to psychiatric hospitals, so who is actually “ill”? Is there any suspicion of 

illegal detention?], Huashang Daily, reprinted in The Paper, June 27, 2023. 39Shou Yi, “马上评|一个千万富翁之死:精神病院是否存在收治漏洞?” [Urgent opinion | The 

death of a millionaire: Are there loopholes in admission procedures at psychiatric hospitals?], The 

Paper, August 25, 2023. 40Liya Su, “Warring Couple in China Send Each Other to Mental Hospitals, Shocking Public 

and Raising Fears over Lax Rules for Psychiatric Admission,” South China Morning Post, July 

1, 2023; Miao Qiaoying, “夫妻先后把对方送精神病院,究竟谁‘有病’?是否涉嫌非法拘禁?” [A 

couple sent each other to psychiatric hospitals, so who is actually “ill”? Is there any suspicion of 

illegal detention?], Huashang Daily, reprinted in The Paper, June 27, 2023. 41 Inventory of speech-based prosecution in China (@SpeechFreedomCN), “广东省陆河县男子

朱某寿 . . ..” [Zhu Moushou, male from Luhe county, Guangdong province  . . ..], X, August 11, 

2023, 10:46 p.m. 42Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “上海杨立进京信访被带回后拘留” [Shanghai Yang Li detained after traveling to Beijing for petitioning], April 23, 2024. 43ChinaAid Association, “安徽阜阳麦种归正教会主日受冲击,常顺传道等9位基督徒被拘留”

[Maizhong Reformed Church in Fuyang, Anhui, raided on Sunday; 9 Christians including Preacher Chang Shun detained], March 14, 2024. 44Rights Defense Network, “辽宁访民李晓东因60天内三次上访被公安拘留七天” [Petitioner Li 

Xiaodong from Liaoning detained for seven days by public security officials for petitioning three 

times within 60 days], January 15, 2023. 45中华人民共和国治安管理处罚法 [PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law], 

passed August 28, 2005, amended October 26, 2012, effective January 1, 2013, art. 10; 中华人民

共和国行政处罚法 [PRC Administrative Penalty Law], passed March 17, 1996, amended January 

22, 2021, effective July 15, 2021, art. 9. 46Ministry of Public Security, 违反公安行政管理行为的名称及其适用意见 [Opinion on the Titles 

and Applicable Laws for Public Security Administrative Violations], issued August 6, 2020.
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47See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “湖南传道人因聚会被拘留转刑拘” [Preacher in 

Hunan detained for gathering now subject to criminal detention], June 12, 2023. 48Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “陈文胜因传福音被拘留期满转刑拘” [Chen Wensheng, 

having completed administrative detention, was criminally detained for spreading the Gospels], 

September 22, 2023; ChinaAid Association, “湖南衡阳基督徒陈文胜被控‘组织、资助非法聚集罪’

判刑” [Christian Chen Wensheng from Hengyang, Hunan, was charged and sentenced for “organizing and funding illegal gatherings”], June 20, 2024. 49Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “陈文胜因传福音被拘留期满转刑拘” [Chen Wensheng, 

having completed administrative detention, was criminally detained for spreading the Gospels], 

September 22, 2023; ChinaAid Association, “湖南衡阳基督徒陈文胜被控‘组织、资助非法聚集罪’

判刑” [Christian Chen Wensheng from Hengyang, Hunan, was charged and sentenced for “organizing and funding illegal gatherings”], June 20, 2024. 50ChinaAid Association, “湖南衡阳基督徒陈文胜被控‘组织、资助非法聚集罪’判刑” [Christian Chen Wensheng from Hengyang, Hunan, was charged and sentenced for “organizing and 

funding illegal gatherings”], June 20, 2024. 51Rights Defense Network, “今天江苏人权捍卫者王默第三次遭行政拘留” [Today, Jiangsu rights 

defender Wang Mo was administratively detained for the third time], September 10, 2023. 52Rights Defense Network, “今天江苏人权捍卫者王默第三次遭行政拘留” [Today, Jiangsu rights 

defender Wang Mo was administratively detained for the third time], September 10, 2023. 53中华人民共和国监察法 [PRC Supervision Law], passed and effective March 20, 2018. 54中华人民共和国监察法 [PRC Supervision Law], passed and effective March 20, 2018, arts. 22, 

43.55Amnesty International, “China: New Supervision Law a Systemic Threat to Human Rights,” 

March 20, 2018. 56“31家上市公司董事长被带走调查” [Directors of 31 listed companies taken away for investigation], Sohu, May 14, 2024. 57Zifei Chen, “三中全会前 住建系官员遭查 多名上市公司高管被留置” [Before the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, officials from the 

Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development were investigated and many executives of 

listed companies were detained], Radio Free Asia, May 3, 2024; Wu Simin, “多地住建系统官员

被查,住建反腐将聚焦三大板块” [Officials within the residential construction sector in multiple 

locations are being investigated; focusing on the three major types of anti-corruption work in the 

residential construction sector], Yicai, April 30, 2024. 58Zifei Chen, “三中全会前 住建系官员遭查 多名上市公司高管被留置” [Before the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, officials from the 

Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development were investigated and many executives of 

listed companies were detained], Radio Free Asia, May 3, 2024. 59“中新網前副總裁控滇紀委刑訊 王亮等3人去年裁貪污罪成 代表律師現實名舉報” [Former vice 

president of China News Network accused Yunnan Commission for Discipline Inspection of torture; Wang Liang and three others convicted of corruption last year; the lawyer reported the case 

in real name], Ming Pao Canada, March 17, 2024. 60“中新網前副總裁控滇紀委刑訊 王亮等3人去年裁貪污罪成 代表律師現實名舉報” [Former vice 

president of China News Network accused Yunnan Commission for Discipline Inspection of torture; Wang Liang and three others convicted of corruption last year; the lawyer reported the case 

in real name], Ming Pao Canada, March 17, 2024. 61“中新網前副總裁控滇紀委刑訊 王亮等3人去年裁貪污罪成 代表律師現實名舉報” [Former vice 

president of China News Network accused Yunnan Commission for Discipline Inspection of torture; Wang Liang and three others convicted of corruption last year; the lawyer reported the case 

in real name], Ming Pao Canada, March 17, 2024. 62“中新網前副總裁控滇紀委刑訊 王亮等3人去年裁貪污罪成 代表律師現實名舉報” [Former vice 

president of China News Network accused Yunnan Commission for Discipline Inspection of torture; Wang Liang and three others convicted of corruption last year; the lawyer reported the case 

in real name], Ming Pao Canada, March 17, 2024; “控告状:中新网副总裁王亮对云南省纪委刑讯逼

供炮制冤案的控告信” [Complaint: Complaint letter by China News Network Vice President Wang 

Liang against Yunnan Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection for fabricating an unjust 

case through torture,” reprinted in Boxun, February 21, 2024. 63“中新網前副總裁控滇紀委刑訊 王亮等3人去年裁貪污罪成 代表律師現實名舉報” [Former vice 

president of China News Network accused Yunnan Commission for Discipline Inspection of torture; Wang Liang and three others convicted of corruption last year; the lawyer reported the case 

in real name], Ming Pao Canada, March 17, 2024. 64Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 110–11; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: 

November 2022), 119–20. 65中华人民共和国刑法 [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, 

amended December 29, 2023, effective March 1, 2024, arts. 102–5, 107–13. 66Dui Hua Foundation, “China: All State Security Judgments Purged from Supreme Court 

Site,” July 26, 2021. 67See, e.g., Christian Shepherd, “China Tries Rights Lawyer in Case Amnesty Denounces as a 

Sham,” Reuters, December 26, 2018. 68Dui Hua Foundation, “Life Sentence for Professor Rahile Dawut Confirmed,” September 21, 

2023. For more information on Rahile Dawut, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2018-00552. 69Dui Hua Foundation, “Life Sentence for Professor Rahile Dawut Confirmed,” September 21, 

2023. 70Human Rights Watch, “Chinese Court Imposes Life Sentence on Uyghur Scholar,” September 

22, 2023. See also World Uyghur Congress, “Press Release: World Uyghur Congress Denounces Dr. 
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Rahile Dawut’s Sentencing to Life in Prison,” September 22, 2023; Henryk Szadziewski, Uyghur 

Human Rights Project, “The Persecution of the Intellectuals in the Uyghur Region: Disappeared 

Forever?,” October 22, 2018. 71中华人民共和国反间谍法 [PRC Counterespionage Law], passed November 1, 2014, amended 

April 26, 2023, effective July 1, 2023; Jeremy Daum, “Bad as It Ever Was: Notes on the Espionage Law,” China Law Translate, May 2, 2023; “评论 | 程晓农:中国新版《反间谍法》的用意”

[Commentary. Cheng Xiaonong: The motive behind China’s new version of the Counterespionage 

Law], Radio Free Asia, May 15, 2023. 72Ministry of State Security, “听劝,别让国家安全机关请你喝这‘十杯茶’” [Heed advice: 

Don’t get invited to have these “ten cups of tea” by national security agencies], reprinted in China Peace, January 30, 2024; 中华人民共和国反间谍法实施细则 [Detailed Implementation Rules for 

PRC Counterespionage Law], issued and effective November 22, 2017. 73Ministry of State Security, “全民国家安全教育日 | 重磅!国家安全部披露‘十大反间谍案

例’” [National Security Education Day: Important! Ministry of State Security reveals “ten 

counterespionage example cases”], Weixin, April 15, 2024. 74Helen Davidson, “China’s Act of ‘Hostage Diplomacy’ Comes to End as Two Canadians Freed,” 

Guardian, September 25, 2021. 75Gu Ting, “《反间谍法》生效后谍影重重 国安又公布一谍案” [“Counterespionage Law” having multiple consequences after taking effect; Ministry of State Security publicizes another spy 

case], Radio Free Asia, August 21, 2023; “中國國安稱偵破英MI6間諜活動 諮詢機構負責人被捕”

[Chinese State Security claims to have cracked British MI6 spy operations; person responsible 

for a consultant organization arrested], Radio Free Asia, January 8, 2024. 76Chip Cutter, Elaine Yu, and Newley Purnell, “China Is Becoming a No-Go Zone for Executives,” Wall Street Journal, October 6, 2023. 77Zhong Guangzheng, “中國《國安法》後首宗台灣人跟團赴陸被扣留 疑與退休前「敏感」職業

有關” [First case after enactment of China’s National Security Law involving a Taiwanese who 

traveled to mainland in a group being detained; possibly related to “sensitive occupation before 

retirement”], Radio Free Asia, June 7, 2024; Chen Zifei, “一名在日学者回中国后失踪” [Scholar 

who had been staying in Japan disappeared after returning to the country], Radio Free Asia, 

April 22, 2024. 78中华人民共和国刑法 [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, 

amended December 29, 2023, effective March 1, 2024, art. 293; Luo Xiang, “Pocket Monsters: 

How ‘Pocket Crimes’ Warp China’s Legal System,” Sixth Tone, January 7, 2019. 79Luo Xiang, “Pocket Monsters: How ‘Pocket Crimes’ Warp China’s Legal System,” Sixth Tone, 

January 7, 2019; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Twitter Becomes Chinese Government’s 

Double Weapon: Punishing Dissent and Propagating Disinformation,” May 11, 2020. 80Fourth Department of Criminal Adjudication, Supreme People’s Court, “关于‘新时代农村

刑事犯罪对乡村振兴战略的影响’暨‘寻衅滋事行为的刑事规制’课题在浙江、福建的调研报告” [Research report on the topic of “the impact of rural criminal crimes in the new era on the rural 

revitalization strategy” and “criminal regulation of provocative behavior” in Zhejiang and Fujian], 

People’s Court News, August 16, 2023. 81Fourth Department of Criminal Adjudication, Supreme People’s Court, “关于‘新时代农村

刑事犯罪对乡村振兴战略的影响’暨‘寻衅滋事行为的刑事规制’课题在浙江、福建的调研报告” [Research report on the topic of “the impact of rural criminal crimes in the new era on the rural 

revitalization strategy” and “criminal regulation of provocative behavior” in Zhejiang and Fujian], 

People’s Court News, August 16, 2023. 82“最高法院承认‘寻衅滋事’被泛用” [Supreme Court admits that “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” is widely used], Radio Free Asia, August 18, 2023. 83“中国人权律师团十大人权案出炉” [Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Group releases ten 

most important cases involving human rights], Radio Free Asia, March 11, 2024. 84中华人民共和国刑法 [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, 

amended December 29, 2023, effective March 1, 2024, art. 300; Rights Defense Network, “获

刑6年6个月的库尔勒市’耶和华见证人’长老李义芳的案情及简历” [The case and background of Li 

Yifang, a “Jehovah’s Witness” elder in Korla City who was sentenced to six years and six months 

in prison], October 18, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report

(Washington: May 2024), 95–96, 110; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 104–5, 120. 85See, e.g., Chen Aizhen, “专栏|解读新疆:维吾尔青年与朋友聚会被判刑 48名维吾尔人在泰国

寻求庇护被拒” [Column | Interpreting Xinjiang: Uyghur youth sentenced for gathering with 

friends; 48 Uyghurs denied asylum in Thailand], Radio Free Asia, June 21, 2024. 86See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, “北京资深民间出版人涂金灿被控涉嫌‘非法经营罪’案已移

送检察院” [Beijing veteran private publisher Tu Jincan charged with “illegal business operation”; case has been transferred to the procuratorate], June 6, 2024. 87Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, arts. 18, 19, 20; International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, 

entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 18, 19, 21. 88United Nations, “International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 26 June,” June 26, 2024. 89Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into 

force June 26, 1987; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention 

against Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), accessed July 6, 2023. 

China signed the CAT on December 12, 1986, and ratified it on October 4, 1988. 90See, e.g., Rights Defense Network, “酷刑案例:云南昆明女教师、法轮功学员赵晨宇女士控告云

南省第二女子监狱践踏法律、长期迫害法轮功学员的违法犯罪行为” [Torture case: Ms. Zhao Chenyu, 

a female teacher and Falun Gong practitioner in Kunming, Yunnan, files a complaint against the 
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Yunnan Provincial Second Women’s Prison for trampling on the law and for persistent persecution of Falun Gong practitioners], June 26, 2024. 91Rights Defense Network, “获刑10年8个月的黑龙江哈尔滨法轮功学员在黑龙江呼兰监狱遭酷刑

虐待” [In Hulan Prison in Heilongjiang, Falun Gong practitioner, who was from Harbin, Heilongjiang, and who received a sentence of 10 years and 8 months, suffered torture and abuse], 

October 22, 2023. 92Rights Defense Network, “获刑10年8个月的黑龙江哈尔滨法轮功学员在黑龙江呼兰监狱遭酷刑

虐待” [In Hulan Prison in Heilongjiang, Falun Gong practitioner, who was from Harbin, Heilongjiang, and who received a sentence of 10 years and 8 months, suffered torture and abuse], 

October 22, 2023. 93Rights Defense Network, “获刑10年8个月的黑龙江哈尔滨法轮功学员在黑龙江呼兰监狱遭酷刑

虐待” [In Hulan Prison in Heilongjiang, Falun Gong practitioner, who was from Harbin, Heilongjiang, and who received a sentence of 10 years and 8 months, suffered torture and abuse], 

October 22, 2023. 94Rights Defense Network, “酷刑案例:谢俊彪:双流看守所举牌回忆” [Torture case example: 

Xie Junbiao: Recalling holding up placard to protest in Shuangliu PSB Detention Center], December 25, 2023. 95Wang Heyan, “The Death of Suspect Sun Renze,” Caixin, January 13, 2024, reprinted in 

China Digital Times, January 14, 2024. 96Wang Heyan, “The Death of Suspect Sun Renze,” Caixin, January 13, 2024, reprinted in 

China Digital Times, January 14, 2024; Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State 

Council, “中共中央 国务院发出《关于开展扫黑除恶专项斗争的通知》” [Chinese Communist 

Party Central Committee and State Council issue “Notice of Launching Specialized Struggle to 

Sweep Away Organized Crime and Eliminate Vice”], January 24, 2018. 97Wang Heyan, “The Death of Suspect Sun Renze,” Caixin, January 13, 2024, reprinted in 

China Digital Times, January 14, 2024. 98Wang Heyan, “The Death of Suspect Sun Renze,” Caixin, January 13, 2024, reprinted in 

China Digital Times, January 14, 2024. 99Wang Heyan, “The Death of Suspect Sun Renze,” Caixin, January 13, 2024, reprinted in 

China Digital Times, January 14, 2024. 100Wang Heyan, “The Death of Suspect Sun Renze,” Caixin, January 13, 2024, reprinted in 

China Digital Times, January 14, 2024. 101Wang Heyan, “The Death of Suspect Sun Renze,” Caixin, reprinted in China Digital Times, 

January 14, 2024; Wu Yitong, Cheng Wen, “揭警察之子遭酷刑逼供致死 「財新」特稿被下架” 

[Special article by “Caixin” taken down after revealing son of police officer was killed due to 

forced confession by torture], Radio Free Asia, January 15, 2024. 102Rights Defense Network, “拉萨西藏大学藏族女孩才冬被警方逮捕不到一个月死亡 疑遭酷刑”

[Tsedron, Tibetan girl of Tibet University in Lhasa, torture suspected, after she died within a 

month of being detained], January 19, 2024; Yangchen Tso, “Tibetan Girl Died while in Chinese 

Police Custody,” Tibet Times, January 17, 2024. 103Rights Defense Network, “拉萨西藏大学藏族女孩才冬被警方逮捕不到一个月死亡 疑遭酷刑”

[Tsedron, Tibetan girl of Tibet University in Lhasa, torture suspected, after she died within a 

month of being detained], January 19, 2024. 104Rights Defense Network, “拉萨西藏大学藏族女孩才冬被警方逮捕不到一个月死亡 疑遭酷刑”

[Tsedron, Tibetan girl of Tibet University in Lhasa, torture suspected, after she died within a 

month of being detained], January 19, 2024. 105Gao Feng, “叶钟家属称目睹遗体 福州公民关注事件恐遭刑拘” [Ye Zhong’s family claim to 

have seen the body; citizens from Fuzhou who monitored the incident may have been detained], 

Radio Free Asia, December 26, 2023; “专栏 | 网络博弈:去世前,南京前媒体人孙林翻墙上网说

了什么?” [Column | Online Gaming: Before the death of Sun Lin, former media worker from 

Nanjing, what did he say online after having circumvented internet restrictions?], Radio Free 

Asia, December 13, 2023. 106中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法 [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended 

and effective October 26, 2018, art. 75. 107中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法 [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended 

and effective October 26, 2018, art. 75; Letter from Mandate of the Working Group on Arbitrary 

Detention et al., OL CHN 15/2018, August 24, 2018, 2. 108中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法 [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended 

and effective October 26, 2018, art. 75; Letter from Mandate of the Working Group on Arbitrary 

Detention et al., OL CHN 15/2018, August 24, 2018, 3. 109U.N. Human Rights Council, “Mandates of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; the 

Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression; the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association; the Special Rapporteur 

on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and 

Mental Health; the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders; the Special 

Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers; the Special Rapporteur on the Right to 

Privacy; the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism; and the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other 

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” OL CHN 15/2018, August 24, 2018. 110Letter from Mandate of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention et al., OL CHN 15/2018, 

August 24, 2018; Letter Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 

Defenders et al., AL CHN 16/2020, August 13, 2020; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern 

Group, “It’s No Secret that China’s Residential Surveillance in Designated Location is Secret Detention,” Jurist, December 16, 2020; Guo Shuo, “论作为‘超羁押手段’的指定居所监视居住制度”

[Discussion on residential surveillance at a designated location, a system known as “a measure 
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111

that goes beyond detention”], Wuhan University Journal 69, no. 6 (November 2016): 119–25; Hu 

Yingshuai and Ye Gengqing, “指定居所监视居住废除之必要” [The necessity of abolishing residential surveillance at a designated location], website of lawyer Zhou Chuikun, reprinted in 

Sohu, March 14, 2020. 111Rights Defense Network, “江苏南通访民朱培娟被公安以‘涉嫌寻衅滋事罪’违法采取指定监视

居住措施” [Petitioner Zhu Peijuan from Nantong, Jiangsu, was unlawfully placed under residential surveillance at a designated location on “suspicion of picking quarrels and provoking 

trouble”], December 31, 2023. 112Rights Defense Network, “江苏南通访民朱培娟被公安以‘涉嫌寻衅滋事罪’违法采取指定监视

居住措施” [Petitioner Zhu Peijuan from Nantong, Jiangsu, was unlawfully placed under residential surveillance at a designated location on “suspicion of picking quarrels and provoking 

trouble”], December 31, 2023. 113Rights Defense Network, “欧彪峰妻子魏欢欢:欧彪峰狱中情况的进一步说明” [Ou Biaofeng’s 

wife Wei Huanhuan: Further explanation of Ou Biaofeng’s situation in jail], January 9, 2024. 114 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 14(3)(b); 

United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules), 

adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2015/20, A/C.3/70/L.3, September 29, 2015, rules 58, 

61; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 43/173 of December 9, 1988, principles 18, 

19. See, e.g., Gao Feng, “家属披露监狱实况惹祸 王藏被剥夺探视通讯权利” [Wang Zang got into 

trouble because family disclosed actual conditions in jail; stripped of right of family visitation], 

Radio Free Asia, November 22, 2023. 115中华人民共和国看守所条例 [PRC Public Security Detention Center Regulations], issued and 

effective March 17, 1990, arts. 28, 32; 看守所留所执行刑罚罪犯管理办法 [Management Measures 

for Carrying Out Punishment in Public Security Detention Centers], passed August 20, 2013, 

effective November 23, 2013, arts. 45, 46; 中华人民共和国监狱法 [PRC Prison Law], passed and 

effective December 29, 1994, art. 48; 刑事诉讼法 [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 1, 

1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, arts. 38, 39, 293. 116刑事诉讼法 [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, arts. 33(3), 39. 117刑事诉讼法 [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective October 26, 2018, art. 39. 118Gao Feng, “卢思位被关看守所 当局禁止家属委托律师会见” [Lu Siwei detained in a PSB 

detention center; authorities denied meeting with lawyer retained by family], Radio Free Asia, 

October 9, 2023; Rights Defense Network, “遭老挝政府遣返回中国大陆著名人权律师卢思位目前被

羁押在成都市新都看守所” [Well-known human rights lawyer Lu Siwei, who was repatriated to 

mainland China by the Lao government, is currently detained at the Xindu PSB Detention Center in Chengdu], October 4, 2023. 119Rights Defense Network, “遭老挝政府遣返回中国大陆著名人权律师卢思位目前被羁押在成都市

新都看守所” [Well-known human rights lawyer Lu Siwei, who was repatriated to mainland China by the Lao government, is currently detained at the Xindu PSB Detention Center in Chengdu], 

October 4, 2023. 120Rights Defense Network, “遭老挝政府遣返回中国大陆著名人权律师卢思位目前被羁押在成都市

新都看守所” [Well-known human rights lawyer Lu Siwei, who was repatriated to mainland China by the Lao government, is currently detained at the Xindu PSB Detention Center in Chengdu], 

October 4, 2023. 121Gao Feng, “卢思位被关看守所 当局禁止家属委托律师会见” [Lu Siwei detained in a PSB 

detention center; authorities denied meeting with lawyer retained by family], Radio Free Asia, 

October 9, 2023. 122Gao Feng, “卢思位被关看守所 当局禁止家属委托律师会见” [Lu Siwei detained in a PSB 

detention center; authorities denied meeting with lawyer retained by family], Radio Free Asia, 

October 9, 2023. 123Changhao Wei, “December 2023: Overview of New Amendments to China’s Criminal Law & 

Charity Law,” NPC Observer Monthly, January 19, 2024; 中华人民共和国刑法修正案(十二) [PRC 

Criminal Law Amendment (12)], passed December 29, 2023, effective March 1, 2024. 124Changhao Wei, “December 2023: Overview of New Amendments to China’s Criminal Law & 

Charity Law,” NPC Observer Monthly, January 19, 2024. 中华人民共和国刑法修正案(十二) [PRC 

Criminal Law Amendment (12)], passed December 29, 2023, effective March 1, 2024. 125国家安全机关办理刑事案件程序规定 [Procedural Provisions for State Security Agencies in 

Handling Criminal Cases], passed April 16, 2024, effective July 1, 2024; 国家安全机关行政执法

程序规定 [Procedural Provisions for State Security Agencies in Handling Administrative Cases], 

passed April 26, 2024, effective July 1, 2024. 126国家安全机关办理刑事案件程序规定 [Procedural Provisions for State Security Agencies in 

Handling Criminal Cases], passed April 16, 2024, effective July 1, 2024, arts. 28, 103; 中华人民

共和国刑事诉讼法 [PRC Criminal Procedure Law], passed July 1, 1979, amended and effective 

October 26, 2018, art. 50. 127国家安全机关办理刑事案件程序规定 [Procedural Provisions for State Security Agencies in 

Handling Criminal Cases], passed April 16, 2024, effective July 1, 2024, art. 78; 国家安全机关行

政执法程序规定 [Procedural Provisions for State Security Agencies in Handling Administrative 

Cases], passed April 16, 2024, effective July 1, 2024, arts. 40, 127. 128Chen Zifei, “国安部首推办案程序规定 赋权国安之手深入民间组织” [Ministry of State Security for the first time introduces case handling procedures to empower the state security agencies 

to penetrate civil organizations], Radio Free Asia, April 26, 2024; Qian Lang and Liu Bangyu, 

“国安人员七月起抽查个人通讯设备 深圳上海等地海关已先实施” [State security officials will spotcheck personal communication devices beginning in July, but such measure already has been 
Criminal Justice

112

implemented by customs in places including Shenzhen and Shanghai], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 

2024. 129PRC Supreme People’s Court, PRC Supreme People’s Procuratorate, PRC Ministry of Public 

Security, PRC Ministry of State Security, and PRC Ministry of Justice, “关于依法惩治‘台独’

顽固分子分裂国家、煽动分裂国家犯罪的意见” [Opinion on Lawfully Punishing Obstinate “Taiwan 

Independence” Offenders for Committing or Inciting Separatism], issued and effective May 26, 

2024. 130PRC Supreme People’s Court, PRC Supreme People’s Procuratorate, PRC Ministry of Public 

Security, PRC Ministry of State Security, and PRC Ministry of Justice, “关于依法惩治‘台独’顽

固分子分裂国家、煽动分裂国家犯罪的意见” [Opinion on Lawfully Punishing Obstinate “Taiwan 

Independence” Offenders for Committing or Inciting Separatism], issued and effective May 26, 

2024. 131PRC Supreme People’s Court, PRC Supreme People’s Procuratorate, PRC Ministry of Public 

Security, PRC Ministry of State Security, and PRC Ministry of Justice, “关于依法惩治 ‘台独’

顽固分子分裂国家、煽动分裂国家犯罪的意见” [Opinion on Lawfully Punishing Obstinate “Taiwan 

Independence” Offenders for Committing or Inciting Separatism], issued and effective May 26, 

2024, arts. 6, 12, 18–20.
113

Access to Justic

Findings

• While China’s Constitution recognizes certain universal hu- man rights, the court system continued to lack any legal chan- nel through which citizens can assert or protect these consti- utional rights, thus failing to fulfill the obligation to provide 

enforceable legal remedies for rights violations committed by 

government officials.

• As courts in China slowed the rate of uploading judicial docu- ments to the publicly accessible database, the Supreme People’s 

Court announced the creation of a parallel database that is ac- cessible only to judicial personnel. This development prompted 

concerns that authorities planned to phase out the public-facing 

database, thereby reducing judicial transparency, which would 

have the effect of undermining the rule of law and judicial cred- ibility.

• Developments this past year indicate that the petitioning 

system has been weakened. The petitioning system, an extrajudicial channel through which citizens file grievances involving official misconduct, is being assimilated into the grassroots 

governance system overseen by the newly established Chinese 

Communist Party agency called the Social Work Department. 

One of the department’s missions is to implement the “Fengqiao 

Experience,” which is a way to exert granular social and political control through neighborhood committees and other grassroots-level organizations.

• Petitioners continued to suffer retaliation from local officials 

who tried to suppress exposure of their wrongdoing. Mistreatment experienced by petitioners included criminal prosecution, 

forcible commitment to a psychiatric hospital, arbitrary detention, and torture.

• Rights lawyers likewise suffered mistreatment, including 

criminal prosecution, for their legal work. After completing 

their sentences, lawyers typically have their law license revoked 

and are subjected to surveillance, restrictions on domestic and 

international travel, repeated forced relocation, and punishment 

of their family members, such as denial of education. As a United Nations special rapporteur pointed out, preventing lawyers 

from fulfilling their legal duties to their clients may “open the 

door to systematic violations of the right to a fair trial and 

equality before the law” in certain kinds of cases.
114

Access to Justic

Introduction

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 

which China signed and expressed its intention to ratify,1 provides 

that all persons are equal before the courts; it also obligates a State 

Party to ensure that people have enforceable legal remedies for any 

violation of the rights and freedoms recognized in the convention, 

even if the violation has been committed by an official.2 While Chi- na’s Constitution recognizes certain universal human rights,3 citi- zens do not have any legal channel through which to assert or pro- tect them.4 Moreover, instances of ongoing persecution of human 

rights lawyers and political control over the judiciary and the legal 

profession are inconsistent with the relevant ICCPR provisions.

Judicial Transparency

In 2013, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) established China 

Judgements Online (CJO), a database that provides public access 

to judicial judgments, and had accumulated over 140 million documents as of December 2023.5 Accessibility, however, became increasingly restricted in 2020 when the database required registration 

with a phone number and limited users’ access to only the first 600 

cases that turned up in a search query.6 Then, in 2021, the Dui Hua 

Foundation reported that the court had removed certain types of 

judgments, including politically sensitive cases and those concerning 

the death penalty, which were considered state secrets.7

In December 2023, media outlet Caixin reported that the SPC was 

building the National Court Judgments Database, which would be 

available only for internal use by court personnel.8 This initiative 

coincided with the declining rate at which judgments were uploaded 

to the CJO. To illustrate, a law professor noted that “[a]mong over 

670,000 judgments of administrative litigations in 2022, only 854 

were published  . . ..”9 A law professor expressed concern that di- minishing judicial transparency could deprive the public of the abil- ity to identify and address problems in the judiciary and would run 

counter to the promotion of the rule of law and judicial credibility.10

Revision of the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law

In September 2023, the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee revised the PRC Administrative Reconsideration 

Law.11 Enacted in 1999, the law provides citizens with a means 

to review the government’s administrative actions.12 The revision 

aimed to enhance institutional neutrality of the review system by 

creating administrative reconsideration committees comprising government departments, experts, and scholars, from which administrative reconsideration offices should seek opinions, particularly on 

cases with complicated or technical components.13 Requiring administrative reconsideration before resorting to judicial remedies in 

some situations, the revision also expanded the scope of applicability 

to cases involving matters such as judgments in occupational injury 

cases, failure to enter into or honor government contracts, and infringement of citizens’ rights in the course of disclosing government 
Access to Justice

115

information.14 Former Minister of Justice Tang Yijun explained that 

the revision addressed some shortcomings of the existing system, 

including narrow coverage that resulted in some citizens not being 

able to use the administrative reconsideration system, scattered jurisdictions that resulted in difficulty in identifying the right review 

agency, and a lack of a unified standard of review.15

Constitutional Enforcement

Despite the Chinese Communist Party’s emphasis on constitutional enforcement, citizens continued to lack a mechanism through 

which to assert their individual rights. The NPC and its Standing 

Committee published in February 2024 the first report that focused 

on constitutional enforcement, in an apparent response to Xi Jinping’s repeated calls for elevating the Party’s stated commitment 

to the Constitution.16 China’s Constitution provides a list of human 

rights that Chinese citizens are entitled to; it also delineates the 

functions of different state institutions and grants the NPC power to legislate and to supervise constitutional enforcement.17 The 

report mainly describes the NPC’s performance of its constitutional duties, such as examining bills for constitutionality and reviewing reports prepared by state institutions.18 It makes no mention, 

however, of any effort to create legal channels for citizens to assert their rights.19 Under the existing legal framework, such legal 

channels are not provided for in China’s Constitution or allowed by 

state institutions.20 The NPC Work Report, published a month later, 

likewise did not describe ways, whether judicial or administrative, 

through which citizens could exercise their rights.21

Petitioning System as Part of the Grassroots Governance Network

Evidence emerged this past year that the petitioning system is 

being positioned as an integral component of grassroots-level governance, one goal of which is to exert social control. The petitioning 

system (xinfang), also known as the “letters and visits system,” is 

overseen by the National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration (Guojia Xinfang Ju, 国家信访局; NPCPA) and operates outside the formal judicial system as a channel for citizens to present 

their grievances in hopes of triggering discretionary involvement by 

Party officials to provide a resolution.22 Although petitioners rarely 

see any results, the system remains widely used especially among 

people who lack the financial means to file court cases.23

With the institutional reform in March 2023, the NPCPA’s status 

was elevated within the State Council,24 but it simultaneously came 

under the leadership of the newly created Social Work Department 

(Shehui Gongzuo Bu, 社会工作部), a Party agency.25

In February 2024, the head of the Social Work Department convened a symposium, jointly presided over by the head of the NPCPA.26 With grassroots governance being presented as a “clear direction,” speakers at the event discussed using the petitioning system 

to receive people’s suggestions and to resolve the root causes of 

problems.27 Speakers also stressed the importance of building political power at the grassroots level and of promoting the “Fengqiao 

Experience,” which is a way to exert granular social and political 

control through neighborhood committees and other grassroots-level 
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116

organizations.28 A model of cross-departmental and cross-regional 

coordination also was raised as a way to augment street- and township-level governments’ capacity to resolve problems.29

Persecution of Petitioners

The Commission continued to observe examples of petitioners 

being subjected to different kinds of control and mistreatment by 

local authorities, such as criminal prosecution and commitment to 

psychiatric hospitals.30 “Stability maintenance” efforts intensified in 

the lead-up to and during events such as the annual meetings of 

the NPC and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 

March (Two Sessions).31 Individuals who suffered mistreatment for 

petitioning include the following:

• Zhang Junjie, after fleeing China, detailed his experience 

of being forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital twice in 

Nantong municipality, Jiangsu province, for protesting the government’s strict zero-COVID measures.32 Hospital staff—having told Zhang that he had schizophrenia because he did not 

support the Party—injected him with sedatives and forced him 

to ingest large quantities of antipsychotic drugs.33 Zhang reported that detainees at the psychiatric hospital were subjected 

to beating, electrocution, and being restrained in a room for at 

least three days for disobedience.34 Detainees included petitioners and dissidents, with the longest stay reported to be at least 

four years.35

• In April 2024, police took petitioner Mao Hengfeng into 

custody when she visited the hotel where the U.S. Secretary of 

State was staying.36 After taking Mao to a police station, police 

strip-searched and shackled her, subjecting her to prolonged interrogation while restraining her in a metal chair.37 Thereafter, 

police transported Mao to a guesthouse (an extralegal detention 

facility often referred to as a “black jail”) and placed her under 

the supervision of two neighborhood workers and four individuals whom she believed were gangsters.38 After releasing Mao, 

police warned that they would detain her again if she contacted 

foreign diplomats or media.39 Previously, Mao had on multiple 

occasions traveled from her hometown in Shanghai municipality to Beijing municipality, to draw attention to her mother’s 

death in 2000, which she said was a result of torture.40 Mao had 

been imprisoned previously and subjected to arbitrary detention 

and torture for her repeated petitioning.41

• Petitioners also are subject to criminal prosecution under various charges. For example, Lei Fengchun was criminally detained on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” 

for persistently asserting his claim of wrongful termination from 

his employment.42 In another example, authorities charged Lin 

Aiqin with disturbing order in a workplace when she and another petitioner mailed a package containing petitioning materials 

at a post office in Beijing.43 In the case of Li Lu (a pseudonym), 

a court in Shandong province sentenced her to two years and 

two months for “extortion” after she received partial settlement 

payment from a government official who verbally abused her 

as she sought to file a petition over her sexual assault claim.44
Access to Justice

117

Persecution of Legal Professionals

In February 2024, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers issued a letter expressing concerns over 

the pattern of the PRC government’s use of legal provisions to criminally prosecute lawyers, and otherwise subject them to different 

forms of hardship for handling politically sensitive cases, accusing 

them of endangering national security under offenses such as “subversion of state power” and “inciting subversion of state power.”45

Allegations of national security crimes can trigger the application 

of a form of detention known as “residential surveillance at a designated location,” which could be a form of enforced disappearance 

given that authorities are not required by the PRC Criminal Procedure Law to notify family members or provide legal counsel for people facing national security charges.46 Other forms of mistreatment 

highlighted in the letter include the denial of legal counsel of one’s 

choosing, deprivation of political rights following a criminal conviction, collective punishment of lawyers’ family members, license 

revocation, and travel bans.47 Stressing that “The free exercise of 

the legal profession contributes to ensuring access to justice,” the 

rapporteur concluded that legal provisions preventing lawyers from 

fulfilling their legal duties to their clients may “open the door to 

systematic violations of the right to a fair trial and equality before 

the law” in certain kinds of cases.48 The PRC government had not 

submitted a response to the letter as of June 2024.49

Some examples of persecution of legal professionals include the 

following:

• Lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife Xu Yan have been in 

detention since April 2023, after being charged with “picking 

quarrels and provoking trouble” and “inciting subversion of 

state power” in connection with their attempt to meet with a 

European Union delegation.50 During detention, Xu went on a 

week-long hunger strike to protest authorities’ denial of access 

to legal counsel. She performed forced labor and was denied 

prompt medical treatment for an incapacitating spinal condition.51 Their 19-year-old son Yu Zhenyang suffered from depression as a result of his parents’ detention and attempted suicide 

over 10 times since October 2023.52 Yu’s 2023 detention took 

place within a year of being released from a four-year imprisonment that was imposed in connection with his advocacy of 

constitutional reforms and his providing legal representation to 

detained human rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang.53

• At the age of 73, lawyer Li Yuhan was released in March 

2024 from six years and six months of imprisonment for the offenses of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and “fraud”;54

the former charge was premised on her passing by the Tiananmen Square in Beijing, and the latter related to her applying 

for public assistance on behalf of her son with disabilities.55 Li 

suffered torture and denial of medical treatment during detention.56 After her release, she traveled to Beijing municipality to 

seek medical treatment, but police immediately evicted her from 

a friend’s home where she was staying.57 Before Li’s detention, 

she had represented detained human rights lawyer Wang Yu.58
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118

• According to an April 2024 article, landlords and hotel owners had evicted rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang over 10 times 

in the past year, which Wang characterized as punishment of 

him and his family.59 The repeated evictions made it difficult 

for his 11-year-old son to stay in school for an extended period 

of time.60 Some schools refused to enroll his son due to pressure 

from the government.61 When trying to seek education overseas, 

Wang’s son was prohibited by border officials from leaving China on national security grounds.62
119

Notes to Chapter 5—Access to Justice

1United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights, accessed July 8, 2024; State Council Information Office, “国家人权行动计

划 (2016–2020 年)” [National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016–2020)], September 

29, 2016, sec. 5. 2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) on December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 2(3), 14. 3中华人民共和国宪法 [PRC Constitution], passed and effective December 4, 1982 (amended 

March 22, 2018), arts. 33–48. 4Luoyang Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, Henan province, 行政裁定书 [Administrative 

order], (2018) Yu 03 Xing Zhong No. 368, November 28, 2018, reprinted in China Judgments 

Online, January 14, 2019; Thomas E. Kellogg, “Arguing Chinese Constitutionalism: The 2013 

Constitutional Debate and the ‘Urgency’ of Political Reform,” University of Pennsylvania Asian 

Law Review 11, no. 3 (2016): 349; Paul Gewirtz, “Constitutional Enforcement: Who Should Do It 

and How?,” China Law Review 4 (2016): 5. 5Shan Yuxiao, “全国法院裁判文书库将开通 供内部查询” [National Court Judgments Database will begin to operate for internal use], Caixin, December 11, 2023; Dui Hua Foundation, 

“Supreme People’s Court Makes Two Announcements about Online Court Database,” Dui Hua 

Human Rights Journal, December 3, 2020. 6Dui Hua Foundation, “Supreme People’s Court Makes Two Announcements about Online 

Court Database,” Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, December 3, 2020; Luo Jiajun and Thomas 

Kellogg, “Verdicts from China’s Courts Used to Be Accessible Online. Now They’re Disappearing.,” 

ChinaFile, Asia Society, February 1, 2022. 7Dui Hua Foundation, “China: All State Security Judgments Purged from Supreme Court Site,” 

July 26, 2021. 8Shan Yuxiao, “全国法院裁判文书库将开通 供内部查询” [National Court Judgments Database 

will begin to operate for internal use], Caixin, December 11, 2023. 9Zichen Wang, Peiyu Li, and Yuxuan Jia, “Tsinghua Law Professors Call for Renewing Open 

Access to China’s Court Judgments,” Pekingnology, December 13, 2023. 10Zichen Wang, Peiyu Li, and Yuxuan Jia, “Tsinghua Law Professors Call for Renewing Open 

Access to China’s Court Judgments,” Pekingnology, December 13, 2023. 11中华人民共和国行政复议法 [PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law], passed April 29, 1999, 

revised September 1, 2023, effective January 1, 2024. 12中华人民共和国行政复议法 [PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law], passed April 29, 1999, 

revised September 1, 2023, effective January 1, 2024, art. 1. 13 Jamie P. Horsley, “Further Observations on the Second Revision Draft of the Administrative 

Reconsideration Law,” China Law Translate, August 10, 2023. 14Yuechao Nie and Laney Zhang, Library of Congress, “China: Revised Law Makes Administrative Reconsideration the Major Means of Resolving Private-Public Disputes,” October 30, 2023. 15Tang Yijun, “关于 《中华人民共和国行政复议法(修订草案)》的说明” [Explanation of the 

PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law (revision draft)], October 27, 2022. 16Changhao Wei, “Dissecting the Chinese Legislature’s First Annual Report on Constitutional 

Enforcement,” NPC Observer, March 6, 2024; “2023年全国人大及其常委会 加强和创新宪法实施情

况报告” [2023 report by the National People’s Congress and its standing committee on strengthening and innovating constitutional enforcement], February 23, 2024. 17中华人民共和国宪法 [PRC Constitution], passed and effective December 4, 1982, amended 

March 11, 2018, arts. 33–56, 62. 18“2023年全国人大及其常委会 加强和创新宪法实施情况报告” [2023 report by the National 

People’s Congress and its standing committee on strengthening and innovating constitutional 

enforcement], February 23, 2024. 19“2023年全国人大及其常委会 加强和创新宪法实施情况报告” [2023 report by the National 

People’s Congress and its standing committee on strengthening and innovating constitutional 

enforcement], February 23, 2024. 20Luoyang Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, Henan province, 行政裁定书 [Administrative 

order], (2018) 豫 03 行终 No. 368, November 28, 2018, reprinted in China Judgements Online, 

January 14, 2019; Thomas E. Kellogg, “Arguing Chinese Constitutionalism: The 2013 Constitutional Debate and the ‘Urgency’ of Political Reform,” University of Pennsylvania Asian Law 

Review, 11, no. 3 (2016): 349. 21“全国人民代表大会常务委员会工作报告”[National People’s Congress Standing Committee 

work report], March 14, 2024. 22Stella Chen, China Media Project, “Petitioning,” CMP Dictionary, May 20, 2022; Carl F. 

Minzner, “Xinfang:  An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,” Stanford Journal of 

International Law (2006): 105. 23Lu Dewen, “‘解局’女教师绝笔信事件:一条诡异的上访之路” [“Solution” female teacher’s 

last letter incident: a strange road of petitioning], People’s Daily, August 6, 2019; Carl F. Minzner, 

“Xinfang:  An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,” Stanford Journal of International Law (2006):106. 24 Jane Cai, “China Seeks to Tighten Grip with New Social Work Department,” South China 

Morning Post, March 17, 2023; “中共中央 国务院印发《党和国家机构改革方案》” [Party Central 

Committee and State Council issues “Institutional reform plan of the Party and State Council’’], 

Xinhua, March 16, 2023, sec. 1(4); Changhao Wei, Taige Hu, and Zewei (Whiskey) Liao, “A Guide 

to China’s 2023 State Council Restructuring,” NPC Observer, March 23, 2023. 25“中共中央 国务院印发《党和国家机构改革方案》” [Party Central Committee and State 

Council issues “Institutional reform plan of the Party and State Council’’], Xinhua, March 16, 

2023; Jane Cai, “China Seeks to Tighten Grip with New Social Work Department,” South China 

Morning Post, March 17, 2023.
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120

26National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration, “努力实现良好开局起步 推进社

会工作高质量发展—全国社会工作部部长、信访局局长座谈会召开” [Working hard towards a good 

start; promoting the development of high-quality social work—National Social Work Department 

Director and National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration convene a symposium], 

February 22, 2024. 27National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration, “努力实现良好开局起步 推进社

会工作高质量发展—全国社会工作部部长、信访局局长座谈会召开” [Working hard towards a good 

start; promoting the development of high-quality social work—National Social Work Department 

Director and National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration convene a symposium], 

February 22, 2024. 28National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration, “努力实现良好开局起步 推进社

会工作高质量发展—全国社会工作部部长、信访局局长座谈会召开” [Working hard towards a good 

start; promoting the development of high-quality social work—National Social Work Department 

Director and National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration convene a symposium], 

February 22, 2024; “Fengqiao Experience,” China Media Project, April 16, 2021. 29National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration, “努力实现良好开局起步 推进社

会工作高质量发展—全国社会工作部部长、信访局局长座谈会召开” [Working hard towards a good 

start; promoting the development of high-quality social work—National Social Work Department 

Director and National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration convene a symposium], 

February 22, 2024. 30See, e.g., “打击上访有新招? 福建访民涉”扰乱单位工作秩序”遭批捕” [New tactic of 

handling petitioning? Fujian petitioner formally arrested on suspicion of ‘‘disrupting order 

of a workplace’’], Radio Free Asia, October 16, 2024; Rights Defense Network, “归侨访民何

观娇被囚精神病院已快四年,亲属今天送冬棉衣棉裤仍被阻止见面” [Petitioner He Guanjiao, who 

returned from overseas, has been forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital for nearly four 

years, family prevented from seeing her as they try to deliver winter clothes to her], December 26, 2023. 31See, e.g., Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “王海凤进京被截访带回上海后关进黑监狱” [Wang 

Haifeng detained in black jail after being intercepted as she travels to Beijing for petitioning], 

April 2, 2024; Gao Feng, “北京‘两会’临近 各地安保升级维稳白热化” [As “Two Sessions” in 

Beijing approach, security and social maintenance measures in different localities intensified], 

Voice of America, February 28, 2024. 32Cheng Kuanhou, “「被精神病」歸來 白紙烟花革命青年一夜長大” [Having been released after being “forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital,” youth who joined the White Paper and 

Firework protests grew up overnight], Radio Taiwan International, August 24, 2023. 33Cheng Kuanhou, “「被精神病」歸來 白紙烟花革命青年一夜長大” [Having been released after being “forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital,” youth who joined the White Paper and 

Firework protests grew up overnight], Radio Taiwan International, August 24, 2023. 34Cheng Kuanhou, “「被精神病」歸來 白紙烟花革命青年一夜長大” [Having been released after being “forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital,” youth who joined the White Paper and 

Firework protests grew up overnight], Radio Taiwan International, August 24, 2023. 35Cheng Kuanhou, “「被精神病」歸來 白紙烟花革命青年一夜長大” [Having been released after being “forcibly committed to a psychiatric hospital,” youth who joined the White Paper and 

Firework protests grew up overnight], Radio Taiwan International, August 24, 2023. 36Rights Defense Network, “上海维权人士毛恒凤:我2024年4月24日周三傍晚9点半被抓全过

程——我在和平饭店门口被抓坐铁椅” [Shanghai rights defender Mao Hengfeng: The whole process of me being apprehended on April 24, 2024 at 9:30 p.m.—I was taken into custody in front 

of Heping Hotel and forced to sit on a metal chair], April 28, 2024. 37Rights Defense Network, “上海维权人士毛恒凤:我2024年4月24日周三傍晚9点半被抓全过

程——我在和平饭店门口被抓坐铁椅” [Shanghai rights defender Mao Hengfeng: The whole process of me being apprehended on April 24, 2024 at 9:30 p.m.—I was taken into custody in front 

of Heping Hotel and forced to sit on a metal chair], April 28, 2024. 38Rights Defense Network, “上海维权人士毛恒凤:我2024年4月24日周三傍晚9点半被抓全过

程——我在和平饭店门口被抓坐铁椅” [Shanghai rights defender Mao Hengfeng: The whole process of me being apprehended on April 24, 2024 at 9:30 p.m.—I was taken into custody in front 

of Heping Hotel and forced to sit on a metal chair], April 28, 2024. 39Rights Defense Network, “上海维权人士毛恒凤:我2024年4月24日周三傍晚9点半被抓全过

程——我在和平饭店门口被抓坐铁椅” [Shanghai rights defender Mao Hengfeng: The whole process of me being apprehended on April 24, 2024 at 9:30 p.m.—I was taken into custody in front 

of Heping Hotel and forced to sit on a metal chair], April 28, 2024. 40Rights Defense Network, “上海维权人士毛恒凤遭截访昨被送长兴岛黑监狱囚禁” [Shanghai 

rights defender Mao Henfeng intercepted and detained at Changxindao black jail], February 

23, 2024; Rights Defense Network, “上海维权人士毛恒凤:我2024年4月24日周三傍晚9点半被抓全

过程——我在和平饭店门口被抓坐铁椅” [Shanghai rights defender Mao Hengfeng: The whole process of me being apprehended on April 24, 2024 at 9:30 p.m.—I was taken into custody in front 

of Heping Hotel and forced to sit on a metal chair], April 28, 2024. 41Rights Defense Network, “上海维权人士毛恒凤遭截访昨被送长兴岛黑监狱囚禁” [Shanghai 

rights defender Mao Henfeng intercepted and detained at Changxindao black jail], February 

23, 2024; Rights Defense Network, “上海维权人士毛恒凤:我2024年4月24日周三傍晚9点半被抓全

过程——我在和平饭店门口被抓坐铁椅” [Shanghai rights defender Mao Hengfeng: The whole process of me being apprehended on April 24, 2024 at 9:30 p.m.—I was taken into custody in front 

of Heping Hotel and forced to sit on a metal chair], April 28, 2024. 42Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “维权人士雷凤春被寻衅滋事案移送检察院” [Picking quarrels and provoking trouble case of rights defender Lei Fengchun transferred to the procuratorate], 

May 6, 2024.
Access to Justice

121

43“打击上访有新招? 福建访民涉’扰乱单位工作秩序’遭批捕” [New tactic of cracking down 

on petitioning? Fujian petitioner formally arrested on suspicion of “disturbing order at a work- place’’], Radio Free Asia, October 16, 2023. 44Wang Jian, “山东女子上访遭信访局长辱骂,‘获赔’两万元被判敲诈提上诉” [Shandong wom- an insulted as she petitioned; appealing extortion conviction after “receiving compensation” of 20 

thousand yuan], Paper, December 2, 2023. 45Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, AL CHN 

1/2024, February 14, 2024, 4. 46Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, AL CHN 

1/2024, February 14, 2024, 4, 6. 47Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, AL CHN 

1/2024, February 14, 2024, 4, 5, 6. 48Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, AL CHN 

1/2024, February 14, 2024, 4, 5, 6. 49United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Communication Report 

and Search,” accessed June 12, 2024. 50ChinaAid Association, “人权律师余文生和许艳夫妇一案已完成补充侦查,起诉在即” [Indict- ment imminent as supplemental investigation has been completed in the case of human rights 

lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife Xu Yan], April 30, 2024. 51ChinaAid Association, “人权律师余文生和许艳夫妇一案已完成补充侦查,起诉在即” [Indict- ment imminent as supplemental investigation has been completed in the case of human rights 

lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife Xu Yan], April 30, 2024. 52ChinaAid Association, “人权律师余文生和许艳夫妇一案已完成补充侦查,起诉在即” [Indict- ment imminent as supplemental investigation has been completed in the case of human rights 

lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife Xu Yan], April 30, 2024; Ye Bing, “人权律师余文生夫妇身陷囹

圄 外界吁中共放过精神病院里的儿子” [Human rights lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife in jail; 

the public calls on the CCP to refrain from persecuting their son who has been committed to a 

psychiatric hospital], Voice of America, June 12, 2024. 53ChinaAid Association, “人权律师余文生和许艳夫妇一案已完成补充侦查,起诉在即” [Indictment imminent as supplemental investigation has been completed in the case of human rights 

lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife Xu Yan], April 30, 2024. 54Rights Defense Network, “刚刚获释的辽宁人权律师李昱函女士赴北京看病 借住王宇律师的朋

友家 竟遭警方驱逐” [Human rights lawyer Ms. Li Yuhan from Liaoning, who had just been 

released, traveled to Beijing to seek medical treatment but was evicted from the home of lawyer 

Wang Yu’s friend where she was staying], April 15, 2024. 55He Randong, “特別面孔|一个延长的709: ‘律师的律师’李昱函的执着与不屈” [Special face: 

A prolonged 709: The stubbornness and persistence of Li Yuhan, “a lawyer of other lawyers”], 

Mang Mang, November 20, 2023. 56Rights Defense Network, “刚刚获释的辽宁人权律师李昱函女士赴北京看病 借住王宇律师的朋

友家 竟遭警方驱逐” [Human rights lawyer Ms. Li Yuhan from Liaoning, who had just been 

released, traveled to Beijing to seek medical treatment but was evicted from the home of lawyer 

Wang Yu’s friend where she was staying], April 15, 2024. 57Rights Defense Network, “刚刚获释的辽宁人权律师李昱函女士赴北京看病 借住王宇律师的朋

友家 竟遭警方驱逐” [Human rights lawyer Ms. Li Yuhan from Liaoning, who had just been 

released, traveled to Beijing to seek medical treatment but was evicted from the home of lawyer 

Wang Yu’s friend where she was staying], April 15, 2024. 58Rights Defense Network, “刚刚获释的辽宁人权律师李昱函女士赴北京看病 借住王宇律师的朋

友家 竟遭警方驱逐” [Human rights lawyer Ms. Li Yuhan from Liaoning, who had just been 

released, traveled to Beijing to seek medical treatment but was evicted from the home of lawyer 

Wang Yu’s friend where she was staying], April 15, 2024. 59Yang Haowei, “异议人士获释多年后中国当局仍在迫害其家人” [Government continues to persecute family members of dissidents years after their release], Voice of America, April 16, 2024. 60Yang Haowei, “异议人士获释多年后中国当局仍在迫害其家人” [Government continues to per- secute family members of dissidents years after their release], Voice of America, April 16, 2024. 61Yang Haowei, “异议人士获释多年后中国当局仍在迫害其家人” [Government continues to per- secute family members of dissidents years after their release], Voice of America, April 16, 2024. 62Yang Haowei, “异议人士获释多年后中国当局仍在迫害其家人” [Government continues to per- secute family members of dissidents years after their release], Voice of America, April 16, 2024.
122

V. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

Governanc

Findings

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to be an au- thoritarian Party-State that increasingly sought to exert com- prehensive ideological control. Central authorities implemented 

Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s ex- pansive notion of national security through legislative acts, po- tentially making repressive measures more enduring. Amended 

laws extended secrecy requirements to non-classified material 

under the vague and expansive concept of national security, ex- posing travelers and businesspersons to the risk of arbitrary 

enforcement.

• With a stated goal of improving administrative efficiency, lo- cal governments created “comprehensive administrative enforce- ment” units. These units, however, serve as a grassroots-level 

mechanism of social control under the grid system, which is 

a Party-devised method of managing and surveilling citizens. 

Local governments hired large numbers of grid workers and 

tasked them with non-political community services, as well as 

political duties including disseminating propaganda, surveilling, 

and collecting personal information of residents.

• With laws requiring political education, Party offices merged 

with college administrative offices to allow for more direct con- trol over academic institutions’ delivery of political indoctrina- tion to students. Political topics that became a requirement this 

past year included patriotism, Party history, and national defense.

• As Party propaganda emphasized “culture building” as a way 

to reduce ideological risks by unifying people’s beliefs, authorities implemented policies that aimed at erasing ethnic cultures 

to promote a single Chinese nationality. Such policies included 

replacing Uyghur buildings with ones that reflect Chinese culture, banning Mongolian-language instruction in schools, and 

punishing advocacy for the Tibetan language.

• Despite official rhetoric promoting constitutional enforcement, 

citizens continued to lack judicial or administrative means to 

assert their rights as enumerated in the PRC Constitution. At 

the same time, the government concealed or manipulated public 

data, undermining citizens’ right to meaningfully participate in 

civic affairs.
123

Governanc

Introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to be an authoritarian Party-State that increasingly sought to exert comprehensive 

ideological control. Through legislation and policymaking, authorities further institutionalized Chinese Communist Party General 

Secretary Xi Jinping’s expansive notion of national security, cultivating in Chinese citizens a sense of animosity toward foreigners and suspicion among neighbors. The Party used the education 

system as a conduit for political indoctrination and expanded the 

“grid system” to ensure compliance and conformity with Party policy. At the same time, the government concealed or manipulated 

public data, undermining citizens’ right to meaningfully participate 

in civic affairs.

Government’s Subservience to Party Formalized

A hierarchy in which the PRC State Council (also known as the 

Central People’s Government) is subservient to the Party was formalized with the revision of the PRC Organic Law of the State Council.1

In March 2024, the National People’s Congress (NPC) revised the 

law for the first time in over 40 years.2 An NPC official explained 

that the revision was in part necessitated by a 2019 Party-issued 

document that required the Party’s comprehensive leadership be 

written into the organic laws of different government bodies.3 Accordingly, the law was revised to add that the State Council and its 

staff members must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party 

of China, a requirement that was absent in the original law.4 Some 

analysts indicated that the legislative act formally subordinated the 

State Council to the Party, thereby institutionalizing a hierarchy 

between them; this represented a reversal of the post-Mao policy of 

conferring upon the government relative autonomy since the 1980s.5

This statutory revision followed the 2023 amendment to the State 

Council Work Regulations, which removed language aiming to improve transparency in policymaking and public participation.6 Other organic laws scheduled to be enacted or amended during the 14th 

NPC between 2023 and 2028 include the PRC Rural Collective Economic Organic Law, the PRC Villagers’ Committees Organic Law, 

and the PRC Urban Residents Committees Organic Law.7

Security as Overarching Mode of Governance

Central authorities, through legislation, further institutionalized 

security as the overarching mode of governance. The year 2024 

marked the 10th anniversary of the launch of Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s comprehensive national security policy.8 The policy directive emphasized political security, the interrelatedness of 

domestic and international threats, the development of preventive 

measures, and reform efforts on law, policy, and the organization 

of official bodies.9 The policy directive also expanded the scope of 

national security to encompass 20 areas including non-traditional 

security concerns, such as cultural, social, technological, food, overseas interests, biological, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity.10
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As the approach to national security has evolved over the past decade, officials increasingly assigned more weight to security relative 

to development, enhanced the prominence of counterespionage, and 

emphasized education in national security.11

To further implement this security policy, PRC authorities enact- ed or amended security-related legal provisions, including the fol- lowing:

• The NPC Standing Committee amended the PRC Law on 

Guarding State Secrets in February 2024 to extend legal protection to “work secrets,” referring to information that is not 

classified “state secret” but “the leaking of which would cause 

an adverse impact.”12 Work secrets would be governed by a separate set of rules, which had not been published at the time of 

the amendment, prompting concerns that the added provision 

would negatively affect transparency and that travelers and 

businesses would face increased risk of arbitrary enforcement.13

The amendment came after Australian citizen Cheng Lei was 

released from prison in October 2023, having completed her detention in China of over three years on the charge of “supplying 

state secrets overseas,” reportedly for breaking an embargo on a 

PRC government briefing by a few minutes.14

• The expanded scope of protected materials under the amended PRC Counterespionage Law15 received similar criticism; 

the undefined concept of “national security” would “create legal 

risks or uncertainty for foreign companies, journalists, academics, and researchers.”16 The amendment also added provisions 

authorizing entry and exit bans on Chinese citizens and foreign- ers deemed to pose a threat to national security.17 Chongqing 

municipality was the first locality to pass regulations to imple- ment the amended law.18 The regulations call for strengthening 

investigation and supervision of entities that have foreign con- tacts and of travelers leaving or entering China.19 A Chongqing 

resident reported that some primary and secondary schools had 

begun teaching children to report their own parents as national 

security risks and to monitor their neighbors.20

• In April 2024, the Ministry of State Security issued two sets 

of regulations that authorized state security officials to search 

people’s electronic devices without requiring any court-issued 

warrant, eliciting privacy concerns.21 Radio Free Asia reported 

that customs officers in at least two locations had begun checking travelers’ phones in May, ahead of the regulations’ July 

2024 effective date.22

Amended Regulations on Political Inspection

In January 2024, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee amended the Party Regulations on Inspection Work.23 Official news outlet Xinhua published an article explaining that the 

meaning of inspection, as provided in the regulations, is a method 

of political supervision that uses a top-down approach to strengthen 

Xi Jinping’s position as the core leader and the Party’s centralized 

leadership.24 Scholars interviewed by Voice of America pointed out 

that the authority of inspection groups was augmented and that 

they could act immediately to make corrections without having to 
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go through additional administrative procedures.25 Scholars also observed that the latest amendment deleted specific misconduct that 

was subject to inspection and instead emphasized obedience to Xi 

Jinping’s directives, suggesting that the previous iterations of the 

regulations were designed to be a tool of power struggle and now 

had transformed into a tool of governance.26

Administrative Enforcement That Runs the Grid of Control

The manner in which local governments tried to improve administrative enforcement reflected the central government’s plan 

to further strengthen the use of grassroots-level units to serve as 

part of the social control apparatus. In August 2023, the State 

Council issued a three-year action plan to improve administrative 

enforcement quality.27 With a stated goal of correcting certain enforcement problems, such as overzealous enforcement and corrupt 

practices, the plan called for an integrated enforcement system that 

requires local governments to standardize the exercise of discretionary authority and to delegate certain responsibilities to lower 

administrative divisions, such as villages and townships.28 In response, some local governments issued documents to show compliance,29 and some expressly linked the policy directive with the 

“Fengqiao Experience,”30 which is a way to exert granular social 

and political control through neighborhood committees and other 

grassroots-level organizations.31 Various bodies of “comprehensive 

administrative enforcement” (zonghe xingzheng zhifa, 综合行政执

法) established by local governments have enforced the law in ways 

that reportedly infringed on citizens’ fundamental rights, including 

personal liberty,32 religious freedom,33 and the right to receive and 

impart information.34

Grid Management as Social Control Tool

Comprehensive administrative enforcement units are features of 

the grid management system, a social control and Party-building 

model.35 The system began in 2004 as a pilot program in Beijing 

municipality and was later endorsed by the central government in 

November 2013 as one of Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s reform initiatives.36 Applicable to villages and urban areas, communities are generally divided into grid units consisting of 300 to 500 

households; these units are further divided into smaller grids (called 

basic grids) consisting of 15 to 20 households (whose manner of division varies by location).37 Commercial establishments, schools, and 

other organizations are managed in specialized grids.38 Personnel 

assignment varies by locality, but usually a police officer oversees 

several basic grids and works with grid directors, grid attendants, 

assistant grid attendants, and members of the comprehensive management team.39

Radio Free Asia reported that local governments had been hiring 

large numbers of grid workers 40 while “[laying] off auxiliary police 

officers and [merging] local police stations” to allocate more resources to the grid system.41 The large-scale hiring of grid workers continued as local governments’ budgets tightened, which adversely 

affected the delivery of public services.42
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Grid workers—temporary workers not on the government’s payroll—provide an additional means of maintaining stability and sharing the workload of police and other civil servants.43 Grid workers 

implement Party policies, identify political and security risks, and 

provide emergency response and policing.44

In some locations, grid workers went door-to-door to collect personal information of residents, and some asked people to install an 

app that would block calls from outside China and potentially monitor phone activities.45 In Sichuan province, grid workers reportedly 

entered homes in an ethnic Yi village to investigate whether residents were eating while crouching on the floor, which a local Party “civic enhancement” office considered to be unhygienic and uncivilized, prompting criticism of overreach of authority.46

Ideological Control in Education

Treating “education” as synonymous with political indoctrination, 

the Party sought to exert increasingly direct control over the education system to channel its ideology to school-age children and young 

adults. Under the PRC National Security Law, the government is 

required to maintain ideological dominance through cultivating socialist values and resisting “bad culture.”47 Related to this duty, 

authorities formalized political indoctrination in legal documents.48

• The PRC Patriotic Education Law, enacted in October 2023, 

obligates citizens and organizations to promote patriotism and 

prohibits them from insulting, distorting, vilifying, or denying matters that the state seeks to protect.49 It also requires 

schools to introduce patriotism throughout the education process.50 Besides citizens in mainland China, the law also targets 

Hong Kong and Macau residents, as well as overseas Chinese.51

• The Party promulgated Regulations on Party History Learning and Education Work in February 2024, which provide that 

primary schools, secondary schools, and colleges should be used 

as a conduit to introduce political education.52

• Authorities also proposed to amend the PRC National Defense Education Law to clarify different aspects of national defense education and to extend the use of propaganda beyond 

colleges to secondary and primary schools, although specific 

changes were unavailable as of April 2024.53 One analyst noted 

that this policy could encourage nationalism, fostering animosity and a skewed view toward the outside world.54

The amended PRC Counterespionage Law requires the promotion of counterespionage topics.55 A video clip circulated by an official source reminded people that spies could be anyone, including 

friends and anyone close. The clip garnered criticism from some parents, who expressed concern that the government’s message could 

distort the psyche of school-age children, leading them to see family 

members as enemies.56

The Party coupled its propaganda efforts with augmenting its 

control over colleges’ governance. In January 2024, the Party committee of Tsinghua University in Beijing municipality announced 

that it had merged with the president’s office, in line with a larger 

trend across China.57 Radio Free Asia reported that while the presence of Party branches and committees in universities is not new, 
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“[the Party had] never actually merged itself with administrative 

structures before, not even during the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.”58 Such mergers would enable the Party’s Central 

Ideological and Political Conference on Colleges and Universities 

to directly command universities to “integrate politics into the core 

curriculum.”59

Politicization of Culture

Recent developments reflect the Party’s efforts to increasingly integrate culture into its political propaganda. In a June 2023 conference, Xi Jinping emphasized the need to “strengthen the Party’s 

comprehensive leadership on propaganda, ideology, and culture,” 

additionally revealing the strategy of using “culture building” as a 

way to unify people’s beliefs.60 At a subsequent conference in October, Xi Jinping reiterated the above theme and delivered “important instructions” on the topic.61 The October conference was called 

the National Conference on Propaganda, Ideology, and Cultural 

Work,62 where the reference to “culture” was a recent addition to 

the title, possibly suggesting a new emphasis in the Party’s propaganda work.63 Consistent with the goal of integrating Marxism 

with China’s “specific realities” and “fine traditional culture,”64 Xi 

Jinping discussed “culture” within the framework of the Party’s political objectives, incorporating it into terms like “socialist culture” 

and “culture building in the New Era.”65 Xi Jinping further urged 

conference attendees to prevent and resolve ideological risks so as 

to create “advantageous cultural conditions” for a modernized socialist country.66 [For information on how officials have used cultural 

propaganda to shape media priorities, see Chapter 1—Freedom of 

Expression.]

The Party’s vision of culture building, however, is inconsistent 

with international human rights standards,67 as shown in authorities’ use of coercive measures to undermine cultural diversity; for 

example—

• In November 2023, authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region formalized an assimilation policy for Ili (Yili) 

Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, XUAR, that observers said is 

intended to erase Uyghurs’ cultural identity and replace it with 

the cultural identity of the Han Chinese population.68 Having 

the effect of replacing Uyghur spaces with Chinese spaces, the 

policy calls for creating mixed housing and other facilities that 

promote “a single Chinese nationality that transcends ethnic 

divisions.”69

• In the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR), authorities have largely completed the implementation of a 2020 policy 

of gradually phasing out Mongolian language in schools, where 

non-language classes would be taught in Chinese only, while the 

hours for Mongolian-language classes were cut.70 As of October 

2023, Mongolian-language classes had been banned in kindergartens, and high school and college entrance exams would be 

given only in Chinese in the near future.71 Parents who send 

their children to schools that teach Mongolian would risk being 

fired from their jobs.72 [For more information on the suppres-
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sion of the Mongolian language in the educational sphere in the 

IMAR, see Chapter 7—Ethnic Minority Rights.]

• In Yushu (Yulshul) city, Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, police in October 2023 injured and 

detained Tibetan-language advocate and entrepreneur Tashi 

Wangchug for three days after he posted online a video showing government staff denying his business license application, a 

denial that a rights advocate said was an attempt to undermine 

his ability to make a living after being released from prison.73

Previously, authorities imprisoned Tashi Wangchug for his advocacy for the use of the Tibetan language and continued to deprive him of political rights after his release, making it difficult 

for him to earn a living.74

Continued Lack of Transparency

Citizens’ access to information about government actions can be 

an indicator of the quality of governance, as it affects political engagement and control of corruption.75 But the Party and the PRC 

government continued to withhold, manipulate, and falsify data.76

For example—

• Following the continued rise in youth unemployment, peaking 

at 21.3 percent in June 2023, the National Bureau of Statistics 

suspended publication of such data.77 The government reportedly withheld the statistics because they tended to contradict 

the official assertion that China’s economy was recovering from 

the pandemic.78 When the government resumed releasing this 

information in January 2024, it created a new age bracket and 

excluded currently enrolled students, producing a lower unemployment-rate figure.79 An independent demographer, however, surmised that the actual unemployment situation had not 

changed despite the lower figure.80 Voice of America, likewise, 

questioned the credibility of the official figures due to the lack 

of transparency.81 For example, the government did not disclose 

details of the newly adopted methodology, nor did it define the 

criteria for determining a person’s unemployment status.82 The 

government also did not recompute historical data using the 

new methodology, depriving the public of the chance to make 

comparisons.83

• Besides unemployment data, the PRC government increasingly withheld other types of previously public information, 

and often did so without giving public notice; they include land 

sales, currency reserves, bond transactions, COVID-19 deaths, 

academic information, and politicians’ biographies.84 In particular, the government removed information about the number of 

cremations in Zhejiang province after China-based news outlet 

Caixin used it to infer the extent of COVID-19 related deaths.85

Likewise, biographies of public officials became abbreviated, 

and the Party stopped publishing readouts of the Communist 

Party Central Committee Political Bureau meetings in at least 

three months between 2022 and 2023.86

• In March 2024, a spokesperson said the National People’s 

Congress (NPC) would no longer schedule a premier’s press 

conference for the remainder of the congressional term through 
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2027, breaking a three-decade tradition that began in 1988.87

An analyst explained that the premier’s press conference is “one 

of the few moments when journalists could directly speak to one 

of China’s top leaders” and the cancellation signified that “the 

Chinese top leadership team revealed its desire to govern the 

country in an even less transparent style, with less need to address public opinion,” which would negatively affect government 

accountability.88

• One example of the government using the criminal justice 

system to suppress transparency is the case of former economics professor Yang Shaozheng, whom the Guiyang Intermediate People’s Court in Guiyang municipality, Guizhou province, 

sentenced to four years and six months in prison in August 2023 

on the charge of “inciting subversion of state power.”89 Yang’s 

conviction is reportedly related to his estimate that the Party 

and the government spent a large amount on personnel costs.90

• After a magnitude 6.2 earthquake hit Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, in December 2023, leaving 

over 148 people dead and many more injured, public security 

officials administratively detained a person for “spreading rumors” after he advised people, in a live broadcast, to be careful 

of aftershocks.91 A New York Times article raised a number of 

other examples where authorities suppressed displays of grief, 

censored public discussions, and withheld basic information 

such as the victims’ names, in an apparent effort to control history and collective memory.92
130

Notes to Chapter 6—Governance

1中华人民共和国国务院组织法 [PRC Organic Law of the State Council], passed and effective 

December 10, 1982, revised March 11, 2024. 2中华人民共和国国务院组织法 [PRC Organic Law of the State Council], passed and effective 

December 10, 1982, revised March 11, 2024. 3Li Hongzhong, “关于《中华人民共和国国务院组织法(修订草案)》的说明” [Explanation regarding the (revision draft) of the “PRC Organic Law of the State Council”], March 5, 2024; 

“中共中央关于加强党的政治建设的意见” [Opinion of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the strengthening of the Party’s political building], January 31, 2019. 4中华人民共和国国务院组织法 [PRC Organic Law of the State Council], passed and effective 

December 10, 1982, revised March 11, 2024, arts. 3, 18; 中华人民共和国国务院组织法 [PRC Organic 

Law of the State Council], passed and effective December 10, 1982. 5Deng Yuwen, “聿文视界:北院与南院:国务院回归政务院” [Yuwen’s vision: North and South 

Campus: The State Council returns to being the Government Administration Council], Voice of 

America, March 11, 2024; Zhuang Zhiwei, “中国修改国务院组织法 分析:习近平大权独揽更甚毛

泽东” [China revised the Organic Law of the State Council; analysis: Xi Jinping’s power grab 

dwarfs that of Mao Zedong], Voice of America, March 8, 2024; “强化集权 逾四十年中国人大再修

订《国务院组织法》” [Strengthening power concentration; the NPC revises the Organic Law of 

the State Council after over 40 years], Radio Free Asia, March 5, 2024. 6State Council, 国务院工作规则 [State Council Work Regulations], issued June 25, 2018, art. 23; 

State Council, 国务院工作规则 [State Council Work Regulations], passed March 17, 2023, issued 

March 18, 2023; 《国务院工作规则》(全文变动对比) [State Council Work Regulations (comparison of changes in the entire document)], March 24, 2023. 7“十四届全国人大常委会立法规划” [Legislative plan of the 14th National People’s Congress 

Standing Committee], Xinhua, September 7, 2023. 8“习近平:坚持总体国家安全观 走中国特色国家安全道路” [Xi Jinping: Uphold the comprehensive national security outlook; walk on the path of national security with Chinese characteristics], 

People’s Daily, April 16, 2014. 9Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “National Security after China’s 20th Party Congress: Trends in 

Discourse and Policy,” China Leadership Monitor 77, September 1, 2023, 1. 10Zhu Ping, “China Fully Justified in Bolstering National Security,” China Daily, April 14, 2024. 11Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “National Security after China’s 20th Party Congress: Trends 

in Discourse and Policy,” China Leadership Monitor, 77, September 1, 2023, 2, 14. See also “钟

才文:必须坚持高质量发展和高水平安全良性互动” [Zhong Caiwen: It is imperative to uphold the 

beneficial interaction between high quality development and high-level security], Guangming, 

February 1, 2024. 12中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法 [PRC Law on Guarding State Secrets], passed September 5, 

1988, amended February 27, 2024, effective May 1, 2024, arts. 3, 4, 9, 64; Shanghai Urban Management and Law Enforcement Bureau, “《中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法》修订前后对照表”

[Comparison table of the “PRC Law on Guarding State Secrets” before and after amendment], 

March 4, 2024; Jeremy Daum, “Open Thoughts on the Secrets Law,” China Law Translate, February 27, 2024. 13Wong Woon Shin, “‘Vague and Broad’: China’s Revised State Secrets Law Sparks Concerns 

from Taiwan and Foreign Businesses,” CNA, May 3, 2024; Jing Wei, “China’s Secrets Law Could 

Mean New Risks Linked to ‘Work Secrets,’” Radio Free Asia, February 29, 2024. 14“Australian Journalist Cheng Lei Back Home after 3 Years Detained in China,” Al Jazeera, 

October 11, 2023; Liam Scott, “Journalist Says China Jailed Her for Breaking Embargo,” Voice 

of America, October 17, 2023; Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Ms. Cheng Lei,” October 11, 2023. 

For more information on Cheng Lei, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2020-00246. 15中华人民共和国反间谍法 [PRC Counterespionage Law], passed November 1, 2014, amended 

April 26, 2023, effective July 1, 2023. 16U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Safeguarding Our Future,” June 20, 

2023; Laney Zhang, “China: Counterespionage Law Revised,” Global Legal Monitor, Law Library 

of Congress, September 21, 2023. 17中华人民共和国反间谍法 [PRC Counterespionage Law], passed November 1, 2014, amended 

April 26, 2023, effective July 1, 2023, arts. 33–35; “Comparison Chart,” NPC Observer, accessed 

May 7, 2024. 18重庆市反间谍工作条例 [Regulations on Counterespionage Work of Chongqing Municipality], 

passed July 27, 2023; “‘反间谍条例’上路 重庆市为何成全国急先锋?” [“Counterespionage 

regulations” launch; why has Chongqing become the vanguard of the nation?], Radio Free Asia, 

September 1, 2023. 19重庆市反间谍工作条例 [Regulations on Counterespionage Work of Chongqing Municipality], 

passed July 27, 2023, art. 10(4). 20“‘反间谍条例’上路 重庆市为何成全国急先锋?” [“Counterespionage regulations” launch; 

why has Chongqing become the vanguard of the nation?], Radio Free Asia, September 1, 2023. 21国家安全机关行政执法程序规定 [Procedural Regulations on Administrative Enforcement by 

State Security Agencies], passed April 26, 2024, effective July 1, 2024, art. 40; 国家安全机关办理

刑事案件程序规定 [Procedural Regulations for Handling Criminal Cases by State Security Agencies], passed April 26, 2024, effective July 1, 2024, art. 80; “国安人员七月起抽查个人通讯设备 深

圳上海等地海关已先实施” [State security officials will spot-check personal communication devices 

beginning in July; customs in Shenzhen and Shanghai have already begun enforcement], Radio 

Free Asia, May 7, 2024. 22“国安人员七月起抽查个人通讯设备 深圳上海等地海关已先实施” [State security officials will 

spot-check personal communication devices beginning in July; customs in Shenzhen and Shanghai have already begun enforcement], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2024.
Governance

131

23中国共产党巡视工作条例 [CCP Regulations on Inspection Work], passed June 26, 2015, revised 

January 31, 2024, effective February 8, 2024. 24Sun Shaolong, “新华视点|新修订的《中国共产党巡视工作条例》亮点解读” [Xinhua Perspective: Highlights and explanation of the newly amended “CCP Regulations on Inspection Work”], 

Xinhua, February 22, 2024. 25Chen Jun, “中共新版巡视条例5大变化 分析:黑老大确立帮规” [Five major changes in the 

Party’s new version of inspection regulations. Analysis: Mafia leader establishes gang rules], Voice 

of America, February 28, 2024. 26Chen Jun, “中共新版巡视条例5大变化 分析:黑老大确立帮规” [Five major changes in the 

Party’s new version of inspection regulations. Analysis: Mafia leader establishes gang rules], Voice 

of America, February 28, 2024. 27State Council, “提升行政执法质量 三年行动计划(2023—2025年)” [Three-year plan for augmenting the quality of administrative enforcement], August 9, 2023. 28State Council, “提升行政执法质量 三年行动计划(2023—2025年)” [Three-year plan for augmenting the quality of administrative enforcement], August 9, 2023, secs. 2(1), (2), 3(2), 4(1). 29Chongqing Yubei District People’s Government Office, “重庆市渝北区人民政府办公室关于印发

渝北区深化镇街综合行政执法改革实施方案的通知” [Regarding the issuance of the “Deepening Reform of Comprehensive Administrative Law Enforcement in Towns and Streets in Yubei District” 

Notice of implementation Plan], October 25, 2023; PRC Ministry of Justice, “广东省广州市聚焦难

点、痛点、堵点问题大力推进镇街综合行政执法规范化建设” [Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong 

Province focuses on difficult, painful and blocked issues and vigorously promotes the standardization of comprehensive administrative law enforcement in towns and streets], September 14, 2023. 30Hangzhou Municipal Urban Management Bureau, “2023年市综合行政执法局政务公开工作总

结和2024年工作思路” [Summary of the Municipal Comprehensive Administrative Law Enforcement Bureau’s government affairs disclosure work in 2023 and work ideas for 2024], February 

2, 2024; Xia Jieyu, “全市综合行政执法系统践行新时代‘枫桥经验’” [The city’s comprehensive 

administrative law enforcement system implements the “Fengqiao Experience” in the new era], 

Wenzhou Daily reprinted in Wenzhou City People’s Government, December 8, 2023; Cai Jingjin, 

“永康市‘执法+’城市管理网格赋能基层治理 画好共建共治同心圆” [Yongkang City’s “Law Enforcement +” urban management grid empowers grassroots governance and draws a concentric 

circle of co-construction and co-governance], Zhejiang Provincial Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, February 27, 2024. 31China Media Project, “Fengqiao Experience,” April 16, 2021. 32Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “由开鲁种地受阻看中国农民身上的枷锁” [Understanding 

the shackles that farmers are in through the obstacles they experienced in Kailu], April 25, 2024. 33Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “浙江一基督教高中被政府责令停止办学并罚款” [A Christian high school in Zhejing fined by government and ordered to terminate classes], October 14, 

2023; ChinaAid Association, “浙江省宁海市责令教会学校 ‘之江圣约高中’停办,并处罚款”

[Ninghai municipality in Zhejiang province fines church school “Zhijiang Shengyue High School” 

and orders it to terminate operations], October 14, 2023. 34“浙江民众在院内装气象仪被指威胁国家安全遭处罚” [Zhejiang residents punished under accusation of threatening national security for installing weather apparatus in yard], Radio Free 

Asia, November 21, 2023. 35Minxin Pei, “Grid Management: China’s Latest Institutional Tool of Social Control,” China 

Leadership Monitor 67, March 1, 2021; Ma Guangfeng, “构建 ‘一体四化’工作机制 提升党建引

领网格化治理水平” [Building a system of “one entity with four improvements”; raise the level of 

grid management led by Party building], Party Building Study, no. 3, 2022; “一 ‘网’情深——

江苏省南京市仙林街道打造新时代城市版‘枫桥经验’” [Love for the grid—Xianlin neighborhood 

in Naning municipality, Jiangsu province, creates a new version of “Fengqiao experience”], Sohu, 

September 24, 2021. 36Minxin Pei, “Grid Management: China’s Latest Institutional Tool of Social Control,” China 

Leadership Monitor 67, March 1, 2021. 37Minxin Pei, “Grid Management: China’s Latest Institutional Tool of Social Control,” China 

Leadership Monitor 67, March 1, 2021; Gu Ting, “China Recruits Thousands to Monitor Its Citizens’ Words and Deeds,” Radio Free Asia, October 17, 2023; Yao Lin and Zhang Jie, “小网格激

活治理大能量” [Small grid activating big energy of governance], People’s Daily, May 30, 2023; 

“浙江省在‘141’框架下推进党建统领网格智治” [Zhejiang province promotes smart governance 

grids for Party-building within the “141” framework], Xinhua, reprinted in Zhejiang Economic & 

Information Centre, August 26, 2022; 38Ma Guangfeng, “构建‘一体四化’工作机制 提升党建引领网格化治理水平” [Building a system of “one entity with four improvements”; raise the level of grid management led by Party 

building], Party Building Study, no. 3, 2022. 39Minxin Pei, “Grid Management: China’s Latest Institutional Tool of Social Control,” China 

Leadership Monitor 58, March 1, 2021. 40Gu Ting, “China Recruits Thousands to Monitor Its Citizens’ Words and Deeds,” Radio Free 

Asia, October 17, 2023. 41Gu Ting and Chen Zifei, “China Moves Ahead With ‘Mass Policing’ Plan for Local Communities,” Radio Free Asia, November 14, 2023. 42“中共财政吃紧却广招网格员 变相实行枫桥经验” [Chinese Communist Party budget tightens 

but widely hires grid workers, implementing Fengqiao experience in disguise], Epoch Times, December 15, 2023. See also Gu Ting, “中央财政困难维稳费增幅减少” [Increase in stability maintenance expenses slows as central government faces financial difficulties], Radio Free Asia, March 

6, 2023. 43“中共财政吃紧却广招网格员 变相实行枫桥经验” [Chinese Communist Party budget tightens but widely hires grid workers, implementing Fengqiao experience in disguise], Epoch Times, 

December 15, 2023.
Governance

132

44Gu Ting, “China Recruits Thousands to Monitor Its Citizens’ Words and Deeds,” Radio Free 

Asia, October 17, 2023. 45Gu Ting, “China Recruits Thousands to Monitor Its Citizens’ Words and Deeds,” Radio Free 

Asia, October 17, 2023. 46“彜族蹲地吃饭不文明?网格员入户纠正惹议” [Is it uncivilized for ethnic Yi people to eat 

while crouching on the floor? Grid workers entering homes to correct the habit causes controversy], World Journal, December 3, 2023. 47中华人民共和国国家安全法 [PRC National Security Law], passed July 1, 2015. 48中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法 [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, effective January 1, 2024; 党史学习教育工作条例 [Regulations on Party History Learning and Education Work], approved January 18, 2024, issued and effective February 5, 2024. 49中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法 [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, effective January 1, 2024, art. 37. 50中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法 [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, effective January 1, 2024, art. 15. 51中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法 [PRC Patriotic Education Law], passed October 24, 2023, effective January 1, 2024, art. 23. 52党史学习教育工作条例 [Regulations on Party History Learning and Education Work], approved January 18, 2024, issued and effective February 5, 2024, art. 20. 53国防教育法拟修订 [Proposed amendment of the National Defense Education Law], Xinhua, 

April 23, 2024; Yang An, “中国修订国防教育法 从小学开始塑造对外敌意” [China to amend the 

National Defense Education Law, creating animosity towards the outside world from primary 

school], Voice of America, April 28, 2024. 54Yang An, “中国修订国防教育法 从小学开始塑造对外敌意” [China to amend the National Defense Education Law, creating animosity towards the outside world from primary school], Voice 

of America, April 28, 2024. 55中华人民共和国反间谍法 [PRC Counterespionage Law], passed November 1, 2014, amended 

April 26, 2023, effective July 1, 2023, arts. 12, 13. 56Gu Ting, “中国反间谍宣传走火入魔 家长不满对学生洗脑式教育” [China’s propaganda on 

counterespionage has gone on the wrong path; parents disapprove of brainwashing students], 

Radio Free Asia, August 17, 2023. 57Gu Ting, “China’s Ruling Party Takes Direct Control of Country’s Universities,” Radio Free 

Asia, January 18, 2024. 58Gu Ting, “China’s Ruling Party Takes Direct Control of Country’s Universities,” Radio Free 

Asia, January 18, 2024. 59Gu Ting, “China’s Ruling Party Takes Direct Control of Country’s Universities,” Radio Free 

Asia, January 18, 2024. 60“文化建设方面的‘十四个强调’” [“Fourteen emphases” on culture building], www.12371.cn

(Communist Party Member Network), accessed May 17, 2024. 61“习近平对宣传思想文化工作作出重要指示” [Xi Jinping delivers important instructions regarding propaganda, ideology, and cultural work], Xinhua, October 8, 2023. 62“习近平对宣传思想文化工作作出重要指示” [Xi Jinping delivers important instructions regarding propaganda, ideology, and cultural work], Xinhua, October 8, 2023. 63Bill Bishop, “Xi Jinping Thought on Culture 习近平文化思想; Xi Meets Schumer; Semiconductor Controls; Disappointing Holiday Data; Xizang,” Sinocism, October 9, 2023; “把习近平文

化思想贯彻落实到宣传思想文化工作各方面和全过程” [Thoroughly implement Xi Jinping Thought 

on Culture in every aspect and the entire process of propaganda, ideology, and culture work], 

Qiushi, no. 20 (2023). 64Xi Jinping, “Speech at the Meeting on Cultural Inheritance and Development,” Qiushi, no. 

17 (2023), November 14, 2023. 65“习近平对宣传思想文化工作作出重要指示” [Xi Jinping delivers important instructions regarding propaganda, ideology, and cultural work], Xinhua, October 8, 2023. 66“习近平对宣传思想文化工作作出重要指示” [Xi Jinping delivers important instructions regarding propaganda ideology, and cultural work], Xinhua, October 8, 2023. 67Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 22. 68Gulchehra Hoja, “China Tests New Ethnic Assimilation Policy on Uyghurs,” Radio Free Asia, 

January 26, 2024; 伊犁哈萨克自治州各民族交往交流交融促进条例 [Regulations Promoting the 

Communication, Exchanges, and Mingling among People of Different Nationalities in the Ili (Yili) 

Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture], passed August 25, 2023, effective January 1, 2024. 69Gulchehra Hoja, “China Tests New Ethnic Assimilation Policy on Uyghurs,” Radio Free Asia, 

January 26, 2024. 70Gu Ting, “China Bans Mongolian-Medium Classes, Cuts Language Hours in Schools,” Radio 

Free Asia, October 5, 2023. 71Gu Ting, “China Bans Mongolian-Medium Classes, Cuts Language Hours in Schools,” Radio 

Free Asia, October 5, 2023. 72Gu Ting, “China Bans Mongolian-Medium Classes, Cuts Language Hours in Schools,” Radio 

Free Asia, October 5, 2023. 73Pelbar, “Police Beat and Detain Tibetan Language Advocate,” Radio Free Asia, October 27, 

2023. For more information on Tashi Wangchug, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2016-00077. 74Pelbar, “Police Beat and Detain Tibetan Language Advocate,” Radio Free Asia, October 27, 2023. 75World Bank Group, “Making Politics Work for Development,” 2016, 171, 172, 183, 184, 191. 76Heritage Foundation, “2024 China Transparency Report,” January 5, 2024. 77Claire Fu, “China Suspends Report on Youth Unemployment, Which Was at a Record High,” 

New York Times, August 15, 2023.
Governance

133

78Claire Fu, “China’s Youth Unemployment Rate Is Back, and Better,” New York Times, January 17, 2024. 79National Bureau of Statistics, “国家统计局局长就2023年全年国民经济运行情况答记者问” [Di- rector of the National Bureau of Statistics answers reports’ questions regarding the status of the 

national economy in 2023], January 17, 2024; National Bureau of Statistics, “2023年国民经济回

升向好 高质量发展扎实推进” [National economy rebounds and improves in 2023; high quality 

development moves forward solidly], January 17, 2024; Claire Fu, “China’s Youth Unemployment 

Rate Is Back, and Better,” New York Times, January 17, 2024. 80Claire Fu, “China’s Youth Unemployment Rate Is Back, and Better,” New York Times, Jan- uary 17, 2024. 81Zhang Legu, “中国‘更好看’的青年失业率数据背后,这几个问题值得关注” [Several note- worthy issues behind China’s “better-looking” youth unemployment data], Voice of America, Jan- uary 28, 2024. 82Zhang Legu, “中国 ‘更好看’的青年失业率数据背后,这几个问题值得关注” [Several note- worthy issues behind China’s “better-looking” youth unemployment data], Voice of America, Jan- uary 28, 2024. 83Zhang Legu, “中国 ‘更好看’的青年失业率数据背后,这几个问题值得关注” [Several note- worthy issues behind China’s “better-looking” youth unemployment data], Voice of America, Jan- uary 28, 2024. 84“China Is Hiding More and More Data from the Rest of the World,” Bloomberg, August 15, 

2023. 85“China Is Hiding More and More Data from the Rest of the World,” Bloomberg, August 

15, 2023; Tom Hancock, “Chinese Province Saw Cremations Surge 73% as Covid Hit: Caixin,” 

Bloomberg, July 17, 2023. 86“China Is Hiding More and More Data From the Rest of the World,” Bloomberg, August 15, 

2023. 87“今年十四届全国人大二次会议闭幕后不举行总理记者会” [This year’s premier’s press confer- ence will not be held after the closing of the second session of the 14th National People’s Con- gress], Yicai, March 4, 2024; Chauncey Jung, “Why Canceling China’s Annual Premier Press 

Conference Matters,” Diplomat, March 11, 2024. 88Chauncey Jung, “Why Canceling China’s Annual Premier Press Conference Matters,” Diplomat, March 11, 2024. 89Gu Ting, “China Jails Economics Professor Who Highlighted Government’s Personnel Costs,” 

Radio Free Asia, August 31, 2023. For more information on Yang Shaozheng, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record [2022-00008]. 90Gu Ting, “China Jails Economics Professor Who Highlighted Government’s Personnel Costs,” 

Radio Free Asia, August 31, 2023. 91“甘肃一边悼念地震遇难者 一边处罚地震‘造谣者’” [In Gansu, as people mourn earthquake 

victims, some are being punished for “spreading rumors”], Radio Free Asia, December 25, 2023; 

“China’s Gansu Earthquake Kills at Least 127 People: What to Know,” Al Jazeera, December 19, 

2023. 92Li Yuan, “When Tragedy Strikes in China, the Government Cracks Down on Grief,” New York 

Times, August 14, 2023.
134

VI. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, 

and Trafficking in Persons

Ethnic Minority Rig

Findings

• During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, Party and gov- ernment officials championed the “integration” of ethnic minori- ties, continuing the implementation of policies contravening the 

rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and other ethnic mi- norities to maintain their own languages and cultures.

• Reports indicate that authorities had altered, destroyed, or 

closed large numbers of mosques serving Hui communities in 

an effort to “sinicize” these communities and restrict their reli- gious freedom, particularly in Gansu province and Ningxia Hui 

Autonomous Region. In February 2024, Radio Free Asia (RFA) 

reported that officials in Nagu town, Tonghai county, Yuxi mu- nicipality, Yunnan province, had installed pagodas in place of 

the dome and minarets they demolished the previous year at 

the local Najiaying Mosque. Authorities also replaced the Ara- bic-style dome and minarets on the Grand Mosque in Shadian 

subdistrict, Gejiu city, Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefec- ture, Yunnan, with a pagoda rooftop and pagoda towers.

• Officials in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) 

continued to implement policies suppressing the use of Mongo- lian as a language of instruction in schools. In September 2023, 

authorities largely completed the transition to a region-wide pol- icy, begun in 2020, of enforcing instruction in Mandarin Chinese 

for all subjects from kindergarten through senior high school.

• Mongols originally from the IMAR who sought refuge in Mongolia reportedly experienced transnational repression from PRC 

authorities, against a backdrop of PRC pressure on Mongolian 

authorities to prevent criticism within Mongolia of the PRC’s 

actions in the IMAR.
135

Ethnic Minority Rig

Party and Government Policy toward Ethnic Minorities

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, Chinese Communist Party and government authorities implemented policies that 

limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional 

Ethnic Autonomy Law1 and international human rights treaties, 

including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 

Rights.2 Chinese leader Xi Jinping continued to promote a historical narrative centering Han Chinese cultural identity and maintaining that all ethnic groups originated from a single Chinese nation.3

Party and government officials also championed the “integration” 

of ethnic minorities, continuing the implementation of policies contravening the rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and other 

ethnic minorities to maintain their own languages and cultures.4

At a “study session” held by the Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo) in October 2023, Xi urged ethnic affairs officials 

from across the country to push for the integration of various ethnic 

groups into the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu), and to work toward “Chinese-style modernization.”5

Officials pushed versions of history endorsing ethnic unity and 

diluting the importance of non-Han Chinese individuals and groups. 

A new university textbook on history and “nation-building” (minzu 

gongzuo), published in February 2024 and edited by National Ethnic 

Affairs Commission director Pan Yue, seeks to de-emphasize the differences between ethnic groups in favor of a Han Chinese-centered 

historiography and integration into a common Han Chinese-centered 

culture.6 According to Australian scholar James Leibold, the compulsory textbook for university students “offers the clearest and 

most complete articulation of President Xi Jinping’s new orthodoxy 

for governing the PRC’s ‘unified multiethnic state.’”7 Pan has long 

endorsed Xi’s policies of assimilation and “ethnic fusion” and has 

emphasized the need for different ethnic groups and religions to 

integrate into “Chinese civilization.”8 PRC scholars also continued 

work on an official history of the Qing Dynasty—work that has been 

delayed for more than a decade under Xi’s tenure—strengthening 

the Party’s justification for ruling over regions inhabited by nonHan Chinese ethnic groups and watering down Western influence 

on the sociopolitical developments of the period.9 Authorities also 

continued efforts to lessen the importance of Mongol ruler Genghis 

Khan in the PRC’s version of history, ending ceremonies and removing artifacts commemorating the historical figure, the adulation of 

whom they view as threatening.10

Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture

During this reporting year, authorities implemented campaigns 

in Hui religious communities that were aimed at “sinicizing” 

Islamic practices,11 a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.12 Reports indicated authorities had altered, destroyed, or closed large numbers of mosques 

serving Hui communities in an effort to “sinicize” these communities 
Ethnic Minority Rights

136

and restrict their religious freedoms, particularly in Gansu province 

and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR).13 Authorities claimed 

the closures and demolitions were part of a mosque “consolidation” 

process aimed at helping local residents,14 but according to historian and Hui expert Hannah Theaker, the practice “seems to be quite 

straightforwardly about just reducing the amount of religious activity.”15 Officials began demolishing mosques’ Islamic features following the Chinese Islamic Association’s circulation of a five-year plan 

to “sinicize Islam” in 2018.16 In February 2024, RFA reported that 

officials in Nagu town, Tonghai county, Yuxi municipality, Yunnan 

province, had installed pagodas in place of the dome and minarets 

they demolished the previous year at the local Najiaying Mosque.17

In May 2023, thousands of Hui Muslims took to the streets of Nagu 

to protest officials’ plans to demolish the dome and minarets,18 after which authorities reportedly detained several dozen protesters.19

Likewise, this past year, authorities replaced the Arabic-style dome 

and minarets on the Grand Mosque in Shadian subdistrict, Gejiu 

city, Honghe Hani and Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan, with a 

pagoda rooftop and pagoda towers.20 Nagu and Shadian have historically been important centers for Muslim worship and the education of 

imams,21 and the Grand Mosque was reportedly the last major mosque 

in China to have its Islamic features removed by authorities.22

In another example of official religious restrictions targeting the 

Hui community, during the 2024 Ramadan period, authorities in 

Yuxi municipality issued a circular strictly prohibiting local minors 

and Communist Party members from engaging in fasting and other 

religious activities.23 In addition, according to the Voice of America, public grade schools in Yuxi distributed a form to young students asking whether their family members engaged in fasting or 

prayer.24 According to anthropologist Ruslan Yusupov, the prohibition on minors fasting represents officials’ efforts to separate Hui 

children from Islamic faith and culture, and demonstrates that repressive techniques first used in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 

Region (XUAR) were now being used in Hui Muslim communities.25

Yusupov referred to “convenience police stations” that have been 

established in Gansu and Qinghai provinces, mirroring those first 

set up in the XUAR, as further evidence of a “Xinjiang turn” in the 

measures officials were using against Hui Muslims.26

Constraints on Language and Ethnic Identity in the IMAR

In July 2023, the IMAR Standing Committee issued regulations, 

effective in September, mandating that the IMAR be made into a 

“model autonomous region” that would “forge the common consciousness of the Chinese nation” (zhulao zhonghua minzu gongtongti 

yishi).27 The regulations were issued following a June 2023 visit to 

the IMAR by Xi Jinping.28 In December 2023, the IMAR Communist Party Committee similarly issued guidelines requiring government officials in the region to promote “a strong sense of community 

for the Chinese nation” in their work and stipulating that they be 

evaluated according to these efforts.29 Scholars expressed concern 

over the effect such policies had on ethnic minorities’ cultures, with 

scholar James Leibold saying “[T]hese new policies continue the 

gradual erosion of minority languages, cultures and identities.”30
Ethnic Minority Rights

137

During this reporting year, officials in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) continued to implement policies suppressing 

the use of Mongolian as a language of instruction in schools.31 The 

right of ethnic minorities to receive an education in their mother 

tongue is protected under international law32 and is also protected under the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.33 At the beginning of the school year, in September 2023, authorities largely 

completed the transition to a region-wide policy that was begun in 

2020 of enforcing instruction in Mandarin Chinese for all subjects 

from kindergarten through senior high school.34 In 2019, around 30 

percent of ethnic Mongol students in the IMAR attended schools 

that used the Mongolian language as the medium of instruction.35

Journalists from British television network ITV reported that when 

they traveled to Hohhot municipality, IMAR, in fall 2023 to report 

on the language policy, they were followed by five or six vehicles, 

and at least 10 individuals followed them as they tried to conduct 

interviews, sometimes physically moving interviewees away from 

them.36 In addition, during this reporting year, schools throughout 

the IMAR began recruiting young native Mandarin Chinese speakers from across China to teach at the preschool through secondary 

school level.37 Observers interviewed by RFA indicated that many 

ethnic Mongol teachers would be forced out of their jobs due to the 

difficulty in switching from teaching in Mongolian to teaching in 

Mandarin Chinese.38 In fall 2020, protests took place in the IMAR 

over authorities’ introduction of the policy to reduce Mongolian-language instruction in several subjects in schools.39

CHANGES MADE TO ENTRANCE EXAM POLICIES FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES

According to an October 2023 RFA report, officials were planning 

to eliminate the option of taking the high school and university entrance exams in the Mongolian language in the coming years.40 China Digital Times reported in June 2024 that censors had removed a 

comment on the social media platform Douban that said the spring 

2024 university entrance exam in the IMAR was the last one that 

would be offered in the Mongolian language.41 China Daily reported 

that beginning in 2026, ethnic minority students in some parts of 

the IMAR would no longer receive the extra points currently awarded to minorities on the university entrance exam.42 The change was 

reportedly in line with official efforts in a number of provinces and 

regions to eliminate or change the system of extra points for ethnic 

minorities.43

Mongols Fleeing China Face Transnational Repression

Mongols originally from the IMAR who sought refuge in Mongolia 

reportedly experienced transnational repression from PRC authorities, against a backdrop of PRC pressure on Mongolian authorities 

to prevent criticism within Mongolia of the PRC’s actions in the 

IMAR.44 According to a December 2023 Washington Post article, six 

interviewees living in Mongolia said Chinese police had used phone 

calls, messages, and actions against their family members in China 

in order to intimidate them.45 A teacher who fled to Mongolia from 

the IMAR after being interrogated by authorities about her participation in the fall 2020 language protests expressed fears that she 
Ethnic Minority Rights

138

might be refouled to China—fears that became greater in the wake 

of the forcible return to China of 80-year-old Mongol historian and 

writer Lhamjab Borjigin in May 2023.46
139

Notes to Chapter 7—Ethnic Minority Rights

1The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law contains protections for the languages, religious 

beliefs, and customs of ethnic minority “nationalities” in addition to a system of regional autonomy in designated areas. 中华人民共和国民族区域自治法 [PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], 

passed May 31, 1984, effective October 1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 10, 11, 21, 36, 

37, 47, 49, 53. 2Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, arts. 22, 27; International Covenant on Economic, 

Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) 

of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 1. China signed the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and ratified it on March 27, 2001. United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, 

Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed July 

20, 2024; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 27; Declaration 

on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 

adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, arts. 2, 4; James Millward, 

“China’s New Anti-Uyghur Campaign,” Foreign Affairs, January 23, 2023; “Interview: ‘They Are 

Away from Their Families, Language, Religion and Culture.,’” Radio Free Asia, February 8, 2023. 3 James Leibold, “New Textbook Reveals Xi Jinping’s Doctrine of Han-Centric Nation-Building,” 

China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, May 24, 2024, 6–7, 9–11; “Xi’s Quest for Ethnic Unity Turns 

Genghis Khan Into New Danger,” Bloomberg, December 8, 2023; Kasim Kashgar, “China Enforces 

Ban on Mongolian Language in Schools, Books,” Voice of America, September 13, 2023; Chris 

Buckley, Vivian Wang, and Joy Dong, “One Nation Under Xi: How China’s Leader Is Remaking Its 

Identity,” New York Times, October 11, 2022. See also “习近平在文化传承发展座谈会上强调 担负起

新的文化使命 努力建设中华民族现代文明” [Xi Jinping emphasized at the Symposium on Cultural 

Inheritance and Development [the need to] take up the new cultural mission and strive to build 

the modern civilization of the Chinese nation], People’s Daily, June 3, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 147. 4“习近平在中共中央政治局第九次集体学习时强调:铸牢中华民族共同体意识 推进新时代党的民族

工作高质量发展” [Xi Jinping emphasized forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese 

nation and promoting high-quality development in the Party’s ethnic work in the new era at 

the Ninth Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo], Xinhua, October 

28, 2023; Yuanyue Dang, “‘All Ethnic Groups Matter’: New Chinese Textbook Cites Splits in the 

West to Justify Beijing’s Integration Policies,” South China Morning Post, March 18, 2024; Chris 

Buckley, Vivian Wang, and Joy Dong, “One Nation Under Xi: How China’s Leader Is Remaking 

Its Identity,” New York Times, October 11, 2022; James Millward, “China’s New Anti-Uyghur 

Campaign,” Foreign Affairs, January 23, 2023; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information 

Center, “New Details Confirm China’s Goal of Total Erasure of Mongolian Language Education 

in Southern Mongolia,” April 11, 2023; Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella 

International Foundation, “Will the Hui Be Silently Erased?,” March 22, 2023. The PRC Regional 

Ethnic Autonomy Law contains protections for the languages, religious beliefs, and customs of 

ethnic minority “nationalities” in addition to a system of regional autonomy in designated areas. 

中华人民共和国民族区域自治法 [PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, effective October 1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 10, 11, 21, 36, 37, 47, 49, 53; Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A 

(III) of December 10, 1948, arts. 22, 27; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 

Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry 

into force January 3, 1976, art. 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by 

U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 

1976, art. 27; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 

Linguistic Minorities, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, 

arts. 2, 4. For a discussion of officials’ implementation of policies contravening the rights of ethnic 

minorities to maintain their own languages and cultures in the 2023 reporting year, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 147–49. 5“习近平在中共中央政治局第九次集体学习时强调:铸牢中华民族共同体意识 推进新时代党的民族

工作高质量发展” [Xi Jinping emphasized forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese 

nation and promoting high-quality development in the Party’s ethnic work in the new era at the 

Ninth Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo], Xinhua, October 28, 

2023; Vanessa Cai, “China’s Ethnic Affairs Officials Urged to Promote Integration of Minority 

Groups,” South China Morning Post, January 24, 2024. 6 James Leibold, “New Textbook Reveals Xi Jinping’s Doctrine of Han-Centric Nation-Building,” 

China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, May 24, 2024, 6–11; Yuanyue Dang, “‘All Ethnic Groups 

Matter’: Chinese Textbook Spells Out Integration Policies,” South China Morning Post, March 

18, 2024. 7 James Leibold, “New Textbook Reveals Xi Jinping’s Doctrine of Han-Centric Nation-Building,” 

China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, May 24, 2024, 7–8. Pan also serves as the Deputy Head of 

the United Front Work Department. 8 James Leibold, “New Textbook Reveals Xi Jinping’s Doctrine of Han-Centric Nation-Building,” 

China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, May 24, 2024, 8, 12–13; Aaron Glasserman, “Touting ‘Ethnic Fusion,’ China’s New Top Official for Minority Affairs Envisions a Country Free of Cultural 

Difference,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, February 24, 2023; Chris Buckley, Vivian Wang, and Joy 

Dong, “One Nation Under Xi: How China’s Leader Is Remaking Its Identity,” New York Times, 

October 11, 2022; “潘岳:以党的二十大精神为指引 奋力推进铸牢中华民族共同体意识工作” [Pan 

Yue: Guided by the spirit of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, strive 

to promote the work of building the common consciousness of the Chinese nation], Research on 

Agency Party-building, no. 11, 2022, reprinted in Lanzhou University Party Committee United 
Ethnic Minority Rights

140

Front Work Department. The term “ethnic fusion” (minzu ronghe, 民族融合) refers to non-Han 

ethnic groups’ adoption of the language and customs used by the Han Chinese ethnic group. 9Chun Han Wong, “Xi Jinping’s Historians Can’t Stop Rewriting China’s Imperial Past,” Wall 

Street Journal, March 23, 2024. 10“Xi’s Quest for Ethnic Unity Turns Genghis Khan into New Danger,” Bloomberg, December 

8, 2023; “Why China’s Rulers Fear Genghis Khan,” Economist, December 20, 2023; Victor Mallet, 

“China’s Mongolian Culture Wars Backfire in France,” Nikkei Asia, December 17, 2023. 11“How China Is Tearing Down Islam,” Financial Times, November 27, 2023; Helen Ann-Smith, 

“China’s Tightening Grip on Islam,” Sky News, accessed May 27, 2024. 12“How China Is Tearing Down Islam,” Financial Times, November 27, 2023; Jeremy Goldkorn, 

“Xi Jinping Orders Officials to Persist with Hard-Line Xinjiang Policies,” China Project, August 

27, 2023; Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Hope Umbrella International Foundation, “Will 

the Hui Be Silently Erased?,” March 22, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 

“Hui Muslims and the ‘Xinjiang Model’ of State Suppression of Religion,” March 29, 2021. 13Human Rights Watch, “China: Mosques Shuttered, Razed, Altered in Muslim Areas,” November 22, 2023; “How China Is Tearing Down Islam,” Financial Times, November 27, 2023; Helen 

Ann-Smith, “China’s Tightening Grip on Islam,” Sky News, accessed May 27, 2024. 14Helen Ann-Smith, “China’s Tightening Grip on Islam,” Sky News, accessed May 27, 2024; 

Human Rights Watch, “China: Mosques Shuttered, Razed, Altered in Muslim Areas,” November 

22, 2023; “How China Is Tearing Down Islam,” Financial Times, November 27, 2023. 15Helen Ann-Smith, “China’s Tightening Grip on Islam,” Sky News, accessed May 27, 2024. 16 “Five-Year Planning Outline for Persisting in the Sinification of Islam (2018–2022),” 

translated in China Law Translate, May 31, 2019; “坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向五年工作规划

纲要 (2018-2022)” [Five-Year Planning Outline for Persisting in the Sinification of Islam 

(2018–2022)], reprinted in China Law Translate, May 31, 2019; Ruslan Yusupov, “Sinicising 

Islam in China: The Story of a Mosque,” Made in China Journal, January 18, 2024. 17Gu Ting, “Yunnan Mosque Gets Pagodas and Party Slogans in Chinese Makeover,” Radio Free 

Asia, February 21, 2024. 18Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” CNN, June 2, 2023; Vivian Wang, “Behind a Rare Clash, a Fight 

over Faith in China,” New York Times, June 8, 2023; Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic Mosque,” China Project, May 30, 2023; Emily Feng, 

“The Plan to Remove a Mosque’s Domes in China Sparks Rare Protest,” NPR, May 31, 2023. For 

more information on the May 2023 protests in Nagu, see Congressional-Executive Commission 

on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 148–49. 19Ruslan Yusupov, “China Is Taking a Wrecking Ball to Famous Mosques,” Foreign Policy, July 

31, 2023; Emily Feng, “The Plan to Remove a Mosque’s Domes in China Sparks Rare Protest,” 

NPR, May 31, 2023; Nectar Gan and Wayne Chang, “Thousands of Ethnic Minority Muslims Defy 

Chinese Authorities in Defense of Mosque,” CNN, June 2, 2023. 20Amy Hawkins and Elena Morresi, “Last Major Arabic-Style Mosque in China Loses Its 

Domes,” Guardian, May 28, 2024. See also Ruslan Yusupov, “China Is Taking a Wrecking Ball to 

Famous Mosques,” Foreign Policy, July 31, 2023. 21Ruslan Yusupov, “Chinese Muslims and Police Clash over Partial Demolition of Historic 

Mosque,” China Project, May 30, 2023; Emily Feng (@EmilyZFeng), “2/ In my years of reporting 

on faith communities in China . . .,” Twitter, May 31, 2023, 8:06 p.m. 22Amy Hawkins and Elena Morresi, “Last Major Arabic-Style Mosque in China Loses Its 

Domes,” Guardian, May 28, 2024. 23Ke Lin, “China Tightens Restrictions during Ramadan,” Voice of America, April 2, 2024; 

Ruslan Yusupov, “Beijing’s Crackdown on Islam Is Coming for Kids,” Foreign Policy, June 17, 

2024; Ruslan Yusupov (@UslanYusupov), “Regulations That Authorize #surveillance of #Ramadan 

Activities among the #cadre and #schoolchildren in Yuxi, Yunnan, #China, This Year  . . .,” X, 

March 16, 2024. 24Ke Lin, “China Tightens Restrictions during Ramadan,” Voice of America, April 2, 2024. 25Ruslan Yusupov, “Beijing’s Crackdown on Islam Is Coming for Kids,” Foreign Policy, June 

17, 2024. 26Ruslan Yusupov, “Beijing’s Crackdown on Islam Is Coming for Kids,” Foreign Policy, June 

17, 2024. See also Chun Han Wong, “China Applies Xinjiang’s Policing Lessons to Other Muslim 

Areas,” Wall Street Journal, December 23, 2018; “China Has Turned Xinjiang into a Police State 

Like No Other,” Economist, May 31, 2018. 27 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People’s Congress Standing Committee, 内蒙古自治区

全方位建设模范自治区促进条例 [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Regulations on Promoting 

the All-Around Construction of a Model Autonomous Region], passed July 31, 2023, effective 

September 1, 2023, art. 4; Yuanyue Dang, “China’s Inner Mongolia Emerges as Model for Xi 

Jinping’s Ethnic Affairs Policy, but Analysts Warn of Cultural ‘Erosion,’” South China Morning 

Post, February 25, 2024. 28“Xi Urges Inner Mongolia to Pursue Green Development, Advance Chinese Modernization,” 

Xinhua, reprinted in International Department, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 

June 8, 2023. See also Yuanyue Dang, “China’s Inner Mongolia Emerges as Model for Xi Jinping’s 

Ethnic Affairs Policy, but Analysts Warn of Cultural ‘Erosion,’” South China Morning Post, February 25, 2024. 29 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Communist Party Committee, 关于全面贯彻铸牢中华民族

共同体意识主线的若干措施 [Several Measures on Comprehensively Implementing the Main Line 

of Strengthening the Common Consciousness of the Chinese Nation], issued January 1, 2024, 

arts. 1, 25, 27, 28; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Communist Party Committee, reprinted in National Ethnic Affairs Commission, “内蒙古自治区党委印发 ‘关于全面贯彻铸牢中华民族

共同体意识主线的若干措施’” [Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region issues several measures on 
Ethnic Minority Rights

141

comprehensively implementing the main line of strengthening the common consciousness of the 

Chinese nation], January 3, 2024; Yuanyue Dang, “China’s Inner Mongolia Emerges as Model for 

Xi Jinping’s Ethnic Affairs Policy, but Analysts Warn of Cultural ‘Erosion,’” South China Morning 

Post, February 25, 2024. 30Yuanyue Dang, “China’s Inner Mongolia Emerges as Model for Xi Jinping’s Ethnic Affairs 

Policy, but Analysts Warn of Cultural ‘Erosion,’” South China Morning Post, February 25, 2024. 31For a discussion of the official implementation of policies restricting the use of the Mongolian 

language in schools in the IMAR in recent years, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission 

on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 149; Congressional-Executive Commis- sion on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 164–65; Congressional-Execu- tive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 117–20. 32Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Lin- guistic Minorities, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, 

arts. 2(1), 4(2–4); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General 

Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 27; 

Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 

November 20, 1989, entry into force September 2, 1990, arts. 29(c), 30. See also PEN America, 

“Decision to Ban Uyghur Language in Xinjiang Schools an Attack on the Minority Group’s Lin- guistic and Cultural Rights,” August 3, 2017. 33中华人民共和国民族区域自治法 [PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], passed May 31, 1984, 

effective October 1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 36, 37. 34Qian Lang, “China Recruits Mandarin-Speaking Teachers to Move to Inner Mongolia,” Radio 

Free Asia, May 6, 2024; Gu Ting, “China Bans Mongolian-Medium Classes, Cuts Language Hours 

in Schools,” Radio Free Asia, October 5, 2023; Kasim Kashgar, “China Enforces Ban on Mongolian 

Language in Schools, Books,” Voice of America, September 13, 2023; Debi Edward, “Inner Mon- golia: China Accused of ‘Cultural Genocide’ for School Language Shift,” ITV News, September 2, 

2023; Gabriel Crossley and Alice Su, “Why Is the Communist Party Redoubling Its Assimilation 

Efforts?,” Drum Tower podcast, Economist, January 16, 2024, 10:54. 35Kasim Kashgar, “China Enforces Ban on Mongolian Language in Schools, Books,” Voice of 

America, September 13, 2023; Christopher P. Atwood, “Bilingual Education in Inner Mongolia: An 

Explainer,” Made in China Journal, August 30, 2020. According to 2017 statistics from the Bureau of Education of the IMAR, there were 520 “ethnic minority” primary and secondary schools 

in the IMAR, serving just under 355,000 students. Ha Lina, “内蒙古少数民族受教育规模和程度达

到历史最高水平” [The scale and degree of education for ethnic minorities in Inner Mongolia has 

reached its highest level in history], Xinhua, July 24, 2017. 36Debi Edward, “Inner Mongolia: China Accused of ‘Cultural Genocide’ for School Language 

Shift,” ITV News, September 2, 2023. 37Qian Lang, “China Recruits Mandarin-Speaking Teachers to Move to Inner Mongolia,” Radio 

Free Asia, May 6, 2024. See also Bao Xianhua, “内蒙古:着力锻造一支躬耕北疆本领过硬的教师

队伍--教育--人民网” [Inner Mongolia: efforts should be made to forge a team of teachers with 

excellent skills in the northern part of the region], People’s Daily, April 17, 2024. 38Qian Lang, “China Recruits Mandarin-Speaking Teachers to Move to Inner Mongolia,” Radio 

Free Asia, May 6, 2024. 39See, e.g., Amy Qin, “Curbs on Mongolian Language Teaching Prompt Large Protests in China,” New York Times, September 4, 2020; James Leibold, “The Not-so Model Minority: Xi Jinping’s 

Mongolian Crackdown,” China Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), December 1, 2021; Huizhong 

Wu, “China Detains 23 in Crackdown on Inner Mongolia Protests,” Associated Press, September 

8, 2020; Christopher P. Atwood, “Bilingual Education in Inner Mongolia: An Explainer,” Made in 

China Journal, August 30, 2020. For more information on the fall 2020 protests, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 117–19. 40Gu Ting, “China Bans Mongolian-Medium Classes, Cuts Language Hours in Schools,” Radio 

Free Asia, October 5, 2023. 41“Censors Take Down Discussion of Last Mongolian-Language College Entrance Exams,” Chi- na Digital Times, June 12, 2024; “[404帖子] 2024年或为最后一届蒙古语高考” [[404 posts] 2024 

may be the last Mongolian-language college entrance examination], China Digital Times, June 

10, 2024. 42Zhao Yimeng, “Additional Points Policy Gets Tougher,” China Daily, May 21, 2024. See also “内蒙古出台深化高考加分改革工作实施方案” [Inner Mongolia issues an implementation plan for 

deepening the reform of college entrance examination bonus points], Inner Mongolia Autonomous 

Region Bureau of Education, reprinted in Paper, September 15, 2021; James Leibold, “The Not-so 

Model Minority: Xi Jinping’s Mongolian Crackdown,” China Leadership Monitor 70 (Winter 2021), 

December 1, 2021. 43Zhao Yimeng, “Additional Points Policy Gets Tougher,” China Daily, May 21, 2024; “Changes 

to China’s Gaokao Exam Are about Politics, Not Fairness,” Economist, June 6, 2024. 44Christian Shepherd, “After Arrests and Deportations, Mongolians Worry about Chinese 

Reach,” Washington Post, December 10, 2023. See also Sumiya Chuluunbaatar, “Will Xi Jinping 

Visit Mongolia in 2024?,” Diplomat, December 16, 2023. 45Christian Shepherd, “After Arrests and Deportations, Mongolians Worry about Chinese 

Reach,” Washington Post, December 10, 2023. 46Christian Shepherd, “After Arrests and Deportations, Mongolians Worry about Chinese 

Reach,” Washington Post, December 10, 2023. For more information on Lhamjab Borjigin, see 

the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00105 and Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report, (Washington: May 2024), 150, 347.
142

Status of Wom

Findings

• Women’s rights were the subject of recommendations during 

the fourth Universal Periodic Review of the People’s Republic 

of China’s (PRC) compliance with international human rights 

norms in January 2024. With legal provisions weakly imple- mented in China, rural and urban women are at risk of losing 

property rights, face gender discrimination at work, are vulner- able to gender-based violence, and have limited access to justice.

• At the October 2023 National Women’s Congress, officials em- phasized building families and the nation, and the role of the 

All-China Women’s Federation in promoting family values to 

promote population growth.

• The Commission continued to monitor official harassment 

and detention of women’s rights advocates, as well as women 

harassed and detained for political advocacy and religious be- lief. These included: Huang Xueqin, Ye Haiyan, Rei Xia, Wu 

Qin, Xu Qin, and Tang Hui.

• So-called “everyday feminism” is on the rise in China, but 

the overall environment for feminist advocacy in China is highly restricted in the wake of crackdowns on independent and 

grassroots civil society advocates and organizations, suspicion 

of women’s public participation, and the censorship of feminist 

websites and social media.

• Women’s political empowerment in China remains low, according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report. Scholarly analysis published this past year concluded that 

the Party’s “commitment to gender equity and its quota policy 

have failed to integrate women meaningfully into the inner circles of power so that Chinese politics remains largely gendered.”

• A State Council assessment of the PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law in August 2023 highlighted problems with implementation, such as a minimal use of mandatory reporting in cases 

of children harmed by domestic violence, the low number of protection orders and warnings issued by local courts and public 

security bureaus, the vulnerability of women with disabilities, 

inadequate funding, and a lack of legal knowledge among frontline personnel.
143

Status of Wom

Authoritarian Misuse of Women’s Rights Promotion and Discourse

PRC officials have presented China as a champion of women’s 

rights in the international human rights system. In major speeches 

at the United Nations (U.N.) in 2015 and 2020, Chinese leader Xi 

Jinping extolled gender equality and creating more opportunities 

for women to have decisionmaking roles.1 At U.N. events in 20232

and 2024,3 PRC officials touted the more than “100 laws and regulations” that protect women’s rights in China.4 Scholars examining authoritarian governments’ use of women’s rights promotion, 

however, have highlighted the “nonegalitarian purposes” motivating 

such advocacy,5 including international prestige 6 and domestic legitimacy.7 With legal provisions to safeguard women’s rights weakly 

implemented, Chinese rural and urban women are at risk of losing 

property rights, face gender discrimination in the workplace, are 

vulnerable to gender-based violence, and have limited access to justice.8 Moreover, as PRC authorities continue to focus on population 

decline, the official discourse on women’s rights protection in PRC 

domestic policy has become increasingly entwined with facilitating 

the goals of the pro-birth population policy.9 As scholar Yige Dong 

observed, the PRC’s paradoxical policies on women illustrate resurgent authoritarian control, with the Party-state “reclaiming its monopoly over women’s affairs.”10

The fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of China’s compliance 

with international human rights norms was held at the U.N. in Geneva on January 23, 2024.11 Nearly one-third of country stakeholders made recommendations related to women and gender in China.12

Recommendations included calls for the PRC government to end the 

use of coercive population control measures against women in China, particularly Uyghur and other ethnic minority women.13 Before 

the UPR session, PRC officials reportedly engaged in lobbying of 

friendly countries, requesting that they “render valuable support to 

China” through “constructive recommendations  . . .,”14 in order to 

“flood the proceedings with bland or adulatory statements.”15 Those 

countries that spoke positively about China’s human rights record16

nevertheless brought attention to gaps in progress on women’s status and rights in their UPR recommendations; for instance, countries put forth recommendations that called for increasing women’s 

public participation.17 According to the World Economic Forum’s 

Global Gender Gap Report for 2024, Chinese women’s political empowerment ranked 111th out of 146 countries and regions,18 and 

as the Commission previously reported,19 no senior women Party 

members were appointed to the Chinese Communist Party Central 

Committee Political Bureau, the top decisionmaking body in China, 

during the 20th Party Congress in October 2022.20

PROMOTING THE PRO-BIRTH POLICY AND PREVENTING POLITICAL RISKS

The Party’s heightened concern about women was on display at 

the October 2023 National Women’s Congress, a gathering held 

every five years that features the work of the All-China Women’s 

Federation (ACWF).21 Several months in advance of the Women’s 

Congress, a compilation of Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s 
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144

speeches on women over the past decade was released.22 Excerpts 

from the compilation published in People’s Daily expounded upon 

Xi’s expectation that the ACWF ideologically adhere to the Party’s 

leadership, specifically in its role as one of the Party’s “mass organizations.”23 While these excerpts made no direct reference to the 

three-child policy, the demographic impetus was clear in Xi’s discussion of building families and the nation, and the ACWF’s role in 

promoting family values among women.24 Officials at the Women’s 

Congress reiterated these points, calling on the ACWF to study Xi’s 

ideological guidance 25 and to urge women to “keep their family and 

nation in mind, and establish correct views on marriage, childbearing, and the family.”26 Additionally, the ACWF Party secretary 27

told the Women’s Congress that the ACWF had “established and 

improved working mechanisms to strengthen risk prevention, and 

political security and ideological security in the women’s field continued to improve . . ..”28 Toward this end, the ACWF charter was 

amended to include “preventing and resolving risks in the women’s 

sphere” in the section on responsibilities of ACWF staff.29 An international legal expert observed that Party officials are “steadily 

moving away from the rhetorical embrace of gender equality, and towards a more full-throated embrace of traditional gender norms as 

a core Party political plank.”30 China Media Project experts deemed 

the acute focus on family, demography, and nation “a retrograde 

movement for women’s liberation.”31 [For more information on the 

promotion of the pro-birth population policy at the Women’s Congress, see Chapter 9—Population Control.]

Suppression of Civil Society Advocacy and Association

ACWF’S NETWORK OF WOMEN’S “SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS”

The ACWF has seen their remit become even more narrowly focused on the political priorities of the Party.32 In what one scholar 

refers to as the “re-politicization” of the ACWF since efforts began 

in 2015 to reform the Party’s “mass organizations,”33 the ACWF has 

worked to intensify control over women’s “social organizations”—the 

term used by PRC authorities for nongovernmental organizations in 

China34—in order to oblige such groups to be more compliant with 

Party priorities and directives.35 At the October 2023 Women’s Congress, the ACWF Party secretary emphasized the ACWF’s responsibility to attract women from “new economic organizations, new 

social organizations, new media industries, and women active in 

cyberspace, and attract them to the Women’s Federation organizational system as widely as possible.”36 An academic analysis published in 2024 examined the work of several ACWF sub-national 

branches to create local networks of “trusted” women’s social organizations, primarily among social welfare service providers.37 According to this research, ACWF branches have not given access to 

the network, potential projects, or funding to women’s organizations 

they deem to be politically sensitive or otherwise “unreliable,” effectively marginalizing such organizations.38 Two examples of organizations that ACWF branches reportedly excluded from network 

participation were a nongovernmental organization (NGO) provid-
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145

ing social services to women factory workers and an organization 

that assists single mothers.39

“EVERYDAY FEMINISM” AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS ADVOCACY

Chinese women in their 20s and 30s may prove to be a “much 

more complicated challenge for the Chinese government,” observed 

scholar Leta Hong Fincher in late 2023.40 Hong Fincher and others have charted the rise of so-called “everyday feminism” in China, identifying shifts in life choices, interests, and behaviors.41 One 

manifestation of “everyday feminism” is the popularity in China of 

books by Japanese sociologist Chizuko Ueno, whose works analyze 

systemic patriarchy in Japan.42 Another is the emergence of Chinese women comedians outside China, whose humor has skewered 

patriarchal attitudes.43 Another widely covered issue in international media outlets this past year is Chinese women’s reluctance 

to marry or have children.44 While “everyday feminism” may be on 

the rise, the overall environment for feminist advocacy in China is 

highly restricted in the wake of official crackdowns on independent 

and grassroots civil society advocates and organizations, suspicion 

of women’s public participation and feminist activism, and the censorship of feminist websites and social media.45 A pioneering Chinese feminist nevertheless noted this past year that even though 

collective action is “almost impossible” in China now, feminists still 

represent a “significant bastion of resistance within the current Chinese landscape.”46

The Commission monitored several ongoing and newly reported 

cases of harassment or detention of individuals who have engaged 

in women’s rights advocacy, including the following:

• On June 13, 2024, the Guangzhou Municipal Intermediate 

People’s Court in Guangdong province sentenced journalist and 

#MeToo activist Sophia Huang Xueqin to five years in prison, 

a fine of 100,000 yuan (US$13,803), and four years’ deprivation 

of political rights on the charge of “inciting subversion of state 

power.”47 Prior to her detention in September 2021,48 Huang’s 

activism included women’s rights and civil society advocacy.49

• In October 2023, Radio Free Asia reported on local officials’ 

harassment of Ye Haiyan in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 

Region.50 Ye gained prominence in the rights community more 

than a decade before in connection with her efforts to seek justice for sexually abused schoolgirls, sex workers, and people living with HIV/AIDS.51

• Two feminist activists, Rei Xia and Wu Qin, left China 

due to harassment and detention or the threat of detention.52

Shanghai municipal public security officials detained Rei, a 

“White Paper” protester and feminist activist, three times in 

2022 and 2023, including for 37 days at the Xuhui District 

Public Security Bureau detention center for exposing physical and sexual abuse of another White Paper protester by 

local police.53 Wu Qin, an arts and media professional from 

Beijing municipality, published “A Letter from a Tehran Prison,” disguising her location and name to give an account of 

her experience of harassment, intimidation, and detention in 

2022 and 2023 in China.54
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146

Women Detained for Rights Defense and Religious Belief

Individual women who have engaged in human rights advocacy, including documenting rights violations, and those associated with religious groups that the government perceives to be politically sensitive, 

continued to face surveillance and the threat of detention. The Commission continued to monitor multiple cases of arbitrary detention of rights 

defenders in its Political Prisoner Database, including the following 

selected cases:

• Xu Qin. On March 29, 2024, the Yangzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court in Jiangsu province sentenced rights activist Xu 

Qin to four years in prison and two years’ deprivation of political 

rights on the charge of “inciting subversion of state power.”55 Xu 

co-founded Human Rights Watch in China, and was a member of the 

Rose Group, which involved WeChat groups, and a website focused 

on human rights education.56

• Tang Hui. In October 2023, a court in Hunan province sentenced 

petitioner Tang Hui to four years in prison in connection with her 

grievances related to property and healthcare matters.57 Observers 

speculated, however, that the punishment was a form of reprisal by 

local officials against Tang dating back over 10 years,58 to the period of time during which she petitioned local authorities to harshly 

punish the perpetrators of her young daughter’s kidnapping, sexual 

assault, and forced prostitution in 2006.59

• Religious adherents. A February 2024 report by the Uyghur 

Human Rights Project (UHRP) analyzed the cases of 408 Uyghur 

Muslim women whom authorities had detained in connection with 

their religious belief and practice.60 The UHRP report found that 

there was “a pattern of removing women from positions of religious 

and cultural leadership, and subjecting large numbers of women to 

long periods of imprisonment for their everyday religious practice.”61

Several women from the Christian house church movement 62 were 

in detention or sentenced this past year.63 Women adherents of other religions and spiritual practices, which the PRC government has 

designated as “cults,” including the Church of Almighty God (CAG) 

and Falun Gong, continued to be targeted for their religious belief.64

In a 2022 report, the Dui Hua Foundation, a nongovernmental organization based in San Francisco, analyzed a period of 18 years of 

data from its extensive political prisoner database and found that 

women constituted 41 percent of individuals detained on alleged 

“cult” charges.65

Party Control of Elite Women’s Political Participation

Scholarly analysis published this past year concluded that the 

Party’s “commitment to gender equity and its quota policy have 

failed to integrate women meaningfully into the inner circles of power so that Chinese politics remains largely gendered.”66 The Party 

and government’s highest ranking woman politician, State Councilor Shen Yiqin, illustrates a career trajectory that has become 

“gendered.”67 Shen, who rose up the ranks in Guizhou province, her 

home province, served in deputy and leadership roles at the provincial Party School, propaganda bureau, politics and legal affairs 
Status of Women

147

commission, and “stability maintenance” office.68 Her career peaked 

in Guizhou as provincial governor and Party Secretary.69 Provincial Party Secretaries wield considerable power,70 and the position 

can be a channel for promotion to the Politburo.71 But Shen was 

not selected to the 24-member Politburo in October 2022,72 and her 

portfolio at the State Council consisted of human resources, civil 

affairs, and women and children’s issues,73 which are typically considered to be gendered “female.”74 Breaking with precedent, Shen 

was given a joint appointment as president of the All-China Women’s Federation in October 2023.75 As of June 2024, no woman had 

been appointed provincial Party Secretary for China’s 31 provinces, 

province-level municipalities, or autonomous regions.76 Eight women were either appointed or continued to serve as Deputy Secretary 

of Provincial Party Committees this past year.77 Two held joint appointments as provincial governors with Wang Lixia as chairwoman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region People’s Government 

(a position equivalent to provincial governor) and Liang Huiling as 

governor of Heilongjiang province.78

Eight Years In: Weak Implementation of the 

PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law

In the PRC country report for its fourth Universal Periodic Review in January 2024, the government noted the passage of the PRC 

Anti-Domestic Violence Law (Anti-DV Law) in 2016 as a mark of 

progress on women’s rights.79 The gap between law and practice 80

has left victims of domestic violence in China vulnerable to continuing abuse even after they have sought official assistance.81 Protection orders in particular are not playing their anticipated role as 

a legal tool in the fight against domestic violence, according to a 

March 2024 editorial in Guangming Daily.82 The Supreme People’s 

Court (SPC) reported this past year that judges issued 5,695 court 

protection orders in all of 2023,83 while a Chinese media outlet reported that the SPC handled 2.17 million domestic violence cases 

in 2023.84 The SPC also issued batches of “model” domestic violence 

cases in June 202385 and November 2023.86 The June cases reportedly were aimed at illustrating the use of harsher sentences for 

batterers, to emphasize that domestic violence should not be adjudicated with lenient sentencing typically used in family disputes.87

One November batch included cases of psychological violence, including against minors.88 A member of the Chinese public interest 

group Purple Ribbon Mothers commented several months later that 

the issuance of the November cases led to an increase in protection 

orders for children who had been hidden away by one parent in 

divorce guardianship cases, but she also indicated that it remained 

difficult to get protection orders from the courts.89

A State Council assessment of the Anti-DV Law presented in 

August 2023 highlighted serious problems with implementation, 

such as minimal use of mandatory reporting in cases of children 

harmed by domestic violence, the low number of protection orders 

and warnings issued by local-level courts and public security bureaus, the vulnerability of women with disabilities, inadequate programmatic funding, and a general lack of legal knowledge by frontline personnel.90 The assessment also reportedly raised concerns 
Status of Women

148

about insufficient and scattered data on domestic violence in China, 

which diminishes the accuracy and value of empirical research and 

limits service providers from identifying the scope and needs of victims of domestic violence.91 Despite the uptick in domestic violence 

widely reported during the COVID-19 pandemic,92 media coverage 

of the State Council assessment of the Anti-DV Law did not mention 

whether the assessment addressed this uptick.
149

Notes to Chapter 8—Status of Women

1“Full Text: Xi’s Speech at UN Event Marking 25 Years since Beijing Women Conference,” 

CGTN, October 1, 2020; Somini Sengupta, “U.N. Summit Meeting on Women’s Rights Highlights 

More Tension Between U.S. and China,” New York Times, September 26, 2015.. 2U.N. Press Release, “As Women Worldwide Still Struggle to Achieve Basic Rights, Third Committee Emphasizes Importance of Access to Citizenship, Education, Work, Justice,” GA/SHC/4375, 

October 3, 2023; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Eighty-fifth 

session Summary Record of the 1977th Meeting, May 12, 2023, CEDAW/C/SR.1977, May 18, 

2023, para. 4. 3U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Forty-fifth 

Session (22 January–2 February 2024), National Report Submitted in Accordance with Human 

Rights Council Resolutions 5/1 and 16/21** China, A/HRC/WG.6/45/CHN/1*, November 3, 2023, 

paras. 7, 14, 33, 35, 44; Minlu Zhang, “China’s Experience with Gender Equality Shared at UN,” 

China Daily, March 13, 2024. 4“为强国建设、民族复兴伟业贡献巾帼智慧和力量——学习 ‘习近平关于妇女儿童和妇联工作论述

摘编’” [Contribute women’s wisdom and strength to the great cause of building a strong country and national rejuvenation—Study “Edited excerpts from Xi Jinping’s remarks about women, 

children and the work of the Women’s Federation”], People’s Daily, November 22, 2023. 5Elin Bjarnegård and Pär Zetterberg, “How Autocrats Weaponize Women’s Rights,” Journal of 

Democracy 33, no. 2 (April 2022): 72; Janet Elise Johnson, “Authoritarian Gender Equality Policy 

Making: The Politics of Domestic Violence in Russia,” Politics & Gender 19, no. 4 (2023): 1041; 

Audrey L. Comstock and Andrea Vilán, “Looking beyond Ratification: Autocrats’ International 

Engagement with Women’s Rights,” Politics & Gender 20, no. 1 (2024). 6Elin Bjarnegård and Pär Zetterberg, “How Autocrats Weaponize Women’s Rights,” Journal 

of Democracy 33, no. 2 (April 2022): 68. See also Janet Elise Johnson, “Authoritarian Gender 

Equality Policy Making: The Politics of Domestic Violence in Russia,” Politics & Gender 19, no. 

4 (2023): 1041; Audrey L. Comstock and Andrea Vilán, “Looking beyond Ratification: Autocrats’ 

International Engagement with Women’s Rights,” Politics & Gender 20, no. 1 (2024). 7 Janet Elise Johnson, “Authoritarian Gender Equality Policy Making: The Politics of Domestic 

Violence in Russia,” Politics & Gender 19, no. 4 (2023): 1036. 8See, e.g., Mandy Zuo, “International Women’s Day: China’s Gender-Equality Failings Still Hold 

Back Women and Economic Growth, Beijing Told,” South China Morning Post, March 8, 2024; 

Sophie Beach, “Interview: Leta Hong Fincher on Advances and Setbacks in Women’s Rights over 

the Past Decade,” China Digital Times, December 1, 2023; William Yang, “Married Women Face 

Discrimination in Hunt for China Jobs,” Voice of America, September 13, 2023; Joy Dong, “For 

Single Women in China, Owning a Home Is a New Form of Resistance,” New York Times, August 

23, 2023. 9 Jiang Zewen, “夏杰:一定比例用人单位存在只招男性或同等条件下男性优先问题” [Xia Jie: The 

problem of a certain percentage of employers recruiting only men or giving priority to men despite the same conditions], Paper, March 7, 2024; Hu Anhua and Li Xinuo, “‘三八’国际妇女节

|全国两会,代表委员聚焦这些‘她权益’” [“March 8” International Women’s Day | During the 

Two Sessions, deputies and members focused on several of “her rights and interests”], China City 

Network, reprinted in Paper, March 8, 2024; Carl Minzner, “Beijing’s Message to the National 

Women’s Congress: Gender Equality Is Out, Family and Childbirth Are In,” Council on Foreign 

Relations (blog), October 26, 2024; Lorna S. Wei, “Egg Freezing in China: A Woman’s Right to 

Have Control over Her Body,” ThinkChina, July 13, 2023. 10Yige Dong, “Chinese Feminists Face Paradoxical State Policies,” Current History 122, no. 845 

(September 2023): 204–5. 11U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, 

China, A/HRC/56/6, March 11, 2024, para. 1. 12U.N. Human Rights Council, Chronological List of Recommendations—China, accessed May 

19, 2024; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 

Review, China, A/HRC/56/6, March 11, 2024. 13U.N. Human Rights Council, Chronological List of Recommendations—China, accessed May 

19, 2024, Speaker 12 Canada, no. 1; Speaker 35 Chile, no. 2; Speaker 45 Iceland, no. 4; Speaker 

136 U.S.A., no. 5. In addition to the countries that specifically called for an end to the use of coercive birth limit measures, Speaker 77 Mexico, no. 2, called on the PRC government to “protect 

the sexual and reproductive rights of all women.” Additionally, the following stakeholders called 

on the PRC government more broadly to implement the recommendations made in the August 

2022 Office of the U.N. Human Rights Commission’s assessment on human rights in Xinjiang, 

which included a recommendation to stop using sexual violence against women: Denmark, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United 

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the 

Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, China, A/HRC/56/6, March 11, 2024; Office of 

the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns 

in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” August 31, 2022, para. 

151(iv), (v), (xi). 14Emma Farge, “Exclusive: China Lobbies Countries to Praise Its Rights Record Ahead of UN 

Review—Diplomats,” Reuters, January 22, 2024. 15Sophie Richardson and Rana Siu Inboden, “Beijing Is Pouring Resources into Its UN Human 

Rights Review—All to Prevent Any Real Review from Taking Place,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, 

January 22, 2024. 16U.N. Human Rights Council, Chronological List of Recommendations—China, accessed May 

19, 2024; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 

Review, China, A/HRC/56/6, March 11, 2024; Lingzhi Fan and Xin Liu, “Chinese NGOs Carry Out 

Exchange Activities, Dispel Misunderstandings on Human Rights at UN Meeting,” Global Times, 
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150

February 4, 2024. See also Audrey L. Comstock and Andrea Vilán, “Looking beyond Ratification: 

Autocrats’ International Engagement with Women’s Rights,” Politics & Gender 20, no. 1 (2024): 

225. 17U.N. Human Rights Council, Chronological List of Recommendations—China, accessed May 

19, 2024, Speaker 6 Bulgaria, no. 1; Speaker 28 Dominica, no. 2; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, China, A/HRC/56/6, March 11, 2024. 18World Economic Forum, “Global Gender Gap Report 2024,” June 2024, 17. 19Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 157. 20Alexandra Stevenson, “Leadership Changes Reveal That in China, Men Still Rule,” New York 

Times, October 23, 2022; “习近平再打破20年传统 无女性进入中央政治局” [Xi Jinping breaks 

another 20-year tradition, no women enter the Central Committee Political Bureau], Voice of 

America, October 24, 2022. 21Qiu Ye, “習近平調整婦聯地位,提出 ‘防範婦女領域風險’” [Xi Jinping has adjusted the 

ACWF’s status, raises “preventing risks in the sphere of women’s rights”], Initium, November 1, 

2023; Alexandra Stevenson, “China’s Male Leaders Signal to Women That Their Place Is in the 

Home,” New York Times, November 2, 2023; Chu Yang and David Bandurski, “China’s Political 

Discourse October 2023: BRI Forum, Li Keqiang, Feminism with a Socialist Character,” Sinocism, 

January 10, 2024. 22“‘习近平关于妇女儿童和妇联工作论述摘编’出版发行” [“Edited excerpts from Xi Jinping’s 

remarks about women, children and the work of the Women’s Federation” has been published 

and is in distribution], Xinhua, June 11, 2023. 23“为强国建设、民族复兴伟业贡献巾帼智慧和力量——学习 ‘习近平关于妇女儿童和妇联工作论

述摘编’” [Contribute women’s wisdom and strength to the great cause of building a strong 

country and national rejuvenation—Study “Edited excerpts from Xi Jinping’s remarks about 

women, children and the work of the Women’s Federation”], People’s Daily, November 22, 2023. 

See also Yunyun Zhou, “‘Being a Good Daughter of the Party’? A Neo-Institutional Analysis of 

the All-China Women’s Federation Organisational Reforms in China’s Xi Era,” China Perspectives

2, (2019). 24“为强国建设、民族复兴伟业贡献巾帼智慧和力量——学习 ‘习近平关于妇女儿童和妇联工作论

述摘编’” [Contribute women’s wisdom and strength to the great cause of building a strong 

country and national rejuvenation—Study “Edited excerpts from Xi Jinping’s remarks about 

women, children and the work of the Women’s Federation”], People’s Daily, November 22, 

2023. 25Ding Xuexiang, “为强国建设民族复兴伟业谱写新时代‘半边天’的绚丽华章” [Writing a brilliant chapter of “holding up half the sky” in the new era for the great cause of building a strong 

country and national rejuvenation], People’s Daily, October 24, 2023; Huang Xiaowei, “以习近平

新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导动员引领广大妇女为强国建设民族复兴而团结奋斗—在中国妇女第

十三次全国代表大会上的报告 (2023年10月23日)” [Guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism 

with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, mobilize and lead women to unite and strive for a 

strong country and national rejuvenation—report at the 13th National Congress of Chinese Women (October 23, 2023)], reprinted in CCTV, November 11, 2023; Chu Yang and David Bandurski, 

“China’s Political Discourse October 2023: BRI Forum, Li Keqiang, Feminism with a Socialist 

Character,” Sinocism, December 21, 2023. See also Shen Yiqin et al., “谌贻琴:牢记嘱托砥砺奋进 

为强国建设民族复兴伟业贡献‘半边天’力量” [Remember well our instructions and forge ahead 

in contributing our strength of “half the sky” to the great cause of building a strong country and 

national rejuvenation], Qiushi, no. 22 (2023), November 16, 2023. 26Ding Xuexiang, “为强国建设民族复兴伟业谱写新时代‘半边天’的绚丽华章” [Writing a brilliant chapter of “holding up half the sky” in the new era for the great cause of building a strong 

country and national rejuvenation], People’s Daily, October 24, 2023; Chu Yang and David Bandurski, “China’s Political Discourse October 2023: BRI Forum, Li Keqiang, Feminism with a Socialist Character,” Sinocism, December 21, 2023. See also “Xi Urges China Women’s Group to 

Cultivate ‘Childbirth Culture,’” Bloomberg, October 31, 2023. 27“ACWF Leaders,” All-China Women’s Federation, accessed October 10, 2024. 28Huang Xiaowei, “以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导动员引领广大妇女为强国建设民

族复兴而团结奋斗—在中国妇女第十三次全国代表大会上的报告 (2023年10月23日)” [Guided by Xi 

Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, mobilize and lead 

women to unite and strive for a strong country and national rejuvenation—report at the 13th 

National Congress of Chinese Women (October 23, 2023)], reprinted in CCTV, November 11, 2023. 29“中华全国妇女联合会章程”[All-China Women’s Federation Charter], amended October 26, 

2023, art. 36(2); “中华全国妇女联合会章程”[All-China Women’s Federation Charter], amended 

November 2, 2018; Qiu Ye, “习近平调整妇联地位,提出‘防范妇女领域风险’”[Xi Jinping has 

adjusted the ACWF’s status, raises “preventing risks in the sphere of women’s rights”], Initium, 

November 1, 2023. 30Carl Minzner, “Beijing’s Message to the National Women’s Congress: Gender Equality Is Out, 

Family and Childbirth Are In,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), October 26, 2024. 31Chu Yang and David Bandurski, “China’s Political Discourse October 2023: BRI Forum, Li 

Keqiang, Feminism with a Socialist Character,” Sinocism, December 21, 2023. 32Yunyun Zhou, “‘Being a Good Daughter of the Party’? A Neo-Institutional Analysis of the 

All-China Women’s Federation Organisational Reforms in China’s Xi Era,” China Perspectives 2, 

(2019): 18–20, 26. 33Yunyun Zhou, “‘Being a Good Daughter of the Party’? A Neo-Institutional Analysis of the 

All-China Women’s Federation Organisational Reforms in China’s Xi Era,” China Perspectives 2, 

(2019): 20; Lin Nie and Jie Wu, “Flexible Organizational Weapon of the Party: The New Presence 

of Women’s Federations in Women’s NGOs in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, April 27, 

2024: 3, 6. See also Yunyun Zhou, “Theorizing Illiberal State Feminism: Institutional Dilemmas 
Status of Women

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and Political Parallelism in China’s Gender Governance,” Women’s Studies International Forum, 

April 18, 2023. 34Shawn Shieh, “The Origins of China’s New Law on Foreign NGOs,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, 

January 31, 2017. 35Lin Nie and Jie Wu, “Flexible Organizational Weapon of the Party: The New Presence of 

Women’s Federations in Women’s NGOs in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, April 27, 

2024: 6, 11–15; Lin Nie and Jie Wu, “Strategic Responses of NGOs to the New Party-building 

Campaign in China,” China Information 36, no. 1 (2022): 47–48. 36Huang Xiaowei, “以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导动员引领广大妇女为强国建设

民族复兴而团结奋斗—在中国妇女第十三次全国代表大会上的报告 (2023年10月23日)” [Guided 

by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, mobilize 

and lead women to unite and strive for a strong country and national rejuvenation—report 

at the 13th National Congress of Chinese Women (October 23, 2023)], reprinted in CCTV, 

November 11, 2023. 37Lin Nie and Jie Wu, “Flexible Organizational Weapon of the Party: The New Presence of 

Women’s Federations in Women’s NGOs in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, April 27, 

2024: 9–15. 38Lin Nie and Jie Wu, “Flexible Organizational Weapon of the Party: The New Presence of 

Women’s Federations in Women’s NGOs in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, April 27, 

2024: 15–17. 39Lin Nie and Jie Wu, “Flexible Organizational Weapon of the Party: The New Presence of 

Women’s Federations in Women’s NGOs in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, April 27, 

2024: 17. 40“Interview: Leta Hong Fincher on Advances and Setbacks in Women’s Rights over the Past 

Decade,” China Digital Times, December 1, 2023. See also Leta Hong Fincher, “Young Chinese 

Women Are Defying the Communist Party,” New York Times, November 26, 2023. 41Leta Hong Fincher, “Young Chinese Women Are Defying the Communist Party,” New York 

Times, November 26, 2023; Yige Dong, “Chinese Feminists Face Paradoxical State Policies,” Current History 122, no. 845 (September 2023): 207; Dalia Parete and Lü Pin, “A Feminist Odyssey,” 

China Media Project, May 9, 2024; Shen Lu and Wenxin Fan, “How a Japanese Sociologist Became a Chinese Feminist Icon,” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2023; Alexandra Stevenson, “In 

China, Ruled by Men, Women Quietly Find a Powerful Voice,” New York Times, May 8, 2024; Liu 

Wen, “上野千鹤子进入‘热搜’女权大众化时代来临?” [Chizuko Ueno has become a “hot search”; 

has the age of popularized feminism arrived?], Deutsche Welle, March 3, 2023. 42Na Zhong, “What China’s Reading,” China Books Review, November 28, 2023; Patricia M. 

Thornton, “Who’s Afraid of Chizuko Ueno? The Party’s Ongoing Counteroffensive against Feminism in the Xi Era,” China Leadership Monitor, December 1, 2023; Helen Sullivan, “Chizuko 

Ueno: the Japanese Writer Stoking China’s Feminist Underground,” Guardian, April 25, 2023; 

Shen Lu and Wenxin Fan, “How a Japanese Sociologist Became a Chinese Feminist Icon,” Wall 

Street Journal, October 5, 2023. 43Alice Su and David Rennie, “Why Chinese Feminists Are Doing Stand-Up Comedy in New 

York City,” Economist, December 5, in Drum Tower, podcast, 34:59; Yuan Li, “EP-088 女子主意:

腿毛、A股、吴京王志安和铁链女” [EP-088 Feminism: Hairy legs, A-shares, Wu Jing, Wang Zhi’an, 

and the chained woman], March 9, 2024, in Bumingbai, podcast, 40:26; Vickie Wang, “The Chinese 

People Have Stand-Up,” China Media Project, August 30, 2023. 44See, e.g., Alexandra Stevenson and Zixu Wang, “China Told Women to Have Babies, but Its 

Population Shrank Again,” New York Times, January 18, 2024; Stacy Hsu, “Chinese Women Unimpressed by Government’s Plan to Make More Babies,” Radio Free Asia, March 7, 2024; Qian 

Liu, “For More Babies, China Must Ensure Its Population Policy Is Fit for the Modern Woman,” 

South China Morning Post, October 24, 2023. 45 James Griffiths, “Chinese Feminists Fight Harassment and Government Censorship to Carve 

Out Space Online,” Globe and Mail, August 1, 2023; Wanqing Zhang, “Heavily Persecuted, Highly 

Influential: China’s Online Feminist Revolution,” Rest of World, September 26, 2023. 46Dalia Parete and Lü Pin, “A Feminist Odyssey,” China Media Project, May 9, 2024. See also 

Joy Dong, “For Single Women in China, Owning a Home Is a New Form of Resistance,” New York 

Times, August 23, 2023; Alexandra Stevenson, “In China, Ruled by Men, Women Quietly Find a 

Powerful Voice,” New York Times, May 8, 2024. 47Helen Davidson, “China #MeToo Journalist Sentenced to Five Years in Jail, Supporters Say,” 

Guardian, June 14, 2024; Rights Defense Network, “黄雪琴、王建兵一审判决书(共27页)”

[First-instance court decision for Huang Xueqin and Wang Jianbing (27 pages in total)], July 8, 

2024. For more information on Huang Xueqin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2019-00454. 48“What Are the ‘Crimes’ of Journalist and MeToo Activist Huang Xueqin, according to Her 

Indictment?,” China Change, September 24, 2023; Letter from Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 

and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the 

independence of judges and lawyers and the Working Group on discrimination against women 

and girls to Chen Xu, Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the PRC to the 

United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, AL CHN 

18/2023, November 2, 2023. 49Catherine Lai, “No #MeToo in China? Female Journalists Face Sexual Harassment, but Remain Silent,” Hong Kong Free Press, December 5, 2017; Catherine Lai, “Over 80% of Female 

Journalists in China Have Experienced Workplace Sexual Harassment, Poll by Journalist Shows,” 

Hong Kong Free Press, March 7, 2018; Ken Moritsugu, “A Chinese #MeToo Journalist and an 

Activist Spent 2 Years in Detention. Their Trial Starts This Week,” Associated Press, September 

19, 2023; “EP-076‘雪饼案’:当局为何如此忌惮黄雪琴、王建兵?(文字版)” [EP-076 “Huang and 
Status of Women

152

Wang’s case:” Why do the authorities fear Huang Xueqin and Wang Jianbing? (Transcript)], Bumingbai, December 10, 2023. 50Gu Ting, “退出女权运动十年 叶海燕仍遭当局刁难求关注” [Ten years after leaving the women’s rights movement, Ye Haiyan seeks support after authorities still make things difficult for 

her], Radio Free Asia, September 8, 2023.] 51Gu Ting, “退出女权运动十年 叶海燕仍遭当局刁难求关注” [Ten years after leaving the women’s rights movement, concern that authorities are still making things difficult for Ye Haiyan], 

Radio Free Asia, September 8, 2023. 52Su Yu, “原声带·夏巢川 :白纸运动后,我在看守所地狱般的日子” [Original soundtrack—Xia 

Chaochuan: my hellish days in a detention center after the white paper movement], Voice of 

America, May 3, 2024; Wu Qin, “A Letter from a Tehran Prison,” Made in China Journal, December 20, 2023. 53Rei Xia, “Arrested for Holding a Blank Paper,” Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy, May 15, 2024; Su Yu, “原声带·夏巢川 :白纸运动后,我在看守所地狱般的日子” [Original soundtrack—Xia Chaochuan: my hellish days in a detention center after the white paper 

movement], Voice of America, May 3, 2024; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “夏巢川因关注‘白

纸革命’网友被带走” [Xia Chaochuan taken away for paying attention to online friends in the 

“White Paper Revolution”], December 20, 2022. For more information on Rei Xia, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2024-00124. 54Wu Qin, “A Letter from a Tehran Prison,” Made in China Journal, December 20, 2023; Wenxin 

Fan, “How One Woman Duped China’s Censorship Machine,” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2024. 55Rights Defense Network, “江苏人权捍卫者徐秦被以所谓“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”判刑4年 徐

秦当庭表示上诉” [Jiangsu rights defender Xu Qin sentenced to 4 years in prison for “inciting 

subversion of state power,” Xu Qin told the court she plans to appeal], March 29, 2024. For more 

information on Xu Qin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2016-00015. 56China Human Rights Defenders, “Winners Named for the 2023 Cao Shunli Memorial Award 

for Human Rights Defenders: Xu Qin and Peng Lifa,” March 14, 2023; China Change, “Crushing 

a Rose Under Foot: Chinese Authorities Target Internet Chat Groups,” April 4, 2018. 57Rights Defense Network, “湖南维权人士唐慧、唐世科寻衅滋事案公开宣判:唐慧被判4年,其

兄唐世科被判3年6个月” [Hunan rights defender Tang Hui and Tang Shike—in the case of picking quarrels and provoking trouble—sentences are publicly announced: Tang Hui sentenced to 

4 years and her brother Tang Shike sentenced to 3 years and 6 months], October 8, 2023; Ge 

Xinghang, “唐慧被控寻衅滋事案庭审结束 13年前医疗纠纷缘何涉罪” [The trial of Tang Hui, who 

was accused of picking quarrels and provoking trouble, has finished, why was a hospital dispute 

from 13 years ago the case of a suspected crime], Caixin, July 16, 2023. For more information on 

Tang Hui, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00243. 58Gao Feng, “湖南一对兄妹因长年上访被以寻衅滋事罪判刑” [Hunan brother and sister sentenced for picking quarrels and provoking trouble for long-term petitioning], Radio Free Asia, 

October 10, 2023. 59Ge Xinghang, “唐慧被控寻衅滋事案庭审结束 13年前医疗纠纷缘何涉罪” [The trial of Tang 

Hui, who was accused of picking quarrels and provoking trouble, has finished, why was a hospital 

dispute from 13 years ago the case of a suspected crime], Caixin, July 16, 2023; Dui Hua Foundation, “Tang Hui Case: Why the Focus Should Be on Judicial Independence,” Dui Hua Human 

Rights Journal, April 18, 2013. 60Rachel Harris and Abduweli Ayup, “Twenty Years for Learning the Quran: Uyghur Women 

and Religious Persecution,” Uyghur Human Rights Project, February 1, 2024, 19. 61Rachel Harris and Abduweli Ayup, “Twenty Years for Learning the Quran: Uyghur Women 

and Religious Persecution,” Uyghur Human Rights Project, February 1, 2024, 2, 3, 19, 31. 62“The Vital Role of Chinese Women in Evangelism,” ChinaSource, August 8, 2022. 63See, e.g., ChinaAid, “被控‘诈骗罪’的湖北省鄂钢桥家庭教会郝志娓牧师案终审裁定,维持八年

重刑,” [The final judgment of the case of Pastor Hao Zhiwei of Hubei Province Egangqiao House 

Church, who was charged with ‘fraud,’ maintained the heavy sentence of eight years] December 

23, 2022; ChinaAid, “CCP Court Sentences Four Christian Leaders from Kali City—Claims Collecting an Offering in Church Constitutes a Crime,” August 15, 2021; Gao Feng, “Online Pastor in 

China’s Dalian Gets 14 Years for ‘Superstition,’” Radio Free Asia, January 16, 2024. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2020-00257 for Hao Zhiwei, 

2023-00148 for Zhang Wenying, 2024-00093 for Wang Fengying, and 2024-00094 for Chu Xinyu. 64Dui Hua Foundation, “The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China,” March 29, 

2022, 1, 2, 7–14. In a dataset of 100 CAG adherents whom Chinese authorities sentenced to seven 

years or more in 2023, 82 percent reportedly are women. Church of Almighty God, “The Chinese 

Government’s Persecution of the Church of Almighty God Annual Report 2023,” February 2024, 

Table 3, 20–23. See also Jiang Tao, “China: New Massive Wave of Persecution Against the Church 

of Almighty God,” Bitter Winter, August 11, 2023. 65Dui Hua Foundation, “The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China,” March 

29, 2022, 53. 66Xinhui Jiang, Sarah Eaton, and Genia Kostka, “Women’s Work: The Gendered Nature of Appointment Politics in Subnational China,” Government and Opposition: An International Journal 

of Comparative Politics, October 13, 2023: 3. See also Xinhui Jiang and Yunyun Zhou, “When 

Socialist Legacy Meets International Norms: Gender Quota Adoption and Institutional Change 

in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, (January 12, 2024): 17–19. 67Phoebe Zhang, “China’s Top Women’s Affairs Official Vows to Promote Marriage and Family,” 

South China Morning Post, November 16, 2023; Qiu Ye, “習近平調整婦聯地位,提出‘防範婦女領

域風險’” [Xi Jinping has adjusted the ACWF’s status, raises “preventing risks in the sphere 

of women’s rights”], Initium, November 1, 2023; Xinhui Jiang, Sarah Eaton, and Genia Kostka, 

“Women’s Work: The Gendered Nature of Appointment Politics in Subnational China,” Government and Opposition: An International Journal of Comparative Politics, October 13, 2023: 3.
Status of Women

153

68Zhang Yifan and Yang Qian, “贵州省召开领导干部会议宣布中央决定:谌贻琴任贵州省委书记 

李炳军任贵州省委副书记” [Guizhou province convenes leading cadres’ meeting to announce Central Committee decision: Shen Yiqin appointed Party Secretary of Province Standing Committee 

and Li Bingjun appointed Party Deputy Secretary of Province Standing Committee], China News 

Service, November 21, 2020. 69Zhang Yifan and Yang Qian, “贵州省召开领导干部会议宣布中央决定:谌贻琴任贵州省委书记 

李炳军任贵州省委副书记” [Guizhou province convenes leading cadres’ meeting to announce Central Committee decision: Shen Yiqin appointed Party Secretary of Province Standing Committee 

and Li Bingjun appointed Party Deputy Secretary of Province Standing Committee], China News 

Service, November 21, 2020. 70Xinhui Jiang, Sarah Eaton, and Genia Kostka, “Women’s Work: The Gendered Nature of Appointment Politics in Subnational China,” Government and Opposition: An International Journal 

of Comparative Politics, October 13, 2023: 5. 71Cheng Li, “The Reshuffling Report: Provinces: The Key to Pekingology,” China-US Focus, 

March 8, 2022; Rahul Karan Reddy and Omkar Bhole, “Xi’s Loyalists: A Breakdown of China’s 

New Leadership,” Organisation for Research on China and Asia, November 3, 2022. 72Qiu Ye, “習近平調整婦聯地位,提出 ‘防範婦女領域風險’” [Xi Jinping has adjusted the 

ACWF’s status, raises “preventing risks in the sphere of women’s rights”], Initium, November 

1, 2023. 73Phoebe Zhang, “China’s Top Women’s Affairs Official Vows to Promote Marriage and Family,” 

South China Morning Post, November 16, 2023. 74Alexandra Stevenson, “For Women in China’s Communist Party, It’s Lonely at the Top,” New 

York Times, October 19, 2022; Xinhui Jiang, Sarah Eaton, and Genia Kostka, “Women’s Work: The 

Gendered Nature of Appointment Politics in Subnational China,” Government and Opposition: An 

International Journal of Comparative Politics, October 13, 2023: 6–7, 9–13, 19; Xinhui Jiang and 

Chuanmin Chen, “Gender Differences in Policy Preferences of Legislators: Evidence from China’s 

National Legislature,” Politics & Gender 20, no. 1 (2024): 156. 75Qiu Ye, “習近平調整婦聯地位,提出 ‘防範婦女領域風險’” [Xi Jinping has adjusted the 

ACWF’s status, raises “preventing risks in the sphere of women’s rights”], Initium, November 

1, 2023. 76“31 个省市区党委,人大常委会,政府政协四套班子一把手名单(简历)” [List of the first-incommand (bios) for the four groups: 31 provincial, province-level municipality and autonomous 

region Party committees, NPC Standing Committee, government, and CPPCC], China Economic 

Net, August 30, 2024. See also Sierra Janik et al., U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission, “Women in China’s Leadership,” December 19, 2023. 77Liang Jianzhong, “8名女性省级党委副书记,5人是二十大后履新,最年轻54岁” [8 women are 

province-level Party committee deputy Party secretaries, 5 of them were appointed after the 20th 

Party Congress, the youngest is 54 years old], Southern Metropolitan Daily, November 7, 2023. 

Cheng Lihua, one of the eight women, left Anhui in December 2023, and subsequently was appointed chair of the Chongqing People’s Political Consultative Congress. She did not hold a joint 

appointment as Deputy Party Secretary in Chongqing municipality. Lin Yunshi, “人事观察|58

岁女中委程丽华 升任重庆政协主席” [Personnel Observer | 58-year-old Central Committee member Cheng Lihua, appointed chair of the Chongqing People’s Political Consultative Committee], 

Caixin, January 23, 2024. 78Liang Jianzhong, “8名女性省级党委副书记,5人是二十大后履新,最年轻54岁” [8 women are 

province-level Party committee deputy Party secretaries, 5 of them were appointed after the 20th 

Party Congress, the youngest is 54 years old], Southern Metropolitan Daily, November 7, 2023. 79U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Forty-fifth 

Session (22 January–2 February 2024), National Report Submitted in Accordance with Human 

Rights Council Resolutions 5/1 and 16/21** China, A/HRC/WG.6/45/CHN/1*, November 3, 2023, 

paras. 7, 44. 80See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: 

May 2024), 159. 81Weiping (Equality), “‘中华人民共和国反家庭暴力法’ 实施八周年 (2016 年 3 月 1 日-2024 

年 2 月 29 日)系列监测报告-概述篇”[Eight years of implementation of the “PRC Anti-Domestic Violence Law” (3/1/2016–2/29/2024) Series Monitoring Report—Overview], February 29, 2024; 

Jia Xue, Kai Lin, Luye Li, Hayden Huaixing Wang, and Ivan Sun, “Supportive Interventions of 

Chinese Police in Domestic Violence: Do Officer Knowledge and Training Matter?,” Journal of 

Interpersonal Violence 39 no. 15–16 (2024): 2–3, 7–8, 23–24; Chen Xuhou, “女子离婚冷静期间被丈

夫持刀杀害,检方:涉案男子长期家暴” [A woman was killed by her husband with a knife during 

the cool-down period after divorce, procuratorate: man accused in the case had been committing 

domestic violence for a long time], Paper, February 4, 2024. 82Tang Wei, “不执行人身保护令被判刑, 让法律‘长出牙齿’” [Sentenced for not heeding a 

court protection order, letting the law show its teeth], Guangming Daily, March 22, 2024. 83Supreme People’s Court, “最高人民法院工作报告” [Supreme People’s Court work report], 

March 8, 2024, sec. 2. 84Liya Su, “China Divorce Court Orders Man Who Called Disabled Wife ‘Trash’ to Pay US$4,200 

Compensation as Insult Is ‘Domestic Violence,’” South China Morning Post, April 4, 2024. 85Supreme People’s Court, “中国反家暴十大典型案例(2023年)” [Ten major model cases of 

fighting domestic violence in China (2023)], June 15, 2023. 86Supreme People’s Court, “最高法发布人民法院反家庭暴力典型案例(第一批)” [SPC issues 

model cases in combating domestic violence from people’s courts (first batch)], November 25, 2023; 

Supreme People’s Court, “最高法发布人民法院反家庭暴力典型案例(第二批)” [SPC issues model cases in combating domestic violence from people’s courts (second batch)], November 27, 2023. 87Shan Yuxiao, “最高法典型案例:家暴不是家庭纠纷,不能从轻处罚” [SPC model cases: Domestic violence is not a family dispute and cannot be punished leniently], Caixin, June 16, 2023.
Status of Women

154

88Supreme People’s Court, “最高法发布人民法院反家庭暴力典型案例(第二批)” [SPC issues 

model cases in combating domestic violence from people’s courts (second batch)], November 27, 

2023. 89Liu Yan, “民法典婚姻家庭编司法解释(二)公开征求意见:回应热点 尚存争议” [Public solici- tation of opinions on the judiciary’s interpretation (2) of the Civil Code’s sections on divorce and 

family issues: Responding to hot topics and ongoing debates], China Youth Daily, April 17, 2024. 90Gao Jia, “反家暴法施行7年:社会观念转变进步明显,官方资金支持力度不足” [Implementa- tion of the anti-dv law for 7 years: The progressive change in societal views is clear, but official 

financial support [for implementation] is ineffectual], Jiemian, August 31, 2023; Huang Yuxin, “反家暴法施行七年半,强制报告制度落实仍有差距” [Seven and a half years of implementation 

of the Anti-Domestic Violence Law, there is still a gap in the implementation of the mandatory 

reporting system], Caixin, August 29, 2023. 91Guo Ruomei, “国务院反家暴报告:人身保护令发放少,应提升受害人申请意愿” [State Council 

anti-domestic violence report: personal protection orders too few, must increase the number of 

victims who are willing to apply [for protection orders]], Southern Metropolitan Daily, September 

1, 2023. 92Nathan VanderKlippe, “Domestic Violence Reports Rise in China amid COVID-19 Lockdown,” 

Globe and Mail, March 29, 2020; Ti Tu, “In Locked Down Shanghai, a ‘Shadow Pandemic’ of Do- mestic Violence,” Sixth Tone, June 9, 2022; Albee Zhang and Ryan Woo, “Thousands Call New Chi- nese Domestic Violence Helpline App,” Reuters, September 1, 2022. See also Harriet Evans, “Hong 

Fincher, Leta. 2023.  Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China  (fully up- dated 10th anniversary edition). London: Bloomsbury.,” China Perspectives, 136 (2024): 89–90.
155

Population Contr

Findings

• The Chinese Communist Party and government of the Peo- ple’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to apply a birth limit 

policy, which violates international standards by seeking to con- trol family size. An expert commented that the PRC three-child 

policy instituted in 2021, which permits and seeks to incentivize 

families to have up to but no more than three children, is a 

project to “ [reassert] Party-State control over [the] population.”

• The pro-birth policy has not resulted in population growth, 

however, and PRC population trends are similar to those in 

other East Asian countries. The National Bureau of Statistics 

of China’s 2023 data revealed that the population declined in 

China for the second year in a row and that the total number 

of births in China declined for the seventh year in a row.

• Young people’s reluctance to marry and have children has 

been linked to a variety of factors, including the high cost of 

raising children in China, economic precarity, and gender inequality.

• Party leaders emphasized the importance of population growth 

during official speeches and events this past year. Pro-birth and 

marriage messaging was featured in official propaganda, municipal governments’ financial incentives, and judicial opinions. 

Measures passed in September 2023 incentivized childbirth for 

military personnel. Some legislative proposals focused on supporting women’s rights in the workplace.

• The legacy of the one-child policy (1980–2015) continues to 

have an impact on Chinese society, including human trafficking 

for the purpose of marriage and the commercial sex trade. Data 

published this past year showed on average, boy-preference for 

couples having a third child, with 133 boys born for every 100 

girls, across China.

• Chinese authorities’ enforcement of population control policies has contributed to increasing socio-economic precarity for 

China’s elderly population, including an underfunded pension 

system and the inability of adult children to provide traditional 

care for their elderly parents.
156

Population Contr

PRC Coercive Population Policies

Despite calls from experts and other observers to remove all birth 

limits in China on both demographic and human rights grounds,1

the Chinese Communist Party and government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to implement a coercive birth limit policy that violates international standards by placing limits on 

family size.2 The one-child policy, in force from 1980 through 2015, 

restricted most couples to one child3 with exceptions permitted in 

some localities, most commonly in rural areas or for ethnic minority 

groups.4 In October 2015, the PRC government modified the birth 

limit policy to allow all couples to have two children.5 Harsh policy 

enforcement included the use of birth permits and fines to punish 

couples for exceeding birth limits, intrusive monitoring of women’s 

fertility, and coercive measures such as forced placement of intrauterine devices (IUDs), forced sterilizations, and forced abortions.6

Beginning in 2016, the use of forced abortion and sterilization to 

control the fertility of ethnic minority women in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 7 resulted in “drastically reduced 

birth rates of ethnic groups.”8 The U.S. State Department deemed 

that such coercive birth control measures used against Uyghurs and 

other predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups in the XUAR 

constituted acts of genocide and crimes against humanity.9 [For 

more information on human rights abuses in the XUAR, see Chapter 18—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.]

To address what senior PRC officials refer to as the “great challenge” of the aging population and the below-replacement birth rate, 

the Party Central Committee Political Bureau (Politburo) announced 

the adoption of a universal three-child policy in May 2021,10 allowing all couples to have up to three children.11 Policy goals include 

increasing the birth rate, balancing the overall sex ratio, “optimizing” the population structure, raising “population quality,” and safeguarding the “rights and interests of women in employment.”12 The 

previous use of fines for exceeding birth limits was abolished.13 The 

shift to the three-child policy, however, did not alter the basic premise of PRC authorities’ “claim [of] sovereignty over childbearing” of 

Chinese citizens, as observed by political scientist Tyrene White.14

In an analysis of the three-child policy, anthropologist Susan Greenhalgh noted authorities’ ambition to establish various systems for 

top-down management of the individual’s full life cycle, along with 

population data monitoring, aimed at “reasserting Party-State control over population.”15 Legal expert Carl Minzner has cautioned 

that the “real risk is that the coming years will see such efforts 

ramped up in ways that align state power and social pressure even 

further to limit the ability of Chinese women to freely make personal decisions about marriage and childbirth.”16

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

Coercive controls imposed on families, as well as additional abuses engendered by the PRC population and family planning system, 

violate standards set forth in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and 

Platform for Action and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo 
Population Control

157

International Conference on Population and Development.17 China 

was a state participant in the negotiation and adoption of both documents.18 Acts of official coercion committed in the implementation of 

population control policies also contravene provisions of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which China has ratified.19 Some scholars also 

have theorized that forced abortion may constitute an international 

crime, noting that “reproductive violence is increasingly being recognized as a distinct form of harm requiring legal recognition, protection, and redress.”20

Population Decline and Official Responses

In January 2024, the National Bureau of Statistics in China announced that in 2023 the total population in China had decreased 

to 1,409,670,000 people—a decline of 2,080,000 from the prior year, 

a significantly larger decrease than the 850,000-person decline recorded in 2022.21 This marked the second year in a row of officially 

reported population decline in China and the seventh year in a row 

that the total number of births in China has declined.22 Births in 

China fell to approximately 9,020,000 in 2023, compared to 9,560,000 

in 2022, with a birth rate of 6.39 births per 1,000 people, the lowest since 1949.23 Closures of obstetric departments in hospitals in 

multiple provinces this past year,24 and of preschools over the past 

two years, are linked to the declining birth rate.25 While an uptick 

in births in 2024 is possible in connection with the traditional belief 

that children born in the Year of the Dragon are lucky,26 international experts expect that the birth rate in China will continue to 

fall, in line with trends observed in other East Asian countries.27

MESSAGING AND POPULAR PROPAGANDA

Party leaders repeatedly emphasized the importance of population growth through official speeches and events, particularly focusing on women and their role in childbearing.28 At the 13th National Women’s Congress in October 2023 held in Beijing municipality, 

Party General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of 

childbearing and family culture,29 and Ding Xuexiang, a member 

of the Politburo Standing Committee—China’s paramount policy 

and decision making body led by Xi—declared that women should 

“establish a correct outlook on marriage and love, childbirth and 

family.”30 Ding and Huang Xiaowei, Party Secretary of the All-China Women’s Federation,31 both briefly mentioned “equality between 

men and women,”32 yet gender equality received negligible attention at the Women’s Congress compared to the focus on family and 

childbearing, and on Xi Jinping’s ideological discourse.33 At a May 

2024 meeting to discuss the population policy’s role in supporting 

China’s modernization goals, Wang Huning—another Politburo 

Standing Committee member—addressed 100 representatives from 

the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), advocating for a strengthened sense of responsibility and mission to 

effectively promote and implement population development.34

Pro-natal propaganda messages were disseminated this past year,35

including via popular culture channels, public art, text messaging, 

and phone calls.36 Public service advertisements aired during China 
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Central Television’s 2024 Annual Spring Festival Gala featured “a 

house full of children” and images of multigenerational bliss.37 Local 

governments modified public artwork and removed outdated slogans 

to attempt to erase the legacy of one-child policy birth restrictions 

and instead promote having more children.38 In August 2023, coinciding with the Qixi Festival, known as “China’s Valentines Day,” 

authorities in Xi’an municipality, Shaanxi province reportedly sent 

texts to residents wishing them “sweet love, marriage and childbirth” and “good fertility.’’ 39 A mother of two from Quanjiao county, 

Chuzhou municipality, Anhui province, reported receiving calls from 

community officials encouraging her to have a third child.40 In late 

2023, a public sculpture near the waterfront in Wuhan municipality, 

Hubei province, was altered to show a couple with three children, 

which previously displayed a couple with only one child.41 The National Radio and Television Administration, which is subordinate to 

the Party’s Central Propaganda Department,42 announced a review 

of dramas, planning to remove unapproved titles and shows that 

portray lifestyle choices deviating from the Party’s messaging about 

family values.43

INCENTIVIZING MARRIAGE AND CHILDBIRTH

A March 2024 editorial in The Paper, a Shanghai-based media 

outlet, argued that greater long-term financial and regulatory planning are needed to ensure the policy’s success, implying that systemic planning is absent in policy implementation.44 The editorial 

called for improving protections for women in the workplace from 

explicit or implicit discrimination due to childbirth, increasing childcare subsidies and personal income tax reductions and exemptions, 

offering male paternity leave and parental leave, and providing 

more employment support for women of childbearing age.45 In a 

Washington Post report, a Beijing-based demographer observed that 

there are no “major incentives at the national level,” and financial 

subsidies at the local level are insufficient.46 Implementation measures reported this past year reflect haphazard efforts to promote 

marriage and childbirth, including the following:

• Local governments. Authorities continued to offer financial incentives 47 to boost birth rates 48 and encourage marriage 

in response to the falling marriage rate and the drop in population,49 including subsidies for couples who get married at 

a younger age, for the birth of a second or third child, and to 

support maternity fees.50 Examples of local government incentive plans include: Changshan county, Quzhou municipality, 

Zhejiang province announced rewards of 1,000 yuan (US$137) 

to couples if the woman is 25 or younger to “promote age-appropriate marriage and childbearing.”51 Hangzhou municipality, 

Zhejiang province, announced a plan to provide couples bearing 

a second child a one-time subsidy of up to 7,000 yuan (US$960) 

and 25,000 yuan (US$3,500) to those with a third child both 

for maternity and childcare fees.52 While officials in Zhengzhou 

municipality, Henan province, promised subsidies for the birth 

of a third child and offered extended parental leave, reports 

emerged in November 2023 that officials had rejected subsidy 

applications.53 Zhengzhou officials accounted for the delay by 
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explaining that they did not yet have implementation details,54

but the municipality’s serious financial debt likely was a factor 

in the rejections, according to Bloomberg.55

• Military. The central government also involved the military 

in the pro-natal agenda with the release on September 7, 2023, 

of “implementing measures for military personnel” of the PRC 

Population and Family Planning Law.56 According to Xinhua, 

the PRC government’s news agency, the 33 provisions contained 

in the implementing measures provide financial incentives, 

family planning, parental leave, and other forms of support to 

encourage childbearing and improve military effectiveness.57

• “Bride price” reform. Bride price refers to the traditional 

betrothal gift of an amount of money or material goods, given 

by the groom’s family to the bride herself or to her family.58 In 

late 2023, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), together with the 

Ministry of Civil Affairs and the All-China Women’s Federation 

(ACWF), issued four “model” cases resolving bride price disputes.59 SPC guidance encouraged judges to take into account 

local folk customs regarding bride price, the length of the marriage or the length of cohabitation, and whether the couple had 

children, among other considerations.60 The SPC also solicited 

opinions for draft provisions to resolve such disputes, provisions 

that went into effect in February 2024.61

• Legislative proposals and suggestions raised at the annual March 2024 meetings of the National People’s Congress 

and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 

were similar to previous proposals made since the pro-natal 

population policy was launched in 2021.62 In an address to the 

CPPCC, the ACWF’s delegate 63 spoke approvingly of the population policy and regulatory framework but pointed out gaps 

in implementation, such as difficulties accessing affordable 

childcare and employment discrimination against women.”64

Another proposal also focused on women in the workplace, suggesting improvements to litigation channels for women who 

had been fired or subjected to unfair work conditions because 

of their pregnancy, childbirth, or needs related to lactation.65

Other proposals recommended allowing single women to have 

access to assistive reproductive technology, such as egg freezing 

(which, as of June 2024, was not permitted for single women in 

China66), and to effectively implement household registration 

(hukou) for children born to single women.67

Disenchantment with the Pro-Natal Policy

Young people’s reluctance to marry and have children68 has been 

linked to a variety of factors, including the high cost of raising children in China,69 concerns over the economy,70 and gender inequality.71 Online commentary and reports from media outlets continued 

to reflect skepticism of, resistance to, and occasional mockery of, the 

government’s focus on population growth as a national responsibility of the rising generation of young adults.72 China Digital Times, 

a California-based organization that monitors the internet and censorship in China, reported in July 2023 that the Guangzhou branch 

of the Communist Youth League (CYL) had conducted a survey to 
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identify the percentage of young people who consider themselves 

among the “four won’t youth.”73 The “four won’t youth” are young 

women and men who intentionally won’t date, marry, purchase a 

home, or have children.74 A copy of the Guangzhou CYL’s report was 

later censored.75 Young Chinese women’s disinterest in the PRC’s 

new “marriage and childbearing culture” has been connected to a 

range of social, economic, and political concerns.76 Rural women 

have cited their reluctance to have more children due to economic 

burdens and concerns about higher divorce rates and abandoned 

children in their communities.77 Some feminists reportedly have explained that their decisions to not marry or have a child are a form 

of non-violent resistance to the official pro-natal policy.78

Continuing Effects of the One-Child Policy

GENDER SELECTION FAVORING BOYS LINKED TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING

The legacy of the one-child policy continues to have an impact on 

Chinese society and beyond.79 In January 2024, the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) reported that in 2023, there were 

30.97 million more males than females in China (720.32 million 

males to 689.35 million females),80 with a sex ratio (total population) of 104.49 males to 100 females.81 The population control policy, 

moreover, continues to influence the use of sex selection based on 

the traditional cultural preference for sons.82 Data published this 

past year show lopsided sex ratios favoring boys following the introduction of the two- and three-child policies.83 According to that data 

(from 2020), boy-preference is seen in couples having a third child, 

with 132.93 boys born for every 100 girls on average across China.84

Observers have linked the trafficking of women within China and 

from abroad into China for purposes of forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation,85 to the lopsided sex-ratio imbalance, 

as well as to an attempt to drive “bride prices” lower as grooms and 

their families attempt to find potential spouses.86 [For more information on the status of human trafficking in China, see Chapter 

10—Human Trafficking.]

PRESSURES ON THE ELDERLY

Chinese authorities’ enforcement of population control policies 

has contributed to increasing socio-economic precarity for China’s 

elderly population.87 The PRC pension system is underfunded,88

and the state-affiliated Chinese Academy of Social Sciences predicted that it could run out of money by 2035.89 Structural changes to 

families, propelled by the one-child policy, weakened the feasibility 

of the traditional reliance 90 on adult children to care for elderly parents.91 In January 2024, the State Council released a 26-point plan 

on developing a “silver economy” to expand services and to develop 

“products” that support the elderly, the first few of which comprise 

meal assistance, at-home care services, community-based elder care, 

and improved geriatric and rehabilitative health care.92 An editorial 

by the Representative of the U.N. Population Fund (UNPF) to China 

following the release of the State Council plan highlighted the need 

to prioritize the rights of older people,93 which were not referred to 

in the 26-point plan.94 The UNPF Representative noted that, “[I]t 
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is important to not stereotype older people as simply a collection of 

problems that can be solved through their consumption of tailored 

products and services.”95
162

Notes to Chapter 9—Population Control

1Martin King Whyte, “Be Careful What You Wish For: China Confronts Population Decline,” 

China-US Focus, August 5, 2023; Natalie Liu, “Desperate for More Children, China Urges Soldiers to Procreate,” Voice of America, September 28, 2023; Jenny Feng, “China’s Three-Child Policy Isn’t Leading to a Surge in Births, Data Shows,” China Project, October 17, 2023; Evelyn 

Cheng, “China Can’t Just Rely on Boosting Births to Address Aging Population Issues, Renmin 

University Professor Says,” CNBC, September 13, 2023; Giulia Carbonaro, “How China Is Tackling a Population Crisis,” Newsweek, March 18, 2024; Yaqiu Wang, “It’s Time to Abolish China’s 

Three-Child Policy,” Essays on Equality: The Politics of Childcare, Global Institute for Women’s 

Leadership, reprinted in Human Rights Watch, February 22, 2023; Amnesty International, “China: ‘Three-Child Policy’ Still a Violation of Sexual and Reproductive Rights,” May 31, 2021; Yan 

Shanping, “严善平:取消生育限制、强化生育支援刻不容缓” [Yan Shanping: It’s urgent to abolish 

birth restrictions and strengthen supports for childbearing], Jiemian, May 28, 2024. 2Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women on September 15, 1995, and endorsed by U.N. General Assembly resolution 50/203 on February 

23, 1996, Annex I, paras. 9, 17. The Beijing Declaration states that governments that participated 

in the Fourth World Conference on Women reaffirmed their commitment to “[e]nsure the full implementation of the human rights of women and of the girl child as an inalienable, integral and 

indivisible part of all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Annex I, para. 9); “[t]he explicit 

recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all women to control all aspects of their health, in 

particular their own fertility, is basic to their empowerment” (Annex I, para. 17). United Nations 

Population Fund, Programme of Action, adopted at the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, September 13, 1994, paras. 7.2, 8.25. Paragraph 7.2 states, “Reproductive 

health therefore implies that people  . . . have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to 

decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and 

women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods 

of family planning of their choice  . . ..” Paragraph 8.25 states, “In no case should abortion be 

promoted as a method of family planning.” 3中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法 [PRC Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, effective September 1, 2002, art. 18; Susan Greenhalgh, “Why Does the End of the 

One-Child Policy Matter?,” in eds. Jennifer Rudolph and Michael Szonyi, The China Questions: 

Critical Insights into a Rising Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 183; Gu 

Baochang, Wang Feng, Guo Zhigang, and Zhang Erli, “China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century,” Population and Development Review 33, no. 1 (March 

7, 2007): 130–36. 4Gu Baochang, Wang Feng, Guo Zhigang, and Zhang Erli, “China’s Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century,” Population and Development Review 33, no. 1 

(March 7, 2007): 131–36. 5中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法 [PRC Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended December 27, 2015, effective January 1, 2016, art. 18; National Health 

and Family Planning Commission, “实施全面两孩政策,促进人口均衡发展”[Implement the universal two-child policy, promote balanced population development], October 29, 2015; National 

People’s Congress Standing Committee, 全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《中华人民共和国人

口与计划生育法》的决定 [National People’s Congress Standing Committee Decision on Amending 

the “PRC Population and Family Planning Law”], passed December 27, 2015, effective January 

1, 2016; Yindie Lin et al., “The Effect of Gradually Lifting the Two-Child Policy on Demographic 

Changes in China,” Health Policy and Planning 39 (2024): 364; Yaqiu Wang, “It’s Time to Abolish 

China’s Three-Child Policy,” Essays on Equality: The Politics of Childcare, Global Institute for 

Women’s Leadership, reprinted in Human Rights Watch, February 22, 2023. 6Rita Cheng, “Women Harmed by China’s Draconian Family Planning Policies Still Seek Redress,” Radio Free Asia, April 8, 2022; James Carter, “‘One of the Most Troubling Social Policies 

of Modern Times,’” China Project, September 27, 2023; Shui-yin Sharon Yam and Sarah Mellors 

Rodriguez, “Reproductive Realities in Modern China: A Conversation with Sarah Mellors Rodriguez,” Made in China Journal, March 29, 2023; Daniel C. Mattingly, “Responsive or Repressive? 

How Frontline Bureaucrats Enforce the One Child Policy in China,” Comparative Politics 52, 

no. 2 (2020): 2, 4–6; Martin King Whyte, Wang Feng, and Yong Cai, “Challenging Myths about 

China’s One-Child Policy,” China Journal 74 (July 2015): 150–52; Andrew Mullen, “Explainer: 

China’s One-Child Policy: What Was It and What Impact Did It Have?,” South China Morning 

Post, June 1, 2021. 7“China Cuts Uighur Births with IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization,” Associated Press, June 29, 

2020; Nathan Ruser and James Leibold, “Family De-Planning: The Coercive Campaign to Drive 

Down Indigenous Birth-Rates in Xinjiang,” International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Brief Report no. 44 (2021): 11–17, 25. See also Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 171–72; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 280–81. 8Adrian Zenz and Uyghur Tribunal, “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction,” February 10, 2022, 

5. 9Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports 

on Human Rights Practices for 2021—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” April 

12, 2022; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “Country 

Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” 

March 20, 2023; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 

“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2023—China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and 

Macau),” April 22, 2024. See also U.S. Department of State, “Determination of the Secretary of 

State on Atrocities in Xinjiang,” January 19, 2021; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 273–74, 280–81.
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10“权威快报|三孩生育政策来了” [Authoritative announcement: Three-child policy has arrived], Xinhua, May 31, 2021; 中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法 [PRC Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended August 20, 2021, art. 18; 中共中央国务院关于优化

生育政策促进人口长期均衡发展的决定 [Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 

of China and the State Council on optimizing the fertility policy and promoting the long-term 

balanced development of the population], Xinhua, July 20, 2021. 11中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法 [PRC Population and Family Planning Law], passed December 29, 2001, amended August 20, 2021, art. 18; “权威快报|三孩生育政策来了” [Authoritative 

announcement: Three-child policy has arrived], Xinhua, May 31, 2021. 12中共中央国务院关于优化生育政策促进人口长期均衡发展的决定 [Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on optimizing the fertility policy 

and promoting the long-term balanced development of the population], Xinhua, July 20, 2021, 

secs. 1, 2(7), 6. 13中共中央国务院关于优化生育政策促进人口长期均衡发展的决定 [Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on optimizing the fertility policy 

and promoting the long-term balanced development of the population], Xinhua, July 20, 2021, sec. 

3(9); “国务院废止三部人口管理法规,《社会抚养费征收管理办法》在列” [State Council abolished 

three population management regulations, among which is recorded the “Measures for the Collection and Management of Social Support Fees”], Jiemian, September 26, 2021. 14Tyrene White, “Policy Case Study: Population Policy,” in ed. William A. Joseph, Politics in China: An Introduction, Third Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 435. White’s comment about ongoing control of fertility in China by PRC authorities was made in relation to the 

shift to the two-child policy in 2016, but it remains relevant for the shift to the three-child policy. 15Susan Greenhalgh, “The Biopolitics of the Three-Child Policy,” Made in China Journal, June 

6, 2024; See also Tyrene White, “Policy Case Study: Population Policy,” in ed. William A. Joseph, 

Politics in China: An Introduction, Third Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 435. 16Carl Minzner, “China Steadily Pivots towards Promoting Marriage and Childbirth,” Council 

on Foreign Relations (blog), September 25, 2023. 17Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on 

Women on September 15, 1995, and endorsed by U.N. General Assembly resolution 50/203 on 

February 23, 1996, Annex I, paras. 9, 17; United Nations Population Fund, Programme of Action, 

adopted at the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, September 13, 

1994, paras. 7.2, 8.25. 18United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, 

September 15, 1995, chap. II, para. 3, chap. IV, para. 12. China was one of the participating States 

at the Fourth World Conference on Women, which adopted the Beijing Declaration and Platform 

for Action. United Nations, Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1, September 13, 1994, chap. II, sec. C, chap. VI, para. 1. 19Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force 

June 26, 1987, art. 1; U.N. Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth 

Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at Its 1391st and 1392nd Meetings (2–3 December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, February 3, 2016, para. 51. In 2016, the U.N. Committee against 

Torture noted its concern regarding “reports of coerced sterilization and forced abortions, and . . . 

the lack of information on the number of investigations into such allegations . . . [and] the lack of 

information regarding redress provided to victims of past violations.” See also Convention on the 

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 34/180 of December 18, 1979, entry into force September 3, 1981, art. 16.1(e). Under 

article 16.1(e), “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 

against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall 

ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:  . . . The same rights to decide freely and 

responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, 

education and means to enable them to exercise these rights[.]” See also International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) 

of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 17. Under Article 17 of the ICCPR, 

“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 

correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” 20Ciara Laverty and Dieneke de Vos, “Forced Abortion as an International Crime: Recent Reports from Northern Nigeria,” Just Security, December 23, 2022. 21National Bureau of Statistics of China, “National Economy Witnessed Momentum of Recovery with Solid Progress in High-quality Development in 2023,” January 17, 2024. Wang Pingping, 

“王萍萍:人口总量略有下降 城镇化水平继续提高” [Wang Pingping: Total population has slightly 

declined, urbanization level continued to increase], Economic Daily, January 18, 2023. See also 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 

172. 22Ken Moritsugu, “China’s Population Falls for a 2nd Straight Year as Births Drop Even after 

End of One-Child Policy,” Associated Press, January 17, 2024. 23Laura He and Simone McCarthy, “China’s Population Declines for Second Straight Year as 

Economy Stumbles,” CNN, January 17, 2024. 24Amy Hawkins, “Closure of Maternity Wards Fuels Chinese Debate over Population Decline,” 

Guardian, October 5, 2023; Farah Master, “Many Hospitals in China Stop Newborn Delivery 

Services as Birth Rate Drops,” Reuters, March 19, 2024. 25Lin Jing, “Over 20,000 Kindergartens in China Have Shut since 2021 as Births Continue to 

Fall,” Yicai, March 25, 2024. 26Lily Kuo and Lyric Li, “Could the Year of the Dragon Bring the Baby Boom That Asia Needs? 

Maybe.,” Washington Post, February 10, 2024.
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27Nicholas Eberstadt, “East Asia’s Coming Population Collapse,” Foreign Affairs, May 8, 2024; 

“China’s Low-Fertility Trap,” Economist, March 21, 2024; “Predictions: China’s Record-Low Births 

Will Leave a Global Mark,” Financial Times, December 28, 2023; Carl Minzner, “China’s Population Decline Continues,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), January 26, 2024; Liyan Qi, “China’s 

Population Decline Accelerates as Women Resist Pressure to Have Babies,” Wall Street Journal, 

January 17, 2024. 28Susan Greenhalgh, “The Biopolitics of the Three-Child Policy,” Made in China Journal, June 

6, 2024. 29Alexandra Stevenson, “China’s Male Leaders Signal to Women That Their Place Is in the 

Home,” New York Times, November 2, 2023; “China Wants Women to Stay Home and Bear Children,” Economist, November 9, 2023. 30Ding Xuexiang, “为强国建设民族复兴伟业谱写新时代‘半边天’的绚丽华章” [Writing a brilliant chapter of “holding up half the sky” in the new era for the great cause of building a strong 

country and national rejuvenation], People’s Daily, October 24, 2023. “China Wants Women to 

Stay Home and Bear Children,” Economist, November 9, 2023. 31“黄晓薇” [Huang Xiaowei], ACWF Leadership, Organization, All-China Women’s Federation, accessed June 21, 2024. 32Ding Xuexiang, “为强国建设民族复兴伟业谱写新时代‘半边天’的绚丽华章” [Writing a brilliant chapter of “holding up half the sky” in the new era for the great cause of building a strong 

country and national rejuvenation], People’s Daily, October 24, 2023; Huang Xiaowei, “以习近平

新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导动员引领广大妇女为强国建设民族复兴而团结奋斗—在中国妇女第

十三次全国代表大会上的报告 (2023年10月23日)” [Guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism 

with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, mobilize and lead women to unite and strive for 

a strong country and national rejuvenation—report at the 13th National Congress of Chinese 

Women (October 23, 2023)], reprinted in CCTV, November 11, 2023. 33Carl Minzner, “Beijing’s Message to the National Women’s Congress: Gender Equality Is Out, 

Family and Childbirth Are In,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), October 26, 2024. 34“全国政协召开‘坚持以人口高质量发展支撑中国式现代化’专题协商会 王沪宁出席并讲话”

[CPPCC convened a special consultation on “Persisting in supporting Chinese-style modernization with high-quality population development,” Wang Huning attended and delivered a speech], 

Xinhua, May 11, 2024. 35Nicole Hong and Zixu Wang, “Why China’s Young People Are Not Getting Married,” New 

York Times, July 10, 2023; Susan Greenhalgh, “The Biopolitics of the Three-Child Policy,” Made 

in China Journal, June 6, 2024. 36He Qitong and Lü Xiaoxi, “Take a Hint! How Chinese Officials Are Subtly Promoting Having 

Children,” Sixth Tone, January 24, 2024; Liyan Qi and Shen Lu, “China Is Pressing Women to 

Have More Babies. Many Are Saying No.,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2024. 37 Isabelle Qian and Pablo Robles, “One Three Is Best: How China’s Family Planning Propaganda Has Changed,” New York Times, March 8, 2024. 38 Isabelle Qian and Pablo Robles, “One Three Is Best: How China’s Family Planning Propaganda Has Changed,” New York Times, March 8, 2024. 39“China’s Xian Sends ‘Sweet Love’ Messages to Encourage Babymaking,” Reuters, August 23, 

2023. 40Liyan Qi and Shen Lu, “China Is Pressing Women to Have More Babies. Many Are Saying 

No.,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2024. 41He Qitong and Lü Xiaoxi, “Take a Hint! How Chinese Officials Are Subtly Promoting Having 

Children,” Sixth Tone, January 24, 2024. 42Ng Yik-tung, Yeung Mak, and Yang Fan, “China’s Central Propaganda Department Takes 

Over Regulation of All Media,” Radio Free Asia, March 21, 2018. During a major government 

restructuring project in 2018, the National Radio and Television Administration was placed under 

the direct management of the Party’s Central Propaganda Department. 43Christian Shepherd, “Mama’s Boys and Marital Strife Are No Joke in Today’s China,” Washington Post, April 22, 2024. 44“【社论】健全生育支持政策,减轻家庭负担” [[Editorial] Improve support policies for childbearing and lessen family burdens], The Paper, March 7, 2024. 45“【社论】健全生育支持政策,减轻家庭负担” [[Editorial] Improve support policies for childbearing and lessen family burdens], The Paper, March 7, 2024. 46Lily Kuo and Lyric Li, “Could the Year of the Dragon Bring the Baby Boom That Asia Needs? 

Maybe.,” Washington Post, February 10, 2024. 47Huileng Tan, “A Chinese City Is Offering Couples Almost $2,900 to Have a Third Child and 

Some Others Are Giving Newlyweds Paid Marriage Leave to Help Boost the Birth Rate,” Business 

Insider, February 24, 2023; Meaghan Tobin. “China Province to Offer Benefits to Single Parents 

as Birthrate Drops,” Washington Post, January 31, 2023. 48Alexandra Stevenson, “China’s Male Leaders Signal to Women That Their Place Is in the 

Home,” New York Times, November 2, 2023. 49Liyan Qi and Shen Lu, “China Is Pressing Women to Have More Babies. Many Are Saying 

No.,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2024; Farah Master, “Chinese County Offers ‘Cash Reward’ 

for Couples if Bride Is Aged 25 or Younger,” Reuters, August 28, 2023. 50Liyan Qi and Shen Lu, “China Is Pressing Women to Have More Babies. Many Are Saying 

No.,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2024; Ken Moritsugu, “China’s Population Falls for a 2nd 

Straight Year as Births Drop Even after End of One-child Policy,” Associated Press, January 17, 

2024. 51Farah Master, “Chinese County Offers ‘Cash Reward’ for Couples if Bride Is Aged 25 or 

Younger,” Reuters, August 28, 2023. 52Hangzhou Municipal Health Commission, 杭州市卫生健康委员会关于做好我市育儿补助发放工

作的通知 [Hangzhou Municipal Health Commission Circular on Effectively Distributing Child-
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care Subsidies in Hangzhou], issued August 4, 2023; He Qitong, “Hangzhou to Pay Parents 25,000 

Yuan for Third Child from September,” Sixth Tone, August 8, 2023. 53Zhengzhou Municipal People’s Government, 关于印发郑州市优化生育政策促进人口长期均衡发

展实施办法的通知 [Circular on the issuance of Zhengzhou’s Implementating Measures for Optimizing Fertility Policies to Promote Long-term Balanced Population Development], issued September 1, 2023; Ye Zhanhang, “Zhengzhou Delays Paying Residents to Have Children,” Sixth 

Tone, November 23, 2023; Chen Guangjiang, “三孩补贴‘无法申请’?好政策也要早落实” [“No 

way to apply” for the three-child subsidy? Good policies also require prompt implementation], 

Beijing News, November 22, 2023. 54Ye Zhanhang, “Zhengzhou Delays Paying Residents to Have Children,” Sixth Tone, November 

23, 2023; Chen Guangjiang, “三孩补贴‘无法申请’?好政策也要早落实” [“No way to apply” for 

the three-child subsidy? Good policies also require prompt implementation], Beijing News, November 22, 2023. 55“Debt-Strapped Chinese City Scraps Plan to Hand Cash for Couples to Have Babies,” 

Bloomberg, November 22, 2023. 56“发布 ‘军队实施“中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法”办法’” [Publication of “Measures for 

Military Personnel in the Implementation of the ‘PRC Population and Family Planning Law’”], 

Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily, September 8, 2023. People’s Daily announced the implementing measures on the front page of the September 8, 2023, issue. 57“发布 ‘军队实施“中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法”办法’” [Publication of “Measures for 

Military Personnel in the Implementation of the ‘PRC Population and Family Planning Law’”], 

Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily, September 8, 2023; Natalie Liu, “Desperate for More Children, China Urges Soldiers to Procreate,” Voice of America, September 28, 2023. 58Ding Rui, “Refunds Allowed! China’s Top Court Clarifies When ‘Bride Prices’ Should Be Returned,” Sixth Tone, December 12, 2023. 59Supreme People’s Court, “人民法院涉彩礼纠纷典型案例” [Bride price dispute typical cases], 

reprinted in Shangqiu Municipal Intermediate People’s Court, December 13, 2023; Gao Qingyang 

and Bo Chengdi, “涉彩礼纠纷如何解决?最高法、民政部、全国妇联发布典型案例” [How to resolve 

bride price disputes? SPC, MCA, and ACWF issue typical cases], People’s Daily, December 12, 

2023. 60Gao Qingyang and Bo Chengdi, “涉彩礼纠纷如何解决?最高法、民政部、全国妇联发布典型案

例” [How to resolve bride price disputes? SPC, MCA, and ACWF issue typical cases], People’s 

Daily, December 12, 2023. 61Supreme People’s Court, 最高人民法院发布关于审理涉彩礼纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的规定

[Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Cases Involving 

Betrothal Disputes], effective February 1, 2024; Cao Yin, “Opinions Solicited on Betrothal Gifts 

Proposal,” China Daily, December 12, 2023. 62Hu Anhua and Li Xinuo, “‘三八’国际妇女节|全国两会,代表委员聚焦这些‘她权益’”

[“March 8” International Women’s Day | During the Two Sessions, deputies and members focused 

on several of these [involving] “her rights and interests”], People’s Daily, China City News et al., 

reprinted in The Paper, March 8, 2024. 63“全国妇联副主席、书记处书记夏杰当选联合国消除对妇女歧视委员会委员” [ACWF vice president and secretariat member Xia Jie elected a member of the U.N. CEDAW Committee], Xinhua, 

November 13, 2020; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 159–60. 64 Jiang Zewen, “夏杰:一定比例用人单位存在只招男性或同等条件下男性优先问题” [Xia Jie: 

The problem is that a certain percentage of employers only recruit men or, despite the same 

conditions, give priority to men], The Paper, March 7, 2024. 65Hu Anhua and Li Xinuo, “‘三八’国际妇女节|全国两会,代表委员聚焦这些‘她权益’”

[“March 8” International Women’s Day | During the Two Sessions, deputies and members focused 

on several of these [involving] “her rights and interests”], People’s Daily, China City News et al., 

reprinted in The Paper, March 8, 2024. See also Jiang Zewen, “夏杰:一定比例用人单位存在只招

男性或同等条件下男性优先问题” [Xia Jie: The problem is that a certain percentage of employers 

only recruit men or, despite the same conditions, give priority to men], The Paper, March 7, 2024. 66Yue Zhao and Huixian Fu, “Social Egg Freezing for Single Women in China: Legal and 

Ethical Controversies,” Risk Management and Healthcare Policy 16 (November 11, 2023): 

2380; Eleanor Olcott, Xueqiao Wang, and Ho-him Chan, “China’s Fertility Treatment Rules 

Push Single Women to Hong Kong,” Financial Times, April 6, 2023; Lorna S. Wei, “Egg Freezing in China: A Woman’s Right to Have Control over Her Body,” ThinkChina, July 13, 2023. 

See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: 

May 2024), 175. 67Hu Anhua and Li Xinuo, “‘三八’国际妇女节|全国两会,代表委员聚焦这些‘她权益’”

[“March 8” International Women’s Day | During the Two Sessions, deputies and members focused on several of these [involving] “her rights and interests”], People’s Daily, China City News

et al., reprinted in The Paper, March 8, 2024. A 2015 State Council opinion included provisions to 

allow household registration for the children of unwed parents, but this has not been uniformly 

implemented. See, e.g., Li Ji, “生育的细节16|中国女性未婚生育研究:‘育’和 ‘婚’尚未脱钩”

[Childbirth Details 16 | Research on unmarried Chinese women: “childbirth” and “marriage” 

have not yet been de-coupled], The Paper, June 25, 2023. Proposals for access to egg-freezing 

technology have been raised at the Two Sessions since at least 2020. See, e.g., Lorna S. Wei, “Egg 

Freezing in China: A Woman’s Right to Have Control over Her Body,” ThinkChina, July 13, 2023. 68See, e.g., Nicole Hong and Zixu Wang, “Why China’s Young People Are Not Getting Married,” 

New York Times, July 10, 2023; Amy Hawkins, “Beijing’s Demographic Crisis Means China Could 

Get Old before It Gets Rich,” Guardian, September 24, 2023. 69Chen Meiling, “Report: Raising a Child in China Costs 6.3 Times per Capita GDP,” China 

Daily, February 21, 2024; Amy Hawkins, “Cost of Raising Children in China Second-Highest in 
Population Control

166

World, Thinktank Reveals,” Guardian, February 21, 2024; Maya Wang, “Chinese Women from the 

Countryside: Views on Marriage,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 12, 2024, 21–26. 70See, e.g., Li Yuan, “They Propelled China’s Rise. Now They Have Nothing to Fall Back On.,” 

New York Times, November 1, 2023; Nicoco Chan, “Some Shanghai Singles Struggle to Get Married as Economy Slows,” Reuters, January 16, 2024. 71Alexandra Stevenson and Zixu Wang, “China Told Women to Have Babies, but Its Population 

Shrank Again,” New York Times, January 18, 2024; Stacy Hsu, “Chinese Women Unimpressed by 

Government’s Plan to Make More Babies,” Radio Free Asia, March 7, 2024; Qian Liu, “For More 

Babies, China Must Ensure Its Population Policy Is Fit for the Modern Woman,” South China 

Morning Post, October 24, 2023. 72“Netizen Voices: ‘Although There Are Fewer Chives, More Is Being Extracted from Them,’” 

China Digital Times, October 26, 2023; Maya Wang and Li Tingting, “Xi vs. She: China’s Government Wants Women to Return to Domesticity, but It’s Already Too Late,” Globe & Mail, reprinted 

in Human Rights Watch, November 30, 2023; Liyan Qi and Shen Lu, “China Is Pressing Women 

to Have More Babies. Many Are Saying No.,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2024. 73“Word(s) of the Week: Four Won’t Youth (四不青年, sì bù qīngnián),” China Digital Times, July 21, 2023. See also Liu Wen, “上野千鹤子进入‘热搜’ 女权大众化时代来临?”

[Chizuko Ueno has become “hot,” has the age of popularized feminism arrived?], Deutsche 

Welle, March 3, 2023. 74“Word(s) of the Week: Four Won’t Youth (四不青年, sì bù qīngnián),” China Digital Times, 

July 21, 2023; “Weibo Users Discern Pro-natalist Propaganda in Sina ‘DINKs’ Article,” China Digital Times, April 23, 2024. In China, both young women and men are choosing to be “four won’t 

youth.” The “four won’t youth,” however, may be rooted in a feminist protest by South Korean 

women that started in 2019, which is referred to as “4B.” Anna Louie Sussman, “A World without 

Men,” New York, March 8, 2023. 75“Word(s) of the Week: Four Won’t Youth (四不青年, sì bù qīngnián),” China Digital Times, 

July 21, 2023. 76Alexandra Stevenson and Zixu Wang, “China Told Women to Have Babies, but Its Population 

Shrank Again,” New York Times, January 18, 2024; Liyan Qi and Shen Lu, “China Is Pressing 

Women to Have More Babies. Many Are Saying No.,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2024. 77Maya Wang, “Chinese Women from the Countryside: Views on Marriage,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 12, 2024, 21–26. 78Lü Pin, “Gender Inequality and the Ultimate Resistance of Women in China,” Asia Society 

Australia, Disruptive Asia 5, 2022; Shen Lu and Wenxin Fan, “How a Japanese Sociologist Became a Chinese Feminist Icon,’” Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2023. 79See, e.g., “China’s Low-Fertility Trap,” Economist, March 24, 2024; Liyan Qi, “How China Miscalculated Its Way to a Baby Bust,” Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2024; Lian Parsons-Thomason, “Cut Off from Our Past, Chinese American Adoptees Seek Belonging,” Center for Public 

Integrity, May 10, 2024. 80National Bureau of Statistics of China, “National Economy Witnessed Momentum of Recovery with Solid Progress in High-quality Development in 2023,” January 17, 2024. 81National Bureau of Statistics of China, “National Economy Witnessed Momentum of Recovery with Solid Progress in High-quality Development in 2023,” January 17, 2024. 82Visalaakshi Annamalai, “China’s Demand for Brides Draws Women from across Southeast 

Asia—Sometimes by Force,” Migration Policy Institute, January 30, 2024; Nicole Hong and 

Zixu Wang, “In China, Marriage Rates Are Down and ‘Bride Prices’ Are Up,” New York Times, 

March 30, 2023; Leta Hong Fincher, “Young Chinese Women Are Defying the Communist 

Party,” New York Times, November 26, 2023. See also Hongbin Li and Grant Miller, “The 

Conflicted Legacy of China’s Population Policies,” Issue Brief, Stanford King Center on Global 

Development, September 2020, 3–6; Xia Chong and Zhao Nan, “男男男男女男男!幼儿园全是

小男孩,中国的新生儿性别比究竟怎么了?” [Boy, boy, boy, boy, girl, boy, boy! The kindergarten 

is filled with little boys, what’s going on with the sex ratio of newborns in China?], Phoenix 

News, October 24, 2023; Mengjun Tang and Jiawei Hou, “Changes of Sex Ratio at Birth and 

Son Preferences in China: A Mixed Method Study,” China Population and Development Studies 8, May 20, 2024.

83Xia Chong and Zhao Nan, “男男男男女男男!幼儿园全是小男孩,中国的新生儿性别比究竟怎么

了?” [Boy, boy, boy, boy, girl, boy, boy! The kindergarten is filled with little boys, what’s going 

on with the sex ratio of newborns in China?], Phoenix News, October 24, 2023; Mengjun Tang 

and Jiawei Hou, “Changes of Sex Ratio at Birth and Son Preferences in China: A Mixed Method 

Study,” China Population and Development Studies 8, May 20, 2024. 84Xia Chong and Zhao Nan, “男男男男女男男!幼儿园全是小男孩,中国的新生儿性别比究竟怎么

了?” [Boy, boy, boy, boy, girl, boy, boy! The kindergarten is filled with little boys, what’s going on 

with the sex ratio of newborns in China?], Phoenix News, October 24, 2023. 85Visalaakshi Annamalai, “China’s Demand for Brides Draws Women from across Southeast 

Asia—Sometimes by Force,” Migration Policy Institute, January 30, 2024. 86Nicole Hong and Zixu Wang, “In China, Marriage Rates Are Down and ‘Bride Prices’ Are Up,” 

New York Times, March 30, 2023. 87See, e.g., Alexandra Stevenson and Siyi Zhao, “China’s Young People Are Giving Up on Saving for Retirement,” New York Times, April 5, 2024; Laura Bicker, “China’s Ageing Population: A 

Demographic Crisis Is Unfolding for Xi,” BBC, April 2, 2024; “The Dark Side of Growing Old,” 

Economist, April 18, 2024. See also Alicia Garcia Herrero, “China’s Aging Problem Will Be Much 

More Serious When Urbanization Is Completed,” China Leadership Monitor 80 (May 30, 2024). 88Alexandra Stevenson and Siyi Zhao, “China’s Young People Are Giving Up on Saving for 

Retirement,” New York Times, April 5, 2024. 89Laura Bicker, “China’s Ageing Population: A Demographic Crisis Is Unfolding for Xi,” BBC, 

April 2, 2024.
Population Control

167

90Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “End of Mission Statement by the 

United Nations Independent Expert on the Enjoyment of All Human Rights by Older Persons, 

Ms. Rosa Kornfeld-Matte, on Her Visit to the People’s Republic of China,” December 6, 2019. 91Wei Wangyu, “Aging Population Forces Rethink on Family Duties, Healthcare,” China Daily, April 30, 2024. 92State Council General Office, “国务院办公厅关于发展银发经济增进老年人福祉的意见” [Opin- ions on Developing a Silver Economy and Improving the Well-Being of Elderly Persons], January 

11, 2024, items 1–4. 93 Justine Coulson, “Opinion-Editorial: Ensuring All Older People Can Benefit from the Devel- opment of the Silver Economy,” U.N. Population Fund, February 2, 2024. 94State Council General Office, “国务院办公厅关于发展银发经济增进老年人福祉的意见” [Opin- ions on Developing a Silver Economy and Improving the Well-Being of Elderly Persons], January 

11, 2024. 95 Justine Coulson, “Opinion-Editorial: Ensuring All Older People Can Benefit from the Devel- opment of the Silver Economy,” U.N. Population Fund, February 2, 2024.
168

Human Traffick

Findings

• The Outlaw Ocean Project, the New Yorker, and the Envi- ronmental Justice Foundation separately identified practices 

indicating forced labor in the Chinese seafood industry. The 

reporting found that International Labour Organization (ILO) 

indicators of forced labor were present onboard Chinese fishing 

vessels and that Turkic and Muslim workers from the Xinji- ang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and North Korea were 

likely subjected to forced labor in the seafood processing indus- try.

• Forced employment and poverty alleviation policies involving 

Turkic Muslims from the XUAR continued during the report- ing year, and they are set to continue at least through 2025. 

Reports found that gold and aluminum were likely tainted by 

forced labor involving Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims from 

the XUAR, and witnesses at a Commission hearing found that 

audits were unreliable when investigating instances of forced 

labor in and from the XUAR.

• Scamming organizations in Southeast Asia, including many 

run by Chinese nationals, continued to force individuals from 

China and other countries to work in compounds carrying out 

online scam operations targeting people around the world.

• In a March 2024 hearing held by the Commission, witnesses 

expressed concern that large-scale collection of the DNA of Uyghurs and others in the XUAR could be used to match organs 

for forced removal. Forced organ removal is considered a form 

of human trafficking by the U.N.
169

Human Traffick

China’s Human Trafficking and Forced Labor 

Obligations under International Law

The Chinese government is obligated to combat human trafficking and enact legislation criminalizing human trafficking as a State 

Party to the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol),1 and has also committed to obligations to combat forced labor 

under the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Forced Labour 

Convention of 19302 and Abolition of Forced Labour Convention of 

1957.3

In 2024, the ILO released an updated framework to identify 

forced labor of adults, specifying conditions of involuntary work and 

coercion.4 While there is no set list of indicators that guarantee the 

existence of either condition, according to the ILO, several practices 

could “signal situations” of involuntary and/or coerced work.5 For 

example, involuntary work indicators include worker recruitment of 

a deceptive, fraudulent, forced, or debt-linked nature, as well as employment in hazardous, abusive, and state-imposed conditions that 

may not allow for employment termination.6 Likewise, physical or 

sexual violence, abuse of isolation, movement restrictions, retention or restriction of worker assets, and abuse of vulnerability and 

state authority may indicate coercion.7 The revised ILO guidelines 

strengthen methodologies for identifying non-internment state-imposed forced labor, allowing researchers to capture more accurately 

the complexities of systemic coercion in regions such as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).8 [For more information on 

how the updated ILO framework addresses Uyghur forced labor, see 

Chapter 10—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.]

Recent State Department Reporting on Human Trafficking 

Activities in China and Macau

The U.S. Department of State, through its annual Trafficking in 

Persons (TIP) report, documented continued9 shortcomings in the 

People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Macau governments’ efforts 

to combat human trafficking in recent years. The 2022 TIP report 

downgraded Macau to Tier 310 in part because the Macau government did not identify or provide services to human trafficking victims, nor did it initiate any trafficking prosecutions.11 As of June 

2024, the U.S. State Department asserted that the Macau government had not convicted a trafficker since 2021 and has never identified a victim of forced labor, despite years of reports of human 

traffickers exploiting victims in Macau.12 China remained at Tier 3 

for the 2024 TIP report.13 The U.S. State Department noted that despite failing to meet minimum standards for eliminating trafficking 

and not making significant efforts to do so, the PRC government did 

take some steps to address the trafficking of women and children 

in 2024, including combating online scam operations and human 

trafficking involving PRC nationals in Southeast Asia and creating 

a new anti-trafficking group called the National Special Action Deployment Meeting.14 However, the PRC government allocated extensive resources toward the widespread forced labor of ethnic and 
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170

religious minority groups and foreign nationals, particularly in the 

XUAR and Belt and Road Initiative host countries, under the guise 

of “deradicalization,” as well as “poverty alleviation” and “labor dispatch programs,” respectively.15

Forced Labor in the Seafood Industry

During this year’s reporting cycle, The Outlaw Ocean Project, a 

Washington D.C.-based human rights non-profit journalist organization,16 the New Yorker, and the Environmental Justice Foundation 

reported the presence of forced labor in the Chinese seafood industry:17

• Forced labor onboard Chinese distant water fishing 

vessels.18 In October 2023, reports revealed practices indicating forced labor onboard Chinese distant water fishing vessels, 

including deception, restriction of movement, isolation, physical 

violence, retention of identity documents, and abusive working 

and living conditions.19 The reporting also found cases of sickness and death due to neglect.20 Between 2018 and 2022, the 

PRC government gave more than US$17 million in subsidies 

to companies where at least 50 ships had “engaged in fishing 

crimes or had deaths or injuries onboard—at least some of 

which were likely the result of unsafe labor conditions.”21 The 

PRC government owns a majority of the country’s distant water 

fishing industry, including 20 percent of China’s squid ships.22

Furthermore, an April 2024 report found that individuals onboard Chinese distant water fishing vessels in the Southwest 

Indian Ocean between 2017 and 2023 were subjected to practices indicating forced labor.23 The Chinese government encouraged Chinese distant water fishing companies to invest in the 

region.24

• Forced labor transfers in seafood processing. Uyghurs 

and other individuals from the XUAR working in the seafood 

industry were subjected to forced labor transfers, surveillance, 

and patriotic education.25 Individuals from the XUAR who resist 

participating in government-sponsored labor transfer programs 

may face reprisals from authorities.26 Between 2018 and 2023, 

The Outlaw Ocean Project estimated that the U.S. Government 

spent more than US$200 million on seafood from importers tied 

to Uyghur labor, for use in public schools, military bases, and 

federal prisons.27

• North Korean workers in Chinese seafood processing. 

North Koreans dispatched to work in China-based factories 

producing seafood28 were subjected to mistreatment including 

withholding of wages, excessive overtime, restriction of movement, intimidation and threats, physical and sexual violence, 

and abusive living and working conditions, which are practices 

that indicate forced labor.29

U.S. law prohibits importing goods produced with forced labor.30

Fishing catches by Chinese companies are difficult to trace, and 

companies known to subject crews to practices indicating forced 

labor were linked to seafood exports to the United States.31 Additionally, seafood produced by workers from North Korea and the 

XUAR were linked to companies that import seafood into the United 
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171

States.32 Under U.S. law, goods produced in the XUAR or by the labor of North Korean nationals are presumed to be tainted by forced 

labor.33 Experts warned against relying on audits to certify that 

forced labor is not being used in seafood production, as auditors 

rely on government translators and rarely speak directly to workers, 

perhaps to avoid angering the companies that have hired them, and 

because of fears that workers will face reprisals for reporting abuses, among other factors.34 They cited examples of victims of forced 

labor from North Korea and the XUAR who worked in factories that 

had been certified by auditing agencies.35 In an October 2023 Commission hearing, Ian Urbina, director and founder of The Outlaw 

Ocean Project, described China as “the most opaque of settings, the 

most prone to illegal fishing practices, and . . . the most dependent 

on forced labor.”36

Forced Labor in and from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

The forced labor of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in and 

from the XUAR remained37 a concern during the Commission’s 

2024 reporting year:

• Forced labor transfer programs to continue. The PRC 

government continued to subject Uyghurs and other individuals 

to forced labor under coercive “labor transfer” programs that 

placed them in work settings in the XUAR and throughout China.38 According to an analysis of government policy documents 

by scholar Adrian Zenz, “coercive XUAR employment and poverty alleviation policies are to continue at least through 2025. 

XUAR state and media sources document that these policies 

continue to be implemented.”39

• Mining industry in the XUAR linked to forced labor.

According to C4ADS, a non-profit research organization, and 

Global Rights Compliance, an international legal practice, PRC 

gold mining companies in the XUAR received labor transfers 

of Uyghur workers, “which are at high risk of being forced labor.”40 XUAR-based gold mining companies were listed in investment, index, and retirement funds and were accredited by 

major accrediting organizations.41 Gold produced by these companies may also have entered the supply chains of major Western companies.42 According to a February 2024 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), major aluminum companies, as well 

as coal companies supplying energy to aluminum companies, 

participated in forced labor transfer programs.43 Nine percent 

of global aluminum is reportedly produced in the XUAR, and 

the HRW report found links between aluminum produced in the 

XUAR and global supply chains for cars and car parts.44 The report asserted that the PRC government threatens reprisals and 

exerts pressure on carmakers for investigating links to XUAR, 

which has contributed to poor mapping of the supply chain for 

aluminum parts.45

• Audits are unreliable for detecting forced labor in and 

from the XUAR. International brands have pointed to their 

use of audits to prove that their supply chains are not tainted 

by forced labor in and from the XUAR.46 Witnesses at an April 

2024 hearing held by the Commission, however, highlighted47
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172

the continued unreliability of using audits to uncover instances 

of the forced labor of workers in and from the XUAR.48 Indeed, 

some auditors themselves conceded that audits may be ineffective tools for ascertaining whether or not Uyghurs and other individuals in and from the XUAR are subjected to forced labor.49

• Products made with cotton from the XUAR entered 

the United States. According to separate tests commissioned 

by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and conducted by isotope testing firm Stratum Reservoir and DNA lab Applied DNA 

Sciences, some cotton products that entered the United States 

showed traces of cotton produced in the XUAR.50 57 percent 

of the cotton products that tested positive for Xinjiang cotton 

“featured labels that claimed the origin of the merchandise was 

U.S.-only.”51 According to reporting from the Sourcing Journal, 

some of the products containing cotton from the XUAR may also 

have been imported into the United States under the de minimis threshold which “subjects them to less scrutiny even though 

they’re not exempt from the [Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention 

Act].”52

Cross-Border Trafficking

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, China remained53

both a source and destination country for human trafficking across 

international borders. Examples of cross-border trafficking during 

this reporting year include the following:

• Forced marriage. This past year, the Commission observed 

reports that found women from North Korea and Cambodia 

were trafficked in China for the purpose of forced marriage.54

Reports indicate that these women were promised improved 

economic circumstances before being forced into marriage.55

Decades of government-imposed birth limits combined with a 

traditional preference for sons have led to a sex ratio imbalance 

in China.56 This imbalance has created a demand for marriageable women that may contribute to human trafficking for the 

purpose of forced marriage.57 [For more information about the 

trafficking of North Korean women, see Chapter 15—North Korean Refugees in China. For more information about how family 

planning policies affect the sex ratio imbalance in China, see 

Chapter 9—Population Control.]

• Chinese nationals forced to conduct international online scams. Reporting from the United Nations and others 

found that scamming organizations in Southeast Asia forced 

individuals from China and other countries to work in compounds carrying out online scam operations targeting people 

around the world.58 Victims were subjected to practices indicating forced labor including deception, isolation and restriction of 

movement, retention of identity documents, physical violence, 

debt bondage, and intimidation and threats.59 In many cases, 

the scamming organizations were run by Chinese nationals.60

In October 2023, it was reported that regional and Chinese authorities cracked down on thousands of people participating in 

the scams, but local elites and criminal networks continue to 

evade authorities.61
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173

Domestic Trafficking

During this reporting year, the Commission continued62 to observe 

reports concerning cases of domestic human trafficking in China:

• In March 2024, official Chinese media announced the 

launch of a new nationwide operation to combat the hu- man trafficking of women and children in China.63 Due 

to the definition of trafficking under Chinese law, such reporting 

on child trafficking likely included cases of illegal adoption.64

• In Hong Kong, migrant domestic workers (MDWs) re- mained65 at risk of exploitation. Two regulations—one re- quiring MDWs to live with their employers (the live-in rule) 66

and another requiring them to leave Hong Kong within two 

weeks of contract termination67—contributed to MDWs’ risk 

of exploitation.68 Hong Kong-based news outlets reported that 

MDWs have been subjected to practices indicating forced labor 

such as deception, debt bondage, physical violence, withholding 

of wages, and excessive overtime.69

CONCERN THAT DNA COLLECTED FROM UYGHURS

COULD BE USED FOR FORCED ORGAN REMOVAL 

International experts continued70 to raise concerns about the 

data collection of DNA samples of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim groups in the XUAR. In a March hearing held by the Commission, witnesses expressed concern that large-scale collection of the 

DNA of Uyghurs and others in the XUAR could be used to match 

organs for forced removal.71 According to testimony from Australian 

National University (Canberra) doctoral candidate Matthew Robert- son, an analysis of PRC Public Security Bureau records suggests 

that over 200,000 detainees in two XUAR counties were targeted for 

involuntary DNA and blood sampling.72 Maya Mitalipova, Director 

of the Human Stem Cell Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute for 

Technology’s Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, asserted 

in her testimony before the Commission that the PRC government 

is investing billions of dollars to sequence the DNA of large ethnic 

minority populations in the XUAR and the Tibet Autonomous Re- gion, and is acquiring DNA sequencing data internationally to build 

the world’s largest DNA database.73
174

Notes to Chapter 10—Human Trafficking

1United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XVIII, Penal Matters, Protocol to Prevent, 

Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing 

the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, accessed October 2, 

2024, art. 12; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 

Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 

Organized Crime, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, 

entry into force December 25, 2003, arts. 5.1, 9.1. China acceded to the Palermo Protocol on 

February 8, 2010. See also U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur 

on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, A/

HRC/35/37, March 28, 2017, para. 14. 2 International Labour Organization, “Ratifications of C029—Forced Labour Convention, 1930 

(No. 29),” accessed May 7, 2024; International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 29) 

Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930, arts. 1, 2, 25. The Forced Labour Convention defines forced labor as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the 

menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” As a 

signatory to the ILO Forced Labour Convention, China is required to prohibit the use of forced 

labor and make the use of forced labor “punishable as a penal offence.” 3 International Labour Organization, “Ratifications of C105—Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105),” accessed May 7, 2024; International Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, January 17, 1959, art. 1(a), (e). 

The ILO’s Abolition of Forced Labour Convention prohibits China from using forced labor “as 

a means of political coercion or education” or “as a means of racial, social, national or religious 

discrimination.” 4 International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Handbook on Forced Labour Surveys,” February 27, 2024, ix, 4. 5 International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Handbook on Forced Labour Surveys,” February 27, 2024, 8–18. 6 International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Handbook on Forced Labour Surveys,” February 27, 2024, 10–14. 7 International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Handbook on Forced Labour Surveys,” February 27, 2024, 16, 18. 8Adrian Zenz, “Updated ILO Forced Labor Guidelines Directly Target Uyghur Forced Labor,” 

China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 14, 2024. 9Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, “2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: China,” June 2023; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 

U.S. Department of State, “2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Macau,” June 2023; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, “2022 Trafficking in Persons 

Report,” July 2022, 170, 358. 10 In the State Department’s tier list, the Tier 3 designation is applied to a country whose government does not “fully meet the [Trafficking Victims Protection Act]’s minimum standards and 

[is] not making significant efforts to do so.” Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 

U.S. Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report,” June 2024. 11Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, “2022 Trafficking in Persons Report,” July 2022, 358. 12Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, “2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Macau,” June 2024. 13Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, “2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: China,” June 2024. 14Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, “2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: China,” June 2024. 15Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, “2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: China,” June 2024. 16Outlaw Ocean Project, “About,” accessed May 7, 2024. 17 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes on the Boats: A Fleet Prone to Captive Labor 

and Plunder,” October 9, 2023; Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes along the Coast: The 

Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” October 9, 2023; Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, 

“Crimes at the Border: The North Koreans Behind Global Seafood,” February 25, 2024; Ian Urbina, “The Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” New Yorker, October 9, 2023; Environmental Justice Foundation, “Tide of Injustice: Exploitation and Illegal Fishing on Chinese Vessels in 

the Southwest Indian Ocean,” April 2024. 18For previous Commission reporting on Chinese distant-water fishing vessels and forced labor, 

see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 

186; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 

2022), 199. Under international law, China has jurisdiction over distant-water fishing vessels 

flying Chinese flags. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted by the Third 

U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea on December 10, 1982, entry into force November 16, 1994, 

art. 94(2)(b), (3)(b), (6); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XXI, Law of the Sea, United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, accessed May 2, 2024. China signed the Convention 

on the Law of the Sea on December 10, 1982, and ratified it on June 7, 1996. 19 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes on the Boats: A Fleet Prone to Captive Labor 

and Plunder,” October 9, 2023. 20 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes on the Boats: A Fleet Prone to Captive Labor 

and Plunder,” October 9, 2023. A young Indonesian crew member, Daniel Aritonang, died after 

having shown signs of being beaten and suffering from severe malnourishment while working 

on a Chinese squid ship.
Human Trafficking

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21 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes on the Boats: A Fleet Prone to Captive Labor 

and Plunder,” October 9, 2023. See also Mark Godfrey, “China’s Coastal Cities Competing for 

Distant-Water Catch with Generous Subsidies,” SeafoodSource, January 26, 2022. 22 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes on the Boats: A Fleet Prone to Captive Labor 

and Plunder,” October 9, 2023. 23Environmental Justice Foundation, “Tide of Injustice: Exploitation and Illegal Fishing on 

Chinese Vessels in the Southwest Indian Ocean,” April 2024, 25, 31–34, 36, 38–39. The indicators 

included deception, isolation, physical violence, intimidation and threats, retention of identity 

documents, abusive working and living conditions, and excessive overtime. International Labour 

Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Handbook on Forced Labour Surveys,” 2024, 8–18. 24Environmental Justice Foundation, “Tide of Injustice: Exploitation and Illegal Fishing on 

Chinese Vessels in the Southwest Indian Ocean,” April 2024, 21–23. 25Workers are placed in regimented environments under the watch of security personnel, 

with one advertisement aimed at factory owners stating that workers will be kept under “semimilitary-style management.” The Outlaw Ocean Project asserts that many workers are subject to 

patriotic education; for example, minority workers from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

have been photographed by a municipal agency at Yantai Sanko Fisheries studying a speech 

by Xi Jinping and learning about “the Party’s ethnic policy.” Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, 

“Crimes along the Coast: The Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” October 9, 2023; Ian 

Urbina, “The Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” New Yorker, October 9, 2023. 26 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes along the Coast: The Uyghurs Forced to Process 

the World’s Fish,” October 9, 2023; Ian Urbina, “The Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” 

New Yorker, October 9, 2023. See also Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 

OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 

People’s Republic of China, August 31, 2022, paras. 124–28. 27 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes along the Coast: The Uyghurs Forced to Process 

the World’s Fish,” October 9, 2023; Ian Urbina, “The Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” 

New Yorker, October 9, 2023. 28 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes at the Border: The North Koreans Behind Global 

Seafood,” February 25, 2024. 29 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes at the Border: The North Koreans Behind Global 

Seafood,” February 25, 2024. For an additional example of North Korean workers subjected to 

practices indicating forced labor, see Pete Pattisson, Ifang Bremer, and Annie Kelly, “UK Sourced 

PPE from Factories Secretly Using North Korean Slave Labour,” Guardian, November 20, 2020. 30Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §1307. 31 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes on the Boats: A Fleet Prone to Captive Labor and 

Plunder,” October 9, 2023; Environmental Justice Foundation, “Tide of Injustice: Exploitation and 

Illegal Fishing on Chinese Vessels in the Southwest Indian Ocean,” April 2024, 46–47. 32 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes on the Boats: A Fleet Prone to Captive Labor 

and Plunder,” October 9, 2023; Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes along the Coast: The 

Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” October 9, 2023; Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, 

“Crimes at the Border: The North Koreans Behind Global Seafood,” February 25, 2024. 33Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 117-78); Countering America’s Adversaries 

Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115-44) Section 302A. See also U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, “CBP Issues Region-Wide Withhold Release Order on Products Made by Slave Labor 

in Xinjiang,” January 13, 2021; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “CBP Enforces Countering 

America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,” December 27, 2022. 34 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes at the Border: The North Koreans Behind Global 

Seafood,” February 25, 2024; Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes along the Coast: The 

Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” October 9, 2023. 35 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes along the Coast: The Uyghurs Forced to Process 

the World’s Fish,” October 9, 2023; Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes at the Border: The 

North Koreans Behind Global Seafood,” February 25, 2024. 36From Bait to Plate—How Forced Labor in China Taints America’s Seafood Supply, Hearing of 

the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Ian Urbina, 

Director and Founder of The Outlaw Ocean Project). 37Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 188–89; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: 

November 2022), 201–3. 38See e.g., Shohret Hoshur and Mary Zhao, “Facing Abuse, Teenage Uyghur Girls are Forced to 

Work in a Xinjiang Garment Factory,” Radio Free Asia, July 15, 2023; Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean 

Project, “Crimes along the Coast: The Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” October 9, 

2023; Adrian Zenz, “Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Assessing the 

Continuation of Coercive Labor Transfers in 2023 and Early 2024,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 14, 2024; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report

(Washington: May 2024), 247–48; 308–9. 39Adrian Zenz, “Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Assessing the Continuation of Coercive Labor Transfers in 2023 and Early 2024,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 14, 2024. 40C4ADS, “Fractured Veins: The World’s Reliance on Minerals from the Uyghur Region,” October 11, 2023, 17, 25, 33; C4ADS, “C4ADS & GRC Share New Update to Our 2023 Fractured Veins 

Investigation,” April 11, 2024; Global Rights Compliance, “About Us.” 41C4ADS, “Fractured Veins: The World’s Reliance on Minerals from the Uyghur Region,” October 11, 2023, 30, 32. 42C4ADS, “Fractured Veins: The World’s Reliance on Minerals from the Uyghur Region,” October 11, 2023, 25–26.
Human Trafficking

176

43Human Rights Watch, “Asleep at the Wheel: Car Companies’ Complicity in Forced Labor in 

China,” February 2024, 3, 43, 49–50. 44Human Rights Watch, “Asleep at the Wheel: Car Companies’ Complicity in Forced Labor in 

China,” February 2024, 26, 51. See also Laura T. Murphy et al., Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, “Driving Force: Automotive Supply Chains and 

Forced Labor in the Uyghur Region,” December 2022. 45Human Rights Watch, “Asleep at the Wheel: Car Companies’ Complicity in Forced Labor in 

China,” February 2024, 1. 46 Ian Urbina, Outlaw Ocean Project, “Crimes along the Coast: The Uyghurs Forced to Process 

the World’s Fish,” October 9, 2023; “Volkswagen-Commissioned Audit Finds No Signs of Forced 

Labor at Plant in China’s Xinjiang Region,” Associated Press, December 6, 2023. 47Factories and Fraud in the PRC: How Human Rights Violations Make Reliable Audits Impossible, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Thea M. Lee, Deputy Undersecretary of Labor for International Affairs, U.S. Department 

of Labor); Factories and Fraud in the PRC: How Human Rights Violations Make Reliable Audits 

Impossible, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) 

(testimony of Scott Nova, Executive Director, Worker Rights Consortium); Factories and Fraud 

in the PRC: How Human Rights Violations Make Reliable Audits Impossible, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Dr. Adrian Zenz, 

Senior Fellow and Director in China Studies, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation); Factories and Fraud in the PRC: How Human Rights Violations Make Reliable Audits Impossible, 

Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of 

Jim Wormington, Senior Researcher and Advocate on Corporate Accountability, Human Rights 

Watch). 48Factories and Fraud in the PRC: How Human Rights Violations Make Reliable Audits Impossible, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024); Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 

260; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 

2022), 215. 49Outlaw Ocean Project, “Supplier Ethical Data Exchange (Sedex),” July 20, 2023; Finbarr 

Bermingham, “Staff of Firm That Cleared Volkswagen on Xinjiang Labour Faults Audit Process,” 

South China Morning Post, December 15, 2023; Human Rights Watch, “Asleep at the Wheel: Car 

Companies’ Complicity in Forced Labor in China,” February 2024, 7. 50Arriana McLymore, “Banned Chinese Cotton Found in 19% of US and Global Retailers’ Merchandise, Study Shows,” Reuters, May 7, 2024; Katherine Masters, “Exclusive: US Customs Finds 

Garments Made with Banned Chinese Cotton,” Reuters, September 1, 2023. 51Arriana McLymore, “Banned Chinese Cotton Found in 19% of US and Global Retailers’ Merchandise, Study Shows,” Reuters, May 7, 2024. 52 Jasmin Malik Chua, “‘Significant’ Volume of Xinjiang Cotton Mislabeled as US or Brazilian,” Sourcing Journal, May 10, 2024. The de minimis threshold allows vendors to send shipments without having to report basic data if the value is under US$800. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 

U.S.C. §1321. See also Richard Vanderford, “Imports Under Closely Watched U.S. Trade ‘Loophole’ 

Surge,” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2024. 53For information on cross-border trafficking to and from China in previous reporting years, 

see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 

185; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 

2022), 199; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: 

March 2022), 164–5. 54Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, “2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: China,” June 2024; Kim Yutharo, “Cambodian Teenage Bride Victim of 

Human Trafficking to China on Way Home,” Phnom Penh Post, reprinted in Asia News Network, 

March 12, 2024. See also Jesse Yeung and Yoonjung Seo, “She Fled North Korea but Was Sold 

to a Man in China. Her Second Escape Came Nearly 20 Years Later.,” CNN, March 8, 2024; 

Visalaakshi Annamalai, “China’s Demand for Brides Draws Women from Across Southeast Asia—

Sometimes by Force,” Migration Policy Institute, January 30, 2024; Seo Hye Jun, “‘He Told Me 

That If I Ran Away He Would Report Me to the Chinese Police,’” Radio Free Asia, August 4, 2023; 

William Gallo, “Activists Slam China After Alleged Forced Repatriation of North Koreans,” Voice 

of America, October 13, 2023. 55Kim Yutharo, “Cambodian Teenage Bride Victim of Human Trafficking to China on Way 

Home,” Phnom Penh Post, March 12, 2024, reprinted in Asia News Network, May 1, 2024. See 

also Jesse Yeung and Yoonjung Seo, “She Fled North Korea but Was Sold to a Man in China. 

Her Second Escape Came Nearly 20 Years Later.,” CNN, March 8, 2024; Seo Hye Jun, “‘He 

Told Me That If I Ran Away He Would Report Me to the Chinese Police,” Radio Free Asia,

August 4, 2023. 56Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, “2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: China,” June 2024; “China’s Low-Fertility Trap,” Economist, March 21, 

2024; Mengjun Tang and Jiawei Hou, “Changes of Sex Ratio at Birth and Son Preferences in 

China: A Mixed Method Study,” China Population and Development Studies, May 20, 2024; Xia 

Chong and Zhao Nan, “男男男男女男男!幼儿园全是小男孩,中国的新生儿性别比究竟怎么了?”

[Boy, boy, boy, boy, girl, boy, boy! The kindergarten is filled with little boys, what’s going on with 

the gender ratio of newborns in China?], Phoenix News, October 24, 2023. 57Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, “2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: China,” June 2024; Visalaakshi Annamalai, “China’s Demand for Brides 

Draws Women from Across Southeast Asia—Sometimes by Force,” Migration Policy Institute, January 30, 2024; Jesse Yeung and Yoonjung Seo, “She Fled North Korea but Was Sold to a Man in 

China. Her Second Escape Came Nearly 20 Years Later.,” CNN, March 8, 2024.
Human Trafficking

177

58U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, “Casinos, Cyber Fraud, and Trafficking in Persons for Forced 

Criminality in Southeast Asia,” September 2023; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Human Rights, “Online Scam Operations and Trafficking into Forced Criminality in Southeast Asia: Recommendations for a Human Rights Response,” August 26, 2023, 7; Isabelle Qian, 

“7 Months Inside an Online Scam Labor Camp,” New York Times, December 17, 2023; Huizhong 

Wu, “China Crackdown on Cyber Scams in Southeast Asia Nets Thousands but Leaves Networks 

Intact,” Associated Press, October 23, 2023. 59U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, “Casinos, Cyber Fraud, and Trafficking in Persons for Forced 

Criminality in Southeast Asia,” September 2023; Isabelle Qian, “7 Months Inside an Online Scam 

Labor Camp,” New York Times, December 17, 2023. 60Huizhong Wu, “China Crackdown on Cyber Scams in Southeast Asia Nets Thousands but 

Leaves Networks Intact,”  Associated Press, October 23, 2023. For reports linking scamming to 

the influx of Chinese state-sponsored investment to Southeast Asia through the Belt and Road 

Initiative see, e.g., Lewis Sanders IV et al., “How Chinese Mafia Are Running a Scam Factory in 

Myanmar,” Deutsche Welle, January 30, 2024; China Labor Watch, “The Aftermath of the Belt and 

Road Initiative: Human Trafficking in Cambodia,” August 19, 2022; USIP Senior Study Group 

on Transnational Organized Crime in Southeast Asia, “Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia: 

A Growing Threat to Global Peace and Security,” United States Institute of Peace, May 13, 2024. 61Huizhong Wu, “China Crackdown on Cyber Scams in Southeast Asia Nets Thousands but 

Leaves Networks Intact,” Associated Press, October 23, 2023. 62Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 186–87; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: 

November 2022), 199–201. 63“China Launches Nationwide Crackdown on Trafficking of Women, Children,” Xinhua, March 

19, 2024; Yang Zekun, “Crackdown Targets Women, Child Trafficking,” China Daily, March 20, 

2024. See also “Chinese Railway Police Rescue More Than 300 Abducted Women and Minors in 

2023,” Global Times, reprinted in People’s Daily, January 4, 2024. 64The PRC Criminal Law defines trafficking as “abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, 

fetching, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of selling [the victim].” The 

illegal sale of children for adoption thus can be considered trafficking under Chinese law. In contrast, under the Palermo Protocol, illegal adoptions constitute trafficking only if the purpose is exploitation. 中华人民共和国刑法 [PRC Criminal Law], passed July 1, 1979, revised March 14, 1997, 

amended December 29, 2023, effective March 1, 2024, art. 240; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 

and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 

Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 55/25 of November 15, 2000, entry into force December 25, 2003, art. 3(a). See also U.N. 

General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against 

Transnational Organized Crime on the Work of Its First to Eleventh Sessions, Addendum, Interpretive Notes for the Official Records (Travaux Préparatoires) of the Negotiation of the United 

Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, A/55/383/

Add.1, November 3, 2000, para. 66. 65For information on human trafficking in Hong Kong from previous reporting years see, e.g., 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 

187; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 

2022), 168. 66 Immigration Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, “Employment Contract for a Domestic Helper Recruited from Outside Hong Kong,” accessed September 

30, 2024, item 3. 67 Immigration Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, “從外國

受聘來港家庭傭工簽證/延長逗留期限申請表” [Visa/Extension of stay application form for domestic helpers coming to Hong Kong from abroad], May 2023, sec. 6(vi). 68Stop Trafficking of People, Branches of Hope, “A Pathway to Justice or a Road to Nowhere: 

Trafficked Migrants’ Experience of Seeking Justice in Hong Kong,” May 2023; Peter Yeung, “‘Tools 

More than Humans’: HK Domestic Workers Fight for Rights,” Al Jazeera, May 1, 2013; U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic 

Report of China, Including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, adopted by the Committee at 

its 30th Meeting (March 3, 2023), E/C.12/CHN/CO/3, March 22, 2023, art. 111. In March 2023, 

the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recommended that the Hong Kong 

government “amend the two-weeks rule and the live-in requirement” to enable migrant domestic 

workers to enjoy their full rights. See also U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of Hong Kong, China, adopted by the Committee at its 3912th 

Session (July 22, 2022), CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, November 11, 2022, art. 31. 69Connor Mycroft, “‘No One to Help’: Sri Lankan Migrant Workers in Hong Kong Lack Support, Face Exploitation and Abuse, NGOs Say,”  South China Morning Post, January 28, 2024; 

Candice Chau, “Excessive Agency Fees Costing Some Hong Kong Migrant Domestic Workers Over 

HK$19,000, Union Says,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 19, 2023; Trevor Tang, “Domestic Workers 

Slam Lack of Action on Abuse, Exploitation,” Standard, July 17, 2023; International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Handbook on Forced Labour Surveys,” 2024, 8–18. 70Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 250, 310; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 231; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2018 Annual Report

(Washington: October 2018), 249, 278. 71Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Maya Mitalipova, 

Director of the Human Stem Cell Laboratory at the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More 
Human Trafficking

178

Must Be Done?, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) 

(testimony of Matthew Robertson, Doctoral candidate, Australian National University (Canberra) 

and co-author, “Execution by Organ Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,” 

American Journal of Transplantation); Alex Willemyns, “Experts: China Is Sequencing Uyghur 

DNA for Organ Harvesting,” Radio Free Asia, March 21, 2024. Under the Palermo Protocol, the 

“abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability” to achieve consent in the removal of organs is 

a form of human trafficking. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 

Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Trans- national Organized Crime, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 55/25 of November 15, 

2000, entry into force December 25, 2003, art. 3. See also Congressional-Executive Commission 

on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 188; Congressional-Executive Commis- sion on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 200; Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 165–66. 72Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, Hearing of the Con- gressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Matthew Robertson, 

Doctoral candidate, Australian National University (Canberra) and co-author, “Execution by Or- gan Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,” American Journal of Transplanta- tion). 73Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, Hearing of the Con- gressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Maya Mitalipova: 

Director of the Human Stem Cell Laboratory at the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology). See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 

2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 289; Congressional-Executive Commission on Chi- na, 2018 Annual Report (Washington: October 2018), 8, 108, 199, 230, 249, 278.
179

VII. Worker Rights

Worker Rig

Findings

• The recorded number of strikes and labor protests in the Peo- ple’s Republic of China (PRC) increased in 2023 for the first 

time since the peak of a “strike wave” that ended in 2016. The 

increase can primarily be attributed to the demand for mon- ey owed for back wages. A slowing economy has led to factory 

closures, causing bosses to leave without paying out back wag- es. This has contributed to a tenfold increase in the number 

of factories that experienced strikes between 2022 and 2023. 

Construction workers were denied pay as a tightening in the 

housing market led to the closure of or slowdown of work at 

construction sites. Police continued to suppress strike activity 

after being called in to disrupt at least 181 strikes in 2023.

• China’s repression against labor rights activists has contin- ued. In June of 2024 a court in Guangzhou municipality, Guang- zhou province sentenced labor rights activist Wang Jianbing

to three years and six months in prison. Additionally, in the first 

half of 2023, police were called in to 82 strikes, and detained 

workers at 7 of the strikes. The continued harassment of whis- tleblowers such as Lu Yuyu and Tang Mingfeng, even after 

their release from prison, highlighted the difficulties faced by 

those who try to tell the truth about labor conditions in China.

• A system of normalized forced overtime among white-collar 

workers persisted despite China officially having an eight-hour 

workday, with the workweek not allowed to exceed 44 hours. 

In the technology industry, workers are expected to participate 

in an overtime practice referred to as “996,” from 9 a.m. to 9 

p.m., six days a week. This overtime practice dovetails with age 

discrimination, as workers over 35 are perceived as unable to 

handle these long hours and are therefore subject to hiring discrimination.

• Inequality continues to be systematized through the hukou or 

household registration system. Urban hukou holders continue 

to be able to access considerably more benefits than rural hukou holders and migrant workers. In December 2023, the World 

Bank released a report that documented the unequal treatment 

of rural and urban residents when it comes to access to pensions sufficient to maintain a worker during retirement.

• The PRC continues to deny its workers the right to unionize. 

The official, party-controlled union, the All-China Federation of 

Trade Unions (ACFTU), continues to be the sole representative 

of workers. In 2023, the ACFTU held its 18th Congress, during 

which it signaled further consolidation and centralization under 

the leadership of Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.
180

Worker Rig

Introduction

During the 2024 reporting year, the Commission observed the 

suppression of internationally recognized worker rights in China, 

as they pertain to wage workers, salaried workers, and workers paid 

piece rates. In 2023, strikes were at their highest number since 2016, 

even as the government continues to crack down on labor rights 

activity and labor activists. The inequalities of the hukou system 

continued to plague rural workers and migrant workers. Recent 

research confirmed ongoing labor abuses in the electronics sector. 

The 18th National Congress of China’s Communist Party-led labor 

union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), signaled 

a shift in policy that is unlikely to address workers’ concerns. Continued abuses in the gig worker economy as well as excessive and 

uncompensated overtime were documented by both activists and 

workers.

Worker Strikes and Protests

STRIKES AND LABOR PROTESTS INCREASE

DESPITE CONTINUED SUPPRESSION

The right to strike has “in effect become part of customary international law,” and “is an intrinsic corollary of the fundamental 

right of freedom of association,”1 a freedom protected by Article 35 

of China’s Constitution.2 Though striking is not formally prohibited 

in China, workers have been prosecuted for participating in strikes, 

often under the criminal charge of “disturbing public order” or “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”3 Authorities detained workers 

in 7 work-related protests and strikes, out of the 181 reported labor 

actions where public security personnel were called in throughout 

2023.4 China Labour Bulletin (CLB), a Hong Kong-based nongovernmental organization (NGO) that compiles data on worker actions 

collected from traditional news sources and social media, reported 

that in the first half of 2023 police were called in to face striking 

workers 82 times, a significant increase from the 49 instances in the 

previous year, with 7 of those instances resulting in the detention 

of workers.5 CLB cautions that their reporting on the resolution of 

strikes is incomplete given difficulties with the availability of information.6 CLB estimates that its database only collects roughly 5 to 

10 percent of all incidents.7 The Chinese government does not publicly report on the number of worker strikes and protests, making 

it difficult to obtain comprehensive information on worker actions.8

Rights organizations, however, documented an increase in labor actions during this reporting year.9

CLB found that the total number of strikes and labor actions recorded in 2023 in China surpassed the number recorded per year 

over the previous five years,10 with the trend of increased labor actions continuing into the first quarter of 2024.11 In other words, in 

2023, strike actions exceeded levels that were recorded previous to 

and during the COVID-19 pandemic, though they have not reached 

the levels recorded during China’s last “strike wave” that ended 

in 2016.12 The year 2016 was the last time that CLB recorded a 
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181

number higher than 2023’s 1,789 strikes, when the organization 

recorded 2,671 strikes on its Strike Map.13 A China labor rights 

expert speculated that the drop in reported labor actions after 2016 

may be linked to increased internet censorship and the detention of 

two labor rights activists who had been chronicling labor actions.14

Freedom House’s China Dissent Monitor (CDM) also documented 

an uptick in labor related unrest in 2023.15 The number of labor 

strikes and protests in the fourth quarter of 2023 was more than 

three times the number from the same quarter in 2022, with CDM 

recording a total of 607 labor actions in the fourth quarter of 2023 

compared to 182 during the same period in 2022.16 There has long 

been an uptick in strike activity around the Lunar New Year, as 

workers seek to return home with their earnings.17 The number of 

protests over unpaid wages that took place before the Lunar New 

Year doubled in 2024.18

NUMBER OF STRIKES PER YEAR 2013–202319

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024

Number of Strikes

Data from China Labour Bulletin. Graph by CECC.

Labor Actions by Sector

WORKER STRIKES AND OTHER LABOR ACTIONS BY SECTOR BASED ON

CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN’S (CLB) STRIKE MAP20

Year Manufacturing Construction

Logistics &

Transportation Services Other

Total

Number

Documented

2023 24%

(438)

53%

(945)

6%

(115)

12%

(208)

5%

(88) 1,789

2022 4.5%

(37)

48%

(399)

21.5%

(179)

21%

(174)

4.9%

(41) 830

2021 6.0%

(66)

38.4%

(420)

33.6%

(368)

14.4%

(158)

7.5%

(82) 1,094

2020 10.9%

(87)

44.8%

(358)

19.5%

(156)

18%

(144)

6.9%

(55) 800

2019 13.8%

(191)

42.8%

(593)

12.3%

(171)

23.0%

(319)

8.0%

(111) 1,385
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182

• Construction workers. The construction industry saw the 

largest number of strikes and protests, accounting for 53 percent of those documented by CLB.21 The financial troubles in 

China’s real estate sector have tightened budgets in the construction industry and caused construction companies to pause 

their operations, leaving many workers with unpaid back wages and without adequate work.22 Bloomberg reported that construction workers and homeowners who have protested against 

the property companies for pausing construction and not paying 

wages complain of having been put under police surveillance.23

• Manufacturing workers. The manufacturing industry saw 

the second-highest number of strikes, with 24 percent of the 

total, a more than tenfold increase compared to 2022.24 Labor 

researchers Simon Han and Jessica Song attribute the uptick 

in workers’ response to a rise in the number of factory closures 

and employers’ attempts to stealthily move factories without 

paying legally mandated severance, a practice that is referred 

to on Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok, as “bosses running 

away.”25

• Auto workers. This reporting year has also seen the highest 

number of strikes in the auto industry since 2015.26 Competition among Electric Vehicle (EV) producers, coupled with the 

elimination of subsidies for EV production, as well as lowered 

profits, has led many EV companies, especially lower-tier EV 

companies, to halt production and withhold wages and benefits 

from workers.27 In higher-tier factories, workers’ wages dropped 

while their workload increased, leading to widespread dissatisfaction.28 At the same time, many lower-tier factories shut 

down, leading to protests and labor actions over back pay.29

• Transportation workers. In 2023, there were also numerous labor actions involving taxi drivers and other parts of the 

transportation and logistics sector.30 Taxi drivers’ grievances 

have included competition with ride-hailing services, high gas 

prices, low base fares, and the right to manage and own their 

own taxis.31 Officially mandated upgrades, such as a transition 

to EVs, have also driven discontent.32

Continued Suppression of Labor Rights Advocates

During this reporting year, the Commission continued to observe 

the PRC authorities’ suppression of worker representation and independent labor advocacy, which has left little space for workers to 

organize, express their grievances, or negotiate satisfactory remedies.33 On June 14, 2024, the Guangzhou Municipal People’s Court 

in, Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, sentenced Wang 

Jianbing,34 a labor rights advocate, to three years and six months 

in prison, a fine of 50,000 yuan (US$6,900), and three years’ deprivation of political rights on the charge of “inciting subversion of 

state power.”35 The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention had 

previously deemed Wang to be arbitrarily detained.36 According to a 

June 2024 article from the Washington Post, Wang’s detention is one 

of several examples of the PRCs growing crackdown on individuals 

who have participated in peaceful activism in China’s civil society.37
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183

The case of Lu Yuyu38 illustrates the ongoing forms of harassment and intimidation of labor rights advocates following their 

release from detention, a condition that has been referred to as 

“non-release release.”39 Authorities in Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan province, detained Lu Yuyu in June 2016 and subsequently sentenced him to four years in prison in connection with 

his efforts to document the activities of striking workers.40 A May 

2024 Wall Street Journal article detailed instances of PRC authorities harassing him after his release in 2020, including pressuring 

his landlord to ask him to move and preventing him from leaving 

the country by imposing an exit ban and restricting him from successfully obtaining a passport.41 In May 2023, Lu secretly left China 

by traveling through Laos and Thailand.42

Additionally, a December 2023 Financial Times piece highlighted 

the difficulties faced by Chinese whistleblower Tang Mingfang,43

who exposed the use of illegal labor practices at a Foxconn factory 

producing Amazon products in Hengyang municipality, Hunan province.44 Authorities detained him in 2019 after he reported the abuse 

to the U.S.-based labor rights NGO China Labor Watch (CLW), and 

a district court in Hengyang subsequently sentenced him to two 

years in prison for allegedly “leaking confidential company information.”45 Since his release in 2021, Tang’s job prospects have been 

limited and his efforts to appeal his case have been stymied because 

domestic lawyers are reportedly hesitant to take on his case due to 

its political sensitivity.46

Hukou System Continues to Exacerbate Migrant Worker Precarity

During this reporting year, China’s slowing economy reduced opportunities for migrant workers and exacerbated the inequalities 

of the hukou, or household registration system.47 The hukou system creates a separate and unequal labor scheme that deprives rural residents and migrant workers of rights enjoyed by those who 

possess an urban hukou.48 This is because one’s hukou determines 

whether they will have access to a full set of benefits, including 

healthcare and education for their children.49 An expert on market 

reform in China referred to the modern hukou system as “apartheid 

with Communist Party characteristics,” because of the ways that 

government-issued hukou bifurcates the labor force.50 The Commission observed reports of continued bifurcation between urban and 

rural hukou holders, despite attempts at reform.51

The right to equality before the law is codified in both Chinese 

and international law.52 In China, however, the household registration system dictates that people’s access to legally defined53 rights 

and privileges is linked to the hukou that they hold.54 One is granted a hukou based on their place of birth or their parents’ place 

of birth.55 Though it is possible to change one’s hukou, the system 

is rigid and often makes it nearly impossible for ordinary migrant 

workers to acquire a hukou in the cities in which they dwell.56

A December 2023 report by the World Bank documented the enduring effects of the hukou system on those with urban hukou and 

those with rural hukou, many of whom reside in urban areas.57 In 

2022, 86 percent of workers paid into one of two pension schemes.58

According to the World Bank, urban workers in the private sector 
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184

are required to participate in the Urban Worker Pension Scheme 

(UWPS), while the Rural-Urban Resident Scheme (RURS) is voluntary and covers rural migrants and others.59 Roughly half of workers who contributed to a pension scheme contributed to the UWPS, 

which pays out on average 3,605 yuan (approximately US$500) per 

month, which is about 41 percent of an average urban worker’s salary, or roughly on par with the rate paid by average retirement plans 

in the U.S. and Canada.60 The RURS, however, pays on average 205 

yuan (approximately US$30) per month, 12 percent of a rural resident’s income, an amount lower than China’s poverty line.61

In May 2024, Reuters published an investigation into the lives of 

elderly workers in the PRC who do not earn enough through their 

pensions to survive and cannot rely on children to pay for their 

living expenses.62 The investigation found that people with a rural 

hukou living in urban areas, who cannot survive on their very low 

rural pensions, work past retirement age, collect recyclable waste 

for small sums a day, or work 13-hour shifts in a shopping mall.63

NPR reporters found similar stories when they interviewed older 

construction workers who lived in urban areas but held a rural 

hukou.64 Though the interviewees had lived and worked in Beijing 

and the surrounding areas for decades, they had not been able to 

save for retirement.65 The interviewees belonged to a generation of 

migrant construction workers who moved to cities with dreams of 

becoming part of the middle class and who have in many cases been 

left disappointed.66

Violations of Labor Rights in the Supply Chains

of Consumer Electronics

During the 2024 reporting year, the Commission observed reports by 

CLW detailing evidence of abuse and labor rights violations in the supply 

chains of major consumer electronic products. Chinese factories investigated by CLW include:

• Foxconn in Chengdu municipality, Sichuan province. CLW 

conducted an on-site investigation of this Foxconn factory in Apple’s 

supply chain in June and July of 2023.67 The in-depth investigation 

revealed illegal use of dispatch workers, bullying, sexual harassment, and mandatory overtime.68

• Pegatron Corporation in Kunshan city, Suzhou municipality, Jiangsu province. Investigations into Apple’s second-largest 

Chinese supplier revealed the illegal use of dispatch workers, bullying, sexual harassment, and excessive use of overtime.69 CLW conducted similar investigations in 2013 into three Pegatron factories, 

in Suzhou municipality, Jiangsu province, and Shanghai municipality,70 and in 2015 into another Pegatron factory in Shanghai municipality.71 The 2023 investigation revealed no significant improvements in conditions since CLW’s first investigations a decade ago, 

calling into question Apple’s promises with regard to labor rights in 

their supply chains.72
Worker Rights

185

Violations of Labor Rights in the Supply Chains

of Consumer Electronics—Continued

• BOE in Hefei municipality, Anhui province. BOE Technology Group Co., Ltd.’s factory in Hefei, which supplies Dell, Lenovo, 

Huawei, and HP, was also the subject of an investigation by CLW.73

CLW found hiring discrimination, illegal use of student interns, and 

excessive overtime.74

• Foxconn in Zhengzhou municipality, Henan province. CLW 

also investigated Foxconn Zhengzhou, which processes and assembles approximately 70 percent of the global supply of iPhones. CLW 

found hiring discrimination, illegal overtime, and illegal use of student interns, among other labor violations.75

• Jabil Circuit Electronics Co., Ltd. in Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province. In the Jabil Circuit plant in Guangzhou that supplies HP, BMW, GoPro, and Tesla, CLW found hiring 

discrimination, excessive working hours and mandatory overtime 

for dispatch workers.76

• Foxconn in Taiyuan municipality, Shanxi province. Foxconn 

Precision Industry Taiyuan Co., Ltd., which produces iPhones as 

well as BMW parts, discriminated in hiring and required excessive 

work hours, according to CLW.77

CLW’s investigations used posts made on the internet as a valuable 

source of documentation for both working conditions and incriminating 

language in job announcements.78

All-China Federation of Trade Unions: Rhetoric Emphasizes 

Nationalism over Worker Rights

The Chinese Communist Party-led All-China Federation of Trade 

Unions (ACFTU) remains the only trade union organization permitted to represent worker rights under Chinese law.79 Categorized as 

a “mass organization,” the ACFTU acts as an intermediary organization between the Party and workers 80 and is required to adhere 

to the leadership of the Party.81 The ACFTU has been criticized 

for not effectively representing workers’ rights to employers 82 and 

aligning itself with enterprise management rather than workers.83

The 18th National Congress of the ACFTU was held in October 

2023.84 According to observers, Chinese state media coverage of the 

congress signaled that the ACFTU would be centering the Party’s 

leadership and the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese people,”—a 

noticeable messaging shift from previous years, when rhetoric at 

the congress highlighted the centrality of workers’ leadership in the 

Party.85 Experts from China Media Project speculated that this is 

likely a sign of further marginalization of workers’ demands, leaving 

an avenue for continued labor rights abuse.86

Worker Rights in the Gig Economy

According to research cited by a state-run media outlet, one-fifth 

of China’s workforce works in the gig economy, around 200 million 

people.87 Official media describes employment in the gig economy, 

including work as food delivery drivers, live-streamers, couriers, and 

drivers for ride-hailing services, as “flexible employment.”88 Many of 
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186

these workers are subject to violations of international labor standards with regard to access to fair pay, employment contracts and 

agreements, pensions, and other insurance categories.89 Around 40 

percent of gig work in China takes place through outsourcing, meaning that gig workers are tied to a particular agency and distribution point.90 Gig work involving driving also takes place through 

crowdsourcing where the driver has full autonomy over location and 

timing, their only relationship with the employer being virtual.91

During the reporting year, Chinese labor specialists argued that 

“strikes by outsourced couriers are surprisingly frequent but largely 

invisible to outsiders.”92 CLB documented seven strikes in 2023 that 

were launched by gig workers who drove for the platform Huolala.93

996, Excessive Overtime, and Age Discrimination

Excessively long work hours continued to be a concern this re- porting year, as underscored in part by multiple fatalities of young 

people that may be attributed to overwork. The Commission’s 2022 

Annual Report documented long working hours among gig workers 

like food delivery workers and the tech sector’s white-collar employees, noting that public concern about the consequences of excessive 

overtime is widespread in China.94 Article 36 of the PRC Labor Law 

provides that the workday should not exceed 8 hours and that the 

workweek may not exceed on average 44 hours per week.95 Nevertheless, China’s white-collar tech industry is known for its “996” 

working hours, which refers to working 9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a 

week.96

Beyond excessive and uncompensated overtime, “996” is associated with age discrimination.97 Hiring managers prefer to hire younger workers because they want people who can dedicate very long 

hours to the company, and the perception is that people above 35 

are likely to get married and dedicate time to their families.98 As a 

result, many people over the age of 35 are unable to find new employment after having been terminated for age-related reasons.99

In response to the long hours and other demands of working life in 

China, a culture of tang ping, or lying flat, has developed among the 

younger generation, including a group of well-educated young people who reject life in the big cities to live in more relaxed cities such 

as Dali, Yunnan.100 [For more information on forced labor, see Chapter 18—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. For more information 

on trafficking in persons, see Chapter 10—Human Trafficking. For 

more information on complicity of business in human right abuses, 

see Chapter 14—Business and Human Rights.]
187

Notes to Chapter 11—Worker Rights

1Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “U.N. Rights Expert: Fundamental 

Right to Strike Must Be Preserved,” March 9, 2017. 2中华人民共和国宪法 [PRC Constitution], passed and effective December 4, 1982, amended 

March 11, 2018, art. 35. 3U.N. Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, Third Periodic Report Submitted 

by China under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, E/C.12/CHN/3*, August 5, 2020, para. 77; 

U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Implementation of the International 

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Second Periodic Reports Submitted by States 

Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant—China, E/C.12/CHN/2, July 6, 2012, sec. 6 

(Article 8, Trade union rights), para. 4; China Labour Bulletin, “Workers’ Rights and Labour Relations in China,” July 10, 2023; International Labour Organization, Interim Report—Report No. 

392: Case No. 3184 (China), Complaint date February 15, 2016, October 2020, para. 493; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and China Labour Bulletin, “Joint Submission for 

the Adoption of the List of Issues, China, to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, 

and Cultural Rights, 68th Session,” December 18, 2020, 7. See also International Covenant on 

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 

2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 8(1)(d); United Nations 

Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and 

Cultural Rights, accessed June 8, 2023. China signed and ratified the ICESCR on October 27, 

1997, and March 27, 2001, respectively. For more on the charge “picking quarrels and provoking 

trouble,” see Jiajun Luo, “Picking Quarrels and Provoking Trouble 寻衅滋事,” CMP Dictionary, 

China Media Project, November 9, 2023. 4HK Labour Rights Monitor, “Labour Disputes Hit a Seven-Year High Last Year in China 

under Its Sluggish Post-Pandemic Economy,” January 18, 2024; China Labour Bulletin, “China 

Labour Bulletin Strike Map Data Analysis: 2023 Year in Review for Workers’ Rights,” January 31, 

2024. See also China Labour Bulletin “Strike Map,” accessed August 8, 2024. 5China Labour Bulletin, “After Years of Pandemic Anomalies, Worker Strikes and Protests Are 

on the Rise across Industries in China,” July 28, 2023. 6China Labour Bulletin, “An Introduction to China Labour Bulletin’s Strike Map,” January 

10, 2024. 7China Labour Bulletin, “An Introduction to China Labour Bulletin’s Strike Map,” January 

10, 2024. 8China Labour Bulletin, “An Introduction to China Labour Bulletin’s Strike Map,” January 

10, 2024. 9China Labour Bulletin, “China Labour Bulletin Strike Map Data Analysis: 2023 Year in Review for Workers’ Rights,” January 31, 2024; Freedom House, “China Dissent Monitor 2023,” Issue 

6 (October–December 2023), February 20, 2024. 10China Labour Bulletin, “China Labour Bulletin Strike Map Data Analysis: 2023 Year in Review for Workers’ Rights,” January 31, 2024. 11“Protests Are Soaring, as China’s Workers Demand Their Wages,” Economist, February 8, 

2024; Evie Steele, “As China’s Economy Slows, Labor Protests Pick Up,” Voice of America, February 16, 2024. 12China Labour Bulletin, “China Labour Bulletin Strike Map Data Analysis: 2023 Year in Review for Workers’ Rights,” January 31, 2024; Simon Han and Jessica Song, “The Return of Strikes 

in China,” Asian Labour Review, June 4, 2024; China Labour Bulletin, “After Years of Pandemic 

Anomalies, Worker Strikes and Protests Are on the Rise across Industries in China,” July 28, 

2023. 13Simon Han and Jessica Song, “The Return of Strikes in China,” Asian Labour Review, June 

4, 2024; China Labour Bulletin, “China Labour Bulletin Strike Map Data Analysis: 2023 Year in 

Review for Workers Rights,” January 31, 2024. For the 2016 number, see China Labor Bulletin, 

“Strike Map,” data for January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, accessed August 26, 2024. 14Manfred Elfstrom, “Book Talk: Workers and Change in China by Manfred Elfstrom,” [Video 

file], YouTube, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, June 16, 

2023, 28:27. 15Freedom House, “China Dissent Monitor 2023,” Issue 6 (October–December 2023), February 

20, 2024. 16Freedom House, “China Dissent Monitor,” accessed July 30, 2024. 17China Labour Bulletin, “Migrant Workers Strike and Protest in Advance of First Post-Zero 

Covid Lunar New Year,” February 17, 2023; “Protests Are Soaring, as China’s Workers Demand 

Their Wages,” Economist, February 8, 2024. 18“Protests Are Soaring, as China’s Workers Demand Their Wages,” Economist, February 8, 

2024. 19China Labour Bulletin, “Strike Map,” data for January 2013 through December 2023, accessed June 13, 2024. 20China Labour Bulletin, “Strike Map,” data for January 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023, 

accessed July 31, 2024. Numbers from CLB Strike Map may change over time due to ongoing 

updates of data. 21China Labour Bulletin, “China Labour Bulletin Strike Map Data Analysis: 2023 Year in Review for Workers’ Rights,” January 31, 2024. 22Laurie Chen, “China’s Property Crisis Leaves Country Garden with Unpaid Workers, Silent 

Sites,” Reuters, August 23, 2023; China Labour Bulletin, “After Years of Pandemic Anomalies, 

Worker Strikes and Protests Are on the Rise across Industries in China,” July 28, 2023; “China’s 

Property Crisis Is Upending Tens of Thousands of Lives,” Bloomberg, October 23, 2023. 23“China’s Property Crisis Is Upending Tens of Thousands of Lives,” Bloomberg, October 23, 

2023.
Worker Rights

188

24China Labour Bulletin, “China Labour Bulletin Strike Map Data Analysis: 2023 Year in Review for Workers’ Rights,” January 31, 2024. 25Simon Han and Jessica Song, “The Return of Strikes in China,” Asian Labor Review, June 4, 

2024. See also Claire Fu and Daisuke Wakabayashi, “There Is No TikTok in China, but There Is 

Douyin. Here’s What It Is.,” New York Times, April 25, 2024. 26China Labour Bulletin, “Auto Workers Bear the Brunt of Competition and EV Transition in 

Chinese Market, International Just Transition Initiatives Provide Valuable Lessons,” April 29, 

2024. 27China Labour Bulletin, “Auto Workers Bear the Brunt of Competition and EV Transition in 

Chinese Market, International Just Transition Initiatives Provide Valuable Lessons,” April 29, 

2024; “China’s Auto Workers Bear the Brunt of Price War as Fallout Widens,” Reuters, September 

5, 2023. 28China Labour Bulletin, “Auto Workers Bear the Brunt of Competition and EV Transition in 

Chinese Market, International Just Transition Initiatives Provide Valuable Lessons,” April 29, 

2024; “China’s Auto Workers Bear the Brunt of Price War as Fallout Widens,” Reuters, September 

5, 2023. 29China Labour Bulletin, “Auto Workers Bear the Brunt of Competition and EV Transition in 

Chinese Market, International Just Transition Initiatives Provide Valuable Lessons,” April 29, 

2024. 30China Labour Bulletin, “After Years of Pandemic Anomalies, Worker Strikes and Protests Are 

on the Rise across Industries in China,” July 28, 2023; China Labour Bulletin, “China Labour 

Bulletin Strike Map Data Analysis: 2023 Year in Review for Workers’ Rights,” January 31, 2024. 

China Labour Bulletin, “Strike Map,” accessed July 31, 2024; Commission staff reviewed data for 

January 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023. 31China Labour Bulletin, “After Years of Pandemic Anomalies, Worker Strikes and Protests Are 

on the Rise across Industries in China,” July 28, 2023; Evelyn Cheng, “China’s Robotaxi Push 

Sparks Concerns about Job Security for Drivers,” CNBC, July 11, 2024. 32China Labour Bulletin, “After Years of Pandemic Anomalies, Worker Strikes and Protests Are 

on the Rise across Industries in China,” July 28, 2023. 33Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 203. 34For more information on Wang Jianbing, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2021-00517. 35Helen Davidson, “China #MeToo Journalist Sentenced to Five Years in Jail, Supporters Say,” 

Guardian, June 14, 2024.. 36Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Human Rights Council, “Opinions Adopted by 

the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at Its Ninety-third Session, 30 March–8 April 2022; 

Opinion No. 9/2022 Concerning Wang Jianbing (China),” A/HRC/WGAD/2022/9, May 11, 2022, 

paras. 36–69. 37Shibani Mahtani, “Chinese #MeToo Journalist, Activist Jailed in Crackdown on Civil Society,” 

Washington Post, June 14, 2024. 38For more information on Lu Yuyu, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2016-00177. 39 Jerome A. Cohen, “The Many Faces of ‘Non-Release Release’ in China,” Jerry’s Blog, April 

4, 2020. 40For details about Lu Yuyu’s detention and sentencing, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner 

Database record 2016-00177. 41Chun Han Wong, “Two Men Persecuted by Xi’s China Tried to Escape, Only One Succeeded,” 

Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2024. 42Chun Han Wong, “Chinese Activist Flees to Canada, as Dissidents Seek Ways Out,” Wall 

Street Journal, September 29, 2023. 43For more information on Tang Mingfang, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2021-00379. 44Yuan Yang, “He Blew the Whistle on Amazon. He’s Still Paying the Price,” Financial Times, 

December 7, 2023. 45Yuan Yang, “He Blew the Whistle on Amazon. He’s Still Paying the Price,” Financial Times, 

December 7, 2023. 46Yuan Yang, “He Blew the Whistle on Amazon. He’s Still Paying the Price,” Financial Times, 

December 7, 2023. 47Luna Sun and He Huifeng, “China’s Most Desperate Migrant Workers Jostle for Temporary 

Jobs—Losing Means They Sleep Outside and Stop Eating,” South China Morning Post, July 9, 

2023. 48China Labour Bulletin, “Migrant Workers and Their Children,” September 6, 2023; Jessica 

Batke, “What’s Behind the Youth Unemployment Statistics Beijing Just Decided to Stop Publishing? A Q&A with Eli Friedman,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, August 17, 2023. 49 Jessica Batke, “What’s Behind the Youth Unemployment Statistics Beijing Just Decided to 

Stop Publishing? A Q&A with Eli Friedman,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, August 17, 2023. 50Richard Smith, “Can Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Model’ Supplant Capitalist Democracies and Why 

Should Western Socialists Care?—Part 2,” New Politics, December 4, 2023; “Author: Richard 

Smith,” New Politics, accessed August 8, 2024. 51China Labour Bulletin, “Migrant Workers and Their Children,” September 6, 2023; Ralph 

Jennings and Mia Nulimaimaiti, “Former Official Names Rural-Urban Divide as Hindrance to 

China’s Economic Future,” South China Morning Post, June 20, 2024. 52中华人民共和国宪法 [PRC Constitution], passed and effective December 4, 1982, amended 

March 11, 2018, art. 33; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by 

U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 7. Article 33 of the PRC 
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189

Constitution explicitly guarantees that “[a]ll citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal 

before the law.” This mirrors language in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 

which states “All are equal before the law.” 53中华人民共和国宪法 [PRC Constitution], passed and effective December 4, 1982, amended 

March 11, 2018, art. 46. Article 46 of the PRC Constitution states that “[c]itizens of the People’s 

Republic of China shall have the right and the obligation to receive education.” International 

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 13. Article 13 of 

the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “recognize[s] the right of 

everyone to education.” 54 Jessica Batke, “What’s Behind the Youth Unemployment Statistics Beijing Just Decided to 

Stop Publishing? A Q&A with Eli Friedman,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, August 17, 2023. 55China Labour Bulletin, “Migrant Workers and Their Children,” September 6, 2023. 56China Labour Bulletin, “Migrant Workers and Their Children,” September 6, 2023. 57World Bank Group, “Which Way Forward? Navigating China’s Post-Pandemic Growth Path,” 

China Economic Update, December 2023, 53. 58World Bank Group, “Which Way Forward? Navigating China’s Post-Pandemic Growth Path,” 

China Economic Update, December 2023, 45. 59World Bank Group, “Which Way Forward? Navigating China’s Post-Pandemic Growth Path,” 

China Economic Update, December 2023, 45. 60World Bank Group, “Which Way Forward? Navigating China’s Post-Pandemic Growth Path,” 

China Economic Update, December 2023, 45. 61World Bank Group, “Which Way Forward? Navigating China’s Post-Pandemic Growth Path,” 

China Economic Update, December 2023, 45. 62Tingshu Wang, Laurie Chen, Kevin Yao, and Farah Master, “In Rapidly Ageing China, Millions of Migrant Workers Can’t Afford to Retire,” Reuters, May 8, 2024. 63Tingshu Wang, Laurie Chen, Kevin Yao, and Farah Master, “In Rapidly Ageing China, Millions of Migrant Workers Can’t Afford to Retire,” Reuters, May 8, 2024. 64Emily Feng, “They Flocked to Build China’s Cities. Now Builders Are Aging with Little Retirement,” NPR, January 18, 2024. 65Emily Feng, “They Flocked to Build China’s Cities. Now Builders Are Aging with Little Retirement,” NPR, January 18, 2024. 66Emily Feng, “They Flocked to Build China’s Cities. Now Builders Are Aging with Little Retirement,” NPR, January 18, 2024. 67China Labor Watch, “Investigation of an Apple Supplier: Chengdu Foxconn Report in 2023,” 

2. See also China Labor Watch, “Labor Conditions in China’s Consumer Electronics Sector,” October 2023, 4, 64. 68China Labor Watch, “Investigation of an Apple Supplier: Chengdu Foxconn Report in 2023,” 

5–6; China Labor Watch, “Labor Conditions in China’s Consumer Electronics Sector,” October 

2023, 65–68. 69China Labor Watch, “Investigation of an Apple Supplier: Pegatron Kunshan Report in 2023,” 

August 2023, 1–6. See also China Labor Watch, “Labor Conditions in China’s Consumer Electronics Sector,” October 2023, Appendix 4. 70China Labor Watch, “Apple’s Unkept Promises: Investigation of Three Pegatron Group Factories Supplying to Apple,” July 29, 2013. 71China Labor Watch, “Something’s Not Right Here: Poor Working Conditions Persist at Apple 

Supplier Pegatron,” October 22, 2015. 72China Labor Watch, “Investigation of an Apple Supplier: Pegatron Kunshan Report in 2023,” 

August 2023, 1–2; 73China Labor Watch, “Labor Conditions in China’s Consumer Electronics Sector,” October 

2023, 38–39. 74China Labor Watch, “Labor Conditions in China’s Consumer Electronics Sector,” October 

2023, 39–47. 75China Labor Watch, “Labor Conditions in China’s Consumer Electronics Sector,” October 

2023, 48–52. 76China Labor Watch, “Labor Conditions in China’s Consumer Electronics Sector,” October 

2023, 53–56. 77China Labor Watch, “Labor Conditions in China’s Consumer Electronics Sector,” October 

2023, 57–61. 78China Labor Watch, “Labor Conditions in China’s Consumer Electronics Sector,” October 

2023, 76–95. 79中华人民共和国工会法 [PRC Trade Union Law], passed April 3, 1992, amended December 24, 

2021, arts. 2, 10–12; International Labour Organization, Interim Report—Report No. 391, Case 

No. 3184 (China), Complaint date February 15, 2016, October 2019, para. 149. The ACFTU is 

a mass organization founded in the legacy of Marxist-Leninist practice where what in liberal 

regimes would be the purview of an independent civil society is instead encompassed in an organization with a relationship to the Party, charged with steering a particular aspect of society. 

China does not allow the formation of independent trade unions that are not incorporated into 

the Party-affiliated All-China Federation of Trade Unions. 80 Judith Audin and Jérôme Doyon, “Intermediary Political Bodies of the Party-State: A Sociology of Mass and Grassroots Organisations in Contemporary China,” China Perspectives, no. 

2 (2019): 3–4. 81中华人民共和国工会法 [PRC Trade Union Law], passed April 3, 1992, amended December 24, 

2021, art. 2. 82 Jude Howell, “From Green Shoots to Crushed Petals: Labour NGOs in China,” Made in China 

Journal: Then and Now 6, no. 1 (January–April 2021): 105.
Worker Rights

190

83Chloé Froissart, Yan Liu, and Quan Meng, “Trade-offs between State Organisations and 

Workers’ Organisations: Chinese Unions in Search of Authoritarian Collective Bargaining,” Chi- nese Perspectives 2, (2019). 84Chu Yang and David Bandurski, “China’s Political Discourse October 2023: BRI Forum, Li 

Keqiang, Feminism with a Socialist Character,” Sinocism, January 10, 2024; “18th National Con- gress of Chinese Trade Unions Concludes,” Xinhua, October 10, 2023; “18th National Congress of 

ACFTU Opens,” Xinhua, October 10, 2023; “18th National Congress of ACFTU Opens in Beijing,” 

China Daily, October 10, 2024. 85Chu Yang and David Bandurski, “China’s Political Discourse October 2023: BRI Forum, Li 

Keqiang, Feminism with a Socialist Character,” Sinocism, January 10, 2024. 86Chu Yang and David Bandurski, “China’s Political Discourse October 2023: BRI Forum, Li 

Keqiang, Feminism with a Socialist Character,” Sinocism, January 10, 2024. 87Guo Jinhui, “Fifth of Chinese Workers Are in Gig Economy as Pay, Independence Prove a 

Draw, Study Finds,” Yicai Global, September 15, 2023; “New Flexible Employment Logs Rapid 

Expansion in China: Report,” Xinhua, September 14, 2023; “2023中国新型灵活就业报告: 新型灵

活就业已经成为传统就业的重要补充” [2023 China new flexible employment report: new flexible 

employment has become an important supplement to traditional employment], Institute for Eco- nomic and Social Research, Jinan University, September 21, 2023. 88Guo Jinhui, “Fifth of Chinese Workers Are in Gig Economy as Pay, Independence Prove a 

Draw, Study Finds,” Yicai Global, September 15, 2023; “New Flexible Employment Logs Rapid 

Expansion in China: Report,” Xinhua, September 14, 2023. 89 Irene Zhou, “Digital Labour Platforms and Labour Protection in China,” International Labour 

Organization, ILO Working Paper 11, October 2020, secs. 3.2–3.3. See also International Labour 

Organization, World Employment and Social Outlook 2021: The Role of Digital Labour Platforms 

in Transforming the World of Work 2021, Executive Summary, February 3, 2021, 1–10. 90Bo Zhao and Siqi Luo, “The Old Conflict in the New Economy? Courier Resistance on Out- sourcing Platforms in China,” China Quarterly 258 (June 2024): 496. 91Bo Zhao and Siqi Luo, “The Old Conflict in the New Economy? Courier Resistance on Out- sourcing Platforms in China,” China Quarterly 258 (June 2024): 496. 92Bo Zhao and Siqi Luo, “The Old Conflict in the New Economy? Courier Resistance on Outsourcing Platforms in China,” China Quarterly 258 (June 2024): 497. 93China Labour Bulletin, “Working Conditions in Destabilised Transport Market Prompt Huolala Drivers to Strike in 2023,” December 28, 2023. For more information on gig workers in China, 

see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 

2022), 211–12. 94For more information about public concern of excessive overtime, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 213–14. 95中华人民共和国劳动法 [PRC Labor Law], passed July 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, 

amended December 29, 2018, art. 36. 96Ryan McMorrow and Nian Liu, “‘We’re Like Gears Grinding Until They Break’: Chinese Tech 

Companies Push Staff to the Limit,” Financial Times, June 23, 2024. 97Kai Waluszewski and Eleanor Olcott, “China’s Ageing Tech Workers Hit by ‘Curse of 35,’” 

Financial Times, April 23, 2024. 98Kai Waluszewski and Eleanor Olcott, “China’s Ageing Tech Workers Hit by ‘Curse of 35,’” 

Financial Times, April 23, 2024. 99Kai Waluszewski and Eleanor Olcott, “China’s Ageing Tech Workers Hit by ‘Curse of 35,’” 

Financial Times, April 23, 2024. 100 Joe Leahy, Sun Yu, and Andy Lin, “China’s Dreamers and Dropouts: ‘Lying Flat’ Generation 

Checks Out in Dali,” Financial Times, December 12, 2023.
191

VIII. Other Thematic Issues

Public Heal

Findings

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities’ response 

following the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan municipality, Hu- bei province, and throughout the COVID-19 pandemic has been 

characterized by a lack of transparency and problematic report- ing. In October 2023, the government considered draft revisions 

to the PRC Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious 

Diseases, including amendments that would strengthen report- ing of infectious disease outbreaks within China.

• During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, PRC author- ities continued to suppress criticism of the Chinese Commu- nist Party and government about the PRC’s response to the 

COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic and have promoted a nar- rative of “success”.

• Several Chinese citizens based in Shanghai municipality 

faced official harassment and detention in connection with their 

efforts to document the COVID-19 pandemic and protest harsh 

lockdown measures including: Chen Pinlin, Ji Xiaolong, Rei 

Xia, and Zhang Zhan. • Although there have been sporadic efforts to punish corrup- tion in the healthcare sector in the past, during this reporting 

year, Xi Jinping’s anticorruption “battle” engulfed the sector in 

a nationwide crackdown.

• The State Council passed new “Regulations on Human Organ 

Donation and Transplantation” that were presented as a means 

to strengthen oversight and management of the organ allocation and distribution system. A group of transplant surgeons 

and ethicists expressed skepticism that the PRC had ended 

abuses in its organ transplant system, noting China’s failure 

to adhere to WHO Guiding Principles—including a lack of accountability, allegations of forced organ harvesting, and falsified 

data on organ transplantation.

• PRC authorities continued to use forcible psychiatric commitment as a tool of political control and repression in China, 

according to a Chinese nongovernmental organization including 

in the cases of: Wu Yanan, Wang Yuping, and Song Zaimin.
192

Public Heal

COVID-19

INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION ON “PANDEMIC EMERGENCIES”

International human rights standards on public health include 

Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 

Cultural Rights, which proclaims the “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 

health” and the “prevention, treatment and control of epidemic . . . 

diseases.”1 The PRC government considered draft revisions to the 

PRC Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases in 

October 2023, including amendments that would strengthen reporting of infectious disease outbreaks within China.2 PRC authorities’ 

response following the COVID-19 outbreak and throughout the 

COVID-19 pandemic has been characterized by a lack of transparency and problematic reporting, such as ordering doctors in Wuhan 

at the outset of the outbreak to delay reporting and not wear protective gear,3 and preventing scientists from publishing or sharing data 

with the international community.4 An April 2024 investigative report from the Associated Press concluded that PRC government officials “froze meaningful efforts to trace the origins of the coronavirus 

pandemic, despite publicly declaring it supported an open scientific 

inquiry . . ..”5 Moreover, a study by a U.S. institute concluded that 

nearly 2 million died between December 2022 and January 2023 

when PRC authorities halted most of the “zero-COVID” prevention 

and control measures.6

The PRC government’s lack of compliance with provisions in the 

International Health Regulations (IHR) in reporting the COVID-19 

outbreak was a factor in recently passed amendments to the IHR. 

The PRC government not only “failed to promptly report” the 

COVID-19 outbreak but also did not provide “timely, accurate, and 

sufficiently detailed public health information” to the WHO, as required by the IHR.7 Amendments to the IHR passed by Member 

States during the World Health Assembly (WHA) in May 2024 will 

allow the World Health Organization (WHO) to declare a “pandemic 

emergency” and hasten international coordination in the case of a 

pandemic.8 Provisions to ensure a country’s compliance that reportedly were under discussion nevertheless were left out of the amended IHR.9 A stand-alone agreement on a global pandemic response 

in development since 202110 was not finalized at the WHA, though 

Member States extended the mandate to work on the agreement 

with a goal of passage later in 2024 or at the 2025 WHA.11

ONGOING INFORMATION CONTROL

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allows 

governments to impose some restrictions on freedom of expression 

in cases of public emergency, yet such restrictions must meet “standards of legality, proportionality, and necessity.”12 As the Commission has reported in prior annual reports,13 PRC authorities have 

suppressed criticism of the Chinese Communist Party and government about the PRC’s response to the COVID-19 outbreak and pandemic, and have promoted a narrative of “success.”14 At the March 
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193

2024 meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC), for example, 

Premier Li Qiang claimed that authorities had “secured a smooth 

transition in epidemic response following a major, decisive victory in 

the fight against Covid-19.”15 Information and news reports about 

PRC policy and management of the COVID-19 pandemic that did 

not align with the narrative of success remained politically sensitive, as seen in the following examples from the reporting period.

• According to a Wall Street Journal report in July 2023, Chi- nese authorities investigated several consulting firms in fall 

2022, seeking to identify the source of alleged information leaks 

about COVID-19 policy and vaccine strategy.16

• In July 2023, PRC internet regulators reportedly shut down 

the domestic online media platform Health Insight.17 Health 

Insight had published investigative reports on corruption in 

the healthcare sector, such as price gouging of medicine; over- spending on COVID-19 measures; and the rise in mental health 

concerns.18

• In December 2023, authorities reportedly censored a news re- port about the possible return of the health-tracking app used 

during the COVID-19 pandemic, in connection with a surge of 

respiratory illnesses 19 that affected many children in China.20

• The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China reported in its 

survey of reporting conditions during 2023 that foreign journal- ists in China “were liable to experience state intimidation and 

harassment” when they attempted to cover COVID-19-related 

stories.21 In one case, a journalist investigating the domestic 

experience of COVID-19, who had arranged to meet a Chinese 

university student in the student’s home village, learned that 

the meeting was canceled by the student’s university.22

Cases of Harassment and Detention in Shanghai Municipality

This past year, the Commission monitored developments in the cases 

of several Chinese citizens based in Shanghai municipality who faced 

official harassment and detention in connection with their efforts to document the COVID-19 pandemic and protest harsh lockdown measures.

• Shanghai authorities detained documentary maker Chen Pinlin

in November 2023 in connection with the release of a film about 

the “White Paper” protests.23 These protests erupted a year earlier 

in multiple locations across China, initially to mourn individuals 

who died in a fire in Urumqi municipality, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and broadened to focus on implementation of the 

“zero-COVID” policy.24 Public security officials reportedly formally 

arrested Chen for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” in January 2024.25

• Ji Xiaolong, a public health activist who criticized Shanghai officials’ management of the COVID-19 lockdown in spring 2022,26 was 

sentenced to four years and six months in prison in October 2023, 

for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”27 In August 2022, Ji 

reportedly had posted an open letter to Premier Li Qiang—then the 

Shanghai Party Secretary—calling for official accountability.28
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194

Cases of Harassment and Detention in Shanghai Municipality—

Continued

• Authorities detained Rei Xia on November 14, 2023, two weeks 

after she wore a costume of blank sheets of paper to a public Halloween celebration in Shanghai.29 She was held for 28 days on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”30 Authorities had 

detained Xia for 24 hours in November 2022 in connection with 

White Paper protests.31 Authorities detained her again in December 2022 for a period of 37 days 32 after she reported online that 

male police officers at another police station subjected several of 

her female friends who also were detained in connection with the 

White Paper protests, to abuse during interrogations, including hitting them and conducting strip searches.33

• On May 13, 2024, Shanghai authorities released Zhang Zhan, a 

citizen journalist imprisoned for reporting from Wuhan municipality, Hubei province, in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.34

Her release after serving four years in prison was unconfirmed until May 21 when she stated in a posted video that she was at her 

brother’s home.35 Human rights advocates raised concerns that authorities were likely to keep Zhang Zhan under heavy surveillance 

and prevent her from discussing her experience.36

Anticorruption Campaign against the Healthcare Sector

Although there have been sporadic efforts to punish corruption 

in the healthcare sector in the past,37 during this reporting year, 

Xi Jinping’s anticorruption “battle” engulfed the sector in a nationwide crackdown.38 A projected year-long campaign was launched in 

July 2023,39 and central authorities signaled at the January 2024 

meeting of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection that 

investigations would remain a priority.40 Bribery, kickbacks, and 

“rent-seeking” are among the activities targeted by the campaign.41

By August 2023, authorities reportedly had already detained more 

than 150 hospital managers, and province-level investigations reportedly exposed thousands of cases of bribery.42 The number of 

hospital directors and hospital Party secretaries under investigation rose to 250 by the end of September 2023.43 Authorities also 

targeted senior officials working in healthcare, medical insurance, 

and drug supervision, as well as scientists and pharmaceutical executives.44 In April 2024, for example, the National People’s Congress 

(NPC) announced that Yang Xiaoming, the scientist who developed 

Sinopharm’s vaccine against COVID-19, had been dismissed from 

the NPC and was under investigation for corruption.45 According 

to a state media report in mid-June 2024, 150 officials were under 

investigation in 2024 alone.46 Public health expert Yanzhong Huang 

observed that the campaign is a “deflective strategy” that “shifts 

blame onto hospital managers, doctors, and medical representatives  . . .” and away from concerns about Party and government 

decision making and management.47 Experts have pointed to the 

lack of sufficient funding for hospitals, medical doctors’ low salaries, 

and other systemic weaknesses in healthcare policy and oversight 

as among the root causes of corruption.48
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195

Ongoing Concerns about Organ Donation and Transplant in China

Articles published in a transplantation journal renewed concerns 

about the PRC’s organ donation and transplant practices.49 In a 

September 2023 article, a group of China-based specialists described 

their facility’s liver transplant experience and outlined government-led initiatives that they said were aimed at bringing organ 

transplant into conformance with international standards.50 Another group of transplant experts, responding to the article, quoted a 

finding by the International Society for Heart and Lung Transplantation Society that the PRC government “systematically support[s] 

the procurement of organs or tissue from executed prisoners,” and 

warned that “scientific journals must exercise caution when reviewing clinical transplantation articles from China.”51 They noted the 

PRC’s failure to “adhere to the World Health Organization (WHO) 

Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation related to transparency (#9), traceability (#10), and openness 

to scrutiny (#11),” additionally citing allegations of forced organ 

harvesting from religious and ethnic minority groups, and falsified 

data on organ transplantation.52 These violations of WHO principles 

have undermined the integrity of PRC official assurances about its 

organ transplant system, according to this group of experts.53

While new regulations enacted in October 2023 provide a more 

detailed framework governing organ donation, they are silent on the 

issue of sourcing organs from prisoners.54 The new regulations—titled “Regulations on Human Organ Donation and Transplantation” 

and superseding the older regulations passed in 2007—retain the 

principle that human organ donation must be voluntary and without compensation.55 The new regulations, however, do not provide 

an exception for donations made by prisoners, including those on 

death row.56 This omission recalls the assertion made in 2015 by 

senior health official Huang Jiefu that “voluntary” donations made 

by prisoners continued to be permissible and that “[n]ew regulations 

will be unveiled to clarify the legal procedures of organ donations 

for prisoners sentenced to death  . . ..”57 Sourcing organs from executed prisoners, however, violates international standards such as 

those adopted by the World Medical Association, which state that 

“executed prisoners must not be considered as organ and/or tissue 

donors.”58 According to a bioethicist, “experts suggest the regulatory 

change will not lead to transparency, bring an end to China’s transplant tourism business, or protect prisoners of conscience and ethnic 

groups from crimes in organ transplantation, including forced organ 

harvesting.”59

Mental Health Treatment: Forcible Commitment for Some, 

Inadequate Resources for Those in Need

FORCIBLE PSYCHIATRIC COMMITMENT

PRC authorities continued to use psychiatric commitment as a 

tool of repression in China, according to Civil Rights & Livelihood 

Watch (CRLW), a Chinese nongovernmental organization that has 

documented the forcible psychiatric commitment of free speech advocates, rights defenders, and petitioners for more than 15 years.60

Petitioners, individuals whose grievances have included miscarriag-
Public Health

196

es of justice in death penalty cases, homes and property ordered 

for demolition by local officials, and other unresolved harms,61 have 

been a frequent target of public security agents.62 In its 2023 report 

on the use of forcible psychiatric commitment, CRLW noted that the 

PRC diagnostic manual on mental disorders includes “petitioning” 

as a potential identifying criterion for paranoid personality disorder.63 The following three cases illustrate the misuse of psychiatric 

commitment this past year.

• CRLW reported that Wu Yanan, an assistant professor of 

philosophy at Nankai University in Tianjin municipality, re- mained in psychiatric detention,64 in connection with her on- line support of individuals who protested COVID-19 lockdowns 

in November 2022.65

• Public security officials forcibly admitted Wang Yuping, a 

democracy activist from Jianli county, Jingzhou municipali- ty, Hubei province, to a psychiatric facility upon completion of 

an 11-year prison sentence.66 According to rights defender Lin 

Shengliang, hospital workers forced Wang to ingest unknown 

medications while hospitalized.67

• Authorities in Beijing municipality reportedly forcibly committed rights defender Song Zaimin to a psychiatric hospital 

twice this past year, including for a period of 48 days starting 

in December 2023.68

CHALLENGES IN MEETING NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS

PRC policy treats persons with disability, including those with 

mental health disorders, as recipients of government welfare rather 

than as persons with rights, according to an expert report from an 

agency affiliated with the United Nations.69 This approach, referred 

to as the “medical model” of disability,70 is illustrated by a government report on national mental health efforts presented to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in December 2023.71

The report identified some of the challenges the government has 

faced, such as the need for more psychiatric hospitals, psychiatrists, 

and counseling services nationwide; insufficient financial resources 

for services and treatment; regional disparities; and limited societal 

understanding of mental health disorders.72 Brief mention of the 

PRC Mental Health Law emphasized the government’s statutory 

responsibility to implement mental health work.73 The report also 

specified the need to develop robust programs for children and the 

elderly.74 However, the published version of the report on mental 

health work was silent on two issues of public concern: the needs 

of women with psychosocial disorders, in light of the case of the 

“chained woman” who was a victim of human trafficking;75 and the 

mental health impact of COVID-19.76
197

Notes to Chapter 12—Public Health

1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by U.N. 

General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 

1976, art. 12(1), (2)(c); United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accessed July 15, 2023. China signed 

the convention on October 27, 1997, and ratified it on March 27, 2001. See also Office of the 

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to the 

Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), adopted at the Twenty-second Session of the 

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (April 25–May 12, 2000), E/C.12/2000/4, 

August 11, 2000, para. 16. 2Changhao Wei, “NPC Observer Monthly: October 2023,” NPC Observer Monthly, November 

2, 2023; “Chinese Lawmakers Set to Overhaul Infectious Disease Reporting System,” Caixin, 

October 20, 2023. 3“In Wuhan, Doctors Knew the Truth. They Were Told to Keep Quiet.,” editorial, Washington 

Post, August 22, 2023. 4Dake Kang and Maria Cheng, “Toxic: How the Search for the Origins of COVID-19 Turned 

Politically Poisonous,” Associated Press, April 22, 2024; Dake Kang and Maria Cheng, “Takeaways 

from AP Report on How the Search for the Coronavirus Origins Turned Toxic,” Associated Press, 

April 22, 2024. 5Dake Kang and Maria Cheng, “Toxic: How the Search for the Origins of COVID-19 Turned 

Politically Poisonous,” Associated Press, April 22, 2024; Dake Kang and Maria Cheng, “Takeaways 

from AP Report on How the Search for the Coronavirus Origins Turned Toxic,” Associated Press, 

April 22, 2024. 6Hong Xiao et al., “Excess All-Cause Mortality in China after Ending the Zero COVID Policy,” 

JAMA Network Open, August 24, 2023; Bernard Orr, “Nearly 2 Million Excess Deaths Followed 

China’s Sudden End of COVID Curbs, Study Says,” Reuters, August 24, 2023. 7Sam Halabi and Kumanan Wilson, “The Plausibility and Resolvability of Legal Claims 

against China and WHO under the International Health Regulations (2005),” in Vulnerable: 

The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19, edited by Colleen M. Flood, Vanessa MacDonnell, 

Jane Philpott, Sophie Thériault, and Sridhar Venkatapuram, (Ottawa: University of Ottawa 

Press, 2020): 537–39. 8World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (2005), Seventy-seventh World 

Health Assembly, Agenda Item 13.3, A77/A/CONF./14, June 1, 2024, art. 1.1 (“pandemic emergency”); World Health Organization, “World Health Assembly Agreement Reached on Wide-Ranging, 

Decisive Package of Amendments to Improve the International Health Regulations,” June 1, 2024; 

Tiaji Salaam-Blyther and Matthew C. Weed, “International Health Regulations Amendments,” In 

Focus, Congressional Research Service, June 24, 2024, 1. 9Kerry Cullinan, “‘The World Has Won’: New International Regulations to Protect against Pandemics Finally Approved,” Health Policy Watch, June 6, 2024; David P. Fidler, “The Amendments 

to the International Health Regulations Are Not a Breakthrough,” Think Global Health, Council 

on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2024. 10Amy Maxmen, “World Commits to a Pandemic-Response Pact: What’s Next,” Nature, December 1, 2021. 11World Health Organization, “World Health Assembly Agreement Reached on Wide-Ranging, 

Decisive Package of Amendments to Improve the International Health Regulations,” June 1, 2024. 

See also Steven Groves and Brett D. Schaefer, “A WHO-Provided Lesson in How Not to Prevent 

Future Pandemics,” National Review, June 1, 2024; Jamey Keaton and Maria Cheng, “Efforts to 

Draft a Pandemic Treaty Falter as Countries Disagree on How to Respond to Next Emergency,” 

Associated Press, May 24, 2024. 12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 19; 

United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights, accessed July 15, 2023. China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR. Daphne 

Eviatar, “Human Rights Guidelines for the Fight against COVID-19,” Just Security, March 27, 

2020; U.N. Human Rights Council, Disease Pandemics and the Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 

opinion and expression, David Kaye, A/HRC/44/49, April 23, 2020, paras. 16, 20, 63(e–f). 13Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 219–21; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: 

November 2022), 228–29; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report

(Washington: March 2022), 190–91; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual 

Report (Washington: December 2020), 204–6. 14Human Rights Watch, “Chinese Activist Paying Terrible Price for Public Health Advocacy,” 

September 11, 2023; Dake Kang and Maria Cheng, “Takeaways from AP Report on How the 

Search for the Coronavirus Origins Turned Toxic,” Associated Press, April 22, 2024; David Bandurski, “Whitewashing China’s Record on Covid,” China Media Project, January 9, 2023. 15State Council, “政府工作报告” [Government work report], March 5, 2024; State Council, 

“Full Text: Report on the Work of the Government,” March 5, 2024, 1. 16Rebecca Feng, “China Probed Covid-19 Policy Leaks by Ex-Government Officials,” Wall Street 

Journal, July 26, 2023. 17Yuanyue Dang, “China Suspends 2 Online Media Outlets as Censors Tighten Grip,” South 

China Morning Post, July 5, 2023; Reporters Without Borders, “China: RSF Denounces the Suspension of Health Insight after Its Reporting into Health Issues in the Country,” July 13, 2023. 18Yuanyue Dang, “China Suspends 2 Online Media Outlets as Censors Tighten Grip,” South 

China Morning Post, July 5, 2023; Reporters Without Borders, “China: RSF Denounces the Suspension of Health Insight after Its Reporting into Health Issues in the Country,” July 13, 2023.
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19Gu Ting, “Chinese Censors Delete News Report Probing Return of COVID Tracking,” Radio 

Free Asia, December 4, 2023. 20Hsia Hsiao-hwa, “Chinese Hospitals Swamped with Severe Child Pneumonia Cases,” Radio 

Free Asia, November 22, 2023. 21Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, “Mask Off, Barriers Remain: The Post Covid Reporting Environment in China 2023,” April 8, 2024, 5. 22Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, “Mask Off, Barriers Remain: The Post Covid Reporting Environment in China 2023,” April 8, 2024, 5. 23Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Chinese Director Arrested for Protest Film,” April 25, 

2024; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “陈品霖被控寻滋案将于六月开庭” [Chen Pinlin’s case of 

picking quarrels to go to trial in June], May 17, 2024. For more information on Chen Pinlin, see 

the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2024-00122. 24Patricia M. Thornton, “The A4 Movement: Mapping Its Background and Impact,” China Leadership Monitor 75, March 1, 2023. 25Rights Defense Network, “遭逮捕的白纸运动《乌鲁木齐中路》纪录片作者陈品霖(网名Plato)

的案情进展:已被起诉到法院” [Case developments for director Chen Pinlin (online name Plato) 

who was arrested for a documentary entitled “Urumqi Middle Road” about the White Paper movement: indictment already sent to court], May 16, 2024. 26Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “上海维权人士季孝龙再被国保从家中带走” [Shanghai 

rights defender Ji Xiaolong again taken from home by domestic security], June 4, 2022. 27Rights Defense Network, “维权网: 获刑4年6个月的著名人权捍卫者季孝龙案转监至上海市新收

犯监狱” [Rights Defense Network: in the case of prominent rights defender Ji Xiaolong, who 

was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months, transferred to Shanghai New Prisoners’ Prison], June 

9, 2024. For more information on Ji Xiaolong, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2018-00526. 28William Nee, “Xi Jinping Has Critics in China. They Have Paid a Steep Price.,” Diplomat, 

October 14, 2022. 29Rei Xia, “Arrested for Holding a Blank Paper,” Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy, accessed May 27, 2024; Xiao Yu, “原声带·夏巢川 :白纸运动后,我在看守所地狱般的日

子” [Original soundtrack—Xiao Chaochuan: After the White Paper Movement, my hellish days 

in a detention center], Voice of America, May 3, 2024. See also Isabelle Qian and Agnes Chang, 

“Shanghai’s Halloween Party, a Rare Chance for Chinese to Vent in Style,” New York Times,

November 21, 2023. For more information on Rei Xia, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner 

Database record 2024-00124. 30Rei Xia, “Arrested for Holding a Blank Paper,” Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy, accessed May 27, 2024. 31Rei Xia, “Arrested for Holding a Blank Paper,” Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy, accessed May 27, 2024. 32Rei Xia, “Arrested for Holding a Blank Paper,” Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy, accessed May 27, 2024. 33Rei Xia, “Arrested for Holding a Blank Paper,” Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy, accessed May 27, 2024. 34Huizhong Wu, “Zhang Zhan: Chinese Journalist Arrested for Reporting on COVID Released 

after 4 Years,” Associated Press, May 22, 2024. For more information on Zhang Zhan, see the 

Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2020-00175. 35Huizhong Wu, “Zhang Zhan: Chinese Journalist Arrested for Reporting on COVID Released 

after 4 Years,” Associated Press, May 22, 2024. 36Human Rights Watch, “Chinese Activist Paying Terrible Price for Public Health Advocacy,” 

September 11, 2023; Rights Defense Network, “维权评论:著名良心犯、公民记者张展女士刑满而

无自由——中共法治实乃一地鸡毛” [Rights defense opinion: Prominent prisoner of conscience and 

citizen journalist, Ms. Zhang Zhan, completed her sentence but is not free—CCP rule of law is 

a mess], May 16, 2024. 37Amy Hawkins, “China Renews Crackdown on Corruption in Healthcare,” Guardian, August 

17, 2023. 38Chun Han Wong, “China’s Xi Is Resurrecting Mao’s ‘Continuous Revolution’ with a Twist,” 

Wall Street Journal, January 1, 2024. 39Xu Wen, Cui Xiaotian, Yang Hanyu, Zhou Xinda, Zhao Jinzhao, Jiang Moting, and Han Wei, 

“Anti-Corruption Storm Sweeps China’s Health-Care Industry,” Caixin, August 14, 2023. 40William Zheng, “China’s Corruption Watchdog Pledges Focus on Finance, Medical Graft, Disloyalty,” South China Morning Post, January 11, 2024. 41Katrina Northrop, “A Crackdown Comes for Healthcare,” Wire China, February 11, 2024. 42Xu Wen, Cui Xiaotian, Yang Hanyu, Zhou Xinda, Zhao Jinzhao, Jiang Moting, and Han Wei, 

“Anti-Corruption Storm Sweeps China’s Health-Care Industry,” Caixin, August 14, 2023. 43“中纪委发文:剑指‘一把手’腐败!250位院长、书记落马!” [CCDI issued a document: 

Targeting corruption by those “first-in-command!” 250 hospital heads and Party secretaries dismissed!], Medical Device Distributors Alliance, reprinted in Huayi Net, December 6, 2023. 44See, e.g., Xinlu Liang, “China’s Health System Anti-Corruption Drive Nets Another Senior 

Official in Guizhou,” South China Morning Post, June 13, 2024; Katrina Northrop, “A Crackdown Comes for Healthcare,” Wire China, February 11, 2024; Xu Wen,  Cui Xiaotian,  Yang Hanyu,  Zhou Xinda,  Zhao Jinzhao,  Jiang Moting,  and  Han Wei, “Anti-Corruption Storm Sweeps 

China’s Health-Care Industry,” Caixin, August 14, 2023. 45Vanessa Cai, “Man behind China’s First Approved Covid-19 Shot Expelled from National 

Legislature,” South China Morning Post, April 29, 2024; “‘新冠疫苗之父’ 杨晓明落马 外媒:

或涉疫苗成效” [“Father of coronavirus vaccine” Yang Xiaoming falls from grace, foreign media: 

may involve vaccine’s effectiveness], Radio Free Asia, April 28, 2024.
Public Health

199

46Shao Meng, “又11人被查!今年医药反腐已打落超150人” [11 more people under investigation! More than 150 knocked down in the healthcare and pharmaceutical anti-corruption [campaign] this year], China News Service, June 19, 2024. 47Yanzhong Huang, “Anti-Corruption Campaign in China’s Medical Sector: Unmasking the Hidden Agenda,” Asia Unbound (blog), Council on Foreign Relations, August 18, 2023. 48Katrina Northrop, “A Crackdown Comes for Healthcare,” Wire China, February 12, 2024; Xu 

Wen,  Cui Xiaotian,  Yang Hanyu,  Zhou Xinda,  Zhao Jinzhao,  Jiang Moting,  and  Han Wei, “Anti-Corruption Storm Sweeps China’s Health-Care Industry,” Caixin, August 14, 2023. 49Zhitao Chen et al., “First Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, People’s 

Republic of China: 5-year Experience at a High-Volume Donor and Recipient Liver Transplant 

Center,” Transplantation 107, no. 9 (September 2023): 1855–59; Nancy L. Ascher and Francis L. 

Delmonico, “Organ Donation and Transplantation in China,” Transplantation 107, no. 9 (September 2023), 1880–81; Adnan Sharif, David McGiffin, Russell Strong, Torsten Trey, David Matas, 

Jacob Lavee, Susie Hughes, and Wendy Rogers, “Response to Chen et al. and the Accompanying 

Commentary,” Transplantation 108, no. 6 (June 2024): 81; Zhitao Chen and Xiaoshun He, “Response to Adnan et al.,” Transplantation 108, no. 6 (June 2024): 83; Francis L. Delmonico and 

Nancy L. Ascher, “A Last Hurrah: Reply to Sharif et al. Regarding China,” Transplantation 108, 

no. 6 (June 2024): 85. 50Zhitao Chen et al., “First Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, People’s 

Republic of China: 5-year Experience at a High-Volume Donor and Recipient Liver Transplant 

Center,” Transplantation 107, no. 9 (September 2023): 1855–59. 51Adnan Sharif, David McGiffin, Russell Strong, Torsten Trey, David Matas, Jacob Lavee, Susie 

Hughes, and Wendy Rogers, “Response to Chen et al. and the Accompanying Commentary,” Transplantation 108, no. 6 (June 2024): 81. 52Adnan Sharif, David McGiffin, Russell Strong, Torsten Trey, David Matas, Jacob Lavee, Susie Hughes, and Wendy Rogers, “Response to Chen et al and the Accompanying Commentary,” 

Transplantation 108, no. 6 (June 2024): 81; World Health Organization, “WHO Guiding Principles 

on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation,” WHO/HTP/EHT/CPR/2010.01, May 2010. 53Adnan Sharif, David McGiffin, Russell Strong, Torsten Trey, David Matas, Jacob Lavee, Susie 

Hughes, and Wendy Rogers, “Response to Chen et al. and the Accompanying Commentary,” Transplantation 108, no. 6 (June 2024): 81; World Health Organization, “WHO Guiding Principles on 

Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation,” WHO/HTP/EHT/CPR/2010.01, May 2010. See 

also Kai Di, “New Rules Targeting Illegal Organ Trade Unenforceable: Experts,” Radio Free Asia, 

December 19, 2023. 54人体器官捐献和移植条例 [Regulation on Human Organ Donation and Transplantation], 

passed October 20, 2023, effective May 1, 2024, arts. 13–34; 人体器官移植条例 [Regulations 

on Human Organ Transplantation], passed March 21, 2007, effective May 1, 2007, arts. 12, 

17, 20, 30. 55人体器官捐献和移植条例 [Regulation on Human Organ Donation and Transplantation], passed 

October 20, 2023, effective May 1, 2024, art. 8; 人体器官移植条例 [Regulations on Human Organ 

Transplantation], passed March 21, 2007, effective May 1, 2007, art. 7. 56人体器官捐献和移植条例 [Regulation on Human Organ Donation and Transplantation], passed 

October 20, 2023, effective May 1, 2024. 57“China to Scrap Organ Harvesting from Executed Prisoners,” China Daily, December 4, 2014; 

Kirk C. Allison et al., “Historical Development and Current Status of Organ Procurement from 

Death-Row Prisoners in China,” BMC Medical Ethics 16, no. 85 (December 3, 2015), 1–6. See 

also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2015 Annual Report (Washington: October 

8, 2015), 202. 58World Medical Association, “WMA Council Resolution on Organ Donation in Prisoners,” May 

7, 2024; Are Martin Holm et al., “International Society for Heart and Lung Transplantation 

Statement on Transplant Ethics,” Journal of Heart and Lung Transplantation 41, no. 10 (October 2022), 1307–8. 59Anne Zimmerman, “Forced Organ Harvesting and Transplant Tourism: Will China’s New 

Regulation Make a Difference?,” Bioethics Today, May 10, 2024. 60Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “被精神病数据库” [Database of forcible psychiatric commitment], accessed July 25, 2024; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “2013年中国维稳与人权年

终报告” [2013 year-end report on stability maintenance and human rights in China], February 3, 2014; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “2014 年中国精神健康与人权(被精神病)年终报

告” [2014 year-end report on mental health and human rights in China (forcible psychiatric 

commitment)], January 14, 2015; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “2015年中国精神健康与人权

(被精神病)年终总结” [2015 year-end summary on mental health and human rights in China 

(forcible psychiatric commitment)], February 8, 2016; Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “2016年中

国精神健康与人权(被精神病)年终总结” [2016 year-end summary on mental health and human 

rights in China (forcible psychiatric commitment)], January 26, 2017; Civil Rights & Livelihood 

Watch, “2020中国精神健康与人权(被精神病)年终报告” [2020 year-end report on mental health 

and human rights in China (forcible psychiatric commitment)], March 3, 2021; Civil Rights & 

Livelihood Watch, “2023年中国精神健康与人权(被精神病)年终报告” [2023 year-end report on 

mental health and human rights in China (forcible psychiatric commitment)], March 14, 2024. 61See, e.g., Xu Zhiyong, “A Beautiful China—Eight—Petitioners’ Village,” Joshua Rosenzweig 

and Leo Timm, trans., China Change, June 6, 2024. 62Safeguard Defenders, “Drugged and Detained: China’s Psychiatric Prisons (updated),” August 

2022, 12; Yitong Wu and Chingman, “Chinese Authorities Still Locking Up Critics in Psychiatric 

Facilities: Report,” Radio Free Asia, August 17, 2022. 63Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “2023年中国精神健康与人权(被精神病)年终报告” [2023 

year-end report on mental health and human rights in China (forcible psychiatric commitment)], 

March 14, 2024, sec. 5.1.
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200

64Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “2023年中国精神健康与人权(被精神病)年终报告” [2023 

year-end report on mental health and human rights in China (forcible psychiatric commitment)], 

March 14, 2024. 65Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “吴亚楠因网上言论被以精神病为由扣押” [Wu Yanan was 

detained on the basis of mental illness due to online comments], December 16, 2022; Yitong 

Wu, “Punishment for Supporting Protests: Philosophy Lecturer Sent to Psychiatric Hospital,” 

Radio Free Asia, December 15, 2022; Ye Bing, “白纸运动多名抗议人士被刑拘或传唤 维权律师义务

法援被捕者遭恐吓骚扰” [Many protesters from the White Paper movement have been criminally 

detained or summoned for questioning, rights defense lawyers who provided legal aid services 

to those detained have been intimidated and harassed], Voice of America, December 16, 2022. 

For more information on Wu Yanan, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2022-00205. 66Rights Defense Network, “获刑11年的良心犯王喻平出狱仅5个月 遭强关精神病院 其激烈反抗

后出院” [Sentenced to 11 years in prison, prisoner of conscience Wang Yuping was released for 

five months but was forcibly admitted to a psychiatric hospital, he was discharged following fierce 

resistance], May 27, 2024. For more information on Wang Yuping, see the Commission’s Political 

Prisoner Database record 2016-00153. 67Rights Defense Network, “获刑11年的良心犯王喻平出狱仅5个月 遭强关精神病院 其激烈反抗

后出院” [Sentenced to 11 years in prison, prisoner of conscience Wang Yuping was released for 

five months but was forcibly admitted to a psychiatric hospital, he was discharged following fierce 

resistance], May 27, 2024. 68Rights Defense Network, “北京维权公民宋再民又被北京警察关进精神病院” [Beijing rights 

defender Song Zaimin again forced into psychiatric hospital by Beijing police], June 29, 2024. 

For more information on Song Zaimin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2014-00346. 69U.N. Partnership on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and U.N. China, “Situational 

Analysis of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities China Country Report,” September 2023, 7, 21, 

38, 47. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: 

May 2024), 220. 70U.N. Partnership on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and U.N. China, “Situational 

Analysis of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities China Country Report,” September 2023, 7, 

21, 38, 47. 71Lei Haichao, National Health Commission, “国务院关于精神卫生工作情况的报告” [Report of 

the State Council on the work of mental health], December 27, 2023; Fan Qiaojia, “国家卫健委:

精神卫生投入保障需进一步加强” [National Health Commission: Mental health engagement needs 

to be further strengthened], Caixin, December 28, 2023. 72Lei Haichao, National Health Commission, “国务院关于精神卫生工作情况的报告” [Report of 

the State Council on the work of mental health], December 27, 2023; Fan Qiaojia, “国家卫健委:

精神卫生投入保障需进一步加强” [National Health Commission: Mental health engagement needs 

to be further strengthened], Caixin, December 28, 2023. 73中华人民共和国精神卫生法 [PRC Mental Health Law], passed October 26, 2012, effective May 

1, 2013, amended April 27, 2018. According to CRLW, the government did not conduct a national 

assessment of the PRC Mental Health Law (MHL) for the 10th anniversary of its passage or 

effective date. Civil Rights & Livelihood Watch, “2023年中国精神健康与人权(被精神病)年终报

告” [2023 year-end report on mental health and human rights in China (forcible psychiatric 

commitment)], March 14, 2024. A group of Shanghai-based experts published an assessment in 

The Lancet Psychiatry finding serious gaps in implementation of the MHL. See Hao Yao, Jingjing 

Huang, and Yifeng Xu, “10-Year Review of China’s Mental Health Law: A Call for Action to Promote Human Rights in Mental Health,” Lancet Psychiatry 10, no. 2 (December 18, 2022). 74Lei Haichao, National Health Commission, “国务院关于精神卫生工作情况的报告” [Report of 

the State Council on the work of mental health], December 27, 2023. 75Qiao Qin’en, “‘铁链女’事件二周年:她真的被遗忘了吗?” [Two years after the “chained 

woman” incident: Has she really been forgotten?], Radio Free Asia, January 26, 2024; Vivian 

Wang and Joy Dong, “Sentencing in China’s ‘Chained Woman’ Trafficking Case Revives Online 

Outrage,” New York Times, April 7, 2023; “On International Women’s Day, Chinese Citizens Con- tinue to Pressure PSB, Government over Abuse and Trafficking of Women,” China Digital Times, March 7, 2022. 76Frederik Kelter, “China Tries to ‘Bury the Memory’ and Trauma of Zero-COVID Era,” Al 

Jazeera, December 21, 2023; Ma Danmeng and Wu Xintong, “Action Urged to Help Children with 

Growing Rates of Depression amid Pandemic,” Caixin, August 10, 2021.
201

The Environme

Findings

• China remained the world’s leading emitter of carbon dioxide 

(CO2) emissions in 2023. China’s CO2 emissions continued to 

grow in January and February of 2024, followed by a 3-percent 

decrease in March, the first decline since the discontinuation of 

the zero-COVID policy in the country.

• International media and observers detailed trends in China’s 

coal sector that may impede the country’s progress towards 

meeting its 2025 targets under the Paris Agreement.

• At the 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference 

(COP28), China did not sign on to the Global Renewables and 

Energy Efficiency Pledge. Experts speculate that China chose 

to refrain from signing due in part to the pledge’s references to 

phasing out fossil fuels and coal.

• Extreme weather events that observers have linked to cli- mate change affected cultural heritage, food and water security, 

and public health in China. 2023 was described as the country’s 

“historic warmest year,” and July 2024 as “the hottest single 

month in the history of observation.”

• PRC authorities repressed environmental advocates. This past 

year, officials detained environmental advocate and blogger Hu 

Nengke, known as “Hu Laoshi” (Teacher Hu), for exposing corruption committed by officials in Gushi county, Xinyang municipality, Henan province, which included allowing companies to 

violate environmental regulations. In addition, PRC authorities 

deployed armed police to peaceful protests in Anqing municipality, Anhui province and detained more than 1,000 Tibetans for 

voicing their opposition to the Kamthog (Gangtuo) hydropower 

dam in Derge (Dege) county, Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province.

• The PRC’s dams, island-building initiatives, and giant clam 

harvesting contributed to environmental degradation in the Indo-Pacific region.
202

The Environme

PRC Government Actions and Legal Developments

In Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s 

speech at the July 2023 National Conference on Ecological and Environmental Protection, he emphasized his belief that “the coming 

five years will be critical to the building of a Beautiful China” and 

urged attendees to “keep our skies blue, waters clear, and lands pollution-free.”1 Xi Jinping also claimed that the PRC is “shouldering 

its responsibilities as a major country” by proactively addressing 

ecological and environmental issues.2 PRC government actions and 

legal developments in the past year addressing environmental protection included the following:

• In July 2023, the China Meteorological Administration published the “Blue Book on Climate Change of China 2023,”

which highlighted the frequency of extreme weather events, including “extreme high temperatures” and “extreme heavy precipitation” in the PRC.3 The publication aims to present readers 

with a “comprehensive picture of the latest monitoring information of climate change.”4

• On August 15, 2023, China observed its first National Ecology Day.5 According to instructions from Party General Secretary Xi Jinping relayed by Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang, a 

member of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party 

Central Committee Political Bureau, at a ceremony that day, 

“ecological conservation is of vital importance[,] . . . a major political issue . . . as well as a major social issue that bears upon 

public wellbeing.”6 The day—inspired by “Xi Jinping Thought 

on Ecological Civilization”—was designated by the National 

People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee in June 2023 to 

increase public awareness about environmental protection and 

conservation.7

• Effective September 1, 2023, the PRC Qinghai-Tibet Plateau Ecological Conservation Law is the “first legislative 

vision for the environmental protection of the Tibetan plateau 

and its surroundings,” according to commentary published in 

Mongabay, an international non-profit conservation and environmental news platform.8 In March 2024, an article by the Tibet Policy Institute, the research center of the Central Tibetan 

Administration, noted that the policy is “purely ornamental . . . 

to cover [the PRC’s] main intention of removing Tibetan nomads 

who have preserved Tibetan culture and tradition for generations.”9 [For more information on threats to Tibetan culture, see 

Chapter 17—Tibet.]

• In October 2023, the NPC Standing Committee amended the 

PRC Marine Environmental Protection Law (effective January 1, 2024).10 The revision was the “first major update of the 

[l]aw in almost 25 years,” according to a Chinese law expert.11

The law aims to protect marine ecosystems from environmental 

degradation and pollution, while “build[ing] a strong maritime 

nation.”12

• In December 2023, the PRC’s State Council issued its third 

national Action Plan to Continue to Improve Air Quality
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203

to “protect blue skies and the health of the people.”13 The plan 

includes key air pollution targets to be achieved by 2025, including the reduction of particulate matter 2.5 (PM2.5) levels in 

cities at the prefecture level and above by 10 percent, compared 

to 2020; in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and its surrounding 

areas by 20 percent; and in the Fenwei Plain by 15 percent.14

• In December 2023, the PRC Ministry of Ecology and Environment released its 2023–2024 Comprehensive Autumn and 

Winter Air Pollution Control Plan for Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Area and Fenwei Plain, referred to as the “winter action 

plan.”15 An expert from the Centre for Research on Energy and 

Clean Air (CREA), an international non-profit research organization, noted that the PRC’s winter action plan is usually 

published in the fall and speculated that the delayed release 

of the 2023–2024 plan was to “align” with the December 2023 

Action Plan to Continue to Improve Air Quality.16 According to 

an April 2024 report by CREA, “half of targeted cities missed 

the PM2.5 targets in 2023 Q4, while 41 percent of cities missed 

those in 2024 Q1.”17

• Effective June 1, 2024, the PRC Law on Ensuring Food 

Security aims to address risks to national food security and 

self-sufficiency.18 The law establishes systems to protect the 

quality of arable land, prevent soil pollution, and to support 

environmental improvements.19

Climate Change

While the Chinese Communist Party and government strives to 

position the PRC as a leader in climate governance, observers raised 

concerns this past year about the PRC achieving its key climate 

targets. The PRC government previously committed to a “dual-carbon pledge” of reaching peak carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions before 

2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2060.20 China remained 

the world’s leading emitter of CO2 emissions in 2023, with per capita emissions 15 percent higher than advanced economies combined, 

and accounting for 35 percent of the world’s total CO2 emissions.21

Scientific data indicated that “[c]arbon emissions from China are 

growing faster now than before COVID-19,” based on an analysis by 

academics from Australian National University comparing emissions 

from early 2019 and early 2023.22 China’s CO2 emissions continued 

to grow in January and February of 2024, followed by a 3-percent 

decrease in March, the first decline since the discontinuation of the 

zero-COVID policy in the country, according to a May 2024 report by 

Lauri Myllyvirta, senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute 

and lead analyst at CREA.23 While China’s carbon emissions “may 

have peaked in 2023,” Myllyvirta questioned whether such a trajectory will continue.24

The Commission observed trends in China’s coal sector that may 

impede on the country’s progress towards meeting its 2025 targets 

under the Paris Agreement.25 January 2024 reports from international media and the National Bureau of Statistics of China revealed 

that the country’s coal production reached a record-high in 2023, 

with a 2.9-percent increase compared to 2022.26 PRC authorities 

continued to approve new coal power projects in China and abroad, 
The Environment

204

despite the government’s 2021 promise to “strictly limit” coal consumption.27 Experts noted that the number of new construction 

projects in China’s coal sector was “nearly quadruple what [it was] 

in 2019,” and warned that the coal capacity gap between China and 

the rest of the world is widening as other countries reduce their coal 

operations.28

At the 2023 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28), 

China did not sign on to the Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge, which included mention of phasing down coal power 

and fossil fuels.29 Li Shuo, director of the China Climate Hub at the 

Asia Society Policy Institute speculated that China refrained from 

signing due in part to potential challenges in meeting the pledge’s 

targets.30 Other observers pointed out that China’s absence from the 

pledge contradicts joint bilateral efforts discussed in the November 

2023 Sunnylands Statement between Xi Jinping and President Joseph Biden.31 Previously, in September 2023, China’s representative 

to COP28 and then-Special Envoy for Climate Change Xie Zhenhua 

claimed that eliminating fossil fuel is “unrealistic.”32

China continued to experience high levels of air pollution.33 Analysis by a researcher at the CREA noted that the country’s national 

average fine particulate matter (PM2.5) level rose for the first time 

in a decade, describing the increase as an “air pollution rebound.”34

As of December 2023, 13 provincial capitals were “off track” to meet 

China’s PM2.5 national standard of 35 μg/m3—far higher than the 

World Health Organization’s recommended PM2.5 level of 5 μg/m3.35

EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS IN THE PRC

During the 2024 reporting year, China continued to experience 

extreme weather events that observers have linked to climate 

change.36 Events included severe droughts and heavy rainfall in 

summer 2023 and the first half of 2024;37 and extreme heat, with 

2023 described as the country’s “historic warmest year” and July 

2024 as “the hottest July since complete observations begin in 1961, 

and the hottest single month in the history of observation.”38 The 

Commission observed reports detailing the effects of extreme weather events linked to climate change in the PRC on the following:

• Cultural heritage. Observers pointed out that climate 

change and extreme weather events have caused damage 

to U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 

(UNESCO) World Heritage sites across the country, including 

severe deterioration of ancient murals in the Mogao Caves, 

known as the Thousand Buddha Grottoes, and the Maijishan 

Grottoes, both in Gansu province.39 The damage is reportedly 

caused by extreme weather, such as heavy rains and flooding, 

and the resulting rising humidity levels in the caves.40 China 

ratified international legal standards on the protection of cultural heritage including the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage in 198541 and 

the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 

Heritage in 2004.42

• Food security. According to observers, the PRC government 

views food security as a means of maintaining social stability 

and establishing political legitimacy.43 In the first half of 2024, 
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205

China experienced droughts in the north and heavy rain in the 

south, which reportedly affected soil quality and wheat production.44 Extreme heat led to the death of livestock and reduced 

vegetable production due to damaged crops.45

• Public health. In a November 2023 research article published in The Lancet, an international medical journal, authors 

warned that “China risks losing health gains within a single 

generation if society fails to adapt to climate change.”46 The 

authors referred to climate change, including extreme temperatures, as “an amplifier” of existing health challenges in the 

country.47 Severe sandstorms in Beijing municipality and other parts of northern China have sent air pollution “soaring to 

hazardous levels.”48 Another challenge faced by China is the 

transmission of mosquito-borne, water-borne, and rodent-borne 

infectious diseases as a result of evolving weather patterns and 

climate variables, such as temperature and precipitation.49 International legal standards on public health include Article 12 

of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which proclaims “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 

health.”50

Environmental Advocacy in the PRC

China’s Constitution provides for freedom of speech, assembly, 

and association,51 as do the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 52 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.53

According to the U.N. Framework Principles on Human Rights and 

the Environment, “[s]tates should provide a safe and enabling environment in which individuals, groups and organs of society that 

work on human rights or environmental issues can operate free 

from threats, harassment, intimidation, and violence.”54 During the 

2024 reporting year, the Commission observed instances of official 

repression of environmental advocacy across the country, including 

in:

• Anqing municipality, Anhui province. In August 2023, 

over 100 people gathered to voice opposition to the local government’s plans for a waste incineration power plant due to 

concerns about environmental pollution.55 Video footage documented “a significant deployment of armed police on the scene 

for monitoring.”56

• Derge (Dege) county, Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province. In February 2024, hundreds of Tibetan villagers peacefully protested the construction 

of the Kamthog (Gangtuo) hydropower dam, citing concerns 

about the project’s environmental and cultural impacts, including displacement of at least six monasteries and two villages.57

PRC authorities deployed police and detained over 1,000 Tibetans, including monks from local monasteries.58 [For more information about the protests, see Chapter 17—Tibet.]

In December 2023, officials detained an environmental advocate 

and blogger on suspicion of “extortion.” Hu Nengke, known as “Hu 

Laoshi” (Teacher Hu), previously wrote about government corruption, including details about local officials allowing companies to 
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206

violate environmental regulations, and about pollution caused by a 

zinc oxide plant in Gushi county, Xinyang municipality, Henan province.59 [For more information about restrictions of freedom of speech 

and assembly in the PRC, see Chapter 1—Freedom of Expression.]

Impact of the PRC’s Dams

Dams built by the PRC government, both in China and abroad, 

continued to pose threats to the environment and human rights. 

The U.N. Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Envi- ronment indicate that “[s]tates should ensure a safe, clean, healthy 

and sustainable environment in order to respect, protect and fulfill 

human rights,” which includes the right to safe drinking water.60 In 

January 2024, observers raised concerns about a newly-constructed 

dam on the Mapcha Tsangpo River in the Tibet Autonomous Region 

(TAR), a river with freshwater supply with downstream effects on 

the livelihoods of local communities in Nepal and India.61 A March 

2024 article published in Geographical, the official magazine of the 

Royal Geographical Society in the United Kingdom, noted that the 

PRC’s dams in the TAR could create water insecurity and “potentially allow China to control water flow into Nepal and India.”62

Local communities in Southeast Asia have expressed their concerns about the PRC’s dams. The PRC’s dams along the Mekong 

River have exacerbated drought conditions, resulting in widespread 

threats to the water and food security of the local communities in 

countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.63 In November 2023, Thailand’s Human Rights Commission sent a letter 

to the prime minister to warn about the potential environmental 

and human impacts of the Pak Beng Hydropower Project—a dam 

to be built in Laos bordering Thailand’s Chiang Rai province—by 

PRC state-owned Datang International Power Generation Company 

and Thailand’s Gulf Energy Development Public Company Limited.64 In addition, the Dumagat-Remontado, an indigenous community in the Philippines, protested construction of the Kaliwa Dam 

in Luzon, Philippines, which was funded by a US$211 million loan 

from the PRC state-owned Export-Import (Exim) Bank of China.65

Dumagat-Remontado groups submitted a joint report to the United 

Nations Human Rights Council for the fourth Universal Periodic 

Review of the PRC, claiming that China breached its commitments 

on human rights and the environment, including by violating indigenous people’s rights to cultural integrity and an adequate standard 

of living, and threatening natural resources in the area.66 [For more 

information about the fourth Universal Periodic Review of the PRC, 

see Chapter 20—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally.]

The PRC in the South China Sea

Reports detailed evidence of environmental degradation in the 

South China Sea (SCS) due to the PRC’s actions. The Philippine 

Coast Guard (PCG) noted “extensive damage in areas frequented 

by Chinese militia,” according to a PCG spokesperson in September 2023.67 Damage observed by the PCG included crushed corals, 

visible discoloration, as well as “minimal to no signs of life” in the 

marine ecosystems of the Rozul (Iroquios) Reef and Escoda (Sabina) Shoal.68 The PCG suggested that “indiscriminate illegal and 
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207

destructive fishing activities” conducted by Chinese maritime militia 

may have contributed to destruction of marine life in the area.69 A 

Philippine news platform warned that if the Chinese militia’s activities continue, “it will undoubtedly result in an ecological catastrophe.”70 In December 2023, a report published by researchers from 

the U.S.-based China Ocean Institute and the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies’ (CSIS) Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative documented environmental damage in the SCS linked to regional powers, including the PRC.71 The report found that the PRC’s 

island expansion activities in the SCS have “caused the most reef 

destruction . . . burying roughly 4,648 acres of reefs.”72 The report 

also estimated roughly 16,535 acres of reefs in the SCS are damaged as a result of Chinese giant clam harvesting.73 The United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which China 

ratified, includes the obligation to “protect and preserve the marine 

environment.”74
208

Notes to Chapter 13—The Environment

1“Xi Stresses Building Beautiful China, Advancing Modernization Featuring Harmony Between 

Humanity and Nature,” Xinhua, reprinted in International Department, Central Committee of 

the Chinese Communist Party, July 28, 2023. 2“Xi Stresses Building Beautiful China, Advancing Modernization Featuring Harmony Between 

Humanity and Nature,” Xinhua, reprinted in International Department, Central Committee of 

the Chinese Communist Party, July 28, 2023. 3China Meteorological Administration,“‘中国气候变化蓝皮书2023’发布全球变暖趋势持续 中

国多项气候变化指标创新高”[“2023 Blue Book on Climate Change” released: Trends of global 

warming continues, and many climate change indicators in China hit new highs], July 8, 2023; 

China Meteorological Administration, “Blue Book on Climate Change of China Unveiled,” July 

19, 2023; Fan Anqi and Xie Wenting, “Extreme Heat Events in China Ever More Frequent: Blue 

Book,” Global Times, July 9, 2023. 4China Meteorological Administration, “Blue Book on Climate Change of China Unveiled,” July 

19, 2023; China Meteorological Administration, “‘中国气候变化蓝皮书2023’ 发布全球变暖趋势

持续 中国多项气候变化指标创新高” [“2023 Blue Book on Climate Change” released: Trends of 

global warming continues, and many climate change indicators in China hit new highs], July 

8, 2023; Fan Anqi and Xie Wenting, “Extreme Heat Events in China Ever More Frequent: Blue 

Book,” Global Times, July 9, 2023. 5“Xi Makes Instructions on China’s First National Ecology Day,” Xinhua, reprinted in the State 

Council, updated August 15, 2023; Hou Liqiang, “August 15 Chosen as 1st National Ecology Day,” 

China Daily, updated June 29, 2023. 6“Xi Makes Instructions on China’s First National Ecology Day,” Xinhua, reprinted in the State 

Council, updated August 15, 2023. 7Changhao Wei, “NPC Observer Monthly: June 2023,” NPC Observer Monthly, July 10, 2023; 

Hou Liqiang, “August 15 Chosen as 1st National Ecology Day,” China Daily, updated June 29, 

2023; The Press Office, International Department of the CPC Central Committee, “Special Issue 

on Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization,” China Insight, accessed June 3, 2024. “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” was formulated shortly after the 18th National Congress 

of the Chinese Communist Party. According to a “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization 

Study Outline,” it incorporates “Ten Adherences” to highlight the importance of protecting the 

environment. 8Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 中华人民共和国青藏高原生态保护法 [PRC QinghaiTibet Plateau Ecological Conservation Law], adopted April 26, 2023, effective September 1, 2023; 

Zhengyang Wang, “China’s Qinghai-Tibet Ecosystem Legislation Is a Landmark, but for Whom? 

(commentary),” Mongabay, June 7, 2023. 9Dechen Palmo, “China’s New ‘Qinghai-Tibet Plateau Ecological Protection Law’: A Threat 

to Tibet’s Environment,” Tibet Policy Institute, March 27, 2024; Tibet Policy Institute, “Mission 

Statement,” accessed April 30, 2024. For a discussion of the threats to Tibetan cultural rights in 

previous Commission reporting, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual 

Report (Washington: May 2024), 289–90. 10Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 中华人民共和国海洋环境保护法 [PRC Marine Environmental Protection Law], adopted August 23, 1982, revised October 24, 2023, effective January 

1, 2024; “Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和

国海洋环境保护法,” translated in NPC Observer, accessed June 15, 2024; Changhao Wei, “NPC 

Observer Monthly: October 2023,” NPC Observer Monthly, November 2, 2023. 11Changhao Wei, “NPC Observer Monthly: October 2023,” NPC Observer Monthly, November 

2, 2023. 12Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 中华人民共和国海洋环境保护法 [PRC Marine Environmental Protection Law], adopted August 23, 1982, revised October 24, 2023, effective January 

1, 2024. 13State Council, “国务院关于印发‘空气质量持续改善行动计划’的通知” [State Council Circular on Issuing “Action Plan to Continue to Improve Air Quality”], December 7, 2023; Ministry 

of Ecology and Environment, “国新办举行‘空气质量持续改善行动计划’国务院政策例行吹风会”

[State Council Information Office held a State Council Policy Briefing on the “Action Plan to 

Continue to Improve Air Quality”], December 12, 2023. 14State Council, “国务院关于印发‘空气质量持续改善行动计划’的通知” [State Council Circular on Issuing “Action Plan to Continue to Improve Air Quality”], December 7, 2023; Ministry 

of Ecology and Environment, “国新办举行‘空气质量持续改善行动计划’ 国务院政策例行吹风会”

[State Council Information Office held a State Council Policy Briefing on the “Action Plan to Continue to Improve Air Quality”], December 12, 2023; “China Publishes Action Plan to Improve Air 

Quality,” Xinhua, December 8, 2023; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Particulate Matter 

(PM) Basics, accessed June 15, 2024. The Fenwei Plain is located in central China. Particulate 

matter consists of particles or droplets in the air that pose threats to health and air quality and 

causes reduced visibility. 15Ministry of Ecology and Environment et al., “关于印发‘京津冀及周边地区、汾渭平原2023-

2024年秋冬季大气污染综合治理攻坚方案’的通知” [Circular on Issuing the 2023–2024 Comprehensive Autumn and Winter Air Pollution Control Plan for Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and Surrounding Areas and Fenwei Plain], December 25, 2023; Chengcheng Qiu, “Half of Targeted Cities 

Missed PM2.5 Targets in China’s Reintroduced ‘Winter Action Plan,’” Centre for Research on 

Energy and Clean Air, April 30, 2024. 16Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, “About Us,” accessed April 30, 2024; Chengcheng Qiu, “Half of Targeted Cities Missed PM2.5 Targets in China’s Reintroduced ‘Winter Action 

Plan,’” Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, April 30, 2024. 17Chengcheng Qiu, “Half of Targeted Cities Missed PM2.5 Targets in China’s Reintroduced 

‘Winter Action Plan,’” Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, April 30, 2024.
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18“Law of the People’s Republic of China on Ensuring Food Security 中华人民共和国粮食安全

保障法,” translated in NPC Observer, accessed June 15, 2024; State Council, 中华人民共和国粮

食安全保障法 [PRC Law on Ensuring Food Security], passed December 29, 2023, effective June 

1, 2024. For a discussion on food security in the PRC from previous Commission reporting, 

see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 137–38. 19State Council, 中华人民共和国粮食安全保障法 [PRC Law on Ensuring Food Security], passed 

December 29, 2023, effective June 1, 2024. For a discussion on the importance of protecting soil 

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“State-Owned Companies Released the Most Carbon Dioxide Emissions,” Institute for Energy 

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Agency, accessed June 10, 2024; David Stanway, “China’s Emissions, Efficiency Targets Under 

Threat after Falling Short in 2023,” Reuters, March 12, 2024. Advanced economies, in this context, 

are defined as economies of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 

countries. U.S. Department of State, “The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),” accessed June 10, 2024; Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 

“Air and GHG Emissions,” accessed June 10, 2024. 22David Stern and Khalid Ahmed, “China Is Pumping Out Carbon Emissions as if COVID 

Never Happened. That’s Bad News for the Climate Crisis,” Conversation, July 9, 2023. 23Lauri Myllyvirta, “Analysis: Monthly Drop Hints that China’s CO2 Emissions May Have 

Peaked in 2023,” Carbon Brief, May 28, 2024; “China’s Falling Emissions Signal Peak Carbon 

May Already Be Here,” Bloomberg, May 27, 2024. 24Lauri Myllyvirta, “Analysis: Monthly Drop Hints that China’s CO2 Emissions May Have 

Peaked in 2023,” Carbon Brief, May 28, 2024. 25United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter XXVII, Environment, Paris Agreement, accessed 

June 25, 2024; Gregor Erbach and Ulrich Jochheim, “China’s Climate Change Policies: State of 

Play Ahead of COP27,” European Parliamentary Research Service, October 2022, 2. As described 

in the European Parliamentary Research Service report, “[China] belongs to the non-Annex I 

group of developing countries, which have less strict requirements and are entitled to support 

from the developed countries listed in Annex I of the convention. Nationally determined contributions (NDC) set out parties’ targets and commitments to climate action with updates every 

five years.” See also State Council Information Office, “Full Text: Responding to Climate Change: 

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Does China’s New Paris Agreement Pledge Mean for Climate Change?,” Carbon Brief, December 

16, 2021; Lindsay Maizland, “Global Climate Agreements: Successes and Failures,” Council on 

Foreign Relations, updated December 5, 2023; Jon Greenberg, “Is the Paris Climate Agreement 

Easier on China and India than the US?,” PolitiFact, Poynter Institute, January 26, 2021. China 

has ratified the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change and is a party to the U.N. Framework 

Convention on Climate Change. The Paris Agreement obliges participating countries to set their 

own goals and publicly report their progress but lacks concrete enforcement mechanisms. United Nations Climate Change, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 

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Tsvetana Paraskova, “China’s Coal Production Hit a New Record High in 2023,” Oilprice.com, 

January 17, 2024; National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Energy Production in December 2023,” 

January 18, 2024; “China’s Coal Output up 1.9 pct in December,” Xinhua, January 20, 2024. 27Amy Hawkins, “Growth in CO2 Emissions Leaves China Likely to Miss Climate Targets,” 

Guardian, February 21, 2024; Helen Davidson, “China Continues Coal Spree Despite Climate 

Goals,” Guardian, August 29, 2023; “China Is Missing Key Climate Targets,” Institute for Energy 

Research, March 19, 2024; “Full Text: Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at Leaders Summit on Climate,” Xinhua, April 22, 2021. 28“China Leads Global Coal Power Surge as Capacity Hits Record,” Bloomberg, April 10, 2024; 

Global Energy Monitor et al., “Boom and Bust Coal 2024,” April 2024, 17–19. 29“Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge,” COP28 UAE, accessed June 20, 2024; 

Polly Bindman, “COP28 Explainer: Why Hasn’t China Signed the Tripling Renewables Pledge?,” 

Energy Monitor, December 8, 2023. 30Li Shuo, “Three Observations on China at COP28,” Asia Society Policy Institute, December 

13, 2023. 31Polly Bindman, “COP28 Explainer: Why Hasn’t China Signed the Tripling Renewables 

Pledge?,” Energy Monitor, December 8, 2023; Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of 

State, “Sunnylands Statement on Enhancing Cooperation to Address the Climate Crisis,” November 14, 2023. 32Zichen Wang et al., “China’s Climate Envoy Proposed to Travel to U.S.,” Center for China 

and Globalization, September 21, 2023; David Stanway, “China Climate Envoy Says Phasing Out 

Fossil Fuels ‘Unrealistic,’” Reuters, September 22, 2023; “外交部介绍新任中国气候变化事务特使情

况” [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs introduces China’s new Special Envoy for Climate Change], 

Xinhua, January 15, 2024. 33Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 235. 34Chengcheng Qiu, “PM2.5 Rebounds in China in 2023, After Falling for 10 Years Straight,” 

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35Chengcheng Qiu, “PM2.5 Rebounds in China in 2023, After Falling for 10 Years Straight,” 

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2024), 235. 37Linhai Sun et al., “State of China’s Climate in 2023,” Atmospheric and Oceanic Science Letters 17, no. 5 (September 2024); Du Qiongfang, “Chinese Authorities Combat Northern Droughts, 

Southern Flooding,” Global Times, June 16, 2024. 38Li Peixuan, “China Sees Historic Warmest Year in 2023,” China Daily, updated July 4, 2024; 

“Swathes of China, Japan Log Record Summer Temperatures,” Agence France-Presse, reprinted 

in Voice of America, September 2, 2024. 39“Ancient Buddhist Art in Peril as Extreme Rainfall Hits China’s Silk Road,” Greenpeace 

East Asia, July 17, 2023; Huang Yanhao, “财新周刊|气候变化考验敦煌” [Caixin Weekly Update 

| Climate change threatens Dunhuang], August 7, 2023; Christian Shepherd and Lillian Yang, 

“Extreme Weather Threatens the Best-Kept Art of the Ancient Silk Road,” Washington Post, July 

16, 2023, updated July 17, 2023; Niu Yuhan, “The Mogao Caves: Preserving Cultural Heritage in 

a Changing Climate,” Dialogue Earth, October 31, 2023; Fadeke Banjo, “7 Heritage Sites We Are 

Losing to Conflict and Climate Change,” Global Citizen, March 15, 2024. 40Niu Yuhan, “The Mogao Caves: Preserving Cultural Heritage in a Changing Climate,” Dialogue Earth, October 31, 2023; “Ancient Buddhist Art in Peril as Extreme Rainfall Hits China’s 

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by the General Conference of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on November 16, 1972, accessed July 10, 2024; United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, accessed June 10, 2024. China 

ratified the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 

on December 12, 1985. 42Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, adopted by the General 

Conference of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on October 17, 2003, 

accessed July 10, 2024; United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention for the Safeguarding of the 

Intangible Cultural Heritage, accessed October 24, 2024. China ratified the Convention for the 

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Raise Food Security Concerns,” CNN, June 14, 2024. 45Helen Regan, “World’s Biggest Polluter Just Had Its Hottest Year on Record, Marked by 

Deadly Extreme Weather,” CNN, January 5, 2024. 46 John S. Ji et al., “China’s Public Health Initiatives for Climate Change Adaptation,” Lancet 

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212

Business and Human Rig

Findings

• Companies that do business in, source from, or work with 

companies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 

are at risk of complicity in human rights abuses being committed by the Chinese Communist Party and government. Reports 

of corporate involvement in mass atrocities in the XUAR implicate the apparel, automotive, mining, seafood, solar, tomato, and 

tourism industries.

• Reports and congressional testimony continued to highlight evidence of the unreliability of social compliance audits 

conducted in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially 

in the XUAR. In December 2023, German car manufacturer 

Volkswagen commissioned Löning Human Rights & Responsible Business to conduct an audit of its joint venture factory in 

the XUAR. Although the automaker claimed the audit found no 

signs of forced labor, human rights experts and advocates raised 

concerns that social compliance audits are neither equipped nor 

designed to accurately identify state-imposed forced labor in the 

region.

• Chinese and international technology companies are linked 

to the Chinese government’s data collection, surveillance efforts, and censorship. Reports from this past year found the 

following:

○ Accelerated Nuclear DNA Equipment, with the support 

of Chinese security equipment vendor Beijing GAC World 

Trade, sold DNA testing machines to public security bureaus across China.

○ Chinese biotechnology firm WuXi AppTec transferred a 

client’s data and intellectual property from the U.S. to China without consent.

○ PRC authorities censored content on Apple’s App Store 

by directly requesting that Apple remove specific apps, by 

setting complex rules for app developers, and by creating 

localized versions of select apps to restrict access to global 

versions, among other tactics.

○ Google’s YouTube blocked access to more than 30 videos of the popular pro-democracy protest anthem “Glory to 

Hong Kong” for viewers in Hong Kong.

• Recent PRC legislation expanded the scope of laws authorizing government control of information, prompting businesses to self-censor or take other precautionary measures. 

The Commission observed businesses implementing heightened precautionary measures, including 1) encouraging use 

of burner phones; 2) withdrawing operations from China; 3) 

limiting access to international databases; and 4) working 

from home.

• As of May 2024, the U.S. State Department’s China Travel Advisory warns travelers about the “arbitrary enforcement of local 

laws, including in relation to exit bans, and the risk of wrongful 

detentions.” According to reporting from September 2023, Chinese authorities blocked a senior executive from American risk 
Business and Human Rights

213

advisory firm Kroll and a senior Hong Kong-based banker from 

Japanese financial services group Nomura Holdings from leaving mainland China.
214

Business and Human Rig

Introduction

The United Nations (U.N.) Guiding Principles on Business and 

Human Rights state that businesses have a responsibility to avoid 

“causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts.”1 China-based companies and international companies that seek to operate in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) may find themselves 

complicit in, or at risk of complicity in, the PRC’s human rights 

violations including surveillance, data collection, censorship, crimes 

against humanity,2 and genocide.3

Former U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 

the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 

business enterprises John Ruggie referred to complicity as “indirect 

involvement by companies in human rights abuses—where the actual harm is committed by another party, including governments 

and non-State actors . . . it may not matter that the company was 

merely carrying out normal business activities if those activities 

contributed to the abuse and the company was aware or should have 

been aware of its contribution. The fact that a company was following orders, fulfilling contractual obligations, or even complying with 

national law will not, alone, guarantee it legal protection.”4

Corporate Involvement in Human Rights Abuses in the XUAR

Companies that do business in, source from, or work with companies in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) are at 

risk of complicity in human rights abuses committed by the Chinese 

Communist Party and government. PRC authorities have subjected 

individuals from ethnic minority groups in the XUAR to mass surveillance, deprivation of freedom of movement, destruction of religious sites, mass arbitrary detention, forced family separations, and 

forced labor.5

Effective since June 21, 2022, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA; Public Law No. 117-78) establishes a rebuttable 

presumption that all goods made in whole or in part in the XUAR 

have been made with forced labor and that the importation of such 

goods is prohibited by Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.6 As of 

June 2024, the UFLPA Entity List consists of 68 PRC-based companies found to be complicit in Uyghur forced labor.7

During the 2024 reporting year, the Commission observed the following reports detailing evidence of various industries implicated in 

or at risk of complicity in human rights abuses in the XUAR:

• Apparel Industry. A December 2023 report by Sheffield 

Hallam University’s Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, in collaboration with the Uyghur Rights Monitor, 

and the Uyghur Center for Democracy and Human Rights reviewed publicly accessible sources to map supply chains of four 

PRC apparel manufacturers and their imports into the European Union market.8 The report found evidence of the companies’ “significant ties” to the XUAR, including connections to 1) 

state-sponsored forced labor transfers; 2) state-sponsored forced 

labor of mass internment camp detainees; and 3) prison labor.9
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215

The report described “corporate obfuscation” tactics that companies deploy to “hide their XUAR connections while continuing to 

profit from the labor of coerced citizens.”10

• Automotive Industry. Human Rights Watch published a 

report in February 2024 discussing companies’ complicity in 

forced labor via ties to the XUAR’s aluminum industry, which 

accounts for roughly 9 percent of global supply.11 Aluminum is 

vital for many car parts, such as vehicle frames, wheels, battery 

foils, engine blocks, and electric vehicle batteries.12 Carmakers 

implicated in the report include BYD, General Motors, Tesla, 

Toyota, and Volkswagen.13

• Mining Industry. According to an October 2023 report by 

the international advocacy organization Center for Advanced 

Defense Studies (C4ADS), global supply chains and index fund 

portfolios of major asset management firms are at high risk of 

being tainted by abuses in the XUAR mining sector.14 Publicly 

traded PRC-owned gold companies Shandong Gold Group, 

Lingbao Gold Group Company, Zhaojin Mining Industry 

Company, and Zijin Mining Group own gold mines and refineries in the XUAR and reportedly participated in Uyghur forced 

assimilation or forced labor transfer programs.15 Brands, such 

as Sony, Express, T-Mobile, Hasbro, Kohl’s, and Best Buy,

among others, have supply chain exposure to one or more of 

these gold companies, and index fund providers such as Fidelity, Blackstone, Vanguard, JPMorgan Chase, and others, 

include them in their portfolio offerings.16

• Seafood Industry. Investigative reporting by nonprofit journalism organization The Outlaw Ocean Project revealed that 

at least 10 major PRC seafood companies used the forced labor of Uyghurs transferred from the XUAR.17 Their reporting 

also documented the forced labor of North Koreans working in 

the PRC’s fish processing industry.18 [For more information on 

the plight of North Korean refugees in China, see Chapter 15—

North Korean Refugees in China.]

• Solar Industry. A July 2023 report entitled “Over-Exposed: 

Uyghur Region Exposure Assessment for Solar Industry Sourcing,” by Sheffield Hallam University’s Helena Kennedy Centre 

for International Justice assessed supply chain connections to 

the XUAR of 10 global solar module manufacturers, including 

companies with operations in the United States.19 As of June 

2024, solar panels with potential connections to forced labor 

“continue to flow into the U.S. market,” according to U.S. data 

analytics firm Kharon.20

• Tomato Industry. A February 2024 Forbes article described 

how tomato products produced by Uyghur forced labor or harvested in the XUAR are sold in the United States through grocery delivery apps and online retailers.21

• Tourism Industry. An August 2023 report published by the 

Uyghur Human Rights Project identified 10 international travel 

companies that had offered trips to the XUAR.22 The authors 

found that the itineraries of a number of these companies included sites that are “linked to the Uyghur genocide  . . . religious repression, [and] destruction of tangible and intangible 
Business and Human Rights

216

cultural heritage.”23 In March 2024, the Commission wrote to 

three of the companies—Abercrombie & Kent, Geographic Expeditions, and Wild Frontiers—to raise concerns that 

tours in the XUAR were whitewashing atrocities in the region 

and to ask that they cancel any upcoming planned tours.24

“Audit-Washing”

When sourcing goods alleged to be made in whole or in part with 

forced labor, international brands often point to their use of audits to 

ensure compliance with corporate codes of conduct prohibiting involvement in forced labor.25 Reports and congressional testimony this past 

year, however, continued to highlight evidence of the unreliability of such 

audits conducted in the PRC, especially in the XUAR.26 The Chinese government has created an “unconducive environment” for auditing firms 

to carry out due diligence, according to executive director of the Worker 

Rights Consortium Scott Nova.27 In December 2023, German car manufacturer Volkswagen commissioned Löning Human Rights & Responsible 

Business to conduct an audit of its joint venture factory in the XUAR.28

Although the automaker claimed the audit found no signs of forced labor, 

human rights advocates and experts raised concerns that social compliance audits are neither equipped nor designed to accurately identify 

state-imposed forced labor in the XUAR.29 Scholar Adrian Zenz described 

the result of Volkswagen’s audit—allowing the company to continue business as usual in the XUAR—as an example of “audit-washing.”30 [For 

more information on labor abuses in the XUAR and elsewhere in the 

PRC, see Chapter 11—Worker Rights and Chapter 18—Xinjiang Uyghur 

Autonomous Region.]

Companies’ Role in Government Data Collection and Surveillance

During the 2024 reporting year, the Commission observed reports of companies supporting the PRC’s data collection and surveillance efforts. PRC laws authorize the government to collect 

individuals’ data from companies without adequate protection for 

the internationally recognized right to privacy, and in the absence 

of an independent judiciary.31 For example, Accelerated Nuclear 

DNA Equipment (ANDE), with the support of Chinese security 

equipment vendor Beijing GAC World Trade, sold DNA testing 

machines to public security bureaus across China.32 Human rights 

experts and advocates have called on human DNA identification 

technology companies, such as ANDE and Thermo Fisher Scientific, to end all sales to Chinese police, judiciary, and forensic genetic labs, citing the government’s use of surveillance to target rights 

advocates and ethnic minorities.33

In February 2024, The Jamestown Foundation detailed security and 

ethical considerations concerning Chinese biotechnology firm WuXi 

AppTec.34 Because companies must comply with demands to provide 

information and access to data under the PRC’s cybersecurity and data 

security laws,35 Jamestown’s authors raised concerns about the company’s unauthorized collection of genetic data, which may be accessible 

to the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army.36

The U.S. State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
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217

Office of the Director of National Intelligence found that Wuxi AppTec 

transferred a client’s data and intellectual property from the United 

States to China without the client’s consent.37

Technology research firm IPVM reported in November 2023 that 

U.S.-sanctioned Hikvision signed a PRC government contract in 2022 

to provide security software with Uyghur recognition analytics for a 

project in Chengmai county, Hainan province.38 The software was reportedly powered by hardware from California-based company NVIDIA.39 In addition, PRC government tenders for a 2022 “Smart Campus” 

project at Minjiang University in Fuzhou municipality, Fujian province, 

required Hikvision to develop “fasting alerts” to help campus administrators identify ethnic minority students who fast for Ramadan.40

Hikvision’s surveillance system for the project also included functionalities to monitor “daily behaviors” of minority students.41

In March 2024, the Uyghur Human Rights Project detailed how 

China-based Shenzhen DJI Innovation Technology Company Limited (DJI), described as the “world’s largest drone maker,” has reportedly been involved in mass surveillance and human 

rights abuses in the XUAR.42 Between 2019 and 2022, the Xinjiang 

Public Security Department partnered with DJI on public security projects,43 and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 

purchased drones from DJI.44 DJI reportedly cooperated with the 

state’s “poverty alleviation” program by providing a Uyghur business training program in 2018.45 Police and local authorities in the 

XUAR continue to purchase surveillance drones from DJI.46

Analysis of mobile device keyboard input method editors (IMEs) 

revealed that the Chinese government may potentially exploit tech- nical vulnerabilities to surveil and “eavesdrop” on what users are 

typing.47 Reporting from University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab detailed 

vulnerabilities in the Windows, Android, and iOS versions of Ten- cent’s Sogou IME, affecting users in China, Taiwan, Japan, and 

the United States.48 Other IMEs with security vulnerabilities de- tected include Baidu, HONOR, Huawei, iFLYTEK, OPPO, Sam- sung, Tencent, vivo, and Xiaomi.49 The authors of the analysis 

advised that “keystrokes coming from users anywhere in the world 

are transmitted to servers in mainland China, which are operating 

under the legal jurisdiction of the Chinese government.”50

Litigating Cisco’s Role in the Persecution of

Falun Gong Practitioners

A federal court ruling issued in July 2023 held that California-based 

technology company Cisco Systems could be held liable for “aiding and 

abetting” human rights abuses that took place in China using its technology.51 In a case dating to May 2011, one American citizen and 13 

Chinese citizens who are adherents of the spiritual practice Falun Gong 

filed a lawsuit in a U.S. District Court against Cisco and its leadership 

for aiding and abetting or conspiring with Chinese officials, in violation 

of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), the Torture Victim Prevention Act, and 

other federal and state laws.52 The United States Court of Appeals for 

the Ninth Circuit found that an American company could be sued under 

the ATS, although it reaffirmed a lower court’s dismissal of the lawsuit’s 

claims against Cisco executives under the ATS.53
Business and Human Rights

218

Litigating Cisco’s Role in the Persecution of

Falun Gong Practitioners—Continued

Digital rights organization Electronic Frontier Foundation hailed the 

court’s opinion that legitimate uses of a company’s technology do not 

immunize it from liability from uses that lead to human rights abuses.54

[For more information about the PRC’s crack down on the practice of 

Falun Gong, see Chapter 3—Freedom of Religion.]

Companies’ Role in Censorship and Removals

Companies were both targets and enablers of Chinese government 

censorship. Examples during the reporting year include the following:

• Amazon Prime. In January 2024, The Guardian reported 

that two episodes of drama series “Expats” were unavailable on 

Amazon Prime’s streaming platform for viewers in Hong Kong.55

The series contains episodes that refer to the 2014 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong.56 The Hong Kong government and 

Amazon did not comment on the removal of the episodes.57 Yaqiu Wang, Research Director for China, Hong Kong and Taiwan 

at Freedom House, speculated that Amazon engaged in self-censorship “because of the vagueness of the [2020 National Security Law]  . . . nobody knows where the line is.”58 [For more 

information on censorship in Hong Kong, see Chapter 19—Hong 

Kong.]

• Apple. A June 2024 report by AppleCensorship analyzed 

patterns of app removals from Apple’s App Store in China and 

found that PRC authorities directly requested that Apple remove specific apps, set “regulatory hurdles” for app developers, 

and created localized versions of select apps to restrict access 

to global versions, among other tactics.59 App removals were related to eight “sensitive” categories: 1) virtual private networks 

(VPNs); 2) privacy and digital security; 3) LGBTQ+ content; 4) 

news, media, and information; 5) social media and communications; 6) Tibetan language, culture, or Buddhism; 7) Uyghur 

culture and religion; and 8) religions outside state-sanctioned 

religions.60

• Chinese microblog Weibo and social media outlet WeChat

continued to censor content that diverges from the government 

narrative about political participation and the economy.61 Weibo 

issued notices warning some users not to post content that expresses “pessimism about the economy.”62 WeChat “disappeared” 

at least seven research reports about China’s credit data in May 

2024.63 Bloomberg noted that “China has increasingly hidden 

negative data over the past few years.”64 [For more information 

on censorship and suppression of expression, see Chapter 1—

Freedom of Expression.]

Companies can face expulsion from the Chinese market, loss of 

revenue, or other forms of punishment for speech or actions that 

do not align with PRC narratives or censorship guidelines.65 As a 

result, international companies often self-censor or assist the PRC 

in exporting censorship for the sake of maintaining market access, 
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219

while Chinese companies operating overseas adhere to PRC censorship.66 For example, American financial services corporation Citigroup reportedly advised private bankers and relationship managers to refrain from discussing “the yuan or hedging the currency 

risk” with its Chinese clients.67 Additionally, in July 2023, Reuters

reported information about how the China Securities Regulatory 

Commission advised domestic law firms to “tone down the language 

used to describe China-related business risks” in the offshore listing 

documents they compile for Chinese companies, or risk not obtaining regulatory approval for their companies’ initial public offerings 

(IPO) process.68 This guidance hinders companies from providing 

accurate disclosures, as required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).69

“Glory to Hong Kong”

During the 2024 reporting year, the Commission observed instances 

of the Hong Kong government pressuring Google in ways that diminish freedom of speech and expression. On May 8, 2024, the Hong Kong 

Court of Appeal issued an injunction to limit the protest anthem “Glory 

to Hong Kong” from being broadcast on Hong Kong’s internet and media platforms.70 While the injunction prohibited distribution of the song 

under certain conditions, it does not impose a blanket ban and allows 

exceptions.71 Nevertheless, as of May 15, 2024, Google, which owns YouTube, blocked access to more than 30 videos of the song for viewers in 

Hong Kong, regardless of their respective viewing purposes.72 The Commission wrote to Google CEO Sundar Pinchai and YouTube CEO Neal 

Mohan in June 2024 to urge them to restore the videos.73

A digital rights expert warned that the ruling “will force global tech 

companies to abandon their responsibilities under the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights . . . [I]nternet intermediaries and 

the global tech community must follow their human rights commitments 

and draw a red line, lest they become complicit in Hong Kong’s further 

descent into digital repression.”74 In October 2023, Google published a 

transparency report revealing that the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) 

requested in March and April of 2023 that Google remove videos relating to “Glory to Hong Kong” and documentary “The Hong Konger” from 

YouTube.75 The report also revealed a May 2023 request from the HKPF 

to Google that a Google Drive file concerning participation in a “Glory to 

Hong Kong” compilation video be removed.76 Google denied the HKPF’s 

requests at that time.77 [For more information on censorship in Hong 

Kong, see Chapter 19—Hong Kong.]

Impact of PRC Legislation on Doing Business in China

Recent PRC legislations expanded the scope of laws authorizing 

government control of information, prompting businesses to self-censor or take other precautionary measures. The amended PRC Counterespionage Law (effective July 1, 2023) broadened the definition 

of acts of “espionage” and further granted state security agencies 

authority to investigate such activities.78 Under the law’s expanded application, foreign enterprises may trigger investigations and 

“face unexpected risks” by conducting what are otherwise normal 
Business and Human Rights

220

business operations such as recruitment of local talent, cross-border 

projects, and research initiatives with overseas partners.79 The revised PRC Law on Guarding State Secrets (effective May 1, 2024) 

expanded the protection of not only “state secrets” but also “work 

secrets,”80 with Radio Free Asia reporting that the government has 

a “highly elastic definition of what constitutes a state secret.”81

The American Chamber of Commerce in China’s white paper in 

April 2024 called on China to “clarify how the country’s national 

security laws apply to business.”82 During the 2024 reporting period, the Commission observed businesses implementing heightened 

precautionary measures to address the risks posed by PRC legislation and by the lack of safeguards for freedom of expression and 

association. Examples include the following:

• Encouraging use of burner phones. International audit- ing and consulting firms Deloitte and KPMG advised Amer- ican staff to use burner phones when visiting Hong Kong, 

referencing data security concerns, with one senior executive 

highlighting “the risk of infiltration by a state-backed hacker.”83

• Limiting access to international databases. To limit law 

enforcement’s access to databases in the event of a raid, Ameri- can law firm Latham & Watkins merged their Hong Kong and 

China databases and cut off “automatic access” to international 

databases for lawyers based in Hong Kong.84

• Withdrawing operations from China. American polling 

and consulting group Gallup withdrew its operations in China 

due to difficulties conducting and publishing public opinion sur- veys, which, in the past, have shown “unfavourable attitudes to- wards China.”85 Global law firm Denton ended its official relationship with their China-affiliate Dacheng, reportedly because 

of the inability to freely exchange information between Chinese 

and non-China based partners and conduct China-related due 

diligence.86

• Working remotely. Prior to an announcement about downgrading China’s sovereign credit rating, Moody’s Investors 

Service advised China-based non-administrative staff to “work 

from home” for a week.87 According to Moody’s staff interviews 

published in the Financial Times, the guidance was likely issued due to “concern over Beijing’s possible reaction” and fear 

of “government inspections.”88

As of May 2024, the U.S. State Department’s China Travel Advisory warns travelers, including businesspeople, about the “arbitrary 

enforcement of local laws, including in relation to exit bans, and the 

risk of wrongful detentions.”89 According to reporting from Septem- ber 2023, PRC authorities blocked a senior executive from American 

risk advisory firm Kroll and a senior Hong Kong-based banker from 

Japanese financial service group Nomura Holdings from leaving 

mainland China.90
221

Notes to Chapter 14—Business and Human Rights

1Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and 

Human Rights HR/PUB/11/04, June 16, 2011, principle 13. 2Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 

Court, A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entry into force July 1, 2002, art. 7; Council on Foreign 

Relations, “China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,” updated September 22, 2022. See 

also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2023), 247. 3Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic 

Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/

CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entry into force July 1, 2022, art. 6; Newlines Institute for Strategy 

and Policy and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, “The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention,” March 2021, 49–50; Beth Van 

Schaack, “Genocide Against the Uyghurs: Legal Grounds for the United States’ Bipartisan Genocide Determination,” Just Security, January 27, 2021; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), approved by U.N. General Assembly 

Resolution 260 (III) of December 9, 1948, entry into force January 12, 1951, art. 2; United Nations 

Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 

the Crime of Genocide, accessed June 15, 2024. 4U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 

on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 

John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/5, April 7, 2008, paras. 73, 80. 5See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Program Targets Xinjiang’s Muslims,” 

December 9, 2020; Adrian Zenz, “Coercive Labor and Forced Displacement in Xinjiang’s 

Cross-Regional Labor Transfer Program: A Process-Oriented Evaluation,” Jamestown Foundation, March 2021, 17, 49; Sigal Samuel, “China’s Genocide Against the Uyghurs, in 4 Disturbing Charts,” Vox, March 10, 2021; Isobel Cockerell, “Revealed: New Videos Expose China’s 

Forced Migration of Uyghurs During the Pandemic,” Coda Story, July 9, 2020; Chris Buckley 

and Austin Ramzy, “China Is Erasing Mosques and Precious Shrines in Xinjiang,” New York 

Times, September 25, 2020; “How Xinjiang’s Gulag Tears Families Apart,” Economist, October 

17, 2020. 6Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (Public Law 117–78); Federal Register, “Notice Regarding the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List: A Notice by the Homeland Security Department on 05/17/2024,” May 17, 2024. Pursuant to the UFLPA, the Entity List is a consolidated 

register of four lists: “1) a list of entities in the [XUAR] that mine, produce, or manufacture wholly 

or in part any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise with forced labor; 2) a list of entities working with the government of the [XUAR] to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, or receive forced 

labor of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of the [XUAR]; 

3) a list of entities that exported products made by entities in lists 1 and 2 from the [PRC] into 

the United States; and 4) a list of facilities and entities, including the Xinjiang Production and 

Construction Corps, that source material from the [XUAR] or from persons working with the 

government of Xinjiang or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps for purposes of the 

‘poverty alleviation’ program or the ‘pairing-assistance’ program of any other government-labor 

scheme that uses forced labor.” 7U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Adds PRC-Based Seafood, Aluminum, and Footwear Entities to Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Enforcement List,” June 11, 2024. 8Yalkun Uluyol and an anonymous team of researchers, “Tailoring Responsibility: Tracing Apparel Supply Chains from the Uyghur Region to Europe,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, December 2023, updated February 2024, 5–6. 9Yalkun Uluyol and an anonymous team of researchers, “Tailoring Responsibility: Tracing Apparel Supply Chains from the Uyghur Region to Europe,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, December 2023, updated February 2024, 7. 10Yalkun Uluyol and an anonymous team of researchers, “Tailoring Responsibility: Tracing 

Apparel Supply Chains from the Uyghur Region to Europe,” Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, December 2023, updated February 2024, 9. 11Human Rights Watch, “Asleep at the Wheel: Car Companies’ Complicity in Forced Labor in 

China,” February 1, 2024. 12Human Rights Watch, “Asleep at the Wheel: Car Companies’ Complicity in Forced Labor in 

China,” February 1, 2024. 13Human Rights Watch, “Asleep at the Wheel: Car Companies’ Complicity in Forced Labor in 

China,” February 1, 2024. 14C4ADS, “Fractured Veins: The World’s Reliance on Minerals from the Uyghur Region,” October 11, 2023, 4, 5, 7, 25, 26, 31, 36. 15C4ADS, “Fractured Veins: The World’s Reliance on Minerals from the Uyghur Region,” October 11, 2023, 16, 25. 16C4ADS, “Fractured Veins: The World’s Reliance on Minerals from the Uyghur Region,” October 11, 2023, 28–29, 31. 17 Ian Urbina, “The Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” New Yorker, October 9, 2023. 18 Ian Urbina, “Inside North Korea’s Forced-Labor Program in China,” New Yorker, February 

6, 2024. 19Alan Crawford, Laura T. Murphy, and a team of anonymous researchers, “Over-Exposed: 

Uyghur Region Exposure Assessment for Solar Industry Sourcing,” Helena Kennedy Centre for 

International Justice, Sheffield Hallam University, July 2023, updated November 2023, 1, 13, 41. 20Kharon Staff, “Solar Panels with Supply Chain Links to Xinjiang Are Entering the US,” 

The Brief, Kharon, June 25, 2024. See also “China To Take Countermeasures Against One U.S. 
Business and Human Rights

222

Company, Two Individuals,” Xinhua, December 26, 2023. In December 2023, the PRC sanctioned 

Kharon for collecting “sensitive information” and providing “so-called evidence for America’s illegal sanctions related to Xinjiang.” 21 Iain Martin, “The U.S. Banned Xinjiang Tomatoes Over Forced Labor Fears. Amazon and 

Walmart Still Sell Them,” Forbes, February 6, 2024. 22Henryk Szadziewski, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Genocide Tours: International Travel 

Companies in East Turkistan,” August 30, 2023. 23Henryk Szadziewski, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Genocide Tours: International Travel 

Companies in East Turkistan,” August 30, 2023. 24Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Xinjiang: Chairs Write to Travel Companies 

and U.S. State Department Concerning the Whitewashing of Atrocities,” March 6, 2024. 25For additional information on audits from the Commission’s previous annual reports, see 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report (Washington: December 

2020), 239; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: 

November 2022), 260. 26 Ian Urbina, “Can Social Audits Work in China?,” Outlaw Ocean Project, January 12, 2024; 

Worker-Driven Social Responsibility Network, “No Bar Too Low: Social Auditing State-Sponsored 

Forced Labor,” February 28, 2024; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Social Audits Fail to Identify 

State-Imposed Forced Labour,” March 12, 2024; World Uyghur Congress, “Questions to Volkswagen Following Publication of Audit Results,” December 19, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “The Unreliability of Social Compliance Audits for Uncovering Forced Labor 

Explored at Hearing,” April 30, 2024. 27Factories and Fraud in the PRC: How Rights Violations Make Reliable Audits Impossible, 

Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of 

Scott Nova, Executive Director of the Worker Rights Consortium). 28Victoria Waldersee, “Volkswagen Says Audit Finds No Sign of Forced Labour at Xinjiang 

Site,” Reuters, December 5, 2023. For a discussion on Volkswagen’s reported links to Uyghur 

forced labor, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 248. 29Worker-Driven Social Responsibility Network, “No Bar Too Low: Social Auditing State-Sponsored Forced Labor,” February 28, 2024; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Social Audits Fail to 

Identify State-Imposed Forced Labour,” March 12, 2024; World Uyghur Congress, “Questions to 

Volkswagen Following Publication of Audit Results,” December 19, 2023. 30Factories and Fraud in the PRC: How Rights Violations Make Reliable Audits Impossible, 

Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony 

of Adrian Zenz, Senior Fellow and Director in China Studies, Victims of Communism Memorial 

Foundation). 31Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 12; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 

1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 17; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, 

Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed May 30, 2024. 

China has signed but not ratified the ICCPR. See also U.N. Human Rights Council, The Right to 

Privacy in the Digital Age, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 

A/HRC/39/29, August 3, 2018, paras. 5–11, 17, 23; U.N. General Assembly, Resolution adopted by 

U.N. General Assembly on December 18, 2013: 68/167. The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, 

A/RES/68/167, January 21, 2014. 32Katrina Northrop, “The DNA Distortion,” Wire China, February 4, 2024. 33Maya Wang and Yves Moreau, “US Company Must Stop Supplying China’s Regime with DNA 

Surveillance Tech,” The Hill, January 25, 2024; Katrina Northrop, “The DNA Distortion,” Wire 

China, February 4, 2024. 34Sunny Cheung, Aaron Hope, and Peter Mattis, “Red Genes: Assessing WuXi AppTec’s Ties to 

the Party-Army-State in China,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 9, 2024. 35Kristen E. Busch, “TikTok: Recent Data Privacy and National Security Concerns,” CRS Insight, Congressional Research Service, IN12131, March 29, 2023; 中华人民共和国网络安全法 [PRC 

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35; 中华人民共和国个人信息保护法 [PRC Personal Information Protection Law], passed August 20, 

2021, effective November 1, 2021, arts. 13, 26, 35, 58(4). 36Sunny Cheung, Aaron Hope, and Peter Mattis, “Red Genes: Assessing WuXi AppTec’s Ties to 

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They Use NVIDIA Chips,” China Project, August 17, 2023; Federal Register, “Addition of Certain 

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Business and Human Rights

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41 IPVM, “Hikvision Wins Project Requiring Ramadan Alerts Against Minorities,” November 

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Human Rights Abuses in East Turkistan,” March 5, 2024. For a discussion on the state’s “poverty 

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Human Rights Abuses in East Turkistan,” March 5, 2024. 47 Jeffrey Knockel, Zoë Reichert, and Mona Wang, “The Not-So-Silent Type: Vulnerabilities 

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Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, August 9, 2023. 48 Jeffrey Knockel, Zoë Reichert, and Mona Wang, “‘Please Do Not Make It Public’: Vulnerabilities in Sogou Keyboard Encryption Expose Keypresses to Network Eavesdropping,” Citizen Lab, 

Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, August 9, 2023. 49 Jeffrey Knockel, Zoë Reichert, and Mona Wang, “The Not-So-Silent Type: Vulnerabilities 

Across Keyboard Apps Reveal Keystrokes to Network Eavesdroppers,” Citizen Lab, Munk School 

of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, April 23, 2024. 50 Jeffrey Knockel, Zoë Reichert, and Mona Wang, “‘Please Do Not Make It Public’: Vulnerabilities in Sogou Keyboard Encryption Expose Keypresses to Network Eavesdropping,” Citizen Lab, 

Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto, August 9, 2023. 51Susan H. Farbstein, “A Good Summer for Human Rights Cases in U.S. Courts: Alien Tort 

Statute Update,” International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law School, September 5, 2023; 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Doe I et al. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. et al., No. 15–16909, 

[2023] United States District Court for the Northern District of California, July 7, 2023; Christopher Mims, “New Evidence that Cisco Enables Surveillance and Control of China’s Citizens,” MIT 

Technology Review, July 6, 2011; Robert McMahon and Isabella Bennett, “U.S. Internet Providers 

and the ‘Great Firewall of China,’” Council of Foreign Relations, updated February 23, 2011. 52U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Doe I et al. v. Cisco Systems, Inc. et al., No. 15–

16909, [2023] United States District Court for the Northern District of California, July 7, 2023; 

“Cisco Sued for Helping China Build ‘Great Firewall,’” CBS San Francisco, May 23, 2011; Don 

Clark, “Falun Gong Practitioners Sue Cisco,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2011. The plaintiffs 

were represented by the law firm of Schwarcz, Rimberg, Boyd & Rader and the Human Rights 

Law Foundation. See also 28 U.S. Code §1350—Alien’s action for tort; Torture Victim Protection 

Act of 1991, H.R. 2092, 102nd Congress (1991). 53Sophia Cope and Cindy Cohn, Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Victory! Ninth Circuit Allows 

Human Rights Case to Move Forward Against Cisco Systems,” July 12, 2023; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Doe I et al. v Cisco Systems, Inc. et al., No. 15–16909, [2023] United 

States District Court for the Northern District of California, July 7, 2023. 54Sophia Cope and Cindy Cohn, Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Victory! Ninth Circuit Allows 

Human Rights Case to Move Forward Against Cisco Systems,” July 12, 2023; Electronic Frontier 

Foundation, “About EFF,” accessed June 2, 2024. See also Susan H. Farbstein, “A Good Summer 

for Human Rights Cases in U.S. Courts: Alien Tort Statute Update,” International Human Rights 

Clinic, Harvard Law School, September 5, 2023. 55Helen Davidson, “Amazon’s Expats Series Not Available in Hong Kong, Where It Is Set,” 

Guardian, January 29, 2024; Issy Ronald, “Amazon Prime’s ‘Expats’ Was Set and Filmed in Hong 

Kong. But It’s Not Being Shown There,” CNN, January 30, 2024. 56 Issy Ronald, “Amazon Prime’s ‘Expats’ Was Set and Filmed in Hong Kong. But It’s Not Being 

Shown There,” CNN, January 30, 2024. 57 Issy Ronald, “Amazon Prime’s ‘Expats’ Was Set and Filmed in Hong Kong. But It’s Not Being 

Shown There,” CNN, January 30, 2024. 58 Issy Ronald, “Amazon Prime’s ‘Expats’ Was Set and Filmed in Hong Kong. But It’s Not Being 

Shown There,” CNN, January 30, 2024; Freedom House, “Yaqiu Wang,” accessed September 23, 

2024. 59Apple Censorship, GreatFire.org, and Article 19, “Isolation by Design: Censorship in Apple’s 

App Store in China and Human Rights Implications,” June 20, 2024, 2, 26–28. 60Apple Censorship, GreatFire.org, and Article 19, “Isolation by Design: Censorship in Apple’s 

App Store in China and Human Rights Implications,” June 20, 2024, 2, 23–24. 61“Weibo Essay Comparing Party-State’s Economic Policy to Gangsterism Censored,” China 

Digital Times, March 27, 2024; “Essay Warning Against Self-Censorship Censored on WeChat,” 

China Digital Times, November 8, 2023; Aadil Brar, “China Tries to Censor Data About Nearly 
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1 Billion People in Poverty,” Newsweek, December 28, 2023. For information about censorship on 

WeChat from the Commission’s previous reporting year, see Congressional-Executive Commission 

on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2023), 253–254. 62“China’s Weibo Asks Bloggers to Avoid Badmouthing the Economy,” Bloomberg, December 

14, 2023. 63“Reports on China’s Bad Lending Data Disappear on Social Media,” Bloomberg, May 13, 2024. 64“Reports on China’s Bad Lending Data Disappear on Social Media,” Bloomberg, May 13, 

2024. See also “China Is Hiding More and More Data From the Rest of the World,” Bloomberg, 

August 15, 2023. 65Freedom House, “China” in Freedom on the Net 2022: Countering an Authoritarian Overhaul 

of the Internet, October 2022; United States International Trade Commission, “Foreign Censorship, Part 1: Policies and Practices Affecting U.S. Businesses,” February 2022, 36; Human Rights 

Foundation, “Corporate Intimidation & Censorship in China: Recommendations for Foreign Companies,” June 2020; How China Uses Economic Coercion to Silence Critics and Achieve Its Political Aims Globally, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 117th Cong. 

(2021); Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 261, 263–64; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report

(Washington: May 2023), 253. 66Human Rights Foundation, “Corporate Intimidation & Censorship in China: Recommendations for Foreign Companies,” June 2020; Freedom House, “China” in Freedom on the Net 2022: 

Countering an Authoritarian Overhaul of the Internet, October 2022. 67Denise Wee, “Citi Tells Private Bankers Not to Discuss Yuan in Mainland China,” Bloomberg, 

January 19, 2024. 68 Julie Zhu, Kane Wu, and Selena Li, “Exclusive: Beijing Pushes for Toning Down of China 

Risks in IPO Prospectuses,” Reuters, July 24, 2023. 69 Julie Zhu, Kane Wu, and Selena Li, “Exclusive: Beijing Pushes for Toning Down of China 

Risks in IPO Prospectuses,” Reuters, July 24, 2023. 70Hong Kong Police Force, “Interim Injunction Order CACV 274/2023 (On appeal from HCA 

855/2023) to restrain four specified criminal acts in relation to a song.” The song “Glory to Hong 

Kong” was previously commonly confused with the PRC’s official national anthem by international sporting audiences. 71Hong Kong Police Force, “Interim Injunction Order CACV 274/2023 (On appeal from HCA 

855/2023) to restrain four specified criminal acts in relation to a song.” 72Zen Soo, “YouTube Blocks Hong Kong Protest Anthem After Court Injunction Bans Song in 

the City,” Associated Press, updated May 15, 2024; Chan Ho-him and William Langley, “YouTube 

Blocks Videos of Hong Kong Protest Deemed Seditious,” Financial Times, May 15, 2024. 73Letter from Representative Chris Smith and Senator Jeffrey A. Merkley to Sundar Pichai, 

Chief Executive Officer, Google; and Neal Mohan, Chief Executive Officer, YouTube, June 4, 2024. 74Article 19, “Hong Kong: Tech Companies Must Resist Ban on Protest Anthem ‘Glory to Hong 

Kong,’” May 8, 2024. 75Google, “Transparency Report—Government Requests to Remove Content,” accessed June 23, 

2024; “警方要求Google刪黎智英紀錄片 另指錄唱《願榮光》合集涉提倡「推翻政府」 [Police asked 

Google to delete Jimmy Lai’s documentary and said recordings of “Glory to Hong Kong” advocated 

for “overthrowing the government”], InMediaHK, October 24, 2023. 76Google, “Transparency Report—Government Requests to Remove Content,” accessed June 

23, 2024; “Google Ignores Half of the Content Item Removal Requests Made by the SAR Govt,” 

Standard, October 25, 2023. 77Google, “Transparency Report—Government Requests to Remove Content,” accessed June 

23, 2024; “Google Ignores Half of the Content Item Removal Requests Made by the SAR Govt,” 

Standard, October 25, 2023; Hong Kong Democracy Council (@HKDC_US), “New Google transparency report discloses #HongKong police asked Google in April to remove ‘The Hong Konger’ 

film about #JimmyLai, 2 videos of #GloryToHongKong & a URL where users could upload videos 

of themselves singing #GloryToHongKong. Google didn’t.,” X, October 24, 2023, 7:48 a.m. 78中华人民共和国反间谍法 [PRC Counterespionage Law], passed November 1, 2014, amended 

April 26, 2023, effective July 1, 2023; Todd Liao and Morgan Lewis, “China’s New ‘Anti-Espionage 

Law’ Raises Complex Compliance Issues for Multinational Corporations,” May 2023, 2–3, 5. See 

also the following unofficial translation: “Counter-Espionage Law of the P.R.C. (2023 ed.),” translated in China Law Translate, April 26, 2023. 79Todd Liao and Morgan Lewis, “China’s New ‘Anti-Espionage Law’ Raises Complex Compliance Issues for Multinational Corporations,” May 2023, 3–4. 80中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法 [PRC Law on Guarding of State Secrets], passed September 

5, 1988, amended February 27, 2024, effective May 1, 2024. See also the following unofficial 

translation: “PRC Law on the Guarding of State Secrets,” translated in China Law Translate, 

February 2, 2024. 81“China’s Spy Agency Encourages People to See Spies Everywhere,” Radio Free Asia, April 

16, 2024; Jing Wei, “China’s Secret Law Could Mean New Risks Linked to ‘Work Secrets,’” Radio 

Free Asia, February 29, 2024; Jeremy Daum, “Open Thoughts on the Secrets Law,” China Law 

Translate, February 27, 2024. 82American Chamber of Commerce, “2024 American Business in China White Paper,” April 

23, 2024. 83Kaye Wiggins, Leo Lewis, and Joe Leahy, “Deloitte and KPMG Ask Staff to Use Burner 

Phones for Hong Kong Trips,” Financial Times, November 27, 2023. 84Chan Ho-him, Kaye Wiggins, and Suzi Ring, “Latham & Watkins Cuts Off Its Hong Kong 

Lawyers from International Databases,” Financial Times, February 12, 2024. 85Sun Yu and Ryan McMorrow, “US Consultancy Gallup Withdraws From China,” Financial 

Times, November 4, 2023.
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86 Joe Miller, “Global Law Firm Dentons’ Retreat Exposes China Risks,” Financial Times, August 9, 2023. 87Sun Yu, “Moody’s Advised Staff to Work From Home Ahead of China Outlook Cut,” Financial 

Times, December 6, 2023. 88Sun Yu, “Moody’s Advised Staff to Work From Home Ahead of China Outlook Cut,” Finan- cial Times, December 6, 2023. Another staff member interviewed by the publication shared that 

Moody’s also advised Hong Kong-based analysts to avoid travel to China leading up to the down- grade announcement. 89Alex Willemyns, “US Says Reconsider China Travel Due to ‘Exit Bans,’” Radio Free Asia, July 

3, 2023, updated July 10, 2023; “US Recommends Americans Reconsider Traveling to China Due 

to Arbitrary Law Enforcement and Exit Bans,” Associated Press, July 3, 2023; U.S. Department of 

State—Bureau of Consular Affairs, China Travel Advisory, accessed May 17, 2024. 90Rebecca Feng and Chun Han Wong, “China Blocks Executive at U.S. Firm Kroll From Leav- ing the Mainland,” Wall Street Journal, updated September 29, 2023; Joe Leahy, Leo Lewis, 

Cheng Leng, and Kaye Wiggins, “Senior Nomura Banker Barred From Leaving Mainland China,” 

Financial Times, September 24, 2023; Selina Li and Kane Wu, “China Bans Nomura Senior In- vestment Banker From Leaving Mainland—Sources,” Reuters, September 25, 2023.
226

North Korean Refugees in Ch

Findings

• Shortly after the border reopening in the summer of 2023, 

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began to repatriate North 

Korean refugees, many of whom were women. In October 2023, 

the PRC government facilitated the return of 500 to 600 North 

Korean refugees. International condemnation followed, and 

concerns were raised this past year at the United Nations by 

the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and by the Re- public of Korea (South Korea) government, among others.

• Despite Chinese authorities’ continual denials, there have 

been reports of abuse and torture of North Korean refugees who 

were repatriated since the border reopening. According to media 

reports, seven female refugees who were repatriated in October 

2023 died due to serious human rights violations that occurred 

at two detention sites in the DPRK, including at least one case 

of reported suicide.

• North Korean workers dispatched from North Korea to earn 

foreign currency in China are overwhelmingly women and are 

vulnerable to sexual abuse and exploitation. Despite recent 

media reports and an international outcry over human rights 

violations in seafood processing plants, Chinese companies employed additional workers, defying international sanctions banning the hiring of workers from North Korea.

• North Korean trafficking victims, mostly women who had 

been residing in China before the outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), remain highly marginalized. Chinese 

authorities denied them access to essential healthcare and social services. The number of North Korean women being trafficked into China has decreased due to strict border controls. In 

a couple of cases heavy sentences were meted out for trafficking 

of North Korean women.
227

North Korean Refugees in Ch

Introduction

The Chinese government argues that North Korean refugees are 

illegal “economic migrants” and repatriates them under a 1986 bi- lateral border agreement and a 1998 border protocol with the Demo- cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).1 At a Commission hearing 

in June 2023, Jung-Hoon Lee—who formerly served as the Repub- lic of Korea’s (South Korea) Ambassador for North Korean Human 

Rights—argued that while famine-related economic migrants are 

not categorized as refugees under international legal standards, 

“the case of North Koreans is different; the main reason for their 

defection to a foreign country—economic plight—is the political out- come of a failed socialist system under totalitarian rule.”2 Further- more, the forced repatriation of North Korean refugees by the Chi- nese government contravenes China’s obligations under the 1951 

U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 

Protocol, to which China has acceded.3 According to the principle 

of non-refoulement, China is also obligated under the Convention 

against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 

or Punishment not to forcibly repatriate individuals if there are 

“substantial grounds for believing that [they] would be in danger 

of being subjected to torture.”4 North Korean authorities consider 

leaving the country without authorization an act of “treachery.”5

Repatriated North Koreans often face torture, imprisonment, forced 

labor, execution, forced abortion, and sexual violence.6 This treatment by the DPRK government, therefore, renders North Koreans 

in China as refugees sur place who fear persecution upon return to 

their country of origin.7

Repatriation of North Korean Refugees from China to the DPRK

Following nearly four years of stringent border closures during 

the COVID-19 pandemic, the China-North Korea border reopened 

in August 2023,8 leading to the mass repatriation of more than 

500 North Korean refugees in October 2023.9 PRC authorities 

continued to repatriate North Korean refugees in 2024, including 

the mass repatriation of more than 200 from a detention center in Jilin province in April 2024, as well as the repatriation 

of other refugees from Liaoning province.10 According to Human 

Rights Watch, the forcible return of about 60 North Korean refugees from Jilin province and Liaoning province followed shortly 

after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s meeting with China’s 

third-highest official, Zhao Leji, on April 13, which was aimed 

at strengthening “bilateral ties.” 11 Against this backdrop, the 

PRC and DPRK governments were reportedly exploring ways to 

“streamline” forced repatriations.12
North Korean Refugees in China

228

Human Rights Abuses at DPRK Holding Centers

After being forcibly repatriated from China in October 2023, North 

Korean refugees were detained at holding centers (jibgyeolso 집결소) in 

Sinuiju, North P’yongan province, and Onsong, North Hamgyong province.13 Holding centers are operated by the Ministry of State Security 

(MSS) and facilitate initial investigations before detainees are transferred to a judicial facility in their respective hometowns, where legal 

procedures, including sentencing, take place.14 North Korean refugees 

were subjected to human rights abuses at these detention sites, some of 

which resulted in death.15 Of the seven detainees who reportedly died 

in holding centers; five died of malnutrition, one from hypothermia after 

being stripped naked and left outside in mid-winter temperatures after 

trying to escape, and one from suicide, brought about by constant torture 

and sexual violence.16 Upon being repatriated, female refugees commonly suffer mistreatment such as invasive body searches and gender-based 

violence, according to Elizabeth Salmón, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the 

situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.17 The South Korean Ministry of Unification’s 2024 North Korean 

Human Rights Report, based on the testimony of 649 North Koreans, 

noted that children have been subjected to various human rights abuses 

under the same conditions as adults while detained after forced repatriation.18 Additionally, women who became pregnant by Chinese men have 

been forced to have abortions while detained.19 The PRC government, 

meanwhile, maintains that there is no evidence to support claims that 

North Korean refugees are abused and tortured upon their return to 

North Korea.20

Heightened Surveillance and Control at the Border

Strengthened security measures, including new and expanded 

fences and guard posts put in place by North Korean authorities 

since the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, remained obstacles to North 

Koreans seeking to flee to China.21 Chinese authorities, meanwhile, 

have continued their efforts to prevent North Korean refugees from 

reaching China and to locate those already in the country.22

During their visit to China in October 2023, the Database Cen- ter for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), found public banners 

encouraging locals to report individuals suspected of being North 

Korean refugees, offering cash rewards ranging from 2,000 yuan 

(approximately US$290) to 20,000 yuan (US$2,900).23 NKDB also 

discovered new double-layered barbed wire fences and surveillance 

cameras installed by Chinese authorities to prevent North Koreans 

from crossing the river to enter China.24 Against this backdrop, according to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, in 2023, 196 

North Korean defectors arrived in South Korea, significantly fewer 

than the pre-pandemic level of 1,047 in 2019.25
North Korean Refugees in China

229

NUMBER OF NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS ENTERING SOUTH KOREA26

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

199820012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023

Male Female

Trafficking of North Korean Women in China

Since the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent restrictions, crossing the border to enter China from North Korea has become in- creasingly difficult,27 reducing the number of individuals trafficked 

into China.28 Conditions for North Korean women living in China 

worsened during the pandemic.29 Deprived of any medical or social 

services due to their undocumented status, many women live under 

constant fear of detection, and are at risk of trafficking and repa- triation.30

According to a study published in 2023, based on Chinese court 

documents from 2012 to 2020, two-thirds of North Korean refugees 

who entered China were female, primarily due to the perception of 

better job opportunities for women.31 These female refugees, how- ever, are disproportionately vulnerable to exploitation, including 

forced marriage, forced labor, and forced involvement in the sex in- dustry.32 Traffickers, sometimes fellow North Koreans, lure North 

Korean women with false promises of improved living conditions.33

Notably, there were a two cases observed this reporting year in 

which Chinese authorities issued sentences of 10 and 20 years in 

prison to such traffickers.34

North Korean Workers in China

The State Department estimated that there are between 20,000 to 

100,000 North Korean workers who have been dispatched to China 

for employment.35 These workers have been subjected to various 

human rights violations as Chinese companies, who can pay them 

lower wages than local employees, exploit their labor.36

Despite the international prohibition on hiring North Korean 

workers in foreign countries, highlighted by a February 2024 New 

Yorker report 37 and referenced in an October 2023 Commission 
North Korean Refugees in China

230

hearing,38 the Chinese government reportedly requested additional workers in late February 2024 for seafood processing plants in 

several municipalities in Liaoning province, resulting in an influx 

of over 100 workers, mainly consisting of female workers in their 

twenties.39 Furthermore, according to a May 2024 Daily NK article, 

North Korean authorities plan to continue working with Chinese 

counterparts to send workers to the PRC.40

Children of North Korean and Chinese Parents

The children of undocumented North Korean mothers and Chi- nese fathers continue to be deprived of public services,41 despite 

the fact that all children born in China are entitled to Chinese na- tionality if either parent is a Chinese citizen.42 As many as 30,000 

children in China born to North Korean mothers and Chinese fa- thers are unregistered due to their mothers’ undocumented status, 

leaving them “de facto stateless.”43 Many of these children are de- nied access to public services, including education, healthcare, and 

legal protection.44 In some cases, Chinese fathers avoid registering 

their children to prevent authorities from discovering their North 

Korean partner’s undocumented status.45 The denial of nationality 

rights and access to education for these children violates China’s 

obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.46
231

Notes to Chapter 15—North Korean Refugees in China

1U.N. General Assembly, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/74/268, August 2, 2019; Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 

Human Rights, “Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Reviews the Report 

of China,” August 13, 2018. The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 

expressed concern that “China continued to deny refugee status to asylum-seekers from the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and it also continued to forcibly return them to their 

country of origin, regardless of a serious threat of persecution and human rights violations.” 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Ministry of State Security and People’s Republic of 

China Ministry of Public Security, Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining 

National Security and Social Order in the Border Areas, signed August 12, 1986, reprinted 

in North Korea Freedom Coalition, arts. 4, 9; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Ministry 

of State Security and People’s Republic of China Ministry of Public Security, 中华人民共和

国公安部朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国家保卫部关于在边境地区维护国家安全和社会秩序的工作中相互

合作的议定书 [Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security 

and Social Order in the Border Areas], signed July 8, 1998, effective August 28, 1998, arts. 

4, 9. The protocol commits each side to treat as illegal those border crossers who do not have 

proper visa certificates, except in cases involving “calamity or unavoidable factors.” Jason 

Bartlett, “China’s New Land Borders Law is a Nightmare for North Korean Refugees,” Diplomat, October 29, 2021; China’s Repatriation of North Korean Refugees, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 112th Cong. (2012) (written statement of Roberta 

Cohen, Chair, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and Non-resident Senior Fellow, 

Brookings Institution). 2North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Jung 

Hoon Lee, Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University and former South 

Korean Ambassador-at-Large for North Korean Human Rights). 3Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by the U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons on July 28, 1951, entry into force 

April 22, 1954, arts. 1(A)(2), 33(1). Article 1 of the 1951 Convention, as amended by the 1967 

Protocol, defines a refugee as someone who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 

reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 

is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 

himself of the protection of that country . . ..” Article 33 of the 1951 Convention mandates that 

“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to 

the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 

religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” United Nations 

Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and Stateless Persons, Convention Relating to the Status 

of Refugees, accessed April 1, 2024. China acceded to the Convention Relating to the Status of 

Refugees on September 24, 1982. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by U.N. 

General Assembly resolution A/RES/2198 of December 16, 1966, entry into force October 4, 1967, 

art. 1; United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter V, Refugees and Stateless Persons, Protocol 

Relating to the Status of Refugees, accessed April 1, 2024. China acceded to the Protocol Relating 

to the Status of Refugees on September 24, 1982. 4Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 39/46 of December 10, 1984, entry into force 

June 26, 1987, art. 3. Article 3 states that “No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or 

extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 

would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, 

Human Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 

or Punishment, accessed April 1, 2024. China signed the Convention on December 12, 1986, and 

ratified it on October 4, 1988. U.N. Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the 

Fifth Periodic Report of China, adopted by the Committee at its 1391st and 1392nd Meetings (2–3 

December 2015), CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, February 3, 2016, para. 46. 5Human Rights Watch, “‘A Sense of Terror Stronger than a Bullet’: The Closing of North Korea 

2018–2023,” 2024, 6, 78. 6Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Elizabeth Salmón, A/HRC/55/63, March 

26, 2024, para. 7; Frances Mao, “North Koreans Deported from Chinese Jails Face Torture, Activists Warn,” BBC, December 7, 2023; North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 

Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th 

Cong. (2023) (written statement of Joanna Hosaniak, Deputy Director General, Citizens’ Alliance 

for North Korean Human Rights); North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 

Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th 

Cong. (2023) (testimony of Jung Hoon Lee, Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University and former South Korean Ambassador-at-Large for North Korean Human Rights); 

North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced Repatriation from China, Hearing 

of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (written statement of 

Suzanne Scholte, Chair, North Korea Freedom Coalition); Office of the U.N. High Commissioner 

for Human Rights, “‘I Still Feel the Pain . . ..’ Human Rights Violations against Women Detained 

in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” July 2020, paras. 23, 65, 67, 80; Roberta Cohen, 

“Legal Grounds for Protection of North Korean Refugees,” Brookings Institution, September 13, 

2010; U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refugee Protection and International Migration,” 

January 17, 2007, paras. 20–21.
North Korean Refugees in China

232

7U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refugee Protection and International Migration,” January 17, 2007, paras. 20–21; Lina Yoon, Human Rights Watch, “China Forcibly Returns More than 

500 to North Korea,” October 12, 2023. 8Ng Han Guan, “North Korea Appears to Be Cracking Open Its Sealed Border with Dispatch 

of Sports Delegation,” Associated Press, August 18, 2023. 9Hyonhee Shin, “Up to 600 North Korean Defectors Deported by China ‘Vanish’—Rights Group,” 

Reuters, December 7, 2023; Susan Crabtree, “Lawmakers to UN: Suspend China for Repatriating 

North Korean Defectors,” Real Clear Politics, December 8, 2023. An estimated 70% of those who 

were repatriated are reportedly women. 10Yang Ji-ho, “‘Jung, talbukmin 200yeomyeong gangjebuksong’ . . . banmyeonman-e daegyumo 

songhwan jaegae” [“China forcibly repatriates over 200 North Korean defectors” . . . large-scale 

repatriations resume after six months], Chosun Ilbo, May 2, 2024; Jung Younggyu, “‘Jung, talbugmin 61myeong gangjebugsong’ . . . neombeo3 jaoleoji, gimjeong-eun-e seonmul?” [“China forcibly 

repatriates 61 North Korean defectors to North Korea” . . . Number 3 Zhao Leji, a gift to Kim 

Jong-un?], JoongAng Ilbo, May 2, 2024; Lina Yoon, Human Rights Watch, “China Forcibly Returns 

60 Refugees to North Korea,” May 8, 2024. 11Lina Yoon, Human Rights Watch, “China Forcibly Returns 60 Refugees to North Korea,” May 

8, 2024. 12Seulkee Jang, “Forced Repatriations of N. Korean Defectors in China Continue into This Year,” 

Daily NK, April 26, 2024. See also Wendy Teo, “China Unlikely to Cave Under Pressure to Stop Sending North Korean Defectors Back: Observers,” Straits Times, January 1, 2024; Julian Ryall, “China 

Under Pressure to Stop Repatriating North Koreans,” Deutsche Welle, December 6, 2023. 13 Jang Seul-gi, “[Gangje buk-song geu hu 1] daebubun gyowaso-haeng . . . ilbuneun jip-gyeolsoseo samang” [[After the forced repatriation to North Korea 1] Most of them were sent to 

reeducation camps . . .. Some died in holding centers], Daily NK, April 15, 2024. “FAQ,” Daily 

NK, accessed June 15, 2024.

14 Jang Seul-gi, “Jung seo gangjebugsongdoen talbugmindeul, guggyeong bowibu jibgyeolso-e 

gugeum jung” [North Korean defectors forcibly repatriated from China are being detained at the 

border security department holding center], Daily NK, October 13, 2023. 15 Jang Seul-gi, “[Gangje buk-song geu hu 1] daebubun gyowaso-haeng . . .. ilbuneun jip-gyeolsoseo samang” [[After the forced repatriation to North Korea 1] Most of them were sent to 

reeducation camps . . .. Some died in holding centers], Daily NK, April 15, 2024. 16 Jang Seul-gi, “[Gangje buk-song geu hu 1] daebubun gyowaso-haeng . . .. ilbuneun jip-gyeolsoseo samang” [[After the forced repatriation to North Korea 1] Most of them were sent to 

reeducation camps . . .. Some died in holding centers], Daily NK, April 15, 2024. 17United Nations Meetings Coverage, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Increasingly Repressing Its Citizens’ Human Rights, Freedoms, High Commissioner Warns Security Council,” 

SC/15387, August 17, 2023. 18Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, “2024 bughan in-gwon bogoseo” [2024 Report on 

North Korean Human Rights], June 27, 2024, 5, 74–75. 19Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, “2024 bughan in-gwon bogoseo” [2024 Report on 

North Korean Human Rights], June 27, 2024, 71–73. 20Letter from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations 

Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, CHN/HR/2023/75, September 13, 2023. 21Human Rights Watch, “‘A Sense of Terror Stronger than a Bullet’: The Closing of North Korea 

2018–2023,” March 2024. 22Lee Chae Eun, “Two N. Korean Defectors in China Arrested for Talking About Going to S. 

Korea,” Daily NK, February 8, 2024; North Korean Refugees and the Imminent Danger of Forced 

Repatriation from China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th 

Cong. (2023) (written statement of Robert R. King, former Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues, U.S. Department of State); Josh Smith and Joyce Lee, “Chinese Raids Hit 

North Korean Defectors’ ‘Underground Railroad,’” Reuters, June 16, 2019. 23Seo Bo-bae, “Buk-Jung gangje songhwan” [North Korea-China forceful repatriation], NKDB 

Issue Brief 2, November 2023, 7–8. The second picture on page 8 of the report was taken in 

Longjing (龙井) in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin province, where most North 

Koreans defect to. The banner in the picture reads, “2000 to 20000 yuan will be rewarded if 

those illegals who cross the border are reported. Posted by Border Control Division in Longjing.” 24Seo Bo-bae, “Buk-Jung gangje songhwan” [North Korea-China forceful repatriation], NKDB 

Issue Brief 2, November 2023, 7–8. 25Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, “Policy on North Korean Defectors,” accessed on 

January 20, 2024; Gawon Bae and Jessie Yeung, “Number of North Korean Defectors Nearly Triples in 2023, Including ‘Elite’ Diplomats, South Korea Says,” CNN, January 19, 2024. According 

to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, most of the North Korean defectors who entered South 

Korea last year did not come directly from North Korea. Instead, they entered South Korea after 

staying in a third country. 26Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, “Policy on North Korean Defectors,” accessed January 20, 2024; Gawon Bae and Jessie Yeung, “Number of North Korean Defectors Nearly Triples 

in 2023, Including ‘Elite’ Diplomats, South Korea Says,” CNN, January 19, 2024. 27Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “2023 Human 

Rights Report: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),” April 22, 2024, 56. 28Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, “2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: China,” June 2023. 29 Jessie Yeung and Yoonjung Seo, “She Fled North Korea but Was Sold to a Man in China. 

Her Second Escape Came Nearly 20 Years Later,” CNN, March 8, 2024; Lee Minji, “N. Korean 
North Korean Refugees in China

233

Defectors Say Ordeal in China Worsened due to COVID-19 Pandemic,” Yonhap News Agency, 

July 10, 2023. 30 Jessie Yeung and Yoonjung Seo, “She Fled North Korea but Was Sold to a Man in China. 

Her Second Escape Came Nearly 20 Years Later,” CNN, March 8, 2024; Lee Minji, “N. Korean 

Defectors Say Ordeal in China Worsened due to COVID-19 Pandemic,” Yonhap News Agency, July 

10, 2023. Kim Cheol-Ok, for example, escaped North Korea in the 1990s only to be forced into 

marriage in China in 1998. After living in China for over two decades without access to proper 

medical care, even during the COVID-19 pandemic, Kim attempted to leave for South Korea or 

England, but Chinese authorities detained her in April 2023 and repatriated her to the DPRK in 

October 2023. For more information see Ifang Bremer and Joon Ha Park, “‘I Can’t Lose Her Too’: 

Family Fears for Loved One Forcibly Sent to North Korea,” NK News, October 31, 2023. 31Shuqin Mei, “Trafficking North Korean Women into China for Forced Marriage: Evidence 

from Court Judgments,” Crime, Law and Social Change 81, 323 (October 5, 2023). 32Shuqin Mei, “Trafficking North Korean Women into China for Forced Marriage: Evidence 

from Court Judgments,” Crime, Law and Social Change 81, 323–25 (October 5, 2023). 33 Jeong Tae Joo, “Jilin Province Sentences N. Korean Defector to 10 Years for Human Traffick- ing,” Daily NK, May 14, 2024; Lee Chae Eun, “N. Korean Defector in China Sentenced to 20 Years 

for Human Trafficking,” Daily NK, November 22, 2023. 34 Jeong Tae Joo, “Jilin Province Sentences N. Korean Defector to 10 Years for Human Traffick- ing,” DailyNK, May 14, 2024; Lee Chae Eun, “N. Korean Defector in China Sentenced to 20 Years 

for Human Trafficking,” DailyNK, November 22, 2023. 35 Ju-min Park, “Signs of Rare Unrest among North Korean Workers in China, Researchers 

Say,” Reuters, February 8, 2024; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. De- partment of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report,” July 2022, 327–28. 36 Ian Urbina, “Inside North Korea’s Forced Labor Program,” New Yorker, February 25, 2024. 37 Ian Urbina, “Inside North Korea’s Forced Labor Program,” New Yorker, February 25, 2024. 

Despite the U.S. law, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which 

presumes work by North Koreans to be forced labor unless proven otherwise, the investigative 

report also exposed the persistent utilization of North Korean workers in Chinese seafood processing plants. Notably, some of these plants export their products to the U.S. 38From Bait to Plate—How Forced Labor Taints America’s Seafood Supply Chain, Hearing of 

the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Ian Urbina, 

Director and Founder of The Outlaw Ocean Project). 39 Jung Tae Joo, “Jung susanmul gongjang-ui gang-gong . . . ‘bae 20dae yeoseong nodongja 

daegeo goyong’” [Strong pushback from Chinese seafood processing plants? . . . “They hire many 

North Korean female workers in their 20s”], Daily NK, June 4, 2024. 40Lee Sang-yong, “N. Korea Plans to Minimize Economic Damage from World’s Moves to Block 

Imports of Chinese Seafoods,” Daily NK, May 1, 2024. 41Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “2023 Country 

Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),” April 2024, 

57–58; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),” March 

2022, 57. 42中华人民共和国国籍法 [PRC Nationality Law], passed and effective September 10, 1980, art. 

4. Article 4 of the PRC Nationality Law provides that “Any person born in China whose parents 

are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese 

nationality.” 43Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “2023 Country 

Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),” April 2024, 

57, 58. 44Kang Seo, “Citizenship Redefined: China’s Hukou System Reform and the Status of North 

Korean Refugee Women and Their Children in China,” Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 12, no. 1 

(2024): 13–15, 25–30. See also Jenna Yoojin Yun, “30,000 North Korean Children Living in Limbo 

in China,” Guardian, February 5, 2016. 45Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, “2023 Country 

Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet),” April 2024, 

57, 58. Registering a child for a hukou (户口), or household registration, requires detailed infor- mation about both parents, along with their marriage certificate. See also Kang Seo, “Citizenship 

Redefined: China’s Hukou System Reform and the Status of North Korean Refugee Women and 

Their Children in China,” Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 12, no. 1 (2024): 13–15, 25–30. 46Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 44/25 

of November 20, 1989, entry into force September 2, 1990, arts. 2, 7, 28(1)(a). Under the Conven- tion on the Rights of the Child, China is obligated to register children born within the country 

immediately after birth and also to provide all children with access to education without discrimination on the basis of nationality. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 

by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 

23, 1976, art. 24.
234

Technology-Enhanced Authoritarian

Findings

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued to rely on 

a National Anti-Fraud Center (NAFC) app to collect data and 

access personal information, monitor online activity, and po- tentially aggregate data for surveillance. While use of the app 

is prevalent across China, the Tibet Autonomous Region was 

a focal point for surveillance, leading individuals to engage in 

self-censorship, reducing cultural expression, and reinforcing 

control and conformity.

• Chinese leader Xi Jinping proposed the Global Artificial In- telligence Governance Initiative, which emphasizes sovereignty 

while potentially limiting human rights. Domestically, the Chi- nese government has issued regulations that further ensure 

that artificial intelligence (AI) is aligned with Chinese Commu- nist Party values, and Chinese academics have posited a need 

to guard against “Western values.”

• Chinese entities demonstrated competency in using AI to create social media content aimed at manipulating public opinion. 

First Voice, an opinion unit of Chinese state-owned media outlet China Global Television Network (CGTN), used AI to generate a series of animated videos on X and YouTube, called “A 

Fractured America,” showing fake strikes and riots happening 

across America because of income inequality and a lack of accountable democracy. Meanwhile, a research report revealed the 

first use of an AI-generated human by a Chinese company in an 

influence campaign.

• An online propaganda and disinformation operation employing a network of social media accounts (or “bots”) linked to the 

Chinese government, called “Spamouflage,” continued to make 

posts on social media favorable to the Chinese government and 

hostile to opinions contrary to PRC policy. The Canadian government attributed the posting of “thousands” of comments in 

English and French on Facebook and X accounts of Members of 

Parliament to the operation.
235

Technology-Enhanced Authoritarian

Surveillance

USE OF THE NATIONAL ANTI-FRAUD CENTER APP TO SURVEIL CITIZENS

The Commission observed reports of authorities’ use of an anti-fraud app called the National Anti-Fraud Center (NAFC) app 

to monitor cell phone users’ online activity, including their use of 

anti-censorship tools, and to access personal information. The PRC 

Ministry of Public Security developed the NAFC App and released it 

in early 2021 to combat internet and telecommunications fraud.1 As 

early as September 2021, authorities used the NAFC app for other 

purposes, including tracking users’ access to overseas financial news 

sites; requiring parents to download the app prior to their children’s 

school enrollment, and requiring tenants to install it prior to the 

signing of rental leases.2 Since the White Paper protests in 2022, 

grid management workers have conducted arbitrary inspections to 

check for the presence of, and compel the installation of, the NAFC 

app, reportedly in part to monitor for anti-censorship tools.3 While 

the Deputy Director of the Criminal Investigation Bureau of the 

Ministry of Public Security claimed that the NAFC app is aimed at 

“. . . enhancing the public’s awareness and ability to combat and 

prevent fraud,” a 2022 forensic analysis indicated that the data 

collected by the app is sent to “private backend servers” that may 

or may not be used for its stated purpose.4 In one case in April 

2024, public security officials reportedly accessed a user’s cell phone 

contacts and geolocation data and froze his bank cards and Alipay 

account after he called a Singaporean bank about a work-related 

issue.5

A report produced by Turquoise Roof and Tibet Watch that forensically analyzed the NAFC app in Tibetan areas found that the 

NAFC app enabled the capture of large amounts of personal information, including by monitoring call logs and text messages.6 The 

NAFC app has “extensive access” to personal information through 

“intrusive permissions,” such as capturing passwords, voice recording, facial verification, and reading of log files that can be used to 

query other installed programs.7 The app’s registration process requires users to “go through facial recognition capture while holding 

up their government identity card to the camera,” which raises concerns about “extensive data collection and monitoring of individual 

internet user behaviour.”8 The report hypothesizes that the collected 

information can be combined with a big data policing platform, such 

as the “Tibet Underworld Criminal Integrated Intelligence Application Platform” prevalent in the Tibet Autonomous Region, to aggregate and analyze data.9 The platform, which is reportedly powered 

by a database provided by the U.S. company Oracle, gathers and 

centralizes data from public security bureaus to “directly investigate 

extremely serious criminal cases” through keyword searches.10 The 

platform “‘takes full advantage of the integrated affordances of “big 

data” computing’ in order to ‘achieve dynamic management and control of key personnel.’”11 Human Rights Watch defines the similar 

terms “key persons” or “key individuals” as individuals seen as a 

threat to society who should be monitored.12 According to Turquoise 
Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

236

Roof and Tibet Watch, the presence of this type of surveillance technology has fostered a “society-wide ‘chilling effect,’” influencing individuals to engage in self-censorship, reducing cultural expression, 

and bolstering control and conformity.13 [For more information on 

Tibet, see Chapter 17—Tibet.]

Artificial Intelligence

CYBER SOVEREIGNTY

Within the discourse on artificial intelligence (AI), Chinese ex- perts have emphasized control and cultural values, as AI is seen 

as a threat to Chinese society if left uncontrolled. In April 2024, 

a researcher at the Jamestown Foundation published an analysis 

of Chinese AI developments and found a close correlation with the 

Chinese concept of “cyber sovereignty,” leading to a new ideological 

framework which some have called “sovereign AI” or “AI sovereign- ty.”14 Some Chinese scholars have emphasized the need for “Chinese 

values” in AI technology.”15 Another group of experts sees a need in 

China to prevent AI from “digital colonization.”16 An October 2023 

opinion piece in official Chinese media framed technological neutrality as an impossibility because “AI products have a stance.”17 In 

August 2023, the Chinese Academy of Sciences released a draft of 

a “National Artificial Intelligence Law” that would require AI technologies to “adhere to the core socialist values, not incite subversion 

of state power, overthrow the socialist system, endanger national 

security and interests, damage the national image, incite secession, 

[or] undermine national unity and social stability . . ..”18

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, Chinese leader Xi 

Jinping put forth a new policy initiative on AI that may have implicitly demonstrated the Chinese government’s motivation to export its version of AI governance, which prioritizes sovereignty over 

individual rights. Chinese leader Xi Jinping introduced the Global 

AI Governance Initiative (GAIGI) at the 10-year-anniversary Belt 

and Road Forum in October 2023, suggesting that China is “all-in 

on constructing the AI ecosystems of the developing world.”19 In addition, the GAIGI emphasizes “respect[ing] other countries’ national 

sovereignty and strictly abid[ing] by their laws when providing AI 

products and services.”20 Experts have previously explained that 

the Chinese government’s use of the word “sovereignty” encompasses the idea of protecting the Party’s power and limiting its human 

rights obligations.21

Malign Influence

MANIPULATION OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION

Chinese entities demonstrated competence in using AI to create social media content aimed at manipulating public opinion.22

In March 2024, First Voice, an opinion unit of Chinese state-owned 

media outlet China Global Television Network (CGTN), used AI to 

generate a series of animated videos called “A Fractured America” 

on X and YouTube showing fake strikes and riots happening across 

America because of income inequality and a lack of accountable democracy.23 According to Voice of America, the series “marks the first 
Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

237

time that the Chinese government has publicly used AI to target 

the hearts and minds of Americans by implanting the idea of mass 

riots and civil disobedience.”24 CGTN used the U.S. company IBM’s 

watsonx generative AI platform to make the videos, according to a 

marketing intelligence firm.25

In December 2023, a research report revealed the first use of an 

AI-generated human by a Chinese company in an influence campaign comprising a series of 4,500 videos spread across 30 YouTube channels about the “U.S.-China tech war,” competition for rare 

earths and critical minerals, the collapse of the United States and 

its partnerships, and other topics.26 Together, the videos attracted 

about 120 million views and 730,000 subscribers, making the campaign “one of the most successful influence operations” related to 

China to have ever appeared on social media.27

CHINESE INFLUENCE OPERATION “SPAMOUFLAGE”

An online propaganda and disinformation operation employing a 

network of automated social media accounts (or “bot” accounts) continued to make posts favorable to the Chinese government on social 

media platforms.28 The network, known as “Spamouflage,” has been 

active since at least 2017.29 Media reports noted that Facebook’s 

parent company, Meta, and federal prosecutors had linked Spamouflage to the Chinese police.30

In October 2023, the government of Canada attributed the posting 

of “thousands” of English- and French-language comments on Members of Parliaments’ (MPs) Facebook and X accounts to Spamouflage.31 According to the government of Canada, the operation “. . . 

could discourage and make it difficult for MPs to carry out their 

duties and may dissuade MPs and diaspora communities in Canada from speaking out on issues which concern them,” including by 

claiming that “a critic of the Chinese Communist Party” had accused 

MPs of wrongdoing.32 Four accounts linked to Spamouflage reportedly posed “convincingly as Americans” in viral posts and videos 

about U.S. culture wars.33 All of the mentioned accounts posted inflammatory content apparently intended to exacerbate political divisions by promoting conspiracy theories and making baseless accusations against individuals, including U.S. President Joseph Biden.34

PROPAGANDA

Chinese entities, in line with PRC policy, covertly broadcast official propaganda without clear attribution. The University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab identified a PRC-based public relations firm called 

Shenzhen Haimaiyunxiang Media Company as being responsible for 

a propaganda campaign that disseminated content favorable to the 

PRC government and hostile to its critics, including foreign governments.35 The campaign consisted of a network of at least 123 

PRC-based websites that posed as local news outlets in 30 countries 

across Europe, Asia, and Latin America.36

 Another such Chinese entity was Yihuan Cultural Communication Company (also known as Haixun Press), a Chinese marketing 

firm, which reportedly used newswire services to publish “pro-Beijing” stories on at least 32 news outlets’ websites.37 Much of the 

content was reportedly directly reproduced from Chinese state-run 
Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

238

media and state-funded think tanks, and included “scathing critiques of U.S. policymakers, academics,” and others critical of PRC 

policies.38 The company reportedly claims to “[work] with over 150 

clients that include Chinese government departments, police and 

state media,” but observers could not determine whether the campaign received funding from the PRC government.39
239

Notes to Chapter 16—Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

1“‘国家反诈中心’App正式上线,唯一国家级反诈防骗系统来了!” [The National Anti-Fraud 

Center App has officially launched, the only national-level anti-fraud system has arrived!], FPData, reprinted in The Paper, March 14, 2021; “国家反诈中心” [National Anti-Fraud Center], 

Tencent, accessed August 21, 2024; Sun Yu, “China Uses Anti-Fraud App to Track Access to 

Overseas Financial News Sites,” Financial Times, September 13, 2021. 2Sun Yu, “China Uses Anti-Fraud App to Track Access to Overseas Financial News Sites,” 

Financial Times, September 14, 2021. 3Qian Lang, “China Steps up Checks for People Bypassing the ‘Great Firewall,’” Radio Free 

Asia, March 26, 2024; Gu Ting, “China Recruits Thousands to Monitor Its Citizens’ Words and 

Deeds,” Radio Free Asia, October 17, 2023. For more information about the White Paper protests, 

see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 53–54, 74–75, 135–36. For more on grid management, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 137. 4Ministry of Public Security, “公安部新闻发布会通报全国公安机关打击治理电信网络诈骗犯罪举

措成效” [The Ministry of Public Security held a press conference to report on the effectiveness of 

the measures taken by public security agencies across the country to combat telecommunications 

and internet fraud crimes], reprinted in PRC Bazhong Municipality Public Security Bureau, June 

18, 2021; Open Technology Fund, “China’s National Anti-Fraud Center—Security Assessment,” 

September 21, 2022. 5“Tales of Anti-Fraud Center Overreach: Freezing Your Bank Cards ‘For Your Own Good,’” 

China Digital Times, April 11, 2024. 6Turquoise Roof and Tibet Watch, “Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s Digital Surveillance in Tibet,” February 2024, 13–17. 7Turquoise Roof and Tibet Watch, “Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s Digital Surveillance in Tibet,” February 2024, 8, 12, 14–17, 26. 8Turquoise Roof and Tibet Watch, “Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s Digital Surveillance in Tibet,” February 2024, 8. 9Turquoise Roof and Tibet Watch, “Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s Digital Surveillance in Tibet,” February 2024, 4, 6, 20, 23–26. 10Turquoise Roof and Tibet Watch, “Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s Digital Surveillance in Tibet,” February 2024, 4, 6, 23–25. 11Turquoise Roof and Tibet Watch, “Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s Digital Surveillance in Tibet,” February 2024, 24. 12Human Rights Watch, “Tibet: A Glossary of Repression,” June 19, 2017; Turquoise Roof and 

Tibet Watch, “Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s digital surveillance in Tibet,” February 

2024, 24; 13Turquoise Roof and Tibet Watch, “Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s Digital Surveillance in Tibet,” February 2024, 4, 5, 7, 26. 14Matthew Dagher-Margosian, “CCP Cyber Sovereignty Contains Lessons for AI’s Future,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 12, 2024, 30–32. 15Matthew Dagher-Margosian, “CCP Cyber Sovereignty Contains Lessons for AI’s Future,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 12, 2024, 31–32; Tencent Research Institute, “AI创新理

念与路线之争:有效加速,还是超级对齐?” [The debate over AI innovation concepts and routes: 

effective acceleration or super alignment?], March 21, 2024. 16Matthew Dagher-Margosian, “CCP Cyber Sovereignty Contains Lessons for AI’s Future,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 12, 2024, 31–32; Outlook Think Tank, “防范‘AI入侵’

?” [Preventing an “AI Invasion”?], April 9, 2024; Tencent Research Institute, “AI创新理念与路线

之争:有效加速,还是超级对齐?” [The debate over AI innovation concepts and routes: effective 

acceleration or super alignment?], March 21, 2024. 17Matthew Dagher-Margosian, “CCP Cyber Sovereignty Contains Lessons for AI’s Future,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 12, 2024, 31–32; Zhao Jing, “人民财评:技术向善的内驱

力是价值观向善” [The driving force behind technology for good is the values of good], People’s 

Daily, October 29, 2023. 18Matthew Dagher-Margosian, “CCP Cyber Sovereignty Contains Lessons for AI’s Future,” 

Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, April 12, 2024, 32; “《人工智能法(示范法)1.0》(专家建

议稿)起草说明和全文” [Drafting Notes and Full Text of “Artificial Intelligence Law (Model Law) 

1.0” (Expert Draft)] Redian News, August 22, 2023, art. 14. For an unofficial English translation 

of the draft law, see “Artificial Intelligence Law, Model Law v. 1.0 (Expert Suggestion Draft)—Aug. 

2023,” translated by Kwan Yee Ng and Jason Zhou in DigiChina, August 23, 2023. 19Bill Drexel and Hannah Kelley, “Behind China’s Plans to Build AI for the World,” Politico, 

November 30, 2023; Secretariat of the Preparatory Committee of the Belt and Road Forum for 

International Cooperation, “习近平在第三届‘一带一路’国际合作高峰论坛开幕式上的主旨演讲(

全文)” [Xi Jinping’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the third Belt and Road Forum 

for International Cooperation (full text)], October 18, 2023. 20Cyberspace Administration of China, “全球人工智能治理倡议” [Global Artificial Intelligence 

Governance Initiative], October 18, 2023. 21 Jerker Hellström, “主权, 国权” [Sovereignty, state power], China Media Project, May 24, 

2021; Jacob Stokes, “Does China Really Respect Sovereignty?,” Diplomat, May 23, 2019. 22U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Increasing Threat of Deepfake Identities,” accessed 

August 20, 2024, 5. “Synthetic content” is created through the use of deep learning techniques, 

which are a type of artificial intelligence in which a model uses training data to improve at a 

specific task. 23Lin Yang, “China’s Cognitive Warfare Campaign Targets Americans with AI Generated Cartoons,” Voice of America, March 27, 2024; David Rennie 任大伟 (@DSORennie), “First time I’ve 

seen this: Chinese state TV pushing out an AI-generated animation showing workers across 
Technology-Enhanced Authoritarianism

240

America striking and rioting as a result of income inequality and democratic crisis.,” X, March 

17, 2024, 7:39 a.m.; “American Workers in Tumult: A Result of Unbalanced Politics and Economy,” 

CGTN, March 17, 2024; “Unmasking the Real Threat: America’s Military-Industrial Complex,” 

CGTN, March 18, 2024; “American Dream or American Mirage?,” CGTN, March 19, 2024. 24Lin Yang, “China’s Cognitive Warfare Campaign Targets Americans with AI Generated Car- toons,” Voice of America, March 27, 2024. See also “American Workers in Tumult: A Result of 

Unbalanced Politics and Economy,” CGTN, March 17, 2024. 25 James Dargan, “China Utilizes AI for ‘A Fractured America’ Series to Challenge the ‘Ameri- can Dream’ in Propaganda Efforts,” AI Insider, March 29, 2024, updated March 31, 2024. 26 Jacinta Keast, “Shadow Play: A Pro-China Technology and Anti-US Influence Operation 

Thrives on YouTube,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2023, 3–4. 27 Jacinta Keast, “Shadow Play: A Pro-China Technology and Anti-US Influence Operation 

Thrives on YouTube,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2023, 3–4. 28Donie O’Sullivan, Curt Devine, and Allison Gordon, “China Is Using the World’s Largest 

Known Online Disinformation Operation to Harass Americans, a CNN Review Finds,” CNN, No- vember 14, 2023; Elise Thomas, “Pro-CCP Spamouflage Campaign Experiments with New Tac- tics Targeting the US,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, April 1, 2024; Government of Canada, 

“Probable PRC ‘Spamouflage’ Campaign Targets Dozens of Canadian Members of Parliament in 

Disinformation Campaign,” October 23, 2023. 29Donie O’Sullivan, Curt Devine, and Allison Gordon, “China Is Using the World’s Largest 

Known Online Disinformation Operation to Harass Americans, a CNN Review Finds,” CNN, No- vember 14, 2023; Elise Thomas, “Pro-CCP Spamouflage Campaign Experiments with New Tactics 

Targeting the US,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, April 1, 2024. 30Donie O’Sullivan, Curt Devine, and Allison Gordon, “China Is Using the World’s Largest 

Known Online Disinformation Operation to Harass Americans, a CNN Review Finds,” CNN, No- vember 14, 2023; Guy Rosen, “Raising Online Defenses Through Transparency and Collabora- tion,” Meta, August 29, 2023; U.S. Department of Justice, “40 Officers of China’s National Police 

Charged in Transnational Repression Schemes Targeting U.S. Residents,” April 17, 2023. 31Government of Canada, “Probable PRC ‘Spamouflage’ Campaign Targets Dozens of Canadian 

Members of Parliament in Disinformation Campaign,” October 23, 2023. See also “Canada Says 

China Linked ‘Spamouflage’ Campaign Targeted Lawmakers, PM Trudeau,” Reuters, October 23, 

2023. 32Government of Canada, “Probable PRC ‘Spamouflage’ Campaign Targets Dozens of Canadian 

Members of Parliament in Disinformation Campaign,” October 23, 2023. See also, “Canada Says 

China Linked ‘Spamouflage’ Campaign Targeted Lawmakers, PM Trudeau,” Reuters, October 23, 

2023. 33Elise Thomas, “Pro-CCP Spamouflage Campaign Experiments with New Tactics Targeting 

the US,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, April 1, 2024. 34Elise Thomas, “Pro-CCP Spamouflage Campaign Experiments with New Tactics Targeting 

the US,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, April 1, 2024. 35Alberto Fittarelli, “Paperwall: Chinese Websites Posing as Local News Outlets Target Global 

Audiences with Pro-Beijing Content,” Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, 

University of Toronto, February 7, 2024. 36Alberto Fittarelli, “Paperwall: Chinese Websites Posing as Local News Outlets Target Global 

Audiences with Pro-Beijing Content,” Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, 

University of Toronto, February 7, 2024. 37Ryan Serabian, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, and Conor Quigley, et al., “Pro-PRC HaiEnergy 

Campaign Exploits U.S. News Outlets via Newswire Services to Target U.S. Audiences; Evidence 

of Commissioned Protests in Washington, D.C.,” Mandiant, July 24, 2023; Cate Cadell and Tim 

Starks, “Pro-China Influence Campaign Infiltrates U.S. News Websites,” Washington Post, July 

24, 2023. 38Ryan Serabian, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, and Conor Quigley, et al., “Pro-PRC HaiEnergy 

Campaign Exploits U.S. News Outlets via Newswire Services to Target U.S. Audiences; Evidence 

of Commissioned Protests in Washington, D.C.,” Mandiant, July 24, 2023; Cate Cadell and Tim 

Starks, “Pro-China Influence Campaign Infiltrates U.S. News Websites,” Washington Post, July 

24, 2023. 39Ryan Serabian, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, and Conor Quigley, et al., “Pro-PRC HaiEnergy 

Campaign Exploits U.S. News Outlets via Newswire Services to Target U.S. Audiences; Evidence 

of Commissioned Protests in Washington, D.C.,” Mandiant, July 24, 2023; Cate Cadell and Tim 

Starks, “Pro-China Influence Campaign Infiltrates U.S. News Websites,” Washington Post, July 24, 

2023; Daryna Antoniuk, “Pro-China Influence Campaign Allegedly Financed Staged Protests in 

Washington,” Recorded Future, July 24, 2023.
241

IX. Tibet

Tibe

Findings

• The Commission did not observe any interest from People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) officials in resuming formal negotia- tions with the Dalai Lama’s representatives, the last round of 

which, the ninth, was held in January 2010.

• The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to control, the reli- gious practices of Tibetans, the majority of whom practice Ti- betan Buddhism. As part of the broader policy of “sinicizing” 

religion, PRC authorities in Tibetan areas issued prohibitions 

on forms of religious worship, including during important reli- gious events or around the times of politically sensitive anni- versaries, limited access to religious institutions and places of 

worship, including Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and temples, 

and otherwise unduly restricted Tibetans’ freedom of religion 

and belief. The PRC continued to assert control over the process 

of selection and recognition of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated 

teachers, including the Dalai Lama.

• The Commission did not observe reports of Tibetan self-im- molations occurring during the 2024 reporting year, the second 

year since 2021 in which no self-immolations were reported to 

have occurred.

• PRC authorities maintained a system of residential boarding 

schools in Tibetan areas that observers fear could constitute 

a serious threat to Tibetan society and the intergenerational 

transmission of culture and language.

• Large-scale protests broke out in February 2024 in Derge 

(Dege) county, Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 

Sichuan province, due to official plans for construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Drichu (Jinsha) River that will submerge 

at least two villages and six monasteries, one of which, Wontoe 

Monastery, contains well-preserved 13th-century murals. Security personnel detained approximately 1,000 Tibetans in connection with the protests; many were later released, but local 

authorities escalated surveillance and monitoring of local communities in the following months.

• In contravention of international human rights standards, 

officials punished residents of Tibetan areas for exercising 

protected rights, including the expression of religious belief, 

expressing criticism of PRC policies, and sharing information 

online. Notable cases this past year included those of writer 

Pema, a monk and teacher at Kirti Monastery, who in a lone 

protest held a portrait of the Dalai Lama and called for the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet and religious freedom for Tibetans; 

Semkyi Drolma, detained for her participation in discussion 

groups about Buddhism on the social media platform WeChat, 

and later sentenced to one year and six months in prison for 

“leaking state secrets”; and Tenzin Sangpo, a senior monk at 

Derge’s Wontoe Monastery detained in February 2024 as part 

of the anti-dam protests.
242

Tibe

Status of Negotiations between the Chinese Government 

and the Dalai Lama or His Representatives

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, the Commission did 

not observe any interest on the part of People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) officials in resuming formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama 

or his representatives.1 The last round of negotiations, the ninth, 

was held in January 2010.2

Self-Immolations

The Commission did not observe reports of Tibetan self-immolations occurring during the 2024 reporting year, the second 

year in a row in which no self-immolations were reported to have 

occurred.3 The Commission has observed 154 self-immolations 

reported to focus on political or religious issues since 2009 in 

Tibetan areas.4

Religious Freedom for Tibetans

The PRC continued to restrict, and seek to control, the religious 

practices of Tibetans, particularly practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism. International observers and rights advocacy groups reported 

on continuing violations of international human rights standards, 

including the right to freely worship and to choose one’s own religion, that result from PRC religious policy and its implementation.5

PRC officials exercise political control and supervision of Tibetan 

Buddhist monastic and educational institutions through the National Religious Affairs Administration (NRAA), a Party office under the 

United Front Work Department (UFWD), and the Buddhist Association of China, the supervisory organization for Buddhism under the 

NRAA.6 [For more information on religion and religious policy in 

China, see Chapter 3—Freedom of Religion.]

During the 2024 reporting year, Chinese Communist Party and 

government organizations continued to organize propaganda campaigns to reach Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, and laypersons 

with messaging reinforcing Party policies.7 As part of these campaigns, Party and government officials held events, including lectures, study sessions, and competitions, at monasteries and other 

religious sites.8 In visits to monastic institutions, Party officials 

responsible for religious or ethnic policy stressed Party leadership over and control of religious institutions, and the responsibility of monastic leadership to guide monks and nuns to adhere 

to Party policies.9 Propaganda events focused on instructing monastics and laypersons on legal provisions restricting religious 

life, such as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Measures on the 

Management of Online Religious Information Services 10 or the 

national-level Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation 

of Living Buddhas,11 as well as discussion of major Party policy 

decisionmaking events, including the 20th National Congress of 

the Chinese Communist Party and the 7th Tibet Work Forum.12

UFWD outreach to Tibetans also emphasized Party ethnic policy, including the importance of learning and using Mandarin 
Tibet

243

Chinese.13 [For more information on language rights in Tibet, see 

Language and Cultural Rights in this chapter.]

PRC authorities in Tibetan areas issued prohibitions on forms 

of religious worship, including during important religious events 

or around the times of politically sensitive anniversaries, limited 

access to religious institutions and places of worship, including Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and temples, and otherwise unduly restricted Tibetans’ freedom of religion and belief.14 Illustrative examples from this past year included:

• Restrictions on Kalachakra gatherings. In July 2023 in 

Qinghai province 15 and in July and September 2023 in Gansu province,16 authorities prevented organizers, speakers, and 

attendees from participating in Tibetan Buddhist ceremonies 

known as Kalachakra. Gansu authorities reportedly canceled 

the July Kalachakra event in Kanlho (Gannan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) in part because July 2023 was the 

70th anniversary of the founding of Kanlho TAP.17 Authorities 

in Qinghai reportedly detained organizers of the July gathering 

and censored discussion of the event, ordering that photographs 

and video online be taken down.18

• Criminal charges for collecting donations. In October 

2023, police in Darlag (Dari) county, Golog (Guoluo) TAP, Qinghai, announced that they had detained eight Tibetan men 

on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” and 

“extortion.”19 Police issued a statement accusing Gonnam

and Gontse of organizing Jigme Tenzin, Palden, Lochoe, 

Namgyal, Norde, and Kalsang20 “in the name of religion” to 

commit crimes, and offered rewards for informants.21 A source 

told Tibet Watch that authorities detained the eight men “for 

collecting donations for religious offerings.”22

• Detentions over fundraising for mani stones. In December 2023, police in Yulshul (Yushu) TAP, Qinghai, detained four 

Tibetans—siblings Nyima and Loga, stone carver Rinchen,

and Tsedar 23—in connection with their work organizing a project to raise funds for the creation of thousands of religious stone 

engravings (mani stones).24 Authorities reportedly accused the 

four of offenses related to “using religious . . . rights to disturb 

society” and “deceiving the masses,” and held them at a detention center in Yulshul.25

• Ban on new admissions at monastery. Local officials in 

Markham (Mangkang) county, Chamdo (Changdu) municipality, TAR, prohibited the admission of new monks to Markham’s 

Khyungbum Lura Monastery.26

• Political education following monk’s detention. In late 

May 2024, authorities ordered monks at an unidentified monastery in Chigdril (Jiuzhi) county, Golog TAP, to attend 10 days of 

“political education” following the detention of a resident monk, 

also unidentified, who had reportedly criticized a local-level legal provision on social media.27 Authorities ordered the monastery’s monastic leadership to exert stricter control over monks’ 

comments on social media platforms, and to share the directive 

with monks’ families and neighbors.28
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THE DALAI LAMA

Reports continued to emerge this year of Chinese authorities pe- nalizing Tibetans for expressions of reverence for the Dalai Lama, 

including through harassment and surveillance, detention, and im- prisonment. Authorities in Tibetan areas reportedly detained Ti- betans in connection with discussions of the Dalai Lama online, 

praying for him, or displaying or sharing his image, including the 

following cases:

• In or around September 2023, police in Dingri county, Shigatse (Rikaze) municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region, detained 

four monks from Dingri’s Lhadong Monastery, accusing Kalsang 

Tsering, Sonam, Nyima, and Phuntsog of having offered 

prayers to the Dalai Lama.29 Police raided the monks’ rooms, 

searched other parts of the monastery, and ordered monks and 

local residents to promise not to conduct prayer gatherings for 

the Dalai Lama at the monastery or in the village.30 Two officials remained stationed at the monastery, which only houses 

14 monks, to conduct surveillance.31

• In October 2023, authorities in Dola (Qilian) county, Tsojang 

(Haibei) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai province, detained Wangchug Tso, a Tibetan resident of Dola.32 Police 

told Wangchug Tso’s family that she had shared information 

with Tibetans outside China and used social media platforms 

to share an image of the Dalai Lama.33

• Reports on the early 2023 detention of Tenzin Khyenrab

(also known by his pen name Dong Rangchag) only emerged 

in February 2024.34 Authorities in Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan province, detained Tenzin 

Khyenrab, then a 28-year-old monk and writer, for possessing 

images of the Dalai Lama on his mobile phone.35

• In March 2024, public security officials in Ngaba (Aba) coun- ty, Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, 

Sichuan, detained Pema, a monk and teacher at Ngaba county’s Kirti Monastery, after he protested by himself in the county seat.36 Pema reportedly held a portrait of the Dalai Lama 

and called for the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet and religious 

freedom for Tibetans.37 He had reportedly also spoken to local 

authorities about pressure on children to attend state schools 

instead of the monastery’s school.38

Hundreds of Tibetans Detained after Protests against 

Dam Threatening Villages and Monasteries

In February 2024, hundreds of residents of Derge (Dege) county, 

Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, 

began protesting against the planned construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Drichu (Jinsha) River which would flood six monasteries and two villages in the Derge area.39 One of the monasteries threatened by the dam project, Wontoe Monastery, notably 

contains well-preserved 13th-century murals.40 The protests began 

on February 14; on February 22, authorities deployed armed police 

to the area in response to the protests, and starting on February 

23 detained hundreds of protesters, including monks from nearby 
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245

monasteries and local laypeople.41 Police reportedly beat some of 

the protesters such that they required hospitalization, and detained 

residents who went to detention centers to call on authorities to 

release previously detained protesters.42 In total, security personnel 

detained nearly 1,000 people, including monks and local residents.43

Authorities released many detainees shortly afterward, but kept 

an unknown number in custody.44 Identified detainees included 

Wontoe Monastery monk Tenzin Sangpo45 and local official Tenzin,46 as well as residents of Wonpotoe (Wangbuding) township: 

Dechen Drolma,47 Dechen Palmo,48 Yangkyi,49 Rinchen Drolma,50 Tsedrub,51 Rigzin,52 and Thubphur.53 On February 27, 

authorities released around 40 of the detainees but reportedly kept 

them under surveillance and post-release restrictions on communications outside the region;54 by late March, authorities released 

hundreds of additional protesters.55 Some local sources reported 

that authorities conducted searches for Tibetans who took photos or 

recorded video of the protests and of officials’ reactions to them.56

Local officials announced that construction of the dam would continue despite the protests and ordered local residents to comply with 

official directives.57 Authorities in Jomda (Jiangda) county, Chamdo 

(Changdu) municipality, Tibet Autonomous Region, which neighbors 

Derge, reportedly conducted individual home visits in two villages 

that would be displaced by the dam’s construction, collecting information on villagers in order to “strengthen social control.”58

The planned displacement of the Derge-area communities and 

monastic institutions illustrates a broader trend in Tibet of Party 

and government officials imposing resettlement plans on Tibetan 

communities from above, without meaningful community engagement or participation in decisionmaking. A Human Rights Watch 

report on official relocation and resettlement campaigns in the Tibet 

Autonomous Region between 2016 and 2023 found that officials justified these campaigns as “poverty alleviation” programs for affected 

communities or as being necessary for local environmental protection.59 Officials often promise state subsidies for those who willingly move, and support for resettled communities in the forms of job 

training, employment, and improved economic prospects, but with 

varying success.60 While officials working in the relocation programs 

provide compensation and incentives to households and communities targeted for resettlement, in practice officials exert such pressure on residents that it amounts to coercion.61 Resettled Tibetans 

often find themselves in substandard housing, living in areas with 

incomplete or inadequate infrastructure, and often in places with 

limited job opportunities.62

The Derge-area dam was not the only hydropower construction 

project threatening Tibetan communities during the reporting year. 

In Dragkar (Xinghai) county, Tsolho (Hainan) Tibetan Autonomous 

Prefecture, Qinghai province, authorities began the forced relocation 

of monks from Dragkar’s Atshog Monastery due to the construction 

of a dam on the Machu (Yellow) River.63 Local officials reportedly previously rescinded the monastery’s protected cultural status.64

Once demolition of the monastery began in spring 2024, authorities 

placed communications and travel restrictions on the area, detaining at least one unidentified Tibetan for documenting the demolition 
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246

on social media.65 One source reported that Atshog monks had to 

live in unfinished residential quarters at the relocation site for the 

monastery.66

Continuing Restrictions on Access to Tibetan Areas

The State Department reported that in 2023 PRC authorities 

maintained heavy restrictions on access to Tibetan areas for diplomats, journalists, and travelers.67 The Tibet Autonomous Region 

(TAR) required foreign diplomats to request permission to visit, unlike other areas of the country; in 2023, PRC authorities did not 

approve any U.S. consular visits.68 PRC officials also “used conspicuous surveillance to intimidate, monitor, harass, and restrict travel” 

to Tibetan areas outside the TAR.69

In its annual report on media freedoms in China, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China reported that access to Tibetan areas for 

foreign journalists remained severely limited, with TAR authorities 

granting access to reporters only if they participated in state-organized tours or if they applied for special official approval from 

central government authorities.70

Restrictions on the Freedom of Expression 

and the Free Flow of Information

Chinese authorities continued to restrict contact between Tibetans in Tibetan areas of China and individuals or groups abroad, 

including by punishing or threatening to punish those found to have 

contact with Tibetans in exile—often those in India—or who have 

shared information in Tibet about Tibetans living abroad.71 Chinese 

authorities also strictly monitored online communications to find 

and punish Tibetans who were alleged to have committed crimes 

online.72 Examples of Tibetans detained by Chinese authorities in 

connection with their exercise of freedom of expression included the 

following:

• In October 2023, police in Damshung (Dangxiong) county, 

Lhasa municipality, TAR, detained Semkyi Drolma, reportedly in connection with her participation in discussion groups 

about Buddhism on the social media platform WeChat.73 On 

December 2, authorities informed Semkyi Drolma’s family 

that she had been sentenced to one year and six months in 

prison on a charge related to “leaking state secrets” to someone abroad.74

• Authorities in Thewo (Diebu) county, Kanlho (Gannan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, took into custody 

Konchog Dragpa, a monk at Thewo’s Tashi Monastery, in late 

October 2023, reportedly in connection with having contact with 

someone outside Tibet.75 Konchog Dragpa studied and worked 

at Kirti Monastery in India for several years before returning to 

Thewo in 2012.76 He was later released on an unknown date.77

• In November 2023, authorities in Sershul (Shiqu) county, 

Kardze TAP, detained Tsomo and Nyidron, two Tibetan women from Sershul, in connection with voice messages they made 

in discussion groups on WeChat, discussing Buddhism and encouraging group members to act virtuously.78
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247

• Tibetan singer Gegjom Dorje disappeared in official custody after authorities in Khyungchu (Hongyuan) county, Ngaba 

(Aba) Tibetan & Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP), Sichuan province, summoned him for questioning in February 

2024.79 Police reportedly told Gegjom Dorje’s family that he 

was under interrogation, but did not inform them of where he 

was held or his condition in custody.80 His detention came days 

after Losar, the Tibetan New Year, and around one month after 

he performed a song at a public gathering in which he criticized 

repressive PRC rule in Tibet and lamented the Dalai Lama’s 

exile from Tibet.81

PRC official interference in the free flow of information in and 

out of Tibet, using means including online censorship, surveillance 

of social media, and punishment of individuals or groups sharing 

information about Tibet, often prevents timely reporting on developments inside Tibet. Information on some cases of political or religious detention pre-dating the Commission’s 2024 reporting year 

only emerged months or years later; examples of these cases follow.

• In June 2021, police in Ngaba T&QAP detained Lobsang 

Tashi, a monk at Ngaba county’s Kirti Monastery, after he 

led prayer sessions while the area was under anti-coronavirus 

(COVID-19) lockdown restrictions, refusing to raise the PRC 

flag at the monastery, and making offerings for COVID-19 victims to the Dalai Lama and Kirti Rinpoche, the leader of Kirti Monastery, who is in exile in India.82 Authorities reportedly 

held a closed trial and sentenced him to three years in prison.83

• On an unknown date early in 2023, authorities in Pema (Ban- ma) county, Golog (Guoluo) TAP, Qinghai province, detained 

Palden (or Golog Palden) after he performed a Tibetan “pa- triotic song” on the social media platform Kuaishou.84 He was 

later sentenced to three years in prison on unknown charges.85

• In spring 2023, authorities in Khyungchu (Hongyuan) county, 

Ngaba (Aba) T&QAP, detained Tsultrim, a Tibetan business- man from Khyungchu, reportedly after he was found to have an 

image of the Dalai Lama on his cell phone.86 In April 2023, the 

Aba T&QAP Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him to two 

years in prison on a charge related to “contact[ing] separatists 

outside Tibet.”87 Police previously detained Tsultrim from July 

to September 2022, also over his possession of an image of the 

Dalai Lama on his phone, during which time he was reportedly 

beaten in custody.88

• Public security officials in Ngaba (Aba) county, Ngaba T&QAP, 

detained Lobsang Thabkhe, a monk and the library director 

at Kirti Monastery, in June 2023.89 Authorities reportedly accused him of maintaining contacts outside China and publish- ing books he had received from Tibetan Buddhist monasteries 

in India.90

Rights advocates and researchers raised concerns about the reported enforced use of a smartphone application, developed by the 

Ministry of Public Security, to surveil individuals, including Tibetans. Analysis of the “National Anti-Fraud Center” app by Tibet 

Watch and Turquoise Roof found that the extensive permissions required by the app could pose serious threats to users’ privacy and 
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248

freedom from intrusive surveillance.91 A Tibetan who fled China 

told Tibet Watch that officials in Tibet scanned travelers’ phones at 

checkpoints to look for the app’s presence, and forced them to download the app if it was not found.92 [For more information on the National Anti-Fraud Center app and digital surveillance, see Chapter 

1—Freedom of Expression and Chapter 16—Technology-Enhanced 

Authoritarianism.]

Language and Cultural Rights

China’s Constitution and laws contain provisions affirming the 

freedom of ethnic minorities to “use and develop”93 their languages, 

yet Chinese authorities continued to threaten linguistic rights in Tibetan areas, including through implementation of policies promoting 

or enforcing the use of Mandarin Chinese instead of Tibetan, as well 

as policies of neglect with regard to minority languages. PRC ethnic 

policy ignores unrecognized linguistic communities, including in Tibetan areas,94 and individuals or communities with languages that 

lack official recognition are deprived of access to official support in 

education and other government services.95 The U.N. Convention on 

the Rights of the Child, to which China is a State Party,96 recognizes 

and protects the rights of ethnic and linguistic minority groups to 

use their languages.97 [For more information on language rights and 

ethnic policy, see Chapter 7—Ethnic Minority Rights.]

Education officials in Sichuan province reportedly ended the use of 

Tibetan as a language of instruction in primary and middle schools 

in both Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) and 

Ngaba (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture beginning 

in September 2023.98 Sources said that education department officials did not inform parents or teachers of the change in policy prior 

to its implementation at the beginning of the school year, causing 

some to fear that the change could threaten the survival of Tibetan 

in the area.99

PRC officials in some Tibetan areas took other steps to limit the 

use of Tibetan in educational settings or to discourage its use at 

home. In Ngaba (Aba) county, Ngaba T&QAP, officials fired a Tibetan language teacher from his job at a primary school and suspended his teaching license after he reportedly advocated greater 

use of Tibetan in schools.100 In Nyagchu (Yajiang) county, Kardze 

TAP, officials reportedly ordered students and teachers to use only 

Mandarin Chinese to speak with each other.101 Nyagchu officials 

also shortened the lengths of school breaks, limiting the amount 

of time students could return home to Tibetan-speaking environments.102 Authorities in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Gansu 

and Qinghai provinces reportedly investigated private Tibetan language classes held during the winter break, in some cases conducting checks in residential areas and questioning students about their 

possible involvement in these courses.103 PRC officials in Tibetan 

areas have issued bans on these private language courses and also 

seek to prevent students from receiving religious education.104

Observers expressed fears that limits on students’ access to Tibetan-language education, in particular because of the system of 

residential boarding schools in Tibetan areas, constitute a serious 

threat to Tibetan society and the intergenerational transmission of 
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249

culture and language.105 Some Tibetans living abroad who were able 

to visit Tibet reported that many children were unable to converse 

fully in Tibetan, as their education was conducted nearly entirely 

in Mandarin Chinese.106 Sources noted also that the environment 

in the residential boarding schools compounded the harms posed to 

Tibetan children due to separation from family and community.107

“Xizang” Replacing Tibet in Official Discourse

During the reporting year, PRC officials and state- and Party-controlled 

media continued108 to promote the use of the Mandarin Chinese-derived 

term “Xizang” (西藏) instead of “Tibet” in English-language communications. At an officially organized academic conference in August 2023, 

participants asserted that using “Tibet” had “misled the international 

community” and that using “Xizang” instead would “enhance China’s international discourse on Tibet.”109 Following the November 2023 release 

of a State Council white paper on PRC governance in Tibet that used 

“Xizang” almost exclusively to refer to the region,110 the South China 

Morning Post reported that use of “Xizang” to replace “Tibet” dramatically increased in official media outlets Xinhua, People’s Daily, and China 

Daily.111 Observers expressed concern that the official change in terminology is part of the broader PRC campaign to assert Chinese control 

over Tibet.112
250

Notes to Chapter 17—Tibet

1See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, “Report to Congress on Tibet Negotiations, Section 613(b) 

of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note),” accessed October 25, 2023. 2U.S. Department of State, “Report to Congress on Tibet Negotiations, Section 613(b) of the 

Tibetan Policy Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note),” accessed October 25, 2023. 3Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 

285; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 

2022), 283. 4This cumulative total does not include six deaths by self-immolation of Tibetans in 2012 and 

2013. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “CECC Update: Tibetan Self-Immolations,” 

January 10, 2017. See also International Campaign for Tibet, “Self-Immolation Fact Sheet,” accessed June 13, 2024. 5Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by U.N. General Assembly 

resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry 

into force March 23, 1976, art. 18. 6See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet, “Buddhist Association of China Takes a Leading 

Role in China’s Attempts to Control and Forcibly Reshape Tibetan Buddhism,” May 29, 2024; 

International Campaign for Tibet, “Party Above Buddhism: China’s Surveillance and Control of 

Tibetan Monasteries and Nunneries,” March 2021, 10–11. 7For past Commission coverage, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 

Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 285–87; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 

2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 283–84. 8See, e.g., Jampaling Monastery Monastic Management Committee, “昌都市强巴林寺开展‘三

个意识’教育暨 ‘学用国家通用语言文字 铸牢中华民族共同体意识’演讲比赛” [Jampaling Monastery in Chamdo municipality convenes speech competition on “three consciousnesses” education 

and “studying use of the common national language and script, forging a common Chinese national consciousness”], reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department, 

December 29, 2023. 9See, e.g., Sog County Committee United Front Work Department, “那曲市索县宗教领域宣讲督

导组深入寺庙开展宣讲活动” [Sog county, Nagchu municipality, religious sector propaganda oversight group enters monasteries to convene propaganda activities], reprinted in Tibet Autonomous 

Region United Front Work Department, March 12, 2024; Driru County Committee United Front 

Work Department, “那曲市比如县宗教领域开展国旗下讲话专题活动” [Driru county, Nagchu municipality, religious sector convenes special speech activity under the national flag], reprinted in 

Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department, March 14, 2024. 10See, e.g., Sera Monastery Monastic Management Committee, “拉萨市色拉寺组织僧人学习

《西藏自治区〈互联网宗教信息服务管理办法〉细则》” [In Lhasa municipality, Sera Monastery 

organizes monks to study “Detailed Rules for the Tibet Autonomous Region ‘Measures on the 

Management of Online Religious Information Services’”], reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region 

United Front Work Department, January 4, 2024. 11See, e.g., Ngari Prefecture Committee United Front Work Department, “阿里地区宗教界代

表人士开展‘三个意识’暨‘爱国爱教’巡回宣讲活动” [Ngari prefecture religious representatives 

convene “three consciousnesses” and “love the country, love religion” touring propaganda activities], reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department, December 1, 2023. 12See, e.g., Shigatse Municipality Committee United Front Work Department, “日喀则市举办

宗教界‘学习贯彻党的二十大精神 争做四好僧尼’暨‘三个意识’主题知识竞赛和演讲比赛” [Shigatse municipality holds knowledge and speech competitions for religious sector on the themes of 

“studying and carrying out the spirit of the 20th Party Congress, striving to be four good monks 

and nuns” and “three consciousnesses”], reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front 

Work Department, November 17, 2023. 13See, e.g., Chamdo Municipality Committee United Front Work Department, “昌都市强巴林寺

管委会打造‘党建引领民族团结 石榴花开籽籽同心’党建品牌” [In Chamdo municipality, Jampaling Monastery monastic management committee creates Party-building brand of “Party-building 

leads the way to ethnic unity, united like the seeds of pomegranate blossoms”], reprinted in Tibet 

Autonomous Region United Front Work Department, October 25, 2023; Shannan Municipal Committee United Front Work Department, “山南市举办宗教界‘铸牢中华民族共同体意识 增强‘三个

意识’ 争做模范僧尼’国家通用语言演讲比赛” [Shannan municipality holds speech competition 

in the common national language for religious sector on “forging a common Chinese national 

consciousness, increasing the ‘three consciousnesses,’ and striving to be model monks and nuns”], 

reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department, October 18, 2023; Jampaling Monastery Monastic Management Committee, “昌都市强巴林寺开展‘三个意识’教育暨 

‘学用国家通用语言文字 铸牢中华民族共同体意识’演讲比赛” [Jampaling Monastery in Chamdo 

municipality convenes speech competition on “three consciousnesses” education and “studying use 

of the common national language and script, forging a common Chinese national consciousness”], 

reprinted in Tibet Autonomous Region United Front Work Department, December 29, 2023. 14See, e.g., Kalden Lodoe, “Tibet’s Beloved Annual Yogurt Festival Spoiled by Heavy Police 

Presence,” Radio Free Asia, August 18, 2023; “China Shuts Down Lhasa Temples during National 

Day Holiday Period,” Radio Free Asia, October 9, 2023; Pelbar and Sonam Lhamo, “China Cracks 

Down on Tibetans during Holy Month,” Radio Free Asia, May 28, 2024; Pelbar, “China Restricts 

Religious Debate Event for Tibetan Monks,” Radio Free Asia, June 27, 2024. 15 Thaklha Gyal and Sangyal Kunchok, “Chinese Police Stop Tibetan Buddhist Gathering, Prevent Lama from Preaching,” Radio Free Asia, July 20, 2023; Tibet Watch, “Government-Approved 

Buddhist Teaching Shut Down in Eastern Tibet,” July 21, 2023; International Campaign for 

Tibet, “Important Tibet Religious Event Prohibited, Organizers Detained,” July 26, 2023.
Tibet

251

16Sangyal Kunchok, “China Blocks Prominent Tibetan Lama from Preaching,” Radio Free Asia,

July 14, 2023; Lhuboom, “China Restricts Tibetans from Attending Buddhist Kalachakra Sermon,” Radio Free Asia, September 14, 2023; Muskan Punia, “Chinese Authorities Restricted Tibetan Buddhists’ Access to the Kalachakra Teachings in Tibet,” Tibet Post International, September 20, 2023. At least one attendee detained in connection with the September 2023 teaching was 

identified: Tsepo, a retired police officer and Chinese Communist Party member, was detained in 

Tridu (Chenduo) county, Yulshul (Yushu) TAP, Qinghai, when he was traveling with his family 

to Kanlho TAP. Tashi Namgyal, “A Former Chinese Police Officer Arrested from Attending the 

Kalachakra Teaching,” Tibet Times, September 15, 2023. For more information on Tsepo, see the 

Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2024-00052. 17Sangyal Kunchok, “China Blocks Prominent Tibetan Lama from Preaching,” Radio Free Asia, 

July 14, 2023; International Campaign for Tibet, “Important Tibet Religious Event Prohibited, 

Organizers Detained,” July 26, 2023. 18 International Campaign for Tibet, “Important Tibet Religious Event Prohibited, Organizers 

Detained,” July 26, 2023. 19Tibet Watch, “Eight Tibetans Detained after Collecting Donations for Religious Offering,” 

October 25, 2023; Tashi Namgyal, “Eight Tibetans of Darlag County, Golok, Are Arrested,” Tibet 

Times, October 27, 2023; Dangqiu, “西藏达日县8名藏人遭警方以 ‘利用宗教寻衅滋事为由’ 拘捕” [In 

Darlag county, Tibet, 8 Tibetans detained by police for “using religion to pick quarrels and provoke trouble”], Voice of Tibet, October 30, 2023. 20For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2024-00004 

on Gonnam, 2024-00005 on Gontse, 2024-00006 on Jigme Tenzin, 2024-00007 on Palden, 2024-

00008 on Lochoe, 2024-00009 on Namgyal, 2024-00010 on Norde, and 2024-00011 on Kalsang. 21Tibet Watch, “Eight Tibetans Detained after Collecting Donations for Religious Offering,” 

October 25, 2023; Tashi Namgyal, “Eight Tibetans of Darlag County, Golok, Are Arrested,” Tibet 

Times, October 27, 2023; Dangqiu, “西藏达日县8名藏人遭警方以 ‘利用宗教寻衅滋事为由’ 拘捕” [In 

Darlag county, Tibet, 8 Tibetans detained by police for “using religion to pick quarrels and provoke trouble”], Voice of Tibet, October 30, 2023. 22Tibet Watch, “Eight Tibetans Detained after Collecting Donations for Religious Offering,” 

October 25, 2023. 23For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2024-00048 

on Nyima, 2024-00049 on Loga, 2024-00050 on Tsedar, and 2024-00051 on Rinchen. 24Luosang, “西藏结古多四名藏人因雕刻并展出 ‘玛尼石’ 遭中共拘捕” [In Kyegudo, Tibet, four 

Tibetans detained by CCP because of carving and displaying “mani stones”], Voice of Tibet, December 13, 2023; “མ་ཎིི་རྡོོ་འབུམ་ཁྲིི་སྟོོན་ཞུས་རྐྱེེན་བོོད་མིི་བཞིི་བཙན་འཁྲིིད་བྱས་འདུག” [Four Tibetans detained for installing m

stones], Tibet Times, December 12, 2023; “Four Tibetans Arrested for Inaugurating Mani Stone 

Mound,” Tibet Times, December 13, 2023. 25Luosang, “西藏结古多四名藏人因雕刻并展出‘玛尼石’遭中共拘捕” [In Kyegudo, Tibet, four 

Tibetans detained by CCP because of carving and displaying “mani stones”], Voice of Tibet, December 13, 2023; “མ་ཎིི་རྡོོ་འབུམ་ཁྲིི་སྟོོན་ཞུས་རྐྱེེན་བོོད་མིི་བཞིི་བཙན་འཁྲིིད་བྱས་འདུག” [Four Tibetans detained for installing m

stones], Tibet Times, December 12, 2023; “Four Tibetans Arrested for Inaugurating Mani Stone 

Mound,” Tibet Times, December 13, 2023. 26Pelbar and Tenzin Pema, “No New Monks Allowed at Buddhist Monastery in Tibet,” Radio 

Free Asia, January 3, 2024. 27 “A Tibetan Monk from Golok Arrested for Alleged Political Offences,” Tibet Times, June 23, 

2024; Tibet Watch, “Tibetan Monk Detained after WeChat Post Criticising Chinese Law,” June 

28, 2024. 28 “A Tibetan Monk from Golok Arrested for Alleged Political Offences,” Tibet Times, June 23, 

2024; Tibet Watch, “Tibetan Monk Detained after WeChat Post Criticising Chinese Law,” June 

28, 2024. 29Tashi Namgyal, “Four Tibetan Monks Are Arrested in Tibet.,” Tibet Times, November 24, 

2023; “China Arrested Four Tibetan Monks for Allegedly Praying for the Dalai Lama,” Tibet Post 

International, November 24, 2023; Zhacuo, “西藏日喀则四名僧人与果洛班玛县一青年歌手遭中共非

法抓捕” [Four monks in Shigatse, Tibet, and a young singer in Pema county, Golog, illegally detained by CCP], Voice of Tibet, November 27, 2023. For more information, see the Commission’s 

Political Prisoner Database records 2023-00247 on Kalsang Tsering, 2023-00248 on Sonam, 2023-

00249 on Nyima, and 2023-00250 on Phuntsog. 30Tashi Namgyal, “Four Tibetan Monks Are Arrested in Tibet.,” Tibet Times, November 24, 

2023; “China Arrested Four Tibetan Monks for Allegedly Praying for the Dalai Lama,” Tibet Post 

International, November 24, 2023; Zhacuo, “西藏日喀则四名僧人与果洛班玛县一青年歌手遭中共非法

抓捕” [Four monks in Shigatse, Tibet, and a young singer in Pema county, Golog, illegally detained 

by CCP], Voice of Tibet, November 27, 2023. 31Tashi Namgyal, “Four Tibetan Monks Are Arrested in Tibet.,” Tibet Times, November 24, 

2023; “China Arrested Four Tibetan Monks for Allegedly Praying for the Dalai Lama,” Tibet Post 

International, November 24, 2023; Zhacuo, “西藏日喀则四名僧人与果洛班玛县一青年歌手遭中共非

法抓捕” [Four monks in Shigatse, Tibet, and a young singer in Pema county, Golog, illegally 

detained by CCP], Voice of Tibet, November 27, 2023. 32 “བོོད་ཀྱིི་བུད་མེེད་ཅིིག་ལ་༸གོོང་ས་མཆོོག་གིི་༸སྐུ་པར་བརྒྱུད་སྤེེལ་གནང་བའིི་ཉེེས་མིིང་འོོག་འཛིིན་བཟུང་།” [Tibetan woman detained o

sharing image of Dalai Lama], Voice of Tibet, November 13, 2023; Dangqiu, “西藏多拉县女子因

在网上分享达赖喇嘛照片遭拘捕” [Woman in Dola county, Tibet, detained for sharing Dalai Lama 

photos online], Voice of Tibet, November 13, 2023. For more information on Wangchug Tso, see 

the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00246. 33 “བོོད་ཀྱིི་བུད་མེེད་ཅིིག་ལ་༸གོོང་ས་མཆོོག་གིི་༸སྐུ་པར་བརྒྱུད་སྤེེལ་གནང་བའིི་ཉེེས་མིིང་འོོག་འཛིིན་བཟུང་།” [Tibetan woman detained o

sharing image of Dalai Lama], Voice of Tibet, November 13, 2023; Dangqiu, “西藏多拉县女子因

在网上分享达赖喇嘛照片遭拘捕” [Woman in Dola county, Tibet, detained for sharing Dalai Lama 

photos online], Voice of Tibet, November 13, 2023.
Tibet

252

34Paldan, “གྲྭ་གཞོོན་སྙན་ངག་པ་ལྡོོང་རང་ལྕགས་ལགས་འཛིིན་བཟུང་བྱས་ནས་ལོོ་ངོོ་གཅིིག་ལྷག་ཕྱིིན་ཡོོད་འདུག” [Over one year since detent

monk and poet Dong Rangchag], Tibet Times, February 13, 2024; “Young Tibetan Monk and Poet 

Dhong Rangchak Arrested,” Tibet Times, February 14, 2024; Tibet Watch, “Concerns Grow over 

Detained Tibetan Monk,” February 16, 2024. For more information on Tenzin Khyenrab, see the 

Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2024-00072. 35Paldan, “གྲྭ་གཞོོན་སྙན་ངག་པ་ལྡོོང་རང་ལྕགས་ལགས་འཛིིན་བཟུང་བྱས་ནས་ལོོ་ངོོ་གཅིིག་ལྷག་ཕྱིིན་ཡོོད་འདུག” [Over one year since detent

monk and poet Dong Rangchag], Tibet Times, February 13, 2024; “Young Tibetan Monk and Poet 

Dhong Rangchak Arrested,” Tibet Times, February 14, 2024; Tibet Watch, “Concerns Grow over 

Detained Tibetan Monk,” February 16, 2024. 36 “A Tibetan Monk from Kirti Monastery Arrested,” Tibet Times, April 4, 2024; Tibetan Centre 

for Human Rights and Democracy, “Lone Tibetan Protester Calling for Return of Dalai Lama 

Detained Incommunicado in Ngaba,” April 8, 2024. For more information on Pema, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2024-00106. 37 “A Tibetan Monk from Kirti Monastery Arrested,” Tibet Times, April 4, 2024; Tibetan Centre 

for Human Rights and Democracy, “Lone Tibetan Protester Calling for Return of Dalai Lama 

Detained Incommunicado in Ngaba,” April 8, 2024. 38Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Lone Tibetan Protester Calling for Return of Dalai Lama Detained Incommunicado in Ngaba,” April 8, 2024. 39Sonam Lhamo and Pelbar, “Tibetans Protest Forced Resettlement Due to Chinese Dam Project,” Radio Free Asia, February 26, 2024. 40Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “China Arrests More than 1,000 Tibetans Protesting Chinese Dam Project,” Radio Free Asia, February 23, 2024. 41Sonam Lhamo and Pelbar, “Tibetans Protest Forced Resettlement Due to Chinese Dam Project,” Radio Free Asia, February 26, 2024; Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “Exclusive: More than 

100 Tibetans Arrested over Dam Protest,” Radio Free Asia, February 26, 2024; Kalden Lodoe and 

Tenzin Pema, “China Arrests More than 1,000 Tibetans Protesting Chinese Dam Project,” Radio 

Free Asia, February 23, 2024; Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Detained Tibetan Demonstrators,” February 28, 2024. 42Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “China Arrests More than 1,000 Tibetans Protesting Chinese Dam Project,” Radio Free Asia, February 23, 2024; Tibet Watch and Turquoise Roof, “Occupying Tibet’s Rivers: China’s Hydropower ‘Battlefield’ in Tibet,” May 2024, 17. 43Sonam Lhamo and Pelbar, “Tibetans Protest Forced Resettlement Due to Chinese Dam Project,” Radio Free Asia, February 26, 2024; Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “Exclusive: More than 

100 Tibetans Arrested over Dam Protest,” Radio Free Asia, February 26, 2024; Kalden Lodoe and 

Tenzin Pema, “China Arrests More than 1,000 Tibetans Protesting Chinese Dam Project,” Radio 

Free Asia, February 23, 2024; Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Detained Tibetan Demonstrators,” February 28, 2024. 44Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “Exclusive: Chinese Authorities Release Dozens of Tibetans 

Arrested for Dam Protests,” Radio Free Asia, February 27, 2024; Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Detained Tibetan Demonstrators,” February 28, 2024; Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, 

“China Releases Tibetan Monks and Residents Held for Dam Protests,” Radio Free Asia, March 

25, 2024. 45For more information on Tenzin Sangpo, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2024-00077. 46For more information on Tenzin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2024-00078. 47For more information on Dechen Drolma, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2024-00132. 48For more information on Dechen Palmo, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2024-00133. 49For more information on Yangkyi, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2024-00134. 50For more information on Rinchen Drolma, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2024-00135. 51For more information on Tsedrub, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2024-00136. 52For more information on Rigzin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2024-00137. 53For more information on Thubphur, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2024-00138. 54Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “Exclusive: Chinese Authorities Release Dozens of Tibetans 

Arrested for Dam Protests,” Radio Free Asia, February 27, 2024; Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Detained Tibetan Demonstrators,” February 28, 2024; Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, 

“China Releases Tibetan Monks and Residents Held for Dam Protests,” Radio Free Asia, March 

25, 2024. 55Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “China Releases Tibetan Monks and Residents Held for 

Dam Protests,” Radio Free Asia, March 25, 2024. 56Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Detained Tibetan Demonstrators,” February 28, 2024; 

Kalden Lodoe and Tenzin Pema, “After Protest, Tibetan Monastery Leader and Village Official 

Sent to Detention Center,” Radio Free Asia, March 7, 2024. 57Pelbar and Kalden Lodoe, “Authorities Urge ‘Stability’ amid Restrictions on Tibetans Due to 

Dam Protests,” Radio Free Asia, March 4, 2024. 58Tibet Watch, “Surveillance Ramped Up after Anti-Dam Protests,” May 29, 2024. 59Human Rights Watch, “‘Educate the Masses to Change Their Minds’: China’s Forced Relocation of Rural Tibetans,” May 2024, 9.
Tibet

253

60Human Rights Watch, “‘Educate the Masses to Change Their Minds’: China’s Forced Relocation of Rural Tibetans,” May 2024, 18, 45, 64, 77. 61Human Rights Watch, “‘Educate the Masses to Change Their Minds’: China’s Forced Relocation of Rural Tibetans,” May 2024, 31–33. 62Human Rights Watch, “‘Educate the Masses to Change Their Minds’: China’s Forced Relocation of Rural Tibetans,” May 2024, 44, 46. 63Pelbar, Tenzin Pema, and Gai Tho, “Historic Tibetan Buddhist Monastery Is Being Moved to 

Make Way for Dam,” Radio Free Asia, April 12, 2024; Tibet Watch, “Government Pressure Mounts 

on Buddhist Monastery in Tibet to Relocate,” April 15, 2024; Tibet Watch, “Demolition of Atsok 

Monastery Begins with Heightened Restrictions,” June 6, 2024. 64Pelbar, Tenzin Pema, and Gai Tho, “Historic Tibetan Buddhist Monastery Is Being Moved to 

Make Way for Dam,” Radio Free Asia, April 12, 2024; Tibet Watch, “Government Pressure Mounts 

on Buddhist Monastery in Tibet to Relocate,” April 15, 2024. 65Tibet Watch, “Demolition of Atsok Monastery Begins with Heightened Restrictions,” June 

6, 2024. 66Tibet Watch, “Demolition of Atsok Monastery Begins with Heightened Restrictions,” June 

6, 2024. 67U.S. Department of State, “Report to Congress on Access to Tibetan Areas—Section 4 of the 

Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 (8 U.S.C. 1182 note),” June 7, 2024. 68U.S. Department of State, “Report to Congress on Access to Tibetan Areas—Section 4 of the 

Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 (8 U.S.C. 1182 note),” June 7, 2024. 69U.S. Department of State, “Report to Congress on Access to Tibetan Areas—Section 4 of the 

Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 (8 U.S.C. 1182 note),” June 7, 2024. 70Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, “Mask Off, Barriers Remain: The Post Covid Reporting Environment in China 2023,” April 8, 2024, 3, 4. 71See, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: 

May 2024), 290–91; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 290–91. 72See, e.g., “Semkyi Dolma Is Sentenced to One and a Half Years in Prison,” Tibet Times, December 8, 2023; Tibet Watch, “Two Sisters Devoted to Community Service Detained in Eastern 

Tibet,” December 5, 2023. 73 “Semkyi Dolma Is Sentenced to One and a Half Years in Prison,” Tibet Times, December 8, 

2023; Zhacuo, “西藏当雄县一名藏人妇女遭中共非法判处一年零六个月徒刑” [In Damshung county, 

Tibet, Tibetan woman illegally sentenced to one year and six months in prison by CCP], Voice of 

Tibet, December 11, 2023. For more information on Semkyi Drolma, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00269. 74 “Semkyi Dolma Is Sentenced to One and a Half Years in Prison,” Tibet Times, December 8, 

2023; Zhacuo, “西藏当雄县一名藏人妇女遭中共非法判处一年零六个月徒刑” [In Damshung county, 

Tibet, Tibetan woman illegally sentenced to one year and six months in prison by CCP], Voice of 

Tibet, December 11, 2023. 75Tashi Namgyal, “A Tibetan Monk, Kunchok Dakpa, Is Arrested,” Tibet Times, November 8, 

2023; Pelbar, “Buddhist Monk in Tibet Confirmed as Detained by Chinese Authorities,” Radio 

Free Asia, November 8, 2023; Tibet Watch, “Tibetan Monk Detained Again under Suspicion of 

Contacts with Tibetans Abroad,” November 13, 2023; Pelbar, “དགེེ་འདུན་པ་དཀོོན་མཆོོག་གྲགས་པ་ལགས་སུ་ཡུན་རིིང་འདྲིི་རྩད་

རྗེེས་ཀློོད་ཡོོད་འདུག” [Monk Konchog Dragpa released after long detention], Radio Free Asia, January 23, 

2024. For more information on Konchog Dragpa, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00242. 76Tashi Namgyal, “A Tibetan Monk, Kunchok Dakpa, Is Arrested,” Tibet Times, November 8, 

2023; Pelbar, “Buddhist Monk in Tibet Confirmed as Detained by Chinese Authorities,” Radio 

Free Asia, November 8, 2023; Tibet Watch, “Tibetan Monk Detained Again under Suspicion of 

Contacts with Tibetans Abroad,” November 13, 2023; Pelbar, “དགེེ་འདུན་པ་དཀོོན་མཆོོག་གྲགས་པ་ལགས་སུ་ཡུན་རིིང་འདྲིི་རྩ

ཉར་རྗེེས་ཀློོད་ཡོོད་འདུག” [Monk Konchog Dragpa released after long detention], Radio Free Asia, January

23, 2024. 77Tashi Namgyal, “A Tibetan Monk, Kunchok Dakpa, Is Arrested,” Tibet Times, November 8, 

2023; Pelbar, “Buddhist Monk in Tibet Confirmed as Detained by Chinese Authorities,” Radio 

Free Asia, November 8, 2023; Tibet Watch, “Tibetan Monk Detained Again under Suspicion of 

Contacts with Tibetans Abroad,” November 13, 2023; Pelbar, “དགེེ་འདུན་པ་དཀོོན་མཆོོག་གྲགས་པ་ལགས་སུ་ཡུན་རིིང་འདྲིི་རྩ

ཉར་རྗེེས་ཀློོད་ཡོོད་འདུག” [Monk Konchog Dragpa released after long detention], Radio Free Asia, January

23, 2024. 78 “Two Tibetan Women Arrested by Chinese Police,” Tibet Times, December 2, 2023; Tibet 

Watch, “Two Sisters Devoted to Community Service Detained in Eastern Tibet,” December 5, 

2023; Luosang, “西藏石渠县两名藏人妇女遭警方非法拘捕” [In Sershul county, Tibet, two Tibetan 

women illegally detained by police], Voice of Tibet, December 6, 2023. For more information, see 

the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2023-00253 on Tsomo and 2023-00254 on 

Nyidron. 79Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Must Release Tibetan Singer Gegjom from Unjust Detention,” March 25, 2024; Dangqiu, “人权团体要求中国当局立即释放遭非法拘

留的西藏琼曲县歌手格炯” [Rights groups demand Chinese authorities immediately release singer 

Gegjom, who was illegally detained in Khyungchu county, Tibet], Voice of Tibet, March 26, 2024. 

For more information on Gegjom Dorje, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2024-00107. 80Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Must Release Tibetan Singer Gegjom from Unjust Detention,” March 25, 2024; Dangqiu, “人权团体要求中国当局立即释放遭非法拘

留的西藏琼曲县歌手格炯” [Rights groups demand Chinese authorities immediately release singer 

Gegjom, who was illegally detained in Khyungchu county, Tibet], Voice of Tibet, March 26, 2024; 
Tibet

254

Pelbar and Tenzin Dickyi, “Tibetan Singer Arrested for Song Lamenting Dalai Lama’s Absence,” 

Radio Free Asia, May 14, 2024. 81Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “China Must Release Tibetan Singer Gegjom from Unjust Detention,” March 25, 2024; Dangqiu, “人权团体要求中国当局立即释放遭非法拘

留的西藏琼曲县歌手格炯” [Rights groups demand Chinese authorities immediately release singer 

Gegjom, who was illegally detained in Khyungchu county, Tibet], Voice of Tibet, March 26, 2024; 

Pelbar and Tenzin Dickyi, “Tibetan Singer Arrested for Song Lamenting Dalai Lama’s Absence,” 

Radio Free Asia, May 14, 2024. 82Drolma Lhamo, “བོོད་མདོོ་སྨད་རྔ་པ་ཀིིརྟིི་དགོོན་པའིི་ཚོོགས་ཆེེན་དབུ་མཛད་ཟུར་པ་བློོ་བཟང་བཀྲ་ཤིིས་ལགས་སུ་ལོོ་གསུམ་གྱིི་བཙོོན་འཇུག་ཁྲིིམས་ཐག་བཅད་འདུག” [In Ngaba, eastern Tibet, ex-Kirti Monastery chant master Lobsang Tashi sentence

prison], Radio Free Asia, January 19, 2024; “Former Chant Master of Ngaba Kirti Monastery 

Sentenced to Three Years in Prison,” Tibet Times, January 20, 2024; Dolma Lhamo and Tenzin 

Pema, “Tibetan Monk Serving 3 Years in Prison for Leading Prayers during COVID Lockdown,” 

Radio Free Asia, January 23, 2024. For more information on Lobsang Tashi, see the Commission’s 

Political Prisoner Database record 2024-00047. 83Drolma Lhamo, “བོོད་མདོོ་སྨད་རྔ་པ་ཀིིརྟིི་དགོོན་པའིི་ཚོོགས་ཆེེན་དབུ་མཛད་ཟུར་པ་བློོ་བཟང་བཀྲ་ཤིིས་ལགས་སུ་ལོོ་གསུམ་གྱིི་བཙོོན་འཇུག་ཁྲིིམས་ཐག་བཅད་འདུག” [In Ngaba, eastern Tibet, ex-Kirti Monastery chant master Lobsang Tashi sentence

prison], Radio Free Asia, January 19, 2024; “Former Chant Master of Ngaba Kirti Monastery 

Sentenced to Three Years in Prison,” Tibet Times, January 20, 2024; Dolma Lhamo and Tenzin 

Pema, “Tibetan Monk Serving 3 Years in Prison for Leading Prayers during COVID Lockdown,” 

Radio Free Asia, January 23, 2024. 84 “China Jailed a Tibetan Singer for Three Years over Singing Tibetan Song,” Tibet Post International, November 27, 2023; Tashi Namgyal, “A Tibetan Singer Sentenced to Three Years 

in Prison.,” Tibet Times, November 27, 2023; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 

“Tibetan Singer Palden Sentenced to Three Years in Prison as China Intensifies Constraints on 

Freedom of Expression,” December 4, 2023. For more information on Palden, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00251. 85 “China Jailed a Tibetan Singer for Three Years over Singing Tibetan Song,” Tibet Post International, November 27, 2023; Tashi Namgyal, “A Tibetan Singer Sentenced to Three Years 

in Prison.,” Tibet Times, November 27, 2023; Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 

“Tibetan Singer Palden Sentenced to Three Years in Prison as China Intensifies Constraints on 

Freedom of Expression,” December 4, 2023. 86Tibet Watch, “Tibetan Jailed for Two Years following Secret Trial,” September 26, 2023; “Authorities Arrest Tibetan Man Twice for Possessing Dalai Lama Photo,” Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2023. For more information on Tsultrim, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2023-00240. 87Tibet Watch, “Tibetan Jailed for Two Years following Secret Trial,” September 26, 2023; “Authorities Arrest Tibetan Man Twice for Possessing Dalai Lama Photo,” Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2023. 88Tibet Watch, “Tibetan Jailed for Two Years following Secret Trial,” September 26, 2023; “Authorities Arrest Tibetan Man Twice for Possessing Dalai Lama Photo,” Radio Free Asia, September 27, 2023. 89 “Library Director of Ngaba Kirti Monastery Arrested,” Tibet Times, February 4, 2024; Pelbar, “ཀིིརྟིི་དགོོན་པའིི་དགེེ་འདུན་པ་བློོ་བཟང་ཐབས་མཁས་ལགས་འཛིིན་བཟུང་གིིས་གར་སོོང་ཆ་མེེད་དུ་གྱུར་ཡོོད་འདུག” [No further reports o

monk Lobsang Thabkhe after detention], Radio Free Asia, February 5, 2024; Dangqiu, “西藏阿坝

僧侣遭以与境外联系为由拘捕,另一僧侣政治犯刑满获释” [Ngaba, Tibet, monk detained for foreign 

contacts, another monk political prisoner released upon sentence completion], Voice of Tibet, February 5, 2024. For more information on Thabkhe Gyatso, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner 

Database record 2024-00053. 90 “Library Director of Ngaba Kirti Monastery Arrested,” Tibet Times, February 4, 2024; Pelbar, “ཀིིརྟིི་དགོོན་པའིི་དགེེ་འདུན་པ་བློོ་བཟང་ཐབས་མཁས་ལགས་འཛིིན་བཟུང་གིིས་གར་སོོང་ཆ་མེེད་དུ་གྱུར་ཡོོད་འདུག” [No further reports o

monk Lobsang Thabkhe after detention], Radio Free Asia, February 5, 2024; Dangqiu, “西藏阿坝

僧侣遭以与境外联系为由拘捕,另一僧侣政治犯刑满获释” [Ngaba, Tibet, monk detained for foreign 

contacts, another monk political prisoner released upon sentence completion], Voice of Tibet, February 5, 2024. 91Tibet Watch and Turquoise Roof, “Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s Digital Surveillance in Tibet,” February 2024, 13–17. 92Tibet Watch, “Forced to Install Phone App at Security Checkpoints,” September 6, 2023; 

Tibet Watch and Turquoise Roof, “Weaponising Big Data: Decoding China’s Digital Surveillance 

in Tibet,” February 2024. 93中华人民共和国宪法 [PRC Constitution], passed and effective December 4, 1982, amended 

March 11, 2018, art. 4; 中华人民共和国民族区域自治法 [PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], 

passed May 31, 1984, effective October 1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, art. 10; 中华人民

共和国国家通用语言文字法 [PRC Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language], 

passed October 31, 2000, effective January 1, 2001, art. 8. 94See, e.g., State Council Information Office, “新时代党的治藏方略的实践及其历史性成就” [CPC 

Policies on the Governance of Xizang in the New Era: Approach and Achievements], November 10, 2023; State Council Information Office, “民族区域自治制度在西藏的成功实践” [Successful 

Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet], September 6, 2015, sec. 6. These State Council 

white papers on the ethnic autonomy system in the Tibet Autonomous Region refer to the use 

of both Tibetan and Mandarin Chinese in schools, but do not mention use of other languages in 

educational or other contexts. 95Gerald Roche, “Articulating Language Oppression: Colonialism, Coloniality and the Erasure 

of Tibet’s Minority Languages,” Patterns of Prejudice 53, no. 5 (2019): 498.
Tibet

255

96United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of 

the Child, accessed June 30, 2024. China signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 

August 29, 1990, and ratified it on March 2, 1992. 97Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 44/25 

of November 20, 1989, entry into force September 2, 1990, art. 30. 98Tibet Watch, “Tibetan Language Classes Banned in Kardze,” October 10, 2023; Pelbar, “Chi- na Bans Tibetan Language in Schools in Sichuan Province,” Radio Free Asia, October 17, 2023. 99Tibet Watch, “Tibetan Language Classes Banned in Kardze,” October 10, 2023; Pelbar, “Chi- na Bans Tibetan Language in Schools in Sichuan Province,” Radio Free Asia, October 17, 2023. 100Pelbar, “China Expels Teacher for Pushing for Students to Use Tibetan Language,” Radio 

Free Asia, April 17, 2024. 101Pelbar and Tenzin Dickyi, “Students Banned from Speaking Tibetan in Sichuan Schools,” 

Radio Free Asia, May 8, 2024. 102Pelbar and Tenzin Dickyi, “Students Banned from Speaking Tibetan in Sichuan Schools,” 

Radio Free Asia, May 8, 2024. 103Pelbar, “Authorities Enforce Ban on Tibetan Students Taking Outside Classes,” Radio Free 

Asia, January 9, 2024. 104Pelbar, “Authorities Enforce Ban on Tibetan Students Taking Outside Classes,” Radio Free 

Asia, January 9, 2024. 105Gyal Lo, “The One Million Tibetan Children in China’s Boarding Schools,” New York Times

(opinion), September 15, 2023; “Returning Tibetans See a Changing Homeland,” Radio Free Asia, September 26, 2023. See also Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Re- port (Washington: May 2024), 290; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual 

Report (Washington: November 2022), 289. 106Gyal Lo, “The One Million Tibetan Children in China’s Boarding Schools,” New York Times

(opinion), September 15, 2023; “Returning Tibetans See a Changing Homeland,” Radio Free Asia, September 26, 2023. 107Gyal Lo, “The One Million Tibetan Children in China’s Boarding Schools,” New York Times

(opinion), September 15, 2023; “Returning Tibetans See a Changing Homeland,” Radio Free Asia, 

September 26, 2023; Tenzin Dorjee and Gyal Lo, “Erasing Tibet: Chinese Boarding Schools and 

the Indoctrination of a Generation,” Foreign Affairs, November 28, 2023; Micky Bristow, “Tibet 

Boarding Schools: China Accused of Trying to Silence Language,” BBC, March 10, 2024. 108Chun Han Wong, “China Doesn’t Want You to Say ‘Tibet’ Anymore,” Wall Street Journal, 

January 6, 2024. For more on historical and current names for Tibet, see Elliot Sperling, “Tubote, 

Tibet, and the Power of Naming,” elliotsperling.org, April 16, 2011. 109Yuanyue Dang, “Chinese Academics Want Tibet to Be Known as Xizang to Help ‘Reconstruct’ Image,” South China Morning Post, August 17, 2023; Chun Han Wong, “China Doesn’t 

Want You to Say ‘Tibet’ Anymore,” Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2024. 110State Council Information Office, “CPC Policies on the Governance of Xizang in the New 

Era: Approach and Achievements,” November 10, 2023. The white paper refers to the “Qinghai-Tibet Plateau” and mentions Tibet Airlines, but for geographical references to Tibet alone 

exclusively uses “Xizang.” 111Yuanyue Dang, “Chinese State Media Drops ‘Tibet’ for ‘Xizang’ after Release of Beijing 

White Paper,” South China Morning Post, December 10, 2023. 112Yuanyue Dang, “Chinese State Media Drops ‘Tibet’ for ‘Xizang’ after Release of Beijing 

White Paper,” South China Morning Post, December 10, 2023; Chun Han Wong, “China Doesn’t 

Want You to Say ‘Tibet’ Anymore,” Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2024; International Campaign 

for Tibet, “China’s External Propaganda on Tibet: Erasing Tibet to ‘Tell a Good Chinese Story,’” 

January 11, 2024.
256

X. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re

Findings

• Research published this past year indicated that the rate of 

imprisonment for Turkic and Muslim individuals in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was disproportionately high compared to China’s overall prison population. According to analysis published by the Uyghur Human Rights Project 

(UHRP) in April 2024, based on official figures, Uyghurs and 

members of other non-Han Chinese ethnic groups in the XUAR 

constituted 34 percent of the number of people estimated to be 

formally imprisoned in China, although these groups make up 

only one percent of the country’s population. UHRP’s analysis 

estimates that members of ethnic minority groups in the XUAR 

are formally imprisoned at more than 47 times the rate of Han 

Chinese people in the region, with 1 in every 26 ethnic minority 

XUAR residents imprisoned.

• During this reporting year, authorities in the XUAR maintained a system of forced labor that involved Turkic and Muslim individuals, shifting from a system involving former mass 

internment camp detainees to one that generally involves people who have not been detained. According to observers, officials 

use forced labor programs to tighten political and social control 

over Uyghur and other communities in the XUAR. Official data 

show that authorities planned to transfer at least one million 

“surplus laborers” through the “poverty alleviation” program 

in 2023—a figure that did not include all types of forced labor 

transfers—and that this figure included a significant increase 

in the number of cross-provincial labor transfers.

• New regulations took effect this reporting year in the XUAR 

that tightened limits on the religious practices of Muslim residents in the region. In December 2023, the XUAR People’s 

Congress amended the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA), which took effect on 

February 1, 2024. The revised regulations focus on the need to 

“sinicize” religious practices and venues, in line with government efforts to “sinicize” religious worship nationwide in recent 

years, and tighten restrictions on the establishment, construction, and renovation of places of worship. Human Rights Watch 

wrote that according to the text of the revised RRA, “[r]eligious 

venues are to be, effectively, training grounds that promote the 

values of the Chinese Communist Party to the people.”

• Reports emerged this past year showing that Chinese authorities have continued implementing policies that infringe upon 

Uyghurs’ rights to maintain their own language and culture. In 

June 2024, Human Rights Watch published research findings, 

which it produced together with the Norway-based organization 

Uyghur Hjelp, showing that between 2009 and 2023, Chinese 

officials had changed the names of more than 600 villages traditionally inhabited by Uyghurs into names that removed their 

cultural or religious significance. In September 2023, three U.N. 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

257

special rapporteurs issued a press release expressing “grave 

concern” over reports of a “significant expansion” of the boarding school system in the XUAR. The three experts expressed 

concern over the fact that the boarding schools into which Uyghur children are placed provide little to no instruction in the 

Uyghur language, and that these children are pressured to 

speak and learn only Mandarin Chinese.
258

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re

International Criticism of China over Human Rights Violations 

in the XUAR

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, countries and 

human rights organizations expressed concern over human rights 

conditions in the XUAR and called on the PRC to end human 

rights abuses in the region. In October 2023, 51 U.N. Member 

States released a joint statement calling upon China to end its 

human rights abuses in the XUAR, saying that “[m]embers of 

Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim minorities in Xinjiang 

continue to suffer serious violations of their human rights by the 

authorities of the People’s Republic of China.” 1 The statement, 

delivered at the U.N. General Assembly’s Third Committee, criticized China for its failure to follow up on recommendations made 

by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 

(OHCHR) in an August 2022 report that found that the PRC’s 

“arbitrary and discriminatory detention” of Uyghurs and other 

predominantly Muslim ethnic groups in the XUAR may constitute crimes against humanity.2 During the January 2024 session 

of the U.N. Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Chinese government’s human rights 

record, a number of U.N. Member States called on the PRC to 

improve human rights conditions in the XUAR and to implement 

the recommendations made in the OHCHR report.3 In its May 

31 response to the report of the U.N. Working Group on its UPR 

review, the PRC rejected such calls.4 In June 2024, human rights 

organizations called upon the OHCHR to take concrete actions 

to follow up on the recommendations it made in the August 2022 

report.5

Officials’ Comments on ‘‘Stability Maintenance’’ and 

Counterterrorism Signal Repression

During this reporting year, PRC officials stressed the importance 

of ‘‘maintaining social stability” and implementing counterterrorism 

efforts in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), in what 

human rights advocates feared signaled a continuation of repressive 

policies in the region. In August 2023, Chinese leader Xi Jinping 

visited Urumqi municipality, XUAR, where he told Communist Party and government officials that they must prioritize the maintenance of social stability and heighten counterterrorism efforts.6 In 

the same speech, Xi called on officials to “more deeply promote the 

sinicization of Islam and effectively control all types of illegal religious activities.”7 Human Rights Watch said Xi’s comments regarding counterterrorism policies indicated “continuing crimes against 

humanity” in the region.8 In January 2024, the State Council released a white paper in support of legal measures enacted in the 

XUAR over the previous decade in order to combat terrorism.9 In 

May 2024, during a visit to the XUAR, top security official Chen 

Wenqing called for the “normalization” of counterterrorism efforts 

in the region and echoed Xi’s calls regarding the need to maintain 

regional social stability.10 On the day after Chen’s visit, a Ministry 

of Public Security spokesman said at a press conference that there 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

259

had not been a terrorist attack in China in more than seven years.11

According to a May 2024 Radio Free Asia (RFA) report, risk analyst 

Anders Corr said in an interview that “[PRC officials] continue to 

prioritize so-called terrorism when there is no terrorism, and there 

never really were actual terrorists at all in Xinjiang. And so, that’s 

the unfortunate issue when they say that they’re normalizing counterterrorism.”12

Rate of Imprisonment Disproportionately High for Turkic Muslims

Research published this past year indicated that the rate of imprisonment for Turkic and Muslim individuals in the XUAR was 

disproportionately high compared to China’s overall prison population.13 According to analysis published by the Uyghur Human 

Rights Project (UHRP) in April 2024, based on official figures, Uyghurs and members of other non-Han Chinese ethnic groups in the 

XUAR constituted 34 percent of the number of people estimated 

to be formally imprisoned in China, although these groups make 

up only one percent of the country’s population.14 UHRP’s analysis 

estimates that members of ethnic minority groups in the XUAR are 

formally imprisoned at more than 47 times the rate of Han Chinese 

people in the region, with 1 in every 26 ethnic minority XUAR residents imprisoned.15 UHRP cited analysis of data on sentencing produced by the Xinjiang Victims Database showing that individuals in 

the XUAR had been sentenced to an average of 8.5 years in prison 

between 2016 and 2024.16

Uyghur Scholar Rahile Dawut Sentenced to Life Imprisonment

In September 2023, the San Francisco-based Dui Hua Foundation reported that, according to a Chinese government source, authorities had 

sentenced Uyghur folklore scholar Rahile Dawut to life in prison for 

a crime related to endangering state security.17 Rahile Dawut, who formerly taught at Xinjiang University, was “disappeared,” or secretly detained, by officials in December 2017.18 Authorities tried her in December 2018 at an intermediate people’s court in the XUAR, and the XUAR 

High People’s Court subsequently rejected an appeal.19 Rahile Dawut is 

one among hundreds of Turkic Muslim intellectuals whom authorities 

detained beginning in 2017 as they carried out mass detention in the 

XUAR.20

Additional cases of Turkic Muslims sentenced to long-term imprisonment that were reported this past year include the following:

• Asqar Azatbek.21 In December 2023, Radio Free Asia (RFA) 

reported that in December 2017, Chinese police detained 41-yearold Asqar Azatbek, an ethnic Kazakh and naturalized citizen of 

Kazakhstan, while he was on the Kazakhstan side of the border 

at the Khorgos International Center for Boundary Cooperation, 

which straddles the China-Kazakhstan border.22 Chinese police 

reportedly dragged him from a Kazakhstan border control office, 

where they had initially brought him for interrogation, into a 

car, and forcibly took him to the Chinese side of the border.23

In December 2018, he was convicted of espionage and fraud by 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

260

the Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture (KAP) branch of 

the XUAR High People’s Court and sentenced to 20 years in 

prison, connected in part to his relationship with an individual 

from the representative office of Kazakhstan in Urumqi who 

the court verdict stated worked for Kazakhstan’s intelligence 

agency.24 Authorities held Asqar Azatbek in custody in a prison 

in Gansu province.25 Authorities twice refused family members 

permission to visit him in prison, and when they were allowed 

a brief visit on the third attempt, they said he appeared “very 

unwell.”26

• Erkin Tewekkul.27 In May 2024, RFA reported that around 

2018, an unknown court sentenced Uyghur high school principal Erkin Tewekkul of Urumqi to 12 years in prison, possibly 

in connection with supporting “separatists” and being “twofaced.”28 Authorities detained him in mid-2017 because he had 

insufficiently praised the Chinese government and Communist 

Party during classes and school meetings.29 While interrogating 

him in 2017, authorities criticized him for comforting students 

several years earlier whose parents had been arbitrarily detained, and accused him of “separatism.”30

As in the past reporting year,31 reports emerged documenting the 

deaths of individuals in prison or shortly after they were held in 

prison. Examples include the following:

• Abdusemet Rozi, a 57-year-old Uyghur educator, researcher, 

and poet, died in a prison in or near Atush (Atushi) city, Kizilsu (Kezilesu) Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture, in August 2023.32

Authorities detained Abdusemet Rozi in 2017 and sentenced 

him to 20 years in prison in 2019 before releasing him for health 

reasons in 2021 and detaining him again in September 2022.33

Authorities summoned members of his family after his death 

to inform them that he had died due to a heart problem, but 

they reportedly intimidated the family so they would not make 

inquiries about his death, including whether or not he had been 

tortured.34 Officials took his body directly to a cemetery instead 

of returning it to his family members.35

• Muhter Nesirdin, a baker who was around 60 years old, 

died in a prison hospital in the XUAR in June 2023 after 

vomiting blood due to an unknown condition.36 Authorities 

reportedly sentenced him to 10 years in prison in 2017 on 

unknown charges, for reasons including his children’s participation in family Quran studies.37 Police only allowed family 

members to see Muhter Nesirdin’s face and not his body after 

his death.38

• Memettursun Imin, 32, was one of six individuals from 

Haneriq (Hannanlike) town, Yengisheher (Shule) county, 

Kashgar prefecture, confirmed to have died in prison.39 The 

cause of his death was unclear, but he was reportedly serving 

a prison term on a charge or charges related to accessing foreign websites.40 Authorities detained around 120 people from 

his village in 2017, often detaining older residents for having listened to religious readings at weddings and funerals, 

and detaining younger residents for reasons related to their 

mobile phone usage.41 Memettursun Imin’s wife, 29-year-old 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

261

Uyghur Nurimangul Hashim, died following a police interrogation after viewing her husband’s body, possibly from a 

heart attack or from being beaten by police.42 Her father, 

Hashim Qurban, died in prison three years earlier, and her 

mother, Gulqiz Helihem, was serving a prison sentence.43

Both parents were detained after authorities accused them 

of engaging in “religious extremism.” 44

AUTHORITIES DETAIN ETHNIC KAZAKH JOURNALISTS AND SCHOLARS

During this reporting year, authorities detained a number of ethnic Kazakh journalists and intellectuals in the XUAR. Examples 

include the following:

• Authorities in Urumqi detained Xinjiang TV journalists 

Kairat Domalin and Kuandyk Koben in or around April 

2024.45 As of July 2024, information regarding their where- abouts and any charges against them remained unknown.46

In an interview with RFA, Serikzhan Bilash, the founder of 

Atajurt Kazakh Human Rights, said authorities may have de- tained Kuandyk Koben because of his documentation of histor- ic buildings marginalized by officials in the XUAR.47 According 

to Serikzhan Bilash, authorities also detained several other 

well-known ethnic Kazakh journalists who had worked for the 

Xinjiang Daily newspaper and various magazines.48

• In the latter part of 2023, police in the XUAR took 45-yearold scholar Duman Zhaqyp into custody after he had been 

placed under “soft detention” for five years.49 He previously 

worked as an associate researcher at the Language Research 

Institute of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences.50 It was 

unclear where authorities held Duman Zhaqyp following his 

2023 detention, or whether they filed any charges against 

him.51 RFA reported that according to a member of Ata- jurt Kazakh Human Rights who is close to Duman Zhaqyp’s 

friends and relatives, authorities had placed him under soft 

detention because of his research on history and Kazakh language and literature.52 Serikzhan Bilash also told RFA that 

authorities had recently detained more than a dozen ethnic 

Kazakhs in the XUAR literary sphere.53

U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR RAISES CASE OF GULSHAN ABBAS

In June 2024, U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders Mary Lawlor called on PRC authorities to provide information 

regarding the whereabouts and health of imprisoned Uyghur doctor 

Gulshan Abbas, stating that she was “. . . appalled by the continued imprisonment of Gulshan Abbas in apparent retaliation for 

her sister’s criticism of the Chinese authorities’ treatment of Uyghurs.”54 In December 2020, relatives of Gulshan Abbas, citing an 

unnamed source, reported that Chinese authorities had sentenced 

her to 20 years in prison in March 2019.55 A Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs spokesman subsequently confirmed that authorities had sentenced Gulshan Abbas to prison.56 Authorities initially detained her 

in the XUAR, in September 2018, six days after her sister Rushan 

Abbas spoke at a think tank in Washington, D.C. about Uyghur 

rights issues.57
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Forced Labor Involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR Residents

During this reporting year, authorities in the XUAR maintained a 

system of forced labor that involved Turkic and Muslim individuals, 

shifting from a system involving former mass internment camp de- tainees to one that generally involves people who have not been de- tained.58 According to observers, officials use forced labor programs 

to tighten political and social control over Uyghur and other commu- nities in the XUAR.59 Under the framework of “poverty alleviation,” 

XUAR government authorities reportedly planned to significantly 

increase the transfer of ethnic minority workers to provinces outside 

the XUAR in 2023.60 Research produced by scholar Adrian Zenz in- dicated Chinese officials’ recent expansion of forced labor transfers 

and plans to continue them through at least 2025.61 Official data 

show that authorities planned to transfer at least one million “sur- plus laborers” through the “poverty alleviation” program in 2023—a 

figure that did not include all types of forced labor transfers—and 

that this figure included a significant increase in the number of 

cross-provincial labor transfers.62

In conjunction with forced labor programs targeting rural Uyghurs, authorities have confiscated land held by Uyghur farmers 

and transferred the land use rights of Uyghur farmers to state-run 

cooperatives and developers.63 Farmers, who are forced into wage labor, reportedly receive little to no compensation for the loss of their 

farmland.64 In one example, official media reported in November 

2023 that in a town in Mongghulkure (Zhaosu) county, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture (KAP), over 90 percent of agricultural 

land use rights had been transferred, and more than 500 laborers in 

one of the town’s villages had been transferred, following the transfer of more than 1,600 acres of the village’s land.65 In May 2024, 

RFA reported that a Uyghur official from Ghulja (Yining) county, 

Ili KAP, had been sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2019, years 

after he advocated for local farmers who were being forced to sell 

their land to a company developing a tourist site.66 In April 2024, 

authorities detained a Uyghur villager in Qumul (Hami) municipality after she submitted a complaint to the government and posted 

a video on the social media platform Douyin in which she protested 

against officials’ confiscation of her land.67 Police deleted the video 

posted by the villager, known as Beliqiz, who had made a living 

by cultivating less than two acres of land.68 [For more information 

on forced labor involving Turkic and Muslim XUAR residents, see 

Chapter 14—Business and Human Rights.]
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Updated ILO Handbook Targets Uyghur Forced Labor

In February 2024, the International Labour Organization (ILO) updated its guidelines on forced labor surveys to include a new chapter on 

state-imposed forced labor that discusses forced labor conditions prevalent in the XUAR and Tibetan areas of China.69 Scholar Adrian Zenz 

noted that the 2024 ILO Handbook included discussion of “labor transfers” targeting minority populations, as well as the assertion that states 

use forced labor for political and not just economic reasons, both of which 

apply to the cases of Uyghur and Tibetan forced labor.70 While the ILO 

had published a preliminary set of guidelines to measure forced labor 

in 2012, these guidelines were limited by their technical nature and did 

not fully describe conditions such as the state-imposed forced labor that 

is common in the Uyghur case.71 The ILO also published a set of more 

widely known forced labor indicators in 2012, but these indicators were 

not designed to measure state-imposed forced labor occurring outside of 

detention facilities, such as the type of labor employed by PRC authorities in the XUAR and Tibetan areas.72 [For more information on the 

updated ILO guidelines, see Chapter 10—Human Trafficking.]

Population Control Measures Reduce Uyghur Birth Rates

Reports published this past year documented the reduction in 

birth rates in recent years among the Uyghur population in the 

XUAR, due to authorities’ implementation of population control 

measures in the region. An analysis of official PRC data published 

in March 2024 by Björn Alpermann of the University of Würzburg 

in Germany showed that birth restrictions enforced against Uyghur 

women in the XUAR were among the factors that had led to a decrease in the growth rate of the Uyghur population.73 Alpermann 

noted that the increase in the Uyghur population in the last decade 

had also been stunted by factors including the mass detention of 

young men and women in the XUAR, and, indirectly, by the separation of children from their parents.74 Alpermann additionally noted 

that 2020 census data showed an increase in the Han Chinese population in the XUAR between 2010 and 2020, which he attributed 

to state-led migration of Han Chinese to the region.75 Both Alpermann, in his piece, and Zenz, in a separate article, wrote that 

PRC officials had attempted to “optimize” the ethnic composition 

of the XUAR through methods including birth restrictions on the 

Uyghur population and increasing the Han Chinese population in 

the region.76 In July 2023, in its submission in advance of the U.N. 

Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review of the Chinese 

government’s human rights record, the Uyghur Human Rights Project highlighted the PRC’s efforts to reduce the birth rate of the Uyghur population through forced sterilization and other forced family 

planning measures.77

Congressional Hearing Sheds Light on Organ Harvesting

At a March 2024 Commission hearing, experts testified about 

the practice of organ harvesting in China, and the state-sponsored 

trade in human organs, which caters to both foreign and domestic patients.78 Scholar Matthew Robertson of Australian National 
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264

University attested to the vulnerability of Uyghurs to organ harvesting, due to factors including the forced collection of biometric 

data in detention and the lack of accountability for deaths in custody.79 Commission Chair Chris Smith and Co-Chair Jeff Merkley 

called for the passage of the Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act, 

which authorizes sanctions for those involved in the illegal trafficking of human organs.80

Freedom of Religion

XUAR government officials curtailed Muslim residents’ freedom 

to practice their religious beliefs, including by holding Turkic Mus- lims in detention for observing their faith.81 During this reporting 

year, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and XUAR Communist Party Sec- retary Ma Xingrui emphasized the need to “sinicize” Islam in the 

region, which both officials tied to the issue of regional security.82 As 

in previous reporting years,83 XUAR authorities placed restrictions 

on Muslims’ observance of Ramadan.84 An Economist reporter ob- served during a visit to the XUAR that Muslim residents appeared 

to be prohibited from fasting during the Ramadan period, and some 

mosques in Urumqi and Turpan municipality had been closed, repurposed, or partially demolished.85 Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported 

that officials in different cities in the region used surveillance, the 

distribution of free food, and mandatory attendance at events to 

prevent Muslims from fasting.86 RFA also reported that during the 

Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha (Qurban Eid in Uyghur) on June 17, 

security personnel in various locations in the XUAR held activities 

for Uyghurs aimed at distancing them from observing the religious 

elements of the holiday and strengthening their loyalty to the Chinese government and Communist Party.87 For instance, on the eve 

of the holiday, in Guchung (Qitai) county, Changji Hui Autonomous 

Prefecture, police asked Uyghur “relatives” with whom they had 

been matched in an earlier surveillance program to watch movies 

about communism at a museum.88
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

265

Amended Regulations Further Restrict Religious Freedom

in the XUAR

New regulations took effect this reporting year in the XUAR that 

tightened limits on the religious practices of Muslim residents in the 

region. In December 2023, the XUAR People’s Congress amended the 

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations on Religious Affairs 

(RRA), which took effect on February 1, 2024.89 The revised regulations 

focus on the need to “sinicize” religious practices and venues, in line with 

government efforts to “sinicize” religious worship nationwide in recent 

years, and tighten restrictions on the establishment, construction, and 

renovation of places of worship.90 In addition, the revised regulations 

contain a new chapter mandating official control over religious education 

and ensuring the cultivation of “patriotic religious talents.”91 The RRA 

were first issued in 199492 and last amended in 2014.93 The 2014 regulations broadened XUAR officials’ authority to limit religious practices, 

control online expression, and restrict the wearing of beards or attire 

perceived to have religious connotations.94 Human Rights Watch wrote 

that according to the text of the revised RRA, “[r]eligious venues are to 

be, effectively, training grounds that promote the values of the Chinese 

Communist Party to the people.”95

[For more information on official restrictions on Muslims’ right to 

practice their faith throughout China, see Chapter 3—Freedom of 

Religion.]

Official Policies Violate Uyghurs’ Right to 

Maintain Their Own Language and Culture

Reports emerged this past year showing that Chinese authorities 

have continued implementing policies that infringe upon Uyghurs’ 

right to maintain their own language and culture.96 The freedom of 

ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities is guaranteed by the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law97

and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 

Social and Cultural Rights.98 In June 2024, Human Rights Watch 

published research findings, which it produced together with the 

Norway-based organization Uyghur Hjelp, showing that between 

2009 and 2023, Chinese officials changed the names of more than 

600 villages traditionally inhabited by Uyghurs into names that removed their cultural or religious significance.99 Officials implemented most of the name changes between 2017 and 2019, at a time of 

escalating repression of human rights in the XUAR, in southern 

areas of the region where Uyghurs comprise the majority of the population.100 Authorities altered village names containing references 

to Uyghurs’ cultural and religious practices, as well as to Uyghur 

historical narratives, and replaced them with names such as “Happiness,” “Unity,” and “Harmony.”101 Reacting to the changes in an 

interview with RFA, Maya Wang, acting China director at Human 

Rights Watch, said, “On a very fundamental level, erasing the symbols of people, the language and culture, is about erasing who they 

are and teaching them to fear.”102
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266

UYGHUR CHILDREN IN BOARDING SCHOOLS AT RISK OF 

LOSING LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

In September 2023, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, and Special 

Rapporteur on education issued a press release expressing “grave 

concern” over reports of a “significant expansion” of the boarding 

school system in the XUAR.103 The three experts expressed concern 

over the fact that the boarding schools into which Uyghur children 

are placed provide little to no instruction in the Uyghur language, 

and that these children are pressured to speak and learn only Mandarin Chinese.104 The experts also voiced concern over the forcible 

separation of children from their families and communities, saying 

that the policy would “undermine their ties to their cultural, religious and linguistic identities.”105 The experts also noted the recent 

closure of schools in the XUAR where students had been taught in 

Uyghur and other ethnic minority languages.106 Many of the ethnic 

minority children placed in boarding schools have reportedly had 

at least one parent in detention, and authorities have placed some 

children in orphanages or other state-run facilities while forcing 

or coercing their parents to work.107 The forcible displacement of 

ethnic minority children has been carried out in violation of the 

PRC Law on the Protection of Minors and the U.N. Convention on 

the Rights of the Child, which the PRC has signed and ratified.108

[For information on the placement of Tibetan children in boarding 

schools, see Chapter 17—Tibet.]

Transnational Repression of Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims

Reports published this past year documented the PRC’s continued transnational repression of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, 

through harassment and intimidation, to prevent them from speaking out about human rights conditions in the XUAR.109 In February 

2024, authorities in Turkey detained six individuals for allegedly 

spying on local Uyghurs and Uyghur groups on behalf of PRC authorities.110 In May, shortly after Xi Jinping conducted a state visit 

to France, a group of unidentified individuals gathered at the home 

of Paris-based Uyghur Gulbahar Jelilova, rang the doorbell of her 

apartment, and called her cell phone.111 Dilnur Reyhan, president of 

the European Uyghur Institute, said the visit may have been meant 

to intimidate Gulbahar Jelilova, who was previously detained at 

multiple mass internment camps in the XUAR.112

UYGHURS IN THAILAND

A group of more than 40 Uyghur asylum seekers remained in 

immigration detention in Bangkok, Thailand, reportedly due to PRC 

pressure on Thai authorities not to allow them to seek refuge in a 

third country.113 The detainees were among 500 Uyghurs who fled 

the XUAR to Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries around 

a decade ago in hopes of reaching Turkey.114 In February 2024, two 

U.N. working groups and six U.N. special rapporteurs wrote a letter 

to the Thai government expressing concern about the conditions in 

which the Uyghurs were being held and asking for an investigation into the deaths of five Uyghurs previously held in immigration 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

267

detention, attributing the deaths to “their prolonged detention, inhumane conditions in which they were held, and inadequate medical care.”115 [For more information on the transnational repression 

of Turkic Muslims, see Chapter 20—Human Rights Violations in the 

U.S. and Globally.]
268

Notes to Chapter 18—Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

1United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and James Kariuki, “Human 

Rights Violations in Xinjiang: Joint Statement at the UN Third Committee,” October 18, 2023, 

updated November 9, 2023; Louis Charbonneau, Human Rights Watch, “UN Member Countries 

Condemn China’s Crimes Against Humanity,” October 23, 2023. Later in October, the government 

of Fiji announced its withdrawal from the statement. 2United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office and James Kariuki, “Human 

Rights Violations in Xinjiang: Joint Statement at the UN Third Committee,” October 18, 2023, 

updated November 9, 2023; Louis Charbonneau, Human Rights Watch, “UN Member Countries 

Condemn China’s Crimes Against Humanity,” October 23, 2023; Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” August 31, 2022, para. 148. For more 

information on the August 2022 report, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 

Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 304–5. 3U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/56/6, March 11, 2024; “China Grilled over Human Rights Record at UN,” 

Deutsche Welle, January 23, 2024; “At a UN Review, China Basks in the Flattery of Friendly 

Countries,” Economist, January 25, 2024; International Service for Human Rights, “China’s 4th 

Universal Periodic Review at the UN: An Explainer for Civil Society and Journalists,” January 

11, 2024. For more information on the January 2024 Universal Periodic Review of China, see 

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “UPR Stakeholders’ Submissions Flooded with 

PRC-Sympathetic Reports,” January 30, 2024; The PRC’s Universal Periodic Review and the Real 

State of Human Rights in China, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 

118th Cong. (2024). 4U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—

China, Addendum, A/HRC/56/6/Add.1, May 31, 2024. See also U.N. Human Rights Council, Report 

of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review—China, A/HRC/56/6, March 11, 2024. 5Human Rights Watch, “China: UN Should Act on Crimes Against Humanity,” June 20, 2024; 

Emma Farge, “Campaigners Urge UN Rights Chief to Act on China Xinjiang Abuse Report,” 

Reuters, June 21, 2024. 6“习近平在听取新疆维吾尔自治区党委和政府、新疆生产建设兵团工作汇报时强调:牢牢把握新疆

在国家全局中的战略定位 在中国式现代化进程中更好建设美丽新疆” [When listening to the work 

reports of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee and Government and the 

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Xi Jinping stressed: firmly grasp Xinjiang’s strategic position in the overall national situation and better build a beautiful Xinjiang in the process 

of Chinese-style modernization], Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central People’s Government, August 

26, 2023; Helen Davidson, “Xi Urges More Work to ‘Control Illegal Religious Activities’ in Xinjiang 

on Surprise Visit,” Guardian, August 28, 2023; Kinling Lo, “Chinese Leader Xi Jinping Doubles 

Down on ‘Social Stability’ as Top Priority for Xinjiang while Pushing Economic Development,” 

South China Morning Post, August 27, 2023. 7“习近平在听取新疆维吾尔自治区党委和政府、新疆生产建设兵团工作汇报时强调:牢牢把握新疆

在国家全局中的战略定位 在中国式现代化进程中更好建设美丽新疆” [When listening to the work 

reports of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee and Government and the 

Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Xi Jinping stressed: firmly grasp Xinjiang’s strategic position in the overall national situation and better build a beautiful Xinjiang in the process 

of Chinese-style modernization], Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central People’s Government, August 

26, 2023; Helen Davidson, “Xi Urges More Work to ‘Control Illegal Religious Activities’ in Xinjiang 

on Surprise Visit,” Guardian, August 28, 2023. 8Human Rights Watch, “China: Unrelenting Crimes Against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs,” 

August 31, 2023. 9State Council Information Office, “中国的反恐怖主义法律制度体系与实践” [China’s Legal 

Framework and Measures for Counterterrorism], January 23, 2024; Yuanyue Dang, “‘China 

Strikes Hard at Terrorism’: Beijing’s New White Paper Praises Its Tough Measures in Hong 

Kong and Xinjiang,” South China Morning Post, January 23, 2024. 10“陈文清在新疆调研时强调 着力推进反恐维稳法治化常态化 确保新疆稳定、全国稳定” [Chen 

Wenqing stressed during his inspection of Xinjiang that efforts should be made to promote the 

legalization and normalization of counterterrorism and stability maintenance to ensure stability 

in Xinjiang and the entire country], Xinhua, May 26, 2024; Yuanyue Dang, “In Xinjiang, China’s 

Security Chief Calls for ‘Normalisation of Counterterrorism,’” South China Morning Post, May 

27, 2024; Uyghar and Alim Seytoff, “In Xinjiang, China’s Security Chief Calls for Normalization 

of Counterterrorism Steps,” Radio Free Asia, May 30, 2024. 11Guo Chaokai, “中国公安部:全国连续7年多未发生暴恐案事件” [China’s Ministry of Public 

Security: No violent terrorist incidents have occurred in the country for more than seven consecutive years], China News Service, May 27, 2024; “陈文清在新疆调研时强调 着力推进反恐维稳法治化

常态化 确保新疆稳定、全国稳定” [Chen Wenqing stressed during his inspection of Xinjiang that 

efforts should be made to promote the legalization and normalization of counterterrorism and stability maintenance to ensure stability in Xinjiang and the entire country], Xinhua, May 26, 2024. 12Uyghar and Alim Seytoff, “In Xinjiang, China’s Security Chief Calls for Normalization of 

Counterterrorism Steps,” Radio Free Asia, May 30, 2024. 13Ben Carrdus and Peter Irwin, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “UHRP Analysis Finds 1 in 

26 Uyghurs Imprisoned in Region with World’s Highest Prison Rate,” April 25, 2024. See also “A 

Simple Model to Estimate Sentence Numbers from Prosecution Numbers in Xinjiang,” Xinjiang 

Victims Database Blog, May 8, 2024. 14Ben Carrdus and Peter Irwin, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “UHRP Analysis Finds 1 in 26 

Uyghurs Imprisoned in Region with World’s Highest Prison Rate,” April 25, 2024.
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

269

15Ben Carrdus and Peter Irwin, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “UHRP Analysis Finds 1 in 26 

Uyghurs Imprisoned in Region with World’s Highest Prison Rate,” April 25, 2024. 16Ben Carrdus and Peter Irwin, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “UHRP Analysis Finds 1 in 26 

Uyghurs Imprisoned in Region with World’s Highest Prison Rate,” April 25, 2024. 17Dui Hua Foundation, “Life Sentence for Professor Rahile Dawut Confirmed,” September 21, 

2023. 18Shohret Hoshur and Gulchehra Hoja, “Noted Uyghur Folklore Professor Serving Prison Term 

in China’s Xinjiang,” Radio Free Asia, July 13, 2021. 19Dui Hua Foundation, “Life Sentence for Professor Rahile Dawut Confirmed,” September 21, 

2023; Edward White, “A Disappearance in Xinjiang,” Financial Times, April 26, 2024. 20Edward White, “A Disappearance in Xinjiang,” Financial Times, April 26, 2024; Uyghur 

Human Rights Project, “Detained and Disappeared: Intellectuals Under Assault in the Uyghur 

Homeland,” May 21, 2019. For more information on Rahile Dawut, see the Commission’s Political 

Prisoner Database record 2018-00552. 21For more information on Asqar Azatbek, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2024-00142. For the transliteration of Asqar Azatbek’s name, see “Asqar Azatbek, Entry 

915,” Xinjiang Victims Database (www.shahit.biz), accessed June 12, 2024. 22 “Police Abducted and Arrested Kazakh Citizen: Chinese Police Officers,” Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2023; Shöhret Hoshur, “Xitay saqchilirining qazaqistan wetendishi esqer azatbegni chégra 

atlap tutup ketkenliki delillendi” [It has been confirmed that the Chinese police have detained 

Asqar Azatbek, a citizen of Kazakhstan, crossing the border], Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2023. 23 “Police Abducted and Arrested Kazakh Citizen: Chinese Police Officers,” Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2023; Shöhret Hoshur, “Xitay saqchilirining qazaqistan wetendishi esqer azatbegni chégra 

atlap tutup ketkenliki delillendi” [It has been confirmed that the Chinese police have detained 

Asqar Azatbek, a citizen of Kazakhstan, crossing the border], Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2023. 24 “Police Abducted and Arrested Kazakh Citizen: Chinese Police Officers,” Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2023; Shöhret Hoshur, “Xitay saqchilirining qazaqistan wetendishi esqer azatbegni chégra 

atlap tutup ketkenliki delillendi” [It has been confirmed that the Chinese police have detained 

Asqar Azatbek, a citizen of Kazakhstan, crossing the border], Radio Free Asia, December 20, 2023; 

“Asqar Azatbek, Entry 915,” Xinjiang Victims Database (www.shahit.biz), accessed June 12, 2024. 25Shohret Hoshur, “Kazakh Jailed on Spy Charge in China Seeks Transfer to Kazakhstan,” Radio Free Asia, December 1, 2023; Zarina Mukanova, “Continuous Fight for Her Relative,” Remote 

Ethnography XUAR (blog), June 17, 2024. 26Zarina Mukanova, “Continuous Fight for Her Relative,” Remote Ethnography XUAR (blog), 

June 17, 2024. 27For more information on Erkin Tewekkul, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 

record 2024-00143. 28Shohret Hoshur, “‘Two-Faced’ Uyghur Principal Jailed for 12 Years for Supporting ‘Separatists,’” Radio Free Asia, May 24, 2024; Shöhret Hoshur, “14-Ottura mektepning mudiri erkin tewekkül 

‘Ikki yüzlimichilik’ bilen eyiblinip 12 yilliq késilgen” [The principal of the No. 14 High School was 

accused of being ‘two-faced’ and sentenced to 12 years in prison], Radio Free Asia, May 21, 2024. 

Authorities use the term “two-faced” to describe ethnic minority individuals who they say appear 

to support the Chinese Communist Party, but privately disagree with official policies toward 

ethnic minorities. Leela Jacinto, “Breaking the Silence on China’s ‘Two-Faced’ Campaign against 

Uighurs,” France 24, July 1, 2020; Fan Lingzhi, Cao Siqi, and Liu Xin, “New Documentary Reveals 

Some Senior Local Officials Support Terrorism, Greenlight ‘Toxic’ Textbooks in Xinjiang for 1st 

Time,” Global Times, March 26, 2021. 29Shohret Hoshur, “‘Two-Faced’ Uyghur Principal Jailed for 12 Years for Supporting ‘Separatists,’” Radio Free Asia, May 24, 2024; Shöhret Hoshur, “14-Ottura mektepning mudiri erkin 

tewekkül ‘Ikki yüzlimichilik’ bilen eyiblinip 12 yilliq késilgen” [The principal of the No. 14 

High School was accused of being ‘two-faced’ and sentenced to 12 years in prison], Radio Free 

Asia, May 21, 2024. 30Shohret Hoshur, “‘Two-Faced’ Uyghur Principal Jailed for 12 Years for Supporting ‘Separatists,’” Radio Free Asia, May 24, 2024; Shöhret Hoshur, “14-Ottura mektepning mudiri erkin tewekkül 

‘Ikki yüzlimichilik’ bilen eyiblinip 12 yilliq késilgen” [The principal of the No. 14 High School was 

accused of being ‘two-faced’ and sentenced to 12 years in prison], Radio Free Asia, May 21, 2024. 31Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 307–8. 32Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Educator, Poet Confirmed to Have Died in Prison in Xinjiang,” 

Radio Free Asia, November 21, 2023; Shöhret Hoshur, “ ‘Izchilar’ namliq kitabning aptori, ma’arip 

tetqiqatchisi abdusemet rozining türmide jan üzgenliki delillendi” [It has been confirmed that the 

author of the book ‘Followers’ and educational researcher Abdusemet Rozi died in prison], Radio 

Free Asia, November 20, 2023. For more information on Abdusemet Rozi, see the Commission’s 

Political Prisoner Database record 2024-00144. 33Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Educator, Poet Confirmed to Have Died in Prison in Xinjiang,” 

Radio Free Asia, November 21, 2023; Shöhret Hoshur, “ ‘Izchilar’ namliq kitabning aptori, ma’arip 

tetqiqatchisi abdusemet rozining türmide jan üzgenliki delillendi” [It has been confirmed that the 

author of the book ‘Followers’ and educational researcher Abdusemet Rozi died in prison], Radio 

Free Asia, November 20, 2023. 34Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Educator, Poet Confirmed to Have Died in Prison in Xinjiang,” 

Radio Free Asia, November 21, 2023; Shöhret Hoshur, “ ‘Izchilar’ namliq kitabning aptori, ma’arip 

tetqiqatchisi abdusemet rozining türmide jan üzgenliki delillendi” [It has been confirmed that the 

author of the book ‘Followers’ and educational researcher Abdusemet Rozi died in prison], Radio 

Free Asia, November 20, 2023. 35Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Educator, Poet Confirmed to Have Died in Prison in Xinjiang,” 

Radio Free Asia, November 21, 2023; Shöhret Hoshur, “ ‘Izchilar’ namliq kitabning aptori, ma’arip 
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tetqiqatchisi abdusemet rozining türmide jan üzgenliki delillendi” [It has been confirmed that the 

author of the book ‘Followers’ and educational researcher Abdusemet Rozi died in prison], Radio 

Free Asia, November 20, 2023. 36 Shöhret Hoshur, “Naway muxter nesirdin tonur béshidin tutup kétilip türmide jan üzgen” [Baker 

Muhter Nesirdin was taken from a bakery and died in prison], Radio Free Asia, July 19, 2023; 

Shöhret Hoshur, “Türmide jan üzgen muxter nesirdinning bir oghli we küy’oghliningmu sanji türmis- ide ikenliki aydinglashti” [It has become clear that one of Muhter Nesirdin’s sons and his son-inlaw are also in Sanji Prison], Radio Free Asia, July 21, 2023. For more information on Muhter 

Nesirdin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2024-00170. 37 Shöhret Hoshur, “Naway muxter nesirdin tonur béshidin tutup kétilip türmide jan üzgen” [Baker 

Muhter Nesirdin was taken from a bakery and died in prison], Radio Free Asia, July 19, 2023; 

Shöhret Hoshur, “Türmide jan üzgen muxter nesirdinning bir oghli we küy’oghliningmu sanji türmis- ide ikenliki aydinglashti” [It has become clear that one of Muhter Nesirdin’s sons and his son-inlaw are also in Sanji Prison], Radio Free Asia, July 21, 2023. 38 Shöhret Hoshur, “Naway muxter nesirdin tonur béshidin tutup kétilip türmide jan üzgen” [Baker 

Muhter Nesirdin was taken from a bakery and died in prison], Radio Free Asia, July 19, 2023. 39Shohret Hoshur, “Questions Surround Uyghur Woman’s Sudden Death,” Radio Free Asia, 

April 25, 2024; Shöhret Hoshur, “Mehbus memettursun iminning türmidin jesiti chiqqan, ayali yürek 

késili qozghilip jan üzgen” [Prisoner Memettursun Imin’s body was released from prison, and his 

wife died of a heart attack], Radio Free Asia, April 24, 2024. For more information on Memettursun Imin, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2024-00147. The names of four 

of the other individuals from Khaneriq township who died in prison were Yusuf Musa, Memet 

Imin, Memet Abdulla, and Tursun Abdukerim. 40Shohret Hoshur, “Questions Surround Uyghur Woman’s Sudden Death,” Radio Free Asia, 

April 25, 2024. 41Shohret Hoshur, “Questions Surround Uyghur Woman’s Sudden Death,” Radio Free Asia, 

April 25, 2024; Shöhret Hoshur, “Mehbus memettursun iminning türmidin jesiti chiqqan, ayali yürek 

késili qozghilip jan üzgen” [Prisoner Memettursun Imin’s body was released from prison, and his 

wife died of a heart attack], Radio Free Asia, April 24, 2024. 42Shohret Hoshur, “Questions Surround Uyghur Woman’s Sudden Death,” Radio Free Asia, 

April 25, 2024; Shöhret Hoshur, “Mehbus memettursun iminning türmidin jesiti chiqqan, ayali yürek 

késili qozghilip jan üzgen” [Prisoner Memettursun Imin’s body was released from prison, and his 

wife died of a heart attack], Radio Free Asia, April 24, 2024. 43Shohret Hoshur, “Questions Surround Uyghur Woman’s Sudden Death,” Radio Free Asia, 

April 25, 2024; Shöhret Hoshur, “Mehbus memettursun iminning türmidin jesiti chiqqan, ayali yürek 

késili qozghilip jan üzgen” [Prisoner Memettursun Imin’s body was released from prison, and his 

wife died of a heart attack], Radio Free Asia, April 24, 2024. 44Shohret Hoshur, “Questions Surround Uyghur Woman’s Sudden Death,” Radio Free Asia, 

April 25, 2024; Shöhret Hoshur, “Mehbus memettursun iminning türmidin jesiti chiqqan, ayali yürek 

késili qozghilip jan üzgen” [Prisoner Memettursun Imin’s body was released from prison, and 

his wife died of a heart attack], Radio Free Asia, April 24, 2024. For more information, see the 

Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2024-00152 on Hashim Qurban and 2024-00153 

on Gulqiz Helihem. 45Liu Bangyu, “人权组织:新疆电视台两人被警方带走后下落不明” [Human rights organization: Two Xinjiang TV Station staff members are missing after being taken away by police], 

Radio Free Asia, June 28, 2024; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Chinese Authorities Arrest 

2 Ethnic Kazakh TV Journalists in Xinjiang,” July 2, 2024. For more information, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database records 2024-00154 on Kairat Domalin and 2024-00155 on 

Kuandyk Koben. 46Liu Bangyu, “人权组织:新疆电视台两人被警方带走后下落不明” [Human rights organization: Two Xinjiang TV Station staff members are missing after being taken away by police], 

Radio Free Asia, June 28, 2024; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Chinese Authorities Arrest 2 

Ethnic Kazakh TV Journalists in Xinjiang,” July 2, 2024. 47Liu Bangyu, “人权组织:新疆电视台两人被警方带走后下落不明” [Human rights organization: Two Xinjiang TV Station staff members are missing after being taken away by police], 

Radio Free Asia, June 28, 2024. 48Liu Bangyu, “人权组织:新疆电视台两人被警方带走后下落不明” [Human rights organization: Two Xinjiang TV Station staff members are missing after being taken away by police], 

Radio Free Asia, June 28, 2024. 49Gu Ting, “新疆社科院副研究员杜曼被软禁五年后下落不明” [Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences Associate Researcher Duman is missing after five years of soft detention], Radio Free Asia, 

December 20, 2023; “Duman Zhaqyp, Entry 77606,” Xinjiang Victims Database (www.shahit.biz), 

accessed July 12, 2024. 50Gu Ting, “新疆社科院副研究员杜曼被软禁五年后下落不明” [Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences Associate Researcher Duman is missing after five years of soft detention], Radio Free Asia, 

December 20, 2023; “Duman Zhaqyp, Entry 77606,” Xinjiang Victims Database (www.shahit.biz), 

accessed July 12, 2024. 51Gu Ting, “新疆社科院副研究员杜曼被软禁五年后下落不明” [Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences Associate Researcher Duman is missing after five years of soft detention], Radio Free Asia, 

December 20, 2023. 52Gu Ting, “新疆社科院副研究员杜曼被软禁五年后下落不明” [Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences Associate Researcher Duman is missing after five years of soft detention], Radio Free Asia, 

December 20, 2023. 53Gu Ting, “新疆社科院副研究员杜曼被软禁五年后下落不明” [Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences Associate Researcher Duman is missing after five years of soft detention], Radio Free Asia, 

December 20, 2023.
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

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54Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “China: Authorities Must Provide 

Information on Imprisoned Uyghur Doctor,” June 19, 2024. For more information on Gulshan 

Abbas, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00002. 55 Joshua Lipes, “Gulshan Abbas, Sister of Uyghur Activist in Exile, Confirmed Jailed after 

Missing for 27 Months,” Radio Free Asia, December 31, 2020. 56Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press 

Conference on December 31, 2020,” December 31, 2020. 57Rushan Abbas, “Opinion: My Aunt and Sister in China Have Vanished. Are They Being Punished for My Activism?,” Washington Post, October 19, 2018. 58Adrian Zenz, “Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Assessing the Continuation of Coercive Labor Transfers in 2023 and Early 2024,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 14, 2024, 22–23; Adrian Zenz, “The Conceptual Evolution of Poverty Alleviation 

through Labour Transfer in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” Central Asian Survey 42, 

no. 4 (October 2, 2023): 649–73; Ruth Ingram, “When ‘Poverty Alleviation’ Means Forced Labor 

for Uyghurs,” China Project, October 26, 2023. 59 “The Evolution of Forced Labour in Xinjiang,” Economist, May 30, 2024; Adrian Zenz, “Forced 

Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Assessing the Continuation of Coercive Labor Transfers in 2023 and Early 2024,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 14, 2024, 

22–23. 60Adrian Zenz, “Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Assessing the Continuation of Coercive Labor Transfers in 2023 and Early 2024,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 14, 2024, 25–26. See also Adrian Zenz, “The Conceptual Evolution of Poverty 

Alleviation through Labour Transfer in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” Central Asian 

Survey 42, no. 4 (October 2, 2023): 649–73. 61Adrian Zenz, “Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Assessing the Continuation of Coercive Labor Transfers in 2023 and Early 2024,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 14, 2024, 21, 23, 25, 28. 62Adrian Zenz, “Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Assessing the Continuation of Coercive Labor Transfers in 2023 and Early 2024,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 14, 2024, 26. 63Adrian Zenz, “Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Assessing the 

Continuation of Coercive Labor Transfers in 2023 and Early 2024,” China Brief, Jamestown 

Foundation, February 14, 2024, 22, 27; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Official Jailed after Refusing 

Land Acquisition,” Radio Free Asia, May 10, 2024. See also “The Evolution of Forced Labour in 

Xinjiang,” Economist, May 30, 2024; Laura T. Murphy and Nyrola Elimä, Sheffield Hallam University, Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice, “Input for the Report on Trafficking 

in the Agricultural Sector Submitted to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Trafficking 

in Persons, Especially Women and Children: Agricultural Sector Forced Labor in the Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region,” January 25, 2022, 3–4. 64Adrian Zenz, “Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Assessing the Continuation of Coercive Labor Transfers in 2023 and Early 2024,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 14, 2024, 22, 27; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Official Jailed after Refusing Land 

Acquisition,” Radio Free Asia, May 10, 2024. 65Shang Jie, Zhao Minghao, and Wang Yizhao, “新疆昭苏:村集体收入倍增的产业‘密码’” 

[Xinjiang Zhaosu: The industry ‘code’ for doubling the village collective income], Guangming 

Daily, November 7, 2023; Adrian Zenz, “Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Assessing the Continuation of Coercive Labor Transfers in 2023 and Early 2024,” China 

Brief, Jamestown Foundation, February 14, 2024, 27. 66 Shöhret Hoshur, “Térilghu yerlerge olturaq oy sélishqa qarshi turghan idare bashliqi abdumanap 

hakimjan türmige tashlan’ghan” [Abdumanap Hakimjan, department head who opposed the construction of residential areas on cultivated land, was imprisoned], Radio Free Asia, May 7, 2024; 

Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Official Jailed after Refusing Land Acquisition,” Radio Free Asia, May 

10, 2024. For more information on Abdumanap Hakimjan, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner 

Database record 2024-00157. 67 Shöhret Hoshur, “Qumulda ‘Bizge ige chiqidighan dölet yoqmu?’ dep chuqan salghan béliqiz 

xanim tutqun qilin’ghan” [Ms. Beliqiz in Qumul, who asked “Is there no country to help us?,” was 

detained], Radio Free Asia, May 10, 2024; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Woman Who Complained 

about Land Grab Arrested by Authorities in Xinjiang,” Radio Free Asia, May 15, 2024. For more 

information on Beliqiz, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2024-00156. 68 Shöhret Hoshur, “Qumulda ‘Bizge ige chiqidighan dölet yoqmu?’ dep chuqan salghan béliqiz 

xanim tutqun qilin’ghan” [Ms. Beliqiz in Qumul, who asked “Is there no country to help us?,” was 

detained], Radio Free Asia, May 10, 2024; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Woman Who Complained 

about Land Grab Arrested by Authorities in Xinjiang,” Radio Free Asia, May 15, 2024. 69 International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Handbook on Forced 

Labour Surveys,” 2024, 147–70; Adrian Zenz, “Updated ILO Forced Labor Guidelines Directly 

Target Uyghur Forced Labor,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 14, 2024, 28, 30. 

See also International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and Children,” 2012. State-imposed forced labor 

is prohibited by ILO Conventions Nos. 29 and 105. International Labour Organization, ILO 

Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, June 28, 1930; International 

Labour Organization, ILO Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, 

January 17, 1959. 70Adrian Zenz, “Updated ILO Forced Labor Guidelines Directly Target Uyghur Forced Labor,” 

China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 14, 2024, 30. See also International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Handbook on Forced Labour Surveys,” 2024, 11, 149–50, 

160, 168, 170.
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

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71Adrian Zenz, “Updated ILO Forced Labor Guidelines Directly Target Uyghur Forced Labor,” 

China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 14, 2024, 29. See also International Labour Organization, “Hard to See, Harder to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults 

and Children,” 2012; Adrian Zenz, “Measuring Non-Internment State-Imposed Forced Labor in 

Xinjiang and Central Asia: An Assessment of ILO Measurement Guidelines,” Journal of Human 

Trafficking, November 20, 2023, 2–3, 12–15, 17, 19–23. 72Adrian Zenz, “Updated ILO Forced Labor Guidelines Directly Target Uyghur Forced Labor,” 

China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, April 14, 2024, 28–9. See also Adrian Zenz, “Measuring 

Non-Internment State-Imposed Forced Labor in Xinjiang and Central Asia: An Assessment of 

ILO Measurement Guidelines,” Journal of Human Trafficking, November 20, 2023, 2–3, 12–15, 

17, 19–23. 73Björn Alpermann, “A Demographic Snapshot of Xinjiang,” Remote Ethnography XUAR (blog), 

March 6, 2024; “Björn Alpermann,” ResearchGate, accessed July 13, 2024. 74Björn Alpermann, “A Demographic Snapshot of Xinjiang,” Remote Ethnography XUAR (blog), 

March 6, 2024. See also Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Statistics Bureau and Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region Seventh National Population Census Leading Group Office, “新

疆维吾尔自治区第七次全国人口普查公报 (第一、二、三、四、五号)”[Bulletin of the Seventh National Population Census of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)], Tianshan Net, June 14, 2021; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Bureau of Statistics and Xinjiang 

Survey Team, National Bureau of Statistics, “新疆维吾尔自治区2022年国民经济和社会发展统计公

报” [Statistical Communiqué on the National Economic and Social Development of the Xinjiang 

Uyghur Autonomous Region in 2022], March 28, 2023, reprinted in China Statistical Information 

Net (中国统计信息网), April 14, 2023. 75Björn Alpermann, “A Demographic Snapshot of Xinjiang,” Remote Ethnography XUAR (blog), 

March 6, 2024. 76Björn Alpermann, “A Demographic Snapshot of Xinjiang,” Remote Ethnography XUAR (blog), 

March 6, 2024; Adrian Zenz, “Sexual Violence and Birth Prevention: Conceptualizing Beijing’s 

Attacks on Uyghur Reproductive Capacities as a Settler Colonialist Strategy of Attritional Genocide,” Cambridge Journal of Law, Politics, and Art, July 1, 2024. 77Uyghur Human Rights Project, “UHRP Submits Comprehensive Report for UN Consideration 

of China’s Human Rights Record,” July 18, 2023. 78Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Ethan Gutmann, 

China Studies Research Fellow, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation), 1–3; Stopping the 

Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Matthew Robertson, Doctoral candidate, 

Australian National University (Canberra) and co-author, “Execution by Organ Procurement: 

Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,” American Journal of Transplantation), 1–20; Stopping 

the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Maya Mitalipova, Director of the 

Human Stem Cell Laboratory at the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology), 1–6; Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be 

Done?, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Tom Oliverson, Texas State Representative, Chair of the Insurance Committee, Texas 

House of Representatives), 1–3. 79Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of Matthew Robertson, 

Doctoral candidate, Australian National University (Canberra) and co-author, “Execution by Organ Procurement: Breaching the Dead Donor Rule in China,” American Journal of Transplantation), 15–16. See also Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, 

Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (submitted 

testimony of Anne Zimmerman, Columbia University and Chair, New York City Bar Association 

Bioethical Issues Committee), 4, 5, 12. 80Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (opening statement of Congressman 

Christopher Smith, Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China), 4; Stopping the 

Crime of Organ Harvesting—What More Must Be Done?, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (opening statement of Senator Jeff Merkley, Co-Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China), 2. See also Stop Forced Organ Harvesting 

Act of 2023, H.R. 1154, S. 761, 118th Cong. (2023), secs. 4, 6. 81See, e.g., Shohret Hoshur, “Police Say Uyghur Man Has Been Serving 15-Year Sentence since 

2017,” Radio Free Asia, September 26, 2023; Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Spy Turns to Religion and 

Lands in Xinjiang Prison,” Radio Free Asia, April 30, 2024. 82 Jeremy Goldkorn, “Xi Jinping Orders Officials to Persist with Hard-Line Xinjiang Policies,” 

China Project, August 27, 2023; “牢牢把握新疆在国家全局中的战略定位 在中国式现代化进程中更好

建设美丽新疆” [Firmly grasp the strategic position of Xinjiang in the overall national situation 

and better build a beautiful Xinjiang in the process of Chinese-style modernization], People’s Daily, August 27, 2023; Jewlan and Uyghar, “China Pushes ‘Sinicization of Islam’ in Xinjiang as Ramadan Arrives,” Radio Free Asia, March 12, 2024; “新疆代表团举行全体会议并向中外媒体开放,”

[Xinjiang delegation holds plenary session and talks to Chinese and foreign media], Xinjiang

Daily, reprinted in People’s Daily, March 8, 2024. 83For information on official religious restrictions enforced during Ramadan in previous reporting years, see, e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 314–15; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report

(Washington: November 2022), 101, 311; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 

Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 283.
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84Chaguan, “What Ramadan Is like in Xinjiang,” Economist, April 11, 2024; Shohret Hoshur, 

“With Feasts and Patrols, China Tries to Keep Uyghurs from Fasting,” Radio Free Asia, April 5, 

2024; Alice Su and David Rennie, “How the Chinese State Is Hollowing Out Religion in Xinjiang,” 

April 23, 2024, in Drum Tower, Economist, 13:17. 85Chaguan, “What Ramadan Is like in Xinjiang,” Economist, April 11, 2024. 86Shohret Hoshur, “With Feasts and Patrols, China Tries to Keep Uyghurs from Fasting,” Radio 

Free Asia, April 5, 2024. 87Uyghar, “Police Host Activities for Uyghurs in Xinjiang on Islamic Holiday,” Radio Free Asia, 

July 3, 2024. 88Uyghar, “Police Host Activities for Uyghurs in Xinjiang on Islamic Holiday,” Radio Free Asia, 

July 3, 2024. For more information on programs that required Uyghurs to be matched with 

“relatives,” who were usually Han Chinese cadres or government workers, see CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 279–80; Congress

ional-Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report, (Washington: December 2020), 305. 89新疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务条例 [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations on Religious Affairs], passed December 22, 2023, effective February 1, 2024. For an unofficial English 

translation of the regulations, see “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Religious Affairs Regulations,” translated in China Law Translate, January 5, 2024. 90新疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务条例 [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations on Religious Affairs], passed December 22, 2023, effective February 1, 2024, arts. 5, 11, 14, 20, 22, 

25, 26; Martin Lavička, “A New Round of Restrictions Further Constrains Religious Practice in 

Xinjiang,” ChinaFile, Asia Society, April 19, 2024; Human Rights Watch, “China: Religious Regulations Tighten for Uyghurs,” January 31, 2024. See also National Religious Affairs Administration, 

国家宗教事务局令 [Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activities], passed June 

29, 2023, effective September 1, 2023, art. 50. 91新疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务条例 [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations on Religious Affairs], passed December 22, 2023, effective February 1, 2024, arts. 13–18; Human Rights 

Watch, “China: Religious Regulations Tighten for Uyghurs,” January 31, 2024; Martin Lavička, ‘‘A 

New Round of Restrictions Further Constrains Religious Practice in Xinjiang,” ChinaFile, Asia 

Society, April 19, 2024. 92Ma Pinyan and Yu Shangping, “新疆公民的宗教信仰自由受到尊重和保護” [The freedom of 

religious belief of Xinjiang citizens is respected and protected], People’s Daily, June 2, 2017; 新

疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务管理条例 [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations on Religious 

Affairs], issued July 16, 1994, effective October 1, 1994. 93新疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务条例 [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations on Religious Affairs], issued November 28, 2014, effective January 1, 2015; Human Rights Watch, “China: Religious Regulations Tighten for Uyghurs,” January 31, 2024. For more information on the 

2015 regulations, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2015 Annual Report (Washington: October 2015), 285. 94 Julia Famularo, Project 2049 Institute, “Chinese Religious Regulations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: A Veiled Threat to Turkic Muslims?” April 8, 2015; RFA Uyghur and 

Roseanne Gerin, “Religious Extremism Law Imposes New Restrictions on China’s Uyghurs,” 

Radio Free Asia, December 10, 2014. 95Human Rights Watch, “China: Religious Regulations Tighten for Uyghurs,” January 31, 2024. 96Human Rights Watch, “China: Hundreds of Uyghur Village Names Change,” June 18, 2024; 

Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “China: Xinjiang’s Forced Separations 

and Language Policies for Uyghur Children Carry Risk of Forced Assimilation, Say UN Experts,” 

September 26, 2023. For information on the implementation of such policies in prior years, see, 

e.g., Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 308–9; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 281–82; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report

(Washington: December 2020), 301–2. 97The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law contains protections for the languages, religious 

beliefs, and customs of ethnic minority “nationalities” in addition to a system of regional autonomy in designated areas. 中华人民共和国民族区域自治法 [PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law], 

passed May 31, 1984, effective October 1, 1984, amended February 28, 2001, arts. 10, 11, 21, 36, 

37, 47, 49, 53. 98 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, art. 27. China has 

signed but not ratified the ICCPR. United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed July 20, 2024; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 

2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 1. China signed the 

ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and ratified it on March 27, 2001. United Nations Treaty Collection, 

Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 

accessed July 20, 2024. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 

by U.N. General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of December 10, 1948, arts. 22, 27; Declaration 

on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 

adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992, arts. 2, 4. 99Human Rights Watch, “China: Hundreds of Uyghur Village Names Change,” June 18, 2024. 100Human Rights Watch, “China: Hundreds of Uyghur Village Names Change,” June 18, 2024; 

Gulchehra Hoja, “China Changes Names of 630 Uyghur Villages in Xinjiang: Report,” Radio Free 

Asia, June 24, 2024. 101Human Rights Watch, “China: Hundreds of Uyghur Village Names Change,” June 18, 2024; 

Gulchehra Hoja, “China Changes Names of 630 Uyghur Villages in Xinjiang: Report,” Radio Free 

Asia, June 24, 2024.
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102Gulchehra Hoja, “China Changes Names of 630 Uyghur Villages in Xinjiang: Report,” Radio 

Free Asia, June 24, 2024. 103Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “China: Xinjiang’s Forced Sepa- rations and Language Policies for Uyghur Children Carry Risk of Forced Assimilation, Say UN 

Experts,” September 26, 2023. 104Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “China: Xinjiang’s Forced Sepa- rations and Language Policies for Uyghur Children Carry Risk of Forced Assimilation, Say UN 

Experts,” September 26, 2023. 105Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “China: Xinjiang’s Forced Sepa- rations and Language Policies for Uyghur Children Carry Risk of Forced Assimilation, Say UN 

Experts,” September 26, 2023. 106Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “China: Xinjiang’s Forced Sepa- rations and Language Policies for Uyghur Children Carry Risk of Forced Assimilation, Say UN 

Experts,” September 26, 2023. 107Elise Anderson, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Coerced Kinship: The Pomegranate Flower 

Plan and the Forced Assimilation of Uyghur Children,” January 2022, 10; “Children of Detained 

Uyghur Parents Held in ‘Welfare Schools’ in China’s Xinjiang,” Radio Free Asia, August 16, 2021. 108Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 44/25 

of November 20, 1989, entry into force September 2, 1990, arts. 5, 9, 10, 29, 30; United Nations 

Treaty Collection, Chapter IV, Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, accessed 

July 21, 2024. China signed the Convention in 1990 and ratified it in 1992. Human Rights Watch, 

“China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families,” September 15, 2019. For more information 

on the placement of ethnic minority children into boarding schools in the XUAR, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 302, 

308–9; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 

2022), 281–82; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2020 Annual Report (Washington: 

December 2020), 301–2. 109See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “If I Disobey, My Family Will Suffer”: Collective 

Punishment of Human Rights Defenders’ Families in China—the Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders (2023),” April 15, 2024, 15–17; Safeguard Defenders, adapted 

from a research report by Yalkun Uluyol, “Targeted in Turkiye: China’s Transnational Repression 

Against Uyghurs,” 2023, 3, 5–20; Sam Judah, “China Using Families as ‘Hostages’ to Quash Uyghur Dissent Abroad,” BBC, July 31, 2023. For information on the transnational repression of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in previous years, see Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 315; Congressional-Executive Commission 

on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 310–11, 348–50; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2021 Annual Report (Washington: March 2022), 140. 110Diego Mendoza, “Turkey Detains Six People Accused of Spying on Uyghurs for China,” 

Semafor, February 20, 2024; Sinan Tavsan, “Turkey Detains 6 for Allegedly Spying on Uyghurs 

for China,” Nikkei, February 21, 2024; Arslan Tash, “Turkish Media Reveal Identities of Alleged 

Spies for China,” Radio Free Asia, March 1, 2024. One of the individuals was later released. 111Nuriman Abdureshid, “Uyghur Activist Moved to Safe Location after Perceived Threat in 

Paris,” Radio Free Asia, May 13, 2024. 112Nuriman Abdureshid, “Uyghur Activist Moved to Safe Location after Perceived Threat in 

Paris,” Radio Free Asia, May 13, 2024. For more information on Gulbahar Jelilova, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2019-00032. 113“Uyghur Migrants See No Release after a Decade in Bangkok Cells,” Radio Free Asia, March 

11, 2024; Jacob Goldberg, “UN Declined Offers to Assist Uyghur Asylum Seekers Detained in 

Thailand,” New Humanitarian, May 2, 2024. 114“Uyghur Migrants See No Release after a Decade in Bangkok Cells,” Radio Free Asia, March 

11, 2024. 115Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Letter from the Mandates of the 

Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; the Working Group on 

Arbitrary Detention; the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; the Special 

Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers; the Special Rapporteur on the human 

rights of migrants; the Special Rapporteur on minority issues; the Special Rapporteur on freedom 

of religion or belief and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrad- ing treatment or punishment, AL THA 2/2024, February 22, 2024, 1–3; Uyghur Human Rights 

Project, “UHRP Welcomes UN Letter on Arbitrary Detention Cases in Thailand, Urges Immediate 

Resettlement,” April 24, 2024.
275

XI. Hong Kong and Macau

Hong Kong and Mac

Findings

• As the Chinese Communist Party and government increas- ingly interfered with Hong Kong’s affairs in violation of the “one 

country, two systems” principle, the Hong Kong government 

continued to implement various repressive policies purportedly 

to protect national security. The arbitrary application of nation- al security laws has led to the imprisonment of dissidents and 

activists, further eroding fundamental freedoms in the city.

• Ongoing criminal prosecution on charges involving national 

security and sedition against individuals who peacefully exer- cised their rights included news media executives Jimmy Lai

and Chung Pui-kuen, human rights lawyer Chow Hangtung, and student activist Joshua Wong Chi-fung. • Hong Kong police issued warrants of arrest on at least 13 

exiled activists and offered rewards for information leading to 

their arrest. These individuals advocated for democratic reform 

and for imposing financial sanctions on Hong Kong and People’s 

Republic of China (PRC) officials who perpetrated human rights 

violations. A group of United Nations (U.N.) experts expressed 

serious concern over the case, saying that the Hong Kong gov- ernment was punishing people for political speech.

• Some foreign judges on Hong Kong’s highest court resigned, 

with one of them explaining the factors that had profoundly 

compromised the rule of law: 1) The National Security Law severely limited judges’ freedom of action; 2) the National People’s 

Congress Standing Committee could overturn judges’ decisions; 

and 3) authorities were intent on quashing even peaceful dissent.

• The Hong Kong government’s application to order unspecified 

social media companies to take down a popular protest song 

was granted by an appellate court, which reversed a lower court 

that denied the application based on protection of civil liberties 

considerations.

• Annual vigils commemorating the violent suppression of the 

1989 Tiananmen protests were no longer held. In past years, 

authorities initially denied applications to hold the vigils on 

public health grounds. More recently, no such applications have 

been made, because the organizing group dissolved after its core 

leaders became political prisoners.

• Allegations emerged this year of physical and sexual violence 

taking place at a juvenile detention facility. Prison guards reportedly abused political prisoners and sometimes did so using 

other inmates as proxies. Avenues through which abuse could 

be reported were ineffective because abusers exploited security 

camera blind spots and victims were too afraid to step forward 

publicly to file complaints.
276

Hong Kong and Mac

Introduction

As the Chinese Communist Party and government continued to 

interfere with Hong Kong’s affairs in violation of the “one country, 

two systems” principle, the Hong Kong government implemented 

various repressive policies purportedly to protect national security.1

The arbitrary application of national security laws has led to the 

prosecution and imprisonment of dissidents and activists, further 

eroding fundamental freedoms in the city.

Institutional Reform to Increase Party Control

The creation of a Party-controlled office suggests an increase in 

involvement in Hong Kong’s affairs by central authorities. The Hong 

Kong and Macao Work Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee held its first public meeting in July 2024, after being 

created pursuant to a plan that aimed to augment the Party’s centralized control.2 Led by the Party, the new office is an expansion of 

what was formerly an entity under the State Council, an affiliation 

which would be retained in name only.3 Some observers have interpreted the change as an indication that PRC authorities would take 

more direct control over Hong Kong affairs, which is inconsistent 

with the “one country, two systems” principle.4

Article 23 Legislation

Despite the existence of a set of national security laws passed in 

2020, Hong Kong authorities swiftly pushed through additional national security laws, something that they were unable to accomplish 

due to popular resistance two decades ago when the city tolerated 

political dissent. Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which is the equivalent of 

the city’s constitution, requires the Hong Kong government to enact 

laws to prohibit a range of acts that would undermine national security.5 The government’s previous attempt in 2003 to legislate in this 

area was abandoned after its plan was met with widespread protests involving half a million people.6 In 2024, and after a “near-total purge of the political opposition,”7 the government’s second attempt moved forward swiftly, and the law was passed in mid-March, 

shortly after a month-long public consultation during which the text 

of the bill remained undisclosed.8

Public participation in the legislative process diminished in 2024. 

Whereas over 90,000 submissions of public opinion were received 

in 2002, there were only 13,147 submissions in 2024.9 Submissions 

expressing opposition likewise dropped from over 35 percent to 0.71 

percent.10 Groups expressing concerns pointed to the vague definition of criminal offenses and the high bar for invoking a defense 

based on public interest.11

The new law, passed by a unanimous vote in the reconstituted 

Legislative Council,12 is titled Safeguarding National Security Ordinance.13 Supplementing the National Security Law passed by 

the National People’s Congress Standing Committee in June 2020, 

the new ordinance amended existing laws regarding four offenses (treason, insurrection, theft of state secrets and espionage, and 
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277

sabotage) and added the new offense of external interference.14 The 

amendments expand the scope of the offenses and increase the maximum sentence length.15 In addition, “[t]he Ordinance allows police 

to apply for extended pretrial detention, restrictions on suspects’ 

consultation with legal representatives, and restrictions on bail for 

national security cases. [The law] also authorizes punitive measures 

(including the termination of HKSAR [Hong Kong Special Administrative Region] passports) against ‘absconders’ overseas with pending warrants in the HKSAR and against individuals who provide 

absconders with funds or financial assets,” according to analysis by 

the Congressional Research Service.16

While the PRC government praised the Article 23 legislation for 

improving legal certainty and social stability,17 a spokesperson for 

the U.S. Department of State said it was “fast-tracked through the 

nondemocratically elected legislative council after a truncated public 

comment period,” and contains vaguely defined offenses that present potential risks to U.S. citizens and other American interests.18

Officials of the European Union and the United Nations expressed 

similar concerns that the legislation could be incompatible with international human rights law.19

Erosion of Fundamental Freedoms

Hong Kong officials continued to use national security as a pretext to systematically eliminate political dissent. Some notable examples are as follows:

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

• Apple Daily. As part of the Hong Kong government’s effort 

to restrict press freedom,20 police raided the pro-democracy 

newspaper Apple Daily, froze its assets, and arrested founder 

Jimmy Lai Chee-ying and several senior executives, forcing 

the newspaper to close in June 2021.21 Pleading not guilty, Lai 

stood trial in December 2023 on criminal charges of “collusion 

with foreign countries or external elements” and “conspiracy” to 

commit said offense under the National Security Law.22 Irregularities reported include allegations that a government witness 

suffered torture when he was detained in mainland China23

and that Lai’s legal team received death and rape threats and 

were the targets of online surveillance and cyber-attacks.24 As 

of June 2024, the prosecution had completed presenting evidence and the trial was adjourned for further submissions.25

• RSF representative denied entry. In April 2024, Hong 

Kong officials at the airport detained Aleksandra Bielakowska, who was an advocacy officer for Reporters Without Borders (RSF), deporting her after six hours of questioning during 

which she and her belongings were searched three times.26

Bielakowska was traveling to Hong Kong to meet with other 

journalists and to monitor Jimmy Lai’s trial.27 An RSF director 

said that the organization had “never experienced such blatant 

efforts by authorities to evade scrutiny of court proceedings in 

any country . . ..”28

• Stand News. The non-profit digital news outlet shuttered in 

December 2021 after police raided its newsroom and arrested 
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seven people on suspicion of conspiring to publish seditious materials, ultimately charging two of them, namely, former chief 

editor Chung Pui-kuen and acting chief editor Patrick Lam.

The trial concluded in June 2023, but the court twice postponed 

the verdict, which remained pending as of April 2024.29 In presenting the closing argument, defense counsel asserted that the 

accused were merely reporting the truth, consistent with the 

news outlet’s purpose.30

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

• Protest song ban. In May 2024, a spokesperson for YouTube 

confirmed that it had blocked access by viewers in Hong Kong 

to a popular protest song known as “Glory to Hong Kong” in 

compliance with a court order that enjoined unspecified defen- dants from distributing or reproducing the song.31 The subject 

order stemmed from a June 2023 application made by the Hong 

Kong government for an injunction to ban the song, citing the 

2020 National Security Law and alleging that the protest song 

had been used to insult the national anthem.32 The court that 

originally heard the case denied the government’s application, 

having weighed the government’s stated national security ob- jectives against the potential chilling effects on free speech;33

that decision, however, was overturned on appeal.34 According 

to Bloomberg, “[t]he injunction represents a potent new tool for 

the government to order the mass removal of content,”35 and 

the New York Times characterized the injunction as an attempt 

“to root out the remaining vestiges of political dissent in the 

city . . ..”36 Previously, Google, which owns YouTube, had resisted the government’s requests to bury search results for the song 

after it was erroneously played in two public events.37

• National anthem arrests. In June 2024, Hong Kong police arrested three people because they “turned their backs toward the pitch and did not stand for the playing of the national 

anthem” before a soccer game.38 In response to people booing 

the Chinese national anthem at sports events, the Legislative 

Council in 2020 passed a law requiring people to stand while 

the anthem is played on certain occasions; it also criminalizes 

public and intentional insults of the anthem, an offense that 

carries up to three years in jail.39

• National anthem at schools. In June 2024, the Education 

Bureau issued an inspection report faulting students’ voices being “slightly weak” when singing the national anthem, further 

advising that “[s]chools need to help students form a habit of 

singing the national anthem with confidence.”40 School inspectors received some pushback as they admonished two schools 

for failing to incorporate sufficient national security materials 

in the curriculum even though the schools served students with 

intellectual disabilities.41
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Tiananmen Commemoration

Consistent with the PRC government’s policy of silencing expression 

relating to the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen protests in 

Beijing municipality, the Hong Kong government has since 2020 banned 

the holding of vigils on the anniversary of June 4th at Victoria Park, 

breaking a three-decade-long tradition.42 This past year, the government 

likewise targeted other forms of commemoration of the event:

• ‘‘Pillar of Shame’’ sculpture. National security police in May 

2023 seized from a university storage unit an eight-meter-tall sculpture titled “Pillar of Shame” that artist Jens Galschiøt created to 

commemorate protesters who died during the 1989 protests.43 The 

statue had stood on the Hong Kong University campus for 24 years 

before the school removed it in December 2021.44 Police seized the 

sculpture as evidence of incitement to subversion in a criminal case 

against Lee Cheuk-yan, Albert Ho, and Chow Hang-tung, leaders of the group that had been organizing the annual vigils.45 In 

responding to the artist’s demand that the sculpture be returned to 

him, Secretary for Security Chris Tang said it was common for people to use “peaceful advocacy” and “artistic creations” as a pretext 

to endanger national security, adding that rights were not absolute 

and could be restricted on security grounds.46

• Banner display. In September 2023, postgraduate student Zeng 

Yuxuan pleaded guilty to a sedition charge and was sentenced to 

six months in jail for planning to publicly display a banner containing an image of the ‘‘Pillar of Shame’’ sculpture as part of a worldwide commemoration event.47

• Performance art. On June 3, 2024, police removed performance 

artist Sammu Chen from the location near Victoria Park where he 

was allegedly “causing chaos” after he mimed writing “8964” in the 

air, representing the June 4, 1989, date of the historical event at 

Tiananmen.48 Police detained Chen and took him to a police station 

before releasing him.49

FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

• Unauthorized assembly acquittal overturned. In January 2024, the Court of Final Appeal (Hong Kong’s highest court) 

overturned the High Court’s decision acquitting pro-democracy 

activist and barrister Chow Hang-tung for unauthorized assembly.50 Chow originally was sentenced to 15 months in prison 

based on allegations that she had made social media posts and 

had written newspaper articles calling for people to join the 

annual Tiananmen vigil in June 2021, which police had banned 

on public health grounds.51 Contrary to the High Court’s ruling, 

the Court of Final Appeal held that the legality of the ban could 

not be raised as a defense in a criminal proceeding.52

• Yuen Long Station mob attack commemoration. In 

July 2023, police carried out stop-and-search operations around 

Yuen Long, arresting 10 people, 2 of whom displayed items 

that showed support for the pro-democracy movement.53 Police 

also ordered journalists to register their identities and produce 

credentials.54 The police operations took place on the fourth 
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anniversary of the July 2019 mass attack on commuters at the 

Yuen Long subway station.55 Residents had accused police of 

having colluded with gang members in the 2019 mob attack.56

CIVIC PARTICIPATION

• 612 Fund. In August 2023, police arrested 10 individuals connected with the defunct 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund, which 

was created to provide assistance to protesters who were arrested or otherwise targeted by the government.57 The arrestees 

were suspected of “conspiring to collude with a foreign country 

or with external elements to endanger national security” and 

inciting a riot, according to a police statement.58 The arrests 

followed the May 2022 convictions of five of the fund’s former 

trustees for failing to register the fund.59

• Spark Alliance. Initially set up in 2016, Spark Alliance was 

a crowdfunded initiative that financed bail applications filed on 

behalf of people arrested during the 2019 protests.60 University 

student Yu Yan-yuk, one of four people arrested in December 

2019 in connection with Spark Alliance, was sentenced to one 

year and four months in prison by the District Court on the 

charge of money laundering.61

• Crackdown on other financial support for dissent. Po- lice likewise targeted other efforts that helped political dissi- dents, arresting four people in July 2023 and seven in May 2024 

for allegedly providing financial support to absconders from the 

National Security Law and for helping post seditious materials 

online.62 The May 2024 arrests were the first under the new 

Article 23 legislation and included Chow Hang-tung and her 

mother.63

• Hong Kong 47. In May 2024, the West Kowloon Magistrates’ 

Courts convicted 14 of 16 defendants who pleaded not guilty in 

a case where police arrested 47 individuals in connection with 

an informal primary election in July 2020 designed to improve 

coordination among pro-democracy candidates.64 Reuters char- acterized the proceedings as “Hong Kong’s biggest ever nation- al security trial against the city’s democratic opposition . . ..”65

Prosecutors had charged the defendants with subversion, alleg- ing that the defendants tried to gain control of the Legislative 

Council for the purpose of bringing down the local and central 

governments.66 Most defendants were denied bail and had 

spent over three years in detention since their January 2021 

arrests.67 As of June 2024, mitigation pleas were underway, and 

the defendants had not been sentenced.68

Judicial Independence

Following the convictions in the Hong Kong 47 case, Jonathan 

Sumption resigned from the Court of Final Appeal as an overseas 

non-permanent judge.69 Finding that the Hong Kong 47 decision “is 

symptomatic of a growing malaise in the Hong Kong judiciary,” Lord 

Sumption penned an op-ed saying that the ruling was legally indefensible because the Basic Law expressly authorized what the defendants set out to do with the informal primary election.70 He then 

proceeded to list factors that had “profoundly compromised” the rule 
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of law: 1) The National Security Law severely limited judges’ freedom of action; 2) the National People’s Congress Standing Committee could overturn judges’ decisions; and 3) authorities were intent 

on quashing even peaceful dissent.71 Lord Sumption observed that 

Hong Kong was “slowly becoming a totalitarian state” and found it 

unrealistic that him remaining on the court would help sustain the 

rule of law.72 Judge Lawrence Collins, who resigned at the same 

time as Lord Sumption, said he was leaving “because of the political 

situation in Hong Kong.”73 With their resignations, the number of 

overseas judges decreased from 15 to 8 as of June 2024.74

Prison Abuse

A Radio Free Asia article reported multiple instances of physical and sexual abuse at a detention facility called Pik Uk Correctional Institution, which housed part of the growing juvenile prison 

population of 450 individuals.75 Former detainees at the facility reported that prison guards would carry out abuses, sometimes using 

inmates as their proxies, by means including sexual assault, beating, slapping, and hitting palms and soles with a metal ruler.76 One 

alleged victim of sodomy required hospitalization, and a victim of 

beating attempted suicide.77 A former detainee reported discriminatory treatment of political prisoners, highlighting an example where 

guards subjected detainees to corporal punishment for singing a protest song but allowed others to sing songs that were not political.78

Mechanisms through which complaints of abuse can be made have 

been ineffective. Prison guards and their proxies reportedly exploit- ed security camera blind spots, which partly contributed to the fact 

that most complaints of abuse filed with the Correctional Services 

Department were found to be unsubstantiated.79 Likewise, Justices 

of the Peace, who are persons appointed by the government to visit 

custodial institutions or detained persons,80 fail to ameliorate the 

situation because victims are unwilling to approach them publicly 

for fear of reprisal.81

Transnational Repression

As extraterritorial enforcement is authorized under national security laws, Hong Kong authorities targeted exiled activists and exerted additional pressure by harassing their family members in Hong 

Kong. The arrest of a Hong Kong official in the United Kingdom also 

exposed the government’s scheme of monitoring exiled activists in 

an apparent effort to undermine their advocacy.82

• Bounties on exiled activists. In July and December 

2023, Hong Kong police issued warrants of arrest for 13 

overseas activists of Hong Kong origin based on national 

security charges. These individuals are—1) Kevin Yam, 2) 

Yuan Gong-yi, 3) Kwok Wing-hang, 4) Hui Chi-fung, 5) Mung 

Siu-tat, 6) Lau Cho-dik 7) Law Kwun-chung, 8) Kwok Fungyee, 9) Cheng Man-kit, 10) Fok Ka-chi, 11) Choi Ming-da, 12) 

Hui Wing-ting, and 13) Joey Siu.83 Police offered rewards 

of HK$1,000,000 each (approximately US$128,000) for information on the suspects, further stating that authorities 

would stop “activities that endanger national security” using 
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various methods including “cutting off proceeds from their 

crimes and other funding sources, as well as identifying their 

accomplices in Hong Kong and holding them accountable.” 84

Police also harassed some of the wanted individuals’ family 

members, summoning them for questioning and raiding their 

homes.85 In response to the bounties, four United Nations 

experts expressed serious concern and observed that “[t]he 

charges appear to seek to punish statements allegedly made 

by each individual criticising the Chinese government’s policies and their activities in support of democracy in Hong 

Kong.” 86 Similarly, a U.S. Department of State spokesperson 

condemned the Hong Kong police’s action, adding that “[t]he 

extraterritorial application of the Beijing-imposed National 

Security Law is a dangerous precedent that threatens the 

human rights and fundamental freedoms of people all over 

the world.” 87

• Assaults at APEC. Protesters, including activists from 

Hong Kong, were assaulted by people believed to be organized by PRC entities during Xi Jinping’s visit to San Francisco in November 2023 for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.88 In December, activists recounted 

at a press conference the harassment and assault they experienced or witnessed, which included one incident where 

a group of men threw an activist to the ground and beat 

him unconscious.89 About two dozen young Tibetan-American 

protesters also were victims of assault.90 The counterprotesters, wearing red headbands and red scarves, reportedly were 

bused to the location by the PRC embassy and consulates 

in the United States.91 Carrying PRC flags, the counterprotesters used flagpoles as weapons and the flags to cover the 

assault from view.92 A spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy 

denied responsibility and instead claimed that the counterprotesters were victims of assault.93 The violent acts, coupled with San Francisco police’s alleged inaction, prompted 

activists to express concern for their personal safety when 

conducting future advocacy work.94

• Surveillance through HKETOs. In May 2024, United 

Kingdom police arrested three individuals on national security charges for allegedly engaging in “information gathering, 

surveillance and acts of deception that were likely to materially assist the Hong Kong intelligence service.”95 One of the 

arrestees was an office manager of the Hong Kong Economic 

and Trade Office (HKETO) in London.96 While official sources 

did not disclose the specific facts underlying the charges, Hong 

Kong Chief Executive John Lee did not answer directly when 

asked whether “Hong Kong authorities had spent any resources to perform surveillance on individuals in Britain, including 

Hong Kong activists . . ..”97 In addition, Executive Council convenor Regina Ip said gathering intelligence on activists by Hong 

Kong’s overseas trade outposts was “legal.”98

[For more information on the Party’s efforts to repress fundamental freedoms abroad, see Chapter 20—Human Rights Violations in 

the U.S. and Globally.]
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283

Freedom of Religion

Recent national security legislation and government policies 

have put freedom of religion under threat, according to reports 

by advocacy groups Hong Kong Watch and the Committee for 

Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation.99 While people were allowed 

to worship, several factors provided “early warning signs” that 

further erosion of religious freedom would continue.100 One such 

sign is the practice of prosecuting religious leaders for political 

reasons under the broadly defined offenses in the 2020 National 

Security Law.101 Additionally, the law’s authorization of search 

and seizure prompted at least one major church to restructure 

in order to hedge against the risk of asset seizure by the government.102

Uncertainties created by the law also promoted self-censorship: 

One cardinal, for example, advised clergy to be cautious in their 

sermons, and the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese announced in May 

2022 that it would no longer hold masses commemorating the violent suppression of the Tiananmen protests in 1989.103 Increasing 

regulatory restrictions presented new challenges to religious groups, 

such as those that tried to raise funds to promote democratic values, 

those with international connections, and those that needed to rent 

space from government-subsidized schools.104

Authorities perceive religion as a political risk. Mainland author- ities have accused some religious groups of providing support to 

protesters,105 while a Party-owned news outlet advocated that an 

antiquated law authorizing warrantless searches on Chinese tem- ples should be extended to all religious groups, suggesting a policy 

direction of imposing additional restrictions on religion due to polit- ical considerations.106

Furthermore, the Hong Kong government has adopted the PRC 

policy of sinicizing religion, hosting and monitoring meetings on the 

topic.107 According to one practitioner, sinicization is a policy that 

casts out religious teaching that does not conform to the Party’s ideology.108 The emerging phenomenon of houses of worship displaying 

the PRC national flag, which was not standard practice in Hong 

Kong, might become the norm and represents increasing encroachment of political indoctrination in the religious space.109

Universal Periodic Review

On January 23, 2024, the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review held a meeting to examine China’s human rights record, 

during which 161 delegations made statements.110 Some Member 

States expressed concern about rapidly declining human rights and 

rule of law, recommending that the Hong Kong government repeal 

the National Security Law and discontinue the prosecution of individuals for exercising their fundamental rights, additionally noting 

the extraterritorial repression of advocacy work.111 They also called 

on the government to restore civil society and to protect political 

rights, as provided for in the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights (ICCPR).112 In response to the recommendations, 

China rejected calls to repeal the National Security Law, asserting 

that the law’s provisions and its enforcement were compliant with 
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284

the ICCPR, implicitly denying that it had intimidated human rights 

lawyers and journalists.113

Travel Advisories for Hong Kong and Macau

Shortly after the Article 23 legislation was passed in March 2024, 

the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 

Australia, and Taiwan advised travelers to exercise caution due to 

the arbitrary enforcement of national security laws in Hong Kong.114

Recognizing a similar risk in Macau, the U.S. Government also high- lighted that it had limited ability to provide emergency services to 

U.S. citizens in Macau because the PRC government required U.S. 

diplomatic personnel to be granted visas prior to traveling there.115

The Hong Kong government defended the national security laws 

and their enforcement, characterizing the travel advisories as inter- ference and scaremongering.116
285

Notes to Chapter 19—Hong Kong and Macau

1Michael C. Davis, Freedom Undone: The Assault on Liberal Values and Institutions in Hong 

Kong, (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 2024), 15–17. 2Chen Qingqing, “Newly Formed Top Office Overseeing HK, Macao Affairs Unveiled,” Global 

Times, July 11, 2023. 3Chen Qingqing, “Newly Formed Top Office Overseeing HK, Macao Affairs Unveiled,” Global Times, July 11, 2023; Gu Ting, “港澳辦改組 目標是穩定政權” [Hong Kong and Macao Office restructured; aims at stabilizing the regime], Radio Free Asia, October 7, 2023; Gao Feng, 

“港澳办改中共直属机构,党管香港终极目标‘一国一制’?” [Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office becomes an entity directly under the Party, is the end game of the Party governing Hong 

Kong “one country, two systems”?], Voice of America, March 17, 2023. 4Gao Feng, “港澳办改中共直属机构,党管香港终极目标‘一国一制’?” [Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office becomes an entity directly under the Party, is the end game of the Party governing Hong Kong “one country, two systems”?], Voice of America, March 17, 2023; “港澳辦改

組 目標是穩定政權” [Hong Kong and Macao Office restructured; aims at stabilizing the regime], 

Radio Free Asia, October 7, 2023. 5Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 

passed April 4, 1990, effective July 1, 1997, art. 23. 6Kelly Ng, “Article 23: What Is Hong Kong’s Tough New Security Law?,” BBC, March 25, 2024. 7Amnesty International, “Hong Kong: Opposition Figures Convicted in ‘Ruthless Purge’ of 47,” 

May 30, 2024. 8Amnesty International, “Hong Kong: Article 23 Legislation Takes Repression to ‘Next Level,’” 

March 8, 2024; “What Is Article 23, Hong Kong’s New Draconian National Security Law?,” Al 

Jazeera, March 19, 2024. 9Marcelo Duhalde, Dennis Wong, Sammy Heung, and Kahon Chan, “All You Need to Know 

about Hong Kong’s Domestic National Security Law,” South China Morning Post, March 20, 2024. 10Marcelo Duhalde, Dennis Wong, Sammy Heung, and Kahon Chan, “All You Need to Know 

about Hong Kong’s Domestic National Security Law,” South China Morning Post, March 20, 2024. 11Marcelo Duhalde, Dennis Wong, Sammy Heung, and Kahon Chan, “All You Need to Know 

about Hong Kong’s Domestic National Security Law,” South China Morning Post, March 20, 2024. 12Amnesty International, “Hong Kong: Passing of Article 23 Law a Devastating Moment for 

Human Rights,” March 19, 2024. 13 Instrument A305 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (Instrument A305). 14Hong Kong SAR Government, “Safeguarding National Security: Basic Law Article 23 Legislation. Public Consultation Document,” January 2024. 15Amnesty International, “What Is Hong Kong’s Article 23 Law? 10 Things You Need to Know,” 

Mary 22, 2024. 16Ricardo Barrios, “Hong Kong Adopts New National Security Ordinance: Article 23,” Congressional Research Service, April 1, 2024. 17Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of the CPC Central Committee and Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, “筑牢安全根基 加快由治及兴” [Strengthening the foundation of security; speeding up transition from good governance to prosperity], March 19, 2024. 18Vedant Patel, U.S. Department of State, “Department Press Briefing—March 19, 2024,” 

March 19, 2024. 19Volker Türk, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for 

Human Rights, “Rushed Adoption of National Security Bill a Regressive Step for Human Rights 

in Hong Kong—U.N. Human Rights Chief,” March 19, 2024; Council of the EU, “Hong Kong: 

Statement by the High Representative on Behalf of the European Union on the Adoption of New 

National Security Legislation,” March 19, 2024. 20Amnesty International, “Hong Kong: Jimmy Lai’s Sham Trial a Further Attack on Press 

Freedom,” December 15, 2023. 21Helen Davidson, “Hong Kong’s Apple Daily, Symbol of Pro-Democracy Movement, to Close,” 

Guardian, June 23, 2021; Lily Kuo, “Hong Kong Rallies Around Apple Daily after Arrest of 

Founder Jimmy Lai,” Guardian, August 11, 2020. 22Amnesty International, “Hong Kong: Jimmy Lai’s Sham Trial a Further Attack on Press 

Freedom,” December 15, 2023. 23Amy Hawkins, “Jimmy Lai Trial in Hong Kong Hears Evidence from ‘Tortured’ Witness,” 

Guardian, March 13, 2024. 24United Nations Human Rights Council, “Cooperation with the United Nations, Its Representatives and Mechanisms in the Field of Human Rights; Report of the Secretary-General,” A/

HRC/54/61, August 21, 2023. 25“The Witness: Live Update | Day 90 of Jimmy Lai’s Trial. Prosecution Finishes Presenting 

Evidence. Court Adjourns until July 24,” supportjimmylai.com, June 11, 2024. 26Reporters Without Borders, “Hong Kong: RSF Representative Detained and Deported on Attempt to Monitor Jimmy Lai’s National Security Trial,” April 10, 2024. 27Reporters Without Borders, “Hong Kong: RSF Representative Detained and Deported on Attempt to Monitor Jimmy Lai’s National Security Trial,” April 10, 2024. 28Reporters Without Borders, “Hong Kong: RSF Representative Detained and Deported on Attempt to Monitor Jimmy Lai’s National Security Trial,” April 10, 2024. 29Lea Mok, “Verdict in Sedition Trial against Hong Kong Outlet Stand News Set for October, Almost a Year after Trial Began,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 17, 2023; Hans Tse, “Verdict for Hong 

Kong Stand News Sedition Trial Postponed Again to August,” Hong Kong Free Press, April 24, 2024. 30Lea Mok, “Verdict in Sedition Trial against Hong Kong Outlet Stand News Set for October, 

Almost a Year after Trial Began,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 17, 2023. 31Sarah Zheng, “Google Blocks YouTube Videos of Hong Kong Protest Song after Court Order,” 

Bloomberg, May 15, 2024; High Court of Hong Kong SAR, Court of Appeals, Secretary for Justice 
Hong Kong and Macau

286

v Persons conducting themselves in any of the acts prohibited under paragraph 1(a), (b), (c), or 

(d) of the indorsement of claim, CACV 274/2023 & CAMP 303/2023, [2024] HKCA 442, May 8, 

2024, para. 105. 32Chang Che, “Hong Kong Asks Court to Stop Protest Anthem from Circulating Online,” New 

York Times, June 7, 2023. 33Kanis Leung, “A Hong Kong Court Rejects a Government-Requested Ban on Popular Protest 

Song after Google’s Defiance,” Associated Press, July 28, 2023; High Court of Hong Kong SAR, 

Court of First Instance, Secretary for Justice v Persons conducting themselves in any of the acts 

prohibited under paragraph 1(a), (b), (c), or (d) of the indorsement of claim, HCA 855/2023, [2023] 

HKCFI 1950, July 28, 2023, paras. 77–84. 34Sarah Zheng, “Google Blocks YouTube Videos of Hong Kong Protest Song after Court Order,” 

Bloomberg, May 15, 2024. 35Sarah Zheng, “Google Blocks YouTube Videos of Hong Kong Protest Song after Court Order,” 

Bloomberg, May 15, 2024. 36Chang Che, “Hong Kong Asks Court to Stop Protest Anthem from Circulating Online,” New 

York Times, June 7, 2023. 37Fan Wang, “Hong Kong Anthem: Google Won’t Alter Search Results amid Protest Song Row,” 

BBC, December 15, 2022. 38“Three Arrested in Hong Kong for ‘Insulting’ Chinese Anthem at World Cup Qualifier,” Agence 

France-Press, reprinted in Guardian, June 7, 2024. 39Sum Lok-kei, “Explainer | Hong Kong’s National Anthem Law: When You Can Ignore the 

Song, and When You Have to Stand,” South China Morning Post, June 6, 2020. 40Education Bureau, Hong Kong SAR Government, “Inspection Annual Report: 2022/23,” accessed July 1, 2024, para. 2.3.5. 41Matthew Leung and Lee Heung Yeung, “Hong Kong Officials Want Louder Singing of 

National Anthem in Schools,” Radio Free Asia, June 27, 2024; “校外评核报告保良局罗氏信托

学校” [External School Review Report: Po Leung Kuk Law’s Foundation School], April 2024; 

“校外评核报告明爱乐群学校” [External School Review Report: Caritas Resurrection School], 

March 2024. 42Ken Moritsugu and Kanis Leung, “Silence and Heavy Security in China and Hong Kong 

Mark 35th Anniversary of the Tiananmen Crackdown,” Associated Press, June 5, 2024; “Hong 

Kong: Tens of Thousands Defy Ban to Attend Tiananmen Vigil,” BBC, June 4, 2020; Yaqiu Wang, 

“A Changed Hong Kong Is Stamping Out Memories of the Tiananmen Square Massacre,” Diplomat, June 2, 2024; Lilian Cheng, “Explainer | Remembering the Tiananmen Crackdown: What 

Happened to Hong Kong’s June 4 Vigil?,” South China Morning Post, June 4, 2024. 43Peter Lee, “Hong Kong National Security Police Seize Tiananmen Crackdown Statue for 

‘Inciting Subversion’ Probe—Reports,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 13, 2023; Kelly Ho, “Artistic Creations Often a ‘Pretext’ to Endanger Nat. Security, Hong Kong Official Tells Tiananmen 

Crackdown Statue Sculptor,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 23, 2023. 44Peter Lee, “Hong Kong National Security Police Seize Tiananmen Crackdown Statue for 

‘Inciting Subversion’ Probe—Reports,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 13, 2023; Kelly Ho, “Artistic Creations Often a ‘Pretext’ to Endanger Nat. Security, Hong Kong Official Tells Tiananmen 

Crackdown Statue Sculptor,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 23, 2023. 45Peter Lee, “Hong Kong National Security Police Seize Tiananmen Crackdown Statue for 

‘Inciting Subversion’ Probe—Reports,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 13, 2023; Kelly Ho, “Artistic Creations Often a ‘Pretext’ to Endanger Nat. Security, Hong Kong Official Tells Tiananmen 

Crackdown Statue Sculptor,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 23, 2023. 46Kelly Ho, “Artistic Creations Often a ‘Pretext’ to Endanger Nat. Security, Hong Kong Official 

Tells Tiananmen Crackdown Statue Sculptor,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 23, 2023. 47Kelly Ho, “Mainland Chinese Student Jailed for 6 Months over Plan to Display Tiananmen 

Monument Banner in Hong Kong,” Hong Kong Free Press, September 12, 2023, updated April 

17, 2024. 48Libby Hogan, “Hong Kong Detains Artist, Vigils Held to Keep Tiananmen Square Memory 

Alive,” ABC News (Australia), June 4, 2024. 49Libby Hogan, “Hong Kong Detains Artist, Vigils Held to Keep Tiananmen Square Memory 

Alive,” ABC News (Australia), June 4, 2024. 50 James Lee, “Top Hong Kong Court Overturns Tiananmen Activist Chow Hang-tung’s Acquittal over 2021 Remembrance Vigil,” Hong Kong Free Press, January 25, 2024, updated February 

21, 2024. 51 Jessie Pang, “Hong Kong Democracy Activist Wins Appeal on Tiananmen Vigil Assembly,” 

Reuters, December 14, 2022; James Lee, “Top Hong Kong Court Overturns Tiananmen Activist 

Chow Hang-tung’s Acquittal over 2021 Remembrance Vigil,” Hong Kong Free Press, January 25, 

2024, updated February 21, 2024. 52 Jessie Pang, “Hong Kong Democracy Activist Wins Appeal on Tiananmen Vigil Assembly,” 

Reuters, December 14, 2022; James Lee, “Top Hong Kong Court Overturns Tiananmen Activist 

Chow Hang-tung’s Acquittal over 2021 Remembrance Vigil,” Hong Kong Free Press, January 25, 

2024. 53Tom Grundy, “Ten Arrests as Hong Kong Police Deploy in Force on 4th Anniv. of Yuen Long 

Mob Attacks,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 22, 2023. 54Tom Grundy, “Ten Arrests as Hong Kong Police Deploy in Force on 4th Anniv. of Yuen Long 

Mob Attacks,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 22, 2023. 55Tom Grundy, “Ten Arrests as Hong Kong Police Deploy in Force on 4th Anniv. of Yuen Long 

Mob Attacks,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 22, 2023. 56Tom Grundy, “Ten Arrests as Hong Kong Police Deploy in Force on 4th Anniv. of Yuen Long 

Mob Attacks,” Hong Kong Free Press, July 22, 2023; Denise Tsang and Victor Ting, “Hong Kong 
Hong Kong and Macau

287

Police Deny Accusation They Colluded with Thugs Who Attacked Passengers at Train Station, as 

One Lawmaker Calls Incident ‘Terrorism,’” South China Morning Post, July 22, 2019. 57 James Lee, “Hong Kong National Security Police Arrest 10 Linked to 2019 Protester Relief 

Fund,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 10, 2023, updated August 29, 2023. 58 James Lee, “Hong Kong National Security Police Arrest 10 Linked to 2019 Protester Relief 

Fund,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 10, 2023, updated August 29, 2023. 59 James Lee, “Hong Kong National Security Police Arrest 10 Linked to 2019 Protester Relief 

Fund,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 10, 2023, updated August 29, 2023. 60Hillary Leung, “Hong Kong Student Jailed for 1 Year and 4 Months over Money Laundering 

Charge Linked to 2019 Protest Fund,” Hong Kong Free Press, April 19, 2024. 61Hillary Leung, “Hong Kong Student Jailed for 1 Year and 4 Months over Money Laundering 

Charge Linked to 2019 Protest Fund,” Hong Kong Free Press, April 19, 2024. For more information on Chow Hang-tung, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2021-00514. 62 Joel Guinto, “Four Arrested in Hong Kong after Bounty Set Up for Activists Abroad,” BBC, 

July 6, 2023; Irene Chan, “Hong Kong Woman Accused of Funding Overseas Activist Nathan Law 

Following Arrest under New Security Law,” Hong Kong Free Press, May 31, 2024. 63Harvey Kong, “Explainer | Who Are the 6 Suspects Arrested Along with Chow Hang-tung for 

Allegedly Breaching Hong Kong’s New Security Law?,” South China Morning Post, May 29, 2024. 64Kaliz Lee, Brian Wong, and Jeffie Lam, “Hong Kong 47: Who Are the Activists Convicted 

and Cleared in Pivotal National Security Trial?,” South China Morning Post, May 30, 2024; 

Human Rights Watch, “Hong Kong: 47 Lawmakers, Activists Face Unfair Trial,” August 22, 

2022. 65 Jessie Pang and James Pomfret, “Landmark Trial for 47 Hong Kong Democrats Enters Final 

Stretch before Sentencing,” Reuters, June 25, 2024. 66Kaliz Lee, Brian Wong, and Jeffie Lam, “Hong Kong 47: Who Are the Activists Convicted and 

Cleared in Pivotal National Security Trial?,” South China Morning Post, May 30, 2024. 67Kaliz Lee, Brian Wong, and Jeffie Lam, “Hong Kong 47: Who Are the Activists Convicted and 

Cleared in Pivotal National Security Trial?,” South China Morning Post, May 30, 2024. 68 Jessie Pang and James Pomfret, “Landmark Trial for 47 Hong Kong Democrats Enters Final 

Stretch before Sentencing,” Reuters, June 25, 2024. 69 Jonathan Sumption, “The Rule of Law in Hong Kong Is in Grave Danger,” Financial Times, 

June 10, 2024. 70 Jonathan Sumption, “The Rule of Law in Hong Kong Is in Grave Danger,” Financial Times, 

June 10, 2024. 71 Jonathan Sumption, “The Rule of Law in Hong Kong Is in Grave Danger,” Financial Times, 

June 10, 2024. 72 Jonathan Sumption, “The Rule of Law in Hong Kong Is in Grave Danger,” Financial Times, 

June 10, 2024. 73Kahon Chan, “Hong Kong Holds Firm on Role of Foreign Judges after Top Court Row. But 

for How Much Longer?,” South China Morning Post, July 4, 2024. 74Kahon Chan, “Hong Kong Holds Firm on Role of Foreign Judges after Top Court Row. But 

for How Much Longer?,” South China Morning Post, July 4, 2024. 75Hsieh Fu-yee, “Young Activists Recall Abuse at Hong Kong Juvenile Correctional Facility,” 

Radio Free Asia, March 30, 2024. 76Hsieh Fu-yee, “Young Activists Recall Abuse at Hong Kong Juvenile Correctional Facility,” 

Radio Free Asia, March 30, 2024. 77Hsieh Fu-yee, “Young Activists Recall Abuse at Hong Kong Juvenile Correctional Facility,” 

Radio Free Asia, March 30, 2024. 78Hsieh Fu-yee, “Young Activists Recall Abuse at Hong Kong Juvenile Correctional Facility,” 

Radio Free Asia, March 30, 2024. 79Hsieh Fu-yee, “Young Activists Recall Abuse at Hong Kong Juvenile Correctional Facility,” 

Radio Free Asia, March 30, 2024. 80Justices of the Peace Ordinance (Cap. 510), sec. 5(1)(a). 81Hsieh Fu-yee, “Young Activists Recall Abuse at Hong Kong Juvenile Correctional Facility,” 

Radio Free Asia, March 30, 2024. 82 James Pomfret and Jessie Pang, “Diplomatic Tensions Grow over UK Arrest of Hong Kong 

Trade Office Official,” Reuters, May 14, 2024. 83Hong Kong SAR Government, “8 Wanted for NSL Offences,” July 3, 2023; Hong Kong SAR 

Government, “5 Wanted for NSL Offences,” December 14, 2023. 84Hong Kong SAR Government, “8 Wanted for NSL Offences,” July 3, 2023. 85See, e.g., Simon Lee, “Hong Kong Police Question Parents of U.S.-Based Democracy Campaigner Anna Kwok,” Radio Free Asia, August 8, 2023; Frances Mao, “Nathan Law: Police Raid 

Family Home of Exiled Hong Kong Activist,” BBC, July 11, 2023. 86United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “China/Hong Kong SAR: 

U.N. Experts Concerned about Ongoing Trials and Arrest Warrants under National Security Legislation,” October 9, 2023. 87Matthew Miller, Department of State, “Hong Kong’s Extra-Territorial Application of the National Security Law,” July 3, 2023. 88Alex Willemyns, “Pro-Beijing ‘Thugs’ Tormented Xi Protesters, Activists Say,” Radio Free Asia, 

December 12, 2023. 89Alex Willemyns, “Pro-Beijing ‘Thugs’ Tormented Xi Protesters, Activists Say,” Radio Free Asia, 

December 12, 2023. 90Alex Willemyns, “Pro-Beijing ‘Thugs’ Tormented Xi Protesters, Activists Say,” Radio Free Asia, 

December 12, 2023. 91Alex Willemyns, “Pro-Beijing ‘Thugs’ Tormented Xi Protesters, Activists Say,” Radio Free Asia, 

December 12, 2023.
Hong Kong and Macau

288

92Alex Willemyns, “Pro-Beijing ‘Thugs’ Tormented Xi Protesters, Activists Say,” Radio Free Asia, 

December 12, 2023. 93Alex Willemyns, “Pro-Beijing ‘Thugs’ Tormented Xi Protesters, Activists Say,” Radio Free Asia, December 12, 2023. 94Alex Willemyns, “Pro-Beijing ‘Thugs’ Tormented Xi Protesters, Activists Say,” Radio Free Asia, December 12, 2023. 95Danica Kirka, “3 Men Charged in the UK with Assisting the Hong Kong Intelligence Service,” 

Associated Press, May 13, 2024. 96Danica Kirka, “3 Men Charged in the UK with Assisting the Hong Kong Intelligence Service,” 

Associated Press, May 13, 2024. 97 James Pomfret and Jessie Pang, “Diplomatic Tensions Grow over UK Arrest of Hong Kong 

Trade Office Official,” Reuters, May 14, 2024; Jeffie Lam, Lilian Cheng, and Jack Tsang, ‘‘Bei- jing Slams UK after Manager of Hong Kong Trade Office in London, 2 Others Hit with Spying 

Charges,” South China Morning Post, May 13, 2024. 98Kahon Chan and Jeffie Lam, “Beijing’s Top Envoy in Hong Kong Makes ‘Solemn Representa- tion’ to UK Consul General in City amid Spying Row,” South China Morning Post, May 18, 2024. 99Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023; Frances Hui, Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong 

Foundation, “Hostile Takeover: The CCP and Hong Kong’s Religious Communities,” January 2024. 100Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023, 10, 33. 101Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023, 12–14. 102Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023, 12, 20. 103Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023, 12, 14, 20, 21. 104Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023, 14, 20, 26, 27. 105Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023, 17. 106Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023, 17, 18; “與時並進/管浩鳴撐改革:《華人廟宇條例》不平

等” [Keeping pace with the times/Guan Haoming supports reform: The “Chinese Temples Ordinance” is unfair], Ta Kung Pao, January 27, 2022. 107Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023, 29; Frances Hui, Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong 

Foundation, “Hostile Takeover: The CCP and Hong Kong’s Religious Communities,” January 2024, 

18–21. 108Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023, 28, 29. 109Hong Kong Watch, “‘Sell Out My Soul’: The Impending Threats to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief in Hong Kong,” November 7, 2023, 11; Frances Hui, Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong 

Foundation, “Hostile Takeover: The CCP and Hong Kong’s Religious Communities,” January 2024, 

24, 25, 30, 31. 110United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the Working Group on the Universal 

Periodic Review: China,” A/HRC/56/6, March 11, 2024, paras. 1, 15, 16. 111United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the Working Group on the Universal 

Periodic Review: China,” A/HRC/56/6, March 11, 2024, paras. 22.27, 22.31, 22.64, 22.99, 22.118, 

22.131, 22.135, 22.142, 22.152, 22.154, 22.157, 22.158, 22.160, 22.167, 22.170, 22.171, 22.172, 

22.181, 22.185, 22.414; Hong Kong Watch, “Hong Kong Watch Welcomes Recommendations on 

Hong Kong at the U.N. Universal Periodic Review,” January 23, 2024. 112United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the Working Group on the Universal 

Periodic Review: China,” A/HRC/56/6, March 11, 2024, paras. 22.27, 22.135, 22.162. 113United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the Working Group on the Universal 

Periodic Review: China; Addendum,” A/HRC/56/6/Add.1, May 31, 2024, paras. 28, 31, 40. 114Kelly Ho, “Security Law: Australia, UK, Taiwan Urge Travellers to Exercise Caution in 

Hong Kong, as Gov’t Blasts ‘Scaremongering,’” Hong Kong Free Press, March 25, 2024; James Lee, 

“Hong Kong Slams ‘Political Manoeuvres’ as US and Canada Urge Travellers to Exercise Caution 

in City,” Hong Kong Free Press, April 15, 2024. 115U.S. Department of State, “China Travel Advisory,” April 12, 2024. Song Ren, “美国更新对

华旅行警示,未见正在’积极考虑’的放宽措施” [U.S. updated travel advisory for China; relaxed 

measures that were said to be “under active consideration” has not been rolled out], Voice of 

America, April 15, 2024. 116Hong Kong SAR Government, “HKSAR Government Strongly Condemns Skewed Remarks 

by Australia, China’s Taiwan Region and Others on Safeguarding National Security Ordinance,” 

March 22, 2024; Kelly Ho, “Security Law: Australia, UK, Taiwan Urge Travellers to Exercise 

Caution in Hong Kong, as Gov’t Blasts ‘Scaremongering,’” Hong Kong Free Press, March 25, 

2024. James Lee, “Hong Kong Slams ‘Political Manoeuvres’ as US and Canada Urge Travellers 

to Exercise Caution in City,” Hong Kong Free Press, April 15, 2024.
289

XII. Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Gl

Findings

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued a multifacet- ed campaign of transnational repression against Hong Kongers, 

Tibetans, Uyghurs, journalists, Chinese university students, and 

others to stifle dissent and intimidate individuals in emigrant 

and diaspora communities. Examples include the issuance of 

HK$1,000,000 (US$127,600) bounties on 13 overseas activists, 

intelligence-gathering efforts in diaspora communities, and the 

harassment of China-based relatives of overseas targets.

• The PRC’s transnational repression efforts were observed 

leading up to, during, and after the November 2023 Asia-Pa- cific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in San Francisco, 

California.

• This reporting year, the Commission observed reports of PRC 

authorities forcibly repatriating overseas Chinese citizens Lu 

Siwei and Yang Zewei, also known as Qiao Xinxin, through 

extrajudicial means.

• The PRC targeted foreign politicians and governments by 

attempting to influence democratic elections and shape public 

opinion abroad about the Chinese Communist Party and gov- ernment, including in Canada, the Solomon Islands, and Tai- wan.

• PRC authorities continued to make efforts to influence pro- cesses and procedures within the U.N. system to limit public 

awareness of China’s human rights abuses in the international 

community. This past year, reports detailed the PRC’s efforts to 

influence and impede the U.N. Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and several U.N. Special Procedures.
290

Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Gl

Transnational Repression

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continued a multifaceted campaign of transnational repression to intimidate and enhance control over critics, Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and others.1 “Transnational repression” refers 

to transnational efforts to stifle dissent or independent organizing 

within emigrant or diaspora communities.2 Freedom House characterized China’s transnational repression campaign as the “most 

sophisticated, global, and comprehensive” in the world.3 In several 

reported cases, authorities harassed or intimidated the China-based 

relatives of overseas targets as an indirect way to compel the compliance of the targets themselves, coercing them into silence or to return to China.4 Targets of the PRC’s transnational repression from 

this past year include:

• Hong Kongers. In July 2023, Hong Kong authorities issued 

HK$1,000,000 (US$128,000) bounties on eight overseas activists: 

Ted Hui Chi-fung, Anna Kwok Fung-yee, Dennis Kwok Winghang, Finn Lau Cho-dik, Nathan Law Kwun-chung, Christopher 

Mung Siu-tat, Kevin Yam, and Elmer Yuen Gong-yi.5 In December 2023, authorities expanded the list to include five additional 

overseas pro-democracy activists: Simon Cheng Man-kit, Tony 

Choi Ming-da, Johnny Fok Ka-chi, Frances Hui Wing-ting, and 

Joey Siu.6 These individuals all live either in the United States, 

the United Kingdom, or Australia.7 These bounties marked the 

first major instance of Hong Kong officials extraterritorially using the PRC Law on Safeguarding National Security to accuse 

overseas activists of crimes, such as “collusion” with foreign forces and incitement to “secession” and “subversion.”8 Hong Kong 

police mounted additional pressure on the wanted activists by 

investigating and interrogating several of their family members 

in Hong Kong.9 On June 12, 2024, Hong Kong authorities initiated specific measures, such as the cancellation of Hong Kong 

passports and the prohibition on the provision of funds, under 

the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (also known as 

“Article 23” legislation), against Simon Cheng, Tony Choi, Johnny Fok, Christopher Mung, Finn Lau, and Nathan Law—all six 

individuals are based in the United Kingdom.10 Finn Lau called 

the Hong Kong government’s actions “an explicit act of transnational repression,” while an expert theorized that the main 

motive for these measures was to deter Hong Kongers from 

“donating . . . or sharing . . . [these overseas activists’] social 

posts.”11 [For more information about Hong Kong, see Chapter 

19—Hong Kong and Macau.]

• Tibetans. A report published this past year by the Tibetan 

Centre for Human Rights and Democracy revealed efforts to 

silence members of the Tibetan diaspora.12 According to a September 2023 interview with an official in the Central Tibetan 

Administration, an estimated 80 to 90 percent of Tibetan refugees with family and relatives still living in Tibet have suffered 

repressive PRC tactics.13 PRC authorities attempted to sever 

connections between diaspora members and their relatives in 
Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

291

the Tibet Autonomous Region and coerced Tibetan activists 

abroad to cease speaking out against the Chinese Communist 

Party.14 Many Tibetans also reported attempts by the Party to 

recruit them to spy on their fellow diaspora members, exacerbating distrust and fear in their communities.15 [For more information about the PRC’s persecution of Tibetans, see Chapter 

17—Tibet.]

• Uyghurs. Reports this past year revealed that Uyghur diaspora members faced transnational repression around the globe. 

One report by the Human Rights Foundation noted that “the 

Uyghur diaspora experiences intimidation, harassment, threats, 

and censorship on a daily basis.”16 Despite long serving as a 

safe destination for Uyghur refugees, Türkiye has become less 

safe in recent years due to the Chinese Communist Party’s 

well-established intelligence-gathering efforts and threats from 

Turkish police against Uyghur exiles in the country.17 Uyghurs 

interviewed for another report shared personal anecdotes of financial exploitation and coercion and threats against friends 

and family still in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

(XUAR) by Chinese police.18 Uyghur journalists in the U.S. 

also raised concerns this reporting year of spies within their 

communities, as well as the threat of detention of their friends 

and family in the XUAR, both aimed at discouraging them from 

publishing stories about sensitive topics.19 [For more information about the PRC’s persecution of Uyghurs, see Chapter 18—

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.]

• Journalists. Australian journalist and researcher Vicky Xu 

detailed in an April 2024 essay about the PRC surveillance and 

threats she faced in recent years for her work exposing human 

rights abuses committed by the Chinese Communist Party and 

government.20 She recounted being intimidated by men in front 

of her apartment complex, learning about her China-based family and friends “disappearing,” and receiving warnings from the 

Australian Federal Police that she was being targeted by foreign agents.21 In June 2024, the Commission observed reports 

of PRC authorities appearing to physically block Australian 

journalist Cheng Lei at an event featuring Chinese Premier 

Li Qiang and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in 

Canberra.22 Cheng speculated that the attempts were likely to 

prevent her “from saying something or doing something that 

they think would be a bad look.”23 [For more information on 

the PRC’s repression of journalists, see Chapter 1—Freedom of 

Expression.]

• Chinese university students. Reports and congressional 

testimony detailed transnational repression efforts against 

Chinese students abroad.24 Amnesty International reported 

in May 2024 about Chinese and Hong Kong students “living 

in fear of intimidation, harassment, and surveillance as Chinese authorities seek to prevent them [from] engaging with 

‘sensitive’ or political issues while overseas.” 25 The authors 

of the report conducted interviews with 32 current students 

and recent graduates from the mainland, Hong Kong, and 

Macau who studied at universities in eight countries; almost 
Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

292

half of the interviewees claimed they had been photographed 

or recorded at events by individuals that they believe did 

so on behalf of the PRC.26 Moreover, nearly a third of the 

interviewees reported that PRC officials had harassed their 

families back home, and more than half admitted to self-censoring their conversations and posts online out of fear of 

being monitored, including on non-Chinese social media.27

Georgetown University law student Zhang Jinrui detailed 

how Chinese police interrogated his family in China following his participation in campus events critical of the Chinese 

government’s actions.28 Zhang himself was also approached, 

threatened, and recorded by other Chinese students on campus for speaking out against China’s zero-COVID policy.29 In 

June 2024, the Commission held a hearing where a Chinese 

student at Columbia University testified that “the intensity 

of transnational repression against outspoken Chinese overseas students has only escalated,” saying that it occurred, 

“[in] most cases, through personal harassment, transnational 

surveillance, and the coercion of proxies—in this case meaning the interrogation and intimidation of family members in 

China.” 30 The student, dressed in a disguise and choosing to 

testify with an alias, took precautions “even though it will 

only delay the inevitable police visit to [her] parents.” 31

According to a December 2023 report by Axios, there are two types 

of PRC overseas centers: 1) service centers, and 2) police-community 

cooperation centers, the latter of which may either have official relationships with host governments or operate “under the radar.”32

The report provided an overview of a PRC overseas service center 

based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with “extensive” ties to the Chinese government and the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification, an organization managed by the United 

Front Work Department tasked to “monitor overseas Chinese citizens.”33 Although the service center provides necessary assistance 

and resources, experts expressed concerns about the Chinese government’s use of transnational repression to prevent dissent and 

control members of Tanzania’s Chinese communities.34

During the Commission’s 2024 reporting year, Radio Free Asia

(RFA) published an investigative report about a PRC overseas police station in New York City (NYC). RFA journalist Jane Tang interviewed individuals in NYC’s Chinese diaspora, revealing specific 

instances of PRC harassment and intimidation perpetrated by members of America ChangLe Association (“ChangLe”), a community 

hub based in Manhattan’s Chinatown that supports residents of Fujianese descent.35 RFA’s report revealed that “Harry” Lu Jianwang 

and Chen Jinping, two men whom the U.S. Department of Justice 

charged in April 2023 with “conspiring to act as agents of the PRC 

government as well as obstructing justice by destroying evidence 

of their communications with [a PRC Ministry of Public Security] 

official,” were both involved with ChangLe’s operations, with Lu 

serving as the chairman of the association.36 Although Lu stepped 

down from the chairmanship position, he later became president of 

another overseas Chinese association located across the street from 

ChangLe in Chinatown.37
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Harassment of APEC Summit Peaceful Protesters

The Commission observed the PRC’s transnational repression efforts 

leading up to, during, and after the November 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in San Francisco due to clashes between 

advocacy groups and pro-Chinese Communist Party demonstrators. Advocacy groups and pro-democracy activists peacefully assembled outside 

the summit during Xi Jinping’s visit, to protest human rights abuses 

perpetrated by the Chinese Communist Party and government.38 The 

Chinese consulate reportedly mobilized overseas pro-Party communities 

to counter-protest by incentivizing them with money, transportation, and 

lodging.39

Video evidence and eyewitness accounts detailed instances of seemingly coordinated pro-Party demonstrators harassing and physically attacking peaceful protestors, including by 1) taking a banner from the 

advocacy group Students for a Free Tibet; 2) beating peaceful protestors with metal rods, umbrellas, and flag poles; and 3) seizing advocates’ 

phones and tossing them into nearby water, presumably because they 

contained evidence of such attacks.40 The Commission wrote a letter to 

U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland in December 2023 requesting an 

investigation into the violence committed by counter-protestors outside 

of the APEC Summit, as well as to determine “whether the violence was 

planned or instigated by elements of the Chinese Communist Party or 

Chinese diplomats in the United States.”41 The Commission has not received a response, as of June 2024.

Extraditions to China

“Operation Fox Hunt,” which officially launched ten years ago 

by the PRC government, began as a joint effort between multiple 

high-ranking agencies to track down fugitives and return them to 

China, either through international cooperation mechanisms or “voluntary” returns.42 According to one estimate, the operation forcibly 

returned at least 283 individuals from at least 56 countries and two 

territories through extrajudicial means in the past decade.43

This reporting year, the Commission observed reports of PRC 

authorities forcibly repatriating overseas Chinese citizens through 

extrajudicial means. Examples from this reporting year include the 

following:

• Lu Siwei,44 a disbarred human rights lawyer from China 

known for representing rights lawyers and pro-democracy activists, disappeared for 28 days after Lao police detained him in 

July 2023 for “illegal entry.”45 Lu had fled to Laos with the aim 

of then traveling to the United States to reunite with his wife 

and daughter.46 Despite calls by UN human rights experts and 

85 non-governmental organizations to release Lu and prevent 

his refoulement to China,47 in September, Lao officials repatriated Lu to China where he was immediately detained by PRC 

authorities under suspicion of “illegally crossing a border.”48

Mary Lawlor, U.N. special rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, denounced the Lao authorities’ decision 

to deport Lu and called on PRC authorities to release him.49

Authorities released Lu on bail pending trial in October 2023.50
Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

294

• Yang Zewei,51 also known as Qiao Xinxin, was abducted 

from his home in Laos in May 2023.52 Yang worked as a journalist in China before moving to Laos, where he launched an 

online campaign named “Ban the Great Firewall” to advocate 

for the end of internet censorship in China.53 Yang’s brother 

messaged him the month before his abduction to warn him that 

PRC authorities were harassing his family in China, prompting 

Yang to publish a “declaration to not commit suicide” on social 

media in case he suddenly disappeared.54 Reports confirmed 

that six Chinese and two Lao police officers took Yang away 

from his home in handcuffs, and Yang later resurfaced in a Chinese detention facility in Hunan province, formally arrested for 

“inciting subversion of state power.”55

Malign Influence

The Commission continued to observe reports of the PRC’s attempts to target foreign politicians and governments, influence democratic elections abroad, and shape public opinions about the Chinese Communist Party and government. These efforts illustrate the 

PRC’s malign influence campaign,56 violating various articles of the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China 

has signed but not ratified.57 Examples include:

• Canada: PRC authorities continued to target Canadian 

Member of Parliament (MP) Michael Chong this year,58 likely spearheading a 10-day disinformation campaign about him 

on WeChat focused on his family, background, and political 

views.59 Media reports focused on an ongoing federal inquiry 

showed that Canadian intelligence officials recently revealed 

that the PRC government “clandestinely and deceptively” interfered in Canada’s 2019 and 2021 federal elections to support 

China-friendly candidates and suppress those critical of the 

Chinese Communist Party and government.60

• Solomon Islands: The PRC attempted to influence Solomon 

Islands’ April 2024 general elections—elections the Associated Press said would “shape relations with China.”61 Experts 

noted an increase of PRC “aid” delivery and detailed evidence 

of coordinated efforts between the PRC and Russia to amplify misleading narratives about the United States’ engagement 

in the Solomon Islands.62 The Solomon Islands had previously 

signed security agreements with the PRC, which contributed to 

an increase of Chinese influence and the “deterioration of due 

process and good governance,” according to an analysis by the 

Center for Strategic & International Studies.63

• Taiwan: The PRC attempted to influence Taiwan’s January 

2024 general elections and “coax and coerce the Taiwanese population into accepting closer ties” with China, as described by 

the German Marshall Fund.64 According to commentary published by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, “while Beijing often 

tries to shape other countries’ political environments in its favour ahead of general elections . . . its interference in Taiwan 

is much more direct,” with the use of cognitive warfare, military threats, propaganda, economic retaliation, and measures 

to further isolate Taiwan in the international community.65 The 
Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

295

PRC, in addition, “tried to co-opt businesspeople and opposition politicians,” reportedly offering local politicians discounted or all-expenses-paid trips to mainland China.66 Leading up 

Taiwan’s May 2024 presidential inauguration, PRC authorities 

sanctioned five Taiwanese political commentators for “spreading 

rumors to smear the mainland.”67 Bloomberg referred to the 

sanctions as an attempt to “[pile] pressure on incoming president Lai Ching-te just days before he takes office,”68 with the 

Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club describing them as “an 

affront to free speech and the rights of journalists to operate 

without intimidation or reprisal.”69

Efforts to Impede U.N. Human Rights Bodies

PRC authorities continued to make efforts to influence processes 

and procedures within and around the U.N. system to limit public 

awareness of China’s human rights abuses in the international com- munity.70 For example, in January 2024, Chinese government-orga- nized groups occupied the few seats available for nongovernmental 

organizations to sit in the room at the interactive dialogue of the 

Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a review of China’s human rights 

record that takes place once every five years.71 Prior to the UPR, 

China’s diplomatic mission reportedly lobbied countries for “valuable support to China.”72 The Chinese delegation to the U.N. promoted boycotting events on “sensitive” topics relating to late human 

rights activist Cao Shunli,73 media freedom in Hong Kong, and human rights abuses in the XUAR.74 [For more information on China’s 

UPR at the U.N. this reporting year, see Chapter 2—Civil Society.]

Scholar Rana Siu Inboden in a May 2024 article described the 

PRC’s attempts to interfere with the United Nations Special Procedures, which are independent human rights experts who monitor 

and report on thematic and country-specific human rights situations.75 Methods deployed by the PRC include 1) targeting Special 

Procedure mandate holders who highlight PRC human rights abuses through public criticism; 2) selectively funding mandates that 

may “elevate the work, visibility, and impact” of initiatives that 

supported the PRC’s vision of human rights; and 3) using institutional power to change regulations, practices, and mechanisms in an 

attempt to stifle certain initiatives.76 Despite the Chinese government’s efforts, however, Inboden notes that the Special Procedures 

remains the U.N.’s “most active and responsive” tools for raising 

public awareness of human rights abuses in China.77
296

Notes to Chapter 20—Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

1Nate Shenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression,” February 2021; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2022 Annual Report (Washington: November 2022), 348; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 346. 2Nate Shenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The 

Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression,” February 2021, 1; Safeguard Defenders, 

“Involuntary Returns: China’s Covert Operation to Force ‘Fugitives’ Overseas Back Home,” January 2022, 8–9; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Transnational Repression,” last accessed May 

14, 2024; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 346. 3Nate Shenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Freedom House, “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The 

Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression,” February 2021, 15. 4Safeguard Defenders, “Families in Fear: Collective Punishment in 21st Century China,” December 2023; Amnesty International, “China: Overseas Students Face Harassment and Surveillance in Campaign of Transnational Repression,” May 13, 2024; Pak Yiu, “Hong Kong Squeezes 

Activists in Exile by Interrogating Relatives,” Nikkei Asia, August 30, 2023. 5Hong Kong Police Force, “Wanted Persons and Reward Notices of National Security Cases,” accessed June 12, 2024; Zen Soo, “Hong Kong Police Offer Rewards for Arrests of 8 Pro-Democracy 

Activists Who Live Abroad,” Associated Press, July 3, 2023. 6Hong Kong Police Force, “Wanted Persons and Reward Notices of National Security Cases,” 

accessed June 12, 2024; Amelia Loi and Lee Heung Yeung, “Hong Kong Vows to Pursue Wanted 

Overseas Activists ‘To The End,’”Radio Free Asia, December 16, 2023. 7Zen Soo, “Hong Kong Police Offer Rewards for Arrests of 8 Pro-Democracy Activists Who Live 

Abroad,” Associated Press, July 3, 2023. 8Hong Kong Police Force, “Wanted Persons and Reward Notices of National Security Cases,” 

accessed June 12, 2024; Dan Strumpf, “Hong Kong Takes Its Crackdown Abroad,” Wall Street 

Journal, updated July 14, 2023; Chad de Guzman, “Hong Kong’s Million-Dollar Bounties Are 

About More Than Arresting 8 Activists,” Time, July 4, 2023. 9Simon Lee, “Hong Kong Police Question Family of Exiled Activist Nathan Law,” Radio Free 

Asia, July 11, 2023; Clifford Lo, “Hong Kong National Security Police ‘Investigating Family Members’ of Unionist Mung Siu-Tat and Ex-Lawmaker Dennis Kwok in Latest Raids Over Wanted 

8,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2023; Li Ruoru, “國安通緝|袁弓夷兒女媳被國安帶走 評

論:調查需要非「誅九族 」,” [Wanted by national security | Yuan Gongyi’s daughter-in-law was 

taken away by national security, Comment: The investigation needs to be done without ‘killing 

the Nine Tribes’], Radio Free Asia, July 24, 2023; Elaine Yu, “A Family is Divided by Hong Kong’s 

Pursuit of U.S.-Based Activist,” Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2023; Helen Davidson, “‘Gangster 

Tactic’: The True Aim Behind Hong Kong’s Pursuit of Overseas Dissidents,” Guardian, August 16, 

2023; Simon Lee, Ng Ting Hong, and Gigi Lee, “Hong Kong Police Question Relatives of Exiled 

Lawmaker Ted Hui,” Radio Free Asia, September 12, 2023; Amelia Loi and Cheryl Tung, “Hong 

Kong Police Question Relatives of Wanted Overseas Activists,” Radio Free Asia, January 11, 2024. 10Hong Kong Government, “Specification of Absconders in Respect of Offences Endangering 

National Security and Specification of Measures Applicable Against Relevant Absconders under 

Safeguarding National Security Ordinance,” June 12, 2024; Tom Grundy, “Hong Kong Cancels 

Passports of 6 ‘Fugitive’ Activists in UK, inc. Nathan Law, under New Security Law Provision,” 

Hong Kong Free Press, June 12, 2024. 11Finn Lau 劉祖廸 (@finnlau_cd), “. . . (2) Such a deployment of Hong Kong Article 23 ordinance is an explicit act of transnational repression and another breach of the Sino-British Joint 

Declaration. (3) As another clear example of Hong Kong judiciary system being weaponized by 

Beijing, this . . . /,” X, June 11, 2024, 9:47 a.m.; Michael Mo (@michaelmohk), “Cancellation of 

#HongKong passports aren’t the point. All of the 6 pro-democracy campaigners/YouTubers in the 

UK have either NBOs or @ukhomeoffice’s travel documents. They won’t have an issue of travelling around. What the HK Gov wants is to deter HKers from subscribing to their Patreons, donating to their projects or sharing their social posts as well as YouTube videos. However, the action 

also shows that they don’t have many [that they] can go after for now.” X, June 12, 2024, 4:27 a.m. 12Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Chinese Transnational Repression of Tibetan Diaspora Communities,” June 2, 2024. 13Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Chinese Transnational Repression of Tibetan Diaspora Communities,” June 2, 2024. 14Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Chinese Transnational Repression of Tibetan Diaspora Communities,” June 2, 2024. 15Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, “Chinese Transnational Repression of Tibetan Diaspora Communities,” June 2, 2024. 16Human Rights Foundation, “Beyond Borders: China’s Transnational Repression of Uyghurs,” 

January 15, 2024. 17Safeguard Defenders, “Targeted in Türkiye: China’s Transnational Repression Against Uyghurs,” August 2023. 18Safeguard Defenders, “Targeted in Türkiye: China’s Transnational Repression Against Uyghurs,” August 2023. 19 Jessica White, Grady Vaughan, and Yana Gorokhovskaia, Freedom House, “A Light That Cannot Be Extinguished,” December 2023, 5. 20Vicky Xu, “How It Feels to Live Under Surveillance by China,” Saturday Paper, April 6, 2024. 21Vicky Xu, “How It Feels to Live Under Surveillance by China,” Saturday Paper, April 6, 2024. 22Ben Westcott, “Chinese Officials’ Viral Moment Casts Shadow on Australia Visit.” Bloomberg, 

June 17, 2024, updated June 18, 2024; Hannah Ritchie, “Chinese Officials Appear to Block Freed 

Journalist,” BBC News, June 17, 2024; Simone McCarthy and Angus Watson, “Chinese Officials’ 
Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

297

Attempt to ‘Block’ Formerly Detained Journalist Mars Australia Goodwill Tour,” CNN World, 

updated June 17, 2024. For more information about Cheng Lei, see the Commission’s Political 

Prisoner Database record 2020-00246. 23Patrick Staveley and Laura Grassby, “‘A Bad Look’: Cheng Lei Speaks Out After Chinese Officials Appeared to Obstruct Her View of Document Signing in Camera,” Sky News, June 17, 2024. 24Yana Gorokhovskaia and Grady Vaughan, Freedom House, “Addressing Transnational Repression on Campuses in the United States,” January 2024, 1, 5–11; Amnesty International, “China: ‘On My Campus, I Am Afraid’: China’s Targeting of Overseas Students Stifles Rights,” ASA 

17/8006/2024, May 2024, 5–64; CCP Transnational Repression: The Party’s Effort to Silence and 

Coerce Critics Overseas, Hearing of the Select Committee on the CCP, U.S. House of Representatives, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Jinrui Zhang, law student, Georgetown University Law 

Center); Tiananmen at 35: The Ongoing Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in China, 

Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of 

“Karin” (an alias), White Paper Protest activist and student at Columbia University). 25Amnesty International, “China: ‘On My Campus, I Am Afraid’: China’s Targeting of Overseas 

Students Stifles Rights,” ASA 17/8006/2024, May 2024, 64. 26Amnesty International, “China: ‘On My Campus, I Am Afraid’: China’s Targeting of Overseas 

Students Stifles Rights,” ASA 17/8006/2024, May 2024, 5, 7, 11; Amnesty International, “China: 

Overseas Students Face Harassment and Surveillance in Campaign of Transnational Repression,” 

May 13, 2024. 27Amnesty International, “China: ‘On My Campus, I Am Afraid’: China’s Targeting of Overseas Students Stifles Rights,” ASA 17/8006/2024, May 2024, 6, 28, 34–35; Amnesty International, 

“China: Overseas Students Face Harassment and Surveillance in Campaign of Transnational 

Repression,” May 13, 2024. 28 Jenny Tang, “Chinese Police Harass Family of Washington DC Student Activist,” Radio Free 

Asia, October 1, 2023; Alex Willemyns, “China Silencing Critics in US, Congress Told,” Radio Free 

Asia, December 14, 2023. 29Alex Willemyns, “China Silencing Critics in US, Congress Told,” Radio Free Asia, December 

14, 2023; CCP Transnational Repression: The Party’s Effort to Silence and Coerce Critics Overseas, 

Hearing of the Select Committee on the CCP, U.S. House of Representatives, 118th Cong. (2023) 

(testimony of Jinru Zhang, law student, Georgetown University Law Center); Jenny Tang, “Chinese Police Harass Family of Washington DC Student Activist,” Radio Free Asia, October 1, 2023. 30Tiananmen at 35: The Ongoing Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in China, Hearing 

of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of “Karin” 

(an alias), White Paper Protest activist and student at Columbia University), 2. 31Tiananmen at 35: The Ongoing Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy in China, Hearing 

of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of “Karin” 

(an alias), White Paper Protest activist and student at Columbia University), 1. 32Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Inside a Beijing-linked Chinese Help Center in Tanzania,” Axios, 

December 6, 2023. 33Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Inside a Beijing-linked Chinese Help Center in Tanzania,” Axios, 

December 6, 2023. 34Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Inside a Beijing-linked Chinese Help Center in Tanzania,” Axios, 

December 6, 2023. 35 Jane Tang, “‘Secret’ New York Police Station Is Mere Sliver of Beijing’s U.S. Harassment 

Push,” Radio Free Asia, July 7, 2023. 36 Jane Tang, “‘Secret’ New York Police Station Is Mere Sliver of Beijing’s U.S. Harassment 

Push,” Radio Free Asia, July 7, 2023; U.S. Department of Justice, “Two Arrested for Operating 

Illegal Overseas Police Station of the Chinese Government,” April 17, 2023. 37 Jane Tang, “‘Secret’ New York Police Station Is Mere Sliver of Beijing’s U.S. Harassment 

Push,” Radio Free Asia, July 7, 2023. 38Students for a Free Tibet, “Rise Up Against Xi: A Cross-Movement Protest during the BidenXi Talk,” November 10, 2023; Sun Cheng, “What Did the Protesters Want with Xi Jinping?,” Radio 

Free Asia, November 16, 2023. 39Frances Hui, “The Long Arm of the CCP Attacks Protesters in the U.S.,” National Review, 

November 30, 2023; Students for a Free Tibet (@SFTHQ), “As Xi lands, we are at SFO with 

Tursunay, a Uyghur concentration camp survivor. We Tibetans, Uyghurs, HKers, Taiwanese, and 

Chinese dissidents who are standing up against paid Chinese counter protestors.,” X, November 

14, 2023, 6:00 p.m.; Alex Willemyns, “Pro-Beijing ‘Thugs’ Tormented Xi Protesters, Activists Say,” 

Radio Free Asia, December 12, 2023. 40Zhou Chenxing, “Anti-Xi Protesters Say San Francisco Police Ignored Beatings during APEC,” 

Voice of America, November 23, 2023; Frances Hui, “The Long Arm of the CCP Attacks Protesters 

in the U.S.,” National Review, November 30, 2023; Olga R. Rodriguez and Haven Daley, “Congress 

Members, Activists Decry Assaults against Anti-China Protesters during San Francisco Summit,” 

Associated Press, updated November 29, 2023; Students For a Free Tibet (@SFTHQ), “On 11/15, 

a group of four peacefully protesting Tibetan youth activists were brutally surprise attacked by 

a gang of over 20 masked Chinese operatives. They stole our banner, assaulted our activists, and 

fled the crime scene. Watch the following video to see the attack.,” X, November 15, 2023, 9:51 

p.m.; Alex Willemyns, “Pro-Beijing ‘Thugs’ Tormented Xi Protesters, Activists Say,” Radio Free 

Asia, December 12, 2023; Anna Kwok 郭鳳儀 (@AnnaKwokFY), “Today’s protest was a bad throwback to the 2019 Hong Kong protests: violence from pro-CCP thugs, phones with evidence were 

snatched and destroyed, activists were tailed by national-police-look-alike. Except they happened 

on American soil. A thread of what happened outside SFO:,” X, November 17, 2023, 11:30 p.m.; 

Maya Wang (@wang_maya), “Frame 00:04 shows a stocky man with earpiece. Interesting equipment for a protestor. Or is he a Chinese security officer? US government should investigate:,” 

X, November 18, 2023, 12:20 a.m.; Chemi Lhamo (@ChooseChemi), “Yesterday in San Francisco, 
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I had my hair pulled, head punched, flag poles shoved and phone with evidence thrown in the 

water.,” X, November 18, 2023, 07:15 p.m. Human Rights in China, “Victim of Pro-CCP Violence 

at APEC Summit Speaks Out,” December 13, 2023; Letter from Christopher J. Smith and Jeffrey 

A. Merkley, Chairs, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, to Merrick Garland, Attorney 

General, U.S. Department of Justice, December 15, 2023. 41Letter from Christopher J. Smith and Jeffrey A. Merkley, Chairs, Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China, to Merrick Garland, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, December 15, 2023. 42Laura Harth and Yenting Chen, “Chasing Fox Hunt,” Safeguard Defenders, April 16, 2024. 43Laura Harth and Yenting Chen, “Chasing Fox Hunt,” Safeguard Defenders, April 16, 2024. 44For more information on Lu Siwei, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 

2021-00269. 45Pak Yiu, “China Critics Chased in Mekong as Beijing’s Security Clout Grows,” Nikkei Asia, 

August 24, 2023. 46Pak Yiu, “China Critics Chased in Mekong as Beijing’s Security Clout Grows,” Nikkei Asia, 

August 24, 2023. 47Raphaël Viana David, “85 NGOs Urge Laos to Immediately Release Chinese Lawyer Lu Siwei, Prevent Refoulement,” International Service for Human Rights, August 3, 2023; Office of the 

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Lao Must Immediately Release Chinese Lawyer Lu 

Siwei and Prevent His Imminent Deportation: UN Experts,” August 11, 2023. 48Hwang Chun-mei, Gao Feng and Wang Yun, “Chinese Rights Lawyer Lu Siwei Repatriated 

by Laos Last Week,” Radio Free Asia, September 14, 2023. 49Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Lao PDR: Stop Deporting Human 

Rights Defenders, Says UN Expert,” October 27, 2023. 50Gao Feng, “Chinese Rights Lawyer Lu Siwei Is Out on ‘Bail, Pending Trial,’” Radio Free Asia, 

October 31, 2023. 51For more information on Yang Zewei, see the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database record 2023-00171. 52Rights Defense Network, “遭中共当局跨境抓捕的拆墙运动发起人、新闻媒体人乔鑫鑫(本名杨

泽伟)的案情及简历,” [The case and resume of Qiao Xinxin (real name Yang Zewei), the initiator 

of the wall-removal movement and journalist detained by the Chinese Communist Party authorities across borders], June 17, 2023. 53Gao Feng, Xiaoshan Huang, and Chingman, “Chinese Activist Missing from Vientiane after 

Launching Anti-Censorship Campaign,” Radio Free Asia, June 13, 2023. 54Safeguard Defenders, “Disappearance of Chinese Critic in Laos, Feared Kidnapped,” June 

19, 2023. 55Gao Feng, “Missing Laos-Based Activist Qiao Xinxin Resurfaces in a Chinese Detention Center,” Radio Free Asia, August 9, 2023; Ye Bing, “家人证实拆墙运动发起人乔鑫鑫现囚湖南衡阳 活动

人士吁国际关注,” [Family confirms that Qiao Xinxin, initiator of the wall-removal movement, is 

now imprisoned; activists in Hengyang, Hunan call for international attention], Voice of America, 

August 9, 2023. 56For more information on what constitutes malign influence and China’s tactics, see e.g., Michael A. Weber, “Democracy and Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy: Tools and Considerations 

for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, updated January 4, 2024, 28–29; Kamya Yadav, 

Martin J. Reidl, Alicia Wanless, and Samuel Woolley, “What Makes an Influence Operation Malign?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 7, 2023, 1–4; Countering China’s 

Malign Influence Operations in the United States, Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence, 118th Cong. (2023) (testimony of Glenn Tiffert, Distinguished Research Fellow and 

Co-Chair, Project on China’s Global Sharp Power, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; The 

Chinese Communist Party’s Malign Influence at the United Nations—It’s Getting Worse, Hearing 

of the Subcommittee on Global Health, Global Human Rights and International Organizations, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 118th Cong. (2024) (testimony of 

Kelley E. Currie, Former U.S. Representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council 

and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. Department 

of State). 57 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by U.N. General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976, arts. 1, 19, 25. 58Steven Chase and Robert Fife, “Trudeau Asks for Probe into CSIS Report China Targeted 

MPs,” Globe and Mail, May 1, 2023; Steven Chase and Robert Fife, “CSIS Head Tells MP Michael 

Chong That He and Family Were Targeted by China,” Globe and Mail, May 2, 2023; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 2024), 350. 59Fang Dehao,“加拿大主動披露 中國針對國會議員莊文浩發動假資訊戰,”Radio Free Asia, August 10, 2023; Paul Vieira, “Canada Says China Likely Behind a Disinformation-Campaign Targeting Lawmaker,” Wall Street Journal, updated August 9, 2023. 60Amanda Coletta, “How China Allegedly Interfered with Canada’s Elections,” Washington Post, 

April 10, 2024; Norimitsu Onishi, “Canadian Politicians Were Targeted by China in 2021, Report 

Says,” New York Times, April 3, 2024; Norimitsu Onishi, “Canadian Lawmaker Testifies Chinese 

Students Were Bused In to Elect Him,” New York Times, April 2, 2024. Norimitsu Onishi, “Canadian Politicians Who Criticize China Become Its Targets,” New York Times, July 15, 2023. 61“Solomon Islanders Cast Votes in an Election That Will Shape Relations with China,” Associated Press, updated April 17, 2024. The April 2024 elections in the Solomon Islands were the 

first general elections since the government switched diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China 

in 2019. 62Cleo Paskal, “PRC Shadow Looms as the Solomons Head for Election,” Sunday Guardian, 

April 14, 2024; Albert Zhang and Adam Ziogas, “Russia and China Co-ordinate on Disinformation in Solomon Islands Elections,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Strategist, May 2, 2024; 
Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally

299

“Solomon Islanders Cast Votes in an Election That Will Shape Relations with China,” Associated 

Press, updated April 17, 2024. 63Kathryn Paik, “The Solomon Islands Heads to the Polls: Sogavare, Democracy, and Great 

Power Competition,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, April 9, 2024. See also Cleo 

Paskal, “PRC Shadow Looms as the Solomons Head for Election,” Sunday Guardian, April 14, 

2024; “Solomon Islanders Cast Votes in an Election That Will Shape Relations with China,” As- sociated Press, updated April 17, 2024. 64Mareike Ohlberg and Etienne Soula, “Voting in Beijing’s Shadow: The People’s Republic of 

China Interferes in the 2024 Taiwanese Elections,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, 

January 19, 2024. The United States Government follows a “one China policy,” guided by the 

1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the “Three Joint Communiqués,” and the “Six Assurances.” The PRC 

has not renounced the use of force to annex Taiwan. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Taiwan,” May 28, 2022; “Taiwan Defense Issues 

for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, updated May 10, 2024. 65 J. Michael Cole, “China’s Attempt to Interfere with Taiwan’s January 2024 Elections,” Mac- donald-Laurier Institute, February 2024, 1, 3–8. 66Mareike Ohlberg and Etienne Soula, “Voting in Beijing’s Shadow: The People’s Republic of 

China Interferes in the 2024 Taiwanese Elections,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, 

January 19, 2024; J. Michael Cole, “China’s Attempt to Interfere with Taiwan’s January 2024 

Elections,” Macdonald-Laurier Institute, February 2024; Lily Kuo, Pei-Lin Wu, Vic Chiang, and 

Joseph Menn, “4 Ways China is Trying to Interfere in Taiwan’s Presidential Election,” Washington 

Post, January 11, 2024. 67Zhang Yi, “Rumormongers in Taiwan to Face Sanctions,” China Daily, updated May 16, 2024. 68“China Sanctions Political Pundits in Taiwan to Pressure Lai,” Bloomberg, May 15, 2024. 69Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club, “TFCC Statement on China’s ‘Punishment’ of Taiwan 

Media Workers and Their Families,” May 18, 2024. For background on Taiwan’s politics, history, 

and relations with the U.S. and China, see also Susan V. Lawrence, “Taiwan: Background and U.S. 

Relations,” Congressional Research Service, updated May 23, 2024. 70Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2023 Annual Report (Washington: May 

2024), 351–352. 71Raphaël Viana David (@vdraphael), “Starting now. A group of us are blocked from entering 

the room for now because Chinese GONGOs are occupying the few NGO seats available. We will 

still follow this review. I’ll be tweeting here,” X, January 23, 2024, 03:12 a.m.; Elaine Pearson-@

PearsonElaine), “#China #UPR—That legitimate NGOs are blocked from entering the room because Chinese GONGOs are occupying the seats tells you everything you need to know about 

the Chinese government’s engagement & their unwillingness to accept genuine criticism.” X, 

January 23, 2024, 3:52 a.m; See also United Nations Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic 

Review—China, January 23, 2024. 72Emma Farge, “Exclusive: China Lobbies Countries to Praise its Rights Record Ahead of UN 

Review-Diplomats,” Reuters, January 22, 2024. 73 International Service for Human Rights, “HRC 55: China Fails in Disrupting Tribute at UN 

to Cao Shunli, Ten Years After Her Death in Custody,” March 22, 2024; Emma Farge, “Tribute 

to Deceased Chinese Dissident Exposes Fractures at UN Rights Body,” Reuters, March 22, 2024; 

Cao Shunli, an advocate for rule of law and governmental transparency and accountability in 

China for many years, died March 14, 2014 after being denied medical treatment by Chinese 

authorities while in detention. 2024 marked the 10- year anniversary of her passing. See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Inadequate Medical Care for Cao Shunli before Her 

Death Contradicts International Law,” April 2, 2014. 74“China’s Boycott Backfires,” editorial, Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2023; RFA Uyghur 

and Roseanne Gerin, “China Warns UN Members Not to Attend Panel on Human Rights: Report,” 

Radio Free Asia, September 19, 2023; Rayhan Asat (@RayhanAsat), “China’s effort [to] intimidate 

participation from UN missions not to attend a high level #Uyghur event organized by @AtlanticCouncil, @hrw & @amnesty It to silence the voices of top experts from foremost human rights 

organizations who bear witness to China’s relentless atrocities.,” X, September 16, 2023. 08:58 

a.m.; Iain Marlow, “China’s UN Mission Warns Against Xinjiang Event in New York,” Bloomberg, September 19, 2023. 75Rana Siu Inboden, “China, Power and the United Nations Special Procedures: Emerging 

Threats to the ‘Crown Jewels’ of the International Human Rights System,” Global Policy 15, no. 

S2 (2024): 80–81. 76Rana Siu Inboden, “China, Power and the United Nations Special Procedures: Emerging 

Threats to the ‘Crown Jewels’ of the International Human Rights System,” Global Policy 15, no. 

S2 (2024), 77–81. 77Rana Siu Inboden, “China, Power and the United Nations Special Procedures: Emerging 

Threats to the ‘Crown Jewels’ of the International Human Rights System,” Global Policy 15, no. 

S2 (2024), 81.
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XIII. Additional Views of Commission Members

Additional Views of Senator Dan Sullivan

Once again, the Commission has produced a very valuable report. It is critical that we stay focused on the values at stake in 

U.S.-China relations, even as the breadth of the relationship—and 

more often, rivalry—expands. This is exactly why the Commission 

was created. It is, therefore, unfortunate that the report has again 

strayed from its intended purpose and statutory mandate.

I care deeply about the environment. Americans, especially 

Alaskans, live amidst an abundance of natural beauty and resources. They maintain an abiding interest in responsibly managing them. For that matter, the people of China have an interest in 

managing and maintaining their own environment. The problem 

is that monitoring the efforts of Chinese authorities to do so is 

not part of the Commission’s legislative mandate. The same holds 

for international commitments the PRC may have made to address climate change.

Beyond the question of focus, on this and other issues, the Commission continues to use as benchmarks international agreements 

and other policy statements outside its writ. The Commission’s mandate identifies two United Nations documents against which to evaluate the state of human rights in China: the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It does not reference the Convention on the Elimination 

of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on 

the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Economic, 

Social and Cultural Rights, or the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

What’s more, none of these supplemental agreements have been 

ratified by the Senate. It makes little sense for American officials 

to cite Chinese compliance with documents over which there is no 

consensus in the United States itself. If anything, citing them mistakenly implies U.S. consent to their contents and expectations for 

U. S. compliance.

I raised these concerns in reaction to last year’s report. Not only 

were my concerns not addressed, but the 2024 report is arguably 

further beyond the Commission’s scope. It brings in an additional 

document outside the Commission’s mandate, the “UN Framework 

Principles on Human Rights and the Environment.” This declaration is not even subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. 

It is a promulgation by a UN Special Rapporteur of 16 principles 

“reflecting the application of existing human rights obligations in 

the environmental context.” The document leaves a great deal to 

interpretation. The U.S. is not even signed up to some of these socalled underlying “obligations.”

In slipping its legislative mandate, the Commission opens the 

way to examine any range of issues at play in the U.S.-China relationship. This distracts from its purpose—monitoring human rights 

and rule of law in China. And by moving beyond the international 

agreements identified as benchmarks in its mandate, the commission opens the way to lend credence to virtually any multilateral 

set of norms. This would be fine if the Commission were a private 
Additional Views of Commission Members

301

research organization. But it is not. The Congressional-Executive 

Commission is composed of officials of the U.S. government.

Not to take away from the fine and diligent work of the commission staff. I am proud of its work and my association with the 

Commission. But for the reasons stated above, I must abstain again 

from voting on the annual report.