U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

57–731 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024

S. HRG. 118–514 

IMPROVING RAIL SAFETY IN RESPONSE 

TO THE EAST PALESTINE DERAILMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 22, 2023 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, Chair 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts 

GARY PETERS, Michigan 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

JON TESTER, Montana 

KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado 

RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER WICKER, Mississippi 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

TED BUDD, North Carolina 

ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri 

J. D. VANCE, Ohio 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Staff Director 

MELISSA PORTER, Deputy Staff Director 

JONATHAN HALE, General Counsel 

BRAD GRANTZ, Republican Staff Director 

NICOLE CHRISTUS, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

LIAM MCKENNA, General Counsel 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on March 22, 2023 ............................................................................ 1 

Statement of Senator Cantwell .............................................................................. 1 

Testimonies from East Palestine residents .................................................... 93 

Statement of Senator Cruz ..................................................................................... 3 

Statement of Senator Vance ................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

Statement of Senator Welch ................................................................................... 22 

Statement of Senator Klobuchar ............................................................................ 54 

Statement of Senator Markey ................................................................................. 58 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 63 

Statement of Senator Peters ................................................................................... 65 

Statement of Senator Capito .................................................................................. 67 

Statement of Senator Duckworth ........................................................................... 69 

Statement of Senator Schmitt ................................................................................ 71 

Statement of Senator Rosen ................................................................................... 72 

Statement of Senator Fischer ................................................................................. 74 

Statement of Senator Luja ́n .................................................................................... 76 

Statement of Senator Blackburn ............................................................................ 78 

Statement of Senator Hickenlooper ....................................................................... 80 

Statement of Senator Warnock ............................................................................... 81 

WITNESSES

Hon. Sherrod Brown, U.S. Senator from Ohio ...................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Hon. Mike DeWine, Governor from Ohio ............................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14 

Misti Allison, Resident of East Palestine .............................................................. 17 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18 

Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board ........ 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 25 

David Comstock, Chief, Ohio Western Reserve Joint Fire District ..................... 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

Clyde Whitaker, Ohio State Legislative Director, SMART—Transportation 

Division ................................................................................................................. 38 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 40 

Alan Shaw, President and Chief Executive Officer, Norfolk Southern Corporation ........................................................................................................................ 41

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

Ian Jefferies, President and Chief Executive Officer, Association of American 

Railroads ............................................................................................................... 47 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

APPENDIX

Letter dated March 21, 2023 to Hon. Maria Cantwell and Hon. Ted Cruz 

from Chris Jahn, President and CEO, American Chemistry Council ............. 113 

Letter dated March 21, 2023 to Members of the U.S. Senate and House 

of Representatives from the National League of Cities .................................... 116 

Letter dated March 22, 2023 to Hon. Maria Cantwell and Hon. Ted Cruz 

from Rev. Lennox Yearwood, President and CEO, Hip Hop Caucus ............... 153 

Letter dated March 29, 2023 to Hon. Maria Cantwell and Hon. Ted Cruz 

from Robert Benedict, Vice President, Petrochemicals & Midstream, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers ........................................................ 156 

Page

IV 

American Association for Laboratory Accreditation (A2LA), prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 159 

Chuck Baker, President, American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), prepared statement ................................................................... 160 

Tony Cardwell, President, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes 

Division/IBT, prepared statement ...................................................................... 166 

Jonathan Long, General Chairman, American Rail System Federation of the 

Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division/IBT, prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 168 

National Safety Council, prepared statement ....................................................... 171 

Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, prepared statement ............... 173 

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy by: 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 174 

Hon. Gary Peters .............................................................................................. 174 

Response to written questions submitted to David Comstock by: 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 177 

Hon. Marsha Blackburn ................................................................................... 177 

Response to written questions submitted to Clyde Whitaker by: 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 178 

Response to written questions submitted to Alan Shaw by: 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 178 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 179 

Hon. Gary Peters .............................................................................................. 179 

Hon. Tammy Baldwin ...................................................................................... 180 

Hon. Tammy Duckworth .................................................................................. 181 

Hon. Ted Cruz ................................................................................................... 182 

Response to written questions submitted to Ian Jefferies by: .............................

Hon. John Thune .............................................................................................. 183 

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IMPROVING RAIL SAFETY IN RESPONSE TO 

THE EAST PALESTINE DERAILMENT 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2023 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:51 a.m., in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Maria Cantwell, 

Chairwoman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Cantwell[presiding], Klobuchar, Schatz, Markey, Peters, Baldwin, Duckworth, Tester, Sinema, Rosen, Luja ́n, 

Hickenlooper, Warnock, Welch, Cruz, Thune, Fischer, Moran, Sullivan, Blackburn, Young, Budd, Schmitt, Vance, and Capito. 

Also present: Senator Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON 

Chair CANTWELL. The Science and Transportation committee will 

come to order for the purposes of a hearing. We are here this morning at the Full Committee for ‘‘Improving Rail Safety in Response 

to the East Palestine Derailment.’’ 

I would ask the witnesses to please join us for the first panel at 

the witness table. Good morning, everyone. The hearing will come 

to order. On February 3, the town of East Palestine, Ohio, experienced a hazardous material event that no community should have 

to suffer from. 

A Norfolk Southern train carrying hazardous material crashed 

just outside the town and 38 cars, more than a quarter of the train, 

derailed. Plastic pellets from one of the derailed cars caught fire 

with engulfed—and engulfed other rail cars, including five carrying 

vinyl chloride. After burning for 2 days, authorities became concerned that the vinyl chloride in one of the tanks was undergoing 

a chemical reaction that made it bigger and more dangerous. 

The authorities then initiated a controlled burn of the remaining 

vinyl chloride in five tanks to prevent a greater catastrophe. 2,000 

residents were forced to evacuate and a community was forever 

changed. We look forward to hearing the witnesses and especially 

appreciate the Palestine moms for their leadership, and we look 

forward to hearing from Ms. Allison this morning. 

Let me be clear, this hearing is not only, though, about East Palestine derailment. Less than a week ago, a Burlington Northern 

Santa Fe train derailed in my state of Washington, the Swinomish 

reservation in Skagit County, spilling 5,000 gallons of diesel near 

Padilla Bay waterfront, a very sensitive aquatic ecosystem. These 

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are important issues for all of America, and we look forward to 

working in a bipartisan basis on this problem. 

Fire Chief Comstock, I know, will be testifying, and he knows 

better that a fire department needs to deal with the hazardous materials, and we will be asking you what Congress can do to better 

equip the firefighters who have to respond. These derailments have 

occurred during a concerning trend. 

That is, we can’t have railroads adopt operating models focused 

on just cutting cost to achieve higher profits and then have higher 

accident rates. We need to invest in the modernization of equipment that will provide the safety we need. From 2017 to 2021, railroads cut their workforce by 22 percent and reduced investment in 

the network by 24 percent. And at the same time, accident rates 

increased by 14 percent. 

We will dive into these details today to better understand what 

that is about. Today, we will hear from Senators Brown and Vance 

about their bipartisan legislation, the Railway Safety Act of 2023, 

and from Ohio Governor Mike DeWine about his experience in responding to the derailment. We will hear from, as I mentioned earlier, East Palestine resident Misti Allison, who will give a firsthand 

account of how the derailment impacted her community. 

We will also hear from a second panel of witnesses who will 

speak to rail and hazardous materials safety policy failures that 

contributed to the derailment and what steps are necessary to protect communities, employees, and the environment. NTSB Chair 

Homendy will be here, and I look forward to asking her about their 

agency’s recommendations to improve rail safety and about what 

investments in detection devices are necessary. 

Mr. Whitaker, you and your coworkers who have raised questions 

about safety, we will hear from you about why you believe these 

concerns have gone unaddressed. And we will hear from Norfolk 

Southern CEO Alan Shaw about these trends and what he is going 

to do to ensure that safety is the top priority. 

A month ago, I sent letters to seven Class I freight railroads asking for information about their hazardous materials safety practices. Nearly all of them failed to provide the Committee with the 

specific information that were requested. I have to say BSNF did 

provide us with information about past inspections, but we need 

clear information from organizations where we are today with safety inspections. 

Let me be clear, we need to know exactly what organizations are 

doing today to make sure inspections are helping us to detect problems. I introduced legislation in 2015 that has some of the same 

provisions that we now see in the Brown, Vance Bill. 

I wish some of those who had been implemented sooner. Our two 

colleagues, though, are working very diligently to make this a top 

priority here in Congress and working hard to represent these communities. 

I believe that our committee can work in a bipartisan fashion to 

improve rail safety, but it shouldn’t go unnoticed that the same 

issues are plaguing us in other areas of transportation. If you want 

to have the safest system, you have to have the most modernized 

equipment, the most minimal of workforce standards, and you have 

to continue to improve safety. 

3 

With that, I will turn it over to the Ranking Member, Senator 

Cruz, for his opening comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank the 

witnesses for being here today. Welcome, Senator Brown. Like so 

many other Americans, I watched with dismay the horror that unfolded in East Palestine, Ohio. 

On television, we saw a fiery train wreck where nearby residents 

were understandably fearful that their water was poisoned and 

their air was polluted. The distress of East Palestine’s residents 

was real then and it is real now. And Ms. Allison, thank you for 

being here and testifying today. 

That is why it is important that we are holding this hearing. 

This hearing will address two critical topics. First, what can be 

done to prevent derailments like the one that occurred in East Palestine? Second, what can be done more broadly to improve the safety of trains transporting hazardous materials? 

While these topics are related, and each topic, I think, merits its 

own hearing, it appears this morning may be our only opportunity 

as a full committee to examine the East Palestine derailment and 

the broader questions about railroad safety policy. 

To be clear, I agree with Senators Brown and Vance that railroad 

safety should be on our agenda, and that it is an opportunity for 

real and meaningful bipartisan cooperation. My team and I will 

continue engaging with their staff and with the Chairwoman’s 

staff, and I am optimistic that we can achieve broad agreement on 

policies that improve safety, that protect our communities, without 

at the same time damaging our supply chain or imposing unreasonable costs that would ultimately harm American families. 

We need to do both. Today, we need to hear what led to the derailment in East Palestine. The NTSB has launched an investigation, and I appreciate Chairwoman Homendy’s appearance here 

today. This committee is also looking very closely at this derailment. For as much as we know about the derailment, key questions 

remain unanswered. 

For example, who specifically made the decision to vent and burn 

the vinyl chloride from all five derailed tank cars, and why? Were 

alternatives considered? Were the right people consulted? I also 

want to know what can be done to prevent or to mitigate similar 

derailments in the future? 

This committee should hear more about wayside detectors and 

advanced technologies that could use algorithms and trending analysis to identify potential safety issues earlier. We should hear more 

about the information available to first responders and about the 

coordination with shippers of hazardous materials. 

Understandably, Americans across the country share the concerns of the residents of East Palestine and wonder, are essential 

hazardous materials being transported safely? Will residents be 

protected if a spill occurs? Unfortunately, the delayed and disjointed response by the Biden Administration has not allayed these 

concerns. 

4 

Notably, we heard calls from residents of East Palestine in the 

local school asking, where is Pete Buttigieg? The response from 

East Palestine’s Mayor, Trent Conway, was, ‘‘I don’t know.’’ It took 

Secretary Buttigieg 10 days to even acknowledge the derailment. 

After he was called out, he did a 180 and tried to sell a slew of 

big Government regulatory proposals desperate to disguise the failure of the Administration to act sooner. 

For example, Secretary Buttigieg, as proposed, is reinstating a 

brake rule that was not supported by cost benefit analysis. Shortly 

thereafter, the Chairwoman of the NTSB, Chairwoman Homendy, 

tweeted about this rule. 

She said, ‘‘some are saying the ECP electronically controlled 

pneumatic brake rule, if implemented, would have prevented this 

derailment. False.’’ She proceeded to explain the proposed break 

rule would not have applied to the East Palestine train and would 

not have prevented the derailment, even if it had. 

Undeterred, Secretary Buttigieg then released a laundry list of 

regulatory proposals, many of which had little to no connection to 

the East Palestine derailment. In an effort to further distract from 

his own failed response, Secretary Buttigieg has suggested that 

President Trump was responsible for the derailment in East Palestine. 

I know that is a frequent playbook of this Administration, blaming every problem on President Trump, but not even The Washington Post fact checker, who usually goes out of his way to back 

Democrat claims, bought this claim. 

The Washington Post fact checker concluded, and I quote, ‘‘from 

our analysis, none of the regulatory changes made during the 

Trump Administration at this point can be cited as contributing to 

the accident.’’ In contrast to Secretary Buttigieg, our colleague on 

this committee, Senator Vance, has kept his focus where it should 

be, on the people affected by the derailment. 

I applaud him and I applaud Senator Brown for focusing on their 

constituents, and I look forward to continuing to work closely with 

both of you and with the Chairwoman on a bipartisan serious rail 

safety package. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you, Senator Cruz. The first panel will 

provide committee testimony about rail safety legislation being 

supported by Senators Brown and Vance. And we will hear how the 

Norfolk Southern derailment has impacted the community. 

First, we will hear from Senator Brown and then Senator Vance, 

who is on the Committee, about their legislation. Next, we will 

hear from Governor Mike DeWine, who will be joining us remotely, 

who has been Governor of Ohio since 2019, is a former Senate colleague and we welcome him back into the Senate for the purposes 

of his experience on this derailment. And we look forward to hearing from you, Governor DeWine. 

And last, we will hear from Misti Allison, who is a member of 

the community from East Palestine, Ohio. So, thank you all for 

being here. And Senator Brown, you lead off. 

5 

STATEMENT OF HON. SHERROD BROWN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Senator Cruz, thank 

you, and members of the Committee, especially my colleague from 

Ohio, Senator Vance. 

I want to thank Governor DeWine for the very good work he has 

done in responding to this. Misti Allison for her activism. She is 

here today with us, as Chair Cantwell said. This is her second trip 

to Washington on behalf of the East Palestine community. She is 

here soon after the loss of her mother. 

Misti, thank you for speaking up during this difficult time and 

for your leadership, and our thoughts and prayers, of course, are 

with you and your family. I appreciate the work that Senator 

Vance has done on this legislation. It has been a bipartisan effort 

from the beginning. I appreciate the comments of Senator Cruz and 

Chair Cantwell. I was just in East Palestine again yesterday. 

I want to thank Ohio witnesses and the second panel, Chief Comstock of the Western Reserve Joint Fire District, and Clyde 

Whitaker with SMART Transportation Division that represents 

some 3,000 rail workers in our state. I appreciate their work. Chief 

Comstock speaks clearly about the challenges first responders in 

communities the size of East Palestine have faced. 

Mr. Whitaker is an unrelenting advocate for safe working conditions for his members and for all people working in Ohio railroads. 

The nation now knows East Palestine is a tight knit community in 

Columbiana County, Ohio. 

The year I was born, and a couple of decades after that East Palestine—the Columbiana County made 80 percent of the tableware 

in this country, the dishes and glasses, and because of bad trade 

policy, those jobs first they moved South, then they moved to Mexico, then they moved to China. 

There are no potteries in Columbiana County anymore. This 

community and neighboring communities just a couple of miles 

away in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, are the kind of places that 

are too often forgotten or exploited by corporate America. 

Now, these Ohioans are worried about whether their water is 

safe to drink, whether the air is safe to breathe, whether their kids 

will get sick, and of interest to the Committee I chair, what happens to the value of their homes. 

We have heard Mr. Shaw say that Norfolk Southern is going to 

‘‘make it right’’ in East Palestine, and do right, is his words, by the 

community. Senator Vance and I are going to make sure that East 

Palestine is not forgotten. He and I both make regular visits there. 

Not next week, not next month, not next year, not ever. 

Doing right by this community must include making sure more 

accidents don’t happen and that is the reason for our legislative efforts. That will only occur if we take clear, commonsense steps to 

make our railways safer. Norfolk Southern followed the Wall Street 

business model, boost profits in its stock price by eliminating over 

the last decade 38 percent of its workforce. 

These profits were spent on stock buybacks that benefit executives instead of investing in workers and investing in safety. Instead, they compromised safety. Cut costs to boost profits, the comVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
6 

munities along their route be damned. For decades, the railroads 

have lobbied to undermine safety rules. 

They are still at it even now, after what they have done to this 

Ohio town, even with the eyes of the country on them, Madam 

Chair. Today you are going to hear arguments from Norfolk Southern and the rail industry’s lobbying arm that they support the intent of the bill, but they don’t really need stronger rules. We have 

heard that before in this committee and elsewhere. 

The railroads are committed to safety. They say they are making 

changes. They claim. Mr. Jefferies’s prepared testimony goes to 

great lengths to hide safety problems in his statistics. Here is a 

statistic you won’t hear, taking out grade crossings. 

The accident and incident rate for Class I railroads, not including 

the short lines, Class I railroads is higher in each of the past 4 

years than any year since 2008. A decade of progress has been 

wiped out. Their trains are growing longer, heavier, and more dangerous. 

The train that went off the tracks in East Palestine was 149 

cars. The train that went off the tracks in Springfield, Ohio, West 

of there, 150 miles, only 2 weeks later was over 200 cars. They are 

longer, they are heavier, they are more dangerous. 

So, remember, when you hear about supposed quote, meaning, 

remember that when you hear about meaningfully improved safety. 

We have heard over the past month and Mr. Jefferies will repeat 

today, that 99.9 percent of rail has met shipments, reached their 

destinations without releasing toxic waste. 

I would urge him to talk to Ms. Allison and others whom I have 

gotten to know in East Palestine about how it feels to be that 0.1 

percent. Ask her if she thinks that record is something to brag 

about. Railroads refuse to support new rules for trains that carry 

dangerous hazardous material, like the vinyl chloride that burned 

in Ohio. 

They have cut the amount of time their car men are given to inspect each railcar to less than a minute. The railroads have often 

argued against increasing fines for safety violations. Of course, 

they have. In most recent Fiscal Year available, Norfolk Southern 

had 579 violations in the cases that have been closed. 

They paid an average fine of less than $3,300. You heard that 

right. Not $30 million, not $3 million, just over $3,000. The largest 

fine Norfolk Southern paid that year was just over $25,000. The 

company, keep in mind, planned to spend $3.4 billion on stock 

buybacks and they already did that, and even more, right before 

they were about to do it again when the train derailed. It is not 

a cost of doing business, the fines. It really is a rounding error. 

Finally, the railroads are fighting the most basic of all requirements, having two crew members in a train. If you ask 50 people 

outside anywhere, how many people you think work on those trains 

that are 200 cars long or two or three miles long, you would hear 

people say 5, 10, 20. The railroads want only one person working 

on a train that is two or three miles long. That is frankly crazy. 

Earlier this month, Norfolk Southern issued a six-point plan of 

modest safety improvements. We don’t need a voluntary plan. We 

need the Brown, Vance bill. We need safety rules. We need the 

Railway Safety Act. Our bill is a commonsense bipartisan plan. 

7 

Senator Vance and I are both here today to urge this committee to 

embrace the obvious need for safety reform. 

It shouldn’t, Madam Chair, Senator Cruz, it shouldn’t take a 

train derailment for elected officials to put partisanship aside and 

work together for the people whom we serve, not corporations like 

Norfolk Southern. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Brown follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SHERROD BROWN, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO

I want to thank Governor DeWine and Misti Allison for joining us today. You both 

know too well the need for stronger rail safety. 

This is Ms. Allison’s second trip to Washington, DC on behalf of the East Palestine and she is here soon after the loss of her mother. Misti, thank you for speaking up during this difficult time. Our thoughts and prayers are with you and your 

family at the loss of your mother. 

I also want to thank our Ohio witnesses on the second panel: Chief Chip Comstock of the Western Reserve Joint Fire District and Clyde Whitaker with SMART’s 

Transportation Division that represents 3,000 railroad workers in our state. 

Chief Comstock speaks clearly about the challenges our first responders in East 

Palestine have faced, and Mr. Whitaker is a constant advocate for safe working conditions on Ohio railroads. 

As the Nation now knows, East Palestine is a tightknit town in Columbiana 

County, Ohio, which once made 80 percent of the ceramics in this country, before 

those jobs—like so many in our state—moved overseas, so companies could pay 

workers less. 

This town—and neighboring communities in Beaver County, Pennsylvania—are 

the kinds of places that are too often forgotten or exploited by corporate America. 

Now, these Ohioans are worried about whether their water is safe to drink, 

whether the air is safe to breathe, whether their kids will get sick, and—of interest 

to the Committee I chair—what happens to the value of their homes. 

We’ve heard Mr. Shaw say that Norfolk Southern is going to ‘‘make it right’’ in 

East Palestine and ‘‘do right’’ by the community. Senator Vance and I are going to 

make sure that East Palestine is not forgotten—not next week, not in two years, 

not ever. 

Doing right by this community must include making sure more accidents don’t 

happen. And that will only occur if we take clear, commonsense steps to make our 

railways safer. 

Norfolk Southern followed the Wall Street business model: boost profits, and its 

stock price, by eliminating 38 percent of its workers over 10 years. Those profits 

were spent on stock buybacks that benefit executives instead of investing in its 

workers and investing in safety. 

Cut costs to boost profits, the communities along their routes be damned. For decades, the railroads have lobbied to undermine safety rules. 

And they’re still at it, even now even after what they’ve done to this Ohio town. 

Even with the eyes of the country on them. 

Today you’re going to hear arguments from Norfolk Southern and the rail industry’s lobbying arm that they support the ‘‘intent of the bill’’ but that we don’t need 

stronger rules. 

The railroads are committed to safety, they say. They’re making changes, they 

claim. 

Mr. Jefferies’ prepared testimony goes to great lengths to hide safety problems in 

his statistics. 

Here’s a statistic you won’t hear: taking out grade crossings, the accident and incident rate for Class I railroads is higher in each of the past 4 years than in any year 

since 2008. A decade of progress has been wiped out. 

Their trains are growing longer, heavier, and more dangerous. 

So remember that when you hear about supposed, quote, ‘‘meaningfully improved 

safety.’’ 

We’ve also heard over the past month—and Mr. Jefferies will repeat today—that 

99.9 percent of rail hazmat shipments reach their destination without releasing 

toxic waste. 

I’d urge him to talk to Ohioans in East Palestine, like Ms. Allison, about how it 

feels to be in that point-one-percent. Ask her if she thinks that record is something 

to brag about. 

8 

Railroads refuse to support new rules for trains that carry dangerous hazardous 

materials, like the vinyl chloride that burned in Ohio. 

They have cut the amount of time their carmen are given to inspect each railcar 

to less than a minute. 

The railroads have also argued against increasing fines for safety violations. Of 

course. 

In the most recent fiscal year available, Norfolk Southern had 579 violations in 

closed cases. They paid an average fine of less than $3,300. 

You heard that right—not $30 million. Not $3 million. Just over $3,000. The largest fine Norfolk Southern paid that year was just over $25,000. 

This company planned to spend $3.4 billion on stock buybacks. A $3,000 or 

$25,000 fine is meaningless. It’s not even a cost of doing business—it’s a rounding 

error. 

Finally, the railroads are fighting the most basic of all requirements: having two 

crew members in a train. 

Trains are miles long. Railroads want just a single human being on these trains. 

That is, frankly, crazy. 

Earlier this month, Norfolk Southern issued a six-point plan of modest safety improvements. We don’t need a voluntary plan. 

We need real safety rules. We need the Railway Safety Act. 

Our bill is a commonsense, bipartisan plan. Senator Vance and I are both here 

today to urge the Committee to embrace the obvious need for safety reforms. 

It shouldn’t take a train derailment for elected officials to put partisanship aside 

and work together for the people we serve—not corporations like Norfolk Southern. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Brown. And 

thank you for accentuating this one point, that is a trend change 

that I don’t think people have fully digested is the length of trains 

has significantly changed. 

And so, I think it proposes definitely new challenges. Senator 

Vance, thank you. I look forward to your comments and appreciate 

your work on this legislation. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES DAVID VANCE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO 

Senator VANCE. So, thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Ranking Member Cruz, for both of your engagement with this issue. 

Thanks to Senator Brown for his partnership on this issue. Appreciate it. Appreciate you being here for the Commerce Committee. 

I want to thank all of our guests here, both during this panel and 

the next panel. But I particularly want to thank Ms. Allison for 

being here. I read your testimony this morning, and I won’t reveal 

what is in it because I don’t want to give anything away but let 

me just say that I am sorry this happened. 

And as the father of three kids under the age of six, I was particularly affected by some of the ways this has affected your children. And the only thing I would ask you, Ms. Allison, because you 

have already done so much with your activism, I appreciate that, 

is that, you know, always treat our office as an open door. 

If there is more that we could be doing, I would like to be doing 

it. I am a new Senator. You don’t always see everything that is 

happening. And the thing that I would ask is, if you think we could 

be doing more, just come and tell us, because we will try to do that. 

So, look forward to your testimony. 

But let me just sort of address a couple of issues related to the 

Railway Safety Act. I have heard a couple of general complaints 

and a couple of specific complaints about the legislation from industry groups, from alleged conservative activists, and I would like 

to address them in broad strokes here and then address one speVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
9 

cific consideration, and then finally suggest a way we might be able 

to deal with this bill and this legislation in the future. 

So, the most outrageous and the most ridiculous thing that I 

have heard from industry groups and other activists in response to 

this bill is that it is somehow a kind of Bolshevism to require the 

railways to engage in proper safety standards, that this bill is a big 

Government solution to the railway safety problem. 

It is funny that that complaint comes from a group that came before this body 3 months ago begging for a bailout from their labor 

dispute. And while I am on that topic, by the way, thank you, 

Ranking Member Cruz, for your leadership on that issue in particular. But you cannot, on the one hand, beg the Government to 

bail you out of a labor dispute 3 months ago and then say that it 

is big Government to have proper safety standards in the way that 

you conduct your railroads. It is a ridiculous argument. It doesn’t 

pass the smell test. 

And the fact that they advanced that argument in their Op-Eds, 

in their paid for activism is insulting to the people of East Palestine and it is insulting to the intelligence of the members of this 

committee. Let me offer a specific pushback to a criticism. 

One of the things that I have heard in response to our legislation 

is that it actually has nothing to do with what happened in East 

Palestine. Well, that is an interesting observation, and it is something that I would love them to go to East Palestine and say themselves. Say it to the firefighters who went into a chemical fire without proper hazmat protection because they didn’t know what was 

on the train. 

This legislation fixes that problem as it should. But you cannot 

say that this has nothing to do with East Palestine when the very 

people on the ground are begging for some of these changes and the 

firefighters, not just in East Palestine, but all across the state of 

Ohio and all across the country, are saying that they need this 

stuff. 

Now, I have heard from people that the railroads are adopting 

certain voluntary standards. You heard some of that in Senator 

Brown’s testimony. They allegedly have an app that notifies the 

firefighters and the first responders what is on the trains. Well, if 

the app was good enough, then why did it fail in East Palestine? 

If the app provided proper notification, then why did firefighters 

in my state 7 weeks ago go fight a chemical fire without knowing 

what was on it? It is a ridiculous argument. Now I want to look 

toward the future here, and I want to offer a suggestion to the rail 

industry and to anybody else who wants to engage on this legislation. 

I had a good meeting with Alan Shaw yesterday, and I am looking forward to Mr. Shaw’s testimony. I would love to see a commitment from Mr. Shaw to defend and to support certain components 

of this bill. I think it would be good. 

I think it would be good for the people of East Palestine, and I 

frankly think it would be good for Norfolk Southern as well. But 

one of the things that we talked about is the hot box detectors and 

whether we need them every 10 miles or every 15 miles or every 

7.5 miles, and whether they should be enhanced by additional technology. 

10 

That is the type of conversation I am willing to have, and I don’t 

want to speak for Senator Brown, but I guess that he would probably be willing to have it, too. Let’s have that conversation about 

what the proper pacing is for the hotbox detectors. 

Let’s have the conversation about how we can advance this stuff 

with better technology. I am open to that. But to the rail industry, 

don’t lie about my bill. Don’t slander the staff who drafted it. If you 

would like to have a good faith conversation about rail safety, let’s 

do exactly that. 

But we are going to learn a lot during this committee and in the 

weeks to come, if the rail industry would like to do that. I hope 

they will, because I am certainly ready to join that conversation. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Vance follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JD VANCE, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO

I thank the Chair and the Ranking Member for holding this hearing. I also want 

to thank Governor DeWine for his statement. Thanks as well to the witnesses, especially Misti Allison, who has joined us from East Palestine. 

The citizens of East Palestine have suffered a profound shock. They have felt the 

mental and physical consequences of an explosion in their community. They have 

felt the alienation of watching that disaster televised and dissected worldwide. They 

felt the terrible fear that all parents feel when their children are in danger. 

This should not have happened in America. This cannot happen again in America. 

Today this Committee gets down to the business of ensuring that it does not. 

Those are the emotional stakes of this disaster, but we are not charged in the 

Senate to proceed on feeling alone. This chamber rightly prides itself on being an 

island of reason in a political culture that has become increasingly frantic. Thinking 

logically, we might be inclined to suggest that an industrial economy like ours requires the transportation of hazardous materials, and that of course accidents happen. We might reason that industry provides enormous benefit to the American people, and so, while these circumstances are regrettable, they do not merit swift action. 

This assessment is logical, but terribly wrong. Both Europe and Japan move more 

trains over more miles of track than the United States. They have many fewer 

derailments. They seem to be able to have a freight rail system with much less risk. 

Their example demonstrates that we can safely remove some of the risk from the 

rail system through reasonable government action without endangering commerce. 

Perhaps accidents will happen, but surely they can happen less often. 

Senators Brown, Hawley, Rubio, Casey and Fetterman and I have offered a solution, the Railway Safety Act of 2023. Representatives Johnson and Sykes and a coalition of our state’s delegation have put forward similar legislation. These measures’ 

provisions are limited, prudent, and urgent. 

Presently, there is no Federal regulation requiring the installation of sensors for 

overheating parts on railway lines. The most common of these sensors detect the 

difference between the outside temperature and the wheel and axle assembly of a 

railcar as it passes by. If there is a failure in this equipment, wheels lock up, and 

friction between the metal wheel and metal track creates heat and sparks. If there 

is enough heat for long enough the car’s wheel and axle assembly will fail, and the 

train will derail. This is what caused the disaster at East Palestine. These facts are 

not in dispute. 

In fact, on March 6, Norfolk Southern itself announced that it was installing additional sensors on its rails. The Senate should not be satisfied with a voluntary 

standard outlined with blurry legalisms. Phrases from their announcement, ‘‘develop 

a plan,’’ ‘‘anticipates adding,’’ and ‘‘where practical’’ are not enough, not when towns 

across America are at stake. Hot bearing detectors must be added to the network, 

and they must be added in sufficient frequency to detect failing equipment. The National Transportation Safety Board preliminary report says that the derailment occurred on a stretch of track where detectors were twenty miles apart. We propose 

to require detectors every ten miles. Currently, there are about 6,000 hot bearing 

detectors on the rail network, averaging approximately 20–30 miles apart, depending on the railroad and the traffic on a rail line. 

11 

The railroad industry is unmoved by the fact that this requirement would have 

prevented the disaster at East Palestine. They have said that this requirement does 

not ‘‘provide appropriate flexibility’’ and that it is a ‘‘prescriptive safety mandate.’’ 

They say that they are ‘‘determining what improvements should be made.’’ They 

say, ‘‘this section fails to evince any need for prescriptive installation of such detectors . . .’’ Such resistance to even this common sense, minimal requirement, that 

railroads have admitted themselves needs to be remedied, should color Senators’ 

perceptions of the railroads’ other objections to this legislation. 

Perhaps just as important as the frequency of detectors is the question of at what 

temperature reading the trains should stop. Outside of East Palestine, the train registered a reading of 103 degrees Fahrenheit above ambient temperature. This did 

not lead to the train stopping. We need to figure out at what sensor reading these 

trains need to stop, and it’s clear that the voluntary guidelines are too lax, especially since Norfolk Southern claimed in the Washington Post that its stopping requirements are ‘‘among the lowest in the industry.’’ Even the most stringent voluntary standard in the industry wasn’t good enough. 

As Governor DeWine stated in his press conference on February 14: ‘‘the railroad 

was not required to notify anyone here in Ohio about what was in the rail cars coming through our state.’’ He called it ‘‘absurd.’’ I agree. It is absurd that there are 

no notification requirements for trains carrying hundreds of thousands of pounds of 

flammable gases under pressure. The railroads claim they have an app. There is an 

app! In their telling, there is no need for a Federal requirement, because the railroads have an app, another voluntary standard. 

The railroads claim that the app tells first responders everything they need to 

know, and that there were check-ins on the app in the area of East Palestine. Ask 

the firefighters if they knew precisely what was on this train. Ask them, and they 

will tell you that the placards of the trains were damaged by fire, and that the app 

was not sufficient. In the crucial early moments firefighters fought an inferno with 

limited protective equipment, because they didn’t know they were facing dangerous 

materials. 

The terms of service for this app state: ‘‘When using the AskRail app at the scene 

of a rail incident, users should try to secure the most up to date, federally-required 

shipping papers (consist) directly from the train crew or the railroad.’’ First responders should not have to come hat-in-hand and beg for these papers in the middle of 

an emergency. Many of these trains run through rural areas, where Internet 

connectivity is limited. There needs to be a mandatory requirement for notification. 

Senators on the Commerce Committee are intimately familiar with the issues attendant with rural broadband access. Emergency response in rural areas cannot be 

held hostage to the resolution of those issues—it is far too urgent. 

Notification is not something new or hasty that was dreamed up in a crisis atmosphere. There was another rail accident, in recent memory, also involving vinyl chloride, in Paulsboro, New Jersey. The NTSB stated, in 2016, that ‘‘notification requirements do not include such materials as the Class 2.1 vinyl chloride that was 

carried by Conrail (not a Class I railroad) and released in the Paulsboro, New Jersey, accident, from which this safety recommendation was derived. We urge PHMSA 

to require all railroads to provide advanced notification to communities for all hazardous materials transported on a given route.’’ If the railroads app is as comprehensive as they say, then compliance with a new, mandatory requirement for notification that the NTSB has been requesting for nearly a decade should be quite 

simple. 

The new regulation on flammable gas trains should also have a similar, but not 

precisely the same requirement as other High Hazard Flammable Trains to ensure 

that the safety regulations on the transportation of hazardous materials appropriately reflect the danger presented to the community. Before the transportation 

of millions of pounds of flammable gas, the railroad should have to have a plan in 

place if there is a release, just like for oil transportation. The government needs to 

take a look at other standards as well, including routing, consist, and train length 

and weight. We’re working on scoping this provision, and listening to stakeholders 

about our approach, but the rulemaking as it stands in the Railway Safety Act accomplishes those objectives. 

Some rationalization of the inspection regime for railcars is also a must. Some 

have claimed there are as many as ninety points of inspection on each side of a railcar. That inspection currently occurs in thirty seconds per side under current railroad practice. The voluntary requirements of the railroad do not provide enough 

time for a carman to actually review a railcar with sufficient care. Failing journal 

bearings, such as what happened in East Palestine can show signs of leaking oil 

or grease. These signs can be missed when the railcar is being inspected too rapidly. 

12 

Abbreviated pre-departure inspections have now become a regular occurrence in 

American railroading, where trains enter yards less frequently. This is a provision 

in the regulations that allows for a reduced inspection when there is not a qualified 

mechanical inspector in the facility. This regulation must be changed so that this 

practice becomes the exception rather than the norm once again, lest an abbreviated 

pre-departure inspection contribute to the next East Palestine as it has to other, 

fatal railroad accidents. 

The railroads suggest that the time for an inspection has no relationship to its 

quality. This is nonsensical. Clearly, there is a minimum amount of time required 

for a human visual inspection to be effective. There is a question as to what the 

appropriate figure for that minimum might be, and I welcome that discussion, but 

this committee should not be subjected to the absurdity that reducing inspection 

time to a hurried glance would have no effect on safety. Airlines welcome a careful 

pilot-driven inspection regime. If railroads are serious about safety, they will as 

well, especially for hazardous materials. 

The bill increases civil penalties for violations, which is a commonsense provision 

when the maximum fine for rail safety violations is only $225,455. This is a multibillion-dollar industry, and fines must be a sufficient deterrent to lax safety behavior. The bill requires two-man crews, to ensure that there are adequate personnel 

to manipulate the train in order to take tension out of a consist so that cut levers 

may be pulled to separate rail cars from the site of a derailment, so that the proper 

braking of partially derailed trains may be achieved, and so that engineers can manipulate the train while other employees respond to the emergency, which is what 

happened in East Palestine. 

These provisions are reasonable responses to a national disaster, which will cost 

untold sums to remediate. This is an industry that was created by land grants and 

subsidies from the Federal government in the first place, and enjoys a host of special privileges currently, not least of which was the recent congressionally-mandated 

termination of a railroad strike. Enacting modest advances in safety regulation after 

a disaster of the magnitude of East Palestine will steer Federal policy away from 

the current status quo, which concentrates reward in the hands of the railroads 

while socializing the risk of their cargoes and practices onto everyone else. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you, Senator Vance, for your passionate 

support on this issue. I know it will make a difference, and I appreciate you pushing back on some of the misinformation that is out 

there. 

We are now going to go to Governor DeWine, who is joining us 

remotely. Governor DeWine, always good to see you. Not good to 

see you on these circumstances but we appreciate your leadership 

in helping to articulate a path forward. 

And I would be remiss if I didn’t also thank you for your leadership on the CHIPS and Science Act and helping us get that legislation done. So, we look forward to you getting your help and support 

on moving the Brown, Vance legislation as well. 

So, Senator—I mean, our colleague, but now Governor, Governor 

DeWine. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DEWINE, GOVERNOR FROM OHIO 

Mr. DEWINE. Chairwoman Cantwell, thank you very much, 

Ranking Member Cruz, members of the Committee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify today. I am actually, as you can see, remote and I am in the East Palestine High School Library. Let me 

tell you a little bit about this community. 

The New Year started off normally in East Palestine. It is a village of about 4,700 people. They just enjoyed Christmas, The annual Snowflake Festival in December. The third quarter of school 

started in late January. Parts had been cast for the high school 

musical, The Lion King Junior that, frankly, my wife and I had the 

opportunity to watch a few days ago. 

13 

And the athletic director was preparing to host 25 to 30 teams 

for the Bulldog Invitational Track Meet in April. The evening of 

February 3, 2023, started off really not unlike a lot of Friday 

nights at that time of year in East Palestine. 

Parents and members of the community were gathered at the 

high school cheering on the varsity boys basketball team at the 

Bulldogs home game against United High School Eagles from nearby Hanoverton. Girls varsity team had played against the Eagles 

just the night before. 

The backdrop, of course, to all things in East Palestine is a near 

constant rumble of trains running through the village. But the people of East Palestine are certainly used to that and many don’t 

even notice them anymore. 

That was until 8:55 that Friday night. At 8:55, life stopped being 

normal for everyone in this community. It stopped feeling safe, 

when 38 cars of the Norfolk Southern freight train, carrying hundreds of thousands of pounds of hazardous material, hurtled off the 

track. Since then, I have visited the community a number of times 

and have had mothers tell me that they are afraid to let their children go outside in the grass to play. 

Some residents have told me about their bloody noses, their rashes, their coughs that they have developed, while others who don’t 

have symptoms now ask, what is going to happen to me in 10 or 

15 years? What is going to happen to my children? 

Some want to know if it is safe to plant a garden this spring, and 

if they do, will the vegetables be safe to eat? People wonder about 

their property values, the values of their homes. If they want to 

sell, will they ever be able to sell their homes? 

Businesses worry about are they going to be able to stay afloat? 

Many people just wonder, will life ever return to normal? What is 

clear for all of East Palestine is this, this has been a deeply traumatic experience for this wonderful community. While all the tests 

of the air and the soil and the water have thus far shown repeatedly that things are safe, fear, fear remains. 

The people of East Palestine have told me that they want their 

community back. They want things to go back to the way they were 

before the train wreck. Members of the Committee, Norfolk Southern has an obligation to restore this community. It was their train, 

their tracks, their action that they are responsible for this tragedy. 

I want to thank Senator Vance, Senator Brown, the other cosponsors of their bill, the Rail Safety Act of 2023. I want to also 

thank Congresswoman Johnson and Congresswoman Sykes for 

their bill, the Rail Act. I am grateful the drafters of both bills included my request for a provision requiring that the rail carriers 

in the future be required to provide advance notification to State 

and local emergency responders about what these trains are in fact 

carrying. 

Let me go further, what—I urge the Senate and House to swiftly 

act to improve the safety, the safety of our railroads. Norfolk 

Southern must do everything in its power to put everything back 

as it was in East Palestine before 8:55 p.m., Friday, February 3. 

The people of this village have a right, they have a right to get 

their lives back. They have a right to get their community back, 

and simply to get their piece of mind. 

14 

Let me just add, if I could, one additional thing. Shortly after the 

derailment, I heard repeatedly from residents they were concerned 

about their health. So, we worked with the East Palestine community, with the health department, and others to create a clinic for 

the residents so they could be assessed immediately, so they could 

walk in and be cared for. We started that clinic shortly after this 

tragedy occurred. 

This morning in this library I met with medical leaders from the 

East Liverpool City Hospital, and we are announcing today that we 

will be making this clinic into a permanent clinic for the community. It is going to be a full-service clinic that will provide comprehensive care and treatment. 

Anybody can walk in, anyone can be treated. And this is a longterm commitment to the health of the people of East Palestine. 

They are worried about their future. They are worried about where 

things are going to be in 5 or 10 or 15 years. It is important that 

they be able to continue to get assessed. 

It is particularly important—I talked to the Fire Chief the other 

day, very, very concerned about the 300 responders, not just from 

East Palestine, but from all the areas into Pennsylvania who responded that night, they all need to be assessed. There needs to be 

established a baseline. And they need to be assured that in 5 years 

or 10 years, there is still a place where they can go. We look to the 

railroad. 

We look to the railroad to establish that fund. I have talked to 

the CEO who is testifying in just a moment. We believe that fund 

needs to be established. It needs to be large enough to give people 

the confidence they have that they are going to be protected in the 

future. Thank you so much for inviting me to testify, and I am 

very, very grateful. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. DeWine follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DEWINE, GOVERNOR FROM OHIO

Chairwoman Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and Members of the Committee— 

Thank you for holding this very important hearing this morning and for the opportunity to testify remotely from East Palestine High School. 

East Palestine is a village of just over 4,700 people. The New Year started off normally for the people of East Palestine. They had just enjoyed Christmas and the 

annual Snowflake Festival in December. The 3rd quarter of school started in late 

January, parts had been cast for the Spring high school musical—The Lion King 

Jr.—and Assistant Principal and Athletic Director Dwayne Pavkovich, was preparing to host 25 to 30 teams for the Bulldog Invitational Track Meet that occurs 

every year in April. 

The evening of February 3rd, 2023, started off not unlike a lot of Friday nights 

in East Palestine. Parents and members of the community were gathered at the 

high school, cheering on the varsity boys basketball team at the Bulldogs home 

game against the United High School Eagles from nearby Hanoverton. 

The girls varsity team had played against the Eagles just the night before. 

The backdrop to all things in East Palestine is the near constant rumble of trains 

running through the village. But, the people of East Palestine are used to this. 

Many don’t even notice them anymore. 

That was until 8:55pm that Friday night. Life stopped being normal for everyone 

in this community—it stopped feeling safe—when 38 cars of that Norfolk Southern 

freight train, carrying hundreds of thousands of pounds of hazardous materials, hurtled off the track. 

In an instant, life turned upside down. 

In the six-and-a-half weeks since the derailment, I have visited East Palestine a 

number of times and have had mothers tell me they are afraid to let their children 

15 

play in the grass in their yards. They want to know when it will be safe or if it 

ever will be safe. 

Some have told me about their bloody noses and rashes and coughs they have developed, while others, who don’t have symptoms now, ask what is going to happen 

to them in 10 or 15 years? 

A young mother worries about what is going to happen to her 15-month-old baby? 

Some want to know if it is safe to plant a garden this Spring. Is it ok to till the 

soil or will that disturb toxins in the dirt? If they do plant a garden, will the vegetables be safe to eat? Local farmers are wondering about their winter wheat crops and 

if they will be able to sell to anyone come June when it is harvested. 

People in the community worry about the valuation of their properties. Will they 

ever be able to sell their homes? 

Will their small businesses stay afloat? 

Many just wonder: How are we going to return to normal? 

What is clear for all of East Palestine is that this has been a deeply traumatic 

experience for the entire community. But, while all the tests of the air and the soil 

and the water have shown repeatedly that things are safe, fear remains. 

What the people of East Palestine have told me is that they want their community back. They want things to be back to the way they were before the train wreck. 

Members of the Committee, Norfolk Southern has an obligation to restore this 

community. I will continue to do everything in my power to hold Norfolk Southern 

accountable. This was their train, their tracks, and they are responsible for this 

tragedy. 

In addition to the full cleanup and restoration of East Palestine, the railroad must 

do all it can to prevent similar derailments in the future and invest significantly 

in improving rail safety around the country. 

It is my commitment that the State of Ohio will not abandon East Palestine. Our 

state agencies arrived at the scene almost immediately—and we remain there today. 

Less than an hour after the train derailed, the East Palestine Police Department 

requested the assistance of our Ohio Highway Patrol. Our troopers in the area responded immediately, followed less than an hour later by Patrol units from a sevencounty area. They quickly began going door-to-door with local police and Sheriff 

Deputies to check on residents and notify them of the one-mile evacuation zone. 

By 10:30pm, the Columbiana County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) notified the Ohio EMA, who then began to monitor the situation and dispatched regional coordinators to East Palestine. Throughout the night and all day Saturday 

and Sunday, the Ohio Highway Patrol had a Sergeant embedded in the local incident command center. 

Shortly after midnight at 12:25am on Saturday, February 4th, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Emergency Response arrived on scene and immediately began containing the chemicals that had already spilled into the nearby 

creek. The U.S. EPA responded shortly thereafter and began monitoring the air. 

Initial reports were that nobody was injured, there was no significant property 

damage, and that the local first responders had the situation under control. They 

had decided that they were going to contain the fire, and let it burn itself out. 

But by late Sunday afternoon, February 5th, the situation significantly changed 

as the experts monitoring the train car noticed a sharp rise in the temperature of 

the chemicals in one of the derailed tankers. By Sunday evening, there was serious 

concern about the potential explosion of one of the rail cars containing vinyl chloride. 

Upon learning this, I immediately sent my Director of the Department of Public 

Safety, Andy Wilson, to East Palestine to assist with the coordination of state emergency response. I also activated the Ohio National Guard and ordered the Ohio 

Highway Patrol to help with evacuations and knock on every door in the evacuation 

zone. By 8:28pm, an evacuation notice went out. 

Throughout the night, Troopers went house by house through the evacuation zone 

alerting every person who remained that the situation had changed, it was extremely dangerous, and that they should leave immediately. Over the course of the 

emergency, public safety and emergency responders knocked on the doors in the 

danger zone on four separate occasions in an attempt to ensure the safety of the 

people residing there. 

When the Ohio EPA officials initially arrived at the scene, they quickly determined that the wells supplying the Village’s water were upstream of the derailment, 

and therefore, should be unaffected by the chemicals spilled in the derailment. In 

the days and weeks following, the Ohio EPA implemented a rigorous plan for testing 

the creeks. We know the creeks are contaminated, but we are excited to see the return of aquatic life which indicates that the waterways are recovering. 

16 

Team members from the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) arrived 

on scene within 24 hours of the derailment to begin surveying the impact on aquatic 

life and other wildlife in the area. As I indicated, it was clear that chemicals from 

the derailment had entered nearby waterways, significantly contaminating Sulphur 

Run and Leslie Run. Our ODNR team immediately began working with independent 

contractors to set up four separate survey locations where impacted aquatic life 

were identified, counted, and measured. 

Also within those first 24 hours, Ohio Department of Health (ODH) staff engaged 

with U.S. EPA and Federal partners to review and provide guidance on proposed 

community air monitoring values for the health and safety of residents. ODH senior 

leadership contacted the Columbiana County health commissioner to get an on the 

ground report and to offer any needed assistance. 

In the days following the derailment, it also became clear that the people of East 

Palestine were very concerned about the short-term and long-term effects on their 

health. I instructed my Department of Health Director, Dr. Bruce Vanderhoff, and 

his team to work with local health providers, the local health district, faith-based 

organizations, and community leaders to open a clinic, where members of the East 

Palestine community could have individualized and comprehensive medical evaluation informed by the best state and national experts. In addition to physicians and 

nurses, the clinic has also offered behavioral health services on site. 

Further, they have coordinated with that patient’s own primary care physician, 

if they have one, and have worked to establish a medical home for them if they did 

not. The importance of linking each patient back to their medical home or helping 

them establish a medical home is essential as part of a continuing journey to support each patient’s best health over the years to come. 

The interest in the clinic has exceeded our expectations. To date, more than 275 

patients have been seen, and while many have medical homes or have been established new medical homes, some have expressed interest in continuing with our clinic. To meet those needs, we will be establishing this clinic as a new primary care 

practice in the East Palestine community to better meet the comprehensive 

healthcare needs of the community. This is a long-term commitment to the health 

and vitality of the people in the East Palestine region. 

The State of Ohio’s response was fast and nimble. But much more remains to be 

done. 

The community of East Palestine is not unique. There are thousands of villages 

all over America just like it. Much of the Midwest and the West was built around 

railroads. Communities grew up where the railroads went. 

At least 1,000 train derailments happen each year across this country. The next 

train derailment could be 10 times worse. The next derailment could be in your 

state. 

No other community should ever have to go through this. And so, there must be 

a great sense of urgency to make our railways safer. As you know, Federal law and 

regulations have preempted state authority in almost all areas of railroad safety 

and security. So, I called on Congress to take strong and quick action. 

I want to again thank Chairwoman Cantwell and Ranking Member Cruz for holding this hearing today. I also want to thank Chairman Carper and Ranking Member 

Capito of the Environment and Public Works Committee for the hearing they held 

two weeks ago. I understand that Congressman Johnson is holding a hearing next 

week and that Ohio EPA Director Vogel will be testifying before his subcommittee. 

I want to thank Senators Vance, Brown, Casey, Fetterman, Hawley, and Rubio 

for their bill—S. 576—the Rail Safety Act 2023. And, thank you to Congressman 

Johnson and Congresswoman Sykes for their bill—H.R. 844—the Rail Act, and the 

nine additional members of the Ohio Congressional Delegation who support this bill. 

I agree with the changes in the law proposed in both bills and understand that 

they are very similar, with only a few differences. What I learned following the derailment in East Palestine is that our state emergency management personnel are 

not informed when hazardous materials are transported by rail unless a train meets 

the very specific definition of a ‘‘high hazard’’ train. We don’t truly know how much 

hazardous material is transported on Ohio railways every day, month, or year. 

I thank the drafters for responding to my request to include a provision requiring 

rail carriers to provide advance notification and information to state emergency response officials about what they are transporting and for including new safety requirements and procedures for trains carrying hazardous materials, such as vinyl 

chloride. 

I urge the Senate and the House to swiftly act to effect meaningful change and 

improve the safety of our railroads. 

17 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you, Governor. Thank you so much for 

highlighting those two details about the clinic and about the need 

that the community has to be further protected with resources. We 

will now turn to Ms. Allison. 

Thank you so much for being here. I am sorry to hear about your 

personal loss. And we very much appreciate you being willing to 

testify today. Ms. Allison. 

STATEMENT OF MISTI ALLISON, 

RESIDENT OF EAST PALESTINE 

Ms. ALLISON. Thank you for inviting me to testify. I am honored 

to be here, but I wish it was under better circumstances. I am here 

to put a face on this disaster. This isn’t just a political issue, it is 

a people issue. Everyone who lives in East Palestine is aware of the 

trains that pass by, but we have never really thought about them. 

Now, we can’t think about anything else. We will never forget 

the night the train derailed. I could see a huge fireball from my 

driveway. It didn’t seem real. Little did we know this was only the 

beginning. 

My family chose to evacuate, but many did not. None of us knew 

exactly what dangers were on that train. We now know that train 

carried multiple toxic petrochemicals. When authorities conducted 

a controlled burn, it was like a bomb went off, a bomb containing 

vinyl chloride, which releases dangerous chemicals. 

When burned, these chemicals never go away. Chemicals such as 

dioxins, which are not safe at any level and cause damage that 

may not show up for years. Two days later, our Government told 

us it was safe to come home. But is it safe? People and animals 

in my community are sick. 

The EPA tells us the data is fine, while independent researchers 

say that there are high levels of carcinogens all around us. Who do 

we trust? And then there is our mental health. The anxiety is real. 

My 7-year-old has asked me if he is going to die from living in his 

own home. What do I tell him? 

This preventable accident has put a scarlet letter on our town. 

People don’t want to come here. Businesses are struggling. Our 

home values are plummeting. Even if we wanted to leave, we 

couldn’t. Who would buy our homes? 

There were over a thousand train derailments last year, and the 

expansion of the petrochemical industry means that more trains 

carrying toxic chemicals will put more families at risk. Alan Shaw 

has repeatedly said that Norfolk Southern will make it right, but 

who determines what is right here? 

East Palestine residents expect meaningful relief, including 

short-and long-term health care monitoring, home value protection, 

and an actionable economic development plan, including the Norfolk Southern training facility placed in our town. As though the 

train derailment wasn’t enough, less than 2 weeks ago my mother 

lost her three-year battle with cancer. 

My mother taught me to fight for what is right, and I will always 

fight to protect the health and safety of my children, of your children, and of every child in America. Remember, this is about people. This is about a community that no one had ever heard of beVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
18 

fore becoming ground zero and a small town being destroyed overnight. 

We must have strong businesses, but I urge all of you to support 

commonsense safety regulations so this doesn’t happen again. Together, we can make sure that East Palestine and the surrounding 

areas not only recover, but thrive, and that no other community experiences this tragedy. 

My mom always told me, either you find a way or you find an 

excuse. So, it is time to learn from this and move forward together. 

Let’s find a way, not another excuse. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Allison follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MISTI ALLISON

Thank you for inviting me to testify. I’m honored to be here, but wish it were 

under better circumstances. I’m here to put a face on this chemical disaster. This 

isn’t a political issue. It is a people issue. 

Four years ago, my husband and I moved to his hometown of East Palestine, 

Ohio. We love raising our two children in Small Town America—where our family 

all lives down the road. 

Everyone who lives here is aware of the long trains that regularly pass by. But 

we’ve never really thought much about them. Until the night of February 3rd. Now, 

we can’t think about anything else. 

We will never forget the night 38 cars of a Norfolk Southern freight train derailed. It erupted into a fire that released toxic chemicals into our air, water, and 

land—about a mile from my home. 

I could see a huge fireball from my driveway. It didn’t seem real. Something was 

horribly wrong. Little did we know, this was only the beginning. 

My family chose to evacuate when a chemical smell persisted after the crash. But 

many of our neighbors did not. None of us knew exactly what dangers were on that 

train. 

But we now know that train carried multiple petrochemicals, including vinyl chloride, which is linked to cancers and especially harmful to infants and children. 

Three days later authorities released toxic chemicals from five tankers—in a socalled ‘‘controlled burn.’’ We watched as a huge cloud of black smoke overtook our 

village. It was like a bomb went off. We were all terrified. And we’re even more terrified now that we know burning vinyl chloride can result in the release of toxic 

chemicals that never go away, including hydrogen chloride and dioxins. 

No amount of dioxins is considered safe for humans. 

And the damage caused by these chemicals may not show up for many years. 

On February 8th, two days later, our government told us it was ‘‘safe’’ to come 

home. Within minutes, a train went through town—on top of highly contaminated 

soil that was left behind. 

But we don’t know if it’s really safe. Since returning home, people and animals 

are sick. The EPA is telling us the data is fine while independent researchers are 

telling us that there are high levels of acrolein and other cancerous chemicals 

around us. Who do we trust with these conflicting reports? 

Some of the companies testing for toxic chemicals are paid by Norfolk Southern. 

How could their findings be unbiased? They are not a neutral third party. How can 

we trust them to act in the interests of public safety? 

Mental health is also a huge issue right now. The anxiety is real. My 7-year-old 

son has asked me if he is going to die from being in his own home. 

Kids are not allowed to play on the playground because it hasn’t been cleaned. 

So the kids now play a game they invented called ‘‘EVACUATION’’ during recess. 

This train derailment has robbed our kids of their childhood, and perhaps more. 

The damage caused by Norfolk Southern’s gross negligence is immeasurable. This 

preventable accident has put a scarlet letter on our town. People don’t want to come 

here. Sports teams refuse to play here. Events won’t be held here. Businesses are 

struggling. Our home values are plummeting. Even if we wanted to leave, we 

couldn’t. Who would buy our homes? 

There were over a thousand train derailments last year, and the rapid expansion 

of the petrochemical industry into the Ohio River Valley, Texas, and Louisiana 

means that more trains carrying toxic chemicals will traveling through more communities. This puts all our families further at risk. 

19 

As Senator Vance said last week, we can—and we must—have strong businesses. 

But that doesn’t mean businesses should be allowed to reject common sense safety 

regulations. Americans need to be protected. And when these organizations fail to 

operate safely, they must be held accountable. 

Months from now, when Norfolk Southern has removed the debris, patted themselves on the back, and moved on from this horrendous disaster, my family, my 

friends, and my neighbors will still be living with the aftermath and the uncertainty. 

Alan Shaw has repeatedly said that Norfolk Southern will ‘‘make it right.’’ But 

who determines what is right in a situation like this? East Palestine residents expect real steps with measurable results including: 1. short-and long-term healthcare 

monitoring and assistance, 2. home value protection, and 3. an actionable economic 

development plan to ensure our community can recover and thrives. 

As though this train derailment wasn’t enough, less than two weeks ago, my 

mother lost her three-year battle with cancer. 

My mother taught me to fight for what’s right. And I will always fight to protect 

the health and safety of my children . . . of your children . . . and of every child 

in America. 

That’s the decision that you will be making. This is about people. This is about 

a community no one had ever heard of becoming ground zero and a small town 

being destroyed overnight. 

We ask you to support basic safety regulations so this doesn’t happen again. 

We can never go back to our life before this disaster, but we can make sure that 

East Palestine not only recovers but thrives. And that no other community experiences this tragedy. 

My mom always told me, ‘‘Either you find a way, or you find an excuse.’’ 

It’s time to collectively learn from this and move forward with bipartisan support 

and the support of Norfolk Southern. Let’s find a way. Not another excuse. 

Thank you. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you, Ms. Allison. And unfortunately, in 

these safety accidents, we have often found that it is the voice of 

the families who come forward and help keep the focus on to safety 

and security. 

So, thank you for helping to lead this charge on this particular 

issue. We very much appreciate it. I don’t know if anybody has any 

questions for these panelists here. If not, we will turn to the second 

panel. 

But maybe Ms. Allison, I just wanted to emphasize, maybe for 

you or the Governor, or actually or any of our colleagues, this issue 

of making sure that there is proper equipment in the community. 

Everybody is in agreement that we have to come up with something that gives proper equipment to the community in advance. Is 

that right? Governor DeWine, is that where you are? 

Mr. DEWINE. Well, absolutely. I think, Madam Chair, the other 

thing that I have talked with the CEO quite extensively about is 

training. You know, in Ohio, most of our fire departments, particularly in our rural areas, are volunteers. 

And so, the railroad really has unique information and it is important that they share that information about how you deal with 

these train fires, how you deal with the train wrecks. As you pointed out, you know that particular night, they didn’t know what they 

were fighting. 

They didn’t know what they were dealing with, at least not for 

sure. So, training is very, very important. And I think, you know, 

we are making some progress in that regard. And I would, you 

know, like for all the railroads to really participate in that training. 

Senator BROWN. Madam Chair. 

Chair CANTWELL. Yes. Senator Brown, then Senator Vance. 

20 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. We are working to create a fund, 

sort of a regional fund, both for training, as Governor DeWine said, 

and for equipment. So, East Palestine has one paid firefighter, the 

chief, and about 20 volunteers, 22, I think. And they obviously are 

not going to be able to train them all to combat hazmat fires. 

But we want—we look at it in a regional way all over the State 

and all over the country with funding from the chemical companies 

and the railroads so that they can all descend on a place like East 

Palestine from 15, 20 minutes away with the right equipment and 

the right training. 

Chair CANTWELL. Senator Vance. 

Senator BROWN. Yes, I just, I forgot my manners earlier, Madam 

Chair. So, appreciate—I just wondered why we still hadn’t, Governor DeWine, thank him for being here, and thank him for his 

leadership, and his hard work over the last six, 7 weeks because 

he has done a great job. Thank you. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. Well, the reason I bring this issue 

up is because we have had the same issue in the Pacific Northwest 

as it relates to oil train derailments. 

And unfortunately, they happen in communities where you might 

be dealing with a volunteer fire department, and what resources 

are there going to be in that community. So, I think the Committee 

here has to really think about how we are going to—what we can 

do to help communities be prepared in these incidents. Senator—— 

VOICE. Madam Chair—— 

Chair CANTWELL. Yes—— 

VOICE. Madam Chair—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Yes, I just—— 

Chair CANTWELL. I just—Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Yes, Senator—I just wanted to thank Senator Brown and Vance, and the Governor, as well as Ms. Allison 

for this incredibly constructive testimony. This is—I can’t even 

imagine what you have been through, Ms. Allison, and the fact that 

you are able to come forward and testify in such a meaningful way. 

We really appreciate. 

And the bill, I am on the bill. I am a strong supporter of it. And 

I just thank you for working across the aisle because you could actually get things done that way, so thank. 

Chair CANTWELL. Senator Cruz. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank each 

of the witnesses for your testimony. It has been powerful. Ms. Allison, in particular, I want to thank you for your courage coming and 

speaking up. I am sorry about the loss of your mom. 

That is very difficult. And you are sharing the story of your 

young children and what they are going through, is really powerful 

and moving, and so thank you for giving voice to their fears, their 

concerns. 

Thank you also for giving voice—there are other moms from East 

Palestine who are here with you and standing with you. And thank 

you for speaking for them as well. I wanted to ask you, we are still 

relatively early in the aftermath of the derailment, but at least to 

date, are you satisfied with the response you have seen, number 

one, from the Federal Government, and number two, from Norfolk 

Southern? 

21 

Do you feel that the families who have been impacted by this 

have received what you need, have received the compensation you 

deserve? And if you are not satisfied, what more do you think is 

needed? 

Ms. ALLISON. I would say there is always room for improvement. 

And this is something that at least in our community, we never expected it to happen here. I would say that there has been some response, but specifically in regards to Norfolk Southern, I do think 

there are a lot of opportunities for improvement, at least from a lot 

of the community members. 

And, you know, I just shared my experience, but I do have testimonies from about 50 other residents with me today that I can 

share with you. I was reading those last night in my hotel room 

and just tears streaming down my face. It is absolutely heartbreaking. 

I am a market researcher by trade, and so looking at all of this 

data in the aggregate, what I saw time and time again was people 

were saying essentially, they feel like Norfolk Southern is just offering breadcrumbs throughout the community with funding. 

And then, so right now, for people that don’t feel safe at home, 

we did receive a flyer that said that you could leave the community 

for the time being if you wanted to re-evacuate, and some people 

have chosen to do that. 

However, there is not clear guidelines of what is going to be paid 

for and what is not. And so, when people go to the assistance center, some people are having a good experience and then some people are really being questioned about why do you feel like you 

should leave? Why do you feel like you need this money from us 

and really feeling interrogated, and so that is really concerning because I think a lot more data needs to come out. 

This testing that the EPA finally said that they are, you know, 

testing for dioxins, et cetera, that is really good, but there is so 

much data that needs to come out there. And again, you can—a 

couple of things, one, you can make the data look however you 

want, and also two, you can test or not test for whatever you want. 

So, I think from a community perspective, we just want to make 

sure that everything is being tested, that should be tested, and we 

are not really sure if that is being done or not. So, I would say, 

we are just really—everybody loves living in East Palestine and we 

would like to stay there, but only if it is safe. 

And so, there is a lot of confusion in the community about whether long term, if it is a good choice to stay or not. 

Senator CRUZ. Well, I am certain with you mentioned the 50 

statements you had, I am certain that the Chair would love to have 

you submit those statements for the record for the Committee. And 

I am sure members on both sides of the aisle would like to see 

those statements. 

One of the things you testified about is the concerns about the 

drop in home values. And I can understand that being a very real 

concern. You mentioned you have done work as a market researcher. Are there any data that are actually quantifying what the 

loss in home values has been? 

And if so, at this point, are the residents being offered any compensation? Is Norfolk Southern offering to make residents whole 

22 

for the loss in home values? If a resident, if a family decides that 

they want to move, are families able to sell their homes? Are there 

any buyers, or I mean—one of the things you said powerfully is, 

even if we want to leave, we can’t leave. 

That—is there any relief being offered now to say, if you make 

the decision to move your home and to move your family somewhere else, there is an avenue for you to sell your home and get 

a fair market price for it? 

Ms. ALLISON. The short answer is, as of today, no, there is not 

a clear-cut explanation or parameters of how you would do that. 

We have heard time and time again from Norfolk Southern that 

they are going to make it right and that they are looking into some 

long-term health care monitoring and assistance and home value 

protection. But details of that plan have not been disclosed to residents as of today. 

Senator CRUZ. I would encourage that for you to let this committee know as it goes forward, if there are residents who are looking to move and can’t sell their homes, this committee is very interested in making sure that the community of East Palestine is treated fairly and that what you are going through—you receive what 

is just. And so, we—I would invite you to provide this committee 

with the specifics so that we can expedite and facilitate making it 

right. 

Ms. ALLISON. Thank you. 

Chair CANTWELL. We are going to get to the second panel, but 

Senator Welch, did you have a question? 

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER WELCH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VERMONT 

Senator WELCH. Yes, just briefly. This is really very moving. You 

know, listening to Ms. Allison, small communities have something 

that is really very, very special. It is trust, you trust one another. 

And there has been a breach of trust here. One of the biggest 

beneficiaries of the trust in a community like yours, and we have 

many like yours in Vermont, one of the biggest beneficiaries is Norfolk Southern. They can roll their two-to-three-mile trains through 

there without anybody asking a question because you trust them 

to do the right thing. And they didn’t do the right thing. 

And they had the opportunity to do the right thing, but they 

made other priorities, stock buybacks in the billions, shortening 

crews, doing the things that a mom would never do to take a shortcut to provide that security like to your 7-year-old. 

And the heart of the discussion here is whether, as a result of 

the breach of trust by a very large and very powerful, very wealthy 

corporation, your Government, and it is your Government, should 

step in to restore justice to you and your fellow citizens. And that 

is what this hearing is about. 

Will Government step up to provide physical, emotional, and 

health security as a result of this, just like it would if there was 

a military threat to our country where Government is got to be on 

the side of folks like you and your neighbors. So, I am very grateful 

to you. Feel very badly at that breach of trust. 

Because you know that trust gets you through hard times. You 

don’t even complain because you know your neighbor has got your 

23 

back. Well, you have to know the Government has got your back. 

We admire you. 

This is going to go on for some time, as Governor DeWine said. 

But I think all of us in this legislation are going to do our level 

best to respond to you and your neighbors and what you are going 

through. Thank you. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you, Senator Welch. And again, thank 

you to our colleagues, to Governor DeWine, to Ms. Allison. Thank 

you for a very compelling testimony. We will now move to the second panel. 

We are going to hear from Jennifer Homendy, the Chair of the 

National Transportation Safety Board. We will hear from David 

Comstock, Fire Chief of Ohio’s Western Reserve, joined Fire District, whose department responded to East Feldstein’s derailment. 

We will hear from Mr. Clyde Whitaker, the Legislative Director of 

Ohio State Smart-TD, who is a long-time railroader. 

Mr. Alan Shaw, CEO of Norfolk Southern. And last, we will hear 

from Ian Jefferies, CEO of the Association of American Railroads, 

who represents the railroad sector. If all of those witnesses would 

come forward and we will start in a minute with Ms. Homendy 

from the NTSB. Welcome to all the witnesses. 

We appreciate you being here. Look forward to hearing—look forward to hearing your testimony. If the—we will start with you, Ms. 

Homendy. Thank you so much. Thank you so much for being here. 

We appreciate all the work that the NTSB does. 

I expressed to you earlier in private your leadership in the investigation of the seaplane accident in the Pacific Northwest, and we 

continue to look forward to your comments on aviation in general. 

We appreciated your comments prior to the aviation summit last 

week about the fact that the FAA needs to implement its open action items that will help us on near-miss incidents at airports. 

So, thank you for your continued voice. I think when we envisioned the safety legislation that we passed, we wanted to know 

trends and we wanted FAA to respond faster to trends. So, thank 

you for helping to identify these trends in aviation and some of the 

issues. 

So, with that, we will turn to you, Ms. Homendy, for this hearing 

on rail safety. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JENNIFER L. HOMENDY, CHAIR, 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Ms. HOMENDY. Thank you so much, and good morning. I would 

like to begin with addressing the people who were impacted by the 

derailment in East Palestine. On behalf of the NTSB, we are so 

sorry for all that you are going through. Please know that the 

agency is committed to conducting a thorough, independent, and 

transparent investigation of this derailment. 

We will issue safety recommendations to prevent similar tragedies from reoccurring, including urgent safety recommendations, 

which we can do at any point if our investigation warrants it. In 

the next few months, we will hold an investigative hearing in East 

Palestine, where it will include time for community members to 

provide comments and ask us questions about our investigation. 

24 

My written testimony goes into more detail on the derailment, 

and by now the preliminary facts have been well covered. The bottom line is this, there are no accidents. This derailment, as all accidents we investigate, was 100 percent preventable. As is the case 

with all our investigations, we are looking into every factor that 

could have led to this tragedy. 

We are looking into the wheel bearing, the wheels sets, the axle, 

and the rail car, including their manufacture, maintenance, and inspection, the hot bearing detectors, Norfolk Southern temperature 

thresholds for alerting train crews of safety concerns, and their use 

of real time monitoring and data trending, and the company’s policies, practices, and overall safety culture. 

We are also looking into the design, maintenance, and performance of the tank cars used to transport hazmat, including the pressure relief devices on the five vinyl chloride tank cars, emergency 

response preparedness and communications, the decisionmaking 

process that led to the vent and burn, the U.S. Department of 

Transportation’s oversight of rail and hazmat safety, and so much 

more. I know that there are a lot of questions about our investigation, and I will provide what I can today. 

I also know that Congress is eager to improve rail safety more 

broadly, so I offer the following five issues for your consideration. 

First, the definition of high hazard flammable terrain should be expanded to a broader array of hazmat. 

And the definitions threshold of 20 loaded tank cars in a continuous block or 35 tank cars dispersed throughout a train should be 

eliminated. Second DOT 111 should be phased out of all hazmat 

service. 

They are not as protected as DOT 117 tank cars. Third, people 

deserve to know what chemicals are moving through their communities and how to stay safe in an emergency. That includes responders who risk their lives for each of us every single day. They 

deserve to be prepared. 

That means access to real time information, obtaining the right 

training and gear, and having the right communications and planning tools. Fourth, like cockpit voice recorders in aviation, audio 

and video recorders in the locomotive cab are essential for helping 

investigators determine the cause of an accident and make more 

precise safety recommendations. Recorders also help operators 

proactively improve their safety policies and practices. 

In the East Palestine derailment, the locomotive was equipped 

with an inward facing camera. However, since the locomotive was 

put immediately back into service following the accident, the data 

was overwritten. 

That means the recorder only provided about 15 minutes of data 

before the derailment and 5 minutes after. The FAST Act, following 

terrible tragedies in Chatsworth and in Philadelphia, required Amtrak and commuter railroads to maintain crash and fire hardened, 

inward and outward facing image recorders in all controlling locomotives that have a minimum of a 12-hour continuous recording 

capability. 

This was extremely helpful in our DuPont, Washington investigation. Now is the time to expand that requirement to audio and 

include the class I freight railroads in that mandate. In fact, now 

25 

1 A report of all currently open safety recommendations related to rail is available at https:// 

data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/query-builder/route/?t=published&n=28. 

is the time to address all of the NTSB’s open rail safety recommendations, many of which are on our most wanted list. 

Fifth, and finally, as the Committee works on enhancing rail 

safety, I trust that you will consider the resources that we desperately need to carry out our critical safety mission. Investments 

in the NTSB are investments in safety across all modes of transportation. 

To that end, we look forward to working with the Committee on 

this year’s reauthorization of NTSB, and hope that you will approve the President’s budget request for the NTSB of $145 million. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Homendy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JENNIFER L. HOMENDY, CHAIR, 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Good morning, Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to 

testify on improving rail safety in the aftermath of the Norfolk Southern Railway 

(NS) freight train derailment and the subsequent release of hazardous materials in 

East Palestine, Ohio. 

As you know, the NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress 

with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant 

events in other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable cause of the accidents and 

events we investigate and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future 

accidents and events. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research studies 

and offer information and other assistanceto family members and survivors for any 

accident investigated by the agency. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA) and the United States Coast Guard, and adjudicate 

appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA. 

The NTSB does not have authority to promulgate operating standards, nor do we 

certificate organizations, individuals, or equipment. Instead, we advance transportation safety through our recommendations, which are issued to any entity that can 

improve safety. Our goal is to identify issues and advocate for safety improvements 

that, if implemented, would prevent tragedies and injuries and save lives. 

First and foremost, I want to thank each of you for your partnership with the 

NTSB to improve safety across all modes of transportation, including rail safety. I 

commit to you, the people of East Palestine, and all others who were affected in 

Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, that the NTSB will conduct a thorough, 

independent, and transparent investigation into how this event occurred. We will 

examine the derailment, fire, hazardous materials release, and the emergency response in the hours and days after the derailment, and we will make recommendations that, if acted on, will prevent other communities from suffering a similar tragedy. 

Despite recent accidents, I want to be clear that rail remains one of the safest 

means of transportation. For transport of some classes and quantities of hazardous 

materials, there is no safer alternative. Certainly, carrying them over our Nation’s 

roadways where more than 43,000 people die every year in millions of crashes is 

not a safer alternative. Moreover, such small quantities of hazardous materials 

shipped by rail may not be economically feasible for pipeline operators to ship. 

For communities that are impacted by rail accidents, particularly involving hazardous materials, I know that is little consolation as just one derailment, as we 

have seen in East Palestine, can be devastating. I also want to be clear that there 

is work that can be done to further improve rail safety, related to East Palestine 

and aside from our investigation. The NTSB has over 180 rail safety recommendations that are currently open.1 These include 5 recommendations to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 80 recommendations to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and 9 recommendations to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

26 

2 National Transportation Safety Board. Norfolk Southern Railway Train Derailment with 

Subsequent Hazardous Material Release and Fires, East Palestine, Ohio, February 3, 2023 (Preliminary Report: February 23, 2023). 3The NRC is staffed by the U.S. Coast Guard and serves as an emergency call center that 

fields initial reports for pollution and railroad incidents and forwards that information to the 

appropriate Federal or state agencies for response. 

Safety Administration (PHMSA). The safety issues we see in our investigations are 

tragic because they are preventable, and therefore should be acted on. 

The Derailment 

Our preliminary report on the derailment, issued on February 23, 2023, summarizes the factual information that was collected during the on-scene portion of our 

investigation.2

On Friday, February 3, 2023, NS freight train 32N, comprised of two head-end 

locomotives, 149 railcars, and 1 distributed power locomotive, was traveling east on 

the Fort Wayne Line of the Keystone Division. The consist included 20 placarded 

hazardous materials tank cars transporting combustible liquids, flammable liquids, 

and flammable gas, including vinyl chloride; 17 of these were fully loaded, 3 were 

residue cars. The train crew consisted of an engineer, conductor, and conductor 

trainee. 

NS had equipped its rail network on that line with hot bearing detectors (HBDs) 

to assess the temperature conditions of wheel bearings while trains are en route. 

When the HBD detects overheated bearings, it provides an audible, real-time warning to train crews. According to NS’s criteria, a reading above 200°F triggers a critical alert. 

Train 32N passed three HBD systems in the last 30 miles before the derailment. 

About 30 miles before the derailment, a wheel bearing from the 23rd car was recorded at 38°F above ambient temperature (about 10°F at the time). When the train 

passed the next HBD about 10 miles later, the bearing’s recorded temperature was 

103°F above ambient temperature. The third HBD, about 20 miles later, recorded 

the bearing’s temperature at 253°F above ambient temperature and sent a critical 

alert to the crew to stop the train and inspect the axle. 

At the time, the engineer was already slowing the train because there was another train ahead. Once the critical alert was received, he increased the brake application to further slow and stop the train. During the deceleration, the wheel bearing 

on the 23rd car failed and the car derailed, resulting in an emergency brake application stopping the train. After the train stopped, the crew observed fire and smoke, 

and reported a possible derailment to the NS train dispatcher. Responders arrived 

at the derailment site and began response efforts. 

A total of 38 railcars derailed, 11 of which were carrying hazardous materials. 

The combination of the plastic pellets in the 23rd car and the hot axle of that car 

likely started the initial fire. First responders implemented a 1-mile evacuation zone 

surrounding the derailment site, affecting up to 2,000 residents. 

On February 5, responders mitigated the fire, but five derailed tank cars, carrying 

a total of 115,580 gallons of vinyl chloride, continued to concern authorities. The 

temperature inside one tank car was still rising, which suggested that the vinyl 

chloride was undergoing polymerization, a chemical chain reaction that could pose 

an explosion hazard. Responders scheduled a controlled venting of the five vinyl 

chloride tank cars to release and burn the vinyl chloride. They expanded the evacuation zone to a 1-mile by 2-mile area and dug ditches to contain released vinyl chloride liquid while it vaporized and burned. The controlled venting began about 4:40 

p.m. on February 6 and continued for several hours. The NTSB had no role in the 

decision to vent and burn the five vinyl chloride tank cars; however, we will evaluate that decision and the process for carrying out the vent and burn in our investigation. 

NTSB’s Response and Investigation 

Each of the NTSB’s investigative offices assigns a duty officer who is on call 24/ 

7 to receive notifications of accidents and incidents, gather pertinent information, 

and make a recommendation as to whether the event meets the criteria for launching an investigation. The duty officer for the NTSB’s Office of Railroad, Pipeline, 

and Hazardous Materials Investigations (RPH) was first contacted about the derailment on February 3 at about 10:00 p.m. and began collecting initial information, 

including contacting NS. At 10:53 p.m., the National Response Center (NRC) received a report on the derailment.3 At 11:16 p.m., the NRC formally notified the 

NTSB’s Response Operations Center of the derailment. From the time of notification 

and throughout the night, NTSB staff worked to collect and assess information from 

27 

4See Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 800.25(a). 5 NTSB investigative page. Norfolk Southern Railway Train Derailment with Subsequent Hazardous Material Release and Fires. 

industry, labor, emergency responders, and others on the scene to determine whether to launch an investigation. 

At about 12:00 a.m., the RPH duty officer, having obtained sufficient information, 

informed the director of RPH, who, by regulation, is authorized to initiate an investigation.4 RPH notified NS, the FRA, and the railroad unions that the NTSB would 

be investigating. This notification to NS also served as an order to preserve evidence. 

Following these calls, the RPH director requested a call with agency leadership 

to discuss whether a Board member should launch to the accident, as well as to determine any additional resource needs. Board members are typically launched on 

major investigations and act as the spokesperson on scene. At 7:15 a.m., the determination was made to launch the on-duty Board member, Michael Graham, and a 

full ‘‘go-team’’ of 14 NTSB staff members. Member Graham and the initial responding staff departed at 11:30 a.m. and began arriving in East Palestine at 1:30 p.m. 

While on scene, investigators examined railroad equipment and track conditions; 

reviewed data from the signal system, wayside defect detectors (including the 

HBDs), local surveillance cameras, and the lead locomotive’s event recorder and forward-and inward-facing image recorders; and conducted interviews. The wheel bearing and affected wheelset from the 23rd car have been collected as evidence and will 

be examined in our laboratories in Washington, DC. 

Investigators returned to Ohio on February 21 to examine each hazardous material tank car, document damage, and secure evidence for laboratory analysis. The 

vinyl chloride tank car top fittings, including the pressure relief devices (PRDs), 

were examined on scene. The top fittings were shipped to Texas for testing under 

the supervision, direction, and oversight of the NTSB. 

Testing of the PRDs and angle valves was carried out the week of March 13. The 

testing was intended to determine if the valves still function in the as-received condition and to what level; document any foreign matter fouling, and document what 

fire/heat damage occurred with photographs and test forms on condition. Following 

testing, the valves and PRDs were disassembled, and the conditions of the parts 

were documented and photographed. Investigators found that further metallurgical 

testing of the PRDs and valves, including valve stems, is warranted to evaluate 

their performance and compatibility with the vinyl chloride lading. This testing will 

be conducted at the NTSB’s laboratory. 

While on scene, Member Graham hosted two press briefings to provide updates 

regarding the status of our investigation: one on February 4 and another on February 5. The briefings, additional videos of the scene, and all investigative updates 

are available on our website.5

For the on-scene and continued fact-finding phase of this investigation, we have 

designated regulators, the carrier, shippers, manufacturers, workers, and first responders with relevant information as parties to the investigation. These parties 

provide the agency with technical expertise. This party system process has been our 

practice for decades because it is the most effective way to investigate major transportation accidents. The party system also ensures that the appropriate regulatory 

agencies and the parties whose products or services were involved in the accident 

or incident will have access to factual information, so they can initiate any necessary safety actions without delay. For this investigation, the parties are the 

PHMSA; the FRA; the Ohio State Highway Patrol; the Village of East Palestine; 

NS; Trinity Industries Leasing Company; the GATX Corporation; Midland Manufacturing; Occidental Chemicals, the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen; the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers; the 

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen; and the International Association of Firefighters. 

Our investigation is ongoing. Future investigative activity will focus on the 

wheelset and bearing; tank car design and derailment damage; performance of 

PRDs and other valves; a review of the accident response, including the venting and 

burning of the vinyl chloride; railcar design and maintenance procedures and practices; NS’s use of wayside defect detectors; and NS’s railcar inspection practices. 

Investigative Hearing 

To support our investigation, we plan to hold an investigative field hearing in 

East Palestine in June. NTSB’s investigative hearings have four goals: to inform the 

public, to collect factual information from witnesses, to discuss possible solutions, 

and to build consensus for change. An investigative hearing will allow us to gather 

28 

6 NTSB Safety Recommendation R–12–3. 

7 Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Tank Car Specifications and Terms. Washington, DC: 

DOT. Accessed March 13, 2023. 8 Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Fleet Composition of Rail Tank Cars Carrying Flammable Liquids: 2022 Report. Washington, DC: DOT. Accessed March 20, 2023. 

sworn testimony from witnesses on issues identified by the investigative team for 

this accident. The hearing will be wholly fact-finding in nature and open to the public; it will be preceded by a town hall for the public to provide comments to the 

NTSB. 

Special Investigation into Norfolk Southern Railway’s Safety Practices and Culture 

On March 7, we announced a special investigation of NS’s organization and safety 

culture. Given the number and significance of recent NS accidents, we also urged 

the company to take immediate action to review and assess its safety practices, with 

the input of employees and others, and implement necessary changes to improve 

safety. We are undertaking this special investigation because, since December 2021, 

we have launched investigation teams to six significant accidents involving NS. We 

are concerned that several organizational factors may be involved in the accidents, 

including safety culture. 

The NTSB has long recommended the implementation of safety management systems (SMS) in all modes of transportation. SMS is a systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, 

policies, and procedures. An effective SMS program can help companies reduce and 

prevent accidents and accident-related loss of lives, time, and resources. Currently, 

there are a number of industry sectors worldwide that have recognized the benefits 

of effective safety management, including aviation and the maritime and pipeline 

communities. 

The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (P.L. 110–432) required each Class I 

railroad to develop and implement a risk reduction program. In 2012, we recommended that FRA require that SMS and the associated key principles (including 

top-down ownership and policies, analysis of operational incidents and accidents, 

hazard identification and risk management, prevention and mitigation programs, 

and continuous evaluation and improvement programs) be incorporated into railroads’ risk reduction programs.6 FRA issued the Risk Reduction Program (RRP) 

final rule on February 18, 2020, which includes the key principles recommended. We 

have since recommended that the FRA review all railroads’ RRP plans to ensure effectiveness and safety. Safety Recommendation R–12–3 is currently classified as 

‘‘Open—Acceptable Response.’’ However, to date, no RRPs have yet been approved 

by FRA and implemented by the freight railroads. The NS derailments may provide 

a good opportunity for FRA to do so, as the recommendation remains open. 

Continued Issues in Rail Safety 

Although this investigation is ongoing, we have identified issues in several areas 

where the NTSB has previously made recommendations to improve safety. 

Rail Tank Car Safety 

Rail tank cars are built to certain DOT or industry specifications.7 DOT–111 tank 

cars are non-pressurized tank cars with a thinner shell (7/16 in.) than is now required for DOT–117 tank cars (9/16 in.). These tank cars can carry both hazardous 

and non-hazardous liquids. DOT–111s are not required to have head shields to protect the tank car from an adjacent car in an incident. The top fittings and valves 

are not protected and are vulnerable to being sheared off in an incident, leading to 

a release of contents. These tank cars also do not have a pressure relief device sized 

to protect against rupture in the event of a large fire. DOT–111s do have pressure 

relief valves that offer some protection in some fires.8

The Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act (P.L. 114–94) phased 

out legacy DOT–111 specification tank cars for transporting Class 3 flammable liquids, such as crude oil, and the cars continue phasing out service for certain other 

commodities, such as ethanol. By May 1, 2023, nonjacketed and jacketed DOT–111 

tank cars must be phased out; nonjacketed CPC–1232 tank cars must be phased out 

by July 1, 2023; and jacketed CPC–1232 tank cars must be removed or retrofitted 

by May 1, 2025. Each of those tank cars must be either removed from flammable 

liquids service or retrofitted with prescribed protective features, such as a head 

shield, jacket, and thermal protection. Other flammable liquids may not be transported in such tank cars beginning May 1, 2029. 

In the East Palestine derailment, 13 of the 16 DOT–111s transporting hazmat 

that were damaged are not covered under the current DOT phaseout schedule. One 

of the three cars that would be covered by the current 2029 deadline breached. The 

29 

9 81 FR 53935. 

10Safety Recommendations R–15–16 and -17. 11 NTSB Safety Recommendation R–07–4. 12 NTSB Safety Recommendation R–14–14. Additional materials railroads should help responders plan for include highly hazardous gases (flammable, nonflammable, and toxic), other 

flammable liquids and substances, oxidizing substances, toxic substances, and corrosive materials. 13Public Law 114–94, sec. 7302. 14 49 CFR § 171.8. 15 NTSB comments on PHMSA’s notice of proposed rulemaking, ‘‘Hazardous Materials: Rail 

Petitions and Recommendations to Improve the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation.’’ 

(2014) 

other 13 DOT–111 cars sustained damage we’ve noted in other accident investigations but would not be covered under the FAST Act or DOT’s final rule.9

The NTSB has pointed out the inadequacy of DOT–111 tank cars for all hazardous materials, including flammable materials, since 1991, and we recommended 

they be replaced or retrofit in 2015.10 The NTSB supports a shorter timeline to transition away from DOT–111s than what is currently in statute and regulation. Additionally, Congress should consider transitioning all other DOT–111s out of hazmat 

service. 

The five derailed railcars carrying vinyl chloride were DOT–105 specification tank 

cars, which are used to transport liquified compressed gases, poison/toxic inhalation 

hazard materials, reactive materials, and/or corrosive materials requiring additional 

protection. None of these cars were breached in the derailment. However, we are 

currently evaluating the performance of the PRDs and valves. 

When a tank car is exposed to fire conditions and its contents are heated, the 

pressure inside the tank rises. This can lead to loss of tank shell strength and eventually a breach. To protect emergency responders and the public from the possibility 

of catastrophic tank failure under fire conditions, the pressure inside tank cars must 

be controlled. PRDs are intended to regulate internal pressure by releasing material 

and reclosing after normal conditions are restored. This reduces the probability of 

a breach in the tank shell and limits the amount of energy a breach can release 

if one occurs. Properly functioning PRDs thus reduce the potential for catastrophic 

tank failure. 

Notification to Emergency Responders 

Emergency responders must have real-time awareness of and information on the 

hazardous materials being transported by rail through their communities so that 

they are well prepared should an accident occur. We first made this recommendation 16 years ago.11 Additionally, 9 years ago we recommended that railroads should 

help communities develop emergency operations and response plans.12 The FAST 

Act also addressed this issue in 2015, but limited emergency responder awareness 

of and information on hazardous materials being transported by rail to high-hazard 

flammable trains (HHFTs), defined as a single train transporting 20 or more tank 

cars loaded with a Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block (a unit train) or 

a single train transporting 35 or more tank cars loaded with a Class 3 flammable 

liquid throughout the train consist.13 Although PHMSA and the DOT have taken 

some actions, we remain concerned that emergency responders are not adequately 

made aware of hazardous materials traveling through their locations, and that current rules do not include a vast number of hazardous materials beyond combustible 

liquids. 

The train in the East Palestine derailment was not a HHFT because it did not 

contain a block of 20 or more than 35 total loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable 

liquid.14 We believe the definition of an HHFT should include a broad range of hazardous materials, including flammable gases and combustible liquids.15

We also believe that even one railcar of any hazardous material justifies notifying 

emergency responders, not 20 or more than 35 loaded tank cars, which could contain 

1 million gallons of hazardous materials. Such thresholds present an unreasonable 

risk to public safety as a catastrophic derailment involving even a single tank car 

loaded with hazardous material can cause extensive destruction and loss of life. 

Therefore, we believe that the notification threshold should be significantly lower. 

In addition, the threshold should be based on the worst-case consequences of a derailment resulting in fire. 

Recorders 

Recorders—data, audio/voice, and video—are essential for capturing and storing 

critical information that can help investigators determine the cause of a transportation accident. Inward-and outward-facing recorders with both image and audio caVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
30 

16 National Transportation Safety Board. Amtrak Passenger Train 501 Derailment, DuPont, 

Washington, December 18, 2017. Rpt. No. RAR 19/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2019). 17 National Transportation Safety Board. Collision of Two CSX Transportation Freight Trains, 

Carey, Ohio, August 12, 2019. Rpt. No. RAR 20/03 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2020). 18 NTSB Safety Recommendation R–10–1. 19 National Transportation Safety Board. 2021–2023 Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements. Washington, DC: NTSB. 

pabilities can increase the understanding of the circumstances of an accident, and, 

ultimately, provide greater precision in safety recommendations and subsequent 

safety improvements. 

In the East Palestine accident, the locomotive was equipped with an inward-and 

forward-facing recorder. However, since NS put the locomotive immediately back in 

service following the accident, data was overwritten and only provide about 15 minutes of data before and 5 minutes following the derailment. 

We use recorder data to determine the probable cause of accidents and to develop 

recommendations to help prevent future accidents. For example, after the December 

18, 2017, derailment of National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) train 501 

in Dupont, Washington, investigators used event recorder data to derive the engineer’s actions prior to the crash.16 Because of Amtrak 501’s inward-facing video and 

audio, investigators were able to determine that brief conversations between the engineer and the conductor during the trip did not distract them from their operational duties. This accident has demonstrated the value of image and audio data 

for the accident investigation and development of safety recommendations. 

In contrast, during our investigation of the August 12, 2019, collision between two 

CSX trains in Carey, Ohio, our investigators did not have important information to 

assist in understanding what happened in this collision due to the lack of inwardfacing video and audio recorders.17 Because the FRA has not required inward-facing 

cameras for freight locomotives, the NTSB was unable to determine the actions of 

the westbound train’s crewmembers while operating the train from Columbus, Ohio, 

to Carey, Ohio, the actions of the westbound train engineer while operating alone 

in the locomotive cab, or the events leading up to the collision. 

The FAST Act required railroads providing regularly scheduled intercity rail passenger or commuter rail passenger transportation to the public to install inwardand outward-facing image recording devices in all controlling locomotive cabs and 

cab car operating compartments in passenger trains. However, the law did not require freight railroads to install such devices. In 2010, we recommended that the 

FRA require the installation, in all controlling locomotive cabs and cab car operating 

compartments, of crash-and fire-protected inward-and outward-facing audio and 

image recorders capable of providing recordings to verify that train crew actions are 

in accordance with rules and procedures that are essential to safety as well as train 

conditions. The devices should have a minimum 12-hour continuous recording capability with recordings that are easily accessible for review, with appropriate limitations on public release, for the investigation of accidents or for use by management 

in carrying out efficiency testing and systemwide performance monitoring programs.18 The recommendation to FRA is currently classified as ‘‘Open—Unacceptable Response.’’ 

In the 13 years since this recommendation was issued, we have reiterated it in 

the six other major railroad investigations: 

1. September 30, 2010, collision of two Canadian National Railway freight trains 

near Two Harbors, Minnesota; 

2. April 17, 2011, collision of a BNSF coal train with the rear end of a standing 

BNSF maintenance-of-way train in Red Oak, Iowa; 

3. June 24, 2012, head-on collision of two Union Pacific Railroad freight trains 

near Goodwell, Oklahoma; 

4. May 25, 2013, collision of a Union Pacific Railroad freight train with a BNSF 

Railway freight train near Chaffee, Missouri; 

5. April 28, 2015, collision of two Southwestern Railroad freight trains near 

Roswell, New Mexico; and 

6. May 12, 2015, derailment of a National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) passenger train in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

Rail Worker Safety 

Improving Rail Worker Safety is one of the issues highlighted in our 2021–2023 

Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements.19 Improving rail worker 

safety means making sure that roadway workers have the training, equipment, rest, 

and layers of protection they need while working on or around tracks. It means 

31 

20 A report of all currently open safety recommendations related to rail worker safety is available at https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/query-builder/route/?t=published&n=18. 21 National Transportation Safety Board Draft Reauthorization Act of 2023. Washington, DC: 

NTSB. 22 49 United States Code 1131(a)(1)(C). 

making sure that crews operating trains carrying hazardous materials have time to 

escape in case of an accident. It also means reducing the risks of derailments and 

collisions as trains become longer and heavier. 

In recent years, we have investigated several railroad and transit accidents where 

workers have been struck and injured or killed while conducting routine maintenance or switching operations. Other workers are vulnerable when cars carrying 

hazardous materials are too close to those carrying train crew. We have also investigated accidents where crew have been killed riding on the sides of trains, in violation of rules. 

On December 8, 2021, an employee for National Salvage and Service Corporation 

assigned to work with a NS work gang replacing track was killed when the operator 

of a spike machine reversed direction and struck the employee in Reed, Pennsylvania. The employee was marking rail to be removed and collected by the NS work 

gang when he was struck. 

On December 13, 2022, NS trainee conductor was killed, and another conductor 

injured, when their locomotive struck a length of steel angle iron protruding from 

a gondola car on a NS freight train that was stopped on an adjacent main track 

in Bessemer, Alabama. The angle iron originally welded to the gondola’s top-right 

edge was broken and hanging loose. As the locomotive approached the gondola car, 

it collided with the angle iron which then pierced the locomotive’s left front door 

window, continued into the operating cab, and struck both conductors. 

On March 7, 2023, a NS conductor was killed when the train he was riding collided with a dump truck as they simultaneously entered a private highway–railroad 

grade crossing in the Cleveland-Cliffs Incorporated steel plant in Cleveland, Ohio. 

The conductor was riding on the end platform of the lead railcar during a shoving 

movement when he was pinned between the railcar and the dump truck during the 

collision. 

These three investigations are currently ongoing and will be part of our special 

investigation of NS’ organization and safety culture. 

Although rail worker fatalities have declined overall in recent years, we continue 

to see recurring safety issues in our accident investigations that are 100 percent 

preventable, highlighting the need to implement our safety recommendations for 

better worker protections.20

NTSB’s Mandate and Resources 

The NTSB’s authorization expired at the end of last Fiscal Year. As you know, 

we have sent Congress a reauthorization proposal that requests resources and hiring flexibility to increase the number of investigators in our Rail, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials Investigations office, as well as in our other modes.21 These resources will allow us to hire professionals with the needed skills, purchase the 

equipment necessary for those skilled professionals to do their jobs, and invest in 

staff training and development. Our workforce is our greatest asset and is essential 

to our mission. 

The NTSB is required to investigate any railroad accident in which there is a fatality or substantial property damage, or that involves a passenger train.22 We must 

currently meet this mandate with only 12 railroad investigators, 3 of whom are eligible for retirement, and 3 hazardous materials investigators. Those investigators 

are currently working on 28 investigations, and we open about 11 new investigations each year. This office is understaffed. In fact, as part of our reauthorization 

proposal, we identified a need for 21 additional staff over the next 5 years. Our reauthorization request only fills a portion of this need. 

Conclusion 

The NTSB was on the ground in East Palestine on the first day following the derailment, and we are committed to finding out what happened, how it happened, 

and how to make sure that it never happens again. 

The NTSB stands ready to work with the Committee to continue improving rail 

safety. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer 

your questions. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. Ms. Homendy. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Comstock, welcome. Thank you for being here. 

32 

STATEMENT OF DAVID COMSTOCK, CHIEF, OHIO WESTERN 

RESERVE JOINT FIRE DISTRICT 

Mr. COMSTOCK. Good morning, Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member 

Cruz, distinguished members of the Committee. My name is David 

Comstock and I am the Fire Chief for the Western Reserve Joint 

Fire District, located in Poland, Ohio. 

I am also a member of a National Volunteer Fire Council, a nonprofit membership organization that serves as the national voice of 

over 670,000 volunteer firefighters, comprising 65 percent of the 

Nation’s fire service. 

My department was one of over 50 fire departments that responded to the East Palestine derailment. This incident has emphasized the need to better train and equip firefighters to respond 

to hazardous material incidents, specifically to derailments in rural 

areas which are mostly served by volunteer fire departments that 

often lack sufficient resources, tax base, and manpower. 

The National Fire Protection Association defines an operational 

level of competence for hazmat response as what is needed for a 

firefighter to implement or support actions to protect the public 

from the effects of a hazmat release. 

Alarmingly, the NFPA’s needs assessment of the U.S. Fire Service showed that only 55 percent of firefighters are certified at a 

hazmat operational level of confidence. For many firefighters, 

hazmat training is difficult to access, especially from volunteers 

who may need to take time off from their paying jobs. 

Progress has been made in making hazardous material training 

more available to firefighters through the pipeline and Hazardous 

Materials Safety Administration’s hazardous material grants. 

Specifically, firefighters are trained through hazardous materials 

emergency preparedness, assistance for local emergency response 

training, hazardous materials structure training, community safety, and supplemental public safety training grant programs. 

Through a SPST grant and the NBFC is offering 15 in-person 

hazmat train the trainer opportunities across the U.S. at no cost 

to departments. It is important that the NBFC can provide this 

program at no cost to volunteer departments, which often lack a 

tax base to support training. 

Thanks to the FMCSA agreements I mentioned earlier, the 

NBFC and other first responder organizations have been able to 

train tens of thousands of firefighters. The NBFC asked that Congress pass legislation to increase funding to these FMCSA hazardous material training grant. 

The NBFC is pleased to see that S. 576, Railways Safety Act of 

2023, includes language that increases support to the alert and 

supplemental training grant programs. The Federal Emergency 

Management agency’s assistance to firefighter grants and staffing 

for adequate fire and emergency response grants is also critical to 

fire departments. 

The goal of these grants is to bring all fire departments up to a 

baseline level of readiness. Many departments struggle to achieve 

this baseline. In alarming examples, NFPA data showing that 53 

percent of fire departments cannot equip every firefighter with selfcontained breathing apparatus. 

33 

The NBFC request that Congress increase funding to AFG and 

safer grant programs and pass S. 870, Grants and Safety Act, as 

soon as possible to ensure the authorization for these critical 

grants doesn’t lapse at the end of this Fiscal Year. 

The NBFC also asks Congress to provide additional support to 

local and regional response coordination initiatives. These include 

hazardous material regional response teams, which facilitate regional, public safety communications, and coordination on hazmat 

response, and local emergency planning committees to ensure they 

fulfill their mission of fostering dialog amongst hazmat stakeholders within a community to prevent and prepare for releases of 

hazardous chemicals. 

The NBFC further encourages Congress to provide additional 

support to FEMA’s local delivery of additional National Incident 

Management System training courses, which provide a comprehensive national approach to incident management. 

The NBFC also requests that we, the NFPA, Congress, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the Federal Rail Administration, work together to enhance the methods for emergency 

hazmat product identification. Firefighters face a higher risk of developing cancer compared to the general public. 

The NBFC supports several initiatives to combat firefighting related cancer exposure, most notably the NBFC and the International Association of Fire Chiefs Volunteer and Combination Officer Section produced a Lavender written report, a Best Practice 

Guide to reduce toxic exposure, and risk to prevent firefighter cancer. 

On behalf of the Nation’s volunteer firefighters, I thank you for 

your opportunity to address the Committee regarding the hazardous material response needs of the volunteer first responders. 

The NBFC looks forward to continuing to work with the committee and the stakeholders assembled here today to improve the 

emergency response to hazmat incidents and ensure that firefighters are properly trained and equipped to carry out this response. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Comstock follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FIRE CHIEF DAVID ‘‘CHIP’’ COMSTOCK, MEMBER, NATIONAL VOLUNTEER FIRE COUNCIL

Good morning Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and distinguished members of the Committee. My name is Chip Comstock and I have served as the fire 

chief of the Western Reserve Joint Fire District (which I’ll refer to as the District) 

for 25 years. My department serves the Township and Village of Poland, Ohio, 

which are suburban/rural communities located in southeastern Mahoning County. 

Mahoning County is located approximately 10 miles north of East Palestine. 

The District was first established in 1923 as a volunteer department and remains 

so today with approximately 60 active fire suppression and EMS personnel. We respond to approximately 1,900 incidents each year from three stations and protect 

over 15,000 people in a 21-square-mile primary response area. The District also provides automatic mutual aid and mutual aid to two cities, two villages, and four 

townships in Ohio and two townships in Pennsylvania. Both CSX and Norfolk 

Southern Railways transverse the District. The District assisted with the emergency 

response to the East Palestine derailment and detonation. 

I have also been a member of the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC) for 

over a decade. The NVFC serves as the national voice for over 670,000 volunteer 

firefighters comprising 65 percent of the Nation’s fire service. Since 1976, the NVFC 

has been the leading nonprofit membership association representing the interests of 

the volunteer fire, EMS, and rescue services. The NVFC provides critical resources, 

34 

programs, education, and advocacy to support the interests of volunteer first responders across the nation, including hazmat and rail safety. I appreciate the opportunity today to discuss the response to the East Palestine incident and what we’ve 

learned we need so far to improve hazmat incident response and rail safety. 

The District’s Response to East Palestine: 

More than 50 fire departments were called to the scene of the East Palestine derailment. My department responded to East Palestine as part of a countywide response on February 3, 2023. Following the derailment, the East Palestine dispatcher 

contacted Mahoning County and requested all water tenders/tankers that could be 

provided as well as additional engines. We were a part of that broader response. 

Our assignment was to a burning structure immediately adjacent to a burning 

rail car. We were called back to the scene on Monday to continue to assist with on 

scene operations for the detonation. Following the East Palestine incident, it became 

clear that additional hazmat incident training needs to be available for first responders, along with improved on scene communication and coordination. 

Fortunately, firefighters from my department did not experience any apparent immediate health issues, although many other firefighters did. Early post-incident 

baseline medical examinations were performed for my department, but many other 

departments were not as fortunate to receive early baseline examinations. The turnout gear and Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) firefighters exposed to the 

rail car contaminants were taken out of service. Temporary rental replacement gear 

is now being used until the months long process of ordering replacement gear is 

completed. The engine that was closest to the burning buildings is also in the process of being examined for any signs of deterioration due to the chemical exposure. 

Recommendations in the Aftermath of the East Palestine Response: 

The East Palestine derailment has emphasized the need to better train and equip 

first responders to respond to hazardous materials incidents, and specifically, to 

derailments of this nature in rural areas, which are often served by volunteer departments that lack the resources (equipment, training, and support), tax base, and 

manpower of their suburban and urban counterparts. 

Additionally, first responders’ exposure to toxic chemicals while responding to 

East Palestine highlights the need for enhanced methods for emergency hazmat 

product identification and the need to make the funding for baseline medical testing 

and follow-up examinations available to all responders to hazmat incidents. 

Increase Support for PHMSA Hazardous Materials Grants: 

As the Federal Rail Administration and this Committee have stated, the number 

of hazmat cars involved in derailments has been increasing in recent years. In 1986, 

there were 1,411 hazardous materials cars involved in derailments; by 2021, that 

number had increased by 339 percent to 6,204. Additionally, according to National 

Fire Protection Association (NFPA) the annual number of fire department calls involving hazardous incidents has also increased considerably from 171,500 in 1986 

to 420,000 in 2020. East Palestine and other incidents in the transport of hazardous 

materials have demonstrated the need for local fire and emergency services to be 

prepared for such incidents. 

According to the NFPA’s 2020 U.S. Fire Service Needs Assessment, 70 percent of 

fire departments provide hazardous materials response and it is more common for 

fire departments to provide this service than emergency medical services (EMS). 

This is even the case in smaller departments. 

The NFPA Needs Assessment surveyed departments on four levels of professional 

competence for responders to hazardous materials incidents. They were: no certification, awareness, operational, and technician. The NFPA defines operational as: 

‘‘first responders trained at this level must meet the National Fire Protection 

Association’s awareness level training as well as any additional competency designed to allow the responder to implement or support actions to protect nearby 

persons, the environment, or property from the effects of the release.’’ 

Of the departments surveyed, only 55 percent of personnel performing hazmat duties were certified at an operational level of competence. According to the 2020 U.S. 

Census, the population of East Palestine is 4,761. Of departments surveyed that 

serve populations between 2,500–5,000 people, only 53 percent of personnel performing hazmat duties were certified at an operational level of competence. This 

level of certification drops to 38 percent in departments that serve populations less 

than 2,500, with 23 percent of personnel having no certification at all. This data 

presents a safety and security risk not only to the responders themselves, but also 

the communities that they protect. 

35 

This data is particularly alarming considering that 65 percent of the Nation’s fire 

departments serve a population of less than 5,000 people. The needs of departments 

serving this population size are of particular importance to the NVFC, because 98 

percent of departments serving populations of less than 2,500 are either all volunteer or mostly volunteer and 96 percent of departments serving populations between 

2,500 and 4,999 are either all or mostly volunteer. 

For many firefighters, hazmat training is difficult to access and/or cost prohibitive. When it is accessible, it is often very difficult for firefighters to attend trainings 

due to lack of flexibility, time, and funding. These pressures are often exacerbated 

for volunteer firefighters because they have to take time off from their paying jobs 

and/or time away from their families to attend training and are often not reimbursed for this time. 

In recent years there has been some progress made in making hazardous materials training more readily available to firefighters through the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administrations’ (PHMSA) hazardous materials grants, 

specifically, through the Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP), 

Assistance for Local Emergency Response Training (ALERT), Hazardous Materials 

Instructor Training (HMIT), Community Safety (CS), and Supplemental Public Sector Training (SPST) grant programs. 

• HMEP Grants: For HMEP grants Governors in each State, or their counterparts 

within Territories or Tribes, designate an agency to receive the HMEP grant 

funds. Agencies submit grant applications to PHMSA annually requesting funds 

for proposed activities. PHMSA reviews and evaluates applications to make certain the proposed activities support the program mission to ensure the safe 

transportation of hazmat. If approved, PHMSA offers the agency a Notice of 

Grant Award (NGA) for acceptance and signature. Once executed, the agency 

may distribute grant funds in accordance with the planned activities identified 

in the grant application within the State, Territory, or Tribe to Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) and first responder organizations. The 

HMEP grant program is designed to allow grantees the flexibility to implement 

training and planning programs that address differing needs for each location 

based on demographics, emergency response capabilities, commodity flow studies, and hazard analysis. We strongly recommend that there be more of an impetus to see that these funds are directed to training front-line first responders 

in core Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and/or NFPA 

response competencies such as Awareness, Operations, Technician, Specialist, 

and Incident Command, including refresher trainings. 

• ALERT Grants: The ALERT grant is competitively awarded to non-profit organizations capable of delivering an established curriculum to emergency responders. This grant promotes hazmat response training for volunteer or remote 

emergency responders. Response activities include the transportation of crude 

oil, ethanol, and other flammable liquids by rail consistent with NFPA standards. 

• HMIT Grants: The HMIT grant is competitively awarded to non-profit organizations that have expertise in conducting hazmat employee training programs and 

are capable of reaching a target population of hazmat employees and including 

them in the training program. Both career and volunteer first responders are 

‘‘employees’’. This grant funds train-the-trainer program that facilitates the 

training of hazmat instructors who then conduct training in Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) for hazmat employees. 

• CS Grants: The CS grant is competitively awarded to non-profit organizations. 

The CS grant enhances the capability of communities to prepare for and respond to hazmat accidents and incidents and supports the training of state and 

local enforcement personnel who are responsible for enforcing the safe transportation of hazmat. 

• SPST Grants: The SPST grant is competitively awarded to national non-profit 

fire service organizations. This grant is a train-the trainer program that facilitates the training of instructors who then conduct training in hazmat response 

for individuals with a statutory responsibility to respond to hazmat accidents 

and incidents. 

Through a SPST grant the NVFC is able offer a hazmat train-the-trainer program: Partners in Training (PIT) Crew. This project will help first responders gain 

the knowledge and skills they need to train others in their communities on hazmat 

safety and response. Through this program the NVFC is providing 15 in-person 

training opportunities across the U.S. at no cost to departments. 

36 

Through this program, the NVFC is making hazmat training more accessible to 

departments around the country. The train-the-trainer aspect magnifies this program’s impact by preparing hazmat trainers to go back to their home departments 

and regions and spread the knowledge they have attained. It is very important that 

the NVFC has the ability to provide this program at no cost to volunteer departments because many of these department serve rural areas that lack a tax base to 

support funding for basic firefighting equipment like turnout gear and SCBAs, let 

alone hazmat training. 

Thanks to ALERT, CS, and SPST grants, the NVFC and other non-profit organizations that serve first responders have been able to provide hazmat incident response training to tens of thousands of firefighters. As seen in the data above we 

still have a long way to go to ensure that all firefighters who respond to hazardous 

incidents are properly trained to do so. The NVFC asks that Congress pass legislation that will increase funding to HMEP, ALERT, HMIT, CS, and SPST grants. The 

NVFC would also urge congress and PHMSA to ensure that HMEP and HMIT grant 

funds reach their intended recipients—the front line first responders—Fire, EMS, 

and Law Enforcement. The NVFC is pleased to see that S. 576, Railway Safety Act 

of 2023 includes language that increases support to the ALERT and Supplemental 

Training grant programs and sincerely thanks Senator Brown, Senator Vance, Senator Casey, Senator Rubio, Senator Fetterman, and Senator Hawley for their leadership. 

Provide Funding for Hazardous Materials Regional Response Teams: 

An incident as large as East Palestine requires a regional response. In addition 

to providing additional funds to existing PHMSA hazardous materials grants, the 

NVFC requests that Congress support initiatives to fund Hazardous Materials Regional Response Teams to facilitate regional public safety communications and coordination on hazmat response, region focused training, equipment, and sharing of 

best practices. 

Additional Support for LEPCs: 

Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) provide a forum for local stakeholders to work together to identify chemical hazards, develop and maintain emergency plans in case of an accidental release, and encourage continuous attention to 

chemical safety, risk reduction, and accident prevention in their communities. 

Stakeholders that participate in LEPCs are first responders, state and local elected 

officials, emergency managers, industry representatives, hospital and public health 

officials, and the media. Because of their broad-based membership, LEPCs can foster a valuable dialogue within the community to prevent and prepare for accidental 

and terrorist-related releases of hazardous chemicals. 

The role of LEPCs is a critical and foundational element in providing the hazard, 

risk, and capability assessments needed by the response community. These assessments should be followed by strategic planning at the community level to prioritize 

and fill capability gaps. Likewise, these LEPC efforts will require sustained support 

at the national, state, and local levels. The NVFC asks that Congress provide additional funds to LEPCs through PHMSA and the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) to ensure this sustained support is provided. 

Support More Enhanced Methods for Emergency Hazmat Product 

Identification: 

A major concern in the immediate response to the East Palestine derailment was 

the lack of knowledge of what hazardous materials were contained in the derailed 

train cars. Each car that contained a hazardous materials was placarded, but the 

heat of the fire melted the placards identifying the contents of the cars. The NVFC 

requests that we, the NFPA, Congress, Nation Transportation Safety Board, and 

Federal Rail Administration work together to enhance the methods for emergency 

hazmat product identification. 

Increase Support for AFG and SAFER Grant Programs: 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters 

Grant (AFG) program and Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response 

(SAFER) grants are by far the most significant sources of assistance that the Federal government provides to local fire departments. The goal of the AFG and SAFER 

programs is to bring all of the Nation’s fire departments up to a baseline level of 

readiness, which includes the purchase of essential equipment to respond to hazmat 

incidents. This funding is particularly important for all-and mostly-volunteer fire departments, which protect 82 percent of the Nation’s communities and 30 percent of 

the population. 

37 

As the NFPA data referenced earlier shows, rural areas are almost exclusively 

protected by volunteers. Unfortunately, NFPA Needs Assessment studies consistently show that volunteer agencies have difficulty affording up-to-date equipment, 

training, and SCBAs. This is primarily for economic reasons. Because fire protection 

services are funded at the local level, the resources available to each department 

are dependent on the local tax base. For smaller communities that can mean having 

to engage in private fundraising and rely on older equipment and vehicles in order 

to maintain operations. 

These pressures are exacerbated by the fact that the number of fire department 

calls increased by 23 percent to more than 36.4 million from 2010 to 2020, while 

during this same ten-year period the number of volunteer firefighters dropped by 

12 percent nationwide. Additionally, data from the Congressional Fires Services Institute show that since 2019, the average cost for turnout gear has increased by approximately 35–40 percent, while the cost of fire SCBAs has increased around 32 

percent. 

According to the NFPA Need Assessment, more than half of all fire departments 

cannot equip everyone with SCBAs. Departments protecting less than 9,999 people 

have the highest rates of unmet need for SCBA equipment. 

• AFG Grants: AFG grants help meet the firefighting and emergency response 

needs of fire departments and non-affiliated emergency medical service organizations. AFG funds are used to obtain critically needed equipment, protective 

gear, emergency vehicles, training, and other resources necessary for protecting 

the public and emergency personnel from fire and related hazards. 

• SAFER Grants: SAFER grants directly assist fire departments and volunteer 

firefighter interest organizations with firefighter retention and recruitment efforts in their communities. SAFER funds provide the resources needed to enhance the local fire departments’ abilities to comply with staffing, response, and 

operational standards. 

NVFC requests that Congress enact legislation that will increase funding to AFG 

and SAFER grant programs. Additionally, the authorization for AFG and SAFER 

grants expires at the end of this Fiscal Year and these programs are scheduled to 

sunset at the end of FY 2024. The Senate has introduced S. 870, Fire Grants and 

Safety Act. The NVFC strongly supports this important legislation which will extend 

the authorization of AFG and SAFER through FY 2030 and urges Congress pass 

this legislation as soon as possible. The NVFC sincerely thanks Senator Peters, Senator Collins, Senator Murkowski, and Senator Carper for their leadership on this 

important legislation. 

Encourage Broader Implementation of NIMS: 

Large incidents like East Palestine that require a response from multiple jurisdictions and state, local, and Federal agencies emphasize the need for communication 

and coordination among first responders and the need to adopt protocols like 

FEMA’s National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is a comprehensive, 

national approach to incident management that is applicable at all jurisdictional 

levels and across functional disciplines and the full spectrum of potential incidents, 

hazards, and impacts, regardless of size, location, or complexity. 

NIMS provides stakeholders across the whole community with the shared vocabulary, systems, and processes to successfully carry out a multi-agency response to 

emergencies. NIMS also defines operational systems that guide how personnel work 

together during incidents. The NVFC encourages Congress to provide additional 

funding and support to FEMA and the U.S. Fire Administration for the local delivery of additional NIMS training courses. As mentioned earlier, volunteer first responders face unique obstacles when it comes to training due to having to juggle 

the obligations of their full-time careers along with their obligations to the fire service. 

Fund Post Exposure Baseline and Follow-up Medical Testing on First 

Responders: 

Firefighters face a 9 percent higher risk of developing cancer and a 14 percent 

higher risk of dying from cancer compared to the general public. The NVFC has 

supported several initiatives to combat the threat of firefighting related cancer exposure. Most notably the NVFC collaborated with the International Association of Fire 

Chiefs’ Volunteer and Combination Officers Section to produce the Lavender Ribbon 

Report, which is a comprehensive best practice guide to reduce toxic exposure risks 

and prevent firefighter cancer. 

The aftermath of East Palestine has emphasized the need for much more work 

to be done to improve the prevention of firefighter cancer and other health issues. 

38 

Those who responded to the East Palestine incident from the Western Reserve Joint 

Fire District received post incident baseline health screenings, but many other firefighters who responded did not receive these screenings. 

Preventive screenings can identify cancer and other health risks at their earliest 

stages when positive treatment outcomes are more likely. However, it remains difficult for individual firefighters to receive early screenings as current screening 

guidance does not account for their occupational exposures. Every firefighter who 

responds to an incident where they are exposed to hazardous materials, like in East 

Palestine, should receive baseline and follow-up health screenings. 

These screenings will not only protect firefighters and save resources by preempting potential health complications, they will also enable researchers to learn 

more about the impact of hazardous exposures on firefighters and the potential conditions they may develop as a result of these exposures. We need to take a proactive 

rather than a reactive approach when it comes to firefighter healthcare. The NVFC 

ask that Congress pass initiatives that would fund baseline and follow-up health 

screenings for firefighter who have been exposed to hazardous materials incidents 

involving hazardous materials like East Palestine. 

Conclusion: 

I thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee regarding the hazardous materials response and rail safety needs of volunteer first responders. As the 

community of East Palestine recovers, the NVFC looks forward to continuing to 

work with the Committee and the stakeholders assembled here today to ensure incidents like this don’t occur again. We also look forward to working together to improve the emergency response to hazmat incidents and ensure that firefighters are 

properly trained and equipped to carry out this response. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you very much for being here. And we 

are so sorry that you had to deal with this, but your experience is 

very helpful and us—helping to know how to evaluate this moving 

forward and the resources that you are asking for. 

Mr. Whitaker, welcome. We look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF CLYDE WHITAKER, OHIO STATE LEGISLATIVE 

DIRECTOR, SMART—TRANSPORTATION DIVISION 

Mr. WHITAKER. Good morning, Chairwoman Cantwell, and Ranking Member Cruz, and members of the Committee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify. My name is Clyde Whitaker. 

I am an Ohio State Legislative Board Director for Smart Transportation, which represents approximately 30,000 railroad workers 

in the crafts of conductor, locomotive engineer, yardmaster, and 

trainperson. 

One of my primary roles is to protect, improve, and assure the 

safety of our members. I would like to begin by saying that our 

hearts, the rail labor break for citizens of East Palestine. This derailment did not have to happen and it makes it so much more 

frustrating for us to know that it was very predictable. 

And yet our warnings and cries for help over the last 7 years 

have fallen on deaf ears and the outcome was exactly as we feared. 

Now the result is a town that doesn’t feel safe in their own homes, 

businesses failing to survive, and railroad that prioritized its own 

movement of trains before the people of the community, as well as 

its workers. It truly is a shame that operational changes in place 

prior to that incident are still in place today, and the possibility for 

a similar disaster is just as possible. 

My entire railroad career, I have listened to the railroads portray 

a message, an image of safety first, but I have never witnessed or 

experienced that truth one single day on the property. For years, 

I have handled complaints after complaint regarding unsafe pracVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
39 

tices and unsafe environments, and for almost every single one, I 

have been fought every step of the way. 

The truth is, ask any railroad worker and they will tell you that 

their carriers are masters of checking the boxes for saying the right 

things without ever doing anything meaningful toward improving 

safety. 

Their only focus is on the operating ratios and bottom lines, 

which is evidenced by the fact that their business structures are 

set up to reward timely movements of freight rather than reaching 

destination safely, as they once were. Actions do speak louder than 

words, and I assure you that what you have heard and will hear 

from the railroads today are nothing more than words. 

Their actions are what is experienced by men and women I represent, as well as what the people of East Palestine have been 

through. This is the reality of what happens when railroads are 

primarily left to govern and regulate themselves. 

To that point, on July 11, 2022, I filed a complaint with the FRA 

regarding an unsafe practice that was occurring on Norfolk Southern. Despite existing operating rules to the contrary, and as I was 

giving instructions to crews, to disregard wayside detector failures 

and to keep their trains moving. 

This meant the trains were not being inspected as intended and 

that the crews were not able to ascertain the integrity of such 

trains. This practice remained in place even after East Palestine, 

but these types of issues aren’t just relegated to wayside detectors. 

It is a virus that has plagued the industry for some time with the 

inception of precision scheduled railroading. Across America, inspections and maintenance is being deferred to expedite the movement of trains. 

No longer is identifying defects and unsafe conditions the goal of 

inspections, but rather minimize the time it takes to perform them, 

or the elimination of them altogether. Compound this with the fact 

that the railroads on a determined course to grow these trains to 

astronomical lengths and you have a predictable outcome, and that 

outcome is the event like we have seen in East Palestine. 

We need meaningful change and we desperately need people like 

yourselves to reverse these dangerous trends in the railroad industry. The Rail Safety Act of 2023 goes a long way toward doing just 

that. 

As we sit here today, the railroads are attempting to eliminate 

the conductor from the cab of a locomotive. They want you to believe that technology is capable of replacing the role of conductor, 

but what they won’t tell you is technology was present in the cab 

of the locomotive, and when the train finally came to a stop this 

day, this job was done. But unlike the technology, the engineer, the 

conductor, and his trainee sprang into action. 

They identified the derailment in the presence of fire. They contacted EMS. They applied brakes on the train cars to prevent further catastrophic damage. They separated the locomotives and got 

the entire crew to safety, all of which technology sat dormant. We 

cannot afford to be dormant. 

The degradation of safety is very real and the numbers prove it. 

The frequency of derailments is up. The frequency of injuries is up. 

And from a railroaders’ perspective, the potential for another disVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
40 

aster is as high as it has ever been. We cannot allow the railroads 

to continue to dodge and sharpshoot regulations. 

We cannot allow them to be sole owners and creators of the data 

and safety statistics, and we cannot allow them to prioritize revenue over profit. Oversight is desperately needed before the next 

big one happens. I thank you for allowing me to testify here today, 

and I look forward to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitaker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CLYDE WHITAKER, OHIO STATE LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, SMART—TRANSPORTATION DIVISION

Good morning, Chairwoman Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and Members of 

the Committee. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify. 

My name is Clyde Whitaker, and I am the Ohio State Legislative Director for 

SMART Transportation Division, which represents approximately 3,000 railroad 

workers in the crafts of conductor, locomotive engineer, yardmaster, and 

trainperson. One of my primary roles is to protect, improve, and ensure the safety 

of our members. 

On July 11, 2022, I filed a complaint with the Federal Railroad Administration 

regarding an unsafe practice that was occurring on Norfolk Southern (NS). Despite 

existing operating rules to the contrary, NS was giving instructions to crews to disregard wayside detector failures and to keep their trains moving. This meant that 

the trains were not being inspected as intended, and that the crews were not able 

to ascertain the integrity of their trains. Unfortunately, my complaint could not be 

acted upon and within months similar sets of circumstances have led us to the place 

we are today, where large-scale derailments have endangered multiple communities 

both in Ohio and nation-wide. 

The driving force behind this decision, and many others like it, is a business 

model otherwise known as Precision Scheduled Railroading (PSR). PSR has caused 

the greatest degradation of safety in modern day railroading. As we have all seen 

in East Palestine, this cut-your-way-to-profit model is not sustainable and it is very, 

very dangerous. And while the NTSB may not be able to identify it by name in their 

report, I assure you, without hesitation, that it is the greatest contributing factor, 

not only in this accident, but in all of the others that have occurred before it and 

since. 

In yards all across America, thorough inspections are being sacrificed and needed 

maintenance is being deferred to expedite the movement of trains. NS is not unique 

in these practices. No longer is identifying defects the goal of inspections industrywide, but rather minimizing the time it takes to perform them or the elimination 

of them altogether. Compound this with the fact that the railroads are on a determined course to grow these trains to astronomical lengths, and you have a predictable outcome. That outcome is East Palestine; or the derailment in Sandusky that 

occurred in October of last year; or the derailment that just happened in Springfield. 

But what’s even more scary is that the practices, rules, and procedures that were 

in place when these accidents occurred are still in place today. This tells me that 

the frequency of derailments that we are experiencing in this country is not going 

to stop anytime soon, and, in fact, may only end up getting worse. 

We need meaningful change, and we desperately need people like yourselves to 

declare an end to PSR. The Rail Safety Act of 2023 goes a long way toward doing 

just that. As we sit here today, the railroads are attempting to eliminate the conductor from the cab of the locomotive. They want you to believe that technology is 

capable of replacing the role of the conductor and that the conductor would be better 

served in a remote, ground-based role. Nothing can be further from the truth. Yes, 

there was a conductor in the locomotive in all the accidents I’ve mentioned here 

today, but there was also technology. In East Palestine when the train finally came 

to a stop, the technology stopped with it as its job was done. But when the train 

came to a stop for the conductor, the conductor and his trainee immediately sprang 

into action. He urgently began a walking inspection, wherein he was quickly able 

to identify a major accident had occurred, that fire was present, and that danger 

was imminent. In doing so, he relayed potential life-saving information to the engineer so that the engineer could notify the dispatcher to get emergency services in 

motion. Then the conductor, realizing the presence of fire presented the potential 

for movement of the train—which would have exacerbated the situation immensely—set manual brakes on the cars to prevent any unwanted movement of the 

train, and then separated the locomotives from the train so that they themselves, 

41 

including the engineer could get to safety. None of that could have happened in a 

timely fashion with a one-person crew. 

I imagine the railroads are going to try and tout their safety record in this hearing. They want you to believe that even though they’re the ones that created the 

scenario we’re currently facing, that they somehow are the ones best suited to right 

the ship. Nothing could be further from the truth. According to them, 99% of all 

hazmat shipments make it safely to their destination. Keep in mind that was true 

before East Palestine, and yet it still happened. They are most likely going to tell 

you that injuries are down, but keep in mind that they eliminated roughly 30% of 

the workforce over the last 5 years. And they’re most likely going to tell you that 

derailments are down but not that they are operating fewer trains. 

It is easy to hide in the numbers. Obviously, if you have less people, you’re going 

to have less injuries, and if you have less trains, you should theoretically have less 

derailments. But when you look at these incidents on a pro rata basis, you see a 

completely different story. 

In December 2022, when the GAO reported on Norfolk Southern’s accident rate, 

it found the Company had hit a 10-year high in 2021 with the Company’s accident 

rate at its highest from 2019–2021. In fact, the Company’s Federal Railroad Administration (‘‘FRA’’) train accident rate has increased for each of the last four years. 

Similarly, the nation’s seven Class 1 freight railroads suffered two derailments for 

every million miles traveled in 2022, compared to the 1.71 derailments per million 

miles in 2013, an increase of 17%. These statistics and the business model that is 

producing them cannot be allowed to continue down its current, reckless path. 

The overarching theme of what the AAR and railroad companies are going to tell 

you is that they are beyond your reach. They will hide behind the interstate commerce clause and tell you that in the name of our nation’s economy, they are empowered to run their critical industry unfettered by your authority. 

I am here today to tell you that is a bastardization of our United States’ Constitution. The Commerce Clause was put in place to protect the people of the United 

State of America, not the railroads. But the PSR business model they have employed in the last 6 years has not been that. Their 3–4 mile trains, skeleton crews, 

and slap dash approach to both maintenance and inspections have not enhanced our 

economic standing in the world. It has led to massive job losses, embargoed shippers 

cut off from rail service, exports not making it to market, products not making it 

to store shelves, and raw materials not making it to assembly lines. 

Derailments make the headlines almost every single day in this country. It 

doesn’t have to be this way, nor should it. We are the greatest nation in the world 

and the safety of our railroad system should reflect, but how can it when the carriers themselves oppose every meaningful piece of regulation and/or legislations that 

comes before it. 

What is happening in this nation is not ok, and the Railway Safety Act of 2023 

is a great beginning to getting us back on track. 

Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify here today, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Whitaker. Very much appreciate you being here and your statement. We will now hear from 

Mr. Shaw. Welcome, Mr. Shaw. 

STATEMENT OF ALAN SHAW, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION 

Mr. SHAW. Good morning, Chairwoman Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and distinguished members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. 

My name is Alan Shaw, and I have been President and CEO of 

Norfolk Southern since May 2022. I want to open by stating how 

deeply sorry I am for the impact this derailment has had on the 

citizens of East Palestine and the surrounding communities. I have 

been to East Palestine and the surrounding communities many 

times over the past 6 weeks. 

I have spoken with the community leaders, business owners, 

school officials, clergy, families, and others. They have shared their 

42 

stories and their concerns about the health of their families, their 

businesses, and the future of the community they love. 

I am determined to make this right. Norfolk Southern continues 

to make good on its promise to clean this site safely, thoroughly, 

and with urgency. You have my personal commitment that we will 

get the job done and we will help these communities thrive. 

At the direction of and in collaboration with the U.S. EPA and 

State and local agencies, we are developing and implementing near 

and longer-term cleanup activities. Air and water monitoring have 

been in place continuously since the accident, and to date it has 

consistently indicated the air is safe to breathe and the water is 

safe to drink. 

We have already invested more than $24 million in East Palestine and the surrounding communities. Norfolk Southern opened 

the Family Assistance Center the day after the incident, and 

through it we have provided more than $10 million to more than 

6,000 families. We have invested over $3 million in community relief funds to support the immediate needs of Ohioans and Pennsylvanians in the area. 

We have also dedicated over $9 million in funds to reimburse and 

support emergency responders, and health and environmental 

agencies for costs related to the derailment. As I have said before, 

this is just the start. We know that people are concerned about 

long term health impacts from the derailment. 

When I appeared before the Senate Committee on Environment 

and Public Works earlier this month, some members of that committee asked me to be more specific about our commitment to do 

the right thing. 

Today, I am able to share more about our plans. We are in the 

planning stages of developing a long-term medical compensation 

fund, a property value assurance program, and a longer-term water 

testing program. We look forward to working toward a final resolution with relevant stakeholders on the details of these plans. If 

residents have a concern, we want them to come talk to us. 

Our website, nsmakingitright.com, provides the latest information and details on how to reach us. I thank Chair Homendy for 

her leadership and the NTSB’s investigation into the derailment, 

and I pledge to continue to cooperate fully. The NTSB’s preliminary 

report found that the Norfolk Southern crew was operating the 

train below the speed limit and in an approved manner, yet it is 

clear from this incident that we can always improve. 

So as the NTSB continues its work, we are not waiting to act to 

make the railroads safer. Shortly after the derailment, I instructed 

my team to look at steps we could take to improve safety beginning 

immediately, and we have announced a number of initiatives to do 

just that. These steps are a start, and we look forward to working 

with policymakers and others in the industry on this. 

We support legislative efforts that use science and data to enhance the safety of the freight rail industry, and the Railway Safety Act and the Rail Act both include measures with the potential 

for meaningful improvement, such as funding additional training, 

better advanced notifications, accelerating the phaseout of older 

tank cars, and much more. 

43 

We strive to make our safety culture the best in the industry. 

When I began my tenure as CEO 10 months ago, I spent hours in 

crew rooms all over our 22-state network thanking our frontline 

railroaders and asking for their advice. 

They are proud of the important work they do for this country, 

and we take their safety and the safety of the communities we 

serve seriously. Today, I am proud to represent more than 19,700 

Norfolk Southern employees who work every day to offer a safe and 

effective means of transporting goods to businesses and families 

across our great country. 

We will continue to invest in the future of Ohio and Pennsylvania, and all the States in which we operate, just as we have always done. Norfolk Southern is here for the long haul and we won’t 

be finished until we make this right. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shaw follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN SHAW, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION

Chairwoman Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and distinguished members of the 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. 

My name is Alan Shaw, and I have been the President and CEO of Norfolk Southern since May 2022. 

I look forward today to sharing information about our progress cleaning the derailment site, assisting families whose lives were disrupted, and investing in the 

community. I will also discuss how we are making Norfolk Southern and the railroad industry safer through our own initiatives, collaboration with others in the industry, and engagement with lawmakers and other stakeholders. 

I am deeply sorry for the impact this derailment has had on the people in the 

region, and I am determined to make it right. 

We are making progress every day as we clean the site safely, thoroughly, and 

with urgency. Working now under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Unilateral Administrative Order, we have submitted a long-term plan that will guide 

our comprehensive testing program for the community’s water, air, and soil. That 

testing is informed by science and regulatory standards. And we will continue to 

transparently share the results of our ongoing testing. Agencies at the state and 

Federal level—including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 

Protection (DEP)—are continually monitoring the air and water quality in the impacted region. We are encouraged that they have reported to date that both the air 

and drinking water are safe. 

Financial assistance cannot change what happened, but it is an important part 

of doing the right thing. To date, we have committed to reimbursements and investments of more than $24 million in total, including by helping more than 5,800 families through our Family Assistance Center. This is just a start. We are currently 

working with the relevant stakeholders to establish three new funds to address 

healthcare, property values, and water testing in East Palestine and the surrounding communities. We also have launched a community website, 

NSMakingItRight.com, to provide the latest information to residents of East Palestine and the surrounding communities. 

Making first responders whole has been a particular area of focus, and we have 

already pledged and paid millions to reimburse local fire departments for costs associated with the emergency response and clean-up. I would like to express my profound admiration for the first responders from Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia who responded to the derailment. 

I want to be clear: this financial assistance is just a down payment. I have visited 

East Palestine and the surrounding area frequently since the accident. I’ve met with 

community leaders, business owners, school officials, clergy, and others to begin to 

identify ways we can invest in the future prosperity of the residents in the area and 

44 

support the long-term needs of its people. We will continue to invest in the affected 

communities for as long as it takes to help people in the area to recover and thrive. 

We are also committed to learning from this accident and to working with public 

officials and industry to make railroads even safer. In the meantime, we have already launched a series of immediate steps to enhance safety, based on the facts 

in the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) preliminary report. We look 

forward to cooperating with the NTSB as it continues its investigation into the root 

cause of the accident as well as its wider investigation. 

I. Our Commitment to Remediation and Monitoring 

I’ve met with residents of the community. I’ve heard their concerns, and I understand their worry. Their feedback has informed our approach. Norfolk Southern is 

working around the clock to remediate the remaining issues and monitor for any 

impact on public health and the environment. We continue to work in close coordination with federal, state, and local regulators and others to conduct environmental 

monitoring and to develop and carry out near-and longer-term clean-up activities. 

The remediation plan and each step of our longer-term efforts will be implemented 

at the direction of the U.S. EPA pursuant to the Agency’s Unilateral Administrative 

Order. 

Norfolk Southern personnel arrived on-scene shortly after the accident, and we 

have been there ever since. We have worked to be transparent and cooperative with 

the various local, state, and Federal stakeholders involved from the early hours of 

Unified Command through today. Following the accident, our specialists have remained on-location, assisted by expert derailment and environmental contractors. 

We are making significant progress. These teams have contained, diverted, and 

treated affected portions of nearby waterways, flushed nearly a mile of surface waterways, and are capturing rainwater within the contaminated areas for temporary 

storage and disposal. To date, we have recovered and transported more than 7.4 

million gallons of potentially affected water from the site for disposal at EPA-approved facilities. 

We also are working to safely remove affected soil, and our crews have removed 

more than 6,800 tons from the site. We are actively removing waste to facilities specifically engineered and permitted to safely handle this type of material. Our work 

will continue until the job is done. 

We continue to listen to the experts and cooperate with state, federal, and local 

government agencies. In particular, Norfolk Southern, the U.S. EPA, Ohio EPA, and 

Pennsylvania DEP are conducting water, soil, and air monitoring throughout the 

area surrounding East Palestine. The air monitoring to date has shown the air is 

safe to breathe. And the monitoring of the area’s public drinking water and private 

water wells by state and local authorities and Norfolk Southern shows that the 

water is safe to drink and there are no harmful levels of substances related to the 

derailment. We are committed to continuing this monitoring for as long as necessary. 

II. Our Commitment to the Community 

I want the people of East Palestine and the surrounding communities to know 

that Norfolk Southern and I are deeply committed to them. As indicated above, we 

have already made an initial investment of more than $24 million. Our financial 

support so far includes: 

• More than $9.5 million in support to more than 5,800 families through our 

Family Assistance Center; 

• A $5 million fund to reimburse local Pennsylvania fire departments for costs associated with the emergency response and clean-up; 

• More than $3 million in reimbursements and support to the East Palestine Fire 

Department and other area first responders for fire equipment used in the derailment response; 

• Almost $1.5 million to Pennsylvania state agencies to cover costs incurred as 

a result of the derailment; 

• A $1 million fund available immediately to East Palestine community leaders 

to identify where donations can do the most good; 

• Another $1 million fund to support the immediate needs of the East Palestine 

community, overseen by a Norfolk Southern craft railroader who lives in East 

Palestine and has been hired to serve as a community liaison, reporting directly 

to my office; 

45 

• Another $1 million Community Relief Fund to provide support to Pennsylvania 

businesses that have experienced losses as a result of the incident, including 

business expenses Norfolk Southern has reimbursed to date; 

• $300,000 to the East Palestine City School District to support the district’s academics, athletics, extracurricular activities, and long-term contingency planning 

regarding the impacts of the derailment; 

• $250,000 donation to The Way Station, an Ohio-based nonprofit delivering aid 

to the East Palestine community, to help establish a larger, permanent location 

in the area and hire additional staff, including a social worker; 

• Funding and coordination of cleaning and air monitoring services for the East 

Palestine Elementary and High Schools; and 

• $65,000 to the East Palestine Youth Sports Association to allow children to play 

in sports leagues for free for the year. 

We are also listening closely to concerns from the community about whether there 

could be long-term impacts from the derailment. Many residents are worried about 

what they will do if health impacts related to the derailment are discovered years 

from now. To date, environmental monitoring continues to show the air and drinking water are safe. To provide an additional level of assurance, we are committed 

to a solution that addresses long-term health risks through the creation of a longterm medical compensation fund. 

We also know residents are worried about their home values. While we are working with local leaders on investments to support the community’s long-term prosperity, we understand these concerns. We are committed to working with all relevant stakeholders to provide tailored protection for home sellers if their property 

loses value due to the impact of the derailment. 

Finally, we have heard the community’s interest in programs that protect drinking water over the long term. We are prepared to work with stakeholders toward 

that goal as well. We look forward to working toward a final resolution with all relevant stakeholders to finalize the details of these programs. 

Finally, we know it is important to keep the community informed. 

NSMakingItRight.com is updated regularly with information about remediation, 

monitoring, financial assistance, and investments in the community. Again, this is 

all a down payment. We are listening to your concerns, and we are committed to 

making this right. 

III. Our Focus on Safety 

Rail is one of the safest modes of transporting hazardous materials. We recognize, 

however, that we need to continue working to improve railway safety. The morning 

after the derailment, I spoke to NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy and pledged the full 

cooperation of Norfolk Southern in the NTSB’s investigation. The NTSB’s preliminary report released last month reflected that the Norfolk Southern crew was operating the train within our protocols and below the speed limit established by Federal law. The wayside detectors installed on the track to identify overheated axles 

operated properly, and the crew took the appropriate action when they received the 

alert. 

We will analyze and address the NTSB’s investigation results when they are 

available, but we are not waiting to act. We are committed to learning from this 

accident and working with public officials and industry to make railroads even 

safer. We have already launched a series of immediate steps to enhance safety, 

based on the facts in the NTSB’s preliminary report. 

As an initial step—and focusing on what we can do on our own—we are making 

our network of early-warning sensors stronger. Shortly after the derailment, I instructed my team to immediately look at steps we can take to improve safety further, and we are taking the following actions: 

• Enhancing the hot bearing detector network; 

• Piloting next-generation hot bearing detectors; 

• Deploying more acoustic bearing detectors; 

• Accelerating our Digital Train Inspection program; and 

• Improving practices, alongside industry partners, for hot bearing detectors. 

We currently spend more than $1 billion a year on technologies, equipment, and 

infrastructure to support safety, and another $1 billion per year on ongoing operations in support of safety. But the safety mechanisms in place did not prevent this 

accident. Every employee at Norfolk Southern is focused on learning from this incident and working with the entire freight rail industry to make changes. 

46 

We are committed to helping our first responders prepare for incidents when they 

do happen. For years prior to the East Palestine derailment, Norfolk Southern funded training for emergency responders. In 2015, Norfolk Southern launched ‘‘Operation Awareness & Response’’ with the goal of strengthening relationships with 

state and local first responders across our network through new training opportunities, and full-scale exercises. 

We recently announced that we are establishing a new regional training facility 

in Ohio, which will offer free training to first responders in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and 

West Virginia. The first safety classes at this new center began this week at our 

rail yard in Bellevue, Ohio, just west of Cleveland. We have more than 400 first 

responders registered for this and other upcoming trainings, and classes are currently full. We will have numerous future training opportunities across our 22-state 

network in 2023. We plan to establish a dedicated facility in the future. Every year, 

Norfolk Southern voluntarily trains between four and five thousand first responders 

throughout the states we serve. 

In addressing issues going forward, Norfolk Southern views an industry-wide comprehensive approach—one that includes railcar owners, car manufacturers, leasing 

companies, equipment makers, and the railroad companies—as essential in helping 

to improve safety as the rail industry continues to provide the logistical infrastructure that enables the United States economy to grow. It’s going to take all of us— 

and we’re eager to help lead that effort. 

IV. Enhancing Our Safety Culture 

An essential part of our effort to make Norfolk Southern a safer company is to 

further strengthen our safety culture. To describe how we are doing that, I would 

like to provide some important context on the new strategy we announced for Norfolk Southern at the end of last year. 

In the weeks since the derailment there have been a number of questions about 

an industry operating approach called precision scheduled railroading (PSR). There 

are five principles of PSR: operate safely, develop people, provide service, control 

costs, and optimize assets. These are sound principles one might find in any industry with an operational focus. 

In recent years, however, PSR has become associated with a singular focus on 

cost-cutting to drive a low operating ratio, which is a common industry measure for 

efficiency. It is here that Norfolk Southern has approached things differently from 

others in the industry and charted a new course. In a significant departure from 

the railroad industry’s recent past, we deliberately moved away from a singular 

focus on operating ratio. Instead, we are taking a more balanced approach to service, productivity, and growth. 

As just one example of what our strategy means in practice, instead of furloughing workers during periodic economic downturns, we intend to use the opportunity to invest in our workforce and provide additional training. When we do that, 

it makes us a more resilient company that is better able to serve our customers, 

and it creates more career opportunities for our craft railroaders. We hired craft 

railroaders aggressively throughout 2022 and continue to do so this year. 

Our new strategy goes hand-in-hand with our increased focus on culture and employee engagement, with an emphasis on transparency and collaboration. I know 

that, when Norfolk Southern is successful, it is because our craft colleagues are getting the job done for our customers and the United States economy. I have spent 

countless hours in the field in the 10 months I have served as CEO, thanking our 

front-line railroaders for their service and listening to their ideas on how to make 

Norfolk Southern better. 

We are committed to enhancing quality of life and work predictability for our craft 

employees, who are the key to our success. When we completed the recent round 

of national labor negotiations, with a historic and well-deserved 24 percent pay increase, I committed immediately to begin negotiations at the local level on qualityof-life issues like paid sick leave. We did what we said we were going to do and 

have already reached agreements on paid sick leave with nine of our unions. 

V. Our Commitment to Industry & Legislative Action 

We support legislative efforts to enhance the safety of the freight rail industry. 

We are committed to working with our fellow industry leaders to make the railroad 

industry a safer place, and we also recognize and appreciate the bicameral, bipartisan leadership by Members of Congress, including by members of this Committee, 

in proposing new legislation to create a safer rail industry. The Railway Safety Act 

and the RAIL Act both include measures with the potential to enhance safety and 

improve outcomes for our industry, our customers, and the communities we serve. 

47 

We support the Railway Safety Act’s provisions for more industry-funded training 

for first responders, and we are not waiting for legislation to move this forward. We 

have already announced the expansion of our existing training programs and the 

creation of a new regional training center in Ohio, which will serve first responders 

in Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. The first class was on March 21. 

We support the principle that first responders need accurate real-time information 

on the contents of trains moving through their communities and instruction on the 

safe handling of those contents in the event of an accident. We intend to take a 

leading role getting the AskRail safety application into the hands of every first responder who needs access. In this area specifically, the details of legislation matter 

as policymakers balance safety enhancements with national security concerns. 

We support triennial reviews of regulations for rail car inspections and standards 

for freight car safety, because regular reviews drive good regulatory policy and outcomes. 

We support the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) Confidential Close Call 

Reporting System (C3RS). Norfolk Southern participates in the C3RS Working 

Group that is part of the Department of Transportation’s Railroad Safety Advisory 

Committee. 

We support accelerating the phaseout of older tank car models, research into advanced tank car design, and additional funding for research and development on 

next-generation early-warning sensor technologies. 

There are other aspects of the proposed legislation that we support in principle. 

Establishing performance standards, maintenance standards, and alert thresholds 

for safety sensors is one example. We have already committed to work with the industry to develop additional data-based best practices in these areas, and we welcome constructive discussion with stakeholders to craft effective and practical legislation. 

There are also areas in which we believe Congress could go further with safety 

legislation. We encourage even stricter standards for tank car design. There are significant opportunities for advanced technology to enhance rail safety, and we encourage Congress to consider additional research into on-board rail car defect detection technology. 

We support increasing fines and penalties for persons found tampering with railroad facilities and safety equipment, such as grade crossing warning devices, wayside detectors, or signal boxes. We support codifying and enhancing the FRA’s confidential close car reporting system. And we support new requirements to ensure 

utility installations in railroads rights-of-way are conducted safely. 

VI. Conclusion 

Finally, Chairwoman Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and members of the Committee, I want to state again how deeply sorry we are for the impact of this derailment on East Palestine and the surrounding communities. We are making progress 

in the recovery and know our work is not yet done. On behalf of the more than 

19,700 hard-working employees of Norfolk Southern, I pledge that we won’t be finished until we make it right. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 

today, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. Mr. Shaw. We will now turn to Mr. 

Jefferies. And welcome, Mr. Jefferies. 

STATEMENT OF IAN JEFFERIES, 

PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Good morning and thank you for the opportunity 

to be here today. Let me start by extending my sympathy to the 

residents of East Palestine and surrounding areas. February’s derailment is a stark reminder that as rare as one is, a significant 

rail incident’s impact on the affected community can be extraordinary. 

And while nothing I say here today can undo the impacts of any 

rail incident, it is important that we have a clear-eyed discussion 

about the state of rail safety and steps that have been taken or 

could be taken. 

48 

As we know, Norfolk Southern is continuing cleanup efforts in 

East Palestine, while the NTSB’s meticulous investigation is ongoing. While those parties will continue to address matters related to 

that incident, today I will provide a broader perspective. 

Let me be clear, railroads work every day to improve safety toward an ultimate goal of zero incidents and zero injuries. That 

starts with our employees, whose commitment to moving America’s 

freight 24 seven and doing it safely should be commended. 

Post-pandemic hiring efforts continue, with our employee base 

currently the highest it has been in over 3 years. And because a 

well-maintained railroad is a safe railroad, the over $20 billion in 

annual investments back into the physical network have resulted 

in the Nation’s highest rated infrastructure by the American Society of Civil Engineers. 

The result? Rail is by far the safest way to move goods on land, 

especially hazardous materials. Per carload, the hazmat accident 

rate is down 78 percent since 2000, and 2022 saw the lowest rate 

of hazmat incidents in the entire industry’s history. Additionally, 

FRA data show class I railroad’s mainline accident rate in 2022 

was at an all-time low, as was the employee injury rate. 

But that does little to comfort a community that experiences a 

significant derailment, and that is why we must continue to apply 

lessons learned and take steps to drive the industry’s accident rate 

even lower. Every train trip provides learning tools for the future. 

To that end, railroads consistently invest in technologies and take 

action without waiting for Government requirements. 

Consider two recent actions. First, following an industry wide 

analysis, railroads are installing approximately 1,000 additional 

wayside hotbox detectors on the national network, standardizing 

critical alert thresholds for these systems, and analyzing and 

adopting new industry standards for trending analysis protocols to 

preempt potential problems. 

The vast network of these and other wayside detection systems 

exist today because railroads installed them voluntarily, not because of Government intervention. And just 2 weeks ago, upon 

learning that a segment of new cars on the network could be prone 

to derailment causing loose wheels sets, the industry took immediate action to take them out of service until those wheels sets are 

replaced. 

Myriad tools and methods are used every day to prevent incidents. Positive train control is fully implemented in helping prevent catastrophic accidents. Automated track inspection that sees 

into the track, as well as machine visioning and onboard sensors, 

all improve safety. Yet prevention is just one part of the threelegged safety stool, along with mitigation and response. 

On the former, the industry has a well-documented history of petitioning for stronger tank car standards. We are also committed to 

working with our partners and Congress to get older tank cars off 

the network. 

On response, first let me recognize Mr. Comstock here today and 

every first responder who tended to the accident in East Palestine. 

These individuals, like all firefighters who respond to rail incident, 

should be commended for their service. To do their jobs, though, 

49 

they need proper training and tools, and thus the industry is reinforcing its training programs and expanding access to information. 

This year, railroads will train 20,000 first responders in communities across the country, while the industry can provide another 

2,000 first responders with free, in-depth training at our world 

class facility in Colorado. 

This week, we launched a pilot program directly targeting emergency communications centers to promote broader access to 

AskRail, which provides first responders real time information 

about the contents of every car on a train and the safe handling 

of those contents in the event of an accident. 

Congress can support this effort by helping increase awareness 

of AskRail in your communities, and we ask for your help in getting the word out. In closing, railroads are fully committed to safety advancement through our own actions and working collaboratively. 

We support data driven policies with demonstrable safety benefits, including the goals of legislative provisions before this committee and look forward to working together. Thank you for your 

time, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jefferies follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF IAN JEFFERIES, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OFFICER, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS

Introduction 

On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads, thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss rail safety and the transportation of hazardous materials by rail. AAR’s freight railroad members account for the vast majority of railroad mileage, employees, and freight traffic in Canada, Mexico, and the United 

States. 

Let me make absolutely clear at the outset: for freight railroads, pursuing safe 

operations is not an option, it’s an imperative. Railroads know that families deserve 

to feel safe within their communities. That’s why railroads are steadfastly committed to solutions-oriented steps to prevent accidents from occurring. Data from 

the Federal Railroad Administration confirm that rail safety has improved substantially over the years. 

Unfortunately, the recent train accident in East Palestine, Ohio, has led some to 

question railroads’ commitment to safe operations and their ability to operate safely. 

Railroads know they have to restore confidence and demonstrate that nothing is 

more important to them than the safety of their employees, their customers, and 

the communities in which they operate. Every rail accident is one too many, and 

railroads’ ultimate goal is to eliminate accidents altogether. 

Actions speak louder than words, of course, which is why railroads will continue 

to take meaningful actions, as they’ve been doing for many years, to enhance safety. 

These actions will continue to be driven by good-faith, cooperative efforts with policymakers, suppliers, customers, and rail employees; sustained private investment 

in infrastructure, equipment, and safety technologies; the modernization of operating and maintenance practices; effective employee training; and steadfast adherence to pertinent laws and regulations. 

As I will explain below, in the wake of the East Palestine accident, railroads have 

pledged to take additional measures that will further enhance the safety of rail operations. 

Rail Safety Data Reflects Safety Gains 

Statistics from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) confirm that the past 

decade has been the safest in rail history. A few examples: 

50 

1FRA data for 2022 are preliminary. Train accident rates are usually represented in terms 

of accidents per million train-miles. A million train-miles is roughly equivalent to 300 train-trips 

across the country. 2 Class I freight railroads are those with 2021 revenue of at least $944 million. There are currently seven Class I freight railroads. Collectively, they account for approximately 95 percent 

of U.S. freight rail revenue. 3 Rail employee injury rates are usually referred to in terms of 100 full-time employee equivalents. 4 An accident involving hazmat can lead to the release of product from more than one railcar. 

5https://www.bts.gov/content/hazardous-materials-fatalities-injuries-accidents-and-propertydamage-data 

• The overall train accident rate was 28 percent lower in 2022 than in 2000.1

• The accident rate for trains traveling on railroad mainlines—that is, outside of 

rail yards—was 44 percent lower in 2022 than in 2000. For Class I freight railroads, the mainline accident rate was down 49 percent from 2000 and set a new 

record low in 2022.2

• The overall train derailment rate fell 31 percent from 2000 to 2022. 

• The rate of train accidents caused by track defects fell 55 percent from 2000 

to 2022 and set a new record low in 2022. 

• The rate of accidents caused by equipment defects (mainly locomotives and 

freight cars) fell 21 percent from 2000 to 2022. 

• As discussed further below, based on preliminary data, the hazardous materials 

accident rate in 2022 was 78 percent lower than in 2000 and set at an all-time 

record low. 

• From 2000 through 2022, the employee injury rate was down 49 percent.3 For 

Class I railroads, the decline was 63 percent, with 2022 setting a new record 

low. According to data from the Department of Labor, railroads have lower employee injury rates than most other major industries, including trucking, airlines, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and construction—even lower than 

grocery stores. 

There is more work to do, but FRA’s data make clear that railroads employees’ 

strong safety culture, paired with the sustained, disciplined investments in maintenance and technologies that target the primary causes of accidents, have delivered 

meaningfully improved safety. 

Railroads Safely Move Large Amounts of Hazardous Materials Every Day 

Most commodities carried by rail pose little or no threat to anyone or anything, 

but some commodities are classified as hazardous. In a typical year, U.S. railroads 

transport approximately 2.2 million carloads of hazardous materials. Depending on 

the year, hazardous materials account for 7 percent to 8 percent of rail carloads. 

Ethanol, crude oil, and propane make up the highest volume of hazardous material 

carried by rail, but countless other hazmat products that are indispensable to our 

Nation’s economy, health, and standard of living are also moved by rail. 

Railroads are the safest mode for transporting hazardous materials. Rail hazmat 

accident rates—accidents that result in hazmat releases as a percentage of total 

hazmat carloads—fell 78 percent from 2000 to 2022. In 2022, there were just 11 

train accidents that involved the release of hazardous materials, with just 19 

hazmat carloads releasing their contents.4 According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, the last fatality caused by hazardous materials transported by rail 

in the United States occurred more than a decade ago. That safety record compares 

very favorably to hazardous materials moved on highways.5

51 

6Providing open, unfettered access to the precise location and contents of every train could 

make those carrying hazardous materials a target for terrorist attacks, which is why railroads 

limit this information sharing to bona-fide emergency response agencies. 

Today, well over 99.9 percent of rail hazmat shipments reach their destination 

without a release caused by a train accident. The rail industry will not rest until 

it can eliminate the accidents that remain. Until that day, the industry will continue to take measures to meaningfully boost safety, prepare communities, and 

make them whole following any incident. 

Railroads want all their shipments to travel safely, but they have consistently 

taken concrete steps dedicated specifically to making hazmat transportation safer 

and hazmat accident response and mitigation more effective. Examples include: 

• Railroads, several Federal agencies, and outside experts collaborated several 

years ago to produce the web-based ‘‘AskRail’’ app. AskRail allows emergency 

responders to input the identification number of a particular rail car and immediately determine the commodity contained in that car, its hazard class, emergency response information associated with the commodity, and other information. Emergency responders in East Palestine used AskRail to quickly obtain information on the railcars involved in that accident. 

• When an accident involving hazmat occurs, railroads follow strict protocols. 

They work closely with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), relevant state and local authorities, 

and outside experts to contain the situation as quickly as possible; protect the 

health and safety of nearby residents and the environment; and remediate impacts. A variety of laws and their accompanying regulations give the EPA and 

other agencies a comprehensive framework to ensure that railroad hazmat spills 

are properly addressed. 

• Railroads provide thorough information to emergency response agencies on hazardous materials moving through their cities and towns.6 They also equip train 

dispatchers and crews with information about hazmat on individual trains and 

contact lists for local emergency responders along a train’s route. 

• Railroads and several Federal agencies jointly developed the Rail Corridor Risk 

Management System (RCRMS), a sophisticated statistical routing model that 

incorporates 27 risk factors (including hazmat volume, trip length, and population density along the route) to aid railroads in identifying the safest and 

most secure rail routes for transporting high risk hazardous materials. 

• Railroads help communities develop and evaluate emergency response plans. 

They also provide training for more than 20,000 emergency responders each 


322JEFFE1.eps
52 

7 ‘‘Toxic inhalation hazard’’ (TIH) materials—gases or liquids, such as chlorine and anhydrous 

ammonia, that are especially hazardous if released into the atmosphere—are a subset of hazardous materials. U.S. railroads carry around 65,000 TIH carloads in a typical year. 

year through their own efforts and through the Transportation Community 

Awareness and Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER). 

• Railroads provide hazmat awareness training to all employees who are involved 

in hazmat transportation. Rail employees responsible for emergency hazmat response efforts receive far more in-depth training. Railroads also have hazmat 

response contractors and environmental consultants on call 24/7. 

• Around half of all hazardous materials, and nearly all TIH materials7, are 

transported in tank cars. All but a tiny fraction of the approximately 437,000 

tank cars in the North American rail car fleet are owned by rail customers and 

leasing companies, not by railroads. Tank cars built today are vastly improved 

over earlier generations, with higher grade steel, better thermal protection, improved valves and fittings, often thicker tanks, and other improvements. 

• Railroads work closely with chemical manufacturers in the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (Chemtrec), a 24/7 resource for emergency responders 

that provides access to chemical product, medical and toxicology experts and assists in the mitigation of hazmat incidents. 

• Railroads provide services (e.g., lodging, food) to those displaced by rail hazmat 

accidents and establish assistance centers and claims teams to assess and meet 

the needs of displaced community members. Railroads also reimburse local, 

state, and Federal authorities for the costs associated with their response and 

cleanup efforts. 

Renewed Efforts to Prevent Rail Accidents 

One of the keyways railroads have reduced accidents is through significant and 

consistent investments back into their networks. From 1980 to 2022, freight railroads spent more than $780 billion—of their own funds, not government funds—on 

capital expenditures and maintenance expenses related to locomotives, freight cars, 

tracks, bridges, tunnels and other infrastructure and equipment. That’s more than 

40 cents out of every revenue dollar. The vast majority of these investments have 

improved rail safety directly or indirectly. In fact, for many of these investments, 

improving safety is a primary reason the investments were made. Massive rail 

spending back into their networks will continue. 

Railroads have also made huge investments in modern safety-enhancing technology. These include sophisticated detectors along tracks that identify defects on 

passing rail cars; specialized vehicles that detect defects in tracks and in the ground 

underneath tracks; and drones that can inspect hard-to-reach areas. Railroads have 

also fully implemented positive train control (PTC) systems that automatically stop 

or slow trains before certain accidents occur. 

On March 8, U.S. Class I railroads collectively announced a new initiative to expand the use of technology to improve safety. This initiative has five key components. 

First, railroads have long recognized the risk posed by overheated wheel bearings. 

That’s why, beginning many years ago, railroads voluntarily installed thousands of 

‘‘hot bearing detectors’’ (HBDs) across their networks. HBDs use infrared temperature sensors to monitor the temperature of bearing housing as railcars pass by. Railroads have also voluntarily installed acoustic bearing detectors along many of their 

tracks. These detectors can identify potential wheel problems based on the noise created by bearings that may be starting to fail. 

For more than 30 years, Class I railroads have voluntarily spaced HBDs no more 

than 40 miles apart on key routes. In recent years, average HBD spacing has fallen 

well below 40 miles. On March 8, Class I railroads announced plans to install approximately 1,000 new HBDs so that the HBD spacing on key routes will be reduced 

to no more than 15 miles on routes that do not have acoustic bearing or similar defect-detection technology. 

Moreover, Class I railroads have agreed to a new industry standard that calls for 

stopping trains and inspecting bearings whenever the temperature reading from an 

HBD exceeds 170 degrees above ambient temperature. This new ‘‘critical temperature threshold’’ is substantially lower than the previous industry norm. 

HBDs have been in use for many years, but only relatively recently have software 

and data processing capabilities evolved enough to allow ‘‘trend analysis’’ of readings from multiple HBDs over time. Class I railroads have agreed to engage in a 

collaborative, fast-tracked effort to identify best practices associated with trend 

53 

analysis to make it more effective at proactively detecting potential bearing problems. 

Second, all seven Class I railroads have agreed to join the FRA’s voluntary ‘‘Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS). Class I railroads have long had mechanisms in place for their employees to provide confidential feedback on safety issues, 

but railroads will use the C3RS program to supplement their existing programs. 

Railroads will work cooperatively with the FRA and labor representative to improve 

the effectiveness of C3RS. 

Third, in 2023, railroads will train roughly 20,000 first responders in local communities across the country on accident mitigation. In addition, the industry will 

facilitate the training of 2,000 first responders at the Security and Emergency Response Training Center (SERTC) facility in Colorado. SERTC’s world-renowned program offers an immersive experience with full-scale training scenarios that prepare 

first responders for real-world surface transportation emergencies. SERTC is a 

member of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC), which fully 

funds local, state, tribal and territorial first responders to attend any of SERTC’s 

DHS/FEMA-certified courses. 

Fourth, the rail industry is intensifying its efforts to get the AskRail app into the 

hands of first responders. Railroads will interface with emergency communication 

centers to promote broader access to the app, rather than relying solely on individual downloads. Railroads are also targeting all 50 state fire associations. The industry’s goal is to double the number of first responders who have access to the tool 

by the end of 2023. 

Fifth, following a recent safety advisory from the NTSB, the AAR’s Tank Car 

Committee is accelerating the work of a dedicated task force that has been investigating the use of heat-resistant gaskets for tanks transporting flammable liquid. 

The task force, comprised of representative from railroads, equipment owners, and 

tank car manufacturers, will expand its scope to consider all fire performance improvements to service equipment. 

Since the March 8th announcement, the industry, lead by Norfolk Southern, determined that a specific model and series of railcars had loose wheels, which could 

cause a derailment and that these came from a series of recently acquired cars from 

a specific manufacturer. Upon inspection of other cars from this series, additional 

cases of unusual wheel movement were found and the industry took immediate action—not waiting on the DOT or other regulators—and ordered the remove these 

cars from service until their wheelsets could be replaced. This is a prime example 

of the industry stepping up and taking action whenever a critical safety issue is discovered. 

Looking Ahead 

Rail is the safest way to move hazardous materials, but railroads fully appreciate 

that public trust in railroads’ ability to operate safely must be restored through action. Until they achieve their goal of zero accidents, railroads will maintain a fierce 

commitment to getting there. Railroads wholeheartedly agree that policymakers 

have a key role to play in this effort, and railroads will continue to work in good 

faith with policymakers at all levels of government to identify ways to genuinely improve rail safety performance. 

That said, it is unfortunate that, in the aftermath of the accident in East Palestine, some policymakers, pundits, and others have asserted that railroads broadly 

oppose increased safety regulations. This is categorically false. Railroads have consistently advocated, and continue to advocate, for data-driven solutions that would 

effectively increase the safety of the rail network. 

Some rail efforts have been successful, such the push for the Department of 

Transportation to enhance tank car standards for flammable liquids. Other rail efforts, like expanding the use of automated track inspection technologies that have 

proven to be far more effective than traditional manual inspections, have been hamstrung by the FRA and are impeding the industry’s efforts to improve safety. 

Railroads are also disappointed that some are using the East Palestine accident 

to push for policy changes that have little or nothing to do with rail safety and, if 

enacted previously, would not have prevented the accident or made railroads safer. 

Railroads also respectfully urge policymakers to remember that laws and regulations, however well intended, that place excessive and unnecessary operational burdens on railroads would distort competition in the freight transportation marketplace and divert freight from railroads to less safe alternatives. If this happened, 

overall transportation safety would be reduced, not enhanced. 

54 

Conclusion 

Our nation’s freight railroads share this committee’s and the public’s urgency in 

augmenting the safety of all rail transportation. Railroads are committed to continuing our work with local, state, and Federal officials; their employees; their customers; their supplies; and other stakeholders to identify additional safety enhancing steps that will make this happen. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. We—I am going to defer my first 

round of questioning to let Senator Klobuchar, who has been here 

on the whole morning, and we thank her for her interest in all of 

this. Senator Klobuchar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Well, thank you very much. I was, like everyone here, horrified by what happened. And actually, when you 

look at the numbers, trains derailed 1,164 times last year, up 17 

percent in the last decade. 29 of those derailments were actually 

in my state. And in 2022, 817 people across the country were killed 

in rail accidents, 266 in railroad crossing collisions. So, clearly, 

there is reason to go forward immediately with Senator Brown and 

Senator Vance’s legislation, and to help in Ohio. 

I guess I would start with you, Mr. Shaw. Norfolk Southern’s accident rate jumped 76 percent between 2013 and 2022. And could 

you just briefly explain why, and if you support the legislation that 

our colleagues have proposed? 

Mr. SHAW. Yes, Senator, thank you for that question. We are a 

safe railroad. The number of derailments on Norfolk Southern last 

year was the lowest in the last two decades. We are committed to 

getting better. And so, yes, there are many provisions within the 

Vance-Brown bill for which we give our full-throated endorsement. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And then do you support the bill? 

Mr. SHAW. I support a number of provisions within the bill, Senator, which include the—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Which ones don’t you support? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, we support the acceleration of the phasing 

of the DT117s, funding first responder hazmat training, expanding 

advanced notification—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK, I will—I will just put it in writing. I 

was just trying to figure out which ones you didn’t support and 

why, because I just think it is very important to move ahead. They 

have signaled an interest in working with all stakeholders to try 

to get this done, and I just don’t want this to be one of these moments where we wait 2 years to pass a bill. 

Chief Comstock, thank you for your work. We have—are greatly, 

greatly appreciated of the first responders, firefighters, and everything that you did not only in this incident, but across the country. 

So, Senator Cramer and I today are introducing a bill, the honoring our Fallen Heroes Act to start looking at making sure that 

our firefighters who already have a register going on as you know, 

that a bunch of us worked on, but to making sure that this is included in their benefits, the exposure and the certain cancers. 

And we think we are going to get a lot of support for this bill. 

Actually, it is specifically targeted, written in a way that we think 

is going to be good. So, could you talk about what some key inforVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
55 

mation you wished you had before arriving at the scene of the derailment? 

Mr. COMSTOCK. I think in any instance that when responders are 

proceeding to a scene of an emergency, we want to have as much 

information as we can. 

And whether it is a car accident, whether it is a medical emergency, house fire, or hazardous materials incident. So, the more information and the quicker we can get information, the better. 

There are apps out there that have been discussed, AskRail being 

one, that provide that type of information. 

But I think we could go further by looking at newer technology 

that will put that information that is available in AskRail on my 

phone while I am in route to the emergency. That is one instance. 

But I understand that there is a lot of other issues that need to 

be looked at—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And also, to be alerted of what toxic chemicals are in there, so you know what you need. 

Mr. COMSTOCK. Everything. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK. 

Mr. COMSTOCK. And the more the better. But I think that the 

fire service needs a seat at that table, with the railroads, in developing the technology that is going to help us out. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. OK, thank you. Railway safety, another 

part of this, of course. Mr. Jefferies, with railway workers being exposed to a range of serious risks, what is the industry doing to improve worker safety? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Well, there are a myriad of regulatory requirements around worker safety under the railway safety—excuse me, 

under the Federal Railroad Administration. Certainly, we comply 

with all of those. 

I know, Alan, and my other CEOs have made a very concerted 

effort to get out in the field. And a lot of that is hearing firsthand, 

what is working, what is not from the employees in the field, because they are the ones who are seeing what is going on every day. 

So that firsthand information that feeds up through management 

and through the executives can really drive decisionmaking. The 

important thing is that we do take a holistic approach to safety. 

And the evidence we have seen, as I mentioned, 2022 had the 

lowest employee injury rate in our industry’s history, but that is 

not zero. So, we have got to continue to look for opportunities to 

further provide safe working conditions. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Right. Do you want to add anything to that, 

Ms. Homendy? 

Ms. HOMENDY. We do have rail workers safety on our most wanted list of transportation safety improvements. And one of the—actually, we have several recommendations that do not support the 

use by the railroads of train approach warning. 

What that is, is when roadway workers are working on the track, 

they put a watchman out and a train, as a train comes along, the 

watchman is supposed to flag it for those who are working on the 

track and they get off the track. 

We have seen several instances where that hasn’t happened and 

they have died, unfortunately. And there are other options. For exVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
56 

ample, using positive train control after establishing an established 

work zone. So, we have recommendations on that. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. All right. And I am going to follow up in 

writing. My colleagues, I know, all have questions on the hazmat 

training, Mr. Comstock, because I understand it is difficult sometimes for firefighters to attend this kind of training, and what we 

can do, and have many other questions. So, thank you very much, 

all of you. 

Chair CANTWELL. Senator Cruz. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to each of 

the witnesses who are here today. Chief Comstock, please—thank 

you for your service, and please express my gratitude to the men 

and women who are first responders who were there when this horrific tragedy occurred. 

And thank you for their courage and the difference that each of 

them makes in the community. Chair Homendy, let me thank you 

also for the professional way in which the NTSB has approached 

this accident. I think you have been a truth teller. I think you have 

managed to avoid politics and focus on the substance of what 

caused this accident and how we can prevent it. 

And so, it is not that often that we get to thank a public official 

for doing a good and effective job. I think you provided also some 

helpful suggestions in your testimony that I am certain the Committee will look closely at the specific suggestions you put forward. 

As I look at what caused this derailment, there are a number of 

factors, but one factor that from the early reports stands out is the 

hotbox detectors. 

We now know that the train derailed past three hotbox detectors 

prior to the derailment. 30 miles away, the reading was 38 degrees 

above ambient temperature. Then 20 miles away, it had risen to 

103 degrees above ambient temperature. So, it had risen dramatically. 

And then just prior to the derailment, it was 253 degrees above 

ambient temperature, reflecting that the bearing had locked and 

derailment was imminent. Mr. Shaw, why did this trend in temperature not trigger an alert earlier to stop the train? And in particular, why were you not able to stop the train after the second 

reading had gone from 38 degrees above ambient temperature to 

103 degrees above ambient temperature? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, thank you for that question. I will note that 

the NTSB report indicated that the crew did nothing wrong, and 

we certainly thank them for that. 

The hot box detectors were working as designed and there were 

no track defects. Since the derailment and the preliminary results 

of the NTSB report, we led the rail industry and the rail industry 

has also implemented—implementation of far more hotbox detectors across our network. 

We are adding 200 hot box detectors on our network to reduce 

the spacing between our hot box detectors. Our hot box detectors 

are already spaced amongst the lowest in the industry. And I 

think, Mr. Jefferies had indicated that the entire industry was adding about 1,000 hot box detectors. 

Senator CRUZ. Mr. Shaw, perhaps you didn’t hear my question, 

so let me ask it again. The first hot box measured 38 degrees above 

57 

ambient temperature. As I understand, the ambient temperature 

was about 20 degrees, so that was roughly 58 degrees. 

Ten miles later, the second hot box measured 103 degrees above 

ambient temperature. That is an increase of over 60 degrees in ten 

miles. Why did Norfolk Southern not stop the train then and examine the bearing to make sure that it didn’t melt the axle and that 

you didn’t have a derailment? If you would stopped then, it would 

have prevented the derailment. 

So, my question is, why did the second hot box reading not trigger action? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, my understanding is that that second reading was still below our alarm threshold, which is amongst the lowest in the industry. In response to this, the industry has agreed to 

work together to share best practices with respect to hot box detectors, trending technology, and thresholds. 

Senator CRUZ. So, when you and I visited my office yesterday, 

you said your threshold is now 170 degrees above ambient temperature. As I understand it, at the time of the derailment, your 

threshold was 200 degrees above ambient temperature. So, you are 

right, 103 was not 200 degrees. 

As you and I discussed, I have spoken with your competitors, 

other class I railroads who have indicated that trending technology 

and algorithms can measure significant changes in temperature, 

and in particular, can flag that when it goes from 38 degrees to 103 

degrees, you need to stop and take a look at it. 

Mr. Jefferies, let me ask you, in terms of how other railroads 

handle it. What is the technology that is available to spot this problem before it has gotten so bad that a derailment is imminent? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Well, thank you for that. And that is a spot-on 

question. And that is one of the three things we are focused on as 

an industry. So, one is the physical deployment of approximately 

1,000 additional detectors. Two is creating the industry standard of 

170 degrees as a critical threshold. 

And the third one is really looking at industry best practices to 

examine and potentially adopt new algorithms for trending detection so that if there is a dramatic spike in temperature, even 

though it may be below that absolute threshold, it is caught. 

And so, we brought the entire industry together, and over the 

next month we will be reporting out, OK, what can we learn from 

each other, and what are the best practices we can adopt, and what 

other steps need to be taken based on the information we have and 

the predictive analytics we can put into place. 

Senator CRUZ. And if I could ask one final question—-oh, Mr. 

Whitaker. Sure. I didn’t see that, but sure, I would welcome you. 

Mr. WHITAKER. Thanks for acknowledging, Senator Cruz. I would 

like to just make note that trending defect detect technology, from 

being in the cab of a locomotive, when we pass a defect detector, 

it trends to an office like Norfolk Southern in Atlanta, Georgia. 

It doesn’t convey to the railroad crews, which is a problem in this 

incident, as well as many others, that still continue to this day. 

What we need as a train crew, which they say they listen—they 

haven’t been listening for quite a while. 

58 

We need to be notified whenever these trending detectors are 

seeing this car trend hotter, that way we can keep a better eye on 

it or even stop and inspect that railcar. 

Senator CRUZ. Sure. 

Mr. WHITAKER. But as it stands right now, even after East Palestine, it is all about moving the train. That is all PSR is. That is 

all they care about. So, right now, they tell the train crew to stop 

your train, set your brakes in a full-service application, then release. And hopefully that releases whatever the case may be. When 

the safest cause case should be, we stop and go back and inspect. 

That is what the conductor is there for. That is why a two-person 

crew is essential. 

Senator CRUZ. So that is very helpful. So, you are saying, if I am 

hearing you right, that having real time reporting of what the sensors are showing for the conductor, the engineer would be helpful. 

Mr. Jefferies, are there technological barriers, are there impediments to giving the crew real time reporting of what is happening? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. So, I can’t get into the technicalities of that, but 

I will say one thing, we are focused on with any sort of regulatory 

requirement on wayside detectors themselves is that we do need to 

be given the opportunity to evolve our technology because continuous onboard detection is the next phase of sensors and detection. 

And so, certainly that is something we are interested in, and interested in further deploying and further developing. 

Senator CRUZ. As we are drafting this legislation, I would ask 

you to please, if there are technological issues we should know 

about, please let us know, because I have to say what Mr. 

Whitaker said there makes a lot of sense to me. 

And if there is a reason it is not yet feasible, we need to know 

about it, because that seems to me a reasonable element for legislation. Mr. Whitaker, yes, my time is gone, but yes, go ahead, Mr. 

Whitaker. 

Senator CRUZ. I apologize, but I do think it is very important to 

shed some light on this. It is feasible. The technology is there. Several days after East Palestinian, we almost had a similar incident 

in Cleveland area on Norfolk Southern. The crew, the defect detectors said no defects to the crew. 

The train dispatcher came along and said, hey, we have a report 

of a trending defect detector on the train. We need you to stop and 

inspect it. Immediately after that, the chief dispatcher, which is the 

person that controls the whole railroad, told them to keep going. 

If it were not for an Eastbound train passing them and instructing them, hey, your train is on fire, stop your train, and we set that 

car out—they had a walking speed, this car, of five miles. So, the 

technology is there, they are just raising and lowering their thresholds to move freight. 

Senator CRUZ. Thank you. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. Senator Markey. 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. It is clear that for 

too long, the rail industry has been raking in profits and putting 

safety on the sidelines. Mr. Whitaker, do you agree that the East 

59 

Palestine derailment would have been far worse if there hadn’t 

been multiple crew members on board? 

Mr. WHITAKER. I do you, sir. Thank you for the question. I think 

if the railroads had it their way, down to one person crew, and they 

reduced the conductor position to ground based, meaning a person 

had a pickup truck driving to the site, that puts the engineer in 

danger. It also puts the response time and the assessment of the 

issue in danger. 

Senator MARKEY. So, if there was only one crew member on that 

train, do you think it could have been far worse? 

Mr. WHITAKER. Oh, absolutely. 

Senator MARKEY. Absolutely. And that is why my Safe Freight 

Act would require trains to have at least two crew members. And 

I am proud that my legislation has been included in the bipartisan 

Rail Safety Act. Mr. Shaw, will you commit to supporting legislation requiring at least two person crews on all freight trains? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, we will commit to using research and technology to ensure the railroad operates safely. 

Senator MARKEY. Will you commit to a two-person crew on all 

trains? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, we are a data driven organization, and I am 

not aware of any data that links crew size with safety. 

Senator MARKEY. Do you—do you disagree with Mr. Whitaker 

when he says that it would have been far worse? His testimony is 

loud and clear. It would have been worse if only one person as a 

crew on that train. Do you disagree with him? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, I believe that we have operations infrastructure on the ground to respond to derailments. 

Senator MARKEY. I think you are not answering the question. It 

is almost like the last hearing all over again, because I think the 

evidence is very clear that these trains can be absolutely safer, but 

that technology is no replacement for human beings. For example, 

it can’t perform the cognitive functions of a conductor and can’t collect visual cues during an emergency. 

Two person crews make our trains safer, and I wish that you 

would commit to that today, because I think it is pretty obvious 

that that is the correct answer. And I just get sick of industry executives talking about supporting the principles of regulation while 

they lobby against common sense regulations like this one behind 

the scenes. 

Again, let me move back over to you, Mr. Whitaker. The safety 

issues that plague our Nation’s rail system are not a mysterious 

and inexplicable phenomenon. They are a direct result of business 

decisions. 

So, Mr. Whitaker, do you agree that the rail industry, including 

Norfolk Southern, has a business model that prioritizes profit over 

safety? 

Mr. WHITAKER. Thank you for the question. Yes, that business 

model is precision scheduled railroading. 

Senator MARKEY. So those safety issues are not just a threat to 

the communities where rail companies operate, they are a threat 

to rail workers. In the wake of the East Palestine disaster, Norfolk 

Southern failed to provide proper protective equipment to the workers who cleaned up the derailment site. That is appalling. 

60 

Mr. Whitaker, do you agree that rail workers should have the 

ability to collectively stop work when conditions threaten their 

health and safety consistent with the Federal Railroad Safety Act? 

Mr. WHITAKER. Thank you for the question. Yes, I do believe 

workers should be able to stop any and all work whenever their 

safety is in danger, except as it stands right now, we would be retaliated against. 

Senator MARKEY. And why would you be retaliated against? 

Mr. WHITAKER. Because we don’t have protections on that level. 

Senator MARKEY. So, Mr. Shaw, do you agree that rail workers 

should be able to collectively stop work in unsafe and unhealthy 

conditions consistent with the Federal Railroad Safety Act? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, I absolutely would expect our employees to 

operate in a safe manner. And if they are concerned about the safety of their operations, then I would expect them to address that. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, the real workers are saying that your 

company has failed to ensure their health and safety, and they fear 

retribution, that is what Mr. Whitaker is saying, for speaking up. 

Workers must be able to stand in solidarity in order to stay healthy 

and safe. So, your response is just unacceptable, Mr. Shaw, today. 

And that is why I am working on legislation to codify this union 

right, and I urge my colleagues to join with me. Thank you, Madam 

Chair. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. Senator Capito, I think. Oh, wait— 

Senator Vance. 

Senator VANCE. All right. Thank you. Thank you all for being 

here. Appreciate your time. Let’s start with the NTSB Chair 

Homendy. So, you said in The Washington Post that train accidents, ‘‘train accidents in general per million train miles are going 

up.’’ So, it is trending upwards, accidents. Is that true? 

Ms. HOMENDY. The yard accidents rates are going up. The mainline track rates are going down. 

Senator VANCE. OK. Has a spill of vinyl chloride occurred before 

due to a freight train derailment? 

Ms. HOMENDY. I am sorry? 

Senator VANCE. Has a spill of vinyl chloride happened due just 

to one of these derailments? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Yes, sir. Paulsboro. 

Senator VANCE. And do you remember the NTSB’s recommendations at that time for notification of first responders? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Yes, sir. 

Senator VANCE. And what was that? 

Ms. HOMENDY. We had several recommendations, including providing real time information to emergency responders, making sure 

that they were adequately trained and provided the appropriate 

gear, and that they were part of emergency planning with the 

locals and the railroads. 

Senator VANCE. And how long ago did you make that recommendation? 

Ms. HOMENDY. 2013 was the accident. 

Senator VANCE. OK. So, I will point out that 9 years ago we 

made a recommendation from the NTSB that they should provide 

proper notification to first responders. That still hasn’t happened. 

That is one of the reasons, by the way, of why we have advanced 

61 

this legislation. I want to go next to—and thank you, Chair 

Homendy. I want to go next to Mr. Shaw. 

Mr. Shaw, I know that you have some disagreements about the 

precise distances necessary for wayside bearing detectors and so 

forth. But I wonder, could you commit to supporting a mandatory 

standard for hot bearing detectors, even if not our specific limits, 

could you submit two to supporting one in principle, assuming we 

can get the limits right in your view? 

Mr. SHAW. Yes, Senator. I absolutely appreciate your leadership 

and Senator Brown’s leadership for the Railway Safety Act. As we 

have talked about, there are a number of provisions in your bill 

with which we support, and it does include the wayside detectors. 

As you noted earlier, we are not sure what the correct spacing 

is. It could be 10 miles, it could 15, it could be 7, and I would support using science and research, and whatever is the right number, 

we would space wayside detectors in that manner. 

Senator VANCE. Thank you. Would you commit to supporting 

mandatory first responder notification requirement, as we do in the 

bill? 

Mr. SHAW. Yes, sir, I certainly would. I want to take the opportunity to thank the first responders from Ohio and West Virginia 

and Pennsylvania who showed the courage and the commitment to 

the community and rushed to the scene. 

And my appreciation for that is we just launched a regional first 

responder training facility in Ohio this week, and we have over 400 

first responders who are signed up for it, including Chief Dresbach 

and four of his commanders. 

Senator VANCE. Great. Thank you, Mr. Shaw. We will go to Mr. 

Whitaker now. So, the railroad industry claims that visual inspections are nearly useless when it comes to journal bearings. Do you 

believe this is true? 

Mr. WHITAKER. Thank you for the question. And I believe visual 

inspection is one of the most important aspects of inspecting a rail 

car. Also smell as well. 

Senator VANCE. Thank you, Mr. Whitaker. Is it true that railroads have used human inspectors for the bulk of their history and 

that a key part for a railcar being inspected is a general bearing? 

Mr. WHITAKER. That is correct. 

Senator VANCE. Can you inspect a railcar adequately in 30 seconds, Mr. Whitaker, or any of your workers? 

Mr. WHITAKER. Absolutely not, sir. I would say a railcar would 

take at least 3 minutes or longer, all in the name of safety, especially if it is hauling hazardous materials. 

Senator VANCE. Yes. I appreciate that, Mr. Whitaker. And I want 

to pick up there and go to Mr. Jefferies here with the minute that 

I have remaining. The railroads have stated in regards to their opposition to tougher inspections,’’ increased time on a task does not 

necessarily correlate to increased safety.’’ 

And to be fair, I think that is a fair argument to make. Mr. 

Whitaker just said 3 minutes. I don’t think we should be mandating 20-minute inspections. If I want to make any requirement, 

we institute a reasonable one, so businesses can comply. Mr. 

Jefferies, would you support a 30 second minimum and inspection 

time? 

62 

Mr. JEFFERIES. I can’t tell you what the right time is. I can be 

focused on outcomes and making sure that we are addressing 

issues. And if there is a systemic or if there is a series of cases 

where failures or malfunctioning equipment isn’t being caught, we 

need to address that. And whether that is because there is not 

enough time allowed, because there is not appropriate training, because of some other factor, we absolutely need to address that. 

Senator VANCE. I understand that, but I am trying to get a specific commitment here. Do you think, and we just heard from Mr. 

Whitaker that he doesn’t even think 30 seconds is enough time to 

properly inspect a railway—or excuse me, properly inspect a railcar. Do you think 30 seconds is enough to do an inspection? Would 

you support that as a mandatory requirement? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Well, certainly not being the technical expert, it 

seems—30 seconds doesn’t seem like a long time to do an in-depth 

inspection. 

Senator VANCE. OK. I appreciate that, Mr. Jefferies. Well, I am 

out of time, and I guess Acting Chairman Welch, I yield. 

Senator WELCH. Thank you, Senator Vance. I think I am next 

here. Mr. Shaw, Ms. Homendy testified that this was a preventable 

accident. Do you agree? 

Mr. SHAW. Yes, thank you for that question. Yes, I do agree. And 

in this industry—— 

Senator WELCH. Stop. What should have been done to prevent it? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, in this industry, we have to look at every accident as if it were preventable. And in this case, we know that the 

Norfolk Southern crew did everything they were supposed to do, 

and we thank them for that. 

We know that the wayside detectors were operating as designed. 

And we know that there were no track defects. We know that 

Chair Homendy’s work is focused on a wheel bearing of a privately 

owned railcar that no railroad owns. 

And so, improvements in safety are going to require an industry 

wide approach, which includes car owners, car builders, customers, 

and railroads. And Senator, many of those components are included 

in the Vance bill, the Vance, Brown bill. 

Senator WELCH. I am just thinking about how Misti Allison 

would try to figure out what you just said. I am asking you, Norfolk. You are in charge of that train. Am I right or wrong? 

Mr. SHAW. Yes, sir. That is a Norfolk Southern train, and I accept responsibility—— 

Senator WELCH. And then you said privately built car as though 

somehow that exempted you from the responsibility for the inspection, the assurance to the community of East Palestine that it was 

a safe car. You are not saying that, are you? 

Mr. SHAW. Sir, that was not my intent. My intent was a holistic 

approach—— 

Senator WELCH. Here is the question, it is your car. You are responsible when the train starts to when the train comes into the 

terminal, correct? You can’t point fingers at other people. It is your 

responsibility to be the assurer to the community of East Palestine 

that a train that Norfolk Southern owns will pass through its community safely. Is that correct? 

Mr. SHAW. Yes, sir, that is my responsibility. 

63 

Senator WELCH. OK. So, you said it was preventable. And whose 

responsibility was it to prevent it? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, in response to this derailment—— 

Senator WELCH. The rail man, not the company? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, in response to this derailment, Norfolk 

Southern has added wayside detectors in and around of our—— 

Senator WELCH. Let’s just get real here. Whose responsibility 

was it to prevent this preventable accident from happening? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, we are responsible for safety on our network 

and working within the entire industry to enhance safety. 

Senator WELCH. OK, let me understand this. You just reluctantly 

acknowledged, a, it is preventable. And b, it was your responsibility 

to prevent it. Am I incorrect? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, I am taking responsibility to enhance safety 

throughout the entire industry. 

Senator WELCH. OK. This sounds like a lobbyist response. I am 

taking responsibility. It is like before executives come in here, they 

go to charm school, and they are told to take responsibility without 

taking responsibility. Are you saying that it was the responsibility 

of Norfolk Southern, the company you lead, to prevent—to have 

prevented this accident you acknowledged was preventable? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, I think about safety each and every day. And 

every day since February 3, I have asked my team what we can 

do—— 

Senator WELCH. I only have a little more time. Let me ask this 

last question. And I understand that the business plan of Norfolk 

Southern includes $7.5 billion stock buyback that is ongoing. 

Do you believe it would be appropriate to suspend the buyback 

program until all of the assurance that you are making to this committee and also to the people of East Palestine about, ‘‘making this 

right,’’ that that stock buyback program should be suspended until 

you have accomplished what you have assured us and what you 

have assured the people of East Palestine that you would do? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, we think about safety every day. We spend 

$1 billion a year in capital on safety, and we have ongoing expenses of about $1 billion a year in safety. And as a result, over 

time, derailments are down. Hazardous material releases are down. 

And injuries are down. We can always get better—— 

Senator WELCH. So, you won’t answer my question about suspending the buyback program? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, stock buybacks never come at the expense of 

safety. 

Senator WELCH. Yes, yes. I take that is that you will continue 

with your plan on the buyback. My time has expired. The Chair 

recognizes Senator Thune. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First of all, I want to 

offer my deepest sympathies to the residents of East Palestine, as 

well as express my gratitude for the first responders, NTSB investigators, and other officials who arrived and have remained on 

scene since the derailment. Railroads remain one of the safest ways 

of transport, all types of freight, including hazardous materials. 

64 

However, the derailment in East Palestine serves as a stern reminder of the importance of this committee’s vigilance in ensuring 

that agencies and railroads faithfully implement and enforce requirements set in place by Congress. 

The strongly bipartisan FAST Act, which was signed into law in 

December 2015, included an expansive hazardous materials title, 

much of it directly responsive to the tragic derailment in LacMegantic and others like it. 

This title set forth new stringent requirements for the operation 

of high hazard flammable trains and a schedule for complete replacement and retrofit of all tank cars carrying class 3 flammable 

liquids, both meant to reduce the impacts of future derailments. 

Unfortunately, other rail safety requirements from the FAST Act 

are still pending on the regulatory agenda, something that this 

committee needs to work to correct. I hope the discussion today remains focused on solutions directly responsive to what we know 

about the underlying causes of this derailment and avoids talk of 

imposing restrictive requirements that decrease the efficiency of 

rail operations without proven data driven benefits to safety. 

Chair Homendy, first of all, I want to thank you and your team 

for NTSB’s leadership during the response and ongoing investigation of this unfortunate accident. 

In response to a requirement from the Rail Safety Improvement 

Act of 2008, the FRA finalized the risk reduction program rulemaking in 2020 and subsequently approved the plan submitted by 

all class I railroads. 

Could you describe why a safety management system like the 

Risk Reduction Program is so important to managing risk and improving safety? 

Ms. HOMENDY. It is critically important and we recommend it in 

all modes of transportation that operators are proactively identifying risks and addressing them before tragedies occur. And then 

as well having a just safety culture so that employees are 

emboldened to speak up when safety concerns arise. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Jefferies, Mr. Shaw, could you describe the 

implementation of the Risk Reduction Program by railroads, specifically how it complements existing rail safety regulations? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Thank you, Senator. As you mentioned, all seven 

class I’s have RRPs in place that have now been approved by the 

FRA. And I think the basis of them is that each railroad, because 

of the unique operating characteristics of that railroad, takes a 

risk-based approach to addressing potential issues on its railroad. 

It allows the opportunity to test out ways to address that, and 

rinse, repeat, and adjust as time goes by versus a more command 

and control, one size fits all. So, we are very early in the stage. I 

think there is an opportunity there to create a flexible system that 

allows for a much more nimble response to risk. 

But that story is yet to be told. But I personally think there is 

opportunity there, and I look forward to the railroads moving their 

programs forward. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Comstock, Section 7302 of the FAST Act required the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or what we refer to as PHMSA, to finalize a rule requiring 

65 

railroads to provide real time emergency response information to 

first responders on trains carrying hazardous materials. 

Unfortunately, that last requirement has languished since 

PHMSA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in 2017, 

despite an update a deadline of December 2022 in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. 

So, Chief, it seems to me that this type of information would 

have been extremely helpful to the first responders in East Palestine. Would you agree? 

Mr. COMSTOCK. Yes, absolutely. 

Senator THUNE. And Chair, your testimony mentioned that 

NTSB has several open recommendations to PHMSA related to 

emergency response notification. It seems to me that the agency 

has simply failed to prioritize this rule. Have they provided NTSB 

with a better answer as to why this has been delayed? 

Ms. HOMENDY. I don’t have their response on why that was delayed, but I am happy to provide it for the record. 

Senator THUNE. That would be great if you could. It seems to me 

at least that is a fundamental—one of the issues, I think, that has 

come out of this, that would have made Mr. Comstock’s and hopefully something that could have been used to avoid and mitigate 

the damage from this terrible derailment. My time has expired—— 

Ms. HOMENDY. Can I add one thing? 

Senator THUNE. Yes, yes. 

Ms. HOMENDY. Just to emphasize what the Chief said, operations 

level training for firefighters. There are different levels of training. 

Most firefighters receive awareness level training, which is not appropriate for firefighters. At a minimum, they should have operations level training, which is a standard, and so just for consideration. 

Senator THUNE. OK, very good. Thank you. I will take that into 

consideration. 

Chair CANTWELL. Senator Peters. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I just want to 

start off by thanking all of our panelists for being here today. I 

share the Surface Transportation subcommittee of this full committee, and I also want to thank Senator Brown and Senator Vance 

for their leadership on working to improve safety of our rail systems. My first question, though, is for you, Mr. Shaw. 

And Mr. Shaw, by the way, thank you for your willingness to testify here today. Your presence before two different committees in 

Congress this month should certainly underline how seriously this 

body takes not only this incident, but also on how important it is 

for us to enhance rail safety all across the industry. 

Over the past few months, Michiganders have seen multiple class 

I railroad derailments in our State, leading to railcars hanging off 

the side of a bridge in the City of Detroit, days long passenger rail 

delays, and near-miss of hazmat incidents. Michiganders are 

watching what is happening in East Palestine and are rightly demanding that we do everything in our power to prevent it from 

happening again. 

66 

And I am certainly committed to do that, and I appreciate that 

you have also stated your commitment to safety in your testimony 

here today and in our conversation that we had earlier as well. Unfortunately, though, I received data yesterday that indicates that 

Norfolk Southern is not yet living up to that commitment. 

A document that I received, which I have right here before me, 

a document I received shows data from Norfolk Southern’s own internal servers that there are dozens of railcars operating on trains, 

some of which are heading into my state of Michigan, that have 

gone over 5,000 miles without a class I brake inspection. 

That is thousands of miles above what the Federal Railroad Administration regulations require. Moreover, the documents show 

that over 100 cars have gone over 10,000 miles, and in one case, 

90,000 miles without a mechanical inspection. And this is the data 

just from two trains. 

So, I suspect we will have data from other trains that we look 

at. So, Mr. Shaw, I would like to know, does Norfolk Southern have 

an internal standard as to how many miles before a train needs a 

full mechanical inspection, and how can you account for why your 

company appears to be running trains right now that have not 

been sufficiently inspected? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, thank you for that question. I am not aware 

of that data. I can assure you that our policies are there to promote 

safety of our train operations and we do not allow unsafe railcars 

to operate. 

Senator PETERS. Well, I will be happy to provide what we have 

here, and we appreciate your comments after the hearing. One of 

the explanations that I have heard for inspection issues that has 

been at least raised to me by railroad inspectors is that there have 

been workforce reductions that have reduced the frequency and the 

quality of those inspections. So, does Norfolk Southern plan to hire 

more inspectors to fill this gap and to make sure that trains are 

traveling safely? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, I have got a deep appreciation and respect 

for my craft colleagues. And ever since I became CEO in the middle 

of last year, we have been on a hiring spree. We hired a near 

record number of employees last year, and our pipeline of conductor trainees is amongst the highest in our history right now. 

And several weeks ago, I reached out to the heads of our largest 

unions and asked them for their assistance in helping Norfolk 

Southern enhance our safety culture. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Shaw. Chief Comstock, thank 

you for your leadership and testimony today. In your testimony, 

you called out the importance of passing legislation that I have to 

continue funding for the assistance the Fire Firefighters Grant Program and the staffing for adequate Fire and Emergency Response 

Grant Program to ensure that our local fire departments have the 

equipment that they need, the training they need, and the personnel to respond to a major hazmat incident. 

As you know, I am—I have authored that legislation. It will 

hopefully come before the Senate as early as next week, the Fire 

Grants and Safety Act to increase that funding. Could you please 

discuss how important it is for this legislation to pass and how 

these grants, if they were to expire, would be detrimental to small 

67 

communities like yours and make it really nearly impossible to respond to disasters like what we saw in East Palestine? 

Mr. COMSTOCK. You are absolutely correct. From the fire service 

perspective, I can’t think of any grants that are more important 

than those. From my own department, it has permitted us to get 

radios, to get SCBA, to put a generator in the station that we can 

put the doors up when the electricity goes off. Fire departments, 

particularly small ones, rely on those grants every year. They are 

critical. And without those grants, we could not do our jobs. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you for your answer. Thank you, Madam 

Chair. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you, Senator Peters. Senator Capito. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

Senator CAPITO. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you all for 

being here today. Mr. Shaw, thank you for coming to our EPW 

hearing 2 weeks ago. Appreciate that and appreciate everybody 

being here today. 

Mr. Shaw, a question I have on the ordering of your cars. It is 

my understanding that this was 149 railcar train, that on the 23rd 

car was carrying plastic pellets, according to the NTSB report, that 

lit up like a match. And then—and it had that overbearing, wheel 

bearing—I mean the overheating wheel bearing. 

And then five cars away were four cars of vinyl chloride. I guess, 

first of all, I would ask if that is correct? And then I know that 

high hazardous flammable trains have more safety regulations. 

Why would this not have been characterized as a high hazard flammable train if it had this hazardous materials as part of the 149- 

car train? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, thank you for your question. I am not familiar with the entire makeup of the train. I know that a highly hazardous train is defined by a certain number of highly hazardous 

cars in it, or it is a certain number of cars in a block. 

Senator CAPITO. Ms. Hamode—Ms. Homendy, sorry. Maybe you 

can help me with that question. 

Ms. HOMENDY. Yes. The definition of a high hazard flammable 

train involves Class III flammable service, flammable liquids only, 

and 20 carloads in a continuous block, which would be a unit train, 

or 35 carloads of Class III flammable liquids in a mixed freight 

train. That was not what was on this train. 

There were some that were flammable liquids of Class III defined 

flammable liquids, but this train was not a high hazard flammable. 

Senator CAPITO. Right, it wasn’t a high hazard train, but it had 

high hazardous materials—obviously very flammable that just lit 

up the sky. So,—— 

Ms. HOMENDY. That is right. 

Senator CAPITO. Is that something that you would consider that 

should be looked at as a safety improvement? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Yes, Senator. We think that these thresholds of 

the 20 and 35 should be eliminated. And we think a broader array 

of hazmat should be in the definition of high hazard flammable 

train. 

68 

Senator CAPITO. Yes. It sounds like that. Let me ask about the 

tracks. We had a derailment in Cabin Creek a couple years ago 

where the track, it got cold and I think then it got—and then it 

melted. And anyway, the track, it derailed there with some hazardous materials. 

How are we doing on track safety, and how or what kind of improvements might be in the future, if we look to this bill that Senator Vance and Brown have put together? Is this something we 

should look at? I know timber ties are what we are most still using. 

Is that the best materials to use? Are you looking at that at the 

NTSB or—? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Yes. And track defects remain the second biggest 

cause of train accidents outside of grade crossing accidents. But 

human factors is number one. Train defects is the number two—— 

Senator CAPITO. Rail defects—rail defects—— 

Ms. HOMENDY. I am sorry, track defects. 

Senator CAPITO. Track, track—— 

Ms. HOMENDY. Sorry about that. Track defects. And there is 

technology, but we also think that personnel are critical as well 

and that technology should supplement, not supplant. 

Senator CAPITO. Mr. Jefferies, did you want to address that question? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Yes, thank you. Track cause being the second 

leading cause. On main lines, we did have the lowest number of incidents, rate of incidents in 2022, but we are not at zero. 

And it is important. Chair Homendy referenced technology that 

can be deployed. Autonomous track inspection tools can one, provide a significantly more intense and sensitive type of inspection 

that is really 360 degree around the rail, through the rail to identify anomalies before they become risks. 

And that could be attached to the back or the front of a train for 

continuous inspection. And that is not dehumanizing the network. 

That is using technology to supplement in a much more effective 

way the naked eye inspections that occur today. 

And so, we believe we should be encouraging and enhancing and 

allowing additional pilot programs to expand that technology to 

take on and get the second leading cause of derailments even 

lower. 

Senator CAPITO. Let me ask a question about the communications. I am a bit confused here listening to the testimony. When it 

showed that things were beginning to overheat, it passed through 

the 10 miles and 10 miles, does that information come directly to 

the engineer at the time, Mr. Whitaker—and I think, I believe it 

is Mr. Whitaker, yes. 

And why couldn’t we do that? In this day and age, we have instantaneous communications. Why is that not happening? Mr. 

Whitaker, can you clarify that on this particular accident, and yes, 

I would like to hear your thoughts on that. 

Mr. WHITAKER. Thank you for the question. So, technically, there 

are two different types of defect detectors. One is a standard that 

gives an audible to the train crew over a radio. It will tell you the 

defect or no defects. The—— 

Senator CAPITO. So, would that be like an automated voice? Stop, 

stop warning, warning or something—— 

69 

Mr. WHITAKER. That is correct. It sounds an alarm and it repeats 

various, depends on the railroad, two to three times. 

Senator CAPITO. OK. 

Mr. WHITAKER. But the trending defect detector technology is 

like an add on to that stall detector. We are not notified if a wheel 

is trending hot on the train. That goes to a location, like a headquarters building, a wayside defect detector helpdesk. 

They monitor that car. That is the big issue. They need to convey 

that information to the train crews because we get a no defect 

alert, and so we are just going down the track. 

Senator CAPITO. Right, right. So, it seems to me that would be 

some huge—would be a huge improvement if instantaneous communication would go directly to the engineers. And the last question I have is—I have no—they say never ask the question you 

don’t know the answer to, but I have no idea what the answer to 

this. Would a different braking system on that train have made 

any difference? Mr. Shaw, I will let you answer that one. 

Mr. SHAW. Chair Homendy was very clear that the use of ECP 

brakes would not have changed the result of this derailment. 

Senator CAPITO. Does anybody disagree with that on the panel? 

Yes, Chair. 

Ms. HOMENDY. So, I had said it wouldn’t have prevented the derailment, which is true. Car number 23, it still would have derailed, the fire would have ensued, and likely would have still had 

some action on the vinyl chloride tank cars. In this case, it was 

event and burn. However, it could keep some of the cars on the 

train, on the tracks. But FRA is doing modeling on that. It would 

probably be a couple of cars. 

Senator CAPITO. So, we could have some more information on 

that as the investigation moves forward. 

Ms. HOMENDY. Right, right. 

Senator CAPITO. Thank you all very much. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. Senator Duckworth. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS 

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking 

Member Cruz for holding today’s hearing. Illinois sits at the center 

of our Nation’s freight rail network. All seven class I railroads run 

through our state, including Norfolk Southern, as they all converge 

near Chicago. 

The Chicago region’s freight rail network is enormous. We have 

3,865 miles of rail, nearly 1,400 of which is shared by passenger 

trains. We see 1,300 trains a day moving through the Chicago area, 

which is one of the most densely populated areas in the country. 

To say that rail safety is important to our State would be an understatement. Yet over the past decade, there have been at least 

272 hazardous material incidents involving trains in 70 different Illinois communities. 

Last year, we were tied for the third highest total of hazardous 

material incidents in the Nation. The bottom line is that what happened in East Palestine could have just easily happened in Illinois. 

And among the causes of rail accidents are blocked rail crossings, 

especially among trains that are carrying hazardous materials. To 

70 

address this issue, our State passed a State law in 1999 to try to 

limit blocked rail crossings. 

However, the law was unfortunately overturned by—in 2008 by 

a State Supreme Court decision due to a Federal preemption. Ms. 

Homendy, the bipartisan Railway Safety Act would require the 

U.S. Department of Transportation to issue new regulations to help 

prevent trains carrying hazardous materials from blocking crossings due to railroad delays. 

Can you explain how that would improve safety in a freight rail 

hub like Illinois? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Senator, the NTSB has not weighed in on the 

blocked crossing issue. We don’t have a recommendation on that. 

So, it is not something we have looked at. 

Senator DUCKWORTH. You don’t have an opinion on what a train 

with hazardous materials in it blocking a rail crossing—— 

Ms. HOMENDY. I think it can be a safety issue, certainly for first 

responder access to areas in communities. And having high hazardous materials could be an issue as well. 

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you. Over my objection, as well as 

that of Senator Durbin and others among the Illinois Congressional 

delegation, the Surface Transportation Board recently approved a 

merger of Canadian Pacific and Kansas City Southern. 

This merger will likely result in more and longer freight trains 

through the Chicago area, particularly the Northwest suburbs. 

Ms. Homendy, without asking you to comment on the recently 

approved CPM, KCS merger, can you explain the safety risks that 

could arise if a rail company injected more and longer freight 

trains, some of which may be carrying hazardous materials into an 

already crowded rail corridor like Chicago, with such a densely 

populated area? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Yes. I will say for the East Palestine train, that 

one was not a particularly long train, in our opinion at the board. 

The one in Springfield was a very long train. It was a 2.55-mile 

train. You have workers who will have to maybe go back and inspect, stop and inspect an axle. And if you are walking back 2.5 

miles, that is a lot—— 

Senator DUCKWORTH. With the equipment—— 

Ms. HOMENDY.—on the crew with the equipment, and potential 

safety issues, as well as higher gross tonnage on the train, which 

is a big safety hazard. 

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you. In 2021, the Federal Railroad 

Administration recommended penalties for 7,300 regulatory safety 

violations it found after inspecting railroads, hazardous materials 

shippers, and railcar lessors. Of those, 3,400 were assessed civil 

penalties for a total of $12.3 million. 

This is an average of $3,600 for each assessed violation. That 

same year, Norfolk Southern’s net income was approximately $3 

billion. Ms. Homendy, do you believe that the current level of civil 

penalties is an effective deterrent? And do you think Congress 

should consider raising them? 

Ms. HOMENDY. The NTSB doesn’t have a position on civil penalties. I will say that most civil penalties, unfortunately, are negotiated pretty, pretty low. They will be assessed to a civil penalty, 

71 

and then there is a conference portion where they will settle their 

penalties on pennies for a dollar. 

Senator DUCKWORTH. Do you think pennies for a dollar is effective deterrent for a multibillion-dollar company like Norfolk Southern? 

Ms. HOMENDY. I do not. 

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you. I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Chair CANTWELL. Senator Budd—I am sorry, Senator Schmitt. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator SCHMITT. Thank you, Madam Chair. You know, East 

Palestine is a town that outside of East Palestine and folks in 

Ohio, people across the country probably hadn’t heard of before this 

terrible tragedy. And there are a lot of towns like East Palestine. 

I know here in Missouri where I am from, Garden City, Bolton, 

Sikeston, Bridgeton, Missouri, where I am from, a real blue-collar 

neighborhood. These are towns that aren’t filled with corporate titans or elites. 

They are working men and women who go to church on Sunday, 

try to get home for dinner, take their kids to practice, try to play 

by the rules, and all of those towns matter. East Palestine matters. 

And instead of showing up in towns like this, and specifically East 

Palestine, this Administration demonstrated that they didn’t matter. Joe Biden still hasn’t showed up to East Palestine. 

He has been to Ukraine, but not East Palestine. Pete Buttigieg 

took 3 weeks for him to show up. And I think so much of this, in 

addition to the things that can be improved, is a lack of attention 

from this Administration that the people of this town, for whatever 

reason to them, weren’t worthy of an appearance. 

Of letting them know that we are going to support them. And so, 

I think that one of the reasons, in addition to the obviously, the 

toxic chemical spill, that this has become such a big issue, is it is 

demonstrative. It shows that this Administration is completely out 

of touch with what I will refer to as flyover country, places like 

Missouri, places like Ohio. 

They should matter to the Biden Administration. And what is 

worse than all of this, I think, is that this accident was foreseeable, 

avoidable, preventable. 

And so, Mr. Shaw, I want to ask you, is it true that Norfolk 

Southern’s accident rate has nearly doubled in the last 10 years, 

and at least 20 of those derailments since 2015 have involved 

chemical releases. Is that true? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, thank you for your question. East Palestine 

does matter. I have been there a number of times and I have visited with the community leaders. I have been in the homes. People 

have invited me to their business. I have been in the schools. And 

I have committed the full support of Norfolk Southern. 

Senator SCHMITT. I hear you, you have said that, and I have limited time. But my question to you was, has the accident rate doubled in the last decade? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, I am not aware of that. I will be happy to 

provide you with that info. I know that from 2021 to 2022, many 

of our FRA, most of our FRA safety stats improved. We will conVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
72 

tinue to get better. We are going to learn from this accident. And 

that is my commitment is, I will lead Norfolk Southern and the industry the better safety practices. 

Senator SCHMITT. So, I would hope so. And you know, I think understanding, and we are happy to educate you on those statistics 

that we have at our ready about how accidents rate, because there 

are a lot of folks who live close to railroad tracks. 

I do, and there is a lot of folks wondering what exactly is going 

to be done to make sure this doesn’t happen again, in addition to 

the things that need to happen to address the concerns of East Palestine. 

And I did want to, with the remaining time that I have—Chair 

Homendy, as you know, in the aftermath of this incident, many in 

the media and in this Administration were quick to blame the previous Administration, President Trump, for, you know, not moving 

forward or rolling back regulations. 

However, those arguments have been dismissed by including the 

USA Today and even The Washington Post, noting that none of the 

regulatory changes made during the Trump Administration at this 

point can be cited as contributing to the incident? 

Can you clarify to the Committee today, I know you have made 

statements about this, just to clarify that, whether the regulatory 

rollback that took place under the Trump Administration was responsible for this tragic incident. 

Ms. HOMENDY. I am not familiar with the—all of the regulations 

and actions taken on those regulations from that Administration. 

What I will say is for—my comments were with respect to electronically controlled nomadic braking. And there were a lot of comments about how that would have prevented this derailment. That 

is not accurate. 

Senator SCHMITT. Right. That was specifically cited by Pete 

Buttigieg, who, by the way, is not here, again, I point out. I have 

many questions for Pete Buttigieg, and maybe he is taking more 

personal time. 

But this is—now we are a couple few months into this Congress 

with a lot of serious issues involving the Department of Transportation, including this and he just has refused to appear. And I 

think that you were very clear publicly saying that that rule would 

not have impacted this at all. Is that correct? 

Ms. HOMENDY. It would not have prevented the derailment—yes. 

Senator SCHMITT. And Madam Chair, I will yield back the rest 

of my time, but I do want to mention the obvious, as I just did, that 

Secretary Buttigieg is not here. He has yet to appear before this 

committee. 

And I think it is incredibly disrespectful not just to this committee, but the American people that he refuses—continues to hide 

from these disasters that have happened under his watch. 

Chair CANTWELL. Senator Rosen—Senator Rosen. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA 

Senator ROSEN. [Technical problems]—thank Senators Brown 

and Vance for working together in a bipartisan way to ensure that 

a tragedy like East Palestine derailment never happens again. And 

73 

also, we have to think about preventing future accidents, how we 

can be proactive. 

So, in addition to transporting hazardous waste, we also transport nuclear waste by rail. And the events in East Palestine should 

be a wake-up call for all Americans that it is time to address how 

we transport hazardous materials in this country. 

For Nevadans, the transportation of hazardous waste to our 

State by rail is something we have been fighting since the 1980s. 

For over 30 years, we have opposed the Yucca Mountain Nuclear 

Waste Disposal Project, in part because it would require transporting 9,500 rail casks of hazardous radioactive waste in 2,800 

trains and over 2,600 trucks from across the country to Nevada. 

This is a major transportation safety crisis waiting to happen, 

putting major metropolitan areas in 44 states, their railways, and 

millions of Americans at risk. We already have an aging rail system, and consistent shipments of heavy casks of nuclear waste will 

cause wear and tear in our railroads and could lead to the kind of 

disaster we saw in Ohio or worse. 

And so, Chair Homendy, can you talk about some of the dangers 

of transporting this kind of waste, nuclear waste could pose to our 

nation? 

And even though I, along with all the Nevada delegation, are 

committed to ensuring that Yucca Mountain never moves forward 

to become a reality, I still want to ask you if you are prepared to 

address nuclear waste spills that could happen as a result of shipping waste on aging rail lines through American cities to places 

like Yucca Mountain? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Well, I will say I do believe that there are some 

more protective measures for moving spent nuclear fuel. However, 

there isn’t positive train control on, say, that last mile for Nevada. 

And I will also mention it would be disastrous if something did 

occur. On our resources, we are pretty strained. 

The NTSB has 12 rail investigators and we have 4 pipeline and 

hazardous materials safety investigators. We need to increase our 

investigator levels, but that requires additional resources, which 

we have asked Congress and the President’s budget would accomplish our request of $145 million for 2024. 

Senator ROSEN. Well, when it comes to safety, we should be investing in that. And I want to carry this a little bit further, because can you talk to us—you said that the positive rail control 

systems, they are not in Nevada. 

So, we hope that would—tell us if that would be beneficial. And 

can you also tell us, are the trains carrying nuclear waste, were 

they currently—do they have their wheel bearings checked regularly and are they—what kind of regular checks are you doing to 

be proactive, as we may be transporting some of this additional 

hazardous waste across the country? 

Ms. HOMENDY. They would be checked regularly, but I would 

have to defer to Mr. Jefferies on the exact requirements for those 

train inspections. 

Mr. JEFFERIES. The Federal Government has established strict 

standards for transport of spent nuclear fuel and has determined 

that the railroads are the safest mechanism for doing so. 

74 

I know my team would be happy to sit down with you and your 

team to talk about the specifics of the requirements there, but it 

is something that we would take with the utmost of seriousness, 

the responsibility that the Government has delegated to our industry to move those cars with the highest level of safety. 

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. I look forward to talking about that 

because I want to be sure that we are being stringent enough. And 

I want to move to another topic very important to Nevada, is reliable freight rail for our tourism economy. 

Because Nevada, we are the Nation’s leader in tourism and hospitality service. It is a sector that relies heavily on freight rail to 

bring in goods from out of State partners to support our industry. 

And the Interstate 15 corridor, which runs from California to Nevada, it is crowded. It makes it difficult for trucks to move efficiently and it makes reliable freight rail service along the corridor 

all that more important. So, Mr. Jefferies, how do you think Congress can support a more reliable freight system that moves goods 

quickly but still promotes safety as its core priority? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Well, thank you for that. We are a service provider at the end of the day, and if we are not providing good, reliable service, then we are not doing our jobs. And I think the pandemic and the associated supply chain challenges really illustrated 

that. The railroads have been making significant progress on the 

service front. 

And as Mr. Shaw mentioned and I mentioned in my opening, significant hiring efforts continue. We are at our highest level of employees that we have been in over 3 years. And really, it is about 

taking things to the next step. 

We have seen the Amazonification of the world. Folks want to 

know exactly where their things are, exactly when they are going 

to get there, exactly when the pepperoni is going on the pizza that 

they have ordered—when that is going to be delivered. 

And so, railroads need to work to provide increased visibility into 

where their shipments are to their customers, increase predictability, and those efforts are underway, and there is some exciting 

things on the horizon. Thank you. 

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. Senator Fischer. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. The East Palestine train derailment has increased our public awareness of rail 

safety concerns, especially for trains that are moving through very 

rural, small communities like those in my home State of Nebraska. 

This committee takes rail safety very seriously. 

Modern technologies can enhance railroad safety, especially in 

how railcars and tracks are inspected. Mr. Jefferies, can you explain how a two-pronged inspection system using visual and automated track inspections can improve rail safety? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Thank you for that and thank you for your efforts 

on rail safety. You are exactly right, a two-pronged approach to 

track inspections is the appropriate path forward. So, as we have 

discussed, autonomous track inspection tools allow for not only a 

75 

continuous inspection of track as a train goes over it, but at a much 

higher level of sensitivity, at a much higher level of effectiveness. 

Has been found to be 90 percent more effective in identifying 

flaws in the track before they become serious risks. And several 

pilot programs have been in place with some of our railroads at the 

FRA. 

Unfortunately, literally had to sue the FRA to expand those pilot 

programs and recently won in court the ability to do that. It is a 

shame that it took that level of effort for a proven safety technology. 

But it is a two-pronged approach. ATI doesn’t catch everything 

and it doesn’t do every job that a human inspector does, so we absolutely still need the human inspection capabilities. And hopefully 

our inspectors are also spending more time addressing found anomalies than using the naked eye walk in the tracks. 

And again, there is a place for both and it is a complimentary 

approach that I think will result in a much higher level of safety, 

which should be the ultimate goal for everybody. 

Senator FISCHER. Yes, you know, that is the ultimate goal. That 

is what we are trying to get at here. So, what is impeding the use 

of those automated technologies throughout the whole rail network? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Right. Well, we are going to take things step by 

step as we deploy this technology for one, but two, we need a—we 

need a regulatory environment, we need a regulator that promotes 

innovation, promotes technology, promotes pilot programs, identify 

new ways of doing things—— 

Senator FISCHER. So, you don’t have to go to court to sue them. 

Mr. JEFFERIES.—that allows you to build a data set. So, you don’t 

have to go to court. And let’s have the opportunity to experiment 

with things. Some technologies may not work out. Others may 

prove to have dramatic safety benefits. Let’s build the data sets 

that then we can objectively analyze, in partnership with the regulator, to advance safety. 

Senator FISCHER. OK. Thank you. Mr. Shaw, as you are aware, 

the current law dictates common carrier obligations that railroads 

must abide by. Specifically, railroads must transport any freight 

under reasonable terms, including hazardous materials. 

Mr. Shaw, can you explain how the common carrier obligation 

impacts the way that your railroad transports hazardous material 

in coordination with shippers? 

Mr. SHAW. Yes. Thank you for that question, Senator. You know, 

rail remains one of the safest forms of handling hazardous materials. We do have a common carrier obligation to handle product. 

We work very closely with our customers, with our fellow railroaders, and with elected officials, and with the regulatory body to 

handle that in the safest manner possible. I will note that in 2022, 

our derailments were the fewest that they have been in the last 

two decades. 

Senator FISCHER. What obligation do shippers have, if any, on 

maintaining their railcars that transport these hazardous materials? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, as you know, there are many components of 

the Vance, Brown bill that we fully support. And the rail industry 

76 

has been advocating and pushing for stronger tank car standards 

for about the last 8 years, is my understanding, and that is included in the bill. 

Senator FISCHER. OK. Thank you very much. I just have a couple 

of short questions here, Mr. Jefferies, for you. 

When I talk to my constituents in Nebraska, one of the items I 

hear about frequently is community notification. Folks just want to 

know what dangerous things could possibly be moving through 

their towns and cities while still maintaining the security that is 

needed, that that information is controlled in a way, because we all 

know that there are a lot of people out there that would like to 

cause mischief. 

That would be disastrous. In the FAST Act, which I helped to author, it added notice requirements that we did it in a way that provided first responders the information they needed, again, ensuring 

that the local actors wouldn’t have access to that. Those 

rulemakings haven’t been completed, is my understanding. 

Do freight railroads agree that appropriate community notification is necessary? And what part do they play in ensuring that 

communities do have that information? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. It is absolutely necessary and we 100 percent 

agree with that assessment. And you are right, the rule was supposed to be done, I think, a year after the FAST Act, and so it is 

7 years overdue. We didn’t wait around. We developed our own 

mechanism to get information into first responders’ hands. But we 

want—we need help building awareness. 

We just sent letters out to every firefighter association in each 

state trying to build awareness. We are shifting toward a—versus 

a responder by responder sign up process to an emergency communication center model, because to Senator Vance’s point earlier, if 

you are in a rural area, you don’t necessarily have cell service. 

But there is a requirement that you always have radio service, 

to my knowledge, with the emergency communication center. So, 

the emergency communication center has that access. The first responder can quickly get that from there. 

But we have got more work to do and look forward to working 

with Congress for further ways to get that information into those 

hands who need it. 

Senator FISCHER. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chair CANTWELL. Senator Luja ́n. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator LUJA ́ N. Thank you, Chair Cantwell and Ranking Member Cruz for this important hearing. And I want to begin by recognizing Senator Brown and Senator Vance for coming together and 

responding so quickly and appreciate their staff and the work that 

they are doing. 

I also want to thank Ms. Allison for being part of that panel 

today. I think, all too often the impact to a family or to a person 

are left out. And just want to say thank you for helping the country, those of us here in the Senate better understand what the family has gone through. And it just reminds me that it shouldn’t take 

77 

a tragedy like this for there to be action. I appreciate everyone 

coming together now. It is the right thing to do. 

But why didn’t we do it before? There are incidents all across the 

country where there are derailments. There have been conversations about reductions in workforce. You have less people looking 

at something, there is going to be a problem that is not going to 

be identified until after something horrific happens. 

We all know the challenges, and one of my frustrations since I 

have been here in the Senate and the House is you go through 

these efforts and we fight for rules, and we thank each other, and 

we recognize each other for that work, and then it goes to be implemented. And then all the folks who didn’t want the legislation, get 

another crack at this, and then they mess it up over, where there 

is a rulemaking or an implementation. 

And then there is a bunch of filings, which I am one of those 

folks that reads filings—they create a bunch of loopholes. But then 

there are some interviews that come after that and, oh, no, we 

well, we wanted all this stuff done. 

I certainly hope there is a lesson here and on this one, that with 

all these filings, every word is watched, every statement is 

watched, and that loopholes are not being advocated for by the 

groups that have been hired to represent companies or represent 

interests, only to allow for something like this to happen again. 

I hope we are mindful to that. Now, a week ago, a train derailed 

in a small community in Arizona, in Mojave. And just hours before, 

as you can imagine, that these trains that, you know, go through 

small town after small town, it was in New Mexico. 

And my question here is around first responders as well, because 

when this happened, the initial reports that went to law enforcement was that there was a concern, a high concern of hazardous 

materials being carried on that train. 

It was corn syrup. So, while I appreciate information was shared, 

that doesn’t sound to me like first responders are being looked 

after when they are getting to an incident like this. There needs 

to be a better way of sharing accurate and timely information. 

I appreciate the questions of my colleague Ms. Fischer as well in 

this particular area, but I am hopeful more can be done there. And 

that is where—Madam Chair, how can the process be improved to 

ensure that once a derailment happens, the first responders quickly 

receive the information they need to appropriately respond? 

Ms. HOMENDY. They need an advance notification. I do appreciate what the railroads have done with the AskRail app. The problem is when you have a derailment and train cars are bunched up, 

when you are pulling up a consist from the AskRail app, it goes 

by car in order. 

If you are looking at a derailment with cars all over the place, 

again, bunched up, you are not going to know what is in what car. 

So, that is not helpful. But the first responders need—— 

Senator LUJA ́ N. Let me pause you there. Can that be fixed? 

Ms. HOMENDY. I will have to get back to you on that. 

Senator LUJA ́ N. If that is a problem, before we have an incident—we know it exists today, and if that is broken in the system, 

let’s fix it. 

78 

Ms. HOMENDY. Advance notification for the first responder community is key because they need to be prepared. They need to be 

adequately trained. They need the right gear. And they need to 

have emergency response planning done in coordination with the 

railroads so that they can be prepared in case something happens. 

Senator LUJA ́ N. I certainly agree with that. But I want to bring 

attention to the challenge that you identified, and I appreciate you 

identifying it. But if that system is in place, but there is no communication because cars are close to one another, but you know what 

is in there, I just hope that that is something that can be fixed because someone knows what is in there, and I will leave it at that. 

Mr. Whitaker, first, thank you for your testimony and your work 

representing Ohio’s rail workforce. You stated in your testimony 

that since 2015, class I railroads have cut over 30 percent of their 

workforce, and I mentioned that in my opening. Mr. Whitaker, yes 

or no, would expanding the workforce have a concrete impact on 

improving outcomes when it comes to safety? 

Mr. WHITAKER. Thank you for the question. Yes, it would. Adding to the workforce would definitely strengthen inspections. We 

would be able to reduce fatigue on people as well, the train crews. 

Senator LUJA ́ N. Let me center on what you just said on fatigue. 

Would paid leave help? If people are getting worn out and tired 

and things of that nature as well, and you want fresh eyes so we 

don’t see mistakes, would that help? 

Mr. WHITAKER. Absolutely. Right now, we have people that go to 

work sick with the flu, COVID, whatever the case may be, and they 

are afraid to take time off because if they mark off sick, they get 

reprimanded. 

Senator LUJA ́ N. I appreciate that. My time has expired. I certainly appreciate this hearing. There is so many questions I have. 

I will submit the rest into the record. But to everyone that is helping the families, thank you for what you are doing. Please, no loopholes. Filings, rulemakings, we can all do better at that, and I certainly hope that is something that we can embrace. Thank you, 

Madam Chair. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. Senator Blackburn. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I want 

to thank you all for being here for the hearing today. And I know 

that everyone is hard at work trying to help the people of East Palestine. 

I so appreciated the Governor’s remarks at the outset, and I 

know that my colleague, Senator Vance, has really worked hard to 

bring some attention to this community. Chief Comstock, I want to 

come to you. 

It is my understanding that the AAR, in partnership with emergency management agencies in Sumner County, Tennessee, piloted 

the addition of AskRail data to their emergency management dispatching system. And following the derailment there in East Palestine, firefighters were on the ground for 90 minutes but could not 

access the AskRail app to get information about what substances 

were on board the train. 

79 

Ms. Homendy did an interview in which she said that none of the 

first responders actually had the app on their devices at all. So, can 

you give me a little bit more information about how the AskRail 

app may have been used, and whether first responders are making 

effective use of the app? And what are the requirements around 

using that app? 

Mr. COMSTOCK. First of all, thank you for the question. With respect to requirements to use the app, I am not aware of any. As 

to the effective use of the app, I asked my own department members as to how many are using that app presently. 

I will tell you I have that on my phone, but I found that 50 percent of the firefighters had that app, much higher percentage with 

respect to our department’s officers. I know one of the complicating 

factors at East Palestine was the fact that the rail cars were off 

the track. They were bunched up in a ladder style formation. 

Keep in mind, it was night. You had burning cars and smoke, so 

it was—and some of the placards had burned off. It was—and you 

have to try to use that at somewhat of a safe distance. So, it can 

be difficult. I think it is a good app, but it can be used more. We 

need to have better education that goes hand in hand with the 

training that we have discussed and advocated for. I also would 

add this with respect to technology. 

There are apps that I have on my phone that when a car flips, 

the OnStar information or others will be relayed to the app. One 

example is I am responding, slash RapidSOS that gathers technology, sends it to my dispatcher. 

My dispatcher gets it to me on my phone. So, enroute to a motor 

vehicle accident, I know if the car has flipped three times, the airbag has gone out, and that it has information about that car, 

whether it is, you know, electric car, things that I have to worry 

about. So, I should be able to get that information about trains, I 

think. 

Senator BLACKBURN. Well, Mr. Jefferies, let me come to you. 

What is your understanding for how the app was used or was not 

accessed during the incident? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. So, based on what I have read, I believe it was 

accessed, but I don’t have details by who and how. To be clear, 

there is absolutely—it is free to all first responders. And to date, 

we have taken a responder-by-responder approach, which there are 

a lot of first responders in this country and having 35,000 with the 

app is absolutely not sufficient, not where we need to be. 

That is why we are shifting to an emergency communication center approach. Also, knowing that, as I understand it, first responders will always have access to the emergency communication center, and so that is a central repository that has that information. 

Responders individually can still download the app, but we are 

wide open to looking at ways and working with Congress and others in the first responder community to further penetrate that population to have—get it into as many people’s hands as possible. 

Senator BLACKBURN. So, you would say the app is not working? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. I think the app works very well, designed what 

it is to do. It is making sure that everybody who—we get it in as 

many people’s hands as possible, and going responder by responder, is a slow, meticulous way to achieving that. 

80 

Senator BLACKBURN. OK. All right. Thank you very much. Thank 

you, Madam Chair. 

Chair CANTWELL. Yes. Senator Hickenlooper. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO 

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. Let me ask a question, Mr. 

Jefferies. The rail sector plays a crucial role in transporting goods 

through our nation—throughout our Nation. I want to talk about 

a specific rail project in the West. It is reportedly seeking a $2 billion private activity bond from 

DOT, and that would be a taxpayer funded subsidy for a project 

that has raised a number of concerns among community leaders in 

Colorado, and its costs have gone up significantly. 

This type of DOT bond, has traditionally been an issue for 

projects with a clear public transportation benefit. Are you aware 

of any examples of DOT private activity bonds issued primarily for 

transportation of commodities for private sale? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Senator, I am not aware of any. I would not say 

that that means there absolutely haven’t been any, but I am certainly not aware of any. 

Senator HICKENLOOPER. OK. Well, if you could follow up on that, 

that would be—that would be great. And Chairwoman Homendy, 

you have gone over in some detail the high hazard flammable train 

definition, and the train carrying 20 more tank cars of Class III, 

or 35 tank cars. 

I guess one question I would be curious about is, what other risk 

factors, such as proximity to natural resources, should be considered when providing notice of a high hazard flammable train? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Well, I think that should be considered for a high 

hazard flammable train. Also, just to clarify for the record, and I 

know this is your time, none of the responders had access to the 

app and they didn’t have the information for quite a long time on 

what was on the train. 

With that said, Senator, for this one, I do believe that environmentally sensitive areas and sensitive waterways should be considered for—especially for routing of trains and for protections. 

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. I appreciate that and agree. 

Chief Comstock, thank you and all your first responder colleagues 

for your dedication and public service. The images that we saw 

from East Palestine were horrific, not just the environmental destruction, but I mean, the homes, community, the lives destructed. 

But the statistic I was shown says that hazardous material cars 

involved in derailments have increased 339 percent from 1986 to 

2021. Can you discuss the need for all fire departments serving 

rural communities to have access to training, to safely respond to 

hazardous material incidents such as this? Could more resources be 

provided by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to increase safety training and response capacity for fire departments? 

Mr. COMSTOCK. Yes, in particularly we have talked about the 

hands-on training and there are a lot of firefighters who, as I said, 

can’t take time off work. So, we need to not only have the good 

hands on, which I think that the railway industry is looking at tryVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
81 

ing to create, but we also need to find ways to deliver that to where 

the firefighters work every day. 

There are a lot of departments, particular in these areas, that 

don’t have those resources. So, we need to be creative and find 

ways to get to those departments in rural areas, and that is whether it is going to be through the use of technology or through more 

home delivery programs like the NDFC is operating. That is what 

we are going to have to do. But we need to devote more resources. 

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And what role should rail companies 

play in ensuring communities have adequate resources to plan for 

but also to respond to rail disasters? 

Mr. COMSTOCK. They are going to have to play a major part, and 

it is going to have to be a partnership with everybody, you know, 

who has an interest in this issue. And we need to work with the 

railways, they need to work with us. And I think that is going to 

be a continued improved result as a result of this hearing and the 

derailment. 

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Right. Thank you, Chief. And Chairwoman Homendy, do you agree with that response in terms of the 

participation of the railroads as well? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Absolutely. We have had recommendations that 

are still open on ensuring that the railroads participate in local 

emergency response planning and helping provide resources, including appropriate training. 

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Great. Thank you very much. Thank all 

of you for your testimony. I yield back to the Chair. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. Senator Warnock. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RAPHAEL WARNOCK, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator WARNOCK. Thank you, Chair Cantwell. Norfolk Southern 

is headquartered in Atlanta, and it runs an extensive operation in 

Georgia that includes 1,700 miles of track, 600 bridges, 2,700 railway highway grade crossings, and a number of rail yards and 

transfer facilities in cities across the entire state, a multimodal 

state. 

That is a lot of Norfolk Southern rail in Georgia, and I can’t help 

but see the accident in East Palestine and wonder what would 

have happened had we instead of watching this in Ohio, witnessing 

this, or experiencing it in Georgia. Mr. Shaw, can you give me and 

the people of Georgia confidence that we won’t see an accident like 

this in Georgia? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, thank you for the question. I am terribly 

sorry for the derailment in East Palestine, and we are working 

every day to make Norfolk Southern and the rail industry safer. 

We have seen the preliminary results from the NTSB investigation, and we have made a number of enhancements to our own 

safety program in response. We have worked with industry to enhance safety and put in more safety features. And there are many 

aspects of the Vance-Brown bill that we fully support to enhance 

rail safety. 

We are a safe railroad. The number of derailments on Norfolk 

Southern was the lowest last year that has been in the last two 

82 

decades. Senator Warnock, I am fully committed to enhancing safety for Norfolk Southern and for the entire industry. 

Senator WARNOCK. And that is good to hear and the work that 

you want to do. Could you speak more specifically, what more 

needs to be done, in your view, to protect our citizens and our 

neighbors from accidents like this? 

Mr. SHAW. Thank you, Senator. We have announced that we enhanced—are enhancing our hot bearing detector network. We are 

adding over we are adding 200 hot bearing detectors to our network. We are piloting next generation hot bearing detectors. We 

are working with the industry on best practices for safety. 

We are deploying more acoustic bearing detectors across our network, and we are installing a digital inspection—a digital inspection portal that we are piloting with Georgia Tech outside of East 

Palestine to inspect passing trains and catch things that the 

human eye cannot catch. We will continue to invest in safety. We spend over $1 billion a year in capital on safety and over $1 billion a year in ongoing operating expenses. 

Senator WARNOCK. Is there anything that you didn’t have in 

place during this accident, and know, hindsight is 20/20, that you 

wish you had had in place? 

Mr. SHAW. You know, what I can point you to is some of the 

steps that we are taking now based on the preliminary results of 

the NTSB investigation, and I certainly look forward to fully cooperating with the NTSB throughout the full investigation and look 

forward to their results. 

Senator WARNOCK. So, I have to tell you that I move across the 

state and you and I have had a chance to talk, and we will keep 

that communication line open. But I have to tell you that as I move 

across the state and I talk to Norfolk Southern workers, I am hearing from rail workers that policies around their working conditions 

are creating safety issues and may have contributed to this accident. Do you believe your company’s worker policies contributed to 

this in any way? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, our policies are there to promote the safety 

of train operations. I, too, have been fully engaged with our valuable craft colleagues. My first day as CEO, I went out into the 

field, I walked into the crew room, and I engaged with our employees and I have thanked them for their service to Norfolk Southern, 

their service to our customers, and their service to the United 

States. 

And since I became CEO, Senator, we have been on a hiring 

spree and we now have 1,500 more employees than we did this 

time last year. 

Senator WARNOCK. So how are you working with those employees 

and labor on any changes that you are considering? And what have 

you learned from the accident that might result in changes to your 

worker policies? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, I am committed to improving the safety culture at Norfolk Southern and throughout the industry, and I have 

reached out to the heads of our two largest labor unions and asked 

them for their assistance and their input on how we can advance 

safety at Norfolk Southern. 

83 

Senator WARNOCK. Great. Thank you so much and I look forward 

to working with you, and with labor, and all of your colleagues to 

do everything we can to make sure everything is being done to ensure the safe operation of our Nation’s rail infrastructure. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you, Senator Warnock. It has been an 

interesting hearing for sure. A lot of information, but I would like 

to get some clarity because we do want to move legislation in this 

area. 

I do want to start with some information, though. My state is 

definitely seen—you know, there is a debate here about are we seeing an increase in derailments. My State definitely in—and it is 

great that we had a witness who was actually a marketing expert 

because Ms. Alison said you can always take numbers and make 

them mean different things. 

So, I am just letting you know this is a 10-year window. In my 

state, we have definitely seen an increase in derailments. And because we carry so much oil, it is always an issue for us in these 

communities. 

It goes through every area. So, I wanted to start with you, Ms. 

Homendy, as it relates to legislation, I originally introduced in 

2015 saying let’s get rid of DOT-111s. And now in the infrastructure bill, we got a 2029 date. This legislation says let’s do it by 

2025. Do you agree that that is the right—— 

Ms. HOMENDY. Yes. We, the NTSB agrees that we should move 

up the date and eliminate the DOT–111s from hazmat service, not 

just from Class III flammable liquid service, but all hazmat service. 

In this train, we had 16 DOT–111s carrying hazmat. Only three of 

them, though, would be covered under that final rule in the FAST 

Act. 

Chair CANTWELL. OK. The rest of the witnesses agree. 

Mr. JEFFERIES. 100 percent. We filed jointly with shippers in 

2011 to upgrade 111s, and following the 2014 rule, came to Congress because there was a 20-car loophole, there wasn’t thermal 

protection, there weren’t top fittings protection. So, we are 100 percent on board. It has got to be done in a way that the manufacturers can achieve—— 

Chair CANTWELL. I am asking you whether you support the legislation to move the date to 2025. 

Mr. JEFFERIES. I support moving it forward as feasibly as possible. 

Chair CANTWELL. 2025. 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Whatever the manufacturers can make happen. 

Chair CANTWELL. Mr. Shaw. 

Mr. SHAW. Yes, we support the component of the Vance, Brown 

bill for accelerating safer tanker standards. 

Chair CANTWELL. OK. Let’s turn to other issues, if we could, on 

your investments. One of the things I want to ask you about, Mr. 

Shaw, is you have been talking about how you have had less 

derailments, but I am pretty sure we have seen an increase in accidents. We think a 14 percent. And so, this issue is about the number of accidents. 

Ms. Homendy was talking about this video issue of the DuPont 

accident. And so, it doesn’t matter, you know, issues are issues. 

And at the same time period as this increase, 14 percent, we also 

84 

have—you stated earlier that you invested $1 billion in safety last 

year. That was at the EPW hearing. 

However, data from your company provided to the Surface Transportation Board says you have cut network investments by 30 percent in just 5 years and at the same time accident rates increase 

by 60 percent. Meanwhile, the company made a record $4.2 billion in profits. So, 

this is a discussion about, are we putting the right resources into 

the network? Are we putting the right resources, in your opinion? 

Mr. SHAW. Yes, Senator, we are. We are investing over $1 billion 

a year in safety improvements. Our capital budget over the last 

couple of years overall has increased about 30 percent. We are hiring at a record clip. 

Chair CANTWELL. But this chart shows that you have had a 40— 

this is your own information from the Service Transformation 

Board, a 25 percent decrease in infrastructure investment and a 22 

percent decrease in the number of employees. 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, when I became CEO of Norfolk Southern in 

May of last year, we went on an aggressive hiring spree and that 

continues to this day. And I will note that last year the number 

of derailments on Norfolk Southern was the lowest in the last two 

decades. 

Chair CANTWELL. I don’t—I think that Ms. Allison made it quite 

clear the damaging impact of these accidents and lasting impacts 

on our children. No, you can’t look at that stat, you are saying, and 

feel comfort. 

She can’t put her kids to bed at night and feel comfortable about 

that. So, what we have to do is figure out, are we shortchanging 

infrastructure investment? This is an issue across the board, in 

aviation, in transportation, here at the rail. We are not going to 

take profits over safety investments. 

We are going to require—now, I don’t even think that’s good 

business. But here we are going to make sure that those investments are made across the board for safety. So, I want to get to 

this issue as it relates to the workforce. You know, particularly this 

issue of what role they play in the inspection process. 

Do you think that your—the current system works or do you 

think we need more enhancements there in workforce? The BrownVance bill obviously increases the workforce. Some of the testimony 

by Mr. Whitaker would say that we need more on the workforce 

side. 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, with respect to the Brown, Vance bill, we 

certainly support the provision that requires FRA audits of railroad 

compliance with railcar safety inspection programs. We also fully 

support the concept of a triennial review of railcar safety standards. 

Chair CANTWELL. Triennial review. What does that mean? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, my understanding is there is a provision in 

the bill that allows for updates every 3 years. 

Chair CANTWELL. OK, OK. So, you are saying—OK. If we could 

look at this chart here that on March 17th, we asked you to send 

us information about standards here, and you stated that Norfolk 

Southern does not have policies that mandate a minimum or maximum amount of time needed for the inspection of a railcar. 

85 

And yet this information shows that it is part of this document 

for railcar inspection that you are saying to your employees that 

the cycle time for a 50-car cut is at point 5 minutes per car with 

one inspection. So, that is saying you have to inspect one side of 

that car within 30 seconds. Mr. Whitaker, do you know about this? 

Mr. WHITAKER. I am aware of this issue here. I know there is 

90 points per side of a rail car that need to be inspected. Conductors, we know how to inspect most of those, but a mechanical force 

person always attribute—they have the doctorate degree and they 

need to take their time. 

And we should not be putting time—safety on a timeline here 

when inspecting rail cars. We are going through communities with 

hazardous materials and very unforgiving equipment. 

Chair CANTWELL. I agree safety should not be on a timeline. So, 

Mr. Shaw, what is going on here? I think you don’t support the 

Brown bill as it relates to a requirement of more people than just 

the conductor on a railcar. 

But this is just an example of how I think the system is being 

short changed. And while the information age gives us all sorts of 

ideas about efficiency, we can’t take that to the extreme when you 

end up cutting safety. 

And the safety standards, we have to have minimum safety 

standards, we have to have modernization of safety technology, and 

we have to have the minimum amount of people to do the job. 

So that’s what’s going to be required across every sector of transportation. And this committee is going to make sure that we get 

there because we can’t—because we are not going to let people just 

keep, you know, putting money in the bank and thinking that you 

can shortchange safety. 

We can’t shortchange Ms. Allison and we can’t shortchange East 

Palestine. So, what are your thoughts about at least getting rid of 

this, getting rid of this notion that it is 30 seconds? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, I am not familiar with a minimum or a maximum railcar inspection duration. We do support evidence-based 

approach to enhance safety and improve outcomes for the industry, 

for our customers, and the communities we serve. 

Chair CANTWELL. Well, maybe you can find somebody in your organization to get you this document. But it is clearly your document and it is clearly what is being implemented. And I don’t think 

it is the standard that we want and I don’t think it is a safe idea. 

Now, I would like to go to this larger issue, which we might be 

able to get some agreement on. Mr. Comstock, in the underlying 

bill is requirement for training of local firefighting teams on dealing with this kind of material. Is this enough? Is there enough in 

there, or do we need to put something in here about equipment? 

I asked the first panel about this. 

Mr. COMSTOCK. I think it goes hand in hand. I mean, I think we 

have to have training, but I think we have to have specialized 

equipment, whether it is for monitoring or suits. And I also raised 

in my initial submittal that we need a second set of turnout gear. 

And the best example for everyday firefighting is we have one set 

of turnout gear. And when I have to wash that, I am out of service. 

In this railcar instance, I had three firefighters who were exposed, 

86 

I had—their gear is contaminated. I can’t use it. It takes 6 months 

to get replacement gear. 

That means I have three firefighters who are out of service for 

6 months who can’t respond to auto accidents or to structure fires. 

I was able to find one spare set of gear, and on two I had to rent 

some. 

So, we have throughout this country, we are lucky and many departments have good one set of gear. The departments that have 

money have two sets so you can wash one. And so, that is just an 

everyday use that we need. 

And then when it comes to equipment on a hazmat incident, the 

specialized suits, which can cost $15,000 or more, or the specialized 

monitoring equipment, it is unrealistic for the Federal Government 

to provide that to every department. But we do need to look at a 

regional approach so we can call in those teams that can supplement what we are trying to do. 

Chair CANTWELL. So, we need to do more than what we have in 

the bill. 

Mr. COMSTOCK. Yes, yes—— 

Chair CANTWELL. I know this already from my work in 2015. 

Trust me, I already know this because I have talked to lots of firefighters across the State of Washington. And believe me, rail goes 

everywhere in our State. So, Mr. Shaw, are you willing to support 

what is in the underlying bill, or are you willing to do more than 

in the underlying bill to make sure local firefighting teams have 

the equipment they need? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, we absolutely support what is in the underlying bill, and we are willing to do more to support firefighters. We 

just opened up a regional training facility in Ohio for first responders. 

Chair CANTWELL. Yes, I am thinking something a little different. 

I think, you know, this committee has dealt with the oil spill trust 

fund. Senator Stevens did great work on that. It literally is about 

having the resources upfront in a timely manner to have in a community. And the challenge here is going to be to figure out how to 

do that and where to do that. 

But I think if we are going to continue to move product like this 

and have this level of risk, we can’t just leave it up to volunteer 

firefighters to be on the front line. So, I do think we have to think 

about what is a way to put resources into the local community. So, 

I appreciate the fact that you are willing to consider that. Mr. 

Jefferies, you want to comment? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. I was going to say, 100 percent agree and would 

love to work with the Committee on how we best approach that. 

Chair CANTWELL. Great. Great. Like that. OK, Ms. Homendy, did 

you have a comment about that? 

Ms. HOMENDY. A great place to look is PHMSA’s Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness Program, which is about $28.3 

million annually and has been there—like that for years. It needs 

to increase. It is paid for by fees from the shippers and the transporters of hazmat. 

Chair CANTWELL. OK. So, good. We get some consensus there. 

OK, and what about in general the—what we covered. One thing 

87 

I actually, isn’t in their bill—I don’t think the video that you 

brought up earlier is in there. 

But you are saying, Ms. Homendy, that there should be some 

video communication. You are saying that there is missing video 

from this accident. Is that what you are saying? I don’t know 

what—OK, you are just saying you don’t have video. 

That it wasn’t required, but there was video, but we don’t have 

it because the engine moved on and went somewhere else and was 

videotaped over? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Yes. 

Chair CANTWELL. OK. And in the DuPont accident, you were 

mentioning how valuable that was. Why was it valuable in the DuPont accident? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Very valuable. First, we—some assumed early on, 

not us, that there was distraction in the locomotive cab, and we 

could see in the video that that did not occur. We also could see 

that there was some hesitation by the engineer around the controls. It was a new locomotive. And we determined, through the investigation, including looking at the video, that they weren’t provided adequate training, the train crew. 

Chair CANTWELL. OK. 

Ms. HOMENDY. So right now, the requirement is on—the requirement and law is on Amtrak and the commuter railroads, not on the 

class I freight railroads. And we would advocate for that. 

Chair CANTWELL. Mr. Whitaker. 

Mr. WHITAKER. I would just like to piggyback on what the Chair 

is saying. In regards to training, these class I railroads have reduced their training programs down to bare minimum. When I 

heard on the railroad 2,000, I had 26 weeks to train. Nowadays it 

is 6 weeks or less on these class I railroads. 

We are hauling 200 plus car trains and hazardous materials. 

And that is not right. You are putting too much pressure on employees right now with inadequate training. And I am sure these 

numbers—I would be curious to see what the retention rate is. I 

know Mr. Shaw brags about how much they have hired people. 

What is the retention rate of people sticking around? I am an advocate for a two-person crew, obviously, but if I am not hearing the 

CEO of my company tell me I am going to have a job, I am going 

to be looking somewhere else. 

Chair CANTWELL. Mr. Whitaker, what standards should we be 

looking at given that we have had this transformation into longer 

trains? I don’t think we have we have heard this intermittently 

through the Committee, but this is a sea change. 

Mr. WHITAKER. Right. So, to Ms. Homendy’s point about how 

much technology is on a locomotive. As an engineer by craft, I am 

looking at four computer screens. I am busy. I don’t even have time 

to look out the window of my locomotive half the time. 

I am depending on the conductor over there to be my eyes and 

ears and keep me in check. Enhanced training for that conductor 

would greatly assist the locomotive engineer, greatly. And I think 

in the railroad industry as a whole, we have lost a lot of our expertise over the years because we have people that have zero railroad 

experience running our railroads. 

88 

We could be so much more efficient and do so much better if railroad management would just listen to labor. We could move trains 

without incident. We can make things more safe. But they just got 

to listen. 

Chair CANTWELL. What would we have done in this instance, do 

you think, given that we were talking about a wheel bearing? 

Mr. WHITAKER. What I feel should have been done with the 

trending defect is sector technology, and this is something going 

back to last year that I have sounded the whistle on. We need to 

eliminate trending defect detector, keeping that information to ourselves in our headquarters. OK, let’s just take the chance, let’s 

move this train on down the line. That is what they are doing. 

What should happen—— 

Chair CANTWELL. Wait, wait, you are saying that they knew that 

this train had a weak spot, is that what you are saying? 

Mr. WHITAKER. Absolutely. 

Chair CANTWELL. You are saying they knew the train had a 

weak spot? 

Mr. WHITAKER. If their trending defect detector, according to the 

NTSB report that I have read, they have seen this car trend hotter 

and hotter over the course of three detectors, I believe, that information is going to somebody at Norfolk Southern and they are not 

conveying that information to the railroad crews. 

Chair CANTWELL. Mr. Shaw, did someone at Norfolk Southern 

have that information? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, my understanding from the NTSB report is 

once they try and hit the third detector, which showed that we hit 

the threshold, then the crew acted appropriately. However, they— 

the part had already failed. 

Chair Cantwell: Why did you keep putting the car on is the question? I think Mr. Whitaker is saying you should have had a signal—listen, this is definitely where this—this is where I am going. 

I don’t know, I will have to ask Senator Cruz and my other colleagues where they are going, but I am telling you right now, we 

are going to use transparency and technology, and make sure that 

people are getting that information as fast as possible. 

We are going to use NTSB to help us hold the FAA accountable, 

and we are going to help them, as they are today, hold this accountable. We have to look at safety trends. We have to look at 

what is coming at us because they are telling us in advance. 

That is what technology can do, tell us in advance where there 

is a problem. But we can’t ignore that because we want to make 

some more money. We have to go and say, we are going to make 

the investment and we are going to make sure everybody has the 

information. And that is how we keep on top of safety. Ms. 

Homendy. 

Ms. HOMENDY. I would just add, so in Atlanta, Norfolk Southern 

has an advanced train control desk. And what they saw there at 

the second wayside defect detector was a noncritical alert. It wasn’t 

a critical alarm because the threshold at the time was 103 plus 

about 10 degrees from underneath the train above ambient. 

And so, they got a critical alarm at the last one, but by that time, 

the train was in the process of derailing because there is a little 

bit of a delay. The crew will get information, but in—at the train 

89 

control desk, the entire train needs to move past that wayside detector before the train control desk has that information. With that 

said, they are also at the same time dealing with other trains that 

may have warm or hot bearings. 

Chair Cantwell: So, you are saying, I don’t—Mr. Whitaker, what 

are you saying, that before this, knowing that the information was 

there, something should have happened on these cars and somebody, if you would have had the information and the workforce 

would have had the information, they would have asked for some 

further inspection. Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. WHITAKER. That is what I am saying. When you are on a 

train and you are passing over a road defect detector, if that detector senses a wheel bearing hits a threshold, we hear a beep alarm. 

That tells me as a locomotive engineer, all right, I am not going 

to apply the train brakes on the train because I don’t know what 

is wrong with them. I will go—we will go on to what is called dynamic braking, which slows the locomotive down and slows the 

train down. 

So, I am going to come to a safe stop. And once I clear that detector, it is going to tell me what is wrong. But in this case, if I see 

my tire pressure on my car losing air, I will go pull over and stop 

and check that out, right. If I own a railroad and I see a wheel 

heating up, I am going to call—I am going to protect my investment and I am going to call that train crew. Hey, I know you are 

not meeting the threshold here, but maybe you guys need to stop 

and go back and check this out. It could be something, a handbrake 

applied on a car or a stuck brake. 

Something that could be addressed right then and there. So, once 

it starts trending, we need to stop and check it out. No matter if 

we don’t even hit that threshold, let’s take the safest course of action. 

Chair CANTWELL. Thank you. All right, Senator Cruz, thank you. 

Do you have a follow up for a second round? Sorry, I kind of took 

my first and second round together. But I think we are nearing the 

end. For our witnesses, you have been very patient and thank you 

for putting—we have been here for much—long time here, so we 

appreciate it. 

Senator CRUZ. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you to 

the witnesses. This has been, I think, a productive hearing, a useful hearing. Mr. Jefferies, I want to start with this. Listen, I think 

everyone here is concerned about enhancing safety standards to 

minimize the risk of derailments. 

And I think there is bipartisan interest in moving rail safety legislation. I think we are going to be successful in doing that. At the 

same time, we want to enhance safety, we want to protect the interests of consumers. 

And I will say there are portions of the Brown bill as currently 

drafted that concern me, in particular giving significantly more authority to the Department of Transportation. This Department of 

Transportation, their policies created a supply chain crisis in the 

last 2 years that drove up costs and increased scarcity for consumers all across the country. And the Biden Administration has 

also demonstrated a deep animus to energy. 

90 

And I would certainly be concerned about giving Secretary 

Buttigieg the authority to make it significantly more difficult to 

transport energy in the United States and to drive up costs for consumers. 

Now, in your judgment, Mr. Jefferies, what are the provisions in 

the current draft of the bill that concern you? And in particular, 

what could be the negative consequences for consumers of Secretary Buttigieg having too much authority to drive up costs? 

Mr. JEFFERIES. Well, thank you for that, and I very much appreciate the question. Contrary to statements that have been made, 

the AAR has not taken a position on this bill. 

Frankly, I think there is a feasible path forward on almost every 

provision in there. Now, your definition of feasible and mine may 

not be the same, but I think there is an opportunity to work together to try to get the yes. I think, you know, the provision you 

are asking about is one that would apply, I think, upwards of 12 

new rulemakings around any train that is moving at least one car 

of hazmat. 

Over 40 percent of trains move with at least one car of hazmat. 

Now, that could be a flammable gas. It could also be asphalt. And 

in my view, I am not sure applying those same levels of restrictions 

for flammable gases and asphalt makes a lot of sense because of 

the overarching impacts it can have on the network overall, the impacts it can have on energy shippers, the impacts it can have on 

Ag shippers, the impacts it can have on intermodal premium shippers, similar to UPS. 

Now, does that mean that nothing should be done? Absolutely 

not. I think there is a logical case to be made for a parallel requirement for trains carrying flammable gases as we currently have for 

flammable liquids. 

But it is about taking a risk-based approach that doesn’t treat 

the entire class of commodities the same, but really focuses on 

what is truly a higher risk train versus one that perceives little 

risk. So, there is a path forward there, and I think we just need 

to target what we are actually focused on here. 

Senator CRUZ. Well, thank you. That is helpful. And we will certainly commit to working with you to try to find a solution that enhances safety while at the same time protecting the interests of 

consumers. Mr. Shaw, you and I talked yesterday, and you described that Norfolk Southern was a proponent of venting and 

burning the vinyl chloride from all five tanks. 

At least one of the tanks was significantly injured. There has 

been disagreement as to whether the other four tanks were compromised or not. Will you commit to providing this committee with 

any and all information you have as to the condition of all five of 

those tank cars? 

Mr. SHAW. Yes, we will be transparent with the Committee about 

our understanding of the conditions on the ground. My goal during 

the entire process was to provide unified command and the incident 

commander with the best information that we had. 

And at that point, there was concern that these four cars had 

been in a pool of fire and that the pressure relief valve had failed, 

and there was concern about the pressure on the cars. 

91 

Senator CRUZ. In terms of the decision to vent and burn the vinyl 

chloride, which is what caused the massive plume of smoke and the 

rather extraordinary sight of an American city essentially on fire, 

among the decisionmakers that were engaged in that process, did 

anyone disagree with the recommendation to vent and burn the 

vinyl chloride from all five tank cars? 

Mr. SHAW. Sir, my understanding is unified command was 

aligned around that decision, and that decision was based solely on 

the safety of that community. 

Senator CRUZ. Ms. Homendy, what are the alternatives to venting and burning, and what are the risks involved in the venting 

and burning procedure? 

Ms. HOMENDY. Part of FRA guidance is—on venting and burning 

is to look at the alternatives. One is a controlled venting through 

the valves. In this case, they were melted. So, that was not an option. You could do hot tapping, which is essentially cutting a hole 

in the tank car and draining the liquid, essentially trans loading 

it into another railcar. There are risks to that. And then there is 

the vent and burn. 

Senator CRUZ. Mr. Shaw, Ms. Homendy testified earlier today 

that the locomotive that was involved in this derailment was immediately or almost immediately put into service on another train, 

and so the video was not available for examination. 

Did that happen and why? I have to admit, hearing that, both 

Senator Cantwell and I looked at each other and thought that was 

a really bizarre thing to hear. So, is that true, and if so, why? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, my understanding is that 15 minutes of 

video are available, time before, during, and immediately after the 

derailment. My understanding is we followed protocols. 

Senator CRUZ. Mr. Shaw, I asked you to answer the question I 

asked. Is it true the locomotive was very shortly thereafter put into 

service and the result was significant portions of the video were 

missing? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, at some point after, and it sounds like it was 

shortly after was put on, sir. I don’t have the details. I am happy 

to follow up. 

Senator CRUZ. All right. Well, let me just say, any time there is 

a locomotive involved in a serious derailment, it is lunacy that that 

video is not preserved and that locomotive is put into alternative 

service. 

So that, I feel confident we could get unanimity on this committee on that. Let me ask also, there is a lot of discussion about 

command central having the wayside detectors and the conductor 

and the engineer not having information on this particular tank 

car, has Norfolk Southern examined whether it had triggered previous wayside detectors either on this train or in other circumstances? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, I believe that is part of the NTSB investigation. 

Senator CRUZ. Has Norfolk Southern examined that? Did you 

know if it had triggered previous wayside detectors? 

Mr. SHAW. I am not aware that it did. 

92 

Senator CRUZ. Ms. Homendy, do you have any information on 

this, or do we have some confidence that we will be able to get the 

answer to that at some point? 

Ms. HOMENDY. I will provide you that answer. What we do have 

is that it had not reached the critical threshold that is set by Norfolk Southern until that third one. 

Senator CRUZ. Yes, I am certainly interested not just in the critical threshold, but the trending analysis, and the shift that is less 

than the critical threshold but could well indicate a problem before 

the derailment. 

Ms. HOMENDY. We are also interested in that as well. 

Senator CRUZ. OK, final question. Mr. Shaw, I am sure you 

heard Ms. Allison’s testimony, which was powerful. She raised a 

very simple question about moms that are concerned about their 

kids. 

She described her 7-year-old who was afraid for his own health 

and safety. What is your answer to her and other moms who are 

afraid for their health and safety in this community? 

And who, as she described, may not be able to move, may not be 

able to sell their house because their home prices have dropped. 

What is your answer tonight? What should she tell her child, her 

7-year-old child tonight? And what should other moms in that circumstance tell their kids tonight? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, I am terribly sorry for the impact that this 

has had on my community, and I know that it has been traumatic. 

I was there during the vinyl burn and I saw this plume and I know 

what it looked like. 

There is ongoing testing by the EPA, the Ohio EPA, and the 

Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. They all 

show that the air is safe and the water is safe to breathe. There 

are millions of data points. There is still enormous concern within 

the community about three long term issues. 

One is long term health care, one is about property valuations, 

as you noted, and one is ongoing water monitoring. And so, Norfolk 

Southern is working with relevant stakeholders, which include 

State and local authorities, on setting up funds to cover all three 

of those. 

Senator CRUZ. How many families were impacted? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, there are 4,700 approximately folks in East 

Palestine, and there are some who are impacted in western Pennsylvania as well. 

Senator CRUZ. So, you had said earlier in your testimony that 

you have spent to date, if I got the number right, $24 million. You 

also noted 6,000 families altogether. Doing a quick math, that is 

about $4,000 per family. Do you agree with Ms. Allison’s testimony 

that home prices have dropped significantly? And if there is a mom 

scared for her kids, that she right now doesn’t have any great options? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, I understand your point. Our contributions 

to date are just the start, and what we are offering through the 

Family Assistance Center is that for folks who want to relocate, we 

will pay for the relocation fees. Our family assistance center since 

the day after the derailment. 

93 

Senator CRUZ. So, I want to understand you correctly, you are 

saying if a family in East Palestine wants to move, that Norfolk 

Southern will pay the cost of their moving, and will you also make 

them whole if they try to sell their house and they can get substantially less for it than they could have before this derailment? 

Mr. SHAW. Senator, what I am saying is that if they want to 

leave their house for a while, we will pay for those relocation fees. 

And we are establishing—working with relevant stakeholders in a 

long-term fund for the property valuable assurance. 

Senator CRUZ. So, you will put them up in a motel or hotel temporarily, but you are not assisting with moving them? I just want 

to understand what you are doing right now. 

Mr. SHAW. Right now, we are putting them up in a hotel and 

paying for food and clothing if needed. And we are also working 

with relevant stakeholders on our long-term fund for property valuation. 

Senator CRUZ. Well, let me say this, Mr. Shaw, you have said 

multiple times you want to make it right. Let me encourage you, 

make it right is a real commitment and this committee expects 

Norfolk Southern to do exactly that. These people and these families matter. 

Chair CANTWELL. Well, thank you, Senator Cruz. That concludes 

our hearing. I thank all the witnesses for participating today. I ask 

unanimous consent that these letters from the East Palestine residents regarding the impact of derailment be entered into the 

record. And without objection, it will be so ordered. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony on the environmental and 

public health threats from the Norfolk Southern train derailment and chemical release. My name is Hilary Flint and I am a resident of Enon Valley, Pennsylvania— 

the tiny town with less than 300 people that borders East Palestine, Ohio. 

My great grandparents purchased this land and I am now the fourth generation 

in my family to call Enon Valley home. My grandparents, Louise Svihra (Benetti) 

and Robert Svihra, worked hard to achieve the American dream—they started a 

family, owned a home and land, opened many successful small businesses and became pillars of the community. My father, Jarett Svihra, has continued their legacy 

by growing those companies and purchasing land to develop throughout Western 

Pennsylvania. Yet I fear that there will be no legacy left for me, or my siblings, to 

continue. 

Since the ‘‘controlled’’ explosion, we have been told that it is safe to be in our 

home. To drink our water. To plant in our soil. Yet my lived experience tells a different story. You see, I have a history of autoimmune disease, chronic illness and 

kidney cancer. This means that I am often more affected by my environment. Stories like mine have been ignored, unheard and undermined throughout this crisis. 

You tell me that my water is safe. Yet when I wash my hands, I get red rashes. 

When I shower, my toes turn purple. When I wash my face, my eyes are itchy. You 

tell me that my air is safe. Yet I have migraines. I’m congested. I’m tired, dizzy and 

weak. You tell me that all tests show that I am safe. Yet the smell in my home 

is so pungent that it travels with me wherever I go—clinging to my skin, my hair 

and my clothes. 

You tell me that since my home is more than 1 mile away, I do not qualify for 

resources. You tell me that if I want independent testing done on my property, that 

I will have to pay that expense. You tell me that if I want to get rid of the smell, 

94 

that I must clean every surface—inside and out, wash every item of clothing and 

change every filter in my home. You tell me that if I have medical concerns, that 

I must go to a clinic that is unable to do tests, give a diagnosis or even write a prescription. You tell me that because Norfolk Southern continued to put corporate 

greed before public safety, that I am responsible for their actions. 

Let me tell YOU something. 

We, the people, have had enough. Appalachian communities are tired of being 

physically, mentally and financially burdened for the benefit of everyone but its residents. This blue collar area will no longer be ignored, silenced or dismissed. 

We, the people, expect real change. Suspend all Norfolk Southern operations. Demand their leadership team be fired and held criminally liable for their actions. 

Make them compensate each and every family within a 30 mile radius of the derailment so that residents can do whatever they need to do to feel safe. 

We, the people, are watching. My grandmother. My father. My siblings. Myself. 

The people that have lived in these communities for generations, the people that 

fought hard to achieve the American dream, the people that have defended this 

country with their vote, their word and sometimes their life. We are all waiting to 

see what you do to end this American nightmare. 

HILARY FLINT. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

My house in Darlington Twp. was covered by the black smoke, after they detonated the rail cars. 

Now we aren’t sure how this will affect our health, our water, and soil. We are 

afraid to even have a garden! 

We want Norfolk Southern to offer buy us out of our houses, so we can move to 

a safer area. 

TIMOTHY MOORE. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I live in hollow road. hollow road. 

My son Dylan has bronchoopulmonary dysplasia do to premature birth. He is now 

16 years old. He has had two treatment of steroids since the controlled release and 

continues to use his inhaler. We moved out of our home for over 2 weeks because 

of his breathing issues. My biggest concern is his health and safety. Am I risking 

further lung damage keeping him in our home?? No one can answer these questions. 

Trust me I’ve reached out to doctors, state NS. No one can tell me. What would you 

do if this was your child? I’ve watched my child struggling to breath more than once. 

We don’t have all the answers now, isn’t going to work if the damaged is done to 

his lungs before we have the answers. 

Is my water safe now or in the future? What is coming out of my ground? Is that 

going to cause issues for him down the road? 

At this time he still leaves our home on the weekends just to keep him our of 

the environment. During the week I no choice because of school. 

Home is your safe area. Not for us anymore. Will I ever fill safe in my home 

again?? I sure hope I can. 

I believe someone has these answers. You can not tell me if your having trouble 

breathing, burning nose and throat, sore in my nose, headaces, rashes on your skin 

your safe. How could you feel safe? Would you feel safe? 

Everything in our world has been turned up side down. My husband passed away 

suddenly of a heart attack. My son unfortunately was the one to find him. He did 

everything he could for his dad. 

95 

I’ve worked hard to rebuild a life for us in our home. Our family home. Were we 

can find some peace and happiness. Maybe some can understand what a struggle 

this can be with loosing a husband, father. That is gone now because I don’t know 

if I am safe in my home. 

No we are not in the one mile circle but our lives have been deeply effected. 

MARIAN MATTERN. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I live in Western Pennsylvania and the East Palestine Derailment has directly affected us in ways more indirect, but just as detrimental to our communities. The 

possible environmental fallout of contamination like dioxins have us on edge. The 

blatant conflicts of interests in regards to who is responsible for the testing, and 

who is hired to do the testing, to who takes responsibility for the testing. 

We would like to know how we can have comprehensive unbiased testing done to 

ensure we are safe just the same as East Palestine does as well. 

Water contamination from this incident was detected in the Gulf of Mexico. If another disaster spill occurs dams must be immediately be put in place across the affected streams to keep contamination from spreading like this one did. The thought 

of another disaster still hangs like an albatross on our necks. This albatross hangs 

while the legislatures mull changes, to an industry and its lobbyists long opposed 

to change. 

These are a few of our concerns. The possible fallout of contamination from the 

controlled burn and the other materials involved has me physically sick. The worst 

of which are Dioxins. Dioxins are well known in the annals of environmental contamination leading to the creation of many ‘‘superfund sites’’ as well as the complete 

dissolution of a Missouri town called Times Beach. The dissolution of a neighborhood in Suburban Buffalo New York. Perhaps you may have heard of it. It was 

called ‘‘Love Canal’’, and Vietnam veterans seek settlements from Veterans Affairs 

because of dioxin exposure in Vietnam stemming from Agent Orange. 

Anytime a chlorinated substance is burned it creates Dioxins. Dioxins have the 

capability to be the worst toxic contaminant. Even worse than nuclear fallout from 

a reactor meltdown such as Chernobyl or Fukishima. Dioxins are toxic at one part 

per billion. Dioxins can take 100s of years to break down in the environment when 

not exposed to sunlight. They do not dissolve in water, but attach to particulates 

which float in water spreading misery and death. Dioxins cause cancers diabetes, 

heart disease and many other life threatening, life altering diseases. The controlled 

burn of vinyl chloride created a toxic plume of dioxin laden smoke. 

The plume was modeled by NOAA at Pittsburgh International Airport showing 

coverage of parts of Eastern Ohio, Pennsylvania, almost all of New York, all of 

Vermont, part of New Hampshire. It also showed coverage of portions of Ontario, 

Quebec, and New Newfoundland Canada. Possibly creating an international incident. The water contamination reaching the Gulf of Mexico is another facet of this 

disaster. The scope of this disaster will take generations and many lives to see the 

effects. 

We need testing of our soil, but testing is a costly endeavor. We want it paid for 

by Norfolk Southern to make sure our soil is safe. Our farmers are starting to plant, 

and we want to start preparing our gardens. We do not know if our soil is safe to 

plant in. Please send us aid to ensure of our safety. 

Personally, I would like to see it be made illegal to intentionally burn any 

chlorinated compound. Firefighters often get dioxin exposure from burning houses 

as many modern homes use Polyvinyl chlorine (PVC) exclusively for their plumbing. 

Unless it is in an incinerator of 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit. Only by incinerating 

Dioxins and chlorinated compounds can they be totally destroyed. I would also like 

to see any chlorinated compounds that can burn to be phased out in favor of more 

environmentally friendly alternatives. 

CERCLA itself needs amended as well. The fact that the E.P.A. allowed a laboratory called Tetra to conduct air sampling when Tetra is currently under investigation by the Department of Justice for using biased under-reporting for the Department of the Navy. This is indicative of more grey areas that must be immediately 

addressed. 

96 

The fact that the investment firm ‘‘Blackrock’’ who is the second highest share 

holder in Norfolk Southern is a large shareholder in Tetra is another problem. This 

is called a conflict of interest. CERCLA must be reworked to say, ‘‘no investigative 

laboratory or firm can be used that is currently under investigation, or which has 

any connection to the company against whom CERCLA is being invoked as the responsible party due to any incident where CERCLA is invoked’’. 

Neutral Third Party testing must become law, immediately. Purdue University, 

Big Pine Consultants of Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon, and other smaller laboratories 

are conducting their own tests, and they are conflicting with the official government 

test results. These private institutions are using more sensitive equipment that are 

able to find much smaller amounts of contamination. Contamination that still pose 

health risks at the levels they are finding, but that the government’s own tests cannot detect. This proves why neutral third parties should always do the testing from 

now on in any incident per CERCLA. 

The derailment is a symptom of a system long overdue for stricter laws. While 

I support the railroad industry. Safety should always be the top priority. The 4 R’s 

Act of 1970 and the Staggers Railroad act of 1977 allowed for large scale deregulation of the U.S. Railroad Industry. In many ways they helped to save railroading 

in the U.S. by this deregulating, but in so doing laid the ground work for the willful 

negligence that precipitated this disaster. 

Many older Americans remember the ‘‘caboose’’ on all freight trains, but after the 

passage of the two aforementioned pieces of deregulation legislation the caboose was 

relegated to only certain hazardous freight trains. Due to how the laws were written 

the Hazardous materials that were released from the derailment did not constitute 

a hazardous train requiring the use of a caboose. Why were cabooses used? They 

were used originally to help with braking the train as well as for the railroad crews 

to watch for ‘‘hot boxes’’ also known as overheating wheels which led to many 

derailments in the past, and which caused this disaster. The Caboose necessitated 

trains not be longer than the line of sight for train crews. Had cabooses not been 

allowed to be relegated to extreme circumstances this disaster could likely have 

been avoided. I would like to see the caboose return as a ‘‘Safetyboose’’. I would like 

to see the modern caboose fitted with state of the art equipment used to detect problems and qualified train crews to man them. We cannot allow the railroads to use 

remote personnel. I would like these modern cabooses to include a ‘‘kill switch’’ that 

will immediately start braking the train, to stop it if the crew detect any sort of 

problem without requiring the consultation of remote dispatchers, or the engineer 

in the lead locomotive. I would like to see implemented an immediate introduction 

of dynamic braking to coincide with the re-introduction of the ‘‘safetyboose’’. 

Dynamic Braking is one piece of safety that I realize is in the news. It was on 

the table. Unfortunately, our infamous lobbyists had congress stop pursuing its implementation citing costs. I am sad to report the environmental and human suffering this incident has created and will do so for generations costs far more than 

a dying fiat currency could ever hope to save. 

Any lobbyist who lobbied Congress to not implement any safety mechanism 

should immediately be fired and not be allowed to work in Washington D.C. again. 

P.S.R. or Precision Scheduled Railroading is another co-conspirator in this disaster 

that must be immediately end. This little acronym, while not known prior to this 

disaster, is now under scrutiny. While PSR allowed NS to increase profits from $2 

to $3 billion, this co-conspirator allowed NS to cut safety checks, cut workers, and 

lengthen trains to a point never before seen in American History, and look at what 

it created. 

Congress needs to pass a law that a train cannot be so long as to be out of the 

line of sight of a train crew. Now of-course on the great plains where tracks are 

straight and flat. Regions where trains can most certainly be longer exist. However, 

in the mountains, valleys, and hills of Appalachia and the Rockies this is not the 

case. Now if the ‘‘safetyboose’’ is implemented, and there can be more than one used 

in a lengthy train, I do not see where this could not be done. 

This derailment maybe the worst environmental disaster not just in the United 

States but the world. We must do everything we can to ensure it never happens 

again. 

SPENCER GALLAGHER. 

97 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I live less than 1 mile from the derailment site. This train derailment should have 

NEVER happened. Norfolk Southern has put a lot of stress on families and the community. We need continued testing for soil, water, and especially medical for years 

to come. Norfolk Southern should pay for this, they are the ones that cut cost on 

safety. Now I have to worry about the safety of my kids and grandkids. I have lived 

in Unity and East Palestine my whole life. East Palestine is a nice community Norfolk Southern should not take that away from us 

JOYCE HENDERSON. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

Hi My Name is Austin Druckenbrod I was involved in the East Palestine train 

derailment crisis not from living their but because my employer NVR located at 

Which is a Fortune 500 company put all of their Employees into danger when they had us working before the Evacuation zone was lifted for the 1–2 

mile radius Governor DeWine issued. 

Employees were asking to call off and with the housing market crisis being as bad 

as it is and all the employees they were laying off at the time they told us if we 

called off over the train derailment we would be pointed and out of a job because 

the state of Pennsylvania according to them never issued a mandatory evac and the 

Ohio evac didn’t apply to the grounds of Pennsylvania when nvr is 1.1 miles from 

ground zero in east Palestine maybe even closer we can see the remediation site 

from the tracks from the company so it’s close enough and when I called osha and 

the cops they told us Ohio had no jurisdiction over pa when NVR was located within 

the evacuation zone from Governor DeWines statement of 1–2 miles but somehow 

that doesn’t apply to Pennsylvania I don’t understand how a state can get out of 

being within the evac zone. 

I called off work on Monday for my own safety I had a personal day thank god 

so I wouldn’t get pointed and than Tuesday February 7th we got a text message 

stating they were shut down I had to return to work on weds the 8th prior to going 

to work on Wednesday Tuesday night I drove out to nvr to figure out how I would 

get to work as the national guard had all roadways closed to get to nvr so I had 

to drive through road closures to get to my job that night Tuesday the 7th when 

I got out of my car to examine the environment I could smell the worst of smells 

I could still see smoke from wherever they were still burning stuff on Tuesday February 7th their was a haze fog like substance hovering over the ground from the 

rain or whatever it was drove home instantly had symptoms of many types which 

are documented at Saint Elizabeth hospital in boardman Ohio. 

I was wrote off from work for symptom management that Norfolk southern never 

paid me for because they said I wasn’t within the evac zone but then cut me a check 

for the days the roads were closed and said this is the best we can do and didn’t 

even offer to pay my medical bills as they said we do not have any information on 

how to handle medical and to top it all off I’m 24 years old I’ve worked hard my 

whole life to get where I’m at and now I don’t even feel safe at my job or work because of the catastrophe that has happened and I’m in fear of my life as I already 

have medical problems and with my job being so close to ground zero I have a fear 

of getting cancer and it’s not fair. 

I may have to change my whole life job career housing situation because of a train 

accident that could have been prevented if safety was the priority I wanted to retire 

at that company that was my new dream and now it’s gone because of Norfolk 

southern. 

AUSTIN DRUCKENBROD. 

98 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I live in East Palestine,3/4 mile from the derailment. I have existing chronic 

health issues and extreme difficulty in detoxifying. As a result, I have what are 

known as ’’paradoxical’’ reactions even to vitamins and supplements. This is due to 

a metaboic disorder and to advance heart failure. So no, I’m not a hysterically-inclined person that reacts to about everything. However, I do have extreme reactions 

to many things, particularly chemicals. 

So yes, I have had a number of aggravated symptoms since the derailment and 

toxic fires. Among them have been throat & lung irritation and occasional burning 

sensations . . . an extreme production of mucous . . . and exhaustion. Prior to the 

event, I would have to make a few rest stops when walking to town. After the even, 

I know have to stop several times. 

My concerns are the common concerns of my entire community . . . a thorough 

clean-up, ongoing testing of air-water & soil . . . paid-for medical testing . . . proper compensation for losses incurred and for potential medical treatment. 

However, according to my own calls, contacts and research.. we already have some 

definite problems in most of these areas. Dr.Beier form Pittsburgh is an authority 

on vinyl chloride. He lab studies have shown liver cancers, etc. at levels lower than 

now considered ’’safe.’’ Meanwhile, she has needed further funding to do testing 

here. 

And, speaking of vinyl chloride a virologist contracted by Norfolk Southern informed me that vinyl chloride ’’metabolizes’’ quickly . . . so, blood detection can pose 

problems. Well, many of us couldn’t afford proper testing there . . . and, NS is yet 

to step up to bat with that one. So, over a month and a half post derail . . . we’ll 

not likely have helpful readings there. 

I expand on that subject because we have definite serious issues with both medical and environmental testing. All of this testing needs to be done ’’independently’’ 

and not via a NS or EPA contractor. And, beyond the testing . . . any and all lab 

work also needs to be independent and not set at higher ’’safe’’ levels. Today, many 

EPA and other testing is still not done at the levels recommended by the CDC, etc. 

And again, NS needs to pay for proper medical testing ’’NOW’’. otherwise, the bloodurine and tissue samples of certain toxic chemicals won’t accurately reflect toxic impact and potential harm. 

More recently, the citizens here have shown even more concern about Dioxins. 

The rail clean-up and it’s delays. as well as the upcoming growing season for farmers and gardeners further emphasizes that concern. Any animal testing to date has 

been reported as ’’safe’’ Well, that’s good to hear and is likely true. for it takes time 

for dioxins to ’’bio-accumulate’’ in living tissues. Therefore, and given the extreme 

toxicity of dioxines even in minute amounts. proper ongoing testing of soils and animals will be absolutely essential. 

7Robert Two Hawks. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I’m writing on Concerning the Toxic Train Derailment that shattered life as we 

know it in East Palestine, Ohio on February 3, 2023. 

We were relaxing after a long day, when we heard constant sirens going by our 

house. We looked outside to see if we could tell where they are going. From our 

front porch on . you could see giant flames and so much smoke. We . you could see giant flames and so much smoke. We 

could tell something major was happening so my son and I got into the car to go 

drive by and have a look. We could not get across town to see where the fire was 

coming from because a train was blocking every railroad crossing and town and 

stopped there. We drove to the overhead bridge at the other end of town to get 

across. When we got to the other side of town. It was like an Apocalyptic event. 

99 

Smoke was everywhere. Police were already going door to doors evacuating the 

residents that lived closest to the fire. It was enormous. A train had derailed and 

caught fire. 

It was pure Chaos. As my son and I dove by, we heard something exploding and 

could feel the heat of the fire on our faces. We drove to my parents home 3 blocks 

South of the train tracks. From there you could really see how big the fire was. The 

flames were hundreds of feet high. The people in town were all coming out to watch 

and see what was going on. Soon the police started setting up roadblocks. I received 

a call from my neighbor saying we were being evacuated on our street. So my son 

and I made out back across town to our house and sure enough the police were 

going door to door telling us to leave. It was very scary and we did not realize how 

dangerous it was. We packed our animals and all we could grab in 10 minutes and 

took off not knowing where to go. 

I called my Ex Mother In law and she took us in at 11:45 pm. 

It has been 45 days now, and we have not returned home. 

Release of the Chemicals that were still burning on the train a few days later. 

This resulted in thousands of gallons of highly hazardous chemicals being burned 

off into the air less than one half mile from My home and my parents home where 

I was born and raised my whole life. The evacuation this time was mandatory if 

you were in a one mile radius of the derailment. So everyone left. 

The days after the release were full of anxiety, fear, uncertainty, anger. 

How could this Happen? How could this happen to us? Our little town. 

Know one knew what was going on. What was safe. What was even on the train. 

When we would be allowed back to our homes. If our homes would be safe to live 

in. The National Guard was called in to help. Media started covering the story. 

After 1 day the evacuation order was lifted and people returned to town only to 

discover the terrible chemical stench that now lingers permanently. People started 

to notice chemicals in the water. Other people started noticing symptoms. 

Headaches, sore throat, eyes, cough, dizziness, bloody noses, rashes. Animals were 

reportedly dying. 

We were told it was safe to return. But it obviously was not safe. 

We were given No Instructions whatsoever on what to do to clean our homes. If 

they even could be cleaned. Whether or not to throw away Plastics or Food. Or clean 

our walls and floors. Did all of the smoke and chemicals get in? No answers.. 

Was our air even safe to be breathing? Or our water safe to use? Are there harmful dioxins on our lawns now? Are our children safe? Will we all need constant medical testing now? Why did the have to happen? Still No Answers. . . 

The town has suffered enough. Please help. 

We don’t want anything special. We just want our lives back. We want our kids 

to be safe walking to school. We want our homes to be safe. We want our water 

tested and our soil and air. We want our health screened. Our home values guaranteed. Or relocation for families that no longer want to live there. 

This has taken a Major Psychological toll on the residents of East Palestine, myself included. Norfolk Southern needs to be held accountable. 

MARCIA GRIFFITH. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

We moved to East Palestine in August. We moved into my fiance ́’s home that he 

has lived his whole life. His grandfather passed away so his parents moved in with 

his grandma who needs full time care because of dementia. They have slowly been 

moving their belongings that have been there for 40+ years into his grandmothers. 

My fiance ́ moved out a little over 5 years ago for the first time ever because we 

met and were having a baby. 

Fast forward we (fiance ́, 4yr old daughter, 13m daughter, and I) moved into his 

home that still had majority of stuff there. We have been working very hard to organize and make this our forever home. We were doing to rent 2 own. He was so excited to have his children grow up in the exact house that he had; show them his 

toys as a kid, etc. We have put a lot of work into the home because I wanted to 

live in a more modern home. There was an issue every time it would rain, the basement would flood. Now that I’ve seen all the dead fish/animals dying i’m worried 

the chemicals have entered through the basement. 

100 

The night of the derailment I heard a noise and yelled down and asked them what 

that was, I had the music on and couldn’t tell where it was coming from and then 

he ran up to get me and told me what happened. He ran outside and called his family and we could see tons of cars trying to escape town. We got an alert on our 

phone saying to leave if you’re in one mile of a location (which we were) we grabbed 

a couple items and went to new Waterford to his parents house. 

We wrapped the girls faces up with masks and scarves as much as we could. We 

grabbed very little compared to what we have here now. I work from home and 

grabbed all the paperwork incase I couldn’t go back. 

On Saturday the 4th I went home and cleaned and all that until Sunday afternoon. When I arrived Saturday night the smell was very strong. I couldn’t smell 

anything the next day but everyone who came into town said they could. So I think 

I became used to the smell and didn’t notice as much. They closed school for a week 

and then claimed it was cleaned top to bottom and school would be open. I was terrified on what to do, but my fiance ́ said she was going. 

It seemed like everyday there was news that it was worse than what they were 

making it out to be. Both girls had rashes, violently puking, i had a migraine, one 

of my girls ended up having periorbital cellulitis in her eyes and we have all been 

sick since with a common cold i’m guessing but for me it has lasted this whole time. 

We just grocery shopped on the 1st and spent almost 300, so all of that was then 

thrown out. We have been back for a few minutes grabbing items and went to abundant life to collect our ‘‘inconvenience check’’ and the man told me that we were not 

home by ‘‘choice’’ and since we haven’t had our air tested they could no longer help 

us. 

I haven’t worked at all since we left and my fiance ́ worked maybe 2–3 times. He 

can’t leave the sight of our girls or they get scared and scream and cry. We already 

tried calling to get our air tested. The people had no clue where the mile was and 

no one said they would come test. 

After abundant life we called the number to get our air tested, left voice-mails, 

received one phone call back to get info (same info we left on a voice-mail) and never 

received a call back. We tried calling again and couldn’t get through. There was a 

new number so we called it and told them we’ve been trying and the lady said the 

number was down and to keep trying, which we have. 43 days later. . .still not a 

phone call back. 

We have changed our furnace filter a few times(keeping the old ones) got an air 

purifier and a dehumidifier. So that’s been plugged in over a week now. 

We’re just at a loss. 

I have seen people on Facebook say they’re still getting help from abundant life 

but we haven’t went back because we can’t get anyone to check on our air. His 

grandma is so confused as to who we are, she doesn’t think this is her house, and 

it’s very sad and uncomfortable and not something my kids should be dealing with. 

Everyday we keep saying we’re going back but we never do-i would never forgive 

myself if something happened to my children because we brought them home. If 

they would’ve been straightforward and honest with us from the beginning than i 

wouldn’t be as scared. But I feel like they minimized the situation and said there’s 

nothing to worry about once they lifted the evacuation and everyone’s air is fine. 

Until a different company does testing and says that they lied. I’m at a loss on 

what to do and i’m terrified. 

Not only my little family, but i feel bad for his parents taking over paying their 

money on the their own bills, while the value of their house had decreased significantly and i don’t want to bail on them and back out of our word. I wish they would 

just demolish the houses within a certain area and rebuild everything brand new. 

They’re worth so much, I’m sure a new park and all they’ve done to ‘‘help’’ will be 

nice for someone, but my family isn’t benefiting from it. We’ve been stuck in a basement with two kids that want to go home. My 4 yr old has turned 5 and we couldn’t 

have a party. I have a video of her crying because she wants to go home. It’s not 

fair to anyone. We just want life back. We are running out of funds, thank God it 

was tax season, but that money is gone now too.. 

CHELSEA FALOBA. 

101 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

My name is Diana Holzer and have lived in East Palestine, Ohio my entire life. 

My husband Anthony and I have been married for 52 years. 

We have two grown children who are begging us to leave East Palestine. . .ever 

since the train derailed and contaminated our village. 

I am also a Registered Nurse and very concerned about the lack of cooperation 

among the NS Railroad, the state and Federal governments, the politicians and 

health and environmental organizations. 

I cannot believe there is no one who has the power to have the contaminated soil 

removed immediately. 

I would love to offer a serious invitation to all of you, in power, to pack a bag 

and come and stay in our village until this mess is cleaned up. 

Norfolk Southern is first to blame but it appears that GOVERNMENT has NO 

power to force a business to clean up our disaster that is destroying a town. How 

about shutting the railroad down? 

I would like to suggest a PERFECT PLACE TO STORE THE CONTAMINATED 

SOIL . . . THAT PLACE WOULD BE ALL ALONG THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF 

THE RAILROAD TRACKS THAT RUN THRU EAST PALESTINE. BLOCKING 

THE TRACKS, LEGALLY, RIGHT, WOULD CERTAINLY GET BOTH GOVERNMENT AND RAILROAD OFFICIALS ABLE TO FIND A PLAN TO HELP US. 

YOUR CONCERN IS LOSS OF MONEY . . . SAME CONCERN FOR EAST PALESTINE, IN ADDITION TO DESTROYING OUR FUTURES BY FORCING U.S. TO 

LIVE IN A NOW CONTAMINATED TOWN. 

Why does it take a Senate hearing to do the right thing? 

What would you all want done if this were your town . . . or YOUR CHILDREN 

. . . OR GRANDCHILDREN. 

I know you have the power. 

Moving the contaminated soil is just one issue . . . 

Restoring our town, restoring our property values . . . praying to our God that 

no one . . . not one person, suffers any health effects from the negligence of the 

Railroad. 

Please . . . please do the right thing. DO NOT MAKE THIS A POLITICAL 

GAME. . .YOU WERE ELECTED TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE IN THE UNITED 

STATES. 

DIANA HOLZER. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I am so disappointed in our representatives. I would have never believed the damage one person can do Allen Shaw and the overall protection he has been given by 

our government. We have been lied to poisoned by chemicals they won’t even admit 

was aboard these trains. 

First I believe Allen Shaw should be arrested. Second I think the hauling of any 

chemical should be on board is chemical engineers not just folks picking up and 

dropping off isn’t OSHA in this anywhere or are they being paid off like EPA is. 

We deserve to know what exactly was in these cars so we know what our life expectancy is and health concerns. 

I lived in Aliquippa PA was driving for Lyft and Uber. Burning in my throat my 

lungs and migraines as well as other symptoms. I packed what I could get in my 

car and fled the area to Texas. Because of this tragedy I am homeless and trying 

to get energy enough to work. I am devastated and not the only one. 

How dare our representatives have so little care for human life that they would 

not protect us in any way or even come to our aid once it happened or now. 

102 

I have covered this situation doing everything I can to inform others since this 

has a major cover up involved. I share on my Tictoc Cynthia.Burton. I am a advocate for others and will stand for others and myself till my last breath. 

How dare you think for one second you have the right to do this to us our environment and generations to come, shame on all of our representatives and Allen Shaw. 

Thank you. 

Cynthia Burton 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I was ready to go to bed about 9:00 on Friday night when I looked out my dining 

room window and saw a huge fire. It looked so close because of the size of it but 

I didn’t know what could cause such a tremendous amount of flames. I went out 

on my porch thinking if I could smell the fumes then it was very close. But I didn’t 

smell any odors. I went inside and video taped long enough to send the video to 

my sons in Columbus. 

I don’t do social media so I contacted a friend that told me what had happened. 

I stayed in my house watching the fire and turned on the 10:00 news. Once I heard 

what happened, I quickly called my other son closer to the fire than myself. I pleaded with them to evacuate, which they did do once they were told by responders. 

We all left town until we were told to come back. 

I have had a tremendous amount of anxiety over all of this. I have suffered PTSD. 

I am on a Beta Blocker for anxiety and have been seeking mental health services. 

I have left town every weekend so far, but 2. I was afraid to leave those two weeks 

because I was getting dizzy spells and suffered a fainting spell. 

I am hopeful to sell my house in the spring to summer, but would feel more secure and safe to go outside in a different place than East Palestine. I can’t get past 

my insecurities and don’t feel safe in my house. I am within the mile radius of this 

wreck. 

MARY A FALCONE. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I live 4 miles from the train derailment. I own 80 acres of farm land that has 

been in my family for 4 generations and my wish is to pass it on to my sons and 

my grandchildren. I don’t know now if the soil is safe for farming, will the crops 

grow and be safe to use. I wish I could get on going soil testing but haven’t had 

a single test yet. Is the water safe to use, we are on a well. 

I took care of my Dad for 4 years, When he died I was hoping to built a house 

on the property, right now we live in a 50 year old mobile home. I’m wondering if 

I should build somewhere else now but if I do what would I do with my farm. I 

just want to know we are healthy and our home is safe. 

APRIL RUMMEL. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

Feb. 3rd, 2023 . . . It was just another Friday night . . . or so I thought . . . 

I was sitting on the couch with my cat on my lap, watching tv, when the local news 

came on with the headline story, which was a train derailment in East Palestine, 

103 

OH. There wasn’t a lot of information about it that night, but on Saturday more 

information came in and it wasn’t good ..I felt really sorry for the townspeople and 

the emergency responders but I didn’t realize just How much it was going to affect 

me because I was 6.4 miles away in South Beaver Twp., Darlington, PA. 

On Sunday morning {Feb. 5th} I woke up and instantly knew something was 

wrong. There was a STRONG smell of chlorine in my bedroom. I have a bucket of 

chlorine pool tablets stored in my garage at the other end of my house but they are 

securely stored in a bucket with a tightly closed lid. My eyes were sore and stuck 

shut, my nose and throat were sore.As the day passed I developed a headache and 

a dry cough. 

On Monday morning Feb. 6th there were constant phone calls from my adult children and my friends warning me of the impending detonation of one of the toxic 

cars . They were begging me to leave my home and take my cat with me because 

they feared for our safety. I left home at 3:45pm with my cat. When I reached my 

friend’s house in Freedom, PA I found out that the plan was to detonate all 5 cars, 

not just the one. On television I saw radar tracking the giant black cloud and it 

looked like it was spreading toward my home. 

I returned home the next morning at 10:30am to discover a strange chemical odor 

in my garage and my house.My headaches returned and so did my dry cough. I also 

developed a patch of red itchy dry skin on my left forearm.The headaches are on 

and off to this day as well as hoarseness. 

I changed my hvac filter on Dec. 30th, 2022 and it is only supposed to be changed 

every 3 months. I was told to change my hvac filter on Feb. 19th by my son. He 

told me to change it once a week I change it every 2 weeks and that is Very expensive to do! On Feb. 23rd my son installed a Pur water filter on my kitchen sink. 

He started coughing and choking when he entered my garage. He said that my 

house still smelled like chemicals. 

On Feb. 24th I called my pcp for a checkup. On Saturday Feb. 25th my next door 

neighbor had to evacuate because she was diagnosed with chemical exposure. I went 

to my pcp on March 1st for my checkup. He ordered a chest xray and blood tests 

for toxins. I now have to pay $20 for the xray. 

On March 5th I noticed a rusty residue on my pool cover. I have owned a pool 

since 1996 and NEVER have seen anything like that on my pool before! I Wish I 

could send pictures of it with this testimony. 

On March 6th I changed my hvac filter once again and went for my xray, blood 

and urine test.One test result was positive for a UTI and I have Never had one of 

those before. I am awaiting final results of the other tests. 

I sent pictures of my pool cover to the PA AG’s office, to the EPA, the DEP, and 

to the Dept. of Agriculture. They are Very interested and are in contact with me. 

They are only Starting to test wells and soil in the 2 mile range for now. But the 

DEP rep has told me to call him back in 2 weeks if he doesn’t contact me by then. 

On March 14th the section director of the Environmental Crimes unit of the PA 

AG’s office came to my house to personally discuss how the derailment has affected 

me. I now have to pay for a well test and a pool cover water test. I also purchased 

2 ice/water filters for my refridgerator and 4 More hvac filters on March 17th. A 

$150 expense I didn’t really need.. 

My daughter visited me today {March 18th} and she developed a runny nose, a 

cough and tightness in her chest . She has asthma and said that it was like a small 

asthma attack. My late husband and I built this house in 1989 and we raised our 

children here with good well water that was drinkable and clean fresh air. I honestly don’t know if I will be able to even have a Normal summer with friends and 

family gatherings around my pool, and it makes me so sad. 

ROSEMARIE LESLIE. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I live in Austintown and am not directly affected by the disaster, but would like 

to be an advocate for those who need help now and in the future. We have seen 

too many incidents where innocent people are hurt by corporations and businesses 

who ignore safety regulations and make ignorant, reckless decisions regarding our 

environment. 

ANNE DAVIES. 

104 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

We need medical testing now. If everything is all good why are we still experiencing, headaches, sore throats, sinus problems? I don’t and won’t drink the water! 

We have not seen honesty from day one. Supporting the school and throwing money 

around to the village officials is not helping the citizens. From the politicians to the 

EPA, I feel we get nothing but lies. Thats not helping!!!Soil testing is only being 

done in common areas. I don’t live at the park or near the school. We are strictly 

in residential area. 

GERALYN COBLENTZ. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

Until the derailment in east Palestine on February 3, I was running a very successful Airbnb business on my 8 acre mini horse farm for the past 6 years. 

I offered several options to experience farm life, such as a little cabin, a room in 

my barn, a camp spot or the entire lower half of my home. 

People came from all over to my place to experience the country lifestyle, fresh 

air, organic gardening, and my breakfast with farm fresh eggs. 

I offered Horseback Riding, treats for people to feed and interact with horses and 

sessions in an infrared, sauna. 

I partnered with Snail Club to offer guests a free picture of themselves at the 

farm sent to their home to remember their trip. 

I took pride in the details of building my business to share my lifestyle with others and earn a living at the same time. 

It was also an asset to the community, as I would direct people into town to the 

local shops and restaurants. 

Very few people have booked my place since the accident. Everyone who booked 

into the summer have canceled. 

Everyone in the community has been affected differently but in some devastating 

way. The long-term effects of our soil and water that’s a whole other issues of concern. It’ll be a long time before our little community rebounds from such a disaster. 

MICHELLE GRAEF. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

1. Independent scientist to do proper testing 

2. Immediate relocation for people within 5 miles 

3. Long term and short term medical monitoring 

4. Proper disposal of soil 

JAMI COZZA. 

105 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I feel very fortunate, other than the immediate displacement during the derailment I have experienced no health issues. My concern is for longer term monitoring 

and maybe an established baseline for all residents in the immediate area. What 

recourse would we have in ten years if we sustain injury then stemming from this 

incident, a long term health monitoring system I believe will help. 

DWAYNE STUCKEY. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I am very concerned for the safety of my family and our health. I have a child 

afraid to be at home, ‘‘I catch everything (they said) . . . I am going to get cancer 

and die from this.’’ 

My husband and I work in education. We have four kids. I love our little home 

and this town. I do see the good things being done, however, right now we have 

urgent things we should have access too. 

We need free blood test immediately, that test for specifics to this derailment, not 

just basic blood work. We need more and different ways to test the air, water and 

soil, that are cohesive to what the universities (and others) are using to get the real 

picture. 

I feel people should be allowed to relocate for a year (not just lodging) with all 

expenses paid until we can get a real picture. 

More needs to be done for the home owners, we cannot afford to pay three to four 

times our mortgage elsewhere. It’s not just property value, it’s the cost associated 

with having to live elsewhere. We are making health decisions based on our own 

personal finances. 

Our monthly expenses have gone up, and personal cost to homeowners, renters 

and business owners. It’s more than just being reimbursed. Let’s put people first 

and do the right thing now. 

REBECCA MCELROY. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

The train derailment has upended our lives, dealing with constant headaches, 

sinus issues, nose bleeds, and an all around general feeling of ‘‘not feeling well’’. 

We live outside the town of East Palestine, with in 3 miles of the wreck site. It’s 

crazy to think the ‘‘experts’’ say the only area that this wreck has effected is 1 mile. 

We have been asked to get blood samples and urine, but no one in our medical community knows what tests to order nor what to look for. (even though we have provided the chemical list to them). 

We have a well and some ground on our property that we don’t know if they are 

safe for our animals or children. Even the local well companies have not been able 

to confirm what tests to complete. 

I also am a small business owner. I have seen my local/daily work slow to a crawl 

since all the activity in East Palestine. Its extremely difficult to reassure my family 

that its going to be ok, simply because I don’t know that answer. 

Every step we have taken to ensure we are safe and healthy has led us to a dead 

end. 

106 

I have watched the hearings with the Alan Shaw and he has done nothing to reassure our whole community will be made ‘‘right’’. I feel we have been left in the dark 

to fend for ourselves. 

As a business owner, property owner, father, and head of my household. . . . It 

would be nice to have reassurances that Norfolk will actually do what is right for 

all our communities. This accident would of never happened if the company operating the train would of done the maintenance and inspections necessary for a safe 

operating transportation vehicle. 

I am an United States Airmen by trade. I have seen what can happen to an airline who disregards safety. There have been cases where a mechanic has been put 

in jail for not doing their job correctly. Railroads haul millions of pounds of cargo 

and subject millions of citizens to that cargo. There should be no difference in the 

safety protocols. Period! 

DAVE PRIESTLEY. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

Since the derailment, I have been having a great deal of difficulty sleeping and 

am very jumpy when I hear sounds. I live 18 miles from the derailment. Having 

seen the video from both the Freshmark and Butch Bliss security cameras, I am 

constantly afraid when I hear a train whistle thinking that this time it will be us. 

I am also concerned that I should not buy any produce or meat from local growers. 

I am closely following Salem’s water readings. I attended the first presentation 

by Erin Brokovich where I had to stand outside for two hours before being allowed 

into the auditorium. I have had a sore throat and feel quite tired ever since that. 

Something must be done to be certain this does not happen again. Sebring, Salem, 

Leetonia and Columbiana could easily have been ground zero for this derailment. 

Are we next? Will we still be affected???? 

MICHELE WEAVER. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

My name is Brandi Foster, my family and I are lifelong residents of East Palestine. We are located 3 miles north of the derailment site. At 3 miles we absolutely 

have felt the effects of the derailment and toxic chemicals. 

Upon returning home after the burn we had soot and ash over our home, vehicles 

and ponds. Our furnace filters were covered with black soot. We have experienced 

headaches more often than we ever have, I myself had chemical pink eye within 

days of returning home. My son has daily headaches and eye watering, this has 

never been an issue prior to the derailment. 

We absolutely need increased rail safety. It is heartbreaking that our little village 

was the site of this catastrophe but truth is this could have and can happen anywhere. We must improve safety requirements. We must put people over profit. 

As I said we are at 3 miles which means Norfolk Southern has deemed us ineligible for relocation reimbursements. Only allowing inside city limits to temporarily 

relocate. We are East Palestine residents. This is our community. This has turned 

all of our lives upside down. 

We all know the toxic chemicals did not know to stop at 1 mile or to stay inside 

city limits. When the odor is bad in town we know. We can smell it at 3 miles away. 

We need to know that we all matter! Every. Single. One. Of. Us. Not only to Norfolk Southern but to our Federal government! 

As property owners we need options to leave if that’s what we choose to do. As 

of now we are forced to choose between the safety of our families and financial ruin. 

Money. . .if we walk away from our homes we loose all we have worked for. To find 

homes in other areas the cost is more than most of us can afford. If we stay we 

are putting our families at risk of this prolonged exposure. 

107 

We need to feel we are getting true answers. Due to the delayed response from 

our government and not the whole story from Norfolk Southern we do not have faith 

that we are safe. We don’t know who to believe, only our gut instincts to go on and 

mine says if it doesn’t smell right it isn’t safe. 

We are all East Palestine residents no matter where we are from the site and 

the fact that Norfolk Southern was allowed to deem who and what zone could relocate is keeping most of us feeling like hostages. 

BRANDI FOSTER. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I am a concerned parent and resident of East Palestine. My son and I chose this 

town as our forever home about 5 years ago. We have loved every minute of living 

here until February 3rd 2023. Then our lives were flipped upside down. My stress 

and anxiety levels have skyrocketed, my son is afraid to play outside at times, and 

I worry about our health every time my son and I walk into the schools each day. 

My friends and family from Michigan pressure me often to pack up and move out 

of East Palestine. 

Before the derailment I couldn’t imagine raising my son somewhere else. It completely breaks my heart that our small community has been impacted like this, due 

to something that could have been prevented. It now crosses my mind more than 

ever that we may eventually have to leave this village. 

I had so many future plans for us that required us to live, work and go to school 

here in EP. Those futures plans are now in jeopardy of being cancelled. We made 

our lives here, planted our roots here, established my framily here (friends that are 

our family), and am an active member of our community. 

I want our lives back, I want to know for certain that living here in East Palestine is safe for us, I don’t want to leave. 

DANIELLE BUBLITZ. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

My family and I live on East Martin Street, less than 2 blocks from where the 

derailment happened. I witnessed the actual explosion when the derailment happened. It was unlike anything that I have ever seen. We also watched from our front 

porch the train cars catching fire, one by one. I’ve never seen flames move that 

quickly. 

The derailment happened at 9:30 pm, by 11:30 pm we were being told by law enforcement in cruisers using their loud speakers and then law enforcement walking 

on foot, that we had to evacuate. We were fortunate enough to be able to stay with 

family until the evacuation was lifted. 

On Tuesday, February 15th we went back home. Our neighborhood smelled terrible. My husbands place of employment is also right beside the tracks. He is having 

some health problems from being in the area all day. He now has chemical bronchitis which he has to use an inhaler for. 

Changes need to be made on how this chemical is transported. It should not be 

allowed to travel through places where people live. The speed at which the railroad 

had those tracks replaced and the train running was just a slap in the face to everyone that lives in East Palestine. 

Profit over safety—they should be ashamed. 

TABITHA COOK. 

108 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

I don’t think the railways should be hauling hazardous waste through towns in 

the first place. Then to find out they had plenty of desolate areas where they could 

have stopped, knowing there was a problem, is a problem with me. I have a compromised immune system and we’ve been told they found benzene in our outdoor 

spigot. We have to shower elsewhere. This is a big inconvenience. I have a deep 

chesty cough that will not go away and have had many headaches. I think that instead of sending $331M to Ethiopia, the funds should have been spent in our own 

country not just on the oil spill but what about our veterans. This government 

sucks. 

LORI DAUGHERTY. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

My name is Jenna Harris. My family and I live approximately 4.5 miles away 

from ground zero. We had our well water tested on February 23rd, 2023. On March 

14, 2023 the Columbiana County Health District called to let me know that they 

had detected a chemical in our well called bis-2 ethylhexyl phthalate. They also said 

that it was within levels that they felt it was safe. Upon receiving the results, levels 

of benzene were also found. 

I personally went to the Norfolk Southern Family Assistance Center on March 16, 

2023 to show them the results and to ask how they would be helping my family. 

They told me not to drink our water and they had bottled water for me to take 

home. Also, they said if someone from Stantech did not call to discuss the results 

by Sunday to call back. I called Monday because nobody called me to discuss results. 

I got hung up on twice by the Norfolk Southern phone representative. 

Stantech then called me that afternoon and said our well was clean and results 

were good. I explained I had results from the county health district and the results 

were not good. Stantech representative was shocked. He said he would call back to 

schedule another round of well test samples. I called and spoke with another Norfolk Southern representative this morning March 21, 2023, explained the situation 

to him. I am still waiting to hear back from him. 

I am deeply concerned for my family and our health, both acute and long term 

due to the chemical exposure in our water and air. We need help. Thank you. 

JENNA HARRIS. 

Mar 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chairperson, Commerce Committee, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Chair Cantwell: 

My name is Ashley Murphy and I am a lifelong resident of East Palestine. I grew 

up in East Palestine going to preschool at the Methodist Church, going through 

school in the East Palestine school district and graduating in the class of 2006. 

When I was picking what college I wanted to go to, I picked on that was close 

enough for me to be able to still live in East Palestine and commute. Many 18 year 

olds are waiting for the day they get the opportunity to leave their hometown and 

adventure somewhere new, but not me. I have always wanted to stay and live in 

my hometown and eventually raise a family here. East Palestine is a place with 

amazing people who really care about the town and have been working hard to build 

it up to its glory again. There is so much history that this town holds and will continue to make. 

109 

Not only am I a lifetime resident of East Palestine, I am also a teacher at East 

Palestine Elementary School and the East Palestine High School girls and boy’s tennis coach. Ever Since I went to college to become a teacher, I have always wanted 

to work at the school that I went to. It was my time at East Palestine Elementary 

School that made me what to become a teacher. When I had to opportunity to become the high school tennis coach I was happy to be part of my school again. At 

the time, I was not teaching in the school district but by goal was to one day have 

to opportunity to become a teacher in the district. 

This school year, I was able to earn a position in the school district as an intervention specialist working in the elementary school. So this year is my first year 

teaching and my third year as girls and boy’s tennis coach in the district. I have 

been working hard to grow the tennis program here and I went from having 8 players to 13 this season! 

For years, I have been working hard to finally reach my goals of owning my own 

house, my professional goals and in coaching to have it possibly taking away because a train company wanted to save money and not do proper safety checks or 

because the government of the country I live in don’t want to have stricter railroad 

guidelines? 

The night of February 3rd, 2023 is a night that changed many lives forever. The 

feelings that I felt that night and the days after are ones that no one should ever 

feel in their lifetime. Going from having dinner with friends talking about our week 

to the next second running out of the restaurant to wondering if you were going 

to be able to get home and what was going to happen to your town. I will never 

forget seeing the fire from state route 14 and thinking that this could not be real. 

Then driving down marking into town and when I hit the first red light at North 

West Ave which is near my house, the feeling of your heart falling into your stomach because all you see is a tanker car siting stopped at the main railroad crossing 

and just realizing how bad this could be. 

Thankfully, I had a place to go to be safe while the firefighters were doing their 

job but I don’t think anyone from town could sleep that night. Hearing sirens all 

night, jumping at every little sound you heard or waking up suddenly wondering 

if our town and houses would be there in the morning. 

No one should have to feel scared or worry about the town that they live in, the 

house that you own and live in or that your possessions that you cherish will be 

there when you wake up. To make things worse, we wake up and our town and 

houses are still there but then we find out that toxic chemicals and oil were dumped 

into our ground. Then to top it all off, we were evacuated for the chemical release 

to happen to put chemicals and dioxins into the air and soil. 

I understand that accidents and natural disasters happen, but when something 

like this happens because things were over looked by a company that obviously 

cares about money in their own pockets rather than the people of the towns that 

their trains are going through. If a company does not even care about its own workers that help make their company successful, why would they care about anyone 

else? 

Norfolk Southern has made a HUGE mistake and we were the unlucky town who 

got caught in this mistake but we WILL NOT and CAN NOT let them get away 

with this. All we can do at this point is fight for what needs to be done with our 

town to make sure that it is safe for us and our families for years and years to 

come. 

East Palestine deserves to thrive and grow as it was before the derailment happened, it does not deserve to disappear. It makes me angry that Norfolk Southern 

CEO would not show his face to the people of this town until weeks later and only 

on TV. Every single person that has been affected deserves an apology face to face 

from him! 

We all know that Norfolk Southern are going to do everything in their power to 

save as much money as they can and in the end the people of East Palestine are 

going to be the ones hung out to dry. 

Norfolk Southern CEO and the other high ranked people don’t care about what 

we have to deal with daily now. 

They get to go home every night and not have to worry about if their family is 

safe or if they will be safe five or ten years down the road. 

They don’t have to worry about losing property value on a house that you worked 

hard to get, put money into to fix it the way you wanted and to look nice and put 

your hard working money each month into. 

They don’t have to worry about those toxic chemicals and oil getting into your 

wells and contaminating your water. 

They don’t have to worry about if it will be safe to take a bath or brush your teeth 

with the water one day. 

110 

They don’t have to watch an air purifier throughout the day to see if the air is 

clean. 

They don’t have to worry about getting medical tests done years to come to see 

if this accident has affected your future. 

Nothing will be able to take that fear of the unknown away and living daily with 

worry is tiring. Norfolk Southern CEO gets to go home with no worry about safety 

of his life or his future. Instead, he approves plans of just coving up contaminated 

dirt so he can get his trains running like we wouldn’t notice. This just proves that 

he never really cared about East Palestine or the People in the town. 

In the CNN town hall meeting when he was asked about the plan to cover up 

the dirt to put the track down, he stated that it was the company’s environmental 

person who came up with it and approved it. . . . . . . I never went to college for 

science but isn’t it common sense that if chemicals and oil get dumped all of the 

contaminated soil would have to be removed or it would still be there? 

They keep stating that they are helping . . . . . . are they passing out money and 

making it look like they care? Yes. But, not once have I heard how they are going 

to be helping me get my property loss back to a house that I now and will ALWAYS 

own! 

On top of the fear of safety and my health, I have to worry about keeping my 

job as a teacher in the school district. Norfolk Southern needs to take all of the necessary and extra measures to make the people of East Palestine feel safe to stay 

and live her to make sure that the school can survive. This is my 9th year teaching 

and I finally got a teaching position in a school district that I want to retire form. 

I absolutely love my job, co-workers and all of the students. I love the facts that 

I can teach and coach all for the same school that I graduated from. My dream has 

come true! 

Then the derailment happened. 

Many people with and without kids are still questioning the safety of the town 

still to this day. If they do not take ALL necessary steps to make it safe, how are 

we supposed to keep this town alive along with our schools? No teacher in the district should have to worry about losing their job as a result of this derailment and 

Norfolk Southern greed for money over safety. Once you find your dream school district to work in, you shouldn’t have to worry about losing it over something that 

wasn’t in your control. This school district should not have to worry about losing 

students or sports games being forfeiting because of Norfolk Southern mistake. We 

have already suffered enough, the students and teaches should not have to suffer 

more! 

Norfolk Southern needs to be held 100 percent responsible and to be held accountable to make the necessary changes and testing for years and years to come. They 

need to pay for medical testing now and in the future. I think that it is ridiculous 

that were told that we needed to get testing done but it would be going to cost thousands of dollars that we did not know if we would be reimbursed for. Then, to find 

out that if you did want to spend the money to get done, you were told that they 

are not allowed to conduct those tests anymore. I think that it is very fishy that 

Quest Diagnostic did that testing prior to all of this and when the testing results 

would hurt Norfolk Southern, all of a sudden they don’t do it. Then when you look 

at who has stock in Quest Diagnostic you see that it is the same people who have 

stock in Norfolk Southern. . . . . . NOT A SURPRISE!!!! 

The United States government needs to stand up for THE PEOPLE of the United 

States and NOT big money companies. People should be more important than 

money and companies. 

Norfolk Southern should have to continue to test the air and soil quality for years 

to come. They should have been doing soil testing way before March. They should 

have to put in underground filtration systems to make sure that the toxic chemicals 

and oils stay out of our water supply in the City of East Palestine and the wells 

in Unity and Negley. They need to continue this for 5–15 years down the road. Norfolk Southern make the mistake and now they need to make sure it right even if 

it takes 20 years. 

The government also needs to look at improving rail safety. The people of East 

Palestine are stuck in this situation and have to fight everyday but we can also 

fight to make sure that this does not happen again! The people of East Palestine 

are grateful that this did not happen seconds before because this whole situation 

would have been so much worse! 

Trains go though and past so many towns in America, the restrictions and safety 

measures need to be stricter. Trains should be a fun and enjoyable things for adults 

and children. First of all, Trains go way to fast through towns like East Palestine. 

There are multiple times that I have sat at the railroad crossing and with the train 

speeding by and seeing the carrier boxes shacking. There were many times I 

111 

thought about what would happen if the carrier boxes did tip over but never really 

figured it would really happen. To drive a car in downtown East Palestine, the 

speed limit is 25 mph. If cars can only go 25mph, why do trains carrying toxic 

chemicals and other materials get to go any faster? 

Secondly, the train company to have some kind of system to communicate what 

are on the trains that go through the towns so first responders know what they are 

fighting if this happens again. The East Palestine and all of the other fire departments risked their lives not knowing what was in the train cars. 

Third, safety checks and maintenance checks needs to be sticker. This should 

never have happened if good maintenance was done. Trains should be checked multiple times to make sure it is safe. Norfolk Southern needs to put safety as number 

one priority or shut the company down. If restaurants do not keep their kitchen up 

to code, they get shut down but the train companies can do what they want and 

break all the rules but nothing gets changed? Why is it that everyone in America 

has to follow laws and rules but Norfolk Southern doesn’t? 

To the United States Government, please stand up for the people of East Palestine and the people of the United States! Do not allow big money companies like 

Norfolk Southern put our lives in jeopardy in order to put money in their pockets! 

Make them do what is right for the people of East Palestine. 

Make them put in underground water filters to make sure our water is safe. 

Make them pay for medical testing and medical bill if our health is affected. 

Make them listen and follow stricter safety rules and maintenance. 

Make new train regulations and lower speed for trains through towns. 

Please make something good come from this horrible mess that has already affected so many lives and will continue to affect for year to come. 

ASHLEY MURPHY. 

Chair CANTWELL. The hearing will be open for two weeks. The 

Committee will be accepting comments on the Brown-Vance legislation and other proposals to advance rail safety. 

The Senators will have until Wednesday, the 5th of April at noon 

to submit questions for the record to the Committee. The witnesses 

will have two weeks to respond to those questions. OK, we are 

standing with those dates. We are—the Committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:19 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(113) 

A P P E N D I X 

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL

March 21, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, 

Chair, 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. TED CRUZ, 

Ranking Member, 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

RE: Hearing on Improving Rail Safety in Response to the East Palestine Derailment 

Dear Chairwoman Cantwell and Ranking Member Cruz: 

On behalf of the American Chemistry Council, I would like to thank the Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation for holding this hearing on 

Improving Rail Safety in Response to the East Palestine Derailment. The tragic 

events related to the derailment and the impacts on the community of East Palestine, Ohio have understandably raised questions and concerns that this hearing 

can help to address. 

ACC shares the Committee’s goal to advance transportation safety and protect 

public health and the environment. We also share the Committee’s gratitude to the 

emergency responders, government officials, and rail workers for their tireless efforts responding to this incident. 

ACC represents the leading companies in the business of chemistry. Our members 

apply the science of chemistry to provide innovative products and services that 

make people’s lives better, healthier, and safer. As a $517 billion enterprise, the 

business of chemistry is a key element in the Nation’s economy and a major user 

of the U.S. freight transportation system. ACC and its members are committed to 

the safe transportation of hazardous materials throughout the supply chain. As part 

of Responsible Care®, the chemical industry’s world-class environmental, health, 

safety and security performance initiative, our members have invested billions of 

dollars in training, technology, and packaging safety. 

Chemicals are essential for growing food, protecting the safety of our water and 

food supply, producing energy, and making life-saving medicines and equipment. 

From farms to factories, more than 25 percent of the U.S. economy and 4.2 million 

jobs depend on chemistry. The nature and properties of chemicals, including hazardous materials, are typically the very thing that makes them useful. For many 

critical uses, there are no suitable substitutes that can provide the same measure 

of performance. We ship chemicals because the country needs chemicals to support 

virtually every aspect of daily life. 

Railroads are vital to the safe transportation of our products. As stated by the 

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), rail is recognized as the safest land-based 

mode to move large quantities of chemicals over long distances. Mainline rail accidents are down 44 percent since 2000, and rail accident rates involving hazardous 

materials have declined by 78 percent over the same period. But the East Palestine 

incident is a strong reminder that more work is needed to improve safety. We 

should carefully examine the factors that contributed to this derailment and other 

rail incidents and review the emergency response procedures so we can learn from 

them. 

Safety is a shared responsibility between railroads, shippers, and equipment suppliers, along with the Federal government. ACC supports a multi-layered approach 

to hazardous material transportation safety. This includes a range of measures: 

first, to further reduce derailments and other accidents; second, to minimize the risk 

of a rail accident resulting in the release of hazardous material; and third, to 

strengthen emergency response and mitigate the impacts of any hazardous material 

incident that does occur. 

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ACC supports the legislative intent of the Railway Safety Act of 2023 (S. 576) and 

other proposals to further improve the safety of the Nation’s rail network, reduce 

hazardous material risks, and enhance emergency response capabilities. ACC welcomes the opportunity to work with the Committee as it further develops and refines rail safety legislation. 

The following sections highlight specific priorities that ACC supports so that 

chemicals and other hazardous materials can be transported from where they are 

produced to where they are needed—safely and without incident. 

Establishing Federal Standards for Railcar Defect Detectors 

The rail industry and Federal regulators have long recognized the risks posed by 

defective wheel bearings. Railroads have voluntarily installed wayside defect detectors and have committed to do more. Following the East Palestine derailment, increasing and improving the use of these technologies should be a top priority. 

ACC supports the development of Federal regulations for railcar defect detectors. 

Such regulations should address the frequency and placement of detectors, standardized criteria for triggering an alert of a potential failure, and appropriate actions 

to be taken by the rail crew upon receiving an alert. Requirements should be developed through a Federal rulemaking process, be risk-and performance-based, and 

allow for continued technological progress and advancement. 

Improving Tank Car Performance 

Chemical shippers own or lease the rail cars used to ship their products, including 

tank cars equipped with special safety features to help prevent the release of hazardous materials in the event of a rail accident. Tank car performance is critical 

to the safe transportation of these materials. Shippers have made significant investments in recent years to upgrade their fleets and will continue to do so. 

Shippers and tank car owners are in the process of upgrading tank cars used to 

transport Class 3 flammable liquids, replacing cars built to earlier DOT standards 

(DOT–111 cars) with cars built to newer standards (DOT–117 cars). Current law 

mandates a commodity-specific phaseout schedule based on risk-based priorities and 

railcar production capacity. For Packing Group II and III flammable liquids other 

than unrefined petroleum products and ethanol, the current phase out deadline is 

May 1, 2029. 

ACC supports an earlier phaseout deadline. However, we believe that a proposed 

2025 deadline is simply not feasible based on the rail equipment industry’s capacity 

to manufacture new cars and retrofit existing cars to meet DOT–117 standards. 

This could undermine the ability to supply critical materials used to produce food, 

fuels, pharmaceuticals, and construction materials. 

Congress established the current 2029 deadline after extensive collaboration with 

industry partners and a review of all relevant data. ACC supports a similar process 

to establish a new deadline based on current data. 

Supporting Emergency Responders 

It is critical that emergency responders have the information, training, and resources they need to respond to a rail incident, particularly one involving hazardous 

materials. 

Chemical shippers comply with a multitude of Federal regulations, including Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) rules for shipping 

and communicating about hazardous materials. In addition, ACC members support 

communities and local emergency responders through the CHEMTREC® and 

TRANSCAER® programs that provide resources and training to respond to hazardous material transportation incidents. This includes immediate critical response 

information about chemicals and hazardous materials. 

Following the East Palestine derailment, Ohio Governor Mike DeWine raised concerns that state officials were not provided specific information about the hazardous 

materials transported by rail through the state. In fact, most trains carrying hazardous materials do not meet the statutory definition of a high-hazard flammable 

train (49 CFR 171.8) and, therefore, do not trigger Federal requirements for railroads to report specified information about these shipments to State agencies (49 

CFR 174.312). 

ACC supports expanding information sharing requirements to a broader range of 

hazardous material rail shipments. DOT should develop risk-based criteria for additional hazardous material shipments that would be subject to the information reporting requirements currently applicable only to high-hazard flammable trains. 

In addition, ACC supports fully funding PHMSA’s Hazardous Materials Grants 

Program. The grant program is funded by hazardous material registration fees paid 

by both shippers and transportation carriers and supports emergency response planning and training activities. However, the current fee structure currently raises only 

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approximately $23.6 million while the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act 

(IIJA) increased the authorized level of the program to $46.8 million. 

ACC supports Congressional action to replace the current $3,000 statutory fee 

limit with a two-tiered limit of $500 for small businesses and $5,000 for large businesses. This approach would provide flexibility to nearly double the funding emergency response training programs while preventing a disproportionate impact on 

small businesses. 

Conclusion 

ACC supports a comprehensive and data-driven approach to advance the safe 

transportation of hazardous materials by rail. Safety is a shared responsibility, and 

shippers, rail carriers, equipment suppliers, and the Federal government have made 

progress by working together. 

But we can, and must, do more. ACC welcomes the opportunity to collaborate 

with policymakers and our transportation partners to apply the lessons learned 

from the East Palestine derailment so the products of our industry can be delivered 

safely and without incident. 

Sincerely, 

CHRIS JAHN, 

President and CEO. 

cc: Senate Commerce Committee Members 

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1 Read more about AFPM’s commitment to rail safety HERE. [https://www.afpm.org/newsroom/blog/transporting-fuels-and-chemicals-rail-what-afpm-members-do-keep-rail-shipmentssafe] 2See ‘‘Norfolk Southern Railway Train Derailment with Subsequent Hazardous Material Release and Fires’’ Preliminary Report RRD23MR005, issued February 23, 2023. 

AMERICAN FUEL & PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS

Washington, DC, March 29, 2023 

Hon. MARIA CANTWELL, Chair, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

Hon. TED CRUZ, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 

United States Senate, 

Washington, DC. 

RE: Improving Rail Safety in Response to the East Palestine Derailment 

Dear Chair Cantwell and Ranking Member Cruz: 

The derailment of a Norfolk Southern freight rail train on February 3rd, 2023, 

was and continues to be, devasting to the community of East Palestine, Ohio. This 

derailment has understandably raised questions and concerns about rail safety. This 

tragic derailment has rightly led to bi-partisan calls to address the root causes and 

contributing factors that led to this accident to ensure no community faces such a 

preventable disaster again. 

American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) is a trade association representing the United States refining, petrochemical and midstream energy infrastructure industries. AFPM members make the fuels and petrochemicals that make 

modern life possible and keep America moving. To produce these essential goods 

and bring them to market, AFPM members depend on safe and efficient rail transportation to move their feedstocks and products to and from refineries and petrochemical facilities. More than two and half million carloads of fuel and petrochemical feedstocks and products—including crude oil, natural gas liquids, refined 

products, petrochemicals and plastics—move by rail every year. AFPM members 

prioritize the safety of our people, communities and products above everything else, 

and that includes the safety of our products in transit. As freight rail shippers, we 

have made significant investments to support and improve the safety and efficiency 

of the rail transportation system.1

Rail safety is a shared responsibility that includes railroads, rail shippers, emergency responders and the regulatory agencies responsible for oversight. The primary 

goal of rail safety policy is to reduce or eliminate the risk of a derailment from occurring in the first place. In the absence of preventing a derailment, effective rail 

safety policies should also aim to mitigate the consequences of a derailment and aid 

in the emergency response for a derailment. 

AFPM appreciates the time and attention your Committee is devoting to the issue 

of rail safety in the wake of the East Palestine derailment. We share the Committee’s goals of advancing transportation safety and protecting human health and the 

environment. While AFPM supports the legislative intent of the Railway Safety Act 

of 2023 and other similar proposals that seek to improve rail safety, it is critical 

that Congress be guided by facts and data when developing legislation that can impact a wide range of stakeholders and consumers alike. The best, most effective rail 

safety policy to protect families, communities and the environment will require a 

solid grounding in facts and data. Thus, in advancing additional rail safety policies, 

Congress should focus on the specific causes and contributing factors of the East 

Palestine, Ohio, derailment and other rail safety events rather than advancing unrelated measures that could end up stifling rail transportation and leaving root causes 

unaddressed. 

AFPM believes it is important to let the National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB) complete its investigation before rushing to judgement and implementing 

policies that may not effectively address the causes and contributing factors for this 

derailment and that could hamper the rail network. While NTSB is not expected 

to release its’ final report on the incident for many months, NTSB’s preliminary reporting should be viewed as an initial policy roadmap to improve rail safety.2

AFPM believes the following policies and principles, would most effectively improve rail safety and begin to address the specific failure points that led to the catastrophic derailment in East Palestine. 

157 

3The FAST Act includes the Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety Improvement Act of 

2015 (sections 7001-7311), which instructs the U.S. DOT to issue regulations that would require 

Class I railroads to generate accurate, real-time, and electronic train consist information and 

provide that information to first responders, emergency response officials, and law enforcement 

personnel that are involved in the response of an accident involving the rail transportation of 

hazardous materials. (See Pub. L. 114–94.) 4See NTSB Safety Recommendation R–07–004 and -005. 

5See 82 Fed. Reg. 6451, Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ‘‘Hazardous Materials: 

FAST Act Requirements for Real-Time Train Consist Information by Rail’’ published 

January 19, 2017. 

Increasing and Improving the Use of Wayside Detection to Prevent 

Derailments 

Wayside detectors are a valuable diagnostic tool for the rail industry. These detectors collect real-time information on the health of passing rail cars and transmit the 

data back to railroad personnel who can use this information to identify potential 

rail safety issues and intervene to mitigate them before they escalate to the point 

where derailment or other incidents could occur. 

Currently, the frequency and placements of wayside detectors is not regulated by 

the United States Department of Transportation (DOT). In addition, there are no 

official protocols governing when certain wayside detector readings should require 

specific action from a train crew—such as additional inspections, reductions in train 

speed or even full emergency stops to visually inspect cars. The requirements and 

thresholds for when a railroad dispatch center would notify the rail crew operating 

a train of a safety alert, are set by the individual railroads and vary across the industry. In the absence of any uniform DOT standards, this is left to the discretion 

of each railroad’s internal policies. 

The NTSB has already indicated that wayside detectors are a primary focus of 

their preliminary derailment investigation. Installing more wayside detectors across 

freight rail routes that frequently transport hazardous materials would improve the 

quality and frequency of real-time data transmissions and could also enhance safety 

warning systems by helping to identify potential problems earlier and at more regular intervals, enabling more immediate response measures, and hopefully the prevention of rail incidents. 

AFPM believes more wayside detectors, and clear protocols for how wayside readings ought to be responded to, would enhance safety warning systems, and help prevent incidents from occurring. AFPM supports establishing requirements for the installation, maintenance, and placement of wayside defect detectors and guidance 

from DOT over how railroads must respond to specific wayside detector readings 

and communicate that information to railroad operators. 

Providing Emergency Responders with Resources to Effectively Respond to 

Derailments 

It is critical that emergency responders have the training, resources, and information, they need to respond to train derailments, particularly those involving hazardous materials. DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA) implements a Hazardous Materials Grant Program that offers six funding 

streams aimed at improving emergency response to hazardous materials incidents. 

These grant programs are funded by hazardous material registration fees paid by 

both rail shippers and railroads. Although the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs 

Act (P.L. 117–58) increased the authorized level of the program to $46.8 million, the 

current fee structure raises only approximately $23.6 million. AFPM supports efforts to fully fund these programs, including provisions to increase railroads’ commitments to this program as detailed in S.576—the Railway Safety Act of 2023. 

First responders should have the real-time emergency response information they 

need to respond to any rail incident both quickly and safely. Congress and NTSB 

agree on this point. The Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act of 2015 (FAST 

Act (P.L. 114–94)) contained a provision that required DOT to issue a rulemaking 

to ensure the availability of robust real-time emergency response information.3

NTSB has issued DOT a safety recommendation for DOT to require ‘‘that railroads 

immediately provide to emergency responders accurate, real-time information regarding the identity and location of all hazardous materials on a train.’’ 4 DOT started this regulatory process in 2017 with an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, 

but there has been no follow through in the form of an actual proposal despite the 

congressional mandate.5

AFPM supports the completion of this DOT rulemaking process but urges careful 

consideration of changes that would vastly and indiscriminately expand the scope 

of information reporting. Vastly increasing proactive notifications for all hazardous 

material shipments by rail could only serve to overload and burden emergency reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00161 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
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6See US DOT, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Fleet Composition of Rail Tank Cars Carrying Class 3 Flammable Liquids: 2022 Report published September 29, 2022. 7These investments by rail shippers have resulted in significant rail safety improvements. 

Since 2013 the U.S. flammable liquid fleet has realized a 74 percent reduction in Conditional 

Probability of Release, a common measure of tank car puncture resistance, for crude oil, and 

a 60 percent reduction for ethanol. Tank Car Resource Center—Progress 8See US DOT, PHMSA ‘‘Safety Advisory Notice for Tank Cars Equipped with Aluminum 

Manway Protective Housing Covers’’ published March 2, 2023 and NTSB Investigative Update 

published March 2, 2023. 

sponders rather than support emergency response. In addition, unfiltered broadcasting of train manifest information could compromise the security of hazardous 

materials rail shipments. 

Improving Pressure Reliefs Valves to Mitigate the Impacts of Derailments 

Expediting the current phase out of the tank car fleet, as the Railway Safety Act 

of 2023 proposes, would not have prevented the East Palestine derailment. This policy change would pose significant burdens on shippers and consumers and threaten 

refiners, petrochemical manufacturers and ultimately consumers. While railroads 

are quick to point to tank car specifications as their preferred risk reduction method, it is clear derailment prevention would have a greater impact on improving rail 

safety and should be the priority. 

AFPM members prioritize the safety of our people, communities, and products 

above everything else, and that includes the safety of our products in transit. As 

rail shippers, we control the tank cars we own and lease up to the point when we 

offer the railcars into transportation and the railroad assumes control. AFPM members’ tank cars are highly regulated and subject to extensive inspection requirements. We depend on the railroads to operate trains safely, maintain tracks and 

conduct pre-trip inspections of their trains and rail cars loaded onto the tracks. 

AFPM members and other shippers voluntarily began the transition to new state 

of the art ‘‘DOT-117’’ tank cars well before it was required and will continue to transition our tank car fleets in accordance with DOT’s tiered schedule. The DOT schedule is risk-based, and safety driven and was informed by extensive analyses, including consideration of tank car shop capacity. In the FAST Act, Congress considered 

all stakeholder input and data analysis and updated and confirmed the categories 

and schedule for DOT’s risk-based phase out of rail cars. Further, the Bureau of 

Transportation Statistics annually reports on the progress of the fleet upgrade and 

tank car shop capacity.6 To date, shippers have replaced nearly 100,000 tank cars 

with new or retrofitted cars.7

Proposals that expedite the DOT schedule do not adequately consider market realities of tank car shop capacity and supply chain constraints and do not address 

the root causes associated with the East Palestine derailment. AFPM members are 

reporting more than a one-year wait for new car orders and retrofits due to constraints in rail shop capacity. Expediting the timeline without assurance of shop capacity could result in a deficit of tank cars for Class 3 Packaging Groups II and III 

materials moved by rail such as gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, naphtha, methanol, petroleum lubes, heating oil, xylene, styrene, petroleum distillates, octanes, etc. A rail car 

shortage brought about by accelerated, unachievable tank car phase out schedules 

could severely impact the operations of refiners and petrochemical manufacturers 

and potentially contribute to an increase in the price of fuels and other related 

goods that consumers and our economy need. A premature phase out could also shift 

shipments of these materials from rail to highway transportation, further straining 

a market already short on truck drivers and move hazardous materials to a transportation mode with a higher statistical probability of incidents resulting in release. 

Alternatively, a more targeted and risk-based approach to improve tank car safety 

would address the valve housings that both PHMSA, through a safety advisory, and 

NTSB, in their March 2, 2023, Investigative Update, identified.8 While it is important for NTSB to conclude their investigation into the East Palestine derailment 

prior to jumping to any conclusions about what caused the incident, the NTSB’s 

March 2, 2023, Investigative Update indicated that the aluminum covers over tank 

car pressure valves melted or were consumed during the fire after the East Palestine derailment and that melted aluminum was observed around the valves inside 

the protective housing. Following the NTSB’s Investigative Update, PHMSA safety 

advisory encouraged all hazardous materials tank car owners and offerors to survey 

their fleets for any tank cars currently equipped with aluminum protective housings 

and to consider replacing this equipment with carbon steel housings. AFPM supports making this effort mandatory. 

159 

Increasing Competition to Enhance Overall Rail Safety 

It remains clear that more rail competition would enhance safety, as shippers 

would be empowered with options to switch freight rail carriers if they face persistent safety and service concerns from their current freight rail providers. Rail 

shippers count on the railroads to operate trains, maintain safe tracks, conduct preshipment inspections, and deliver essential materials on time and safely. AFPM 

members continue to be extremely vocal and critical of the precision scheduled railroading (PSR) operating model that is widely used by railroads. PSR cost-cutting 

and Class 1 consolidation have compromised rail service, led to significant reductions in the rail workforce, drops in the frequency of service, systemic delays, condensed training schedules, and the deployment of much longer trains. When developing future rail safety initiatives, we urge policymakers must review and determine if PSR-related cuts to employment levels, operational overhead and operational practices could potentially have safety impacts. 

Almost 80 percent of the Nation’s shippers, including most AFPM members, are 

captive to just one railroad. They essentially have no ability to shop for better service. Captive shippers cannot choose another railroad if they do not like the railroad’s 

operating practices. Reciprocal switching would bolster competition and allow shippers to negotiate fair terms in indemnity, liability, and insurance; including terms 

associated with safely shipping cargos. When there is no choice in rail carrier it becomes a ‘‘take it or leave it’’ proposition with no room for shippers to push for better 

safety practices in relation to shipping cargos. AFPM supports consideration and review of how PSR has impacted rail safety. 

Conclusion 

AFPM thanks the Committee for its time and consideration of all stakeholder 

viewpoints on this important effort to improve rail safety. AFPM emphasizes the 

need for maintaining a safe and efficient rail network for the energy and petrochemical industries and the U.S. economy. AFPM shares Congress’s desire to prevent an event like what happened in East Palestine from ever happening again. We 

urge Congress, and this Committee to be guided by the facts and data and pursue 

policies that prioritize eliminating derailments. In the absence of preventing a derailment altogether, effective rail safety policies should also aim to mitigate the consequences of a derailment and aid in the emergency response. 

AFPM and our members appreciate your consideration of our perspective and priorities to bolster rail safety. 

Sincerely, 

ROBERT BENEDICT, 

Vice President, Petrochemicals & Midstream, 

American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR LABORATORY ACCREDITATION

(A2LA) 

The American Association for Laboratory Accreditation (A2LA) is deeply saddened 

by the rail tragedy that occurred in Palestine, OH on February 2, 2023. We hope 

that conditions continue to improve for the citizens of Palestine and the surrounding 

communities and environment. 

We are concerned with the magnitude of this specific incident and the trend of 

train derailments occurring across the Nation. 

The proposed Railway Safety Act of 2023 would rely on inspections as a tool to 

identify equipment and infrastructure failures. We are concerned that the proposed 

act focuses on time as an essential component but not on the quality of the inspection. By requiring high quality, objective inspections conducted by accredited, independent, third-party inspectors, the Railway Safety Act may be strengthened. This 

arrangement will facilitate inspections that are objective and technically robust. 

Current practice is to rely on railway owner inspectors which may not provide the 

objectiveness necessary to assure an effective inspection. 

ISO/IEC 17020 provides the standards for the operation of inspections. The requirements define and document the performance and the competencies needed for 

all personnel involved in inspection activities. They also address equipment needs, 

recordkeeping, inspection procedures, audits and management reviews, impartiality, 

and corrective and preventive actions. 

Accreditation is an objective process that determines the technical competence 

and impartiality of organizations conducting testing and inspections. When an organization is accredited, it has demonstrated that a prescribed level of technical competence has been achieved. Accreditation of inspectors means increasing the conVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00163 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
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fidence in data produced, eliminating redundant reviews, providing a means of 

qualifying contractors, building greater public trust, and redirecting government resources to enforcement and oversight. We recommend that the legislation mandate 

that inspection bodies be ISO/IEC 17020 accredited by an International Laboratory 

Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC)-recognized accreditation body. 

Established in 1978, A2LA provides independent, world-class accreditation programs that inspire confidence in the quality and security of services and acceptance 

of results from our accredited organizations. A2LA, a nonprofit accreditation body 

with over 4000 actively accredited organizations, supports a broad array of industries including food and agricultural testing, environmental, pharmaceutical, aerospace, mining, telecommunications, defense, clinical, consumer products, construction, electrical and automotive. 

A2LA appreciates the opportunity to provide a statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation for this hearing and for the consideration of these remarks. We welcome the opportunity to work with you to establish legislation that can help assure the safety of all Americans and protection of 

the environment, all while providing the safe delivery of passengers and goods. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHUCK BAKER, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN SHORT LINE AND

REGIONAL RAILROAD ASSOCIATION (ASLRRA) 

Introduction 

As president of the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association 

(ASLRRA), the trade association representing the Nation’s 600 small business Class 

II and III freight railroads, commonly known as short line railroads or short lines, 

I submit this testimony for inclusion in the record of this committee’s hearing. 

The short line freight rail industry 

We are America’s first and last mile freight rail service. Short line railroads are 

neither household names nor mentioned frequently in major media outlets, but they 

are critical movers in the Nation’s economy, and they have an outsized impact on 

the communities they serve. These small business entities in total operate nearly 

47,500 route miles, or about a third of the total freight rail network system. Short 

line railroads can be found in 48 states; some are just a few miles long, while some 

run for hundreds of miles. 

Short line railroads handle one in five rail cars moving annually, mostly at origin 

or destination, providing service to over 10,000 customers everywhere from rural 

America to dense urban centers. These railroads are a critical link in the country’s 

supply chain. Our members serve and support nearly every industry, and they are 

particularly vital for the energy, agriculture, minerals, chemical, and manufacturing 

sectors. Short lines are also well-known for their ability to provide custom, tailored, 


322BAKER1.eps
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1The Section 45G Tax Credit and the Economic Contribution of the Short Line Railroad Industry, prepared by PWC for ASLRRA (2018). 

friendly white-glove service to a variety of shippers. Short lines make the extra effort to ensure that rail service for any shipment size is an efficient, reasonably 

priced option for shippers along their route. 

We are small businesses with a big impact. ASLRRA’s freight railroad members are tied to 478,000 jobs nationwide, $26.1 billion in labor income and $56.2 billion 

in economic value-add—providing a service that 10,000 businesses nationwide rely 

upon to get goods and products to market daily.1 Short lines are nearly all small, 

entrepreneurial businesses, with most employing fewer than 30 people, running an 

average of 79 total route miles, and earning an average of $7.7 million or less in 

revenue per year. At the local level, the availability of rail service provided by short 

lines is sometimes the tipping point for manufacturers and shippers deciding to locate in the area, driving new, well-paying jobs particularly in rural and small-town 

America. 

We live and work in the communities we serve. Short lines are owned, managed 

and staffed by individuals who are integral to the fabric of their local communities. 

When they’re not moving goods and freight, short line personnel are at the local grocery store, at the PTA meeting, on the ballfield, and in their houses of worship. Because short lines are small business owners, and they live and work in the communities they serve, safety is more than a good business decision—it is a steadfast personal obligation. 

We have an impressive safety story to tell. According to Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) data, train accident and hazardous material accident rates are down 

42 percent and 71 percent, respectively, since 2000. One indication of short lines’ 

performance is ASLRRA’s annual Jake Safety Award program honoring railroads 

that have had better than industry-average injury frequency rates for person-hours 

worked. Since 2000, an increasing number of short lines have received the ‘‘Jake 

with Distinction’’ designation, indicating zero reportable injuries for the calendar 

year—that was 344 short lines in 2021. In addition to our awards program, 

ASLRRA provides an exhaustive offering of programs and training for short line 

railroad members. 

And our environmental record is strong. The rail industry is a sustainable, environmentally friendly mode of transportation. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

data show freight railroads account for only 0.6 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas 

emissions and only 2.1 percent of transportation-related sources (e.g., trucking, air, 

etc.). Moving freight by rail reduces highway congestion and lowers idling emissions 

and fossil fuel consumption by 75 percent versus trucks. Short lines are committed 

to doing their part, seeking ways to reduce their environmental impact with the implementation of technology and operating practices that reduce emissions. By contrast, regulatory proposals that overshoot the mark would shift freight from rail to 

truck and harm the environment. 

What Rail Safety Discussions Must Recognize in the Wake of the East Palestine Incident 

Since the February 3, 2023 derailment of a Norfolk Southern train in East Palestine, Ohio, a vigorous national discussion has begun about railway safety. 

ASLRRA and its members are eager to participate in this dialogue. Many policy 

ideas have been suggested, and small business short line freight railroads do not 

oppose proposals that make what is already an extraordinarily safe mode of freight 

transportation even safer in a realistically implementable manner. 

Against this national conversation, however, there have been discussions of Precision Scheduled Railroading (PSR), accusations that railroads put ‘‘profits over people,’’ assertions about reductions in the workforce, paid sick leave for employees, 

blocked crossings and long trains. While the relevance of those issues to rail safety 

is questionable, it is unquestionable that those discussions have essentially nothing 

to do with short lines—they concern business decisions and practices that have no 

relevance to short line railroads’ economic or operating model and culture. Accordingly, as rail safety is discussed in Congress and amongst other policy makers, it 

is important to remember the following with relation to short lines: 

Hazmat safety incidents are incredibly rare on short line railroads. Efforts to address concerns over the movement of hazardous materials on freight rail miss the 

mark if they include short line railroads without taking into account short lines’ 

unique operations. Short lines, as one could expect, move relatively short lengths: 

the average length of haul for Class II and III railroads (together) is 38.5 miles— 

not hundreds or thousands of miles. Along these routes, short lines typically operate 

trains at speeds slow enough that in the event of an already rare derailment, a tank 

162 

car is extraordinarily unlikely to be punctured and cause the release of hazardous 

materials. 

• According to FRA data, from 2019 to 2022, the freight rail industry experienced 

51 derailments with a hazardous material release, and only four of those occurred on a short line railroad. Of the 86 cars carrying hazardous materials 

that were in the consist of derailed trains and experienced a release, only four 

cars were on a short line. 

• From 2019 to 2022, short line railroads have run an average of approximately 

122 million train miles per year. Over that four-year period, derailments have 

declined from 298 to 254, derailments involving hazardous material cars have 

declined from 64 to 43, and as noted above, only four derailed cars released hazardous materials in those four years. 

We are committed to getting these numbers—derailments and derailments with 

releases of hazardous materials—to zero and to keep it there, but this overall safety 

context is important to understand before enacting potentially counterproductive 

regulations. 

Short lines are small businesses with limited resources. Short line railroads are 

small enterprises, and efforts to regulate problems in the rail space can impose outsized new burdens and demands on these railroads. It is crucial that any new safety 

requirements be directly relevant to their operations and realistic for a small business to implement. Policymakers should be precise in crafting measures so as to 

avoid instituting unnecessary, disproportionately burdensome demands on small 

business enterprises. A longstanding body of law, including the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act 

(SBREFA), requires that agencies exercise utmost care and discretion in evaluating 

how regulations they promulgate affect small businesses. Congress should heed the 

wisdom of these measures in crafting updates to the current regulatory framework. 

Many small business railroads are not able to comply with costly ‘‘one size fits all’’ 

requirements that may make sense for other, larger entities, and Congress’ ignoring 

this fact could inflict extreme duress and economic harm on a critical sector of the 

freight rail industry—without providing any safety benefit. 

The rail industry is already highly regulated. It is a false choice to suggest that 

the rail industry must now face regulations or continue to operate outside any safety regimen. The rail industry is already highly regulated and was one of the first 

industries to experience Federal oversight nearly 150 years ago. The true choice is 

whether Congress will advance smart, sensible policies that make the network safer 

or impose stark new measures unsupported by science that actually introduce new 

risks onto the freight network. The current regulatory framework consists of the following: 

Federal Railroad Administration Regulations at 49 C.F.R. 

Part 213 Track Safety Standards 

Part 214 Railroad Workplace Safety 

Part 215 Railroad Freight Car Safety Standards 

Part 216 Special Notice and Emergency Order Procedures: Railroad Track, 

Locomotive and Equipment 

Part 217 Railroad Operating Rules 

Part 218 Railroad Operating Practices 

Part 219 Control of Alcohol and Drug Use 

Part 220 Railroad Communications 

Part 221 Rear End Marking Device—Passenger, Commuter and Freight 

Trains 

Part 222 Use of Locomotive Horns at Public Highway-Rail Grade Crossings 

Part 223 Safety Glazing Standards—Locomotives, Passenger Cars and Cabooses 

Part 224 Reflectorization of Rail Freight Rolling Stock 

Part 225 Railroad Accidents/Incidents: Reports Classification, and Investigations 

Part 227 Occupational Noise Exposure 

Part 228 Passenger Train Employee Hours of Service; Recordkeeping and 

Reporting; Sleeping Quarters 

Part 229 Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards 

Part 231 Railroad Safety Appliance Standards 

163 

Part 232 Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other Non-Passenger Trains and Equipment; End-of-Train Devices 

Part 233 Signal Systems Reporting Requirements 

Part 234 Grade Crossing Safety 

Part 235 Instructions Governing Applications for Approval of a Discontinuance or Material Modification of a Signal System or Relief from the Requirements of Part 236 

Part 236 Rules, Standards, and Instructions Governing the Installation, Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train Control Systems, 

Devices, and Appliances 

Part 237 Bridge Safety Standards 

Part 240 Qualification and Certification of Locomotive Engineers 

Part 241 United States Locational Requirement for Dispatching of United 

States Rail Operations 

Part 242 Qualification and Certification of Conductors 

Part 243 Training, Qualification, and Oversight for Safety-Related Railroad 

Employees 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Regulations at 49 

C.F.R. 

Part 105 Hazardous Materials Program Definitions and General Procedures 

Part 106 Rulemaking Procedures 

Part 107 Hazardous Materials Program Procedures 

Part 109 Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Procedural 

Regulations 

Part 110 Hazardous Materials Public Sector Training and Planning Grants 

Part 130 Oil Spill Prevention and Response Plans 

Part 171 General Information, Regulations, and Definitions 

Part 172 Hazardous Materials Table, Special Provisions, Hazardous Materials Communications, Emergency Response Information, Training Requirements, and Security Plans 

Part 173 Shippers—General Requirements for Shipments and Packagings 

Part 174 Carriage by Rail 

Part 178 Specifications for Packagings 

Part 179 Specifications for Tank Cars 

Part 180 Continuing Qualification and Maintenance of Packagings 

Transportation Security Administration Regulations at 49 C.F.R. 

Part 1520 Protection of Sensitive Security Information 

Part 1570 General Rules 

Part 1572 Credentialing and Security Threat Assessments 

Part 1580 Freight Rail Transportation Security 

The Federal Railroad Administration, the Pipelines and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration and the Transportation Security Administration are also already taking action on a host of new regulatory measures. The chief rail safety oversight agency, the FRA, is in the midst of a broad campaign of regulatory activity. 

These efforts include the following: 

• Emergency Escape Breathing Apparatus (Supplementary NPRM announced by 

FRA on March 8, 2023); 

• Amendments to Locomotive and Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 

(NPRM scheduled for 2023); 

• Railroad Noise Emission Compliance (NPRM scheduled for August 2023); 

• Train Crew Staffing (NPRM issued July 2022; Final rule scheduled for 2024); 

• Dispatcher Certification (NPRM scheduled for 2023); 

• Signal Employee Certification (NPRM scheduled for 2023); 

• Miscellaneous Amendments to Federal Glazing Standards (NPRM published 

April 2022); 

• Amendments to the Freight Car Safety and Reflectorization Standards (NPRM 

published July 2022); and 

164 

• Training, Qualification, and Oversight for Safety-Related Railroad Employees 

(NPRM published October 2022). 

FRA is also engaged in extensive activity through its Rail Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) to explore future regulations, which includes efforts on track safety 

standards, roadway worker protection, use of electronic devices, Confidential Close 

Call Reporting (C3RS), practices to maximize alertness and reduce fatigue, critical 

incident stress plans/Part 272 amendments, and wayside detectors (which is expected to be announced at an upcoming March 27, 2023 RSAC meeting). 

FRA’s sister agency in the hazardous materials space, the Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), is also busy and engaged in the 

following rulemakings: 

• FAST Act Requirements for Real-Time Train Consist Information by Rail 

(ANPRM issued January 2017, NPRM scheduled for 2023); 

• Hazardous Materials: Advancing Safety of Highway, Rail, and Vessel Transportation (NPRM scheduled for 2023); and 

• Hazardous Materials: Improving the Safety of Transporting Liquefied Natural 

Gas (NPRM scheduled for 2023). 

Meanwhile, the Transportation Security Administration, which has jurisdiction 

over railroads on security matters, is currently working on rulemakings covering 

short lines related to the Vetting of Certain Surface Transportation Employees 

(NPRM scheduled for 2023) and Cyber Risk Management (ANPRM issued in 2022 

and NPRM scheduled for 2023). 

From within this list of existing regulatory activity, several items have nonetheless been re-proposed as legislative initiatives in recent weeks, including proposals 

on mandatory crew size and C3RS. We urge policymakers to avoid adding a layer 

of redundancy with proposals that are already underway and are being reviewed 

and considered through the administrative process. 

New policies should advance only if they focus on safety problems that truly warrant further action. ASLRRA supports efforts to address recognized safety hazards 

presented by the incident in East Palestine. But many ideas that have been brought 

forward or recycled in recent weeks have no relationship to the February 3 derailment, like requiring railroads to hire additional personnel when no hazard has been 

identified that would be mitigated through the hiring of those personnel. Support 

for mandating crew size for the first time in the 195-year history of railroading is 

untethered to any actual safety data or solid scientific statistics that show how hiring requirements improve safety, and it is out of step with domestic short line experience, passenger and commuter rail experience, and international experience. 

Finally, new policies should do no harm. ASLRRA urges policymakers to avoid exacerbating problems in the wake of East Palestine. Hiring mandates that force 

small business railroads to put scant funds toward adding unnecessary personnel 

means they must divert resources from actual safety upgrades, such as track upgrades. Exorbitant fines detached from reasonable deterrence needs can put small 

business railroads into bankruptcy. Many ill-advised proposals like these are now 

on the table, and their implementation will mean more heavy freight and hazardous 

materials will end up moving on the highway, which is more detrimental to our environment, more dangerous to motorists, more likely to gum up the supply chain, 

and undeniably proven to inflict more damage America’s already worn-out roads. 

Sensible Policy Proposals Responsive to Actual Safety Concerns 

Ensure the NTSB’s findings inform any policymaking. As part of this hearing, this 

panel is taking testimony from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 

which is uniquely tasked with leading investigative activities and will present in the 

months to come what we expect will be a thorough assessment of its findings, likely 

including what could have caused and prevented the February 3 derailment. Advancing major policies without having a robust discussion on that report would be 

premature. 

Include Class 2 flammable gases within the definition of High-Hazard Flammable 

Trains (HHFTs). It would be reasonable to include within the definition of HHFTs 

certain trains carrying a combination of loaded Class 3 flammable liquids and Class 

2 flammable gases. It would be problematic, however, to include within the definition of HHFTs any train carrying even a single car of any type of hazardous material—this would encompass a huge percentage of all trains moving, stretch the definition of ‘‘high hazard’’ beyond reason, and set the stage for overly burdensome restrictions for no safety benefit. 

Require hot box detectors for certain trains. It may be reasonable to create a requirement for hot box detectors or other wayside detectors or on-board sensors withVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00168 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
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in the current HHFT regulatory framework (e.g., requiring detectors on routes routinely hosting trains that are also traveling in excess of 30 mph) or on certain key 

routes carrying substantial amounts of hazardous materials over certain speeds. It 

would be problematic, however, to require new wayside fault detectors like hotbox 

detectors on any route carrying any train carrying any hazardous materials at even 

low speeds, as hundreds of short line railroads would be required to install the expensive devices but would achieve no new safety benefit and mitigate no meaningful 

risk. This would be existentially threatening for some short lines, for no safety benefit. 

Phase out older tank cars. It may be reasonable and responsive to East Palestine 

to expedite the FAST Act-mandated phasing out of certain older tank cars. 

Support the Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS). It may be reasonable to require some sort of rulemaking on the C3RS framework, and indeed, as 

noted above, there is already an RSAC effort underway on the topic. A C3RS mandate is unnecessary, however, as all of the largest railroads are now already in the 

program. The program should remain voluntary. A rulemaking to develop the program could still be beneficial, for example, so that proper parameters could be instituted to preclude employees from using the program to evade proper discipline. 

Avoid punitive fine increases for short lines. While it may be politically attractive 

to update maximum fine levels, we can state that as far as short lines are concerned, they have established a long record of being good corporate citizens who are 

more than willing to cooperate with regulators and focus on safety and community 

relations—there is no call to threaten them with dramatically increased fines. Updates to fines should only reflect inflation and must account for the significantly 

negative effect a large fine could have on a small railroad. 

Increase funding for research and development at FRA and PHMSA and increase 

funding for certain inspection activities at FRA. It may be reasonable to increase resources for FRA for certain safety-advancing activities. For short lines, the most significant source of derailments is simply problematic track infrastructure, so inspection activities such as track geometry cars are at least responsive to a realistic safety risk. 

Direct USDOT and FRA to target CRISI funds for freight rail safety. The Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements Program (CRISI) has been instrumental in repairing, updating and rebuilding aging and outdated rail facilities— 

especially for short line freight railroads. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs 

Act (IIJA) significantly increased the funds available for CRISI. As Congress begins 

to consider priorities for Fiscal Year 2024 spending measures, Congress should fully 

fund this program with annual appropriations at the full authorized level of 

$1,000,000,000 per year, and resources should be targeted toward freight rail safety 

needs—not toward passenger rail expansion efforts, which are largely unrelated to 

freight rail safety and are better addressed through other well-funded programs in 

IIJA. Again, for short lines, track, roadbed and structures challenges (rail, joint 

bars, track geometry, switches, roadbed, etc.) are the most common cause of 

derailments, so investments to help short lines rehabilitate that track are the most 

effective safety actions available. 

Provide resources for short lines to join the AskRail program. AskRail is a safety 

app made available by the Class I railroads through the Association of American 

Railroad’s technology subsidiary, Railinc. The undertaking provides real-time information to first responders regarding the contents of railcars. Some short line railroads lack the resources and technical systems to join the program but would welcome resources to participate, recognizing, of course, that short line railroads 

present little hazardous material safety threat as is. 

Provide resources for efforts like RailPulse. RailPulse is an undertaking designed 

primarily to give freight railroads and rail shippers visibility into the real-time location of railcars, which would help improve supply chain visibility and performance. 

The RailPulse roadmap also involves installing a variety of other asset health sensors onto railcars beyond GPS, such as accelerometers and door status monitoring. 

This program could be expanded to include thermal, acoustic, visual and vibration 

sensors to monitor car components, such as for integrity of wheels and axles, possibly providing a dramatically improved method of constant monitoring of the safety 

of railcars. A policy statement and support for a significant funding infusion could 

provide key momentum to expand RailPulse. 

Provide increased resources for the Short Line Safety Institute (SLSI). FRA has 

been funding this effort annually at $2,500,000 per year for several years now 

through its research and development budget. Congress recommends to FRA that 

it do so through appropriations report language each year. The core service SLSI 

delivers is safety culture assessments. SLSI has now completed 121 safety culture 

assessments and touched over 12,000 railroaders. SLSI conducts leadership developVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00169 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
166 

1There was also a Zoom conference with the Members on March 2, 2023 and the NSR Employees continued to confirm that they were indeed working at the derailment site, performing 

the work of cleaning up and track restoration and reconstruction work. Some Members noted 

that they were required to work in location(s) in immediate proximity and even past the ‘‘blue 

building’’, which was later determined to be the area where the chemicals had been spilled and 

where there was a controlled burn of the vinyl chloride. 

ment training as well. SLSI has also successfully applied for PHMSA grants to expand its offerings to include Hazardous Materials Instructor Training (HMIT) and 

Assistance to Local Emergency Response Training (ALERT). SLSI is also the entity 

that facilitates short line participation in C3RS. With increased funding, SLSI could 

expand its offerings and capabilities in various ways: 

• New safety trains. SLSI has rented an older ‘‘safety train’’ to conduct some 

hands-on field training. The train consists of three or four rail cars, but SLSI 

does not own the cars. With additional resources, SLSI could acquire its own 

trains and expand its service to railroaders and emergency responders. 

• New mobile training facilities. SLSI is leasing a mobile trailer specifically designed for hazardous materials training—both classroom and hands-on. Additional funding would allow for more facilities to be available to reach more railroads and first responders across the country. 

• Support C3RS. With more resources, SLSI could provide more analysis and reporting for those railroads participating in the C3RS effort, especially as that 

number increases. 

• Launch a community standard of care training program. SLSI could begin what 

would be considered a ‘‘community standard of care’’ training program that 

would instruct short lines on how to interact and care for a community should 

a safety incident occur. 

Conclusion 

ASLRRA appreciates the committee’s close attention to the items we have noted 

in our statement, and we welcome future opportunities to work together on these 

matters. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TONY CARDWELL, PRESIDENT, BROTHERHOOD OF

MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES DIVISION/IBT 

1. I am the President of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (BMWED/IBT). 

2. BMWED represents Employees working in the craft or class of Maintenance of 

Way Employee, employed by most of the freight railroads in the United States, including Norfolk Southern Railway (NSR) and the other Class I railroads, Amtrak, 

and major commuter railroads as well as some regional and short line railroads. 

3. BMWED represents the NSR Maintenance of Way Employees that performed 

derailment clean-up and the related track reconstruction/restoration work at the 

East Palestine derailment site to restore NRS’s rail services. 

4. Within days of the February 3, 2023 derailment at East Palestine, I received 

numerous phone calls from the NSR Maintenance of Way Employees who reported 

concerns about their health and safety due to the potential exposure to toxic chemicals, including vinyl chloride, while working at the East Palestine derailment site 

performing clean-up or track reconstruction/restoration work. I committed to contacting NSR officials about the safety of the working conditions at the derailment 

site. 

5. When I contacted NSR officials and expressed the NSR Maintenance of Way 

Employees concerns about their potential exposure to hazardous chemicals while 

working at the derailment site the NSR officials stated that none of the BMWEDrepresented Maintenance of Way Employees were assigned to work at the East Palestine derailment site. NSR also stated that the Employees did not assist in the 

clean up and performance of track reconstruction/restoration work following the derailment. NSR’s statement was perplexing given the numerous calls I had received 

from the Members stating they had worked at the derailment site or that they 

would be working at the derailment site. I made several different phone calls with 

various BMWED representatives to determine if NSR did not actually assign any 

of its Maintenance of Way Employees to perform work at the East Palestine derailment site. 

Ultimately, BMWED conducted a Zoom conference on February 22, 2023 1 with 

several NSR Employees. Contrary to what NSR officials told me, these NSR Maintenance of Way Employees stated they worked at the East Palestine derailment site. 

167 

These Employees also described the types of work that they performed, that there 

was indeed strong chemical smells and fumes at the worksite, that there was black 

smoke at the worksite that often came into the areas where they were working, that 

there were chemical residues (iridescent sludge) on different surfaces and track materials where they were working, and that they were not offered personal protective 

equipment (PPE) that are designed for more safely performing work in and around 

hazardous chemicals, such as full-face hazardous chemical respirators, hazardous 

material suits, rubber overboots and rubber gloves, but that outside contractor 

workers and emergency medical services workers were wearing such PPE while 

working at the derailment site. 

Additionally, several of these Members reported experiencing multiple health 

symptoms since working at the East Palestine Derailment site, including nausea, 

diarrhea, migraines, shortness of breath, skin irritation and irritation of the eyes. 

In fact, I recently received a report that a NSR Maintenance of Way Worker that 

worked at the derailment site and who reported experiencing numerous symptoms 

while working at the derailment site, and continues to experience shortness of 

breath, sought medical care to ‘‘establish a baseline’’ of their health for the purpose 

of monitoring any potential long-term impacts on their health from potential exposure to hazardous chemicals at the derailment site. This Employee stated that he 

worked at the East Palestine derailment site for nearly four (4) days without being 

advised of any dangers of being exposed to hazardous chemicals or the necessity for 

wearing personal protective equipment. It came as no surprise that this Employee 

was unfortunately diagnosed with chemical exposure and dyspnea (shortness of 

breath, inability to fully fill one’s lungs). This Employee is scheduled to have an additional examination performed by a pulmonary doctor that specializes in chemical 

exposures. My hope is that this Employee was misdiagnosed and that he does not 

have any long-term impacts on his health. However, given that over one million gallons of hazardous materials and substances were released because of the East Palestine derailment, and given that the NS Maintenance of Way Employees did indeed 

work at the East Palestine derailment site where these chemicals were released, I 

anticipate additional concerning diagnoses for this Employee and others. 

Following the February 22, 2023, Zoom conference with the NSR Maintenance of 

Way Employees, I contacted NSR about the safety of the Employees’ working conditions. During my conversation with NSR at this time, I demanded an in-person 

meeting in the immediate future to discuss the safety of the Employees at the derailment site. NSR initially stated that they would not have time to meet for at 

least one (1) week to discuss this issue. It took me telling NSR that the Employees 

have serious concerns for their health and safety, that working at the derailment 

site posed a serious, imminent danger to these 

Employees and that we would withdraw services (i.e., engage in a safety strike) 

if NS did not address these issues. NS answered several questions and concerns at 

that moment, guaranteed the Employees’ safety to work at the jobsite and ultimately agreed to meet in person on Monday, February 27, 2023, at their corporate 

headquarters in Atlanta. 

When we met in person on February 27, 2023, I and American Rail System Federation General Chairman Jonathan Long, raised several questions and concerns of 

the Members about their potential exposure to chemicals at the derailment site. 

NSR officials insisted that the Employees were safe. NSR also stated that CTEH 

(the outside environmental contractor NSR used at the derailment site) had authority and was responsible for making determination about safety of the work location 

and any PPE the Employees may have needed to work safely at the derailment site. 

We asked NSR if they had any formal procedures or protocols for ‘‘checking into and 

out’’ of the derailment site given the hazardous chemicals and NSR again stated 

that CTEH was authorized and responsible for such. We also asked if NSR if they 

had any sort of ‘‘markers’’ or ‘‘barriers’, such as caution tape or fencing, for identifying any hazardous areas that were/may be unsafe for the Employees to work due 

to the spilled chemicals. NSR stated that the ‘‘barrier’’ was a blue building but that 

no Employees were ever required to work near or past such ‘‘barrier’’. NSR’s response was essentially that the Workers were never near hazardous chemicals and 

that there was no PPE for such because CTEH made such determination. This is 

rather nonsensical, especially given the reports from the Employees that there were 

near hazardous chemicals, the volume of chemicals that were spilled and burned at 

that location, and the evidence that shows CTEH employees had specialized PPE 

on the jobsite. The Union believes that given the chaos at the time of the derailment, the dearth of information about the situation, the frantic efforts to control the 

spill, and the drive to restore service quickly, NSR should have erred on the side 

of safety for its workers. A responsible company that cared about its employees 

would have provided them with the most protective PPE possible, looking out for 

168 

the possibility that a worst-case scenario might come to pass. Instead, as with so 

many other things, NSR just assumed that the best case scenario would ensue, and 

it sent our Members into work at the site in their regular work clothes as if this 

was an ordinary derailment with no toxic chemicals released. 

6. Railroad Workers are a rare group of people. They take pride in the work they 

perform, and many especially pride themselves on their ‘‘grit’’ and ‘‘toughness’’ to 

endure the extreme challenges that railroading imposes upon them. But these NS 

Employees, took exception to the safety of their working conditions at East Palestine, and they now have concerns for their long-term health and fear of losing 

their employment for coming forward. These Employees must have their long-term 

health protected by NSR, NSR CEO Alan Shaw must publicly make such commitment and be held to such. NSR must also be held responsible for ensuring the immediate and long-term health and well-being of these Employees and their families. 

Additionally, these employees must be protected from retaliation by NSR in response to their reporting their safety and health concerns, and in response to the 

Union reporting their safety and health concerns. Mr. Shaw must also make a public commitment not to retaliate against these employees because of their actions and 

the actions of their Union. 

7. NSR must commit to improving the safety of its workplace, through serious investment in adequate staffing, serious investment in its track structure and rolling 

stock/operating equipment in an amount that exceeds their investments in their 

shareholders and executives’ stock-buy backs and dividends. NSR, as well as all 

other Class I railroads, must abandon its reckless cost-cutting business model that 

has resulted in obscene profits for Wall Street Hedge Fund activist ‘‘value extraction’’ investors, rail executives and shareholders, in the face of numerous senseless 

accidents and seriously diminished rail services and at the expense of the railroads’ 

customers, the American public, the Workers and their families. 

Respectfully, 

TONY D. CARDWELL, 

President. 

BMWED. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JONATHAN LONG, GENERAL CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN RAIL

SYSTEM FEDERATION OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES

DIVISION/IBT 

1. I am the General Chairman of the American Rail System Federation of the 

Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (BMWED/IBT). 

2. BMWED represents employees working in the craft or class of Maintenance of 

Way Employee employed by most of the freight railroads in the United States, including Norfolk Southern Railway (NSR) and the other Class I railroads, Amtrak, 

and major commuter railroads, and some regional and short line railroads. 

3. As General Chairman of the ARSF, I represent the NSR Maintenance of Way 

Employees that performed derailment clean-up and the related track reconstruction/ 

restoration work at the East Palestine derailment site to restore NSR’s rail services. 

4. Following the derailment, I received multiple phone calls from the NSR Maintenance of Way Employees that were working and that had worked at the East Palestine derailment site performing clean-up or track reconstruction/restoration work. 

These Employees reported concerns about the safety of their working conditions at 

the derailment site due to the hazardous chemicals, including vinyl chloride, that 

were being burned or that had spilled onto the ground. I committed to contacting 

NSR officials about the safety of the working conditions at the derailment site. 

When I contact NSR about the Maintenance of Way Employees’ safety while working at the derailment site, the NSR official stated that I had his word that no Employees would be put in harm’s way. Despite this commitment, I continued to receive inquiries from Members that were working at the derailment site and who 

were very seriously concerned about their safety. After several internal discussions 

with multiple BMWED-representatives, it was determined that a Zoom conference 

call with the NSR Maintenance of Way Employees was necessary to ascertain precisely what had transpired and what was taking place at East Palestine. 

5. BMWED conducted two (2) Zoom conferences with several of the BMWED-represented NSR Employees that worked at the East Palestine derailment site. The 

first Zoom conference was held on February 22, 2023, and the second Zoom conference was held on March 2, 2023. The NSR Employees confirmed during these 

Zoom conferences that they were assigned to work at the derailment, and they described their experiences working at the derailment, all of which indicated that their 

169 

conditions were unsafe. Their experiences of working at the derailment site are 

shocking to say the least. Several of the Employees stated that they were involved 

in the performance of removing damaged track, performing grading work, installing 

new track panels, surfacing and regulating ballast for the purpose of providing a 

safe roadbed and track surface for the trains to travel safely on once the tracks were 

temporarily rebuilt, fueling equipment that was used to perform such work, etc. 

Multiple Employees reported they were near the area of the ‘‘controlled burn’’ of the 

vinyl chloride, and that there was obnoxious smelling black smoke at the work site. 

All the NSR Employees reported that they were not offered any personal protective 

equipment, such as full face hazardous chemical respirators (i.e., respirators that 

cover the eyes, mouth and nose with canisters that are rated for toxic fumes),, 

hazmat suits, rubber overboots, rubber gloves, etc. designed for working more safely 

around hazardous materials while working at the derailment site. Several of the 

NSR Employees reported the outside contractor employees, and emergency medical 

service (EMS) workers wore such PPE, including full-face hazardous chemical respirators, hazmat suits, rubber overboots and rubber gloves while working at the derailment site. Many of the NSR Employees, did report that NSR displayed a small 

supply of N95 particulate respirators and some half-mask particulate respirators 

and told the Employees that they could wear them if they wanted to. But these respirators are not made for protecting the Workers from exposure to toxic fumes but 

are instead meant to prevent particles such as dust from being inhaled. Workers 

also reported not being provided a means for washing their hands so that they could 

eat with clean hands during quick meal breaks at or near the derailment site. Multiple NSR Employees reported working in or very close to an ‘‘iridescent sludge’’ that 

had a very strong, obnoxious gaseous odor. These Employees also reported that the 

iridescent sludge saturated their work boots, clothing, and gloves, and that they had 

to dispose of such items because they were ruined by such saturation and exposure. 

After not being provided hazmat personal protective equipment or a means for 

washing their hands, many of the Workers reported experiencing multiple health 

symptoms since working at the derailment. These symptoms included migraines, 

shortness of breath, skin irritation, irritation of the eyes, nausea, and diarrhea. Several of the Workers reported that they continued to experience these symptoms for 

multiple weeks following the derailment; several are still receiving breathing therapy. Additionally, all the Workers reported their concerns about how the exposure 

to the chemicals at the derailment would impact their long-term health. 

6. BMWED solicited a list of questions to NSR officials regarding the Members’ 

exposure to these chemicals and had follow-up conversations with NS officials. I 

submitted those questions on February 24, 2023. NSR did not answer the questions 

submitted to it as of March 21, 2023, and the information NSR officials provided 

conflicted with the reports received from the Workers. BMWED eventually received 

information from the Membership that high-ranking NSR officials would be conducting a meeting with those Maintenance of Way Employees that worked at the 

East Palestine Derailment as well as their hazardous material contractor, CTEH. 

I as well as BMWED representatives Heath Vezza and Reese Saulter attended this 

meeting and during such, NSR officials and CTEH representatives stated that the 

Employees were not exposed to any hazardous chemicals while working at the derailment site. These officials and representatives went on to state that the vinyl 

chloride evaporated and was not in the ground where they worked, or that the air 

quality was safe where the Employees were when the vinyl chloride was burned. 

Ultimately, these representatives stated that the Employees were exposed to no 

dangers or hazards from the vinyl chloride that was spilled from the tank cars into 

the ground where the Employees worked or in the air during the ‘‘controlled burn’’. 

Some of the Employees asked why the residents of East Palestine were evacuated 

from the town during the controlled burn if they were not in danger. 

7. Although NSR and CTEH claimed the Employees were not exposed to toxic gasses, our Members reported smelling gasses at the site. We also don’t know how NSR 

and CTEH can be so certain that there was no exposure when numerous toxic 

chemicals were spilled at the site and mixed together. Also, while vinyl chloride may 

evaporate when exposed to the air, our Members were disturbing the ground where 

they worked, some were assigned to remove inches of chemical drenched roadbed/ 

soil and after they did, liquid at the site pooled up in puddles or ‘‘sludge’’ on the 

ground after the ballast (rocks) and soil above was removed. We also received reports that CTEH employees were holding some sort of air sampling device supposedly to protect our Members when they were working, but the CTEH employee(s) 

was apparently not paying attention and it was noticed that the device was registering in the ‘‘red’’ where our Members were working, and they were then told to 

leave where they were working immediately. So if there was no danger to our Members, why were residents told to evacuate? Residents may have been exposed to 

170 

fumes in the ambient air, but our members were working at the site, walking 

through puddles and mud contaminated with chemicals. If it was hazardous for residents to be in the general area of the spill, wasn’t it dangerous for NSR employees 

to be working at the spill site? And if there was no danger to the Maintenance of 

Way Employees, why were other workers at the site given substantial PPE, industrial respirators and hazmat gear? But here is the ultimate question—given the 

chaos at the time, the short time frame and frantic efforts to control the spill, 

shouldn’t NSR have erred on the side of safety for its Workers? Perhaps the vinyl 

chloride evaporated by the time our members arrived on the scene, but perhaps not. 

Perhaps the chemicals mixing together in unpredictable ways and amounts did not 

cause greater danger than if it was a single chemical or the chemicals were kept 

apart. Perhaps having the ground so soaked with chemicals that more liquid pooled 

up when a top layer of roadbed/soil was removed did not create new exposure after 

the chemicals initially evaporated. But wouldn’t a responsible company that cared 

about its Employees have provided them with the best PPE in case all those perhaps’ did not turn out to be so? Instead NSR cavalierly sent our members into work 

at the site in their regular work clothes as if this was an ordinary derailment with 

no toxic chemicals. Even if NSR is ultimately shown to be correct in what it assumed, it could not have known for sure; instead, it played toxic gas Russian Roulette with its Maintenance of Way Workers. 

8. BMWED has received statements from its Members who were present and 

worked at the East Palestine derailment site. The intention was for these Employee 

statements to be shared with the Committee, but the Employees have since requested that their statements not be shared, even with their identities and certain 

details redacted, due to grave fears of retaliation by NSR, which I will address such 

in further detail below. 

9. Given what happened, I wrote to the of Mayor of the City of East Palestine, 

Mr. Trent Conaway, Governor of the State of Ohio, Mr. Mike DeWine, U.S. Secretary of Transportation, Mr. Pete Buttigieg and Administrator to the Federal Railroad Administration, Mr. Amit Bose, to describe the misfeasance of NSR with respect to its Employees. Copies of those letters are attached to this statement. The 

Members’ concern for fear of retaliation were validated, because shortly following 

the General Chairman’s letter to NSR, the General Chairman received reports from 

Members that a high-ranking official from NSR had told all NSR Division Engineers 

and Track Supervisors that if ‘‘the Union wanted a war, we will give them a war’’, 

and further told these management personnel to ‘‘treat the East Palestine Workers 

like gold’’ when it came to their concerns about the safety of their working conditions but to perform audits on the NSR Maintenance of Way Employees and ‘‘handle 

it accordingly’’. The implication was that managers were to go hunting through 

records and closely reviewing employee actions to look for potential violations that 

would not ordinarily be sought out in order to effect retribution on them because 

of the efforts of their union to protect their welfare. I was also advised that this 

same high-ranking NSR official told these management personnel that they are not 

to speak to any of the BMWED’s ARSF Union representatives as they have historically done for resolving disputes on the property and that only NSR Labor Relations 

personnel could have such discussions. Additionally, during this NSR call, the 

names of the ARSF Union representatives were announced so that every manager 

knew their names and to avoid engaging with them accordingly. These instructions 

were allegedly given to the NSR management personnel via a conference call on 

March 3, 2023. 

10. There is no question that NSR Maintenance of Way Employees worked at or 

near the East Palestine derailment site. There is also no question that these Employees were not provided PPE equivalent to the PPE worn by the outside contractor workers and EMS workers that were at the derailment site. There is no 

doubt that there were toxic chemicals present in the environment when these Employees worked tirelessly to help clean up the derailment site and restore the track 

structure at East Palestine—NSR’s derailment resulted in ‘‘. . .over one million gallons of hazardous materials, hazardous substances, hazardous wastes, and/or other 

harmful pollutants into Ohio’s air, streams, rivers, soil, and groundwater. . .’’ right 

where these NSR Employees worked. These Employees now fear for their long-term 

health after working at the derailment site and they fear for their livelihood for 

raising concerns about the safety of their working conditions. All NSR Maintenance 

of Way Employees that performed work at the East Palestine derailment site must 

be protected from retaliation. NSR CEO Alan Shaw must publicly make such commitment and be held to such. NSR must also be held responsible for ensuring the 

immediate and long-term health and well-being of these Employees and their families. NSR must commit to improving the safety of its workplace, through serious investment in adequate staffing, serious investment in its track structure and rolling 

171 

1https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/safety-culture.html 

stock/operating equipment in an amount that exceeds their investments in their 

shareholders and executives’ stock-buy backs and dividends. Therefore, NSR must 

abandon its reckless cost-cutting business model that has resulted in obscene profits 

for Wall Street Hedge Fund activist ‘‘value extraction’’ investors, rail executives and 

shareholders, in the face of numerous senseless accidents and seriously diminished 

rail services and at the expense of the railroads’ customers, the American public, 

the Workers and their families. 

Respectfully, 

J. B. LONG, 

General Chairman, 

ARSF. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL

Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz and members of the Committee, the National Safety Council (NSC) appreciates the opportunity to submit these comments 

to improve railroad workplace safety. NSC was founded by the business community 

to improve workplace safety over 100 years ago. We continue to support safe and 

healthy workplaces, consulting with hundreds of workplaces each year—including 

high hazard workplaces—and we are honored to share our learnings with the Committee here today. 

NSC is America’s leading nonprofit safety advocate and has been for more than 

100 years. As a mission-based organization, we work to eliminate the leading causes 

of preventable death and injury, focusing our efforts on the workplace and roadway. 

We create a culture of safety to keep people safer at work and beyond so they can 

live their fullest lives. Our more than 13,000 member companies represent employees at nearly 41,000 U.S. worksites. 

Despite differences among business operations, there are key factors that are common among safety programs. NSC believes that optimum safety performance requires strong Safety Management Systems (SMS) and an organizational culture 

that prioritizes high safety standards, incident prevention and preparedness. Of 

course, continual improvement and learning must be fully integrated into any safety 

program. 

America’s rail operators, like other industries with similar risk profiles, need to 

have strong safety and health programs that address: 

• Personal safety—employees and teams 

• Contractor safety—critical partners in safe operations and maintenance 

• System safety—assets, infrastructure, operating systems, maintenance 

• Public safety—customers, communities and the general public 

Key factors of successful programs include the following concepts: 

1. Management commitment 

2. Employee involvement 

3. Training 

4. Hazard/risk identification 

5. Hazard control 

There are learnings to be gained from organizations that implement safety and 

health systems well. NSC believes that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Normative Framework, 10 Traits for a Healthy Safety Culture, is time-proven methodology for evaluating culture and has wide applicability to a number of industries.1

The components of this framework include: 

1. Leadership Safety Values and Actions—Leaders demonstrate a commitment to 

safety in their decisions and behavior. 

2. Personal Accountability—All individuals take personal responsibility for safety. 

3. Decision-Making—Decisions that support or affect safety are systematic, rigorous and thorough. 

4. Questioning Attitude—Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge existing conditions and activities to identify discrepancies that might result in error or inappropriate actions. 

172 

2Public Law 110–432 

5. Environment for Raising Concerns—A safety conscious work environment 

(SCWE) is maintained where personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment or discrimination. 

6. Respectful Work Environment—Trust and respect permeate the organization. 

7. Work Processes—The process of planning and controlling work activities is implemented so that safety is maintained. 

8. Effective Safety Communication—Communications maintain a focus on safety. 

9. Organizational Learning—Opportunities to learn about ways to ensure safety 

are sought out and implemented. 

10. Problem Identification and Resolution—Issues potentially impacting safety 

are promptly identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and corrected commensurate with their significance. 

There is always an opportunity to improve safety to protect all stakeholders. 

Every worker deserves to return home in the same way he or she went to work. 

NSC welcomes an opportunity to work with the Committee on these issues and 

build upon efforts started in the Rail Safety Improvement Act.2

173 


322TWU1.eps
174 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

HON. JENNIFER L. HOMENDY

NTSB Resources. In 2016, a Union Pacific train derailed just 600 feet from the 

Columbia River in Mosier, Oregon, which borders Washington state. A total of sixteen cars derailed, spilling 47,000 gallons of crude oil. It subsequently caught fire, 

forced roughly 100 people to evacuate, and required over 500 response personnel. 

However, the NTSB chose not to investigate the Mosier train derailment ‘‘due to 

limited resources.’’ 

Question. Does the NTSB have the resources it needs to carry out its critical safety mission? 

Answer. To continue as the world’s preeminent safety agency and to keep pace 

with the technological advancements seen in all modes of transportation, the NTSB 

needs additional resources. 

As you know, we are a small agency relative to our Federal partners, in terms 

of the size of our budget and our workforce, but our impact is profound. Our small, 

mission-driven staff are currently working on an outsized number of investigations. 

We need more staff to conduct more safety investigations and complete them more 

quickly. At the moment, our staffing levels, workload, and needs are as follows: 

• Office of Aviation Safety: 113 staff working on 1,194 domestic and 132 foreign 

investigations; 150 staff are needed 

• Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials Investigations: 34 staff 

working on 30 investigations; 56 staff are needed 

• Office of Highway Safety: 32 staff working on 21 investigations; 53 staff are 

needed 

• Office of Marine Safety: 18 staff working on 49 investigations; 38 staff are needed 

• Office of Research and Engineering: 53 staff supporting 340 investigations and 

working on 6 safety research reports; 63 staff are needed 

The objective of each investigation is to uncover safety challenges and identify 

trends to prevent a future tragedy from occurring. Between January 1, 2020, and 

April 11, 2023, we have issued 371 new recommendations and closed 473. Of those 

closed, 355 (75 percent) were closed acceptably, meaning that the recipient took action to implement the safety recommendation. 

Despite the tremendous growth in transportation over the last two decades, the 

size of our agency has stayed virtually the same—approximately 400 staff members. 

Our workforce is our greatest asset and is essential to our mission. We need additional resources to hire the skilled professionals noted above, hire operational staff 

to support them, purchase the equipment necessary for staff to do their jobs, and 

invest in crucial staff training and development. When I became Chair in August 

2021, we had 399 staff members. This year, we have undertaken 62 hiring actions 

and aim to end the year with 435 people on board. This is being accomplished with 

the $129.3 million provided by Congress for Fiscal Year (FY) 2023. We need at least 

$145 million in FY 2024, with incremental increases to $185 million in FY 2028, 

to reach full staffing of 515 by 2028. We need Congress’s continued support for the 

NTSB’s mission and resources. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. GARY PETERS TO

HON. JENNIFER L. HOMENDY

Question 1. Chair Homendy in your testimony you mentioned the need to reauthorize the NTSB and for sending the details of your request to my subcommittee. 

In your reauthorization request, you asked for additional staffing capacity over the 

next 5 years. Can you describe how additional staffing capacity would improve 

NTSB’s ability to investigate safety incidents, including whether it could shorten 

timelines for investigation completion or improve investigative techniques? 

Answer. The NTSB’s workforce is our greatest asset. We need robust, diverse, and 

well-trained staff to keep pace with the technological advancements seen in all 

modes of transportation. For this, the NTSB needs additional resources. There is no 

question that additional staff would improve the NTSB’s ability to investigate safety 

incidents and shorten the time it takes to complete our investigations. 

The integrity of our investigations is vital to maintaining public confidence. The 

NTSB has recently faced several issues, however, that affect the timeliness of our 

reports, including government shutdowns, a global pandemic, and parallel criminal 

investigations. We are actively pursuing ways to expedite our processes while keeping in mind the time required to complete thorough and accurate investigations. 

175 

1 AAR Circular No. OT–55–N 

2OSHA 1910.120—Hazardous waste operations and emergency response 

3P.L. 114–94, Sec. 7302 

4Federal Register:: Hazardous Materials: FAST Act Requirements for Real-Time Train Consist Information by Rail 

Our Office of Aviation Safety is leading the agency effort and has several initiatives 

underway. Our focus has been on process improvements, eliminating the investigation backlog, and adding resources where most needed. For example, at its peak in 

January 2022, our aviation backlog included 442 open cases over 2 years old. Today, 

we have fewer than 40. We are using a data-driven approach to evaluate each step 

of an investigation to identify efficiencies and process improvements, and we have 

already improved the timeliness and consistency of our investigation reports as a 

result of this new approach. We are also using this approach to better monitor, 

track, and measure progress, holding employees accountable for their performance, 

and to identify the need for adjustments if projects are delayed. 

Additionally, we have identified staffing shortages as a reason that some reports 

take longer to produce than we would like. The reduction in workforce due to retirements and budget constraints means that there are simply fewer people to accomplish increasing workloads. This retirement trend is only projected to increase over 

the next several years; therefore, as an interim measure to meet the immediate 

need, we have hired retired investigators as reemployed annuitants to provide writing and final report processing support for certain investigations. We have also 

streamlined our hiring process to expedite filling vacancies, to the extent we are 

able under current budgetary constraints. For example, in the Office of Aviation 

Safety, these efforts have led to the onboarding of six staff this year, and we have 

ten positions in the interview and selection phase. 

Support of our reauthorization proposal would allow the NTSB to hire more staff 

to meet the expanded need for transportation investigations, including those related 

to emerging issue areas. Funds will also allow us to focus investigations on our 

aging infrastructure and to reinforce our current recommendations. 

Question 2. Chair Homendy, your testimony mentions open NTSB recommendations regarding notification of first responders when hazardous materials travel 

through a community like East Palestine—or Michigan towns that have seen nearmisses in recent months. A few questions related to this recommendation: 

A. Can you expand on what NTSB sees as the threshold for sufficient notification 

that would allow swift response and risk mitigation? 

Answer. The NTSB believes that just one railcar of any hazardous material justifies notifying emergency responders of hazardous materials transiting their communities. A single tank car loaded with hazardous material can cause extensive destruction and loss of life. If a derailment does occur, emergency responders are the 

next line of defense to minimize loss of life, injury, and damage to the environment 

and to property. It is critical that emergency responders receive critical hazardous 

materials information. In fact, the NTSB recommended in 2014 that the Department of Transportation require railroads transporting hazardous materials through 

communities provide emergency responders and local and state emergency planning 

committees with real-time or advanced notification in order to facilitate a quick response (R–14–14). Having awareness and timely access to information will prepare 

emergency responders to protect themselves and their communities. 

Communities are granted commodity flow information by completing a request 

found in the Association of American Railroad’s (AAR’s) Circular OT–55.1 However, 

this is not real-time, but annualized information, and many communities are unaware of its availability. Further, most emergency responders have awareness-level 

training, which is sufficient for railroad operating personnel; however, emergency 

responders need operations-level training, such as that outlined in the Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration’s Standard 1910.120.2

B. What types of mechanisms could be employed for this type of notification and 

how could we ensure security of these transmissions to ensure this information does 

not fall into the wrong hands? 

Answer. As you know, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act 

directed the Department of Transportation (DOT) to require Class I railroads transporting any hazardous materials to generate real-time electronic train consist and 

emergency response information and provide it to state and local first responders 

in the event of an incident.3 This rulemaking has languished since January 2017.4

The FAST Act also directed that each state emergency response commission be 

given advance notification regarding high-hazard flammable trains (HHFTs) passing 

176 

5P.L. 114–94, Sec. 7302(a)(3) 

6Federal Register: Hazardous Materials: Oil Spill Response Plans and Information Sharing 

for High-Hazard Flammable Trains (FAST Act) 7 AAR: United States Hazardous Materials Instructions for Rail, Section VIII. Emergency Response (Jan. 20, 2022), paragraph 4(a) 

through their communities.5 The DOT completed this rule in February 2019.6 As 

you know, the train in East Palestine was not an HHFT, however, and the first responders had no awareness it was traveling through their community. 

As a voluntary measure, the railroad industry in 2014 launched the AskRail app 

through which railroads can provide electronic notification of the contents of train 

consists to authorized qualified users who have completed industry-sponsored training for emergency responders. However, it is not clear that all emergency responders have the AskRail app available and are trained on how to use it. In East Palestine, none of the East Palestine Fire Department personnel had the app on their 

devices. 

The AskRail user guide states that the app displays the last known information 

about railroad equipment contents. This information is expected to be current and 

correct; however, it may not be due to various data quality impediments or delays 

in data transmission. The AAR recommends that emergency responders use AskRail 

temporarily for safety isolation, evacuation, and assessment from a distance while 

securing the proper shipping paper from the railroad or train crew. According to the 

guide, the sequencing of the cars in the application may not match the sequencing 

of the cars on the paper consist, which is the compliance document and takes precedence in any discrepancy. Further, after a derailment, the sequence of cars in the 

consist and in the app does not match due to the railcars bunching up. Therefore, 

the AskRail app is not an absolute replacement for accurate hazardous materials 

shipping papers carried on-board the locomotive. 

The AAR United States Hazardous Materials Instructions for Rail instructs train 

crews to immediately share any requested information from the shipping documents 

with emergency response personnel, provide an extra copy of the train consist when 

available, and immediately share a copy of the emergency response information provided with the shipment.7 These current instructions and Federal regulations fall 

short of requiring rail carriers to seek out emergency responders to provide them 

timely information about a train consist following a hazardous materials release incident. 

We acknowledge the security issues associated with these notifications to ensure 

this information does not fall into the wrong hands. The NTSB is focused on safety 

and accident investigation and does not have the expertise to comment on how to 

best ensure the security of these notifications. We would look to other Federal agencies with the required expertise, such as in the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), to develop 

and issue appropriate standards and procedures. For security reasons, only emergency communication centers, emergency first responders, and other authorized persons, as determined by the North American Class 1 Railroads, can download and 

use the restricted features of the AskRail app. 

C. Has NTSB considered partnering with DHS or CISA on making specific recommendations to address these parts of the recommendation? 

Answer. No. However, if we determine in an investigation that DHS or the CISA 

could take an action to prevent a noncriminal act/accident, we will not hesitate to 

make a recommendation to either agency. Further, we may also add DHS or the 

CISA as parties to an investigation where there were cybersecurity issues. 

However, the NTSB does not investigate criminal activity. If our investigation reveals that a transportation event was caused by criminal activity, we are obligated 

to turn the investigation over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other appropriate law enforcement organization. We believe it is likely that any investigation 

involving DHS or the CISA would likely be a criminal investigation. 

Question 3. Chair Homendy, in your testimony you discussed NTSB’s recommendation that the Federal Railroad Administration review railroads’ Risk Reduction Programs to ensure that they include sufficient planning for prevention and 

mitigation and that they reflect companies’ commitment to continuous evaluation 

and improvement. Has the Federal Railroad Administration given NTSB a reason 

for not following through with this recommendation? Do you believe it could be related to a lack of capacity? 

Answer. Our last update from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) was in 

September 2021 when the FRA said it had drafted the recommended guidance on 

risk reduction programs and was reviewing and clearing it for public release. We 

177 

have not received any further information, and we are currently awaiting a copy of 

their guidance for our review. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

DAVID COMSTOCK

Emergency Response. Over 75 percent of fire departments in the State of Washington are volunteer or mostly volunteer-run. Only 14 percent of fire departments 

in the state have a specialized hazardous materials team that could best respond 

to hazmat spills. There are currently six Federal hazardous materials safety grants 

at DOT, but none that fund equipment. To properly prepare for and respond to hazardous materials incidents, communities need access to the right training and 

equipment. 

Question 1. Mr. Comstock, did your department have the resources it needed to 

respond to the East Palestine derailment? 

Answer. My department did not possess the necessary specialized equipment to 

deal with a hazardous materials incident like East Palestine. Though hazardous 

materials rail incidents can occur near any jurisdiction that is located near a rail 

line where these materials are transported, many departments in these jurisdictions 

do not possess specialized hazmat equipment. This is often due to fire departments 

within these jurisdictions having very limited funding that in many cases don’t even 

cover enough funding to provide basic firefighting equipment to all personnel. 

Additionally due to the intensity of the East Palestine incident, turnout gear and 

self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) used at the incident were destroyed. I 

must now rent replacement turnout gear because I don’t have enough back-up gear 

for my firefighters during the months long process of ordering new gear. 

My department also relies on a county level hazmat response team for technical 

support. Our county’s team did not have all of the monitoring meters it needed at 

the East Palestine incident. These meters cost $60,000 each. 

Question 2. Are current Federal grant programs adequate for providing communities like yours with hazardous materials response equipment? 

Answer. The DoT’s grant programs are excellent at providing hazmat response 

training and the National Volunteer Fire Council strongly recommends additional 

funding for these programs. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) 

Assistance to Firefighting Grant (AFG) program is the best existing grant program 

for firefighting equipment, but this program receives many more requests than it 

can fulfill. 

The fire service would benefit from a new grant program to provide hazardous 

materials response equipment. Additional funding for regional hazmat teams consistent with NFPA standards would also be helpful. This is provided neither of these 

additional funding sources take away from the funds available for hazmat training, 

AFG, or Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) grants. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN TO

DAVID COMSTOCK

To Chief Comstock: I know product identification on train cars is paramount to 

first responders’ safety. In situations like we saw in Ohio, fast and accurate identification of hazardous materials is necessary to make sure we don’t put first responders at risk. 

Question. How can Congress work with industry and first responders to enhance 

methods for emergency hazmat product identification? 

Answer. The most effective way to improve emergency hazmat rail product identification is to ensure that all firefighters that provide hazmat incident response are 

trained at an operational level of competence. A big step toward accomplishing this 

goal would be to provide additional funding to Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administrations’ (PHMSA) hazardous materials training grants. Specifically 

to Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP), Assistance for Local 

Emergency Response Training (ALERT), Hazardous Materials Instructor Training 

(HMIT), Community Safety (CS) program, and Supplemental Public Sector Training 

(SPST). 

Additionally, Congress can take steps to foster dialog between industry and first 

responders to ensure perspectives are exchanged to identify the best ways to distribute needed hazardous materials transportation information to first responders. 

I also believe that Congress should support the recommendations made by the NaVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:58 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00181 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57731.TXT JACKIE
178 

tional Transportation Safety Board regarding the notification of first responders. 

See page 8 of Chair Homendy’s testimony for this hearing. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

CLYDE WHITAKER

Emergency Response. Over 75 percent of fire departments in the State of Washington are volunteer or mostly volunteer-run. Only 14 percent of fire departments 

in the state have a specialized hazardous materials team that could best respond 

to hazmat spills. There are currently six Federal hazardous materials safety grants 

at DOT, but none that fund equipment. To properly prepare for and respond to hazardous materials incidents, communities need access to the right training and 

equipment. 

Question 1. Mr. Comstock, did your department have the resources it needed to 

respond to the East Palestine derailment? 

Answer. My department did not possess the necessary specialized equipment to 

deal with a hazardous materials incident like East Palestine. Though hazardous 

materials rail incidents can occur near any jurisdiction that is located near a rail 

line where these materials are transported, many departments in these jurisdictions 

do not possess specialized hazmat equipment. This is often due to fire departments 

within these jurisdictions having very limited funding that in many cases don’t even 

cover enough funding to provide basic firefighting equipment to all personnel. 

Additionally due to the intensity of the East Palestine incident, turnout gear and 

self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) used at the incident were destroyed. I 

must now rent replacement turnout gear because I don’t have enough back-up gear 

for my firefighters during the months long process of ordering new gear. 

My department also relies on a county level hazmat response team for technical 

support. Our county’s team did not have all of the monitoring meters it needed at 

the East Palestine incident. These meters cost $60,000 each. 

Question 2. Are current Federal grant programs adequate for providing communities like yours with hazardous materials response equipment? 

Answer. The DoT’s grant programs are excellent at providing hazmat response 

training and the National Volunteer Fire Council strongly recommends additional 

funding for these programs. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) 

Assistance to Firefighting Grant (AFG) program is the best existing grant program 

for firefighting equipment, but this program receives many more requests than it 

can fulfill. 

The fire service would benefit from a new grant program to provide hazardous 

materials response equipment. Additional funding for regional hazmat teams consistent with NFPA standards would also be helpful. This is provided neither of these 

additional funding sources take away from the funds available for hazmat training, 

AFG, or Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) grants. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

ALAN SHAW

Safety Investments. According to data Norfolk Southern provided to the Surface 

Transportation Board, investments the company have made in its network decreased by about 30 percent from 2017 to 2021. During that same time accident 

rates increased by 60 percent. 

Question. How much does Norfolk Southern plan on investing in its network this 

year? 

Answer. At Norfolk Southern, safety is our top priority, and we have long been 

committed to operating a safe railroad. We have a multipronged approach to safety 

that includes capital investments to reduce the number and severity of accidents. 

We invest over $1 billion every year in technologies, equipment, and infrastructure 

to enhance the safety of our rail operations. These include safety-focused items, such 

as rails, ties, ballasts, bridges, culverts, vehicles, and maintenance of way equipment. We spend an additional $1 billion every year on ongoing operations in support 

of safety. 

179 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

ALAN SHAW

The Bipartisan Railway Safety Act of 2023: This bill takes a number of key steps 

to improve rail safety protocols, such as enhancing safety procedures for trains carrying hazardous materials, establishing requirements for wayside defect detectors, 

creating a permanent requirement for railroads to operate with at least two-person 

crews, increasing fines for wrongdoing committed by rail carriers, and more. 

Question 1. Please identify the provisions in Senator Brown and Vance’s Railway 

Safety Act of 2023 which you do not support, and clarify the reasons why. 

Answer. We support legislative efforts to enhance the safety of the freight rail industry. We are committed to working with our fellow industry leaders, and we also 

recognize and appreciate the bicameral, bipartisan leadership by Members of Congress in proposing new legislation to create a safer rail industry. The Railway Safety Act includes measures with the potential to enhance safety and improve outcomes 

for our industry, our customers, and the communities we serve. 

We support the Railway Safety Act’s provisions for more industry-funded training 

for first responders, and we are not waiting for legislation to move this forward. We 

have already announced the expansion of our existing training programs and the 

creation of a new regional training center in Ohio, to serve first responders in Ohio, 

Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. 

We support the principle that first responders need accurate real-time information 

on the contents of trains moving through their communities and instruction on the 

safe handling of those contents in the event of an accident. We intend to take a 

leading role in getting the AskRail safety application into the hands of every first 

responder who needs access. In this area specifically, the details of legislation matter as policymakers balance safety and national security concerns. 

We support triennial reviews of regulations for rail car inspections and standards 

for freight car safety because regular reviews drive good regulatory policy and outcomes. 

We support the Federal Railroad Administration’s (‘‘FRA’’) Confidential Close Call 

Reporting System (‘‘C3RS’’). Norfolk Southern participates in the C3RS Working 

Group, which is part of the Department of Transportation’s Railroad Safety Advisory Committee. 

We support accelerating the phaseout of older tank car models, research into advanced tank car design, and additional funding for research and development of 

next-generation, early-warning sensor technologies. 

There are also areas in which we believe Congress could go further with safety 

legislation. We encourage even stricter standards for tank car design. There are significant opportunities for advanced technology to enhance rail safety, and we encourage Congress to consider additional research into on-board rail car defect detection technology. 

We support increasing fines and penalties for persons found tampering with railroad facilities and safety equipment, such as grade crossing warning devices, wayside detectors, or signal boxes. We support codifying and enhancing the FRA’s 

C3RS. And we support new requirements to ensure utility installations in railroads’ 

rights-of-way are conducted safely. 

We also look forward to constructive discussions with stakeholders regarding 

other provisions of the proposed legislation, as our goal is to help craft effective, 

data-driven, practical legislation that improves the Nation’s rail system and rail 

safety. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. GARY PETERS TO

ALAN SHAW

Question 1. Mr. Shaw, my office has subsequently shared the document with you 

that I referenced in the hearing on March 22, 2023 that appeared to show Norfolk 

Southern trains running rail cars past the FRA-imposed limit for a brake inspection. 

Can you provide an explanation for these apparent violations? Has Norfolk Southern investigated this issue and what steps have you taken to ensure there is not 

habitual overrun of FRA brake inspection standards? 

Answer. The document in question is a report from an internal commercial-facing 

tool called the Commodity Train Management System (‘‘CTMS’’). This system provides some information about equipment that serves coal, grain, and other commodities customers. CTMS is not the system of record for brake tests or mechanical inspections, and it no longer displays interval mileage and brake mechanical inspection data. We have consulted the relevant system of record and confirmed that the 

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train in question received a brake test in compliance with applicable Federal regulations. 

Question 2. The document I entered into the hearing record appeared to show NS 

cars traveling tens of thousands of miles without a full mechanical inspection. Does 

Norfolk Southern have an internal standard for how many miles a car should travel 

before receiving a full mechanical inspection? 

Answer. We do not allow unsafe trains to operate. Norfolk Southern requires railcar inspections in compliance with applicable Federal regulations. As relevant to 

this question, Norfolk Southern requires that cycle unit trains receive a mechanical 

inspection by qualified personnel at appropriate intervals. 

Question 3. Your testimony mentioned that Norfolk Southern ‘‘aggressively hired’’ 

in 2022. According to the GAO and witness testimonies, Class I rail companies have 

cut their workforces by as much as 30 percent over the past decade. Is there an internal hiring goal that Norfolk Southern is committed to meeting with new hiring? 

Can you share with the committee how many new roles are inspection-related positions that will increase the company’s self-inspection capacity? 

Answer. We know that our employees in the field are key to our success. To that 

end, we hired craft railroaders throughout 2022 and continue to do so this year. 

We’ve invested in our Train and Engine workforce and maintained a robust pipeline 

of trainees, including more than 930 conductor trainees in the first quarter of 2023. 

And in December 2022, Norfolk Southern was the first in the industry to announce 

a move away from a focus on reducing operating ratio—a common industry measure 

of efficiency. As part of our December announcement, we made clear that we are 

going to make reliable and resilient service our goal. That means investing more in 

services, running a safe railroad, and moving away from the practice of furloughing 

workers during a downturn. Instead, we’ll use the opportunity to invest in additional training for our people. That makes us a better railroad, improves service for 

our customers, and improves the quality of life for our frontline railroaders. 

Hiring target goals are affected by a number of factors throughout the year and 

are therefore fluid and dynamic. Norfolk Southern recently provided the Surface 

Transportation Board with revised labor force targets for May 2023. These revised 

targets projected a companywide total of 18,624 employees by May 2023, including 

7,613 Full-time Employees (‘‘FTEs’’) in Train and Engine, 4,166 FTEs in Maintenance of Way, and 2,472 FTEs in Maintenance of Equipment and Stores. 

When Norfolk Southern is successful, it is because our frontline railroaders are 

getting the job done. For context, optimized train routes and newly adopted technologies that assist inspectors have increased the efficiency of on-arrival and predeparture inspections. We agree on the importance of ensuring thorough inspections, and we understand the most successful inspections are carried out through 

a process that utilizes both technology and human resources. We note that inspection frequency has generally remained consistent, and Norfolk Southern has remained committed to complying with federally mandated mechanical inspection obligations. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. TAMMY BALDWIN TO

ALAN SHAW

Mr. Shaw, I have serious concerns about the safety record of Norfolk Southern, 

particularly as the number of safety incidents at the company has risen 76 percent 

in the last decade and the National Transportation Safety Board felt it necessary 

to open a special investigation into the company’s safety culture. 

I have long believed that a fully staffed, highly qualified, and well-trained workforce is vital to the safety and success of rail carriers throughout the country. 

Question 1. To that end, how many carmen are currently working for Norfolk 

Southern? And how does that level compare with a decade ago in 2013, prior to the 

company implementing precision scheduled railroading? Finally, what steps are you 

taking to properly invest in your workforce? 

Answer. Safety is our top priority at Norfolk Southern. We are committed to ensuring the safety of communities that live by our railroads and the safety of our 

employees. We invest over $1 billion every year on technologies, equipment, and infrastructure to support safety, and another $1 billion per year in ongoing operations 

in support of safety. We have a multipronged approach to safety that includes capital investments to reduce the number and severity of accidents. 

Norfolk Southern publicly reports the number of ‘‘Maintenance of Equipment and 

Stores’’ employees, which includes carmen and a wide range of other roles. In 2022, 

there were approximately 2,420 Maintenance of Equipment and Stores employees 

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at Norfolk Southern. We know that our employees in the field are key to our success. In December 2022, Norfolk Southern was the first in the industry to announce 

a move away from a focus on reducing operating ratio—a common industry measure 

of efficiency. As part of our December announcement, we made clear that we are 

going to make reliable and resilient service our goal. That means investing more in 

services, running a safe railroad, and moving away from the practice of furloughing 

workers during a downturn. Instead, we’ll use the opportunity to improve training 

for our people. That makes us a better railroad, improves service for our customers, 

and improves the quality of life for our frontline railroaders. 

Mr. Shaw, I have received reports from BMWED, the Union that represents Norfolk Southern Maintenance of Way workers, that its members were sent out to clear 

muck and debris from the tracks in East Palestine and to restore the tracks so Norfolk Southern could resume operations. 

While many of them have since asked that their statements not be shared for fear 

of retaliation, the reports suggested that there were dozens of employees on and 

around the tracks, including when residents were told to evacuate and the controlled burn was conducted. Concerningly, the reports also said Norfolk Southern 

did not provide those employees with full face chemical respirators, other industrial 

grade respirators that protect workers from chemical gasses, eye protections, rubber 

gloves, rubber boots, or hazmat overalls. The track workers have since reported experiencing headaches, nose bleeds, skin irritations, and difficulty breathing. 

In light of these reports: 

Question 2. Were the maintenance of way employees assigned to help clear the 

track and right of way given full face chemical respirators, or other industrial grade 

respirators that protect workers from chemical gasses, eye protection, rubber gloves, 

rubber boots or hazmat overalls? 

Answer. We are fully committed to keeping our employees safe as they work to 

clean up and restore the community of East Palestine, just like we’re fully committed to keeping the community safe. Immediately following the incident, we 

worked closely with contractors who specialize in this type of clean-up. The first 

Norfolk Southern employees on the scene were supervisors, not unionized workers. 

Only after the contractors cleared the site for work did we call in our craft colleagues to assist with the clean-up. Our contractors advised us on conditions, including what sort of protective equipment we needed and constantly monitored the air 

to make sure it was safe to work. 

We provided our workers with personal protective equipment (‘‘PPE’’), including 

safety glasses, hardhats, reflective vests, and hearing protection, as well as N95 respirators. Air monitoring conducted immediately after the derailment by Norfolk 

Southern and our expert consultants—which was shared with first responders—indicated that the chemical levels in areas delineated for Norfolk Southern activities 

were below what would have required chemical protective PPE or respirators. Our 

expert contractors who responded to the derailment provided PPE to their own personnel. 

Question 3. Are you aware that a high-level Norfolk Southern manager, in conversation with other managers, suggested that letters sent by BMWED to Secretary 

Buttigieg and Governor DeWine raising safety concerns were ‘‘BMWED going to 

war’’ with Norfolk Southern, while also suggesting that individual employees’ 

records should be scrutinized for potential opportunities for retaliation? 

Answer. We have robust, ongoing dialogues with our unions, and we value the relationships we have with them. We are not aware of such a comment. Norfolk 

Southern prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers. 

Question 4. Will you commit that Norfolk Southern will not retaliate against individual workers because their union raised safety concerns with Federal and state 

officials? 

Answer. We do not penalize or retaliate against our employees when their unions 

raise safety concerns, whether that is within the company or to Federal and state 

officials. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH TO

ALAN SHAW

On March 8, 2023, the FRA announced that it will be conducting a 60-day assessment of Norfolk Southern (NS), related to the derailments and other NS safety-related incidents. The FRA noted that it would specifically assess various operational 

elements, including dispatcher training and the training and qualification programs 

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available to all railroad employees, including engineer and conductor training and 

certification. 

Question 1. Taking into account that the FRA recently investigated NS’s Conductor Certification Program in 2021 and found it to be non-compliant, what steps 

has NS taken to improve its training and qualification programs to ensure that staff 

are all properly trained to avoid further derailments and rail accidents and what 

new steps will it take given the recent East Palestine derailment? 

Answer. We are working with the FRA to ensure our program continues to comply 

with applicable regulations. With regard to the East Palestine incident, the NTSB 

preliminary report indicated the rail crew operated the train below the track speed 

limit and handled the train in an approved manner. Once the rail crew was alerted 

by the wayside detector, they immediately began to stop the train. During the NTSB 

press conference held on February 23, 2023, Chair Homendy said, ‘‘[w]e have no evidence that the crew did anything wrong.’’ 

As a general matter, and consistent with Federal regulations, conductors must 

complete Norfolk Southern’s conductor training program, which includes approximately four months of classroom and on-the-job training. The FRA audits compliance with these regulations. In performing these audits, FRA representatives spend 

time at our training center in McDonough, Georgia, and in the field with our Conductor Trainees, supervisors, and craft employees. 

Norfolk Southern is committed to investing in our people, our infrastructure, and 

in new technology and systems to make our operations safe for our employees and 

the communities we serve. We are also committed to doing our part to help maintain the freight railroad network as one of the safest and environmentally sustainable modes of surface transportation in the nation. We are collaborating with our 

employees and their labor representatives to request input in continuing to improve 

safety. We have held safety stand-down briefings across our network and throughout the organization to emphasize our commitment to safety. We are continually 

looking for ways to improve our strong safety culture and welcome feedback from 

the FRA. We intend to implement measures that are proven to increase operational 

safety, including enhancements to the safety and response training provided to Norfolk Southern employees. 

In the course of their regular oversight duties, the FRA is currently reviewing the 

conductor training programs for Class I Railroads, including Norfolk Southern’s. We 

are also cooperating with the FRA as it conducts a full safety culture audit. As part 

of the audit, the FRA has attended Norfolk Southern training across all crafts to 

observe the company’s messaging around safety, which will allow Norfolk Southern 

and the FRA to openly exchange ideas to continue to improve our programs. We also 

agreed to join the FRA’s C3RS. Norfolk Southern is cooperating with the NTSB’s 

special investigation of its organization and safety culture. We are resolved to work 

with lawmakers, the NTSB, the FRA, and other stakeholders to improve railway 

safety and learn from this derailment. 

All Norfolk Southern field supervisors and craft employees receive hazardous materials training, including training on the procedures in Norfolk Southern’s emergency response plan, which is loaded on all company-provided devices. All field supervisors and craft employees also receive safety sensitive training, which includes 

topics such as railroad security, improvised explosive devices, and threats to the 

railroad. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. TED CRUZ TO

ALAN SHAW

Question 1. During the hearing, you indicated that Norfolk Southern was working 

on a fund to compensate homeowners in the surrounding area of East Palestine 

whose property values had been affected by the February 3 derailment. 

a. Has such a fund been established yet? 

Answer. We are listening closely to concerns from the community about whether 

there could be long-term impacts from the derailment. We know residents are worried about their home values. We are working with local leaders on investments to 

support the community’s long-term prosperity. We are currently working towards a 

final resolution with Attorney General Yost and relevant stakeholders to establish 

three new funds to address healthcare, property values, and water protection in 

East Palestine and the surrounding communities. However, these are complicated 

issues that will likely take time to resolve in a comprehensive fashion. The details 

of these programs are being developed, and we look forward to sharing additional 

information about them in the future. 

183 

b. If such a fund has already been established, please provide details regarding 

the claim process and the compensation available. If not, please explain the remaining tasks and the expected date that claims can be made. 

Answer. Although the fund is not yet in place, Norfolk Southern is covering costs 

for any resident who has chosen to relocate, either temporarily or permanently. As 

of May 1, 2023, Norfolk Southern has paid nearly $4 million providing relocation 

assistance. 

Question 2. Responding to a major hazardous materials incident can impose substantial costs on first responders, and the delay in repaying those expenses can 

lower the readiness of those organizations in the aftermath of such an incident. 

a. Has Norfolk Southern or its insurer reimbursed the expenses of all first responders to the East Palestine derailment? 

Answer. Norfolk Southern has profound admiration for first responders, and we 

are committed to making first responders whole for costs associated with the emergency response in East Palestine. We have paid over $5.3 million in reimbursements 

and support to first-responder organizations in East Palestine and the surrounding 

communities to replace equipment used in the derailment response. 

Additionally, we have pledged additional funds for first responders and taken a 

number of steps to ensure that local communities are equipped to respond to trainrelated incidents. Norfolk Southern maintains a robust network of emergency response contractors who can respond to an incident in any of the twenty-two states 

where we operate. Our emergency response contractors include hazmat specialists 

who are licensed and qualified to respond to incidents involving the release or potential release of hazardous materials. Further, these contractors are geographically 

situated such that they can be on-site, often with their own emergency response 

equipment, shortly after an accident. 

b. If not, please indicate what payments have been made to date and explain the 

reasons for the ongoing delays regarding any remaining reimbursements. 

Answer. As of May 3, 2023, only two of the sixty-seven first-responder organizations that have submitted claims for reimbursement have yet to receive payment because their claims are still being processed or require additional information. Certain claims from three other organizations have been paid in part, pending calculation of the total expense or delivery of back-ordered equipment. All other claims 

have been paid in full. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN THUNE TO

IAN JEFFERIES

Question. Mr. Jefferies, your testimony and a recent announcement from the Association of American Railroads describe an effort to install new wayside hot bearing 

detectors to reduce spacing on major routes to 15 miles. Your testimony also mentioned that the previous average had been every 40 miles, but had fallen below that 

number in recent years. Do you have an estimate for what the average spacing is 

nationwide currently? What sort of considerations are made in determining a spacing threshold for these wayside detectors? In your testimony, you describe the use 

of data analytics to improve early detection of faulty bearing and other rail equipment. Where and how is this analysis being deployed, and how does it improve the 

use of these detectors? 

Answer. Freight railroads have long recognized the risk posed by hot bearings and 

have voluntarily installed thousands of hot bearing detectors (HBDs) throughout 

their networks. To drive toward a future with zero incidents and injuries and ensure 

what happened in East Palestine never happens again, all Class I railroads have 

agreed to go even further and are immediately installing additional HBDs across 

their key routes, with the goal of achieving an average spacing of 15 miles, except 

if the route is equipped with acoustic bearing detectors or other similar technology 

which can ascertain potential problems from the noise created by bearings that are 

starting to fail. In that case, HBD spacing will not exceed 20 miles. As a result of 

this commitment, railroads will deploy approximately 1,000 new HBDs. 

The appropriate spacing between HBDs is not a one-sized-fits-all approach. Generally speaking, the spacing threshold is designed to ensure that coverage is sufficient to provide the necessary level of protection. Numerous variables regarding the 

route are considered, including whether the routes is near sensitive waterways or 

other ecological sites or includes timber or other bridges identified by the railroad, 

areas where residential neighborhoods are close to mainline track, and other heavy 

industrial areas or interchange locations that generate large carload traffic. Additionally, numerous operational factors are taken into account, including the nature 

and density of the traffic, speed restrictions, and utility or maintenance access. 

184 

The Class I railroads have also established a new industry standard and other 

policies related to HBDs. This includes stopping trains and inspecting bearings 

whenever the temperature reading from a HBD exceeds 170° above ambient temperature. Inoperative HBDs on key routes will also generate critical incident tickets 

and be prioritized for dispatch and repair without undue delay. 

Furthermore, while HBDs have been in use for a long time, relatively recent software and data processing advances now allow railroads to employ detectors that 

communicate their readings back to their internal networks and to engage in ‘‘trend 

analysis’’ of readings from multiple HBDs over time. Analysis of trending data has 

led to the ability to proactively identify bearings that have not yet exceeded absolute 

temperature thresholds but, based on findings of HBD-trending data, may become 

problematic and need to be addressed. Class I railroads employ a variety of approaches when analyzing this data and are now working collaboratively to identify 

best practices associated with trend analysis to make their programs even more effective at proactively detecting potential bearing problems. 

These efforts are reflective of an industry-wide commitment to develop complex 

technologies to ensure safer, more reliable operations in the field. For example, 

freight railroads, in conjunction with AAR and its wholly-owned technology subsidiary, Railinc, have established the Asset Health Strategic Initiative which includes technology products that monitoring the entire railcar life cycle and allow 

railroads and car owners to share information about potential defects found by detectors. 

Future railroad efforts to harness technology to improve operations and drive 

safety innovation will be most effective if safety policy is well grounded in evidencebased, scientific understanding. Railroads respectfully urge policymakers to not 

‘‘lock in’’ existing technologies and processes so that new innovations and technologies that could improve safety and efficiency are not stifled. Achieving maximum safety benefits requires regulatory flexibility that does not hinder innovation, 

allows railroads to find what works best, and encourages railroads to keep investing 

in those technologies. 

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