No. 04-539 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2005 MT 313N 

 __________________________________________ 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

JORGE L. MARRERO, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 __________________________________________ 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

 In and for the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC-98-13335 

 The Honorable Douglas G. Harkin, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

 For Appellant: 

 Christopher Daly, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana 

 For Respondents: 

Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General, Micheal S. Wellenstein, 

Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney; Karen Townsend, 

Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana 

 __________________________________________ 

Submitted on Briefs: November 9, 2005 

Decided: December 12, 2005 

Filed: 

Clerk 
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Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal 

Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be 

cited as precedent. Its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be 

included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter 

and Montana Reports. 

¶2 Appellant Jorge L. Marrero (Marrero) appeals from an Order of the Fourth 

Judicial District, Missoula County, revoking his suspended sentence and sentencing him 

to fifteen years at the Montana State Prison. We affirm. 

¶3 Marrero contends that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to 

consider alternatives to incarceration. Marrero relies on our decision in State v. Lee, 

2001 MT 176, 306 Mont. 173, 31 P.3d 998, in support of his claim that the District 

Court’s failure to consider alternatives to prison violated his due process right. We agree 

with the State, however, that the Court considered alternatives and rejected them in light 

of the fact that Marrero’s non-incarceration proposal posed “too great a risk given the 

level of supervision and the original nature of the offense and what has occurred since.” 

Moreover, unlike the facts in Lee, the State was not responsible for Marrero’s failure to 

comply with the conditions of his probationary sentence. 

¶4 Marrero next contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel 

in failing to object to the blood alcohol test indicating that he had a blood alcohol 

concentration of 0.359 when he arrived at the Fort Harrison VA Hospital. We agree with 

the District Court that Marrero’s status as a probationer diminished any privacy interest 
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he may have had in such information. We recognize the fact that refraining from 

drinking any alcohol remained a condition of Marrero’s original probation and 

undermines any claim by Marrero that his counsel should have objected to the State’s 

possession of his blood alcohol concentration results. 

¶5 Marrero also contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel 

in failing to seek an interpretor, but Marrero fails to point to any prejudice resulting from 

this omission other than the fact that Marrero’s counsel went over the waiver of rights 

document at the beginning of a hearing in which Marrero entered a guilty plea. Marrero 

further contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance in not challenging the 

failure of the probation officer to present a written statement of Marrero’s alleged 

violations within twelve hours of delivering Marrero to the detention center as required 

under § 46-23-1012(2), MCA. Finally, Marrero argues his counsel’s failure to request a 

bail hearing or to argue for release on his own recognizance constituted ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

¶6 As we noted in State v. Grixti, 2005 MT 296, ¶ 27, 329 Mont. 330, ¶ 27, ___ P.3d 

___, ¶ 27, this Court does not automatically reach the merits of ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims. We deem the matter more appropriate for postconviction relief where the 

record is insufficient to determine whether counsel’s performance fell below an 

objectively reasonable standard. Grixti, ¶ 27. Although the record in this case does not 

reveal why Marrero’s counsel failed to take the various actions that he raises, we deem 

further inquiry unnecessary to determine that Marrero’s counsel’s actions did not fall 

below an objectively reasonable standard. We have said “the fact that some other lawyer 
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. . . would have done differently . . . is not ground for branding an appointed attorney with 

the opprobrium of ineffectiveness.” State v. Turner, 2000 MT 270, ¶ 64, 302 Mont. 69, ¶ 

64, 12 P.3d 934, ¶ 64. 

¶7 Marrero’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails to meet the first prong of 

the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 

S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, in that he has failed to establish that his counsel’s 

performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard. Therefore, we reject it on the 

record established at trial. Affirmed. 

¶8 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(d) of 

our 1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, which provides for 

memorandum opinions. 

 /S/ BRIAN MORRIS 

We Concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

/S/ JIM RICE