[Cite as In re A.R. , 2021-Ohio-2573.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
IN RE: A.R. C.A. No. 29917

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. DN 19 01 0081
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: July 28, 2021

HENSAL, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Appellant Mother appeals the j udgment of the Summit County Cour t of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated her parental rights a nd placed the child A.R. in the permanent custody of Summit County Children Services Board (“CS B” or “the agency”). This Court affirms.
I. {¶2} Mother and Father are the biological parents of A.R. (d.o.b. 8/ 4/18). When the child was approximately six months old, CSB filed a complaint a lleging that A.R. was a dependent child based on concerns regarding domestic violence between the parents and Mother’s use of drugs during her pregnancy and around the child after her birth . At the adjudicatory hearing, Mother stipulated that A.R. was dependent. Because Father was in jail, CSB also presented evidence to establish the child’s dependency. At the dispositi onal hearing, Mother stipulated to the child’s placement in the temporary custody of CSB, while ev idence was also presented based2 on Father’s ongoing incarceration. Mother was granted supervis ed visitation. The juvenile court adopted the agency’s case pla n as the order of the court. {¶3} After the first review hearing, Mother’s visitation was increas ed based on some progress with her case plan objec tives. Four months later, Mot her showed evidence of struggling. She had overdosed since the prior hearing and continued to test positive for methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, and marijuana. She had not yet begun substan ce abuse treatment as required. Although she was permitted to visit with the child twice a week , Mother was not consistent in attending visitation. Nevertheless , the magistrate again incre ased Mother’s weekly visitation. {¶4} Eleven months into the case, CSB filed a motion for permanent c ustody. Mother moved for a six-month extensi on of temporary custody. The cour t scheduled the permanent custody hearing for approximately six months later. Shortly be forehand, Mother moved to continue the hearing for health reasons. The juvenile court co ntinued the hearing for another three months. {¶5} Nineteen months into the case and on the evening before the per manent custody hearing was scheduled to begin, Mother fired her court-appointe d counsel and hired private counsel. That evening, Mother’s new attorney filed a notice of appearance and a motion to continue the permanent custody hearing, as he had just been ret ained. The next morning before the hearing, Mother’s attorney filed four alternative dispositi onal motions seeking: (1) a six-month extension of temporary custody, (2) legal custody to the matern al grandmother, (3) legal custody to maternal aunt H.V., and (4) l egal custody to maternal aunt J .C. (“Aunt”). {¶6} Immediately before the permanent custody hearing, the juvenile court heard the attorneys’ arguments regarding Mother’s motion for a continuanc e. Thereafter, the judge denied the motion upon finding that anothe r continuance would inconven ience the other parties, attorneys,3
and witnesses; would leave the child in custodial limbo for ano ther 15 percent of her life (assuming a four-month continuance); and could be a dilatory tactic given the last-minute firing of appointed counsel and retention of private counsel. Notwithstanding the juvenile court’s denial of a continuance, the court neverthe less informed the parties that i t would revisit the issue when it was time for Mother’s attorney to cross-examine the agency casework er. Specifically, the court indicated a willingness to continue the matter for further proc eedings so that Mother’s attorney would have time to prepare for both cross-examination of the ag ency’s key witness and the presentation of Mother’s case in chief. The judge also granted a recess to allow Mother’s attorney the opportunity to obtain copies of CSB’s exhibits and review t hem prior to commencing the hearing. {¶7} On the first day of the hearing, Mother’s attorney cross-examin ed two records custodians and the child’s foste r mother who testified on behal f of CSB. The agency also presented the testimony of its caseworker. The juvenile court then conti nued the hearing for two months to allow Mother’s attorney time to prepare to cross-examine the ca seworker and present Mother’s case in chief. {¶8} At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court allowed ti me for the parties to file written closing arguments, p roposed findings of fact and c onclusions of law, and proposed judgment entries. On Mother’s counsel’s request, the juvenile court granted Mother an additional week to file her proposals afte r CSB’s proposals were due. No party filed written closing arguments or proposed judgment entr ies, while only CSB filed pr oposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. {¶9} The juvenile court issued an order to which it attached an unsi gned copy of a portion of CSB’s proposed findings of f acts and conclusions of law. Th e document contained only the4 agency’s proposed findings of f acts. The trial court asserted that it was adopting those, as well as the agency’s proposed judgment entry, 1 as its own. Nevertheless, the juvenile court further issued a separate judgment which include d findings of facts, conclusio ns of law, and specific orders granting CSB’s motion for perman ent custody and terminating all parental rights to A.R. Mother filed a timely appeal in which she raises four assignments of e rror for review. This Court consolidates some assignments of error to facilitate review.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FINDING 12 OF 22 AS ONE OF THE REQUIRED PRONGS FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR BY FINDING THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD TO BE PLACED IN THE PERMANENT CUSTODY OF [CSB] EVEN THOUGH IT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. {¶10} Mother’s first two assignments of error challenge the substance of the juvenile court’s judgment that granted per manent custody of the child to CSB. First, she challenges one of the juvenile court’s alleged fi ndings regarding the first prong of the permanent custody test. Second, she argues that the perm anent custody judgment was agai nst the manifest weight of the evidence. This Court disa grees with both arguments. {¶11} In considering whether the juve nile court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court “wei ghs the evidence and all reason able inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving co nflicts in the evidence, the [finder

1 There is no proposed judgmen t entry in the record.5 of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest misca rriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new [hear ing] ordered.” (Internal quota tions and citations omitted.) Eastley v. Volkman , 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. When weighing the evidence, this Court “must always be mindf ul of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21. {¶12} Before a juvenile court may termin ate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and co nvincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at leas t 12 months of a consecutive 2 2-month period; the child or another child of the same parent has b een adjudicated abused, neglected , or dependent three times; or that the child cannot be placed with either parent, based on an anal ysis under Revised Code Section 2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under Section 2151.414(D)(1). R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re William S. , 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996). {¶13} Mother’s first assignment of error alleges that the juvenile co urt committed reversible error by basing its a ward of permanent custody on th e first-prong ground that A.R. had been in the agency’s temporary custody for 12 months of a conse cutive 22-month period. It is well settled that a parent suffers no prejudice when the juveni le court makes an erroneous firstprong finding, as long as it has properly found one of the alle ged first-prong grounds for permanent custody. In re U.D. , 9th Dist. Summit No. 29195, 2019-Ohio-512, ¶ 9, citing In re K.C. , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011258, 2018-Ohio-2348, ¶ 11, 21 (holding that, although the juvenile court erred in basing its permanent c ustody decision on a ground that was not alleged in the motion, the error was harmless because the parent had notice of an alternat ive ground that was properly alleged and proven at the hearing).6
{¶14} Here, CSB alleged as its sole first-prong ground that the child could not or should not be returned to her parents’ custody pursuant to Section 215 1.414(B)(1)(a). The juvenile court found that the agency had prove d that allegation by clear and c onvincing evidence, and Mother does not challenge that finding. M oreover, the evidence suppor ted that first-prong finding. Accordingly, even if the juvenile court made an additional firs t-prong finding as to a ground that was not alleged, the erro r would be harmless. {¶15} A review of the judgment indicates that the juvenile court did not, however, find “12 of 22” as an alternative first-prong basis for its award of permanent custody. The trial court did find that, on April 24, 2019, A.R. “was placed in the Tempo rary Custody of [CSB]. The child has remained in the Temporary Custody of [CSB] since that time. ” However, the court made no express finding that A.R. had b een in the agency’s temporary cu stody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period for purposes of Section 2151.414(B) (1)(d). Accordingly, the juvenile court did not make that finding as a first-prong basis , but instead made the finding pursuant to Section 2151.414(D)(1)(c), relevant to a best inter est consideration. Section 2151.414(D)(1)(c) considers the child’s custodial history, incl uding, but not limited to, whether the child has been in the temporary custody of a public childre n services agency in excess of 12 months of a consecutive 22-mont h period. Accordingly, as the j uvenile court did not rely on “12 of 22” in finding that CSB had e stablished a first-prong basis for permanent custody, Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled. {¶16} In her second assignment of error, Mother argues that the award of permanent custody is against the manifest weight of the evidence because it was contrary to the best interest of the child. Mother does not challenge the juve nile court’s f irst-prong finding that A.R. could not or should not be returned to Mothe r’s custody. Moreover, she d oes not argue that she was able to7 provide a safe and stable home fo r A.R. Instead, Mother challe nges the juvenile court’s denial of her motion for legal custody to Aunt. 2 {¶17} The best interest factors include: the interaction and interrel ationships of the children, the wishes of the children, the custodial history of the children, the children’s need for permanence and whether that ca n be achieved without a grant of permanent custody, and whether any of the factors outlined in Section 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) appl y. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e); see In re R.G. , 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 24834 and 24850, 2009-Ohio-6284, ¶ 11. Clear and convincing evidence is that which will “pr oduce in the mind of the trier o f facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” (Internal quotations o mitted.) In re Adoption of Holcomb , 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985), quoting Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶18} When reviewing the propriety of an award of permanent custody i n lieu of granting a competing motion for legal cus tody, this Court considers the following: Because the trial court’s decision whether to place the child[ ] in the legal custody of [any person] was also based on the best interest of the chil d[ ], this Court typically conducts a single best i nterest review of the trial c ourt’s decision to place the child[ ] in the permanent cu stody of the agency rather than in the legal custody to a relative. If permanent custody is in the child[ ]’s best interest, legal custody to [any other person] necessarily i s not. Consequently, this Court will review the factors set forth in [Section] 2151.414(D) in reviewing the bes t interest decision of the trial court. (Internal quotations a nd citations omitted.) In re D.T. , 9th Dist. Summit No. 29876, 2021- Ohio-1650, ¶ 15., quoting In re S.P. , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27138, 2014-Ohio-1211, ¶ 10.

2 Mother does not challenge the denial of her motions for legal c ustody to the maternal grandmother or the other materna l aunt. Nor does she challenge the denial of her motion for a sixmonth extension of temporary custody.8
{¶19} A.R. was removed from Mother’s care when the child was not yet six months old. She remained in agency custody and was placed in foster care th roughout the duration of the case, in excess of two years. {¶20} The child has a bond with Mother and the foster mother. She is also comfortable with Aunt who has had all-day vi sits with the child in her home . According to Aunt, A.R. gets along well with Aunt’s two boys, one of which is the same age a s A.R. The other boy is a year
younger. {¶21} A.R. has some gastrointestinal and sensory issues. Initially, she screamed incessantly for a few months after placement in her current fos ter home. The child then engaged in a six-to-eight-month period of head banging, during which sh e had to wear a helmet to protect her skull. While the head bangi ng has subsided, the child now emits high pitched screams when she is agitated or wants atten tion. A.R. requires constant sti mulation. The foster mother has learned how to de-escalate the child’s tantrums by refocusing A .R.’s attention. The child is receptive to those proactive measures. {¶22} The two-year-old child was too immature to express her wishes r egarding custody. The guardian ad litem testified that permanent custody was nece ssary to meet the best interest of the child. The guardian ad litem had earlier recommended a six -month extension of temporary custody in her report filed in advance of the second day of the hearing. She opined that additional time was necessary to allow the ag ency to further assess Aunt a nd to give Aunt the opportunity to visit for longer periods of time with the child and demonstrate her commitment to A.R. By the third day of the hearing two months later, however, the guardia n ad litem modified her recommendation to permanent cust ody based on concerns regarding Aunt’s ability to provide a safe and stable home for the child.9
{¶23} The child requires a legally secu re home in a timely manner. N either parent could provide that for her within a reasonable time. Father was serv ing a prison sentence that was expected to last several more years. Mother had made negligibl e progress on her case plan objectives. {¶24} Mother was required to engage i n mental health services to addr ess childhood trauma and her history of domes tic violence with Father. Despi te numerous referrals by CSB, Mother failed to engage in serv ices with any provider. Instead of working on developing good decision-making skills, Mother continued to maintain contact wi th Father, who sent her threatening and emotionally abusive letters from prison. In ad dition, Mother has a current boyfriend who has a criminal hi story, including a pending charg e for domestic violence. {¶25} Mother was also required to enga ge in substance abuse treatment to address her long term drug use. She failed t o obtain her required assessme nt, did not participate in treatment, and refused to cooperate with many of the caseworker’s requests for drug screens. Of the eight screens to which Mother submitted, seven were positive for drug s, including oxycodone, methamphetamine, marijuana, fentanyl, and heroin. While the ca se was pending, Mother overdosed on fentanyl and had t o be revived with Narcan. {¶26} Mother’s last case plan objective addressed basic needs. Mothe r was living at one point between her car and her mo ther’s home, which was not appr opriate because Mother’s presence violated her mother’s public housing agreement. The m aternal grandmother also struggled with substance abuse i ssues, so that it was detriment al to Mother’s recovery to be in that environment. Mother obtained public housing but struggled to p ay her utility bills. She claimed to periodically have a job but n ever provided any verification. Although the caseworker told Mother about the child’s medical appointments, Mother never att ended any. The agency10

maintained concerns that Mother would not be able to care for A .R. given the child’s particular needs because of Mother’s lac k of awareness regarding those iss ues. {¶27} While Mother’s interactions with A .R. were appropriate, Mother was inconsistent in visiting with the child. Of 68 scheduled visits, Mother fai led to appear for 20, and arrived 10- 15 minutes late for another 13. E ven after the agency required Mother to call to confirm her visits, Mother missed visits she had confirmed. {¶28} CSB offered visitation with the child to maternal family member s once a month at the Family Interaction Center, but Mother’s family attended onl y one visit. During the entire year of 2019, Aunt visited with A.R. only once and did not express a ny interest in placement or custody. CSB filed its motion for permanent custody in December 2019. T he first day of the hearing was on August 27, 2020. Aunt did not contact CSB until September 2 020, to request that the agency consider her as a potential legal custodian. It began to do so immediately. Aunt was quickly approved for visitation and was allowed to visit with the child in her home, at first for four hours at a time, and later for full days. At the conclusion of the s econd day of hearing on October 26, 2020, the juvenile court continue d the hearing until December 1 4, 2020, on Mother’s request to give CSB and the guard ian ad litem additi onal time to assess Au nt’s ability to care for the child. {¶29} Although CSB allowed Aunt to pick up the child once a week for full day (9:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.) in-home visits, it had been several weeks since Aunt appeared on time to retrieve the child. Pursuant to agency policy, visits are cancelled whe n the visitor is more than 15 minutes late. The guardian ad litem was unable to observe a visit in A unt’s home to gauge the interactions between A.R., Aunt, and Aunt’s sons because Aunt failed to pick up the child on time. The guardian ad litem and caseworker had hoped to increase Aunt’s v isits with the child to include11 overnights, but they were unable to do so based on Aunt’s incon sistency in arriving to pick up
A.R. {¶30} There were additional concerns regarding Aunt’s ability to prov ide a safe and stable home for the child. The guardian ad litem observed a lot of cl utter in Aunt’s home, even during announced and scheduled visits. The walls of the home were cov ered with crayon where Aunt’s children had scribbled while she was not supervising them. The guardian ad litem opined that the addition of another child in Aunt’s home would exacerbate the a lready “fairly chaotic environment.” Given A.R.’s tende ncy to tantrums and need for c onsistent one-on-one interactions, the guardian ad litem was concerned that Aunt would be unable t o provide the necessary structure and stimulation for the child. She opined that it would be dif ficult for Aunt to address A.R.’s escalating behaviors while need ing to also focus on her own two young children. {¶31} While Aunt’s home was generally a ppropriate, the child would ha ve to share a bedroom with Aunt. The child’s bed had not been constructed du e to some missing parts. Although Aunt had a portable play pen for the child, A.R. had d ifficulty sleeping in something other than a bed. Aunt also a dmitted that she would have to bu y additional furniture and clothing for the child. {¶32} Of greater concern to both the cas eworker and guardian ad litem was the unknown status of M.Y., the father of Aunt’s children. M.Y. had a crim inal history, including an active warrant and pending drug charges at the time of the hearing. A lthough Aunt reported knowing M.Y. for eight years, she denie d any knowledge of his criminal history. At another time, however, she testified regarding marijuana found by the police in M.Y.’s car but asserted that he was only charged in that incident because he was the driver. In additio n, while Aunt knew there were also12 open child welfare cases involving M.Y.’s other children, she a ttributed those cases to the drug issues of the mother(s) of those children. {¶33} In any event, Aunt denied that she and M.Y. were currently in a relationship. Although they co-parent their ch ildren, Aunt testified that the ir romantic relationship ended in January 2020. Both the caseworke r and guardian ad litem spoke with Aunt, however, about recent social media posts wherein she refers to M.Y. as her fiancé. G iven A.R.’s potential exposure to drugs if M.Y. were a fixture in A unt’s home, the caseworker and guardian ad litem had concerns about Aunt’s ability to prioriti ze the child over her relations hip and keep her safe. {¶34} None of the Section 2151.414(E)(7) -(11) are applicable in this case as to either parent. {¶35} Based on a thorough review of the r ecord, this is not the excep tional case in which the trier of fact clearly lost its way and committed a manifest miscarriage of justice by terminating the parents’ parental rights and awarding permanent custody to CSB. Father was in prison and not available for several years to care for the child. Mother had not addressed her mental health and substance abuse issues. She had very inconsistent visitation w ith A.R. Moreover, she had no stable home where she could raise the child. Under these circu mstances, the juvenile court’s finding that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate p arental rights and award permanent custody to CSB was supported by clear and convincing evidence. As such, an award of legal custody to Aunt was not in the child’s best interest. See In re S.P. at ¶ 10. Accordingly, the judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. M other’s second assignment of error is overruled.13

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
MOTHER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HER TRIAL ATTORNEY DID NOT PRO PERLY ASSERT/RE-ASSERT THE NEED FOR A CONTINUANCE; DID NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR TRIAL; AND DID NOT OBJECT TO LEADING QUESTIONS, NOR SUBMIT ANY PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. {¶36} Mother argues that her trial attorney failed to provide her wit h effective assistance of counsel. The test for ineffe ctive assistance of counsel in permanent custody cases is the same as that applicable to criminal cases. In re C.M. , 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 23606, 23608, and 23629, 2007-Ohio-3999, ¶ 27. The two-part test requires a demonstrati on of deficient performance by the attorney and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Bradley , 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragr aph two of the syllabus. To determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient, this Court must apply an objective s tandard of reasonableness.
Strickland at 687-688. As Mother recognizes, there must have been a “sub stantial violation of * * * counsel’s essential du ties” to the client. Bradley at 141, quoting State v. Lytle , 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396 (1976). To establish prej udice, the appellant must pr ove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the p roceedings would have been different.
Strickland at 694. Because proof of both pa rts of the test is necessary to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court may dispose of the claim base d solely on the appellant’s failure to demonstrate either deficient performance or the requisite pr ejudice. Bradley at 142-143. {¶37} Mother argues that her counsel w as deficient for failing to (1) properly assert and re-assert the need for a continua nce of the permanent custody h earing, (2) adequately prepare for the hearing, (3) object to leading questions, and (4) submit pr oposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the juven ile court. We consider each cha llenge in turn.14
{¶38} Mother fired her court appointed counsel and hired new trial co unsel the evening before the commencement of the p ermanent custody hearing. Even though Mother and counsel did not first discuss her case until after 4:00 p.m. on the eve of the hearing, counsel prepared and electronically filed a motion to continue the hearing that even ing. The following day, at the commencement of the proceedings, Mother’s counsel orally argued in favor of a continuance to give him more time to prepare. Mother placed counsel in the po sition where he would have to participate in a hearing with no opportunity to prepare unless the juvenile court granted a last minute continuance. {¶39} The juvenile court denied counsel’s motion to continue based on inconvenience to the other parties, attorneys, and witnesses; the additional tim e the child would have to remain in custodial limbo; and concerns tha t Mother’s last minute change of counsel could be a dilatory tactic. Nevertheless, after CSB’s presentation of some witness es’ testimony, Mother’s counsel renewed his motion to continue and the juvenile court in fact r econsidered its prior denial and continued the hearing for, not one, but two additional days ove r the course of almost four months. Accordingly, not only did Mothe r’s counsel properly move for a continuance, but the court granted his motion. This Court cannot say that counsel was deficient w hen he moved for and obtained the requested accommodation. {¶40} Mother’s counsel not only filed a motion for a continuance, but also prepared and filed four dispositional motions on Mother’s behalf prior to th e commencement of the permanent custody hearing. He filed motions for legal custody to the mat ernal grandmother and two maternal aunts, and a motion for a six-month extension of temporary cust ody. He requested and was granted a recess to obtain and review copi es of CSB’s exhibits it plann ed to present at the hearing. After reviewing the exhibits, counsel w as able to effectively cross-e xamine the two records custodians15

who testified on behalf of the agency. Mother’s counsel also c ross-examined the foster mother. After CSB presented the direct examination testimony of the age ncy caseworker, the court continued the hearing for two months to allow Mother’s counsel the opportunity to prepare to cross-examine that witness. {¶41} On the second day of the hearing, Mother’s counsel thoughtfully cross-examined the caseworker on relevant issues raised during direct examinat ion. He also elicited testimony relative to Aunt’s interest in obtaining legal custody and her appropriate interactions with A.R. In addition, Mother’s counsel present ed a case-in-chief on behalf of Mother, calling Aunt as a witness. When Mother’s counsel rested Mother’s case, he reques ted another continuance of the hearing prior to the presenta tion of the testimony of the guard ian ad litem to allow for further assessment of Aunt as a potential legal custodian for the child . The juvenile court granted that second continuance and scheduled t he final day of hearing for a lmost two months later. By strategically reques ting continuances, thoughtfully cross-exami ning CSB’s witnesses and the guardian ad litem, and presenting a case-in-chief on behalf of Mother, counsel demonstrated his competence in his representation of Mother in this case. Accor dingly, this Court cannot conclude that counsel’s trial prep aration was deficient. {¶42} Mother argues that counsel was d eficient for falling to object to leading questions by the assistant prosecutor. Mot her cites to one question in t he transcript in support of her argument. The question involved Aunt’s relationship with the m aternal grandmother, including whether Aunt allowed the matern al grandmother to babysit Aunt’s children despite concerns regarding the grandmother’s substance abuse. It is well settle d that “debatable trial tactics will not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Griffin , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28829, 2019- Ohio-37, ¶ 11, citing State v. Clayton , 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49 (1980). Moreover, “as a matter of law,16 the failure to object at trial may be justified as a trial tact ic and thus does not sustain a claim of effective assistance of counsel.” Griffin at ¶ 16, citing State v. Miller , 9th Dist. Summit No. 23240, 2007-Ohio-370, ¶ 10. This Court accords the proper deference a nd will not second-guess the strategic trial decisions of t rial counsel in this regard. Griffin at ¶ 16; see also State v. Carter , 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558 (1995). {¶43} Here, Mother makes no argument as to why counsel’s failure to o bject in this instance was deficient, and we will not second-guess counsel’s decision. Moreover, Mother fails to cite to anywhere else in the record where she believes couns el should have obj ected. Pur suant to Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 12(A)(2), which allows the appellate court to disregard an assigned error if the appellant h as failed to identify the alle ged error in the record, we decline to address the issue further. {¶44} Finally, although Mother references counsel’s failure to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the juvenile court in her ass ignment of error, she does not address the issue in her argument. Accordingly, we decline to consider the argument. See App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7). {¶45} For the above reasons, this Cour t cannot conclude that Mother’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance. In fact , despite Mother’s hiring of co unsel on the evening before the hearing, counsel performed compe tently. Accordingly, Mother’s third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV THE COURT[’]S ADOPTION OF UNSIGNED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IS RE VERSIBLE PLAIN ERROR. {¶46} Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by adopting CSB’s u nsigned findings of fact and conclusions of law as the judgment of the court. M other’s argument i s not well taken.17
{¶47} The juvenile court judge allowe d all parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law after the conc lusion of the permanent custod y hearing, should they wish to do so. On December 18, 2020, CSB filed its proposed findings of f act and conclusions of law. The record demonstrates that that document was signed by the assist ant prosecuting attorney assigned to the case. On January 8, 2021, the juvenile court issued its independent judgmen t, incorporating the court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders, w hich was signed by the juvenile court judge. This Court finds no error in these proceedings. Mother ’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III. {¶48} Mother’s assignments of error ar e overruled. The judgment of t he Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juven ile Division, is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State o f Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file sta mped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to m ake a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.18 Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT

CALLAHAN, J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES: HEATHER DYER, Attorney a t Law, for Appellant. SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuti ng Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CO RGAN, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee. HOLLY FARAH, Guardian ad Litem.