Opinion issued November 21, 2017

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-16-00982-CR

———————————

PATRICK HENDERSON COOPER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 176th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1450541

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Patrick Henderson Cooper, was indicted for and convicted of two 

offenses—possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance1and engaging in 

 

1 Trial Court Case No. 1450541, Appeal No. 01-16-00982-CR (“the present 

appeal”). 
2

organized criminal activity.2 Appellant pleaded guilty to both offenses, and the trial 

court assessed punishment at 30 years’ confinement on each, to run concurrently.

In his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends that he cannot be punished for 

multiple offenses involving the same act, and that his possession conviction should 

be reversed on double jeopardy grounds. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

The closing arguments made at the sentencing hearing indicate that 

appellant, Patrick Henderson Cooper, and his co-defendants agreed to participate 

in an armed robbery. Specifically, during a meeting at a Chile’s restaurant, 

appellant and the co-defendants agreed to steal cocaine from a warehouse so that 

they could sell and distribute the drugs themselves. On December 4, 2014, 

appellant and co-defendants robbed men at the warehouse, who were actually 

undercover police officers, taking a large quantity of cocaine. Appellant was armed 

during the robbery. Appellant and his co-defendants were arrested for the stated 

offenses that same day.

Procedural Background

In December 2014, appellant was indicted for possession with intent to 

deliver a controlled substance in cause number 1450541. In cause number 

 

2 Trial Court Case No. 1489378, Appeal No. 01-16-00983-CR (“the related Anders

appeal”).
3

1489378, appellant was indicted for engaging in organized criminal activity. The 

indictments included enhancement paragraphs alleging use of a deadly weapon in 

the commission of the offense and a prior felony conviction. Appellant pleaded

guilty and confessed that the enhancement paragraphs were true on May 20, 2016. 

The punishment range was 25 years to life in prison, and the trial court sentenced 

appellant to 30 years’ confinement for each charge. Appellant filed timely notices 

of appeal. Appellant’s counsel filed an Anders brief3in the organized-crime case,

and this Court affirmed appellant’s conviction in that case. See Cooper v. State, 

No. 01-16-00783-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 21, 2017, no pet. h.). 

In this case—the possession case—appellant contends that his “right to be free 

from multiple punishments for the same act was violated.”

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Standard of Review

The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, enforceable against the 

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person shall “be 

subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. 

CONST. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects an accused against 

multiple prosecutions for the same offense and multiple punishments for the same 

 

3 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).
4

offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, (1977); Ex parte Chaddock, 369 

S.W.3d 880, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 

The Blockburger same-elements test provides that “[w]hether there are two 

offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact 

which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304,

(1932). “Application of Blockburger does not serve, however, to negate otherwise 

clearly expressed legislative intent.” Villanueva v. State, 227 S.W.3d 744, 747 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In Missouri v. Hunter, the Supreme Court made clear that 

“[w]ith respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double 

Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing 

greater punishment than the legislature intended.” 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983).

“Where, as here, a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under 

two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the ‘same’ conduct 

under Blockburger . . . the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may 

impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.” Id. at 368–

369.

Analysis

Appellant was convicted of engaging in organized criminal activity with the 

underlying charge of aggravated robbery. Appellant was also convicted of

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Appellant’s sole argument 
5

on appeal is based on the mistaken assumption that that the possession of cocaine

was the underlying act of the engaging-in-organized-criminal-activity charge, and 

that, as a result, appellant is being tried and convicted twice for possessing the 

same cocaine. Appellant is mistaken; the underlying offense for the engaging-inorganized-criminal-activity conviction was actually armed robbery, not possession

of cocaine.

4

Here, the engaging-in-organized-criminal-activity charge requires proof of a 

robbery; the possession of cocaine charge does not. The possession case requires 

an intent to deliver cocaine; the engaging in organized criminal activity does not. 

Thus, appellant’s argument fails under Blockburger, which requires us to 

determine “whether each [charged offense] requires proof of a fact which the other 

does not.” 284 U.S. at 304.

Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue.

 

4 The indictment for engaging in organized criminal activity alleged that:

. . . PATRICK HENDERSON COOPER, hereafter styled the Defendant 

heretofore, on or about December 4, 2014, did then and there unlawfully, with 

intent to establish, maintain and participate in a combination and in the profits of a 

combination . . . conspire to commit the offense of aggravated robbery, namely, 

in that he did unlawfully and the defendants did then and there agree with 

members of the aforesaid combination to engage in conduct constituting said 

offense, and pursuant to such agreement the defendants performed the following 

overt acts, to-wit: arrive to 21145 FM 526, Katy, Harris County, Texas with a 

deadly weapon and remove kilograms of cocaine from a building.

(Emphasis added.)
6

CONCLUSION

 We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Sherry Radack

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Caughey.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).