### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00014- CV
Mayor He ctorGonzale s, Com m ission er K enneth W. Moon, Com m ission er Thom as

Trantham , and Vil lage of Webb erville, Appellants
v. Co nc e r ne d Ci ti z e ns o f We bbe r vil le , D av id G las s, Ri c ky Tu r ne r , J e anne tt e Jo hnst on,

Ro be r t C oe , J am e s Sa nso m , C ar r ollSans om , M at th e w P ond, and

Weldon R. John ston, Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. GN301631 , HO NORAB LE PAUL DAVIS, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N Our disposition of this acce lerated interlocutory appea l turns on wh ether appellee s have sta ndingto c ha lle ng e the inc or po ratio n o f a

mun ic ipa lity . B e c a

us e we ho ld t

hat a pp e lle e s’ pleading s and the e vidence demonstrate that appellee s challeng e the incor poration as voidable rathe r than void, we va cate the denial of the plea to the jur isdiction and dismis s for wa nt of jurisdiction.
BACK GR OUND The unde rly ing dispute in this case conce rns whether the village of Webberville wa s proper ly incorporated as a T y

p e C municipality
. See Te x. L oc . G ov ’t Cod e Ann. § 8 .0 01 (We st 19 99 ). Th e fo llo wi ng fa c ts are un dis pu te d. Web be rv ill e is a c omm un ity loc a te d in

e a ste rn Tr a vis County wh os e his tor ic a l or ig ins date back to th e mi d- 18 30 s. On De c e mbe r 2 , 2 00 2, a

pp e lla ntsThe r ec o rd s ug g ests that the incorpor ation eff ort was spurr ed by

a land use issue; 1 sp e c if ic a lly , c e rt a in r e sid e nts we re c on c e rn e d a bo ut g ra ve l mini ng in t

he are a and ha d a de sir e to cre ate a local g overnme nt that could regulate such a ctivitie s . W e ar e n o t asked to addr ess the validity of any regulatory

actions in this appeal. I n the “e x cluded properties” section of the statement, the prope rty is list ed by

descr iption— 2 i.e. , “powe r l ine easement” or “excluded re ctang le”—in addition to the number of acr es excluded. Webberville no long er ha s a Un ited States Post Office; ar ea r esidents who sig ned the 3 petition had mailing a ddresse s in Manor and Elg in. 2 Gonzales, Moon, and Tra ntham filed a pe tition wit h the Travis County J udg e to incorpor ate a

land
are a in an d ar o u n d the Webberville c ommunity as a Ty pe C municipality
. See id . § 8. 00 2 ( Wes t 1999). The pe tition allege d that the community included fe wer

than 2,000 i nhabitants and not more 1 t h an t wo square miles of surfa ce a rea . Se e id
. § 5
. 9 0 1 ( We s t 1 9 9 9 ) ( c o mm u n it y w it h few er tha n 2, 00 0 inha

bit ants mus t ha

ve no t mo re than tw o s qu are mil e s o f s ur fa c e are a ); id . § 8.001. The petition also included a de tailed textual st atement describing the proposed pe rimeter bounda ries and a plat providing a g raphic illust ration of the bounda ries. Within t he outer

perimete r boundar ies wer e various “hole s” that we re e x cluded f rom the ar ea to be incorporated. 2 The pe tition was signed by more than f

ifty reg istered voters re siding within the pr op os e d mu

nic ipa l bo un da

ri e s. Se e id . § 8.002. Attache d to the petition was Tra ntham’s sworn 3 statement that the prop osed boundar ies included more than 201 inhabitants. See id . § 8.001 (ar ea incorpora ting a s Ty pe C g ener al-law municipality must have betwee n 201 and 4,999 inhabitants). When a p e ti ti o n f

o r in c o r p o r a ti o n is f

il e d , th e c o u n ty ju d g e is r e qu ir e d to order an inc or po ratio n e le c tio n if

“ satis fa c tor

y pr oo f i s mad e that th e c omm un ity c on ta ins the re qu isi te number of inha

bitants.” Id
. § 8.003 (West 1999). The c ounty judge hear d evidenc e on the pe tition at a he aringheld on Dec ember 17, 2002. The evidenc e included a De cembe r 16 memora ndum from3

J osep h P. G ie s e lm a

n , E xe c uti v e M a

n a g e r o f the Travis County

Transpor tation and Natur al Resourc es Depa rtment. The Gie selman memora ndum states that “throug h aer i al photog raphy we have bee n able to ver ify

that there are 215 houses in the proposed ar ea s . W i t h a household size of 2.47 for Travis County

(U.S. Census), multipli ed by the num ber of

houses would equa l approxim ately 530 persons.” Reviewing the statutory require ments for a

Ty pe C g ener al law municipality , Gieselman stated that the de partment “ has now de termined that the a rea is 1.98 square mi l es ” an d that “petitioners have ther efor e met the statutory require ments of the law unde r criteria #(1) [l ocal g overnme nt code se ction 5.901(1)] and as a Ty pe C Gene ral-L aw municipality .” The c ounty

judge then found satisfa ctory proof that th e s t atut ory

require ments had been me t, including that the “area to be incorporated contains few er than 2,000 inhabitants and does not have more than two square miles of surfa ce a rea , there fore satisfying the require ments of Texas L oc a l G ov e rnme nt C od e , § 5. 90 1. ” Thus , h e or de re d a n e le c tio n o n Satur da

y , F e br ua ry 1, 20 03 , in wh ic h th e vo te rs re sid ingwi thi n th e pr op os e d v ill a g e of Web be rv ill e wo uld

de c ide wh e the r t o incorpora te that entity . The incor poration ele ction was c losely contested; the vote in favor of incorpora tion was ninety -four to eig hty -seve n. Concurre ntly , the vot ers e lected G onzales as may or and Moon and Tr antham as c ommissi oners. Se e id
. § 8.001(b). Appellee s have not contested the results of this elec tion.

On Fe bruar

y 18, the county

judge order ed the c ommunity o f Webberville, as contained wi t h i n the terr itory and boundar ies identified in the petition, incorpora ted as a Ty pe C Gene ral L aw Municipality
. I n the order , Gonzales was decla red may or and Moon an d T ra n t h am commissioners. The ne w villag e g overnme nt then adopted various ordinanc es in Marc h, includingGonzales ran unoppo s ed
. M oon defe ated a ppellee Weldon Johnst on, and Tra ntham 4 defe ated Stephen T urner , son of appe llee Ricky Turner
. See Tex as Parks & W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 227-28 (Te x . 2004). 5 4 a right -o f- wa y

manag ement ordina

nce, a n ordinanc e cr eatinga municipal cour t, an ordinanc e g ranting a utility

fra nchise, a traff ic-re g ulation ordinance , and a f lood damag e pre vention ordinanc e. Additionally , moratoriums on subdivisions, ex cavations, and buildings wer e adopted. On Ma y 3, the voters a

pproved a sales and use tax of 1.75% in a specia l election. On May 20, 2003, app ell ees f

iled suit ag ainst Gonzales, Moon, Trantham, and the City of Webberville se eking a per manent injunction prohibiting the sales tax and enforc ement of the ordinanc es and moratoriums. Whil e the suit was pending, on May 15, 2004, Gonzales, Moon, and Trantha m were eac h re- elec ted to their vi llag e g overnme nt posts. I n J une, both sides filed motions 4 for summary

judgme nt, a

nd appellants filed a plea to the jurisdiction. After hear ing e vidence , which 5 inc lud e d th e Gi e se lma

n mem or and

um, the dis tr ic t court de nie d the ple a to the jur isd ic tio n a nd bo th motions for summary

judgme nt. Appellants then broug ht this interlocutor y appea l from the denia l of their plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. C ode Ann. § 51.014 ( West S upp. 2004- 05).
DI SCU SSIO N

Appellants present three issues on appea l that challeng e the district cour t’s denial of t h ei r p l eat o t h e j u ri s d i ct i o n . T h ey u rge t h at p ri v at e p ar t i es l i k e ap p el l ee s l ac k s t an d i n g t o ch al l en ge
a mun i ci p al i n co rporation that is not void ab ini tio ; th a t on ly the State , thro ug h a

qu o w arr a nto action, can bring such a challeng e aga inst a de facto municipality ; and that private parties may notAs the Durham court e x plained: 6 [I ]t is c le ar t

hat a qu o warr anto pr oc e e din g , in sti tut e d a nd c on du c te d in

the name of the State of Texas, is the only proper method of making a dire ct attac k upon a vo ida ble mun ic ipa l c or

po ratio n e xistin g de fa c to o r u nd e r c olo r of law. Pr ivate parties, by

themselves, lac k standin g t o d irec tly attack the exis tence and or g anizatio n of a mun ic ipa l c or po ra tio n, and any su c h su it br ou g ht by pr ivate individuals alone will be d i s m i s sed for want of a

nece ssary

party , the State of Texas. Only

the State of Te x as ca

n direc tly attack a voidable incor

poration by a q u o wa rr an t o p ro ce ed i n g. Du rh am v . Cr utc hfi e ld , 578 S.W .2d 438, 440 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tex arka na 1979, wr it ref’ d n.r.e.)
. 5 c oll a te ra lly

a tta c k a mu ni cip a l in c or po ratio n w he re mun ic ipa l bo un da ri e s, a s d ra wn , c omp ly

wi th statutory limit s on surfac e ar ea. Ap p el l ee s co n ce d e t h e l ega l p ri n ci p l es t h at p ri v at e p ar t i es l ac k s t an d i n g t o ch al l en ge municipal incorpora

tions that are not void ab ini tio and that Tex as law re qu ir e s a qu o w arr a nto action to cha lleng e de facto mun ic ipa lit ie s. Se e Du rh am v . Cr utc hfi e ld , 5 7 8 S. W. 2 d 4 3 8 , 4 4 0 ( T e x. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1979, w rit ref’d n.r.e.); see also W alling v. North C ent. Tex. M un. W ater 6 Auth. , 3 4 8 S
. W
. 2 d

5 3 2 , 5 3 3 ( T e x . 1 9 6 1 )
. H o w e v e r , a p p e l l e e s a s s e rtt h a tt h e y ar e challeng ing Web be rv ill e ’s inc or

po ra tio n a s v oi d— sp eci fi cal ly , t hey con ten d t hat app ell ant s fa il ed t o co mp ly wi th the statutory require ment limit ing the municipality ’s surfa ce a rea to two square miles. See Tex. L oc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 5.901, 8.001.

Appellee s also argue that bec ause the y have c halleng ed Webber ville’s incorporation as void and not me rely voidable, appellants cannot bring this a ppeal be cause Webberville’s status
as a “g overnme ntal unit” rema ins in iss ue. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 51.014(a )(8) , 101.001 (West 2 0 0 5 ). Appellants respond that appellee s have f ailed to ra ise an issue that6

Webber v i l l e’ s incorporation is voi d and thus, Webberville re tains the status of a de fac to municipality

unless and until it i s j u d i ci al ly deprive d of that status in a prope rly asser ted quo
war ranto a ction.

We ag ree with appellants that our thre shold jurisdictional inqui ry overla ps somewhat with the merits of appe llants’ plea to the jurisdiction—if appellee s’ pleading s and evide nce do not raise a fac t issue reg ardingwhether Webberville’s incor

poration wa s void due to noncom pliance with statutory

are a limitations, t heir claim would nece ssarily fail and Webbe rville would continue to enjoy the status of a de facto municipality with sta nding to br ing this a

ppeal. We ac cording ly

turn to t he se int e rt

wi ne d is su e s.
Stand ard of review

Whether appe llees have alleg ed fac ts that a ffirmatively demonstrate subje ct-matter jurisdiction is a question of law re viewed de novo
. See M iranda , 133 S.W
. 3 d at 2 2 6
. L ikewise, whether u n d i s p uted evidenc e of jurisdictional fa cts establishes a tr ial court’s jurisdiction is also a question of law. Id . I n some case s, disputed evidence of jurisdictional fac ts that also impli cate s the merits of the c ase m ay re q u i re resoluti on by the finder

of fa ct. Se e id
. ( c iti ng

Ga te s v . P itt s , 291 S.W . 948, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1927, no writ)). In thi s ca s e, howeve r, undisputed evide n ce implicates both the subject-matter jurisdiction of the cour t and the mer its of the case
. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226.

When a plea to the jurisdiction challeng es t he pleadings, we determine i f t he plea der has alleg ed fac ts that a ffirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hea r the c ause. Id . (citing Texas Ass’n of B us. v. Texas Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W .2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)). We construe the7

pleading s liberall y i n favor of the plaintiffs a

nd look to their intent. Id . I f the plea dings do not
c on ta in s uf

fi c ie nt f a c ts t o a ff ir ma tiv e ly de mon str a te the c ourt ’s jur isd ic tio n b ut d o n ot a ff ir ma tiv e ly demonstrate inc ura ble def ects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of plea ding suf ficienc y and the plaintiffs should be af

forde d the opportun i t y t o am end. Id . at 22 6- 27 ; see County of Cameron v

. Br own , 80 S.W .3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). I f t h e pleadings a ffirmatively neg ate the e x istence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jur isdiction may be g rante d without allowing the pla intiffs an opportunity

to amend. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226-27. Ho we ve r, if a ple a to the jur isd ic tio n c ha lle ng e s th e e xiste nc e of jur isd ic tio na l f

a c ts,
we c onsider re levant evidence submit ted by the par ties when ne cessa

ry to resolve the jur isdictional issues raised, as the trial court is require d to do. Se e id .; see also Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W .3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000)
. I f the evidenc e cre ates a fac t que stion re g arding t h e jurisdi ctional issue, then the trial c ourt ca nnot gr ant t he plea to the jurisdiction and the fa ct issue will be re solved by the fa ct finder
. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 228. Howe ver, if the rele vant evidenc e is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the j urisdictional issue, the t rial cour t may rule on the ple a to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Se e id
. Appli cation De fe c ts i n th e inc or po ratio n pro c e ss wh ic h re nd e r the inc or po ratio n a bs olute ly vo id
are limit ed to alleg ations: (1 ) t hat the ac t of incorpor ation itself was e ither prohibited or
unau t h o ri z edb y

l aw ; (2 ) t h at t h e p u rp o rt edi n co rp o ra t i o nwa s p u rs u an tt o an u n co n s t i tu t i o n al s t at ute; or (3) that the attempt to comply wi t h t h e p ro visions of the law authorizing the cre ation of such municipality

was so utterly

lackingor def

ective a s to render

the attempt to cre ate suc h corpor ation8

void. Durham , 578 S.W .2d at 441. Appellants concede that a viol ation of t he surface are a limitation require ments would constitute the third ty pe of de fe ct. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. §§ 5.901, 8.001. Turning first to appellee s’ pleading s, it is undisputed that appellee s have alleg ed that Webberville’s incor

poration wa s void. On its face , appellee s’ l i v e p et i t i o n alleg es that the

“ inc or po ratio n of the purp or

te d Vill a g e of Web be rv ill e is v oid (n ot m e re ly

vo ida ble ) a nd the e ff or ts to exercise of [sic] muni cipal powe rs by Def endants Gonzales, Moon a nd Trantham are illega l be c au se thec om mu nit

ywas sta tutor ily

pr oh ibi te d fr om inc or

po ra tin g b e c au se it e

x c e e ds thetwo square mile surface pr oh ibi te d b y Te x. L oc . G ov ’t

Cod e Ann. §§ 5. 90 1( 1) and 8. 01 (3 ). ” (E mph a sis
a dd e d. ) B a se d o n th e se ple a din g s a lon e , t he di str ic t c ourt wo uld have pr op e rl y

de nie d th e ple a

to the jurisdiction. See D urham , 578 S.W .2d at 440-41.

Howeve r, appellants introduced undisputed e vidence —specific ally , the Giese lman memorandum—that Webber ville’s incorporated area was less than two squar e miles. See M iranda , 13 3 S. W.3 d at 22 7; Bland , 3 4 S. W.3 d at 55 5; see also Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. §§ 5.901, 8.001. Ap pe lle e s, in f

a c t, c on c e de that the mun ic ipa l bo un da ri e s w e re int e nti on a lly

dr awn to i nc lud e le ss than two square miles of surfa ce a rea . Their c ontention, rather , is that appellants violated the statutory surfa ce a

rea limit ations and re ndere d the i n co rp o ration voi d by including w ithin the incorpora ted territory “unincor

porate d voids, f

orming islands of unincorporated are as within a sea of mun ic ipa l te rr ito ry ,” e xclu din g “ loc a l hi sto ri c Web be rv ill e c omm un ity loc a tio ns suc h a s a downtown chur ch and r esidenc es traditionally considere d to be par

t of the Villag e.” T he par ties do not dispute that the are as within the excluded “donut holes” a re uninha bited. They

also ag ree that9

if the e xclu de d a

re a s w e re inc lud e d in

the c a lc ulatio n o f s ur fa c e are a , th e inc or po ra te d a re a wo uld exceed two squa

re miles in violation of section 5.901. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 5.901. Ap p e ll an ts r e s p o n d b y c la im in g th a t th e ar e a s w e r e e xc lu d e d f o r v a li d rea sons including a

voiding powe r line ea sement s , fl ood plains, or ar eas w ithin the ex tra-te rritorial ju r is d ic ti o no f

th e Ci ty of Bastrop. Se e id . § 42.041 (West 1999) (municipality may not be incorpo ra t ed in extraterr itorial jurisdiction of exi sting municipality without written consent of g ov e rn ingbo dy

of e xistin g mun ic ipa lity

); se e als o H

off ma n v . E lli ott , 4 7 6 S. W. 2 d 8 4 5 , 8 4 6 ( T e x. 19 72 ). We ne e d not co ns ide r the va lid ity of the se re a so ns be c a

us e a pp e lle e s’ argume nt t

ur ns pure ly on a question of statutory

interpre tation: whether a n incorporated ar ea of

less than two square miles of surfa ce a

rea , which thus complies with the literal langua g e of section 5.901, nonetheless violates the lim itatio n b e c a

us e it e xclu de s “ isl and s” or “ ho le s” that, i f i nc lud e d, wo uld caus e th e area to exceed two squa

re miles. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 5.901. As they explained during oral argument, appellee s’ position is essentially that the leg islature could not have intended section 5.901 to a llo w a pp e lla nts to “ c arv e ou t” isl and s o r h ole s w ith in t he pe ri me te r o f m

un ic ipa l bo un da

ri e s. I f languag e in a statute is unambig uous, we consider the intent of the leg islature as found in the plain and c ommon meaning of the wor ds and terms used. See Sorokolit v. Rhode s , 889 S.W. 2d 23 9, 24 1 ( Te x. 19 94 ); se e als o Mo ntg om e ry In de

p. Sc h. Di st. v . D av is , 34 S.W .3d 559, 564 (Tex. 2000). I n applying the plain and common meaning of the lang uag e in a statute, courts may

not by implication e nlarg e the meaning of any word in the statute bey ond its ordina ry meaning; s uch implication is inappropriate when leg islative intent ma y be g ather ed fr om a re asonable interpre tation of the statute a s it is writt en. So ro k oli t , 889 S.W .3d at 241; see M onsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun.10

Ut il. Di st ., 86 5 S.W.2 d 937 , 9 39 (T e x. 19 93 ); Moreno v . Sterling Drug, Inc. , 787 S.W .2d 348, 352 (T e x. 19 90 ); see also Laidlaw W aste Sys. v. C i ty of W

ilmer , 904 S.W .2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1995) (g ener al rule is that cour

ts should not i nsert wor ds in statute except to give eff ect to cle ar le g islative intent). O n it s f

a c e , s e c ti o n 5
. 9 0 1 r e qu ir e s o n ly th a t an in c o r p o r a te d ar e a c o n ta in le s s th antwo square miles. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 5.901. I t contains no requir ement that the incorpora ted area be fully inclusive of all surfa ce are as wit hin its perimete r boundaries, or even that the incorporated ar ea be a sing le contig uous are a. Se e id
. Significa ntly , the leg islature has c hosen to include this ty

pe of requirement in other statutes. See id
. § 4 3
. 0 7 1 ( W e s t1 9 9 9 ) ( g e n e r a l l y, municipality

may not annex area

i n water or sewe r district unless it annexes entire pa rt of district outside municipality ’s boundar ies); Tex
. Educ. Code Ann. § 41.206 (West 1996) (pr operty may be
ann e xed by sc ho ol d istri c t w ith ou t r e g ard to w he the r p ro pe rt

y is co nti g uo us to o the r p ro pe rt y in dis tr ic t) ; Id . § 13.051 (West 1996) (ter ritory may be deta ched f

rom school district and anne x ed by
ano the r s c ho ol dis tr ic t that is c on tiguo us to d e ta c he d te rr ito ry ); see also Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 43.054 (West Supp. 2004-05) (g ener ally , municipality with population less than 1.6 mill ion may not ann ex p u blicly

or private ly

owned a rea , including strip of

are a following course of roa d, h ig h w ay , r iv e r , s tr e a m, o r c r e e k , u n le s s w id

th o f ar e a a t n ar r o w e s t p o in t i s a t le a s t 1, 0 0 0 f e e t)
. We must assume that the leg islature acted deliberately in omitt ing suc h limit ations from sec tion 5.901. Se e So ro k oli t , 889 S.W .3d at 241. I n light of the lang uag e the leg islature has c hosen to g overn the surfa ce a rea limit ations of Ty

pe C g ener al l aw municipaliti es, we must reje ct appe llees’ c ontention that we infer an additional, contr ary limit ation. See Te x. L oc . Gov ’t Cod e Ann. §§ 5. 90 1, 8. 00 1; see als o S or ok oli t , 8 89 S.W. 3d at 241. F ur the rm or e , a

pp e lle e s h a ve c ite d n o a

uth or ity that w ou ldWe e xpre ss n o o pin ion re g ard ing the imp lic a tio n of su c h an a lle g a tio n, a lth ou g h w e no te 7 that one of our

sister courts ha s held that “g err y man d er ing” of boundar ies did not render an incorpora tion election void. See City of Gladewater v . Pelphrey , 309 S.W .2d 472, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana

1957, writ ref

’d n.r.e .). 11 support their construc tion of section 5.901. Unless and until the Texas Supre me Court instruc ts us otherwise, w e ar e bound to construe the statutory text as written. Additionally , while we do not f ind these fa ctors to be dispositive, we note that the pa rt ie s a g re e tha

t no ne of the are a s e xclu de d f

ro m the inc or

po ra te d are a we re inh a

bit e d. Thus , th is is not a case wher e it is alleg ed that the pe titioners manipulated the municipal boundar ies in order to impact the incorpor at i o n elec tion. Moreove r, we observe that if we w ere to declar e the 7 Webberville incorpor ation void, we would be judic i ally supplanting the will of the voters in that municipality . I mplicit in our democratic c onstitut ional sy st em is that, barringthe ty pe of extraordinary

issues reg ardingballot compilation that are a ddresse d in election conte sts, see T e x. Elec. Code A nn. §§ 221.001-.017 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004-05), which a re not pre sented he re, elec tions should be decided by voters rather t h an co u rt s . Cognizant of our pr oper r ole in our constitutional scheme, we are reluc tant to intervene in the Webberville incor poration ele ction based on appellee s’ novel construc tion of section 5.901.

We c on c lud e that a

pp e lle e s h a ve fa ile d to ra ise a fa c t is su e th at th e Web be rv ill e incorpora tion was void ab ini tio . Acc ording ly , appellee s cannot show that Webberville is not a de facto municipality ; thus, appellants have the leg al rig ht to pursue this interlocutory appea l. See T e x. Civ. Prac
. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (8). For the same rea sons, w e hold that the district court
err ed in deny

ing a ppellants’ plea

to the jurisdiction. Bec ause the leg al basis of appellee s’ complaint12

is that the incorporation is voi dable, not void, appe llees lac k standing to pursue the i r cl ai m s , the State o f T ex as i s a nec essar y party , and a quo w arr anto ac tion is t he only reme dy throug h which appellee s’ claims may

be adva nced. Durham , 578 S.W .2d at 440-41. Appellants’ f irst and sec ond issues are sustained.

Be cause we have alr eady

found that a quo w arr anto ac tion was requir ed in this case, we do not re ach appellants’ issues reg arding whether the fac tual finding s of the county judge may
on ly be c oll a te ra lly

a tta c ke d th ro ug h a qu o w arr anto a c tio n, or wh e the r a

pp e lle e s h a ve su ff

ic ie ntl y alleg ed a spe cial burde n which would conf er standingon them if the incorporation was void. See City of W est Lak e Hi lls v . Sta te e

x re l. City of A us tin , 466 S.W .2d 722, 727 (Tex. 1971) (“e ven if the municipal act is void, the private party must suffer some bur den pec uliar to himself to ac q uire standing to sue.”).
CO NC LU SION

We vacate the district c ourt’s orde r deny ing a ppellants’ plea

to the jurisdiction and dismiss appellee s’ petition for wa nt of jurisdiction.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Vac ated a nd Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: Jul y

28, 2005