THE STATE OF SOUTH C AROLINA

In The Supreme Court

The State, Petitioner

- Respondent,

v.

Charles Dent, Respondent

- Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2021

- 001246

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal f rom Beaufort County

Alex Kinlaw Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 28172

Heard April 20, 2023

– Filed August 16, 2023

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior

Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch

Jr., both of Columbia ; and Isaac McDuffie Stone III, of

Bluffton, all for Petitioner

- Respondent.

E. Charles Grose Jr., of The Grose Law Firm

, LLC, of

Greenwood, for Respondent

- Petitioner.JUSTICE KITTREDGE : Charles Dent was convicted and sentenced on one count

of first

- degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor and two counts of

disseminating obscene material to a minor. Dent appealed, and a divided court of

appeals ' panel reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court erred in

failing to give the requested circumstantial evidence charge this Court articulated in

State v. Logan

, 405 S.C. 83, 747 S.E.2d 444 (2013)

. State v. Dent , 434 S.C. 357,

863 S.E.2d 478 (Ct. App. 2021). Because this ruling was dispositive, the court of

appeals did not reach Dent ' s other assignments of error. We granted the State's

petition for a writ of certiorari and now reverse. While we agree with the court of

appeals ' finding of error in the trial court ' s failure to charge circumstantial evidence

pursuant to Logan , the error was harmless. We reverse and remand to the court of

appeals for consideration of Dent's remaining issues on appeal

.

I.

Dent's minor granddaughter (Granddaughter) accused Dent of sexually abusing her

when she was eight and nine years old. Following her disclosure, Granddaughter

underwent two forensic interviews. During the first forensic interview,

Granddaughter revealed that one of the initial incidents of abuse occurred when Dent

went to the bathroom

, took lewd pictures of himself

, and showed them to

Granddaughter. Granddaughter told the forensic interviewer, "After he showed me

all of his pictures

— he took like ten of t hem

— . . . he told me, 'Here, go take pictures

of yours,' and I said, 'No!'" Granddaughter also detailed occasions when Dent would

touch her vagina, breasts, and buttocks : "He was just touching me everywhere. He

was kissing me on the mouth." Granddaught er stated Dent made her watch a

pornographic video . Dent also took pictures of Granddaughter's vagina while she

was asleep and later showed the pictures to Granddaughter.

In Granddaughter's second forensic interview, she wrote on a piece of paper : "He

made me touch it more than once," indicating that her hand had touched Dent's penis.

Granddaughter also wrote , "He made me lick it," and stated Dent's penis had gone

inside her mouth on multiple occasions. Granddaughter disclosed that Dent touched

h er vagina with his mouth and that his hands went inside her vagina. Granddaughter

described seeing Dent's "urine," which she recalled was "whiteish" in color

, looked

" like a flour mix ," and stained the carpe t. In both forensic interviews, Granddaughter

s tated Dent bribe d her with money and toys. Dent was paying rent for the houseGranddaughter lived in, and he threatened that if Granddaughter reported the abuse,

he would kick the family out of their home.

Dent was indicted for two counts of first

- degree CSC with a minor and two counts

of disseminating obscene material to a minor. At trial, the State presented mostly

direct evidence against Dent. Granddaughter testified

, "I remember he started

kissing me, like, on my face, my mouth. He started licking my belly, like, my belly

button and started, like touching me in weird places. And he took pictures of his

private parts and told me to take pictures of mine." Granddaughter stated Dent

touched her "private parts" and "made [her] lick his private parts." Granddaughter

also testified that Dent showed her videos of "[p]eople hav ing sex." In addition to

Granddaughter's direct, in

- court testimony, the trial court admitted videos of both

forensic interviews into evidence

, and the videos were published to the jury.

The State also presented circumstantial evidence at trial, including testimony from

Granddaughter's mother and her mother's boyfriend concerning changes in

Granddaught er's behavior around the time of the abuse.

At the end of trial

, defense counsel requested a circumstantial evidence charge in

accordance with Logan

. See Logan , 405 S.C. at 99, 747 S.E.2d at 452 (providing

language that trial courts should include in a circumstantial evidence charge when

the charge is requested by a defendant). The S tate, to its credit, did not oppose the

circumstantial evidence charge. The trial court, nevertheless, refused to provide the

jury with the mandated Logan instruction. Dent noted his objection and

, following

the verdict, unsuccessfully moved for a new trial based in part on the Logan issue.

Dent subsequently appealed

, raising eleven issues to the court of appeals. Finding

the Logan issue dispositive, the court of appeals ' majority d eclined to address Dent's

remaining ten issues on appeal. T he court of appeals held the trial court erred in not

giving the full Logan charge and reversed and remanded for a new trial. Judge

Thomas dissented. While Judge Thomas concurred with the finding of error in the

trial court ' s failure to give the Logan charge, she pointed to the wealth of direct

evidence and concluded " the error committed by the trial court was ultimately

harmless. " Dent , 434 S. C. at 364, 863 S.E.2d at 481 (Thomas, J.

, dissenting).

We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals'

decision. The State argues the trial court's failure to give the entire Logan chargewas harmless error. Dent filed a cross

- petition for a writ of certiorari, raising as

additional sustaining grounds the ten issues the court of appeals declined to address.

We held Dent's cross

- petition in abeyance pending resolution of the State's petition.

II.

" In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only. " State v.

Baccus , 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006)

. "When requested, the Logan

charge must be given in c ases based in whole or part on circumstantial evidence."

State v. Herndon , 430 S.C. 367, 371, 845 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2020). Nevertheless,

"[i]n reviewing jury charges for error, this Court considers the trial court's jury

charge as a whole and in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial." Logan

, 405 S.C. at 90, 747 S .E.2d at 448. "To warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to

give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the

defendant." State v. Brandt , 393 S.C. 526, 550, 713 S.E.2d 591, 603 (2011) (quoting

State v. Mattison , 388 S.C. 46 9, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010)).

III.

The parties con cede the trial court e rred in refusing to give the Logan circumstantial

evidence charge following Dent's request. Therefore, t he only issue before us is

whether the trial court's failure to give the Logan charge was harmless. S ee Herndon

, 430 S.C. at 373, 845 S.E.2d at 502 (acknowledging the failure to give a requested

Logan charge is s ubject to a harmless error analysis); State v. Burdette , 427 S.C.

490, 496, 832 S.E.2d 5 75, 578 (2019) ("An e rroneo us instruction alone is insufficient

to warrant this Court's reversal.").

" Harmless error analyses are fact

- intensive inquiries and are not governed by a

definite set of rules. Rather, appellate courts must determine the materiality and

prejudicial character of the error in relation to the entire case. " State v. Jenkins , 412

S.C. 643, 651, 773 S.E.2d 906, 909

– 10 (2015) (citations omitted). Our appellate

courts have found a trial court's failure to give a requested Logan charge is

prejudicial when t he evidence against the defendant is almost entirely circumstantial

. For example, in Herndon

, this Court stated

, "We acknowledge there may be a case

in which a trial court's failure to give the Logan charge might be harmless error, but

this is not such a case. The State's case against Petitioner was almost exclusively

circumstantial ." 430 S.C. a t 373, 845 S.E.2d at 5 02 (emphasis added) ; see also Statev. Sanchez , 435 S.C. 468, 475

– 76

, 867 S.E.2d 595, 598

– 99 (Ct. App. 2021) (finding

the error prejudicial where

, "[s] imilar to Herndon

, the evidence of [the defendant's

guilt] was largely circumstantial ").

Here, the evidence was largely direct

, especially Granddaughter's extensive

testimony. See 30 S.C. Jur. Evidence § 154 (Supp. 2021

– 2022) ("'Direct evidence'

is the testimony of a person who asserts or claims to have actual knowledge of a fact,

such as an eyewitness." (citation omitted)) ; Logan , 405 S.C. at 99, 747 S.E.2d at 452

(" Direct evidence directly proves the existence of a fact and does not re quire

deduction. "). Before the jury, Granddaughter directly nam ed Dent as her abuser and

detailed the sexual acts he perpetrated on her

. T he jury watched almost two hours

of videotaped forensic interviews

, during which Granddaughter recounted Dent's

abuse over a two

- year period. This was direct evidence.

It can not be said that the evidence presented was almost entirely circumstantial

. In

discussing the nature of the evidence , t he court of appeals ' majority decision noted

the absence of physical evidence of sexual abuse. We construe this finding as a

comment on the issue of credibility, especially Granddaughter ' s credibility. See

Herndon

, 430 S.C. at 373 n.6, 845 S.E.2d at 502 n.6 ("Fundamental to a jury's role

as fact

- finder is mak ing credibility determinations, which lie in the sole province of

the jury."). Whether Granddaughter's testimony was credible is an entirely distinct

issue from whether direct evidence existed. T he fact that the State also utilized

circumstantial evidence does not detract from the existence of direct evidence. The

State recognized the importance of th e direct evidence

, highlighting Granddaughter 's

trial testimony and two forensic interviews in its initial closing argument

.

Moreover

, we agree with the State that the trial court's instruction, as a whole,

accurately charged the law to be applied . O ur appellate courts have previously held

the failure to give the Logan charge was harmless error where "[t] he trial court's jury

instruction , as a whole, properly conveyed the applicable law. " Logan , 405 S.C. at

94 n.8

, 747 S.E.2d at 449 n.8 ; see also State v. Jenkins

, 408 S.C. 560, 573, 759

S.E.2d 759, 766 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding "any error in the omission of other

language from the Logan instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

because the trial court's instruction, as a whole, properly conveyed the applicable

law"); State v. Drayton

, 411 S.C. 533, 546, 769 S.E.2d 254, 261 (Ct. App. 2015)

(same), aff'd in result and vacated in part on other grounds , 415 S.C. 43, 780 S.E.2d902 (2015); State v. Lynch , 412 S.C. 156, 178, 771 S.E.2d 346, 357

– 58 (Ct. App.

2015) (same).

Other than the error in failing to give the Logan circumstantial evidence charge, t he

trial court thoroughly and properly charged the jury on the law, including the

presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt. As a result, in

light of the trial court's charge as a whole and in light of the direct evidence

, we hold

the trial court's failure to give the requested Logan charge was harmless error

. We

reverse the court of appeals' opinion and remand th is matter for the court of appeals

to address Dent's remaining issues on appeal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BEATTY, C.J., FEW, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Jan B. Bromell Holmes,

concur.