GOVERNMEM

MO ND AY , MAR CH 11, 1963

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-EIGHTII CONGRESS

FIR ST SESSION

IT Pri nte d fo r th e use of th e Com m ittee on For ei gn R el ati ons

95900

D.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1963

r i H

F 7i/z-
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, C hair m an

JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota

MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana

WAYNE MORSE, Oregon

RUSSELL B. LONG, Louisiana

ALBERT GORE, Tennessee

FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio

FRAN K CHURCH, Idaho

STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut

GEORGE A. SMATHERS, Florida

BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa

GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont

FRANK CARLSON, K ansas

JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaw are

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota

n

Carl Marcy, C hie f of Sta ff

Darrell St. Claire, C le rk
C O N T E N T S

Page

Statement of Rusk, Hon. Dean, Secretary of Sta te; accompanied by 

Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency_____________________________________________________ 2

Memorandum on Presidential authority to disarm and commit U.S.

Armed Forces______________________________________________

Summary index_______________________________________________ i

ui

TEST BAN NEGO TIA TIO NS AND DISARMAME NT

MONDAY, MA RC H 11, 196 3

U nit ed Sta te s S enate, 

C om m it te e on F or eig n R el ati ons,

Washing ton, D.G.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New 

Senate Office Building, Senator Hubert II. Humphrey presiding.

Pres ent: Senators Fulbrigh t (chairman), Humphrey, Morse, 

Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Williams.

Senator H u m ph r e y. On behalf of Senator Fulbrigh t, I will call the 

meeting to order.

Mr. Secretary, this is a meeting called by Senator Ful bright and 

represents a meeting of the full committee and not of a subcommittee.

PURPOSE OF MEETING

The committee is meeting this morning to discuss with the Secretary of State the foreign policy implications of the nuclear test ban 

trea ty negotiations which resumed at Geneva on Fe brua ry 12.

In recent days there has been a considerable amount of discussion 

and speculation in the press and in the Congress about the position 

the United States has been taking in these test ban negotiations. 

Questions raised go to the basic issue of the soundness of this Nation’s 

test ban proposals from the standpoint of our national security.

I would like to digress for a moment to say tha t Mr. Foster, the 

Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, will be 

completing his testimony, as I understand it, this afternoon before the 

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and, therefore, is not with us 

this morning. Since Senator Pastore had requested tha t the Director 

be with him this afternoon, I saw no reason to duplicate today the 

testimony of such a fine witness. But we are very pleased to have 

Mr. Fisher, the Deputy Director, here with us.

I know all the members of this committee, indeed all Americans, 

would welcome the day when safe and sure progress could be made 

toward arms control and disarmament in order that this country 

might be able to divert more of its resources now spent on m ilitary 

pursuits to economic and social pursuits. Of course, any arms 

control or disarmament measures to which the United States subscribes must assuredly promote and not risk the security of this 

Nation.

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased tha t you have been willing to 

give us of your time to come here to this committee this morning.

The subject matter that you are to discuss with us has been a matter of grea t concern, as expressed in the public press. I am pleased

1
2 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

that Mr. Fisher, who has done an admirable job of stating the position of the administration, is here.

I want the record to be clear since there was some discussion about 

this hearing at our last meeting in executive session. If I have anything to do with these hearings, the witnesses who will appear will 

represent every possible point of view, so that we run the full gamut 

of expressions of attitude and opinion on arms control and disarmament.

There will be no attem pt made under any circumstances to present 

just a one-sided picture. There are differences of opinion among the 

Senators on this committee.

We are very pleased to have the administration represented by the 

Secretary of State and the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency. I think I should forewarn you gentlemen 

that there will be those who may not exactly subscribe to every statement which is put forth by the administration.

Having said th at as a friend of the administration’s point of view, 

why don’t you proceed, Mr. Secretary ?

STA TEM ENT OF TH E HONORABLE DEA N RUSK, SECRETAR Y OF

STAT E; ACCOM PANIED BY AD RIAN S. FI SH ER , DE PUTY DIRE CTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I am very glad to have this opportunity to talk with the committee today about a most important aspect of our foreign policy, our 

long-continued effort to achieve agreement on a safeguarded nuclear 

test ban treaty.

Let me emphasize this word “tre aty ” because there is no doubt whatsoever th at an agreement with respect to the banning of nuclear tests 

would be a treaty and would be submitted to the Senate for consideration as a treaty.

SAFEGUARDED CESSA TION OF NUCLEAR WE APO NS TESTING IN OUR NA TIO NAL 

INT ER ES T

Since the summer of 1958, the U.S. Government has consistently 

adhered to the view that a safeguarded cessation of nuclear weapons 

testing would be in our national interest. Periodic policy reviews in 

the lig ht of shifting patterns of foreign policy, of changes in the negotiating situation, and of technical developments have always produced 

the same a nswer: tha t an effective test ban treaty is in our national 

interest.

Indeed, it is worth recalling tha t in 1945-46, at the very birth of the 

nuclear age, it was clearly perceived that a nuclear arms race would 

create the greatest dangers for all mankind. Consequently, Pres ident Trum an directed the most serious and diligent effort to prevent 

such a race by bringing atomic energy under international control. 

Unhappily, the Baruch proposals did not succeed.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 3

Today, I would like to discuss a nuclear test ban with you from the 

standpoint of our relations with the Soviet bloc and with countries 

outside the bloc, including our allies. I would also like to discuss what 

I believe to be the basic requirements for a nuclear test ban trea ty 

to be effective. For it is clear tha t an illusory set of obligations on this 

sensitive subject ought never to be entered into by the United States.

ADVANTAGES TO UN ITED STATES OF EFFECT IVE TEST BAN TREA TY— FIRS T, 

SIGNI FICA NT STEP TOWARD SLAC KE NING PACE OF ARMS RACEI

In my judgment, the conclusion of an effective nuclear test ban 

treaty would have three advantages of prim ary importance in our 

relations with the Soviet Union.

First, a nuclear test ban treaty would constitute a significant step 

in the direction of slackening the pace of the arms race. Once this 

step had been taken with satisfactory results, new opportunities for 

further steps toward turning the arms race downward might well be 

more within the realm of reality th an at present.

For the past 16 years during which the cold war has been waged 

we have experienced the effect of an almost unlimited arms race on 

our national security and on our position in relation to the Soviet 

Union in the w’orld arena. Although our position has been preserved and Communist aggression has been effectively deterred to a 

large extent by the buildup and deployment of our military forces, 

our security in that position has not necessarily been improved. In ­

deed, our military position might well be more secure today if we had 

successfully achieved agreement on a test ban treaty several years 

ago, earlier in the negotiations.

Because of the extensive history of past negotiations on this pa rticular question, the narrowing of the issues th at has resulted from 

these negotiations and the worldwide interest, I believe that this problem may be more ripe for solution than perhaps any other first step 

in the arms control and disarmament field. It is clear tha t unless at 

some point we are able to step off in a new direction, the upward 

spiral of the arms race will continue unabated. The prospects of 

such a future for both ourselves and the Soviet Union are not 

attractive.

SECOND ADVANTAGE— A MILITAR Y ONE

Second, an effective nuclear test ban treaty would be to th e military 

advantage of the United States. At the present time we feel confident in our nuclear capabilities. We have today a stockpile of nuclear 

weapons which ranges from a few’ tens of tons of TNT equivalent 

to many megatons. These weapons are useful for a variety of strategic and tactical uses. The Soviet Union has a stockpile of its own.

In certain areas of the spectrum of explosive power, namely the 

extremely large yields, the Soviets have developed weapons fo r which 

I am informed we do not have a present military requirement. In 

other areas, namely in the development of intermediate and lower 

yield weapons, wTe believe that we have a more varied arsenal than 

the Soviet Union.
4 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

The President and his chief national security advisers, including 

myself and the Secretary of Defense, believe it doubtful tha t either 

side would, th rough further testing, achieve major advances in any 

significant area which could be translated into a military advantage 

without the other side making either a similar or offsetting gain.

There is one proposition which we must keep in mind despite confidence and understandable national pride: nature does not yield up 

its secrets with political favoritism. The list of Nobel Prize winners in the sciences over the past half century shows that major bre akthroughs in knowledge come from many directions and have little to 

do with national frontiers. If our present assessment of the military 

situation is correct, and I believe it is, now would be an opportune 

time from our point of view for the conclusion of a treaty to halt 

furthe r nuclear weapon testing.

TH IR D ADVANTAGE----A POLIT ICA L ONE

The th ird primary advantage of an effective nuclear test ban treaty 

to the United States in relation to the Soviet bloc is a political one. 

I have repeatedly emphasized in my public statements in the United 

States and at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and in previous 

statements before this committee, my conviction that disarmament 

and secrecy are incompatible.

The Soviet Union has reasons of its own for its penchant for secrecy. 

Regardless of the merits of their case, however, it is clear th at a closed 

society breeds suspicion and distrust on the pa rt of other nations. 

Such an atmosphere is not conducive to taking steps to treat the 

symptoms of international tensions or to come to grips with the causes 

of these tensions.

A nuclear test ban treaty would obviously not lift the veil of secrecy 

from the Soviet Union. It would not even result in any substantial 

opening up of Soviet society. It could, however, have a very important impact on the Soviet attitude toward secrecy, especially as it 

relates to problems of arms control and disarmament. The carrying 

out of onsite inspections on Soviet territory woidd provide the United 

States with not only the necessary assurance th at unidentified seismic 

signals were not underground nuclear explosions but also additional 

advantage.

If a test ban treaty can operate effectively and in ways which demonstrate tha t the inspection connected with it does not jeopardize 

Soviet security or result in any particu lar embarrassments to the 

Soviet Union and its people, then the Soviet leadership may be 

more inclined to enter into other similar agreements. The first 

step seems to be the most difficult. If it can be made successfully 

then further steps in the same direction might lie taken with less 

difficulty than the first.

Therefore, in our relations with the Soviet Union I believe tha t 

a nuclear test ban treaty would have both political and military 

advantages. In addition, an effective nuclear test ban would have 

advantages in our relations w ith countries outside the Soviet bloc.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 5

DANGERS OF CO NT INUE D TE ST ING

Among the dangers to the United States from continued testing by 

both sides I would consider the danger of the further spread of 

nuclear weapons to other countries of perhaps primary importance. 

Unlimited testing by both the United States and the Soviet Union 

would substantially increase the likelihood th at more and more nations 

would seek the dubious, but what some might consider prestigious, 

distinction of membership in the nuclear club. The risks to the 

security of the free world from nuclear capabilities coming within the 

grasp of governments substantially less stable than either the United 

States or the Soviet Union are grave indeed.

A test ban would not of itself solve the problems of proliferation of 

nuclear weapons. It should be recognized t hat at least one present 

nuclear power and one power apparently bent on developing nuclear 

weapons might not be persuaded to subscribe to the test ban treaty 

from the outset. However, many potential nuclear powers might 

at this stage be induced to accede to the treaty.

Moreover, a nuclear test ban could lead to furthe r steps which 

would deal more directly with the proliferation problem. I am 

referring here to the possibility of an agreement on the one hand by 

the nuclear powers not to tran sfer control of weapons or to give 

assistance in weapons development to countries not already possessing 

them, and on the other, by the nonnuclear powers not to produce or 

acquire nuclear weapons of their own.

Another possibility would be an agreement to h alt further production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons and to transfer 

agreed quantities of such materials to peaceful uses. Wh at should 

be emphasized here is th at while a nuclear test ban by no means offers 

a total solution, it would be a necessary first step.

What I have just said is, I believe, applicable both to the problem 

of the spread of nuclear weapons outside the North Atlantic Alliance 

and to the problem of the development of additional national nuclear 

capabilities by NATO members. I believe tha t a nuclear test ban 

would be fully consistent with the possibilities for increased participation in the multilateral control of nuclear forces dedicated to NATO 

by our partners in the Alliance.

IMPORTAN CE OF PROBLEM OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT

Of secondary, but nevertheless significant importance is the problem of radioactive fallout. In large part because of real or assumed 

dangers from fallout, nuclear testing has become a key political issue 

in a grea t many countries around the world. Our relations with 

those countries are sometimes adversely affected when our tests pro ­

duce fallout outside our own borders. On the other hand, our initiatives in seeking a test ban agreement have been well received by not 

only our allies but by the uncommitted countries.

ADVANTAGES TO SOVIET UNIO N OF TEST BAN TREATY

I have pointed out what I believe to be the prim ary advantages to 

the United States in an effective nuclear test ban treaty in terms of 

our relations with the Soviet Union and with other countries around 

95900— 63------ 2
6 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

the world. However , I wou ld like to make it cle ar th at I believe 

there may also be ad vanta ges to t he Soviet U nio n in a nuc lea r test ban .

A certa in deg ree of mutua lity of interest is an obvious prer eq uis ite 

fo r an y agreement.

I have sta ted th at an effective nu cle ar test ban would be to the 

military ad va nta ge of th e United Sta tes . Th is sho uld no t exclude 

the possibility th at th e Sovie t Un ion could at the same tim e hav e 

valid mili tary reasons fo r en ter ing int o a n uc lea r test ban trea ty with 

the inten tio n of ca rryi ng it out. Th e Uni ted States and th e Sov iet 

Un ion have to da te a pp ar en tly p ursued som ewhat d iffere nt objectives 

in th eir testin g pro gra ms .

Th is difference in em phasis ap pe ars at trib ut ab le to diffe ren t st ra ­

tegic concepts, as well as techno logical con siderations. Th erefo re, 

whi le we may be ass ure d th at ou r own re ta lia tory ca pa bility in the 

eve nt of nu cle ar atta ck is sufficient to de ter such an att ack, th e Soviet 

Un ion could at the same tim e believe th at it ha s a sufficient nu cle ar 

ca pability fo r its own sec urity req uir em ents with ou t th e need of 

fu rt her testing.

Simila rly , the possibility of the fu rther spread of n uclea r weapons 

is a leg itima te concern no t only to ourselves, but to the Sovie t Un ion 

as well.

ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE TEST BAN TREATY

I have thus f ar attempted to demo nstra te why an d how an effective 

nu cle ar tes t ba n trea ty would serve the foreign policy inter ests of 

the U nited Sta tes. I wou ld now like to addre ss th e que stio n of w ha t 

mak es a nuclea r te st ban tre at y effective.

Th ree re quireme nts are, in my ju dg me nt, basic to a n effective nuc lea r 

test ban tre aty.

Fi rs t, the verific atio n arrang em en ts mu st provide an ade quate dete rren t to vio lation on the par t of the Sov iet Union . However, no 

ver ific atio n system, no m atter how ela borat e or intru siv e, cou ld be 

com pletely foo lproof.

Th ere fore, the second req uir em ent of an effec tive trea ty is th at the 

scope of any vio lation which might escape detection mu st no t be so 

exte nsive th at it would subs tan tia lly affec t the m ili tary bala nce.

Fina lly , a nu cle ar test ban trea ty will be ad hered to only so lon g 

as a mutua lity of interest in the agree me nt per sists. I f the Sov iet 

Un ion were eve r to conclude th at a tes t ba n were no lon ger in its 

intere sts , we c an be s ure that the Sov iet l eadersh ip would no t he sitate 

to abrog ate th e tre at y an d resu me tes tin g. Th ere fore, an effective tes t 

ban trea ty mu st no t leave the Un ite d States in a sta te of u np re pa re dness in the event of a S oviet change of attitu de .

In my opinion, ou r present tes t ban pro posals mee t these three re ­

quireme nts fo r an effective tre aty.

EFFECT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN FIELD OF DETECTION AND IDENTIFICAT ION

La st week the Jo in t Com mittee on Atom ic En er gy held a series of 

ill um inating hearings on developments in th e field of det ection an d 

ide ntification of nu cle ar explosions an d th ei r relatio nship to the nu ­

cle ar tes t ban negotiations. These hearings e xplored in con siderable 

de pth the scientific an d technical basis fo r the presen t U.S. position 

wi th res pec t to a nucle ar test ban.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 7

The efficacy of the technical underpinning for our test ban proposals is certainly an im portant factor in determining the overall effectiveness of a treaty based on these proposals. However, the effectiveness of the verification arrangements associated with a test ban does 

not depend entirely upon numbers or locations of detection stations. 

Nor is any particular number of on-site inspections the key to effectiveness. The verification arrangem ents must be considered as a 

totality. The effectiveness of the total system should be judged in 

the light of the entire geographic, technical, military, political, and 

economic environment in which it would operate.

The increase in our technical ability to detect seismic events at long 

distances permits us to rely upon seismic stations outside the Soviet 

Union to detect underground nuclear explosions inside the Soviet 

Union.

Moreover, a decrease by a factor of 2 ^ in a previous estimate of 

the number of earthquakes of a given seismic magnitude occurring 

annually in the Soviet Union has enabled us to reduce the number of 

on-site inspections on Soviet te rrito ry to seven.

But perhaps more important than a particu lar number of on-site 

inspections in determining its effectiveness as a deterrent to cheating 

is the manner in which an on-site inspection would be carried out. 

Our present position with respect to the number of on-site inspections 

which would be acceptable to us has, therefore, been very clearly stated 

by Mr. Foster in discussions with the Soviet representatives to be 

conditional upon f urther agreement on such im portant matters as the 

method of selecting particu lar earth tremors for inspection, the size 

and composition of inspection teams, the area and duration of search, 

and logistical arrangements.

Finally, an effort has been made to increase the effectiveness of our 

present proposals over previous positions by vesting control over the 

installation and operation of th e detection network, and control over 

the carrying out of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union, more 

completely in the hands of the United States and United Kingdom.

This has resulted in a proposal for a simpler and more economical 

system. It would also permit us to evaluate a greater range of factors 

in determining whether the Soviet Union was honoring its treaty obligations than would be the case under a treaty providing for more 

complete international operation and control of the verification system.

I will leave to officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency the discussion of the details of this proposal. But it is the 

conclusion of the President and his chief advisers in the national security area tha t clandestine testing which might escape detection, in 

spite of the verification system, would not result in developments 

which would significantly alter the m ilitary balance.

Finally, an announced national policy of maintaining our readiness 

to test will minimize the risks to the U nited States stemming from the 

possibility of Soviet abrogation of the treaty and an open resumption 

of testing. Indeed, such a policy would be a deterrent to abrogation 

and would reinforce the effectiveness of the treaty itself.
s TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

CONCLUSION

Iii conclusion, I believe tha t the cessation of nuclear weapons tests 

would advance the interests of the foreign policy of the United States, 

and that the present proposals of the United States for a nuclear test 

ban provide a sound basis for negotiation of an effective treaty. In 

reaching this conclusion I am aware of the risks involved in an undetected Soviet violation of the treaty or its surprise abrogation.

I am also aware, however, of the graver risks to our security and 

the security of the free world implicit in a future without any multilateral re straint on the development of nuclear weapons. In addition 

to the risks with and without a test ban which must be carefully 

weighed against each other, we should also consider the opportunities 

created by taking a step in the direction of controlling the arms race. 

I believe that if these new opportunities are placed in the scale, it will 

be tipped decisively in favor of our present proposals for a ban on the 

further testing of nuclear wreapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your 

statement.

I have some questions that I want to pose to you. I am sure my 

colleagues on the committee will want to interrogate you with reference to some of the statements you have made and the policy th at 

has been advanced at the Geneva discussions.

WORK OF MR. FO STER AND MR. KUZ NETSO V

First, I want to place in this record the fact that, as one of the 

Senators privileged to be an observer at Geneva in recent weeks, I 

was much impressed with the work of Mr. Foster—the meticulous 

care of his preparation for the negotiations, and the manner in which 

he conducted those negotiations.

I believe that most Americans are unaware of some of the difficulties 

tha t our diplomats face in these negotiations and they also are unaware of the competence of the Soviet negotiators.

The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, 

is not exactly an amateur in these matters. He was well prepared 

to state the case of the Soviet Union, and to do whatever he could 

to deflect any attention to the subject matter that was before the conference ; namely, the nuclear test ban.

DEPARTM ENT OF STATE’S SUPPO RT OF TES T BAN PROPOSALS

Mr. Secretary, so that we may make clear the relationship between 

the Arms Control Agency and the Department of State, does the 

Department of State fully concur in the positions tha t this Government, has taken, as represented by Mr. Foster in the test ban negotiations of recent months?

Secretary Rusk. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reports to the President throu gh the Secretary 

of State. I sit with the Committee of Principals advising the President on these matters, and I am present for all the discussions when 

the final policies are determined and I have fully supported these 

proposals.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 9

COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

Senator Humphrey. You speak of the Committee of Principals, 

Mr. Secretary. Would you outline for the record what the Committee of Principals is and who serves on it ?

Secretary Rusk. The Committee of Principals is made up of Cabinet level officials and heads of departments: the Secretary of State, 

the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Disarmament Agency 

itself, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Administra tor of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the 

Director of the CIA .

We also have the Executive Secretary of the National Security 

Council, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, who sits with that Committee as 

well as the President’s Scientific Adviser, Dr. Wiesner.

Senator Humphrey. Does the Committee of Principals present 

a majority report to the President of the United States?

Secretary Rusk. We sit with the President for a full discussion, 

and we go to considerable pains to be sure tha t if there are any differences of view they are fully disclosed to the President. With so 

many different points coming up it is true there are different views 

tha t are discussed with the President but I thin k the record shows 

that in most instances we are unanimous.

Senator H umphrey. In the instance of the proposals tha t are now 

being advanced at Geneva, including the seven on-site inspections, 

Mr. Secretary, were these proposals and was th at particular item approved by you ?

Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.

Senator Humphrey. Were they approved by the Secretary of 

Defense ?

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I thin k that the answer would be 

yes, but I would hope we would not pursue this to the point of putting on the record the advice given by officers of Government to the 

President on a matter of this sort.

Senator Humphrey. May I ask, was it a majority view of the Committee of Principals ?

Secretary Rusk. The President and his advisers were all in favor of 

these proposals.

Senator Humphrey. Inclu ding the reduction to seven on-site 

inspections ?

Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.

POSSIBILITY OF LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, in the event tha t in furthe r 

discussions with the Soviets on a comprehensive test ban treaty, it becomes obvious th at they are determined to stick to their position of 

two or three inspections—which is w hat they have been offering—do 

you think it might be fru itfu l for this Government to forget about a 

comprehensive treaty and instead attempt to negotiate a treaty covering atmosphere, underground, and outer space tests ?

Secretary R usk. Well, Senator Humphrey, we proposed some tune 

ago th at in the absence of an agreement on a comprehensive test, we 

move promptly for a separate agreement on testing in the atmosphere,
10 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

un de r wa ter an d in ou ter space or at hi gh altitud es. We fee l this 

wou ld go a lon g way towa rd meeting no t only th e sec uri ty int ere sts 

of ou r own country bu t me eting the concern o f peo ple in ma ny pa rts 

of the world about the ty pe o f tes tin g th at results d ire ctl y in fallo ut.

Th us fa r the Sovie t Un ion has no t been wi lling to addre ss its elf to 

th at kind of an agreem ent. Th ey are insis ten t th at an arrang em en t 

sho uld be com preh ensive. Now, th at may be because they have no t 

developed un de rgroun d testing as much as we have, an d there fore, 

would look up on t his as dis advanta geous to them. But as fa r as the 

United State s is con cerned we would be pr ep ar ed to move imm edi ately 

into such an arrang em en t an d have been disapp ointed th us fa r the 

Sov iet Un ion has no t been wi lling to do so while we discuss fu rther 

an d negotia te fu rther abou t an agree me nt on un de rgroun d tes tin g.

RELATIONSHIP OF INSP ECT ION ISSU E TO SOVIET SINCERITY IN

NEGOTIATONS

Se na tor H um phrey. Mr. Se cre tar y, it has been very difficult fo r 

some o f us to un de rstand the a pp ar en t reluctan ce and th e stubbornn ess 

of the Sovie t U nion on th is figure o f two or t hr ee on-site insp ections. 

As you m ay rec all, fo r about a year, t he Sovie t Un ion ref used to dis ­

cuss any on- site inspection s.

Ov er a ye ar ago, th e Sovie t Un ion ha d accepted the pr inciple of 

on-site inspection s. As I recollect, the figure of two to three came 

int o the pu bli c pri nt by an exchan ge of lette rs betw een Ch airm an 

Kh rushchev and the Pr es id en t of the United St ates ; is th at correc t?

Se cretary Rus k. T hat is correc t, begin ning in December of las t 

year.

Se na tor H um phr ey. Do you believe th at th e Sovie t Un ion in t hat 

exchan ge of le tte rs was i nd icating an y sincere desire f or effective negotia tio ns on a te st ban tre at y ?

Se cre tar y Rusk. I th ink, Se nator , loo kin g at the objective int ere st 

which the Sovie t Un ion its elf undoubted ly has in tryi ng to put some 

cei ling on the arm s race, if possible, th at it is en tirely possible th at 

they did mak e those proposals in Dec ember expecting o r ho ping t hat 

th is wou ld open th e way fo r an agreem ent . You see, since the y 

aba ndoned in 1960, I believe, t he id ea of on-site insp ections, th e We st, 

as well as the uncomm itte d cou ntries th ro ug ho ut the world, pressed 

the m very ha rd on acc epting the p rin ciple o f o n-si te inspec tion .

SOVIET VIEW OF ON-SIT E INSPECTION AS CONTRASTED TO U. S. VIEW

I t may well be th at the Sovie t Un ion thou gh t th at all th at was re ­

quire d was the acceptance of the princ iple. But I th in k there is 

an othe r elem ent th at enter s int o this. Th e Sovie t Un ion has mad e 

the po int repeate dly th at na tio na l detection systems are adequate fo r 

the job. Well , on th is the argu men t may be som ewh at uneven, if I 

may say so, because loo kin g at th ei r problem in de ter mining wh at is 

ha pp en ing in ou r coun try , they may well be ri ght on th at. T hat is 

here the y are loo kin g at an open society, wh ere i t would be e xtremely 

difficult, at be st, to con duc t tes tin g of any sort secretly , a nd wh ere the y 

have rel ati ve ly easy means of reinforcing the norm al kind of pub lic 

flow of inform ation wi th, sha ll we say, a deg ree of espionage in an
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 11

open society like ours. Therefore, they may judge tha t they can 

assure themselves tha t we are not testing. But when you look at it 

the other way around and see the problem tha t we are confronted 

with, a closed society, occupying this vast land mass in Eurasia, much 

of it sparsely populated, we do not have the same opportunity that 

they have to check these matters.

Therefore, to us it is not just a principle, it is not just a political 

principle. We need arrangements which permit us to get reasonable 

assurance that any treaty on this subject is not being violated. In the 

process our capacity for developing such assurance has been improved 

in many different directions, not just in the matter of instrumentation. 

But nevertheless the problem remains, and from the Soviet point of 

view they may consider tha t the concession of on-site inspections is 

somewhat, from their point of view, unilateral because they don’t 

need it to inspect us, given the nature of our society.

We do need it with respect to them, and this runs into their historical 

attitude toward secrecy. I think there is the problem.

SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS TOTALITY OF TREATY ARRANGEMENTS

I think in December that the Soviet Union then perhaps hoped 

tha t this would open the way to a test ban treaty. Why they have 

not been willing to pursue the matter more seriously since then, I am 

frank to say, I don’t completely know.

We have been disappointed, for example, tha t they have stuck 

tightly on their two or three inspections and have not p ut that number aside to sit down and talk about the entire arrangem ents under a 

treaty, because to do th at we are not talking about a number of anythin g in particular. It is important for us to know the number of 

what—all of the arrangements tha t determine whether any number 

is realistic. You can have a hundred inspections and if they were not 

properly arranged and set out with all th e fine prin t that would make 

them adequate inspections you would get no assurance out o f such a rrangements. But so fa r the Soviet Union has not been willing to sit 

down and talk about the rest of the treaty. I think that to me has 

been the princ ipal sign tha t at the present time they are not trying 

very hard.

COMPLAINTS OF CONCESSIONS MADE BY TH E UNITED STATES

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, the emphasis that you placed 

upon the totality of the inspection quotient of the treaty, I think, is 

very, very important. This has not been properly understood or emphasized in the public discussion. It has been said, Mr. Secretary, 

tha t the Government of the United States in recent months has made 

a number of concessions to the Soviet Union which—and I believe I 

accurately state the complaint—threaten the security of the United 

States.

Wh at concessions do you feel have been made, and do you feel 

tha t any of those tends to threaten or weaken our security.

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, we get this coming at us from both 

directions.
12 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

On the one side, it has been said by some people tha t we have made 

concessions in Geneva, whereas the Russians say to us, “You have been 

taking substantial steps backward in some of the other things you are 

talking about.” Fo r example, when we moved from international teams to do the 

inspecting to teams th at are comprised primarily of United States or 

dominantly United States-United Kingdom specialists this was a 

movement toward a more rigorous inspection procedure.

Now, what we are talking about here is a total system, and the 

total system has in it many components, and the number of inspections 

is not by any means the only element that is of importance.

So tha t we believe th at the discussions of the system itself do not 

reflect any weaker position in terms of a total verification and detection system, but I think an increasing realistic approach to tha t 

problem.

Senator Humphrey. I s it not true tha t up un til about a year and a 

half ago, we had a proposal before the Soviet Union—and one which 

was being respected by both sides as sort of an unofficial agreement, 

tha t there was no inspection to be provided on explosions of less than 

18 to 20 kilotons. Was tha t our position up until about 1061?

Secretary Rusk. It was a t tha t time the idea th at since it would be 

difficult to detect explosions at th at order of magnitude, the smallest 

end of the spectrum, that a treaty ought not to apply to those explosions. We believe tha t there is advantage in applying the treaty all the way 

down.

Senator Humphrey. Does the present proposal apply the principles of the trea ty to all explosions regardless of magnitude ?

Secretary Rusk. All explosions above a level tha t is normal in a 

laboratory with the very lowest energy release.

Senator H umphrey. In other words, 1 kiloton and up and even less.

Secretary Rusk. Down to the peaceful kinds of experimentation.

Senator Humphrey. In this instance, therefore, the present proposals are more demanding, and are more restricting, than the earlier 

proposals; is tha t true ?

Secretary Rusk. This, I think, has been made possible by the improvement in the types of information which can expose t ha t lower 

yield testing to discovery.

ABILITY TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY EXPLOSIONS

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, is there any real difficulty in 

identifying or detecting explosions above the magnitude of 4.75, which 

is about a 20- to 21-kiloton explosion ?

Secretary Rusk. We have a high degree of confidence in our ability 

to detect such explosions. There is some variation, as you know, in the 

type of soil, type of formations in which explosions occur, but we have 

a high degree of confidence in the ability of the system to detect those 

above that magnitude.

Senator H umphrey. Mr. Secretary, you speak of a national system 

of detection. You are now speaking primarily of seismic instrumentation, are you not ?
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 13

Senator Rusk. Not entirely, Senator. That would be one of the 

very important elements in it. I could not go into too much detail 

here except in executive session, but-----

Senator H umphrey. This is the problem, Mr. Secretary. How can 

the public know about the system of detection tha t we have if every 

time we get to it we have to make it hush-hush ?

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I realize tha t is a problem. We are 

studying that very carefully in the executive branch to see what more 

can be said without injuring our national security interests in the 

effectiveness of existing means of detection right across the board. 1 

am not able, unfortunately today, to discuss that with the committee 

but it is a serious question, because we do believe tha t the detection 

capabilities are better than can be fully clarified at this point publicly.

Senator Humphrey. I surely want to emphasize-----

INTE RN AT IO NA L COOPERATION ON DETECTION

Secretary R usk. I don’t want to sound, if I may say so, too spooky 

on this point, because one of the reasons is that anything th at is called 

a national detection system does involve a good deal of international 

cooperation.

Senator H umphrey. Exactly.

Secretary Rusk. It involves help, assistance, combined effort on the 

part of many countries and you will have observed tha t in connection 

with previous tests tha t reports came in from countries who are in no 

way alined with us in any security sense.

Senator H umphrey. Such as Sweden.

Secretary Rusk. Such as Sweden, and, therefore, it is rather delicate 

for us to talk about how this works together except in the framework 

of internationally agreed arrangements in which everyone can pa rticipate without embarrassment.

NEE D FOR PU BL IC TO BE INF OR ME D ON U. S. DEFEC TIO N CAPABIL ITIES

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, I do hope that the executive 

branch will give this its most serious consideration. I hope it will 

give some weight to the fact tha t the longer there is uncertainty as 

to the scope of our mechanism for detection and identification, the. 

more will be the uncertainty and the confusion about the treaty 

proposals.

Secretary R usk. Right.

Senator Humphrey. Somewhere along the line this has to be 

balanced off, because I am quite sure the Russians know a grea t deal 

about our detection system. From my conversations I am quite sure 

they know an awful lot about it. 1 think it is only fai r that the 

American people should be confided in as to what we have as a system 

of detection and identification, far beyond just what we call the 

seismic instrumentation or with our own national laboratories or 

national units. We have several new ones which have been established 

in recent years ; isn’t tha t correct ?

Secretary R usk. That is correct, sir.

95900— 61 •3
14 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

EXPENDITURES ON SEISMIC RESEARCH

Se na tor Hum phr ey. H ow much money hav e we spent on seismic 

research in the last few yea rs?

Secre tar y Rusk. In the neigh borho od of $90 or $100 million . 

Se na tor Hum phrey. Thi s y ea r we are co nte mpla tin g $41 million ? 

Secre tar y Rus k. That is righ t.

Se na tor Hum phrey. The se are some of the re su lts of the re com mendatio ns of the Berk ne r r eport ; is th at not r ig ht ?

Secre tar y Rus k. Ri gh t.

Se na tor Hum phr ey. Thi s is a m atter of th e gr ea test importance . 

I wa nt to a sk ju st two mo re q uestion s because I know my c olleagues 

wa nt to q ues tion you.

CHANGE IN U.S. POSITION ON TREATY

Air. Secre tary, do you th in k we hav e weakened our position in any 

su bstan tia l measure, or do you th in k we have str en gth en ed it at the 

discussions in Gen eva? By th at I mea n are we presen tin g as of t his 

moment a trea ty pro posal whi ch is more exact ing in its requir em ents 

in terms of com pliance, in ter ms of ide ntification an d detection of 

tests, or are we presen tin g one which is less rig id?

Se cre tar y Rus k. I a m convinc ed th at th e one we are p ropo sin g now 

is more rig orous th an it was, say, a ye ar ago, an d I also have been 

rei nforced by the rea ction of the Sovie t Un ion to these ad ditio na l 

de tails in which we have put new ideas to them. I mentio ned some 

of these ea rlier to day.

Se na tor Hum phrey. Mr. Ch air man, I was there on the day the 

seven figu re was ann oun ced. I was there whe n it was firs t pro posed 

in a priv ate discussion between Air. F os ter a nd Air. Kuzn etsov, even befor e o ur allie s knew about it or befo re the nonalined kn ew about it.

W ha t was p rint ed in the pu blic press wa s that we ha d drop ped fro m 

8 to 10 to 7 o n-site insp ections. AVhat else was inc lud ed in th at pr opos al, Air. Se cre tar y? Alaybe you need the coo per ation here of Air. 

Fish er, since there was a good deal of technical da ta involved when 

we made th at ad jour nm en t fro m 8 to 10 dow n to 7. W as t he re an yth in g else included in the proposal ?

Se cre tar y Rus k. I t hink , in o rder to m ake it as c omplete as p ossible 

I will tu rn to Mr. Fi sh er on th e d eta ils of tho se proposa ls.

Air. Fisher. I think, Air. Ch air man, the pr im ar y othe r p art was an 

increased empha sis upo n U.S. control as opposed to internationa l 

in sti tutio na l c ontrol of th e insp ection mechanism.

Thi s wou ld includ e relian ce, pr im ar ily , on ou r na tio na lly ma nned 

and opera ted seismic d etectio n stations.

Th en when som eth ing ind ica ted th at there was a suspicious event, 

you decided wh eth er to presen t th at thro ug h the Commission to the 

Russians indica tin g the Uni ted State s did believe th at it me t the 

trea ty criteria f or onsite inspec tion .

Th ere was increased em phasis upo n a U.S. selection of a seismic 

eve nt for inspec tion if it wasn’t satisfied with any expla natio n, and 

also the Un ite d States desig nated the key mem bers of the insp ection 

team .
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 15

Basically, it was a tidier proposal in terms of working all around.

Now, I think, in terms of your question as to how this compares 

to how we stood, say, 16 months ago, and I use tha t term advisedly to 

avoid any indications th at a change in administration made any difference on this because the position tha t the previous administration had 

on the old Geneva type treaty we also advanced.

Senator Humphrey. I understand.

Mr. Fisher. The reason I would feel safer under the present proposal than tha t one, notwithstanding the difference in the number of 

onsite inspections, is th at because under tha t proposal we had only a 

moratorium banning the tests from 4.75 down. The moratorium 

lasted only 3 years, it was true, but no one had much confidence that 

once we got started on a moratorium in a trea ty context we would ever 

get out of it without the whole treaty structure falling down.

The treaty provisions covering onsite inspections did not apply to 

the events below 4.75.

MEASURING SIGNIFICANCE OF SUSPICIOUS EVENTS

Now, in order to indicate the significance of tha t problem, I recently 

took an average year of the suspicious events tha t had occurred in 

the Soviet Union, and in a sense went through, I couldn’t use the 

term “ war game,” but use the term “peace game’’ within our own staff 

to determine which one of those events we would find most suspicious.

We started about with about 170 total events and you begin to sort 

of peel off the ones that you really wouldn’t want to have an onsite 

inspection of. One reason might be i t is located in water 10 miles 

east of Kurile Islands. You would peel tha t one off fairly quickly. 

Fo r others you have seismic indications tha t the events were probably 

deep, deeper than it would be if it were an explosion, or also indications tha t some might have what they call rarefactive first motion, 

nearing the earth went inward. An explosion, on the other hand, gives 

an indication of outward movement.

When you got down to the group of seismic events you were really 

most concerned about, it was a group between 30 and 40 in the average 

year and it turne d out t ha t only about 10 of those produced a seismic 

magnitude of 4.75 and above.

So here were 30 events eligible for inspection under the present 

proposal, which would have been excluded under the prio r proposal, 

and which yet were on the A-plus list so far as the degree of suspicion 

is concerned.

I am not suggesting tha t in the context of a treaty tha t we would 

exclude all of these others from the point of view of a possible candidate for onsite inspection. We would reserve the right ourselves, 

if it met certain criteria of location and was not clearly established as 

a very deep earthquake, 60 kilometers or lielow. We would have a 

right to pick any one of the 170 and tha t righ t is a real deterrent 

because the fellow doesn’t know which one you are going to pick.

Of the 30 or 40 which were the most suspicious, 10 on the average, 

10 or 15, satisfied this 4.75 criteria. This is said being in no sense 

or in no spirit critical of anybody else. But I just think this is a better 

proposal and I th ink you really can say we have taken into account not
16 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

only seismic improvement in detection and identification, but some 

more clear evaluation of the practical problems involved in making 

a control system effective, and an assessment of really what it was 

we are worried about.

We have been looking at earthquakes at the Soviet Union for 4 

years now and have spent a good deal of money on it. The program 

started in the last administration. It is not surprising tha t something has paid off.

RATIO OF NUMBER OF SUSPICIOUS SEISMIC EVENTS TO NUMBER OF ONSITE 

INSPECTIONS

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, or Mr. Fisher, is it true tha t 

our estimate of the number of seismic events 16 months ago, for instance, inside the Soviet Union of an earthquake nature was substantially larger than it is today ?

Mr. F isiier. Th at is correct, sir.

We thought that instead of the 170 that I have talked about as 

the average number of events, that it was about 2i/2

 times bigger.

Senator H umphrey. At that time, when you thought the number of 

seismic events within the Soviet Union was about 2 ^ times larger, 

how many onsite inspections did your treaty proposal include, over and 

about the threshold ?

Mr. Fisiier. The treaty proposal included 20.

Senator Humphrey. Excuse me; let’s go back. The treaty proposal included 20 onsite inspections.

Mr. F isher. That was our position 2 years ago.

Senator Humphrey. That was your position when you thought 

the number of seismic events in the Soviet Union was about 2 ^ times 

as large as it is now calculated to be?

Mr. F isher. That is correct, sir.

Senator Humphrey. All right.

At the present time your treaty proposal is seven onsite inspections; 

right ?

Mr. Fisher. That is correct, sir.

Senator Humphrey. Therefore, if you proposed 20, when you had 

2 ^ times as many seismic events, have you strengthened or weakened 

your position on onsite inspection, in light of the more accurate scientific information tha t you have on seismic events inside the Soviet 

Union?

Mr. Fisiier. Well, I believe, Senator, it is strengthened not just as 

a result of any proportionate factor.

Senator Humphrey. Let’s be very simple for us country folks. Just 

take a look at the arithmetic of this. It really gets down to something 

like this when you are talking to the public, because it takes too much 

time to go into the m atter of concepts and magnitude.

NUMBER OF SEISMIC EVENTS IN TH E SOVIET UN ION

Were you right or wrong 16 months ago, Mr. Fisher, about the 

number of seismic events in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Fisher. Wrong.

Senator Humphrey. You were wrong. What reason do you have 

to believe that you may be right now since you were wrong before?
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 17

Mr. F isher. There are a couple of things th at have happened. The 

problem wasn’t the total number of events in the Soviet Union because 

we have been looking at tha t for some period of time. It was relating 

those to the sort of magnitude th at you would get out of a test. And 

the original estimates were made on very little data. The revised 

estimates were made on considerable data including a substantial 

series of U.S. underground tests.

Senator Humphrey. Did you make those revised estimates, Mr. 

Fisher, or did you have some scientists working on them ?

Mr. Fisher. The Department of Defense. They were initially 

made available to us through a group called AFTAC, Air Force 

Technical Applications Center, and were the subject of some rather 

extensive discussion last summer. We have ourselves evaluated the 

estimates, not I myself because I am not a seismologist, I am a lawyer. 

But we have a train ed scientific staff which includes people who are 

physicists and are aware of th is business and seismic consultants. We 

have satisfied ourselves as well th at the present estimate is a realistic 

and an accurate one.

I think when you compare percentages, Senator, in order to be 

completely fair—where we stand now with reference to where we 

stood 2 years ago—the present number of 20 would have been applied 

not to the full 420 since all of those would not have been above the 

4.75 threshold. In the neighborhood of 70 or 80 would have, but on 

the other hand those others below 4.75 would still be happening. The 

seismic events beneath the threshold tha t were still happening and 

which could have been covered by a moratorium would still be ha ppening whether we saw them or not. They would still be a concern 

to me, being interested in the national security of the United States, 

whether I had the righ t to inspect them or not. In fact, as we have 

proceeded through this selection process it appeared to us there would 

be more concern about those events tha t were below the threshold 

just for the reason tha t if someone was engaged in a clandestine program what more logical way to do it than at a level of magnitude 

where by the terms of the treaty itself you had no rig ht to inspect.

M A GNIT UDE AT W H IC H DET EC TI ON AN D ID EN T IF IC A T IO N SY ST EM MOS T 

E F F IC IE N T

Senator H umphrey. Mr. Fisher, so we may just get this right down 

to even simpler terms, is it not a fact tha t above a magnitude of 4.75 

the national detection and identification system is much more effective 

than below?

Mr. Fisher. That is correct, sir. I wouldn’t say that now 4.75 

represents the real benchmark. The benchmark they are thinking of 

about now is about 4, and I want to avoid giving the impression tha t 

this was a black-and-white line.

Senator Humphrey. I understand.

Mr. Fisher. It is a spectrum. You are sure above the threshold. 

When you get below the threshold you aren’t sure. He isn’t sure, 

though, tha t you don’t detect it. It is a spectrum of increased probability of detection. Where you begin to notice the shade changing, 

if I may mix a metaphor, is in the neighborhood of the present 

capability of 4.75.
18 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

Senator Humphrey. The greatest degree of uncertainty is in the 

neighborhood between 4 and 5; is that correct ?

Air. Fisher. That is correct.

Senator Humphrey. Tha t is correct.

Let’s say above 5 there is more certainty of detection and identification; correct?

Air. Fisher. Yes, sir.

Senator Humphrey. Was it not true tha t the proposal we had 16 

months ago provided no inspection below 4.75 ?

Air. Fisiier. Tha t is correct.

Senator Humphrey. It is now true tha t the present proposal provides fo r inspection below 4.75?

Air. Fisiier. The present proposal provides-----

Senator Humphrey. Yes or no.

Air. Fisher. Yes.

Senator Humphrey. OK. Now, go ahead.

Air. F isiier. It provides for inspection of any event that you detect 

and locate according to certain criteria.

Senator Humphrey. Yes.

Air. Fisher. That is, the reason for my qualification, Senator, was 

you have to pick it up on a seismograph under the present program 

before you can inspect.

Senator Humphrey. I understand. There are also the differences, 

of course, relating to underground tests in alluvium.

Air. Fisiier. Yes, sir.

MAJOR PROBLEM AREA

Senator Humphrey. There are many technical aspects of this. 

However, the problem area we have been wrestling with for several 

years is below the magnitude of 4.75 in underground testing, is it not?

Air. Fisiier. Tha t is correct, sir.

Senator Humphrey. I s tha t problem covered by onsite inspection 

procedures in the proposals?

Air. Fisiier. Yes, sir.

Senator Humphrey. Was that problem covered 16 months ago 

under the previous proposal?

Air. Fisher. No, sir; it was not.

Senator H umphrey. Do you feel, therefore, tha t under the present 

proposal you have a more restrictive and a more inclusive treaty or 

a less restrictive treaty ?

Air. Fisiier. I think it is a more restrictive treatv as far as a 

potential evader is concerned than the previous proposals.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you. I th ink it is time to yield to somebody else.

IMPORTANCE OF NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS

Senator Aiken. Do you feel, Air. Secretary, whether a test ban 

agreement is reached or not depends upon reaching an agreement as 

to the number of inspections ?

Secretary Rusk. I think tha t would lie one important element in 

it. From our point of view, we have to have a number tha t would
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 19

give us good assurance that systematic cheating is not occurring. But 

this is only one of a good many items on which we would have to have 

agreement. Agreements simply on the number standing alone, Senator, could involve some dangers because if there were an agreement 

in principle without an agreement on all of the arrangements that 

would be necessary to give effect to any such number, we might find 

ourselves in a position where we have almost an uninspected moratorium in terms of the political pressures that would be pouring in on 

all sides.

So we want to get this fine print worked out before we agree to any 

number because we are not talking about a number of what.

Senator Aiken. How many inspections did Russia offer, we will 

say, 3 years ago?

Secretary Rusk. Two to three.

Senator Aiken. And what do they offer now ?

Secretary Rusk. Two to three.

Senator Aiken. What did we ask 2 to 3 years ago ?

Secretary Rusk. Three years ago. It was 20.

Senator Aiken. Wh at do we offer now ?

Secretary Rusk. Seven.

Senator Aiken. Seven?

Secretary Rusk. Right.

Senator Aiken. Do you thin k if we accepted the Russians’ offer for 

three inspections that you would get an agreement ?

Secretary Rusk. You are not asking this particu lar question, but 

I don’t see how we could agree to two or three. But in any event we 

would not know un til we got all this fine print worked out how can 

you assure the inspectors they are in fact going to the area which they 

want to inspect under the arrangements, whether the Russians agree 

to the personnel tha t ought to be on the inspection team, and whether 

they agree to the conduct of the inspectors with respect to such information, whether they agree to the site.

All of these things have to be worked out.

EFFECT OF REDUCTION OF U.S. INSPECTION DEMANDS

Senator Aiken. Do you think reducing our demand from 20 inspections to 7 indicates to the rest, of the world tha t the United States 

perhaps thought it wrong to demand so many inspections ?

Secretary Rusk. We have told the rest of the world we think there 

have been improvements in detection and verification capabilities. 

This is one of the effects of progress in this field. I think also as far 

as the rest of the world is concerned it does indicate tha t we believe 

that it is in the interests of ours and the Soviet Union and everybody 

else to get a test ban treaty tha t is workable if possible.

PRESENT PROSPECT FOR A TEST BAN TREATY

Senator Aiken. Are you anticipating an early agreement? 

Secretary Rusk. The present prospect is not at all encouraging, 

Senator.

Senator Aiken. Isn ’t this discussion rather academic?

Secretary Rusk. If I were to answer th at question yes or no today 

I would say “Yes” today.
20 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

Senator Aiken. Have you observed in the discussion over getting 

a test ban agreement, almost a direct conflict between ideology and 

technology? There are so many people think ing we should go as far 

as necessary in order to get an agreement, but I happen to be on the 

Atomic Energy Committee, too, and you have testified before us.

Secretary Rusk. Yes.

Senator Aiken. I don’t hear any optimism tha t we hear exuded in 

some meetings and in some of the reports we get. I don’t get the 

optimism that we have airtight methods of detecting explosions and 

determining what caused them. Do you think we can ?

Secretary Rusk. I am convinced, Senator, the proposals we have 

made at Geneva would give us a high degree of assurance tha t the 

kind of testing is not being carried on that would affect our basic security interests; that the deterrent effect of the system on the Soviet 

Union would be very strong and tha t the Soviet Union would have 

to think very hard about the choice between g etting caught in a test 

on the one side and simply doing the more for thrigh t thin g and 

abrogating the treaty on the other, if they decide to resume testing. 

QUESTION OF COMM UNIST CH INA’S PARTICIPATION IN A TEST BAN TREATY

Senator Aiken. Would an effective test ban require the cooperation 

of Communist China ?

Secretary Rusk. The probability tha t Communist China would sign 

a test ban treaty is at the present time not high. I would say tha t it 

is very low. But on the other hand, I th ink that authorities in Peking 

would have to consider very hard whether they would go ahead if 

the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States did in 

fact sign a test ban treaty.

If they tested it would be open to us to abrogate the treaty if we 

determined our security were affected. The treaty itself has th at provision in it.

LACK OF HOPE FOR EARLY TEST BAN AGREEMENT

Senator Aiken. Tha t is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Humphrey. Senator Fulbright.

The Chairman. Mr. Chairman, than k you very much. I don’t 

know tha t I have much to say. If I understood you correctly, Mr. 

Secretary, you say that, th is is largely an academic discussion—you 

have very little hope of any agreement in any case ?

Secretary Rusk. Well, I would comment on that. Perhaps I was 

a little too categorical. I think at the present time there is no prospect,. There is no indication of any serious progress on these discussions.

On the other hand, I thin k tha t we ourselves ought not to drop interest in it. I think we ourselves ought to be prepared to move ahead 

if the other side changes its view as expressed in Geneva in recent 

weeks.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 21

PRINCIPA L INTERE ST IN A CHIEVING A TEST BAN TREATY

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, is your principal interest in this 

treaty tha t it would slow down or prevent the contamination of the 

atmosphere, or tha t it would contribute to peace?

Secretary Rusk. I thin k the principal interest is, and I think there 

would be disagreement in other p arts of the world, perhaps? but to me 

the principal interest is taking a first step which would begin to pu t a 

ceiling on the arms race.

When we look ahead at the prospects of the arms race, the billions 

upon billions of resources tha t will have to be poured into it, and the 

increasing chanciness of tha t arms race, the increasing unpredictability of its course, the increasing dangers in the mounting piles of 

sophisticated and terrible weapons, I would think if we could find 

some way to begin to turn tha t down, th is would be one of the most 

important things we could do a t the present time.

The Chairman. Then it is economics rath er than peace or contamination that interests you mostly.

Secretary Rusk. No, sir, I don’t think it is just economics.

The Chairman. Well, which is it? I asked you a simple question 

and I am not clear that I got an answer.

Could you make it a little clearer for me. I am a little slow on Monday morning.

Secretary Rusk. Let me enumerate the elements fo r you.

The Chairman. I said, is it contamination or is it peace ? You said 

it wasn’t either. You said it was limitation of arms, and I took it 

these were expensive and they ought to be limited.

Secretary Rusk. I would say it is peace, it is economics, and it is 

contamination. I thin k all three are there.

The Chairman. Would you have any priority among those three for 

purposes of discussion?

Secretary Rusk. I think I named them in my p riority so f ar as I 

am personally concerned, peace, economics, and contamination.

The Chairman. Do you really think a test ban treaty would contribute to peace if you got one?

Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir, I think this would be an impo rtant contribution.

The Chairman. Did our experience afte r World Wa r I with disarmament contribute to peace? We did have a disarmament conference, didn’t we?

Secretary Rusk. Yes, we did, sir.

The Chairman. And we did set a limitation at that time on what 

were considered important arms in the nature of ships, didn’t we?

Secretary Rusk. But, Senator, at about the time of that disarmament conference I first began to wear the uniform at the age of 12. It 

wasn’t just tha t disarmament conference that got in the way of organizing the peace in the postwar period. We really disarmed unilaterally regardless of these disarmament treaties. We starved our Armed 

Forces between W orld Wars I and II and we were unwilling to play 

the kind of role we were going to play internationally if we were going to organize a peace.

95900—63----- 4
22 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING DISARMAMENT

The Chairman. I just wanted you to clarify this a bit. This whole 

subject is rapidly becoming involved in our domestic political situation, is it not? If you are for inspections above a certain number, you 

are a good pa trio t; if you are for inspections below a certain number, 

you are soft on communism. Isn ’t that the way it is becoming now ?

Secretary Rusk. I am a little confused, Senator. I don’t want to 

point to specific remarks, but I am a little confused about the discussion on the one side which seems not to want any disarmament, and 

others want us to make deep slashes in our defense budget. It seems 

to me we have got to do the job in our defense budget tha t is required 

and at the same time work for disarmament tha t will help turn this 

thin g down so tha t our defense budgets can be more manageable.

The Chairman. You will admit there is room for difference of opinion as to whether or not this treaty really contributes to peace, won’t 

you ? There are a lot of people who don’t think it has any particu lar 

relevance to the promotion of peace; is th at not correct ?

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I have no doubt at all in my own mind 

on that one. I acknowledge there are differences of view but if you 

look at the prospect lying out ahead of an unlimited, qualitative arms 

race in the nuclear field, that arms race certainly contributes to war, 

and therefore, I would think if we Could find a way to put some ceiling 

on it that would be a contribution to peace.

OBJECT OF INTEREST IN PEACE

The Chairman. Well, these are questions. I am not sure whether 

it is the weapons involved tha t contribute to war. Maybe it is the 

people who make the weapons who are the primary object of our 

interest in whether or not we have peace.

I wonder if we are not really preoccupied with the symptoms rather 

than the cause of our troubles.

Secretary Rusk. It is true, sir, tha t weapons are only fired when 

people fire them and that the policies and attitude of the people are 

a determining factor. But the weapons confrontation itself taxes 

the ingenuity, the patience, the intelligence of men who are having 

to make the decisions of war and peace, and the more sophisticated, the 

more instantaneous, the more complex, the more all-pervasive these 

weapons systems become the more difficult it is fo r frail human beings 

to keep control of the situation.

The Chairman. I will yield.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEUTRON BOMB

Senator Aiken. In consideration of a test ban trea ty have you given 

full thought to the development of the neutron bomb ?

Secretary Rusk. That is one of the elements th at has to be taken 

into account when you determine whether or not it is in our interest 

to stop testing where it is. It has been our judgment since 1958, forgettin g for the moment the whole Baruch experience, th at it is in the 

interests of the United States, if possible, to stop testing where it is.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 23

Senator Aiken. In tha t case, you would be too late now, would 

you not? Is not the theory of the neutron bomb pretty well known 

to different countries?

Secretary Rusk. Yes, I think the theory of it is known, but a ban 

on testing would impose very severe limits upon the development of 

such weapons.

Senator Aiken. In the event of trouble, would not the neutron 

bomb be likely to supplant the atomic bomb as we now know it, to a 

grea t extent ?

Secretary Rusk. I am not at all sure tha t would be the case. I 

think there has been some discussion of that, but I would think tha t 

it would not be a substitute, but an addition.

Senator Aiken. I am not sure, but I think it has to be taken into 

consideration because the atomic bomb, as we know it now, is undoubtedly just a step toward the ultimate means of destruction.

INVOLVEMENT OF POLITICS IN TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I do not want to labor it, and I 

do not wish to take up the time of these experts on the committee 

who know so much about how many black boxes we have to have. I 

really do not know, I confess. I do not know whether it ought to be 

3, 10, or 100.

I do know t hat it looks as if this matter is becoming involved in 

politics, which I think would make it a rather useless exercise, because 

it destroys any rational and objective examination of it.

WISDOM OF TEST BAN NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES QUESTIONED

Frankly , I rathe r disagree with the whole procedure you are following—that you try to get agreements of this kind in the open. I think 

t hey do not lend themselves to fru itfu l discussions, if everything the 

negotiators say has to be addressed to the local constituency back home, 

rather than to the people participa ting in the meeting. I think it is a 

very poor procedure that you have adopted, but tha t is a gratuitous 

bit of advice.

You are already in it, and I do not know how you can disengage, except tha t I think it will come to an end in the near future.

Senator Humphrey. Will the Senator yield ?

The Chairman. Yes; I will yield.

Senator Humphrey. I just want to add this. It was my privilege to be around when this sort of development took place, where the 

chief negotiator of the United States at Geneva was attempting to 

slate the American Government position, only to read in the European 

edition of the New York Times or the Paris edition of the New York 

Herald Tribune a new proposal tha t was supposedly going to be advanced—even though it never was advanced—and the negotiator 

having to spend most of his time telling our allies and the nonalined 

nations that the news story just was not true.

Then, when the “seven” figure came up, long before anybody else in 

Geneva had heard about it officially or unofficially, it had appeared in 

print in Washington, D.C.

I knew th at my little mission at Geneva was to go around from one 

delegation to another to explain carefully that there was no substance
24 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

to this at all, only to find ou t a lit tle lat er, of course, th at there was 

sub stance to it.

I do not know how in the world any body can con duct negotiations 

under those k ind s of circ ums tanc es. Fr an kl y, it made us look alm ost 

like com edians, or at least a par t of some sort of a vau dev ille act. I 

thou gh t it was ridicu lou s, and I certa inly wa nt to con cur in wh at the 

Se na tor from Arkan sas has just sa id: If you are going to negotiate, 

we o ug ht to negotiate as quiet ly and as carefully as p ossible, and possibly not have to go thro ug h all these exercises like we are going 

throug h here tod ay.

I co uld n ot h elp but th in k how much of this sub ject is being discussed 

in the Soviet Union at th is par ticu la r hour. Th ey mu st feel very 

happ y.

Se na tor Aik en . Will the Sen ato r yield ?

I th in k wh at the ch air man is tryin g to say is th at y ou ou gh t to be 

as quiet abo ut yo ur plan s as th e In tern al Rev enue depa rtm en t is about 

its.

Se na tor H umphr ey. An d as effective.

Se cre tar y Rus k. I think no Se creta ry of St ate wou ld fail to ap pr ecia te the rem ark s po intin g to the difficulties between lin king of public 

deb ate and an effective inter na tio na l negotia tio n concurr ently. Th is 

is a difficulty, and it is not a new problem, and I am sure thi s will not 

be the l ast 1 ime t hat we will hav e t his p roblem , b ut it is difficult.

Se na tor H um phrey. I t is alm ost impossible. You are very ge ne rous, M r. S ecret ary .

Se cretary Rus k. Th ere wa s an exchang e, as yo u know, in December 

an d Ja nuar y between Ch airm an Kh rushchev and Presiden t Kennedy 

on th is matter. Tha t, hopeful ly, had opened up the possibility of 

some serious negotiations th at wou ld lea d to an agreem ent. But 

ap pa rently th at has no t been the case. Th ere was a case where a 

pr iv at e com municatio n did e nte r into the public discussion, the public 

negotiations, and since th at tim e there has been no rea l hea dway 

made.

Th e Chairma n. I hav e one othe r th in g to me ntion in th is conn ection. Se na tor Hum ph rey, in his usual an d ini mi tab le way, made the 

po int mu ch be tte r th an I could possibly make it. I do no t see why 

you n ecessarily m ust look fo rw ard to a c on tin uatio n of t hi s pro ced ure 

in this an d o ther cases. It seems to me you ou gh t to be able to a rran ge 

for negotiations to be pr ivate, of course making wh ate ver you con ­

clude pub lic. These are quite d iffere nt ma tte rs.

possible proposal concerning destruction of bombers

As to this que stio n th at I believe is again in the morning pa pe r 

about t he destru cti on o f bombers, is t here any rel ati on between it and 

th is disa rm am ent business?

Se cretary R us k. Well, i t has no d ire ct relatio n wi th th e nucle ar tes t 

ban discussion.

Th e Chairman. Does it relate to the general question of disarm ament?

Se cre tar y Rus k. I th in k th at sto ry was inc orrec t, Senator. Th ere 

has been discussion in the Di sarm am en t A gen cy of a gr ea t ma ny p os ­

sible steps in th e di sarm am ent field.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 25

The Chairman. At the moment, I am not particularly interested 

in the substance of one or the other of those matters under discussion. 

As I say, this whole thin g is becoming political in its nature.

I do not care whether you destroy these obsolete bombers or not. 

However, it seems to me that it ought to be possible to be quite clear 

as to whether they are being destroyed or not, without there being 

implications of deception or untruths about the matter.

We destroyed thousands, or at least hundreds, of bombers in my 

State after World War II tha t were old fashioned. We are beginning to decommission these B—17’s now, I understand. I have heard 

tha t with respect to one of the bases in my State. I believe they are 

substituting B-52’s.

In any case, I see i t in the paper as a matter of controversy. Can 

this not be cleared up or can you clear it up this morning?

Secretary Rusk. This is a point tha t has been discussed inside the 

Disarmament Agency and with the departm ents as one possible step 

which might at some stage be seriously considered. There has been 

no proposal made on this to other governments or to the Soviet Union 

on such a step.

Now, one of the elements in this sort of an idea, th at you mutually 

destroy certain of your obsolescent weapons, in order to limit the 

extent to which highly sophisticated weapons become obsolete, as 

between the Soviet Union and the NATO powers, is that they do not 

spread all over the world and become a pa rt of the other arms races 

tha t are going on in different parts of the world; and th at they do not 

feed out into a lot of countries which would find them a burden and 

would stimulate the dangers elsewhere.

But here, again, is a problem. We are concerned with a lot of 

things in the Disarmament Agency, looking at them as possibilities. 

We reject a lot of them; we put others up for further study. But, 

with reference to your earlier remark about negotiations, Senator, 

it is very difficult to have these things prematurely out for public 

debate before one even knows whether it will be well to negotiate 

them.

So tha t clarification on a point of this sort is not simple. The 

idea is being studied. The idea is being considered. But no proposals have been made.

The Chairman. I personally do not thin k much of the idea one 

way or the other. However, I do not like to see these controversies 

develop which have political overtones, because, regardless of our dif ­

ficulties in getting along with Russia, we do not need to tear ourselves apart internally as between the two parties over something of 

this kind, which, I am frank to say, I do not think is particula rly 

significant.

QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT PREOCCUPATION WITH DISARMAMENT

Lastly, I will end by saying tha t my real suspicion about disarm ament is th at this is diverting your attention and the attention of the 

whole Government from those areas which might lend themselves to 

improving our relations with our present enemies. I doubt if this 

contributes very much. You have created a whole Agency for this 

particular activity. Nobody is very optimistic about getting anywhere. A lot doubt tha t you would achieve very much even if you
26 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

made an agreement. You neglect the other areas of relationships tha t are connected with definite human relations which are 

fundamental, rath er than with the symptom, by fixing your attention 

so strongly upon this aspect of our problem.

For whatever it is worth, there are some people who feel this 

very strongly.

Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, tha t public attention has been drawn 

very strongly to the nuclear test ban discussion and to the whole disarmament problem. But I do not think that means the other problems are being neglected inside Government, to tha t extent.

I think, also, it is fair to say-----

The Chairman. Well, for example, you are very concerned about 

this, but, at the same time, last year this Government took away the 

most-favored-nation clause for two countries which are important in 

this area.

So, with one hand, you say we are very concerned about this because 

of its peace overtones. On the other hand, we go out of our way 

to create worse relations with the people who are involved. We seem 

very inconsistent.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, my views on the most-favored-nation 

clause with respect to Poland and Yugoslavia have been stated repeatedly to the Congress. I was, myself, very regre tful to have that 

action occur. I think it has not been in our public interest to have 

it occur.

Tho Chairman. Well, it did occur, anyway.

Secretary Rusk. But I think on the disarmament point, sir, here 

is a place where there could be a genuine common interest between 

ourselves and the Soviet Union to try to move ahead, if we can.

As late as this so-called electoral speech about a week or 10 days 

ago, Air. Khrushchev pointed once more to the great burden that 

this arms race imposes upon the Soviet Government in the allocation of its resources as between arms, on the one side, and consumer and other goods on the other.

Now, leaving aside ideological considerations, for the moment, T 

think an outsider would say tha t here is one field in which there is 

some basis of continuing common interest between these two groups of 

nations. They both have great unfinished business which calls for 

resources, and the arms race makes it more difficult for them to turn 

to that, unfinished business. So tha t we have felt, as one of the points 

at which we might engage a genuine interest, tha t the disarmament 

idea, the disarmament possibility, was one that ought to be thoroughly 

explored.

The Chairman. I do not mean to disengage completely. What I 

meant is tha t I think the disarmament effort is overemphasized. I 

think it is given more attention than it really deserves. I think it 

ought, to be continued, and, if there is anything to it, take advantage 

of it. However, you certainly ought not to get the idea tha t this is 

the one and only way you can make progress toward peace.

That is all, Senator.

Senator Humphrey. Senator Carlson?
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 27

TOSSIBLE PROPOSAL CONCERNING DESTRUCTION OF BOMBERS

Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I just want to follow along with 

what our chairman, Mr. Fulbright, mentioned in regard to this article 

tha t appeared in the paper this morning. I want to be sure tha t 1 

understand you correctly. This article states th at:

U.S. disa rm am en t officials den ied y es terd ay th at an y pla n ha d been sha ped for 

the rec ipr ocal bu rning of bom bers by th e United St ates an d the So vie t Union.

Do I understand your answer to our chairman was that you had been 

considering this ?

Secretary Rusk. Yes.

Senator Carlson. And it was pa rt of your program ?

Secretary Rusk. But I believe the reported denial itself was a misunderstanding of what the Disarmament Agency official has said.

Senator Carlson. I am glad to get tha t clarification, because, as 

the chairman has well stated, th at is one of the problems th at we have 

up here on the Hill.

Senator Morse. Will the Senator yield for a clarification?

Senator Carlson. I certainly will.

Senator Morse. I do not think the record is clear now a t all, since 

the last response of the Secretary. I understood the Secretary to say, 

and he can check me, tha t there had been no negotiations with the 

Soviets or anyone else in regard to the destruction of any bombers, 

but tha t there had been discussions within our own Government as to 

possible program s for the demolishing of obsolete equipment, including bombers. Now, if tha t is the statement, the record ought to show 

it.

. Secretary Rusk. Tha t is right.

Senator Morse. Is that your position ?

Secretary Rusk. Tha t is correct.

Senator Carlson. I wanted to clear it up because the quote in the 

paper this morning says tha t there had been no discussion about reciprocal burning. Now, the Secretary says there has at least been 

discussion within the Agency here in Washington in regard to this; 

is tha t correct ?

Secretary R usk. That is correct, sir.

And I added the point tha t I think the reporter misunderstood 

what the official in the Agency said, because the official did not deny 

tha t there had been discussion.

Senator Carlson. I wanted the record to be clear on this, because 

I want to state categorically tha t in this connection there have been 

representatives of the Disarmament Agency up on the Hill.

Secretary Rusk. That is correct. This has been discussed with 

leaders of the Congress as one of the possible steps tha t we might 

want to take.

Senator Carlson. Tha t clears th at up, I hope.
28 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

POSSIBLE PROHIBITION ON SALE OF OBSOLETE EQU IPM ENT

Senator Aiken. Does that mean that we will agree to destroy our 

antiquated equipment rath er than selling it to the so-called developing nations? Would that not be a good agreement for Russia and the 

United States to make ?

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I mentioned this earlier because one of 

the curious things about the disarmament discussions has been tha t it 

tends to concentrate on the arms as between the Soviet Union and 

the United States without regard to the other arms races going on 

in other parts of the world.

At the time the General Assembly was voting for disarmament, 70 

nations were asking for military assistance.

Senator Aiken. That is right.

Secretary Rusk. We do not want to see burdensome weapons of 

this sort move out into general supply in competition around the 

world, because they are expensive, burdensome, and in many situa ­

tions, could increase the dangers.

Senator Aiken. I think tha t would be a profitable subject for discussion, and one which, perhaps, might prove more fr uitful than the 

test ban treaty—and more immediate, perhaps.

Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, I have just one or two more questions.

Senator H umphrey. Go righ t ahead, Senator.

IN TERPRETA TIO N of arms contr ol an d DISARMAMENT ACT (PUBLIC LAW 

8 7 -2 9 7 )

Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I receive a great deal of mail from 

citizens in my State—and I assume other Members do from their 

States—who are concerned th at the Arms Control and Disarmament 

Act, Public Law 87-297, gives the President the power to turn over 

the defense of the United States to the United Nations. I wish you 

would discuss that a little bit.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not see any basis whatever for tha t 

interpretation of the act. Let me repeat again what I have said about 

any nuclear test ban agreement. Such an agreement would be a treaty. 

The trea ty would be negotiated in consultation with the leadership 

of the Congress and the appropriate committees.

Tf negotiated to a conclusion, it would be submitted to the Senate 

as a tre aty, at which point the Senate can pass its own complete judg ­

ment on the matter. It is just as simple and categorical as that.

An agreement on such an important matter as this is intended to be 

a treaty. The rest of the world knows it; the Soviet Union knows i t : 

tha t we are talkin g about a treaty, with all tha t means in terms of 

Senate consideration.

Now, insofar as other matters are concerned, the President is not in 

this disarmament field going to move out with arrangem ents affecting 

the security of the United States without full collaboration with the 

Congress.

The Congress has its own great constitutional responsibilities in 

this field. The President has his, and both, together, are responsible 

for the security of the United States. I believe that those fears or 

misgivings just have no basis in fact or intention or capability.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 29

Senator Carlson. Does the United Nations Charter contain any provision that could be interpreted as authorizing the President to turn 

over the defense of the United States to the United Nations?

Secretary Rusk. Not as a charter. I mean the United Nations 

Charter has strongly registered at our own insistence tha t the regulation of armaments be a major objective of the United Nations, but 

the arrangem ents would still have to be negotiated out with the members, and nothing could occur there without our full consent, and the 

Congress would be fully involved in any such consent.

PRES IDEN TIA L AU TH OR ITY REGARDING U. S. ARMED FORCES

Senator Carlson. I can assure you tha t there is grea t concern 

among some people in our Nation tha t the Congress would not be the 

final authority on approving a treaty. There is concern that the President does have this auth ority through the Disarmament Act and also 

the United Nations, and I am glad for your statement this morning.

I would like to submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, a staff memorandum on this subject th at was helpful to me, and I would like to have 

it made a part of the record.

Senator Humphrey. It will be made a part of the record.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

Sta ff Mem ora ndum on P r esid en tia l Au th o r it y T o D is a r m an d Co m m it U. S. 

A rm ed F orc es

Section 33 of Pub lic Law 87-297 provides in p a rt:

“Th at no actio n shall be take n under this or any other law th at will obligate the United States to disa rm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces 

or arm aments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty making

power of the President tinder the Constitu tion or unless auth orized by fu rther affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United Sta tes .” [Emphasis added .]

This section make s it quite clea r th at the Pre sident cann ot enter into a disarm ament agre eme nt or obligate the United Sta tes to disarm, except as authorized by a subseque nt law or treaty.

The United Nations Ch art er does not contain any provisions which could be 

inte rpreted as authorizin g the Pre sident to turn over the defense of the United 

States to the United Nations. Article 43 of the Ch arter prov ides:

“1. All Members of the United Nations, in ord er to contribute to the maintenance of int ern ational peace and secu rity, und ertake to make available 

to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agre ement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilitie s, including 

rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining intern ationa l 

peace and se curity. 2. Such a greement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and 

the n atu re of the facilities and assistance to be provided. 3. The a greem ent 

or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initia tiv e of 

the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members 

and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance

with their respective constitutional processes.” [Emphasis supplied.]

The United Nations Particip ation Act of December 20, 1945, implem ents these 

provisions as follow s:

“The Pre sid ent is authorized to negotiate a special agreeme nt or agreements with the Security Council whic h shall be subject to the approval of

the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution, [emphasis supplied] 

providing for the numbers and types of arm ed forces, their degree of rea diness and general location, and the na ture of facilities and assistance, including rig hts of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on 

its call for the purpose of maintainin g int ern ational peace and security in
30 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

accordance with article 43 of said Charter. The President shall not be 

deemed to require the authorization of the Congress to make available to 

the Security Council on its call in order to take action under article 42 of 

said Charter and pursu ant to such special agreement or agreements the 

armed forces, facilities, or assistance provided for the rei n: Provided, That 

nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council for such 

purpose armed forces, facilities, or assistance in addition to the forces, 

facilities, and assistance provided for in such special agreement or agreements.”

The foregoing provisions give the Congress adequate control over the President’s authority to enter into agreements to commit U.S. forces p ursuant to the 

provisions of the United Nations Charter. In addition, Congress has enormous 

power (including control over the purse strings), the support of which is indispensable to any foreign policy. For example, the Congress is the body which 

lays and collects taxes for the common defense, and creates armies and maintains navies, although it does not direct them. It also has the power to pledge 

the public credit, declare war, define offenses against the law of nations, regulate foreign commerce; and it has the further power “to make all laws which 

shall be necessary and proper” for carrying into execution not only its own 

powers but all the powers “of the Government of the United States and of any 

departm ent or officer thereof.” Moreover, its laws made “in pursuance” of these 

powers are the “supreme law of the land” and the President is bound constitutionally to “take care t ha t” they “be faithfully executed.”

EFFECT ON U .S. MILITARY FORCES OF FUBLIC LAW 8 7-2 9 7

Secretary Rusk. I might just comment, Senator, a brief historical 

note:

That back in 1945 and 1946 we were negotiating with the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations the 

arrangements th at were contemplated under chapter 7 of the Charter, 

Military Staff Committee, United Nations Forces, questions of that 

sort.

Had tha t move followed—those provisions, for all practical purposes, died in 1946—there might have been a United Nations command of military forces that would have played roles th at m ight have 

engaged some of these questions. But that is not in fron t of us any 

more at the present time.

Senator Carlson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Humphrey. Just to clarify this record again, Mr. Secretary, I am very familiar with the provisions of the Arms Control Act. 

Do you find anything within tha t act which bestows power upon the 

President of the United States to demobilize the forces of the United 

States without the consent of the Congress ?

Secretary Rusk. No, sir ; I do not.

Senator Humphrey. Do you find anything in the Arms Control 

Act which would place jurisdiction over the command of the U.S. 

Armed Forces in the hands of the United Nations ?

Secretary Rusk. No, sir.

Senator Humphrey. Do you find anything in the Arms Control 

Act which would in any way dilute the authority of the President of 

the United States to be Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of 

the United States?

Secretary Rusk. No, sir.

Senator Humphrey. Or do you find anything that would dilute the 

constitutional authority of the Congress of the United States on 

treaty making powers insofar as the Senate is concerned ?
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 31

Secretary Rusk. I do not, sir.

Senator Humphrey. And you do not find anything tha t would 

dilute the ap propriation powers of the Congress of the United States ?

Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.

Senator Humphrey. I think th at pretty well ties down the response 

to this kind of emotional appeal that is spread across the land.

Senator Morse?

NEED FOR DISARMAMENT EFFORTS AND DISCUSSION

Senator Morse. In laying the foundation for my questions, Mr. 

Secretary, I want the record to show that the senior Senator from 

Oregon is not an expert in this field, and does not claim to be one. In 

fact, I do not know of a disarmament expert on this committee. If 

there is one, I would like to be introduced to him sometime. The man 

who, in my opinion, knows more about it than anyone else on the 

committee, in my personal view, is the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. 

Humphrey. He has never claimed to be an expert, but a student in 

the field, which is what all of us should try to be. I am not an expert, 

but I am not a cynic, either. I feel that I ought to thank you, in 

behalf of by grandchildren and everyone else’s grandchildren, for the 

statesmanship that your reasoned discourse portrayed this morning. I 

thank you for not being a cynic, for trying to be somewhat of a student 

of history.

I am not going to escape the fact tha t material things condition 

people; that is an elementary psychological law of conditioning. 

And, not being a cynic, I am not going to ignore what history has 

tau ght : tha t with other material weapons of the past where mankind 

in various eras of history has failed to lim it their use, they have p roduced war.

There has been talk here, even by you, about this being an academic 

discussion. I am glad there has, because I want to point out also 

tha t mankind has made its great progress toward peace on found ations of earlier academic discussions, out of which developed great 

ideals that were eventually implemented into patterns of human behavior. I am for as much public discussion of this subject as we can 

have everywhere in the world.

I wish the Russian officials were as concerned about their gra ndchildren as I am of mine. I offer no apology for holding the point 

of view tha t in our time we are either successful in leading mankind 

to disarmament, so far as nuclear weapons are concerned, or we are 

not going to leave any system of freedom to our grandchildren. This 

just happens to be a belief of mine.

So long as I hold this trust, all the politics, all the partisanship, all 

the waving of the flag into tatters, are not going to divert me from 

doing what I can to help along the cause of working out a system of 

enforceable peace. However, you are not going to have an enforceable peace try ing to put into perpetuity the matter of nuclear containment.

I wanted to say that as a foundation f or these questions which I am 

going to ask you now.

I have supported the program of nuclear containment, and I will 

continue my support for the time being, until we can get the time I
32 test ban negotia tio ns and dis arma me nt

think it is going to take to implement what is really foundation material in this kind of discussion this morning. If you do not have the 

American people thinking about it, in my judgment, there is no hope 

of our adopting a sound national policy.

I do not care what administration it is, the present one or a 

future one. Your national policy is going to come from the people 

themselves. It is one thing to talk to me about secrecy in negotiations 

at Geneva. It is quite a different thing to try to sell me on secrecy in 

discussion of American policy on the domestic scene. I am for all the 

public discussion of it that you can possibly have.

Academic as this is, it is a great seminar, and we need many of 

them. Yet, I am very much concerned about a seeming rise in acceptability on the part of increasing numbers of Americans tha t maybe 

we had better have a nuclear war and be through with it. We will 

sure be through with it, if we have one.

Therefore, I think, rather than show a sensitivity about political 

barbs—a sensitivity tha t some people in our constituency are displaying tha t maybe we should not be discussing these matters—our 

answer to them ought to be more discussion, not less. The interesting 

thin g is, when you get the facts out to the American people, such as 

you are bringing out here this morning, you do not have to worry 

about their final judgment. But you get these waves of emotionalism 

because so many people are ignorant of the facts, and secrecy breeds 

ignorance, emotional, popular reaction.

We have gone through it in smaller spheres of foreign policy in 

recent months, and I know how those barbs feel. I do not intend to 

change my course of action just became somebody is going to assume 

tha t we are not protecting the flag because we are not waving it into 

tatters.

The American flag is being harmed more by the so-called super 

patriots and their partisan waving of it. Before I ask you three or 

four questions, I just wanted this record to show tha t this is the 

philosophical approach the senior Senator from Oregon makes to 

this.

RELATIONSHIP OF NATO NUCLEAR FORCE TO TEST BAN

Mr. Secretary, you said that a test ban would be fully consistent 

with the possibilities for a NATO system of multilateral control of 

nuclear forces.

Is it not possible tha t the Russians would regard a NATO multilateral Polaris force as a proliferation of nuclear weapons?

Secretary Rusk. It is possible that they would oppose any multilateral arrangement within NATO, but I think the point t hat they are 

most concerned about would be the addition of further , independent, 

national, nuclear capabilities.

The multilateral force idea is a way in which to engage the joint 

responsibility of our present NATO allies in a nuclear force and in 

its arrangements without, adding to the capabilities of any single 

government to make decisions for the employment of such weapons.

I think this is the point to which the Soviet Union would be very 

sensitive.

Senator Morse. In tha t answer you have also answered my next 

question. I am going to ask it, though, because I want to emphasize 

it and point it up a bit.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 33

Secretary Rusk. I understand.

Senator Morse. Jud gin g from what you said, if we should ever 

amend the McMahon Act to permit nuclear assistance to our Eur opean allies, is it not at least likely, or possible, that the Russians would 

denounce any test ban treaty with the United States or the United 

Kingdom, if we entered into such a treaty prior to the amendment of 

the McMahon Act to permit us, for example, to help France build 

up a nationalistic nuclear program?

Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that at the present time the Soviet 

Union recognizes that France does have, and will have, a national 

nuclear capability, but I think they would be very much concerned 

if this number should increase. T think it is no secret that the Soviets 

are very much concerned about a German national nuclear capability, 

for example. But, I think, if other countries in NATO were to begin 

testing or were to develop national nuclear weapons, a nuclear test 

ban treaty would become unimportant.

I think they would undoubtedly abrogate it.

Senator Morse. The fact tha t the Russians recognize th at France 

will undoubtedly develop its own nuclear force would not change the 

fact, would it, that if we bilaterally proceeded to assist her in developing a national nuclear force, Russia would look askance at any proposal on our part or on the part of the United Kingdom for the development of a nuclear test ban trea ty ?

Secretary Rusk. I think, undoubtedly, tha t action on our pa rt of 

tha t sort would create reactions on the part of the Soviet Union, th at 

is, political reactions. But I think, also, th at the Soviet Union might 

be interested in a nontra nsfer of nuclear weapons agreement at some 

stage, by which those tha t have them would agree not to give them 

to other national governments on a national basis, and those who do 

not have them would agree not to receive them or manufacture them.

Senator Morse. If there is to be any hope for the development of 

an enforceable, effective nuclear test ban treaty, would you agree with 

me tha t tha t hope would be increased if we maintained our present 

position in regard to assisting in a NATO nuclear force development, 

and not assisting in an individual nation-by-nation nuclear force development?

Secretary Rusk. I think tha t is correct, sir; there is no question 

of it,

effect of test ban treaty on weapons development

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, what is the administration assessment of the effect a test ban treaty would have on the development by 

the United States of low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons and an effective antimissile, or the so-called neutron bomb?

Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, the effect of a test ban treaty on such 

steps would be to prevent field testing or weapons testing which would 

be necessary for the development of those additional weapons.

In other words, one of the purposes would be to stop testing, and 

tha t would include testing necessary for those directions.

I might just add parenthetically, Senator, that there are steps in 

the anti-ICBM field, the antimissile field, which could be taken without nuclear testing, as such.
34 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

Senator Morse. Yes.

Secretary Rusk. In terms of carriers and things of tha t sort. 

Senator Morse. I understand that. I was only discussing it in its 

relationship to the test ban.

Secretary R usk. Righ t, sir.

possibility or soviets having satellite nations conduct tests

Senator Morse. Air. Secretary, in the event a test ban trea ty were 

concluded, do you see any likelihood that the Soviets might evade the 

intent of such a treaty by having their satellites conduct tests?

Secretary Rusk. I think any testing anywhere else would, of course, 

bring the tre aty down. It would make it possible fo r any signatory 

to the treaty to relieve himself of any obligations under it.

I doubt very much that the Soviet Unon would agree to a test 

ban treaty and then evade it through testing in its, say, Eastern 

European satellites. I think tha t there are problems involving the 

interests of the Soviet Union itself. I do not think they will sign 

such a treaty unless they thin k it basically is in their own interests, 

and I think the hazards of being caught in tha t kind of an arrangement would be very great.

Senator Morse. The criticism implied by my question—which is 

made by those who seem to be against any test ban treaty—would be 

answered, would it not, by pointing out th at our negotiators certainly 

would not be sitting mute in Geneva, or anywhere else where such 

negotiations were conducted, without bringing into the discussion full 

compliance on the part of Russia, including agreement not to evade 

by seeking to make use of Communist satellites ?

Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.

STATE DEPARTMENT PUBL ICATION NO. 72 7 7 RELATING TO DISARMAMENT

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, my last question was really covered 

in part by Senator Carlson, although I think it needs to be pointed 

up and made clear in the record. Some people seem to have the impression that the mere existence of the a dministration’s disarmament 

proposals set forth in State Department Publication 7277 amounts 

to surrender of all U.S. military forces and U.S. sovereignty to the 

United Nations. I wonder if you would clarify for the record what 

the nature and purpose of these U.S. proposals are.

Secretary Rusk. If we may just identify the bulletin. The document to which you refer, Senator, was a comprehensive outline of a 

disarmament program which would look to graduated disarmament 

as the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations and of the 

world community of nations became increasingly effective.

Now, these steps would be taken only by the United States on the 

basis of decisions made by the Government of the United States, including the Congress of the United States, and we do not contemplate 

tha t the security of the United States would be turned over, without 

our consent and participation, to somebody else outside the United 

States.

Senator Morse. Th at is a statement I wanted to get into this record. As Senator Carlson pointed out, we have been receiving a
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 35

considerable amount of mail, and, in my judgment, it grows out of 

this document, and a misunderstanding on the part of many of the 

critics as to the procedures tha t would have to be followed if this 

outline of disarmament should eventually be effectuated.

It calls for following all the constitutional processes of our form 

of government: checks of the Congress tha t are in no way attempted 

to be circumvented or undermined. This is a general outline of an 

overall, comprehensive disarmament program tha t is envisioned as 

at least a hope for the world, if the leaders of the countries of the world 

come to their senses and finally work out this kind of an enforceable 

disarmament program.

WO RK ING TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE WORLD OF LAW

You see, Mr. Secretary, so many of these critics just forget about 

tha t word “enforceable” which is always used by those in positions of 

responsibility who are seeking to prevent a nuclear holocaust by 

substitution of reason for force. We are not ovemighters, but we 

recognize that, academic as it may be at the present time, we have got 

to continue to work for implementing those ideals, if we are, in my 

judgment, going to accomplish the only hope tha t mankind has for 

survival.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I feel t hat what you have said this morning about working toward an effective world of law is so important 

tha t I would like to have the record show that, when I acceded to 

this word “academic,” I was talking about the immediate negotiating 

situation in its most shortrun term, tha t at the moment there is no progress visible on this subject. But I would not wish to apply that word to 

the total effort here of nuclear test ban or disarmament, because I 

think we have got to stay with tha t and make some headway with 

it, i f we can.

Senator Morse. I understood that. Knowing you as I do, I took 

tha t for granted.

Secretary Rusk. Thank you, sir.

Senator Humphrey. Senator Hickenlooper?

BASIC PURPO SE OF TH E SOVIETS

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, has your general observation over the years been th at the basic purpose of the Krem lin has 

been to attain economic and military superiority over the rest of 

the world ?

Secretary R usk. I think their objective, as Marxists and Leninists, 

has been to put themselves in a position of domination. They have 

been pursuing the ir idea of a world revolution. I think there have 

been times when they have been restricted in means by actions taken 

by others and by their own capabilities.

I think tha t the grea t problem for the future is whether they will 

elevate tha t doctrine to the realm of doctrine only, or whether they 

continue to supp ort it in action by every means at their disposal.

I think they have made their own purposes and their own predictions about the future of the world very clear over the last-----
36 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

Senator Hickenlooper. Have you noticed any diminution of their 

action so far as the ir purs uit of world superiority is concerned? 

In other words, have they continued to develop physically with speed 

within their capabilities for tha t dominion or for the purpose of 

strength ?

Secretary R usk. I thin k they have made a major effort in building 

up their military power and keeping it strong. I thin k I could not 

say tha t they have committed all of the resources tha t it were possible for them to commit to a m ilitary effort, nor in particu lar situations in different parts of the world have they used their military 

resources to the extent tha t military resources might have been used 

by them.

Now, on the one side, I think there is no question about their objectives. But, on the other hand, they, too, have some problems to 

think about in terms of the safety of their own country, in terms of 

the tolerability of their own people to what might be asked of them. 

I think tha t they are capable of, on occasion, making Soviet judgments in their interests, and tha t some of these may be also in the 

interest of other countries.

QUESTION OF SOVIET WILLING NESS TO M AIN TAIN STATUS QUO IN WEAPONS 

DEVELOPMENT

Senator Hickenlooper. Considering the rather consistent and characteristic conduct of the Russians since World War II , and then assuming, at least for the sake of argument—which, I think, is a proper 

assumption myself—that we do have in mass and power and probably in ultimate deliverability a substantial atomic superiority over 

the Russians, do you think it is compatible with Russia’s past conduct 

and announced purposes that she will voluntarily reduce or stop 

her atomic development, which will inevitably keep her in a secondary 

position in the atomic field in the future, under present circumstances 

and present attitudes ?

Secretary Rusk. This turns on some judgments which they have to 

make about their own situation, taking into account several elements. 

I think they do have to be concerned about the extent of the resources 

tha t will be required in an unlimited arms race.

I believe, also, they have no reason to suppose, if they wish to continue the race, that they will ever catch up on that relative position 

between ourselves and them, because I think t hat the free world has 

the capability, the resources, and, if necessary, the will to maintain its 

position in that regard.

I also thin k we have to take into account that the Soviet Union has 

at the present time a very large and powerful nuclear delivery system. 

Who knows what their judgment will be about what is enough for their 

purposes in terms of deterring or possibly p reventing a nuclear exchange on the initiation, say, of the West some day.

I do not think one can rule out that they will come to the determination tha t a real test ban treaty would be in their interests, looking 

ahead.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 37

SOVIET POLIC Y OF WORLD CON QUE ST

Senator Hickenlooper. Considering the repeated statements tha t 

have been made by Khrushchev, and the other statements from official 

agencies in Russia, all along the line t hat they are determined to bury 

us economically or otherwise—and 1 do not know th at they have retracted any of those statements; they seem to reiterate them on various 

public occasions-----

Secretary R usk. They have been repeated fairly recently.

Senator Hickenlooper (continuing). Is there any reliable reason 

to believe that they have changed th at policy of the ultimate conquest 

of us and the rest of the world economically and otherwise? Have 

they really receded from th at position any ?

Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, tha t in terms of their theory, there 

has not been much change in doctrine. There have been some changes 

inside the Soviet Union that, in terms of the freeing up of certain of 

their scientists, technicians and managers, show some change, as compared with, say, 10 years ago.

But, on the other hand, they, too, are humans, who have to consider 

the dangers, the burdens, the risks in relation to how and when they 

try to get on with their program.

WORLD OPI NIO N OF U. S. PO SIT ION ON A TES T BAN

Senator H ickenlooper. With reference to the discussion which we 

have had here about the impression which many people in th is country 

may have had, rightly or wrongly, about what concessions we are 

making or what power may be abandoned by the Congress or otherwise, I assume that this impression being gained by the American 

people with quite a prolific and diversified press, could well be gained 

by other people in the world, could it not ?

Secretary Rusk. I think, thus far, the attitude of the Soviets, for 

example, has been tha t we have been very harsh and unyielding and 

insistent in trying to work at this nuclear test business. I just saw 

some stories the other day, refer ring to my own comments at the last 

press conference, tha t tried to make the point in Moscow that I clearly 

demonstrated tha t we had not the slightest interest in a nuclear test 

ban proposal or a treaty.

I think, as far as many people in the rest of the world are concerned, they do not carry the same responsibilities as we carry in 

the United States. I thin k they would like to see nuclear testing end 

on almost any basis whatever on which the Soviets, the United States, 

and the U nited Kingdom would end it. They are not so much inte rested in the details as basically the ending of the tests, although I am 

quite sure most of them would not want us to do so, if, in our judgment, it was contrary to the basic security interests of the United 

States.

Senator Hickenlooper. The point I am trying to make is that if 

our own people get the idea tha t perhaps the United States is not 

interested in really stopping this headlong rush by the Russians to 

world supremacy, is it not entirely possible that other nations in the 

world which have a great concern about Russian objectives and the 

ultimate Russian program might also gain the same idea from the same
38 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

general sources ? And those nations may get a little bit discouraged 

about this, might they not ?

Secretary R usk. To the extent th at that is possible, I thin k it is all 

the more important tha t we, ourselves, here, in the course of our 

domestic discussion, do not misinterpret or misread what, in fact, we 

are saying in these nuclear test ban negotiations.

Senator Hickenlooper. I thin k it is very important.

Secretary Rusk. Yes.

Senator Hickenlooper. I do not read the same thin g into them 

tha t many people do.

Secretary Rusk. Yes.

Senator Hickenlooper. But in many ways I have come to live 

with this thin g for a good many years, and I hope I understand basically what our position is. I am aware, though, tha t there is an image 

created from time to time in the minds of many people, regardless of 

the reasons and regardless of the sources.

QUEST ION OP SOVIET TER MS FOR A TES T BAN TREATY

Now, do you think the Russians really want a binding treaty on 

any terms except th eir own, and upon terms which will not in any 

way weaken their position vis-a-vis the United States and other nations in the world ?

Secretary Rusk. I think it is clear tha t they will not want a treaty 

except on terms that they feel they can accept, but I think tha t it 

is also entirely possible th at they, too, have some stake in this arms 

race and putting some limitation on it.

The problem would be to find out whether there is a sufficient 

degree of common interest to support a treaty which has the necessary 

degree of assurance in it against violations.

Senator H ickenlooper. They have some stake in it, without doubt, 

just as every nation has a stake in it. Do you not, however, think 

there is quite a conflict in the Kremlin management between the 

philosophy of internationalism, which is pointed toward world dominion, on the one hand, and some possible responsibility for inte rnal betterment within the country?

Secretary Rusk. I think there is a very important discussion and 

debate going on and some very difficult decisions being made in the 

Soviet Union about the allocation of resources, say, as between its 

military establishment, on the one side, and its capital plan t and 

agricultural investments, on the other.

Senator Hickenlooper. Is there any real evidence tha t Russian 

internal development has materially benefited at the expense of Russian military expansion power?

Secretary Rusk. I would suppose, Senator, particularly in view 

of Mr. Khrushchev’s remarks during the election the other day, that 

those doubts, at least for the present, have been resolved in favor of 

supporting the military requirements.

SOVIET OPP OSITIO N TO IN SP EC TION DAT ING FROM BAR UCH PLAN

Senator Hickenlooper. I recall, as I know you do, very actively 

the fact that at least at the beginning of 1947 the United States had 

a complete monopoly on atomic weapons. No other country could
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 39

make them or had them. We had the weapon and the know-how, 

the plant capacity, the production potential to wipe any other nation 

practically off the face of the earth, if we got into a rumpus with 

it. Yet we offered throu gh the Baruch plan to give tha t all up and 

turn over all atomic materials, all weapons, all uranium, and get 

clear out of the business and tur n it over to an international agency, 

providing other countries would do the same, in order to preserve 

the world against the development by any nation of this weapon 

and the danger which we thought we saw at tha t time and which 

we have increasingly seen as it has developed.

Is it your recollection—it certainly is mine—that Russia adamantly 

refused to join in this kind of an arrangement, and it foundered on 

the rocks of inspection? Russia would not let anybody into their 

country then to see whether they were going forward with this or not. 

However, we were willing to have inspection, and most of the other 

major countries expressed a willingness to have inspection.

As far as I know, the other major countries, with the exception 

of China which was not very well organized at tha t time, expressed 

a willingness to stand for all reasonable international inspection, 

and the assumption of responsibility by an international agency.

Now, I do not see any particular evidence that Russia has moved 

away from that adamant position. In other words, they said at tha t 

time they were going to have atomic weapons. It was not the peace 

that was involved; it was a question of Kremlin equality first and then 

superiority. I do not see that they have changed in that fundamental 

pattern.

Now, I am not opposed to talks. As many people have said heretofore, when you are talking, you are not necessarily fighting. I am not 

opposed to talks. I am not opposed to exploratory activities.

However, I do not think we ought to follow the 50-50 concession, 

one horse and one rabbit, where we give the horse and the other fellow 

gives the rabbit. I have not seen much evidence of even the rabbit 

coming out in these years tha t we have talked about it. I do not see 

tha t Russia has moved any distance a t all in any matter t hat tends to 

weaken or to lessen its chances of its general movement toward world 

supremacy.

I just do not see tha t they have made any concession on any basic 

fundamental at all. They talk about the theory of inspection being 

accepted and all this, but when we get rig ht down to talking the 

details, they stop. Insofa r as 2 or 3 inspections are concerned, there 

is nothing at all new about that.

I was in Geneva 6 or 7 years ago when the Russians were willing to 

talk about 2 or 3 inspections. They have not increased their inspection numbers at all in the last 5 or 6 years, so there is nothing novel 

about that. I have not seen a single thing advanced by the Russians 

tha t would in any way tend to cut down or to reduce their drive 

toward superiority. But I still think we ought to go ahead and talk 

and explore this as much as we can. At the same time we must be 

awfully careful about how much we give away.

Secretary Rusk. It was, Senator, I think, a very great tragedy for, 

perhaps, the human race tha t the Baruch proposals did not succeed 

and that the Soviet Union refused, as you properly pointed out, to 

have anything to do with them. I suppose at that time one thing that
40 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

was on Mr. Stalin’s mind was t hat if we had succeeded in bringing 

this energy under international control, that that would have left the 

United States in a position of having a know-how which the Soviet 

Union had not developed, and tha t for the future the Soviet Union 

was unwilling to accept tha t position.

Now, tha t particular issue is not involved in a nuclear test ban at the 

present time, and I th ink there is enough in it-----

Senator H ickenlooper. I beg your pardon, I have great respect for 

your opinion, but I am not so sure tha t I can go along with you on 

tha t last statement that tha t is not involved. I have a feeling tha t 

there are certain areas of superiority which we believe we have tha t 

the Russians will not be satisfied until they reach. I thin k i t all goes 

to raise the question whether or not they will ever discuss anything 

of this kind when they feel tha t they are in any way in an inferior 

position.

Secretary Rusk. Perhaps I should say i t is not necessarily involved. 

If your surmise is correct, sir—and I have no way of knowing how 

the Russians look at it at the moment—then I think we are not likely 

to have a nuclear test ban.

Senator Hickenlooper. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Humphrey. Senator Church?

POLITICS AND A TEST BAN TREATY

Senator Church. Mr. Secretary, early this morning Senator Fu lbrig ht expressed his anxiety tha t this whole question of a nuclear test 

ban seems to be entering more and more into the arena of partisan 

politics.

I thin k tha t if rising partisanship would make the successful solution of the dilemma tha t faces us in Cuba more difficult, then pa rtisanship will make any progress toward disarmament well nigh 

impossible.

It seems to me th at “war” has been our constant companion, now, 

for nearly 22 years. We have grown accustomed to its face, and any 

loosening of this tuning can only be achieved, if it can be achieved, 

through a genuine bipartisan effort.

RELA TION SHIP OF A TREATY TO NATIONAL INTERESTS

I think you have said several times that you are very skeptical that 

the Russians are now serious about a test ban treaty. If we are serious about a test ban treaty, it is because, in our assessment, such a 

treaty advances the genuine interests—including the security inte rests—of the United Sta tes ; is that not correct ?

Secretary Rusk. Th at is correct, sir.

Senator Church. Then, if you are correct in your assessment th at 

the Russians may not want such a treaty, is it not equally because in 

their assessment such a test ban treaty would not advance the general 

interests, including the security interests, of the Soviet Union ?

Secretary Rusk. I thin k we have to assume that is their judgment 

about the treaty, unless we see some indications, more than any we 

have had recently, th at they would like to go ahead on the basis of this 

kind of treaty.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 41

EFFECT OF A TEST BAN TREATY ON OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND ARMED 

FORCES

Senator Church. I thin k tha t there is some feeling in this count y —generated by the way this question has been presented in the 

press—tha t a nuclear test ban would constitute some kind of gian t 

stride toward disarmament. My own feeling has been th at it could 

hardly be more than a toe in the door, even if we were to achieve it. 

I wonder if you would answer these questions in order to bring this 

consideration into better perspective.

Suppose we were to achieve a nuclear test ban on the terms that we 

are now proposing. Would that, treaty in any way reduce our nuclear 

arsenal ?

Secretary Rusk. No, sir. It would not effect the reduction of our 

nuclear arsenal within the terms of the treaty.

Senator Church. Would it stop our production of nuclear warheads?

Secretary Rusk. No, sir.

Senator Church. Would it stop our scheduled or projected manufacture of missiles—either intercontinental missiles or medium-range 

missiles ?

Secretary Rusk. No, sir; it would not.

Senator Church. Would it affect our scheduled production of 

Polaris submarines ?

Secretary R usk. No, sir.

Senator Church. Would it reduce by one man the number of members of our Armed Forces in the Army, in the Navy, and in the Air 

Force?

Secretary Rusk. Perhaps a few of them who might be associated 

with testing, but otherwise not.

Senator Church. Would it affect any appreciable or significant 

reduction in our Armed Forces?

Secretary R usk. Not in itself ; no, sir.

Senator Church. Would it then effect any immediate disarmament 

in terms of reducing the present level of the Armed Forces of the 

United States or the manufacture of the weapons with which we equip 

the Armed Forces of the United States ?

Secretary Rusk. It would not have the effect of reduction, Senator. 

It might have the effect of preventing furthe r necessary increases 

if the testing were to go on, on both sides.

GENERAL EFFECTS OF A TOST BAN TREATY

Senator Church. I s it an accurate appraisal, Mr. Secretary, to 

say that if we were to achieve such a tre aty, its immediate and direct 

effect would be to prevent further testing of nuclear devices; tha t 

is to say, the advancement of the art and the further sophistication 

of nuclear weapons, with respect to those countries tha t are members 

of the treaty—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United 

States ?

Secretary Rusk. Tha t is correct, sir.
42 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

Senator Church. And the second effect would be to establish an 

inspection system which might at a later date lead to enforceable 

means to achieve more significant progress toward disarmament? 

Is tha t the other hope or expectation of the State Department?

Secretary Rusk. Senator, we do believe tha t it is very important, 

somehow, to break through this veil of secrecy tha t is so deeply 

entrenched in Soviet doctrine, because we believe tha t their fear of 

espionage in connection with international arrangements for inspecting disarmament is a groundless fear, for many reasons. We think 

tha t inspection can be accomplished which does not involve espionage, 

and, furth er, we certainly know enough about each other these days 

to inflict frig htful destruction in the event of war, so tha t oldfashioned espionage is not quite as relevant as it might have been a 

long time ago.

Now, if the Soviets discover tha t inspection arrangem ents for a 

test ban can be accomplished with respect to tha t purpose without 

involving the kinds of information about the Soviet Union tha t are 

generally not involved in tha t purpose, then I think this might open 

up the possibility of other measures about surprise attack and questions of that sort in which we could go ahead, where, now, this problem 

of secrecy is the bar.

Senator Church. Mr. Secretary, if we are to make any progress 

at all toward reducing the terrible dangers of a nuclear balance of 

terror, if we are to move at all in the direction of enforceable arms 

control, is it not an essential prerequisite tha t we pierce this veil of 

secrecy that now surrounds the Soviet Union ?

Secretary Rusk. It is very important to do so, Senator, and to 

do so on a basis which makes it clear tha t these matters do not and 

cannot turn upon bl ind trust.

What we need are arrangements on which confidence can be built 

as a matter wholly separate from the question of whether the Russians 

will trus t us or we can tru st the Russians, because the very arrangements, themselves, provide a basis for growing confidence.

I think this is one of the potentially important aspects about a 

genuinely enforceable test ban.

Senator Church. Would it not seem tha t in the whole spectrum of 

disarmament possibilities the nuclear test ban presents a t the moment 

the best opportunity for establishing such a pioneer inspection 

system ?

Secretary Rusk. I would think, sir, that because of the nature of 

the weapons themselves, because of the nature of the detection and 

verification, instrumentation and other means, tha t this would be one 

of the simpler ways to get at th at question.

Senator Church. This is one of the reasons why the administration—the State Department and all others who are interested—has 

focused so on the test ban, would you not say ?

Secretary Rusk. I think that is one of them, sir. The other is the 

prospects ahead if the nuclear arms race goes on unchecked in any 

way, and the very deep interest tha t people have in all parts of the 

world about the effect on them of an unlimited nuclear testing p rogram.
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 43

DIF FERENC ES FROM EAR LIER DISARM AM ENT TRE ATIES

Senator Church. In earlier questions, Mr. Secretary, some reference has been made to e arlier disarmament treaties and the fact that 

in due course they were broken.

I think the one t ha t was mentioned was the Naval Disarmament 

Treaty of the 1920’s. There have, of course, been others. Does not 

this test ban treaty we hope to achieve include provisions for inspection and enforcement tha t are quite different in character from any 

enforcement provisions tha t any previous disarmament treaty has 

contained ?

Secretary Rusk. It provides, in the first instance, a system of detection and verification which not only requires the signatories to 

admit inspection on their territory , b ut enlists the cooperative action 

of a good many other governments throughout the world in making 

such a system effectively operational.

I think, to tha t extent, it is quite different.

I think, perhaps, in terms of violation, the principal enforcement 

sanction is the resumption of the nuclear arms race by the signatories. 

That, I think, is not an unimportant sanction, because the magnitude 

of problems involved in looking down the trail to the future is such 

tha t it will be no simple thing for a government to decide tha t it is 

going to take that path again.

RISK S IN FA ILU RE TO HALT ARM S RACE

Senator Church. Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on your 

testimony and on your splendid statement, which I have read, although I did not have an opportunity this morning to hear it.

I am not optimistic that much progress is going to be made at this 

time, but that is not as discouraging to me as the difficulty of presenting the case to the American people. The debate on this question 

has almost been entirely occupied with an assessment of what the 

risk will be of cheating in the event tha t a treaty is agreed to. Here 

opinions vary as to whether or not the Russians could get by with 

one or two or three overt tests, how large the detonations would have 

to be, and how big the hole would have to be.

Yet practically no attention is given at all—which would permit 

the people of the United States to put this question in perspective— 

to the risks that we are taking and continue to take if, somehow, we 

do not begin to turn this nuclear arms race down.

I do not know how we are goin<r to solve this question. As I said 

at the beginning, we are so used to the necessity for the uniform, which, 

indeed, existing circumstances in the world make essential. I supported the armament program and voted for every enlargement of it 

tha t has been proposed by this administration, but unless, somehow, we 

can bring into focus the terrible dangers th at face us if we cannot find 

another route, the political possibilities of making progress in the 

direction of meaningful arms control are very remote.
44 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT REQUIRES PATIENCE

We are like passengers on a train tha t is headed toward a terrible 

precipice, and we know the bridge is out, and yet, we are arguing 

with one another as to what the dangers are in jumping off the train 

without taking into account what the inevitable end result will be if we 

continue on the tracks. Are we going to slip, scratch ourselves or 

break our necks?

This is the most discouraging aspect of the whole question to me, 

and, I must say, I see little progress being made in the presentation of 

this issue to the American people, either throu gh the Government, in 

the halls of Congress, or through the press, that gives me much 

grounds for encouragement.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, may I comment very briefly on that.

Senator Church. Yes.

Secretary Rusk. That very important statement, because I do not 

think there is any subject requiring more patience, doggedness, and, 

perhaps, even courage, than to stay at this disarmament possibility 

year after year afte r year.

I indicated earlier th at I had, myself, taken part in the discussions 

in 1945 and 1946 in the U nited Nations. It would be relatively easy 

to say in complete honesty that so many attempts have failed, tha t 

prospects are not good. But we dare not say that, Senator. This 

is the point.

I think tha t a good many of our citizens around the country who 

do see the need for disarmament, who are interested in it, have that 

occasional sense of discouragement, so tha t their attitude, their 

approach, and their sense is not, itself, as strong a part of the national 

discussion as it ought to be and as, at times, in the past it has been.

I think tha t those who see these dangers ahead, who would like to 

see some steps in disarmament achieved, themselves, have to gird 

themselves and realize th at this is tough. It requires patience, understanding. We must not take these month-by-month and year-byyear disappointments as the end of the trail, because we cannot let the 

trail end there.

We have got to keep going, because the alternative to the trail is 

something that no one wants, even those who are now most opposed to 

any steps in the disarmament field.

Senator Church. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Humphrey. Senator Church, I want particularly to compliment you on your interrogation. Mr. Secretary, I want to conclude 

this hearing with a very few summary questions.

Secretary Rusk. All right, sir.

EFFECT OF A TEST BAN TREATY ON OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Senator Humphrey. Do you believe tha t a test ban treaty, if it 

were to be concluded, might mark the beginning of more hopeful 

progress in our relations with the Soviet Union on such m atters as 

cultural exchange agreements, Berlin and overall disarmament 

discussions ?

Secretary R usk. I do, sir, because we do have indications tha t this 

subject of a nuclear test ban is one that is high on their priorities,
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 45

and they might look on this as a test of the possibilities ahead, just 

as we might, and I think this would be a very constructive step forward in the sense in which you put it in your question.

QUESTION OF SOVIET INTEREST IN A TEST BAN TREATY

Senator Humphrey. In view of your recent experience at Geneva 

and in all of your many contacts with the Soviets, what reasons are 

there for believing th at they might be seriously interested in concluding a test ban treaty ? I believe you have answered that pretty much

Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.

Senator Humphrey. Do you think tha t they are still serious in 

these discussions?

Secretary Rusk. I am not sure th at they are at this moment interested in view of the line of discussion th at we have been having for 

the last several weeks in Geneva. But I find it very difficult to believe 

tha t they have come to a conclusion th at this is something now which 

we will just p ut aside and forget, not only because of what they have 

said repeatedly in terms of their own needs and their own interests 

on this point, but, looking at it objectively, they have some reasons 

why they need to bring this arms race to some sort of a halt and turn 

their attention to other problems.

NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY OF TH E UNITED STATES

Senator Humphrey. I hope th at point can be emphasized, because 

it seems to make considerable sense. Is it true tha t the conclusion of 

a test ban trea ty now would leave the United States in a position of 

nuclear superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?

Senator R usk. That is correct, sir, it is true.

Senator Humphrey. I s it equally true that, as time goes on, our 

degree of supremacy may well diminish?

Secretary Rusk. If testing goes on, there will be a tendency for the 

scientific capabilities of the two sides and the variety of weapons and 

capabilities to move toward equality, not necessarily in magnitude, 

but in quality.

BUILDING AN ALTERNATIVE TO TRUST

Senator H umphrey. Yes. Mr. Secretary, when you were speaking 

of this lack of tru st and this sense of suspicion tha t permeates the 

area of international relations—and particula rly our relationships 

with the Soviet Union—I am reminded of a statement by Admiral 

Radford in reference to the nuclear test ban discussions at another time 

when he said tha t what we were attempting to do was to build a mechanism tha t was an alternative to trust. In other words, w hat was in 

mind was the building in of a system t hat would compensate for what 

we might call the inadequacy of the human factor. Is that a way of 

stating your view?

Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir; I would accept that, because I think this 

is basically the way th at institutions of law and order have developed.
46 TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT

SOVIET IN TE NTI ONS TOWARD FU RT HE R TESTING

Senator Humphrey. Do you have any reasons to believe tha t the 

Soviets are stalling now because they may want to initiate another 

series of tests this summer or fall ?

Secretary R usk. I have no way of knowing that, sir. I did notice 

a ticker report this morning of possibly a test, but I have no confirmation on that. We have had no word from the Soviets on this 

point at all.

DEVEIX)PME NT OF TH E NEUTRON BOMB

Senator Humphrey. In ligh t of our tremendous investment in 

nuclear weapons, the atomic and the hydrogen weapons, and our tre ­

mendous stockpile of these weapons and our high degree of sophistication of both strategical and tactical weapons, is it to our advantage 

to continue testing th at might develop a neutron bomb ?

Secretary Rusk. If the race continues, we will, of course, do th at 

and other things. But in terms of the capacity to kill and destroy at 

the present time, it does not appear to me to be an overriding desire 

to find a weapon tha t only kills people.

Senator Humphrey. And does not destroy property.

Secretary Rusk. And does not destroy the property. That, to 

me, is not an impelling consideration, somehow.

Senator H umphrey. I have been told tha t the development of the 

neutron bomb, at least based upon what theoretical knowledge we 

have today, would be cheaper in cost. I also understand tha t once 

the theory is proved out in terms of practicality, the technology of it 

would be available to many nations.

Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.

Senator Humphrey. It might very well leave us with a tremendous 

investment in obsolete weapons of the atomic and hydrogen nature. 

Therefore, the conclusion drawn by some is that since we already 

have enough weapons to destroy practically all th at God has created, 

once or twice, it would be in our advantage to attem pt to stop the 

testing that might result in the development of a neutron bomb which 

a nation of lesser resources and less investment in existing stockpiles 

could develop.

Secretary Rusk. This has been one of the factors taken into account, 

and has been a p art of the general judgment that a nuclear test ban 

now would be in the interest of the United States.

This also relates to such things as the antimissile development and 

the missile which gets around antimissiles, and so for th ad infinitum.

But our judgment is tha t it is in our interest to stop this matter now.

POSS IBLE SOVIET DEV ELOPM ENT OF ANTI M IS SI LE MISSILE

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of talk about 

the antimissile missile. Does this Government have any solid information tha t indicates that the Soviet Union has developed what is called 

an antimissile missile—one tha t we do not have ?

Secretary Rusk. We know that they are, of course, working on 

that. I think the judgment on that is one th at I would prefer to get 

from the Defense Department, because it is a matter of some detail in
TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS AND DISARMAMENT 47

terms of the capability of the particular weapons. I do not believe 

tha t they are ahead of us in this field.

Senator Humphrey. We are working on it, too ?

Secretary Rusk. Th at is right, sir.

Senator Humphrey. I mention this because one of the main arguments against the test ban treaty is tha t a halting in the tests will 

place us at the mercy of the Soviet Union insofar as the antimissile 

missile is concerned.

You are a member of the Committee of Principals, Mr. Secretary, 

and I, of course, would not ask you to violate any rule of executive 

privilege. However, I will ask, have you heard th at the Soviet Union 

has an effective antimissile missile—one more effective than we have— 

and, therefore, to h alt testing would be to our disadvantage ?

Secretary Rusk. No, sir, that is not my information.

Senator Humphrey. You have been rath er close in on these 

meetings ?

Secretary Rusk. Th at is right, sir.

Senator Humphrey. You are there, yourself, are you not, Mr. 

Secretary ?

Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir, I attend personally.

Senator Humphrey. You attend personally.

I want to than k you very much for the time tha t you have given. 

1 know tha t you have another appointment. It has been very reassuring. May I commend both you and Mr. Fisher upon your testimony this morning.

We will have other witnesses later on, and they will go into some 

of the scientific aspects of this. I hope and pray tha t there can be 

some reassurance to the American people that the proposals which 

have been advanced have been proposals which have been well thought 

out, and that men of unquestioned patriotism and loyalty to this 

country are of the mind tha t these proposals advance the security of 

the United States.

Thank you.

Secretary Rusk. Than k you very much, Mr. Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the 

call of the Chair.)

SUMMARY IN DE X

Pag e

Ability to detect and identify explosions-------------------------------------------- 12

Achieving disarm ament requires patience------------------------------------------ 44

Advantages to United S tates of effective te st ban tre aty :

Military_____________________________________________________ 3

Political_____________________________________________________ 4

Significant step to ward slackening pace of arm s rac e______________ 3

Aiken, Senator George D., examination of witness, Itusk, Hon. Dean___ 18-20,

Anti-missile-missile, possible Soviet development of___________________ 40 22-23, 28

Arms Control and Disarm ament Act (Public Law 87-207), interpretation of________________________________________________________ 28

Basic purpose of the Soviets_______________________________________ 35

Carlson, Senator Fra nk, examin atio n of witness, Rusk, Hon. Dean_____ 27-20

Change in U.S. position on trea ty ------------------------------------------------------ 14

Church, Senator Frank, examination of witness, Rusk, Hon. Dean______ 40-44

Committee of Principals__________________________________________ 0

Communist C hina’s pa rtic ipation in a test ban trea ty, question of________ 20

Concessions made by the United State s, complaints of_________________ 11

Dangers of contin ued testing______________________________________ 5

Departme nt of State ’s support of tes t ban prop osals__________________ 8

Destruction of bombers, possible proposal concerning__________________ 24, 27

Detection and identification, effect of developments in field of__________ 6

Detection, international cooperation on______________________________ 13

Differences from earlier disarm ament tre aties_______________________ 43

Disarm ament efforts and discussion, need fo r_______________________ 31

Effect of a tes t ban tre aty on our nuclear arsena l and Armed Forces___ 41

Effect of reduction of U.S. inspection demands_______________________ 19

Effect on U.S. M ilita ry Forces of Public Law 87-297__________________ 30 Elements of an effective tes t ban tre aty_____________________________ 0

Fulbrig ht, Senator J. W., examination of witness, Rusk. Hon. Dean_ 20-23, 24-20 General effects of a tre aty_________________________________________ 41

Government preoccup ation with disa rmamen t, question of____________ 25

Hickenlooper, Senator Bourke B., exa min atio n of witness, Rusk, Hon.

Dea n------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------35-10

Humphrey, Senator H ubert II., examination of witnesses :

Fish er, Adrian S_____________________________________________ 14-18

Rusk, Hon. Dean____________________________ 8-14, 23-24, 30-31, 44-47

Importance of number of inspectio ns------------------------------------------------ 18

Inspectio n issue, rela tionsh ip of, to Soviet sincerity in negotiations___ 10

Involvement of politics in test ban negotiations______________________ 23 Lack of hope for ear ly tes t ban agre eme nt__________________________ 20 Limited tes t ban treaty , possibility of_______________________________ 9

Magnitude at which detec tion and identification most efficient_________ 17

Measuring significance of suspicious events__________________________ 15

Morse, Senator Wayne, exam ination of witness, Rusk, Hon. Dean___ 27, 31-35

National inte rest, safe gua rded cessation of nuc lear weapons testing in

our___________________________________________________________ 2, 40

NATO nuclear force, rela tionsh ip of, to test ban_____________________ 32

Need for public to be informed on U.S. detection cap abilitie s___________ 13

Neutron bomb, development of the_________________________________ 22. 40

Nuclear superiority of the United Sta tes ___________________________ 45

Obsolete equipm ent, possible proh ibition on sale of__________________ 28

Overall rela tions with Russia, effect of a tes t ban tre aty on our________ 44

49
50 SUMMARY INDEX

Pa ge

Polities and a test ban treaty----------------------------------------------------- 40

Possibility of Soviets having satellite nations conduct tests--------------- 34

Presidential authority to disarm and commit U.S. Armed Forces---------- 29

Present prospect for a test ban treaty----------------------------------------- 19

Principal interest in achieving a test ban trea ty------------------------------ 21

Public opinion regarding disarmament------------------------------------------ 22

Purpose of hearing____________________________________________ 1

Radioactive fallout, importance of problem of--------------------------------- 5

Ratio of number of suspicious seismic events to number of onsite

inspections__________________________________________________ 16

Risks in failure to halt arms race_______________________________ 43

Seismic events, number of, in the Soviet Union--------------------------------- 16

Seismic research, expenditures on----------------------------------------------- 14

Soviet Union:

Advantages to, of test ban treaty _____________________________ 5

Intentions toward furthe r testing____________________________ 46

Interest in a test ban treaty, question of---------------------------------- 45

Opposition to inspection dating from Baruch plan---------------------- 38

Policy of world conquest____________________________________ 37

Reluctance to discuss totality of trea ty arrangements------------------ 11

Terms for a test ban treaty _________________________________ 38

View of on-site inspection as contrasted to U.S. view--------------------- 10

Willingness to maintain status quo in weapons development, question of_________________________________________________ 36

Test ban vis-a-vis our relations with other countries------------------------- 3

Weapons development, effect of test ban treaty on___________________ 33

Wisdom of test ban negotiating procedures questioned----------------------- 23

Work of Mr. Foster and Mr. Kuznetsov___________________________ 8

World of law, working toward an effective------------------------------------- 35

World opinion of U.S. position on a test ban______________________ 37

„ I „ o