U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

57–801 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025

S. HRG. 115–879 

HAWAII FALSE MISSILE ALERT: WHAT HAPPENED 

AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO NEXT? 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 5, 2018 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman 

ROGER WICKER, Mississippi 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

GARY PETERS, Michigan 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire 

CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada 

JON TESTER, Montana 

NICK ROSSI, Staff Director 

ADRIAN ARNAKIS, Deputy Staff Director 

JASON VAN BEEK, General Counsel 

KIM LIPSKY, Democratic Staff Director 

CHRIS DAY, Democratic Deputy Staff Director 

RENAE BLACK, Senior Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 5, 2018 ................................................................................ 1 

Statement of Senator Schatz .................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES

Hon. Mazie Hirono, U.S. Senator from Hawaii ..................................................... 2 

Hon. Colleen Hanabusa, U.S. Representative from Hawaii ................................. 3 

Hon. Tulsi Gabbard, U.S. Representative from Hawaii ....................................... 5 

Hon. Jessica Rosenworcel, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission ........................................................................................................................ 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Rear Admiral Patrick A. Piercey, United States Pacific Command, U.S. Department of Defense ............................................................................................. 17 

Prepared statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command ................................................................... 18 

Nicole McGinnis, Deputy Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, 

Federal Communications Commission ............................................................... 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 22 

Antwane Johnson, Director, Continuity Communications Division, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Major General Arthur J. Logan, Adjutant General and Director, Hawaii 

Emergency Management Agency, State of Hawaii, Department of Defense .. 40 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42 

Chris Leonard, President and Legislative Chair, Hawaii Association of Broadcasters, Inc. ........................................................................................................... 43 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

(1) 

HAWAII FALSE MISSILE ALERT: WHAT 

HAPPENED AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO NEXT? 

THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 2018 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Honolulu, HI. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. HST, at 

1601 East-West Road, East-West Center, Keoni Auditorium, Hon. 

Brian Schatz, presiding. 

Present: Senator Schatz [presiding], Senator Hirono. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII 

Senator SCHATZ. Good morning. On behalf of the Senate Commerce Committee, I would like to welcome everyone to today’s 

hearing on Hawaii’s Emergency Alert System. I want to thank 

Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson for working with 

me to convene this hearing, and to the FCC, especially Chairman 

Pai and Commissioner Rosenworcel for their support, including the 

resources that they’ve devoted to the FCC’s investigation. 

I also want to thank each of the witnesses who are here today 

to testify, and the members of our delegation—Senator Hirono, 

Congresswoman Hanabusa, and Congresswoman Gabbard—for 

being here and for our partnership in the aftermath of the false 

alarm; and, of course, finally, to the East-West Center for hosting 

this hearing. 

What happened in Hawaii on January 13 raised some basic policy questions. Right now, any city, county, or state can choose to 

participate in the Emergency Alert System, and when they do, they 

get the technical capacity to get the word out, but that does not 

make them experts to know when a missile is coming. That ability 

rests with the Department of Defense. And it is increasingly clear 

that if—that we are not going to get all 50 states and 3,007 counties to voluntarily participate in such a program. But even if we 

did, it is possible, even likely, that we will have another mistaken 

missile alert as a result of human error or a security breach. 

Local officials have the lead on disaster response and recovery, 

but if the Federal Government knows a missile is coming, they 

should have the responsibility to inform the public. In other words, 

a missile attack is not a local question. The people who know first 

should be the people who tell the rest of us. 

Now, I understand that when it comes to natural disasters, we 

take a different approach, but it’s clear that a missile threat is fundamentally different from tsunamis, hurricanes, or other threats 

2 

that we routinely face. Congress needs to decide who should be responsible for notifying the public of a missile attack. It is my judgment that there is nothing more Federal than an incoming ICBM. 

The false alarm in Hawaii also highlighted some of the weaknesses in the State’s Emergency Alert System, which had a poorly 

designed user interface and did not have a verification system to 

prevent mistakes. The incident made clear the need for Federal 

standards in the system and raised basic questions about who 

should be doing this kind of thing. 

And that’s why in January, I joined with Senators Harris, Gardner, and Hirono, and others to introduce the ALERT Act. This bill 

gives the Federal Government the primary responsibility of notifying the public of a missile threat. The bill would also strengthen 

the way states and counties use IPAWS, the FEMA platform used 

by emergency management professionals to issue warnings. The 

ALERT Act is now in the DHS authorization bill, which has been 

passed by the Senate Homeland Security Committee, and is pending a vote in the full Senate. 

The false missile alert also made clear the need for improvements to the distribution side of our Emergency Alert System. So 

I’m also preparing a companion bill to the ALERT Act called the 

READI Act. The READI Act would take steps to update the broadcast and mobile phone systems that actually deliver the emergency 

warnings initiated by government entities. The READI Act would 

close gaps in these systems so that they don’t fall behind as technology advances. It would also require the FCC to set best practices and update the process for creating and approving the State 

plans that organize these emergency response systems and the networks that deliver the alerts. On the State level, steps have been 

taken by HI-EMA and others to address some of the issues that 

caused the false alarm, but questions remain about what happened 

on that day. 

We intend for this hearing to be constructive and clear-eyed. We 

will not shy away from necessary accountability during this oversight process, but we also need to clarify what to do next in order 

to keep everyone safe, and most importantly, to ensure that we can 

all have confidence when future alerts occur. 

I’ll now turn it over to my colleague in the Senate, Senator 

Hirono, for her opening remarks. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MAZIE HIRONO, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Schatz and all 

of you, for convening this important field hearing to assess how the 

Hawaii Emergency Alert System failed on January 13, 2018, and 

what specific remedies exist to fix the system so that this never 

happens again. This hearing presents a good opportunity to bring 

State and Federal officials together to work to regain the public’s 

trust after such a traumatizing event. 

It bears repeating that it took the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency 38 minutes from the initial emergency alert being 

sent for them to officially notify the public that there was no inbound missile, that it was a false alarm, and that the alert had 

been sent in error. While the relief was palpable, it gave way to 

3 

real visceral anger, anger that there was a false alarm, anger that 

it took 38 minutes to alert the public, anger that we faced a missile 

threat in the first place. 

The fact that the people of Hawaii and the hundreds of thousands of visitors in the State that day immediately presumed the 

missile originated from North Korea speaks to the broader concern 

about the potential for conflict and the threat that North Korea 

poses to Hawaii and the Nation. And this threat is real, and people 

across Hawaii and our country need to have confidence in the government to provide accurate information about potential threats. 

It’s one of the reasons why today’s hearing and discussion is important. 

Our congressional delegation is of one mind in getting to the bottom of what happened and making sure that it never happens 

again. With each of us sitting on different committees of jurisdiction, we’ve been able to engage with a full range of stakeholders 

on this important issue. 

Over the past 3 months, I have focused on clarifying what role 

the Federal Government can play in supporting State level emergency preparedness and response and what it can do to prevent the 

incident, this kind of incident, from occurring again. 

Through my work on the Armed Services Committee and in conversations with senior officials, like Secretary of Defense Mattis, 

then Secretary of State Tillerson, and Admiral Harris, of PACOM, 

I’ve emphasized the critical role of diplomacy in deescalating tensions with North Korea so that we can prevent a missile strike 

from coming our way in the first place. 

I’ve also engaged with the Secretary of Department of Homeland 

Security Nielsen about how to strengthen Federal-State cooperation on emergency alerts and secure the commitment from the Department’s Inspector General’s Office to examine the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s oversight of the Emergency Alert 

System, and our entire Nation will benefit if key Federal agencies 

work with states to close gaps in training and communication, institute best practices, and ensure that our states and local governments have the appropriate resources to prevent an incident like 

this from happening again. 

Once again, mahalo to Senator Schatz for convening this hearing 

today, and to all of our witnesses for coming together to address 

this important issue. It will take all of us working together to ensure that we’ve learned the right lessons from this incident and 

that longstanding improvements have been made to the Emergency 

Alert System. 

Mahalo. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you. 

Congresswoman Hanabusa. 

STATEMENT OF HON. COLLEEN HANABUSA, 

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Senator Schatz. I do want to say 

again the appreciation for you and the convening of this hearing, 

and for the Senate for taking the lead on this. It is very important 

for the people of Hawaii. 

4 

Let us understand why we are all here. It really is the public 

confidence of the people. We have elected officials, but as government itself, the most important thing we have to do is to ensure 

that the public believes that we know what we’re doing, and it is 

a situation like this that causes them pause, causes them to question, but more critically than all of that is when they wonder 

whether we even know what we’re doing or what did we do. 

This hearing is so important because we need to assuage all 

those fears and those questions, the anger, as Senator Hirono 

pointed out. There was a lot of anger, but imagine the anxiety that 

many of them went through. That father, that image that flashed 

across the whole Nation of him placing his child in a storm drain. 

What—what do we do now to say, ‘‘Look, we have learned’’? And 

that’s what this is about. It is about what we have learned. And 

it also is about, How do we begin to address so that it will not happen again, not of this type of situation where people are saying, 

‘‘Why did it take 38 minutes?’’ or, ‘‘Why is it that we couldn’t have 

been told immediately?’’ 

It is not the intent of all of us to point fingers or to say this person was wrong or that person was wrong or this government entity 

failed, but it is to say, How do we now come back to all of you and 

say to the public that we are addressing the major mishaps? Part 

of addressing the major mishaps is not simply identifying what 

happened, it is giving people the sense of security that we really 

do know what we’re doing. 

I share the sentiment that Senator Schatz initially stated, which 

is that maybe when it comes to natural disasters, or disasters period, or warning, or HI-EMA’s jurisdiction, maybe it is time for us 

to draw the distinction between that which is a, quote, natural disaster—hurricanes, basically tsunamis, floods—maybe that’s one 

category, but when it comes to ballistic missiles, maybe that should 

be a separate category. 

And I still recall that day. What caused so many people pause 

was when that banner went up on one of the television stations 

that says, ‘‘PACOM confirms.’’ That I think set a different tone for 

everything that was happening. And we have subsequently learned 

that PACOM is part of this system. So the sirens went off in Pearl 

Harbor. The Pearl Harbor workers also ran off the base and drove 

off the base. So the question becomes, Why? And who should address it? 

Representative Gabbard and I have asked the House Armed 

Services Committee to look into that because we do believe that 

there is a role that the military has to play, and the role that the 

military has to play is one of really assuring the people across the 

United States, but especially in Hawaii, when we look at PACOM, 

that in fact it is a true situation versus, quote, a drill. 

So this hearing, I hope, will help all of you understand and get 

the people at least some sense of public confidence again that government can do this right and government is asking the right questions. 

So again, Senator Schatz, thank you so very much, and Senator 

Hirono as well, for the Senate’s leadership in this matter. 

Mahalo. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you. 

5 

Congresswoman Gabbard. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TULSI GABBARD, 

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Senator Schatz and your Committee, 

for convening this very important hearing today. It’s important 

that these conversations not only happen in Washington, but that 

they happen here in Hawaii. 

Mahalo to our witnesses for coming and joining us today. And 

thanks to the East-West Center for hosting us. 

What happened on January 13 was a wake-up call for everyone 

here in Hawaii and to leaders across the country, really showing 

barely the stark reality of what the chaos of a nuclear strike on 

Hawaii would be like. We saw many of those powerful images, and 

I still hear from constituents across the state now about what they 

did during those minutes following that false missile alert, the 

tough choices that they were having to make about how they would 

spend those last—what they thought were those last remaining 

minutes of their lives. 

They remain frustrated with a lack of clear answers and really 

clear direction on, What do we do? What do people do in this situation? I look forward to the conversations this morning to be able 

to help provide those answers. 

I’ve heard from many of my colleagues in Congress who have 

watched closely what happened here in Hawaii, and causing them 

now to ask questions within their own states, within their own 

communities, about their level of preparedness, and their actions 

that they can take now to make sure that something like this does 

not happen there. 

Along with Congresswoman Hanabusa, I have introduced two 

bills in the House of Representatives to help deal with some of 

these issues. The first is the Civil Defense Accountability Act, 

which is really focused and centered around transparency and accountability, requiring public reporting from the Federal agencies 

involved, including FEMA, the Department of Defense, and the 

FCC, to make sure that the lessons learned here in Hawaii are 

shared in communities and states across the country, and requiring 

the Department of Homeland Security to review the current notification protocols for these ballistic missile threats, studying the best 

practices regarding civil defense emergencies, to prevent a similar 

catastrophic mistake from happening again. 

The second bill is the Civil Defense Preparedness Act, which 

would expand existing Department of Homeland Security terrorism 

and catastrophic event grant programs to include improving nuclear, biological, and chemical attack preparedness. Like I said, this 

event has really laid bare the lack of preparedness and the lack of 

response plans in place and the need for resources to our communities and our states to be able to harden the infrastructure and 

to put these plans in place. The grants could be used for things like 

training, protective equipment, building reinforcements, and other 

community preparedness measures to ensure that our local and 

State governments have the support that they need. 

One glaring problem that came to light was that many cell 

phones and wireless phones did not receive the wireless emergency 

6 

alert. Different people in different parts of the state, for one reason 

or another, did not even know that this false missile alert had gone 

out. This is something that needs to be resolved. It also again became very clear the lack of response plans in place both at the 

leadership level as well as within the community on what would 

happen if this were not a false missile alert, if the alert were real, 

and we were facing a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

attack. 

What Hawaii went through in January can never happen again. 

We must take the corrective actions necessary to make sure that 

a false alert never goes on, but we also have to make sure that we 

are prepared in the event of a real attack. We have to improve our 

emergency alert dissemination to fit with the changing technological environment and ensure that everyone is reached and fully 

informed. We will continue to work to strengthen our missile defense systems, but most importantly, we have to do all that we can 

to deal with this underlying threat and the fact that we are facing 

this threat at all. We need to exhaust all diplomatic efforts to continue to work toward denuclearizing North Korea, bring about 

peace, and prevent an all-out catastrophic war. 

Thank you, Senator Schatz. Thank you to our witnesses. I look 

forward to our conversation. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you, Congresswoman Gabbard. 

We will start with our first panel. We’re going to have 5 minutes 

of testimony and 5-minute rounds of questions from each of the 

members of the delegation. And we want to thank Jessica 

Rosenworcel, FCC Commissioner, for being here. 

Ms. Rosenworcel. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JESSICA ROSENWORCEL, 

COMMISSIONER, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Good morning to the members of the Senate 

Commerce Committee in absentia, and in particular to Senator 

Schatz, whose leadership has brought us all here today. 

Years ago, I had the privilege of serving as Counsel to the late 

Senator Inouye, who was then the Chairman of this Committee, so 

it’s a special treat to be back here in the Aloha state. 

I’m also so glad that Senator Hirono, Representative Hanabusa, 

and Representative Gabbard are here to join this important discussion. 

Back in Washington, I serve as a Commissioner at the Federal 

Communications Commission. Every day I see how communications 

technology is changing every aspect of civic and commercial life. 

And when it comes to the most critical aspect of our communications, emergency alerts, I know that we bear a special responsibility. 

The FCC sets technical requirements for both the Emergency 

Alert System and Wireless Emergency Alerts. And our work then 

informs the work of others across government, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency. But the bottom line for every 

entity involved in emergency alerts is that the public needs confidence in the systems that warn us when the unthinkable occurs. 

Now, as we all know, on January 13, the people of Hawaii woke 

to ominous messages flashing on their mobile phones, booming in 

7 

from radio stations, and lighting up their television screens. These 

messages commanded all who saw and heard them to seek immediate shelter due to a ballistic missile threat, and they included 

those haunting words, ‘‘This is not a drill.’’ 

Now, from my experience working for Hawaii, I know that the 

people of this state are resilient, I know that they are keenly aware 

of old and new global threats to security, especially in the Pacific. 

So when this incident occurred, I reached out to some of my former 

colleagues, and they had only harrowing stories to tell. I still can’t 

quite imagine it, being told you only have minutes left to live, and 

knowing that everything you hold dear could be destroyed. When 

the threat was over, I am sure that the people of Hawaii held their 

children a little bit closer. I know I did the same that night. 

After the false missile alert, the Chairman of the FCC swiftly 

called for an investigation, and this was the right thing to do. The 

agency’s staff got to work, as did officials in Hawaii, who conducted 

their own investigation. Those investigations have revealed that 

this false alert could have been avoided, and its effects could have 

been mitigated. 

There were serious failures at the point of alert origination, the 

Hawaii Emergency Management Agency. These errors were both 

human and operational. There appears to have been a miscommunication between personnel that fateful morning. There was an apparent deviation from the script of the agency’s drill procedure. 

There was a human failure to recognize that a drill was even being 

conducted. These problems were compounded by a lack of secondary checks to prevent one person from mistakenly sending an 

alert to the entire state. And there were also no software checks 

to differentiate between a testing environment and a live environment. And to make matters worse, it took a full 38 minutes to 

issue an alert correction, and there were no pre-existing systems to 

do so. 

None of this is acceptable. We need to do better. This is true here 

in this state and across the country because false alerts have happened elsewhere, including in the last year in Polk County, Iowa, 

and Riverside County, California. In short, it can happen anywhere. 

So what can we do about it? We need ideas to fix these problems, 

so here are some of mine. 

For starters, the FCC has conducted an investigation. It now has 

a final report. It needs to make that report public as soon as possible. 

Next, State Emergency Alert System plans are filed with the 

FCC, and they’re subject to annual confirmation. It’s time to make 

that process a meaningful one by making sure every plan is up to 

date. The Hawaii plan filed with the FCC was over a decade old. 

The FCC should prevent this from happening by serving as a convening force to develop a checklist of best practices, including security protocols, at the local, State, and Federal level, and then support their inclusion in up-to-date annual EAS filings. 

Second, the FCC does not now have a reporting system for false 

alerts. I think we should have one. And I think if we did, we’d be 

able to study what happens, learn from it, and prevent it from happening again. 

8 

I also think the FCC needs to be mindful of future alert capabilities from embedded multimedia to many-to-one communications 

that allow for public feedback and to explore how to make those 

viable in the marketplace. 

Finally, and I’m stepping out of my jurisdiction here, I do think 

we need to address failures at the alert origination point. To this 

end, I know the recently introduced ALERT Act proposes improvements, including clear lines of responsibility, specifically when it 

comes to missile threats. 

So let me close by thanking you for having me at this hearing. 

I’m happy to answer any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenworcel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JESSICA ROSENWORCEL, COMMISSIONER, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Good morning, Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, Members of the Committee and in particular, Senator Schatz. Years ago I had the privilege of serving 

as counsel to the late Senator Daniel Inouye, who was then Chairman of this Committee. It is a special treat to be back in the Aloha state. I am glad that Senator 

Schatz has convened this hearing and that Senator Hirono, Representative 

Hanabusa, and Representative Gabbard are here to join the discussion. 

In Washington, I serve as a Commissioner at the Federal Communications Commission. I have a front row seat at the digital revolution. Every day I see how technology is changing every aspect of civic and commercial life. Every day I am reminded that the future belongs to the connected. And when it comes to the most 

critical aspect of our communications—those involving emergency alerts—I know 

that we bear a special responsibility. The agency sets technical requirements for 

both the Emergency Alert System and Wireless Emergency Alerts. This informs the 

work of others across government, including the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency. But the bottom line for every entity involved is that the public needs confidence in the systems that warn us when the unthinkable occurs. 

As we all know, on January 13 the people of Hawaii woke to ominous messages 

flashing on their mobile phones, streaming in from social media, booming from radio 

stations, and lighting up their television screens. These messages commanded all 

who saw and heard them to seek immediate shelter due to a ballistic missile threat. 

They included the haunting words: ‘‘This is not a drill.’’ 

From my experience working for the people of this state, I know that Hawaiians 

are resilient. I know that they are keenly aware of old and new global threats to 

security, including in the Pacific. So when this incident occurred, I reached out to 

friends and former colleagues in Hawaii to understand what happened. They had 

only harrowing stories to tell. I still can’t quite imagine it—being told you have only 

minutes left to live and knowing everything you hold dear could be destroyed. When 

the threat was over I am sure that people in Hawaii held their children a little bit 

closer. I know I did the same that night. 

After the false missile alert, the Chairman of the FCC swiftly called for an investigation. It was the right thing to do. The agency staff got to work, as did officials 

in Hawaii who conducted their own investigation. 

These investigations have revealed that this false alert could have been avoided 

and its effects could have been mitigated. 

There were serious failures at the point of alert origination—the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency. These errors were human and operational. There appears to have been a miscommunication between personnel that fateful morning; 

there was an apparent deviation from the script of the agency’s drill procedure; 

there was a human failure to recognize that a drill was being conducted. These 

problems were compounded by a lack of safeguards to ensure that a false alert 

would not be transmitted. There were no secondary checks to prevent one person 

from mistakenly sending an alert to the entire state. There were no software checks 

to differentiate between testing and live alert environments. To make matters 

worse, it took a full 38 minutes to issue an alert correction—and there were no preexisting systems to do so. 

None of this is acceptable. 

We need to do better. This is true in Hawaii and across the country because false 

alerts have happened elsewhere—including in Polk County, Iowa and Riverside 

County, California during the past year. In short, it can happen anywhere. 

9 

So what can we do about it? We need ideas to fix these problems. Here are mine. 

First, state Emergency Alert System plans are filed with the FCC. They are subject to annual confirmation. We should make this process a meaningful one by making sure every plan is up to date. The Hawaii plan was over a decade old. The FCC 

can help prevent this from happening by serving as a convening force to report current best practices—including security protocols—at the local, state, and Federal 

level and then support their inclusion in annual filings. 

Second, the FCC should know when false alerts occur. The FCC should have a 

reporting system for false alerts—to learn when and where they happen and to prevent them from happening again. 

Third, the FCC should explore future alert capabilities, from embedded multimedia to many-to-one communications enabling public feedback. The agency also 

should also explore the viability of offering alerts to audio and video streaming services. 

Fourth—and I’m stepping out of my jurisdiction here—we need to address failures 

at the alert origination point. To this end, the Authenticating Local Emergencies 

and Real Threats (ALERT) Act of 2018 proposes important improvements, including 

clear lines of responsibility when it comes to missile threats. 

Let me close by thanking you for having me at this hearing. I look forward to 

answering any questions you may have. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you, Commissioner Rosenworcel. 

I’ll start with the first thing you talked about, the FCC oversees 

this process in which states submit their plans. And you said it’s 

subject to annual confirmation. Is that just to check to see that 

something is on file? In other words, it sounds, from your language, 

that there’s not a ton of analysis that goes on, you’re just checking 

to see that it has been submitted and it is complete. Is that correct? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. You’re right. 

Senator SCHATZ. OK. So it seems to me that the FCC has a real 

opportunity to drive change here. And in the development of the 

specifications for the EAS plan and the WEA plan, that form can 

follow function—right?—that you can really develop best practices 

by requiring something meaningful in the specs, and I’m wondering 

if that’s the direction that the Commission is going right now. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I think that’s a terrific idea, Senator. It’s certainly the direction I would like to see the agency go. We’re already 

requiring states to file these plans with us. We should make that 

process a meaningful one. We can convene all sorts of authorities, 

identify best practices, create a checklist of those best practices, 

and induce states to follow them through this filing process. I think 

that would help make all of us safer going forward. 

Senator SCHATZ. Do you have the capacity within the FCC to 

provide this kind of technical expertise? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I believe we do. I’ve got to urge my colleagues to agree with me. 

Senator SCHATZ. OK. Thank you. I wanted to ask about the problem that we found, as Members of Congress, as leaders in the government, both State, Federal, and county, jammed phone lines. Actually, members of the media as well, people trying to call in to Hawaii News Now or KSSK, or I was trying to call into PACOM, and 

phone lines were jammed. And it seems to me that this is a absolutely solvable problem, and I’m wondering if you can shed some 

light on that. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Sure. Most of our networks are built to withstand capacity about 99 percent of the time. The problem is when 

they are overloaded. Sometimes you can anticipate an overload if 

10 

there’s a concert or a protest at a big event, and networks can be 

adjusted with cellular service on wheels and the like in order to 

take care of that excess capacity. But in an emergency like this, 

you can’t plan for it. 

Federal, State, and local officials, though, are eligible for the 

Government Emergency Telecommunications Service and Wireless 

Priority Service programs. And I think as we review what happened here in Hawaii, we should ask whether or not our State authorities are taking advantage of those programs, which help them 

get priority when networks are jammed. 

Senator SCHATZ. I think this is a really important point, and I 

would like this to be a takeaway probably for HI-EMA, that the 

GETS card is available to government leaders. Many of us didn’t 

know that it existed. And so someone has got to coordinate a process of determining who are the key leaders that need—not everybody can get one of these cards. But certainly the radio station of 

record, all four television stations, your newspapers, Civil Beat, all 

of our media partners, anybody at a high level of government and 

who has a role in communicating to the public ought to be in possession of a card that allows you to supersede anyone else’s phone 

call. That is no small thing because I think that 38 minutes would 

have been a lot briefer had any of us had access to each other. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Yes. 

Senator SCHATZ. I want to talk a little bit about the nature of 

these alerts. As we increasingly have cord cutters and people who 

are watching—I’m sure they’re watching television in the sense 

that they’re watching a show on a screen, but they’re not watching 

necessarily broadcast television. So if you’re on Hulu, Amazon, 

Netflix, you don’t get the alert over the screen. That’s one question 

I have for you. And then the second question has to do with whether or not these things should be repeating and whether or not we 

want to draw a distinction. In other words, if there’s an incoming 

ICBM, that thing—that alert should not run once, that should be 

running constantly as a ticker, and, frankly, no one should have 

any discretion to take it off the screen until we get an ‘‘all clear,’’ 

but if it’s a flash flood on Kauai, you could probably tell folks, you 

know, once every 5 minutes. 

And so I wondering whether we can get to a more granular place 

with all of that. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. OK. Your first question. You know, yesterday 

we were at Hawaii’s Pacific University, and as I looked at the students there, I thought, they’re not watching video the way I did 

when I was in school. They watch on whatever screen is handy 

whenever they want. And I don’t think our Wireless Emergency 

Alert System or existing Emergency Alert System for traditional 

media is really well calibrated to that new watching reality. I don’t 

think it’s yet time to create new obligations, but I think it is incumbent on the FCC to continue to monitor those and continue to 

ask questions about them because we need to make sure emergency information reaches people where they are. 

And then with respect to persistent alerts, this is a really important point. In January of this year, with respect to wireless emergency alerts, the FCC changed its policies to make sure that any 

wireless emergency alert is available for 24 hours, and that’s good 

11 

because it speaks exactly to the problem you described. But I see 

a gap with respect to traditional media and broadcast and cable 

emergency alerts because those can be on once, and if you didn’t 

turn on the television when they were on, you might have missed 

the most important information that you need to receive. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you very much. 

Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Can I—I have something to clarify, Commissioner. I think you 

said that the FCC sets the technical requirements for WIAs and 

some other communication networks? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. For wireless emergency alerts, which are associated with your mobile devices, the Emergency Alert System, 

which is an outgrowth of the traditional Emergency Broadcast System. 

Senator HIRONO. So when you were—when you were talking just 

now about the new watching reality—— 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Yes. 

Senator HIRONO.—and people have all kinds of devices and platforms and whatever else, as you reviewed what happened in Hawaii and the complexities of how people get their information and 

under what circumstances and what tools, have you also begun to 

check on what is happening in terms of the capabilities of other 

states to issue appropriate warnings? Because I—the sense I have 

is that there is no state that is prepared to respond to a ballistic 

missile threat. And Hawaii did seek to institute such a system. But 

where are the other states with regard to their ability to alert their 

people to a missile strike? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I don’t have specific information, but I can 

tell you that my suspicion is the same as yours. I do not believe 

other states are prepared. That’s why I think the legislation that’s 

been introduced to make sure that ballistic missile threats are 

alerted at the Federal level is so important. 

Senator HIRONO. So if the responsibility for the alert goes to the 

Federal Government, then do we need to institute a whole new 

kind of a system of whatever the infrastructure is? Or how do you 

see this happening? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I think that’s an important conversation to 

have with the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, which oversees the IPAWS system that generally gets those Federal alerts out, both through traditional media and mobile devices. 

Senator HIRONO. So I think this is definitely a conversation that 

involves a lot of different Federal departments as well as the states 

because we would like to have—I would like to see a system where 

you don’t necessarily have to create a whole new kind of infrastructure for alerts because in Hawaii, yes, we do have a system for tsunami and hurricane alerts and other natural disasters. So if we can 

possibly make sure that the system would be in place or the infrastructure would be in place, that makes sense to me. 

In January, the FCC released a preliminary report from the 

FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, which found 

that a combination of human error and inadequate safeguards contributed to the transmission of a false alert, and the preliminary 

12 

report recommended that the FCC partner with FEMA to help implement best practices at the local, State, and Federal level in an 

effort to improve our Emergency Alert Systems across the board. 

Can you update us on how the stakeholder engagement effort led 

by the FCC and FEMA is coming along? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I have not been a part of those conversations, 

though I believe it’s absolutely paramount that they occur. So I 

think that I would have to defer to the FCC Chairman, who has 

probably been leading them at this point. 

Senator HIRONO. So is this something that you can pursue or put 

to—— 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Absolutely. I would be—— 

Senator HIRONO.—the FCC Chair? And then can this Committee—— 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Yes. I would be happy to make sure that I 

can get that information for you and follow up. 

Senator HIRONO.—receive a response? Now, there is also a proposal, I think there’s an—from the FCC to create a reporting system for false alerts. Is that correct? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I believe that the FCC should have a recording system for false alerts. We do not have one now. I think if you 

don’t study your errors, you will—you risk the likelihood you will 

repeat them. 

Senator HIRONO. So I think it’s important that you do get the information about false alerts when they—after they’ve occurred, I 

guess. Do you think it’s also important for FCC to know when false 

alerts occur in real time? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I think we’re going to have to identify what’s 

the appropriate reporting practice because if there is a false alert, 

I think the priority needs to be to make sure that the individuals 

who received it get accurate information. I don’t want it to be a bureaucratic hassle associated with reporting obligations to the FCC. 

Senator HIRONO. Yes. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. But I do think we need to develop a record 

when these happen because if we identify patterns of behavior that 

are causing them to happen, we can take steps to make sure they 

do not happen again. 

Senator HIRONO. So I recall that I was here when 9/11 occurred, 

and there were huge problems with interoperability of the police 

department, the first responders, all of that. And I don’t even know 

if we have resolved those issues. I don’t think we’ve still gotten 

that down. And so here we are with this potential missile attack, 

and you have all these different first responders, you have different 

Federal agencies, and I think that what Senator Schatz pointed out 

about our ability to communicate with each other, I just—I think 

that is quite the challenge to figure that out and to make sure that 

we are able to communicate with each other. As I said, after 9/11, 

I’m not sure that we’ve still resolved that issue. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I think you’re absolutely right. I will point 

out that there—since 2012 law passed by Congress, there is now 

a process in place to make sure that all first responders use the 

same 700 megahertz spectrum. 

Senator HIRONO. Yes. 

13 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. And as a result, they will have common 

interfaces and be able to talk to one another in ways they were not 

able to on that fateful day. 

Senator HIRONO. And do you think we should have that kind of 

capability with regard to missile attacks? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I just think we need a level of coordination 

in order to ensure that people stay safe and they get the information they need. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SCHATZ. Congresswoman Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Senator Schatz. 

Commissioner, welcome. I would like you to take a message back 

to the Chair, Ajit Pai. He was very accommodating when this happened and we put in a call, and he spent time on the phone answering our questions. So please thank him. 

I do have a follow up on something that you said about the reporting of the false alerts. You mentioned the fact that it has occurred in Polk County, Iowa, and Riverside, California. Were there 

ICBM false alerts? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. No. 

Ms. HANABUSA. They weren’t? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. They were not. 

Ms. HANABUSA. OK. So what kind of false alerts were they? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. You know, I found them in news reports because right after this occurred, I thought it would be prudent to try 

to identify other places where this was happening. One involved direction to shelter in place. Another involved an emergency evacuation that was not necessary. I’m confident there are other places. 

I think we have to develop a way to study them comprehensively. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So along those lines, do you know how long it 

took to either retract or repeal those false alerts? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I don’t have that information for you right 

here right now. I could look for it for you, though. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Because I—the Senator—I mean the Representative from Riverside has never brought up that he had one, so I was 

just curious. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. No. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I’ll go back and ask him. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. All right. 

Ms. HANABUSA. The other thing that you said that I was curious 

about was the fact that Hawaii’s plan is over a decade old. So if 

Hawaii’s plan is over a decade old, as you know, this whole issue 

of the ICBMs or ballistic missile alerts is sort of recent. I don’t 

think we’re going back to the Cold War, but basically that’s what 

they did. So are we correct that there has never been even a small 

update to say, ‘‘And, by the way, we’re going to do a missile alert 

as part of our plan’’? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Not to my knowledge. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And what was the purpose of these plans? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Well, the purpose of these plans was compliance with the FCC’s Emergency Alert System obligations, which 

apply to more traditional media, like broadcast and radio. The act 

of filing them should be something more than bureaucratic, though. 

14 

The agency should be compelling State actors in emergencies to 

come together, develop an up-to-date modern plan, and then make 

those plans publicly available. We can help states identify best 

practices and make those plans much more effective in the event 

that something unthinkable really does occur. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So am I correct then in assuming that the FCC 

or Department of Homeland Security, nobody has like a template 

that says, ‘‘Have you done this?’’ or, ‘‘Do you have any kind of response in this case?’’ There’s nothing like that? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. We have some categories, but it is not as instructive, as you’ve just described. I think there would be a lot of 

benefits in trying to develop that kind of checklist of best practices. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And as we spoke about this earlier, yes, there 

are different kinds of disasters, and, of course ballistic missile attack is, in my opinion, a separate category. So would this type of 

alert system identify all these different kinds of disasters and what 

is it that a particular state or subcounty or whoever it is that’s responding to this is doing? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I think what we’re starting to recognize is 

that ballistic missile attacks are a completely different category in 

the panic that ensues and also in the damage that could occur, and 

we might need to treat those differently. So for all of you who have 

introduced legislation or supported legislation to do so, I think 

that’s a really good idea. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So back to this report, I’m just curious, because 

I can’t imagine that our report is a decade old, whose responsibility 

is it to file that report? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. You know, it’s generally the State Emergency 

Communications Committee, and that is done differently in different states, but, again, the process of filing it just shouldn’t be 

bureaucratic. The agency shouldn’t just take them online and put 

them on a dusty shelf; we should be making that process meaningful and we should be helping states along the way by identifying 

current best practices that make those plans effective. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And in the time I have left, I would like for you 

to address, Do you believe, for example, that if there was a lead 

taken by DoD or Homeland Security on the issue of a ballistic missile attack, that somehow that there would be difficulties in interfacing that with the existing system on all of the alerts that we 

have? Would it be possibly two separate entities that would be triggering the actual alert? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. It is essential for something like a ballistic 

missile attack that we coordinate. Anything less is unacceptable. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So you don’t see a problem with that. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. We’re going to have to find a way to do it. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. And the other, just quickly, you did 

say that you want a process where no one can take off a message—— 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA.—if it’s put on? I guess the other time is—you 

know what the problem in Hawaii was, they tried to contact 

FEMA, which they didn’t have to contact, and as a result, that’s 

one of the explanations for the 38-minute delay. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. That’s right. That’s exactly right. 

15 

Ms. HANABUSA. So you anticipate, I assume, that if it’s false, that 

there will be a quick way to withdraw it. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Well, the idea of filing a plan is any plan 

should include, What are your procedures if a false alert goes out? 

Know immediately how fast you can correct that alert, and what 

forms of social media you might use to make sure that you bolster 

that information and it gets out there. So any proper plan should 

include that. And if there’s a takeaway from the experience we just 

had, it’s very clear that that is a necessary element of any plan 

that’s filed. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Commissioner. 

Thank you, Senator Schatz. 

Senator SCHATZ. Congresswoman Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Thank you for your testimony. A follow-up again to the decadeold EAS plan. You know, you talked about the annual confirmation 

that’s required. Was the situation here that Hawaii just submitted 

the same decade-old plan every year, and that was confirmed by 

the FCC’s receipt, or was it that there was no updated plan or plan 

submitted at all? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I think it was just an annual obligation to 

just say, ‘‘Yes, this is our plan, and it continues.’’ I would describe 

that as benign neglect. 

Ms. GABBARD. And right now, that is all that’s required by the 

FCC’s annual confirmation, is that a plan exists. 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Exactly. 

Ms. GABBARD. What kind of oversight would you recommend to 

make sure that these plans are current and up to date? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. Well, the FCC is a terrific convening force. 

We could set up a blue ribbon panel. We could have experts from 

multiple states, including states that have experienced false alerts, 

come together and say these are the key elements of an effective 

plan. We could assess them, identify a checklist of best practices, 

and then encourage every state that files with us to comply with 

them. And over time, to the extent they don’t, we should 

incentivize them to do so. We can also work with our colleagues at 

FEMA, which oversees the IPAWS process, which sends out alerts, 

to make sure that they have comparable memoranda of understanding or work with their State actors to make sure we are all 

growing in the same direction and making those plans up to date 

and effective. 

Ms. GABBARD. And is there currently any form of recourse or accountability measure that the FCC has if a state is not in compliance? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. No, I don’t believe so. 

Ms. GABBARD. With regard to the Wireless Emergency Alert System, I think what came to light was that wireless providers are not 

required or obligated to participate, so it’s a voluntary program 

where a wireless carrier can either participate in whole or in part. 

Why is this not an obligation? Why is this optional? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. The Warning Alert and Response Network 

Act makes it voluntary. 

Ms. GABBARD. OK. 

16 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. So to change that would require a change in 

law. 

Ms. GABBARD. And I wrote a letter to Chairman Pai about tracking—right?—how do we know how many of these carriers participate in whole versus in part? And he sent a reply basically saying 

that it is tracked which carriers participate and whether it’s in 

whole or in part, but for those who participate in part, there is no 

current mechanism to track what geographic areas may or may not 

be covered. 

So for us here in Hawaii, Chairman Pai confirmed that the FCC 

is not aware of any eligible wireless provider that is—has elected 

not to participate, but those who have chosen to participate in part, 

there is no current collection of information with regards to what 

geographic areas are covered or not. 

Can you comment on what I see is a big problem in that our residents don’t know if their carriers are covering them where they live 

or work? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I agree with you, that’s a problem. I think we 

need to figure out where coverage exists and does not. There are 

three ways I think you could do that. 

Like I mentioned at the outset, you could change the Warning 

Alert and Response Network Act, which makes this wholly voluntary. 

Second, you could follow up with the FCC and ask us, in light 

of your earlier correspondence, to reach out to every carrier that 

serves in Hawaii and ask, ‘‘Please tell us, where do you serve and 

not serve? Are there certain islands, for instance, where residents 

are likely to be left behind?’’ 

And then, third, you could also write the carriers directly because I’m confident that they do have this information, and I think 

it’s important for emergency planning purposes that Federal and 

State officials who represent the state have it. 

Ms. GABBARD. Yes, absolutely. We talked a little bit earlier about 

streaming services and the changing technology and how people 

are getting access to media. While this is a big shift in change that 

needs to be addressed, has—do you know if the FCC has started 

kind of studying this and how this technology could be used to get 

these emergency alerts out there? 

Ms. ROSENWORCEL. I think it’s important for the FCC not just to 

think about the present, but to think about the future and how we 

interact with media and how we make sure everyone gets the information they need. There’s a lot more we could do with multimedia 

alerts, so that the alert that comes to your phone might, for instance, have a picture of an area that’s dangerous or a suspect for 

whom public safety officials want to know some information. We 

can also do new activities with many-to-one communications, which 

allows feedback from the public that receives emergency alerts. 

And we should be exploring how the ways that we’re consuming 

media are different today and how we make sure people get information over those new means. 

Whether or not we have the authority, I think we have the responsibility to explore what these alerts should look like in the future so that we can inform all of you if we need changes in the law 

to make that happen. 

17 

Ms. GABBARD. Great. Thank you so much. 

Senator SCHATZ. I want to thank Ms. Rosenworcel for her testimony and bring in the second panel. And I will introduce them as 

they are walking up and our staff is putting the information in 

front of their seats. 

We have Rear Admiral Patrick Piercey of U.S. Pacific Command, 

United States Department of Defense; we have Ms. Nicole 

McGinnis, Deputy Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau of the FCC; and Mr. Antwane Johnson, Director, Continuity 

Communications Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

And we’ll start on my left with Rear Admiral Piercey. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PATRICK A. PIERCEY, UNITED 

STATES PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Admiral PIERCEY. Senator Schatz and distinguished members of 

the Hawaii delegation, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. As part of the Hawaii ohana, we at PACOM share 

the concerns raised by the false ballistic missile alert broadcast by 

the State of Hawaii on an otherwise quiet Saturday morning in 

these tranquil islands. 

PACOM works hand-in-hand with Federal and State agencies 

both in times of calm and in times of crisis to defend our homeland 

and our citizens. This is PACOM’s enduring responsibility and Admiral Harris’ Number One priority. 

While the false alert broadcast by the State of Hawaii was unfortunate, the event also served to underscore the complexities facing 

not only the State of Hawaii, but also all 50 states when it comes 

to alerting the public of a possible North Korean missile attack and 

also provide—however, also provided a valuable learning opportunity. 

Other states can look to the proactive leadership and engaged 

approach the State of Hawaii has demonstrated to prepare for the 

new normal, specifically, living under the threat of a North Korean 

missile attack. This event is likely to strengthen its capability to 

notify the public in any future emergency situation. 

Perhaps as importantly, this event provides an opportunity to 

collectively assess and refine our internal notification and coordination processes in civil defense scenarios to ensure command and 

component preparedness. To this end, PACOM will continue to 

maintain a close relationship with the State of Hawaii. PACOM 

will again participate in a triannual Defense Support of Civil Authorities Executive Steering Board designed to facilitate, coordinate, align, and prioritize support of DSCA efforts. 

With reference to the 13 January incident, USPACOM’s review 

of actions validated the fact that this alert was not generated 

through DoD channels. It was, in fact, a false alarm generated by 

the State of Hawaii. USPACOM assisted the State of Hawaii by 

validating that this alert was false and communicating the same to 

the military components in Hawaii. 

As the State of Hawaii has no means to independently detect a 

missile launch, the proper sequencing of ballistic missile notification to the State of Hawaii authorities is from FEMA to HI-EMA. 

Simultaneously, USPACOM validates the occurrence of a launch to 

18 

HI-EMA and notifies other DoD command centers in the Pacific via 

classified conference call. 

PACOM remains in close coordination with HI-EMA, FEMA Region IX, U.S. Northern Command, and Department of Defense 

stakeholders to gather lessons learned, identify areas requiring improvement, and refine notification processes. 

Of the things that went well, perhaps most importantly, the 

event validated the importance of the existing missile notification 

coordination between civil and military authorities. Emergency 

management spanning the spectrum of State and local governments and communities is a core mission of the State of Hawaii, 

and PACOM will continue to work in close coordination to ensure 

the effective synchronization, integration, and coordination of disaster prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts. This coordination has taken place since 2009 and has been 

used during every ballistic missile event. 

PACOM learned from this experience as well. In response to HIEMA’s false alert, missile alert, PACOM has taken action to ensure 

senior leaders maintain the ability to contact the PACOM Joint 

Operations Center, the JOC, regardless of call volume. PACOM is 

also coordinating with HI-EMA and has added the JOC to their 

AlertSense system distribution, which transmits emergency alerts 

via unclassified e-mail. Additionally, to facilitate expediency of information flow, HI-EMA was added as a participant to the classified USPACOM conference call, allowing for near simultaneous validation and redundant notification from the initial report that HIEMA receives from FEMA. 

PACOM stands ready today to provide defense support to civil 

authorities, emergency management drills, alerts, exercises, and response operations within the Hawaiian Islands. Moving forward, 

we will continue to exercise missile notification procedures with HIEMA and will continue to support Nation State Threat planning for 

ballistic missile notification and response, to include integration 

with FEMA’s National Warning System. 

Thank you for your enduring support to PACOM’s team and our 

families who live and work in the Indo-Pacific. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL HARRY B. HARRIS JR., U.S. NAVY COMMANDER, 

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished members of the 

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to submit this written statement and also 

allowing Rear Admiral Patrick Piercey, U.S. Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) Director of Operations (J3), to appear on my behalf before you today as a subject matter 

expert. During my time at USPACOM, I have had the tremendous honor of serving 

with the almost 400,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, Coast Guardsmen, and 

Department of Defense (DoD) civilians standing watch for America’s largest and 

most diverse geographic combatant command. I am grateful for these men and 

women, and to their families, for their hard work and devotion to duty. I’m humbled 

to serve alongside them. 

Since its inception in 1947, USPACOM and the joint military forces assigned to 

it protect the U.S., its territories, its people, and its interests throughout the IndoPacific region. To accomplish this, USPACOM works hand-in-hand with the other 

U.S. government agencies in this region to defend our homeland and our citizens. 

This is USPACOM’s enduring responsibility and my #1 priority. The path to security is based on our commitments to mutual interests and partnerships, continuous 

military presence, and global readiness. 

19 

While it is unfortunate that the State of Hawaii erred in broadcasting a ballistic 

missile threat notification on Saturday, 13 January 2018, the event also provided 

a valuable learning opportunity. Other states can look to the proactive leadership 

and engaged approach the State of Hawaii has demonstrated to prepare for the new 

normal—specifically, living under threat of a North Korean missile attack. Perhaps 

more importantly, this event provides an opportunity to collectively assess and refine our internal notification/coordination processes in civil defense scenarios to ensure command and component preparedness. To this end, USPACOM will continue 

to maintain a close relationship with the State of Hawaii. USPACOM will again 

participate in the triannual Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Executive 

Steering Board (ESB) designed to facilitate, coordinate, align and prioritize support 

of DSCA efforts. 

With reference to the 13 January 2018 incident, USPACOM’s review of actions 

validated the fact that this alert was not generated through DoD channels. It was, 

in fact, a false alarm generated by the State of Hawaii. USPACOM assisted the 

State of Hawaii by validating that this alert was false and communicating the same 

to the military components in Hawaii. A timeline of the incident is as follows: 

• 0807: An employee of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency (HI-EMA) 

broadcasted the following emergency alert through the Emergency Alert System 

(EAS) and Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system across the state of Hawaii: 

EMERGENCY ALERT

BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. 

SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER. 

THIS IS NOT A DRILL. 

• 0810: State Adjutant General, Major Gen. Joe Logan, contacted USPACOM to 

confirm there was no missile launch. 

• 0812: HI-EMA initiated cancellation messages. 

• 0813: The state issued an internal cancellation of the warning to prevent the 

false alert message from being broadcast further. 

• 0820: HI-EMA tweeted ‘‘NO missile threat to Hawaii.’’ 

• 0823: HI-EMA posted ‘‘NO missile threat to Hawaii. False alarm. We’re currently investigating’’ on Facebook. 

• 0823: Following confirmation with USPACOM Joint Operations Center (JOC) 

Director that there was no threat, USPACOM sent an on-the-record statement 

via e-mail to Hawaii and national media: ‘‘USPACOM has detected no ballistic 

missile threat to Hawaii. Earlier message was sent in error. State of Hawaii 

will send out a correction message as soon as possible.’’ A similar message was 

posted to USPACOM social media within minutes. 

• 0824: Hawaii Governor David Ige retweeted HI-EMA’s 0820 tweet, noting: 

‘‘There is NO missile threat.’’ 

• 0825: Commander Navy Region Hawaii issued a radio broadcast to all ships in 

port stating the alert was a ‘‘false alarm.’’ 

• 0830: Hawaii Governor David Ige posted: ‘‘NO missile threat to Hawaii’’ on 

Facebook. 

• 0835: HI-EMA initiated cancellation messages to the public. 

• 0835: Governor Ige shared HI-EMA’s Facebook post: ‘‘NO missile threat to Hawaii. False alarm. We’re currently investigating.’’ 

• 0845: HI-EMA broadcasted EAS and WEA messages confirming the initial notification was a ‘‘False Alarm’’ and ‘‘There is no missile threat or danger to the 

State of Hawaii.’’ 

Overall, 38 minutes transpired (0807 to 0845) before HI-EMA retracted the false 

emergency alert of a ballistic missile inbound to Hawaii by the same communication 

channels as the original alert (EAS and WEA). 

As the State of Hawaii has no means to independently detect a missile launch, 

the proper sequencing of ballistic missile notification to State of Hawaii authorities 

is from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to HI-EMA. Simultaneously, USPACOM validates the occurrence of a launch to HI-EMA and notifies 

other DoD command centers in the Pacific via a classified conference call. 

20 

USPACOM remains in close coordination with HI-EMA, FEMA Region IX, U.S. 

Northern Command, and DoD stakeholders to gather lessons learned, identify areas 

requiring improvement and refine notification processes. 

Of the things that went well, perhaps most importantly, the event validated the 

importance of coordination between civil and military authorities. Emergency management spanning the spectrum of state and local governments and communities is 

a core mission of the State of Hawaii, and USPACOM will continue to work in close 

coordination to ensure the effective synchronization, integration, and coordination of 

disaster prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts. This coordination has taken place since 2009 and has been used during every ballistic-missile event. 

USPACOM learned from this experience as well. For example, we discovered that 

the USPACOM JOC, as configured at the time of the event, was unable to receive 

unclassified Short Message Service texts and, as such, did not directly receive the 

erroneous missile warning or the following cancellation messages on 13 January. 

USPACOM also identified an inefficiency in the reporting process which, in addition to the notification requirements maintained by the USPACOM JOC, required 

a separate unclassified phone call to HI-EMA designed to provide validation to the 

notification report HI-EMA receives from FEMA. 

Additionally, the event highlighted the importance of maintaining an independent 

and dedicated unclassified line into the JOC for senior USPACOM leaders to communicate in the event of an emergency, regardless of call volume. 

In response to the HI-EMA’s false missile alert, the following USPACOM actions 

have been implemented: 

• Two unclassified dedicated conference calls (Commander’s Conference Call and 

Director’s Conference Call) have been established to ensure USPACOM senior 

leaders maintain the ability to contact the JOC regardless of call volume. 

• The first dedicated unclassified conference call is the Commander’s Conference 

Call which uses a USPACOM Bridge (managed by the USPACOM Command, 

Control, Communications and Cyber Director) and is limited to senior 

USPACOM personnel, to include the Commander, Deputy Commander, their 

designated principals, and the JOC Director (Conference Manager). 

• The second dedicated unclassified conference call is the Director’s Conference 

Call which allows for a greater number of conference participants and is managed by the JOC Operations Officer (Conference Manager). 

• To ensure the USPACOM JOC has the ability to receive HI-EMA alerts, 

USPACOM has coordinated with HI-EMA to add the JOC to their AlertSense 

system distribution which transmits emergency alert via unclassified e-mail. 

The e-mail messages have the same content as the cell phone alerts and display 

on the unclassified consoles of the JOC watchstanders. 

• To facilitate expediency of information flow, HI-EMA was added as a participant to the classified USPACOM conference call, the Pacific Missile Defense 

Event Conference, allowing for near-simultaneous validation and redundant notification from the initial report that HI-EMA receives from FEMA. 

While the false ballistic missile threat notification event was unfortunate, it 

served to underscore the complexities facing not only the State of Hawaii, but all 

50 states, when it comes to alerting the public of a possible ballistic missile attack. 

The State of Hawaii has taken a proactive approach in this regard, and this event 

is likely to strengthen its capability to notify the public in any future emergency 

situation. 

USPACOM stands ready today to provide DSCA for emergency management 

drills, alerts, exercises and response operations within the Hawaiian Islands. Moving forward, we will continue to exercise missile notification procedures with HIEMA and will continue to support Nation State Threat planning for ballistic missile 

notification and response, to include integration with FEMA’s National Warning 

System. 

Thank you for your enduring support to the USPACOM team and our families 

who live and work in the Indo-Pacific. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you. 

Ms. McGinnis. 

21 

STATEMENT OF NICOLE MCGINNIS, DEPUTY CHIEF, 

PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU, 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Good morning, Senator Schatz and members of 

the Hawaii congressional delegation, and thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

The false alert warning of an imminent ballistic missile attack 

issued on January 13 by the State of Hawaii was unacceptable. But 

as unfortunate as this incident was, alert messaging remains an 

essential tool for protecting the lives of all Americans. The Commission is committed to doing everything within our legal authority 

and in coordination with our Federal, State, and local partners, to 

ensure that our Nation’s alert messaging tools are available and 

used properly when they are needed most. 

The Commission acted swiftly in the wake of this incident to 

open an investigation into this matter. As part of its investigation, 

the Bureau has coordinated with the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, or HI-EMA; with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA; as well as with industry; and has conducted 

several interviews with stakeholders. 

The Bureau expects to release its final report in the near future. 

The final report will provide an analysis of the facts gathered from 

our independent investigation, and incorporates facts developed in 

a separate report that’s been prepared by HI-EMA. We expect that 

the final report will confirm the Bureau’s preliminary findings. The 

false alert in Hawaii and HI-EMA’s delay in correcting it was due 

to a combination of human error and their lack of effective operating procedures and safeguards. 

In my testimony today, I’d like to highlight a few of the report’s 

anticipated key findings and lessons learned. 

First, human error occurred on many levels. For example, one 

error was the use of an incorrect drill recording that erroneously 

contained language from the EAS message for a live ballistic missile alert. This contributed to the additional error made by the employee responsible for issuing the alert, who has stated that he 

mistakenly believed that the alert was real. 

Another error was the miscommunication between the outgoing 

and incoming shift supervisors as to which shift would be conducting the test. The day shift supervisor mistakenly believed that 

the midnight shift would be conducting the test, resulting in the 

drill being conducted by the day shift without supervision. 

Second, the procedures to prevent or correct the false alert were 

not adequate. For example, HI-EMA lacked procedures to present— 

prevent a single person from mistakenly issuing a live ballistic missile alert. Given that the employee issuing the alert was the only 

one under the mistaken impression that the event was real, requiring signoff of a second warning officer would have prevented this 

false alert. 

The checklist used during the January 13 exercise also lacked 

any protocol for correcting a false alert with an ‘‘all clear’’ or similar message to the public. In addition, the software failed to adequately distinguish between test environments and live alerting environments. Clear protocols for not just cancellation, but for prompt 

correction of a false alert over the same systems used to issue the 

22 

alert would have reduced the public panic that ensued in the extensive time following the false alert. 

The report will also examine the performance of the Emergency 

Alert System, or EAS, and Wireless Emergency Alert, or WEA, system participants. As the report will explain in greater detail, these 

technical systems generally broadcast the alerts as designed. 

Where the alert was not transmitted by the EAS, we understand 

that those protocols are being addressed to ensure transmission in 

the future. 

With respect to WEA, we have heard issues regarding whether 

some consumer devices appropriately received and displayed the 

alerts. While there are multiple reasons why this could have been 

the case that are not system failures, for example, if the consumer 

was on a 3G call or data session during the relatively short active 

duration of the alert, we are continuing to study this issue. 

The most important outcome of this investigation, however, is 

the identification of lessons learned and best practices to prevent 

this type of mistake from occurring in the future. The final report 

will offer recommendations to State, local, Tribal, and Territorial 

emergency alert originators and managers to minimize the risk of 

similar incidents occurring in the future. HI-EMA has already implemented or has—or is in the process of implementing many of 

these. 

I would like to highlight a few of the key recommendations, 

which will include conducting regular internal tests in a controlled 

and closed environment, such as FEMA’s Integrate Public—Integrated Public Alert and Warning System, or IPAWS, Test Lab; requiring more than one credentialed person to validate message content prior to the transmission of high-impact alerts; implementing 

specific upgrades to alerting software to separate live from test 

alerting environments; developing and memorializing standard operating procedures for responding to false alerts, including issuing 

corrections using the same system that was sent to issue the false 

alert; and consulting with State Emergency Communications Committees on a regular basis at least annually to ensure that EAS 

procedures are mutually understood, agreed upon, and documented 

in the State EAS plan. 

The Bureau intends to follow up on these recommendations by 

engaging in additional outreach in coordination with our partners 

at FEMA to encourage the use of these best practices, including a 

planned webinar and roundtable. 

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today 

and look forward to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. McGinnis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NICOLE MCGINNIS, DEPUTY CHIEF, PUBLIC SAFETY AND

HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Good morning Senator Schatz and members of the Hawaii Congressional delegation, and thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

The false alert warning of an imminent ballistic missile attack issued on January 

13 by the State of Hawaii was unacceptable. It resulted in widespread panic, which 

was exacerbated by a delay of nearly 40 minutes before a correction was issued 

through proper alerting channels. False alerts like this one can shake the public’s 

trust in alert messaging, and ultimately jeopardize the public’s safety in times of 

real emergency. 

23 

But as unfortunate as this incident was, alert messaging remains an essential tool 

for protecting the lives of all Americans. The Commission is committed to doing everything within its legal authority, and in coordination with our federal, state, and 

local partners, to ensure that our Nation’s alert messaging tools are available and 

used properly when they are needed most. 

The Commission acted swiftly in the wake of this incident in Hawaii to open an 

investigation into the matter. Since this Committee’s hearing on January 25, the 

Bureau presented its preliminary findings to the Commission on January 30 and 

submitted that presentation to this Committee for the record. As part of its investigation, the Bureau has coordinated with the Hawaii Emergency Management 

Agency (HI-EMA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and industry and has conducted many interviews with stakeholders. 

The Bureau is finalizing its final report and expects to release it in the near future. We would be pleased to submit that report in its entirety to the Committee 

upon its release. The final report will provide an analysis of the facts gathered from 

our independent investigation and will incorporate facts developed in a separate report prepared by HI-EMA. We expect that the final report will confirm the Bureau’s 

preliminary findings: The false alert in Hawaii and HI-EMA’s delay in correcting 

it was due to a combination of human error and the lack of effective operating procedures and safeguards. 

In my testimony today, I’d like to highlight some of the final report’s anticipated 

key findings and lessons learned. 

First, human error occurred on many levels. For example, one error was the use 

of a recording to initiate the drill that contained the text of an EAS message for 

a live ballistic missile alert, including the language, ‘‘THIS IS NOT A DRILL.’’ 

While the recorded message also contained the language ‘‘EXERCISE EXERCISE 

EXERCISE,’’ the employee tasked with issuing the alert submitted a written statement to HI-EMA stating that he mistakenly believed the exercise was, in fact, a real 

event. This failure to hear and/or properly understand the instructions indicating 

the exercise was a test was clear human error. Another error was the result of miscommunication between the outgoing and incoming shift supervisors as to which 

shift would perform the test during the shift change. The midnight shift supervisor 

did not provide the day supervisor with written notice of the test, and only mentioned it to the day supervisor minutes before the drill was conducted. The day shift 

supervisor assumed that the drill would be run by the midnight shift, and did not 

understand that the drill would involve the day shift. Because of this miscommunication, the day shift supervisor was not in the watch center at the time of the drill, 

and it was conducted without supervision. 

Second, the procedures to prevent or correct the false alarm were not adequate. 

For example, HI-EMA lacked procedures to prevent a single person from mistakenly 

issuing a live missile alert. Given that the employee issuing the alert was the only 

one under the mistaken impression that the event was real, requiring sign off of 

a second warning officer would have prevented the false alert. Equally significant, 

the checklist used during the January 13 exercise lacked any protocol for correcting 

a false alert with an ‘‘all clear’’ or similar message to the public. Clear protocols for 

not just cancellation, but also for prompt correction of a false alert over the same 

systems used to issue the alert would have reduced the public panic that ensued 

in the extensive time following the false alert. 

The final report will also detail the Bureau’s findings with respect to the how the 

emergency alert system (EAS) participants and participating wireless emergency 

alert (WEA) providers transmitted the message. The majority of EAS participants 

received the alert within seconds and retransmitted it. From a technical perspective, 

this was exactly as the system is designed to work. Those that did not relay the 

alert did not have their equipment set to ‘‘auto-forward’’ the message, which we understand is being addressed and that such messages will now be auto-forwarded 

going forward. The four nationwide wireless carriers offering service in Hawaii also 

received and transmitted the WEA alert within seconds. Neither EAS nor WEA is 

designed such that a carrier or participant would have the discretion to question 

whether an alert was erroneous. Although reports suggest that some consumers did 

not receive the alert, there are several reasons why this might have been the case, 

including lack of access to a wireless signal or having the device powered off during 

the time the alert was sent and cancelled, which would have impacted the receipt 

of the message. In addition, some handsets are not WEA capable, and consumers 

may also opt out of non-Presidential alerts. None of these are flaws in the operation 

of the system. 

The most important outcome of this investigation, however, is the identification 

of lessons learned and best practices to prevent this type of a mistake from occurring in the future. 

24 

In this respect, the final report will offer recommendations to state, local, Tribal, 

and territorial emergency alert originators and managers to minimize the risk of 

similar incidents occurring in the future. HI-EMA is already implementing or has 

implemented many of these anticipated recommendations. Among others, these recommendations will include: 

• Conducting regular internal tests in a controlled and closed environment, such 

as the FEMA’s Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) Test Lab. 

This will enable staff to maintain proficiency with alerting tools and to exercise 

plans and procedures in a manner that does not affect the public; 

• Requiring more than one credentialed person to validate message content prior 

to transmission of high-impact alerts that affect a significant percentage of the 

population; 

• Implementing specific upgrades to alerting software to separate live environments from test environments, including clearer prompting language distinguishing live and test messages; 

• Developing and memorializing standard operating procedures for responding to 

false alerts within their jurisdictions, including specifying that corrections to 

false alerts must be issued over the same systems used to issue the false alert, 

including the EAS and WEA, as well as other available means; and 

• Consulting with state emergency communications committees (SECCs) on a regular basis—at least annually—to ensure that EAS procedures, including initiation and cancellation of actual alerts and tests, are mutually understood, 

agreed upon, and documented in the State EAS Plan. 

The final report will also make recommendations addressing the incorporation of 

social media within standard operating procedures, notifying the media of false 

alerts, establishing redundant lines of communications, and use of priority communications tools. 

The Bureau intends to follow up on these recommendations by engaging in additional outreach, in coordination with our partners at FEMA, to encourage the use 

of these best practices, including a planned webinar and roundtable. 

Finally, the Commission continues to work to improve EAS and WEA. For example, the Commission recently adopted new rules that require State EAS Plans be 

updated annually and be filed in a streamlined electronic database, the Alert Reporting System. By replacing paper-based filing requirements and coordinating 

State EAS Plan information in this manner, administering the EAS at the state 

level will be more clear and consistent. We hope to release that item soon. 

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and look forward to any questions you may have. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Johnson, with FEMA. 

STATEMENT OF ANTWANE JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, CONTINUITY 

COMMUNICATIONS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. Senator Schatz and distinguished 

members of the Hawaii congressional delegation, good morning. My 

name is Antwane Johnson, and I am the Director of Continuity 

Communications at FEMA. 

On behalf of Secretary Nielsen and Administrator Long, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

Integrated Public Alert and Warning System, also known as 

IPAWS, and how it is used to save lives across the country. 

An effective and timely public alert and warning system is critical to communicating threats to public safety and providing people 

with guidance during times of crisis. At FEMA, we manage 

IPAWS—IPAWS and its two main components: warnings and communications from the President in the event of a catastrophic national emergency through the National Public Warning System, 

and geotargeted alerts sent from Federal, State, local, Tribal, and 

25 

Territorial officials during emergencies, such as those issued last 

year during the hurricanes and wildfires. 

IPAWS allows these alerting authorities to send emergency messages to people in their geographic jurisdiction by Emergency Alert 

System broadcasts through radio and TV, Wireless Emergency 

Alerts to cell phones, and other Internet-connected services. Today, 

IPAWS supports more than 1,000 Federal, State, local, Tribal, and 

Territorial users; connections to more than 26,000 radio, TV, and 

cable connections; 63 cellular carrier gateways reaching millions of 

cell phones; as well as 73 Internet vendors that tap into the alert 

feed. And we established a connection with—between IPAWS and 

Canada’s multiagency situational awareness system for the exchange and sharing of disaster information. 

Since inception of the system in 2012, there have been nearly 3 

million messages disseminated through IPAWS. These messages, 

which cover everything from a natural disaster to active shooter to 

missing children and planned power outages, help communicate 

critical lifesaving information to the public. For example, in September 2016, New York City sent a Wireless Emergency Alert with 

an electronic ‘‘Wanted’’ poster to identify a suspect in connection 

with bombings in Manhattan and New Jersey. The suspect was 

captured within hours. 

Last year, Wireless Emergency Alerts were used by officials to 

issue warnings and evacuation orders across Texas, Florida, and 

California, in response to hurricanes and wildfires. 

Significantly, since 2012, 53 kidnapped children have been reunited with their loved ones after AMBER Alerts were issued 

through the system and members of the community helped law enforcement locate perpetrators. 

In addition to managing the IPAWS program, FEMA helps train 

users and create guidance for alerting authorities and software tool 

vendors. It is important to note that while FEMA manages the 

IPAWS system, we rely on our State and local partners to originate 

communications to their jurisdictions, as they are the boots on the 

ground that are best able to communicate the threats they face and 

provide specific protective action information related to their area. 

Following direction from Congress and the IPAWS Modernization 

Act of 2015, FEMA has established a subcommittee to the National 

Advisory Council. The subcommittee includes members from State, 

local, and Tribal governments and communications service providers; organizations representing individuals with disabilities or 

limited English proficiency; and others. 

This committee is consulting with IPAWS users and experts to 

consider new and developing technologies that may be beneficial to 

IPAWS and the Nation. The subcommittee will develop recommendations on matters related to common alert and warning 

protocols, standards, terminology, and operating procedures. 

Through this subcommittee, we are looking at recent uses of the 

system, including use during the 2017 natural disasters, as well as 

the false alert in Hawaii. To identify lessons learned and best practices to fold into these recommendations, the IPAWS subcommittee 

report will be available by spring 2019. 

FEMA continues to assist State and local agencies with their 

specific training requirements. In the last year, FEMA assisted 

26 

multiple State and local agencies with IPAWS-specific training, 

testing, and exercise requirements during 115 separate engagements. Two of those trainings were with Hawaii Emergency Management Agency prior to the false missile alert. 

Additionally, FEMA IPAWS is also working with the Emergency 

Management Institute, National Exercise Division, and Director of 

the FEMA National Incident Management System program to incorporate public alert and warning training, tests, and exercises, 

into the NIMS program. 

This month, FEMA will launch an online collaborative forum to 

enable alerting authorities and software developers to share best 

practices, operating procedures, and safeguards, and alerting concepts for their communities. 

FEMA is assisting states with guidance on the type of alerts a 

state may wish to include in their State warning plans, and alert 

and warning template tailoring according to each state’s specific 

needs. 

This month, FEMA will issue recommendations to vendors to address functionality issues to clearly illustrate when alerting originators are in the test or lab environment. 

I look forward to continuing to work with Congress and provide 

updates as we move forward with recommendations to continue to 

modernize the system and our processes. I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today. And I am happy to respond 

to any questions the Subcommittee may have at this time. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTWANE JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, 

CONTINUITY COMMUNICATIONS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Introduction 

Good morning Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the 

Committee. My name is Antwane Johnson, and I am the Director of Continuity 

Communications within the National Continuity Programs Directorate (NCP) at the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). On behalf of FEMA Administrator Brock Long and John Veatch, the Assistant Administrator for NCP, I appreciate the opportunity to speak today on the importance of the Integrated Public 

Alert and Warning System (IPAWS), how the system was used during the events 

of January 13, 2018, and the steps we are taking to improve the system. 

What is IPAWS? 

An effective, timely, and far-reaching public alert and warning system is critical 

to communicating threats to public safety and providing people with guidance during times of crisis. 

Executive Order 13407 and The IPAWS Modernization Act of 2015 define FEMA’s 

responsibility to provide a public alert and warning system. The Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act directs FEMA to provide technical assistance to state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments to ensure that 

timely and effective disaster warning is provided. In accordance with these statutes, 

IPAWS was created to enhance and extend a national infrastructure and capability 

to SLTT officials for public alert and warning. 

IPAWS is a national warning infrastructure that provides a single interface for 

public safety officials to alert and warn the public about emergencies. There are two 

main system components: 

(1) IPAWS supports warnings and communications from the President in the 

event of a catastrophic national emergency. The President can reach the American people through the National Public Warning System, where the message 

27 

is transmitted through FEMA Primary Entry Point (PEP) radio stations and 

Emergency Alert System (EAS) radio television, and cable stations. 

(2) IPAWS also supports geo-targeted alerts sent from federal, local, state, tribal, and territorial officials during emergencies, such as those issued last year 

by Florida and Texas, in anticipation of hurricanes Harvey, and Irma. 

These federal, local, state, tribal, or territorial alerting authorities can, via the 

‘‘IPAWS OPEN’’ gateway, send emergency messages to people in their geographic 

jurisdiction by radio and TV Emergency Alert System (EAS) broadcasts, Wireless 

Emergency Alerts (WEA) to cell phones, broadcasts from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather Radios, and other IPAWS internet-connected services. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) conducted research to improve geo-targeting capabilities and public response to alerts and warnings, through funding provided by the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration. Today, IPAWS supports more 

than 26,000 radio, TV, and cable EAS connections, 63 cellular carrier gateways 

reaching millions of cell phones, connections to NOAA dissemination systems, and 

73 Internet application vendors that tap into the IPAWS alert feed. 

States determine who their state alerting authorities are, and validate requests 

from potential local alerting authorities to gain access to the IPAWS. A profile is 

created in the system for each validated authority describing the geographic jurisdiction, types of alerts, and which alert dissemination systems will be used by the 

authority. Following completion of required FEMA-developed training by the authority, access to send alerts directly through IPAWS to people is turned on. This training provides skills to draft effective and accessible warning messages, and best practices in effective use of the Common Alerting Protocol. In addition to the initial 

training, in June 2014 FEMA released an advanced course to further develop these 

skills among alerting authorities. Messages that match the authorities profile pass 

automatically through the system to EAS, WEA, and the other alert dissemination 

systems to population’s TV, radio, and cell phones. 

IPAWS supports ‘‘broadcast’’ type alert and warning services. Unlike subscription 

based-alert services, warnings are sent to all people located in a specified area, both 

residents and visitors. 

FEMA is responsible for development, operation, integration, and maintenance of 

IPAWS infrastructure, which includes the EAS, WEA, NOAA, and IPAWS Alerts 

Feed components plus any future connections. IPAWS was designed so it can easily 

adapt to technological advances. 

As of March 2018, there are 1,075 total IPAWS public alerting authorities. Since 

its inception in 2011, more than 2.7 million alert messages have been processed by 

IPAWS. 

Authorities have used IPAWS connections to successfully alert people of a wide 

variety of threats to public safety. This includes, but is not limited to: natural disasters, gas plant explosions and evacuations, armed robbers, active shooters, dangerous water advisories, 911 service outages, and electrical power outages. 

AMBER Alerts 

In 2003, President George W. Bush signed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other 

Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003 (Public Law 

108–21). This act established the national coordination of state and local programs, 

including the development of guidance for issuance and dissemination of AMBER 

alerts. 

The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) is responsible 

for America’s Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) plan, which allows 

broadcasters and transportation authorities to immediately distribute information 

about recent child abductions to the public and enables the entire community to assist in the search for and safe recovery of the child. 

The AMBER Alert program is a voluntary partnership among law enforcement 

agencies, broadcasters, transportation agencies, and the wireless industry to activate an urgent Wireless Emergency Alert in the most serious cases of child abduction. 

Since the AMBER alert program’s inception, 53 children across the country have 

been safely returned to their families as a direct result of these WEAs. 

IPAWS Use during Recent Hurricanes, Wildfires, and Mudslides 

For the three major hurricanes in 2017—Harvey, Irma, and Maria—nearly 700 

emergency messages were sent via IPAWS by both the National Weather Service 

and state and local alerting authorities. 

Prior to Hurricane Irma, state and local alerting authorities issued a series of 

timely WEA and EAS alerts to advise the public to take appropriate protective 

28 

measures. The Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) issued several 

evacuation alerts that facilitated the safe and timely evacuation of nearly 6.5 million residents and visitors. FDEM issued IPAWS alerts on behalf of counties that 

were unable to issue an alert because they were not an authorized alerting authority, demonstrating state-local coordination. 

For Hurricane Maria, FEMA IPAWS developed an innovative arrangement with 

SirusXM to deploy satellite radios to Puerto Rico. Extensive efforts by the IPAWS 

project management office successfully kept PEP stations broadcasting in Puerto 

Rico to provide critical response and recovery information to the island’s residents. 

These efforts included coordination of fueling where power was unavailable, and 

providing technical assistance to ensure the PEP stations remained up and running. 

In the U.S. Virgin Islands, FEMA IPAWS had primed the backup generator for the 

PEP station two years ago and had replaced the fuel tank generator and fuel distribution systems in June 2017. This continued maintenance allowed for radio 

broadcasts and alerts to be sent to residents in the U.S. Virgin Islands through this 

station while the power was out following Hurricane Irma. 

In October 2017, WEAs were issued to warn California residents about the wildfire danger. This event highlighted a few strengths as well as areas for improvement. Strengths include some local authorities using a variety of warning and communications methods to reach as many people as possible, including WEAs, police 

sirens, opt in reverse 911 and text alerts, door-to-door notifications and social media. 

Areas for improvement include the regular testing of IPAWS to ensure the system, 

and user access, is operational and working correctly. One alerting authority’s user 

access was recently updated and was not tested prior to attempted use during the 

wildfires, at which time it was discovered to have not worked. It has since been 

fixed. 

During the January 2018 flooding and mudslides in Southern California, 10 

WEAs were sent: five by the National Weather Service, three by Santa Barbara 

County, and two by the City of Los Angeles. 

Implementation of IPAWS Modernization Act 

The IPAWS Modernization Act of 2015 (PL 114–143) directs FEMA to implement 

and modernize the IPAWS and to establish an IPAWS subcommittee under the National Advisory Council (NAC). This council advises the Administrator on all aspects 

of emergency management to ensure input from and coordination with state, local, 

tribal, and territorial governments, non-profit organizations, and the private sector 

communities on the development and revision of plans and strategies. 

Additionally, the law directs the IPAWS subcommittee to consult with users and 

experts to consider new and developing technologies that may be beneficial to the 

public alert and warning system; develop recommendations for IPAWS and submit 

a recommendation report to the NAC for approval. The recommendations will be on 

matters related to common alerting and warning protocols, standards, terminology, 

and operating procedures. The subcommittee will also make recommendations to the 

NAC on having the capability to adapt the distribution and content of communications based on locality, risks, or user preferences. As outlined in the law, the subcommittee will terminate no later than April 2019. 

FEMA announced the IPAWS subcommittee membership in July 2017. Membership includes participants from: state, local, and tribal governments and emergency 

management agencies; communications service providers; third-party service bureaus; commercial mobile radio service industry; satellite industry; organizations 

representing individuals with access and functional needs and limited English proficiency; privacy advocates; and senior Federal leaders. The subcommittee members 

are divided into four working groups, focused on: alert writers and alerting authorities; public needs; stakeholder engagement and coordination; and future technologies. 

As of January 2018, the working groups have held 45 webinars, with 48 guest 

speakers presenting to subcommittee members. These guest speakers include educators and researchers, state and local alerting authorities, and private sector partners to help inform the recommendations. 

The subcommittee will continue developing and refining recommendations in the 

coming months, in order to present draft recommendations to the NAC in fall 2018. 

The subcommittee will also take into consideration recent uses, including best practices and lessons learned, when developing the recommendations. Once a draft is 

complete, the subcommittee will work with NAC to develop the final approved recommendations to present to the FEMA Administrator, the head of each agency represented on the subcommittee, this committee, the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, and the House committees on Homeland Security and on Transportation and Infrastructure. 

29 

Hawaii False Missile Alert and Next Steps 

On January 13, 2018, at 8:07 am local time, the Hawaii Emergency Management 

Agency (HI-EMA) mistakenly issued an alert through FEMA’s Integrated Public 

Alert and Warning System-Open Platform for Emergency Networks (IPAWS–OPEN) 

to residents of Hawaii notifying them of an inbound ballistic missile threat. The 

alert was issued as an IPAWS WEA displayed on cell phones and via EAS on television and radio. The live EAS and WEA messages used the event code Civil Defense Warning (CDW). The WEA message read: 

‘‘BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. SEEK IMMEDIATE 

SHELTER. THIS IS NOT A DRILL’’ 

HI–EMA canceled the WEA cell broadcast at 8:13 am local time, thereby preventing additional cell phones from receiving the alert. FEMA was contacted by HI– 

EMA at 8:30 am local time to seek confirmation to use the Civil Emergency Message 

(CEM) event code to issue a follow-up message. At 8:45 am local time (approximately 38 minutes after the erroneous alert was sent), HI–EMA issued a second 

IPAWS message to inform the public there was no missile threat. The second WEA 

message stated: 

‘‘There is no missile threat or danger to the State of Hawaii. Repeat. False 

Alarm’’ 

The alert issued on January 13 brought to light gaps in existing alerting plans, 

protocols, and procedures, including those for responding to an erroneous public 

alert. These gaps exist at multiple levels. Standard operating procedures for the release of alerts need to include additional review steps to ensure the accuracy of a 

public alert. Additionally, all plans, protocols, and procedures need to include clear 

guidance and steps for rectifying an erroneous alert if one is sent. 

FEMA continues to assist state and local agencies with their specific training requirements and has assisted multiple state and local agencies with IPAWS-specific 

training, testing, and exercise requirements during 115 separate engagements. Two 

of those trainings were with HI-EMA. 

FEMA is taking steps to review and improve public alert and warning guidance, 

planning, training, practice, and exercises, and incorporate them across FEMA programs and into the National Incident Management System. 

To help share the lessons learned from the Hawaii missile alert and other recent 

events (including the use of IPAWS during the 2017 hurricane season and recent 

California wildfires), FEMA is highlighting best practices to help guide alerting authorities as they review and update their policies and procedures. To facilitate dissemination within the emergency management community, FEMA will launch an 

online collaborative forum in the spring of 2018 to enable alerting authorities and 

software developers to share best practices, experiences, operating procedures, and 

lessons learned. 

FEMA has also issued recommendations to Alert Origination Software Providers 

(AOSP) that go beyond recommendations provided to AOSPs in 2015. In particular, 

FEMA recommends that vendors providing alert origination software ensure critical 

capabilities be included in their products to make alert and warning more effective 

and include steps to mitigate alerting errors. 

The success of IPAWS depends on public confidence in the reliability of the system to issue timely, accurate, and actionable information. While alerting authorities 

have their own public outreach strategies, FEMA conducts a series of awareness 

programs to ensure the American people understand the functions of IPAWS and 

how to respond to alerts and warnings from public safety officials. Project Management Office (PMO) efforts have included releasing Public Service Announcements 

(PSAs) on radio and television, providing a 15-minute online course ‘‘IPAWS and the 

American People,’’ and incorporating IPAWS and WEA information on Ready.gov. 

The PSAs educate the public on what a WEA is and how to recognize a message 

when received, advise the public to heed the warning and take the prescribed protective action in the message, and direct viewers to learn more about life-saving 

alerts on www.fema.gov/ipaws and www.ready.gov/alerts. Public safety officials are 

encouraged to work with local broadcasters to make the WEA PSAs a part of local 

public education campaigns. 

IPAWS will also continue to make State, local, tribal, and territorial emergency 

managers aware of the ‘‘IPAWS Lab.’’ This lab, located at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Indian Head, Maryland, provides alerting authorities with test and 

evaluation, operational assessments, IPAWS demonstrations, and expert technical 

support. The lab provides an interactive and closed IPAWS testing environment, 

and allows users the opportunity to practice and train to increase familiarity and 

confidence using IPAWS. 

30 

In accordance with new WEA rules established by the Federal Communications 

Commission (FCC) in 2016, IPAWS is working with wireless carriers and alerting 

software vendors to enhance WEA capabilities based on research conducted by S&T. 

This includes creating room for more detailed information in messages, allowing 

links to instructions and images, Spanish language support, and dedicated test message type for use by SLTT alerting authorities. 

The IPAWS PMO continues to collaborate with our alerting authority partners to 

look for opportunities to incorporate best practices and lessons learned into program 

guidance and training. 

Conclusion 

Every day I am grateful for the opportunity to work with a program dedicated 

to helping alert and provide guidance to people during times of crisis. Thank you 

for your interest in the program and we look forward to collaborating with this subcommittee on ways the program can improve. I am happy to take any questions you 

have at this time. 

Senator SCHATZ. Well, thank all the testifiers. 

My first question is for Ms. McGinnis. 

When can we expect the report? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. In the near future. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SCHATZ. Are we talking about days or weeks? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Well, we wanted to take some time to benefit—— 

VOICE. Turn it on. 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Thank you. I apologize. 

Just to repeat, we wanted to take some time to benefit from this 

hearing today to have that opportunity to fold that into the report. 

So—— 

Senator SCHATZ. But you’re almost done. 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Correct. 

Senator SCHATZ. OK. 

Ms. MCGINNIS. We are almost done, but we want to make sure 

that it’s thorough, and we’re listening very closely to the testimony 

and information shared today. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you. 

The next question is for Admiral Piercey. 

The sirens went off at the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. Is 

that correct? 

Admiral PIERCEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator SCHATZ. And did they go off on any other bases or installations? 

Admiral PIERCEY. They—they also went off the—in the Wahiawa 

complex. 

Senator SCHATZ. Now, does HI-EMA have the ability to set off a 

siren on a base or an installation, or was that a—was that in response to the HI-EMA errant missile notification, and then someone, a Department of Defense personnel, pressed the button to set 

off the sirens? 

Admiral PIERCEY. Well, the latter is correct, sir. So in response 

to the false alert, the command duty officer, a command duty officer, activated the sirens for both the Wahiawa complex and also 

the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam area. 

Senator SCHATZ. So if we’re able to enact our legislation, all of 

our legislation, this would be moot, but in the meantime, I’m assuming you’re doing after-action analysis to make sure that your 

people are not responding to any errant information coming from 

the HI-EMA side. 

31 

Admiral PIERCEY. So, yes, sir, that’s correct. We conducted an informal after-action analysis review, and we determined that we do 

have procedures in place to ensure there’s appropriate backup. In 

this particular case, the Command Duty Officer did not go through 

the normal process to—to validate with another Command Duty 

Officer that this was an actual alert. 

Senator SCHATZ. OK. Could you follow up for the members and 

for the Committee, and especially for the other members of the delegation and members of the Armed Services Committee, to understand exactly how you’re changing your procedures and your training to make sure that something like that doesn’t happen again? 

Admiral PIERCEY. Sure. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson, you know, I want to talk a little bit about the way 

FEMA highlights best practices. And I think when it comes to natural disasters, you have so many reps, if you will, you have so 

many iterations and so many years of experience that if you’re 

doing, you know, flood notification, wildfire notification, tsunami, 

hurricane, that merely highlighting a best practice is a useful way 

to do this because it’s highly localized stuff. 

But we have a voluntary program for missile alert notification. 

We have one state, zero territory, zero counties participating. 

You’ve got 3,017 counties. I doubt any other state is going to be 

rushing in to voluntarily participate in this program. 

And so you have a couple of problems. First, no one wants to voluntarily participate in this program at this point. Second of all, to 

the extent that FEMA provides a service under normal circumstances in highlighting what states and counties are doing 

right, there are no examples of what states and counties are doing 

right. There are no best practices at this point. The FCC is leaning 

into this, FEMA is considering this, but, frankly, the way you’re 

configured is to simply look at what other places are doing and saying this works, this maybe is not so good, but you have literally no 

examples for other states or counties to consider best practices. 

So I’m wondering how you view missile alert notifications as possibly different from any other category, not merely as it relates to 

the ALERT Act and who should be primarily responsible, that’s another public policy question, but how do we get best practices if 

what your job is under normal circumstances to see what other 

states and counties are doing, and then say ‘‘Attaboy’’ or ‘‘Attagirl’’? 

But there are literally no examples. So how is any state going to 

be able to follow any example if there are zero examples to be followed? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Great. Thank you for that question. Today, in 

terms of voluntary participation in the IPAWS program, all 50 

states are voluntarily participating with IPAWS—— 

Senator SCHATZ. I know that. I’m saying there are zero participants in a missile alert notification program. And I get that you 

can—you can sort of, in a broad sense, show what states and counties are doing using IPAWS. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mm-hmm. 

Senator SCHATZ. But I’m talking about a missile notification, 

which clearly we’ve learned from experience that there are difVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:13 Jan 02, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57801.TXT JACKIE
32 

ferent procedures, there are different protocols, there’s more coordination, and it’s, frankly, higher stakes. 

So I get that 50 states are participating in IPAWS. I love 

IPAWS. It works great for what it works for. It doesn’t appear to 

be working for something which is essentially notifying the public 

of a war. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Correct. And thank you so much for your question, 

Senator. I think that when we look at the history of alerting in the 

country and what’s been done for the last 60-plus years, both on 

the technology side as well as what’s been done in the social 

sciences arena with studies by the National Academies of Science 

and others, there’s a great deal of room for improvement in terms 

of how we do things. But I would say that there are a number of 

best practices that have evolved over the last few years in terms 

of how states plan and organize similar to—and organize their activities as it relates to alert and warning. 

Now, it is true that with the accidental warning, ballistic missile 

warning, that took place here in Hawaii, it did prompt a number 

of other states to contact our office because, you’re right, they were 

not preparing or planning for a ballistic missile warning having to 

be issued by the state or anyone else. 

Senator SCHATZ. Well, to put a fine point on it, they call FEMA 

and say, ‘‘I didn’t know that was on us.’’ 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. So there is some level of coordination and 

there is some degree of misunderstanding as to how the process 

works. We at FEMA are going back and revisiting that and working with the State and local governments so that they clearly understand what those responsibilities, those roles, are when it comes 

to a ballistic missile warning or any other type threat to public 

safety. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you. 

Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. What I’m getting from our witnesses is that this is—it’s a lot more complicated than meets the 

eye because there are a number of Federal agencies, State agencies, and local authorities that are involved. And so to me, this 

really underscores how important it is that we not create an environment where a missile strike comes our way to Hawaii, or anyplace else for that matter, because it is rather astounding to contemplate what might happen if there was an actual missile strike. 

Yes, we want to have the warning systems. At least the warning 

systems should be accurate, at least. But what happens after a 

missile strike would be, I would say, devastation and chaos. And 

so, you know, I want to underscore some of the things that I said 

as well as Congresswoman Gabbard, that we really need to shore 

up our capability, diplomatic capabilities. 

Now, for the Admiral then, it was sort of alarming that the 

alarms went off at Joint Base Pearl Harbor and that you had a 

person there that did not follow the appropriate protocols to verify. 

So I take it that this has led to all of you reviewing what it is that 

you folks do and how you interface with the local governments and 

our local alert systems. 

Admiral PIERCEY. Yes, ma’am. As I mentioned before, we took 

the opportunity as we went through this process, one, to validate 

33 

that we did not initiate the false alert. And then, second, we took 

a look at our own internal process to see where we could make 

some improvements because clearly we share with you the concern 

that we have to have the public’s trust and confidence—— 

Senator HIRONO. Yes. 

Admiral PIERCEY.—to do our number one mission. 

Senator HIRONO. So that alarm should never have gone off at 

Joint Base Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral PIERCEY. Oh, I would like to say we would always want 

to go with never, but I would offer this, that based upon where 

many acted upon a false alert, and it said this was not a drill, we 

enable our commanders, in this particular case, the command duty 

officer, to make a decision given the indications that he received, 

and based upon that, he took action, initiative, in this case, to activate the alerts. The process was then corrected. It took some time 

to reverse that process to turn the alarms off and say this was a 

false alert. 

But what I have to face from a readiness side is, as a military 

officer, is I have to create conditions that enable my leaders to 

make decisions. In this case, I will say that the particular individual did not make the right decision. However, and the process 

had backup, and we did not follow that process. But at the same 

time, I can’t squash initiative because I need that in cases where 

things aren’t exactly always by the book. 

So I would like—I want this—there to be no accidents or incidents or mistakes, but part of the readiness part here is I have to 

recognize that we have to create the conditions so that—— 

Senator HIRONO. Excuse me, I’m running out of time, but I 

thought that Admiral Harris had determined quite early on that 

Northern Command had never issued such a missile alert, and that 

was a verification that should have occurred. But I’m assuming 

that you’ve corrected that situation. 

Admiral PIERCEY. Senator, the alert was based upon the text 

alert that the command duty officer had received, the individual. 

Senator HIRONO. Yes, but they—it was supposed to have come 

out of Northern Command to begin with, and that never emanated 

from Northern Command. 

Turning to Mr. Johnson, as we talk about how all of the states 

can update their plans, their Emergency Alert System plans, and 

that we have not done so, and I would probably not be wrong to 

assume that a lot of other states have not done so, so we’re all sitting here talking about, How can we enable them to understand 

what the best practices are? And the Commissioner, FCC Commissioner, said that they could convene different groups to come. 

But, you know, I notice in your testimony that as a result of 

what happened in Hawaii, that FEMA is highlighting best practices to help guide alerting authorities. So what are the best practices that you have already identified? Or are you still working on 

identifying best practices that could be sent out to the states to enable them to, for example, update their plans? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Hirono. There—there are a 

number of initiatives that were taken within FEMA, one of which 

that I’ll mention is a number of Nation State Threat meetings that 

34 

are taking place to sort through internal procedures and protocols 

and how we will respond to that type of threat as a nation. 

But, second, we are looking at things like testing and training. 

We want to make sure that there is adequate training, not only 

that’s provided by the Federal Government, meaning FEMA, 

throughout—through the Emergency Management Institute, but 

we’re also looking at the type of training that the software vendors 

who are providing these tools to State and locals that they provide, 

and assuring that it’s consistent and that they’re providing adequate support 24/7 and respond to questions that the state may 

have on the use of their tool. 

For example, there was somewhat of a delay in contacting FEMA 

during the course of that errant message that went out on the thirteenth. Had the vendor that they were using at the time had a 24/ 

7 more robust training help desk capability, that question could 

have been answered very quickly without additional guidance or 

seeking FEMA guidance on that matter. So we’re looking at testing 

and training. 

We’re standing up this collaborative environment on Monday. I 

just got the word back from my office that Monday we will launch 

an environment that will allow State and local government as well 

as the private sector, you know, technology providers, to collaborate 

on best practices, and as a whole of community, come up with appropriate practices that can be applied by each of the states that 

have a responsibility or role in this area. So that’s one of the others. 

We are working with the FCC in the review of State plans, ensuring that they not only address the Emergency Alert System and 

how that whole daisy chain plays out, but we’re also looking at all 

of the emerging technologies, like the inclusion of Wireless Emergency Alerts or the inclusion of ATSC 3.0 nanotechnology, which is 

the next generation of over-the-air broadcasts, to be able to disseminate information, not only through the scroll or the audio message that appears on your screen, but other rich media as well, and 

to be able to provide that information in multiple languages, so to 

speak. 

Senator HIRONO. So I appreciate that you are taking concrete 

steps in conjunction with the FCC. So at some point, is there a report that comes—that is made available to everyone of the various 

steps and the best practices that you all have identified? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Senator HIRONO. Is there a report that’s coming at some point? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. And so—and later in the spring, FEMA will 

release its after-action report that will contain a number of best 

practices as well as specific actions that FEMA has taken in response to the January 13th event. We will make that report available to the Committee and others within the community. And so 

it will be fairly comprehensive, but will include things that are not 

necessarily knee-jerk reactions to an event like the one of January 

13th, but will be more systematic in addressing some of the issues 

that surfaced as a result of that false missile alert—— 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Mr. JOHNSON.—training, education, and all of the other things 

that we’ve talked about in short form this morning. 

35 

Senator HIRONO. Well, keep doing what you’re doing. I look forward to the report. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Senator SCHATZ. Congresswoman Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, I heard you say two different things, so let me try to 

clarify it. First you said that part of readiness, you have empowered whoever—whatever level that commander was. And given the 

fact that he, I guess, believed—he got the alert that it was a proper 

alert, he then triggered whatever he triggers, the sirens in both 

Pearl as well as in Wahiawa, which are you talking about Schofield 

or someplace else in Wahiawa? 

Admiral PIERCEY. The NCTAMS PAC facility at Wahiawa, 

ma’am. 

Ms. HANABUSA. OK. So then you said that he didn’t follow proper 

protocol. So first you’re saying he’s empowered to take action, 

which he apparently did. So let me ask you a follow up on that. 

Is HI-EMA’s, I guess, notification, is that considered proper notification as far as PACOM is concerned? 

Admiral PIERCEY. Proper notification would go through our— 

through military channels. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So are you—so are you now saying that the whoever it was, the Commander, who triggered the, quote/unquote, the 

alert at Pearl Harbor did not have and did not follow protocol because he triggered it and it should not—or the notification did not 

come through proper military channels, or are you saying HIEMA’s notification is considered part of proper military channels? 

Admiral PIERCEY. So, ma’am, let me sort of step back to this and 

go through the process again. So through the normal alert process, 

you know, so we at—at PACOM, we have the ability to validate an 

event, and then we, through—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand that, Admiral. 

Admiral PIERCEY. Right. So I—ma’am, I have to sort of—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. I want to know, is HI-EMA’s notification considered proper or not? 

Admiral PIERCEY. I would consider under normal circumstances, 

HI-EMA’s alerting notification to be an indicator of a ballistic missile attack in this particular case. Under normal circumstances, 

where it was not sent as a false alert, I would expect people to take 

that as notification that they then need to take certain actions because of the alert. 

Our processes are written in a way that normally through the 

process, since he did not receive this notification through his normal chain of command, he is required to validate that by going 

back to the next level up, the Command Duty Officer at Joint Base 

Pearl Harbor-Hickam, and then based upon that, then activate the 

alarm. He took it on his own initiative, based upon what he saw 

in the alert, to then activate the alarm. 

So from that mistake, then we had to go back through and then 

go through the process to have the alarms or the sirens turned off 

as we went back to the process of—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. Admiral, I guess my concern is, Why would 

PACOM, a branch of DoD, which, of course, has the entity 

36 

NORTHCOM, who would really be the one who would get the notification properly, why would you rely on or consider the HI-EMA 

as a valid source versus looking whether or not you’ve got something from DoD versus HI-EMA? 

Admiral PIERCEY. Because the notification to HI-EMA through 

the normal reporting process would be they’re part of our secure 

conference call, and also through another reporting procedure, it 

goes in through FEMA, and then FEMA notifies HI-EMA. So there 

are two paths in terms of coming into HI-EMA for notification. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And I guess the problem that I see with what 

you just said is that’s a lot of steps. And as you know, when they 

tried to validate with FEMA as to whether or not this is true or 

not, we had another delay, and you have a situation where if anybody should know that this is a valid ballistic missile coming into 

Hawaii, it should be you, it should be your process. 

So I would, I hope—and I want to ask you as part of what you’re 

doing, Have you taken HI-EMA out of this process as opposed—as 

when it comes to your notification internally? Simply because one 

of the banners was, ‘‘PACOM confirms,’’ because your sirens went 

off. I believe that the people would feel a lot safer and have more 

public confidence if HI-EMA was out, and if you, PACOM, or someone within DoD is the one who sets it off, that’s something else. 

So have you taken HI-EMA out as a proper notification step so that 

we can at least get to the people who know, which is DoD? 

Admiral PIERCEY. The answer to that is no, we have not taken 

HI-EMA out of the process. We’ve paused pending the implementation of the corrective actions from the various studies, as HI-EMA 

has implemented their changes to their processes, and at the request of the state, we have paused conducting exercises. I would 

offer that PACOM has a very close relationship with—with—with 

many organizations, clearly the State of Hawaii, and that we believe that continued close—working closely together, coordinating 

closely together, building that trust, continues to be critical. And 

so—so, therefore, Admiral Harris has not taken action nor has 

been direction that we should eliminate our relationship with the 

State of Hawaii through the HI-EMA. 

Ms. HANABUSA. But you have put it on pause, right? You’ve put 

it on pause is what you testified. 

Admiral PIERCEY. We’ve paused—what we’ve paused is the conduct of—the conduct of exercises. However, our current procedures 

exist that if in the event of an actual launch, we would, through 

two conference calls, one conference call through FEMA, and the 

other conference through HI-EMA, they would give—we would notify them once we validated the fact of an actual launch. From our 

perspective, it’s a parallel reporting method that also—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand, Admiral. Let me just tell you this: 

a ballistic missile into Hawaii is an act of war, and I don’t think 

you should be delaying notification by doing a parallel path or 

whatever else. If you know it is, you should act accordingly. 

And with that, thank you very much. 

And thank you, Senator Schatz. 

Senator SCHATZ. Representative Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

37 

You know, I think you’re getting the point here of the delineation 

between any of a number of the natural disasters that our EAS 

system is set up to notify our residents about, the difference between that and what is an act of war and attack on the homeland. 

And the reason, you know, Senator Schatz’s legislation I think gets 

to the heart of this issue in treating this differently, understanding 

that time is of the essence, when we have mere minutes from the 

point that a missile is launched to point of impact, and that every 

second in that period counts. 

Mr. Johnson, you know, the President has sole responsibility to 

determine when EAS will be activated at a national level, and that 

responsibility has been delegated to the Director of FEMA. When 

was the last time this occurred? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The activation of the Emergency Alert System in 

response to a national type of event has never been activated and 

has never been carried out. We have, however, tested our national 

capabilities both in 2011 as well as 2016 and 2017. And you are 

correct, at the direction of the President, if we were under attack 

or there was a national emergency, we would, at the direction of 

the President, activate these capabilities. But until that direction 

is provided by the President, we would not activate those systems 

under any conditions. 

Ms. GABBARD. So this delegation of authority to the FEMA Director really isn’t a whole delegation because the FEMA Director 

would still wait for the President to take action, is that correct? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. So there are two things at play here. One 

is, of course, the Executive Order that was issued by President 

Bush in 2006, as well as the 1995 statement of requirements that 

were issued by President then Clinton. It establishes protocols, one, 

to allow what—it establishes protocols that would cause FEMA to 

respond at the request of the President to activate the system, but 

it also goes on further to state that once the system has been activated or directed to be activated by the President, then the Director of FEMA can use the system for follow-on information, and that 

would typically be during the response-and-recovery phase of an 

event. 

Ms. GABBARD. OK. Thanks. Sorry. I don’t have much time. I 

guess the point here is that when our country has been attacked 

by a foreign nation state, all of this seems like far too many layers 

for our residents to be notified that we are under attack, especially 

those, in the instance of Hawaii, who are in the impact zone. 

So I guess the question for Admiral Piercey is, Why shouldn’t the 

DoD, being that first point of verification that North Korea has 

launched a missile, as you go through your process every time to 

see what the direction and where the potential impact zone is, as 

that first point of verification, why shouldn’t the DoD be responsible for sending out the notification, especially given with the existing notification system, State and local governments already 

have the authority to send out these messages? It doesn’t seem like 

it would be too much to authorize DoD and PACOM directly to be 

able to do so. 

Admiral PIERCEY. Yes, ma’am. I would offer that we are the first 

point of verification. 

Ms. GABBARD. Correct. 

38 

Admiral PIERCEY. And through that process, it then goes through 

the established—the existing channels that exist through both 

FEMA and HI-EMA. I would offer that if you’re proposing that we 

are actually the ones that drop down the menu and do the notification, if that’s what the proposal, the legislation, is, I would offer 

that the existing process in terms of that covers—a notification 

process that covers the entire range both from the very high end, 

as we have discussed today, through—you know, through the other 

ones that—that allow both states, localities, and municipalities to 

exercise some level of management and oversight to see to, responsibility for, those systems that—that that—the existing process 

supports that. Ultimately, we recognize, we accept, the fact that we 

need to verify. We have that process in place. 

Ms. GABBARD. Right. 

Admiral PIERCEY. And through—but if we go through our process, we have verified this, and then through the existing—through 

FEMA, through the Federal process, and through the State process, 

those at the Federal level and the State level, they take the action 

for notification. 

Ms. GABBARD. So I guess that’s—that’s the question here, Admiral Piercey, is, Why do we need these extra layers? Because we recognize obviously that PACOM and NORTHCOM have the direct 

verification and the first line of verification. Why not cut out the 

extra layers and empower you to click the dropdown option and 

send out that alert so that people are getting it directly from the 

verification source rather than questioning, whether it be at FEMA 

or the local level or the county level or the State level, that someone may have made a mistake along the way and wondering if this 

is, in fact, real or not? 

Admiral PIERCEY. I would offer again that there are existing 

agencies that have that authority and responsibility. 

Ms. GABBARD. I think this is the reason why we’re gathered here, 

though, is there’s a problem with the existing process. So, you 

know, this is an important follow-up response that I think we need 

from PACOM, is, Why not? You say there’s an existing process, but 

why not improve that process by creating that direct line of communication between your command and the people of Hawaii? 

Admiral PIERCEY. And I would offer that the existing lines of 

communication with the existing system supports that. 

Ms. GABBARD. OK. Thank you. We’ll look forward to follow up on 

this. 

Senator SCHATZ. I’m just going to follow up with a comment, and 

if the other Members have any follow-up questions, they’re welcome to ask them. 

You know, I don’t think this is quite as complicated as it sounds. 

We just want the origination of a notification of a missile alert to 

start with the people who know and then drop down to the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA. It’s not that HI-EMA shouldn’t 

have a role, just like it’s not that HPD shouldn’t have a role, it’s 

not that the Sheriff’s Department shouldn’t have a role, it’s not 

that the Red Cross shouldn’t have a role, it’s just that the information should flow from the people who know for sure and then down 

and out to the community. 

39 

And the concerning thing, Admiral, that you said is that I understand, actually like, that you said we want to authorize our people 

in terms of organizational culture to exercise initiative and err on 

the side of readiness, right? That totally makes sense to me. And 

that can be in conflict with a procedure. And so somebody made a 

mistake, and yet you’re sort of—you’re accounting for the fact that 

people may make mistakes because you’re asking them to exercise 

their initiative. Frankly, in contrast to what happened in the HIEMA headquarters, where everyone was frozen in time, worried 

about making a mistake and worried about noncompliance with 

Federal procedures when they should be worrying about notifying 

their neighbors that they’re not going to perish. 

So I don’t mind that someone was authorized to exercise discretion, but I do think it’s important what all of my colleagues have 

said, is that we now have a convoluted process, and we have a convoluted process that, based on results, is a failure. And we don’t 

have to reconfigure something very fancy, we just want to say people who know whether there’s a missile in the air tell people who 

can operate IPAWS on a nationwide level. 

Because the other part of this—right?—is that the FEMA model 

is there’s a flood in San Mateo County, San Mateo County should 

be informed; there’s a hurricane in the Western Pacific, you know, 

people should be informed. If we are at war, there is no reason not 

to inform every American citizen. 

The idea that there should be a regional alert about an incoming 

ICBM is preposterous. Imagine that there’s an ICBM and it’s 

tracking to—I don’t even want to name a state—a state on the 

mainland, do you think it’s appropriate for only those states that 

have enlisted in a missile notification program to have the capacity 

to get the word out? Do you think it’s—what about an adjacent 

county that didn’t sign up? What about an adjacent state? And we 

don’t know, by the way, if we’re at war, how many additional warheads are on the way. 

This is Federal by its very definition. We have robust conversations with our Republican colleagues about the role of the Federal 

Government versus local government, but, gosh, I can’t find even 

my most Libertarian colleague who thinks that this is something 

that the local government should handle. So it’s not that the local 

government shouldn’t have a role, it’s just that they’re downstream 

from the decisionmaking process. And I think that’s what we’re all 

looking to accomplish. 

Do the other Members have any follow-up questions? 

Ms. HANABUSA. I have a comment. 

Senator SCHATZ. Representative Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Admiral, what we’re here to do, all of us, is to 

try to build back public confidence. So I understand what you’re 

saying, I understand readiness, and I understand the ability to empower. However, what we’re saying is if you are—put yourself in 

the shoes of someone out there. Who do they want to believe? 

That’s the issue. And actually, you can go back, and I’m sure—Admiral Harris and I have had this conversation, you can go back and 

tell the admiral—you should be proud of the fact that we are saying people would believe the military because it is, in their minds, 

an act of war. 

40 

FEMA has to wait for the President, everyone else. The FCC 

doesn’t have the authority to trigger anything. This is a situation 

where we want our people to know that if it comes over, and it 

should be throughout the United States, I agree with Senator 

Schatz, that, in fact, it comes from the best source that we have, 

not—and every time you have another person in there, you have 

a potential error. I’m not going to say that you will be absolutely 

perfect, but I’ll tell you what, January 13 should not have happened if it’s you, I would like to think, because you wouldn’t be out 

there triggering an alert because there is no alert to trigger. So 

that is, I think, the basis of what we are saying. 

And I think that the military should view it as a compliment, 

that we’re saying, hey, people believe in you. People want to see 

that whoever makes that decision doesn’t have all these other 

things that they’ve got to think about. You have the defense of this 

country and Hawaii, of course, very important to us. That’s the priority. 

Thank you. 

Senator SCHATZ. Well, thank the—— 

Senator HIRONO. Can I just add? 

Senator SCHATZ. Sure. Senator Hirono. 

Senator HIRONO. As we sit here and have this really robust discussion, is there some kind of a technical problem with the military, the DoD and PACOM, pressing the button that sends the 

alert to everybody in our state? Is there some technical problem 

with you folks having that initial responsibility? Because, yes, as 

we’re sitting here, we recognize that a missile alert, an attack, is 

an act of war and that this is not a localized weather condition or 

anything. So is there some way—is there a problem with you folks 

being able to press the alert button from your end? 

Admiral PIERCEY. There’s not—right now it’s not technically supported, but I could imagine that could be technically supported. 

Senator HIRONO. We can figure out, can’t we? 

Admiral PIERCEY. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator HIRONO. OK. Thank you. 

Senator SCHATZ. Well, thank the testifiers and bring in the new 

panel. Our third and final panel has Major General Joe Logan, Adjutant General, Hawaii—for the State of Hawaii and Hawaii Emergency Management Agency; and Mr. Chris Leonard, President and 

Legislative Chair for the Hawaii Association of Broadcasters. 

General Logan, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ARTHUR J. LOGAN, 

ADJUTANT GENERAL, AND DIRECTOR, 

HAWAII EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 

STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General LOGAN. Good morning, aloha, Senator Schatz—Senator 

Hirono had to step out—but Representative Hanabusa, Representative Gabbard. Thank you for the opportunity this morning. I am 

Major General Joe Logan, the Adjutant General of the State of Hawaii. I am also the Homeland Security Advisor to the Governor and 

the Director of Hawaii Emergency Management Agency. 

I provided my testimony this morning regarding Hawaii’s State 

warning systems and the steps that we are taking to ensure accuVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:13 Jan 02, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57801.TXT JACKIE
41 

rate and timely emergency notification to the public. You have my 

written testimony, and I will take just a few minutes for this opening statement. 

On January 13, 2018, the people of Hawaii and our visitors, including loved ones far away, suffered an unnecessary fear of a missile strike resulting from human error and a series of HI-EMA 

leadership failures. We’ve apologized for this incident, especially for 

the 30-minute delay in correcting the message error and providing 

accurate information to the majority of the public. 

Most important, we have been taking—we have taken immediate 

steps to guard against a false alert being sent and to ensure that 

such a delay will not happen again. While inexcusable, the false 

alert revealed systemic issues and provides opportunities to undertake corrective actions, thereby generating enduring solutions and 

rebuilding trust in Hawaii’s Emergency Management Agency. 

As you may already know, shortly after the incident, Governor 

Ige suspended all activities surrounding the ballistic missile alert 

campaign plan, including the additional wailing siren tone testing 

and the ballistic missile checklist rehearsal at the State Warning 

Point. Furthermore, Governor Ige directed us to develop a comprehensive Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High 

Explosive Annex to our 2014 Hawaii Catastrophic Plan prior to any 

further training on the ballistic missile alert. 

Under new management, HI-EMA has already implemented 

many recommendations from Brigadier General Retired Oliveira’s 

investigative report and Brigadier General Hara’s 30-day action 

plan report ordered under the Governor as Executive Order 18-01. 

We appreciate the support we have received from our military 

and Federal partners, and we look forward to continued collaboration as we implement the action steps identified in both reports. 

HI-EMA continues to provide timely and accurate alert and 

warnings and executes its role and responsibilities to ensure that 

the State of Hawaii is able to prepare for, respond to, and recover 

from all hazards, manmade or natural. This is evident by the January 23, 2018, tsunami warning, which, due to a 7.9 magnitude 

earthquake off Alaska threatened Hawaii and the West Coast of 

the United States. The tsunami warning came in at 23:40, or 11:40 

p.m., Monday, and the State Warning Point immediately went into 

action. And just after midnight, the Governor, the HI-EMA administrator, other staff members, and I were at the State Emergency 

Operations Center connected to the counties and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center awaiting further information and preparing 

to activate warning systems if necessary. The alert was canceled 

shortly after 1 a.m. I’ll reiterate that the system does work. 

Again, mahalo for the opportunity to be here this morning, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Logan follows:] 

42 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ARTHUR J. LOGAN, ADJUTANT GENERAL, 

AND DIRECTOR, HAWAII EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, STATE OF HAWAII, 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Aloha Chairman John Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and members of the Committee: 

I am Major General Arthur J. Logan, State Adjutant General, the Director of the 

Hawaii Emergency Management Agency (HIEMA), and the Homeland Security Advisor to Governor David Y. Ige. 

Mahalo for the opportunity to provide testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation regarding Hawaii’s False Missile Alert on 

January 13, 2018 and what we do next. 

I am here today to provide testimony, not to focus on the events of January 13, 

2018, as that has been covered extensively via an internal investigation, media coverage, media releases, and testimony at a State Joint Legislative Committee hearing 

on January 19, 2018. I would like to focus my testimony on the topics of what we 

have done, what are we doing in the short term and long term to improve our emergency management systems, and how we are regaining the trust of the people of 

Hawaii. 

Let me first state that the people of Hawaii and our visiting tourists, including 

loved ones far away, suffered unnecessary fear resulting from human error, exacerbated by a series of HIEMA leadership failures. These failures were in the domains 

of decision-making and communications evident by the time it took to correct the 

false alert message error and provide that information to the majority of the public. 

While inexcusable, the false alert revealed systemic issues and provides opportunities to undertake corrective actions thereby generating enduring solutions. 

Let me lay the ground work that set in motion the State of Hawaii being the first 

state in the Nation to identify the threat and, barring any Federal guidance, began 

a campaign plan to educate the population and further prepare for, and respond to, 

a ballistic missile threat. 

From January through November 2016, North Korea tested a nuclear device and 

fired some 20 ballistic missiles, each time improving its ballistic missile and nuclear 

capabilities. In January 2017, the Administrator of HIEMA and I discussed our concerns about this with the Governor and recommended that we plan and prepare for 

this threat and to inform the public about it. 

According to open source news reports, in 2017 North Korea launched 15 ballistic 

missiles and conducted another nuclear test. This nuclear test of a hydrogen bomb 

increased the earlier assessments from 15 kilotons to 150 kilotons. 

The experts tell us that the flight time of an ICBM from North Korea to the State 

of Hawaii is approximately 20 minutes. 

Further, we are told that it takes approximately 5 minutes after launch to determine the direction and likely target of the ICBM. This leaves Hawaii with approximately 15 minutes when we are notified that we are under a ballistic missile threat. 

Because time is of the essence with ballistic missile preparedness we began the 

campaign plan with development of a ballistic missile checklist for the State Warning Point (SWP) and a public outreach program, well before we completed a tangible 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Explosive (CBRNE) response 

Annex to Hawaii’s 2014 Catastrophic Plan. 

By law, the HIEMA is responsible for monitoring and issuing alerts and warnings. 

The SWP, a section of HIEMA, is tasked with the timely warning and notification 

to government, county warning points, emergency operations centers, and when directed, the public. 

Further, the State Department of Defense Public Affairs Office and the HIEMA 

Public Information Office are responsible to notify the public through the use of live, 

taped, print, and social media modes. These entities were trying everything humanly possible to get the word out to the public. The lack of adequate telecommunications capabilities in the Diamond Head Crater severely impacted HIEMAs ability 

to provide timely live news media feeds to the public. 

Immediate actions occurring as of January 13, 2018: 

While it took HIEMA 38 minutes to issue the ‘‘false missile alert’’ message via 

the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system, this capability continues to reside on 

the vendor HIEMA subscribes to that access Integrated Public Awareness Warning 

System (IPAWS). 

Governor Ige suspended all activities related to the Ballistic Missile Preparedness 

Campaign, including ballistic missile tone siren testing and SWP ballistic missile 

checklist rehearsals until a comprehensive CBRNE Annex is prepared. 

43 

The State Emergency Communications Committee met the day after this incident 

with appropriate broadcasting media agency heads and engineers to discuss the 

communications issues and to develop a way ahead. 

HIEMA has updated its Ballistic Missile Alert Checklist, which now provides 

greater clarity and standardization for the members of the SWP. 

Short-and long-range recommendations and actions: 

Governor David Ige issued Executive Order 18–01, directing BG Kenneth Hara, 

Deputy Adjutant General (DAG), to review current emergency response systems, including notifications and warnings, and make recommendations for improvement. 

His Initial Action Plan—30 day Report was released to the public on February 14, 

2018 and is available online via the Hawaii State Department of Defense website. 

(http://dod.hawaii.gov/blog/news-release/fma-final-report/) 

We, at the State Department of Defense and HIEMA, are implementing those recommendations and have tasked the new HIEMA Administrator, Thomas Travis, 

with the responsibility to track and report to myself and the DAG as to the status 

of each recommendation. 

HIEMA continues to work with the vendor that provides access to the IPAWS system and they have greatly enhanced the software so that there are color differences 

between test and real world alert icons to click on. We are also working on twofactor authentication with the vendor, however, this adds a complexity layer that 

would only be used for very specific alerts, such as a missile alert. 

The HIEMA Administrator has developed an action plan based on his initial assessment of the organization. He has briefed me and the DAG, and we concur with 

his assessment and action plan. His priorities are preparing a HIEMA Strategic 

Plan, realigning the organizational chart to cross-walk strategic goals and objectives 

with agency branches, and filling vacancies to help with accountability, roles and 

responsibilities. 

HIEMA is establishing internal processes and procedures to ensure supervisors 

are monitoring the performance of its subordinates, tracking training, and identifying training requirements for the established positions. 

The State Emergency Communication Committee is working to establish a comprehensive mass notification system between HIEMA and the broadcasting companies. 

HIEMA is working with the Department of Land and Natural Resources on a permit to locate a Cell on Wheels (COW) device to enhance wireless telecommunications within the crater. 

Hawai’i continues to have an outstanding relationship with FEMA. During the 

initial campaign plan FEMA provided a wealth of knowledge to HIEMA to prepare 

its outreach to the public. In fact, the Administrator or FEMA scheduled a visit to 

Hawaii prior to the January 13, 2018 event. 

Administrator Long, along with FEMA Regional IX Administrator Robert Fenton 

and others visited with U.S. Pacific Command, HIEMA, and Governor Ige, and discussed the lessons learned from Puerto Rico’s disaster recovery. They also discussed 

how FEMA can better assist State and Local governments to prepare for, respond 

to, and recover from major disasters. 

Mahalo. 

Senator SCHATZ. Mr. Leonard 

STATEMENT OF CHRIS LEONARD, PRESIDENT, 

HAWAII ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS 

Mr. LEONARD. Good morning, Senator Schatz, Senator Hirono, 

who is not with us right now, Congresswomen Hanabusa and 

Gabbard. My name is Chris Leonard and I am the President of the 

Hawaii Association of Broadcasters. On behalf of over 100 local television and radio broadcasters across the state, thank you for inviting me to testify today. 

I also bring the perspective today as the President and General 

Manager of New West Broadcasting Corp., a locally owned business 

that operates five radio stations on Hawaii Island, and as a member of the Committee tasked with updating Hawaii’s Emergency 

Alert System plan. 

44 

Broadcasters in Hawaii and across our great Nation play a vital 

role as the country’s first informer sometimes of emergency and 

disaster. Local stations have proven time and again that they will 

not hesitate to put themselves in harm’s way to deliver critical 

emergency information to their communities, whether it’s the recent false missile alert, Tropical Storm Iselle from a few years ago 

on my island, or Category 4 Hurricane Iniki on Kauai in 1992, local 

broadcasters are there providing lifeline information to the public 

before, during, and after a crisis. 

Often local broadcasters are the only available and reliable communications medium available during disasters. Our transmission 

systems are not subject to outages due to network congestion. The 

robust one-to-many nature of our technology and the redundancy 

provided by multiple broadcasters who have invested heavily in 

equipment and generators ensure that we are uniquely situated to 

remain on the air. FEMA has noted in the past that there is no 

more reliable source of information during emergencies than local 

broadcasters. 

On January 13, at 8:07, the Hawaii Emergency Management 

Agency issued a civil danger warning alert that automatically triggered wireless phones and EAS messages on radio and television 

stations across the state. I immediately raced out of my house and 

drove to my studios, and as I was driving, I heard the EAS message broadcast on my stations that said the U.S. Pacific Command 

has detected a missile threat to Hawaii, a missile may impact on 

land or sea within minutes, this is not a drill. 

I literally watched cars pull off the road as the message played 

instructing people to seek shelter immediately if you’re in a vehicle. 

I made it to my studios in about 7 minutes and immediately started fielding phone calls from panicked and confused listeners. And 

I, like many people, wanted to think that the warning couldn’t be 

true, but the message was clear that this is not a drill, and as a 

result, it wasn’t subject to my interpretation, nor was it subject to 

the interpretation of any other broadcasters. 

The EAS system was built to allow emergency managers immediate access to broadcast airwaves in times of national emergencies 

precisely because of the resiliency and reach of broadcasting. 

Broadcasters are required by Federal law to participate in the EAS 

program and to carry Presidential level alerts, but participation in 

State and local messages is voluntary. However, almost every 

broadcast station in Hawaii and the Nation see it as their duty to 

participate with their State plans. Thus, although the alert on January 13 was issued by the state, it was still carried by a majority 

of the stations across Hawaii. 

As a community member, I was troubled by the false missile 

alert and the level of responsiveness to correct it. As a broadcaster, 

I was and remain concerned about the procedural failings of that 

day. Broadcasters need to know that emergency messages have 

been thoroughly vetted and authenticated before they are sent to 

us, and emergency managers need to have confidence that broadcasters will disseminate those messages in accordance with the 

State plan. 

The same technology and systems that allowed emergency managers to immediately push out the false warning on air would have 

45 

also allowed them to immediately push out another message saying 

it was a mistake. According to the after-action reports, emergency 

managers knew the alert was a mistake almost immediately after 

sending it, yet it took 13 minutes to acknowledge that mistake on 

Twitter and another 25 minutes before a corrected EAS message 

went sent out under a different header code to broadcasters and, 

as a result, the public. In many cases, broadcasters informed audiences of the error in much less time than the 38 minutes it took 

for the second EAS alert to be issued. 

But make no mistake about it, the EAS system and the technology worked as it was intended. The underlying technology 

worked on that day. It was human procedure and implementation 

that failed to ensure its accuracy. 

Currently, and it has been discussed a bit here already today, 

our State’s EAS plan is significantly out of date. As the State 

Emergency Communications Committee revises its plan, the plan 

needs to thoroughly address the errors that occurred due to the 

shortfalls of the existing plan. Any new plan needs to, one, clearly 

define the roles and responsibilities of all EAS participants, both 

public and private; two, provide redundant communication paths to 

EAS participants and the public, both for EAS alerts and ideally 

for longer form emergency information; three, address rapid response issues and the ability to replay the message as needed, as 

the situation warranted on that particular day. 

On January 13, the EAS message played immediately after officials issued the alert. However, for residents and visitors that 

didn’t hear the initial broadcast, they had no way of knowing of the 

alert. As far as they were concerned, if they didn’t hear it, it didn’t 

exist, and that’s something that needs to be addressed. 

Emergency managers need the ability to repeat messages on an 

automated basis as the situation dictates, either by updated procedures in the State EAS plan or upgrades to the technology. 

In conclusion, the American public relies heavily on local radio 

and television broadcasting during times of emergency. On 

January 13, broadcasters fulfilled their duty and successfully 

transmitted the EAS message as intended to keep our communities 

informed. Unfortunately, we didn’t receive official corrective information in a timely manner, and, as a result, many of our State’s 

1.4 million people and nearly 200,000 visitors were scared and confused for a terrifying 38 minutes, and clearly the public deserves 

better. We must update and improve our State EAS plan, and 

broadcasters stand ready and committed to work with all stakeholders to do so. 

And with that, I thank you for your time and look forward to answering any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leonard follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRIS LEONARD, PRESIDENT, 

HAWAII ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS

Introduction 

Good morning, Senator Schatz, Senator Hirono, Congresswomen Hanabusa and 

Gabbard and members of the committee. My name is Chris Leonard and I am the 

President of the Hawaii Association of Broadcasters (HAB). On behalf of over 100 

local television and radio broadcasters across the state of Hawaii, thank you for inviting me to testify on ‘‘Hawaii’s False Missile Alert: What Happened and What 

46 

Should We Do Next.’’ In addition to my role at HAB, I am also the President and 

General Manager of New West Broadcasting Corp., a locally-owned business that 

operates five radio stations on Hawaii Island. I also serve as a member of the State 

Emergency Communications Committee (SECC) a group that is tasked with updating the State’s Emergency Alert System (EAS) plan. 

Hawaii’s radio and television broadcasters and broadcasters across our great nation play a vital role in emergency alerting. We are the country’s first informers and 

first choice for news and emergency updates. Local stations are an integral part of 

the communities that they serve and have proven time and again that they will not 

hesitate to put themselves in harm’s way to deliver critical emergency information 

to the public. Often times, local radio and television stations are the only available 

and reliable communications medium during disasters. Our transmission systems 

are not subject to outages due to network congestion. The robust ‘‘one-to-many’’ nature of our technology and the redundancy provided by multiple broadcasters who 

have invested heavily in equipment and generators ensure that we are uniquely situated to remain on-air and deliver critical information before, during and after natural disasters and other emergencies. The Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) has noted that there is no more reliable source of information during natural disasters than local broadcasters. Whether it’s a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico, the recent catastrophic hurricanes in Puerto Rico, Tropical Storm Iselle from a 

few years ago on my Island, or Category 4 Hurricane Iniki on Kauai in 1992, broadcasters are there providing crucial information to the public. We provide information 

to help people prepare prior to disasters, to keep safe during disasters and we help 

our communities recover and rebuild in the aftermath. Local broadcasters are committed to help the public and were committed to help on January 13, 2018. 

What happened on January 13 

On January 13 at approximately 8:07am, the Hawaii Emergency Management 

Agency issued an EAS and Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) alert using a Civil 

Danger Warning header. That alert automatically triggered wireless phone alerts 

and EAS broadcast alerts on radio and television stations across the state of Hawaii. 

The EAS messages were broadcast on New West Broadcasting’s five stations immediately after they were received, as they were on most radio and television stations 

across the state. 

I raced out of my house immediately. As I was heading to my studios, I heard 

the EAS message broadcast on my stations in Hilo that said: 

‘‘The U.S. Pacific Command has detected a missile threat to Hawaii. A missile 

may impact on land or sea within minutes . . . THIS IS NOT A DRILL. If you 

are indoors, stay indoors, if you are outdoors, seek immediate shelter in a building . . . If you are driving, pull safely to the side of the road and seek shelter 

in a building or lay on the floor. We will announce when the threat has ended. 

. . .’’ 

Cars were literally pulling off the road ahead of me as the message played. I made 

it to my studio in 7 minutes and immediately started fielding phone calls from panicked and confused listeners. 

I, like many people, wanted to think that the warning couldn’t be true, but the 

message was clear that ‘‘THIS IS NOT A DRILL.’’ It was not subject to my interpretation. Our stations received this message on a dedicated phone circuit that was installed by Hawaii’s Civil Defense Agency. We also received copies of the message 

via FEMA’s Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS) Common Alerting 

Protocol server. The EAS system was built to allow emergency managers immediate 

access to radio and television stations in times of national emergencies, precisely because of the resiliency and reach of broadcasting. Broadcasters are required by Federal law to participate in the EAS program and are required to auto-forward an 

Emergency Action Notification to all stations. Broadcaster participation in EAS for 

state and local messages is voluntary; however, almost every radio and television 

station in the state of Hawaii and around the country see it as their duty to participate in state and local emergency alerting in accordance with their state plans. The 

alert on January 13 was issued by the state and as such is considered a ‘‘state level’’ 

alert that was not required to be rebroadcast but was carried by the majority of 

radio and television stations across the state. 

As a community member I was troubled by the January 13 issuance of the false 

missile alert and the level of responsiveness to correct it post-issuance. As a broadcaster, I was and remain concerned about the procedural aspects of the issues that 

we faced on that day. The federal, state and local government along with various 

stakeholders (radio and television stations, wireless providers) have procedures in 

place that need to be followed. Broadcasters provide voluntary access to our airVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:13 Jan 02, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57801.TXT JACKIE
47 

waves to state and local emergency managers in times of emergency. We run monthly emergency management tests in compliance with Federal law and on a voluntary 

basis with the state. These tests instruct the public to ‘‘tune in to this station for 

more information.’’ Broadcasters take this responsibility and obligation seriously. 

For a threat of this level, we voluntarily provide direct access to our air chain. 

Emergency management officials can click a mouse and immediately be on-air on 

all of our stations. At the most basic level, broadcasters need to know that emergency messages have been thoroughly vetted and authenticated before they are sent 

to us and emergency managers need to have confidence that broadcasters will disseminate those messages in accordance with the state EAS plan. The same technology and systems that allowed emergency managers to push out a false warning 

immediately on-air through our stations would have also allowed them to push out 

another message saying it was a mistake. According to the after-action reports, 

emergency managers knew that the alert was a mistake almost immediately after 

sending it. It took 13 minutes to acknowledge the mistake on Twitter and—what 

I found extraordinarily upsetting—it took approximately another 25 minutes before 

that message was sent to broadcasters to share with the nearly 1.43 million residents of the state of Hawaii via broadcast radio and television. We have been telling 

the public for decades to tune-in to radio and television in times of emergencies and 

they have been conditioned to rely on that system. 

Where do we go from here? 

Make no mistake about it, the EAS system and its underlying technology worked 

as intended on January 13 in alerting the public; however, it was human procedure 

and implementation that failed. Broadcasters distributed the missile alert messages 

and, in many cases, informed audiences of the error in much less time than the 38 

minutes that it took for a second EAS alert to be issued by emergency management 

officials. I have referenced several times in this testimony the state EAS plan. According to 47 CFR 11.21, ‘‘EAS plans contain guidelines which must be followed by 

EAS participants personnel, emergency officials, and National Weather Service 

[NWS] personnel to activate the EAS. . . .’’ The state plans also ‘‘contain procedures 

for State emergency management and other State officials, the NWS, and EAS participants personnel to transmit emergency information to the public during a state 

emergency using the EAS. . . . The State plans must include specific information 

describing how such messages will be aggregated and distributed to EAS Participants within the state. . . .’’ The plans must be reviewed and approved by the 

Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau prior to implementation to ensure that they are consistent with national plans, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations and EAS operation. 

Currently our state’s EAS plan is out of date and is need of a significant rewrite 

to address the changes in technology and distribution methods that have happened 

since the plan’s last update in 2006. The SECC is tasked with the responsibility to 

rewrite this plan. The committee has met twice since January 13 and a rewrite of 

the plan is being worked on. The new state plan needs to thoroughly address the 

procedural errors that occurred on January 13 and address the shortfalls of the existing plan. It needs to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of all EAS participants. It needs to provide redundant communication paths to EAS participants 

and the public, both for EAS alerts and ideally for longer form emergency information as available. It must also address rapid-response issues and the ability to replay a message as needed. On January 13 the message played on radio and television stations across the state immediately after emergency management officials 

issued the alert. However for members of the public that didn’t hear the initial 

broadcasts, they had no way of knowing of the existence of the alerts. Emergency 

managers need to be able to have messages repeated on an automated basis as the 

situation dictates, either by updated procedures in the state EAS plan or upgrades 

to the technology. It is also imperative that local jurisdictions have the ability to 

activate EAS through the ‘‘daisy-chain system’’ from each local warning point 

whether they have connectivity to FEMA’s IPAWS servers or not. It is not a question of if, but when local jurisdictions will be cut off from network connectivity. Our 

state needs to have a plan to address this critical scenario for public safety. 

Conclusion 

We have spent many years training the public about where to tune-in during 

times of emergency. On January 13, broadcasters fulfilled their duty and successfully transmitted the EAS message as intended. Unfortunately, broadcasters did not 

receive official corrective information from emergency managers in a timely manner. 

As a result, many of the state’s 1.4 million people were scared and confused for approximately 38 minutes with little information available to them. Broadcasters were 

48 

left scrambling to try to figure out what was happening and to inform the public. 

The EAS technology worked to issue the first warning, however additional procedures were not in place to properly authenticate the warning nor to address the 

issuance of a false alert. The public deserves better. Although mistakes happen, 

proper procedures and implementation help prevent them and there should be plans 

on how to address them when they happen. We must update and improve our state 

EAS plan to fix many of the issues that we faced here in Hawaii on January 13. 

While the false missile warning happened in Hawaii, it presents an issue with national implications. We may face different disasters in different parts of the country, 

however the common thread is that emergency managers and broadcasters have a 

duty to inform the public in times of emergencies. Broadcasters are committed to 

work with all stakeholders to evaluate and greatly improve our public safety communications here in Hawaii and across the Nation. Thank you very much for your 

time. I am prepared to answer any questions that you may have. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you very much. 

General Logan, I want to ask you three questions. The first is 

about the chain of command. It’s HI-EMA Administrator to TAG to 

Governor, is that correct? 

General LOGAN. Yes. 

Senator SCHATZ. And is that in all cases? In other words, including in a case of emergency, the Governor does not—the HI-EMA 

Administrator is not a direct report to the Governor, is that correct? 

General LOGAN. No, but he could be. If I am out of state, he 

could be, yes. 

Senator SCHATZ. If you’re out of state, it doesn’t go to the Deputy 

Adjutant General, it goes to the HI-EMA Administrator. 

General LOGAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator SCHATZ. OK. Does that make sense? Is that the best way 

to do this? 

General LOGAN. I think so. 

Senator SCHATZ. So, you know, I met with General Hara. You 

and I have had several conversations. There’s a lot of work going 

on at HI-EMA, the legislature is doing their oversight, and in my 

view, there has been an appropriate focus on policies and procedures, but if you kind of get into that room in those moments, you 

know, it wasn’t a question of the right policy, you know, not being 

in a binder to be, you know, pulled off the shelf, referred to, and 

executed. To me, the more you hear about exactly what went on 

in that room and the confusion and the—like I said, the being frozen in space, the arguing among staffers, the shifting of blame, the 

lack of clarity about whether you needed to get clearance from 

FEMA, and I’ll just add that we all know now that they didn’t need 

clearance from FEMA. But I will tell you, if they did need clearance from FEMA, even if a statute or a rule said they needed clearance from FEMA, somebody ought to have violated that statute or 

rule to make sure all of us knew we weren’t going to die, and that’s 

the kind of initiative that you want in an emergency management 

agency. 

And so I guess the question I have for you is, How much of this 

is policy and procedure and statute, and how much of it is organizational culture? And what do you think is the path forward for 

HI-EMA in terms of fixing what I think is clearly a broken organizational culture? 

General LOGAN. Well, I think had, you know, myself or the Deputy Adjutant General been in or the Administrator been in HIVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:13 Jan 02, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57801.TXT JACKIE
49 

EMA at the time of the false alert, you would have seen that initiative being taken. We have—I’m allowing Mr. Travis to assess his 

organization now and see where he can—where he needs to be 

changed. And he has already come forward to me with his initial 

assessment. He has identified some key areas that need some— 

some change and some updates, some training. And so he is working towards that, and I’m giving that latitude to—— 

Senator SCHATZ. I will just convey to you and to him that I think 

all of that is great, but I don’t want to focus just on resources, 

which may be an issue, the physical plan, which may be an issue, 

training, staff salary, policies and procedures. All of that sounds 

like an appropriate set of priorities to work on, but organizational 

culture is tougher to talk about and tougher to fix, but it seems to 

me foundational to what happened on that day. 

General LOGAN. Yes, sir, and I agree. And one of the issues and 

concerns that we’ve identified quickly is the lack of a strategic plan 

in HI-EMA that would set the culture, set a vision and mission for 

what they need to do. 

Shortly after the incident, I sat down with most of the HI-EMA 

members and I talked about Simon Sinek’s book ‘‘Start With Why,’’ 

and why do they do what they do and why—the State Warning 

Point is so important to 1.4 million people, and they are the tip of 

the spear to keep safety and security throughout the State of Hawaii and to inform them timely and accurately. 

There seemed to have been a culture where that was lacking. In 

the operations piece, not in the Preparedness Branch, not in other 

branches, but in that specific Operations Branch, that seemed to be 

lacking. 

Senator SCHATZ. Is it true that the person who clicked on the erroneous missile alert button on the screen is paid around $40,000 

a year? 

General LOGAN. I’m not sure what their salary is, but I know it’s 

fairly low. We are looking at the position descriptions for the State 

Warning Point and trying to figure out what is the right and adequate pay for that. Are they similar to Honolulu Police Department 

dispatchers? Are they similar to other Warning Point? They have 

a—because they have a reason and expectation, as you mentioned 

earlier, for initiative and take action, we believe that should be 

higher, so we’re working through that now. 

Senator SCHATZ. Mr. Leonard, just a quick question. When—I 

know you’ve been deeply engaged, thank you, as a volunteer in the 

SECC, and I’m wondering when you think a new plan will be ready 

and submitted to the FCC. And are you already working with 

FEMA and the FCC in terms of getting the expertise necessary to 

have a functional plan? 

Mr. LEONARD. I can’t speak to the exact date. It is in the works. 

We will have another meeting later this month. It is my expectation that we should have some draft language for that plan by that 

time. I’ve had numerous conversations with FEMA and with the 

FCC, both as a broadcaster and as a member of that committee, 

and it’s much needed. It will provide quite a bit of guidance and 

hopefully will address a number of the issues that we faced on January 13. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you. 

50 

Representative Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Senator Schatz. 

General Logan, I want to understand some of the things you 

said. But first I want it to be clear to everyone, that as the—we 

call you the TAG, The Adjutant General—you are not simply in 

charge of the—basically the Guard Army or the Guard Air. You actually have other divisions, if we were to do an organizational chart 

on you. Isn’t that true? 

General LOGAN. Yes, I have six divisions. 

Ms. HANABUSA. You have six divisions. So taking away the 

Guard Air and the Guard Army, can you name the other six divisions? 

General LOGAN. Yes. I have the Office of Homeland Security, I 

have the Youth Challenge program, I have the Office of Veterans 

Services, and HI-EMA. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So HI-EMA actually is a division under you, so 

you are responsible for HI-EMA, correct? 

General LOGAN. That’s correct. 

Ms. HANABUSA. OK. Now, given that, given that, can you tell us 

how your time is spent? Like how much time would you say, a percentage of a pie, for example, is Guard duty, taking care of the two 

Guard units, Veterans, Homeland Security, Teen Challenge, HIEMA? 

General LOGAN. Ma’am, I don’t—I don’t divvy up my time. I go 

based on what sometimes first come, first served, and where I can 

fit it in my schedule. Being that I have so many things, it’s an interesting question that you ask. A fairly new TAG of Alaska who 

came on shortly after I did, she has similar hats that I wear, and 

she asked that very question, ‘‘How do you divide up that time?’’ 

and you can’t. I devote as much time as I can to each of those divisions. But I will say I have leadership in each of those divisions. 

I have an administrator of HI-EMA. I have an administrator of 

Homeland Security. I have a director that runs the Youth Challenge program. I have two general officers who run the Army and 

the Air National Guard. And I have a deputy. So I have layers of 

ability to help me manage all of that. 

Ms. HANABUSA. OK. Then let me ask you this. You said, in response to Senator Schatz, that had you been there, and I think you 

were talking about basically what we call Diamond Head, I mean, 

had you been there, this would not have happened. Isn’t that what 

you said? 

General LOGAN. No, I wouldn’t say the false alert wouldn’t have 

happened, I said the reaction and the initiative to get it quickly 

fixed probably would have been shorter. 

Ms. HANABUSA. OK. So tell me this: When you found out about 

the false missile alert, it was within a couple of minutes, as I recall. 

General LOGAN. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Correct? Then I assume you were in Hawaii, 

weren’t you? 

General LOGAN. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Then I assume you probably went immediately 

to Diamond Head. Is that correct? 

51 

General LOGAN. I did not go immediately. I was on Joint Base 

Pearl Harbor-Hickam. We were at a family readiness group with 

the senior leadership of the National Guard and our spouses talking about what we can do next for our soldiers and airmen. 

Ms. HANABUSA. But the alert went off, right? 

General LOGAN. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So you knew the alert went off? 

General LOGAN. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So why would you have physically been required 

to respond at Diamond Head? Why couldn’t you have taken care of 

it immediately from where you were? 

General LOGAN. Because of the congestion of the phone. I got an 

initial call out within a minute or two talking to the State Warning 

Point, understood that it was a false—a false alert. I then tried to 

get a hold of Vern Miyagi, the Administrator. I couldn’t get in 

touch with him. He might have been trying to call. I couldn’t get 

back into the State Warning Point. And from that point, I fielded 

numerous, some 37, phone calls, texts, and e-mails over that period. 

Ms. HANABUSA. When did you get into your car and go to Diamond Head? 

General LOGAN. Maybe about 10 or 12 minutes later. 

Ms. HANABUSA. 10 or 12 minutes later. 

General LOGAN. Yes. Because I couldn’t drive and talk on the 

phone at the same time. I had two phones going, and I needed 

to—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. But you could not—even in the 10 to 12 minutes, 

you still couldn’t clarify what was going on from where you were 

at Pearl Harbor. 

General LOGAN. I knew what was—I mean, I knew what was occurring, but I didn’t know what was going on outside the base. 

Ms. HANABUSA. You said on January 18, as an indicator of how 

the system works—— 

General LOGAN. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA.—you said that there was a tsunami, you went 

over there, you took care of it, and it shows how the system works. 

Do you remember that testimony? 

General LOGAN. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So tell me, how long did it take you to get to Diamond Head? I assume that’s where you were for that system to 

work. And what was the time from the time it went out to the time 

that you decided that, you know, it’s an ‘‘all clear’’? 

General LOGAN. The ‘‘all clear’’ message—well—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. We’re talking about January 18. You said the 

system works. I want to know, how can you say that? What is it 

that happened that you can sit here today and tell us the system 

works? Why did the system work on January 18 and didn’t work 

on January 13? 

General LOGAN. Well, we didn’t put out any warnings. We didn’t 

put out any—we didn’t sound any sirens, we didn’t sound—we 

didn’t put out any wireless or emergency alert system notifications 

because we didn’t have to. And so the news was on—the media was 

on the stations reporting the tsunami, and as soon as Pacific Tsunami Warning Center gave the ‘‘all clear,’’ that was immediately 

52 

broadcast into the television. So it wasn’t—the public wasn’t—addressed to the public yet because we didn’t—we didn’t know what 

the threat was to Hawaii. We were still waiting for the Tsunami 

Warning Center to let us know, yes, there is in fact a tsunami coming. There are buoys out there that have to be measured, have to 

be watched, and they make the decision. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I’m very familiar with the buoy system. I understand that. So that’s the reason why it worked, because you never 

sounded an alarm. That’s basically what you’re saying. 

General LOGAN. Yes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Senator Schatz. 

Senator SCHATZ. Representative Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. Thank you both for being here. 

Mr. Leonard, how much of the current outdated EAS plan is 

dedicated to addressing broadcast communications, given our residents in Hawaii really will learn about a natural disaster or a 

threat incoming through two main sources, the EAS system and 

our local broadcasters? 

Mr. LEONARD. I think part of the issue with the current plan is 

it does not thoroughly address IPAWS, which has been in play for 

a number of years now. Some of the daisy-chain participants are 

not properly identified in there, and that needs to be updated. And 

then I think the big factor, and this plays into the situation on January 13th, the event codes—there’s a table that has event codes for 

everything, and we all understand what a tsunami watch is or a 

tsunami warning is. We issued a CDW and CEM, a Civil Danger 

Warning and a Civil Emergency Message, and nobody really had 

a relationship between that and a ballistic missile attack. While 

those both were codes that were in the 2003 plan, which was last 

updated in 2006, there was really no clarification as to what those 

were for, and at the State and local level, the participation is voluntary. 

It’s my belief that most of our broadcasters, when we update the 

plan and we provide an updated list of codes and say, ‘‘These are 

the things that we want you to auto-forward,’’ most of them will 

do that, I would be willing to bet that almost all of them will do 

that. But we need to provide some guidance on that, and we need 

to be able to provide some clarity, and CDW or CEM, Civil Danger 

Warning, Civil Emergency Message, were things that weren’t really 

fully understood. 

Thankfully, we didn’t have to worry about that a whole lot until 

recently, and now this has obviously brought about a new discussion that we have to find some answers to and make sure that all 

of the partners, both private and public, are all on the same page, 

and that’s really what the plan will help do, and it will solidify 

that. 

Ms. GABBARD. And are you fairly confident through the SECC 

and the work that you guys have been doing and are doing that 

the updated plan will include that information? 

Mr. LEONARD. Yes, absolutely. 

Ms. GABBARD. Good. 

General Logan, you know, in the report that General Hara 

issued, there were obviously a number of things that were noted, 

but one of them was talking about the robust public outreach camVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:13 Jan 02, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57801.TXT JACKIE
53 

paign that was conducted, I think you, HI-EMA, called it Ballistic 

Missile Preparedness Phase 1—— 

General LOGAN. Yes. 

Ms. GABBARD.—that went through I think the majority of the 

second half of last year. And while, you know, I’ve seen the numbers, you know, 41 town halls, meeting engagements, radio ads, 

and public service announcements, and so on, you know, the reality 

was that beyond the mantra of, ‘‘Get inside, stay inside, stay 

tuned,’’ that really people didn’t have any idea what to do beyond 

that, and that included individuals as well as some of the business 

owners that we saw who were just telling people, ‘‘Get out of here.’’ 

What kind of information and what is the outreach plan to actually make sure that people are armed with accurate and factual information and know what to do? 

General LOGAN. That’s correct. And we are working towards 

that, and that’s why we are looking at one is a strategic plan for 

HI-EMA, but number two is the CBRNE annex to our catastrophic 

plan, and that would help us outline. 

I think part of the issue, what we had, is we developed the ballistic alert campaign plan in three phases, so you just mentioned. 

Phase 1 was a public outreach and to understand and speed up the 

notifications between PACOM/FEMA to the State Warning Point, 

and we could put out the alert to the public. So that was Phase 

1. 

So what we did is we really started flying the plane before we 

built the whole plan. And so Phase 2 was to sit down with stakeholders and identify what’s—what we need to do to react and respond—how do we respond to and recover from a ballistic missile 

or nuclear, biological, chemical attack? And then Phase 3 is to actually write the plan out with our stakeholders. So we never got— 

we didn’t get that far this—unfortunately because we—of certain 

protocols we did not have in place on the 13th allowed for the ballistic—the false alert to go out, and that took us time to—because 

we didn’t put on the back end a way to correct the false alert, we 

couldn’t turn it off right—— 

Ms. GABBARD. And are the plans in place currently? Admiral 

Piercey mentioned, you know, DoD is ready to stand in support and 

provide DSCA support. Are the plans in place with HI-EMA, DoD, 

FEMA, DHS, to respond to a WMD attack? 

General LOGAN. We have the capability today to take the call 

and to send out the alert warning as intended, as it worked on January 13. We also have—we also have a way to turn it off if we sent 

out an accidental. We also have a way to get—— 

Ms. GABBARD. Right. But I’m talking about in the event of an attack, what are the—are the response plans in place working—— 

General LOGAN. Don’t know yet. 

Ms. GABBARD. There are no response plans in place. 

General LOGAN. No, we—we’re trying to gather and understand 

completely what that means. HI-EMA is working through its Preparedness Branch, but we are working on letting a contract to 

allow an outside agency with a little more expertise to come in and 

help us because we just don’t have the manpower to write the 

annex and continue with day-to-day operations. So—— 

54 

Ms. GABBARD. Are you aware of DoD or FEMA, who obviously 

are much larger agencies, working through these plans in an interagency capacity? 

General LOGAN. Yes. So our outreach plan is with them also, to 

bring in all of the stakeholders from outside to help us draft this 

plan and understand what—what the impact is—probably a bad 

term—but what the result would be of an actual missile impact 

and what is the response requirements for all of that. 

Ms. GABBARD. And you already have modeling, though, that you 

are using to identify what are the likely scenarios of attack, what 

the likely points of impact would be, and how far-reaching they 

would go specific to Hawaii. 

General LOGAN. Yes. We have modeling that can place over what 

we may think likely targets that would understand what the impact is. 

Ms. GABBARD. And has that modeling been made public? 

General LOGAN. I don’t believe so. 

Ms. GABBARD. Why not? 

General LOGAN. I’m not sure. I think there is modeling available 

on the FEMA website. So you can take a look at that. And we’re 

using their data also. So, yes, it is out there to the public. 

Ms. GABBARD. OK. I’m over my time, but I think it’s really important as you’re looking at communication and preparedness and 

response that, A, the public knows and understands the reality of 

the seriousness of the threat, what the reality of the impact would 

be in event of an attack, and to better equip the response plans. 

One of the other things that was mentioned in General Hara’s 

report was the fact that we don’t have fallout shelters. So what is 

being done to change that, to fix that, given the reality of the 

threat that we’re facing today? There are a number of things obviously that we’ve got to follow up on really. A lot of this focus has 

been on what led up to this false missile alert attack, but obviously 

this is a major wake-up call to see what response plans are in 

place. How are individuals as well as the Federal Government and 

State government reacting to and responding to such an attack? 

General LOGAN. Absolutely. And we’ve corrected the error that 

created the situation of the false missile alert. That I won’t say will 

never happen again, but we’ve put in all the protocols and worked 

with the software vendor, updated the page that you see and the 

operator would see. It’s color-coded, and so it’s much better than 

it was on January 13. 

The outreach program that we started identified, you know, a 

number of casualties and impact areas, the widespread. So we tried 

to get out as much information as we could to the public as we 

were briefing them on our public outreach plan if they were there 

present while we were giving it. It’s also on the HI-EMA website, 

so you can look at the prepared—— 

Ms. GABBARD. I think, if I recall, the projections that were put 

out, the information that was put out, you know, I think it had 

something like, you know, only 10 percent of the state population 

would die in this scenario, which, you know, when you look at it’s 

130-, 140,000—— 

General LOGAN. Right. 

55 

Ms. GABBARD.—people, given that projection, but it failed to include the fact that, as an island state, water—you know, the response plan, the support plan. So you can talk about the numbers 

of people who would perish in the event of the attack itself, but in 

the aftermath of that and the weeks coming, especially if you’re 

dealing with a nuclear or biological attack, what are the realistic 

scenarios and the responses that—the plans that need to be in 

place to deal with that? 

General LOGAN. Exactly. And that’s why the Governor postponed 

the continuation of our public outreach plan and the continuation 

of the checklist rehearsals inside the State Warning Point, even 

though they’ve updated the rehearsal checklist, and he has tasked 

us to put the plan together so we know how to respond to and how 

to recover from and what entities from the United States Federal, 

military, and other agencies that would descend upon the state to 

help us respond to and recover from this type of disaster. 

Ms. GABBARD. Yes. 

General LOGAN. And so we are leaning way forward than any 

other State and Territory, other than Guam, they are trying to stay 

up with us, because they were physically threatened by a North 

Korean leader that he was going to shoot missiles at Guam. 

And so in our ability to lean way ahead, we didn’t do everything 

we should have done on the checklist to put in the proper ways to 

basically alert the public quicker and faster that it was a false 

alert. 

Ms. GABBARD. And I think this is the issue that our legislation 

is trying to address because this is a much bigger issue than just 

Hawaii, and it’s something that the entire country has to deal with 

and the Federal Government needs to take the lead on. Thank you. 

General LOGAN. Thank you. 

Senator SCHATZ. Second round for Representative Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Senator Schatz. 

Mr. Leonard, how long have you been on the SECC? 

Mr. LEONARD. The SECC had not met for a number of years. I 

was part of the group that signed off on the original plan on behalf 

of the Hawaii Association of Broadcasters back in 2003. And the 

Committee had not convened since—I can’t give you an exact date, 

but it hadn’t convened in a number of years. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So who convenes the Committee? Who says, ‘‘OK, 

you guys meet’’? 

Mr. LEONARD. It is chaired by Courtney Harrington. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So in the interim from 2003 or 2006, whichever 

one is the report, Hawaii instituted this whole issue with the missile alert and so forth. There is no incorporation in any plan of this 

new warning system that they’ve put in? 

Mr. LEONARD. So IPAWS has been up and operational for a number of years. It is not addressed in our existing State plan, but it 

has been the operational mechanism for most of the EAS alerts. 

One of the things that we’ve talked about quite a bit as we become 

reliant upon new technology, IPAWS is wonderful, it provides 

greater detail, greater access, but one of the things that we’ve been 

concerned about as well is that networks go down. We saw that in 

the Gulf. We saw that in Puerto Rico. And broadcasters have been 

looking at fortifying their facilities and looking at it, providing reVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:13 Jan 02, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57801.TXT JACKIE
56 

dundant power, redundant equipment, redundant transmission 

sites in some cases, so that we can stay on through those situations. But the plan has not kept pace with the operational practice. 

Ms. HANABUSA. So you don’t even have IPAWS included in the 

plan, so you don’t have—— 

Mr. LEONARD. It’s not—it’s not currently included. 

Ms. HANABUSA.—you definitely haven’t addressed anything like 

a false missile alert or anything like that. 

Mr. LEONARD. Well, and I think what’s even more important and 

beyond just a false missile alert is a rapidly changing situation. In 

this particular case, the fast-changing situation was that we made 

a mistake and issued a wrong alert. But if you were to look at a 

train derailment in the Midwest in a chemical car, and we say, 

‘‘OK, everybody shelter in place,’’ and the winds shift, and now that 

changing situation is we need to evacuate everybody; or wildfires 

in California, it jumps a firebreak, I think our ability to rapidly respond or change the messaging for whatever reason, whether it’s 

erroneous or changing scenarios, needs to very clearly be addressed 

in our plans. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

General Logan, you know, something that you’ve been saying 

that bothers me is that you talk about now we’re developing the 

plan. So it seems like, was getting—trying to be the first state to 

even have a ballistic missile kind of warning system, was that premature? Because now you’re suspended it. Because you don’t have 

the critical answers to what Congresswoman Gabbard asked you. 

OK, so what do you do? So, yes, warning is one thing, but what 

do you do? Because, you know, it makes no sense to have people 

trying to protect their children by putting them into storm drains 

or telling them to get off the road, or people trying to get home because they want to be with their family. This is the end, they want 

to be with their family. So you’ve got all these other things. 

So why did—why did we do what we did? You’re the head of HIEMA. I mean, why did—why did you do what you did without everything else in place? 

General LOGAN. If you look at my testimony and you look at 

what was happening in 2014, 2015, and 2016, North Korea was firing off multiple ballistic missiles. They were firing—they were 

doing underground nuclear testing. They were threatening the 

United States, Guam, and Hawaii. We, myself and the emergency 

management organization, went to the Governor and said, ‘‘Sir, we 

believe we are—,’’ we’ve already been threatened, we believe this 

is escalating, there are more and more missile tests. He fired more 

missiles than his predecessors had fired. So we felt—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. But he has fired four at Japan, General. And we 

all know that the Earth is round, and we all know that Seattle is 

500 miles closer than we are. So the question is, Why, when you 

didn’t have all the necessary components in place, did you decide 

that we needed to do this? Because it seems like all that we had 

was possibly the Cold War plans that you kind of dusted off and 

said, ‘‘OK, this is what we’re going to do.’’ 

General LOGAN. Right. So as I explained to Representative 

Gabbard, we—we developed a campaign plan with three phases. 

We started with Phase 1—right?—based on the threat and based 

57 

off that we needed to inform the public that we at least—we only 

have 15 minutes from the time of launch to the time that it would 

impact. 

Ms. HANABUSA. That’s right. 

General LOGAN. That doesn’t leave Hawaii residents a lot of time 

to do anything. So the shorter—the reduced amount of time for notification and the more time I give the citizens of the State of Hawaii, the residents and visitors, more time to get inside and stay 

inside, the more people will survive. So that’s the point we did 

based on the—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. So you made the decision, as the head of HIEMA, that we are—we should do this, that we should have this 

missile alert plan, even if we can’t tell people what it means to 

shelter in place, or if it comes, what do you do? You decided that 

what we’re going to do is we’re going to have this alert, that that 

was going to be what HI-EMA was proposing to the Governor. So 

is that—is that your testimony here today? 

General LOGAN. That’s exactly what we did. Based on the threat, 

we needed to do something, and we were going to do a three-phase 

operation, building the second part, which is, How do you respond 

to and recover from? 

Ms. HANABUSA. Did the PACOM tell you or somebody tell you 

that we are the target, Hawaii is the target? Is that why you decided that we needed to have this in place, even if we don’t have 

really anything in place? Your testimony here today confirms it, we 

don’t have anything in place. 

General LOGAN. I didn’t mean—— 

Ms. HANABUSA. We don’t even have this testing anymore, because everything is suspended. We don’t have it. 

General LOGAN. Because my duties and responsibilities in state 

law require that the safety of the people of the State of Hawaii, it 

is part of my responsibility as Director of emergency management, 

I felt that it was imperative that we do something rather than just 

wait for a launch and then try to react. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And, of course, you realize that that would be an 

act of war and that it would be something within the defense of 

Title 10 as opposed to your Title 32 status—— 

General LOGAN. I fully understand that, but the consequence 

management relies on the State emergency management office. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you very much, Senator Schatz. 

Senator SCHATZ. I want to thank the testifiers. I want to thank 

all three of our panels. I want to thank the good Commerce Committee staff, the congressional delegation and their staff, our community partners. 

There are several lines of inquiry and effort to be talked about. 

Obviously, we need best practices. There are lots of Federal public 

policy questions to be addressed. There are funding questions. 

There are organizational culture questions. But in the end, all of 

this comes down to restoring public confidence in the system. 

We have been blessed over the many years in Hawaii to be able 

to rely upon our Emergency Management Agency to inform us 

when there’s a hurricane, when there is any other kind of weather 

event, and that partnership has been absolutely productive and 

certainly kept us safe. 

58 

And so as we move forward, again, we’re going to be clear-eyed 

about what mistakes were made, we’re going to be tough on these 

issues, but we have to focus on one thing, and one thing only, 

which is restoring the public’s confidence in this alert system. 

So I thank everybody. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ