IN THE COURT OFAPPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Inthe Matterofthe Guardianship of ] NO. 68419-1-1 

## ARTHURD. HAYS. j ARTHURD.HAYS, j DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION r-o

25 —*,c a'~7',.. Appellant, ]

v. cro c5<•" REBECCA CASTILLEJA, CO "-;-'-'. Respondent. i FILED: August26, 2013 Leach, C.J.

— In this contested guardianship proceeding, Arthur Hays 

### seeks review ofthree issues concerning the trial court's award ofattorney fees and costs to the successful petitioner, Rebecca Castilleja. He challenges the reasonableness ofthe fee award, the court's decision to assess the entire award 

### against hisestate, and the court's decision toenterits judgmentimmediately. He also moves to supplement the record with the guardian's inventory report and 

### budget. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in approving 

### Castilleja's fee petition and in giving the guardian discretion to apportion the fee award and Hays did not timelyappeal the court's decision to enter its judgmentNO. 68419-1-1/2 immediately, we affirm. Because Hays's motion to supplementthe record fails to meet RAP 9.11(a)'s requirements, we deny his motion. FACTS Arthur D. Hays accumulated substantial wealth operating a wholesale distributing business and acquiring real property to store his merchandise. He is the trustee and beneficiary ofthe Hays FamilyTrust. When his wife died in 1980, her estate was transferred into this trust. He has been the manager of Hays Elliott Properties LLC (HEP) since he created it in 1999. HEP owns and manages real property. In 2000, Hays created three irrevocable trusts. Each trust owns shares of HEP. Castilleja, Hays's daughter, became the successor trustee ofeach trust in2008. Hays also maintains a collection ofvintage vehicles and owns the Hays Distributing Corporation, a wholesale distributing business. 

### Additionally, he owns property in Suquamish, Washington, that is part of the Hays Millers Bay Limited Partnership; a residence inthe Magnolia neighborhood in Seattle; a condominium inthe Alkiarea; and real estate on West Commodore 

### Way. The case involves assets valued at approximately$28 million. In March 2011, Castilleja filed a petition seeking the appointment of a 

### guardian ofHays's estate. Hays's son Howard supported the guardianship, but 

### Hays and his son Robert opposed it. On November 18, 2011, after a six-day bench trial, the trial court found Hays incapacitated as to his estate. The courtNO. 68419-1-1/3 

### appointed an independent professional guardian, finding, "There isfamily conflict 

### and all ofMr. Hays' children at any given timecould stand to benefitfrom any decision or error that Mr. Hays might make, thus making appointment of a guardian independentofthefamily necessary." 

### In the November 18 order, the court also concluded that Castilleja should
recover her reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred bringing the guardianship action. The court's order provides for the determination of the 

### reasonableness ofthese fees "underthe lodestar measure by separate motion." 

### The court ordered the guardian tofile an inventory of Hays's propertywithin three
months. 

### On February 1, 2012, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of 

### Castilleja for $380,592.92, representing $352,755.36 in attorney fees and 

### $27,837.56 in costs. The judgment authorized the guardian to pay it and provided forpaymentfrom "the guardianship estate and/orany otherasset/entity inwhich Mr.Arthur Hays has a beneficial interest." On February 29, Hays filed a notice ofappeal, seeking review of both the February 1, 2012, order and designated portions of the November 18, 2011, order. On May 7, 2012, Hays filed a motion to supplementthe record.

-3-NO. 68419-1-1/4

STANDARD OF REVIEW We apply a two-part standard to review a trial courtjudgment awarding 

### attorneyfees: "(1) we review de novo whetherthere is a legal basis forawarding attorney fees by statute, under contract, or in equity and (2) we review a discretionary decision to award or deny attorney fees and the reasonableness of 

### anyattorney fee award for an abuse ofdiscretion."1 The parties do notdispute 

### the statutory basis2 for the court's authority to award attorney fees. Thus, we applythe second partofthis review standard. When reviewing a trial court's decision for abuse of discretion, we will uphold the decision unless it is "'manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on 

### untenable grounds, orfor untenable reasons.'"3 Acourt makes a manifestly unreasonable decision if it falls outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard; a court bases its decision on untenable grounds ifthe record does not support the court's factual findings; a 

### 1Ganderv. Yeaqer, 167 Wn. App. 638, 647, 282P.3d 1100 (2012); see RCW 11.96A.150 (trial court and appellate court have discretion to order costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to be awarded to any party in guardianship matters); see also In re Estate of Black, 153 Wn.2d 152, 173, 102 P.3d 796 (2004) ("[RCW 11.96A.150] leaves the award of attorney fees to the discretion of the court, and we will not interfere with a trial court's fee determination unless 'there are facts and circumstances clearly showing an abuse of the trial court's discretion.'" (quoting In re Estate ofLarson, 103 Wn.2d 517, 521, 694 P.2d 1051 (1985))). 2RCW11.96A.150. 

### 3 Black, 153 Wn.2d at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Statev. Downing, 151 Wn.2d 265, 272, 87 P.3d 1169 (2004)). -4-NO. 68419-1-1/5

court bases its decision on untenable reasons if it uses an incorrect standard or 

### the facts do not meet the correct standard's requirements.4
ANALYSIS 

### Hays claims that the trial court abused its discretion "(1) [b]y concluding 

### that all of the petitioner's fees were reasonable; (2) by failing to properly articulate the basis for its decision; and (3) by failing to properly consider all relevant factors, including[] whether the particular actions taken by the petitioner's counsel benefitted Mr. Hays." Wedisagree. 

### Hays challenges the reasonableness of the attorney fee award on three grounds: (1) the court failed to make findings showing that itconsidered the 

### factorsin RPC 1.5(a), (2) the courtfailed toperform a lodestaranalysis, and (3) the court failed to respond adequately to Hays's objections. We reject these arguments. First, Hays claims that the trial court should have stated how the factors 

### enumerated in RPC 1.5(a) affected its fee decision. RPC 1.5(a) states, in relevant part, The factors to be considered indetermining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: 

### (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 

### 4In reMarriage ofLittlefield. 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997) (citingStatev. Rundguist, 79 Wn. App. 786, 793, 905 P.2d 922 (1995)). -5-NO. 68419-1-1/6 (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employmentby the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged inthe locality for similarlegal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length ofthe professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; (8) whetherthe fee is fixed or contingent; and (9) the terms of the fee agreement between the lawyer and the client, including whetherthe fee agreement or confirming writing demonstrates that the client had received a reasonable and fair disclosure of material elements of the fee agreement and of the 

### lawyer'sbilling practices.[5] Specifically, Hays asserts that the court failed to apply the first, third, fourth, and seventh factors and that "had the trial court properly considered the relevant factors, it would have reached the inevitable conclusion that the total fees were excessive for the establishment of a guardianship ofthe estate." He bases this assertion upon the absence of any specific finding applying these factors. He contends that the case presented no novel issues about the establishmentof a guardianship; that Castilleja's attorneys offered excessive and irrelevantevidence; thatthe participation of two attorneys produced an excessive combined hourly rate, although the individual rate for each attorney was reasonable; that counsel expended considerable time presenting irrelevant 

### 5 Hays cites the former rule, which contained only eightfactors. The current rule includes nine factors.NO. 68419-1-1/7



### evidence ofassets Hays previouslytransferred to HEP, which had an operating agreement addressing the incapacity of its manager; and that Castilleja's attorneys should have been more efficient because of their experience in guardianship law and "excellent reputations" in providing representation in guardianship proceedings. 

### Hays citesIn re Guardianship ofHallauer6 to support his contention, but he cites the plaintiff's argument in the case rather than the court's holding. In fact, in Hallauer, we cited our Supreme Court's unanimous decision in McNearv 

### v. American Cvanimid Co.,7 that to determine whether attorney fees are reasonable, the factors in RPC 1.5(a) "should be used as 'guidelines.'"8 More recently, in Mahler v. Szucs.9 our Supreme Court held, "[CJourts should be guided incalculating fee awards bythe lodestar method indetermining an award ofattorneyfees as costs." Additionally, "[tjhismethodologycan be supplemented by an analysis ofthe factors setforth in RPC 1.5(a) which guide members ofthe 

### Baras to thereasonableness ofafee."10 RCW 11.96A.150governs attorneyfee awards in guardianship proceedings. Itstates, "In exercising its discretion under this section, the court may consider any and all factors that it deems to be 

### 644Wn.App. 795, 723 P.2d1161 (1986). 7105Wn.2d 136, 143, 712 P.2d 845(1986). 

### 8Hallauer. 44Wn. App. at799-800. 9135Wn.2d 398, 433, 957 P.2d 632 (1998), overruled on other grounds 272 P.3d 802 (2012).
-7- by Matsvukv. State Farm Fire &Cas. Co.. 173 Wn.2d 643, 10 Mahler, 135Wn.2d at433 n.20.NO. 68419-1-1/8


### relevantand appropriate."11 Becausenoauthorityrequiresthetrialcourttomake findings demonstrating that it considered the factors in RPC 1.5(a), we find no

error in its failure to do so. 

### The judgment also recites that the court considered "the attorneys' experience and the nature of the work performed" to conclude that the rates 

### charged were reasonable. As part of its analysis ofthe reasonableness of the number of hours that counsel expended, the court considered "the results 

### obtained, the work performed, and the contested nature of the proceedings." The trial court affirmatively found that the time expended did "not reflect any significant redundancy, waste orunnecessary services." In Hays's second challenge to the fee award, he contends that the trial 

### court failed to apply the lodestar method when determining if the requested attorney fees and costs were reasonable. He claims that the court "failed to 

### properly articulate how itdetermined that the number of hours expended was reasonable." He further alleges, "It appears the trial court simply accepted the numbers stated by Mrs. Castilleja's counsel and signed the order, without any independent review ofthe reasonableness ofamounts billed."



### 11 RCW 11.96A.150(1). -8-NO. 68419-1-1/9 

### Generally, Washington courts apply the lodestar method to calculate 

### attorney fees.12 The court awarding attorney fees makes its independent determinationabout thereasonableness ofthe fees requested.13 To apply the lodestar method, the court considers first the number of 

### hours reasonably expended on the matter.14 "'[T]he attorneys must provide reasonable documentation of thework performed.'"15 This documentation must include at least (1) the number ofhours worked, (2) the type of work performed, 

### and (3) thecategoryofattorneywho performed the work.16 The courtdoesnot need to conduct an hour-by-hour analysis ofeach lawyer's time sheets, so long


### as the court provides a consideration of the relevant factors and reasons 

### sufficientto review the amount of the fee award.17 "The awarding courtshould take into account the hours spent on unsuccessful claims, duplicated effort, or 

### otherwiseunproductivetime."18

12 Mahler, 135Wn.2d at433. 

### 13 McGreevv v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 90 Wn. App. 283, 291, 951 P.2d 798 

### (1998)(quoting AbsherConstr. Co. v. KentSch. Dist. No. 415, 79 Wn.App. 841, 847, 917 P.2d 1086 (1995)), overruled on other grounds by Panorama Vill. Condo. Owners Ass'n Bd. of Dirs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 144 Wn.2d 130, 26 P.3d 910(2001). 

### 14McGreevv, 90 Wn.App. at291. 15 McGreevv, 90 Wn. App. at 292 (quoting Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100Wn.2d 581, 597, 675 P.2d 193 (1983)). 

### 16 McGreevv, 90 Wn. App. at 292 (citing Bowers, 100Wn.2d at 597). 17 McGreevv, 90 Wn. App. at 292 (quoting Absher Constr. Co., 79 Wn. App. at 848). 

### 18 McGreevv, 90 Wn. App. at 292 (citing Bowers, 100Wn.2d at 597). -9-NO. 68419-1-1/10

As the second step in the lodestar method, the court determines ifthe 

### hourlyfeechargedwasreasonable.19 Thecourtcomputesthereasonablehourly 

### rateforeachattorney.20 Theattorney's usualfee isnotconclusively reasonable butmay require an adjustment.21 Thecourtmay alsoconsider"the level ofskill required by the litigation, time limitations imposed on the litigation, the amount of the potential recovery, the attorney's reputation, and the undesirability of the 

### case."22 As a third step, the court multiplies those two numbers toproduce the lodestarfee.23 Finally, the court may adjust the lodestar amount up or down to reflect 

### factors not already considered.24 The party proposing a deviation from the lodestaramountbears theburdenof justifying it.25 Here, Hays vigorously challenged Castilleja at each stage of the proceedings. The trial court's November 18 order includes 68 findings of fact and 11 conclusions of law, which provides some indication of the complexity of the contested issues. In the February 1 order, the court stated, "To assess the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees requested by the Petitioner, the Court 

### 19McGreevv, 90Wn. App. at291. 20 McGreevv, 90 Wn.App. at 293 (citing Bowers, 100Wn.2d at 597). 21 Bowers, 100Wn.2d at 597. 22 Bowers, 100Wn.2d at 597. 

### 23 McGreevv, 90Wn. App. at291. 24 Bowers. 100Wn.2d at598-99. 

### 25 Bowers, 100 Wn.2d at 598 (quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). -10-NO. 68419-1-1/11 

### employed the lodestarmethodology, multiplying the attorney's and support staff's hourly rates by the reasonable number ofhours of work performed." The court concluded that the number of hours, 1025.25, "was reasonable considering the results obtained, the work performed, and the contested nature of the 

### proceedings, as setforth inthe contemporaneous billing records and declaration 

### filed in support." Additionally, the court found the attorneys' hourly rates, $350 and $300, reasonable, "considering the attorneys' experience and the nature of 

### the work performed." As previously noted, the court determined, "The billing records do not reflect any significant redundancy, waste or unnecessary services." 

### At oral argument, counsel for Hays agreed that the billing records do not 

### reflect any unnecessary work or excessive time spent on necessary work. He 

### also characterized Castilleja's attorneys as "very ethical and very honest" and statedthathe "had a very high opinion ofthe services they provide." 

### To perform its supervisory function, the trial court must make findings of 

### fact and conclusions oflaw.26 Because the court made the findings required under the lodestar method and because the court's findings support its conclusions of law and decision, we conclude that the trial court applied the lodestarmethod correctly.
26 Mahler, 135Wn.2d at 435. -11-NO. 68419-1-1/12

In Hays's third challenge, he contends that the court did not adequately consider his objections to the petition: "Rather than engaging in a substantive analysis, the trial court simply concluded that all fees were reasonable. The trial court should have entered findings indicating its consideration ofand conclusions regarding the following specific objections raised by Mr. Hays." Hays objected on five grounds: (1) fees incurred in presenting evidence on "irrelevant issues" and pursuing unsuccessful claims; (2) fees incurred from the presence of two attorneys at trial; (3) fees incurred seeking discovery from Hays's former and current attorneys; (4) "vague or block billings that make it difficult or impossible
... to determine whether the fees relate to the successful claims"; and (5) "unnecessary costs," including costs for "computerized legal research." In the February 1 order, the trial court made a number of findings offact and conclusions of law. The court found that "[t]he billing statements were sufficient and not vague"; "[t]he attorneys' fees and costs itemized in the billing statements were reasonable and necessary, and should be approved"; "[t]he billing records do not reflect any significant redundancy, waste or unnecessary services"; and "[t]he court specifically rejects the arguments made by Mr. Hays regarding] the reasonableness ofthe fees or the manner in which the case was presented."

-12-NO. 68419-1-1/13 

### Hays claimsthatIn reGuardianship ofIvarsson27 requiresthetrial courtto undertake a "substantive analysis
. . . which culminates in an explicit finding that the requested fees are reasonable in the circumstances of the particular case." 

### Hays alsorelies upon AbsherConstruction Co. v. KentSchool DistrictNo. 415,28 which states, "The court may discount hours spent on unsuccessful claims, duplicated effort, or otherwise unproductive time." Additionally, Hays argues that the fee petition "failed to segregate those fees incurred to establish a guardianship of the estate from those incurred on all other issues, including Mr. Hays' prior estate planning, his management of HEP, and distributive issues 

### discussedpriorto theguardianship." Finally, Hays citesIn re Estate ofLarson29 to argue that the attorney fee award may not include "fees incurred in seeking paymentof or defending objectionsto approval offees." The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Hays's objections to Castilleja's fee petition. Hays cites no authority that requires the court to make a written finding stating its rationale for approving each specific item in the fee petition. Hays's reliance on Ivarsson is misplaced. In Ivarsson, the court denied a coguardian's request for attorney fees because the record contained only the attorney's time records. The court required additional 

### 27 60Wn.2d 733, 375 P.2d 509(1962). 

### 2879Wn. App. 841, 847, 917 P.2d 1086(1995) (citing Bowers, 100Wn.2d at 597). 

### 29 103 Wn.2d 517, 694 P.2d 1051 (1985). -13-NO. 68419-1-1/14



### evidence of the services provided because "[t]he time required is onlyone factor 

### in determining thereasonable value of services."30 Here, therecord contains contemporaneous billing statements describing the work that the attorneys 

### performed. Additionally, Absher Construction Co. does not require the court to discount certain hours. Again, RCW 11.96A.150(1) gives the court discretion to decide what factors to consider, and counsel for Hays agreed at oral argument 

### that Castilleja's attorneys performed no unnecessary work or spent excessive time on necessary work. 

### Further, it is well settled that if a statute is inconsistent with the common 

### law, thestatute abrogates thecommon law.31 Larson held that"an attorney in probate is notentitled to additional fees for attorneys and experts in proving the 

### reasonableness ofhis fee in thefinal report."32 But RCW 11.96A.150 gives the trial court broad discretion to include such fees in the award in an equitable

manner. To the extent that Larson conflicts with the court's discretion under 

### RCW 11.96A.150, thestatutehasabrogatedthatholding.33 Moreover, inAbsher Construction Co., we approved computer research expenses, concluding, "The 

### use ofcomputer-aided legal research is a norm in contemporary legal practice.

30 Ivarsson, 60 Wn.2d at744. 

### 31 Statev. Butler, 126 Wn. App. 741, 750, 109 P.3d 493 (2005). 32 Larson, 103 Wn.2d at533. 33 See In re Estate of Bockwoldt, 814 N.W.2d 215, 225 (Iowa 2012) 

### (recognizing abrogation). -14-NO. 68419-1-1/15
Properly utilized, it saves the client attorney fees which would otherwise be 

### incurredformoretimeconsuming methods oflegal research."34 The trial court provided an adequate record for us to review its reasoning for approving the fee petition. Because the court's assessment was not manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons, we hold that the February 1 orderadequately addressed Hays's objections. In addition to challenging the reasonableness of the attorney fees, Hays claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing "to properly apportion what fees are to be paid by Mrs. Castilleja, by Mr. Hays and by the other entities benefitted," including Hays's limited liability company and the trusts. He asserts that "[t]he only fees and costs properly assessed against Mr. Hays are those that

were incurred in seeking the appointment of a guardian of the estate." Specifically, Hays contends that he should not be responsible for fees incurred before the guardianship proceeding commenced, fees thatthe attorneys incurred in recovering their fees and costs, and fees incurred after the guardianship was established because he claims that those actions did not benefit him. 

### In In reEstateofBlack,35the courtstated, The touchstone of an award of attorney fees from the estate is whether the litigation resulted in a substantial benefit to the estate. This does not mean that attorney fees may never be 

### 34Absher Const.Co..79Wn. App. at 849. 

### 35116Wn. App. 476, 490, 66P.3d670(2003) (internal citationsomitted). -15-NO. 68419-1-1/16 appropriately awarded against an estate if the estate is not substantially benefited. There is no firm rule.
.. . The trial court must evaluate the particular action to determine if its benefit to the estate was substantial. But RCW 11.96A.150(1) states, Either the superior court or any court on an appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to be awarded to any party: (a) From any party to the proceedings; (b) from the assets of the estate or trust involved in the proceedings.
. . .The court may order the costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to be paid in such amount and in such manner as the court determines to be equitable. In exercising its discretion under this section, the court may consider any and all factors that itdeems to be relevant and appropriate, which factors may but need not include whether the litigation benefits the estate or trust involved. In the November 18 order, the trial court stated, "The Petitioner's request forfees is governed by RCW 11.96A.150." Itconcluded, "The courtfinds that it is equitable to award Petitionerher reasonable costs and attorneys' fees to be paid from the guardianship estate and/or any other asset/entity in which Mr. Arthur 

### Hays has a beneficial interest." The court noted, "[T]he petition for guardianship
was filed in good faith, was necessary to protect Mr. Hays' assets and property interests, and benefitted Mr. Hays' estate by resulting in the appointment of a 

### guardian of the estate ofMr. Hays." On the court's February 1 order approving the fee petition, thejudge wrote, "The fees and costs may be allocated to Hays 

### Elliott Properties LLC, Hays Distributing Corp., and Arthur D. Hays individually as determined bythe guardian."

-16-NO. 68419-1-1/17

We do not accept Hays's arguments. While Hays concedes that the 

### limited liability company and the trusts were not parties to the guardianship proceedings, he argues that the fact they benefitted from the guardianship warrants apportioning some ofthe fees and costs to those entities. Hays citesjn 

### reGuardianship ofMcKean36forthenotion that"itisappropriatetoallocatefees 'amongstthose who created the need for the guardianship.'" But, in McKean, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court ordered a party to pay the 

### guardianship's attorney fees simply "because the guardianship could not."37 In that case, the trial court acted improperly because "the simple ability to pay does not provide an equitable basis for the award. Rather, equity requires some 

### finding offault thatin fairness requires a party to pay."38 As an example, the court cited Gillespie v. Seattle-First National Bank,39 where the court concluded that even absent bad faith or self-dealing, it was equitable to assess attorney fees against the trustee where, but for its breach of fiduciary duty, the beneficiaries would not have needed to incur the fees. Here, no evidence suggests any fault as to the other entities. Accordingly, the court did not err by giving the guardian discretion to allocatethefees and costs. 

### 36 136Wn. App. 906,920, 151 P.3d 223(2007). 37 McKean, 136Wn. App. at 920. 38 McKean, 136Wn. App. at 920. 39 70Wn. App. 150, 177-78, 855 P.2d 680 (1993); see also McKean, 136 Wn. App. at 920. -17-NO. 68419-1-1/18 

### Hays claims that fees incurred "when matters other than guardianship were being explored" provided no benefit to his estate. This argument conflicts with RCW 11.88.090(5)(f)(iv), which requires the guardian ad litem to investigate alternatives to guardianship. 

## Hays also cites Larson, In re EstateofRiemcke,40and In re Guardianship ofAdamec41 to support hisclaim that attorneys may not recover fees incurred in seeking fees. These cases do not apply here. As discussed above, RCW 11.96A.150 abrogated Larson. Riemcke held that a personal representative cannotcollectattorneyfees to the extentthat the representative incurred the fees 

### to protect his or her own interests as a beneficiary of the estate and not in 

### furtherance of its administration.42 Hay identifies no evidence showing that Castilleja benefitted in such an individual capacity. Adamec concerned a 

## guardian seekingfees underRCW 11.92.180,43whichdoes notapplyhere. The "fees incurred after the guardianship" concerned the attorneys' discussions with their client. Despite Hays's assertion, noevidence indicates that the mattersthey discussed were unrelated to establishing the guardianship or that the actions did not benefit the estate. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to



### 40 80 Wn.2d 722, 497 P.2d 1319 (1972). 41 100 Wn.2d 166, 667 P.2d 1085 (1983). 42 Riemcke, 80 Wn.2d at735-36. 43 Adamec, 100Wn.2d at 178-79. -18-NO. 68419-1-1/19

determine the amount of and manner of paying the judgment. Therefore, we rejectthis claim. In addition to these specific objections to the fee petition, Hays asserts for the first time on appeal that this court should deduct the specific fees he cites and then reduce the remainder by one half. He did not raise this argument inthe 

### trial courtand he cites noauthorityto supportit, so wedeclineto considerit.44 Hays also alleges that "itwas inequitable for the court to direct entry of a judgment, with interest accruing at 12%, immediately, thereby unnecessarily depleting Mr. Hays' estate." He argues that the court's actions were improper because (1) "Mr. Hays does not have sufficient cash assets with which to paythe fees and he no longer has control of his assets" and (2) the court "should have exercised its discretion as to 'the mannerofpayment' ofthe approved fees under RCW 11.96A.150 to delay entry of the judgment at least until the guardian's inventory and petition for order authorizing disbursements was presented and approved." With the exception ofHays's challengeto the interest on thejudgment, as to this claim his appeal is untimely. Under RAP 2.2(a)(1), a party has a right to appeal a finaljudgment "regardless ofwhether the judgment reserves for future



### 44 See RAP 2.5(a) ("The appellate court may refuse toreview anyclaimof errorwhich was not raised inthetrial court."). -19-NO. 68419-1-1/20


### determination anaward ofattorneyfees orcosts."45 RAP 5.2(a) requires filing a notice ofappeal within 30 days afterthe trial courtenters its decision. While RAP 2.4(b) allows a party to timely appeal a trial court's attorney fee decision, it "makes clear that such an appeal does not allow a decision entered before the award of attorney fees to be reviewed (i.e., itdoes not bring up for review the judgment on the merits) unless timely notice of appeal was filed on that decision."46 Here, Hays filed a notice of appeal more than 30 days after the court entered a judgment granting Castilleja's fee request but within 30 days of its decision approving herfee petition. Because Hays's notice ofappeal challenging the court's decision to assess attorney fees against him was untimely, we do not address it. Although Hays timely challenges the interest on the judgment, his claim lacks merit. Under RCW 4.56.110(4), "judgments shall bear interest from the date of entry." RCW 19.52.020(1)(a) sets the interest amount at 12 percent per
annum. Therefore, the court properly ordered that the principal judgment bear interestat 12 percentperannum.



### 45 Carrara, LLC v. Ron &E Enters., Inc., 137Wn. App. 822, 825, 155P.3d 161 (2007). 

### 46Carrara, 137Wn. App. at 825. -20-NO. 68419-1-1/21

Based on his claim that the trial court should have delayed entering a 

### judgment against him, Hays filed a motion to supplement the record to include the guardian ofthe estate's inventory report and budget. He argues that these 

### documents are necessary to determine (1) whether the court should have ordered him to pay all of Castilleja's fees and costs, without allocating them to 

### otherentities, and (2)whetherthe court should have entered ajudgmentagainst him before he demonstrated an ability to paythejudgment. 

### RAP 9.11(a) permits this court to allow a party to supplement the record 

### where the party establishes each of six criteria, including, "the additional 

## evidence would probably change the decision being reviewed."47 First, Hays offers no reason thatthe inventory report and budgetwould probably changethe 

### decision to enter a judgment against Hays's estate and give the guardian 

### discretion to allocate the payment of the judgment; rather, he merely contends
47 The six criteria are 

### (1) additional proof of facts is needed tofairly resolve the issues on review, (2) the additional evidencewould probably changethe decision being reviewed, (3) it is equitable to excuse a party's 

### failure to present the evidence to the trial court, (4) the remedy available to a party through postjudgment motions in the trial court is inadequate or unnecessarily expensive, (5) the appellate court remedy of granting a new trial is inadequate or 

### unnecessarily expensive, and (6) it would be inequitable to decide the case solely on the evidence already taken in the trial court. RAP 9.11(a). -21-NO. 68419-1-1/22

that the documents are "necessary to resolve the issues" that he asserts on appeal. The remainder of his motion asks us to revisitthe trial court's November 

### 18judgmentthat he does not timely challenge. Because Hays fails to establish all ofthe requirements in RAP 9.11(a), we deny his motion to supplement the
record.Both parties request costs and attorneyfees incurred on appeal. Because 

### Castilleja is the prevailing party, she filed the petition for guardianship in good faith, the guardianship benefitted Hays, and she did not file the petition out of personal interest or for personal gain, we award her costs and reasonable attorneyfees under RAP 18.1 and RCW 11.96A.150. CONCLUSION Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney 

### fees and costs and acted within its discretion to order Hays's estate to pay the entire award and because Hays did not timely appeal the court's judgment assessing fees against his estate, we affirm the trial court's February 1 orderand award costs and reasonable attorneyfees incurred on appeal to Castilleja upon

-22-NO. 68419-1-1/23

her compliance with applicable court rules. Because Hays fails to meet RAP 9.11(a)'s requirements, we deny his motion to supplementthe record. 

### jL*caLo&. c ••
WE CONCUR: 

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-23-