Filed 5/3/18

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re D.L., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 B284646

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. DK22283)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

ANGELINA A.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Reversed in part and 

affirmed in part.

Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.
2

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, 

Assistant County Counsel, Jeanette Cauble, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________________

In February 2017, a loaded gun was found in an unlocked 

closet in a bedroom where two-year-old D.L. slept. In May 2017, 

the juvenile court determined that the parents’ indifference to the 

risks posed by leaving a loaded gun in the child’s reach presented 

an ongoing risk of danger to the child. The court declared the 

child a dependent of the court and placed her in the home of her 

mother, with her father having monitored visitation.

We conclude the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding as to 

mother regarding ongoing risk was not supported by substantial 

evidence. We affirm the court’s order in all other respects.

BACKGROUND

On February 9, 2017, Eli L. (father) was arrested for 

carrying a loaded firearm in public. On February 21, 2017, the 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received an 

anonymous referral indicating police had found a loaded rifle, 

bulletproof vest, gun parts, and ammunition in an unlocked 

bedroom closet in a home where two-year-old D.L. resided. The 

items were confiscated and removed from the home, but DCFS 

later verified that the gun and ammunition had been present. A 

detective familiar with father’s criminal case told DCFS that 

father was affiliated with a criminal street gang. 

A social worker interviewed Angelina A. (mother), who 

stated that she never saw guns, gun parts, ammunition, or a 

bulletproof vest in the home, and had never seen father with any 

guns in his possession. Mother advised the social worker that 
3

she was no longer in contact with father, and he was not welcome 

in her home. 

DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 

petition on behalf of D.L.1 The juvenile court conducted a 

detention hearing and ordered the child released to mother and

temporarily detained from father. 

Mother was subsequently interviewed by a social worker, 

who asked if she was concerned about father leaving a loaded gun 

in reach of the child. Mother stated that she did not think father 

would put her child in danger. Mother also showed the social 

worker the closet in which the gun had been found, which was 

closed only by a curtain that did not reach the floor. Mother 

stated that she would not keep the child from father. The social 

worker observed D.L. climbing on top of a sofa and kitchen table 

during the visit.

A social worker interviewed father in jail. Father stated 

that the gun had been in a bag on top of a stack of blankets on 

the floor of a closet in the bedroom where D.L. slept. Father 

believed the gun was loaded, but it was there for only a week, and 

the child could not reach it, although he acknowledged she was a 

climber. Father stated that mother did not know about the gun. 

He felt he needed it for protection after he had been shot in 2010, 

but stated that in the future he would either not have a gun or 

lock it in a safe so the child could not access it. 

The juvenile court conducted a jurisdictional and 

dispositional hearing, where mother, father, and minor’s counsel

asked that the court dismiss the petition. The court noted that 

 

1

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
4

the risk of harm to the child was continuing because father was

no longer in custody, and mother had a “lackadaisical” view and 

did not appear to be proactive in protecting the child, as she 

continued to allow father to babysit. Although the court noted 

that some of DCFS’s concerns were speculative, it sustained the 

petition, declared D.L. a dependent of the court, and (1) removed 

her from father’s custody, (2) placed her with mother, (3) ordered 

mother to receive family maintenance services, and (4) ordered 

father’s visits to remain monitored. 

Father did not appeal. Mother filed a timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. No Substantial Evidence Supported the 

Jurisdictional Findings as to Mother

Mother contends the juvenile court’s findings of substantial 

risk of future harm because of the prior presence of a gun and 

ammunition were not supported by substantial evidence. We 

agree.

We review a jurisdictional order for substantial evidence. 

(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “ ‘In reviewing a challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional 

findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, 

contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this 

determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency 

court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the 

court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and 

credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do 

not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but 

merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the 

findings of the trial court. [Citations.] ‘ “[T]he [appellate] court 
5

must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the 

judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial 

evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that 

the order is appropriate].” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)

A child may be adjudged a dependent of the court under 

subdivision (b) of section 300 if the “child has suffered, or there is 

a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm 

or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent 

. . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, subd. 

(b)(1).) The juvenile court need not find “that a parent is at fault 

or blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect 

her child.” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 624.) “The three 

elements for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) are: 

‘ “(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified 

forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘ “serious physical harm or illness” ’

to the [child], or a ‘ “substantial risk” ’ of such harm or illness.” ’ 

[Citations.] ‘The third element, however, effectively requires a 

showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is 

at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., 

evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will 

reoccur).’ ” (In re B.T. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 685, 692.) 

Evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions. 

(In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135-136.) To 

establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there 

“must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the 

alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 136.)

Dependency jurisdiction may be based on evidence that a

parent stored a loaded gun in such a manner that it could be 

accessed by a child. (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 

995.) 
6

Here, the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction was based 

on father’s storing a loaded rifle in a location that was accessible 

to D.L., and on mother’s failing to protect the child by allowing 

father unlimited access to her despite knowing or having reason 

to know that a loaded gun was in the home. The court held that 

this conduct put D.L. at substantial risk of suffering serious 

physical harm.2

Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the

juvenile court’s determinations, no substantial evidence supports 

the juvenile court’s finding.

Mother argues that there was no risk at the time of the 

jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. We agree. Father no 

longer resided with mother and D.L., and was not welcome in 

mother’s home. He recognized that in the future he would either 

not have a gun or lock it in a safe so the child could not access it. 

Any risk of future danger to D.L. posed by father’s keeping a 

loaded gun in the house would be entirely speculative. Therefore, 

no sufficient evidence in the record supported the juvenile court’s 

finding of a future risk. 

In Yolanda L., supra, Division Eight of this district found 

future risk based on evidence that father’s drug trafficking 

activity would likely reoccur, reasoning that firearms are “tools of 

the trade” in the “narcotics business.” (In re Yolanda, supra, 7 

 

2

Apparently DCFS was not concerned about the child’s 

safety in the mother’s care, as in a jurisdictional report dated 

May 10, 2017, the workers stated, “[a]t this time, although there 

are no immediate concerns for the child’s safety in mother’s care, 

DCFS is concerned about the risk associated with mother’s 

ability to protect the child upon father’s release from jail. 

Father’s release date is unknown at this time.”
7

Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) No evidence of drug activity is present in 

this case, though father was affiliated with a gang. In In re C.V. 

(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 566, this court suggested that gang activity 

alone was insufficient for taking jurisdiction of a child. (Id. at p. 

573.) Nothing in the record suggests that father’s gang activity 

endangered the child.

Given that there was no substantial risk of future harm, we 

need not address whether the gun was stored in such a manner 

that it could be accessed by D.L. 

II. Because the Juvenile Court Has Jurisdiction Over 

the Child, It May Require a Non-Offending Parent to 

Participate in Services

Mother argues that because there were no grounds for 

assuming jurisdiction, ipso facto there were no grounds for the 

juvenile court’s dispositional orders. She does not otherwise 

challenge the juvenile court’s dispositional orders, including 

requiring her to receive family maintenance services. 

Mother’s argument is a non sequitur. Irrespective of 

whether the court’s jurisdictional findings as to her were well 

founded, the court had jurisdiction over the child. Accordingly, it 

had the authority to order a nonoffending parent to participate in 

services. Section 362, subdivision (a) gives the court the 

authority, once a child is declared a dependant, to “make any and 

all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, 

maintenance, and support of the child.” Division Two of our 

district has explained: “The problem that the juvenile court 

seeks to address need not be described in the sustained section 

300 petition. [Citation.] In fact, there need not be a 

jurisdictional finding as to the particular parent upon whom the 

court imposes a dispositional order.” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 
8

Cal.App.4th 297, 311; see In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 

1492 [“[a] jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a 

particular parent is not necessary for the court to enter orders 

binding on that parent, once dependency jurisdiction has been 

established”].)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding as to mother is 

reversed. The court’s order is otherwise affirmed in all respects.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

CHANEY, Acting P. J.

We concur:

JOHNSON, J.

BENDIX, J.