J-S31029-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LANCE COHEN,

Appellant No. 1542 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered April 30, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001487-2010 and 

CP-38-CR-0000256-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, and WECHT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN J.: FILED MAY 18, 2015

Lance Cohen (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after a jury convicted him at Docket No. 1487-2010 of attempted 

criminal trespass, aggravated assault, disorderly conduct, and providing 

false identification to the police,1and at Docket No. 256-2011 of receiving 

stolen property.2 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history 

as follows:

During the early morning hours of August 15, 2010, Robert 

Ditzler (hereinafter “Ditzler”) was watching a preseason football 

game on television in his home located at 322 North Ninth Street 

in the city of Lebanon, Pennsylvania. Ditzler heard a noise at his 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i), 901, 2702(a)(3), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914.

2 18 Pa.C.SA. § 3925(a).
J-S31029-15

- 2 -

front window. Ditzler then went to his front window and saw 

[Appellant] trying to rip the screen apart. Ditzler testified that 

as soon as [Appellant] saw him, [Appellant] left right away.

Ditzler contacted the police. He indicated that [Appellant] 

was alone and he provided a description of [Appellant]. Ditzler 

indicated that [Appellant] was a Hispanic male wearing a shirt 

with blue and white stripes on it. [Appellant] was also wearing a 

hat.

Detective Christopher Cook was dispatched to Ditzler’s 

home for an attempted entry through a window. Det. Cook was 

provided with the description of the person as given by Ditzler. 

Officer David Zinda informed Det. Cook and Officer Eric Sims 

that he observed a male matching the description provided by 

Ditzler within one city block of Ditzler’s home.

When Det. Cook originally approached [Appellant,] he 

smelled a very strong odor of alcohol. [Appellant] had many 

things that he pulled from his pocket. Among these items was 

an I.D. card. When asked what his name was, [Appellant] 

responded “you have my I.D.” The name on the I.D. card was 

Josue Hernandez Figueroa. [Appellant] was referred to as Josue 

until they arrived at the police station. 

In addition to the I.D. card which [Appellant] possessed, 

Det. Cook also testified that [Appellant] possessed a large 

amount of money consisting of both paper money and coins, two 

watches, a flashlight and a white glove.

Later that evening, Officer Lebo of the Lebanon City Police 

retrieved [Ditzler] from his home in order to identify [Appellant]. 

Ditzler was able to positively identify [Appellant] based on his 

appearance and his clothing. 

When interviewed by Det. Cook, [Appellant] stated that he 

had been at Woofer Magoos and that he was travelling to a 

Turkey Hill. When questioned about which Turkey Hill 

[Appellant] was referencing, he became confused and 

increasingly agitated. Based on Ditzler’s identification of 

[Appellant], [Appellant] was told that he was being arrested by 

Det. Cook and the other officers on the scene, at which time 

[Appellant] became more agitated, oppositional, louder and 

abrasive.
J-S31029-15

- 3 -

When Officer Zinda attempted to place [Appellant] inside 

the patrol car, [Appellant] stiffened up, would not bend at the 

waist to sit in the car and continued to make verbal threats. At 

one point, [Appellant] leaned back into the car, pulled both 

knees up in a striking motion and swiftly kicked out at Officer 

Zinda. [Appellant] was yelling and using curse words and 

obscenities directed at the officers. Although [Appellant] was 

repeatedly asked to desist, he continued to scream while inside 

the police car all the way back to the station.

Once back at the police station, Det. Cook examined the 

I.D. card and ultimately learned that [Appellant] was not Josue 

Hernandez Figueroa but was in fact, Lance Cohen.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/14, at 2-4 (citations to notes of testimony 

omitted).

The police investigation led to the home of Samantha Montgomery of 

Lebanon, Pennsylvania, who informed police that Appellant was her friend, 

and allowed the police to remove from her home items given to her children 

by Appellant, and other items belonging to Appellant. Id. at 8-9 (citing 

N.T., 4/10-11/14, at 94-137). The items removed from Ms. Montgomery’s 

home were later identified as belonging to various victims, including Gary 

Deck, who had reported a burglary of his home in Lebanon County on 

August 14, 2014, in which the perpetrator entered through a window and 

stole various belongings including a credit card, a PlayStation game console, 

video games, memory cards, video game controllers, and credit cards. Trial 

Court Opinion, 8/14/14, at 4-5, 8-9 (citing N.T., 4/10-11/14, at 94-137, 

155-156); Affidavit of Probable Cause, 9/17/10.
J-S31029-15

- 4 -

Appellant was charged at Docket No. 1487-2010 with one count of 

attempted criminal trespass for his attempted entry into the home of Mr. 

Ditzler, one count of aggravated assault of Officer Zinda, one count of 

disorderly conduct, one count of loitering and prowling at nighttime, and one 

count of providing false identification to law enforcement authorities.

Appellant was charged at Docket No. 256-2011 with one count of 

burglary of Mr. Deck’s home, one count of receiving stolen property, one 

count of access device fraud pertaining to the unlawful use of Mr. Deck’s 

stolen credit cards, and one count of criminal attempt to commit a theft by 

unlawful taking with regard to charges made on Mr. Deck’s credit cards.

A consolidated jury trial at both dockets commenced on April 10, 

2014, and on April 11, 2014, the jury returned the following verdicts: 

Docket No. 1487-2010: guilty of attempted criminal trespass, 

aggravated assault, disorderly conduct, and providing false 

identification, and not guilty of loitering and prowling at 

nighttime.

Docket No 256-2011: guilty of receiving stolen property and not 

guilty of burglary, access device fraud, and attempted theft.

Following a hearing on April 30, 2014, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant at Docket No 1487-2010 to a period of incarceration of fourteen 

months to three years for attempted criminal trespass, a consecutive twelve 

months to three years for aggravated assault, three months to two years for 

disorderly conduct concurrent to the sentence for criminal trespass, and 

three months to two years for presenting false identification, consecutive to 
J-S31029-15

- 5 -

the sentence imposed for aggravated assault, for an aggregate sentence of 

29 months to 8 years of imprisonment.

At Docket No. 256-2011, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term 

of imprisonment of 1 to 4 years for receiving stolen property.

The sentence at Docket No. 1487-2010 was imposed consecutive to 

the sentence at Docket No. 256-2010, for a combined aggregate sentence of 

3 years and 5 months to 12 years of imprisonment.

Appellant filed post-sentence motions on May 12, 2014, which the trial 

court denied by order and opinion dated August 14, 2014. This appeal 

followed. On September 29, 2014, Appellant complied with the trial court 

orders at both docket numbers instructing him to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On 

September 23, 2014, the trial court entered an order stating that its August 

14, 2014 opinion adequately addressed Appellant’s alleged errors.

Appellant presents two issues for our review:

I. Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence 

at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant 

was guilty of the charges at Docket Number CP-38-CR1487-2010?

II. Did the Sentencing Court commit a manifest abuse of 

discretion by sentencing running [sic] Appellant’s charge at 

Docket Number CP-38-CR-1487-2010 consecutively, and 

by running his sentence at Docket Number CP-38-CR1487-2010 consecutive to Appellant’s sentence at Docket 

Number CP-38-CR-256-2011?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.
J-S31029-15

- 6 -

In his first issue, Appellant raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence.

Our standard when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is 

whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences 

derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient to establish 

all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We may 

not weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the 

fact-finder. Additionally, the evidence at trial need not preclude 

every possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free to 

resolve any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. When evaluating the credibility and weight of 

the evidence, the fact-finder is free to believe all, part or none of 

the evidence. For purposes of our review under these principles, 

we must review the entire record and consider all of the 

evidence introduced.

Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273, 1276–77 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his 

convictions for attempted criminal trespass, aggravated assault, and 

providing false identification to the police at Docket No. 1487-2010. 

Appellant’s Brief at 15-18.3

____________________________________________

3 While Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support 

his conviction for disorderly conduct at Docket No. 1487-2010, his brief 

contains no discussion or development of this claim and accordingly he has 

abandoned it for purposes of this appeal. See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 

948 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating an issue identified on appeal 

but not developed in an appellant's brief is abandoned and, therefore, 

waived). 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S31029-15

- 7 -

With regard to Appellant’s conviction for attempted criminal trespass, 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a)(1) provides that “[a] person commits an attempt 

when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which 

constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime,” while 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i) explains that “[a] person commits an offense if, 

knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he ... enters, gains 

entry by subterfuge or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied 

structure or separately secured or occupied portion thereof.”

Here, the trial court explained:

The evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury’s 

decisions. Ditzler stated that he was at his home during the 

early morning hours of August 15, 2010. He stated that 

[Appellant] attempted to rip a screen in his window in order to 

enter his premises. Ditzler described the man who was doing 

this as a Hispanic male wearing a blue shirt with white stripes 

and wearing a hat. Ditzler immediately called police and 

provided the description of the culprit. City police officers 

located a man matching the description given by Ditzler only a 

few blocks away from Ditzler’s residence. Ditzler then identified 

[Appellant] as the person who had attempted to gain entry into 

his residence through the window.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/14, at 15-16.

We agree with the trial court that the foregoing evidence presented by 

the Commonwealth was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction of 

attempted criminal trespass. Appellant argues, however, that because Mr. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with 

regard to his conviction for receiving stolen property at Docket No. 256-

2011.
J-S31029-15

- 8 -

Ditzler testified that he did not see the face of the individual at his window, 

but could only identify his clothing, and was only able to identify Appellant 

as the suspect based on what he was wearing, Mr. Ditzler’s identification of 

Appellant as the perpetrator was insufficient to support his conviction. 

Appellant’s Brief at 16. Additionally, Appellant asserts that Mr. Ditzler’s 

identification of him was tainted because his identification of Appellant 

occurred after Mr. Ditzler was driven by police to where Appellant had been 

apprehended, the police officers told Mr. Ditzler that Appellant was a 

suspect, and Mr. Ditzler’s identification of Appellant as the perpetrator 

occurred while Appellant was in custody and surrounded by police officers. 

Id. at 16-17. Appellant thus argues that the evidence, in particular Mr. 

Ditzler’s identification of Appellant, was insufficient to sustain his conviction 

for attempted criminal trespass.

This Court has explained:

[E]vidence of identification need not be positive and certain to 

sustain a conviction. Although common items of clothing and 

general physical characteristics are usually insufficient to support 

a conviction, such evidence can be used as other circumstances 

to establish the identity of a perpetrator. Out-of-court 

identifications are relevant to our review of sufficiency of the 

evidence claims, particularly when they are given without 

hesitation shortly after the crime while memories were fresh. 

Given additional evidentiary circumstances, any indefiniteness 

and uncertainty in the identification testimony goes to its weight.

Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 874 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) 

(citations and internal quotations omitted).
J-S31029-15

- 9 -

At trial, Mr. Ditzler testified that on the night of the incident, he saw a 

person at his window attempting to rip open the screen, and while he was 

unable to see the person’s face, he observed that it was a male and was able 

to describe the man’s clothing to police. N.T., 4/10/14, at 9-10. Detective 

Christopher Cook responded to the report describing an individual as having 

a light complexion and wearing a blue and white horizontally striped shirt 

and light colored hat. Id. at 19. Approximately one block away from Mr. 

Ditzler’s residence, the detective encountered Appellant, who was wearing 

clothing identical to that described by Mr. Ditlzer. Id. at 19-20. A short 

time thereafter, Mr. Ditzler was transported to the scene where Appellant 

had been apprehended, and immediately identified Appellant by his clothing 

as the person he had seen at his window. Moreover, Appellant provided the 

officers with false identification information. Based on the foregoing, we 

agree with the trial court that this circumstantial evidence here was 

sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for attempted trespass. See Orr, 

38 A.3d at 868 (evidence was sufficient to identify the appellant where the 

victim of a robbery described his assailant as a tall man with a red beard and 

light complexion, wearing a camouflage jacket and grey pants, and shortly 

thereafter, the appellant was apprehended and the victim unequivocally 

identified him as the robber).

To the extent Appellant argues that Mr. Ditzler’s identification was 

unreliable or incredible, such a claim constitutes a challenge to the weight of 
J-S31029-15

- 10 -

the evidence which is waived, here, because Appellant did not specifically 

raise a weight of the evidence challenge in either his post-sentence motion 

or in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607; Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii); Commonwealth v. Priest, 18 A.3d 1235 (Pa. Super. 

2011) (finding weight of the evidence claim waived for failure to present the 

claim before the trial court either orally or in writing before sentencing or in 

a post-sentence motion, and failure to present argument in court-ordered 

concise statement).4

Finally, Appellant argues that the circumstances surrounding Mr. 

Ditzler’s identification were unduly suggestive, that Mr. Ditzler’s testimony 

was therefore suspect, and the jury could not have relied upon Mr. Ditzler’s 

____________________________________________

4 We recognize that in his post-sentence motion and memorandum in 

support thereof, within his claim that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the verdict, Appellant asserted that the circumstances surrounding 

Mr. Ditzler’s identification of Appellant rendered Mr. Ditzler’s testimony 

incredible. Such an assertion in essence constitutes a challenge to the 

weight of the evidence, although Appellant couched this argument as a 

sufficiency claim. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 319-20, 

744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (delineating the distinctions between a 

claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and a claim that challenges 

the weight of the evidence). However, even if Appellant properly preserved 

a weight of the evidence claim in his post-sentence motion, such claim is 

meritless. As the trial court noted, the jury “obviously believed Mr. Ditzler” 

and his description of Appellant as the person he observed attempting to 

tear open his window screen. Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/14, at 16. The 

weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence, and determine the credibility of the 

witnesses, and it is not within our province to disturb such credibility 

determinations on appeal. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835 A.2d 801

(Pa. Super. 2003). 
J-S31029-15

- 11 -

identification of Appellant as the perpetrator to support its guilty verdict. 

Although Appellant also couches this argument as a sufficiency claim, he is 

challenging Mr. Ditzler’s credibility, which was for the jury to resolve. See 

McCloskey, 835 A.2d at 809 (the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of 

the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses). 

Moreover, Appellant could have sought pre-trial suppression of Mr. 

Ditzler’s identification testimony on the basis that the circumstances 

surrounding it were unduly suggestive, but opted not do so, waiving 

appellate review of any claim that the identification testimony was 

improperly admitted and relied upon by the jury. See Commonwealth v. 

Douglass, 701 A.2d 1376, 1378 (Pa. Super. 1997) (appellant waived his 

claim that identification evidence should be suppressed because the 

procedure was impermissibly suggestive where appellant failed to move to 

suppress the identification and therefore the Commonwealth had no burden 

to establish the constitutionality of that identification and there was no 

record on that issue for us to review; the failure to raise a suppression issue 

prior to trial precludes its litigation for the first time at trial, in post-trial 

motions or on appeal). 

Once the identification testimony of Mr. Ditzler was properly admitted 

at trial without objection, it was for the jury to assess the credibility of that 

testimony and to determine the weight to ascribe it, and within its province 
J-S31029-15

- 12 -

as fact finder, the jury found Mr. Ditzler’s testimony credible. We will not 

reweigh such credibility determinations on appeal.5

Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with regard 

to his conviction for aggravated assault. To support a conviction for 

aggravated assault, the Commonwealth was required to demonstrate that 

Appellant “attempt[ed] to cause or intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily 

injury to any [police officer] in the performance of duty.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2702(a)(3), (c)(1).

The trial court, finding the evidence sufficient to support the 

conviction, explained:

Officer Zinda testified to the events that occurred when police 

confronted [Appellant]. Specifically, [Appellant] screamed and 

refused to stop. He would not identify himself. When Officer 

Zinda attempted to place [Appellant] into the rear seat of the 

patrol car, [Appellant] stiffened up and would not bend at the 

waist or sit in the car. Eventually, [Appellant] leaned back into 

the car, pulled both of his knees up and attempted to swiftly kick 

at Officer Zinda.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/14, at 16. 

____________________________________________

5 We cannot determine from the record before us whether Appellant 

requested that the trial court issue a Kloiber instruction to the jury. See

Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1954) (holding that “where 

the witness is not in a position to clearly observe the assailant, or he is not 

positive as to identity, or his positive statements as to identity are weakened 

by qualification or by failure to identify defendant on one or more prior 

occasions, the accuracy of the identification is so doubtful that the Court 

should warn the jury that the testimony as to identity must be received with 

caution”). The jury instructions are not including with the notes of 

testimony transmitted to this Court.
J-S31029-15

- 13 -

Our review of the record confirms Officer Zinda testified that during 

the course of his encounter with Appellant, Appellant was “very agitated” 

and “yelling”, and that Appellant “jerked away” when Officer Zinda 

attempted to seat him in the police vehicle. N.T., 4/10-11/14, at 51-52. 

When the officer finally succeeded in placing Appellant in the police vehicle 

and instructed Appellant to place both his legs inside the car, Officer Zinda 

testified that Appellant “rocked back, pulled up his right knee and then tried 

to kick me [with a] fast motion.” Id. at 54. This testimony was 

corroborated by Officer Cook, who testified that Appellant “leaned back into 

the car, pulled both knees up in a striking motion, and kicked out at Officer 

Zinda.” Id. at 29. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, we agree with the trial court that the 

evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction.

Appellant additionally challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with 

regard to his conviction for providing false identification to law enforcement 

authorities in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914, which provides:

A person commits an offense if he furnishes law enforcement 

authorities with false information about his identity after being 

informed by a law enforcement officer who is in uniform or who 

has identified himself as a law enforcement officer that the

person is the subject of an official investigation of a violation of 

law.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914.

The trial court explained:
J-S31029-15

- 14 -

When [the police officers] asked [Appellant] to give him his 

name, he told them to look at his identification card. The 

identification card showed the name of Josue Hernandez 

Figueroa. Up until the time that [Appellant] was arrested and 

taken to Central Booking, police referred to him as “Josue 

Hernandez Figueroa.” Because it is Central Booking’s policy to 

run fingerprint identification when someone is processed that 

does not cooperate, police were able to determine that 

[Appellant] was not in fact “Josue Hernandez Figueroa” but was 

instead “Lance Cohen.”

In addition, when police asked [Appellant] where he lived, 

he provide[d] them with an address that was nonexistent. He 

also told them that he was employed at ASK Foods. However, 

when police followed up with ASK Foods, they were informed 

that [Appellant] had never worked at ASK either on a part-time 

or full-time basis.

It is clear that [Appellant] attempted to conceal his identity 

from police and provided false information in an effort to do so. 

Thus, the Commonwealth established sufficient evidence to 

support the crime of False Identification to Law Enforcement 

Officers.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/14, at 17-18.

Again, viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, we agree with the trial court that the 

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s 

conviction for providing false identification information to the police. 

Although Appellant argues that he never voiced to the police that his name 

was Josue Hernandez Figueroa, the jury found credible the officers’ 

testimony that when asked to provide his name, Appellant directed the 

officers to the identification card that bore the name “Josue Hernandez 

Figueroa.” Thereafter, when the officers arrested Appellant and transported 
J-S31029-15

- 15 -

him to the police station, they repeatedly addressed him as “Josue,” with 

Appellant making no effort to correct the officers. We agree with the trial 

court that this evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Appellant guilty of 

providing false identification to law enforcement authorities.

In his second issue, Appellant raises a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it mandated that Appellant’s sentence at Docket No. 1487-2010 be 

served consecutive to his sentence at Docket No. 256-2011. This Court has 

explained that “[a] challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must 

be considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such 

a claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Treadway, 104 A.3d 597, 599 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).

To reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we 

conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; 

(2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in 

a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, Pa.R.Crim.P. [708]; 

(3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code, 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Appellant has preserved his claim by filing a post-sentence motion and 

timely notice of appeal. Appellant has additionally included in his brief a 

concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). See Appellant’s Brief at 
J-S31029-15

- 16 -

14. Therefore, we proceed to determine whether Appellant has raised a 

substantial question for our review.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by ordering that the 

sentences at Docket No. 1487-2010 be served consecutively to each other 

and that the aggregate sentence at Docket No. 1487-2010 be served 

consecutive to the sentence at Docket No. 256-2011. Appellant’s Brief at 

19-20. Specifically, Appellant claims that the incidents at each docket 

number occurred over the same time period, and were part of the same 

criminal episode, and therefore concurrent sentences should have been 

imposed. Id.

In Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

this Court explained that bald claims of excessiveness due to the consecutive 

nature of sentences imposed will not raise a substantial question. However, 

a defendant may establish a substantial question where the consecutive 

nature of the sentences results in an aggregate sentence that is clearly 

unreasonable. Id. “The key to resolving the preliminary substantial 

question inquiry is whether the decision to sentence consecutively raises the 

aggregate sentence to, what appears upon its face to be, an excessive level 

in light of the criminal conduct at issue in the case.” Commonwealth v. 

Treadway, 104 A.3d 597, 599 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).

Here, at Docket No. 1487-2010, Appellant was found guilty of 

attempting to enter Mr. Ditzler’s home on August 15, 2010, aggravated 

assault relative to attempting to kick Officer Zinda, and providing false 
J-S31029-15

- 17 -

information to the police. At Docket No 256-2011, Appellant was found 

guilty of receiving stolen property belonging to Mr. Deck, following the 

burglary of Mr. Deck’s home that occurred on August 14, 2010. Appellant 

received an aggregate sentence of 3 years and 5 months to 12 years of 

imprisonment. This sentence does not appear on its face to be so manifestly 

excessive as to raise a substantial question. Treadway, supra. Because 

we conclude that Appellant has failed to raise a substantial question, we will 

not proceed to reach the merits of his discretionary challenge.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/18/2015