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UNITED STATES SENA TE

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FIRST SESSION

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

J. W. FUL BRIGHT , Arkansas, Chairman

JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama BOURKE B. HICKEN LOO PER , Iowa

HUBER T H. HU MPHREY, Minnesota GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont

MIK E MAN SFIELD, Montana FRANK CARLSON, Kansas

WAYNE MORSE, Oregon JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware

RUSSELL B. LONG, Louisiana KARL E. MUNDT , South Dakota

ALBERT GORE, Tennessee

FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho

STUART SYMIN GTON , Missouri

THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut

GEORGE A. SMATHERS, Florida

Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff

Darrell St. Claire, Clerk

Subcommittee on I nternational Organization Affairs

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman

HUBERT II. HU MPHR EY, Minnesota FRANK CARLSON, Kansas

RUSSELL B. LONG, Louisiana JOH N J. WILLL1MS, Delaware

Donald G. Henderson, Staff Assistant

II
C O N T E N T S

Statement of Hon. Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. representative to the United 

Nations; accompanied by Hon. Francis Plimpton, U.S. representative to the United Nations, and Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant P»ee

Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs_____________ 2

Insertions for the record: List of U.S. contributions to U.N., specialized agencies, UNEF, UNOC, and voluntary programs____________________________ 17 List of arrearages of U.N. member states receiving reductions on UNEF and UNOC_______________________________________ 28 List showing total cost to U.N. of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East _____________________________________________ 30 Information furnished by Department of Defense on cost of Lebanon

operation_______________________________________________ 31

Summary index________________________________________________ 41

in

REVIEW OF UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE 

UNITED NATIONS

W E D N E SD A Y , M A RCH 13, 19 63

U nit ed S ta tes S en ate ,

S ub co mmitte e on I nte rnati onal O rg an izat io n A ff air s,

C om m it te e on F or eig n R el at io ns .

Washing ton, D.G.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2: 30 p.m., in room 4221, 

New Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman of the 

subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbrigh t (chairman of the full committee), 

Sparkman, Humphrey, Gore, Church (presidin g), Aiken, Carlson, 

and Mundt of the committee, and Senator Clark of Pennsylvania.

Senator Ch u r c h . The Subcommittee on Internatio nal Organization Affairs, and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

as a whole, this afternoon take great pleasure in welcoming the distinguished U.S. representative to the United Nations, Ambassador 

Adlai E. Stevenson.

PURPOSE OF THE HEARING

We have asked Mr. Stevenson both to bring us up to date on U.N. 

developments since the end of the 87th Congress and to outline current 

and future major problems and prospects facing the U.N. organization.

The Committee on Foreign Relations normally requests the highest 

officials of the executive branch agencies basically concerned with foreign policy to give the committee their overall views on the world 

situation at the beginning of each session of the Congress. Ambassador Stevenson obviously is almost uniquely capable of providing 

such information.

However, because of various factors, and particularly the delay 

encountered in organizing the Senate, the committee heretofore has 

not had an opportunity to invite him to present his views on U.N. 

affairs. We thus are especially glad to see Air. Stevenson and have 

this chance to remedy that involuntary omission.

It is our impression tha t the major functions and the performance of 

the United Nations as an organization primarily devoted to keeping 

the peace have been considerably obscured during the past 2 months 

because of the furor over incidents involving the U.N. Special Fund 

and UNESCO.

This subcommittee and the members of the full comittee have entirely shared the very legitimate concern of the American people regarding those incidents.
2 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

We have held hearings on both subjects and are in the process of 

making the findings available to the public. We believe fairly detailed and comprehensive material has been developed in the course 

of these inquiries.

This afternoon we would like to concentrate on the larger and the 

more important general picture of the United Nations activities over 

the last 6 months or so and on the developing issues which we will 

encounter in the months ahead. So I have asked Mr. Stevenson to take 

this into account in formulating his presentation.

In a word, Mr. Ambassador, we would hope to focus today on the 

main role and, indeed, the reason for being of the United Nations, its 

role as a peacekeeper.

I want to say again how glad we are to have you with us today, Mr. 

Ambassador. I think you have a prepared statement. Please proceed as you care to.

STATEM ENT OF HON. ADLAI E. STEVENSON, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO 

TH E UN ITED NATIONS

Mr. Stevenson. Mr. Chairm an and members of the committee, I 

welcome this opportunity to report to you again on the work of the 

United Nations.

VA RI ET Y OF FU N C T IO N S OF T H E U N IT E D N A TIO N S

As you know, the United Nations is a big subject—one which can 

be approached from many points of view. From one point of view it 

is a symbol of the aspirations of most of humanity for peace, for 

decency, and human dignity. From another point of view it is an 

institution of 110 members pioneering the arts of parliamentary 

diplomacy on a near-universal level. From still another, it is a very 

large operating mechanism performing such varied activities as stopping a war, spraying tropical villages with DDT to combat malaria, 

and d rafting a convention on some aspect of human rights. There is 

even a point of view—albeit a narrow one—from which the United 

Nations appears to be the symbol of wicked one-worldliness, a sinister 

threat to the national sovereignty, and a joint convention of international do-gooders and bobby-soxers.

So like a novelist approaching some universal theme, anyone preparing to say or write something about the United Nations must somehow come to grips with his material, determine his point of view, decide where to focus—what to put in and what to leave out. In the 

process, many arbitrary choices must be made.

ST AKE OF T II E U N IT E D ST AT ES IN T H E U N IT E D N A TIO N S

My arbitrary choice for this occasion—which I hope will meet with 

the committee’s approval—is to focus briefly but sharply on this question : How and to what extent does our membership in the United Nations serve the foreign policy interests of the United States of America ? Or, more crudely, Mr. Chairman, what’s in it for us ? I think 

this coincides with your assignment.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS 3

I make no apology to the most sensitive supporter of the United 

Nations for phrasing it that way. After all, if the very considerable effort and time and money which we have investsed in the United Nations has not been a good investment from the U.S. point of view, then we should say so and behave accordingly—as, I feel sure, every 

other member does. I shall try to test this question of what’s in it for us against two criteria: first against the record of the 17th General Assembly which had just over 100 items on its agenda; and second, against the roles of the U.N. in two of the greatest crises of recent history—the collapse of the Congo and the discovery of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. These are tough tes ts: one covers a virtual compendium of the ongoing prob­ lems which beset the modern w orld; the other raises specific issues of 

peace and war in specific areas at specific times. But before coming to these two tests of how well or how badly our membership in the U.N. serves the national interest, it is worthwhile to pose a prior test: Is the United Nations relevant to the real world of the second half of the 20th century? For if the United Nations does not reflect the real world, it is unlikely to be able to do anything 

useful about it.

FIVE DOMINANT FACTS OF LIFE IN TIIE 2 0T II CENTURY

Wh at then are the dominant factors that make the real world what it is in the second half of the 20th century? I think we can limit ourselves to brief mention of five dominant facts of life in our 

tumultuous tim es: Let me say first is the great confrontation which goes under the name of the East-W est conflict or the cold war—and the nuclear arms race which is its most dangerous manifestation. This has brought into conflict two sets of ideas about the value of human dignity which cannot be bridged philosophically. It also has brought into conflict two great and powerful nations whose national differences must be bridged politically if either is to survive. The proceedings of the United Nations consistently reflect both aspects of this so-called EastWest confrontation. The second factor dominating contemporary history is the revolu­ tionary wave of national independence which, in an incredibly short period, has brought political independence to nearly 1 billion people, leaving less than 2 percent of the former colonial peoples in dependent status—an historic convulsion which perhaps offered communism its greatest opportunity to absorb vast areas of the world. The United Nations has itself administered a number of these changes from de­ pendent to independent status and is deeply involved with the difficult and emotional final stages of liquidating the old colonial system and 

the race problems embedded in it. The third factor is the so-called revolution of rising expectations, 

which has put a spotlight on the glaring gap between the material conditions of the rich minority and the poor majority among the world’s peoples. Some 85 percent of the entire staffs of the U.N. system is occupied with the first systematic effort at international co­ operation in the field of economic and social affairs—certainly one of 

the great phenomena of contemporary times.
4 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNITED NATIONS

Fou rth is the fantastic pace of discovery and invention—which 

romps ahead oblivious to the political and social consequences and 

which makes the demands for a decent life for all a practical proposition for the first time in history. The United Nations is concerned 

increasingly with the complex and little-understood problems of how 

to transfer effectively science and technology from one cultural setting 

to another.

Fi fth is the fitful emergence of a restless, teeming, volatile, frequently quarrelsome open socity of nation-states—a society of enormous diversity of cultures, races, and political, economic, and social 

systems. The United Nations is, of course, the institutional center of 

this open international society—partly the cause and p artly the result 

of the forces which impel an interdependent world into more intimate 

association on an expanding agenda of political and human problems.

If these are the principal factors which mold our times—the cold 

war, the liquidation of colonialism, the pervasive demand for a better 

material way of life, the thunde ring impact of science, and the emergence of a vast, new, open society on the international plane—then we 

must conclude tha t the United Nations is indeed relevant to these 

times—that it is part and parcel of the contemporary scene. And 

being relevant, it is in a position to be effective.

PROBLEMS BEFORE TH E U.N . DURING TIIE 17TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Let us come, then, to the question of how effective from our point of 

view. What ’s in it for us ? How—as the most recent example—does 

the record of the 17th General Assembly stand the test ?

I said a moment ago that the agenda of the 17th General Assembly 

was a virtu al compendium of the ongoing problems of the modern 

world.

Listen to this list of trouble spots and sore spots: the Congo, the 

Gaza Strip, Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa, the Portuguese 

African territories, Kashmir, Yemen, West New Guinea, and the 

Arab refugee camps.

Mark this string of contentious issues: Chinese representation, 

North Korea, Hungary, colonialism, troika, and sovereignty over 

natu ral resources.

Consider, if you will, this list of universal concerns: disarmament, 

nuclear testing, outer space, world food, world trade, world science, 

and the training of manpower fo r economic and social development.

All of these issues, in one form or another, came before the United 

Nations for some kind of action during the last General Assembly, 

even if each one did not appear formally on the Assembly’s agenda. 

Many of them are among the most complex, the most intractable, the 

most ancient troubles of the human race. And many come to the 

United Nations as a court of last resort—because nobody else has been 

able to cope with them at all.

Obviously, the United Nations did not “solve” all or even many of 

these problems; but it worked on them. On a few it took conclusive 

action; on some it made progress, and on others it did not.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNITED NATIONS 5

FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF UNITED STATES SERVED BY MEM BERSHIP IN 

TH E UNIT ED NATIONS

We have made full reports on the record of the 17th General Assembly—item by item and vote by vote; I shall not take your time 

to repeat the record. The point to be made is simply th is: the U.S. 

view was the majority view in over 80 percent of the 40 key votes 

cast in committees and full Assembly. On several issues we abstained, and on two extreme resolutions recommending sanctions 

against member States we voted against the majority.

This is the measure of the extent to which our membership in the 

United Nations served the foreign policy interests of the United 

States across the spectrum of issues represented by the agenda of the 

17th General Assembly.

Meanwhile, the impact of the twin crises in the Caribbean and the 

Himalayas raised our credit—and our credibility; had the opposite 

effect on the stock of the Soviet Union; improved Western Hemisphere solida rity; activated the members from N AT O; and gave pause 

to those who tend to equate the bona tides of the United States and 

the Soviet Union.

Nlr. Chairman, I am not saying for one moment tha t the 17th General Assembly—or any other meeting or organ of the United Nations— 

was the handmaiden of the Department of State. I am not even saying t hat there were no disappointments or no cause for apprehension; 

for example, we expect continuing fireworks over the hard core cases 

in the remnants of European empires, and we are most gravely concerned at the lack of evidence of financial responsibility on the part 

of all too many members. But I am saying, most emphatically, tha t 

in no case was U.S. interest damaged, in most cases our objectives 

were furthered in a positive fashion, and in other cases we have reason to hope for a better result on another day. In short, it was very 

much in our national interest to be there, paying our considerable 

share of the cost and exercising our considerable share of the 

leadership.

The political problems before the General Assembly tend to be those 

anguished issues which have roots in the past and drag on from year 

to year—so hardy or so virulent that sometimes our best efforts succeed only in keeping them from going from bad to worse.

POLITICAL CRISES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

But now I should like to discuss two crises which had sudden beginnings, which directly and immediately involved the United Nations, and which now seem to be ended—at least in the form in which 

they arose. I refer to those most dangerous events which raised the 

dire threat of g reat power confrontation—and thus of nuclear war— 

in the Congo and the Caribbean. The point is to ask in each case 

whether the role of the United Nations in these crises served the foreign policy interests of the United States.

96022—63----- 2
6 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNITED NATIONS

TH E PRO BLE M OF TH E CONGO AF FA IR

W ha t were ou r aim s in th e Congo aff air ? Our aim s in the Congo 

are the same as ou r aim s fo r all of tro pica l Africa. They are quite 

simple to s ta te : to help cre ate an are a of trul y fre e an d ind epe ndent 

African states, saf e fro m ex ter nal agg ression or subv ersion, wo rking 

ou t th ei r own des tinies in th ei r own way, coopera ting wi th each other 

an d with those who wis h to help in th ei r ove rwh elm ing task of pr ogres sive mo der niz ation. In the Congo, as elsew here, this req uires 

na tio na l un ity and a reason able degree of p olitical sta bility.

Co ntr ast ed to this, th e collapse of the Congo in its firs t week of 

nationhood offered these sud den p ro sp ec ts: n ationa l d isu nit y, politi cal 

chaos, civil dis ord er, social disin teg ratio n, a nd ex ter nal pe ne tra tio n— 

pro spe cts made to or de r fo r Comm unist e xploi tation . An d because of 

this, the ultim ate prospect fo r the Congo was fo r the forces of the 

nu cle ar powers to find themse lves f ace t o face in the h ea rt of c entral 

Africa in t he infanc y of independ enc e—about as messy and d anger ous 

a sta te o f af fairs as one can imagine.

Th e sto ry of the stru gg le of the Uni ted Nations— with unflagging 

su pp or t fro m th is cou ntry—to b rin g orde r out of chao s in the Congo 

is too well known to m embers of thi s co mmittee to review it here. I am 

all too conscious of e very b it a nd every k ind of cr itic ism t hat ha s been 

leveled ag ain st th is op eration; and it has been of every kind —from 

honest dou bts about th e leg al basis fo r U.N . action to pu rp le pr op aga nd a and ou trageous lies. I also will stat e th at in th is unpreced ented, 

alm ost fan tasti c op eration in any h istorica l sense, some decisions were 

no t perfectl y co ord ina ted , some operation s were not fully efficient, some 

judg men ts were no t la te r justified, and a few actions were n ot excusable. My po int is ne ith er to tabu late the accomplis hments nor to 

count th e mistakes.

My po int is, r at he r, to look a t the r esults and sta te th at , as of to day , 

civil war has been r eplac ed b y na tio na l un ity , po litica l chaos has been 

rep lac ed by reason able pro spe cts fo r politica l sta bility, total dis order 

ha s been rep laced by orde r, social disin teg ratio n has been rep laced by 

an evolving pr og ram for social pro gress, and the scav engers have been 

sen t home p ack ing . None of t hi s is ye t gu ara nteed to be permanent. 

But this is wh at has ha pp en ed in the Congo; th is is wh at the Un ite d 

State s w ant ed t o h ap pe n in the Co ng o; a nd it could not have happened 

un de r any o ther auspices th an t hat of th e Un ite d Nations, w ith out the 

ce rta in ty or at least the risk of interna tio na l w ar.

It , the ref ore, is difficult—ind eed it is impossible—to avoid the conclus ion that the f ore ign policy in terest s o f th e U nited State s h ave been 

served well by the Uni te d Na tions p erf orm ance in the Congo crisis— 

and this, of c ourse, would have been out of the que stio n wi thou t our 

memb ership and o ur fu ll supp ort. I kn ow no way o f pu ttin g a d ollar 

value on the resto ratio n of p eace in centr al Af ric a.

Th e U.N. ro le in the Congo was, of course, an extremely la rge op eratio nal task, by fa r the larg es t it has ever un derta ken inv olv ing n ea rly 

20,000 troo ps fro m 21 n ati ons, supp orted b y a massive ai rl ift, and by 

hu nd reds of civ ilia n tec hnicians rec ruite d thro ug h a dozen in te rna tio na l agencies.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS 7

T II E CUBAN CR IS IS AND T H E U .N .

The U.N. role in the Cuban crisis was entirely different. Actually, 

the U.N. had three roles in the Cuban crisis—two of which were played 

out while the third was frustrated but nonetheless useful to us. Because the naval quarantine of Cuba was the first dramatic move in th at 

crisis, and because of the critical part played by the Organization of 

American States, it is easy to forget how the United Nations fitted into 

the pattern of these supercharged days when the world stood at the 

edge of the abyss in late October. You will remember, of course, tha t the President called into play 

at one stroke all the available instruments of diplomatic action—U.S. 

military power, the Organization of American States, the United 

Nations, and an appeal to public opinion around the world.

T II E FIR ST ROLE OF T H E U .N . IN T H E CUBAN CR ISIS

The first role of the United Nations was to serve as a world forum 

where the facts could be laid on the table. When the Security ( Council 

met in emergency session, I was able to present the U.S. case not only 

to the members of that Council, but to all other members of the I niited 

Nations who crowded that tense room, as well as to the press and the microphones and the cameras which carried our story to our own 

public and to every corner of the world reached by the mass media of 

today. Our case was righ t; our case was thoroughly documented; and 

our case was vastly strengthened as it unfolded before the bar of world 

opinion in the Security Council of the U.N.—the only bar of uni versal 

public opinion there is. Ju st how much this revelation of Soviet deceit and recklessness shocked the innocent bystanders in the cold war, 

I can’t guess. Nor, of course, can I estimate how much this blow to 

confidence in Russia’s word and influence among the new nations contributed to Mr. Khrushchev’s decision to pull out quickly and make 

the l)est of a bad mistake.

T II E SECO ND RO LE OF T H E U .N . IN T H E CUBAN CR ISIS

The second role of the United Nations—or, more precisely, of the 

Secretary General of the United Nations—was that of third party 

to the issue. At a critical moment—when the nuclear powers seemed to be set on a collision course—the Secretary General’s intervention 

led to the diversion of the Soviet ships headed for Cuba and interception by our Navy. This was an indispensable first step in the peaceful resolution of the Cuban crisis. The mere existence of an impartial 

office which could perform such a service in the middle of the night 

at such a time, is no small asset to the human race.

ROL E OF IN TE R N A T IO N A L IN SPE CTO R PL AY ED BY T H E U .N . IN CU BA

The third role of the U nited Nations in the Cuban crisis—the one 

which could not be played out—was that of an international inspector 

ready and willing to go at once to Cuba to verify the removal of the 

missiles. As we all know, Castro refused a U nited Nations presence
8 REVIEW OF U.S . PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

on Cuban soil—U T hant’s visit was in vain, and thus Castro prevented 

a quicker and cleaner liquidation of the crisis. But the fact is th at 

at the height of this most dangerous period of the postwar world, 

Chairman Khrushchev agreed—even proposed—an international inspection team under United Nations auspices, a proposal to which we 

could quickly agree and which became part of the formula for disengagement between the United States and Soviet heads of state. And 

Castro’s refusal of U.N. inspection converted a quarrel between the 

Soviet Union and the United States into a defiance of the United 

Nations by Cuba.

SIT E OF M EE TING S BE TW EE N UNIT ED STAT ES AN D SOVIE T NEGOTIATORS

Finally, and I won’t detain you longer on this subject, the United 

Nations also provided a site where Mr. McCloy and I could meet with 

Mr. Kuznetsov and the Soviet negotiators for those long weeks to 

conclude the transaction and bring about the withdrawal of the Soviet 

bombers.

Mr. Chairman, I should not care to speculate on how or when the 

Cuban crisis might have been resolved—or whether it could have been 

resolved—without the U nited Nations. But I do say that the United 

Nations played a large part in a complex exercise in diplomatic action 

which averted the thre at of thermonuclear war; and for this I think 

we can thank our stars.

U .N . SERVED TI IE U NIT ED STAT ES WELL

Now, gentlemen, we have put the record of the United Nations at 

the 17th General Assembly, during the Congo crisis, and during the 

Cuban crisis, to the te st; and we have seen that, in very large measure, 

the performance of the U.N. served well the foreign policy interests of 

the United States. There was, indeed, much in it for us.

But I should p refer, in the end, not to read tha t record as though 

it were a scoreboard on which victories and defeats are recorded. I 

prefer to avoid the specious habit of treating the course of human affairs—even the massive conflicts in world affairs—like some sporting 

event which ends when the timekeeper blows his whistle.

The real world of international politics is, as you know, not tha t 

simple. We are dealing with fitful tides of history which ebb and 

flow. We are wrestling often with problems which, when solved in 

their immediate forms, promptly give rise to new forms and new problems—as witness the case of the Congo today.

We can, of course, say with assurance that, in this case or that, our 

policies prevailed and our objectives were gained. We can point to 

objective proof of progress here and there. We can show that unfriendly moves by X and Y were defeated or diverted—and that in all 

of these cases the Un ited Nations had a useful part to play.

SPEC UL AT ION ON A WORLD W IT HOUT TH E UNIT ED NA TI ONS

But to form mature judgments as to the real value of the United 

Nation to the interests of the United States, it seems to me tha t we must 

raise alternatives—th at we must ask questions which challenge the 

imagination to say what might have happened if the U nited Nations 

had not been there at all. For example:
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS 9

Would the Communists have fared better or worse in their efforts 

to divert the independence movement into a Communist mold—their 

supreme opportunity to extend power—if the United Nations had not 

existed ? Would the prospects of peace be better or worse—in Ira n, in Greece, 

in Korea, in Kashmir, in the Middle East, in the Western Pacific, in 

central Africa—if there had been no United Nations during the past 

decade and a ha lf ?

Would U.S. foreign policy interests, more recently in the Congo and 

the Caribbean, have been served better or worse without a United 

Nations during the past few months ?

Could the United States put its ideas, its beliefs, its policies before 

the watching world more—or less—effectively if the United Nations 

did not exist?

I shall not attempt to speculate on these rather frightening alternatives for, it seems to me, the questions answer themselves.

But I should like to conclude my remarks with a few comments 

about the position of those who favor the United Nations in principle 

but want to withdraw or restrict our support on those relatively few 

occasions when the United States finds itself in a minority position.

U .S . PO SIT IO N IN T II E U N IT E D N ATIO N S

The basic point here, of course, is tha t the United States does not 

own or control the United Nations. It is not a wing of the State 

Department. We are no more an d no less than the most influential of 

the 110 members. If we were less we would be failing to exert the 

influence of freedom’s leader; if we were more we would destroy the 

effectiveness of the U.N., which depends precisely on the fact t hat it is 

not an arm of the United States or of any other government, but a 

trul y international organization—no better or worse than the agreements which can be reached by the controlling majorities of its 

members.

Before such agreements are reached—or not reached—debate and 

negotiation bare differences and reveal similarities which frequently 

lead to accommodation and compromise. And I would ask: Is this 

not the heart of the democratic method? Is this not the parliamentary system in action? Is this not our own idea of how we are 

most likely to make more wise decisions than foolish ones—how the 

weak are most likely to be protected from the strong—how the will of 

the majority and the righ ts of the minority can both find expression 

without injustice to either ?

The answer to these questions is “Yes.” And if we were to pick 

up our marbles and go home whenever there is a disappointment we 

would not only destroy the effectiveness of the U.N. but would abandon 

hope that nations can work out their problems most of the time by the 

same methods by which conflicting interests get resolved within democratic nations and communities. This would deny on the international level and principles, methods, and techniques which we swear 

by on the national and local levels.
10 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

U. S. FAITII IN THE UNITE D NATIONS JUSTIFIED

Even faith in our kind of institutions would not, however, be enough 

to justify support for the United Nations if it worked against us.

But this dilemma, happily, does not exist, and the record proves it.

The fact is that the story of the last General Assembly—when the U.S. 

position was the majority position better than four times out of five— 

is the standard story of succeeding Assemblies over the past 17 years.

The fact is that in 17 years the Soviet Union has never once, never 

once, succeeded in building a majority for any proposition of substance 

against the opposition of the United States. And the fact is that 

in 17 years the United States has never felt obliged to exercise its veto 

in the Security Council to protect its interests, and the Soviet Union 

has used the veto 100 times.

That’s the record and there is, of course, a fundamental reason for 

it. The reason should be recalled frequently—for in this fact lies 

one of our greatest assets in the world today: the fact tha t the foreign <

policy interests of the United States are generally in harmony with 

the foreign policy interests of all nations which want to see a peaceful 

community of independent states working together, by free choice, to 

improve the lot of humanity. And since the majority of the nations 

of the world share this goal, the majority consistently sides with the 

United States—or we side with them, depending on your point of 

view—when the roll is called and the yeas and nays are counted. It’s 

as simple as that.

But let us take a couple of blemishes in the record and the performance of the U.N. and its members—the kind of blemishes that lead 

some of our people who favor the U.N. in principle to want to restrict 

it in practice.

U.S . DISAGREEMENT WIT H SPECIAL FU ND PROJECT

First, take a case where the United States could not agree with 

a majority of the decision-making group in a U.N. agency. A recent 

case, was the one that you re ferred to in your opening statement, Mr. 

Chairman, of the decision of the Un ited Nations Special F und to help 

finance an agricultural research project in Cuba. We objected to th at 

project and still do. Yet the whole story is t hat out of 288 projects 

assisted by tha t Fund, in the course of its existence, we approved of 

287. So we face a choice: should we retaliate by withholding or limiting our support for an agency which we invented, which has allocated 

97 percent of its funds to nations which we ourselves are aiding, and 

which represents an economical way for the United States to contribute to the decade of development because in one instance out of 

288 instances we were unable to persuade a majority tha t our view was 

the correct one ?

CONTRIBUTIONS BY SOVIET UN IO N NOT MADE TO UNITE D NATIONS

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

Let me refer also to a situation which seems to agitate some of our 

people—the fact tha t the Soviet Union does not make the voluntary 

contributions which it is well able to make to such programs as technical assistance, the malaria eradication, the world food program,
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNITED NATIONS 11

and so forth. Their delinquency is deplorable but understandable from their point of view. These programs do not serve Communist ends, on the contrary. So it is hardly surprising tha t the Soviet Union makes little or no voluntary contributions to agencies whose work cuts straight across th eir own objectives. But should we sup­ port these programs less because they fail to win applause from the 

Kremlin? As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I rathe r suspect th at the Soviet Union and other Communist countries will tend to participate—and contribute—somewhat more in the work of these agencies in the years to come. There is some evidence of that already. And I think that the reason is clear. The policy of self-ostracism from the specialized agencies has not worked well for the Soviet Union, even though it 

has made life with them a bit easier for us. If this in fact happens, it will raise some day-to-day problems for us but, in my view, it also will raise problems for them and oppor­ tunities for us. For while the so-called Communist states operate more or less closed societies at home, once they step out into a United 

Nations forum they enter an open society. In an open forum, over a period of time, ideology becomes trans­ parent, dogma wears thin and becomes tiresome, and the myth of the magical solution evaporates slowly in the free a ir of a marketplace of ideas. There is contention in all this; there is frustration and the stuff of headlines; there is danger tha t the fearful and the insecure will want to withdraw from the free interplay of conflicting ideas and concepts and terminology—especially if, now and again, things 

do not go exactly the way we would like them to. Yet it is we who do best in the open forum—for this is our natural habitat. And if we have the nerve to go ahead—if we have the stomach for the test of the open society—if we have the courage to build even that which is not perfect from our point of view—I can foresee nothing but a more meaningful dialogue coming out of it, a gradual erosion of tension, and finally the dominance of a set of ideas which are better—and bette r able also to stand the test—than the 

Marxist ideas as revealed to his successors. All this would require, on our part, a degree of responsibility, of restraint, of maturity, and of political sophistication which never before has been demanded of a democratic public and its elected representatives. It will not be easy and it will not be without tempo­ rary disappointments; and I, for one, have no doubt of the outcome— for this, too, would serve and serve well the foreign policy interests 

of the United States of America.

AM ER IC A N PU B L IC O P IN IO N AB OU T T H E U .N .

Senator Church. Governor, let me commend you on a very eloquent and impressive statement which this committee is used to hearing when you come to testify. We appreciate the statement very much. You have postulated the question to what degree does the United Nations conform with the foreign policy interests of the United States, or in the vernacular, what’s in i t for us? That certainly is a question tha t many Americans ask themselves. Jud gin g from the mail tha t
12 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS

we are gettin g up here on the Ilil l, it is a question tha t is very much 

on the minds of the American people.

In your statement, you have well observed that this question ought 

to answer itself. It really should. I, for one, wonder why so many 

people have it on their minds.

PROTESTATIONS AGAINST U.S. MEMBERSHIP IN TH E U.N.

Yet there is a rising chorus of protestation against the United 

Nations. Some of it seems to be strident and irrational, but it is 

there. Some of it seems to be more tempered and more rational, and 

needs careful consideration.

In your statement you have rebutted the major arguments tha t 

are most frequently raised against the United Nations. But, I think, 

for purposes of emphasis we would do well here to restate them in 

terms tha t are better known to the people; more often used by those 

groups who are adamantly opposed to the U nited Nations.

I should like to start, Governor, with a most extreme kind of antiU.N. sentiment that so often comes to us in letters and other communications from our own constituents.

There seems to be a strong suspicion, and I gather tha t it arises 

from the fact tha t some 10 percent of the total membership of the 

United Nations is composed of Communist countries, tha t the United 

Nations is, therefore, somehow the instrum ent of Communist manipulations and Communist design. This leads to the cry tha t “We 

ought to get the United States out of the United Nations and the 

United Nations out of the United States.”

In your experience as our Ambassador to the United Nations, and 

your close knowledge of its affairs, have you detected any factual 

basis for this feeling or any basis on which you might conclude 

tha t the influence of the Communist membership in the United Nations 

and the extent to which the Communist members may direct the 

decisions and policies of the United Nations exceeds the actual 

numbers of Communist governments present in the General Assembly ?

In a word, is there any plausibility to the argument th at the Communists exercise undue influence over the decisions of the United 

Nations?

LACK OF COMMUNIST INF LUENCE OVER U.N . DECISIONS

Mr. Stevenson. I adverted to this in my prepared statement, Mr. 

Chairman, and I can repeat tha t in the last General Assembly, of 

the 40 issues, the 40 key votes, tha t were cast in plenary session or in 

committees, 80 percent of them coincided with the U.S. position. That 

would hardly sound like Communist domination.

Over the 17-year history of the United Nations, its entire existence, 

75 percent of all votes taken in the General Assembly have been with 

the United States voting fo r them, that is, it coincided with our views; 

13 percent against, over our opposition, and of the remaining 12 percent, we have abstained.

This, I consider to be not only a good record but an extraordinary 

record, particularly in a body composed of representatives of sovereign. and widely divergent nations, and one which I think should be 

borne in mind when criticisms of this kind are made.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNIT ED NATIONS 13

We also point out that it wasn’t very long ago, hardly a year, that 

we were hearing confident and grave predictions of all the defeats 

that the U.S. interests were about to suffer, defeats in Africa, defeats 

in Asia, defeats in the Middle East.

The United Nations frustra ted Communist designs to penetrate 

central Africa, as we know. In Asia, the Chinese have acutely embarrassed Moscow by attack ing India, and instead of ta king over the 

Middle East, the Communists are now fleeing headlong from Iraq, 

and much of the Communist investment there is now down the drain.

I would say both on the world scene and within the halls of the 

United Nations tha t the Communist influence has not only not dominated the organization, but has almost no influence.

In not one case of any consequence has the Communist position prevailed over the United States. There have been many cases were they 

have exercised a veto, where they have frustrated positions, in which 

we believe, in the Security Council.

I think most of this anxiety about Communist influence probably 

arises, and is probably somewhat confused with colonialism, with the 

high emotional content of colonialism, to ex-colonial countries, and the 

» fact tha t the colonial issue has been exploited by the Soviet Union for

many years, and will continue to be as long as it endures as an issue.

This is not so much a consequence of Soviet manipulation or influence as it is the Soviet enjoying the benefit of a conflict between the 

colonial, the newly emerging countries, and the ex-colonial countries.

POSS IBLE CONTROL BY TIIE AFRO -AS IAN BLOC

Senator Ciiurcii. Another side of this same argument that is often 

offered is not that the Communists exert undue influence, but that with 

the growing membership in the United Nations there is an Afro-Asian 

bloc; and that this bloc, by virtu e of its numbers, can control the decisions of the United Nations in a way that would be adverse to the 

Western community and to the United States. Would you comment 

on tha t argument ?

Mr. Stevenson. There is an Afro-Asian majority in the United 

Nations. As far as its influence is concerned, it has only coincidental 

identification with the Soviet Union's position, and that is mostly in 

the colonial cases where you could better say that the Soviet is voting 

with them as that they are voting with the Soviet.

Actually among the Afro-Asian powers, 12 of them are former 

members of the French West African, French Equatorial Africa.

These states even changed in the last session from abstaining from 

voting on the admission of Red China, to voting against. This would 

hardly be a Communist victory.

As to six or eight, they are states which are definitely aligned with 

the West, such as Pakistan. Many of them are nonaligned or neutral. 

But there is no pattern of solidarity in the Afro-Asian or Middle Eastern states on any issue except one issue, of colonialism, which finds 

virtually all ex-colonial people in a high degree of solidarity.

So my answer to your question is, no, the Afro-Asians don’t vote 

as a bloc, have never voted as a bloc, except in the one case of colonialism, and I see no evidence that they will. Disparities and differences 

that exist among them are too numerous.

96022—63-----3
14 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNIT ED NATIONS

As far as the Communist influence is concerned, if it ever existed, it has diminished perceptively in the last vear, both as a result of the Communist attack on In dia, the leader of the Afro-Asian bloc, so to speak, and also because of the confrontation in the Security Council in the Cuban case and the revelation of Communist deceit and perfidy.

ROLE OF THE U .N . IN A DIRECT CO NF RO NTAT ION OF WORLD POWERS

Senator Church. The thir d argument I should like to mention, Mr. Ambassador, certainly comes from a more moderate group. It is often stated in a very well-reasoned wa y: tha t although the United Nations can be helpful in avoiding peripheral wars tha t involve smaller countries, the U.N. cannot play a significant role in any kind of crisis tha t involves a direct confrontation between the United States, say, and the Soviet Union; tha t here the U.N. cannot be particularly useful and that, therefore, in the broad design of American foreign policy it must be destined to play a secondary role. Now, in view of the U.N. involvement in the Cuban crisis and the experience tha t we have had in recent months, what is your assess­ ment of this argument, and what is your feeling as to the kind of role the U.N. might well play in crises th at do involve such mortal threats as nuclear war and such confrontations as the kind tha t occurred last 

October over Cuba ?

Mr. Stevenson. You have asked me a question tha t relates to the greatest weakness and deficiency and defect in the United Nations, tha t is to say, it cannot impose its will on any great power. This is 

true. At the time of San Francisco when this charter was written, I had the privilege of being present. It was contemplated tha t the five great powers who were the permanent members of the Security Coun­ cil would be charged with the responsibility for keeping the peace. Immediately they fell apa rt and at the Foreign Ministers Confer­ ence, where I was also present, in the autumn of 1945, hence the sequel has been nothing except the hardening of the cold war. The provision in the charter for members supplying national mili­ tary contingents was never implemented. However, grante d that this is true, because the U.N. has no divisions, the fact remains, and we saw an eloquent illustration of it in the case of Cuba this fall, that rhe force of public opinion, together with the marshaling of the United Nations, together with firmness and resolve on the part of any great power can have an effect, a peaceful effect, in solving dangerous issues. The point I am attempting to make is that while it is not in the im­ mediate prospect that the United Nations will ever exert greater power than one of the great powers and, therefore, cannot impose its will on one of the grea t powers because the world is divided, what is true is that the United Nations can summon a very powerful force in world opinion, and world opinion itself is a weapon of vast significance, especially in a world fragmented as this one is, with so many new and small states whose only security rests in the United Nations. There is another point, th at so long as the United Nations can bring great powers together, it can sometimes keep them apart by interven­ ing, bv interposing, the counsels of mediation and conciliation and 

world opinion.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS 15

Senator Church. This was, in fact, tlie role the U.N. played in the 

Cuban crisis, was it not?

Air. Stevenson. Yes.

POSSIBILITY OF A P ERM ANE NT U .N . POLICE FORCE

Senator Church. I just have one further question and then I will 

turn the matter over to the other Senators here.

In the course of your last statement, you made reference to the fact 

that the U.N. has no divisions. It certainly does not. Is there any 

possibility that in the years ahead the U.N. m ight be equipped with 

some kind of permanent standby police forces that it could readily call 

upon to snuff out brush fire crises of the kind we have experienced at 

Suez and in the Congo ?

Air. Stevenson. Well, there have been many of us who had hoped 

that the United Nations might have some forces at its own disposition. 

Thus far, as you know, we have had strenuously difficult times even 

financing the voluntary forces provided, as in the case of the Congo.

I do not exclude the possibility tha t the world may come to realize 

the necessity of the advisability of having some force at hand or on 

call by the United Nations which could be useful in the smaller or 

brush fire instances.

I cannot predict with any confidence whether this will come to 

pass or not, or whether it will continue as we are now—which is soliciting by voluntary contribution forces—as we did in the case of the 

Aliddle E ast emergency force at Suez, and as we have done la tterly 

in the case of the Congo. I rather think it will be in the latter way 

for some time to come.

Senator Church. Than k you, Air. Ambassador.

Air. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. I am sorry I did not get to 

hear all of the Ambassador’s statement, but I shall read it with much 

interest.

COST OF U. S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITE D NATIONS

Air. Ambassador, in an effort to try to make this perspective perhaps a little clearer, could you indicate what the average cost of the 

United Nations—because this complaint about the cost arises from 

time to time—has been to the United States during the past 5 years?

Air. Stevenson. To the United States?

The Chairman. Yes. AVhat is our cost? In other words, has it 

cost us $100 million or $200 million a year?

Air. Stevenson. I think I can best answer it this way, because I do 

not have the figures a t hand, Senator Fulbrig ht, but the American 

contribution for the past 5 years to the regular budget I think has 

averaged less than $30 million a year. U.S. total contributions have 

been vastly increased by the U.S. contribution to the Congo forces.

The Chairman. Yes. I thin k it would be interesting, for various 

reasons. I think people trans late these things, and get them out of 

proportion.

AVould you say, on the average, during the past 5 years all special 

assessments on the part of the U.N. would be more than an additional 

$70 million annually ?
16 REVIEW OF U.S . PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

In other words, would you say that $150 million would cover all of 

the costs of the U.N. to tne United States per year during the past 5 

years ? Is that a good estimate ? I do not want it down to the dollar. 

I was trying to make a comparison here to some other costs th at we 

had.

Senator Gore. It may not be that much.

The Chairman. I am trying to be generous about it.

Then I want to try to keep some of the costs in this field in proper 

relation.

U. S. CON TRIBUTIO N TO REGULAR U .N . BUDGET AND ASSE SSMENTS LAST YEAR

Mr. Stevenson. The U.S. contribution, not the regular budget of 

the U.N., but the U.S. contribution to the regular budget of the I ,N. 

has been running around $30 million a year, that is to say, one-third 

of the total, something less than one-third of the total budget 

between-----

The Chairman. $30 million?

Mr. Stevenson. Now, latterly our total contribution to all activities of the United Nations, including all of the specialized agencies, 

plus the peacekeeping agencies, plus the regular budget, has run to 

about $200 million a year in this past year.

The Chairman. Tha t is in I year. That is more than the average, 

isn't it, considerably ?

M*r. Stevenson. Yes. That is due to the Congo.

The Chairman. Yes, and you are lumping in 1 year there a very 

large assessment, are you not ?

Mr. Stevenson. Th at is right.

REQUEST FOR AMO UN T OF CONTRIB UTION S TO THE U .N . IN AN AVERAGE YEAR

The Chairman. I would like to have supplied for the record the 

cost to the United States of an average year, not an unusual, exceptional year.

My point is simply this : It might appeal to some of the people who 

are critical of the cost of the U.N. When you compare this to our 

own domestic budget for armaments and space, what percentage is it ? 

Is it one-tenth of 1 percent or one-hundredth of 1 percent ?

Mr. Stevenson. You would have to be a mathematician in diminutives to do it.

Senator Church. One-thirtieth of 1 percent.

The Chairman. My colleague says one-thirtieth of 1 percent. However, we get all this complaint, particularly from certain areas of the 

country, and it seems to me it is misleading because the American 

people ought to keep in proper perspective what the United States is 

contributing to, what our purpose is; and it is, after all, allied with 

the purpose of our defense; that is, to prevent war, and to create conditions which would make war unlikely. Is that not correct ?

Mr. Stevenson. Th at is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. So if you compare these kinds of costs, it seems to 

me it would make the people who are complaining look a little 

ridiculous.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS 17

Mr. Stevenson. We would be very happy to supply for the record. 

1 am embarrassed tha t 1 did not have them here at my fingertips— 

precise figures on the total contribution to the regular budget, to the 

operating or peacekeeping budget, and to all activities of the United 

Nations for the past 5 years, an average, and the percentage which 

that represents to the total defense budget for those relative years.

(The information refered to follows:)

U.S. contributions to U.N., specialised agencies, UNEF, UNOC and volu ntary

programs

In m illion s

of do lla rs

Fis ca l year 19 58 ______________________________________________________________ $10 5, 619

Fi sc al yea r 19 59 _______________________________________ 97, 719

Fisca l ve ar 19 60 _____________________________________________________________ 118, 318

Fi sc al yea r 19 61 ______________________________________________________________ 22 6, 03 3

Fisca l yea r 19 62 ______________________________________________________________ 242, 718

T o ta l___________________________________________________________________ 790, 407

Annual average of $158,081,000 as a percentage of the D epartment of Defense 

bu dget:

D ep art m en t of 

Defen se bu d g et

P erc en tage

Fis ca l ye ar 1958___ __ _ _______ ____________________ . . _____ $38 ,500,0 00, 000 0.41

Fis ca l year 1959 _____ _ ______ ___ _ ___ _______________________ . . . 39,14 5,0 00,00 0 .40

Fis ca l year 1960 ______ __________ _______ . ___ ______ _____ ______ _ 40,850 ,00 0,0 00 .39

Fi sc al ye ar 1961________________________________ ____ ____________ _____ 42,577,0 00, 000 .37

Fis ca l ve ar 1 9 6 2 _____________________ 43,640,3 45, 000 .36

CO M PA RI SO N BET W EE N U .S . CON TRIB U TIO N TO T H E U .N . AN D T H E 

DEFE NSE BUDG ET

The Chairman. We read much in the paper today about the one 

plane for which a contract for $6 billion has recently been signed. 

How long do you think it would take the U.N. to use up that much 

money in its operations? That is one plane which probably will be 

obsolete by the time it is actually produced. Don't you guess it will 

be obsolete ?

Mr. Stevenson. Well, I think you are a better historian on these 

things than I am.

The Chairman. It will be approaching obsolescence, is the way they 

put it, by the time it is produced.

Mr. Stevenson. I th ink the actual figures we should have given you 

are that the cost of U.S. partic ipation in the United Nations, all 

inclusive, represents less than one-third of 1 percent of our defense 

budget.

Senator Church. One-third—it takes a calculating machine to figure it out, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Those figures are available. I know the Ambassador did not expect this. The reason I asked this kind of question is, 

I think, very unsophisticated people like Senators from the South and 

Arkansas and others can understand it if you will put it in simple 

terms. Don't you think we might be more likely to understand it ?

Mr. Stevenson. I might be likely to understand it. I think you 

do already.
18 REVIEW OF U.S . PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

PERIOD AF TER WORLD WAR I COMPARED TO PERIOD AFTER WORLD WAR II

The Chairman. There is another comparison I think you could 

make tha t I think is meaningful. It has now been 18 years since 

World War II, hasn’t it?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. How would you compare the state of the world, and 

particularly our relations to it, the prospect of peace, and so on, with 

18 years afte r World W ar I when you didn’t have a United Nations ? 

Can you make a comparison tha t means anything to us ?

Mr. Stevenson. Eighteen years afte r World War I we were in 

World W ar I I ; we were on the verge of it.

The Chairman. We were almost on the verge in 1936. But there 

was very little prospect at that time of communications or negotiations 

among the nations of the world. They were all going their own way, 

weren’t they ? We had a Neutrality Act, didn’t we ?

Mr. Stevenson. We also had a League of Nations which had disintegrated largely for the reasons you know very well, for failure of 

the United States to support it.

The Chairman. It seems to me this is of some significance. If we 

look back and see what happened under conditions at a period afte r 

World W ar I, and if we understand how that war came about, under 

conditions (quite different from those represented by the United 

Nations) in which there was virtually no communication among the 

great nations of Europe or with this country, it seems to me that also is 

encouraging. We are far better off. We have many more strings to 

our bow now th an existed in 1936 or 1937 or before World War I : 

don’t you agree ?

Mr. Stevenson. I do, sir. I think that it is very apparent now that 

diplomacy and foreign relations have to be conducted on three levels in 

the. future, in this world, as a result of the progress of invention and 

discovery. Tha t is, through a bilateral basis, as we have conducted 

diplomacy tradition ally in the past, also on a regional basis as we 

have come in later years to practice it in organizations such as the 

Organization of American States or NATO, and now we are practicing it on a third level, which is the universal level, and this is becoming more and more im portant to more and more countries.

Large countries, can, as we have said here, defend themselves. The 

small countries cannot. Their only security lies in their collective action through this organization, or virtually their only security.

This will become more and more the case as time goes on and, 

therefore, their dependence on this organization and, therefore, the 

opportunity for influence, assuming that our motives are always good, 

and iust, and righ t, will increase.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator Church. Senator Aiken.

ROLE OF THE U .N . I N TH E CUB AN CRIS IS

Senator Aiken. I would just like a little background material, Mr. 

Ambassador, relative to what happened in the U.N. at the time of the 

Cuban crisis.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS 19

I will quote from your statement:

But the fact is that at the height of this most dangerous period of the postwar world, Chairman Khrushchev agreed—even proposed—an international inspec­ tion team under United Nations auspices, a proposal to which we could quickly agree and which became part of the formula for disengagement between the United States and Soviet heads of state. And Castro's refusal of U.N. inspection converted a quarrel between the Soviet Union and the L nited States into a defiance of the United Nations by Cuba.

I do not want to go into all th at has been said about th at situation, 

but the fact tha t there was no inspection has given rise to a barrag e of charges and countercharges both against the United States and the 

United Nations, and the charge tha t missiles were not all removed, and 

so on and so forth. If this inspection had been carried out, there would have been no grounds for the charges and recriminations tha t have taken place up 

to today.

REFU SA L OF CUBA TO PE R M IT IN SPE C T IO N

What. I want to ask is, What reason did Cuba give—Cuba, a member 

of the U.N., a Cuba th at is largely dependent on the U.N. today—for objecting to an inspection team of the United Nations certifying tha t 

these Russian missiles had been removed ?

Mr. Stevenson. Cuba took the position. Senator Aiken, tha t they 

would tolerate inspection on their soil only if there was—if it was mutual, if there was inspection on our soil, and on the surrounding periphery of the Caribbean.

Senator Aiken. Would you consider that the situation was analogous ?

Mr. Stevenson. No, sir.

Senator Aiken. No, because no foreign country was placing missiles 

on our soil at all.

Mr. Stevenson. Yes.

reasons for failure to insist on inspection IN CU BA N CR IS IS

Senator Aiken. Why did the U.S.S.R. and the U.N. and the United 

States recede from th eir insistence on an inspection team at tha t time? 

Why did you abandon a solution which would have reassured the 

world and forestalled much of this suspicion which exists today? How was it that Russia made the proposal, backed down, the United 

States backed down, and the United Nations backed down? What 

reason was there for this ?

Mr. Stevenson. Because there was no means of enforcing the recommendation. the agreement of Khrushchev and President Kennedy with 

respect to Cuba, except by force.

Senator Aiken. The U nited Nations had no means of enforcing it ?

Mr. Stevenson. No ; no means of enforcing it.

Senator Aiken. I thought they had the means in Korea, the Congo.

Mr. Stevenson. If they had been willing to launch an invasion.

Senator Aiken. Would Russia have backed away from their pro ­

posal had the United Nations undertaken to use force ?

Mr. Stevenson. It would be hard for me to answer tha t question, 

sir.
20 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNIT ED NATIONS

ORIG IN OF PROP OS AL TO W IT HDRAW IN SIS T EN C E ON IN SPE CTIO N

Senator Aiken. Did you, representing the United States, propose 

that the United States recede from its position ?

Mr. Stevenson. No, we never receded from our position. We had 

taken the position right up until now that we were entitled to, under 

the agreement with Khrushchev, an agreement, unfortunately, which 

Castro didn't enter into.

Senator Aiken. Who did insist on receding from the position?

Mr. Stevenson. Well, as a practical matter we had to get the 

weapons out of there, and the only means that we could devise to inspect their removal was by sea.

Senator Aiken. But who first proposed receding, backing down, 

from insistence on inspection?

Mr. Stevenson. Well, as I sav, we have never backed down. We 

have-----

Senator Aiken. 

Mr. Stevenson. 

Senator Aiken. 

backdown.

That is right.

We have never fulfilled the agreement.

Somebody else must have proposed that the U.N.

Mr. Stevenson. No, I don't know that there was evef any-----

Senator Aiken. But they did back down. T am just wondering who 

proposed it. Whose idea was it to recede from the position which, 

if adhered to, would have done away with all of the suspicion which 

existed there?

Mr. Stevenson. The only thing that happened, Senator Aiken, was 

that Cuba refused to accept U.N. inspection forces on its soil and given 

this fact, we had to devise other means of doing it. There was no 

backing down from it.

Senator Aiken. A on mean that when the United States and Russia 

insisted on inspection that Cuba could have walloped both the United 

States and Russia put together and the rest of the United Nations?

Mr. Stevenson. If you are speaking about the use of force, no, of 

course not.

PO W ER WIELD ED BY CUBA

Senator Aiken. Do you think Cuba would have declared war 

against both the United States and Russia and any other countries 

that undertook to carry out United Nations decisions?

Mr. Stevenson. I don't—there was no United Nations decision. 

There was never a resolution adopted by the Security Council at any 

time durin g the Cuban crisis. There was an agreement between 

President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev.

Senator Aiken. But you say this proposal to have an international 

inspection team under United Nations auspices became part of the 

formula.

Mr. Stevenson. This was a suggestion by the Secretary General ro 

the Russian Ambassador.

Senator Aiken. You mean a formula as agreed to simply by the 

United States and Russia ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes, sir.

Senator Aiken. And then Cuba told the United States and Russia 

where to go ?
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS 21

Mr. Stevenson. Yes.

Senator Aiken. And nobody dared to do anything about it ; is that 

righ t ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes.

Senator Aiken. Do you consider the Castro government of Cuba a 

government of the Cuban people ?

Mr. Stevenson. No. I think it is a minority government like virtually all Communist governments are. I don't have any special information on that, but I should suspect that it represented a relatively 

small minority of the Cuban people.

Senator Aiken. A small minority of Cubans ?

Mr. Stevenson. A minority of Cubans, yes.

IN FL U E N C E OF T H E SO VI ET U N IO N OVER T H E CU BAN GOVER NM EN T

Senator Aiken. Wh at influence do you think Russia has over the 

Cuban Government today ?

Mr. Stevenson. I think it has a considerable influence, especially in 

military affairs and defense, and obviously its economy is now almost 

wholly dependent upon the Soviet Union. So I would suppose it 

had a very considerable influence over the Cuban Government. But 

there is some reason to thin k that its influence is diminishing. Mikoyan, as you know, spent a month in Cuba trying to induce the Cubans 

to accept the agreement entered into by Khrushchev and was unsuccessful. It is ha rd for me to speculate, I am just not competent to 

tell you, to what extent Russian influence in Cuba has diminished.

Senator Aiken. Wouldn't you say that Russia virtually holds the 

life and death power over the Cuban Government today?

Mr. Stevenson. Certainly over its economy. Whether it holds it 

over its Government I do not know.

Senator Aiken. You would not say it held it militarily?

Mr. Stevenson. Oh, militarily, I would think so.

Senator Aiken. And economically and politically?

Mr. Stevenson. Economically certainly.

Senator Aiken. But not politically?

Mr. Stevenson. I just do not know. I am not informed.

Senator Aiken. Well, it is still a mystery to me why Cuba can defy 

the United States, U.S.S.R., and the United Nations and make them all 

back down, and thus create a situation, an atmosphere, which is 

charged and surcharged with suspicion when if, as you say, Chairman 

Khrushchev agreed and even proposed this inspection. Yet all together were powerless to enforce the formula.

Mr. Stevenson. Maybe Chairman Khrushchev doesn't exercise as 

much influence over Cuba as we suspected.

Senator Aiken. I think Chairman Khrushchev has his troubles, too. 

But in the meantime he officially represents the U.S.S.R. as head of 

state.

Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Church. Thank you. Senator.

Senator Aiken. I wish we had gone ahead with inspection.

Mr. Stevenson. I wish we could have.
22 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNIT ED NATIONS

RE FU SA L OF IN SPE C T IO N S BY CU BA

Senator Church. On this question of inspection, may I just ask 

this, Mr. Ambassador: I take it from your testimony tha t had we attempted to force onsite inspection against Castro’s resistance it would 

have required an invasion of Cuba or the definite intention and use of 

force ?

Mr. Stevenson. I would suppose so, if a country refuses to accept 

a proposal.

Senator Church. Do you know of any case where any country heretofore has been invaded on the basis of its refusal to permit onsite inspection inside its territory ?

Mr. Stevenson. I don’t think there ever has been any such case.

The most interesting thin g about inspection here was the proposal 

that came from the Secretary General to the Soviet Union, and it accepted for itself. It could not accept it for Cuba, and then it tried 

to persuade Cuba to accept it, too. They declined and made a counterproposal which was that there be reciprocal inspection, and this was, 

of course, intolerable to us.

So we made another counterproposal which was if there is any reciprocity tha t—if there was reciprocity by inspection of the United 

States, we should also inspect their source and this, of course, was in 

Soviet territory , and this, of course, was rejected by the Soviets.

Senator Church. So in the end we had to balance whatever the risk 

might be in foregoing onsite inspection in Cuba against what the cost 

might be to the United States of its position in L atin America and in 

the world. It had to be a general assessment of a general balance of 

interests. Is that not correct?

Mr. Stevenson. That is correct, plus the fact tha t we had an alternative method of inspection. The reason for the inspection was 

security for the United States at sea, which, while it was not as satisfactory as territorial onsite inspection, it was still very effective.

Senator Church. Senator Sparkman ?

IN SPE C T IO N AGREE M ENT A BI LA TE RA L ON E

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Ambassador, Cuba was never a part of 

these negotiations, was it?

Mr. Stevenson. Never.

Senator Sparkman. Therefore, any agreement between the United 

States and Russia was simply an agreement between those two powers 

in the hope that Cuba might be persuaded to permit the onsite 

inspection?

Mr. Stevenson. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Sparkman. Wh at we actually did was to avoid the use of 

force rath er than to insist upon the onsite inspection ?

Mr. Stevenson. Correct.

Senator Sparkman. And to rely on the other types of inspection 

as you have mentioned.

Mr. Stevenson. Yes, si r: at sea.

Senator Sparkman. I want to compliment you upon a very fine 

statement which you have given. I want to ask you just a couple of 

questions.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS 23

FAIL U R E OF SO ME NA TIO N S TO K E E P U P T H E IR F IN A N C IA L ASS ES SM EN TS

You said something about the financial standing and, you mentioned particularly, the failure of Russia to participate in some of 

these activities. Of course, there has been a great deal of concern 

over the country, and it has been reflected in the Congress, as you 

know, with reference to the failure of a good many nations to keep 

up with their payments.

Now, you believe, do you not, t hat the Internatio nal Court decision 

was helpful to this situation ?

Mr. Stevenson. It was very helpful, Senator, because this is the 

first time we have ever had any interpretation of the charter with 

respect to the assessments for peacekeeping operations and whether 

or not they were subject to the penalties provided in the charter for 

assessments for the regu lar budget.

Senator Sparkman. By the way, the General Assembly approved 

that decision overwhelmingly, did it not ?

Mr. Stevenson. I think it was 76 to 17; yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. Seventy-six to seventeen. So it stands as the 

policy of the United Nations generally ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes, sir.

A PPO IN T M E N T OF EU G EN E BL ACK AS CO N SU LT ANT TO T H E SECR ET AR Y 

GE NE RA L ON FI SC AL AFF AIR S

Senator Sparkman. By the way, I think another encouraging 

thing which has been done has been the action recently taken of securing the services of Mr. Eugene Black as financial consultant or adviser 

or whatever his title may be.

Mr. Stevenson. Yes. He has very generously agreed, a fter negotiations which we opened last summer, to act as consultant to the 

Secretary General on fiscal affairs, and especially with reference to 

the future financing problem, and also the embarrassment caused by 

the accumulation of arrearages for nonpayment.

Senator Sparkman. In other words, he is going to do what he 

can to collect the arrearages ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes. I think it would be perhaps a mistake to try 

to label his position as finance minister, but you could certainly label 

it as senior financial adviser of the organization.

U .S . PO LI CY TOWA RD T H E CONGO

Senator Sparkman. I want to ask just a question or two about the 

Congo. You gave a very fine treatment of that, but I want to clarify 

my own thinking on this .

First of all, our policy with reference to the Congo was decided 2 

or 3 years ago, was it not ?

Mr. Stevenson. Our policy was decided in July 1960.

Senator Sparkman. In Jul y 1960. And this administration simply 

followed the policy established by the preceding administration ?

Mr. Stevenson. That is correct.

Senator Sparkman. Isn 't it true that the decision made in 1960 

followed a solemn agreement that had been entered into at the Brus ­

sels Conference in which both contending factions participated?
24 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNIT ED NATIONS

E ST A B L IS H M EN T OF T H E CON GO AS A ST AT E

Mr. Stevenson. Yes. If you are referring to Katanga, the representatives at the Brussels Conference in Janu ary 1960, which adopted 

the proposed Loi Fundamentale, under which Belgium relinquished 

sovereignty over the Congo, and the new state was created, was signed 

by Mr. Tshombe as representative of the Province of Katanga.

Senator Sparkman. And signed as well by representatives of the 

other parts of the Congo?

Mr. Stevenson. All the other provincial leaders.

Senator Sparkman. Then, following that, was not a government set 

up in keeping with that agreement ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. And wasn’t Mr. Adoula duly elected according 

to the procedures outlined in that agreement ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes; but not at first.

Senator Sparkman. I realize he was not at first, but most of the 

trouble arose after he had been elected, I believe.

Mr. Stevenson. The trouble started a little bit earlier than Mr. 

Adoula and his election.

Senator Sparkman. But it started in connection with a government 

that had been duly established in accordance with the agreement 

arrived at in Brussels, when Belgium, the former ruling power, and 

the representatives of the Congo areas had reached agreement?

Mr. Stevenson. That is correct.

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Tshombe. who was dominant in Katanga, 

participated ?

Mr. Stevenson. I think Provincial President was his title at the 

time of the Brussels Conference in January.

U .S . SU PP ORT OF T H E GOVER NM EN T ES TA BL IS HED IN T H E CONGO

Senator Sparkman. What the United States did, even early in 

I960, was to go along with the U.X. decision to support a duly established government in the Congo, and to try to unify the country.

Mr. Stevenson. Restore law and order after the mutinies had 

broken out.

Senator Sparkman. In your opinion, was the undertaking successful ?

Mr. Stevenson. I have tried to indicate here this afternoon that I 

think it is, perhaps, the most remarkable historic case of collective responsibility by the world community in restoring peace and order 

to a region of the world, especially one this large.

Senator Sparkman. I)o you believe that our contribution to that 

movement, that action, constituted a tremendous contribution to world 

peace ?

Mr. Stevenson. I do indeed. It wouldn’t have been possible without the I ’nited States support.

Senator Sparkman. Yes.

T believe that is all. Mr. Chairman.

Senator Church. Thank you. Senator.

Senator Carlson?
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS 25

U .N . HOLE IN T H E C UB AN CR ISIS

Senator Carlson. Mr. Ambassador, 1 want to get into the financial 

problems a little bit, but 1 was intrigued by one sentence in your state­ ment, and 1 think it needs clarification—at least as far as I am concerned. It reads this way :

I sh ou ld no t care to sp ec ul at e on how or whe n th e Cub an cr is is m ig ht ha ve 

be en reso lved or w heth er it co uld ha ve be en reso lved w ithout th e U ni te d 

Nations .

Am I to take tha t statement to mean that as fa r as the United Nations is concerned the Cuban situation has been resolved ?

Mr. Stevenson. I was referring to the threat created by the existence of the missiles in Cuba, the crisis we confronted last October.

Senator (\ \rlson. 1 )o you think we have a crisis in Cuba now ?

Mr. Stevenson. We have a crisis in Cuba insofar as we have a crisis 

in all the Communist areas of the world who are pledged to destroy our system. We don’t have the same threat to our peace and our security that we had at the time these missiles were targeted on American 

bases.

Senator Carlson. Are we not continuing to fly planes over Cuba 

daily in order to get what inspection we can because we think the prob­ lem is serious enough to endanger our situation in this hemisphere'?

Mr. Stevenson. I hope we are flying them; I assume we are still 

doing it.

CUBAN T R A IN IN G OF REPR ES EN TA TI VES FR OM L A TIN AM ER IC A N CO U NTR IE S

Senator Carlson. Does not the United Nations have any interest 

in the fact that it has been brought to light recently that 1,500 re pre­ sentatives of Latin American countries were in Cuba for training in 

order to go home and spread the Communist doctrine ?

Mr. Stevenson. I cannot speak for the United Nations on that. 

But, of course, this is a source of grave concern to the United States 

and to the Western Hemisphere. 1 think, in my own judgment, it is of much greater concern to me 

than the existence of some Russian forces in Cuba.

Senator Carlson. I might agree with you on that. I am greatly 

concerned about it personally, and I was a little fearful of this state­ ment here that the United Nations—and maybe that was a feeling of our representative in the United Nations—has no problem in Cuba 

at the present time.

Mr. Stevenson. I do not have that quote right in front of me, sir. 

Could you tell me where it was ?

IM PO RTANCE OF U .N . IN CU BAN CR ISIS

Senator Carlson. It says that the crisis might not have been resolved without the United Nations, and I gathered that it was resolved as far as they were concerned.

Mr. Stevenson. Well, I think, perhaps, maybe my language is not 

apt.What I was attempting to say was tha t the crisis that was created last fall by the clandestine introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba was resolved by their removal; that this would have been pos-
26 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

sible without collision and the risk of war, without the intervention 

of th e U nited Nations, I am n ot prepared to say. Perhaps it would 

have been.

This is all I was saying here. But tha t the United Nations contributed to tha t peaceful conclusion, this is unquestionable.

Senator Carlson. I shall not disagree with you, Mr. Ambassador, 

on that phase of it. I wanted the record clear tha t, so far as one member of this committee is concerned, the situation in Cuba has not been 

resolved as far as the United States is concerned.

Mr. Stevenson. Perhaps I should have said “the crisis of October.”

Senator Carlson. I would have accepted that.

PERCENTAGE OF U. S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO TOTAL COST OF U .N . OPERATIONS

I did want to get into a little discussion on the financial operations 

of the United Nations. The Senator from Arkansas started asking 

some questions about it. What percentage of the total cost of the 

operations of the United Nations does the United States contribute?

Mr. Stevenson. We have tha t statutory maximum which was laid 

down by Congress of not to exceed 33 ^ percent of the budget of the 

United Nations. Actually we are contributing now 32.02 percent.

Senator Carlson. I notice now tha t the figure of $94 million was 

voted by the General Assembly fo r the 1963 regular budget. Tha t is 

an increase, as I see it, of $7 million beyond the estimates for the 1963 

period made when the Assembly began its last session. If we should 

grant this increase, how much would the percentage share be of the 

United States?

Mr. Stevenson. It would be th e same percentage on which we are 

proceeding now, which would be 32.02.

CONTRIBUTION OF UNITED STATES TO U .N . PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Senator Carlson. 'What percentage have we been contributing to 

the operation for the Congo and for the United Nations Emergency 

Force?

Mr. Stevenson. For those two activities of the Congo and the 

Middle Eas t emergency force, our contribution is approximately 47, 

between 47 and 48 percent.

Senator Carlson. In other words, we are contributing about onehalf of the cost of the operations in the Congo and the Middle East ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes, sir.

Senator Carlson. How about the contributions from other countries?

Mr. Stevenson. Those, you understand, are not assessed. Those 

are voluntary.

Senator Carlson. That is true. But they are contributions, however.

Mr. Stevenson. Yes, sir.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNIT ED NATIONS 27

CONTRIB UTION S OF OT HE R COUNTRIES TO THE U .N . REGULAR BUDGET

Senator Carlson. Returning now to the regular operating funds, how about the payments of other countries. Are they all contributing 

their full share?

Mr. Stevenson. On the regular budget for the regular operations of the U.N., the record is quite good. I think we could give you a number of states that are delinquent and in what amounts very read­ ily. I do not have them readily at hand, but I could give them to you for the record. But the record is very good and it has been on regu­ lar assessments. The trouble has all arisen over these peacekeeping 

operations.

CONTRIB UTION S OF OT HE R COU NTRIES TO U .N . PE AC EK EE PING OPERATIONS

Senator Carlson. H ow well have other countries been contributing to the United Nations Emergency Force, and the Congo operations ?

Mr. Stevenson. That is much worse.

Senator Carlson. How much worse?

Mr. Stevenson. Twenty-five U.N. members have paid nothing on their Middle East assessments, and 48 members have paid nothing on their bills for the Congo. What tha t amounts to in percentages of 

total cost I do not have. None of the Soviet states, none of the Communist bloc, have con­ tributed to the Congo, no r has France, no r has Belgium. Many of th e 

small, very small states are likewise in arrears.

Senator Carlson. Could you have a total there ?

Mr. Stevenson. Likewise China, Nationalist China, has not con­ tributed, nor have the Arab States to the Middle E ast because of their 

conflict with Israel.

granting of reductions in assessments

Senator Carlson. I read somewhere tha t some of these nations have been granted reductions of 50 to 80 percent of their assessments. 

Who grants those reductions ?

Mr. Stevenson. The first resolution providing for reductions for very small states who have difficulty in meeting their assessments was started in 1957. Tha t practice has been followed subsequently. Many of the smaller states, especially Latin American States, have taken the position tha t the peacekeeping, the keeping of the peace of the world, was intended at San Francisco to be the responsibility of the great powers, and have insisted they do not have responsibility for it.

arrearages of countries granted a reduction in assessments

Senator Carlson. Would you submit for the record th e arrearages of these countries who have been granted this special compensation 

from 1957 on to the present time ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes, we could do that, sir.
28 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNIT ED NATIONS

Senator Carlson. How much do you think it might, be ?

Mr. Stevenson. I could give it to you not going back to 1957. I 

think 1 could give it to you with reference to the Congo—it is about 

the order of $9,462,000 for the small states for the Congo operation.

Senator Carlson. 1 am speaking now of all arrearages since 1957 

of the member states who have been granted 50- to 80-percent reduction of th eir assessments.

Mr. Stevenson. I am afraid we will have to supply that for the 

record, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

Arrearages of Member States Receiving Reductions on UN EF and UNOC 

(Exclud es 10 new members admitted in 1961 and 1962)

Balance due, 1962 and prior years, Jan uary 31, 1963

C o u n tr y R eg ul ar

budget

U nited

N at io ns

E m er gen cy

For ce

U N O C

B al an ce d u e 

1962 an d 

prior yea rs

A fg hanis ta n____________ ____ _____ . _________ $39,323

34.1 08

856,376

38,0 59

$34,365

33,6 64

649,372

33,664

410, 943 

141,055

$73,688 

83,420 

2, 759,925 

120,407

413.334 

357,449

A lb an ia . . . _______ __ $15,648 

1,254,177 

48,684 

2,391 

87,088

A rg en ti n a_____________________________ . . . .

B oli via ______________________________ __ ___

B ra zil _______________ _________ .

B u lg ari a_____________________ 129,306 B u rm a_______________________ _

C am b o d ia ________ ____________ ____ _______ 24,7 46 27,2 98 52,044 C a m e r o o n __ . .......... ........... ......... . . . ____

C a n a d a ._____ _________ _____ _ . .

C en tr al A frican R epubli cs____________________

C ey lo n_______________________________________

C h a d ______________________ _____ 777 

91,802 

4,1 89, 837

13,036

160,247 

5,751,74 3

13,813

412,389

15,8 65,3 55

C hil e_____ ______ ___________ 160,340 

C h in a . ____________________ 5,923,775

C olo m bia _____________________________________

Con go (B ra zz av il le )___________________________

Con go (L eopold vil le )_________________________

C ost a R ic a___________________________________

26,3 69 

17,670 

9,231 

199,464

8,745

1,362

7,628

191,001

16,452 

11,196 

23,978 

205,598

51,5 66 

30,228 

40,8 37 

596,063 C u b a ______________ ________________________

C y p ru s _______________________________________

D a h o m e y .. . . . . ________ _________________ 19,936 1,159

10.275

6,246

42,079

8,65 6

16,263 

34,3 65

27,341 

52,3 54 

11,968 

21,640 

99,450

D om in ic an R ep u b li c_________________________

E cuador _______ . . _________ . . . . . . . 3,312

E l S alv ad o r_____ . . ____ . . . . 5,37 7

65,085 E th io p ia ____________ ____ ____________________

F ed era ti o n of M ala y a______________________ . .

G a b o n .. . ____________ ____ _______ _______ ._

G h an a_____________ _______ 63,5 74 

29,273 

61,074 

25,682 

69,634 

71,014

1,676

160,116

18,053

8,219

14.470

8,408

14,341

137,869

29,971

33,6 64

23,9 78 

23,9 78

79,591

327,258 

109,098 

67,565 

108,082 

103,400

G re ec e. ______________________ ______ ______

G u ate m ala _________ _____ _____ ___________ . .

G u in ea_______________________ __________ ____

H a it i_____________ ______ _____________________

H o n d u ra s_______ _______ ________ . __________

Ic el an d ___________ _______ __________ ________

In d ia _____ ______ ______________________ ______ 140.000 140,000 In d o n esia ______ ____ _________________________

Ira n __________________________________________ 99,281 

75, 744

99,281

152.342 Ira q __________________________________________ 76,598 Ire la n d ______________________________________

Is ra el_________________________________________ 95, 548 95,548 Ita ly ______ ____ ___________ ____ ____________

Iv o rv C o ast______________________ _________

J a p a n . . ________ _____ ____ _________ _______

J o rd a n ________________________________________ 34,1 08

3.72 2

19,845

33.6 64 

17,612 

12,108

67,772 

46,0 80 

31,953

Lao s............................... . . . 24, 746

L eb an o n ______________________________________

L ib eri a____ __________________________________

L ib y a ______________ ________ _______________ . 34.1 08 34, 108 

7,949 

17,330 

14.336 

1,129.359 

147,274

52,614 

56,464

L uxem bourg __________ _________________ ___ 7,949

17,330

14,321

602,331

117,823

23.977

23.978

M a d a g a s c a r .. ___ _ _________ _____ ____ ____

M ali __________________________________________ 15

527,028

29,451 

26,346 

3,697

M ex ic o____________ _______ ___________________

M or oc co _________ ___________________________

N ep al__________________ . . . . . _____________ 2.291 

N ic ara g u a......................................................................... 28, 789
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS 29

Balance due, 1962 and prior years, Janu ary 31,1963—Continued

C o u n tr y R eg ul ar

b u d g et

U nit ed

N ati o n s

E m er gen cy

For ce

U N O C

B al an ce due 

1962 a n d 

p ri or yea rs

N ig er____________________ ______ _____________ $40,100 $4,983 $15,386 $60,469

N ig eri a_______________________________________

P a k is ta n ____________________________________ 140,000 140,000

52,2 18

109,382 

158,745 

485 

3,3 06, 839 

161,919 

153,119 

41,682 

7,507 

1, 638,647 

73,510 

28,405 

20,3 70

P a n a m a ................................ - _______ ______ - -- 28,241 

30,346 

94,4 08 

485 

1,2 69,00 4

23,977 

23, 978 

64,337 P a rag u ay __ __________________________________ 55,0 58

P e ru . _______________ __ _____________

P h il ip p in e s .__ _________ ___________________

P o la n d _________________ - ___________________ 184,920 1,8 52, 915 

161,919 

52,095 

7,994 

7,507 

771,483

P o r t u g a l . . ________ _________ ______________

S au di A ra b ia _________________________________ 45,71 5 

32,7 17

55,3 09 

Sen eg al __________ . _____ _____ _____________ 971

Som al ia __________ . . . ________________

S p ain _______________ _______ _________________ 867,164

71,1 18

2,940

4,9 83

S u d an . _________ . . . __ ___________ 2,392

T h a il a n d .. . ___________ . . - ______ _____ 25,4 65 

Togo______________________ . . _____________ 15,387

T u n is ia __ _____ ______________ _____ _________

T u rk e y . ____ _ _____ ___________________

U n it ed A ra b R e p u b lic ................... ........... ............. 342,672

25,744

125,655

317,409 

8,745 

24,9 83

266,110

16,452 

70,3 32 

302,917 

33,6 64 

299, 358

926,191 

50,941

220,970 

302,917 

94,657 

299,358

U p p er V o lt a__ _______________________ _____ _

U ru g u ay ________________ ______ ______________

V en ez uel a_______________ ____ ____ ______

Y em en _____ ________ _____________ __________ 26,8 85 34,108

Y ugosl av ia ____________________ _____________

T o ta ls __________________________________ 9,42 6,3 14 9,4 51, 277 12,941,415 31,81 9,0 06

Senator Carlson. If I quoted your distinguished colleague there, 

Richard Gardner, would you object ?

Mr. Stevenson. No, sir.

Senator Carlson. Well, I notice in a statement he made yesterday 

tha t the arrearages to tal $121,604,114 of debt. Would th at be correct ?

Mr. Stevenson. Tha t is correct. That, of course, includes not only 

the small states but the large as well.

Senator Carlson. That is correct. I was t rying to get the total 

figure.

loss of vote by countries in arrears

Do these countries that are in arrea rs lose their votes ?

Mr. Stevenson. The charter provides that after a state has been 

in arrears for 2 years, after a state has been in arrears, in an amount 

tha t equals the last 2 years’ assessments, then it loses its vote in the 

General Assembly. This, however, was originally interpreted as regular assessments. Now we have a ruling of the International Court of 

Justice tha t extends tha t doctrine to special assessments for peacekeeping operations. That has not been tested.

Senator Carlson. I was going to ask you, has tha t yet been enforced ?

Mr. Stevenson. It has not, no. It has not arisen yet.

Senator Carlson. If it has arisen, do you know whether it has been 

used in UNESCO?

Mr. Stevenson. Mr. Gardner tells me that in some of the specialized 

agencies it has arisen and has been enforced specifically in the case 

of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Senator Carlson. I have, and I am sure the chairman is familiar 

with this, heard testimony from witnesses on UNESCO tha t concerned me a little on this voting.
30 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNIT ED NATIONS

As I understand it, they waived these arrearages on three countries 

and permitted them to have a vote.

It seems to me that establishes a precedent that might be h armful 

in futu re considerations when it comes before the United Nations, 

and I wanted to just mention that for the record.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Church. I must say I share this concern. I know this is 

a matter you have not dealt with, Mr. Ambassador, at all. But I 

share the concern of the Senator with respect to UNESCO, and it 

won’t be of help to us when the matter comes up afresh in the General 

Assembly this year.

Senator Humphrey.

Senator Humphrey. First, Mr. Ambassador, I want to commend 

you on a remarkable statement. I hope it will be well read and studied 

by not only members of this committee but by the general public.

U .S . SU PP ORT FOR U .N . PE A C EK E E PIN G OP ER AT IO NS

I should like to ask a few questions in reference to the peacekeeping 

operations of the United Nations.

Did we vote for the peacekeeping operations in reference to the 

Middle East?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes, sir.

Senator Humphrey. When did we vote for tha t peacekeepingoperation ?

Mr. Stevenson. 1956.

Senator Humphrey. Do you recall the Middle East emergency aid 

program in the same period of time ?

Mr. Stevenson. Was tha t the bilateral program of the United 

States ?

Senator Humphrey. The request tha t was then made by the then 

President of the United States to the Congress of the United States 

for $300 million.

Mr. Stevenson. Yes.

TO TA L COS T OF U .N . PEA C EK E E PIN G OP ER AT IO NS

Senator Humphrey. Do you have any idea how much the peacekeeping operation of the United Nations has totaled throughout the 

years in the Middle East as compared to the special grant of $300 

million?

Mr. Stevenson. It has run, I think, at the rate of about $10-$20 

million a year, which would be since 1956, that would be for 6 years, 

about $120 million against $300 million the United States contributed 

at tha t time.

(The information referred to follow s:)

Total cost to United Nations of United Nations Emergency Force in the

Middle East

1957 _____________________

1958 _____________________

1959 _____________________

1960 _____________________

$29, 909. 000

23, 914, 000 

18, 949, 000 

19,09 6, 000

1961 _____________________ $19, 000, 00 0

1962 _____________________ 19 ,500 ,000

To ta l______________ 130, 368, 000
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS 31

COST TO UNITED STATES OF LANDING THE MARINES IN LEBANON

Senator Humphrey. Do you have any idea how much it cost to land 

the Marines in Lebanon in the Lebanon crisis ?

Mr. Stevenson. No, but I can imagine it was a very considerable 

figure.

Senator Humphrey. I think it would be very interesting to get that 

figure. As I recall, it was somewhere around $50 to $60 million. 

But we could look that figure up, and I would like to have it put in the 

record. That did not include, of course, the use of the ships and the 

fact that the manpower was at sea.

(The information referred to follows:)

Tlie follow ing inform ati on wa s fu rn ishe d by th e Dep artm en t of Defen se on 

th e cost of th e Lebanon operati on : “Th e to ta l cost of th e Leban on op erati on wa s $120 million . Of th is figure $66 million wa s fo r op erati on s an d ma intenance. Th e rema ind er, which would 

he $54 million , con sisted of m ilita ry per son nel cost an d su rfa ce tran sp or t.”

COST TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN WEST GERMANY

Do you have any idea how much it costs to keep one division of 

American troops without equipment in West Germany per year?

Mr. Stevenson. I don’t have tha t figure at hand.

Senator H umphrey. $120 million. I just asked the staff to get me 

this information.

Mr. Stevenson. Per division.

Senator H umphrey. Per division. That is exclusive of equipment.

NUMBER OF U.N . TROOPS IN THE CONGO

How many men does the United Nations have in its peacekeeping 

operations in the Congo? Wh at did you say in your statement?

Mr. Stevenson. It has been up to 21,000. It is down to between 

17,000 and 18,000 now, and it is now phasing out, and now declining 

very rapidly since the termination of the military phase in Katanga.

Senator Humphrey. How many U.S. citizens are members of the 

combat forces of the United Nations troops in the Congo ?

Mr. Stevenson. Not one.

Senator Humphrey. How many U.S. citizens have perished in 

battle in the Congo ?

Mr. Stevenson. Not one.

U.S. MONETARY contributions TO U.N. peacekeeping operations

Senator Humphrey. I have here the report of the 87th Congress, 

2d Session, House Document No. 460, “U.S. Contributions to Inter ­

national Organizations,” and the estimated cost in 1962 of our contribution to all “peacekeeping operations” was $96,677,000.

Mr. Stevenson. That sounds just about right.

Senator Humphrey. Yes. It was $76,122,000 in 1961; $39,963,000 

in 1960, and so on back.

Now, as I recall your statement, you indicated that it was in our 

national interest, according to this administration and the previous 

administration, to support a unified Congo; is tha t correct?
32 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Stevenson. Yes; that is correct.

Senator Humphrey. Do I recall correctly tha t it was in 1960 tha t 

the resolution was adopted for the peacekeeping operations in the 

Congo ?

Mr. Stevenson. The resolution by which the United Nations entered 

the Congo was adopted, I think, in July 1960, July 13,1960.

Senator H umphrey. 1960.

U.S. CO NT RIB UT ION OF TROOPS TO U .N . PE AC EK EE PIN G OPERA TIONS

Have we ever been asked for a contribution of troops to the Congo ?

Mr. Stevenson. No. Dag Hammarskjold, the then Secretary General, laid down a principle at the time tha t the great powers would 

not participate in the peacekeeping operations with military forces. 

This was to obviously avoid confrontation between Russian and Ame rican or British forces.

Senator Humphrey. Have the Soviets supported the peacekeeping 

operations ?

Air. Stevenson. It has not supported them since the very first days 

when there was some, I gather, hope that Lumumba would emerge as 

the leader of the Congo.

Senator Humphrey. Has the present Congolese Central Government indicated that it was pro-Soviet ?

Air. Stevenson. In no way whatsoever tha t we have ever detected.

U.S. SUPPO RT OF PE AC EK EE PIN G OPERAT IONS IN THE CONGO

Senator H umphrey. Therefore it is a fact, is it not, tha t two administrations and two separate Secretaries of State and two separate Secretaries of Defense and two or three representatives in the United Nations—I believe Mr. Lodge and Air. Wadsworth both served as the 

representatives—have agreed tha t it was in our national interest to 

have peacekeeping operations in the Congo; is that correct?

Air. Stevenson. Tha t is correct, sir.

Senator Humphrey. And it was understood we would make a financial contribution ?

Air. Stevenson. Yes. I think—I can’t tell you the exact sequence 

of events as to when we decided or how much was—when we made our 

first voluntary contribution, but from the very start the United States 

has made it emphatically clear tha t it proposed to support the Congo 

operation and has done so consistently ever since J uly 1960.

I think, Senator Humphrey, the first request for voluntary contributions to meet the accruals from the forces that were put into the Congo 

by neutral states, for the most part, probably came in the autum n of 

1960.

Senator H umphrey. That is correct.

Mr. Stevenson. And we have been contributing regularly something like 47, bet ween 47 and 48 percent.

Senator Humphrey. Let us say 47, 48 percent of th at total cost.

Air. Stevenson. Tha t is correct.

Senator Humphrey. But the record is clear, no U.S. nationals, no 

U.S. national casualties were involved, nor were there requests made 

for U.S. nationals.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNITED NATIONS 33

Mr. Stevenson. That is correct.

Senator Humphrey. And yet the record is also clear tha t this was a 

national security policy of the Government of the United States; is 

tha t correct?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes.

Senator Humphrey. Presidential national security policy ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes.

U. S. SUP POR T OF PE AC EK EE PING OPERAT IONS IN TH E MIDDLE EAST

Senator Humphrey. It is also clear, is it not, tha t we, the Government of the United States, regardless of who occupied the Office of 

President, supported the Middle East peace efforts following the Suez 

crisis; is tha t correct ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes. That commenced in November 1956.

Senator Humphrey. We are still supporting that, are we not?

Mr. Stevenson. We are still supporting it.

Senator Humphrey. This again was a policy of the U.S. Government arrived at throu gh the mechanism of our Government, the National Security Council, and the President; was it not ?

Mr. Stevenson. And the President, a fter the United Nations Force 

was established.

Senator Humphrey. Exactly. We voted for the establishment of 

the U.N. Force, did we not ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes. I th ink we proposed the resolution.

Senator Humphrey. As I recall, I was there at the time it was 

done. In other words, the Ambassador to the U.N. does not make 

these proposals on his own, does he?

Mr. Stevenson. No.

Senator Humphrey. You generally get instructions; is that correct ?

Mr. Stevenson. I generally get quite a lot of help.

TOTAL COST OF U .N . PE AC EK EE PIN G OPERATIONS

Senator H umphrey. Yes. I thought we just might put down what 

the total peacekeeping costs have been of the U.N. since its inception 

in 1945, with the first session of 1946. The total costs for peacekeeping operations of the U.N. have been $430,368,000. Tha t includes 

every operation of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, exclusive of the war in Korea.

Mr. Stevenson. Except the war in Korea.

Senator Humphrey. Except the war in Korea.

I also noted, just to give some idea of what comparisons are, the 

cost of the nuclear carrier Enterprise was something over $400 million; our latest conventional aircraft carrier cost $305 million; insofar as the Government of the United States was concerned, the peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East, last year cost 

$96,677,000.

The point I seek to make is th at it appears to me these were all decisions tha t were in the national interest, according to the President 

and the Government of the United States.

Mr. Stevenson. I am sure that is the case and as it happens, at 

least three Presidents have been involved in these decisions commencing in 1946.
34 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

COST OF U. S. OPER ATIO N IN VIE TN AM

Senator Humphrey. The cost of our operations in Vietnam would 

be interesting. This is a very vital area of the world where we are 

confronted with the forces of communism of an aggressive nature 

which are seeking to overthrow a friendly government and take over 

an entire area.

Do you have any idea what the cost in dollars per year is of our operation in Vietnam ? We will talk about manpower a little later. It 

is over $300 million.

Mr. Stevenson. Yes.

Senator Humphrey. And the total amount we poured into th at one 

country since 1954 is approximately $2 billion.

Mr. Stevenson. To include north Vietnam and south Vietnam, $2 

billion ?

Senator Humphrey. $2 billion. Do we get any help in the 

peacekeeping there ?

Mr. Stevenson. No. The United Nations has never been involved 

in Vietnam.

U. S. RE SPON SIB ILI TY FOR KEE PING WORLD PEACE

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Ambassador, isn’t it about time tha t we 

recognized who really has the responsibility for keeping the peace? 

If we say we are a leader in the free world, isn't it about time that 

we recognize who really has the responsibility for keeping the peace ?

Mr. Stevenson. Emphatically I agree.

Senator Humphrey. We are in a contest for our lives with these 

Communists. They do not want to keep the peace. It is to their advantage not to have it. It seems to me w’e ought to be quite grate ful 

for any help we get in keeping the peace.

Mr. Stevenson. I should have thought so.

Senator Humphrey. It would dawn on me somewhere along the 

line tha t it should be something for which we have some appreciation. Possibly it would not make quite as much difference to Uruguay, 

if the Congo had been overrun and taken over by the Communists. 

In fact, if this had happened we perhaps might have given a little hit 

more aid under the Alliance for Progress, wouldn’t we?

Mr. Stevenson. I wouldn’t be a bit surprised if we would have to 

enlarge our aid and military assistance, perhaps, in many places in 

the world.

foreign aid received by countries in arrears

Senator Humphrey. I s it not true tha t many of the countries that 

have had a reduction in their assessments, many of them, not all, are 

also people who have been recipients of U.S. foreign aid?

Mr. Stevenson. I think the large majority have received such aid.

Senator Humphrey. A substantial number anyway.

Mr. Stevenson. A large majority.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS 35

IM PO RTA N C E OF BERLIN

Senator Humphrey. We are attem pting to keep the peace in 

Berlin, are we not ?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes.

Senator Humphrey. Berlin is considered just as vital an area tothe United States as is the Congo and as is the Middle Ea st; is that 

not a fact ?

Mr. Stevenson. Tha t is correct.

Senator Humphrey. Has it not been said by the top leadership in 

this country in years gone by and presently that the Middle East is 

a powder keg that could explode and involve the world in a war?

Mr. Stevenson. Yes; and, of course, t hat situation is even further 

aggravated right now.

Senator Humphrey. Therefore, peacekeeping in the Middle East 

is to our national inte rest; is it not ?

Mr. Stevenson. Of course.

Senator Humphrey. We are getting a pretty good bargain it seems 

to me.

Mr. Stevenson. I would have thought we were getting an extremely good bargain. We also get the furthe r advantage of the participation of many other countries who are equally involved and 

equally committed and equally concerned.

Senator Humphrey. I am sure a large number of young Americans 

would think it was to their advantage to have the Norwegians and 

the Swedes and a few others there.

Mr. Stevenson. Yes.

Senator Humphrey. It is considered to be an area of vital interest 

to the United States. Berlin is considered to be an area of vital interest to the United States.

Mr. Stevenson. So is the Middle East.

Senator Humphrey. And yet last year, or 2 years ago, we increased 

the defense budget, because of Berlin, $6 billion. I mention this because I am deeply concerned over what I consider to be the over­ whelming concern about the cost of the operations of the United Na­ tions when, in fact, the operations of the United Nations, as I see them, in these strategic areas that you have mentioned in your testimony, Mr. Ambassador, are operations tha t are conducive to our national inter­ ests or tha t surely support our national interests. Is tha t not the 

burden of your testimony ?

Mr. Stevenson. That is the burden of my testimony and your conclusion, I think, is correct also, Senator. It seems to me a relatively simple thing. Peace is important and the alternatives are very disturbing, and the cost is incalculable of the alternatives.

TO TA L COST OF T H E U N IT E D N ATIO N S TO T H E U N IT E D STA TES 

SIN C E IN C E PT IO N

Senator Humphrey. Now, the total cost of the operations of the 

United Nations to the United States, Mr. Ambassador, so we might 

complete the record, since 1946, including the cost of all refugee pro­ grams, the Internatio nal Refugee Organization, the Palestinian refu­ gee program, the refugees in Hong Kong and elsewhere, has been
36 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

$1,864,218,000 for 17 years. This is slightly over $100 million per 

year.

Tha t is one-fourth the cost of the Enterprise carrier ; tha t is less 

than the cost of the maintenance of one division of troops in West 

Germany, troops without equipment or not having been delivered, just 

arrived.

Of this amount, $171,450,000 has been for regular technical assistance. Would you say we have gotten our money’s w orth out of the 

$171 million over 17 years for technical assistance?

Mr. Stevenson. I would have thought the technical assistance programs had been very well administered by the United Nations.

Senator Humphrey. The refugee program in the Middle East has 

been supported by the Congress, $289,668,000.

Would you consider the Children’s Fund a rather wholesome enterprise, Mr. Ambassador ?

Mr. Stevenson. To me it has been one of the—the word is well 

chosen.

Senator Humphrey. Well, we have contributed $192,231,000 in 17 

years to th at; and over-all to the International Refugee Organization 

$237,117,000.

COST PER U. S. PERSON OF U .N .

In other words, Mr. Ambassador, there has been a total cost for 17 

years to the Government of the United States and the people of this 

country of $1,864,218,000. Th at is approximately 75 cents per man, 

woman, and child per year for the entire operations of the United 

Nations for 17 years.

I consider tha t a rather good bargain even with the mistakes it has 

made.

What would be your evaluation ?

Mr. Stevenson. My impression is that I am just as Scotch as you 

are.

Senator Humphrey. Thank you. May I say you may be a little 

more so.

Well, Mr. Ambassador, I am very pleased with the splendid testimony you have given, and again I want to say that the only answer 

to the distortion is the fact, and I believe the facts for the U.N. speak 

rather well, providing we put these facts in proper perspective. 

UN ITED NA TIO NS----A ONE-AVORLD ORGANIZ ATION ?

Do you claim that, the U.N. is a one-world organization ?

Mr. Stevenson. Unhappily there isn’t one world, Senator. There 

are at least two worlds. 1 do not know what is going to happen between China and the Soviet Union, but there may be several worlds.

Senator Humphrey. Do you consider it a world government, Mr. 

Ambassador ?

Mr. Stevenson. No, it is a long way from that.

U. S. RI GH T TO EXERCISE VETO

Senator Humphrey. Do we have the right to exercise the veto in 

case our national interests are violated by any action of the U.N. ?

Mr. Stevenson. We did in the Security Council, and we have never 

had to exercise it yet. Our interests have never been imperiled.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNITED NATIONS 37

Senator Humphrey. Have you found any instance that our national 

security interests have been violated or seriously affected by a vote of 

the General Assembly ?

Mr. Stevenson. There have been some cases in which we have voted 

against the majority in the General Assembly. They have not been 

cases which we thought were of first consequence.

Senator H umphrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator Church. Senator, I want to express my appreciation for 

your efforts, and questions, in bringing into some perspective the kind 

of money that we are spending for furnishing Mars with his armor 

as compared to what we are spending in our effort to promote peace.

I suppose this is the time when the innkeeper is and has been Mars, 

and there is very little room at the inn for the U.N.

Mr. Stevenson. I hope very much th at we can have a tra nscript of 

Senator Humphrey’s questions and answers.

Senator H umphrey. You have been very helpful, Mr. Ambassador. 

By the way, Mr. Chairman, I hope we can have a transcript of this 

whole hearing to be rath er widely circulated.

Senator Church. A transcript is being made during the process of 

this hearing. We will have an official transcr ipt and, of course, that 

will be published in regular form.

RECOGNITION OF OTHERS PRESENT AT HEARING

It is now 4:30, Mr. Ambassador, and you have been here for 2 hours, 

and I do not want to prolong this very much longer. Before I ask 

the concluding questions, I do want to recognize the presence here, 

as I should have done earlier, of some very distinguished people: your 

colleague at the United Nations and an outstanding member of our 

diplomatic corps, Ambassador Fran cis Plimpton, who has been with 

you at the table throughout the afternoon; also the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State, Mr. Kichard Gardner, who sat at your elbow. 

I notice th at just a few minutes ago the Assistant Secretary of State 

for Internatio nal Organization Affairs, Harla n Cleveland, came in. I 

want to recognize his presence.

I want to say that Senator Gore was here and unable to participate. 

He had to leave. I am sorry about tha t because I know what it is to 

sit down at that end of the table where I normally sit, in fact, beneath 

Senator Gore. I am sorry tha t he could not particip ate because he 

was part of the American delegation at the United Nations at the 

17th General Assembly, and I know he would have something very 

meaningful to contribute.

Mr. Stevenson. I would like to say, if I can in terrupt, Mr. Chairman, tha t both Senator Gore and Senator Allott, who served on the 

delegation this fall, not only provided us with invaluable service and 

useful counsel, but also, I believe, have filed a report to the Senate 

on th eir experiences in the United Nations and the last General Assembly which we have found very enlightening, and I, for one, would 

like to express, I am sure, the gratitud e of our mission in New York 

for their services.

Senator Church. Thank you very much.

Senator Clark has joined us at the table, and I am wondering, 

Senator, if you have any questions you would like to ask the Ambassador ?
38 REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator Clark. I do not.

Senator Church. I want to express appreciation to yon for your 

coming.

Senator Clark. I certainly appreciate your inviting me here. I 

was interested in Senator Humphrey’s questions about the cost of the 

U.N. program. As a result of the public hearing w’e had in a Subcommittee on Manpower and Employment which I chaired just the other 

day Secretary of Labor Wirtz, speaking of the cost of Senator 

Humphrey’s youth conservation bill on which we Avere holding hearings, where the authorization requested was $100 million, pointed out 

tha t w’e had spent more money than that since 0 o’clock last night on 

the defense program.

Senator Ciiurcii. Thank you very much, Senator.

UNIT ED NA TIO NS STR ENGTH AS PEACEKEEPER

Now, I have these concluding questions, Mr. Ambassador. In your 

opinion, is the United Nations sufficiently strong to accomplish its 

principal mission, given the conditions of the world today—tha t of 

keeper of the peace ?

Mr. Stevenson. I think the record over the past 17 years speaks for 

itself. Virtually all of the cases of so-called peacekeeping operations 

in which it has been involved, the record is extremely good and, on 

the whole, satisfactory to us.

There is the built-in defect tha t in a divided world, with the great 

powers at the extremities of a polarization of power within and 

throughout the world, that we do have the difficulty of ever-imposing 

collective view’s or judgment of the world organization on any such 

great power except by its acquiescence.

Given that one infirmity, which is inherent in the situation th at persists in the world, I think the United Nations is strong enough to 

accomplish its principal mission and has accomplished its principal 

mission.

POSSIBLE REVIEW OF U .N . CHA RTER

Senator Church. I s there a likelihood of any meaningful review 

of the United Nations Charter in the foreseeable future ?

Mr. Stevenson. I do not see any immediate prospect for one. There 

are many who would, indeed, say tha t if w’e didn’t have the United 

Nations already it might be impossible now’ to create it.

PROBLEM OF ARREARAGES

Senator Church. Do you think that section 19 will work as a sufficient inducement to clear up the problem of arrearages with respect 

to the General Fund of the United Nations ?

Mr. Stevenson. The advisory opinion of the World Court was so 

emphatic last fall tha t we have felt very much encouraged tha t it 

would have this influence on governments.

Senator Ciiurcii. Do you think there w ill be a test case in the coming General Assembly ?

Mr. Stevenson. 1 think there will be one after the first of Janu ary 

1964, which will be after, presumably after, the adjournment of the 

next General Assembly, when the Soviet Union becomes delinquent 

under the terms of the charter.
REVIEW OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN TH E UNIT ED NATIONS 39

There are already some 10 countries delinquent. We had two last 

year who paid up at the last moment. I think these 10 that are pres­ ently delinquent will probably remedy th eir delinquency, but we can­ not tell about the test which may come in the case of the Soviet Union.

Senator Church. Senator Carlson, do you have any further 

questions ?

Senator Carlson. No.

COM MENDATION FOR WORK OF AMBASSADOR STEV ENSO N

Senator Church. Do any other Senators want to ask any final questions? If not, just let me express on behalf of the committee our appreciation for your coming, Mr. Ambassador. I remember being in New York briefly during those grim days of 

the crisis last October when the tension was very great. It was right afte r the dramatic sessions in the Security Council which were tele­ vised and watched by the American people; when your own perform­ ance was so very fort hright and effective tha t I found people in New York on the streets and at the magazine counters when they didn’t get what they wanted and were a little bit anxious to get the response tha t they were looking for saying, ‘“Never mind the translation, just 

answer yes or no.” I think, perhaps, you have added a new colloquialism to the language. But durin g those days, we were very proud indeed to have you at the U.N. to be our spokesman, and in your continuing mission there, I am sure th at I express the wishes of all members of this com­ mittee in wishing you Godspeed and the best of luck in every way. 

Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Stevenson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate th at very much. (Whereupon, at 4:40 o’clock p.m. the subcommittee was recessed.)

SUMMARY INDE X

Pago

Afro-Asian bloc in the U.N., possible control by th e____________________ 13

Aiken, S enator George D., exam ination of witness, Stevenson, Hon. Adlai E_ 18-21

American public opinion about the U.N______________________________ 11

Appointment of Eugene Black a s con sultant to Secretary General on fiscal

affairs________________________________________________________ 23

Arrearages of coun tries granted a redu ction in assessments___________ 27

Average year contributions of U nited Sta tes to the U.N------------------------- 16

Berlin, importance of_____________________________________________ 35

Carlson, Senator Fra nk, ex aminatio n of witness, Stevenson. Hon. Adlai E — 25-30 

Church, Senator Fra nk, examin atio n of witness, Stevenson, Hon.

Adlai E________________________________________________ 11-15, 22, 37-39

Communist influence over U.N. decisions, lack of_____________________ 12

Comparison between U.S. contribution to the U.N. and the defense budget— 17

Comparison of period after World Wa r I to period after World Wa r II----- 18

Congo:

Establishm ent of the, as a state________________________________ 24

Policy toward the____________________________________________ 23

Problem of the Congo affair____________________________________ 6

U.S. sup port of peacekeeping operatio ns in the ------------------------------ 32

U.S. support of the government esta blished in the________________ 24

Contributions by Soviet Union not made to U.N. specialized agencies------ 10

Contributions of other countries to the U.N. reg ular budget and peacekeeping operations______________________________________________ 27

Contribution of United States to reg ula r U.N. budget and assessments

last y ear ______________________________________________________ 16

Cost of U.S. p articipation in the U.N_______________________________ 15

Cost per person of U.N___________________________________________ 36

Cuban cr isis:

Importanc e of the U.N. in the__________________________________ 25

Inspection agreement a bilat era l one___________________________ 22

Origin of proposal to withdr aw insistence on inspectio n---------------- 20

Reasons for withdrawal by all concerned on issue of inspection-------- 19

Refusal of Cuba to permit inspectio n___________________________ 19, 22

Role of the U.N. in the ______________________________________7,18, 25

Cuban training of representatives from Latin American cou ntries_______ 25

Dominant fac ts of life in the 20th centu ry_________________________ 3

Fa ith in the U.N. justified________________________________________ 10

Financ ial assessments to the U.N., failu re of some nations to keep up

tlie ir_________________________________________________________ 23

Foreign aid received by countries in ar re ar s________________________ 34

Foreign policy intere sts of United Sta tes served by membership in the

U.N__________________________________________________________ 5

Fulbrig ht, Senator J. W., examin atio n of witness, Stevenson, Hon.

Adlai E________________________________________________________15,19

Func tions of the United Nations, variety of___________________________ 2

Humphrey, Senator Hubert H., examination of witness, Stevenson,

Hon. Adlai E ___________________________________________________ 30-37

Influence of the Soviet Union over the Cuban Government------------------- 21

Loss of vote by coun tries in ar re ar s_________________________________ 29

Lebanon, cost to United States of land ing the Marines in______________ 31

Meetings between United States and Soviet negotiators on Cuban crisis___ 8

Middle East, U.S. support of peacekeeping operations in t he ____________ 33

Peacekeeping operations, U.S. support for U.N-----------------------------------26, 30

Perc enta ge of U.S. contributions to total cost of U.N. operations_______ 26

Permane nt U.N. police force, possibility of a--------------------------------------- 15

Political crises in the U.N_____________________________ ____________ 5

41
42 SUMMARY INDEX

Page'

Position of the United, States in the U.N--------------------------------------------- 9

Problem of arre arages in the U.N---------------------------------------------------- 38

Problem before the U.N. during the 17th General Assembly------------------- 4

Pro testation s aga inst U.S. membership in the U.N---------------------------- 12

Purp ose of the hea ring ------------------------------------------------------------------ . 1

Reduction in assessments to U.N., g ran ting of-------------------------------------- 27

Role of the U.N. in a direct co nfrontation of w orld powers------------------- 14

Sparkman, Senator John, examination of witness, Stevenson, Hon.

Adlai E______________________________________________________ 22-24

Special Fun d project, U.S’. disagreement with------------------------------------- 10

Speculation on a world withou t th e U.N--------------------------------------------- 8

Stake of the United States in the U.N----------------------------------------------- 2

Strength of U.N. as peacekeeper----------------------------------------------------- 3S

Total cost of the U.N. to the United States since inception--------------------- 35

Total cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations---------------------------------------30, 33

U.N. served the United States well---------------------------------------------------- 8

U.S. right to exercise veto in U.N----------------------------------------------------- 36

Vietnam, cost of U.S. operation in--------------------------------------------------- 34

West Germany, cost to the United States of American troops in------------- 31

World peace, U.S. respo nsibility for keeping-------------------------------------- 34

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