# United States Court of Appeals **for the Fifth Circuit**

____________ No. 22-20163

____________ United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee ,

versus Margil Reyna, Jr., Defendant—Appellant

.

______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:15-CR-564-2

______________________________ Before Smith, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges

. Stephen Higginson , Circuit Judge : Reyna appeals the district court’ s written judgment imposing the“standard” conditions of supervised release. Because the district court satisfied the oral pronouncement requir ement and its written judgment did not conflict with its oral pronouncement, we AFFIRM.
I. Margil Reyna, Jr., pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to conspiracy to participate in a rack eteering enterprise. Reyna waived the preparation of a presentence report (PSR), and the district court determined United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED September 8, 2023 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 22-20163 Document: 00516888044 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/08/2023No. 22-20163

2 that a PSR was not necessary. The dist rict court proceeded to sentencing directly after taking Reyna’s guilty plea. Pursuant to the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, Reyna was sentenced to 36 0 months of imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. As part of his supe rvised release term, the district court stated that Reyna was “subject to the standard conditions.” Reyna’s written judgment included a list of the fifteen “standard” conditions of supervision listed in the Southern District of Texas’s standing order. Reyna timely appealed.
II. Reyna challenges solely the district court’s imposition of the standard conditions of supervised release. Reyna argues that the list of fifteen “standard” conditions of supervised re lease in his written judgment should be vacated because they were not or ally pronounced at sentencing. The government contends that no such conflict ex ists between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment because the district court satisfied the pronouncement requirement by orally adopting the district’s standing order through its shorthand reference. As an initial matter, the parties di sagree as to the standard of review. In United States v. Martinez , our court explained that when “a defendant objects to a condition of supervised re lease for the first time on appeal, the standard of review depends on whethe r he had an opportunity to object before the district court.” 47 F.4th 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2022) (“ Alexander Martinez ”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The opportunity to object exists–and th us a district court satisfies the pronouncement requirement–when the court notifies the defendant at sentencing that conditions are being imposed.” Id. at 367 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the de fendant had the opportunity to object, we review for plain error; however, if the defendant did not, we review for Case: 22-20163 Document: 00516888044 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/08/2023No. 22-20163

3 abuse of discretion. See id . at 366. Therefore, we cannot resolve the disagreement as to the a ppropriate standard of re view until we determine whether the district court satisfied the oral pronouncement requirement.
III. Due process requires that the dist rict court orally announce any conditions for supervised release thatare not mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), see United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc); however, “oral pronouncement does not mean that the sentencing court must recite the conditions word-for-word.” United States v. Grogan , 977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2020). To satisfy the oral pronouncement requirement, the district court may, am ong other things, reference a list of recommended supervised release condit ions from a court-wide or judgespecific standing order. Diggles , 957 F.3d at 560-63 & n.5.
Since our court’s en banc decision in Diggles in 2020, we have elaborated on the notice required to comply with a defendant’s due process rights. For example, in United States v. Vargas , we affirmed a district court’s imposition of the standard conditions listed in a court-wide standing order where the court stated that “the Court’s mandatory, standard, and special conditions to be outlined momentarily” would be imposed. 23 F.4th 526, 527 (5th Cir. 2022). We affirmed on the gr ounds that, “it should have been clear to defense counsel in this case that the ‘standard’ condit ions of supervised release mentioned by the sentenci ng judge were the same standard conditions referenced in Vargas’s PSR and set forth in the Western District’s standing order.” Id. After briefing closed in th is case, our court issued United States v. Baez-Adriano , 74 F.4th 292 (5th Cir. 2023). In Baez-Adriano , the district court orally imposed “[t]he stan dard and mandatory conditions of supervision” at the sentencing hearing, despite the PSR listing no conditions Case: 22-20163 Document: 00516888044 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/08/2023No. 22-20163

4 of supervised release. Id. at 296. The written judgment contained the standard and mandatory conditions as set forth in the Western District of Texas’s standing order. Id. at 297. Baez-Adriano appealed and argued that the district court did not properly pron ounce at sentencing the standard and mandatory conditions. Id. Our court held, “[I]f the conditions imposed in the written judgment match those in the standing order, a dist rict court need only orally reference the standard conditions to satisfy the pronouncement requirement. In that instance, a simple reference to ‘s tandard conditions’ is sufficient.” Id. at 301. Our court elaborated, “[W]hen the [d istrict] court imposes standard conditions of supervised release sourced from a standing order, the PSR’s inclusion or exclusion of said conditions is irrelevant.” Id. Accordingly, our court held that the district court satisfied the pronouncement requirement. Id. at 301, 304 (affirming the judgment, but urging that sentencing judges highlight standard conditio ns as a best practice). Here, like in Baez-Adriano , the district court made a shorthand reference to the “standard” conditions of supervised release when imposing its sentence. The written judgment in both cases mirrored the standard conditions as listed in that district’s standing order, but neither defendant had the benefit of a PSR containing the “standard” terms of supervised release. In supplemental letter briefing to this court, Reyna concedes some similarity between his case and Baez-Adriano ; however, he argues that the expedited sentencing in his case and the absence of a PSR indicate that the oral pronouncement requirement was not met. The distinction put forth by Reyna—the absence of a PSR in Reyna’s ca se as compared to a PSR silent on the terms of supervised release in Baez -Adriano’s case—is irrelevant. As our court explained in Baez-Adriano , the district “court’s reference to and oral Case: 22-20163 Document: 00516888044 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/08/2023No. 22-20163

5 imposition of the court-wide standard conditions . . . is dispositive.” 74 F.4th at 301. If whether a PSR includes th e standard conditions is “irrelevant” where the district “court imposes stan dard conditions of supervised release sourced from a standing order,” id. , it follows that the absence of a PSR is irrelevant in that same context. In fact, Reyna’s case may be simpler to resolve than Baez-Adriano’s as Reyna could not have been under the misimpression that the district’s “s tandard” conditions of supervised release would not be imposed because th ey were not contained in his PSR. Reyna also contends that the expedited sentencing—held immediately after re-arraignment—left “little opportunity to discuss” the implications of the various aspects of th e sentencing hearing. The district court docket reflects that on March 9, 2023, the district court set the rearraignment and sentencing hearing to be held simultaneously on March 14, 2023. While this schedule was compresse d, there is no indication in the record or in the briefing that trial counsel felt unprepared to handle the sentencing hearing or was unable to communicate with his client. Moreover, the docket reveals no objection by either party to this schedule.
The Southern District of Texas’s standing order provided advance notice of the standard conditions of supervised release, which the district court then orally adopted via shorthand reference at the sentencing hearing. The written judgment listed the standard conditions of supervised release contained in the district’s standing order. Based on our precedent, the district court satisfied the oral pronouncement requirement. Baez-Adriano , 74 F.4 th at 301. Because Reyna did not obje ct during the sentencing hearing, plain-error review applies. See Alexander Martinez , 47 F.4th at 366. Reyna, who argues that our review is for abuse of discretion, did not brief the four plain-error prongs. See United States v. Escalante-Reyes , 689 Case: 22-20163 Document: 00516888044 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/08/2023No. 22-20163

6 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). We discern no error in the district court’s oral imposition of the standard conditions of supervised releas e contained in the district’s standing order, which mirror the conditions then listed in the written judgment. Furthermore, even if we assume the firs t three prongs of the plain-error test, Reyna has not met his burden in d emonstrating that any claimed error affected “the fairness, integrity or pub lic reputation of judicial proceedings.” See Puckett , 556 U.S. at 135; United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir. 2012).
AFFIRMED. Case: 22-20163 Document: 00516888044 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/08/2023