### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 13, 200 5
SHER RY KA Y H EP LERv. D ONA LD MER LE HE PL ER
An Appeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 00D-1373 M uriel Robins on, Circuit Judge

No. M2004- 00530-COA-R 3-CV - F iled October 25, 2005

This is a petition to m odify custody . When the parties divorc ed in 2000, t he mot her r ece ived primary
c us tod y of the pa rt ie s’ thr e e c hil dr e n. Aft e r the mothe r s ou g ht an in c re a se in the fathe r’ s c hil d support obligation, the father filed t his petition to obtain primary custody of the c hildren, alleg ing a material chang e in circ umstances. The fathe r later amende d his petition t o include alleg ations of phy sical abuse b y

the mother. The trial court de clined to modify custody , finding the evidenc e insufficient to justify modification. We vacate t he ruling of the t rial court and re mand for w ritten finding s on the abuse a lleg ations, pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated Section 36-6- 106(a) (8).
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court is Rem anded

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P. J., W.S

. and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.

Clark L ee Shaw and Stephanie C. Hatchett, Nashville, TN, f or the a ppellant, Donald Me rle He pler.
Pamela M. Spicer, B rentwood, TN , for the a ppellee, Sher

ry Kay Hepler

. OP IN ION

Pe tit ion e r/Ap pe lle e She rry Kay He ple r ( “ Mo the r” ) andRe s p o n d e n t / A p pe lla nt D on a ld M e rl e He ple r ( “ F a the r” ) w e re div or c e d o n Se pte mbe r 1 3, 2000 . A ma ri ta l di sso lut ion a g re e me nt, incorporated into the final decr ee, provided for joint custodyof the c ouple’s thre e minor childre n and de sig na te d M oth e r a s th e pr imary cust od ia l pa re nt. Pur su a nt t o th a t a g re e me nt, F a the r p a id c hil d support bi-wee kly

in the amount of $427.38.

On Fe bruary

20, 2002, Mother filed a petition seeking an incr ease in Fathe r’s c hild support obligation. I n response , Father filed a counter petition which, in p ar t , soug ht custody of the thre e children, a lleg ing a

materia l chang e in circ umstances. F ather ’s counter p et i tion cited his rece nt
rema rriag e and a sserted tha t he was a ble to provide a more stable home environment for the childre n, and also a lleg ed proble ms reg arding Mother’s c arefor the c hildren.-2-

I n an orde r date d May

10, 2002, the trial court found that the new child support g uidelines mandated that Fathe r pay

incre ased c hild support. Consequently , Father’s c hild support obligation was incr ease d to $555.69 bi-wee kly . Two we eks later , Mother answe red Father’s c ounter pe tition for a chang e of c ustody . Nothing f urther oc curr ed until April 7, 2003, at which time Fathe r filed a
re ply to M oth e r’ s r e sp on se a sse rt ing th a t a su bs ta nti a l a ndma te ri a l c ha ng e in the pa rt ie s’
c ir c ums ta nc e s ju sti fi e d mo dif ic a tio n o f the c hil d c us tod y arr a ng e me nt.

Th re e da y s late r, on Ap ri l 10, 200 3, F a the r fi le d a re qu e st fo r an or de r o f p ro te c tio n o n b e ha lf of the c hildren, asse rting that Mother had struck one of the children in the fac e and c aused a n injury to the child’s nose that nec essitated medica l attention, and alleg ing othe r objec tionable conduc t by Mother. On April 22, 2003, pending a full hearing on the matter, the tria l court ente red a temporary restra ining or der, en

j o i ning Mothe r fr om using a ny corpor al punishment on the children. T he matters we re se t to be hear d on September 24, 2003.

On the a p p o i n t ed date, the trial court conducted the custody modification hea

ring . At the he ari ng , F a the r t e sti fi e d th a t Mo th e r h a d be e n c ri min a lly

c ha rg e d w ith c hil d a

bu se in c on ne c tio n w ith the incident in which the pa rties’ c hild was struck in the fa ce. F ather testified that Mother ha d not informed him of t he incident and would not discuss it with him, and that her trial on the cha rg es had
no t y e t oc c ur

re d. F a the r a lso a sse rt e d th a t Mo the r had b e e n te lli ng the pa rt ie s’ c hil dr e n th a t hi s curr ent wife was poisoning their food, a nd th at as a c onsequenc e the c hildren re fused to eat food prepa red by Father’s c urre nt wife whe n the childre n wer e at F ather ’s home. F ather testified about other c oncerns as well, such a s Mother having had a boy friend living at her home wit h the childre n a ndMo the r f

a ili ng to o bta in a

pp ro pr ia te tr e a tme nt f

or a c hil d’ s me dic a l pr ob le m.

Mo the r w a s c a lle d to te sti fy by F a the r’ s c ou ns e l. Re g ard ing the inc ide nt in wh ic h th e c hil d was struc k, Mother testified that whe n she ar rived a fter w ork at the home of the c hildren’s ba by sitter, Fr ancis Dr ennen ( “Dr ennen” ), Dre nnen acc used Mothers’s ten- y ear -old daug hter of unr uly behavior and of ly ing. Mother and the t en-y ear -old had words, and Mot her said she reache d the poi nt of not wanting to hear anything further from the child. Mother testified that she then “put my hand up and when I did I g uess I put my hand too far on her face , and I hit her nose. . . . A fe w sec onds later he r nose starte d to bleed.” She sa id t h at t h e bleeding stopped befor e they left Dre nnen’s home, but started a g ain t h at ev en i ng , so she took the child to the emer g ency room. Asked if she told her daug hter that she hope d her nose was broke n, Mother testified, “ I might have in the moment of being upset” a nd asserted that s he had apolog ized to the child for the remar k. Mother denie d telling the
c hil dr e n th a t F a the r’ s c ur re nt w if e wa s p ois on ing the m, a sse rt ing that sh e ha d o nly c omm e nte d to the children that they wer e “alway s sick” whe n they returne d from F ather ’s house, a nd that she aske d the childre n about the foods they ate while at Fathe r’s home.

Th e tr ial cou rt then he ardte sti mon y fr om the ba

by sit te r, Dr e nn e n, wh o li ve d in the sa me trailer pa rk as Mother . When asked a bout the incident in which the te n-y ear -old’s nose wa s injured, Dre nnen said that whe n Mother ar rived at Drenne n’s home af ter wor k, she t old Mother that she had disciplined the ten-y ear -old. Dre nnen testified that Mother “wa s mad and she hit [t he child] in the
no se a ndblo odjus t st art e d g us hin g .” She ind ic a te d tha t Moth e r str uc k th e c hil d w ith a

c los e d f ist

.-3-

Dre nnen said that Mother then told the child, “I

hope I broke y our nose an d I h o pe it bleeds.” Dren n en said that Mother late r admonished the c hildren not to say anything to F ather

about the inc ide nt or the y wo uld pr ob ably e nd up liv ing wi th F a the r andthe re wo uldbe le ss m on e y fo r the m. Dre nnen testified that on other occa sions she had see n Mother strike another daug hter in the fac e. Dre nnen asse rted that she had hea rd discussions betwee n Mother and the parties’ children in whic h Mother expressed the beli ef t h at Fa t h er’ s curr ent wife was poisoning them and in which Mother made dispar ag ing r emar

ks about Father.

Father’s curr ent wife, Be ula Evely n Hepler (“Stepmother” ) testified as well. S t ep m o ther testified that, for a

time, t h e ch i l d re n wo u ld not eat the foods she prepa red. She sa id that the situatio n w a s r e me die d w hen sh e ta ste d th e fo odin the c hil dr e n’ s p re se nc e ; a ft e r that, the y wo uld eat. Stepmother a cknowledg ed knowing that the parties’ oldest daug hter ha d allerg ies and a sthma, and conc eded that she and F ather had a va riety of pets. She also admitted that she and F ather smoke, but maintained that they

did not smoke inside their home while the c hildren we re the re.
Af te r the c los e of

F a the r’ s pro of

, the tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o g rant F ather ’s petition to chang e custody

. Elaborating, the trial judge stated that while “I understand Mr. Heple r’s c oncerns. . .the problem wa s he di d n ’t have a spec ific orde r re ally to have he r, technica lly , in contempt to visit ation order violation.” Although the trial judge strong ly admonished Mo the r a bo ut s tr iki ng the c hil dr e n a ndwa rn e d th a t th e ou tcom e of the c us tod y pr oc e e din g wo uld be diffe rent in the futur e if Mother wer e indi cted and convicted of child abuse, the trial judge found that the proof w as insufficie nt to chang e custody

. In its Februa ry 6, 2004 order , the trial court dis mi s s e d F a th e r ’ s p e ti ti o n to mo d if y c u s to d y , e n te r e d a Pe r man e n t Pa r e n ti n g Pl a n mo d if

y in g the pare nting sc hedule a nd child support, and awa rded Mother attorney ’s fee s. Fr om this orde r, F ather
no w a pp e a ls.

On app e a l, F a the r r a ise s th re e re la te d i ss ues , a lle g ing that ( 1) the tr ia l c ou rt inc or re c tly d e t e r m i n e d t h a tt h e r e m u s t b e a v i o l a t i o n o f a s p e c i f i c v i s i t a t i o n o r d e r

t o s u p p o r ta

c h a n g e i n c u s t o d y, (2 ) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr on e ou sly de te rm ine d tha t Moth e r sho uld re ma in the prima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt, and, (3) the trial court erre d in awar ding attorney ’s fe es to Mother.

I n t hi s c a se , o ur

re vie w o f the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t is de novo upon the re cord,
a c c omp a n i e d w i t h a p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o rr e c t n e s s u n l e s s t h e p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e is otherwise. T enn. R. App. P. 13(d). No such pr esumption of corr ectne ss applies to the trial court’s conclusions of law. Ja hn v . J ahn , 93 2 S.W. 2d 93 9, 94 1 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 96 ). Ap pe llate c ou rt s are re luc ta nt t o s e c on d- g ue ss the c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio ns of

the tr ia l ju dg e, who is in the be st position t o judge the parties’ cr edibility

. C o n s equently , considera ble def ere nce is a ffor ded to the fac tual finding s of t he trial court which hinge on a determination of a witness’ cre dibilit y , Ga sk ill
v . G as kil l , 936 S.W .2d 626, 631 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

I n T e nn e sse e , c ou rt s st

ri ve fo r r e so lut ion of

a c h i l d c u s t o d y dis pu te wh ic h p ro vid e s c on tin uit y and st ability for the child. Adelsperger v. Ade lsperger , 970 S.W .2d 482, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)

. Thus, the orig inal custody decr ee is c onsidered re s ju dic ata , to be disturbed only if the non-c ustodial-4-

pare nt establishes a mate rial cha ng e in circumstances since t he ini tial custody determination. Gr

if fin v . St one , 834 S.W . 300, 301-02 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1992).

There fore , the threshold issue is w hether there has been a material chang e in circ umstances since the initial custody

determination. See, e .g. , Kendrick v. Shoem ake , 90 S.W .3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 20 02 ); Bridges v. Bridges , 63 S.W.3 d 346 , 348 (T e nn . Ct. App . 200 1) . “[T]h e re are no ha rda ndfa st
ru l es fo r d et er m i n i n g wh en a ch i l d ’s ci rc u m s t an ce s h av e ch an ged s u ff i ci en t l y t o wa rr an ta c h an ge of his or her

custody .” Kendrick , 9 0 S

. W

. 3 d at 5 7 0 (c i t i n g Blair v. Badenh ope , 77 S.W .3d 137, 150 (Tenn. 2002) ). Neve rtheless, sever al fac tors have emer g ed as sound bases for determining whe ther a material chang e of c ircumstance s has occ urre d. Id . These inc lude whethe r the c hang e occ urre d subsequent to the existi ng order s o ug ht to be modified, whethe r the c hang e could not have been
re a so na bly a nti c ipate d a t th e tim e the e xistin g or de r w a s e nte re d, a ndwh e the r the c ha ng e “ a ff e c ts the child’s we ll-being in a meaning ful way .” Id . T he bu rd e n is on the no n- c us to di al par e nt t o establish the material chang e in circ umstances. Bridges , 63 S.W .3d at 348.

With o u t q u e s t i o n , c h i l d

a b u s e th at o c c u r s a ft e r the ini tia l c us tod y de te rm inatio n a nd“ a ff

e c t[s] the child’s well-be ing in a meaning ful way ,” Kendrick , 90 S.W .3d at 570, can qualify as a ma terial
c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s. A fi nd ing of c hil d abu se wi ll su pp ort a tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t a materia l chang e in circ umstances has occur red, and may be sufficie nt to support modification of a custody order

. Gr

if fi n v . St one , 834 S.W .2d 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

I n the instant case , the baby sitter, Dre nnen, testified that she had witne s s ed Mot her strike one of the children in the face with a closed fist and re mark a fterw ard, “ I hope I broke y our nose a nd I ho pe it bl eeds.” Mo the r c on c e de d in juring the c hil d’ s n os e , b ut i nd ic a te d th a t it wa s a c c ide nta l, and admitted the statement to w hich Dre nnen testified. Dre nnen also testified that she had witnessed Mo the r s tr ike a no the r d a ug hte r i n the fa c e on a no the r o c c a sio n, a ndMo the r d id n ot r e sp on d to thi s testimony . Dre nnen’s testimony is disturbing. The trial court did not make express determinations reg arding the wit nesses’ cre dibilit y , and the trial court’s ora l comments after the testimony

do not make this clea

r. Mother w as admonished ag ainst striking the c hildren and y et the proof was de emed insufficient to cha ng e cus t o d y ; however , Mother wa s told that it would be a “ whole diffe rent situatio n” if

sh e we re c on vic te d of the c ri min a l c hil d abu se c ha rg e s. I n a wa

rd ing a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to Mother, the tria l judg e commented that Father’s evidenc e was “pre tty wea k from the be g inning. . . .” Unde r these c ircumstance s, it is unclear on appea l whether the t rial court found that abuse in f act
occur red. H aving not observed the witnesses’ testimony , this Court i s not in a position t o determine their cr edibility . I nstance s of abuse , howe v er , can w eig h heavily in asce rtaining whether the
e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s in fa vo r o f the tr ia l c ou rt ’s app are nt f ind in g o f no ma te ri a l c ha ng e in
c ir c ums ta nc e s.

Tenne ss ee Code Annotated Sec tion 36-6-106(a )(8) sets forth fa ctors to be c onsidered in a custody determination, in dete rmining the best interests of the child. I ncluded among these fa ctors is e vid e nc e of

ph y sic a l or

e mot ion a l a

bu se . In p e rt ine nt p art , Se c tio n 3 6- 6- 10 6( a )( 8) pr ov ide s:-5-

wher e ther e ar e alleg ations that one (1) pare nt has committed child abuse. . .the court shall consider a ll evidence rele vant to the phy sical and e motional sa fety of the c hild, and dete rmine, b ya cle ar pr eponder ance of the e vidence , whether such abuse has
occur red. The court shall include in its decision a written finding of all evidenc e and all finding s of fa cts conne cted ther eto.
Thus, Section 36-6-106( a)( 8) mandates w ritten finding s of fa ct in a custody determination in which abuse is alleg ed. I n Nelson v. Ne lson , 66 S.W .3d 896, 902-03 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), the tria l court was pre s en t ed with an initial custody determination in a divorce c ase. The wife a lleg ed that the husband had phy sically

abused he r, at times in the pre sence of the children, during the marria g e. Id. at 900. The tria l court designated t he husband as the primary residential pa

rent, ba sed on the wife ’s admitted adultery , and made no finding s on the wife’ s alleg ations of abuse

. Id. at 900-02. The wife appea led. On appe al, this Court commented that the abuse alleg ations were sharply disputed, and noted the require ment under Section 36-6-106( a)( 8) that the trial court make written findings of fac t in connec tion with allege d abuse. Id. a t 901- 02

. Th e app e llate c ou rt fo un d tha t th e a lle g e d a bu se wa s p i v o tal in the custody determination. Id. a t9 0 3

. T h e ap p e l l a t e c o u r to b s e r v e d : “ T r i a l c ou rt s ha ve br oa d d isc re tio n in makin g c us tod y de te rm inatio ns , but co urts stil l must a pp ly the app lic able principles of la w.” Id. at 9 0 1 (c i t i n g Ga sk ill v . G as kil l , 936 S.W .2d 6 2 6 , 6 3 1 (T enn. C t. App. 1996)). Conseque ntly , the Court vacated the permanent custody portion of the divorc e dec ree and
rema nded the c ase to the tria l court for a written finding of the evidenc e and spe cific f indings on the wife’ s alleg ations of abuse by the husband. Id. at 903.

The re asoning in Nelson is clear ly applicable here . In the abse nce of finding s on the
a lle g a tio ns of

abu se , w e are un able to d e te rm ine wh e re the prepond e ranc e of the e vid e nc e lie s. Mo re ov e r, F a the r a

pp e a ls the a wa

rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to Mo the r, a ndwe are lik e wi se un able t o determine if the trial court’s awa rd was a ppropriate in the absenc e of f indings on the a lleg ations of abuse. A ccor dingly , we vacate the porti ons of t he trial court’s order dismi ssing F ather ’s petition for
a chang e in c ustody and awa rding attorney ’s fee s to Mothe r, and rema nd for written finding s of fa ct pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated Section 36-6- 106(a) (8).

Father a lso arg ues that t he trial judg e utiliz ed the wr ong standard, r equiring him to have had an orde r setting forth his pare ntal residential sc hedule be fore the t rial court would consider c hang ing
c us tod y to d e sig na te him a s th e prima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. Af te r o ur re vie w o f the e nti re re c or d, it appea rs that the trial judg e’s c omments, though less than clea r, were not indicating that she dec lined to gr ant Father’s pe tition t o chang e custody based on the lack of

a de fi n i t e p are ntal residential
sc he du le fo r h im. Th e re fo re , w e de c lin e to r e ve rs e on thi s b a sis

.-6-

T h e d ec i s i o n o f t h e t ri al co u rt i s v ac at ed as s et fo rt h ab o v e a n d r e m an d ed fo r p ro ce ed i n gs consistent with this opi nion. Costs on appea l a re a ssessed to Appellee Sherry Kay Hepler , for whic h
e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e , i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE