UNI TED S TATES DI S TRI CT COURT FO R T H E D IST R IC T O F C O L U M B IA HAJI WAZIR , et al., P e ti ti one r s, v. Civil Action No. 06-1697 ROBERT GATES, et al., Re spo nde nt s.
MEMOR A N D U M OP I N I ON Haji Wazir, an Afg han citizen, is being detained by the United States at the B ag ram Th e ate r I nte rnme nt F a c ili ty

at B a g ra m A ir fi e ld, Af

g ha nis tan. On

Se pte mbe r 2 9, 20 06 , Wa zir filed a pe tition for a writ of ha beas c orpus, and r espondents then f iled a motion to dism iss for lack of jurisdiction on October 3, 2008. Responde nts had filed similar motions to di smiss t hree other ha beas pe titions filed by

Ba g ram de tainees, a

nd on November

17, 2008, the four c ases we re consolidated for

argument. This Court heard or al ar g ument from the pa rties on J anuar

y 7, 2009. On April 2, 2009, the Court denie d responde nts' motion to dismis s the petitions filed by the other thre e B ag ram de tainees but de fer red r uling on r espondents' motion to di smiss t he petition filed by

Wazi r. See A l Maqaleh v. G ates, 604 F . Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009). Applying the multi-factor

test set forth by

the Supreme Court in B oumediene v. B ush, 128 S. Ct . 2229 (2 00 8) , th is C ourt

re a so ne d th at th e oth e r t

hr e e pe tit ion e rs , n on e of

wh om a re Af g ha n c iti zen s,
are entitled to invoke the Suspension Clause of the Constituti on, Art. I . § 9 cl. 2. Henc e, the Court concluded, § 7( a) of the Military

Commi ssions Act of 2006 (" MCA") , Pub. L . No. 109- 366, 120 Stat. 2600, which deprive s courts of jurisdiction to enter tain habea s petitions filed by ind ivi du a ls d e signate d b y the Pr e sid e nt a s " e ne my

c omb atants ," is unc on sti tut ion a l a s a pp lie d to-2-

those three petitioners. As to Wazi r, howe ver, the Court determined that "ther e is a re al po ss ib il it y

of f ri cti on wi th th e Afghan govern men t w it h res pectto Afghan det ain ees. " 604 F. Sup p. 2d at 22 9. In b a lanc ingthe B oume die ne fa c tor s, thi s p os sib ili ty of fr ic tio n w a s su ff

ic ie ntl y weig hty to defe at Wazir's cla im that he is entitled to invoke the protections of the Suspension Clause. I d. at 231. Havingreje cted Wazir' s Suspension Cl ause a rgument, the Court considere d "f our other g rounds to deny

responde nts' motions to dismi ss: the MCA constitut es a usur pation of the J udiciary ' s Article I I Ipower s; the MCA amounts to a permane nt suspension of the writ of ha beas corpus; the jurisdiction-strippingprovisions of the MCA do not apply to [ Wazi r]; and
res po nd ent s ar e vi ol ati ng [ W az ir 's] ri ghts un der c on st it ut io nal , s tat ut ory , an d i nt erna ti on al l aw. " I d. at 232. The Court re

jected the three latter g rounds. I d. at 233-35. As to the f irst gr ound, howeve r, the Court found the br iefinginadequate to permit a re asoned c onclusion. I d. at 233. The Court there fore order ed fur ther brie fingon this iss ue. In particula r, the Court orde red f

urther br ie fi nga s to wh e the r M CA§ 7 vio late s th e pr inc ipl e s se t out in Un ite d St ate s v . K le in, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). Kl e in a ro se a ft e r t

he Civ il Wa

r. In 1 86 3, Con g re ss p a sse d a law a llo wi ngind ivi du a ls whose prope rty

was seized duringthe Civil W ar to re cover their prope rty

(or r ece ive compensation for it) upon a showingof loy alty . In United States v. Padelfor d, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869), the Supre me Court held that proof of a pre sidential pardon wa s sufficient to prove loy alty . Klein, whose pr operty had bee n seized duringthe Civil W ar but who ha d since be en pardone d, then filed suit in the Court of Claims and succe ssfully rec overe d his property . The g overnme nt appea led, and a s the appe al was pe nding be fore the Supreme Court, Cong ress pa ssed-3-

a new statute. The ne w law pr ovided that proof of a pre sidential pardon did not show loy alty , but instead wa s conclusive pr oof of disloy alty , and proof of a pa rdon would divest cour

ts of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the statute wa s unconstitutional. The Court recognized that Congr ess has a

uthority to control the appe llate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but held " that Congr ess has inadve rtently passed the limit which sepa rate s the leg islative from the judicial power ." 80 U .S. at 147. By decla ringthat pardons we re not, a s the Court had pre viously found, proof of loy alty , but instead wer e conc lusive proof of disloy alty , Congr ess had " presc ribe[d] rules of dec ision to t he Judi cial De partment of the g overnme nt in cases pe nding be fore it." I d. at 146. The Court also held that by "impair ing the eff

ect of a par don," the statute " infring [ed] the constitutional power of the Ex ecutive." I d. at 147. Whether MCA § 7 violates Klein and its prog eny is the only

rema ining issue. The Court pr e vio us ly

c on sid e re d a ll o f Wa zir ' s o the r a rgume nts a

nd , f or the re a so ns state d in

the Ap ri l 2 memorandum opinion, found them insuffic ient to defe at re spondents' motion to di smiss. Be cause the Court now finds Wazir's ar g ument under K lein unavailingfor the r easons be low, responde nts' motion to dismis s Waz ir' s habea s petition will be g rante d. AN AL YSI S The issue be fore the Court is whether MCA § 7 violates the separ ation of powe rs principle set out in Klein and is ther efor e fa cially unconstitutional. A statute can potentially run afoul of K lein in two way s. First, Cong ress may not pass a statute " infring ing the constitutional power of the Executive." Klein, 13 U.S. at 147; see a lso United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404 (1980) (inter pretingscope of

Klein). MCA § 7, if any thing, e nhance s-4-

the Executive' s role, and he nce this aspe ct of Kle in is not at iss ue her e. Second, a statute violates Klein if it "pr escr ibe[s] a rule of dec ision in a case pe nding be fore the cour ts." Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 404. I t is thi s second a spect of K lein that forms the ba sis of petitioner' s challeng e. And, in analy zing this prongof Klein, re spondents do not argue that petitioner' s case was not pending when the MCA wa s enac ted. See Resps.' Br . at 9 & n.3. The only question, then, is whether MCA § 7 unconstituti onally presc ribes a " rule of de cision." A " rule of de cision" is def ined as a "statute . . . that provides the ba sis for dec iding or adjudicatinga ca se." Bla ck' s L aw Dic tionary 1359 (8th ed. 2004). T he only "r ule of de cision" that th e Sup re me Court

ha s r e je c te d a s unc on sti tut ion a l un de r K le in w a s th e statut e at is su e in Kl e in i tse lf

. T he re , a s d isc us se d a

bo ve , Co ng re ss e na c te d a ne w s tatut e pr ov idi ngthat a pr e sid e nti a l pa

rd on wa s n ot e qu iva le nt t o p ro of of loya lty , a s th e Sup re me Court ha d p re vio us ly held, but was in fa ct proof of disloy alty . See Klein, 13 U.S. at 145. I f, on appe al from the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court deter mined that a cla imant had provided a presidential pa

rdon as proof of loy alty , then the statute re quired the Supre me Court to dismi ss the case for lac k of jurisdiction. I d. Th e Sup re me Court

signif ic antl y a lte re d th e sc op e of

Kl e in i n Ro be rt so n v . Se attl e Audubon Society , 503 U.S. 429 (1992). At issue in Robertson wa s a statute ena cted while two
case s were pendingin the lower f eder al cour

ts. The pendingcase s challeng ed propose d timber harve sting in the Pac ific Northwe st. I n response to the litigation, Cong ress pa ssed an
a pp ro pr iatio ns a c t c on ta ini nga c la us e pr ov idi ngtha

t " Con g re ss h e re by

de te rm ine s a

nd dir e c ts that manag ement of a

rea s acc ordingto [ other subsec tions of the statute] is adequate consider ation for the pur

poses of mee ting the statutory require ments that are the basis for the [pendingSee, e. g . , A m y D
. R on ner, Ju dici al Self

- D em i se: Th e Test of

W hen C on g r ess 1 I mpe r mi s s i bl y I nt r ude s on Jud i c i a l Po wer a f t e r Robe r t s on v. Se a t t l e Audub on Soc i e t y a nd t he Fe de r a l Appe l l a t e Cour t s ' Re j e c t i on of

t he Se pa r a t i on of

Po wer s Cha l l e ng e s t o t he Ne w Se c t i on o f the S ecu ri ti es E x ch an ge A ct of 1 9 3 4 , 3 5 A ri z. L
. R ev . 1 0 3 7 , 1 0 4 8 -55 ( 1 9 9 3 ). -5- litigation]." 503 U.S. at 434-35. The defe ndants soug ht dismi ssal based on the new statute, a nd pla int if fs argue d th at it

vio late d K le in. Al tho ug h th e dis tr ic t c ourt re je c te d p la int if

fs ' argume nt, the Ninth Circuit reve rsed, holdingthat the statute " direc ts the court to re ach a specific result and
make c e rt a in f

a c tua l f ind ing s. " Se attl e Au du

bo n So c ' y v. Rob e rt so n, 91 4 F .2 d 1 31 1, 13 16 (9 th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court gr anted c ertiora ri and una nimously reve rsed. The Court concluded that the statute at issue " repla ced the leg al standar ds underlying the two orig inal challeng es . . . without directingparticula r applications under either the old or newstandards." 503 U.S. at 437. In other wor ds, the statute " compelled c hang es in law, not finding s or re sults under old law." I d. at 438. While some have a rgued that this interpre tation in fact ove rruled K lein, most scholars 1
and c ourt s inte rp re t Ro be rt so n to have na rr ow e d K le in s o th at it

a pp lie s o nly

wh e n Co ng re ss dir e c ts c ourt s h owto a

pp ly e xistin glaws , b ut n ot whe n Co ng re ss a do pts a ne w l aw. Se e Er

wi n Chemerinksy , Fe dera l J urisdiction § 3.2 (5th ed. 2007); Nat'l Coalition to Save Our Ma ll v. Norton, 269 F .3d 1092, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Under Klein, as interpr eted by

Robertson, petitioner' s argument fails. MCA § 7 does not dir e c t c ourt s h owto a

pp ly e xistin glaws . N or

do e s it c omm and

c ourt s to fi nd

that c e rt a in petitioners ar e or a

re not " enemy

combatants." Rather, it amends the applicable substantive law

-- 28 U. S.C. § 2 24 1 - - t o s tr ip c ourt s o f j ur isd ic tio n f or pe tit ion e rs de ta ine d a s " e ne my combatants." And when a statute mere ly

"a mends the applica

ble substantive law," it does not-6-

violate Klein. See Save Our Mall, 269 F .3d at 1097; see a lso Pl aut v. Spendthrift Fa rm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (" Whatever the prec ise scope of Klein . . . later

decisions have made c lear that its prohibiti on does not take hold whe n Congr ess ' amends a pplicable law .' ") (quoting Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441); J ungv. Ass' n of Am. Medica l Coll eg es, 2006 WL1582667, at *2 (D .C. Cir . Jun e 1, 20 06 ) ( " Con g re ss m ay ame nd su bs tanti ve laws , e ve n whe n d oin gso a ff e c ts pendinglitigation." ) (c iting Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438). Other statutes that have be en upheld unde r Klein a nd Robertson furthe r demonstrate that MCA § 7 does not violate Klein. The statute at issue in J ung , for e x ample, is instructive. Ther e,
a s an a nti tr us t su it c ha lle ng ingthe Natio na l Re sid e nt M atc hin gPr og ra m w a s p e nd ing , Co ng re ss passed a law exempting the matchingprog ram fr om the antitrust laws and " bar[ring ] evidence of any participation in such prog rams in support of a claim in fede ral c ourt that antitrust laws have been violate d." 2006 WL 1582667, at *1. The la

w expressly

applied to pendingsuits. I d. Un d er th e n ew s t atu t e, th e c as e w as d i s m i s s ed
. On ap p ea l , th e D
. C
. C i rc u i tre j ec t edp l ai n t i ff

's argument under K lein and Robertson, holdingthat "Cong ress ha s done nothing more he re tha n amend the a

ntitrust laws by

car ving out a safe harbor

for pa rticipation in [t he Matc hing Prog ram]." I d. at *2. Klein, then, is a na

rrow holdingas interpr eted in subseque nt case s. As responde nts point out, Klein is rare ly

(if eve r) suc cessf

ully invoked in constitutional challeng es to fede ral statutes. Respondents ave r that since K lein was de cided in 1871, the Supre me Court has neve r dec lare d a fede ral statute unc onstitut ional under K lein. Resps.' Br . at 5. Indeed, r espondents conte nd -- without contradiction -- that only two courts of a

ppeals have over

turned fe dera l statutes under Kl e in, and

that bo th c ourt s w e re late r r e ve rs e d b y the Sup re me Court . I d. (c iti ngSe attl e-7-

Audubon Soc' y

v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 ( 9th Cir. 1990), and F renc h v. Miller, 178 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1999)). In the end, Kle in offer s no aid to Waz ir in his challeng e to MCA § 7. Although this Court order ed fur ther brie fingonly

on the Klein issue, petitioner invoke s
sever al ca ses that addr ess other se paration of powers pr inciples. For example, petitioner
re pe ate dly

c ite s to Pla

ut. Se e Pe t' r' s Re sp . at 3, 5, 6. Al tho ug h Pl a ut b ri e fl y a dd re sse d K le in (a nd , in fa c t, u nd e rs c or e d th e na

rr ow ingimp a c t of

Rob e rt so n) , th e se pa

ratio n o f p ow e rs pr inc ipl e animatingthat case is not at issue here. T here , the question was whe ther Cong ress may re- open a fi na l ju dg me nt i ssu e d b y

a c ourt . Se e Pla

ut, 51 4 U .S. at 21 8. MCA§ 7 ha s n oth ingto d o w ith
re- openingfinal judg ments rende red by courts. Plaut, then, does not help pe titioner' s case . Petitioner also cites to Gutierr ez de Martinez v. L amagno, 515 U.S. 425 (1995). Although Gutierre z does not int erpr et or a pply Klein (indee d, it only

cites Klein onc e, and the n with a " cf." signa l), the sepa ration of powe rs principles a ddresse d there merit some examination. Gutie rr e z wa s a

tor t la ws uit br ou g ht a g a ins t a

fe de ra l e mpl oye e , a

nd at is su e wa s a

statut e permitting the Attorney

Gene ral to ce rtify

whether the employ ee w as ac ting within the scope of his e mpl oy

me nt at th e tim e of

the a lle g e dly

tor tio us be havio r. I d. at 42 1- 22 . I f t he de fe nd antemploy ee w as ac ting within the scope of his employ ment, then the United States would be substitut ed as the defe ndant and c erta in immuni ties could apply . I d. The Attorne y Gene ral ha d
cer tified that the def

endant- employ ee w as ac ting within the scope of his employ ment, and once the Un ite d St ate s w a s su

bs tit ute d a s th e de fe nd ant, the Un ite d St ate s c la ime d s ov e re ig n immun ity under the Fe dera l Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff c halleng ed the statute on se paration of powers g ro un ds , a

rguin gthat th e ke y

thr e sh old de te rm inatio n - - whe the r a n e mpl oye e wa s a c tin gwi thi n the scope of his employ

ment -- wa s made by

the Executive with no judicial review . The-8-

Sup re me Court

re c og nize d th at su c h a

pr ov isi on

c ou ld b e pr ob le matic be c a us e it " wo uld

c a st Article I I Ijudge s in the role of pe tty functionar ies, persons r equire d to enter a s a cour t judgment an executive of

fice r' s decision, but stripped of c apac ity to evaluate independe ntly whether the executive' s decision is corr ect." I d. at 426. Despite suc h swee ping la ng uag e, howe ver, Gutierre z
no ne the le ss h e ld t

hat thre sh old

de te rm inatio ns may

be c omm itt e d to the Exe c uti ve if Con g re ss clea rly intended that re sult. I d. at 424-25; see also J ohnson v. Robison, 415 U.S . 361, 368-69 (1974) ( upholding statute that forbid judicial re view of thre shold determinations by the Ad min istrator

of the De pa rtme nt o f V e te ra

ns ' Af fa ir s b e c a us e the c on sti tut ion a lity

of the statut e itself was subjec t to challeng e). The Supreme Court then a naly zed whether

Congr ess' s intent was clea r and f ound that it was not. Gutierre z, 515 U.S. at 430-34. The wr ongcomplained of by the plaintiff in Gutierr ez is the same as that c omplained of by pe tit ion e r h e re : th e thr e sh old qu e sti on -- wh e the r a

de ta ine e is a

n " e ne my c omb atant" -- is
answe red by

the Executive with no opportunity for judicial r eview. B ut unlike the statute at issue in Gutierre z, C ong ress' s intent to make the Executive' s "e nemy combatant" deter

mination
unre vie wa

ble is p la in. As is c le ar f

ro m th e statut e s p a sse d a

nd c a se s d e c ide d b e fo re the Sup re me Court decided B oumediene, Cong ress intende d to deprive c ourts of jurisdiction over ha beas petitions filed by

detainee s determined to be "e nemy combatants" by

the President. See A l M aq al eh , 6 0 4 F. S u

p p . 2 d at2 1 2 (r ec o un t i n g h i s t o ry l ea d i n g t o Bo u m ed i en e)
. He n ce , al th o u gh Gutierre z contains abundant dicta a iding pe titioner' s argument, Gutierre z's ac tual holding doe s not advanc e petitioner' s case . Finally , petitioner re surre cts sever al ar g uments the Court previously considere d and addre ssed in its April 2 opinion. S ee, e .g ., Pet'r ' s Resp. at 10-12 (r e-a rguing the "f

riction with theH ence, t he C ou r t exp r esses no view o n the m er i t s of peti t i on er ' s r esurr ect ed ar g um ents. 2 -9- host gove rnment" fac tor of the B oumediene te st); id. at 12-13 (re -ar g uing that MCA § 7 constitutes a per

manent suspension of the writ). To support these a rguments, he pre sents new fa c ts a s w e ll. Ins of

ar a s p e tit ion e r i s a sk ingthi s Co ur t to re c on sid e r o r a lte r i ts A pr il 2 jud g me nt, ho we ve r, he make s n o e ff or t to me e t th e sta

nd a rd s se t f or th b y the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure . Se e F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 9( e ), 60 (b ). Ab se nt a mot ion fo r r e c on sid e ra

tio n o r a mot ion to amend or alter judg ment, the Court will not reconsider its April 2 opinion at thi s time. 2 In sum, MCA § 7 does not violate separation of powers unde r Klein, a s interpre ted by Robertson and subseque nt decisions. Nor do the othe r sepa ration of powe rs doctrine s invoked by petitioner fa cially

defe at MCA § 7. Be cause the Klein question wa s the only rema ining issue preve nting this Court from g rantingresponde nts' motion to dismis s petitioner Wazir's habe as pe tit ion , a

nd be c a us e the Court

fi nd s in fa vo r o f r e sp on de nts on

tha t is su e , r e sp on de nts ' mot ion to dismiss will be g rante d. A sepa rate order acc ompanies this opinion. S O O R D E R E D . /s/ JOHN D. BATES U n ite d S ta te s D is tric t J u d ge
Dat e : Jun e 29 , 20 09