2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-17-2009

Victor Tartaglia v. Bison Comm Leasing Corp

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-2443

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Recommended Citation

"Victor Tartaglia v. Bison Comm Leasing Corp" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 647.

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1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 08-2443

 

VICTOR TARTAGLIA,

 Appellant 

v.

BISON COMMERCIAL LEASING CORP.; 

MICHAEL BERG; 

WILLIAM LINKNER

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

District Court No. 2-05-cv-06004

District Judge: The Honorable Harold A. Ackerman

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 16, 2009

Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 17, 2009)

 

 OPINION

 

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Victor Tartaglia filed a Complaint alleging that the Appellees forged his

signature on certain lease documents and inflated the value of certain equipment used to
Tartaglia also asserts for the first time on appeal that 1) several of his claims are 1

based on evidence discovered since the resolution of the prior state court action, so they

cannot be barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata; and 2) New York law permits him

to seek contribution notwithstanding collateral estoppel or res judicata. Additionally, in

his reply brief, Tartaglia argues for the first time that the Appellees did not even seek to

dismiss the contribution allegation contained in his Complaint. These arguments are all

waived. Gass v. V.I. Tel. Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is well

established that failure to raise an issue in the district court constitutes a waiver of the

argument.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Joint Stock Soc’y v. UDV N. Am.,

Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 178 n.9 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Because the plaintiffs in the present case did

not develop this argument until their reply brief, we do not regard it as properly before

us.”).

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and we have 2

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s order granting

Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss is plenary, and “we accept as true all well-pled factual

allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them,

and we affirm the order of dismissal only if the pleading does not plausibly suggest an

entitlement to relief.” Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir.

2008).

2

secure the loans. The District Court granted Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res

judicata. On appeal, Tartaglia argues that this decision was in error because the District

Court 1) failed to consider his contribution claim; and 2) incorrectly construed the

purportedly preclusive New York state court decision as including a finding that no

forgery occurred. We will affirm. 1 2

First, the District Court did address Tartaglia’s contribution claim. In its recitation

of the factual and procedural background, the District Court noted that Tartaglia was

“alleging counts of fraud and contribution stemming from the lease agreements . . . .” 

(J.A. 4a (emphasis added).) It later held that “Tartaglia’s claims are barred by issue
3

preclusion,” and that “Tartaglia’s claims are also barred by claim preclusion.” Thus, it is

clear that the District Court did consider Tartaglia’s contribution claim and determined

that it was barred by both collateral estoppel and res judicata. 

Second, the New York state court did determine that Tartaglia’s signature was not

forged. In the state court proceedings, the state court imposed liability on Tartaglia as a

guarantor or co-guarantor of certain leases that were in default. There, Tartaglia’s

defense was that he never agreed to guarantee any of the leases because his signature was

forged on the lease documents. Accordingly, as the District Court correctly stated, the

state court “could not have found Tartaglia liable under the lease agreements without

having decided that his personal guaranty was valid.” In other words, before it could

impose liability on Tartaglia, the state court must have determined that no forgery

occurred.

Tartaglia’s argument to the contrary is unfounded. Tartaglia contends that the state

court only decided that the evidentiary proof he submitted was not in the proper form, not

that his signature was not forged. He points to the state court’s statement that the plaintiff

in that case “submitted evidence in admissible form.” But that statement says nothing

about any evidence that Tartaglia, a defendant, submitted. Nor is it logical to conclude

that since the state court deemed the plaintiff’s evidence “in admissible form,” that it

believed Tartaglia’s evidence in improper form. As a result, we will affirm the District

Court’s order granting the Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss.