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, THE GULF OF TONKIN, 

1964 INCIDENTS

(, OVERNMENT _

Storage

T H E .

H E A R IN G

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITE D STATES SENATE

NI NET IE TH CONG RESS

SECOND SESSION '

W IT H

TH E HONORABLE RO BE RT S. McNAMARA, 

SEC RETARY OF DE FE NS E

ON

FEBR UA RY 20, 1968

Print ed fo r the use of the Co mm itte e on Fo rei gn R ela tio ns

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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For sale b y the Superintendent of Docum ents, U.S , Governm ent Printing Office 

Washington, D. C. 20402 - Price 30 cents
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CO M MIT TE E ON FO REIG N REL ATI ONS 

J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Cha irma n

JO H N SP AR KM AN , Alaba m a 

M IK E M ANSF IE LD , M on ta na 

WAY NE MO RS E, Or eg on 

ALBERT GO RE , Te nn es se e 

FR ANK J. LA US CH E, Ohio 

FR ANK CH UR CH , Id ah o 

ST UA RT SY MI NG TO N, Miss ou ri 

TH OM AS J. DO DD , Con ne ct ic ut 

JO SE P H S. CL AR K, P en nsy lv ania 

CL AIB ORN E PE L L , Rh od e Is la nd 

EUGEN E J. MC CA RTHY , M in ne so ta

BO URK E B. HIC KENLO OPE R, Io wa 

GE OR GE D. AIK EN , Ver m on t 

FR ANK CA RLSON, K an sa s 

JO H N J. W IL LI AM S, Delaw are 

KARL E. MU ND T, Sou th D ak ot a 

CLIF FO R D P. CASE, New Je rs ey 

JO H N SH ER MA N CO OP ER , Ken tuck y

n o

Cabl Ma rc t, C hi ef o f Sta ff

Ar t h u r M. K u h l , Chi ef C ler k

(ID
C O N T E N T S

Page

Pre face ________________________________________________________ V

Statem ent of Hon. Itobert S. McNamara, Secreta ry of Defense, accompanied by Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

and Capt. H. B. Sweitzer, U.S. Navy, m ilit ary as sis tant to the Chairm an,

JCS _________________________________________________________ 3

Insertion s for the record:

Letter to Secretary of Defense McNamara from Senator Fulbrig ht, 

Feb rua ry 7, 1968___________________________________________ 2

Correspondence between Senator F ulb right and Secreta ry of the Navy 

Paul R. Ignatius, J an ua ry 12,1968, and Janu ary 16,1968__________ 35

(in)

(T e e p r / n

/ ' / 4 z

TV

PREFAC E

The Committee on Foreign Relations on February 21, 1968, authorized the release of this trans cript of an executive hearing on the Gulf of 

Tonkin incidents of 1964. The Department of Defense has examined 

the transcript for possible security matters and the very few deletions 

for such reasons have been noted in the text.

There have been a few changes, mostly of a grammatical nature, in. 

the language of witnesses and members of the committee. None of these 

changes are significant with respect to an accurate portrayal of the 

hearing.

J. W. F ulbright, C ha irm an .

(V)

Z 2

GULF OF TONKIN. THE 1964 INCIDENTS

U nite d S tates S en ate , 

C om m it te e on F or eig n R el at io ns .

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, a t 10 a.m., in room S-116, 

the Capitol Building, Senator J . W. F ulbrigh t (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, 

Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken. Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: Senators Gruening, Morton, and Percy.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

The Committee on Foreign Relations is meeting this morning in 

executive session to hear the Secretary of Defense.

Air. Secretary, I am very gratefu l to you for coming before the committee this morning in this executive session.

You have had a long and arduous experience in serving your country for some 7 years. I know from my own knowledge that it has been 

an extraordinarily gruelling tour of duty for you and I believe you 

have applied your talents and energy far beyond the call of duty. 

You appear to have survived remarkably well, I may say.

I recall with satisfaction the several meetings and conversations I 

have had with you during these 7 years. You have always been responsive and in good humor and, I for one, regret to see you leave the 

Government at th is very perilous time in our history. I know, of course, 

tha t your new assignment is a very important one and I am sure you 

will discharge your responsibilities with efficiency and with honor.

I should like to add as a personal observation tha t I am very pleased 

tha t your lovely wife Marge has returned home from the hospital and 

T know that eases your troubles.

EST A BLIS H IN G T R U T H OF T O N K IN GULF IN C ID EN T S

My view of the purpose of this hearing is simply to review the decisionmaking process of our Government in time of crisis. I am interested only in establishing the tru th about the Tonkin Gulf incidents 

of August 2 and 4, 1964. The purpose is not to assess blame on anyone, certainly not upon you. Personally, I have long since acknowledged publicly my own shortcomings in connection with the affair. I 

am a firm believer in the idea tha t to acknowledge my mistakes of 

yesterday is but another way of saying I am a wiser man today.

But this committee and the Government we hope will continue long 

after you and I are gone and there will be crises in the future and I 

think it will be helpful to future Senators and future Secretaries of 

State and even future Presidents if we review past decisions of importance and evaluate them in the light of subsequent developments.

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This is one of the ways we can help develop a wiser and more mature 

procedure and judgment in the future.

If this Nation cannot learn from its past performance and acknowledge where it has been wrong or insufficient to the task, then the United 

States will become servile to its past—and suffer for this servitude.

Air. Secretary, you have shown your fondness for T. S. Eliot on 

other occasions, particularly Elio t's thoughts in “Little Gedding." 

You will therefore appreciate the thought behind Eliot's words:

“History may be servitude,

“History may be freedom.”

Mr. Secretary, I believe all of us here share your own desire that 

the United States profit from its mistakes—not repeat them.

As is customary in these proceedings, you may have the opportunity to make an open statement if you desire, which I understand 

you have prepared. I would hope tha t in your statement you will 

describe the military and political situation as it existed during the 

spring and summer of 1964, in this country and in Vietnam. If you can 

refresh our memory about the background conditions relative to 

which the incidents of August 1964 took place, I believe it will be 

most helpful.

Before I yield to the Secretary. I should like to submit to my colleagues on the committee the suggestion that afte r the Secretary concludes his opening remarks, I should like to proceed with the questioning in accordance with the questions prepared by the staff in order to develop these complicated events and communications in as 

orderely a manner as possible. I shall, of course, be very glad to yield 

for questions or suggestions from the members as we go along, but 

I do believe if we are to understand these events and make an intelligible record, a systematic, more or less chronological approach, 

should be followed. After I have submitted the prepared list of questions, I shall call upon all members in the usual manner. I hope this is 

agreeable to the committee.

The Secretary does have a prepared statement which I understand 

lie would like to read.

LETTER REL ATING TO THE HE AR ING

I wish to put into the record also, Air. Reporter, a copy of the letter relating to this hearing which was sent to the Secretary.

(The letter referred to follows.)

February 7. 1968.

lio n. Robert S. McNamara,

Secretary of Defense,

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to our telephone conversation of yesterday concerning your scheduled appearance before the Committee on the incidents in the 

Gulf of Tonkin.

As I said during our conversation. I appreciate your concern that your testimony he fully responsive to the wishes of the Committee. Therefore. I can understand your interest in the internal working paper done by the staff. As I said 

to you. however, the Committee does not wish at this time to release the staff 

study. Moreover, the information used in the staff study is drawn entirely from 

data provided by your office; so there will be no surprises there. At the same 

time, I know tha t the Committee staff does not have all information available 

to you on the Tonkin incidents. As I told you. however, I am enclosing a list 

of the documents your Department has supplied the Committee. If there are 

any questions about the material, please have your office contact the Committee staff.
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In an y ev en t, th e in te re st of th e Com m itt ee is no t in a disc us sion of th e st aff stud y, but in yo ur testim on y of A ugu st 6, 1964, an d A m ba ss ad or Ste ve ns on ’s st ate m ent to th e U ni te d N at io ns of A ug us t 5 in li ght of an y in fo rm at io n your 

office ma y hav e acq uir ed sin ce th e in ci den ts in th e G ul f of T on kin. The re fo re , in th e in te re st of a th or ou gh di sc us sion on F ebru ary 20, th e Co m­ m itte e will m ak e av ail able to your office a cop y of th e tr a n sc ri p t of th e te sti ­ mo ny of Aug us t 6, 1064, (A m ba ss ad or St ev en so n’s pre se nta ti on is, o f co ur se , a 

m att er of pu blic re co rd .) I wo uld ho pe th a t yo u will he ab le to re vi ew th is tr ansc ri pt an d br in g th e Com mitt ee up to d ate on w hat we now kn ow of th e in ci de nt s in th e G ulf of To nk in. The Com m itt ee is p art ic u la rl y in te re st ed in dis ­ cu ss in g w hat less on s ha ve bee n le ar ne d abou t th e pr ob lems of an al yzin g in ­

fo rm at io n in th e m id st of a cri si s si tu at io n. Fin al ly , as I m en tion ed to yo u duri ng our co nv er sa tion , I wo uld lik e to re ne w my re qu es t of Ja n u a ry 8tl i th a t th e D ep ar tm en t of Defen se pr ov id e th e Co m­ m itte e a t th e earl ie st po ss ible date w ith a re port do ne by thesJV ea po us Sy stem Eva lu at io n Group on th e su bj ec t “C om man d an d Con trol of th e Ton ki n G ul f 

In ci de nt . 4- 5 Aug us t 1 964.”

I look fo rw ard to se eing yo u on F ebru ary 20.

Si nc erely yo ur s, J. W. F ulbrigh t, C ha irm an .

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, my own view is that this statement 

of yours should not be made public until after the committee has had an opportunity to go through the hearings, and also to decide what it does about its own staff report and the hearings. This is an executive meeting and I hope that you will be willing to retain that. 1 realize there will be pressures upon you, as there are upon the committee, for release of these documents, but I would think it is premature to do so.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. EARLE G. WHE ELER, CHA IRMAN OF THE JO INT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND CAPT. H. B. SW EIT ZE R,-

U.S. NAVY. MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT

CHIEFS OF STAFF

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate your 

personal kind wishes and compliments. I t has been a most satisfying 7 years to me, made more so by the courtesy with which I have been 

treated by this committee on my numerous occasions before it. I might also say I share T. S. ElioCs belief tha t history may be freedom, and I look forward to the development of our discussions here today in a way tha t will make it freedom and not servitude. I do have a statement which I would like to present to the committee at this time. I have not released it to the press. I told my associates that we should not do so. We have submitted to the committee some 200 copies of it so they may release it. I doubt very much th at we will be able to withstand the pressures of the press today without releasing 

it. We have been deluged by requests for it.

RELEASING OF DOCUMENTS

Senator Morse. Can I only say, Mr. Chairman, on a procedural 

matter, 1 quite agree with the Secretar}’. I do not think we ought in any way to place any restrictions on the Secretary in regard to releas­ ing anything he wants to release. I know you did not so imply. But I think the judgment of the Secretary should prevail in regard to what the Department of Defense releases, and I think the judgment of the 

committee should prevail in regard to what we should release.
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The Chairm an. Th e only th in g I was suggest ing ------

Se nator Morse. I t is in keepi ng with the div isio n o f powers d octrine.

Th e Chairm an. I thou gh t it would be much fa irer if we could arran ge to release them sim ultane ously. For exa mple, the staff rep ort 

would present only one side of th e pic tur e, as wou ld th e Se cretary’s 

statem ent. I think it would be too bad if this goes out an d no thing 

else. Tha t is a matter fo r the com mittee to determ ine , I gr an t.

Se nator Mo.rse. I still would no t want to—I would perso nally not 

be a pa rty to placing any res tri cti on on th e Secre tary.

The Chairm an. The point I am tryi ng to m ake is th at muc h of the 

inform ation which we hav e is confide ntia l and cannot be released. 

Wherea s a g re at many of the documen ts to w hich the Secretary refe rs, 

bu t does no t inc orp ora te, are also confidential. I wou ld subm it th at it 

is a very one-sided pictu re to release only the s tatem ent .

Se na tor Morse. It is one-sided only if the committee leaves it th at 

way.

Th e Chairm an. I gra nt th at . But it is only a matter of time. We 

hav e no t ha d a chance to rea d the Se cretary’s statem ent. We only 

received th is statem ent an hou r ago and it is a m atter of timing.

Se na tor Morse. I understand.

Th e Chairm an. Does the Se na tor object fo r the committee to have 

tim e to consider the statem ent ?

Se na tor Morse. I would only obje ct as to placing any rest ric tio ns on 

the Se cretary a t all.

Th e Chairm an. I do no t con sider it placing res tric tions. I t is a 

m at ter for us to ar rive at an u nd erstan ding as to w hen we do it.

Se na tor Gore. Mr. Ch airma n.

Th e Chairm an. Yes?

Se na tor Gore. There is a qu estion here. W e are hav ing an executive 

session. Co uld we no t de fer judg men t on this un til we have ha d a 

chance to read i t ?

The Chairm an. That is what we norm ally do. Tha t is wh at I was 

suggesting , un til we receive it ; the committee mak es up its own mind 

usu ally afte rw ar d, th is aft ern oo n, fo r example.

Se na tor Gore. The po int I was attempt ing to rais e, I find a great 

dea l of appeal in wh at Se na tor Morse has s aid, bu t I th in k it mu st be 

interp reted in the lig ht of th e fact tha t we a re dealing here wi th classified mate ria ls and havin g an executive he ari ng. The release of a 

sta tem ent in executive heari ng, used in an executive heari ng, has not, 

so f ar as I can recall, been done except by per missio n o f th e comm ittee.

I rem emb er one tim e when I was c hairm an of a subcommittee, Secre ta ry R us k was appeari ng , and th e question o f releasing his sta tem ent 

was su bm itted to the co mmittee, a nd the com mittee vote d unanim ous ly 

to approv e its release. I dare say it might do so—we m igh t do so, a fter 

he aring this, bu t I would like to de fer ju dgme nt on it.

Th e Chairm an. That is all r ig ht .

procedural right of witness

Se na tor Morse. Ca n I tak e 30 seconds more ? I do no t wa nt to be a 

stickler o r make a t em pest in a te ap ot, bu t I do think, gentlem en, you 

are deali ng here wi th a procedural matter th at you sho uld no t set a 

pre cedent on. I do no t t hink t hat a t any tim e a com mittee of th e Co ngress has t he righ t to call into executive session a C abine t officer or any-
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one who is really a spokesman for the administration and seek to impose any restriction on that witness in regard to anything that ho 

says in tha t executive session in respect to his right to make any comment afte r the meeting is over or release any statement he wants to 

make afte r the meeting is over.

Speaking hypothetically, although the Secretary has made very 

clear his willingness to oblige you, I am not talking about his willingness to oblige but I am talking about what I consider to be a very, 

very important basic procedural right of the administration witness 

under the separation powers doctrine. I have never transgressed upon 

it knowingly, and I am not going to let the administration at any time 

transgress upon our corresponding right under the same doctrine. 

Therefore, I think we ought to deal with each other on the basis tha t 

we know what these respective rights are and seek to place no restriction on each other. That is my point.

I took the same position, you will recall, in the MacArthur hearings 

when there was an attempt, in my judgment, on the part of the committee then to infringe the rights of the administration under the doctrine there. I take the same position this morning.

Senator H ickenlooper. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELEASING A STATEMENT

Senator Hickenlooper. I think we have a rath er complicated situation here which is not necessarily one under the control of the Secretary or of the committee. It may be more under the control of the 

committee than of the Secretary.

I would say tha t the Secretary has no righ t whatsoever under our 

procedure to release a transcript of this record where members question the Secretary and answers come in. On the other hand, I would say 

this, th at the responsibility of releasing a statement on the sole responsibility of the Secretary or any other administrative official is the 

responsibility of tha t official of th at department. I am not so sure we 

can control it. We can control what we release. I think it is a matter of 

some kind of an understanding.

I am thoroughly sympathetic with what you have said, Mr. Chairman, about piecemeal releases of these things. I hate to read about 

them even though they have not been released—I hate to read about 

them in Time magazine or the New York Times or other papers of that 

kind, where we have to get some of our information from there. That 

makes us quite restless but apparently there is nothing we can do about 

it, and sometimes what goes on in this committee at least seems to be 

approximative in some of those news releases of certain columnists 

and so on.

So it is a problem that has its various facets. But so far as a straight 

statement of the Secretary, I would say tha t we have no authority to 

inhibit him from a s traight statement he wants to make to the public 

on his own responsibility without rega rd to questions or answers or 

what anyone else has said, because when tha t occurs, then there is a 

dual responsibility there, not only on the questioner but the Secretary, 

and I hope we can control that.

But I do not know; it is a very difficult thing, and I am thoroughly 

sympathetic with the piecemeal-----
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The Chairman. I was not asserting any right to control it. It was 

merely a suggestion if there was some comity-----

Senator Hickenlooper. If it is a question of comity, we can arrive 

at it.

The Chairman. He can keep it within his control.

Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.

NE WS PA PER REPORTS OF CLA SSIFIED INFO RM AT ION

Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, having listened to what Senator 

Hickenlooper has just said, I feel obliged to make a statement th at this 

body, vested with secret information of the most intimate character, 

dealing with the security of the United States, has been brought 

scandalously into disrepute by the frequency with which reports are 

carried in the newspapers of what is supposed to be done under closed 

executive meetings, and I do not feel content that we can wink at 

these leaks that are coming out of this committee. I am not satisfied 

with the statement that there is nothing we can do about it. Somebody 

is leaking things, whether it is a member, Members of the Senate, or 

whether it is members of the staff. I do not know who it is, but it is a 

terrible mistake tha t this body, related most intimately to matters 

tha t deal with the security of the United States, finds itself with 

newspapers reporting what takes place under confidential discussions.

It cannot be denied that these reports are being carried outside 

of the meeting. How do they get out? I think we ought to make an 

investigation. We ought to find out whether it is from the staff or 

where it emerges.

The whole world can laugh at us at what happened. It seems you 

do not need spies, all you have to do is look at the papers and fully 

you will find revealed what takes place confidentially in this room.

The Chairman. I wonder if we could get on with the testimony.

Senator Aike n. I would like to observe tha t sometimes the leaks 

appear 2 or 3 days after they come out in the newspapers, which can 

hardly be in the category of a leak.

The Chairman. Let us get on.

Senator Lausche. The chairman wants to get on with this matter, 

and I can understand why he would want to get on, but I will say 

to you with what you are trying to get on is not as significant as what 

I am try ing to search out. Something is wrong with this committee.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I wonder if we could proceed.

Senator Clark. Let us go ahead.

PL AC IN G RES TRICTION S ON AD MINISTRA TIO N SPOK ESME N

Senator Morse. We are not going to leave this record in this condition so fa r as the Senator from Oregon is concerned. I do not think we 

ought to take up the Secretary’s time with quarrels of the committee, 

but, Fran k, you were not here and you are not aware of what Senator 

Hickenlooper was talking about. We are not talking about what you 

are talking about. Tha t was not raised. I had risen to the defense of 

what I think is a very impo rtant doctrine that always ought to prevail 

at our hearings when we have a Cabinet officer or anyone else from 

the administration here: namely, we should make no attempt to place
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any restriction on the spokesman of the administration regarding 

what he says to the press afterward and what he releases. The only 

suggestion was a very helpful intention by the chairman suggesting 

tha t the Secretary of Defense hold any statement when he goes out of 

this meeting such as releasing the testimony he is about to give us 

until we will have the whole record considered.

I only raised a point there, understanding the motivation of the 

chairman to be of the highest, that I would not support placing any 

restriction, under the separation-of-powers doctrine, on Secretary 

McNamara. That is how all this occurred. We were not talking, Frank, 

about the problem tha t you are raising, and I do not think we ought 

to be taking the time of the Secretary to be talking about tha t now, 

That is for us to handle in our own executive session.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, will you go ahead. I think we ought 

to proceed.

Senator Lausche. I want to make this statement, and then I will 

close.

In the repo rt that was filed by the staff, there was an addendum, 

and in the addendum there was stated t hat X contacted the staff and 

told about the t ruth th at there were no missiles seen fired at our ships. 

Y spoke to the staff. Well, as a member of the bench for 10 years, when 

you begin offering tha t type of proof to establish a fact, I simply 

cannot accept it.

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.

STAFF STUDY REFUSED

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I have sought in my statement to be as responsive as I can to what I believe to be are the questions in the mind of the committee regarding the Tonkin G ulf incident. 

I have not had the advantage, however, or the privilege of exposure 

to the staff study that I know has been completed and circulated among 

you. I asked for that several weeks ago but was denied access to it, 

and I may, therefore, not entirely respond to all of the information 

tha t you wish to query me about. I will be very happy to take questions concerning the statement.

Senator Mansfield. Do I understand the Secretary requested a 

copy of the study and was denied?

The Chairman. T hat is correct. I also requested their command and 

control documents and it was denied.

Senator Mansfield. I was thinking of those in juxtaposition.

The Chairman. That is correct.

Senator Gore. Perhaps we can exchange those now. That might 

solve it.

The Chairman. I think we ought to go on.

Go on, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary McNamara. Let me comment, Mr. Chairman. These are 

not to he equated. You can have any raw material we have. We tried to 

supply all of it to you. Some of it is very highly classified, and we assume you will trea t i t with the care that its classification deserves. We 

also are quite willing to let you have evaluation reports, but only af ter 

we have ascertained t hat the authors of those reports had access to all 

the appropria te information. It turn s out tha t the author of this pa rticular study you mentioned did not have access. I never heard of th e
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stu dy when you requ ested it. G enera l Wh eeler was not aware of it. The 

au thor d id not q uer y Gen eral Whee ler or me about the ac tion s we took 

tod ay, or the a ctions o f the J oin t Chi efs, the National Se curity Council, 

or tho se th e P resid en t took.

1 do not think you wa nt evalu ative repo rts sent over here th at are 

inco mplete. Any rep ort we have, you have access to, but only after it 

has been pr op erly reviewed as to its relia bil ity .

Your stall' s tud y is quite a d iffere nt ma tter. I conside r it a very ser ious ha nd icap to me in ap pe ar ing before you today to add ress these 

issues th at hav e been reviewed and add ressed and conside red in your 

staff stu dy , evidence of which is examin ed in your staff stu dy, which 

evidence has never even been br ou gh t to my att en tio n, bu t if you are 

willin g to go a hea d with th e h ea rin g on t hat basis, 1 am.

Th e Chairman. All of the staff was based upon ma ter ial th at came 

from yo ur office, all of it. We gave you a com plete lis t of every docu ­

ment and ev erythin g we had received, and it is ava ilable to you as it 

was to us.

ADDENDUM TO STAFF STUDY

Se cretary McNamara. Se na tor Lau sch e has ju st sta ted it had an 

addendum to it th at i nclude d inform ation t hat was no t avai lab le to me.

Th e C hairma n. Tha t was no t used in the pr ep ar atio n of the staff 

stu dy and it was purely a n a ddendum of th ings th at had h appened o utside o f th e d ocuments w hich came from th e P entag on.

Se na tor Lausche. Let me say, Mr. Ch airm an , th at the add end um 

recited a numb er of conta cts made by a staffm an wi th persons un ­

know n. Now it was offered as an addendum sup posed ly ha ving an insig nif ica nt impor tance, bu t it is there. Th ree or four men who were 

suppos ed to have been in the To nkin Bay are alleged to h ave sa id th at 

there were no missiles fired. Who are the men? flo w did the y contact 

them ?

Se na tor Cooper. Wh at we igh t was given to it ?

Se na tor Mansfield. Mr. Ch air man , I a pologize for the inter ruption 

but I have to he up here on th e floor.

Th e C hairma n. I would hop e the Se creta ry would be allowed to 

proceed.

Mr. Secretar y ?

ESS EN TI AL FA CT S AR E T H E SA ME TODAY

Se cretary McNamara. Mr. C ha irm an , on A ugust 6,19 64,1 appeare d 

before th is c omm ittee and testified conce rning th e att acks in the To nkin Gul f on the destroyers U.S.S . Mad do x and U.S .S. Tu rn er Jo y,

and o ur response to those attac ks.

Ov er 3!/2 y ears have passed since th at time. How ever, even with the 

ad va ntag e of hind sh ight, I find th at the esse ntia l fac ts of the two 

att acks ap pe ar today as they d id the n, when the y were fully e xplored 

with t his committee and o ther Mem bers of Congress.

Tho releva nt events, and th ei r significance, were t he sub ject of i nte nsive debat e in the House an d Senate. Bo th my testim ony and th at of 

other officials of the G overn me nt r eported the evidence th at establish ed 

conclus ively the occu rrence of these att acks on U.S . naval vessels op ­

er at in g in internationa l wa ters. Th is evide nce was available to us at 

the tim e of the decision to mak e a ca refully tailo red response to the
9

attacks. In my testimony, I noted that, while sonar and radar readings may be subject to interpretation and argument because of sea and 

atmospheric conditions,4ve had intelligence reports of a highly classified and unimpeachable nature which established, without question, 

tha t the attacks took place on both August 2 and August 4.

PART PLAY ED BY U. S. NAVAL VESSELS

Also fully explored at the time was the question whether the attacks 

on the Maddox and Turner Joy were in any way provoked by or related to certain South Vietnamese naval activity which occurred in the 

period from July 30 to August 4. As I stated then, and repeat now, 

our naval vessels played absolutely no par t in, an d were not associated 

with, this activity. There was then, and there is now, no question but 

tha t the U.S. Government knew, and tha t I knew personally, the general nature of some countermeasures being taken by the South Vietnamese in response to North Vietnam’s aggression. As I informed 

Congress, the boats utilized bv the South Vietnamese were financed by 

the United States. But I said then, and I repeat today, th at the Maddox

and the Turner Joy did not participa te in the South Vietnamese 

activities, tha t they had no knowledge of the details of these operations, and tha t in no sense of the word could they be considered to 

have backstopped the effort.

As the chairman noted in the Senate debates, he was informed that 

“our boats did not convoy or support or back up any South Vietnamese 

naval vessels” and that they were “entirely unconnected or unassociated with any coastal forays the South Vietnamese themselves may 

have conducted.” He was so informed and the inform ation was completely accurate. When the South Vietnamese conducted the first of 

their two naval operations against North Vietnamese targets during 

this period, the Maddox patrol had not even begun and the ship was 

at least 130 miles to the southeast. The attack on the Maddox on 

August 2 took place 63 hours after completion of this South Vietnamese naval operation. When the South Vietnamese boats conducted 

their second foray, the Maddox and the Turner J oy were at least 70 

nautical miles to the northeast.

Senator Case. I wonder if you could go a little more slowly. It is a 

little hard to understand.

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

The attack made against them on August 4 was almost a full day 

after this second South Vietnamese operation.

The facts thus show today, as they showed 314 years ago, that attacks occurred against our ships both on August 2 and August 4, 

tha t we had available to us incontrovertible evidence of these attacks 

when the decision was made to make our limited and measured response, and that these attacks were in no sense provoked or justified 

by any participation or association of our ships with South Vietnamese 

naval operations. I would like briefly to review these facts with you.

REVIE W OF FACTS OF ATTACK

On the 2d of August 1964, the U.S.S. Maddox was engaged in a 

patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. At no time during the conduct of her patrol did Maddox depart from international
10

waters , or e ngage in any h osti le act . Yet, while she was 28 m iles from 

the coast of Nor th Vietnam , on a course away fro m the co ast, M ad dox

was att acked by three No rth Vietnamese tor pedo boats. A t least thr ee 

torp edo es were dir ected by the boa ts at the Ma dd ox, as well as 

ma chi neg un fire. Th e Ma ad ox avoided all torp edo es and, together 

wi th ai rc ra ft ar rivi ng o n the scene from the U.3.S . Tic ond ero ga, re ­

pelled the atta ck an d sank or dam age d the attack ing c raft.

Th e atta ck on M ad do x took plac e in da yli gh t. Nor th A ietnamese 

repo rts of th ei r pla ns ha d pre vio usly been obtained fro m an intelligence source. The attack ing cr af t were clearly seen by M ad do x pe rsonnel and were photo gra phed. Th e lau nchin g of the torped oes by 

these P T boats was also obse rved as were the tor pedo wakes pas sing 

near Ma dd ox. Ma chineg un fire from the att ackers was also observed 

and, indeed, one bullet was recovered—it is in our possession and 1 

have it here th is m orn ing if you wish to inspect it.

A T his was an unpro voked attaqk on a ship of the I nit ed St ates on 

the high seas. Nev ertheless, no reprisa l by the Un ite d St ates was 

un derta ken. Th e Ma dd ox, fo rtu na tely, ha d avoided significant damage itself, an d inflicted dam age on the attack ers . Since no rat iona l 

motive f or th e attack was ap pa rent, we believed it possible th at it had 

res ulted fro m a mis calculatio n or an imp ulsive act of a local commander. A ft er the second att ack, the chair ma n com mented in Senate deb ate th at I had sta ted , aft er the firs t attack on the Ma dd ox,

th at I did not expect it to be rep eated, li e also noted th at th is showed 

how w ron g I was.

X On Au gu st 3, the day follow ing , a note of prote st was dis patch ed 

to the Nor th Vietn am regime at the direction of the Pr esiden t. It 

con clud ed wi th the wo rds: “T he U.S . Government expects th at the 

au thorities of the regime in North Vietn am will be un de r no misappre hension as to the grave consequences whi ch would inevitabl y 

result fro m any fu rthe r unpro voked offensive mili tary action ag ain st 

U.S. fo rc es /’ A t the same time, the Presiden t mad e public his i ns tru ctio ns to the Navy to con tinue and to add an othe r destr oy er to its 

pa tro ls in th e G ul f of Ton kin.

It was wi thin th is con text th at we received, at about 9 :20 W ashing ton tim e on the mo rni ng of Au gu st 4, inform ation fro m an intelligence source th at No rth Vietnam ese naval forc es ha d been ord ered 

to a tta ck the patr ol.

Soon th er ea fter rep orts fro m the Ma dd ox were receive d th at the 

pa tro l was being appro ached by hig h speed surfa ce ra dar con tacts 

an d th at an attack appeare d imm inent. Other am pl ifyi ng messages 

quickly followe d and by about 11 a.m., we received a flash repo rt th at 

ou r de stroyers, th en located some 60 to 65 miles from the co ast of No rth 

Vietn am , were actua lly un de r att ack. Dur in g th is same tim e, in telligence sources repo rte d th at Nor th Vietnam ese vessels sta ted the y had 

our ships un de r attack . Th ro ug ho ut the remaind er of the mo rning 

and early aft erno on , flash message repo rts of the engag em ent , some 

ambig uous an d some conflicting, continued to po ur in. Freq uent 

tele phone conta ct was main tained with the com ma nder in chief of 

the Pacific Fleet, Ha wa ii. Th e Presiden t was kept infor me d of these 

develop men ts.
11

CONTRADICTIONS EXAMINED AND RECONCILED

During this period, I had a series of meetings with my chief civilian and m ilitary advisers in which the apparent ambiguities and contradictions in the reports were examined and reconciled to our satisfaction. We identified and refined various options for a response to 

the attack, to be presented to the President. Among these options 

was the air strike against the attacking boats and their associated 

bases, which option was eventually selected. As the options were identified, preliminary messages were sent to appropriate operational commanders alerting them to the several possibilities so tha t initial planning steps could be undertaken.

In the early afternoon, the National Security Council met, at 

which rime we briefed the participants, including the President, on 

the available details of the attack. Shortly thereafter, having received 

the advice of the J oin t Chiefs of Staff, we recommended to the Pres ­

ident, and he approved, a response consisting of an air strike on the 

PT and Swatow boat bases and their associated facilities. During all 

of this time, the message reports of the engagement from the ships, 

plus other information of a very highly classified nature received du ring the attack, were being reviewed to eliminate any doubt that an 

attack on the destroyers in fact occured.

For example, I saw a message from the onscene task group commander which expressed doubts as to the validity of many of the 

sonar reports. 1 discussed this message by telephone with the commander m chief. Pacific, and informed him that, although we would 

continue with the preparations, the reprisal strike would not be 

executed until we were absolutely positive of the attack. He of course 

agreed and in a la ter telephone call informed me tha t he was satisfied, 

from all the reports he had on hand, tha t an a ttack on our ships had 

taken place.

Finally, at about G:30 p.m., Washington time, the message to 

execute tlie strike was transmitted by the commander in chief, Pacific.

Those are the essential details. To recapitulate, on August 2, one 

of our destroyers was attacked by North Vietnamese naval forces 

without provocation while on patrol on the high seas. Since the destroyer had suffered no damage and had repulsed and damaged her 

attackers, and since the possibility seemed to exist that the incident 

was an isolated act, no further military response was made. North 

Vietnam was warned the next day, however, of the “grave consequences which would inevitably follow” another such attack. Furth ermore, the President announced that the patrol would continue and 

would consist of two destroyers. The next night, the two destroyers 

were also attacked without provocation on the high seas by North 

Vietnamese naval forces.

When these facts were established to the complete satisfaction of 

all responsible authorities, we responded with an air strike on the 

facilities which supported the attacking vessels.

90-187—6S----- 2
12

ACCURACY OF DETAILS STILL QUESTIONED

Now, three and a half years later there again seems to be debate 

about the essential accuracy of the above account. The questions that 

appear now to be raised are the same as those considered and settled 

at the time:

Was the patro l in fact for legitimate purposes?

Were the attacks unprovoked ?

Was there indeed a second attack ?

If there was a second attack, was there sufficient evidence available 

at the time of our response to support this conclusion ?

I would like to address these questions.

WAS PURPOSE OF PATROL LEGITIMA TE?

First, was the patrol in fact for legitimate purposes?

Patrols of the nature of those carried on by Maddox and Turner

Joy were initiated in the western Pacific in 1962. They were carried 

out in international waters along the coastlines of Communist countries in tha t area. They were open patrols and no hostile actions were 

ever taken by the U.S. forces involved. Provocative actions were 

avoided. The purpose was to learn what we could of military activity 

and environmental conditions in these parts of the world, operating 

in waters where we had every legal rig ht to be. The primary purpose 

of the Maddox was to observe North Vietnamese naval activity in 

those waters, in view of the evidence we had of infiltration by sea by 

North Vietnam into South Vietnam. Other secondary purposes were 

area familiarization and observation by visual and electronic means of 

any other activity of military interest. We had the undisputed right 

to do this. In view of our assistance to South Vietnam, such observations were needed.

The suggestion has appeared incidentally tha t because Maddox,

prio r to commencement of its patrol, took abroad certain communications equipment, with personnel to operate this equipment, its patrol 

had some different and presumably more sinister purpose than others 

which had preceded it. This is simply not true. The mission of observation which I have outlined was to be fulfilled with the regularly installed equipment of the ships. The extra equipment brought abroad 

Maddox consisted in essence of standard shipboard radio receivers 

added to the ship’s normal complement of such receivers in order to 

give an added capability for detecting indications of a possible hostile 

attack on the patrol.

The Congress, at the time of the debates on the Tonkin Gulf resolution, was aware tha t visual and electronic surveillance of the area was 

one of the purposes served by the De Soto patrol. Any suggestion 

now tha t the installation of passive radio receiving equipment changed 

the essential nature of the patrol is unwarranted.

I might add tha t virtually all of the De Soto patrols, since their 

commencement in 1962, had been outfitted with similar equipment for 

the same primarily defensive purposes.

WERE THE ATTACKS UNPROVOKED?

Second, were the attacks unprovoked ?

Senator Mundt. Are you defining the De Soto patrol ?
13

Se cre tar y McNamara. T he ter m as I am using it here ref ers to the 

pa tro ls in the To nk in Gulf of which this was the fo urth, one ha ving 

occurre d in 1962, one in 1963, an d the th ir d in the early part of 1964, 

and the fo ur th in Au gust 1964. A ctua lly it is a gen eric ter m coverin g 

a broade r ran ge of pa tro ls in the wes tern Pacific bu t as used in th is 

pa pe r it ref ers to the fo ur pa tro ls in the To nk in Gulf.

Second, were t he attacks unpro voked ?

1 have he ard it suggested th at th e pa tro l provoked the attack s by 

in trud ing into the te rritor ia l wa ter s of Nor th Vie tnam. Th e fac ts, I 

think , are these.

Pr io r to the first att ack, on Au gu st 2, th e Mad do x had been e ngage d 

on its pa tro l since J uly 31. At no tim e d ur in g the co nduct of th is pa tro l 

did the Ma ddox de pa rt fro m in tern ationa l waters . I t ha d been in ­

str uc ted to ap proa ch the Nor th Vietnamese coastline no closer th an 8 

nauti cal mile s an d any offshore island no closer than 4 n au tic al miles. 

Maddox adhered scrup ulo usly to thes e ins tru ctions. Wh en the pa tro l 

resu med with Mad do x and tu rn e r Jo y, the ships were instr uc ted to 

rem ain at lea st 11 mile s fro m the coast. The se instructio ns also were 

followed. Th e Uni ted State s reco gnizes no claim of a te rr itorial sea 

in excess of 3 m iles. Th is consistent position o f the Un ite d States was 

ree mp hasized at th e close of th e 1960 Convent ion on Law of the Sea 

in Geneva.

Th ere hav e, how eve r, been sta tem ents repo rte d in the press th at the 

Ma ddox e nte red into wa ter s claimed by Nor th Vietn am as te rr itor ia l. 

Such sta tem ents have no basis in fac t. At no tim e pr io r to the Aug us t 

1964 To nk in Gul f inc ide nts did the No rth Vie tnamese Governm ent 

claim a wi dth of te rr itorial sea in excess of 3 m iles. Th e Nor th Vie tnamese Govern me nt succeeded t he F renc h Go ver nm ent , which adhered 

to the 3-mile lim it. Und er the rules of in tern ationa l law, no claim by 

Nor th Vietnam in excess of 3 miles w ould be as sumed unless specifically 

made and publishe d. It sho uld be noted th at Camb odia, a sis ter suc ­

cessor sta te, pu blicly adopted the Fr en ch 3-mile rule on achie vin g 

inde pendence. Lat er , it pro claimed a 5-mile lim it. South Vietn am 

clai ms 3 m iles. T he first sta tem ent o f N orth V ietnam which appro aches 

a claim in excess of 3 miles occurred well af te r the attacks on Septe mber 1, 1964, in the form of a broadcast fro m Ra dio Ha no i in which it 

was sta ted , “T he Democratic Re public of Vi etn am dec lare d th at the 

te rritor ia l sea is 12 m iles.” No official docume nta ry confirm atio n of the 

claim a sse rted in th is bro adcast is kno wn to ex ist.

In short, at no t tim e du ring the pa tro l di d either o f the destroyers 

leave the high seas an d enter are as claimed by the No rth Vietnamese 

or rec ognized by the Un ite d S tates as na tio nal w aters.

Th e que stio n might be asked, however: Sh ou ld not we as a p ractical 

m atter have assumed a claim o f 12 m iles since t his is th e un ifo rm p osition of the Comm unist countrie s? Th e sim ple answer is th at Commu nis t countrie s do no t have such a un ifo rm po sition: Cuba and 

Po land each adhere to the trad itio na l 3-mile lim it, whi le Yu gosla via 

and A lban ia claim 10 miles.

SOUTH V IE TN A M ESE OP ER ATI ONS

An othe r po int re la ting to “ prov ocati on ” w as discussed an d disposed 

of du ring the d eba tes o n the To nkin Gul f res olu tion and the he arings 

pr io r the reto, but, of late, it seems to have been res urrected . It is th °
14

suggestion that our patrol was in some way connected with certain 

reconnaissance and bombardment activities of South Vietnamese patrol craft against North Vietnamese.

I informed members of this committee of these activities of the 

South Vietnamese in an informal meeting on August 3,1964, afte r the 

attack on the Maddox. The subject was again raised in lesser detail in 

my testimony before this committee on August 6, 1964. I pointed out 

that these raids were a legitimate attempt by the South Vietnamese to 

counter and retaliate against the systematic infiltration of th eir country by sea which had been carried out by North Vietnam for the previous two and a half years. I described the scope of tha t infiltration; 

tha t is, 140 known incidents between Ju ly and December 1961, an estimated 1,400 infiltrators having been landed in South Vietnam during 

tha t time.

With respect to the legitimacy of those South Vietnamese operations, 

you, Mr. Chairman, stated during the Tonkin Gulf floor debates:

Th e bo at s th a t m ay ha ve st ru ck a t th e co as ta l are as of N or th Vietnam may 

ha ve been su pp lied by us. We ha ve been he lpin g So ut h Vietnam arm its el f. I do 

not k no w abou t th e spe cific b oa ts.

I pe rs ona lly th in k th is is a per fe ct ly le gitim at e an d pro per w ay to de fend 

on es elf fr om th e ki nd of ag gr es sion So uth Vietnam has be en su bj ec te d to fo r 

ye ar s.

Senator Morse, at the hearing on August 6, specifically raised the 

question of a connection between our patrol and the South Vietnamese 

bombardment of two North Vietnamese islands which had occurred 

some two and a half days prio r to the attack on Maddox, and I responded tha t there was no connection. The two operations were separate and distinct. I informed you tha t our destroyers took no part 

whatsoever in the South Vietnamese operation. They did not convoy, 

support, or back up the South Vietnamese boats in any way. As I 

stated during the hearings:

* * * as I re po rt ed to yo u earl ie r th is we ek, we unders ta nd th a t th e So uth 

V ietn am es e se a fo rc e carr ie d out patr ol ac tio n aro und th es e is la nds an d ac tu ally 

sh elled th e po in ts th ey fe lt w er e as so ci at ed w ith th is in filtra tion .

Our sh ip s had ab so lu te ly no kn ow ledg e of it, w er e no t co nn ec ted w ith it; in no 

sens e of th e wor d ca n be co ns id er ed to ha ve ba ck stop pe d th e effort.

That statement remains entirely accurate. I can confirm today that 

neither the ship commanders nor the embarked task group commander 

had any knowledge of the South Vietnamese action against the two 

islands or of any other specific South Vietnamese operations against 

the North. Higher naval commands were made aware of the operations by Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 

in order to avoid mutual interference or confusion between our patrols 

and those operations.

DIRECT ION S TO U.S. DESTROYERS

Throughout the patrol conducted first by the Maddox alone and 

later by the Maddox and the Turner Joy, the U.S. destroyers were 

directed to remain in waters which would keepThem from becoming 

operationally involved with the South Vietnamese activity. The restrictions this imposed on the patrol were such that, a t one time, consideration was given to its abandonment. The task group commander 

knew only tha t certain South Vietnamese naval operations were 

periodically carried on in the area. He had no detailed knowledge
15

of their type or of where or when they would be conducted. Indeed, 

his lack of knowledge was such tha t he mistakenly identified the 

South Vietnamese craft returning from their operation of July 31 

as Soviet P -6 class boats.

In point of fact, our patrols and the shore bombardments by South 

Vietnamese forces were separated in both time and space. When South 

Vietnamese P T F’s bombarded the islands of lio n Nieu and Hon Me 

on the n ight of July 30-31, the Maddox had not even commenced her 

patrol, and was at least 130 miles to the southeast of the nearest of 

those islands. At the time of the attack on the Maddox on August 

2, the South Vietnamese boats had been back at their base in I)a Nang 

for almost 53 hours.

I learned subsequent to my testimony of August 6, 1964, tha t another South Vietnamese bombardment took place on the night of 

August 3-4. At the time of that action, the Maddox and Turner Jo y

were at least 70 miles to the northeast. The North Vietnamese attack on Maddox and Turner J oy on the nigh t of August 4 occurred 

some 22 hours later.

I think it important, too, in dealing with this issue, to recall tha t 

the President had announced publicly on August 3 t hat our patrol 

would continue and consist of two destroyers. It is difficult to believe, in the face of that announcement, and its obvious purpose of 

asserting our right to freedom of the seas, tha t even the North Vietnamese could connect the patrol of the Maddox and Turner Joy

with a South Vietnamese action takin g place some 70 miles away.

WAS THERE A SECOND ATTACK ?

Now, thirdly, was there indeed a second attack?

I know of no claim that the attack on Maddox on August 2 did not 

occur. As for the second attack, the incident occurred on a very dark, 

moonless, overcast night. As would be expected under these conditions, 

some uncertainty existed, and to this day exists, about some of the 

precise details of the attack. But there should be no uncertainty about 

the fact tha t an attack took place. The evidence pertaining to the 

incident is reviewed in the following paragraphs.

On the evening of August 4, 1964, Task Group 72.1 consisting of 

U.S.S. Maddox and U.S.S. Turner Joy. with COM DESDIV 192 embarked in Maddox and acting as CTG 72.1, was proceeding on an 

easterly course in the Gulf of Tonkin at a speed of 20 knots. At about 

7:40 p.m., Tonkin Gulf time,1

 the task group commander, Capt. J. J. 

Herrick, USN, observed on the surface search rad ar at least five contacts, which he evaluated as probable torpedo boats, located about 36 

miles to the northeast of the two ships. At 7:46 p.m., Maddox and 

Turner Joy changed course to 130 and increased speed to 28 knots to 

avoid what the task group commander had evaluated as a trap.

Shortly after 9 p.m., both ships' radars held contacts approximately 

14 miles to the east. These contacts were on course 160. speed 30 knots. 

At tha t time the two U.S. ships were approximately 60 miles from the 

North Vietnamese coast.

At about 9 :39 p.m., both Maddox and Turner Joy opened fire on the 

approaching craft when it was evident from the ir maneuvers that they

1

 To convert local Tonkin Gulf time to e.d.t. subtr act 12 hours.
16

were pressing in for attack positions. At about this time, the boats were 

at a range of 6,000 yards from Maddox when the radar track ing indicated t hat the contact had turned away and begun to open in range. 

Torpedo noises were then heard by the Maddox's sonar. A report of 

the torpedo noise was immediately passed to the Turner Joy by intership radio and both ships took evasive action to avoid the torpedo.

REPORTS OF EYEW ITN ESSES

A torpedo wake was then sighted passing abeam Turner Joy from 

aft to forward, approximately 300 feet to port on the same bearing 

as tha t reported by Maddox. This sighting was made by at least four 

of Turner Joy's topside personnel: the forward gun director officer, 

Lt. (jg.) John J. Barry, USNR; the port lookout, Edwin R. Sentel, 

SX, US X; by a seaman who was in the forward gun director with the 

director officer, Larry O. Litton , SX, US X: and by a seaman who 

was operator of the after gun director, Roger X. Bergland, SX, USX.

At about 10:24 p.m., one target was taken under fire by Turner Joy.

Xumerous hits were observed on this target and it disappeared from all 

radars. The commanding officer and other Turner Joy personnel observed a thick column of black smoke from this target.

Later, 10:47 p.m., during the attack a searchlight was observed by 

all signal bridge and maneuvering bridge personnel including the 

commanding officer of U.S.S. Turner Joy. The beam of the searchlight 

did not touch the ship, but was seen to swing in an arc toward Turner

Joy and was immediately extinguished when aircraft from the combat 

air patrol orbiting above the ships approached the vicinity of the 

searchlight. (Walter L. Shishim, QMCS, U SX ; Richard B. Johnson, 

SMI, U SX ; Richard D. Xooks, QM 3, USX; Richard M. Bacino, SM2, 

US X; and Gary D. Carroll, SM3, USX, stationed on the Turner Joy s 

signal bridge all made written statements tha t they sighted the 

searchlight.)

The silhouette of an attacking boat was seen by at least four Turner

Joy personnel when the boat came between the flares dropped by an 

aircra ft and the ship. When these four men were asked to sketch what 

they had seen, they accurately sketched P-4-type boats. (Xone of the 

four had ever seen a picture of a P-4 boat before). (Donald V. Sh arkey, BM3, US X; Kenneth E. Garrison, SX, U SX : Delner Jones, GMG 

SX, USX, and Arthur B. Anderson, FT SX, USX, are the four personnel from the Turner Joy who sighted the boat.)

In addition to the above, a gunner's mate second class stationed 

aft of the signal bridge aboard U.S.S. Maddox saw the outline of a 

boat which was silhouetted bv the light of a burst from the 3-inch 

projectile fired at it. (Jose R. San Augustin GMG2, USX.)

The commanding officer of Attack Squadron 52 from the Ticonderoga (Comdr. G. IL Edmondson. USX) and his wingman (Lt. J . A. 

Burton), while flying at altitudes of between 700 and 1,500 feet in the 

vicinity of the two destroyers at the time of the torpedo attack both 

sighted gun flashes on the surface of the water as well as light a ntia ircra ft bursts at their approximate altitude. On one pass over the two 

destroyers, both pilots positively sighted a “snakey” high speed wake 

1 ^ miles ahead of the lead destroyer, U.S.S. Maddox.

Two U.S. Marine Corps personnel who were manning machineguns 

on U.S.S. Maddox saw lights pass up the port side of the ship, go out
17

ahead, and pass down the starboard side. Their written statement asserts their belief th at this was one or more small boats at high speed. 

(These were Matthew B. Allasre, SGT, USMC, and David A. Pro uty, 

L/CP L, USMC.)

IN TE LL IG EN CE REPORTS

Tn addition to the above, intelligence reports received from a highly 

classified and unimpeachable source reported that North Vietnam was 

making preparations to attack our destroyers with two Swatow boats 

and with one PT boat if the PT could be made ready in time^The same 

source reported, while the engagement was in progress on August 4, 

tha t the attack was underway. Immediately afte r the attack ended, the 

source reported tha t the North Vietnamese lost two ships in the 

engagement. No one within the Department of Defense has reviewed all of this 

information without arriv ing at the unqualified conclusion that a determined attack was made on the Maddox and Turner Joy in the Tonkin 

Gulf on the nigh t of August 4, 1964?}Vice Adm. Roy L. Johnson, 

USN, commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet at the time, stated in his 

review of the combined chronology and track charts submitted by the 

task group commander:

Commander, Seventh Fleet, is convinced beyond any doub t th at Maddox and Turne r Joy were subjected to an unprovoked surface torpedo attack on the night 

of 4 August 1964.

Adm. T. II. Moorer, then commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, concurred in that appraisal. In Washington, the Director of the Joi nt Staff, Lt. Gen. David A. 

Burchinal, USA F, analyzed the incoming information from message 

traffic, with the assistance of the Jo int Staff. He then gave his evaluation to the Secretary of Defense: “The actuality of the attack is 

confirmed.” In the face of this evidence, I can only conclude tha t many of 

the persistent questions as to whether or not an attack took place must 

have arisen from confusion between the August 4 attack and another incident which occurred on the 18th of September 1964; that is, 

about 45 days later. At tha t time, the U.S. destroyers Morton, and 

Edwards were patrolling, at night, in the Gulf of Tonkin, and initially 

reported themselves under attack. While the ensuing situation reports 

indicated the probability of hostile craft in the area of the patrol, 

it was decided at both the Washington and field command levels 

tha t no credible evidence of an attack existed. It should be noted that 

the intelligence source tha t confirmed the attacks of August 2 and 4 

provided no evidence of any enemy action on September 18. In view 

of our unresolved doubts, no retaliatory action was taken. Many 

individuals who were not aware of all of the facts about all three 

incidents, that is, August 2 and 4, and September 18, have made the 

mistaken assumption that descriptions of the September 18 incident 

were referring to the second Tonkin Gulf incident. Aware of the 

negative findings on September 18, they have mistakenly assumed tha t 

there is serious doubt as to whether the “second” Tonkin Gulf attack 

in fact took place.
18

REPORTS FROM CAPTU RED NO RTH VIE TNAM ESE NAVAL PERSON NE L

As a final point on this issue, U.S. naval forces in the 3 ^ years which 

have elapsed since the August >1964 incidents have captured several 

North Vietnamese naval personnel. These personnel were extensively 

interrogated. One of these, captured in July 1966, stated he had taken 

part in the August 2, 1964, attack on the Maddox, and his account of 

that attack coincided with our observations. He professed no knowledge of the August 4 attack and said that he believed th at PT boats 

were not involved in that attack. He stated that Swatows could have 

been used for that attack. His disclaimer of PT participation is contradicted by information received from a later captive. A North Vietnamese naval officer captured in July 1967 provided the name of the 

commander of a PT squadron. In intelligence reports received immediately after the August 4 attack, this commander and his squadron 

were identified by name and number as participants.

SU FF IC IE NT EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO SUPPOR T CON CLU SION

Now, finally, if there was a second attack, was there sufficient evidence available at the time of our response to support this conclusion?

Some of the details cited above, p articularly the statements of eyewitnesses, although gathered immediately afte r the attack, had not 

reached Washington at the time that the reprisal air strikes were 

ordered executed. Sufficient informationn was in the hands of te President, however, to establish beyond any doubt then or now that an 

attack had taken place. Allow me to repeat again that information:

An intelligence report of a highly classified and unimpeachable nature received shortly before the engagement, statin g t hat N orth Vietnamese naval forces intended to attack the Maddox and Turner Joy.

Reports from the ships th at the ir radars indicated they were being 

shadowed by high speed surface vessels.

Reports from the ships tha t they were being approached by the 

high speed vessels and an attack appeared imminent.

Reports from the ships that they were under attack.

A report from the ships tha t searchlight illumination had been 

utilized by the attacking craft and th at gunfire against the patrol had 

been observed.

A report tha t two torpedoes had passed close to the Turner Joy and 

tha t there had been positive visual sightings of what appeared to be 

cockpit lights of patrol c raft passing near the Maddox.

An intelligence report stating tha t North Vietnamese naval forces 

had reported th at they were involved in an engagement.

Reports from the *US. ships that they had sunk two and possibly 

three of the attacking craft.

An intelligence report stating that North Vietnamese naval forces 

had reported losing two ships in the engagement,

A report from the onscene task group commander th at he was certain th at the ambush had taken place, although precise details of the 

engagement were still not known.

A report from the commander in chief. Pacific, that he had no doubt 

that an attack had occurred.

All of this information was available prior to the time the Executive 

order was issued.
19

MON ST RO US IN S IN U A T IO N S

As a filial point, I must address the suggestion that, in some way, 

the Government of the United States induced the incident on August 

4 with the intent of providing an excuse to take the retaliatory action 

which we in fact took. I can only characterize such insinuations as 

monstrous.

The effective repulsion of the August 2 attack on the Maddox with 

relatively high cost to the small North Vietnamese Navy, coupled with 

our protest which clearly and unequivocally warned of the serious consequences of a recurrence, made us confident that another attack was 

unlikely. The published order of the President that the destroyers 

should continue to assert the right of the freedom of the seas in the 

Gulf of Tonkin, and setting forth the composition of the patrol, should 

have served to avoid any further misunderstanding. As the patrol resumed the ships were ordered to remain 11 miles from the coastline in 

lieu of the 8 miles ordered on the previous patrols, hardly indicative 

of an intent to induce another attack. As a matter of fact, on their own 

initiative the two ships approached the coastline no closer than 16 

miles during their patrol. But beyond that, 1 find it inconceivable that 

anyone even remotely familiar with our society and system of Government could suspect the existence of a conspiracy which would include almost, if not all, the entire chain of military command in the 

Pacific, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joi nt Chiefs, 

the Secretary of Defense, and his chief civilian assistants, the Secretary of State, and the President of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement, and 1 will be very happy to try to answer any questions.

The ( Jiairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I would like to have a few preliminary questions with regard to 

the situation under which this whole affair took place. I don't think 

they are very difficult to answer.

IN T E R N A L TR OU BL ES OF K IIA N H GOVER NM EN T

Mr. Secretary, is it true that the government of General Khanli 

which overthrew the Minh junta in Jan uar y 1964 was in serious trouble by the spring and early summer of 1964 ?

Secretary McNamara. I think there was considerable dissension 

among the members of the government, Mr. Chairman, and there was 

then and later a series of changes in the government as a result of that 

dissension.

The Chairman. Did you not say recently on “Meet the Press,” and 

I quote: “Three and a half years ago the South Vietnamese forces were 

on the verge of defeat. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces 

were on the verge of victor}’.”

Is that accurate ?

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, if I said that. I misestimated 

the date. What I was talking about—I think later in that same broadcast I specifically referred to it, was July 1965. I should have said two 

and a half years ago. That was the reference I was making.

The Chairman. That is a quote from just 2 weeks ago.

Secretary McNamara. It may be, Mr. Chairman. I would have to 

have the full transcript of what 1 said. I believe I mentally deducted
20

July 1965 from Jan uary 1968 and came to three and a-half and it 

should have been two and a-half. And I believe I also corrected that 

in the succeeding sentence, or later in the discussion. In any case, what 

I was talking about was Ju ly 1965, at the time the President made the 

decision to send the large increment of U.S. combat troops.

The Chairman. In July of 1964 General Kanh delivered a major 

address calling for carrying the war to the north. Did General Kanh 

press the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon for further U.S. involvements in 

the war in Vietnam, and particularly for a commitment to take the war 

into the north?

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I would have to check the 

record on that. I don’t believe he did.

The Chairman. Well, I think the record shows that in his speech, 

I don’t know what reference you have-----

Secretary McNamara. You asked did he press the U.S. Ambassador. 

I don’t believe the record will show he did press the U.S. Ambassador 

to take the war to the north.

EX TEN T O F U .S . PA RTIC IP A TIO N IN SV N OP ER AT IO NS AG AI NS T N O R TH IN 19 64

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, would you describe the organization, 

the extent of U.S. participation in South Vietnamese operations 

against the north during 1964?

Secretary McNamara. I can’t describe the exact organization although I will be happy to try to obtain the information for you.

The operations of the South Vietnamese against the North were 

carried out by South Vietnamese personnel, utilizing to some degree 

U.S. equipment. The boats, as I think I stated before th is committee 

in August 1964, were, I believe, wholly supplied by the United States. 

I was going to say, in p art ; I think they were wholly supplied by the 

United States.

The United States was informed of the operations to insure tha t they 

did not interfere with patrols of the kind that we are describing now.

I believe, also, some U.S. personnel may have trained, or participated 

in the training, of some of the South Vietnamese personnel partic ipating in the operations.

The operations, however, were under the command of the South 

Vietnamese and were carried out by the South Vietnamese. There were 

no U.S. personnel participa ting in it, to the best of my knowledge. 

AM O U N T OF U .S . T R A IN IN G AN D SU PPLIE S

The Chairman. Do you recall, what did America do beyond training 

and supplying the equipment, do you know? You should know.

Secretary McNamara. No. In the first place, I don't believe we carried on all the training, although I think there were some U.S. personnel participating in it.

In the second place, we did provide some of the equipment, but I 

don’t believe we provided all of it.

Thirdly, we were informed of the nature of the operations but we 

did not participate in them and we did not command them.

The Chairman. The information provided by the Department of 

Defense reveals that the U.S. Navy trained South Vietnamese for 

interdiction missions against North Vietnam beginning in June of
21

1964. These missions included the bombardments of North Vietnamese 

positions from both the sea and air: did they not ?

Secretary McNamara. I don’t believe there were any air bombardment missions. However, I would add, I don't believe the training started as your 

question implied, in June of 1964. I think it must have started earlier 

than that.

The Chairman. Well, it was at least by June of 1964 and possibly 

it did before that.

E X TE N T OF U .S . PA RTIC IP A TIO N IN T R A IN IN G M IS SIO N S

I don't believe, however, that this committee or the Congress was 

informed of these training missions for this purpose; were they?

Secretary McNamara. When you say training missions, they weren't 

training missions. They were U.S. personnel. I don't know whether 

Navy, or Army, or some other service personnel—who were training 

them.

The Chairman. The point I wish to make is at that time we had 

not declared war or even a substitute for a declaration against North 

Vietnam, had we ?

Secretary McNamara. No ; certainly not.

The Chairman. Yet we did participate in the missions which were 

for the specific purpose of attacking the north ?

Secretary McNamara. We did not participate in the mission.

The Chairman. No ; in the training.

Secretary McNamara. In the training of personnel for tha t purpose. I made very clear at the time, if I may emphasize, Mr. Chairman, tha t we supplied the equipment to some degree for most missions 

and the public debate bore reference to my statement on that subject.

The Chairman. Yes.

SI ZE OF U .S . M IL IT A R Y C O N TIN G EN T IN SV N IN 1 9 6 4

Can you give us the size of the military contingent in South Vietnam in the spring of 1964, approximately ?

Secretary McNamara. Total U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam in the spring of 1964, I would guess, was on the order of 12,000 

or 15,000.

Senator Lausciie. It must have been more than that because when 

President Kennedy lost his life it was 18,000, and he lost his life in 

1963.

Secretary McNamara. I believe it was 16,000 at the end of 1963. I 

think it dropped a little bit, but it was on the order of 16,000, Senator 

Lausche.

In any case, I will check and clear the record.

DI SC US SION OF EX TEN D IN G U .S . M IL IT A R Y ACT IO NS TO NORTH

The Chairman. According to an article written by Hansen Baldwin 

of the New York Times in July of 1964, the Pentagon at th at time was 

arguing in favor of extending the war into North Vietnam. Were 

there, in fact, recommendations by the U.S. m ilitary at any time from 

late 1963 until J uly of 1964 to extend the war into the n orth by bombing or any other means ?
22

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I would have to check the 

record on that.

When he says the Pentagon argued for extending the war to the 

North, I don’t know who the Pentagon is-----

The Chairman. Well, but-----

Secretary McNamara. May I just finish my answer ?

I know it wasn’t me.

The Chairman. Was it General Wheeler ?

Secretary McNamara. Whether there were any recommendations 

from the (Chiefs recommending extension of the war to the North during that period, I can’t recall. I will be very happy to check the record 

and put the proper answer in the record.

(The following answer was later supplie d:)

We have identified no such recommendation. A check of the records of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff is continuing.

The Chairman. I wonder if General Wheeler knows tha t at this 

time?

General Wheeler. I don’t believe so, Mr. Chairman. I think that 

the proper answer would be tha t there were certain intelligence activities [deleted] but to the best of my knowledge and belief during 

that period there was no thought of extending the war into the North 

in the sense of our participation in such actions, activities.

The Chairman. You can supply any change ?

General Wheeler. I will check for the record.

^"Contingency draft of southeast asia resolution

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, did you see the contingency d raft of 

what became the Southeast Asia resolution before it was ready ?

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I read in the newspaper a 

few weeks ago there had been such a contingency draft. I don’t believe 

I ever saw it. I called Mr. Bundy myself to ask him if he had any 

recollection tha t I ever saw it. He states he has no recollection tha t I 

did, and he believes I did not.

But I can’t testify absolutely tha t I didn’t. My memory is not 

clear on that.

The Chairman. Mr. Bundy told this committee that this draft was 

prepared some months before the Tonkin incidents in the hearing. You 

know tliat.

Secretary McNamara. I know that, but I don’t think he said I saw 

it.

The Chairman. No, I was asking you, you don’t think you saw it?

Secretary McNamara. I don’t believe I saw it, and he doesn’t believe 

I saw it.

The Chairman. Isn ’t it customary for the State Department to 

consult you on a matter of this kind ?

Secretary McNamara. Well, if it were a working paper, and apparently th at is what it was, no. It hadn’t advanced to a point of decision within the Government.

SEND IN G U N IT S TO SOUTH V IE TN A M AN D T H A IL A N D

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the most immediate result of the 

Tonkin incidents were the deployment of U.S. fighter bomber aircraft
23

into South Vietnam, into Thailand, and a movement of interceptors 

to South Vie tnam ; is that not so ?

Secretary McNamara. T would want to check the movement, Mr. 

Chairman. I don’t recall there were any movements after that. As you 

remember, we had the strike, the night of the 4th, and then T don't 

believe there were any other air strikes until February the following 

year, nor do I recall any movement of air units into Thailand or South 

Vietnam during the period.

May I check the record of tha t and then introduce the facts ?

(The following answer was later sup plie d:)

The reco rds of the Dep artm ent are being examined to determ ine which ai r 

uni ts were moved to South Vietnam or Thailand between the Tonkin Gulf incidents and Febru ary 1965.

The Chairman. I think for the record that the attack was on the 

morning of the 5th, wasn't it, following-----

Secretary McNamara. It was the 4th, sometime. The launch took 

place about. 10 p.m., the night of the 4th.

The Chairman. You mean Washington time?

Secretary McNamara. Washington time.

The Chairman. Well, I was jus t tryin g to translate it.

Secretary McNamara. Right.

The Chairman. Local time the attack took place at night and of the 

4th and we attacked approximately 10 or 12 hours later: is that correct, 

General ?

Secretary McNamara. That is correct.

General Wheeler. It. would be the morning of the 5th, Saigon time, 

Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. General, maybe you can answer the question I just 

asked. Maybe you are more familiar with military equipment. Ts it not 

true that fighter bombers were moved into Vietnam and Thailand 

immediately after this took place ?

General Wheeler. We moved some bombers in 1964, but I don’t have 

the exact dates, but you are speaking particularly about aircraft. I 

would have to-----

The Chairman. Figh ter bomber aircraft.

General Wheeler. I would have to check that and supply it fo r the 

record.

The Chairman. T wonder if you would answer this and supply it 

if you cannot now: Were these units alerted to impending movement 

prior to the Tonkin incidents?

General Wheeler. To the best of my knowledge, not, Mr. Chairman, 

but T will check that, also, and make sure.

The Chairman. Would you check whether or not you were considering sending these units to South Vietnam and Thailand prior to 

the Tonkin incidents?

General Wheeler. I will check that particu lar point.

(The following inform ation was later supplied:)

We have not identified any ai r unit which had been alerted for movement 

into South Vietnam or Thailand prior to the Tonkin Gulf incidents. A check of 

the records is continuing.
24

TIM ING OF MILITARY DEPLOYMENT

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, just to supply something for the 

record, I don’t want to involve this, but I think it helps the Secretary, 

but we have the Secretary’s testimony before the committee on A ugust 6, 1964, in which he said:

Certain military deployments to the are a are, therefore, now underway. These 

include (a) tra ns fer of a ttack c arrie r group from the Pacific coast to the western 

Pacific, (b) movement of interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft into South 

Vietnam, (c) movement of fighter bomber aircraft to Thailand, (d) tra nsfer of 

inte rceptor and fighter bomber squa drons from the United States to advance 

bases in the Pacific, (c) movement of an antisubmarin e force into the South 

China Sea, (/ ) the alertin g and read ying for movement of select Army and 

Marine forces.

In the meantime, U.S. destroyers with protectiv e ai r cover as needed, continu e their patro l in the intern ational waters of the Gulf of Tonkin.

The moves we have taken to reinforce our forces in the Pacific are in my 

judgment sufficient for the time being. Other reinforcing steps can be taken 

very rapidly if the situation requires.

This concludes my descriptions of the two delibera te and unprovoked North 

Vietnamese attacks on U.S. naval vessels on the high se as ; of the United States 

reprisal aga inst the offending boats, the ir bases and rela ted fa cilit ies; and of 

the precau tion ary deployment a nd ale rtin g steps we have take n to gua rd against 

any eve ntuality.

I just, assume the chairman got his information from that testimony.

Secretary McNamara. I will be very happy to determine when those 

movements were first initiated, when the units were put on alert, and 

whether it occurred before the Tonkin Gulf incidents. I don’t recall 

tha t information.

INT ENS IFIC ATION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, if there had not been a Tonkin incident would you have recommended to the President and Congress that 

the U nited States step up its military assistance to South Vietnam because of the security problem facing General Khank ?

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I think it is a speculative 

question. I would have recommended, I believe, that if the level of infiltration continued to grow as it did—and it grew very substantially 

in the latter part of 1964—tha t we provide additional assistance.

The Chairman. But to be more specific, was there any plan for such 

an intensification of the U.S. involvement ?

Secretary McNamara. No; not tha t I can recall.

The Chairman. Did it then include the bombing of North Vietnam ?

Secretary McNamara. Not that I know of, Mr. Chairman.

I don’t mean to say tha t contingencies and targets hadn’t been examined, because they had been, prio r to that time, but there was no 

plan for furthe r buildup tha t I can remember, and no plan for the 

bombing of the north.

REASON FOR INTELL IGEN CE-GATHERING VESSELS

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, why was it necessary to send intelligence-gathering vessels into the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964?

Secretary McNamara. For the same reason tha t it was necessary to 

do so in 196*2 and 1963, and in the early part of 1964. To obtain information on the environment of the gulf, the movement of North Viet-
25

namese naval forces in the gulf, and certain military installations on 

the shores of North Vietnam.

The Chairman. Did we wish this information, want to have this 

information on ra dar installations in order to be better able to attack 

North Vietnam by air from our aircraft carriers offshore ?

Secretary McNamara. 1 don't think that we wished to in 1964 for 

that reason any more than we wished it in 1963 or 1962, Mr. Chairman. 

I rather doubt tha t the people who were gathering the information 

had any basis for believing there would or would not be attacks on 

North Vietnam.

The Chairman. On August 6, 1964, in testifying for the Southeast Asia resolution, you described the patrols of the Maddox and 

Turner Jo y—the ships involved in the incidents on August 2 and 4— 

as “engaged in a routine patrol in international waters of the Gulf of 

Tonkin.”

Was the Maddox engaged in an electronic spy mission similar to 

the Pueblo?

Secretary McNamara. I think th at the equipment on the Pueblo was 

more sophisticated than tha t on the Maddox; at least I am told that 

by technical experts. The Maddox was engaged in the same kind of 

patrol that we carried on in the western Pacific 2 or 3 years prior to 

the time she was out there, and have carried on in many areas of the 

western Pacific since that time.

The Chairman. But was the purpose dissimilar to the Pueblo^ It 

was an electronic spy mission, wasn't it ?

Secretary McNamara. No; the purpose was not prim arily electronic, 

and, as I say, I haven’t compared, myself, item by item, the equipment 

on the Pueblo and the Maddo x: but I am told the Maddox had much 

less sophisticated equipment and less of it, and was less capable, therefore, of electronic surveillance. Electronic surveillance was one of her 

missions, but was not the only mission by any means, nor was it the 

primary mission.

PR IM A RY M IS SIO N

The Chairman. Wh at was the primary mission ?

Secretary McNamara. The primary mission was to observe North 

Vietnamese naval patrols and the junk fleets in tha t area. We were 

concerned at that time, particularly, about infiltration by sea. As a 

matter of fact, it was a short time after that—about 2 or 3 months, 1 

think—when the large U.S. sea patrol was established, known as 

Market Time operations.

Senator Mansfield. You mean North Vietnamese pa trol; not U.S. 

patrols.

Secretary McNamara. No; but the large U.S. patrol known as 

Market Time Operation was a few months after the Desoto patrol, because of our concern about infiltration by sea from the North to the 

South; and the Desoto patrol, in August, among other things, was collecting information tha t would lead to a consideration of the character 

of the infiltration from North to South. The Market Time patrols 

established by the United States after th at, of course, took place off the 

coast of South Vietnam but they were based upon the kind of information that we obtained from Desoto patrols.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, in the orders, I mean tha t we obtained from the Pentagon, the Maddox was authorized in its missions,
26

and 1 quote from the orders: “to stimulate Chicom-North Vietnamese 

electronic reaction.”

What does that language mean ?

Secretary McNamara. It means tha t they turn on certain kind of 

equipment on board the Maddox which, in turn, leads the Chicoms or 

the North Vietnamese to turn on the radars so th at we can measure 

the radar frequencies, that was clearly one of their objectives.

The Chairman. That is what I meant. That is what I meant by electronic spy mission.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I said specifically that electronic surveillance was part of this mission, but it was not the primary 

mission. If you read further into those orders, you will find it.

IN STRU CTIO N S TO T11E “ MA DDOX”

The Chairman. And the Maddox was given orders to penetrate the 

territorial waters of North Vietnam and stimulate their electronic 

networks, assuming their territorial waters was 12 miles.

Secretary McNamara. Absolutely not. The Maddox was specifically 

instructed to stay out of territorial waters and was instructed to go no 

closer than 8 miles to the coastal area.

The Chairman. I said assuming their territorial waters was 12 miles.

Secretary McNamara. But you said the Maddox was instructed to 

penetrate territo rial waters.

The Chairman. Assuming it was 12 miles.

Secretary McNamara. I want to just make perfectly clear the 

Maddox was not instructed to penetrate territorial waters assuming 

anything.

Senator Lausche. What is the fu rther language in that which gives 

the primary cause.

Secretary McNamara. Yes, I was just tryi ng to find the specific 

cable, and if I may have a moment I will find it and read from it 

here.

I am reading now from the cable to the commander of CTF 72, 

which was the task force that the Maddox was pa rt of, and this was 

sent on July 17, [deleted].

Par agraph 9 states “The primary purpose of this patrol is to determine, DRV,” meaning Democratic Republic of Vietnam, “coastal activity along the full extent of the patrol track,” that is the primary 

purpose and that was the charge given to the commander.

Now, parag raph 10:

Other specific intelligence requ irem ents are as follo ws: (a) location and 

identification of all rada r tra nsmi tters, and estimate of range cap abilities; (b) 

navigatio nal and hydro information along the routes traverse d and par ticula r 

navigatio nal ligh ts cha racteri stic s, land marks, buoys, curren ts and tida l information. river mouths and channel accessibility, (c) monitoring a junk force 

with density of surface traffic pattern, (d) sampling electronic environment 

rad ars and n avig ation aids, (e) photography of opportunities in support of above. 

In addition, includes photography as best detail track would perm it of all prominent landmarks and islands, particularly in vicinity of river and build-up areas, 

conduct coastal rada r scope photography by ship which is transm itting from 

Point A which is the end of th e mission.

12. Specific search location identification requ irem ents [deleted], to be conducted while th e Maddox is in the Gulf of Tonkin, [deleted].

Then it goes on to say additional intelligence guidance will be provided by the naval commander, Japan , and operational guidance will 

be provided by MACV, and so on.
27

So its mission was not primarily electrical surveillance but it also 

had that as one of its several items to be carried out, to be covered.

The Chairman. One of the ways to do this is to stimulate electronic 

reaction ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, by its own transmitting equipment.

The Chairman. This was tru e of the Pueblo, too, it is customary ?

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure of that. In 

the case of the Pueblo, I don’t believe that during the m ajority of the 

voyage it was to stimulate the transm itters. I think quite the reverse, 

it was to collect information on the transmitters assuming they had 

not been stimulated by the Pueblo.

TERRITORIAL WATERS QUESTION

The Chairman. Well, now, you make the point tha t they did not 

give orders to go into the territorial waters, but, and I said assuming 

it is 12. You are basing it on the assumption it was three. B ut I notice 

the order told them to stay off the 12-mile limit of the coast of 

China, which was next door, isn't that so ?

Secretary McNamara. I think so.

The Chairman. I mean, the orders were to go to 4 miles off the islands and 8 miles off the mainland of North Vietnam, but to stay 

beyond the 12-mile limit of China which was just beyond, where this 

attack was predicated, is that not correct ?

Secretary McNamara. I think th at is correct. And I assume that the 

reason— I haven’t checked this—but I assume the reason would be 

tha t China at tha t time claimed a 12-mile limit which North Vietnam at that time did not.

The Chairman mentioned to me that the closest approach to China 

is 15 miles; yes, here it is.

The Chairman. Yes. Fifteen miles but South Vietnam it was 4 miles 

off the island.

Secretary McNamara. And 8 miles off the coast.

SIMILAR MISSIONS SINC E 19 62

The C hairman. Did you state how many missions there had been of 

this kind since 1962 ?

Secretary McNamara. I believe this was the fourth . There was one 

in 1962, one in 1963. one in early 1964, and one in July 1964.

The Chairman. Similar to this one ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, I examined the tracks myself just to 

•check that exact point and they are almost identical.

The Chairman. And with similar equipment ?

Secretary McNamara. I am told thev had similar equipment.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, were there several officers and men 

of the U.S. Military Advisory Command in Vietnam aboard the 

Maddox.

Secretary McNamara. No. They were invited, but they didn’t accept 

the invitation.

The Chairman. Well, I thought our information indicated they were 

aboard.

Secretary McNamara. No, sir. The cables I have gone throu gh are 

quite clear on that. They were invited, but they didn’t believe tha t 

90-1 87— 68-------3
28

this was a p atrol connected with their activities and they saw no reason, therefore, to participate in it. They participated, I believe, on 

board the third patrol, and found tha t they got so little out of it 

they didn’t want to take the time to participate in a fourth, and, therefore, were not on board that patrol.

The Chairman. I f they had the invitation they were aware of it, 

though ?

Secretary McNamara. Oh, yes, indeed; they were aware of the 

patrol.

But they felt it had so little connection with their activities tha t 

they didn’t choose to participate in it.

operations of svn against nvn on specific nights

The Chairman. Could you give a brief description of the operations 

of the South Vietnamese against North Vietnam on the nights of the 

30th and 31st of July, 1964, and the nights of the 3d and 4th of August 

of 1964? What were they doing?

Secretary McNamara. I can give you—it will be a brief description 

because I don’t have all th e information on it. But on the night of the 

30th of J uly certain patrol boats of the South Vietnamese bombarded 

Hon Me and Hon Nieu, and on the night of the 3d of August certain 

patrol boats of South Vietnamese bombarded Rhon River in North 

Vietnam and Vinh Sonh r ada r in North Vietnam.

The Chairman. That is what was called Operation 34.

Secretary McNamara. It was called a 34A operation.

The Chairman. And they did bombard the coast on those 2 nights?

Secretary McNamara. They did.

The Chairman. During your testimony of August 6,1964, you state:

Our Navy was not aware of any South Vietnam actions, if there were any.

Do you thin k afte r reviewing the case tha t tha t is an accurate 

statement ?

Secretary McNamara. Well, if you go on in the same paragraph, 

Mr. Chairman, I think it is an accurate statement.

The Chairman. How is it accurate?

Secretary McNamara. Because you are talking about the commanders of these ships, and whether the ship commander knew enough about 

the South Vietnamese operation to place their ships in some way in 

support of those operations, and the fact is tha t the ship commanders 

didn’t know about the South Vietnamese operation as to target or 

time. They knew so little about it t hat one of them on the 31st of July, 

just as he was starting his patrol, sent a report of vessels that he 

observed on rada r, and I guess visually as well, which he identified 

as Soviet P6 vessels, when, in fact, they were vessels of the South 

Vietnamese 34A operations.

I simply mention this to indicate how little they knew about it.

Beyond that, one of my own staff members, called Captain H errick, 

who was the commander of the Maddox and Joy task force, I asked 

him specifically if he knew of the targets or dates or details of the 

operations, and he said he did not.
29

KNOWLEDGE OF TH E OPERATION

Senator Gore. Will the chairman yield there?

It seems to me it wasn’t so important a commander of a destroyer 

knew about it, tha t the command of the operation—the central question is whether the command of the operation knew about it. The 

Maddox was following detailed instructions as to where it was sailing. 

So it seems to me it is no t whether the captain of the Maddox knew 

about it. It was whether the Navy knew about it.

Secretary McNamara. Well, I stated at the time tha t the Government knew about it, and I specifically testified on August 3, before this 

committee, in informal session, and on August 6, in formal session, 

that our Government knew about it. But it is important tha t the 

commanders on the scene did not know about it because they had grea t 

latitude as to where their ships were to be at particular times. They 

were allowed to orbit at particular points and shift the time schedule 

of their position along a 200- or 300-mile coastal track within their 

own discretion, and even if a higher command may have known somethin g and tried to plan it could not have been carried out successfully 

if the local commanders were not informed of the details of the 

operations.

NAVY CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF OPERATION

The Chairman. I thin k to complete the record, I ought to read 

what was said at tha t time before this committee. And I quote:

Our Navy played absolutely no part in, was not associated with, was not 

aware of, any South Vietnamese action, if there were any. I want to make that 

very clear to you. The Maddox was operating in international waters, was carrying out a routine patrol of the type we carry out all over the world at all times. 

It was not informed of, was not aware of, had no knowledge of, and so fa r as I 

know today has no knowledge of any South Vietnamese actions in connection 

With the two islands, as Senator Morse referred to.

That is page 23 of the tra nscript of hearings.

Senator Mundt. Was this the Secretary ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

The Chairman. It was the Secretary’s statement at tha t time.

Senator Cooper. I have a question.

The Chairman. Yes.

Secretary McNamara. May I just-----

COMMANDERS KNOWLEDGE OF SOUT H VIETNAMESE ACTIONS

Senator Cooper. Were you stating as a fact, as you knew it at the 

time of your testimony tha t the commanders of the ships did not know 

that the South Vietnamese vessels had attacked the two islands ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes: exactly so.

Senator Cooper. Do you still say as a result of your investigation 

tha t your statement was correct ?

Secretary McNamara. That is correct, and the third sentence and 

the fourth sentence of the quotation read by the chairman makes tha t 

very clear. The Maddox was operating in international waters, was 

carrying out a routine patrol of the type we carry out all over the 

world at all times. I t was not informed of, was not aware of, had no 

evidence of, and so far as I know today has no knowledge of any 

possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the tw’o islands
30

that Senator Morse referred to. That was my belief then, it is my 

belief today. Since the testimony was given, I have had, as I said, one of the members of my staff talk to Captain Herrick personally, and he 

certifies tha t was true then.

Senator Morse. I want to make this comment on the Secretary’s comment. The general proposition laid down in the testimony, and I quote, was “Our Navy played absolutely no par t in it, was not asso­ ciated with it, was not aware of any South Vietnamese actions, if 

there were any.”

Well, the Maddox doesn’t speak for the Navy, in general.

Secre tary McNamara. No.

DOUBT AS TO LAC K OF NAV Y KNO WLEDG E OF OPERATION

Senator Morse. You go on to say the Maddox was operating in international waters but 1 am still in doubt even in your testimony this morning as to whether or not the Navy was oblivious to the South 

Vietnamese action.

Secretary McNamara. Senator Morse, I think there is an ambiquity 

in th at sentence. I am quite prepared to say that to you in one respect. I will comment on this in a moment, bu t I want to emphasize that the Navy played no p art in, and was not associated with these South Vietnamese actions. Now, maybe you would say, “Well, even tha t is too strong a state­ ment,” because later in my testimony that same day I stated we had supplied the boats. Maybe th at is a “pa rt in it,” but it is not “a p art in it” in the sense that it was of concern, and I think quite properly of concern to you at the time, and it is not a part of it in the sense that we were addressing. We d idn’t command the operation, we didn ’t associate the Desoto patrol with it, and the particular question at issqe at |lie time was did the Desoto patrol commanders know of it; 

they did not.

Senator Morse. I only want to say at the time I had information tha t was given to me tha t the Navy was aware of i t and tha t there was a maintenance of radio communication with Saigon on the part of our Navy during the time of the attack, and that is what I brought out at the time, and I was seeking to find out whether or not th at was true 

or false.

Secretary McNamara. And I stated at the time tha t we knew of the 

operation, we knew of the fact tha t operations of th at kind were car­ ried on. Periodically, future programs for such operations were trans­ mitted to higher headquarters above Saigon, including the Pentagon. Beyond that the Navy had worked out an arrangement—and I am not sure I mentioned this a t the time, although I think I may have— but it is a fact tha t the Navy had worked out an arrangement be­ tween the separate commands in the Pacific, the Saigon command on the one hand, and the 7th Fleet Command on the other, to insure that these operations stayed out of each other’s areas, and the command­ ers of the ships on patrol were specifically instructed to stay away from certain geographic areas in order to avoid interference or asso­ ciation with the 34A operations of the South Vietnamese.

The Chairman. Well, on th at point, there is one cable which shows 

the following, and T quote from a cable to the Mad dox :
31

“The above patrol will (a) clearly demonstrate our determination 

to continue these operations, (b) possibly draw NVM’ —that is North 

Vietnamese navy—“PGMS (patrol boats) to northw ard away from 

the area of 34A operations, (c) eliminate De Soto patrol interference 

with 34A operations.”

It is unusual that, having received that cable, that the Maddox did 

not know what 34A was.

Secretary McNamara. The Maddox did know what 34A was, no 

question about that, But Maddox was not associated with 34A, was not 

playing a part of it, was not planning to draw’ forces away from it.

Senator Morse. I thought you said they did not know anything 

about it. . .

Secretarv McNamara. Now wait a minute, I did not say they did

not know anything about it.

Senator Morse. You said “were not aware of.” f

/ r • >4h, r1rore«9»

EXTENT OF KNOW,’LEDGE OF DETAILS OF ACTION , - * •

Secretary McNamara. They were not aware of the details is what 

I said, of the attacks, as to location, or as to time, and unless one is 

aware of that, you cannot properly plan a diversionary effort.

Now, since we are on th at subject, may I mention some other points 

tha t bear on it, I have already mentioned that they knew so little 

about it that they identified certain of the 34A ships as Soviet vessels. 

They very much wanted to avoid interference with it, and CINCPAC 

fleet advised MAC /V that they would make every effort to give him 

36 hours’ notice of changes in the time schedule of the patrol at certain points, in order to allow’ MA C/V to change the suggestion that he 

might make regarding location of 34A attacks. MAC /V came back 

and said that they had worked out w ith the South Vietnamese adjustments to assure th at 34A operations would prevent interference with 

the patrols.

Senator Morse. Could I read one-----

Secretarv McNamara. May I just continue ?

Senator Morse. I tho ught you were through. I am sorry.

TWO OPERAT IONS SEPARATE

Secretary McNamara. I am simply trying to develop the point that 

every possible effort was made to keep these two operations separate.

In the message on the 1st of August, the commander of the task 

force, which included the Maddox, stated that he thought tha t in view 

of the hostile intent of the North Vietnamese they should consider 

stopping the patrol, and the 7th Fleet stated, “You are authorized to 

deviate from itinearv” any time that the risk appeal’s too great.

(Subsequently the chairman inserted in this record the full text of 

the cable cited by Secretary McNamara, as follows: “1. Ref Alfa 

Bravo and Charlie noted. When considered prudent, resume itinerary 

IAW ref Delta. You are authorized deviate from itinerary at any 

time you consider unacceptable risk to exist. Keep Alcon advised.”)

Again later the same day on the 2d the commander of the 7th Fleet 

directed the Maddox to retire from the area to avoid hostile fire.

Senator Lausciie. What date was this?
32

Secretary McNamara. This was on the second.

On the second they also put in restrictions on hot p ursuit tha t were 

much more severe than we normally apply in situations like this. The 

U.S. vessels were not allowed to carry on hot purs uit of enemy vessels 

closer than 11 miles from shore and the airc raft were not allowed to 

earn* on hot purs uit closer tha n 3 miles from shore.

Again on the second, MAC/V told the commander of the 7th Flee t 

to keep the De Soto patrol clear of a designated area. Late r, on the 

third, MAC/V sent another request that the De Soto on patrol be 

moved even farther north to stay farther away from the area the South 

Vietnamese were planning to operate in.

Also on the third, later in the same day, the commander of the 

7th Fleet reported his intention to terminate the patrol on the evening 

of August 4 in order to move it away from the area and avoid any possibility of conflict with 34A.

I mention this simply to tell you that the higher commands were 

knowledgeable about the 34A and De Soto and took every possible 

action to separate the two.

BASIS OF STAFF STUDY DISCUSSED

Senator Lausche. It is regrettable tha t our staff study contains none 

of these facts which negative all tha t is in our secret report.

The Chairman. Well, I will say-----

Senator Lausche. It is a tragedy.

The Chairman. I will say to the Senator we requested all relevant 

documents, and Mr. Nitze-----

Senator L ausche. But i t is thoroughly apparent t ha t none of this 

material is relevant to any of the papers I have before me. All of the 

paper is directed to show that there was falsehood presented.

The Chairman. The paper contains all of the information supplied 

to the committee, and we could not put in what they did not supply, 

and there is no selection as far as the documents supplied, and I had 

a meeting with Mr. Nitze-----

Senator Lausche. Well, the paper which I have before me has nothing justifyin g the action that was taken. All tha t I have in my p aper 

is material showing t hat the action should not have been taken.

The Chairman. I wish to make it clear, I had a meeting with Secretary Nitze and Senator Russell at Secretary Nitze’s request, and we 

discussed this matter^and Senator Russell advised Secretary Nitze that 

he thought tha t the Department of Defense should make available to 

this committee—to this committee, which met jointly with the Armed 

Services Committee when this matter was heard in 1964—and he told 

Mr. Nitze he should make available relevant documents to these incidents, and it was my understand ing he would make those available 

with one sole exception which I have already described to the committee. I f those documents are not in here, it is because the Department 

of Defense did not supply them to us upon request of all relevant documents. Not being aware of them, we could not ask for them specifically, 

but we have asked for other documents specifically, bu t not these because we did not know about them.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, may I simply say th at four of 

the facts tha t I just stated to you were supplied to the committee. 

Others may have been. But I can check from my list in front of me
33

that four of the statements I made, the committee, was aware of. 

Whether they are in your report, I do not know. I do not have access 

to the report.

Senator Lausche. W ill the chairman point out a single statement 

in this report to th e committee th at shows that there is in it anything 

justifying the action that our U.S. Government took? Every statement 

in this secret report tends to prove th at we should not have done what 

we did, and I cannot understand how we did it.

Senator Gore. I respectfully submit tha t is not an accurate statement.

Senator Lausche. It is pretty substantial.

Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I do not thin k this discussion is seemly. I think we ought to proceed in a normal manner. You ought to wait 

until your tu rn.

Senator Lausche. If he will quit?

 I will get my turn.

Senator Clark. He is your chairman. You owe him some courtesy 

and you are not giving it to him.

CABIJS FRO M “ MA DD Ox" TO TH E FLE ET C OMMAN DER

The Chairman. I will go on with the record. On the 3d of August 

some 15 hours before the second incident the operational commander 

of the Maddox and the Turner Joy, who was aboard the Maddox, sent 

the following cable to the commander of the 7th F lee t: ‘ (a) Evaluation 

of info from various sources indicates th at the DEV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) considers patrol directly involved with 34-A operations. DRV considers U.S. ships present as enemies because of these 

operations and have already indicated readiness to treat us in tha t 

category, (b) DRV are very sensitive about H on Me. Believes this is 

PT operating base and the cove there presently contains numerous 

patrol and PT cra ft which have been repostioned from northerly 

bases.”

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on this specific cable?

The Chairman. Yes.

Secretary McNamara. Two points: Fir st, we can find no basis for 

the commander making this statement, tha t the DRV considered the 

De Soto patrol directly involved in 34-A operations.

Second, Herrick himself now states he can recall no basis for coming 

to that conclusion.

Third, the PT boat officer tha t we captured and interrogated in 

Jul y 1966 told his interrogators th at it was clear in his mind that the 

De Soto patrol was separate from 34-A operations.

The Chairman. Well, you are not saying this cable was not sent.

Secretary McNamara. I simply stand on what I said, Mr. Chairman. 

Of course the cable was sent.

The Chairman. You are not saying it was not sent.

Secretary McNamara. But I am saying it is a complete distortion 

of the fact to leave the record indicating tha t the commander of the 

Maddox task force had any basis whatsoever for believing tha t North 

Vietnam confused 31—A and De Soto. He did not have the basis. He 

now says he did not have the basis, and a North Vietnamese captured 

since that time states that North Vietnam distinguished between the 

two operations.
34

The Chairman. Well, at the time, all I am saying—I am not going 

into his mind, this is what he is saying.

Secretary McNamara. I am perfectly happy to have it on the record 

along with my refutation.

The Chairman. That is all right.

Senator Williams, did you want to say something at this point?

COULD “ MADDOX” HAV E BEEN OPERA TIN G 4 MILE S OFF COAST?

Senator Williams. The question in my mind, Mr. Secretary, is that 

you say the Maddox was operating with substantial freedom in this 

area with no knowledge of the operation of the plans of the South 

Vietnamese. Would it not have been conceivable or possible tha t it 

could have been operating 4 miles off the coast of one of these islands 

during the attack?

Secretary McNamara. No.

Senator Williams. What would have prevented it?

Secretary McNamara. No, because as the cables submitted to the 

committee showed, the commander of the 7th Fleet and the U.S. commander in Vietnam had an arrangement under which the position of 

the Maddox on its patrol was to be submitted to Vietnam so tha t the 

South Vietnamese could plan their operations to stay away from the 

patrol.

Secondly, the commander of Vietnam had said to the commander of 

the 7th Fleet, “In addition to knowing where you are, we would like 

you stay away from certain pa rticular places,” and he, on two occasions 

during the period of patrol, gave to tne commander of the 7th Fleet, 

who in turn passed it on to the commander of the Maddox, specific 

instructions to stay out of certain areas.

I recall one of the areas was an area set by a line between 17 degrees 

and about 17 degrees, 50 minutes north and a line runn ing north-south 

into which area the patrol was not to penetrate, and late r tha t restricted area was substantially expanded to everything south of 19 

degrees, 10 minutes.

Senator Williams. Tha t is all.

FU LB RIGH T LETTER TO NAVY SECRETARY IG NA TIUS

The Chairman. I think we should put in the record the fact that I 

sent a letter on Janu ary 12 to Hon. Paul R. Ignatius requesting one of 

the cables relating to this question. I say this was with regard to the 

Senator from Ohio’s observations. I will ask the reporter to put it 

in the record, this is Janu ary 12. I might read it. It is very difficult 

to translate it except by those familiar with the symbols that are used 

by the Nav y:

In the message sent by CTU72.1.2 to AIG-181 dated [deleted] the following 

sentence is included: “RCVD info indicating attack by PGM/P-4 imminent. My 

position 19-10.7 N 107-003 proceeding southeast at best speed.”

The reply to tha t—I will put the whole letter in—Mr. Ignatius 

replied that:

With respect to your lette r to me of January 12, it is my understanding that 

the points you raised were discussed at length in a meeting with Secretary 

Nitze, Senator Russell, and yourself. There is nothing further I can add to 

these discussions.
35

In other words, it was not supplied to the committee although it 

was requested.

(The letters referred to follow:) J anuary 12,1968.

Hon. Paul R. Ignatius,

Secretary of the Navy,

Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary: As you are well aware, over the past few months the 

the Department of Defense has been providing the Committee with information 

and materials on the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin. One of the cables you 

provided on November 24 has given rise to a particular question. In the message sent by CTU 72.1.2 to AIG 181 dated [deleted] the following 

sentence is included: “RCVD INFO indicating attack by PGM/P-4 imminent. My position 19- 

10.7N 107-003 proceeding Southeast at best speed.” The staff of the Committee is unable to determine from the text whether the information in question was received from shipboard radar as the chronology 

of the Turner Joy would indicate or through special intelligence means such 

as interception of North Vietnam messages. Would you please provide me the information necessary to clear up this 

point. If the information comes from a communication intercept, I would appreciate having the text of that intercept as well as any other intelligence interceptions relating to the second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. Fulbright, Chairman.

The Secretary of the Navy, 

Washington, D.C., January 16,1968.

Hon. J. W. Fulbright,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman : With respect to your letter to me of Ja nua ry 12, it is my 

understanding tha t the points you raised were discussed at length at a meeting with Secretary Nitze, Senator Russell and yourself. There is nothing further I 

can add to those discussions.

Sincerely, Paul R. I gnatius.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I am confused on th at. The 

message that you read from has a date code of [deleted]. My inform ation is that it has been supplied to the committee. Am I in error on 

that ?

The Chairman. Mr. Bader, has it been supplied ?

Mr. Bader. Senator, we have the message.

Senator Mansfield. We have?

Mr. Bader. The letter reads in part as follows:

The staff of the committee is unable to determine from the text whether the information in question was received from shipboard rad ar as the 

chronology of the Turner Joy would indicate or through special intelligence 

means such as an interception of North Vietnam messages.

Would you please provide me the information necessary to clear up this point?

This was the crux of the letter. We were unable to determine the 

source of the information referred to in the cable. Therefore, we had 

no way of evaluating it.

STAFF CLEA RANC E FOR CERTAIN INTE LL IG EN CE IN FO RM AT IO N

Secretary McNamara. We have some problems, because the staff has 

not been cleared for certain intelligence and we are under specific 

written instructions from the President, as are all executive dep artments, not to furnish such intelligence to uncleared personnel.
36

Senator Lausche. I do not understand that. The members of our 

staff are not cleared ?

Secretary McNamara. Certain members of congressional staffs have 

requested clearance, others have not, and we are under instructions from 

the President in writing not to submit intelligence to individuals that 

have not been cleared other than to Members of Congress.

Senator Lausche. May I ask the chairman, are all the members of our 

staff cleared?

The Chairman. All of those who have worked on this matte r, but he 

is talking of a special classification of intelligence communications.

Secretary McNamara. I do not believe any member of the staff has 

been cleared for certain kinds of intelligence relating to this incident.

Senator Lausche. Of the Foreign Relations staff ?

Secretary McNamara. Tha t is correct, on specific items of intelligence.

The Chairman. I might say for the information of the committee, 

Mr. Bader was cleared at one time for such intelligence information. He 

has not been cleared subsequent to that, and I assume—you say they do 

not carry th eir clearance?

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I do not know the rules of 

clearance. All I know is that because of receiving these written instructions from the President, I made a personal effort to find out who had 

been cleared and who had not been cleared, and there was no member 

of this staff cleared on the registries of the FB I, the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Defense Intelligence Agency—cleared for this 

kind of intelligence.

Senator Gore. Air. Chairman, could we know what particu lar classification tha t is? I had not h ard of this particular super classification.

The Chairman. The staff. Air. Alarcy, and Air. H olt are cleared for 

top secret information. This is something I never heard of before 

either. It is something special with re gard to intelligence information. 

However, Mr. Bader was cleared for that.

Secretary McNamara. If the staff would wish to request clearance, 

I am sure the Government would do it.

Air. AIarcy. All of the members who are here submitted renewal 

requests for top secret clearance recently and, so far as I know, all of 

those requests have been granted.

Secretary McNamara. But tha t is not the issue. Clearance is above 

top secret for the particular inform ation involved in this situation.

Senator Case. Air. Chairman, may I clear this up in my own mind?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Case. On this particu lar request for information, it was 

denied on the ground of lack of clearance.

Secretary AIcNamara. Yes.

Senator Case. I see. Tha t was made c lear; there was no question.

Secretary AIcNamara. I do not know th at that was made clear, but 

that was the reason.

Senator Case. I think it is important to know whether the committee was told tha t information was not being given it and for w’hat 

reason.

The Chairman. I told the committee th at Air. Nitze showed me one 

message-----
37

(Subseq uentl y the chair ma n inserte d in the rec ord the follow ing 

pa ra gra ph fro m the staff stu dy da ted Ja nuar y 17, 1968:)

In late December Under Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze asked to see Senator 

Fulbright. At that meeting Mr. Nitze presented for Senator Fulbright’s eyes only 

a cable from special intelligence which he said was “conclusive” evidence tha t 

the Maddox and Turner Joy had been attacked. The staff has not seen this information and has no way of judging whether this particular piece of information is the conclusive piece of evidence that will demonstrate without doubt tha t 

the Maddox and Turner Joy were actually attacked.

Se na tor Case. Is t ha t th e one you a re ta lk in g about ?

The Chairm an. A t th is pa rtic ul ar mo ment I th in k th at is the one 

we are tal ki ng about. T here may be oth ers.

Se na tor Case. Th is is no t a question where we were no t giv en inform ation an d we were not told t h at we were no t being giv en it.

Th e Chairm an. I would like to go thro ug h these. I wa nt t o try to 

make the rec ord and then let the mem bers eng age t he ir own time. 

WHY DID “ MADDOX” NOT BREAK OFF PATROL?

Mr. Se cretary, w hy was the Mad do x ordere d to g o with in wh at the 

Nor th V ietn amese believed to be t hei r t er rito rial w ate rs an d w hy, once 

the Mad do x ha d received inform ation th at the Nor th Vietnamese 

were in a n up ro ar about the ac tiv ities of the Maddox, d id the sh ip not 

bre ak off i ts patro l ?

Se cre tar y McNamara. Mr. Ch airm an , as I expla ine d earlier, the 

North Vie tnamese ha d not claimed wa ter s bey ond 3 miles, so I do no t 

th in k the questio n is pe rtinent.

TERRITORIAL LIMI T DISCUSSED IN MAY 19 66 HEARING

Se na tor Morse. Could I pu t in the rec ord at th at po int, because I 

am con fused about this—I take you back to page 24 of th e May 24, 

1966, exe cutive hearings. Th e ch air man was exam ining Mr. Jo hn 

Mc Naugliton an d on the top o f page 24 he first quo ted fro m S ecret ary 

McN am ara’s testim ony of Aug us t 6,1 964:

As part of that, as I reported earlier to you this week, we understand the 

South Vietnamese Sea force carried out patrol action around these islands and 

actually shelled the points they felt were associated with this infiltration. Our 

ships had absolutely no knowledge of it, were not connected with it, and in no 

sense of the word can be considered to have backstopped the effort

Tha t is the qu ote fro m Se creta ry McNamara . No w to quote th e cha irma n on Ma y 24,1966:

First, I want to ask you: had your ships within days before the incident 

gone within territoria l limits recognized by North Vietnam?

Mr. McNaughton. Within the 12-mile limit, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. That is the terr itor ial limit.

Mr. McNaughton. I think tha t it is. If th at is the case, the answer is “Yes”.

The Chairman. That had been the limit.

Senator Pell. May I interject for a moment. Is 12 miles the territorial limit 

that we recognize?

Mr. McNaughton. No, sir, it is the one—the chairman, I understood the 

chairman to say territoria l limits recognized by North Vietnam.

Mr. U. Alexis J ohnson. Claimed by North Vietnam.

The Chairman. That is right. Many countries have different ones.

Senator McCarthy. Texas claims the 12-mile limit.

The Chairman. They vary, but they claimed 12 miles. But our ships had gone 

into it.

Mr. McNaughton. Yes, sir ; tha t is correct
38

I still think it is a little vague, but we certainly—and in those he arings—asked the Defense Department if they were within the 12-mile 

limit.

You now say they did not claim the 12-mile limit, and we were 

advised they did.

Secretary McNamara. Senator, if I understood, the testimony you 

read from were the hearings of May 24, 1966.

Senator Morse. That is right.

Secretary McNamara. I do not believe during the hearings of 1964 

any of us stated that North Vietnam claimed a 12-mile limit. I believe 

further tha t it is rath er ambiguous in the testimony you read as to 

whether it was Mr. McNaughton or the chairman who was stating 

North Vietnam claimed the 12-mile limit: but to the extent Mr. McNaughton eithe r stated or acquiesced in the chairman’s statement 

of it, he was wrong.

IDENTITY OF CLEARANCE STATUS

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, would you please clear up the exact 

identity of this clearance status tha t is something superior to top 

secret and whether or not the President’s letter applied only to this 

particular operation? I would like to be informed. I never heard of 

this kind. I thought top secret was top secret.

The Chairman. I am not sure that T can do it justice, I never heard 

of this clearance before. But at the meeting I attended, which is referred to, and is referred to in the staff report, with Mr. Nitze, he 

said that this particular message was beyond top secret, and it has to 

do with intelligence communications, and that was the reason he could 

not give me tha t particular communication. He allowed me to look 

at it. It was a very short message: T think it was only about a paragraph, and I read it very rapidly. He said this was beyond top secret, 

and only a few people are allowed to see it. I was given to understand 

it relates to what is called an intercept, and it is my information, well, 

my memory, that he stated this was the conclusive evidence upon which 

the Pentagon relied to prove beyond all doubt that there was an attack 

upon our ships oil the 4th of August.

Senator Gore. Excuse me, what is the classification, what is the 

name of it?

Senator Sparkman. “Eyes only.”

Senator Mansfield. Does this have to do with codebreaking or 

things of that sort ?

Senator Gore. No ; that is not it.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, may I try to answer it?

The Chairman. The Secretary can do better than I can.

Senator Mansfield. Or General Wheeler seems to want to say 

something.

The Chairman. Or General Wheeler.

Types of Clearances

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, let me comment on this first. 

Senator Gore asked, “Does this instruction from the Presiilent apply 

only to this incident?” The answer is “No.” All of the executive departments, because of recent security violations in this country, have
39

been instructed to tighten up on security, with their own personnel and 

with all other personnel. All of the executive departments have been 

instructed to observe strictly the appropriate clearance procedures. 

They are many. There are a host of different clearances. I would guess 

I have perhaps 25. There are certain clearances to which only a handful of people in the Government are exposed. There are others with 

broader coverage, and overlapping coverage, and it is not really a 

question of degree of clearance. It is a question of need to know, and 

need to know clearances apply to certain forms of data.

Now, there is a top secret clearance tha t covers certain kinds of 

information, and is a rather broad clearance and is related to a level 

of clearances s tarting for official use only, rising through confidential 

and secret and top secret and generally speaking that is a pyram idal 

clearance. There is another clearance, Q clearance, that relates to certain categories of information.

There is another clearance which is the special intelligence clearance we are talking about, t hat relates to intercept information, and 

it is this latter clearance in particular tha t is at issue here, and the 

staff members of this committee have not been cleared for that kind 

of information. So far as I know they have not requested clearance. If 

they do request clearance, we will be happy to consider it.

The Presiden t instructed me specifically to make information available to members of the committee—Members of the Congress, whether 

they are cleared or not. I have the information here with me this 

morning and I will be happy to go over it with you, but I will have to 

ask individuals in the room, staff members and others, who are not 

cleared to leave the room when I do it.

Senator Gore. Because it deals with intercepts.

Secretary McNamara. It deals with intercepts.

Senator Gore. Ambassador Goldberg discussed the intercepts at the 

U.N. on television.

Secretary McNamara. But the problem here involves an intercept 

with the particular traffic involved. Our intelligence analysts have gone 

over this and have stated the area is a danger to us in certain kinds of 

intercept material and disclosure of it. |"I)eleted.] We are under instructions to deny it other than to Members of Congress and others 

properly cleared.

Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, the fact we have publicly stated that 

intercept information confirmed the location outside North Korean 

territorial waters of the Pueblo* which has strengthened our case to 

this effect, has this not thrown into the public domain quite a portion 

of the fact tha t we have access to this kind of intelligence?

Secretary McNamara. The intelligence analysts believe not. Well,

I do not want to get into a furthe r discussion until the room is cleared 

of those not authorized to handle it. We would run the risk of compromising intelligence sources if disclosed.

NORTH VIETNAM TERRITORIAL LIMI T CLAIM

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one very brief 

question. Going back to this 12-mile limit, I believe you said in your 

paper, did you not, tha t sometime following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, North Vietnam did claim throu gh a radio dispatch a 12-mile 

limit ?
40

Secretary McNamara. They did, Senator Sparkman.

Senator Sparkman. But tha t was the first time they had stated it.

Secretary McNamara. That is correct.

Senator Sparkman. I think tha t might explain the difference between 1964 and 1966.

Secretary McNamara. It might well.

W HY DID “ MAD DOx” N OT BR EAK OFF PATR OL?

The Chairman. I forgot that. Did you reply to why the Maddox

did not break off the patrol when they believed they had stimulated— 

according to this cable, they said that the North Vietnamese regarded 

them as hostile and an enemy and tha t they were very sensitive about 

Hon Me. Why did they not break off at th at point ?

Secretary McNamara. I am not certain I know which particular 

message you are referring to.

The Chairman. The one I read.

Secretary McNamara. Yes. Can you give me the time date group on 

it? I think I have it here, and it is [deleted] and in that particular 

message he was speculating on North Vietnam’s interpretation of his 

operations. He did not at tha t point consider the risks sufficiently high 

to break off the patrol.

You will recall tha t later the following day he did state that he 

believed it m ight be advisable to break off the patrol, but he had not 

reached th at point of judgment then.

The Chairman. Well, that was his judgment. Why did his superiors 

not order him to break it off in view of th at cable if they did not wish 

to provoke an incident ?

Secretary McNamara. Because we were on the high seas and operating legally and entirely within our rights. The President stated publicly that we would continue to carry out the patrol in international 

waters in a legal fashion.

The Chairman. Here, this is the—have you identified that now ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

The Chairman. I read from a cable from the operational commander of the two ships sent some 15 hours before the second inci den t:

(a) Evaluation of info from various sources indicates DRV considers patrol 

directly involved with 34A ops. DRV considers U.S. ships present as enemies because of these ops and have already indicated their readiness to treat us in that 

category. Cb) DRV very sensitive about Hon Me, believe this is PT operating 

base, and the cove there presently contains numerous patrol a nd PT craft which 

have been repositioned from northerly liases, (c) Defense against PT"s very 

difficult when in close proximity to Hon Me in th at they can hide behind it until 

the opportune moment and start their run leaving very little time for tracking 

and spotting and allowing no international water working space for aircraft 

(d) Under these conditions 15 minutes reaction time for obtaining air cover is 

unacceptable. Cover must be overhead and controlled by DD’s a t all times.

It seems to me it is very clear they thou ght they were extremely 

exposed and in a dangerous position and were requesting authority 

to break off.

Secretary McNamara. No, I beg your pardon, Mr. Chairman, they 

Specifically did not request auth ority to break off, and, had they 

wanted to break off, they would have requested it. Those were their 

orders, and later in the sequence of messages you will find th at they 

did not suggest breaking off.
41

The Chairman. Maybe I overstated it. At least they did not even 

want a 15-minute delay in airc raft. They wanted the airc raft right 

over them.

Secretary McNamara. That is clear.

The Chairman. They thought they were pretty exposed.

Secretary McNamara. Oh, yes; I do not dispute that.

WERE WE IN TERRITORIAL WATERS?

Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, are you tryi ng to prove-----

Senator Mundt. W hat is the date of that?

Secretary McNamara. August 3.

The Chairman. It is shortly before the attack.

Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, are you trying to prove we were 

in territorial waters ?

The Chairman. I am trying to get the tru th of what took place, 

that is all, Senator.

Senator Lausche. Well, I would be able to follow you better if I 

can learn-----

The Chairman. What this means will have to come later. I cannot 

tell what the answers are. All I am trying to do is develop the truth.

Senator Lausche. Let me finish my question.

Are we trying to prove tha t because we were not in international 

waters but in territo rial waters that North Vietnam had the right 

to shoot at us ?

The Chairman. I am not a witness, Senator. I do not propose to 

answer those questions. I am trying to develop a case of what happened. 

WARNIN G SHOTS FIRED BY “ MADDOX”

Mr. Secretary, as to the attack of August 2, 1964, your testimony 

states that the Maddox first fired “three warning shots before taking 

the North Vietnamese torpedo boats under fire.”

Is there such a thin g as a warning shot between naval combatants?

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I do not know. I would be 

happy to check with the Navy and answer the question for the record.

(The following was subsequently supplied:)

There is a difference of opinion as to the use of wa rning shots between combatants. Obviously, a commanding officer would only have recourse to such shots 

und er very special and compelling circumstances.

The Chairman. Well, a former admiral communicated volunta rily 

to this committee, Adm. Arnold True, said he was a destroyer commander during quite a number of years. He said tha t this is not a recognized procedure between naval combatants.

General, do you know anything about this ?

General Wheeler. I am not a naval officer, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I understand.

General W heeler. However, I would submit this, tha t we were not 

at war with North Vietnam, and I would think tha t rather than the 

commander opening fire directly on approaching vessels in daylight 

tha t, as a precautionary measure, he might very well have fired warning shots rathe r than firing directly at them.

The Chairman. I may add th at a gunnery officer aboard the Maddox

when asked about the so-called warning shots, was quoted as saying,
42

and I quote, “Oh, no. We. were definitely aiming ri ght at them because 

the speed factor was there. We did not want to waste much time in 

spotting our shots.”

Then the logs of the Maddox reveal that the Maddox simply opened 

fire on the patrol craft. Tha t is what the log reports.

Secretary McNamara. Did we furnish you the testimony from the 

gunnery officer, Mr. Chairman ?

The Chairman. Where did it come from, Mr. Bader ?

Mr. B ader. Mr. Secretary, that quotation is not from material provided by the Defense Department.

Secretary McNamara. I s tha t in the staff study? I would like to 

have the name of the gunnery officer in order to check the testimony. 

I am not familiar with it. I never heard it or saw it. I would like to 

have it and I will check it. May I have it, Mr. Chairm an ?

The Chairman. I do not have the name.

Senator Lausche. I do not have the name.

Mr. Bader. I have it right here.

Senator Lausche. Is this one of the x’s in the addendum ?

Mr. Bader. I t is a newspaper quotation from a gunnery officer.

(Subsequently the chairman inserted the following information in 

the reco rd:)

Lieuten ant Raymond P. Connell, gunnery officer aboard the Maddox, quoted 

in AP dispatch in the Arkansa s Gazette, Ju ly 16,1967.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, considering the fact that the Maddox

was heading for an island recently attacked by South Vietnamese 

raiders using F.S. equipment, is it not possible tha t the North Vietnamese could have concluded the United States had a role and had remained in North Vietnamese waters and to atack the island again?

Secretary McNamara. I think not, Mr. Chairman. My reasons are 

twofold. First, Vietnamese rad ar could track our vessels and 34-A 

vessels and, therefore, knew they were separated by time and distance..

Secondly, as I mentioned to you earlier, prisoners tha t we have 

since captured indicate that they knew that these were separate operations.

WH Y AIR COVER WAS PROVIDED IN TO NK IN INCID ENTS

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, in your recent “Meet the Press” interview you stated that the Pueblo was not given air cover and an 

armed escort because this would have been provocative to the North 

Koreans. Yet in the case of both incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin, 

American aircraft earners provided air cover.

If in the case of the Pueblo air cover and protection would have 

been provocative, why would not the same term apply in the Gulf of 

Tonkin, particularly since the Maddox and the Turner Joy had orders 

tha t would take them within what the North Vietnamese considered 

to be territorial waters?

Secretary McNamara. First, the N orth Vietnamese did not consider 

them to be territorial waters, as I have pointed out on several occasions 

this morning.

Secondly, there is a major difference between the situation with the 

Pueblo off the coast of North Korea and the situation of the Madd ox

and Joy off the coast of North Vietnam.
43

North Vietnam at tha t point, in fact, was infiltrating several thousand armed personnel a year from N orth to South Vietnam, and there 

was reason, therefore, to protect our craft, a reason that was not present 

in the case of the Pueblo.

The Chairman. Well, it was present, but you did not recognize it 

because they took the ship, did they not ?

Secretary McNamara. Well, the same reasons were not present, Mr. 

Chairman.

Senator Mundt. Will you yield?

The Chairman. Yes, I will yield.

NORTH KOREAN INFILTRATIONS INTO SOUTH KOREA

Senator Mundt. Were not the North Koreans infiltrating people 

into South Korea?

Secretary McNamara. Not several thousand.

Senator Mundt. In this Blue Palace incident ?

Secretary McNamara. Not several thousand a year, Senator Mundt, 

nor was North Korea at the time of the Pueblo incident carrying out 

direct, and from its capital, armed attacks upon the people and the 

political institutions of South Korea to the extent as tha t North Vietnam was then doing against South Vietnam.

Senator H ickenlooper. If I may observe there, it is my understanding North Koreans went throu gh the American lines and we did not 

do anything to stop them, but they do not go through the R OK lines. 

The Koreans stop them, the South Koreans, and they attacked Seoul.

Secretary McNamara. On the po int of whether we are stopping the 

North Korean infiltrators or not stopping them, and whether our 

record compares favorably with South Korea’s, I cannot testify. But 

I will be happy, Senator Hickenlooper, to check.

(The desired information will be supplied at a later date.)

Secretary McNamara. Now, on the question of the relations between 

North Korea and South Korea, on the one hand, and North Vietnam 

and South Vietnam, on the other, there is just a m ajor difference in 

the situation is Southeast Asia in 1964 and tha t in North and South 

Korea today.

Senator Hickenlooper. I should not have asked it. I got tha t information from a soldier who has been over there for quite a little 

while.

Secretary McNamara. It may be correct, but I am not familiar 

with it.

Senator Hickenlooper. He seemed to know what he was talking 

about. But I do not know.

Senator Mundt. Is it your position that the attack by the North 

Koreans on the Blue Palace was not a planned attack on the high 

Korean Government ?

Secretary McNamara. No, Senator Mundt, my position is very simple. There is a major difference between the situation in the North and 

South Korea today, on the one hand, and that which existed in Southeast Asia between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, on the other, 

and I will be very happ y to take some hours of the committee’s time to 

document it.

90-1S7—68-
44

EVIDEN CE OF NO RTH VIE TNAM ESE IN FI LT RA TI ON INTO SOUTH QUEST ION ED

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to argue the point now, 

but as the Secretary knows, I always have believed in pretrail hearings 

and giving advance notice of your case. But, if I understand you now, 

Mr. Secretary, your position is tha t prior to the Tonkin Bay incidents 

there was heavy infiltration of North Vietnamese forces into South 

Vietnam. I have just asked Mr. Marcy to have someone go to work on 

our hearings, because unless I have lost all power of recollection^ it is 

my recollection that pr ior to the Tonkin Bay incident the admin istration. through an administration witness, testified to a committee, and 

we will find it on the record, there was not infiltration of N orth Vietnamese forces into South Vietnam prior to Tonkin Bay. You will find 

one administration witness who says they did not have any evidence of 

a single cadre. He pointed out th at South Vietnamese had been sent to 

North Vietnam for training, but they had gone back. Bu t the administration could not give us any proof th at North Vietnamese forces had 

infiltrated into South Vietnam, and I want to tell you so in order that 

we may discuss it later.

Secretary McNamara. Senator Morse, I think, without arguing the 

point of whether there was evidence of North Vietnamese forces, 

meaning formal units of its military service, infiltrating from north 

to south, there was ample evidence of infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam of thousands of people sent from the north 

to the south to subvert the government of the south, and operating 

there in the south for tha t purpose under the direct control and lit ­

erally the hour-by-hour directon of Hanoi.

Senator Morse. Military personnel?

Secretary McNamara. Military personnel.

Senator McCarthy. Air. Chairman, may I ask a question ?

The Chairman. Yes.

TRAN SM ISS ION OF INFO RM AT ION TO SVN NAV Y

Senator McCarthy. Was the information tha t our destroyers were 

gathering transmitted to the South Vietnamese Navy for its use?

Secretary McNamara. I cannot answer the question.

Senator McCarthy. Well, you must know that.

Secretary McNamara. No, I do not know that.

Senator McCarthy. You cannot answer that? If we get information tha t would be helpful to the South Vietnamese Navy, we would 

give it to them ?

Secretary McNamara. I do not say we would not. I simply cannot 

answer it.

Senator McCarthy. I f we were transmitting it, wouldn’t it be the 

equivalent of an act of war against North Vietnam? In other words, 

you were not just out gathering information for the files of the Defense Department, were you ?

Secretary McNamara. We were gathering inform ation tha t we 

needed to assist the South Vietnamese in reducing the adverse effect 

on them of the infiltration from north to south by sea, and I so 

stated.

I further stated, and I stated this at the time, it was pa rt of 

the public debate at the time, tha t we were furnishing to South 

Vietnam the boats they used.
45

Senator McCarthy. I know.

Secretary McNamara. Whether we gave information or not, the 

fact is-----

Senator McCarthy. The question of the time lapse, and so on, has become much less important. If you picked up inform ation one day and gave it to them, and the next day South Vietnam took mili­ tary action, it becomes almost a part of the same naval operation.

Secretary McNamara. Whether we gave information to them or did 

not give information to them, we did supply boats, and that was known on August 6, at the time. I think it is extremely unlikely tha t we gave any inform ation from the patrol to the South Vietnamese in the time interval such as you suggested. It is possible tha t over a period of weeks or months we may have. B ut I am certain we did not in a matter of hours or days afte r the collection of the information.

W H Y IN T E L L IG E N C E S H IP WAS O FF NORTH KOREA N COA ST

Senator McCarthy. I was interested in your comparison of the sit­ uation of the difference between North and South Vietnam as con­ trasted to North and South Korea. So, therefore, the protection given the destroyers can be quite different from th at of the Pueblo. What was 

the role of the Pueblo? If the relationship between North and South Korea was so much better, why do we have a spy ship off the coast, which we assume was 

helping South Korea?

Secretary McNamara. We have patrols that we are carrying out ail 

over the world in the air and on the sea, international waters and international airspace, collecting information t ha t would be of benefit to us in protecting our security. That was the mission of the Pueblo.

Senator McCarthy. Shouldn’t we-----

Secretary McNamara. Pardon me, Senator, if I may finish.

Senator McCarthy. Yes.

Secretary McNamara. That was the mission of the Pueblo, and it is 

the mission of literally thousands of reconnaissance flights that we carry out, and many seaborne missions that we carry out each year.

Senator McCarthy. Would it not seem to be more provocative to 

have a ship like the Pueblo there if supposedly the relations between 

North and South Korea were reasonably good, and we were not as directly involved as we were in South Vietnam ? Is n’t this a kind of unnecessary intrusion of American power?

Secretary McNamara. No. I think American ships, when it is in our 

interest should move any place in international waters-----

Senator McCarthy. Spy any place they want to, but take the 

consequences.

Secretary McNamara. I believe-----

Senator McCarthy. Get the information.

Secretary McNamara. If you want to change the entire legal 

basis-----

Senator McCarthy. I am not goingto change anything.

Secretary McNamara (continuing). Of operations of the sea, that 

is your prerogative.

Senator McCarthy. Well, there really are not any, as you know. I 

mean everybody claims different things.
46

Secretary McNamara. Of course, there are. Let us not say there is 

not a basis.

Senator McCarthy. We do not have to go into it now.

Secretary McNamara. We will go into it.

Senator McCarthy. Well, we won't.

Secretary McNamara. We will.

Senator McCarthy. I would like to ask my questions. He is not 

answering the question I wanted to ask him.

The Chairman. Let him try, and then you can respond.

Senator McCarthy. I do not want to go into the law of the sea.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, may I simply ask permission 

to respond ?

Senator McCarthy. Yes.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Secretary McNamara. May I ask permission to respond for the record, because the question I was answering Senator McCarthy several 

minutes ago—I do not want to ask the reporter to go back and find it— 

but i t did attribu te to me a statement for the record, and I want to correct my own statement for the record.

The Chairman. Do you want to do it now ?

Secretary McNamara. I would like to do it later.

Senator McCarthy. I will take it all out.

Secretary McNamara. No, I want to leave it in, but correctly.

Senator McCarthy. T did not get a chance to finish it with you. I 

have no objection to our spying for our own purposes, but I say if 

we have a spy ship picking up information and then transmitting 

that information to another country which is engaged in hostilities 

with a nation on which we are spying, then we are not quite so pure 

as we represent ourselves to be. That is the point I wanted to make.

DID U N IT E D STAT ES T R A N SM IT IT S IN FO RM A TIO N TO SOUTH KO REA ?

With reference to the Pueblo off the coast of North Korea, I think it 

is somewhat the same thing that applies to the destroyers. It was really 

in that sequence that I wanted to ask the question, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary McNamara. What was the question ?

Senator McCarthy. All right. We can say—you say—America has 

the right to do it. That is fine, I think we have, too. But it becomes 

different if we pick up information tha t should be ours, and we then 

transmit it to another country like South Korea, which, in turn, uses it 

against North Korea. Then our ship picking up the information is not 

quite in the same immune position as it would be if it were pickingup information for our use alone. That is my question.

Secretary McNamara. Tha t is a statement not a question, but I 

will let it stand, and I would be happy-----

Senator McCarthy. Tha t was the point I wanted to make.

Secretary McNamara. I disagree with the statement. I do not think 

it is factual.

Senator McCarthy. It is a question. I ask-----

Secretary McNamara. What is the question ?

Senator McCarthy. Two questions I asked. Let us answer them.

Secretary McNamara. Let the reporter go back and read the question.
47

Senator McCarthy. I will ask the question, first of all, about the 

destroyers, as to whether the information they were picking up would 

be transmitted to South Vietnam. Then 1 tried to ask the same question with reference to the Pueblo,

that is all. I said if it was doing this—and you said there was a dif­ ference in the relations between North and South Korea from those of 

North and South Vietnam—if the Pueblo was picking up that kind of 

information, and giving it to South Korea, the justification for that ac­ tion. it seems to me, would be less clear than the justification for what might have been taking place off the coast of South Vietnam. Tha t is 

alh

Secretary McNamara. Let me rephrase it and see if I state your 

.question properly, and then I will see if I can answer it.

USE OF U.S. INFOR MATION FOR SVN NAVAL OPERATIONS

Your first question was whether information picked up by the destroyers Maddox and /or Joy while the 4th DeSoto mission was taking place in the Tonkin G ulf was transmitted to the South Vietnamese.

Senator McCarthy. Well, not immediately. I want to know whether 

tha t information was being used to give direction to South Vietnamese naval operations, not necessarily on the same day or the same 2 days, 

but as part of the pattern of operation.

Secretary McNamara. Well, to the best of my knowledge, it was not 

transmitted at the time. I t was not transm itted shortly the reafter and, so fa r as I know, it was not used in the planning of the South Viet­ namese operation. I do not know the latter for a fact. I will check it and 

answer it for the record.

(The following was subsequently supplied :)

We ha ve fo un d no e vide nc e th a t an y in fo rm at io n gai ned on th e DeS oto patr ols 

was use d in th e p la nni ng of th e S ou th V ietnam es e o pe ra tion s.

Senator McCarthy. All right.

TRANSMISSION OF INFOR MATION TO SOUTH KOREANS

Secretary McNamara. Your second question—the same question 

with respect to the Pueblo in relation to South Korea. To the best of 

my knowledge, the Pueblo did not break radio silence from the time it 

moved on station, some time around Jan uary 10, to approximately 

Jan uary 22 and, therefore, could not during tha t period have trans­ mitted any knowledge to the South Koreans. I am not aware that we 

had anv plans, had the Pueblo voyage been completely successful, to 

transmit any knowledge to the South Koreans.

Senator McCarthy. That answers the question. I am sorry we had 

the confusion over the question.

CARRIERS IN TH E TONKIN GULF AREA

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, what carrier was in the Gulf of 

Tonkin when this affair started?

Secretary McNamara. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. What carrier, a ircraft carrier-----

Secretary McNamara. I believe the Ticonderoga was there.

The Chairman. Was a second carrier moved in shortly before the

second incident on the 4th?
48

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, my memory is faulty, I do not 

recall. I will be happy to answer it for the record.

The Chairman. Do you know, General Wheeler ?

General Wheeler. At the time of the first incident, the Ticonderoga

was in the Tonkin Gulf area. The Constellation was in Hong Kong, 

and we started to sail her south from H ong Kong toward the Gulf of 

Tonkin.

The Chairman. Shortly before August 4 ?

General Wheeler. Before August 4.

The Chairman. Had she arrived in the Gulf of Tonkin by August 4 ?

General Wheeler. She had not, sir. She was still outside the (iulf of 

Tonkin.

W HY IT WAS NECESSA RY TO GO CLOSE TO COAST

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, according to the orders sent to the 

Maddox and Turner Joy the ships were directed to go toward the 

North Vietnam coast and then retire to sea at night. The track of the 

ships took them within 8 nautical miles of the North Vietnam coast, 

and 4 nautical miles of the North Vietnamese islands. Why was it 

necessary to go so close to the coast ?

Secretary McNamara. Jus t a minor point, Mr. Chairman. I think 

the Maddox was authorized to go as close as 8 miles, not directed to go 

to 8 miles, and I believe the Joy, when i t was added to the Maddox,

was restricted to an area no closer than 11 miles, and in the latter 

case the Maddox and the Joy, operating under the restriction of no 

closer than 11 miles, did not actually go closer than 16 miles. The purpose of allowing such a proximity to the coast was, of course, to 

obtain the maximum amount of information on coastal activities.

The Chairman. They went as close as 4 miles to the islands, did 

they not ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, I am not sure they went as close as 4 

miles, but they were authorized at least on July 30, to go as close as 

4 miles.

The Chairman. They were authorized, and they were authorized 

to go no closer than 15 miles from the coast of Communist China; is 

that correct ?

Secretary McNamara. Tha t is correct.

our legitimate rights in international waters

The Chairman. According to the cables the Defense Department 

sent to the committee, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet 

sent a message to the Maddox and Turner J oy on August 4, stating 

tha t the termination of the patrol afte r 2 days as called for in the operational plan, “Does not in my view adequately demonstrate the 

U.S. resolve to assert our legitimate rights in these international 

waters.”

What did the commander mean by this? Th at is a quote from his 

statement.

Secretary McNamara. Well, the portion tha t is the quote, of course, 

does not indicate the ship went within the territorial waters of North 

Vietnam. I would simply like the record to show th at it did not enter 

the waters claimed as territorial waters by North Vietnam or recognized as territorial waters by the United States.
49

The commander you referred to was simply responding to a suggestion from the task force commander or intermediate headquarters—I have forgotten which suggested tha t the p atrol be terminated, 

and the commander you referred to said in his opinion, it should not 

be terminated, in view of the present President’s statement of August 3, 

tha t we would continue to operate the patrol in international waters.

If we then terminated it, it would appear to him tha t we were 

changing the directive as made public by the President.

The Chairman. And he did not think it adequately demonstrated 

our resolve to assert legitimate rights.

Secretary McNamara. I thin k t ha t is exactly the language he used.

The Chairman. Th at is the language from the cable.

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

Senator Morse. May I refer to that cable a moment, the cable you 

just cited?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, don’t forget in para graph 2 of that 

cable he said, “Accordingly.”

According to paragraph 2 o f that; “Accordingly, recommend following adjustments in remainder of patrol schedule. Provided par agrap h T2, reference B in order to accommodate commander, U.S. Military Assistance Commander in Vietnam. Request patrol ships remain 

north of latitude 19-10 north until 060600H—to avoid interference 

with 34A OPS. Four August patrol from points Delta to Charlie 

remaining north at 19-10 north.”

Then later in the cable, he says, “The above patrol will clearly demonstrate our determ ination to continue these operations.

“B. Possibly draw NVN (North Vietnamese Navy) PGNS (pa trol 

boat) northward away from the area of 34A OPS.

“C. Eliminate DeSoto patrol interference with 34A OPS.”

CO NN ECTIO N OF MADDOX AND TU RN ER JO Y W IT H SVN FLEET

Here you get from the commander of the fleet out there, specific ref ­

erence to the operations of the South Vietnamese attacking boats with 

instructions to our destroyers. Th at is where you lose me, unless there 

is some break in my thin king, that is where you lose me if it is the contention th at we were not using the Maddox in connection in some way 

with the attacks.

It is only my premise, and I am not reaching any final conclusion 

until I hear all of the record—I hope I am too good a lawyer for that— 

but it seems to me tha t these cables tha t we got from your own Departm ent show th at instructions went out to the Maddox and to the 

Jo y in relationship to 34A, and they were being used.

Now, if they were, does that make any difference whether they were 

on the high seas or not, if they were acting as a provocateur, if they 

were in fact cooperating with the South Vietnamese boats? You are 

not arguing, are you, that the North Vietnamese had no right to attack them on the high seas ?

Secretary McNamara. I am arguing, Senator Morse, tha t the reason 

for the change in the area border from which area the Maddox was tobe restricted was designed by the U.S. commander in South Vietnam 

to further separate the Maddox from the 34A operations in order t o 

assure tha t there was less reason for anybody, including the Norths 

Vietnamese, to associate the two.
50

I am arguing furth er tha t the North Vietnamese themselves have 

stated th at they did not confuse the two.

Senator Morse. Well, Mr. Secretary, you give us the testimony of 

a captured prisoner or two, which does not bespeak what the naval 

operators of North Vietnam not captured were thinking. After all, 

when you are using a prisoner as a witness, you are certainly not using 

the best witness.

POSIT ION OF DESTROYERS IN 34 A PRO JEC T

You see, one of the things that disturbs me is that I think the cablegram itself shows that we were tryin g to draw those North Vietnamese 

boats away from the South Vietnamese boats in order to give the 

South Vietnamese boats greater freedom of action, and tha t if that is 

not involving our destroyers in the 34A project, I do not know what 

it is.

T think we were using them as a decoy.

Secretary McNamara. Senator Morse, had we been using them as 

a decoy we would not have so substantially increased the restricted 

area.

This move to north of 19 degrees 10 minutes was a move of about, 

I would say, 90 miles, moving the northerly boundary of the restricted 

areas farthe r and farther away from the 34-A operations.

Senator Morse. It is a pretty good decoy if you are trying to get 

the North Vietnamese boats to follow them.

Secretary McNamara. No, because then the North Vietnamese boats 

knew that our boats had no hostile intent and played no hostile role. 

They knew tha t from having tracked them the previous nights, and 

they knew that from previous patrols, so there was no basis for this 

assertion by the author of tha t cable and, by the way, he said it 

would possibly draw them to the north. There was no-----

Senator Morse. Possibly in tha t context could be interpreted as 

hopefully.

Secretary MoNamara. In any case it was not possible and it was 

not a plan, and it was not the purpose of the PeSoto Patrol, and 

the Joint Chiefs had never considered that, and would never have 

approved that purpose, nor was the patrol carried out in such a 

wav to permit such a purpose to be achieved.

Senator Morse. It is most unfortunate you had them anywhere 

near there while the South Vietnamese attacks were going on because you opened yourself, I think, to just this kind of an interpretation of the messages.

The Chairman. Could I say to the committee that the Secretary 

has a luncheon engagement, and I thought we would adjourn at 12:30. 

The Secretary has agreed to come back at 2 :30 if that is agreeable 

to the committee. We will have our floor vote around 1 o’clock.

FU RT HE R PRISO NE R IN 196 7

Could I ask this, Mr. Secretary, I wonder why were we not given 

the fact tha t you had another prisoner in 1967? They told us about 

the prisoner in 1966, but Mr. Nitze never indicated you had a furth er 

prisoner in 1967 who testified. I think you should have notified us of 

that.
51

Secretary McNamara. I think so, too, Mr. Chairman. I must say 

I wish we had. We would have avoided some of the controversy 

because the testimony of a 1966 prisoner was not nearly as comprehensive or as illuminating on the participation by N orth Vietnam in 

the August 4 attack as was the testimony of the prisoner of July 

1967 which, I think, came to light only within the past few days.

The Chairman. I see.

Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, may I have just 1 minute?

The Chairman. The Secretary wants to go.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I am quite happy to stay 

longer if the committee wants me to. I would be delighted to that, 

and also come back later this afternoon.

The Chairman. We will go to a quarter of one if you like.

Senator Lausche. Yes.

W H A T IS OBJE CTI VE OF T H IS M E E T IN G ?

I would more clearly be able to see what is sought to be proved if 

I knew the objective of this meeting. One, were we trying to prove 

we were in territorial waters of North Vietnam and, therefore, North 

Vietnam had the right to shoot at us?

Two, are we trying to prove we were not shot at and that we initiated the shooting under a misapprehension of the facts?

Two avenues are sought to be followed, and there is nothing clear 

in what has been developed this morning afte r two and a ha lf hours 

of what the real objective of this meeting is.

It looks to me as i f it is trying to put the United States in a bad 

light and the North Vietnamese in a good light, and I cannot subscribe to that.

Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, could I say something about 

procedure ?

The Chairman. Senator Morse.

Senator Morse. It is easy in situations such as this for sincere men 

with some different viewpoints trying to find out, to check their own 

viewpoints against the evidence tha t the Secretary of Defense can 

offer us, to take the position tha t we are trying to put our country 

in a bad light, as Senator Lausche suggests.

There is no basis for tha t at all. I think this is so important tha t 

we try to find a way of reaching an understanding with regard to the 

Gulf of Tonkin.

I am not convinced by anything the Secretary has said this morning that we followed the proper course in regard to the Maddox and 

the Joy in reference to this incident, and that is why we want his 

answers to these cables, and we want the supplements to these cables 

of information we do not have, anything that he can give us.

There is still every reason for my continuing to believe tha t we 

followed an unwise course of action in the Tonkin Bay incident, and 

tha t we do not have clean hands in regard to what happened over 

there. It just happens to be my honest opinion. But tha t does not 

mean I am not going to change it before this hearing is over.

So the procedural point I make, Mr. Chairman, I think we ought 

to continue. I thin k this has been very beneficial. Each person will 

get his turn to discuss this.
52

I think you have done a magnificent job in carrying out this meeting. We ought to meet this afternoon, but whatever hours the Secretary has indicated are necessary would be of assistance to us. I am not 

so sure th at you can finish it this afternoon. If you cannot, we ought 

to meet tomorrow morning. This is the last opportunity tha t we will 

have to talk to the man, who is the best witness in regard to helping 

us get the facts because he was Secretary of Defense at the time, and 

I hope that there will be no attempt to restrict the chairman or any 

other member of this committee from taking the time we need to 

carry out what we thin k our duty is.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, could I have a half minute to answer, 

to attempt to answer, Senator Lausche’s question ?

The Chairman. Yes.

EXA MIN ATION OF TO NK IN INCIDENTS

Senator Gore. Before you entered the room, Senator Lausche, the 

chairman stated the purpose of the hearing was to develop as fully 

as possible the true facts relating to the incidents in the Gulf of 

Tonkin in the process of examining the decisionmaking process of 

the United States in a crisis; is tha t correct?

The Chairman. That is correct.

Senator Gore. Now, the country, rightly or wrongly, has taken 

itself—has been taken into a war tha t has proved rather disastrous, 

and it is important not only from the context of history but for the 

future of our country to examine this p articular incident and develop 

the truth. Inso far as I am concerned, I share in the objective the 

chairman stated, as the chairm an stated it.

i

r The Chairman. Tha t is correct. This resolution has been interpreted by the administration as a “functional equivalent” of a declaration of war under the Constitution. I do not accept tha t definition, 

but in any case that is what Under Secretary of State Katzenbach 

said.

It seems to me how one makes a decision that inspires a functional 

equivalent of a declaration of war is very important to the country 

and to this committee.

Senator L ausche. The pa per th at was submitted in the last 2 weeks, 

and which I read, premised its judgment or its implied recommendations on the claim tha t we were never fired upon, tha t there was 

proof of those on the ship who said, “We saw no torpedoes,” and the 

implication was that we initiated the firing.

Well, today I do not know, the questions are directed not to that, 

to proving tha t point, but to prove the point that we were in waters 

in which we were not allowed to be and, therefore, the Communists 

had the right to shoot a t us.

I do not know which direction you are moving and in trying to 

establish some conclusions as a consequence of this meeting.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, then with your permission we will 

go mitil a quarte r of one.

I would like to get throu gh this because then each member will be 

called upon for his own questions. These questions are all based upon 

official documents which we have received, and that is why I thought 

it was important to address the initia l questions to them.

I will go through one or two more before we adjourn.
53

NATURE OF INFORMATION RECEIVED BY “ MADDOX*'

Mr. Secretary, some 15 hours before the second incident on the 

4th of August, the Maddox sent a message to the commander of the 

7th Fleet stating that evaluation of information from various sources 

indicated tha t the North Vietnamese considered the patrol directly 

involved with the South Vietnam attacks on North Vietnam. These 

attacks, as has been stated, took place on the night of the 3d and 4th 

of August.

Could you tell us what the nature of this information th at the Maddox received was ?

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I have already responded to 

tha t question. I t was asked an hour or so ago, and I stated then that 

the Maddox had not received any inform ation that would have supported such a conclusion.

Captain Herrick, the man who wrote the cable, testifies today he 

can recall no information tha t would have supported the conclusion 

and, as I mentioned, a North Vietnamese prisoner stated that the 

North Vietnamese separated the patrol from the operations, knew they 

were not connected.

Senator Case. Was the cable sent ?

The Chairman. Yes. This is a cable from the Maddox.

Senator Case. No question about tha t, Mr. Secretary ?

Secretary McNamara. Oh, no, no.

The Chairman. This was the language I mentioned.

Senator Case. Is there a suggestion that somebody else other than 

the commander sent a cable?

The Chairman. No. Who was the commander?

Secretary McNamara. Herrick.

The Chairman. Where is he now ?

Secretary McNamara. He is in this country.

The Chairman. What is his assignment?

Secretary McNamara. I think he is in the Norfolk area.

The Chairman. lie was the then commander of the Maddox?

Secretary McNamara. He was the commander of the task force.

The Chairman. Who was commander of the Maddox?

Secretary McNamara. He was CTG 72.1 who was superior to the 

commander of the Maddox. They embarked a task force commander 

onboard the Maddox in addition to the commander of the Maddox

itself.

The Chairman. Ju st for the record, who was the commander of 

the Maddox?

Secretary McNamara. I do not know.

The Chairman. Commander Ogier?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

The Chairman. Who was commander of the Tiirner Joy? Barn hard ?

Senator Gore. Who sent the cable ?

Secretary McNamara. Herrick sent the cable.

Senator Morse. Do I understand he was on the Maddox when he 

sent the cable ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

Senator Case. Now he says he did not have any -----

The Chairman. Justification for it.
54

Secretary McNamara. This was speculation on his part, and he 

says he has no basis for speculation.

The Chairman. What I was really asking for, he says from various 

sources. I assumed this to have been some of these messages th at we 

have previously talked about.

Secretary McNamara. We have gone over all the messages and I 

know of no information in them tha t would lead to such a conclusion, 

so I can only conclude that it was sheer speculation, unfounded 

speculation.

Frankly , I have in my own mind an explanation of why he sent it, 

but I do not think it bears on the issue at hand, and I am not going to 

repeat it to you.

W HY WAS PATR OL NOT BROKE N OFF?

The Chairman. For the record, why was the patrol not broken off if 

we were certain that the North Vietnamese considered our ships part of 

an attack on North Vietnam ?

Secretary McNamara. We were not certain they considered it. We 

had every reason to believe th at they did not believe our ships were 

preparing to attack North Vietnam.

The Chairman. They did not ?

CABLE FRO M TH E PH IL IP PIN E S

As to the second incident itself, I want to read a cable sent to Washington in the immediate aftermath of the second incident by theNaval Communications Center in the Philippines. T want to note, as 

background, that this naval facility had monitored all of the messages 

coming from the Maddox and the Turner Joy during the incident. The 

text of the message from the Philippines, afte r review of all the 

reports from the Maddox and Turner Joy. reads as follows:

Review of action makes many recorded contacts and torpedoes fired appear 

doubtful. Freak weather effects and over-eager sonarman may have accounted 

for many reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action.

With a cable like this coming from the Philippines, it seems to 

raise a very serious question as to why, in view of this suggestion, at 

least some reasonable investigation or delay in time in order to clarify 

was not taken.

I think, Mr. Secretary, you will have to admit t hat this was a pretty 

clear warning that there were some uncertainties about the situation.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, let me make sure we have the 

right cable so we can all be talkin g about the same thing.

The Chairman. Mr. Bader, bring the document.

Secretary McNamara. Give me the time date, let me get it from 

them.

[Deleted.]

The Chairman. Will you place it in time context ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes. You say that is from the Philippines? 

My message in front of me indicates i t is from the commander of the 

task force.
55

COMMUNICATION FROM PHILIPPINES SUGGESTS ATTACKS UNCONFIRMED

Mr. Bader. I t is from the Communications Center, Philippines to 

CIXCPA C Fleet, and then it-----

Senator Gore. Read it.

Mr. B ader. It is the same cable tha t the Senator just read:

Review of ac tio n ma kes many rec ord ed co ntacts and torped oes tire d ap pe ar 

doubtful. Fre ak w ea ther------

Secretary McNamara. Let me look at the cable because you may have 

misidentified it.

Senator Gore. Let him read it first.

Mr. Bader (read ing) :

Fre ak wea ther effects an d over-eag er sona rm an may have accou nte d for 

ma ny rep orts. No ac tu al visual sig hting s by Maddox. Sugge st com plet e ev al ua ­

tion bef ore an y fu rt her act ion .

This is a copy of the original cable, Air. Secretary.

Secretary AIcNamara. 1 just want to see the identification on the top.

General Wheeler. It is a relay from the commander of the task 

force.

Secretary AIcNamara. I think I am correct in saying th is is a message from the task force commander. It is of some importance, as you 

will see later, who it came from. The underlying message is here. I 

will be happy to give it to you. I t is exactly the same words.

Air. Bader. Mr. Secretary, it is marked as NCS Phil.

Secretary McNamara. 1 es, but tha t is the relay point. The message 

from the task force commander goes to the Philippines and then is 

relayed in here, and tha t message, therefore, is from the task force 

■commander.

Now, the reason it is important—

The Chairman. I am not sure it makes it any weaker.

Secretary AIcNamara. I am not arguing. I just want to get the facts 

straight.

The Chairman. All right.

Secretary McNamara. Now, that message came in to us, I believe, at 

1327 on the 4th of August, and it is a message from the commander 

of the task force stating t ha t atmospheric conditions and sea conditions and other conditions cast doubt on some of the reports of firings, 

•observations, and torpedoes.

Senator AIorse. Is that Herrick again ?

Secretary AIcNamara. Yes.

Senator Morse. He was on the Maddox ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

Senator Morse. And from the Maddox he sends this wire which 

raises questions of doubt.

Secretary McNamara. Tha t is correct. At least, that is the way my 

message reads. It reads “From the Commander of Task Group 72.1,” 

which is him.

Senator AIundt. Would he be in a better position to know what 

happened ?

source of message is important

Secretary McNamara. Oh, yes, I am not disputing the point. I am 

just trying to get the record clear as to where the message came from, 

and it is im portant tha t he raised these points himself.
56

Wha t would yo u th in k we wo uld do w hen we go t it ? W ell, obviously, 

we were concerned, an d we imme dia tely beg an to exa min e it, and I 

hav e here a whole serie s of steps we took at th at po in t as to wh at 

was done. I per son ally called Adm ira l Sh ar p an d br ou gh t th is t o his 

att entio n, an d said we obviously do no t wan t to c arry ou t retalia tory 

action unless we are “da mn ed sure wh at happ ened.” Those were theexa ct words.

Th e Chairm an. Di d you see the cable?

Se cretary McNamara. I am no t sure I saw the cable or wh eth er it 

was brou gh t to my attentio n in an oral repo rt. Gener al Bu rchina l, 

who was t he n Di rector of the Join t Staff, was do wn sta irs a floor below 

my office, an d I ha d a nu mber of teleph one con versation s wi th him . 

and I do not know wh eth er I saw the docum ent or whethe r he reported 

it to me. B ut any how , I go t th e inform ation, because I then called 

Adm ira l Sh ar p, and I have a tr an sc ript of th at teleph one conversation 

in which th e specific words were, “We obviously don’t wa nt to ca rry 

out the re ta lia tory str ike unless we a re damn ed sur e wha t h ap pe ned.” 

Th en t he i nstru cti on was to go find o ut.

Now, there is a lot of exc han ge here , Mr. Ch airma n. You may not 

wa nt t o take t he tim e now t o go into it.

Se na tor Mundt. We h ad b ette r wa it un til 2 :30.

Se cretary McNamara. I f you do I am wi lling to go throug h it.

Th e Chairm an. I f y ou wish the n, it is a qu ar te r of 1, an d we will 

ju st resu me at this po int , if th at is agre eable.

Se cretary McNamara. I will be ha pp y to do th at.

Th e Chairm an. A ll righ t.

Se cretary McNamara. Mr. Ch airm an , may I say I notic e there were 

press ou t in fr on t when I came in. I t w ill be my intenti on to w alk o ut 

there and say nothing.

Th e Chairm an. Tha t is m ine, a nd I am going to say I have n othing 

to say, which is exactly wha t I am go ing t o say.

(W hereu pon, at 12:45 p.m., th e com mittee recessed to reconvene at 

2:3 0o’clock the same aftern oo n) .

AFTERNOON SESSION

PRESS RECEIVES SECRETARY m ' n AMARa 's STAT EM EN T

2:40 p.m.

Th e Chairm an. Th e pre ss say s the Pe ntag on has rele ased it.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA: ACCOMPANIED BY

GEN. EARLE G. W HEE LER AND CAPT. H. B. SWEITZER—Resumed

Se cretary McNamara. W e hav e, Mr. Ch airma n.

The Chairman. I n v iew o f th at , there are some here who said their 

people called them and they wa nte d it. You hav e some copies here.

Se cre tar y McNamara. Yes, rig ht. I will tell you wh at I did , Mr. 

Ch air ma n. U P I 109, which came out abo ut 1 :22 th is after no on , af te r 

we had all left here, stated that a m ember of th is committee said tod ay 

one of the vessels involve d in th e 19G4 G ul f of To nkin inc ident pen etrat ed Nor th Vietn am ’s 12-mile lim it. Th e inform ation was given the 

com mittee by M cNamara . That is ju st------

Th e Chairm an. W ho did th at ?
57

Se cretary McNamara. I wou ld ra th er n ot say. I hav e it h ere if you 

wish to rea d it. U P I 109. B ut t hat is ju st c on trary to w ha t I said th is 

mo rni ng. I cannot stan d wi tho ut ha ving w ha t I said in my statem en t >. 

issued.

Se na tor Cooper. I h ave been asked if y ou said it. I said you did not.

Th e Chairm an. I t says Se na tor McC art hy said it.

Se cretary McNamara. T ha t is why I rele ased it.

Mr. Ch airm an , I ha d instr ucted my people un de r no circ umstance s 

to rele ase it and the y did no t relea se it u ntil I issu ed the instr uc tio ns 

to them .

Th e Chairman. W hen I went ou t I said I ha d no th ing to say.

Se cretary McNamara. So did I.

Th e Chairm an. T hey said , “A re you going to h ave a ny thin g to say 

th is aft erno on ?” I sai d, “ Not so fa r as I know.*’

Se na tor S ymington. Will the ch air man yiel d ?

Mr. Ch airm an , the Navy is up before the A rm ed Services Co mm ittee, an d I p lan to go bac k th ere. B efo re l eav ing , however, may I re mind 

us th at at a pre vio us me eting I fe lt we first ou gh t to hav e some body 

disc uss this matter, some body fro m a “high classif ication ” s tand po int, 

CIA or D I A. W e kicked th at a roun d a bit.

I t is cle ar the Se cretary him sel f was no t alon e respon sible fo r the 

or de rs out the re. Eve ry Se na tor sho uld have the ri ght to know the 

fu ll detai ls of wha t we nt on, bu t I would ag ain po int ou t the witness 

would no t be the only one to make any decision.

I wou ld exp ress my regret th at any mem ber of the com mittee said 

an yt hi ng to the press if there was agreem ent no t to say anyth ing.

I f you will excuse me, Mr. Se creta ry, I would like to go back an d 

listen to why we need all th at money. [L au gh ter.]

Se creta ry McNamara. T ha nk you ve ry m uch, Senato r.

Se na tor Symingt on. It is a lot.

Th e C hairman. Well, th e comm ittee will come to or der .

NAVAL COMMUNICATION RECEIVED FROM PHILIPPINES

We were, w hen we a djou rned , discus sing—j ust for the reco rd I will 

reread it, a re po rt, a cable, or message t hat was relayed by the com munications—Nava l Comm unications Ce nter in the Ph ili pp ines , a message 

th at ha d been sen t by Comm and er Herric k of the task force. It read s:.

Review of action make s many recorded contacts and torpedoes fired appear 

doubtful. Fre ak weather effects and overeager sonarman may have accounted fo r 

many reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete eva luation before any furth er action.

To p in it down again , wh en was th at message se nt ?

Se cre tar y McNamara. I believe it was sent—th e numb er date grou p 

is [de leted] me aning Gre enw ich tim e, an d th at would mean it was 

sent at —on the 4th of Au gu st at arou nd 1:30 p.m. easte rn da ylight 

time .

Th e C hairm an. Wh at was local t ime ?

Se cretary McNamara. Local tim e would have been aro und 1 :30 a.m> 

Aug us t 5.

Th e Chairm an. A pp roximately 4 or 5 hours af te r the attack took 

place.

Se cretary McNamara. Yes, pe rhap s 3 hou rs.
58

The Chairman. I s that approximate?

Secretary McNamara. Three hours.

The Chairman. Three hours afterward and it was received in 

Washington-----

Secretary McNamara. Essentially a few minutes.

Senator Gore. I f you will yield so that I may relate something.

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Gore. One instruction to the task force was that it search 

the area for debris. Was this after the search for debris?

Secretary McNamara. Substantially before the search for debris. 

I have forgotten the exact times. I can give it to you or insert in the 

record. It was the following day tha t the search for debris was to 

take place.

(The following was subsequently ad ded:)

T he in st ru cti on to s ea rc h f or de br is w as in it ia te d a t 5 : 11 p.m . e.d .t.

Senator Gore. In tha t connection, did they find any debris?

Secretary McNamara. I do not believe so.

Senator Gore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, this approximately 1:30 a.m. 

would be on the 5th, would it not ? It would have been a.m. of the 5th.

Secretary McNamara. Tha t is correct, local time. If I said around 

1:30,1 meant around 1 :20, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. 1:20.

Secertary McNamara. On the 5th.

The Chairman. The morning of the 5th.

Secretary McNamara. That is correct. Local gulf time.

The Chairman. Th at is right.

Well now, will you come back to tha t message. Did you have something to say ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, Mr. Chairman; if I may take a few 

minutes of your time, I would like to tell you of a sequence of conversations with respect to this subject. Because needless to say we 

were concerned about the question raised. Although the message itself 

does not state that he questioned whether an attack had taken place, 

it did say t hat many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appeared 

doubtful. So we began then to correlate information and ask for 

further views and evaluations from the commander in chief of the 

Pacific.

CONVERSATION WITH PACIFIC COMMANDER

At roughly 2 :45 Eastern Daylight Time, which is roughly an hour 

and 20 minutes later, the commander in the Pacific, or rather the commander of the task force, reported to the commander in the Pacific 

tha t he was certain tha t the original ambush was bona fide. This is a 

message on [deleted]. Details of the action present a confusing picture, 

but he had made positive visual sightings of cockpit lights or similar 

lights passing near the Maddox, and the Turner Joy reported two to rpedoes passed near her.

Then, at 1500?

 roughly 15 minutes after the report I just gave you, 

I met, along with Secretary Vance, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

to review all of the evidence relating to the attack, to determine 

whether, in fact, an attack on the destroyers had occurred. We met for 

about 2i/£ hours discussing it, reviewing it, considering particularly
59

the communications intelligence information we had available to us, 

and then at 1723, which was 2 hours 23 minutes after the meeting 

started, we received a telephone call from the commander in chief of 

the Pacific stating tha t in his opinion the attack had occurred.

I should have mentioned earlier that about 40 minutes before that 

telephone call, this is to say at 1640, the commander in chief Pacific had 

called in stating that he had received the information from the commander of the task group, saying that the commander of the task 

group was certain the original ambush was bona fide and had made 

positive visual identification of cockpit lights, and reporting that th e 

Turner Joy had reported two torpedoes.

Then, as I say, about 43 minutes after tha t the commander in chief 

Pacific called back again while I was still in the meeting with the Jo int 

Chiefs, stating tha t he was convinced the attack had occurred and that 

all were satisfied it had.

Then, at 1807, which was 34 minutes after that, the commander in 

chief Pacific called again, and I was present down in the Joint Chiefs

Quarters when the call came in. We discussed it, and he stated he was 

ully assured the attack took place. I stated tha t I was then convinced 

tha t it had, and I released the Executive order on the strike. So th at 

between 1327 and 1807 we were reviewing the information tha t bore 

on whether an attack had taken place.

Senator Gore. Would you mind stating again what he said in the 

call a t 1807?

Secretary McNamara. Yes. I spoke to the director of the J oin t Staff 

and asked him to make certain that the commander in chief, Pacific 

was willing to state tha t the attack had taken place, and therefore 

tha t he was free to release the Executive order because earlier in the 

afternoon I had told him tha t under no circumstances would retaliatory action take place until we were, to use my words, “damned sure 

tha t the attack had taken place.

He confirmed tha t he believed the attack had taken place. I stated 

tha t afte r my furthe r discussions with the Chiefs and reexamination 

of all of the evidence, particularly the communications intelligence, 

tha t I was convinced it had taken place and therefore he was free to 

release the Executive order.

COMMITTEE REQUEST FOR RELEVANT INFORMATION

The Chairman. Were these conversations—did we receive copies of 

these reports ?

Secretary McNamara. I do not know th at you did, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. It seems to me they are relevant to this situation. 

Why did we not ?

Secretary McNamara. I do not know that anyone asked. Nobody 

asked me for them. But in any case I will be happy to see that you get 

such information.

The Chairman. We—I thin k we should have them. As I told you in 

the beginning, obviously we cannot know all that is available. It was 

my understanding with Secretary Nitze that all relevant communications would be made available. I t seems to me th is certainly should be 

made available. They do not involve any highly secret matters, and I 

think all of it should be made available.

90-18 7—68----- 5
60

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I am quite happy to make it 

available to you. Nobody queried me about it. These were conversations I had with Admiral Sharp. I do not know all of the records tha t 

are available in the Department on such matters. But I know what I 

said to him, and I will be happy to check to see whether there are 

records.

(The check is in progress according to the Departm ent of Defense.)

Senator Lausche. What was Sharp in charge of ?

Secretary McNamara. He was commander in chief of the Pacific 

at th at time.

Senator Lausche. Pacific.

Secretary McNamara. Yes, and had his headquarters in Hawaii.

The Chairman. I do not think I recall seeing any records of conversations of that kind, Mr. Bader; did we?

Mr. Bader. I did not hear.

Mr. Marcy. No, sir; we did not have any conversations.

The Chairman. I think we should have all of those th at are relevant to this situation. It was my understanding that we were to be 

given those, with the sole exception of tha t one communication that 

you said was an intercept.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman—pardon me, sir.

Senator Lausche. May I put a question at this time, Mr. Chairman ?

The Chairman. Sir ?

Senator Lausche. May I put a question ?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Lausche. The report that was submitted to us by the staff 

indicated that the commander of the Pacific sent a communication back 

to the commander of the 7th Fleet asking that a careful check be made 

to make certain th at there was an attack and th at communication indicating tha t the commander of the Pacific was in doubt has been used 

as the basis of a charge tha t there was no attack made. Will you comment on that?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

doubt about attack

The commander in the Pacific at one point was in doubt—I do not 

believe as to whether an attack had been made, but as to the character 

of the attack and the details of the attack and his doubts occurred 

for at least two reasons: First, because he had received a copy of the 

message tha t we referred to a moment ago, message [deleted] from the 

commander of the task force reporting questions about certain of the 

details of the incident, and, secondly, the commander in the Pacific 

expressed doubts because I, having seen the same message, called him 

on the telephone and said I had seen it. I had doubts as to the details. 

I wanted him to examine them, supply me additional evidence and, 

to use my words, “be damned sure th at no retaliatory action was taken 

until any doubts as to what went on were eliminated, at least to the 

point of justifying retaliation.”

Senator Lausche. Then the use of the commander of the Pacific’s 

communication to the commander of the 7th Fleet asking for extreme 

caution was the consequence of talks which you had with the commander of the Pacific t hat no re taliatory action be taken unless it was 

damned certain tha t there was an attack.
61

Secretary McNamara. That was one of the two contribu ting factors, 

the other being the cable he had gotten from the commander of the 

task force.

Senator Lausche. I might say that the report filed with the committee, the secret report, predicated doubts about the alleged—about 

the attack, because the commander of the Pacific asked for further 

inform ation wanting to make certain.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I must say again t ha t is not an accurate statement. I would like my friend from Ohio-----

Senator L ausche. Poi nt out where it is not an accurate statement.

Senator Gore. I will not take the time now, but I will be glad to do 

it privately.

Senator Lausche. P oint out where it is not, because that is the communication tha t went through.

Senator Gore. My friend from Ohio is all emotional about this.

Senator Lausche. I certainly am.

Senator Gore. But it is not an accurate statement. I will be glad to 

point it out to you privately.

Senator Lausche. Yes.

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, that covers my comment on the 

details of the incident.

The Chairman. I s it understood you will make available all of the 

conversations during this period relative to this attack ?

Secretary McNamara. That we have a record o f; yes. I am not certain, Mr. Chairman, how much record we have. Generally speaking, 

there are no records made of telephone conversations in the Defense 

Department other than communications that happen to go through a 

very special channel, which is the channel of operational command. I 

do not allow any recordings, I have none in my office, and there are no 

recordings made of conversations in any other offices of the building 

with this single exception of the operational command channel.

I do not know how much of this will be recorded. I will have to examine it to see.

The Chairman. What is the source of your statement there ?

Secretary McNamara. The source of my statement is my memory 

of what I myself said and did, since I am reporting on my own conversations.

The Chairman. I see.

Secretary McNamara. May I say one further thing? A moment ago 

someone mentioned that you understood you had been given all information excepting for one communications intelligence message. There 

were many communications intelligence messages that bore on this, at 

least nine, that I would like to acquaint you with this afternoon. I do 

not—if we have misled you to believing there was only one, I regret 

it. I am just commenting on the statement tha t someone made a moment ago.

CLASSIFICATION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY

The Chairman. Are these matters you are ta lking about now in the 

study tha t was prepared, the command and control study, which was 

not given to us ?
62

Secretary McNamara. I do not know how much of it was in there. 

It does not bear a communications intelligence classification. I do not 

know why it does not. It is classified top secret. If it were to be—if it 

were based on communications intelligence and referred to it, it would 

have to be more highly classified. 1 myself cannot explain whether he 

did or did not have access to it. I have asked people to look into it. This 

is one of the problems I have with it. We do not know exactly what 

access the author had to all the information available. I know he did 

not talk to me. I know he did not talk to General Wheeler. I do not 

believe he talked to others who participated in the decisionmaking and 

evaluating process.

The Chairman. If I can clear up a point, did you agree this morning to make that study available to the committee ?

Secrtary McNamara. If the author of it had access to raw material such as to allow him to give a balanced picture of it—and I 

frankly do not know—it is a very long, long detailed study. I understand it was for the purpose of examining some of the procedures of 

the J oin t Staff. The Chairman of the Joi nt Chiefs was not aware of it. 

I have not been aware of it. Neither one of us has yet had time to 

examine it in detail. I cannot tell you to what degree the author was 

acquainted with all of the facts relating to the incident. I know he was 

not acquainted with the facts I had in my mind because he did not ever 

talk to me about it.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, if the chairman will yield.

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Gore. Well, even though tha t be the case, it seems to me 

it would contribute to the probity of this procedure if we had the report and study, together with such information as the Secretary and 

his assistants think was lacking by reference or availability to the 

author. I hope the committee is going to dig quietly and thoroughly 

into this whole proposition because this is a very fundamental question about the decisionmaking process, and a question of war or 

peace.

The Chairman. I t is.

Senator Gore. And I would hope tha t the Secretary would make 

it available, together with such deficiencies as in his view it suffered. 

verification of incident was adequate

The Chairman. Tha t raises a question, Mr. Secretary, that is after 

the incident in September I understand you convened a formal inquiry into that incident, is that not right ?

Secretary McNamara. I thin k th at I first sent out certain representatives of my own on an informal basis to check—to see whether there 

was sufficient basis for questioning whether the incident took place, 

and then late r asked the Navy to set up an investigating group, Mr. 

Chairman.

The Chairman. That was not done on the August 2 one.

Secretary McNamara. No.

The Chairman. Why not?

Secretary McNamara. Or August 4.

Because the information was persuasive tha t it took place. I myself had doubts as to the incident of September 18 right from the 

beginning of the set of reports we received on it. It was not preceded
63

by, nor accompanied by, nor followed by intelligence reports of the 

kind tha t we bad available to us on both the August 2 and August 4 

incident.

The Chairman. I s that all you have then to say on tha t matter 

from Commander Herrick ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, sir, it is.

Secretary McNamara.WIio was the sonarman on the Maddox to whom 

he refers—an overeager sonarman—do you know ?

Secretary McNamara. I do not know whether he said man or 

men.

The Chairman. It says man.

Secretary McNamara. I can find out the name of the man.

The Chairman. I just thought you had it there. If you could supply it for the record.

Secretary McNamara. Surely, I would be happy to.

(The following information was supplied:)

To the best of our knowledge, his name is David E. Mallow, Sonorman Th ird 

Class.

The Chairman. You said this morning Commander ITerrick is in 

Norfolk.

Secretary McNamara. Norfolk, I believe.

I believe the message says “men,” not “man,” “overeager sonarmen.”

The Chairman. Was there more than one ?

Secretary McNamara. Well, at least the message says “men.”

time of order for attack

The Chairman. When was the order you mentioned a moment ago, 

the executive order-----

Secretary McNamara. Execute order.

The Chairman. When was that issued ?

Secretary McNamara. When was it what, sir?

The Chairman. When did you authorize it to be sent?

Secretary McNamara. At-----

The Chairman. Wh at time ?

Secretary McNamara. 1807 eastern daylight time, August 4.

The Chairman. Which would be?

Secretary McNamara. 6:07 p.m.

The Chairman. Out there?

Secretary McNamara. Which would be in the morning out there. 

The Chairman. Ju st 12 hours different, is it not?

Secretary McNamara. That is right, exactly; 6:07 a.m. August 5, 

gulf time.

The Chairman. Right. That was approximately 8 or 10 hours after 

the attack.

Secretary McNamara. Tha t is right.

The Chairman. I will proceed with these others.

A review of the communications sent by the Maddox and Turner Joy

during and afte r the incident on August 4 suggests tha t there was 

much confusion on the ships and contradictory inform ation coming 

from the ships. Are you personally satisfied that the evidence th en 

available of the second attack on these vessels was so conclusive th at
64

it was reasonable for the United States to retaliate by sending 64 sorties 

against N orth Vietnam?

Secretary McNamara. I am, Mr. Chairman, and in answer to the 

question, rather than take your time, I would like to have inserted here 

the first full para graph on page 19 of my statement including the 10 

or 11 bits of evidence available to me at the time the execute order was 

sent establishing beyond any reasonable doubt tha t the attack took 

place.

(The following information was subsequently supplied:)

Some of the details cited above, particular ly the stat ements of eye witnesses, 

altho ugh gathered immediately af te r the atta ck, had not reached Wash ingto n 

at the time th at the rep risa l ai r strike s were ordered executed. Sufficient inform atio n was in the hand s of the Preside nt, however, to esta blish beyond any 

doubt the n or now th at an att ack had taken place. Allow me to rep eat again 

that information:

• An intelligen ce report of a highly classified and unimpeach able na tur e received sho rtly before the engagem ent, sta tin g th at North Vietnamese naval 

forces inten ded to atta ck the MADDOX and TURN ER JOY.

• Rep orts fr om the ships th at th eir ra da rs indi cate d they were being shadowed 

by high speed surface vessels.

• Rei>orts f rom the ships th at they were being appro ached by the high-speed 

vessels an d an att ack appeared imminent.

• Rep orts from th e ship s t ha t they were und er a ttac k.

• A rep ort from the ships th at sea rch ligh t illum inat ion had been utiliz ed by 

the att ackin g craft and th at gun fire aga ins t the p atrol had been observed.

• A repo rt th at two torpedoes had passed close to the TURN ER JOY and th at 

the re had been p ositive visua l sigh tings o f wh at appe ared t o be cockpit lights 

of p atr ol cr af t passing near the MADDOX.

• An intelligen ce rep ort sta ting th at North Vietnamese nav al force s had repor ted the y w ere involved in an engagement.

• Rep orts fr om the U.S. ships th at they had sunk two and p ossibly thre e of the 

att ac kin g craf t.

• An intelligen ce report sta tin g th at North Vietnamese nav al forces had reported losing two ships in th e enga gement.

• A rep ort from the on-scene Tas k Group Commander th at he was cer tain 

th at the ambush had tak en place, altho ugh precise details of the engagemen t we re stil l not known.

• A repo rt from the Commander-in-Cliief, Pacific th at he had no doubt th at an 

att ac k had occurred.

command and control report

The Chairman. The committee has information tha t the Department of Defense has a report on the operational command and control 

procedure during the second incident. Our information is that this 

study includes the text of communications between P resident Johnson 

and Admiral Sharp and others during the period when the critical decisions were being made. I understand tha t you have reviewed this 

study you rself; is that correct ?

Secretary McNamara. Which study are we talking about, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I did not know there was b ut one, on the operational command and control procedures, the one to which we have 

already referred.

Secretary McNamara. I have not read the entire study. It is a very 

thick document. I first learned of it a few days ago when you asked 

for it. I asked my staff to get it for me at the time. They did. I glanced 

through it. It raises lots of questions, one, because its classification is 

not high enough to indicate that it covers all of the intelligence in-
65

formation which contributed significantly to our conclusion tha t an 

attack took place and, two, I know tha t the author of it did not discuss 

with me, and I am told he did not discuss with General Wheeler, events 

which took place during the day, and there are certain events which 

took place during the day that only General Wheeler, or I, or the 

President, or one or two others whom the author did not contact, 

had knowledge of.

I am not aware, for example, of any communication between President Johnson and Adm iral Sharp.

General Wheeler, do you know of any ?

General Wheeler. I know of none, sir.

The Chairman. Who was the author ?

Secretary McNamara. What was the author’s name ?

General Wheeler. Ponturo. He was an employee of the Institu te 

for Defense Analysis.

The Chairman. H ow do you spell his name ?

General Wheeler. I do not know. I would say P-o-n-t-u-r-o.

The Chairman. Ponturo. Is he still there ?

General Wheeler. Ye s; he is, sir.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, do I understand he made an unauthorized study or was it authorized ?

STUDY NOT BROUGHT TO TH E ATTENT ION OF PENTAGON CHIEFS

Secretary McNamara. He made a study for one of the sections of 

the Joi nt Staff on certain procedures and operations that th at section 

was interested in. The study was not brought to the attention of the 

Chiefs and it was not brought to my attention, and I am not familiar 

with how he made it or what access lie had to information that bore on 

the attack.

Senator Gore. Are copies widely distributed in the Department?

Secretary McNamara. Not to my knowledge.

Senator Gore. How many are there ?

Secretary McNamara. I do not know.

The Chairman. General Wheeler, do you know about that?

General Wheeler. In the first place, this was not a study. It was a 

critical incident report. I understand that there were some 40 copies 

made. I t was never coordinated within the Jo int Staff. It has been the 

practice within the Joint Staff to have a series of examinations of 

staff procedures, and this was one of the inputs to the methodology 

of improving our staff procedures, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I s this the only attempt to bring together these 

various elements in one place ? Is there any other study ?

General Wheeler. I know of no other, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. This is it. If there is one, this is it.

General Wheeler. This is it, and, as I say, until a request was made 

the other day, jus t like Mr. McNamara, I had never heard of this study 

or critical incident repo rt o r whatever you want to call it. And it had 

never been reviewed by the Joint Chieis. It had never been subjected 

to cross check within the Join t Staff, and, as the Secretary indicates, 

scanning it, which is all I have had time to do, I find errors of fact and 

I believe omissions that would be pertinent to any definitive study of 

the operation.
66

The Chairman. W ould eith er o f y ou be wi lling to inform the committee as to wh at you do or yo u hav e observed in th is re po rt o r do yo u 

wish no t to ?

Se cre tar y McNamara. I would ra th er not, Mr. Ch airm an , because 

I have no t h ad tim e to read this. I ha ve been t es tif yi ng before co mm ittees of Con gress in the last 2 weeks and th is is a doc um ent of gr ea t 

len gth, a nd I have not re ad it.

Gener al W heeler. I have rea d may be a hal f dozen pag es, Mr. 

Ch air man, an d th at is all. And any c omm ent I m ake w ould be inco mple te and m aybe misleading.

Th e Chairman. All righ t.

Does eit he r th e study o f you r own kno wledge indic ate the re were consid era ble delay s in receiving inform ation fro m the ships an d th at as 

tim e w ent on there was increa sin g evidence throw ing d oubt on w hethe r 

there h ad been a n atta ck at all ?

Se cre tar y McNamara. Abs olu tely not.

Mr. Ch airm an , I would lik e at some po int , sub ject to yo ur permission, to review in detai l the com municatio ns intellige nce inf orma tio n 

which was very im po rta nt in its effect upon ou r in terp re tatio n at the 

tim e of o th er evidence we rece ived and very impo rtan t in i ts influence 

on ou r decision at the time th at an attack ha d tak en place.

Se na tor Morse. I th in k that is very im po rta nt.

Th e C hairm an. Pa rd on me ?

Se na tor Morse. I th in k it is very im po rta nt whenever y ou want to 

hav e th e S ecret ary do th at th at i t be done.

The C hairman. I do, too.

SPECULATION ON NUMBER OF TORPEDOES FIRED

In the r ep or ts o f the att acks fro m the ships on Au gu st 4, the figure 

of 22 torped oes is given as t he numb er o f torped oes fired at th e Mad do x

an d Tu rn er Jo y. IIo w ma ny Nor th Vietnam ese pa trol boats would 

have ha d to hav e been 65 miles at sea at the tim e of th e inc ide nt in 

or de r t o fire 22 torped oes ?

Se cretary McNamara. I do no t know, Mr. Ch air ma n. I am no t entir ely sur e how many torpedoes each of the boats carri ed , bu t we had 

reason to believe at the tim e th at there were no t a larg e numb er of 

torped o boats p ar tici pa tin g in th e attack.

Th e Chairm an. T hen the re po rt t hat there were 22 is still in err or.

Se cretary M cNamara. I th in k it probably was. The re po rt th at came 

in from A dm ira l Sh ar p, a ft er he beg an h is inv estig ati on of th e details , 

sta ted th at the Tu rner J oy repo rte d two torpedoes passed ne ar here.

Th e Chairman. I th in k we have been told by someone th at a PT 

bo at ca rries two to rped oes. Does your staff know about tha t ?

Gen eral W heeler. Th at is correct.

Th e C hairm an. Is that not correc t ?

Gener al W heeler. Th at is gen era lly.

Th e C hairm an. Does a Sw ato w bo at ca rry torp edo es?

Se cretary McNamara. A Sw ato w does n ot c ar ry torpedoes.

Se na tor Morse. Co uld I ask a question the re, because you raised it, 

and I was goi ng to ask the Se cretary la ter .

On page 17 of you r state me nt this m orn ing you s aid :

In addition to the above, intelligence reports received from a highly classified and unimpeachable source r eported th at North Vietnam was making prepara-
67

’tions to attack our d estroyers with two Swatow boats and with one PT boat if 

the PT could be made re ady in time.

' Before I jump to a conclusion, I thought tha t if the Swatow boats 

attacked, they would attack with torpedoes but apparently they make 

some other kind of attacks.

Secretary McNamara. They have guns, but they do not have torpedoes, Senator Morse.

Senator Morse. Do they have heavy-cal iber guns ?

Secretary McNamara. No; relatively light, 37-millimeter guns, and 

it was this information tha t we had available to us that caused us to 

question some of the reports of numerous torpedo attacks.

The Chairman. It is unusual for a Swatow with a 37 millimeter to 

attack a destroyer with 5-inch guns anywhere under any circumstances, is it not ?

ORDER FOR SWATOWS TO ATT ACK

Secretary McNamara. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am prepared today to 

show you the order to Swatows to do that.

Senator Morse. How fast can they go? Can they catch a destroyer?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

General Wheeler. They can do 43 knots.

Senator Morse. They can ?

Senator Pell. Excuse me; if I may interrupt for one second. You 

mean there is available, there can be shown to us, an operational order 

directing a small light ship armed only with machineguns to attack 

a destroyer ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

The Chairman. Do you wish to do it at this point ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, I will have to ask the room be cleared of 

all personnel for special-----

The Chairman. Why do we not finish these and then we will come 

to that. I did not know that was necessary.

Secretary McNamara. Very good.

The Chairman. Did the North Vietnamese use shipboard radar 

during the attack ?

Secretary McNamara. I believe the answer is “Yes,” but I cannot say 

for sure.

General Wheeler. Yes; there is one message which talks about being 

painted by what they thought was a skinhead rada r, and the skinhead 

is a name"for a type of radar, a surface-search radar, which is carried 

on a Swatow-class vessel.

The Chairman. Skinhead is a strange name. Wh at does that mean 

for a layman ?

General Wheeler. All it is, it is a surface-search radar.

The Chairman. Surface search.

General Wheeler. Yes.

The Chairman. And you are saying that the Swatow did have skinhead radar ?

General Wheeler. They do have them, and, as I say, there is one 

message in the events leading up to the attack. The commander reported tha t he thought he had been contacted by a skinhead-type radar.

The Chairman. W hat was that message from? Who was it from?

General Wheeler. I will have to locate it, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Do we have that message ?
68

Mr. Bader. Senator, that is the summary of the attack from the ship 

itself.

The Chairman. This is from the Maddox.

Mr. Bader. I t is from the Turner Joy. But this is a summation.

General Wheeler (reading) :

The commander of Task Force 72.1 rej>orted at (deleted) hours position of 

vicinity of Point Delta, suspect Red Shadow 15 miles to west. Skinhead radar 

detected on same bearing.

The Chairman. What is the time of that message ?

General Wheeler. I t would be roughly, 2 :30 in the morning, eastern 

daylight time.

Captain Sweitzer. The daytime group is (deleted) Zulu.

The Chairman. The time, the local time ?

General Wiieelf.r. The local time would have been around 1430.

The Chairman. I s that 2 :30 ?

General Wheeler. Around 2 :30 in the afternoon.

The Chairman. A.m.

General Wheeler. Xo, p.m. I gave it to you first in eastern daylight 

time.

The Chairman. You mean long before the attack ?

General Wheeler. Yes.

The Chairman. This was very early in the game, before-----

Captain Sweitzer. It is the afternoon. The attack took place tha t 

evening.

The Chairman. This was about 6 hours before the attack took place?

General Wheeler. Roughly.

The Chairman. I s that correct ?

General Wheeler. That is correct.

The Chairman. I t was the afternoon of the 4th at approximately 

2 :30. I thought it was afterward. Read tha t again. I am getting the 

picture now.

General Wheeler. It said:

The commander of the task force reporting his position as being in the 

vicinity of Point Delta. Suspect shadow 15 miles to west, skinhead rad ar detected 

on same bearing.

The Chairman. Is that the only evidence of a ra dar being used ?

General Wheeler. I cannot answer the question.

LOCA TION OF TORPEDO BOAT

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, Point Delta is close to the Vietnamese 

coast, and I do not know what would be unusual about a torpedo 

boat or some other Vietnamese craft being at that point.

The Chairman. IIow close is it to the island?

Senator Gore. It is not—if you look on your map, it is not near the 

island. It is up here.

The Chairman. At the top.

Senator Gore. Ju st judging from this distance, I would say it is 

maybe 12 miles or 15 miles, something like that, from the coast.

The Chairman. I see. What I was try ing to understand in my question here and I will ask if the Xorth Vietnamese used shipboard radar 

during the attack. Yours is long before, the attack, 6 hours before the 

attack.
69

General Wheeler. Then I responded incorrectly, Mr. Chairman. 

I do not recall any message reporting anything during the attack. I wanted to make the point here. Since you asked about radar, I was making the point tha t shipboard radar associated with Swatow type 

vessels were in the vicinity-----

The Chairman. I see.

General Wheeler. Of the task group.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, would there be anything p artic ularly 

significant about a Vietnamese Swatow boat being within the 

coastal-----

General 'Wheeler. The only point I am try ing to make, Senator, is 

this: He reported he suspected a shadow 15 miles to his west, a vessel tha t was shadowing him and using rad ar to keep him under detection.

Senator Gore. I f he was near the Point Delta which I am advised 

here was 11 miles east of the Vietnam east coast, and if he observed a 

Swatow’ some miles west of him, tha t wrould mean tha t he observed 

maybe, if tha t is what it was, a Vietnamese Swatow somewhere along 

the Vietnamese coastline.

General Wheeler. This would be possible, yes, sir.

Senator Gore. W hat would th at indicate?

General W heeler. The point I am trying to make, Senator, is th at 

he felt he was being shadowed by this vessel. The vessel was following him and track ing him, keeping him under observation.

Senator Gore. Would tha t be unusual if a U.S. vessel were 11 

miles off the Vietnamese coast, would it be unusual for a Vietnamese Swatow or gunboat to be watching somewhere between him and the 

coast ?

General Wheeler. Well, I would say tha t in the past De Soto 

patrols there had been intermittent contacts but not the steady contact that the task force commander was reporting.

Senator Gore. I do not wish to be niggling about it, but it just 

does not seem to me it shows anything.

The Chairman. Let me see if w’e can get to this. If durin g the 

attack the Maddox and Turner Joy detected this rada r, they would 

repo rt that, would they not, during the attack?

General Wheeler. I am not sure, Mr. Chairman. I cannot answer 

the question.

MEANS OF LOCATING AMERICAN VESSELS

The Chairman. Let me ask you, if there w as no radar, how would 

these patrol cra ft manage on a dark night, which the Secretary has 

already described, to find the Maddox and Turner Joy 65 miles at 

sea, how would they possibly locate them without radar?

General Wheeler. They could be using some variety of radar, 

which is one way of doing it. I have some naval officers here. Maybe 

they could advise me better as to other ways they might do it.

The Chairman. Would radar be the normal way for this kind of 

a boat to locate another?

General Wheeler. I have been given three answers. They could 

track on the wakes of the destroyers, they could have been vectored by radars on the shore, or they could have been vectored from Swatows 

over the horizon.

The Chairman. Well, in the Turner Jo y18 communication of the 

5th, it is h ard to iden tify this, the date time is [deleted] says this:
70

“Estimate two P T’s attack originally. However must admit two factors defer. Xo. ECM”—which I take it is electronic activity—activity 

from PT boats. However, tactics seem to be to bore-sight on wake 

thus accounting for lack of rad ar signals. Xo sonar indications of 

torpedo noises even that which passed down side. Self noise was very 

high.”

In other words, he is saying there was no rad ar signal during the 

attack. He says no sonar indication or torpedo noises, even th at which 

passed downside. Self-noise was very high. We gath er from other 

messages th at when these destroyers rev up to 30 knots or more, that 

it interferes with the operation of the sonar; is th at correct?

General Wheeler. Tha t is my understanding.

The Chairman. That is my understanding from this. So it would 

indicate there was no ra dar durin g the attack.

Mr. Secretary, I will try to get on with this. Are you satisfied tha t 

the command and control techniques then used were adequate and th at 

the President had such reliable information available to him tha t he 

could reasonably have ordered the air strikes against a nation with 

which w e were not at war ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, s ir , I am.

SCOPE AN D RE TA LI ATI ON

The Chairman. Why did the United States consider it necessary 

to retaliate against North Vietnam in a manner so completely disproportionate to the nature of the offense?

Secretary McNamara. Air. Chairm an, I do not believe it was disproportionate to the offense. W e had had tw’o attacks on U.S. naval 

vessels operating on the high seas in an entirely legal fashion. One of 

the attacks occurred after a warning from the President that we would 

continue to operate in those waters in a legal fashion and tha t a further attack would have grave consequences. The attack itself was very 

limited in character; i t was directed against the bases of the attacking 

boats and their petroleum support facility. It was not followed by any 

further actions.

The Chairman. How many missions were flown against the installations on the shore?

Secretary McNamara. I cannot give you the answer from memory, 

but I will be happy to insert it here.

(The following information was supplied:)

64 attac k sorties were flown against the installations.

The Chairman. Well, there were 64, were there not?

Secretary McNamara. I do not recall the number.

The Chairman. Why do you call 64 missions such a limited attack 

occurring within hours ofter that? I think tha t is a very vigorous 

attack.

Secretary McNamara. It is a limited response because we attacked 

such low-value targets as the bases of the PT boats instead of the much 

more important military ta rgets that lay within the range of those 64 

flight paths.

The Chairman. Why did we not take the issue to the United Nations 

before retaliation?

Secretary McNamara. We had no reason to lielieve the United Nations could have acted in any effective manner.
71

The Chairman. Why did we not protest to the International Control 

Commission as the North Vietnamese did on July 31, 2 days before 

the first incident, when Hanoi formally protested the attacks on its 

islands?

Secretary McNamara. Because the Internationa l Control Commission has a record of failure in investigating incidents of this kind and 

has consistently refused to extend its operation to the point where it 

can investigate them effectively.

Senator Lausche. May I ask a question ?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Lausche. Do you know of any incident in which the Inter ­

national Control Commission, I think made up of Canada, Poland, 

and India, has taken action when requested so as to bring about a 

settlement of disputes,

Secretary McNamara. I know of none. I know of some cases, some of 

them quite recent, where it has even refused to accept outside help 

offered to it when the ruler of the nation in which it is located has 

asked that it increase the effectiveness of its investigation.

RO LE OF T H E U N IT E D N A TIO N S

Senator Lausche. Have we gone to the United Nations asking it to 

intervene in South Vietnam and lias the United Nations in any event 

intervened ?

Secretary McNamara. The United Nations has not taken effective 

action with respect to South Vietnam although we have on many 

occasions indicated our willingness to have it act in the situation.

Senator Lausche. Why has it not taken action ?

Secretary McNamara. Senator Lausche, I can only conclude-----

Senator Lausche. Well, Russia will not permit it to do it.

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

Senator L ausche. So the questions why we did not go to the Inter ­

national Control Commission and why we did not go to the United 

Nations are answered by the fact that neither of those agencies have 

ever exercised the authority assigned to them.

The Chairman. I do not wish to argue about it.

Senator Lausche. But your questioning implies-----

The Chairman. I do not think it is correct. I think your statement 

is quite in error.

Senator Morse. We never submitted a resolution to the United Nations that meets the law—never.

The Chairman. I t is no t the issue in this case about Vietnam. The 

North Vietnamese did protest afte r the attack on the 31st, which was 

just a few days before, to the ICC.

Mr. Secretary, when was the decision made to bomb North Vietnam ?

Secretary McNamara. The execute order was released at 1806, I 

believe, 1807.

The Chairman. Th at is the issue.

Secretary McNamara. On the 4th of August.

The Chairman. When was—was there no consideration of this prior 

to that time ?

Secretary McNamara. No decision was made prio r to t hat time, Mr. 

Chairman. The consideration of it, the discussion of it, had proceeded 

all day long star ting at the Department of Defense level at about 10 

o’clock that morning.
72

The Chairman. And the decision to execute it was deferred until 

after the attack, but the orders were already made, is tha t right?

Secretary McNamara. No, sir; consideration of it was not even 

undertaken until we received a message indicating tha t the North 

Vietnamese had issued orders to initiate the attack. The discussion of 

it took place durin g the attack and afte r the attack, and the execute 

order was issued after we were certain in our own mind that the attack 

had taken place and that it was intentional.

The Chairman. So that you are certain that no decision was made 

to attack North Vietnam p rior to the issuance of the execute order.

Secretary McNamara. I am positive of that.

The Chairman. General Wheeler told us during the August 6 hearings tha t the North Vietnamese patrol boats were found dead in the 

water at their base as the U.S. aircra ft attacked. If the North Vietnamese had actually attacked the Maddox and Turner Joy. why would 

they leave offensive patrol c raft tied up at the dock without any alert?

General Wheeler. I suppose they presumed since we had not retaliated against them afte r the first attack on Maddox that we would 

not retaliate when they had a second attack, Mr. Chairman.

Senator L ausche. May I on tha t item comment, Why did we leave 

the Pueblo unprotected and unguarded when we were in there?

The Chairman. Well, I remember from your testimony it strikes me 

that they are extraordinarily stupid. If a fter having attacked at approximately 9,10 o’clock in the evening, that all those boats are in their 

berths only a few miles. 60 miles away without any alert at all, sitting 

there quite vulnerable to destruction from attack—I would not do that.

General Wheeler. I would say there were two factors, Air. Chairman. The one I mentioned a moment ago and the others would be the 

speed with which we retaliated. In other words, had they anticipated 

retaliation, they probably did not anticipate tha t we would be quite 

as prompt.

Furthermore, vessels which had taken part in the attack would undoubtedly have had to replenish after having gotten back to port. 

BRIEFINGS ON NORTH VIETNAMESE TARGETS

The Chairman. Were the patrols and crews tha t participated in the 

attack against the North Vietnamese oil depots and patrol bases briefed 

on their targets prior to the incidents of August 4?

General Wheeler. No, sir; I do not see how they could have been.

The Chairman. Do you know anything, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McNamara. No, I would say exactly the same thing, Mr. 

Chairman.

The Chairman. You say they were not.

Secretary McNamara. I do not know how they could have been. 

There was no plan to attack those targets, no decision to attack them. 

I do not know any reason why the crews would have been briefed on 

those targets.

General Wheeler. I was not present for a portion of the day because I had been absent in New York, and I did not get back to Washington until 4 :30 of the afternoon-----

The Chairman. What day is this ?

General Wheeler. This was the day of the 4th, Mr. Chairman. In 

my absence the Secretary had met with the JC ’s on a couple of occa-
73

sions, and when I returned I found th at my colleagues were engaged in 

discussing the types of targe ts tha t might be struck and so on. As I 

recall, they had recommended a series of targets which in turn were 

recommended to the Secretary, and the targets, after having been 

modified, were the ones th at were finally approved for strike. So I do 

not see how the pilots could possibly have been briefed prio r to the 

time.

Secretary McNamara. Refresh my memory on this. Am I not correct 

in saying that the time of the strike was influenced in part by Admiral 

Sha rp’s statement th at he would need time to brief the pilots and load 

the aircra ft ?

General Wheeler. Th at is correct—and load the aircraft.

Secretary McNamara. I think we can find th at in some message. I 

believe I remember reading it or hearing it at the time.

General Wheeler. In fact, he said it would be tight, if I recall correctly.

The Chairman. How long does it normally take to brief—strike that.

How many planes were engaged in making the 64 strikes? There 

were 64 missions according to the information we have.

General Wheeler. There were about 59 aircraft, all told, Mr. Chairman, that engaged in the operation, and there was a tota l of 59 in the 

first wave, and 21 in the second wave on a recycle.

The Chairman. How many targets were there ?

General Wheeler. There was a total of six all told, I believe.

Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question ?

The Chairman. Ju st as soon as he finishes.

General Wheeler. Six.

The Chairman. Six targets.

General Wheeler. Yes.

The Chairman. How long does it normally take to brief a crew of 59 

on a mission ?

General Wheeler. I would say that in a case like th is you have to 

get out targ et materials and so on, and tha t you would want at least 

an hour in order to do it, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Well, how would you account, Mr. Secretary—well, 

pardon me—yes, Senator?

PR ES IDEN TIAL APPROVAL FOR ATT ACK S

Senator Lausche. Did the President approve these attacks upon the 

Vietnamese patrol bases ?

Secretary McNamara. Oh, yes, Senator Lausche. The President was 

kept informed fully during the day. I was just checking my diary last 

night as to the number of calls and meetings I had with him and it exceeded 11 during the day and it was late in the afternoon that he 

approved the attacks.

The Chairman. Did the President also order a series of additional 

measures such as sending aircraft into South Vietnam and fighterbomber aircraft into Thailand?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

Te Chairman. And following that the President came to the Congress, the Senate of the United States, Congress of the United States, 

asking for the passage of the resolution.

Secretary McNamara. Yes; that is correct.
74

The Chairman. When does your diary show tha t the President 

authorized the attack, what time?

Secretary McNamara. I think it was about 6 o’clock in the afternoon that his final authorization was made. It had been tentatively 

authorized subject to the final information on the details of the incident earlier in the afternoon. We met some time shortly after 3, and 

then I talked to him five times after that and it was in the last conversation that it was authorized at about 6 o’clock.

The Chairman. Six o’clock on the evening of the-----

Secretary McNamara. August 4.

The Chairman. Of the 4th, which would be 6 o’clock on the morning of the 5th in Vietnam.

Secretary McNamara. That is correct.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Secretary, how do you account for the fact tha t the North 

Vietnamese boasted of their attack on the Maddox on August 2 and 

yet vehemently denied tha t there h ad been an incident on August 4 ?

Secretary McNamara. I cannot answer the question, Mr. Chairman. 

Their damage may have been greater on the 4th than it was on the 

2d, I just do not know.

The Chairman. Do you have any idea, General Wheeler?

General Wheeler. I have no idea, Mr. Chairman.

EVIDENCE FROM CAPTURED NORTH VIETNAM ESE OFFICER

The Chairman. A North Vietnamese commander who was a squadron commander of the North Vietnamese patrol cra ft told U.S. investigators after his capture that the North Vietnamese had attacked 

the Maddox on August 2 but tha t there had been no attack on August 

4.1 This denial was consistent with interrogation reports of several 

other members of a North Vietnamese naval vessel who were captured 

by the United States in 1966.

How can we account for this denial when this particular officer 

gave the United States valuable information that led to the destruction of a number of North Vietnamese installations? In other words, 

the report we have shows that he d id give you quite a lot of information which was very useful in your attacks but he denied there was 

any attack at all on the 4th ?

Secretary McNamara. First, Nlr. Chairman, I believe I am correct 

in saying he was not a squadron commander. This is of some importance because the name of the squadron commander was given to 

us a year after the interrogation you speak of by another North 

Vietnamese naval officer whom we captured. We had evidence at the 

time of the attack th at a man by th at name participated in the attack 

and we have the boat number th at he was operating from, and it was 

stated that that boat participated in the attack, so I think that the 

statement you made is erroneous.

Second, I do not believe he stated there was no attack on the 4th. 

I think he said he had no knowledge of such an attack.

Third, I do not believe th at it is correct to say that his statement 

was consistent with information of others from other captives whom

1

 Identified in a Navy publication as a "division commander” of a “torpedo boat division.”
75

wo interrogated. I am not aware tha t tha t is true. It is possible it is 

true, but 1 would have thought it would have come to my attention 

if it was. I am not aware of it.

And finally, most importantly, as I mentioned to you earlier today, 

in July of 1967 we captured an individual of some rank in the North 

Vietnamese Navy who gave us the name of the squadron commander 

in charge of the PT boats participating in the August 2 attack, and 

it is that name that we had reported to us as having participa ted in 

the August 4 attack at the time of the attack, and it is Ins boat by number that we had reported to us as having participated in the August 4 

attack at the time of the attack.

The Chairman. Will you give us the second report-----

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

The Chairman (continuing). That you got in 1967?

Secretary McNamara. I would be very happy to.

The Chairman. For the record, I want to complete it, and read what 

the Navy’s own report has to say with regard to this interrogation.

Extensive interrogation of all potentially— 

this is from the report of the Navy—

Extensive interrogation of all potentially knowledgeable sources reveals they 

have no info concerning a NVN attack on U.S. ships on 4 August 1964. They 

state definitely and emphatically tha t no PT’s could have been involved. They 

do have knowledge of a U.S. air attack on 5 August in which at least one and 

possibly three *Swatow PGM’s were sunk by AOFT in vicinity of the Gianh 

River (17-43N/106-30E). Slight damage was also inflicted by ACFT on 2 PT’s 

this date as stated Ref Alfa.

2. The possibility that Swatows could have committed the 4 Aug attack has 

also been carefully explored. Here again, however, all sources disclaim any 

knowledge of such an attack. Based on the experience of interrogations thus far 

it is very possible that PT boat crews in general might not have heard of this 

attack since they apparently have little contact with other ship types. On the 

other hand, source I deleted] obviously has traveled in higher circles and has 

proved himself exceptionally knowledgeable on almost every naval subject and 

event of interest. Yet he specifically and strongly denies that any attack took 

place. When pressed fur the r on this issue he states that if such an attack did 

take place, it could only have been committed by Swatows.

Senator Lausche. Will you comment on that ?

Secretary McNamara.. Yes. I think, Mr. Chairman, we should stop 

hero and get into this communications intelligence because it bears on 

this issue and I am afraid tha t the record will be distorted unless we 

introduce it at this point.

The Chairman. All rig ht.

Secretary McNamara. With your permission I would like to do so 

and I would like to ask those who have not received clearance for 

special intelligence other than the Members of Congress to leave the 

room if they would.

The Chairman. All right.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask, I know that your 

time is very limited—do I understand tha t you do not wish to come 

back again a t any time before the committee before you leave?

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, if the committee feels tha t 

it is essential that I return, I will in some way or other try to return,

♦Note: From earlier Interroga tion source stated th at Swatows are neit her designed 

nor intended fo r missions agains t large ships.

90 -18 7— 68------ 6
76

but I look at the 10 or 11 days that lie ahead of me. I don’t see how it is 

possible.

The Chairman. We may not.

I would like to ask a few questions.

POSSIBLE APPEARANCE OF OTHER WITNESS

Is there any objection on the p art of the Department to our having 

Commander Herrick who was commander of the task force appear 

before the committee?

Secretary McNamara. None, no objection.

The Chairman. Mr. Ponturo, is that his name ?

Secretary McNamara.. In his case-----

The Chairman. Ponturo. Is he still in the Departm ent ?

Secretary McNamara. He is not an employee of the Department 

so fa r as I know. He is an employee of an outside agency, the Institute 

for Defense Analysis. I don’t know whether it would be appropriate 

Mr. Chairman, for him to appear.

The Chairman. Then you have nothing to do about it.

Secretary McNamara. We have something to do about it because 

the Institute for Defense Analysis is under contract to the Defense 

Department; but I just can’t answer your question.

The Chairman. Put i t this wa y: the Defense Department will not 

raise any objection to his appearing; is that correct ?

Secretary McNamara. I can’t say that, Mr. Chairman. I just don’t 

know the man. I don’t know his qualifications, I don’t know just how 

much he knows about this. I am very reluctant to see witnesses appear for the Defense Department who are not qualified to testify fully 

and completely on the questions raised to them. I am quite happy to 

have Commander Herrick appear and testify on anything th at relates 

to his activities there because I know he was present and is a qualified 

witness.

I don’t know Ponturo, I never heard of him. I haven’t the faintest 

idea what his qualifications are. I know nothing about the man and, 

hence, I am reluctant to say we concur in his appearance.

The Chairman. I t is strange he would be given access to all these 

papers and be given the duty to prepare a repo rt w ithout having him 

cleared.

Secretary McNamara. I can only tell you I lack knowledge.

The Chairman. General Wheeler, you know nothing about it?

General Wheeler. I know nothing of him, sir. At one time in the 

operations of the J-3, this is the operation division of the Joint 

Staff, certain employees of IDA were in there assisting and looking 

at the Joint Staff operations with an idea of helping us to improve 

them, and this gentleman was one of several at some time or another 

who assisted.

The Chairman. They would be of the highest clearance. They 

wouldn’t allow him to assist without being cleared.

General Wheeler. It would depend on what type of operation they 

are working on, Mr. Chairman. If he were operating in the communications intelligence field he would have to have the necessary 

clearances. I mean we grade them according to whatever they have 

to do.
77

STATUS OF COM MAN D AND CONTROL REPOR T

The Chairman. I understand the grading. You have seen this report, 

Mr. Stempler wrote the committee, with regard to this document, “I t 

is an internal paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is currently under 

review by the Chairman,” tha t was Janua ry 23. I just want to try to 

get where we s tand with regard to this matter. You have had all the 

time—or do you want more time or will you make it available? I want 

to know what to instruct the staff.

Secretary McNamara. I think I covered th at this morning.

The Chairman. You will make it available?

Secretary McNamara. I simply stand on what I said.

The Chairman. I have forgotten what you said. Will you refresh 

my memory ?

Secretary McNamara. What I said was tha t I was not fam iliar with 

the report, I am not familiar with the man, and I don’t know the degree to which he had access to all of the information tha t is required 

to obtain a proper understanding of the incident. I know he didn’t 

have access to some of it; he did n’t talk to General Wheeler about his 

participation, and he didn’t talk to me about my participation. There 

is information tha t he could not have obtained regarding the incident 

unless he talked to General Wheeler or me, or to the President or one 

or two others who had been in on th e discussions, and under these circumstances I am not willing to release a report until I know more 

about it.

General Wheeler. Furthermore, I don’t know, but I am informed 

tha t Mr. Ponturo ’s report has no communications intelligence in it. I 

don’t know whether he is cleared or not, and tha t is one of the weaknesses of the report.

Secretary McNamara. At least it doesn’t have a communications-----

The Chairman. Could you clear this up for us? Could you inform 

the committee, give us a memorandum on what the situation is? Could 

tha t be done ?

Secretary McNamara. We will be happy to.

The Chairman. In the near future?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

Senator Gore. And the location now of the 40 reports, the 40 copies?

Secretary McNamara. Su rely; I don’t know where they are.

The Chairman. I don’t care where they all are, but I would just 

like to get one of them.

Senator Gore. Let’s know where they are. You will find some in the 

Rand Corp.

The Chairman. I have been told there was a very responsible scientist who was well informed about and working in Defense Intelligence 

by the name of Fubini. Do you know such a man ?

Secretary McNamara. I do indeed, although I don’t think he was 

working in Defense Intelligence.

The Chairman. Well, do you t rus t him? Is he a trustworthy man?

Secretary McNamara. He is a very able individual in his field, which 

is electrical engineering and associated subjects.

The Chairman. Assuming he did have knowledge of this matter, do 

you have any objection to our calling him ?

Secretary McNamara. No, I have objection to his being called. H e 

is a private individual now not working for the Defense Department.
78

Let me simply say this, I am certain he didn't have full and complete knowledge of this incident.

The Chairman. Well, he may have had some knowledge.

Secretary McNamara. He was at tha t time, he would have been 

Deputy Director of Research and Engineering. He was not a p art of 

the intelligence organization.

The Chairman. Yes, but as a man, you regard him as a trustworthy 

American ?

Secretary McNamara. I do indeed, but I don’t regard all trustworthy Americans as competent witnesses on the Gulf of Tonkin inciCOMMITTEE CONTACT WITH OTHER INTERESTED PERSONS

The Chairman. As a result of the committee’s review and the general interest in this subject, there have been certain individuals, civilian and military, who have sought out the committee or the staff. 

There also have been newspaper reports based on press interviews 

based on officers and men on the Turner Joy. I refer to an AP report in 

Jul y 1967, for example, which was well before this committee had any 

idea of review. Have any military or civilian employees been disciplined in any way for talking to the press, communicating with this 

committee or otherwise breaching security ?

Secretary McNamara. None to my knowledge. As a ma tter of fact,, 

we have leaned over backwards to avoid talking to certain of the individuals to whom the committee has talked, to avoid any indication 

tha t we might in any way have disciplined them or pressured them in 

relation to what they would say to us or to the committee.

The Chairman. Are you aware of a commander who voluntarily 

called up and came to a member of the staff of this committee, talked, 

at his request, with the chairman and a member of the staff, and the 

next day was picked up and sent to a psychiatric ward?

Secretary McNamara. No, sir; I am not aware of that incident.

The Chairman. Would you believe i t if I told you it is a trut h?

Secretary McNamara. Well, I would not believe tha t we would 

penalize a man in any way for talking to this committee, assuming he 

told the truth. I think it would be a monstrous act if we sent a man to 

a psychiatric ward even if he told a falsehood to the committee, and 

I can’t believe i t was done. I will be very happy to investigate it.

Senator Morse. How do you mean, Mr. Chairman, tha t he was requested to take a psychological examination?

The Chairman. Tha t is right. And he was examined by this place, 

I can’t—it slips my mind at the moment—but this was all initiated by 

him, we had nothing to do with it. I mean we didn’t initiate it. I never 

heard of him. He called a member of the staff and requested to relieve, 

as he said, himself of a burden. He was, the next day, taken for a 

psychiatric examination but after the examination he was found to 

be fit, and returned to duty. I t seemed to me to be a very ominous thing 

if a man like this would be picked up like he was.

Lastly-----

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, may I simply say on th at if 

there is any feeling on the pa rt of the committee that the examination 

of this man by psychiatric personnel was in retaliation for his report 

to the staff, I will personally have the Inspector General analyze the 

case and I will promise to discipline anyone who took action of that 

kind.
79

The Chairman. I am not really seeking to discipline anyone, bnt it 

seemed to me it was an unusual circumstance that the next day after he 

•came over, and this man had been in the so-called flag plot of the 

Pentagon during the incidents referred to here, and he felt it was on 

his conscience, and he had been in the Navy a long time, and I am sure 

your people, some of them know about it, and I would interpret it since 

be was picked up the next day, as being a gesture intended to intimidate him or anybody else who did such a thing.

Secretary McNamara. NEr. Chairm an, I will have the Inspector 

General investigate it and send a report to the committee. I can’t believe tha t any individual, civilian or military in the Defense Department would behave tha t way w ith respect to any man whether he gave 

true or false testimony to the committee.

Furthermore, if the man you are speaking of is the man I am thin king about he was not assigned to flag plot at the time of the August 2 

and August 4 incidents.

The Chairman. Well, he said he was. T hat is subject to proof, I 

guess.

JUS TIFICA TIO N OF COMMITTEE INQ UIR Y j"

Lastly, it was, I thin k you said this morning—I don’t have the 

quotation—tha t anyone who entertained a doubt about these events 

was engaged in a monstrous affair. D on't you agree that in view of the 

conflicting nature of the testimony, especially from the commander of 

the task force, that there was a reasonable justification for at least this 

committee inquiring into these incidents?

•Secretary McNamara. First, Mr. Chairman, I don’t think I said this 

morning that it was monstrous for anyone to retain a doubt about this. 

I thin k I said there is no doubt about the attack of August 2. Th at 

was one statement I made.

The Chairman. We don’t allege that at all.

Secretary McNamara. I understand. I am saying what I said, and, 

secondly, I stated in the latter part of my statement that the insinuation or the suggestion that the Government of the United States induced the incident on August 4 with the intent of providing an excuse 

to take retaliatory action, I could only characterize as monstrous. Tha t 

is quite a different thing from saying it is monstrous tha t anybody 

should doubt what happened.

The Chairman. Well, I don’t think anyone, I don’t believe anyone, 

certainly myself, entertained the idea this was a plot or a conspiracy.

The point really is, and I thin k there is evidence sufficiently to 

justify an inquiry as to whether or not the decisionmaking process, 

with all these conflicting reports coming in, is sufficiently accurate and 

reliable to justify taking such a decision to declare war on another 

country, which was the immediate outgrowth of this particular series 

of events.

Secretary McNamara. I didn’t comment on that.

COMMITTEE ACTED W IT H INCOMPLETE EVIDENCE

The Chairman. I think this conunittee, and certainly as chairman 

of the committee I think it was very unf air to ask us to vote upon a 

resolution when the state of the evidence was as uncertain as I think 

it now is, even if your intercepts are correct. Of course, none of those
80

intercepts were mentioned to us, I don’t believe, in the testimony on 

August 6. Your statement and General Wheeler’s was without any 

doubt, any equivocation that there was an all-out attack.

I submit that even if you give the most favorable interpretations to 

these reports th at it was fa r less than positive and unequivocal as your 

statement before the committee indicates.

This has been very serious to me and all members of th is committee 

and the Senate.

We have taken what is called the functional equivalent of a declaration of war upon evidence of this kind, and action as precipitate as this 

was. Even the commander, that is one of the crucial cablegrams from 

the commander of the task force, recommended that nothing be done 

until the evidence was further evaluated. I read it this morning, I 

won’t read it again.

But that alone almost, if I had known of tha t one telegram, if 

tha t had been put before me on the 6th of August, I certainly don't believe I would have rushed into action.

We met, if you will recall for 1 hour and 40 minutes, in a joint meeting of the Armed Services and this committee and we accepted your 

statement completely without doubt. I went on the floor to urge 

passage of the resolution. You quoted me, as saying these things on 

the floor. Of course all my statements were based upon your testimony. I had no independent evidence, and now I think I did a great 

disservice to the Senate. I feel very guilty for not having enough 

sense at that time to have raised these questions and asked for evidence. I regret it.

I have publicly apologized to my constituents and the countrv for 

the unwise action I took, without at least inquiring into the basis. 

It never occurred to me th at there was the slightest doubt, certainly 

on the part of Commander Herrick who was in charge of the task force 

tha t this attack took place. He obviously had doubts, his own cablegram so states. That is the reason for it. I feel a very deep responsibility, and I regret it more than anything I have ever done in my 

life, tha t I was the vehicle which took tha t resolution to the floor 

and defended it in complete reliance upon information which, to say 

the very least, is somewhat dubious at this time.

Well, I just wanted to make that for the record.

Now, I think other members should have an opportunity.

Secretary McNamara. May I simply at this point make one very 

brief comment?

I don’t believe Commander Herrick in his cable stated he had doubt 

the attack took place. He questioned certain of the details of the attack and, secondly, his questions-----

The C hairman. Mr. Secretary-----

Secretary McNamara. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman, secondly, his 

doubts we resolved tha t afternoon before the retaliatory action was 

taken.

The Chairman. I think he went much furthe r than that. He advised you not to do anything until it had been reevaluated. I don’t 

want to burden the record but it is a very strong statement.

Secretary McNamara. Nothing was done until it was reevaluated.

The Chairman. He says “Suggest complete evaluation before any 

further action.”
81

Now, that is a very strong recommendation from a man on the scene 

in charge of the operation.

Senator Gore. Bead it.

CH AI RM AN WOULD HA VE ACTED DI FFER EN TL Y IN 1964 W IT H MORE 

EVIDE NCE

The Chairman. If I had had enough sense to require complete 

evaluation I never would have made the mistake I did. If I had had 

notice of tha t particu lar cable in 1964 I think I would have had 

enough sense at least to raise a warning sign, and normally this committee does have hearings and questions. I don't know why, what possessed me, the background was such tha t I went along, of course I 

wasn’t the only one. Both committees, except for the Senator from 

Oregon, unanimously accepted your testimony then as the whole 

story, and I must say this raises very serious questions about how you 

make decisions to go to war.

I mean, this is not a small matter tha t we are in, in Vietnam, and 

I think for the futu re, the least I can do and the committee can do, 

is to alert future committees and future Senates that these matters are 

not to be dealt with in this casual manner.

I felt very badly about it, about the m atter. I must say tha t I don’t 

blame you personally for this. These communications were very conflicting, and I don’t think—I never meant to leave the impression tha t 

I thought you were deliberately trying to deceive us, bu t I must confess I think the evidence is very conflicting and warrants wdiat Mr. 

Herrick suggested—time to evaluate what the evidence was—which 

we didn’t do.

Well, I delivered myself.

Senator Mansfield, do you have a question ?

Secretary McNamara. Two points, Mr. Chairm an, if I may, only 

10 seconds.

One, the commander evaluated it th at afternoon, concluded an attack 

took place and came to a conclusion before the retaliatory action was 

executed.

Two, I know of no evidence since that time tha t would support the 

conclusion this attack did not take place. That is all I have to say.

The Chairman. Well, there is evidence, you, yourself, I mean, the 

evidence of one captured man, there are a number of things depending 

upon credibility of the people.

It isn’t all tha t clear cut.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, there is at least evidence that a 

doubt existed even after the order went out, because the order to loose 

the retaliation we are informed went on at 6: 30 and at 7: 06 Admiral 

Moorer of CincPac cabled the Maddox and Turner Joy to report 

immediate confirmation of the earlier attack on them.

The Chairman. He still had evident doubt after the order had been 

given there or he wouldn’t make the inquiry.

Secretary McNamara. This was simply a response to the earlier inquiry of Sharp who got the information by other channels before tha t 

time.

Senator Mansfield. Mr. Chairman, my remarks will be brief.
82

secretary m’namara testified in good faith

I felt at the time th at Secretary McNamara when he was before us 

tha t he was being as candid and as honest as he could be in the light of 

all the facts which were at his disposal.

I still feel the same way, and I happy that this additional highly 

confidential information was made available, and because to me it 

seems to establish a fairly close correlation between the intelligence 

and the reports sent back from this particu lar task force at tha t 

time.

Of course there are questions in all of our minds, I am sure there 

are still questions in the Secretary’s mind.

But three and a h alf years ago is a long time, and you were under 

pressure, we were under pressure. Maybe we did some things tha t we 

wouldn’t do if we would be more careful and tha t is the reason for 

tha t resolution of yours.

The Chairman. Don’t call it mine. I didn’t originate it. It was the 

administration’s resolution.

Senator Mansfield. No, no, I am speaking of the resolution which 

is pending on the calendar as to which we w ill take up later this year.

The Chairman. I see. I thought you were talking about this commitment resolution. I apologize. [Laughter.]

Senator Mansfield. 1 wonder myself what I would say if 3% years 

later I was called upon to testify. I am quite sure that I wouldn’t do a 

very good job because I have a hard job remembering what goes on the 

week before, let alone what happened so long ago.

That is all I have got to say.

The Chairman. Senator Aiken, do you have any questions?

Senator Aiken. I hate to see Russia reaping so many benefits, th at 

is all. We ought to do something about that.

The Chairman. That is, from the war you mean ?

Senator Aiken. Yes.

The Chairman. Well, I do, too.

Senator Aiken. T hat is the only thing tha t came to mind. I have 

nothing to say. But, as I have said frequently, the last 3 years have 

gone by. The next 3 years, the next 3 months should be very interesting.

The Chairman. Is that all ?

Senator Aiken. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Morse?

Senator Morse. Air. Chairman, I would have very, very many questions if we were going to trial. We are not on trial. Time would not 

permit the asking of the questions if we were in trial, and I only want 

to say to the Secretary tha t I thin k he knowTs no m atter how much I 

disagree I have an exceedingly high regard and respect for him.

I am sorry I shall so completely disagree.

N E W EV ID EN CE DOES N O T AL TE R SK EPT IC IS M

He has not said anything here today, a single thing today, that 

changes anything I said on the floor of the Senate in August 1964 and 

what I said in committee at the time in our very short hearing. I 

don’t think we have been talking all day about what we ought to be 

talking about, the Tonkin Bay Resolution.
83

I think we ought to be talking about what preceded the incidents 

and what brought about the incident and our involvement in Tonkin 

Bay at the time. We have a right to have freedom of the sea. But a 

right with regard to it doesn't justify following the course of action 

or give the right to create it. As to comments tha t I made in August 

1964,1 didn’t make them in a vacuum.

I was communicated with by sources at the Pentagon Building in 

whom I have high confidence, that raised a lot of doubts in my mind. 

I remember, I said, I don't have to have it in front of me but I paraphrase it, “You ought to get the logs because this Senator suggests 

you had better ask f or the logs. You had better ask for some facts as 

to where those ships were and how they got there and what the knowledge of the Navy was in advance of the incident.”

What I have heard here today verifies all the information I received 

before I ever said anything in August 1964.

You see, what I think we never come to grips with is what we were 

doing long before the 2d and the 4th, long before the incidents of 

Tonkin Bay- The fact we had this kind of a presence there, that we 

were stimulating the electronic devices of the N orth Vietnamese, that 

we were carrying on intelligence operations was wrong. The Maddox

was, on this occasion, a spysliip and quite a different body of international law applies to spy activities than applies to other activities. 

So I only want to say for the record that I don’t think we should 

have been there and especially under those circumstances when the 

Navy and the administration knew tha t South Vietnamese naval 

vessels that we had furnished and the personnel whom we had trained 

were on their way in that period of time to bombard North Vietnam 

and its two islands. The Maddox and the Trimer Joy were in the area, 

despite all our talk about the distances. The fact is tha t the North 

Vietnamese had no reason to believe tha t we were trying to keep 

separate the South Vietnamese boat operations and our patrol. They 

had no reason to know or believe that. We don’t know what conclusions they reached. I think it would be a very reasonable conclusion 

if they thought there was a connection.

CON NECTIO N B ETW EEN A M ERIC A N AND SOUTH V IE TN A M ESE OPE RA TI ON S

I happen to think there was a very clear connection.

The very fact tha t you were electronically invading, so to speak, 

North Vietnam, while at the same time, in tha t series of time, the 

South Vietnamese boats were going to make their attack, put us, I 

think, in the position where the North Vietnamese and the rest of 

world, for that matter, would see some interrelation.

But I still go back beyond that.

Wha t worries me is th at we were at tha t time escalating, we were 

involving ourselves more and more in the difficulty in South Vietnam. 

We know from the record what the thinking was in the administration, having in their pocket a resolution ready to spring on us.

We have some evidence that the resolution, or a draft of a resolution 

was prepared before the Tonkin Bay incident ever occurred. It was 

to give to the President the authority that the Congress gave. I am 

willing to let history be the judge, eventually it will be recorded tha t 

it was a completely unconstitutional move.
84

You can’t possible give the Pr es id en t th at pow er un de r th e Co nstitutio n. Tha t alw ays has been the position th at I have ta ke n fro m the 

begin nin g of ma ny aspects of th is matter. W ith this pr ep ar atio n fo r 

bo mbarding Nor th Vie tnam, I wan t to say mo st respec tively, I th ink 

th at wisdom dictate d th at we should have ha d th e AIa ddo x an d the 

Tu rner J oy fa r removed fro m any are a, high seas or not, th at would 

possibly ju stify any bod y making this conn ection. To be on the high 

seas and com mit an illegal act on th e hi gh seas constitu tes a form of 

agg ression, constructive or actua l, th at was really ou r position , in 

pa rt, in Octob er 1962 du rin g ou r conflict with Ru ssi a over he r clear 

act of constru ctive agge ssion aga ins t u s vis -a-vis Cuba .

So one o f m y bones o f c onten tion is t hat I don’t th in k ou r h an ds are 

cle ar if we fa ll back on tec hnica l defenses of ou r righ ts on the high 

seas and m ak ing p erf ectly clear to N or th Vietn am we were going to e nforce tho se r ight s.

Th e basic question is why wer e we follow ing this course of act ion 

at th at tim e in th e Gu lf of To nk in whe n th e So uth Vietnamese b oats 

were going up there to mak e an attack ? I th in k all the expla natio n 

of t he Se cretary, all the e xp lan ati on of the a dm inist ratio n ju st ducks 

th at pr oblem.

One of th e reasons w hy we find ou rselves so m uch isola ted is because 

the wo rld does no t like th is inv olvement we go t ourselv es into on 

a u ni latera l ba sis.

I only wan t say we have ha d th is inform ation giv en to us. I, as a 

law yer, don’t question fo r a mo me nt th at it is sub ject to a consider ­

able am ount of attack and qualifica tion s, ju st as I th in k Se cretary 

McN am ara’s use of c ap tured Nor th Vie tnamese pri soners isn’t a very 

relia ble source u pon w hich to form a judgme nt. In fa ct, even in domestic law , as a law yer I never th ou gh t too m uch about the stool pigeon 

tes tim ony because too fre quently it is no t wo rth t he lip s th at em it it.

ALL EVIDENCE SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE

But here we do have, and it be ars on som eth ing y ou sai d, Se na tor 

Fu lb righ t, we do hav e a com munica tion . I t is anonym ous, it is true; 

bu t on th e ot he r hand, its conte nt give s a pr et ty good ide a of the 

relia bi lit y of th e source. A lth ou gh some o f th e ideas I don ’t agr ee with, 

I th ink th e Se cretary is en titled to he ar it. I don’t th in k we are fa ir 

wi th the Se cretary if we hav e t his kind o f mate ria l in ou r reco rds an d 

do n’t discuss it wi th him. Ju st as I said th is m orn ing , as fa r as I am 

concern ed, I th in k he should ha ve every mem ora ndum we have. I d on’t 

see why we should keep it fro m him .

As fa r as I am concern ed, I would give him everything we have, 

an d wh ate ver help he can g ive to u s in re ga rd to it, I wou ld welcome.

But we have th is com municatio n, received December 26, 1967. T he 

le tter is to th is com mittee th ro ug h its ch air ma n. I t rea ds in p art :

Getting the logs of the Maddox and the Turner Joy may be of some use to you 

in trying to get to the bottom of the Tonkin Gulf incident, but it really won’t 

help much.

What you most need is the record of events of communications p assing through 

the national milita ry command an d control center. Most of them have probably 

now been destroyed.

Wha teve r study was made on the basis of most of these records, fresh after 

the event, by the Weapons System Evaluatio n Group entitled “Command and 

Control of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 4-5 August 1964,” thi s document is Top
85

Secret and it is very tightly held because it is based in par t on the tape record­ ings of conversations over the phone of the President, the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Sharp and others during the period when the critical decisions were being made. Very probably an effort will he made to have all copies of th e study destroyed when and if there is any intimati on th at you know of the existence of the study. The study will not disclose tha t the incident was a put-up job. 

It will disclose several embarrassing things, however. One is tha t the first attack, tha t on the Maddox, was very probably made 

because the NVN confused the Maddox with [deleted] operations which were 

covering SVN hit-and-run attack s against NVN coastal areas. This was probably 

due simply to lack of coordination. Another point will be that the attack on the Turne r Jo y the following day was 

indeed probably imaginary. After the first report of the attac k there was a report there probably had not been an attac k at all. But the Presid ent was to go on the air to address the Nation about the retal iatory attacks th at had alrea dy been planned, and after anothe r flurry of confusion Admiral Sharp said there had been a real atta ck 

aft er all. At this point the Secretary of Defense decided to advise the President t ha t the 

attac k on the Turner Joy was real and to order the retal iator y attacks and go

ahead with the speech because it was getting very late for the address to the Nation and, moreover, the retal iator y atta ck planes had been kept in a state of 

take-off readiness for the maximum time. It was clearly a case of making a definite decision when operational circumstances dicta ted ha ste but the facts suggested caution. One may wonder how much the Secretary of Defense, who is a man of honor and conscience, has worried about this since. Because late r events all indicate t ha t 

the second attack was at best a trick of false ra dar images. I am sure if I signed this I would lose my job, but if you proceed wisely, you should be able for the good of the country to learn the truth of a ll I have suggested here and much more. The Tonkin Gulf incident, upon the basis of which the resolution was so quickly obtained, was not a put-up job. But it was not the inexcusable and flagrant atta ck upon U.S. ships tha t it seemed to be, and tha t would have justified the resolution and retaliation had there been so. It was a confused bungle which was used by the President to justify a general course of action and ix>licy t hat he had been advised by the mili tary to follow. He, like the Secretary of Defense, was a prisoner. He got from them all the critical and decisive information and misinformation and he simply put his trust in th e wrong people. One of the things your committee should really look into is the constant use of security regulations to conceal the blunders and the connivings in the field of 

national security. But I doubt th at all the power of the United States Senate could ever penetrate fa r enough into the supersecret world to learn much about what goes on. Right now the JCS is refusing materials in the ir field wanted by people working on Viet­ nam for the Secretary of Defense, most obviously because they are fearfu l it would serve the Secretary of Defense’s purposes, not theirs.

I want the Secretary to know that one must weigh that with grea t 

caution and circumspection and some doubt. It is only one of several 

memorandums or letters that we have in these files. We have a lot of 

signed material, but on this committee you have to weigh this and 

doublecheck it to see if there is any other evidence that hears out any 

of these contentions. We have plenty tha t bears out some of his 

contentions.

But I close, Mr. Chairman, by saying that the thin g that is wrong 

with the whole case we have listened to today is th at it doesn’t go back 

far enough, hack to 1954 when you have the Gavin report against involvement in Asia, where you have the Ridgeway support of the report.

Other military officers in the next few years will look askance at 

what we were doing, and yet the admin istration step by step gets us 

more and more involved.
86

NO LEGAL BASIS FOR AM ERICAN INV OLVEME NT CLAIMED

So here we. are now , involved ov er there b y w hat the fo rm er Atto rney 

General of the U nited State s tri es t o ju stify as a kind o f a functio nal 

decla rat ion of wa r, which is of c ourse pu re nonsense legally .

Th is is wh at bothe rs me. I th in k we o ught to go back to th e begin ­

ning. We o ug ht to be dev oting o urselves to t ry in g to find ou t how we 

can h onora bly get out of the mess th at we are in. We need some kind 

of a m ultilateral takeo ver to se ttle th is war.

I wish he w ere stil l in the room because I quite agree wi th wh at the 

Se na tor f rom M ontan a him self said to the P resid en t, and his t op fo reign policy advisers in one confe rence. We ha ve nev er subm itte d a res ­

olu tion to the inter na tio na l bod ies th at have juris diction over this 

matter, i f th ey would exercise th ei r ju ris dic tio n.

I do n't see how we can ever exp ect them to exercise th ei r ju ris diction unless we are willing to c ommit ourselves to abide by th ei r ju risdic tio n prov ide d the y, in tu rn , will ca rry out their corollary res ponsib ility to enfo rce the peace.

I am so concerned. I think hi stor y has got us recorded as en ga ging 

in wha t I th in k is the un ila tera l mak ing of war. Th at is the great 

forei gn policy mistak e.

I am sorry I took as much tim e as I did , bu t I thou gh t the record 

ou gh t to show my resp ect fo r th e Secre tar y. He doesn 't share any of 

my views o n th is or my major premises, I am sure , th at is where ou r 

gr ea t di vision is.

I am never going to s up po rt the kind of a mili tary op eration th at 

we are engag ed in over the re, or the policy o f t his ad minist ratio n un til 

it gets back to the Co nstitu tion an d declares war. You know why we 

do n't. You wo uld n’t have the wo rld with you.

Th e C hairm an. Sen ato r Case ?

Se cretary McNamara. Mr. C ha irm an ?

Se na tor Morse. I think the Se creta ry sho uld be allowed to say 

anything .

denunciation wit hout foundation

Se cretary McNamara. Mr. Ch air man, Se na tor Morse is ce rta inly 

one o f the most able advocates t hat it has ever been my fo rtu ne o r m isfortu ne to sit opposite. He h as prese nte d a case very powe rfu lly.

I th in k it is bu ilt on an en tir ely false foundatio n, and I th in k the 

ea rli er testimony to day in dic ates th at .

Th ere are certai n lega l points he has m ade which I am no t q ualified 

to com men t on, but as a lay ma n, I ca n't believe th at there was a constr uc tiv e ac t of agg ression comm itte d by the Ma dd ox or the Jo y and 

if the re wasn't , they were actin g e ntire ly legally. As I unders too d w ha t 

he said, he acce pted the sta tem ent th at an attack ha d take n plac e on 

the 2d an d he was at least wi lling to reco gnize the possibility of an 

atta ck on th e 4th.

He re fe rred to an a nonymous letter which m ade very g rav e charges,, 

which I wou ld assume the com mittee wou ld wa nt to expose.

I ca n’t refu te people who are faceless accusers. I know some of the 

sta tem ents in the l etter are abs olutely false. I do n't make tap es of my 

conversations with the Pr esiden t. I do n't know of anybody else in 

th e D ep artm en t who does.
87

I can’t believe any study made by the Department refers to tapes 

■of conversation with the President.

All of the investigations tha t I know of that have been made by the 

commanders involved of the attack of the 4th, after the attack, concluded tha t the attack did take place. So I think it extremely illfounded for the anonymous writer to conclude tha t the attack was 

imaginary.

There are a number of other charges there that I would be happy to 

investigate if the committee wishes me to do so.

I think it would be very helpful if the individual could muster up 

enough courage to make his accusations, state his evidence openly, so 

we can discuss them and follow them down.

I don’t have anything to hide.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT POLICY RE INFORMATION

Fo r 7 years I have tried not to hide the actions of the Department. 

We have disclosed more to our Nation and to our enemies, for that matter, about the national security of th is country and the factors that we 

take account o f in protecting it than has ever been disclosed before. 

I believe in disclosure, and I believe tha t the tru th will support itself, 

and I am perfectly prepared to have the anonymous accuser or anybody else come in and examine the raw material available in the Departmen t tha t bears on this.

But I think, as does Senator Morse, th at you do yourself a disservice and you do me a disservice by withholding information from me 

and expecting me to comment on information which has not been available to me.

The Chairman. Th is letter, I may say, was in no way included in 

the report and nothing in the statements based on it. It was in the addendum, as the Senator knows, and was volunteered as an anonymous 

message.

WeJtiad others that were not anonymous, but that is not a p art of 

the report, and we did not question you about t ha t today. Tha t is the 

reason I didn’t refer to it.

Senator Morse. I thought I made clear in my statement I am not 

basing my case on this anonymous letter, but only giving you an idea 

■of the kind of information which has been made available to the 

■committee.

My case has nothing to do with what happened on the Tonkin Bay, 

on the 2d and the 4th.

It is what preceded it.

When I talk about an act of constructive aggression, my case is tha t 

I think there was clear knowledge of what the South Vietnamese boats 

were up to. I think the fact tha t the Maddox and the Joy were kept 

in the Tonkin Bay, in close proximity to North Vietnam, justified the 

enemv in assuming that we were giving aid and abetting.

I think they did aid and abet bv their very presence there. I thin k 

they created a problem with North Vietnam.

I think while the preparation for that bombardment was going on 

that the electronic stimulation of North Vietnam at tha t time couldn’t 

be jusified, and would justify North Vietnam striking back, and I 

think that is why, as I said in my speech in August 1964, we cannot
88

escape the conclusion that we are to a degree a provocateur in this 

whole matter.

SECRETARY M ’NAM ARA INF OR ME D OF SOURCES OF STAFF STUD Y

The Chairman. I want to make it clear, too, tha t I did give the Secretary a complete list of all the documents which were the basis of the 

staff study. They are all available to him in the Department.

There is nothing else in the staff report except the staff views about 

the documents, which is not a matter in issue at all. It is the significance 

of the documents which we have read to you, and we gave you a complete list of everything we used. You had them available the same as 

we did. In fact, you have a lot more.

If there is any complaint, I will say th at despite my understanding 

with Mr. Nitze, at least, the Department did not supply the committee 

by any means with all relevant documents which I had understood 

they had.

Senator Case.

Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, than k you. I f I may, I would yield to 

the Senator from Kentucky because I have to go, and if I do not get 

back here before the Secretary leaves, tha t is all right, too. But I do 

have to be away for the next few minutes.

I will yield to him and say, so far as the record goes, my concern 

is not about this incident, but about the use of this resolution subsequently in ways that were never intended by Congress. That is my 

basic concern.

The Chairman. Senator Cooper.

Senator Cooper. I will be brief.

I would like to say, first, that I appreciate the willingness of the 

Secretary to give the committee his testimony. His testimony has been 

helpful and forthrig ht. I would also like to say th at I think the Secretary has been a faith ful, able, and conscientious servant of our 

country.

Secretary McNamara. Thank you very much, Senator.

The Chairman. I will join him in that.

Senator Morse. If you will permit me, I would say one of the most 

dedicated public servants I have experienced in my 23 years in the 

Senate.

Secretary McNamara. Thank you very much, Senator Morse,

Senator Cooper. As the Chairman has stated, his chief purpose and 

tha t of the committee in conducting this inquiry is to evaluate the effectiveness of decisionmaking decisions, which could bring about the 

involvement of American military forces, and the Nation’s engagement in war. I think it is a proper inquiry.

It has also raised other questions, extreme charges and you have 

referred to one of them. In asking the question I am now propounding 

to you, I do not do so because I accept it. But it has been stated in some 

quarters tha t the administration did not have any information which 

would justify either retaliation or the submission of the resolution. I t 

has been speculated that the incident was contrived to bring the resolution before the Congress.

As I understand it, you say, there is no truth a t all in such a statement or speculation. Is that correct? That is my question.

Secretary McNamara. My answer is as you have indicated, Senator 

Cooper. There was nothing to it.
89

EXECUTIVE ATTITUDE REGARDING PROVOCATION

Senator Cooper. It lias also been suggested tha t the incident was 

provoked in order to have a reason to come to the Congress. Was there 

ever any discussion or consideration of provoking an incident which 

would enable the administration to come to the Congress with the 

Tonkin Bay resolution ?

Secretary McNamara. No, sir. The reverse was the case. Every reasonable effort was made to reduce what otherwise would have been 

illegal operations or reduce what were legal operations in order to 

avoid provocation. It was no intention to provoke an incident. We do 

not believe it did provoke an incident. I t is inconceivable to me th at a 

plan to provoke an incident could have been developed within the kind 

of government we have without this having been known to enough 

people for one of them to report authoritatively to the Congress that 

such the csae. There was, I can just state unequivocally, there was, no 

intent to provoke. Quite the contrary.

Senator Cooper. Now, turning toward the evaluation that was made 

on August 4, is it correct that you did consult on tha t day with the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, sir. I did on numerous occasions during 

the day.

Senator Cooper. You have said tha t you consulted with other advisers. Would that include the Secretary of State ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes. As a m atter of fact, the matter was so 

urgent and so important tha t I asked the Secretary of State to join 

me at the Pentagon before lunch, on August 4, which he did. We met 

there for a considerable time with representatives of the Chiefs. I say 

representatives because the Chairman was not then present, being out 

of the city, and subsequently the Secretary of State and I met with 

the President at the W hite House, and on several other occasions during the day the Secretary of State and I directly or indirectly discussed 

our views with the President—indirectly only in the sense tha t we 

may have been on two telephones at the same time with the President.

Senator Cooper. Did you detail your reasons for finding tha t an 

engagement had taken place ?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, sir.

Senator Cooper. Acting upon the basis of information received 

from the destroyers themselves and also from intercepts, was there 

included a message from the commander of the Turner Joy before the 

retaliatory strike, reporting that there had been an engagement?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, sir. The commander of the Task Force 

72.1, who was not the commander of the Turner Joy , but was the 

superior officer to the commander of the Turner Jo y, and was on the 

scene on the Maddox.

Senator Cooper. There is a statement in the record, furnished us 

by the staff, which says tha t 3 hours before th e retaliatory strike, the 

commander of the Turner Jo y reported there had been an attack.

Secretary McNamara. That is correct. I simply wanted to differentiate between him and the commander of the task force.
90

CONFIRMA TIO N OF ATTACK

Senator Cooper. At the time the decision was made to make the retaliatory strike, was any question raised or was there any in your mind 

that an engagement had not take place ?

Secretary McNamara. No, sir.

Earlier in the afternoon, because of some of the uncertainty as to 

the details of the engagement, I had said that we should not carry 

out any retaliatory strike until we satisfied ourselves th at an engagement had taken place. We did so satisfy ourselves during the remaining hours of the afternoon, and that is not just my view. It is the view 

of every one of the key senior and civilian and military officials in the 

Department.

Senator Cooper. Accepting the fact of the engagement, and I do, 

there remains a question of judgment whether the scope of the engagement was such that a resolution should have been presented, and also 

whether in hindsight the Congress should have voted one.

You have said categorically that our ships were never in territorial 

waters. Is th at correct ?

Secretary McNamara. That is correct, sir.

Senator Cooper. That conclusion is based upon the statement that 

the United States did not consider territo rial waters of N orth Vietnam 

to extend a distance beyond 12 miles?

Secretary McNamara. Tha t is correct.

Senator Cooper. This is bound to be questioned, you know. What autho rity do you find for making tha t statement ?

Secretary McNamara. The authority I cited in my statement based 

upon the lawyers of the D epartment who are familiar with the law of 

the sea, which is that unless a nation claims beyond 3 miles its territorial waters are not believed to be extending beyond th at limit, and 

North Vietnam had not claimed beyond 3 miles before August 4, 1964.

Senator Cooper. There has been brought in question a statement you 

have made when you came before the committee to testify for the 

Tonkin Bay resolution, that the Navy was not associated with the 

South Vietnam 34A operations. You said furth er, “I must emphasize 

the Maddox did not know of these actions.”

NAV AL KNO WLEDGE OF SOUT H VIETNA ME SE OPE RAT IONS

Were you intending to say that the Navy had no knowledge of them 

or were you emphasizing th at the Maddox had no knowledge of them?

Secretary McNamara. I was emphasizing the Maddox did not, Senator Cooper, because I knew at the time—as a matter of fact I informed 

the committee a t the time—that I knew and the senior commanders in 

the Navy knew of the South Vietnamese operations, at least in terms 

of the general character of them.

At the time of the specific incidents of August 4, I did not know 

of the attack on August 3 by the South Vietnamese, but we knew of the 

operations, and some senior commanders above the level of the commanders of the task force did know the specific dates of the operations.

Senator Cooper. Questions have been raised about the patrolling 

of North Vietnam, Tonkin Bay, and an analogous situation in North 

Korea.
91

Is there communication in the Department between the naval authorities, between you and the President and the Secretary of State 

about patrolling these coasts when it involves the possibility of actions such as occurred in the Tonkin Bay and off N orth Korea?

Secretary McNamara. There is a special group set up, on which I 

am represented by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and which includes comparable senior officials from the State Department, the 

CIA, and certain other agencies of Government before which must 

be presented every one of these missions for the approval of the 

members of tha t group.

If there is any difference of opinion among those members, the m atter is to be b rought to the attention of the Secretary of State and 

the Secretary of Defense. So the answer to your question is, “Yes.”

I do not mean to say that the President is personally involved in 

this. But I am personnally involved in it throug h my Deputy Secretary, and the Secretary of State is personally involved in it through a 

very high level representative of the State Department.

Senator Cooper. I would assume tha t such measures must be taken 

at times when necessary to protect the security of our country.

RISKS OF NAVAL INTELLEGENCE OPERATIONS

I clo think, however, that there is a very serious problem involved 

when, as has been evidenced by the Pueblo, and when we are rather 

thinly spread, it seems to me risks are taken which result in incidents 

which humiliate our country and also place the United States in a 

position where there is danger of deeper involvement and not of our 

choice.

I assume that you look at these problems. But I give my own view 

tha t there should be the most thorough and immediate consideration 

of this problem undertaken—so that we will not become further 

involved.

I think tha t is all I have to say at present.

Secretary McNamara. Thank you very much, Senator.

The Chairman. Senator Gore.

Senator Goke. Well, Air. Secretary, it is painful to subject you to 

this interrogation afte r the sacrifices you have made for public service, 

and I regret that I do feel the necessity of doing so.

CLAIM THAT ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN MISLEADING

I do not in any sense question your patriotism or your sincerity. On 

the other hand, I feel tha t I have been misled, and that the American 

people have been misled. Indeed, the statement tha t you released to 

day does not fully comport with the testimony that you gave to this 

committee earlier today.

I cite one instance, the statement—well, when I say “testimony” 

I mean other than the prepared statement. I read from your prepared 

stateme nt:

In a dd iti on to t he above—

This is on page 17—

intellige nce repo rts received from a highly classified an d unimp eac hab le source 

rep orted th at No rth Vietnam was makin g pr ep ar at io ns to at tack ou r de str oy ers 

90-187—68----- 7
92

w ith tw o Sw atow bo at s an d with one PT boat if th e PT co uld be m ad e re ad y 

in tim e.

The second sentence—I raise no question about the first sentence I 

just read, except the characterization of the source as “highly classified 

and unimpeachable.”

The second sentence:

The same so ur ce re po rted , while th e en ga ge m en t w as in pr og re ss on A ug us t 4, 

th a t th e att ack w as u nder wa y.

T submit, Mr. Secretary, you have cited nothing from the intercepted 

message to support tha t.

Secretary McNamara. Let me put in at this point in the record, if I 

may, the four messages, starting with the first at [deleted] indicating 

there were two objectives, enemy attack vessels, located at a point at 

which the Maddox and the Turner Joy were located or located within 

3,000 yards of th em ; and the second message, which stated tha t—-—

Senator Gore. Directing them to make ready for military operations.

Secretary McNamara. Make ready for military operations, again 

referring [deleted] and the third message indicating tha t the Swatow 

boats reported an enemy aircraft falling and enemy vessel wounded, 

and that message coming 12 minutes a fter our ships reported that they 

were being attacked.

The fourth message later reporting tha t they had shot down two 

planes and sacrificed two ships, and adding further details of the 

engagement.

I submit tha t any reasonable explanation of these messages leads 

one to the conclusion that the attack was underway, as I stated in my 

statement.

Senator Gore. Well, that interpretation is possible. Another interpretation is tha t this was an exaggerated report by the North Vietnamese commander, just as they exaggerated the losses of our planes.

Rut your statement released to the public is th at the same source reported while the engagement was in progress on August 4 t hat the 

attack was underway. Tha t is a flat-footed statement that nothing 

you have submitted today supports.

Secretary McNamara. I take issue with that, Senator Gore, and T 

think it is not p roper to say that the four messages were just a report 

from a commander. These four messages were flowing back and forth 

among various stations.

Now. T am going further than T should in discussing this classified information.

Senator Gore. Well, your publicly released statement this is compounded by your flatfooted statement on page 5:

D ur in g th is sa m e tim e, in te lli ge nc e so ur ce s re port ed th a t N or th Vietnam es e 

ve ssels st at ed th ey had o ur sh ip s under at ta ck.

Well, the same flatfooted statement is repeated. Nothing you have 

submitted supports this unqualified statement.

Secretary McNamara. Well, I differ on that, Senator Gore, and I 

do not think we should discuss this further unless we want to back 

into messages which I do not want to do in the room with uncleared 

people present

Senator Gore. Then I would like to call to your attention, and I 

do not know what the committee wishes to do, but I think we have 

no choice but to make an incisive examination to reveal the actual 

facts.
93

Now, without identifying the messages to which I will refer on 

page 17 as to time, you quote the task group commander this way:

Vice Admiral Roy L. Johnson, USN, Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet 

at the time, sta ted in his review of the combined chronology and track charts 

subm itted by the Task Group Commander: “Commander, 7th Fleet, is convinced beyond any doubt that Maddox and Turner Joy were subjected to an unprovoked surface torpedo a tta ck on the night of 4 August 1964.”

PO ST MISSION EVA LUATION NOT REVEALED

Now, what I wish to point out is not any inaccuracy there but the 

failure to reveal to the American people th at this statement was made 

on August 14.

Secretary McNamara. Quite right.

The Chairman. August 14?

Senator Gore. August 14.

Secretary McNamara. Tha t whole paragraph relates to postmission evaluations and, as I pointed out on page 19, some of the details 

cited above, particularly the statements of eye witnesses, although 

gathered immediately after the attack, had not reached W ashington 

at the time the reprisal a ir strikes were ordered executed.

Sufficient information was in the hands of the President, however, 

to establish beyond any doubt then or now th at an attack had taken 

place, and I cite the information available, and I do not include A dmiral Johnson’s report or Admiral Moorer’s report or General B urch ­

inal's report, all of which came in as a result of their evaluations of 

the reprisal attack.

Senator Gore. I understand. I have read this report, and I realized 

when I read it that the evaluation made was afte r the fact, after 

the attack had been ordered.

This goes to the matter tha t troubled this committee, and I will 

say troubles me—I won’t speak fo r the committee, 1 will say it troubles 

me.

I do not hold that this was a rigged affair, but from all the testimony 

you have submitted here today the administration stands revealed 

as having acted very hastily and out of proportion to the provocation 

and, it seems to me, to further compound the thing you quote, let 

me see, you refer here to Lt. Gen. David A. Burchinal.

Secretary McNamara. Burchinal.

Senator Gore. It says he analyzed the information from message 

traffic with the assistance of the Joint Staff. You do not say when. 

He gave his evaluation to the Secretary of Defense, “The actuality 

of the attack is confirmed.”

Now, you had sent out messages hours before the order to attack 

North Vietnam asking that that attack on our ships be confirmed. 

You got your confirmation from Lieutenant General Burchinal on August 7, 2 days after we had made an attack on North Vietnam. So this 

has gone out to the public today.

Now, I have said nothing publicly, so fa r as I know the chairman 

has said nothing publicly, but once again the facts have been twisted, 

Mr. Secretary.
94

FACTS ARE PRESENTED IN A STRA IGHTFOR WARD MAN NE R

Secretary McNamara. No, sir; I beg your pardon, Senator Gore, 

the facts have not been twisted. 1 am talking about no one within 

the Department of Defense has reviewed all of the information which 

I later point out came in afte r the incident. All of these eyewitness 

reports came in afte r that. That is known to you, i t is known to the 

members of the committee, it is known to others.

Senator Gore. But it is not known to the American people.

Secretary McNamara. I so indicated. I stated on page 19 that it was.

Senator Gore. It is not so identified.

Secretary McNamara. Also on page 19 I specifically listed the information available to the President at the time he ordered the reta liatory attack, and it does not include reports from Admirals Johnson or 

Moorer or General Burchinal. That is exactly the purpose of it.

Senator Gore. You bolstered the decision by stating conclusions reported after the fact.

Secretary McNamara. No, no.

Senator Gore. And you state twice that these highly classified and 

unimpeachable sources said tha t the attack was underway. We have 

had no such information. We have had corroborative evidence that 

might bear th at interpretation.

Let me cite one other thing, if I may.

Secretary McNamara. May I first make clear tha t I did not indicate 

tha t Johnson’s, Moorer’s, or Burchinal’s evaluation took place before 

the retaliatory decision. I did indicate tha t they reviewed all of the 

information tha t I previously discussed, much of which, particu larly 

the testimony of eyewitnesses, was taken after the retaliatory attack, 

which I stated on page 19 occurred afte r the retaliatory attack.

Senator Gore. Well-----

Secretary McNamara. I worked until 8 :30 last night tryi ng to be 

certain this statement was accurate. I had some of the best lawyers in 

the Department to work on it, and I submit to you it is not misleading.

Senator Gore. Well, it is a difference of opinion. I say tha t there is 

nothing you presented today that supports your public statement that 

you had a report from a “highly classified and unimpeachable” source 

reporting th at the attack was underway.

Secretary McNamara. Well, we just differ then on the meaning of 

words, Senator Gore.

Senator Gore. Well, let us see if we differ on this matter. Today in 

your statement you say this, and this is page 2:

As I stated then and repeat now our vessels played absolutely no part in and 

were not associated with this activity. There was then and there is now no question but th at the United States Government knew, and tha t I knew personally, the 

general nature of some countermeasures being taken by the South Vietnamese in 

response to North Vietnamese aggression. As I informed Congress the boats utilized by the South Vietnamese were financed by the United States. What I said 

then, and I repeat today, th at the Maddox and the Turner Joy did not participate 

in the South Vietnamese activities, and they had no knowledge of the details of 

these operations, and tha t in no sense of the word could they be considered to 

have backstopped the effort.

Now, here is what you said to the committee on the 6th:

I would like to cover three points. First-----

The Chairman. Of August 1964.
96

Later in the paragraph I think it is clear I was referring in the whole paragraph to the task force. Bu t 1 certainly agree with you 

tha t the word “Navy” in the first sentence is ambiguous.

UNITED STATES KNEW OF 34A OPERATIONS

Senator Gore. Well, of course, we know now from the cables that 

the Maddox was, in fact, informed of th e 34 Ops.

Secretary McNamara. You do not know now tha t they had knowledge of-----

Senator Gore. The details.

Secretary McNamara (continuing). Possible—not the details. You 

do not know now they had knowledge of what I said they did not have knowledge of, which is possible Vietnamese actions, you know 

very well tha t the Navy meant Maddox in this context in tha t first 

sentence because I myself reported tha t the Navy had furnished the boats to the South Vietnamese, and you, meaning the Congress, so reported in the congressional debate, so there could have been no misinterpretation then, and I do not think there is now of tha t 

paragraph.

Senator Gore. Well, I won’t review the cables. They are already in 

the record. - f / Z f .

There is another sentence which you spoke to the committee about on page 24 of the.executive hearings, tha t was deleted. I will read the whole sentence lest—and then I will identify what is stricken:

I testified tlie oth er day th at the American vessels were or the American vessel was, it was the MADDOX at th at time, was operating on a southerly course in routine patrol in intern ational waters in this area .

The following p art of the sentence is stricken, “and tha t vessel had absolutely no knowledge of any actions of any kind by the South Vietnamese in South Vietnam or outside of South Vietnam.”

The cables certainly contradict that.

Secretary McNamara. I do not believe so, Senator Gore.

Senator Gore. Will you give me those cables?

Secretary McNamara. Yes, sir; I have them here, and I will be happy 

to see that they are inserted in the record right here. The cables in ­

struct the commander of the Maddox to stay outside certain restricted 

areas. They do not tell him who is operating in the areas or against what targets or at what times. They simply say, “Stay north and east of a line between two points 17 degrees, 17 plus degrees, in such and 

such easterly longitude.” Later that instruction is modified to say, “Stay north of 19 degrees 

10 minutes north.”

Senator Gore. Well, Mr. Secretary, you said earlier tha t the commander of the Maddox knew what,r34 operations''stood for.

Secretary McNamara. I did not say. I thin k you will find in the 

record that I did not say that.

Senator Gore. Did n't he say that, Mr. Chairman?

KNOWLEDGE OF SHIP COMMANDERS LIMITED

Secretary McNamara. You will have to check the record and see 

that. I said he did not know the time schedule of operations or of the targets or of the details of the operations. He did know tha t he was
95

Sena tor Gore. Of August 1964.

Firs t, our Navy played absolutely no part in, was not associated with, was not 

aware of any South Vietnamese actions, if there were any. I want to make that 

very clear.

N E W ST A TEM EN T AL TE RS TESTIM O N Y OF AU GU ST 1 9 6 4

This was stricken from the record tha t was published. You state, 

further , and I read again what was stricken from the record—

It was not informed of, was not'aware, had no evidence of and, so far as I knowtoday, has no knowledge any, any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands th at Senator Morse referred to.

Now, in your statement today you modified that. You said they had 

no knowledge of the details of these operations. That was not the question at all. So there is a considerable difference in what you said to the 

public today on this point and what you said to the committee on 

August 6, 1964. I read further, and all I am reading here, Mr. Secretary, was stricken from the record.

Secretary McNamara. Could I inte rrup t you one moment, Senator 

Gore?

Senator Gore. Yes, sir.

Secretary McNamara. Possibly throu gh oversight you omitted a 

very important sentence in tha t August 6, 1964, statement because 

you read a sentence tha t started with the word “It” when the word “I t” 

in relation to what you said previously might have reflected back on 

the Navy, to mean the Navy, whereas it meant the Maddox, and the 

sentence you omitted was, “The Maddox, operating in international 

waters, was carrying out the routine patrol we carry out of the type 

we carry out at all times, it was not informed of it,” meaning the 

Maddox was not informed of it.

Senator Gore. Th at is correct. The Department or you struck tha t 

from the record.

Secretary McNamara. I said the Maddox-----

Senator Gore. I t differs from what you said to the public today.

Secretary McNamara. I beg your pardon ?

Senator Gore. Let me read two sentences.

Secretary McNamara. Let me make clear what tliis says and what 

the committee understood at the time, tha t the Maddox was not informed of, was not aware of, had no evidence of, no knowledge of 

any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two 

islands that Senator Morse referred to. T hat was my belief then, it is 

my belief today, and I personally had the commander of the patrol 

called w ithin the last 72 haul’s to check and make sure th at my understanding was still correct, and he says he did not have knowledge 

then of the possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the 

two islands Senator Morse referred to.

Senator Gore. Well, your first statement there is tha t our Navy 

played absolutely no part in-----

Secretary McNamara. I think the word, when I say our Navy 

played no p art in, I think t hat is true; was not associated with, tha t 

is true. I said it was not aware of, I think tha t is ambiguous. I was 

using the word “Navy” referring to the task force. But I think that 

it is ambiguous.

90-1 87— 6! •8
97

to sta y out of ce rta in res tricte d area s. lie knew the ter m “34- A” because it was inc lud ed in a message th at was sen t to him.

Se na tor Gore. But did not know wh at it stoo d for?

Se cretary McNamara. I do not believe he knew wh at it stood for, 

an d he certa inly did no t know a ny thin g about these p ar ticu la r t ar get s 

or dates or the natur e of operations.

One good evid ence of th at is th at he mis ide ntified 34-A vessels as 

Ru ssian vessels.

Th e Chairm an. Did n't he la te r say in one of his cables th at th e 

Nor th Vietnamese were very ag ita ted about th ei r presence there an d 

reg arde d the m as part of the 3 ^ A opera tio ns, in one of the la te r 

cables? I th in k he said th at is why he was appreh ensiv e and suggested 

th at the y ca ll off th e f ur th er ope ration .

Th e cable—let me see, I th in k— let me see, th is is very pu zzlin g to 

me. Is th is th e one at th e top ? Th e ca ble fro m the Ma ddox, “T he above 

pa trol wi ll”—th is is to the Maddox— “clearly demo nstrate ou r de termi nation to continue these ope ration s. Possibly draw North Vietnamese Na vy pa tro l boa ts to no rth ward awa y from the area of 34-A 

opera tio ns an d elimi nate De Soto pa trol inter fer ence with 34 

op era tio ns.”

Then, on the 4th of Augu st, some 15 ho urs before the second inc ide nt, 

th e op era tio nal com ma nder of the Maddox an d the Tu rner J oy , who 

was abroa d the Maddox, sen t the fol low ing to the com mande r of the 

7th Fl ee t:

Evaluation of info from various sources indicates that DRV considers patrol 

directly involved with 34A Ops.

The DRV considers United States presence as enemies because of these ops 

and have already indicated readiness to treat us in tha t category.

B. DRV are very sensitive about Hon Me. Believe this is PT operating base 

and the cove th ere presently contains numerous p atrol and PT craft which have 

been repositioned from northerly bases.

I can not im agine a com mander who s ent t hat sayin g th at they con ­

sidere d him a p art of the 34 op era tio ns with ou t know ing an yt hi ng 

abo ut wh at 34 op era tio ns was.

Secre tary McNamara. We ll, I can only tell you wh at he tells us, 

which is th at he did not know the na tu re of the 34-A opera tions, the 

tar ge ts, th e t imes, t he boats , t he courses, o r an yt hi ng at th at time.

The C hairman. Th e deta ils.

Se nator Gore. That was no t wha t you told the com mittee thou gh , 

Mr. Secre tary.

Secre tary McNamara. It is wh at I belie ve I told the com mittee, 

Se na tor Gore.

PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE ADMINIST RATION DECEPTIVE

Se nator Gore. You told the Am erican people tod ay the y did no t 

know abo ut the detai ls of the opera tion. W ha t you said to the com ­

mittee, back in 1964—let me fin d i t :

Our Navy played absolutely no p art in, was not associated with, was not aware 

of, any South Vietnamese actions if there were any.

Secre tar y McNamara. First , l et us g et cle ar th at is in th e p ar ag ra ph 

th at is ta lk in g about th e Maddox, and th e w ord “N av y” is s yno nymous 

with the Mad do x there.

Se nator Gore. We ll, wo jus t read------
98

The Chairman. This paragraph is from the communication from 

the Maddox.

Secretary McNamara. Let me just take it step bv step here because 

I had in the same testimony said tha t the Navy had given boats to the 

South Vietnamese for this, for the purpose of Operation 34-A, so 

it is quite clear tha t the Navy in the generic sense and in the sense 

of the upper echelons of the Navy knew about 34—A, and my own 

testimony so indicated.

Senator Gore. May I interject something here ?

Secretary McNamara. Surely.

Senator Gore. Also the Maddox received a cable that they could 

pick up a MAAG officer from South Vietnam, one of the advisory 

group in charge of 34 operations for any intelligence communication 

it wished to make.

Secretary McNamara. I do not believe that the MAAG officer was 

in charge of 34 operations. I think it was a MAC/V liaison officer.

The Chairman. It is MAC/V.

Senator Gore. What did the cable say? I t was an advisory military 

officer to South Vietnam.

Mr. Bader. It simply said a MAC /V representative. It made no 

indication-----

Secretary McNamara. It made no indication.

Senator Gore. What would he lie if he was not a military adviser to 

South Vietnam ?

Secretary McNamara. So far as the Maddox is concerned, he had 

no known relationship to 34-A but was presumably interested if he 

were there at all, and it turned out he was not interested enough to go, 

in sea infiltration, and the information the Maddox would collect in 

relation to it.

Senator Gore. For whatever it means, the commander of the task 

force was aware tha t if he wished some advice from an officer in, an 

American officer in South Vietnam, he could contact him.

Secretary McNamara. Not advice. He was aware tha t he could-----

Senator (Tore. Information instead of advice.

Secretary McNamara. Not even information. I t was presumably for 

the purpose of the MAC/V benefiting from association with the intelligence collection patrol, and MAC/V believed i t did not benefit 

enough from association with the intelligence collection patrol to send 

an officer on it, and it did not.

Senator Gore. Well, the reason I am pressing this point is tha t a 

point was made by a member of this committee at the time tha t the 

U.S. vessels Maddox and Turner Joy were conducting their patrols if 

not in conjunction with, a t least in such a way and at such times over 

a period of 2 days here, tha t the North Vietnamese m ight reasonably 

assume that there was coordination between the South Vietnameseoperated vessels which we had furnished, and the crews which we had 

trained and advisers which we had supplied, that they could likely 

consider, and it was reasonable that they would consider, that our ships 

were sufficiently associated with the operations as to be possibly confused with the attack and, indeed, as you have today cited, the communication, the intercepted communication, of the North Vietnamese 

referred to our ships as enemy vessels.
99

PREPARATIONS FOR INTE LLIG ENCE PATROL

I now have the cable to the Maddox. You are going to have to read 

this, Mr. Bader. This is the original. I cannot read this.

Mr. Bader. “Embark COMVAN with personnel MAC /V rep”—a 

representative from the military assistance group in Vietnam—“and 

mobile photo unit photographer in Keelung, Taiwan. Offload personnel and equipment Keelung upon completion of patrol.”

Secretary McNamara. Yes, and the MAC /V representative was, in 

effect, invited to participa te in the patrol, assuming that he might 

find it useful to obtain at first hand the intelligence information the 

patrol collected, because of MAC/V’s concern about sea infiltration, a 

concern tha t la ter led within 3 or 4 months after that to the establishment of the U.S. naval patrol along the coasts of Vietnam to stop sea 

infiltration. In anv case MAC/V did not accept the invitation. H e did 

not feel he would benefit from it, and there was no MAC/V representative on board.

May I go back to the point you made that it is your belief that the 

DeSoto patrols on the 2d of July, 2d of August, and 4th of August 

were carried out in such a way that North Vietnam could reasonably 

assume there was coordination between them and operations 34A, I do 

not believe so for the following reasons:

At the time of the July 30 operation, 34A attack, the Maddox was 

130 miles from the point of attack when it occurred. The attack on 

the Maddox occurred 63 hours after the 34A attack. At the time of the 

attack on the Maddox, the Maddox was 28 miles from the coast and 

steaming east. I see no basis on which the North Vietnamese could 

have concluded tha t tha t Maddox patrol was coordinated with the 

34A operation.

Secondly, at the time of the August 4 attack on the Maddox and the 

Turner Jay, they were 70 miles from the Operation 34A attack when 

it occurred.

The attack on the Maddox and the Turner Joy appeared 22 hours 

after the 34A attack. At the time the Maddox and Turner J oy were 

attacked they were 60 miles from the coast and they were steaming 

east.

And, finally, I am informed by those who interrogated the prisoners, 

the North Vietnamese naval prisoners, we have captured subsequent 

to the attack, tha t North Vietnam knew the difference between the 

34A operations and the DeSoto patrols and did not confuse the two.

Senator Gore. I have now found the telegram I was, the cable 

I was searching for, and this was on July 10.

The Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces in Pacific auth orizes his fleet 

units involved in the DeSoto Patro l to contact Commander, United States Military Assistance Vietnam for any add itional intelligence requ ired for prev ention of mutual interference with 34A Operations and such communications 

arra nge ments as may be desired.

That is what I was looking for.

Secretary McNamara. Yes. Well, tha t simply means that the commanders were trying to separate the two.

Senator Gore. But you tell us-----

Secretary McNamara. May I just finish one second?

Senator Gore. Yes.
100

ATTEM PTS TO COORDINATE AM ERICA N AND SOUTH VIE TN AM ESE PATROLS

Secretary McNamara. That the commanders were trying to separate the two, and the commander in chief Pacific instructed his subordinate commanders in the commander of Naval Forces Pacific, 

and the 7th Fleet they were authorized to contact the U.S. commanders in South Vietnam to obtain enough information on the 

34A operations to plan the DeSoto patrol in such a way as to not 

conflict with it.

Senator Gore. I do not know why you belabor the point. I do not 

wish to belabor it further.

It is clear to me tha t our Navy and the commander of the task force 

knew of the 34A operations. He was advised, as I have just read, to 

contact the commander in chief of the military assistance in Vietnam 

for additional intelligence required. F or what purpose? Prevention of 

mutual interference with 34A operations.

The chairman has just read a telegram from the commander of the 

DeSoto patrol, of the Maddox, referring to 34A operations.

Secretary MgNamara. Senator Gore, may I interrupt you here one 

moment. I do not believe i t is correct to say, as I understood you to 

say, that the commander of the Maddox was advised to contact MAC/V 

regarding 34A operations. I do not think that tha t cable is to the commander of the Maddox.

Senator Gore. Well, let me read it.

Secretary McNamara. Let us be sure, let me get the cable in fron t 

of me so I can be absolutely certain I know to whom it is addressed. 

Wh at is the number of the cable ?

Senator Gore. I do not know. I am reading from a summary here. 

It was on Ju ly 10,1964.1 do not believe I have-----

Mr. Bader. I have the cable here, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Gore. Let-the Secretary have it, if you will.

Mr. Bader. I want to make it clear for the record t hat this cable is 

to U.S. Fleet units, not direct to the Maddox.

Secretary McNamara. This is not the Maddox. This is from 

CINCPA C in Honolulu to CINCPAC Fleet, and i t says:

“Desire you”—CINCPAC Fleet—“submit data required for the 

DeSoto patrol for the primary purpose of determining”—such and 

such, in designating type—“not mandatory it be employed. Desire 

patrol be scheduled to commence 1 August. Direct liaison is authorized 

with MAC/V for any additional intelligence.” Tha t is between 

CINCPAC Fleet and MACAV and not between the commander of the 

Maddox or the Maddox patrol.

Senator Gore. We keep alternating from the commander of the task 

force and the Pacific commander, and it seems to me that is really not 

consequential because whoever was directing the operation knew of 

both operations, and they were occurring within a period of 3 days 

within the same gulf, and the point was made here—let me repeat— 

tha t this would give cause or provocation because of concern for any 

reasonable opposing country to assume tha t there was coordination. 

But then you have given a statement.

NO RT H VIETNA ME SE COULD DI ST IN GU ISH “ MADDOX”

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield? The Secretary said the 

North Vietnamese did not confuse the Maddox with 34 ops. I think
101

tha t is true, because they knew it well enough that they certainly 

thought it was involved in or coordinated with it. That is, 1 accept the 

idea that they could tell the difference between the Maddox* which is 

quite a 1 ittle ship, and a pat rol boat.

But the wire, the cable, from the Maddox commander, that is, the 

commander of the task force, clearly indicates that the DBA , as he 

says, considers patrol directly involved with 34—A Ops. 1 lie word 

confused with—no one is contending they could not tell the difference 

between a destroyer and a patrol boat, but they were involved with 

or they were coordinating their a ctions; that is what this shows.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, there have been several points 

raised by Senator Gore and you, and let me tr y to cover them, as I 

recall. First, Senator Gore said it is not very relevant to whom the message 

is addressed. It is absolutely fundamental in relation to my testimony 

and in relation to the question of the degree to which the commander of 

the Maddox knew about 34—A, as to whether the cable from CINCPAC 

instructing CINC PAC Fleet to feel free to contact MAC/V went to 

CINC PAC Fleet or to the Maddox. If i t went to CINCPAC Fleet it 

is not an instruction to Maddox. It is very relevant.

Secondly, the wire from the commander of the Maddox to which 

you referred, Mr. Chairman, as I explained this morning, was not 

based on any information available to him that he can now recall or 

tha t we know he had. I think it was sheer speculation, and an unfounded speculation, and a speculation tha t is disputed by other 

evidence.

Thirdly, there is no question but what the DeSoto patrol and the 

Operation 34 tracks and activities were separated in place and time 

by miles and times that I referred to a moment ago.

The N orth Vietnamese ra dar tracked both of the m; we can be confident of that. They knew they were separated in place and time, but 

importantly, and most important of all, the North Vietnamese knew 

they had nothing to fear from our DeSoto patrol. This was the fourth 

one carried out. They were all carried out essentially in the same 

fashion and operating procedures. At no time did any of these patrols 

carry out hostile action. At no time did they contribute in any way to 

the success of the 34—A Operations and, therefore, there was no basis 

whatsoever for the North Vietnamese to consider them a part of or 

associated with 34-A Operations.

The Chairman. Th at is mighty hard to believe. I n this same cable, 

the Maddox commander asks for cover overhead under the control 

of the destroyers. Even 15 minutes was not enough. Why would he be 

so concerned ?

Senator Gore. He wanted them immediately overhead and under his 

command.

The Chairman. Tie wanted them immediately under control of 

the destroyer.

Secretary McNamara. Let me ask each of you gentleman if you had 

been attacked yesterday, and you had knowledge that you were likely 

to be attacked again, would yon be satisfied with less than immediate 

air cover? I would not, and he was not.

The Chairman. No, because of what he says here, because he considers him the enemy.
102

Secretary McNamara. Not because of what lie says here, but because 

he was shot at. I happen to have one of the bullets in niy pocket, 24 

hours before. Here it is, right here. This came from the man who sent 

the cable. Th at is the reason why he was asking for a 15-minute-reaction air cover.

Senator Gore. You hold one bullet, and we sent 64 ships in retaliation.

Secretary McNamara. And there were-----

Senator Gore. Airships.

Secretary McNamara. There were two separate attacks on U.S. vessels on the high seas.

Senator Gore. I do not think, Mr. Secretary, the second attack has 

been established by your testimony today at all.

EVIDENCE FOR SECOND ATTACK IS NOT SU FF IC IE NT

Secretary McNamara. All I can say is tha t that-----

Senator Gore. I think there is more question now than when you 

came.

Secretary McNamara. All I can say, Senator Gore, is that those in 

the Department who had no responsibility for the retaliation, and who 

have examined the information, concluded beyond any shadow of 

their doubts that the second attack occurred.

Senator Gore. Let me state quite candidly my feeling of doubt and 

question. I hope tha t further inquiry will resolve these doubts and 

questions. I feel the Congress and the country were misled about the 

closeness of operation of DeSoto patrol and the South Vietnamese 

raids by vessels tha t we had furnished, by men we had trained, operating with the advice of our military advisers in South Vietnam. Tha t 

is No. 1.

I know I have been misled. It may be pa rtly my fault. I am not excusing myself.

Secondly, I feel that I was misled that this was an entirely unprovoked attack, tha t our ships were entirely on routine patrol. The fact 

stands from today tha t they were intelligence ships; tha t they were 

under instructions to agitate North Vietnam radar, that they were 

plying close to the shore within 4 miles of the islands under orders in 

the daytime, retirin g at night; that they were covered with immediate 

air cover which, in itself—that they were covered with military aircraft 

which you said on television the other day which would be provocative 

off of North Korea. Why it would not be provocative off of North Vietnam I do not know.

Thirdly, I think th at from my tentative conclusion it is th at the administration was hasty, acted precipitately, inadvisably, unwisely, out 

of proportion to the provocation in launching 64 bombing attacks on 

North Vietnam out of a confused, uncertain situation on a murky 

night, which one of the sailors described as one dark as the knob of 

he ll; and, particularly, 5 hours after the task force commander had 

cabled tha t he doubted th at there were any attacks, and recommended 

no further action be taken until it was thoroughly canvassed and reviewed. And yet you give to the American people the canvass that occurred, two canvasses, one on the 7th and one on the 14th, several days 

after the attacks.
103

So I think, Mr. Chairman, in view of all these facts, and in view of 

the statement t ha t has been released which, I submit, is misleading in 

details which I have cited, and I have marked others as I went through, 

tha t we have no choice but to proceed furt her with the inquiry.

The Chairman. Senator Pell, you have been patient.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, may I make one or two brief 

comments. I do not think you will want me to take time at 6:25 in the 

evening to respond in full to Senator Gore’s comments, because I 

disagree almost completely with all of them, and I think the record 

or the testimony today will show why.

I do want to make two points, however, that the commander of the 

task force did not say he doubted there was any attack, as Senator 

Gore alleged. He specifically did not use that language, and I think 

the record should not be allowed to show tha t-----

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that his-----

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

Senator Gore. I was paraphrasing .

Secretary McNamara. He raised a question about certain details, and 

we will put the exact message in here. It is at [deleted].

Air. Bader. Mr. Secretary, I think I could read it for you again.

Secretary McNamara. No, we will just put it right in here.

Senator Gore. Let me read it. It is certainly better than the words 

tha t I have used:

Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear 

doubtful. Freak weather effects and over-eager sonarmen may have accounted for 

many reports. No actual visual sitings by Maddox suggests complete evaluation 

before any further action.

Yet 5 hours late r we launch an attack with 64 planes on a little 

country.

Secretary McNamara. Because we have made a complete evaluation.

The point I want to make is he did not doubt there was any attack. 

He did not say so in his message.

WASHIN GTON DID NOT HAVE ALL DETAILS OF ATTACK

The second point I want to make is that I did not state in my statement tha t we had information from Admiral Johnson or th at we had 

Admiral Johnson’s evaluation report or Admiral Moorer’s evaluation 

report or General Burchinal’s evaluation repo rt at the time w’e made 

the decision regarding retaliation. I very specifically mentioned on 

page 1 9,1 believe, that some of the details cited above, particularly the 

statements of eye witnesses, had not reached Washington at the time 

the reprisal air strikes were executed, but information adequate to 

establish beyond any doubt tha t an attack had taken place was available, and I listed specifically what that was. I said allow’ me to repeat 

again tha t information.

Senator Gore. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Pell, you have been very patient.

Senator Pell. I have a couple of questions and one comment, if 

I may.

In your open, released statement, you mentioned the figure of, first 

it was 8 miles and then withdrawn to 11 miles, of the patrol. What was 

the reason for choosing 11 miles as opposed to 12 or 13?
104

Secretary McNamara. I cannot say why it was 11. I think I can say 

why it was 8. They simply wanted to make it a little fu rther away than 

it has been previously and, as you know, the patrol itself stayed 16 

miles away, although it was authorized to go 11.

CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS

Senator Pell. Right.

I understand you presumed N orth Vietnam had a 3-mile limit because it was a successor country to France, which had had it.

I am disturbed here with the analogy of Korea because Korea is 

also, North Korea is also, a successor country to a nation tha t had a 

3-mile limit, specifically, Japan.

And yet we have honored, as I understand, quite conscientiously, the 

12-mile limit tha t North Korea has claimed. Wh at is the reason for 

presuming or for not presuming that North Vietnam did not also have 

a 12-mile limit?

Secretary McNamara. Because in the case of North Korea they had 

previously stated a claim to territorial waters out to 12 miles whereas 

North Vietnam had not made any such claim. I want to emphasize, 

of course, we do not recognize North Korea’s claim to 12 miles. The 

point here is that North Vietnam had not claimed 12 miles.

Senator P ell. Right.

Secretary McNamara. And, therefore, we were not operating within 

territorial waters claimed by them.

Senator P ell. I t is not so much a question of recognizing or not 

recognizing. We do not willfully want to provoke more hostilities. I 

am sure you probably feel tha t way more strongly than any of us.

I was looking at the note that the North Vietnamese sent to the 

Internationa l Control Commission, on the 31st of Jul y objecting to 

the 34A operations, calling it a violation of the sovereignty and ter ­

ritorial integrity of the T)RV. and referring to them as acts of the 

Americans, and the Southern Administration. Then on August 5. they 

made an English language broadcast, in which they referred specifically to our destroyer, and sa id:

On the afternoon of 2d August it (th e destroyer) encountered our patro l boats 

between Hon Me a nd Lach Truong in our ter ritorial waters. In the face of the 

provocations by the sea rovers, our patrol ships took action to defend our te rritorial waters and fishermen and chased the enemy ship out of our terri toria l 

waters.

This (this broadcast of August 5 stating that our destroyer was in 

their territorial waters on August 2 when we knew tha t, while she 

had gone to within 8 miles of the North Vietnamese main shore, her 

orders had permitted her to go no ne arer )1

 would indicate to me that 

they had thought tha t 12 miles was their territorial limit. Would you 

believe that this broadcast supported that thought?

Secretary McNamara. It would indicate that they thou ght 3 miles 

or 12 miles?

Senator P ell. Twelve miles.

1

 P are nth et ic al st ate m ent su bs eq ue nt ly ad de d fo r clar ificatio n.
105

U .S . RE CO GN IZED 3 -M IL E L IM IT

Secretary McNamara. I do not think it really led us to tha t conclusion. We believed, up to tha t time they thou ght 3 miles was the 

territorial limit because they had not stated anything beyond that.

Senator Pell. You thought 12 miles up to that time?

Secretary McNamara. No; we thought 3 miles.

Senator P ell. Three miles, I am sorry.

Secretary McNamara. Was their territorial limit because they had 

not said anything to the contrary. It was not until September 1 that 

they did, to the best of my knowledge.

Senator Pell. I must say I agree with Senator Gore in his point 

tha t the retaliation seems large in proportion to the offense. I know 

from the old rules of land warfare tha t if you are engaged in hostilities 

or occupying a country, the rule of thumb given to a commanding 

officer is tha t you can retaliate 10 to one. If two of you r men are killed 

by saboteurs or franc tireurs, you have recognized authority to kill 10 

civilians for each one of your men. At least, this is what we were 

taught in World War II. It seemed to me in these two attacks, one definite and one quite possible, we suffered no damage. Therefore, why did we feel we had to 

retaliate on the basis of almost infinity from the viewpoint of the 

damage we suffered?

Secretary McNamara. Well, the attack was, the retaliation was, 

against sites associated with the vessels tha t carried out the attacks 

on our ships. The crime was not measured by the amount of damage 

done. I t was measured by the violation of our rig ht to navigate freely 

on the high seas, and it appeared to us that the retaliation was controlled, limited, and quite appropriate to the character and type of 

attack upon us.

Senator Pell. This is obviously a question of, a very subjective question of, opinion, where some of us would disagree strongly with you. 

But tha t is past history.

I would commend you on the way you handled the Pueblo case, because, although you had so many similarities there, you apparently 

followed a completely opposite course from the Maddox. You did not 

have an air cover, kept out of the 12-mile limit, and did not over 

react.

Do you feel th at the lessons of the Mcuddox and Tonkin Bay resolution may have had an effect on your reaction to the heinous seizure of 

the Pueblo?

Secretary McNamara. No. I thin k the Pueblo case was different in 

the history th at preceded it as compared to the Maddox.

We had clear and convincing evidence tha t North Vietnam was 

directing military operations of the Vietcong in South Vietnam; was 

supplying men for those operations by sea as well as supplying military materiel in large quantities, both men and materie l; and. therefore, that there was greater risk for our operations in the Gulf of 

Tonkin than there was in the waters off of North Korea.

I think that is the reason for both a difference in the nature of 

the patrol and also for the difference in the response.

Beyond that, beyond the history leading up to the actions. I think 

one should also recognize in the case of the retaliation attack against 

the North Vietnamese patrol boat bases, tha t this occurred after the
106

second attack, and afte r the President, following the first attack, had 

stated that we would maintain our rig ht to operate on the high seas, 

and that interference with that right would carry with it the gravest of 

consequences. So I think the situation really was quite different.

Senator Pell. A ll right.

COMPARISONS WITH OTHER ATTACKS ON AMERICAN SHIPS

The Chairman. I wonder if he would elaborate on the distinction 

between these cases and the Liberty where we were on the high seas 

and they actually destroyed the boat and killed 34 of the men.

Secretary McNamara. I think the m ajor difference, Mr. Chairman, 

is in intent. There was no intent on the part of the attackers of the 

Liberty tha t has ever been disclosed to me from the Government of 

Israel to attack our ship.

The Chairman. Tha t is more important than the actual destruction?

Secretary McNamara. I think so.

Senator Pell. I have the greatest sympathy with the officers of the 

ships. As one of the few people here who once stood watch unde rway and engaged in combatant activities a t night, I can see how the 

confusion comes. I think you can imagine it, as you read your statement, as you hear Senator Gore's questions. I still stick to my view 

tha t our Government's response was excessive to the offense, par ticularly as it has been delineated in this hearing.

My regard for you as an individual, remains very high. I am sure 

that in no way would you intentionally or are you in any way now 

intentionally misleading us. But I still believe we can all be honorable men and yet differ as to the courses of the same actions and 

react differently.

Secretary McNamara. Thank you.

The Chairman. I s that all?

Senator P ell. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Does the Senator from Missouri wish to ask a 

question ?

Senator Symington. Again, Mr. Secretary, I am sorry I was not 

here more today. Most of the people on this committee are also on the 

Finance Committee, so they never schedule hearings for me.

As I understand it from the little tha t I heard this morning and 

have heard today, if there was a mistake, and you do not believe there 

was a mistake, it was an unintentional mistake; and there was no 

conspiracy, no effort to formulate something to mislead the American 

people so as to justify going into a more active state of belligerency 

with North Vietnam. Does that sum it up?

Secretary McNamara. It does.

My belief is that the first attack occurred, the second attack occurred. We had evidence of a second attack at the time of our decision to retaliate. We acted constructively to try to avoid provocation, 

and there is no evidence submitted then or now that indicates either 

provocation or planned provocation.

Senator Symington. Thank you.
107

PROBLEM OF DISCLOSING SOURCES OF INFORMATIO N

One other question. I noticed you mentioned in your statement, 

which I saw only a few minutes ago, intelligence reports of a highly 

classified and unimpeachable nature. If tha t has been released, does 

tha t release us from being more specific about what the information 

was ?

Secretary McNamara. No, sir. While you were at the other committee hearing I read a report from General Carroll that emphasized 

the very serious penalties that we faced were the source of the information disclosed.

Senator Symington. From the standpoint of future m ilitary operations?

Secretary McNamara. From the standpoint of current military 

operations.

Senator Symington. Well, tomorrow is future. I am probably the 

least informed. I just have not had the time, but is it fair to say t hat 

the actions taken were taken on the basis of this highly classified unimpeachable source information ?

Secretary McNamara. I t was one of the major factors leading us to 

the conclusions tha t we came to.

Senator Symington. Do you think you would come to these conclusions without it?

Secretary McNamara. Yes.

Senator Symington. That is an interesting answer.

It was not the deciding factor, but it justified the decision.

Secretary McNamara. It did.

Senator Symington. I s th at correct?

Secretary McNamara. It did.

Senator Symington. I have no further questions, Air. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I apologize for going so long.

RELEASE OF TESTIMON Y CONSIDERED

In view of your release of your statement, do you have any objection 

to the committee, i f it so decides, to release this transcript?

Secretary McNamara. Only as much information, Air. Chairman, 

in the transcript that ought to be removed is that which refers to 

sources of data, and so on. B ut subject to tha t, I would be delighted to 

see it released.

The Chairman. This was one reason why I objected to releasing 

your statement until we had had an opportunity to see what the hearing would develop. But I think you can understand that it is going 

to be rather difficult to refrain from making public a major part, if not 

all, of this transcription order to give a balanced picture of the whole 

affairs, don’t you ?

Secretary AIcNamara. Air. Chairman, I am sure you will recall 

I explained why my statement was released. I released my statement 

because there was an absolutely incorrect newspaper report of my 

testimony this morning issued.

Senator Gore. Air. Secretary, you released an incorrect statement, at 

least one tha t is not in conformity with your testimony today.
108

Secretary McNamara. Senator Gore, I am sorry you hold tha t opinion. It is not held by others who have reviewed my statement in great 

detail. But I think it is perfectly clear tha t there was a newspaper 

report released at 1:22 this afternoon tha t was an absolutely false 

report on what I said this morning on a very important issue, and 

I do not suggest that a member of the committee made a false statement. I simply say tha t the newspaper report falsely reported what 

I said this morning.

Senator Symington. It is most unfortunate if he did.

The Chairman. I, of course, have no knowledge of tha t either, but 

I do not think it is all tha t important when he said it was in ter ritorial waters.

LOCATION OF AM ERICAN SH IP S DISCLOSED

Secretary McNamara. l ie did not say it was in territorial waters. 

I should not say he said, the newspaper report said he said I said 

it was in territorial waters. I did not say it was in territorial waters. 

It is a most important point, and I could not stand with th at—I made 

every effort—I delivered 200 copies of that statement to this committee 

this morning. I specifically instructed my people not to release it. We 

leaned over backward.

The Chairman. What I mean, there is nothing at all critical if you 

had stated tha t you did not say they were in territorial waters. But 

you released the whole statement, and tha t 20-page statement, which 

is a slight escalation.

Secretary McNamara. All I can say I told you, Mr. Chairman, why 

I did it.

The Chairman. I can understand why you did it. But you released 

the entire statement. There was no reason why you could not have 

stated to the press that you did not say they were in territorial waters, 

which would have been a direct denial of what was said. All, or 

even the report of the newspapers, all he said was they were in the 

territorial waters.

Now, there has been this general feeling around of 12 miles. We 

recognized 12 miles in Korea. We carefully recognized or at least 

we avoided going within 12 miles of Communist China, and if he 

said it, I think it was an inadvertence, because of the g reat discussion 

tha t has been place about North Korea and the Pweolo, and I regret 

it was said.

If Senator McCarthy, was quoted in the press report.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Cnairman, may I read it to Senator Symington ? I would like him to know, if I may read it.

The Chairman. You can give it to him.

Senator McNamara. Read the first two lines pencil bracketed, Senator Symington.

In view of the Pueblo case, in view of the controversy over whether 

we were o r were not in territorial waters with the Maddox and the 

Joy, it was absolutely essential that that be corrected, and corrected 

quickly and precisely, and that is why the statement had to be released.

The Chairman. I see no objection to your saying you did not say it 

was in territorial waters.
109

NORTH VIETNAMESE CLAIM IS UNDERSTANDABLE

The exchange th at Senator Pell read, it is quite clear th at the North Vietnamese believed you were in te rritoria l waters. They did not come right out and say, “Our 12-mile te rritorial waters,” but if you were in the area which the record shows you were, they believed you were in their territorial waters. I have no way of knowing whether they never had expressed 12 miles. That requires research. I do not know whether your lawyers have done a complete research, and are positive tha t in the last 10 years they have never claimed 12 miles or not. Th at 

is a matter that has never been brought up before. Actually there was an assumption, because of these other cases that 12 miles was what they claimed. We have not, the staff has not, had an opportunity to make any inquiry at all on that point. But I think publication of your statement puts a great deal of pres­ sure on the committee to release the transcript, and I do not propose, of course, to do it without action of the committee, but I th ink it does make 

it very difficult for us.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, grea t reliance has been placed, the Secretary has placed great reliance, it seems to me, upon this uniden­ tified, unimpeachable, highly classified source. Twice in his statement he has quoted that source as reporting something which the evidence does not support. So I do not know what the committee does now. I thin k we must plow fo rth and get to the full truth and make a report 

to the people.

The Chairman. I understood the Secretary to say to the Senator from Missouri that this highly classified information was not an ab­ solutely essential basis for the decision. Even without those reports he would still have made the same decision, so th at might make it easier 

to simply delete that evidence. I do not know. Well, I do not know what the committee, in its wisdom, will decide to do. I certainly do not feel authorized to release the transcript, T do not propose to do it until the committee considers the matter. But I was just inquiring while the Secretary is here, as to what his attitude is 

toward releasing of the transcript.

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, after eliminating those pa r­ ticular aspects of it t ha t woidd compromise our intelligence collection 

sources, I would be delighted to see it released.

would disclosure jeopardize our security?

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I do not like to take issue with you, but it is awfully hard for me to believe that 3 ^ years after that this is of any significance to current security. It is just incredible. [Deleted.j

Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I am quite prepared to have this issue presented to the Foreign Intelligence Board and rely on their decision. I simply tell you tha t the intelligence, senior intelligence, directors of our Government, CIA, DIA , and NSA, state categorically tha t it would be a serious compromise of intelligence sources. I am quite prepared to have mv acceptance of their statement judged and overridden by a decision of the Foreign Intelligence Board, and I 

will put it up to them if you wish.

The Chairman. Of course, you raise this very difficult question that confronts us all along, and it seems to me the executive branch takes
110

the position th at the Congress has no function to play in foreign relations and in making war; tha t we should do anything and everything 

tha t the executive-----

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, if I may, when this question of 

the Tonkin Gulf episode came up I did suggest th at we get somebody 

knowledgeable [deleted] and have him come before the committee, so 

we could get an independent slant on what the damage might be. 

Frankly, I did not know what it was or would be.

We are losing 300 or 400 men a week now, and should be careful. I 

did make tha t suggestion, before the two Secretaries went on “Meet 

the Press” 3 or 4 weeks ago; and still think it then was a good suggestion. I would hope the Chair and the committee would give consideration, not as decisive, but as something th at should be considered.

The Chairman. The Senator says he has not read it. But if he reads 

the Secretary’s statement which has been released, it is quite definite, 

I think, to anyone [delete].

Senator Symington. I must say that was my impression when I just 

read it.

The Chairman. I t is a highly classified source. That is the only thing 

it could mean [deleted] and fo r us to say it a second time does not seem 

to me to add anyth ing to it [deleted].

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, it is nearly 7 o’clock.

The Chairman. I move we adjourn.

Senator Gore. I suggest you and the Secretary ta lk about th is privately.

The Chairman. I move we adjourn.

Senator S ymington. I second that motion.

Secretary McNamara. If you want my opinion, I agree with the 

chairman.

(Whereupon, at 6:50 p.m., the committee adjourned.)

o