F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

L O N E S T A R S E C U R

I T Y A N D V I D E O , I N C ., a California corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

C I T Y O F L O S A

N G E L E S ; C I T Y O F S A N T A C L A R I T A ; C I T Y O F R A

N C H O C U C A M O N G

A ; C I T Y O F L O M

A L I N D A , Defendants-Appellees

. N o. 14-55014

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-02113- ODW -MRW

S A M I A M M A R I , an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

C I T Y O F L O S A

N G E L E S , Defendant-Appellee

. N o. 14-55050

D.C. No. 2:12-cv-04644- ODW -MRW

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Otis D. W rig ht I I , District J u dg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted March 11, 2016 Pasadena, CaliforniaL O N E S T A R S E C

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. C I T Y O F L O S A N G E L E S 2

F iled J uly 7, 2016

B e fore: Stephen Reinhardt, Mary H. Murg uia, and J ohn B . Owens, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e Murg uia; Concurrence by

J udg e Owens

SUMMARY *

Constitutional Law

Affirming the district court’s summary judg ment in favor

o f defendant municipalities, the panel held that five c it y ordinances reg ulating mobile billboards withsto o d F irst Amendment scrutiny a s content-neutral, reasonable, time, place, and manner restrictions on speech.

One of the ordinances limited the ty pe of sig n that could be affix ed to motor vehicles parked or left standing o n public

s t r e ets, and the others prohibited non-motoriz ed, “mobile billboard advertising display s” within city limits.

Disting uishing Reed v. Town of Gilbert , 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), the panel held that the ordinances were c ontent neutral. The p anel c oncluded that the w ord “advertising ” did
not render the ordinances content based o n their face, and the ordinances r eg ulated the manner, not the content, of affected speech. The panel held that the ordinances were narrowly

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.L O N E S T A R S E C

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tailored to sig nificant g overnment interests in traffic c ontrol, public safety

, and aesthetics. I n addition, the ordinances left open adequate alternative opportunities for advertising

. Concurring in the majority ’s opinion, J udg e Owens wrote that the Supreme Court should take a second look at Members of City Council of City o f Los Angele s v. Taxpayers for Vincent
, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), because if “ a es t h e tics” are to play a part in speech r estri c t ion, then they should a pply equally to all unattractive sig ns or decals.

COUNSEL

Georg e M. W allace (arg

ued)

, W a l lace, B rown & Schwartz

, Pasadena, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Kimberly A

. Erickson ( arg ued), Deputy City Attorney ; R o nald S. W h itaker, Assistant City Attorney ; Thomas H. Peters, Chief Assistant City Attorney ; Michael N. F euer, City Attor n ey ; Office of the City Attorney
, L os Ang eles, California, for Defendant-Appellee City of L os Ang eles.

J oseph P. B uchman (arg

ued), B rian A. Pierick, and J oseph M. Montes, City Attorney ; B u rke, Williams & S o r ensen L L P, L os Ang eles, California, for Defendant-Appellee City o f Santa Clarita.

Richard E. Holda w a y ( arg ued), City Attorney
, Robbins & Holdaway

, Ontario, California, for Defendant-Appellee City of L oma L inda.L O N E S T A R S E C

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J ules S. Z eman, Kevin M. Osterberg

, Melin d a Carrido, a nd Vang i M

. J o h nson; Haig h t B rown & B onesteel L L P, L os Ang eles, California; f

or Defendant-Appellee City o f Rancho Cucamong a.

OP INION

MURGUI A, Circuit J udg e:

These consolidated appeals concern the constitutionality of five c ity ordinances that r eg ulate mobile b ill boards. One of the ordinances limits the ty pe of sig n that may be affix ed
to motor vehicles parked or left standing on public streets; the other ordinances prohibit non-motoriz ed, “mobile b i l l board advertising display s” within city limits. Appellants, w ho have been subject to enforcement under t h e o r dinances, broug ht suit ag ainst the municipalities arg uing that the mobile billboard laws impermissibly restrict their freedom of speech in violation of the F irst Amendment. W e have j u r i sdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and w e review de nov o the district court’s g rant o f summary judg ment in favor of the municipalities. W e h old that the o r d i n a nces withstand F irst Amend ment scrutiny as content-neutral, reasonable, time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. S ee Long Beach Area Peace N

e t w ork v. City of Long Beach

, 574 F .3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009). W e affirm.

BACK G ROUND

B e tween 2010 and 2012, the California L e g islature enacted a series of amendments to the V e h i cle Code empowering local municipalities to reg ulate mobile billboards, which the L eg islature found to blig ht city streets,L O N E S T A R S E C

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endang er residents, a

nd reduce a vailabl e o n -street p arking

. 1 See Assemb. B

. 2756, 2009–2010 Reg

. Sess. (Cal. 2 010); see also Assemb. B

. 1 2 9 8, 2011–2012 Reg

. Sess. (Cal. 2 011); Assemb. B

. 2291, 2011– 2012 Reg

. Sess. (Cal. 2012). The

new sections of the Vehic le Code authoriz ed cities to adopt laws penaliz ing the parking of p o rtable, non-motoriz ed, wheeled vehicles that carry sig ns and are “for the primary
purpose of advertising”—known a s “mobile billboard adver t i s i ng display s.” See Cal. Veh. Code §§ 395.5, 21100(m), 2 2651(v). T he enabling leg islation a l s o allowed cities to reg ulate motor vehicles bearing “advert i sing sig ns” that are not “permanently affix ed” and that “e x t e n d bey ond
t h e o verall leng th, w idth, or heig h t o f the vehicle.” S e e i d

. § 21100(p)(2). Under the Vehicle Code, an advertising sig n is “per manently affix ed” if it is “ [ p] a inted directly o n the body of a motor vehicle” or “[ a] p p l i ed as a decal.” Id. § 21100(p)(3). I

n sum, these c ode sections a uthoriz ed cities
to r eg ulate two ty

pes of mobile b illboar d advertising : advertisements affix ed to portable, n on

- m otorized

, w heeled

v e h i c l e s ( “ n o n

- m o t o r i z e d m o b i l e b i l l b o a r d s ” )

, a n d advertisements attached to motorized veh icles (“motoriz ed mobile billboards”).

I n response, the cities of L os A ng eles, Santa Clarita, Rancho C u c among a, and L o ma L inda passed v irtually iden tical ordinances banning one or both ty pes of mobile

1 Un d er Calif

o rn ia law , a v eh icle can b e rem o v ed an d im p o u n d ed o n ly

w h en th at actio n i s ex p ressly au th o rized b y th e Calif o rn ia Veh icle Co d e. Cal. Veh

. Co d e § 2 2 6 5 0 (“ It is u n law f u l f o r an y p eace o ffi c e r

. . . to

rem o v e an

y u n atten d ed v eh icle f

ro m a h ig h w ay t o a g arag e o r to an y o th er p lace, ex cep t as p ro v id ed in th is co d e.

. . .”). Bef o re 2 0 1 0
, im

p o u n d in g a leg ally p ark ed v eh icle b ecau s e it w as a m ob ile b illb o ard w as n o t

au th orized b y th e Calif

o rn ia Veh icle C o d e, an d th u s ex ceed ed l o cal
g o v ern m en ts’ au th o rity

.L O N E S T A R S E C

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billboards and permi t t i ng public officials to e x act civil penalties a

nd impound vehicles sporting sig ns that violate the ordinances. The citie s’ ordinances mirror and ex plicitly reference the California L eg islature’s amendments t o t he Vehicle Code. Fo r ex ample, section 87.54 of the L os Ang eles Municipal Code (the “mot o r i z ed mobile billboard ordinance”) provides, in pertinent part:

A motor vehicle may c ontain advertising sig ns that are painted directly upon or ar e permanently affix ed to the body of, an integ ral part of, o r fix ture of a motor vehicle for permanent decorat ion, identification, o r display and that do n o t e x tend bey ond the overall leng th, width, or h eig ht o f the vehicle. Advertising sig ns that are painted directly
upon or perma n e n t ly affix ed to a motor vehicle s h a ll not be p ainted directly upon o r permanently affix e d in such a manner as to make t h e motor v ehicle unsafe to be driven, moved, parked or left standing o n a n y public
street or public lands in t h e City

. Motor vehic l e s that pose a safety haz ard shall be impounded p ursuant t o [ the] California Vehicle Code . . . .

L .A. Mun. Code § 87.54 (2012). The other four ordinances (the “non-motoriz ed mobile billboard ordinances”) make it unlawful to park a “mobile billboard advertising display ” on any public street within city limits. See L .A. M u n. Code § 87.53 (2013); L oma L inda Mun. Code § 10.36.070 ( 2 011); R a ncho Cucamong a Mun. Code § 10.52.080 (2011); San t a Clarita M un. Code § 12.84 (2011). The non-motoriz ed mobile b illboard ordinances all incorporate the definition o fL O N E S T A R S E C

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“mobile b illboard advertising d isplay ” codified at California Vehicle Code section 395.5: “advertising display [ s] ” that a re attached to non-motoriz ed vehicles, carry a sig n or billboard, and are “for the primary

purpose of advertising .”

Appellants L one Star Sec u r i t y & Video, I nc. and Sami Ammari own mobile billboards that are subject to the cities’ bans. L o ne Star Security operates a fleet of standalone trailers that were specially c onstruc t ed to display sig ns o r b a n ners, which L one Star Security uses to advertise i t s burg lary alarm services as well as other products and political

causes. Ammari promotes his L o s Ang eles-based businesses by bolting sig ns to m o t o r vehicles that he parks on city
streets. After the o r dinances took effect, L one Star Security and Ammari broug ht suit alleg ing that the m o b i l e billboard bans are facially invalid because they abridg e the freedom o f speech g uaranteed b y the F irst Amendment. L one Star Security specifically challeng es the c i t i e s’ prohibition o n nonmotorized mobile billboard advertising d isplay s, whereas Ammari’s case concerns the constitut ionality of L os Ang eles’s reg ulation of mobile bi l l boards on parked, motorized vehicles.

L one Star Security was last b e f ore this court in 2013, when a panel a ffirmed the district c ourt’s denial o f a preliminary injunction blocking the cities from enforcing the non-motoriz e d mobile billboard ordinances. See Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City o f Los Angeles

, No. 12-56333 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2013). Upon remand, the district court consolidated L one Star Security ’ s case with Ammari’s, who had f i l e d his c omplaint shortly before L one Star Security ’s first appeal. On cross-motions for summary judg men t , t h e district court concluded that the mob i l e billboard bans were content-neutral, rea s o n able, time, place, and mannerL O N E S T A R S E C

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restrictions on speech that did not violate the F ir s t Amendment. According ly

, the court e n t e r e d judg ment in favor of the cities and ag ainst L one Star S e cu r i ty a nd Ammari. These appeals followed.

D ISCUSSION

The F irst Amendment, as applied to the states throug h the F o u r t ee n t h A m e n d m e n t , p r o h i b i t s s t a t e a n d l o c a l
g overnments fr o m enacting laws “ abridg ing the f r eedom o f speech.” Reed v

. T

own of Gilbert

, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (quoting U. S

. C o n st. amend. I ). Certain ty pes o f speech reg ulations a

r e p resumptively invalid, including laws that “targ et speech based o n its c ommunicative content. Id. These kinds of reg u lations a r e strictly scrutiniz ed and will be upheld only if “they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling
state interests.” Id

. L aws affecting speech in traditio n al
p ublic fora like sidewalks and c ity streets are a lso
p r esumptively invalid, Long Beach Area
, 574 F

. 3d at 1020–22, 1024, althou gh t h e g overnment may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in traditional public f

ora so long as the re s t r i c tions are c ontent neutral, are “narrowly tailored to serve a sig nificant
g overnmental interest,” and “leave open a mp l e a lternative channels for communication of the informatio n

. ” Clark v

. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence

, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).

The cities bear the b urden of proving the constitutionality of the ordinances at issue. See United States v

. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc

. , 5 29 U .S. 8 03, 816 (2000) (“W h en the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the cons titutionality of its actions.”). Be c ause Appellants raise facial challeng es to the municipal ordinances, w e will s t r ike down the mobile billboardL O N E S T A R S E C

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reg ulations if they are “unconstitutional in every conceivable application,” or if they “seek[ ] to prohibit such a broad r ang e of protected conduct that [ they are] unconstitutionally

o v e r b r oad.” See Foti v. City o f Menlo Park

, 146 F .3d 6 2 9
, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
, 466 U.S. 78 9
, 7 9 6 (1984)). The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case,

so “the only question we must determine i s whether the district court correctly applied the law.” EEOC v. L u c e , Forward, Ham i l ton & Scripps
, 345 F .3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

I. Content Neutrality

The parties concede that all of the ordinances at issue bear
upon interests that the F irst Amendment protects. T hus, we consider first whether the reg ulations are content neutral o r content based. 2 See R eed , 135 S. Ct. at 2226–27.

A reg ulation is content based if, “on i t s fa c e,” it “draws distinctions based on the messag e a speaker convey s.” Id. at

2 In af f irm in g th e d en ial o f a p relim in ary i n j u nctio n to L o n e S tar Secu rity

, a p an el o f th i s co u rt f ou n d th at t

h e n o n -m o to rized m o b i le b illb o ard ord in an ces are co n ten t n eu tral. T h e p an el relied o n o u r h o ld in g in Reed v. To wn o

f Gilb ert (“ Reed I

”), 5 87 F.3 d 9 66 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ), w h ich

co n clu d ed th at a sig n reg u latio n restrictin g th e size, d u ratio n , an d lo catio n

o f d irectio n al sig n s w as co n ten t n eu tral. Id

. at 9 77 ; a cco rd Reed v. To w n

o f G i lb ert (“ Reed II

”), 7 07 F.3 d 1 0 5 7
, 1 0 6 9

– 7 0 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 3 ). T h a t h o ld in g , h o w ev er, w as later o v erru led b y th e Su p rem e Co u rt. S

ee Reed

, 1 3 5 S

. C t

. at 2 2 32

. T h eref ore, w e rev isit th e co n ten t n eu trality o f t h e

m o b ile b illb o ar d b a n s in lig h t o f th e Su p rem e Co u rt’ s d ecisio n in Reed

. S ee U n ited Sta tes v. Ba d M

a r ria g e , 4 3 9 F

. 3 d 5 3 4
, 5 4 0 (9 th Cir. 20 0 6) (ex p lain in g th at th e law o f t h e case n eed n o t b e f o llo w e d w h en

“ i n terv en in g co n tro llin g au th o rity m ak es reco n sid eratio n ap p ro p riate” (citatio n o m itted )).L O N E S T A R S E C

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2227. A reg ulation that defi n es reg ulated speech by a particular s u b

j ect matter or that discriminates b etween viewpoints is plainly content based. I d. at 2 2 2 7
, 2230. F o r

ex a mple, the Supreme Court recently held that an ordinance that imposed more string ent restrictions o n sig ns directing the public to a church meeting than on “political” sig ns was content based. See id. at 2232. I n addition, a n ostensibly viewpoint-neutral law is content based if it was “adopted b y the g overnment because of d isag reement with the m es sag e the speech c o n vey s.” Id. at 2227 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

B y its terms, the motoriz ed billboard ordinance r eg u lates the w ay in which “advertising sig ns” may be affix ed to motor vehicles on city streets. The non-motoriz ed billboard ordinances likewise apply to “mobile b illb o ard advertising display s” within the meaning of California Vehicle Code section 395.5, w hich includes as part of the definition that the vehicle be “for the primary purpose of advertising .” Neither the California Vehicle C o de nor the mobile billboard ordinances define “advertising ,” however, and Appellants insist that the ordinances are c ontent ba s ed b ecause they disting uish between billboards that “advertise” and all other

s i gns, such as those that do not advertise. Appellant s ’
arg ument, in e s s ence, is that the o nly sig ns that “ advertise” are those that propose a commercial transaction. 3

3 A p p ellan t s h av e n o t d irectly ch allen g ed th e m o b ile b illb o ard law s o n th e g ro u n d s th at th ey u n du ly r e s t rict “ co m

m ercial sp eech ” in th e

co n stitu tio n al sen se—in f

act, L o n e Star S ecu rity o b j ect s t hat th e

o rd in an ces af

f ect h is ab ility to co n v ey po litical m essag es reg ard in g l o cal elected o f f icials o r b a l l o t p ro p o sals u sin g m o b i le b illb o ard s. Nev erth eless, A p pellan t s ap p ear to o v erw h elm in g ly co n f

late “ ad v ertisin g ” sp eech w i th

“ co m m ercial sp eech ,” w

h ich ref ers to sp eech t

h at “ d o es ‘ n o m o re th an p ro p ose a co m

m ercial tran sactio n .’ ” S ee Co yo t e P u b

., In c. v. Miller

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W e disag ree that the word “advertising ” renders the challeng ed reg ulations content b as e d o n their face. I n the
contex t of mobile billboard r eg ulations, the California Court of Appeal has already recog niz ed that the word “advertising ” refers to the a ctivity of disp l a y i ng a messag e to the public,

n o t t o any p a

rticular content that may be display e d. I n Showing A n i m als Respect & Kindness v. City of W e st Hollywood

, the California Court of Appeal reje c t ed a constitutional challeng e to a nearly identical municipal b an

on mobile billboard advertising d isplay s after finding that the ordinance w as content neutral. 4 See 166 Cal. A p p

. 4th 815, 819– 2 0
, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 1 34, 137–38 (2008). The p laintiff i n t h a t c ase was a non-profit org aniz a tion that used mobile b i l l b o a r d s

— a c c o m

p a n i e d w i t h l o u d s p e a

k e r a nn o u n c e m e n t s

— to protest a

nimal c ruelty

. The California C o u r t of Appeal concluded that W est Holly wo o d ’s “advertising ” b an was

5 9 8 F.3 d 5 9 2
, 5 9 8 (9 th Cir. 2 0 10 ). B u t, alth o u g h la w s t h at restrict o n ly

c o m m e r c ial sp eech are co n ten t b ased

, see Reed III
, 1 3 5 S. Ct. at 2 23 2
, su ch restrictio n s n eed o n ly w ith stan d in term ed iate scru tin y

. S ee Cen t r a l Hu d so n Ga s & Elec. Co rp

. v. Pu blic S erv. Co mm’n o

f N ew Y o rk

, 4 47 U .S. 5 5 7
, 5 6 4 (1 98 0 ) (req u i rin g t h at law s af

f ectin g co m

m ercial sp eech seek to i m p lem en t a su

b stan t ial g o v ern m en tal in terest, d irectly ad v an ce th at in terest, an d reach n o f

u rth er th an n ecess a r y t o acco m p lish th e g iv en

o b j ectiv e).

4 W est Ho lly

w o o d Mu n icip al C o d e sectio n 1 1

. 4 4

. 0 2 0 states: “ It is

u n law f u l f o r an y p erso n to co n d u ct, o r cau se to b e co n d u cted

, an y m o b i le b illb o ard ad v ertisin g u

p o n an y street, or oth er pu b lic p lace w ith i n th e city in w h ich th e p u

b lic h as th e rig h t o f t

rav el.

. . . Mo b ile b illb oard ad v ertisin g in clu d es an y v eh icle, o r w h eeled co n v ey an ce w

h ich carries, co n v ey s, p u lls, o r tran sp o rts an y sig n or billb o ard f o r th e p r i m ary pu rp o se of ad v ertisin g .” Ho w ev er, th e o rd in an ce ex em p ted f ro m th e p ro h ib itio n th e f o llo w in g : “ [a]n y v eh icle w h ich d is p l a y s an ad v ertisem en t o r b u sin ess id en tif i catio n o f its o w

n er, so lo n g as su ch v eh icle is en g ag ed in th e u su al b u sin ess o r reg u l ar w o rk o f t h e o w n er, an d n o t u sed m erely

, m ain ly or p rim arily to d isp lay

ad v ertisem en ts,” as w ell as b u ses an d tax icab s

. Id

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content neutral because it did not differ e n t i ate b etween categ ories of speech:

T h e term “advertise” is n ot limited to calli n g the public’s atte n t i o n to a p r oduct or a business. The definition o f “advertise” is more g eneral: “ to make something known to[ ;]

. . . to make publicly and g enera l l y known[ ;]

. . . to announce publicly esp[ecially] by a printed notice or a broad

c a s t

. . . .” (Merrian [ sic ] –W ebster’s Colleg iate Dict. (10th e d., 1995) p. 1 8; italics a dded.) Thus, althoug h the subject of the matter broug ht to notice may be commercial, it is not necessarily so. Messag e s endorsing a political candidate, a social cause

or a r elig ious belief w ould also fall within the term “advertise.”

Id. at 819–20, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 138. The California Court of Appeal further noted that the ordin a nce defined “ mobile billboard advertising ” a s “any v ehicle or wheeled convey a nce which c arries, c onvey s, pulls, o r transports any s i g n o r billboard,” a

nd reasoned that these active verbs demonstrated that “the ordinance [ was] concerned with the speaker’s acts, not the content of the speech.” Id. at 823, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3 d at 140–41.

I n e v a luating a facial challeng e w e “must c onsider the [ municipality ’s] authoritative constructions of the ordinance, including its own implementation and interpretation of it.” Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement
, 505 U.S. 123, 131 ( 1 992); see also Oxborrow v. Eikenberry

, 877 F .2d 13 9 5
, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that we defer to a state court’s interpretation of its own laws u n l ess that interpretation isL O N E S T A R S E C

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“untenable or amounts to a subterfug e to avoid federal r eview of a constitutional violation”). W e will “follow the decision of the intermediate a p p ellate courts of the state unless there i s convincing evidence that the hig hest court of the s t a t e would decide differently .” In re Schwarzkopf

, 626 F .3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (quo t i n g Owen ex. rel Owen v

. United States
, 713 F .2d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir. 1 983)). The definition of “advertising ” that the California Court of A p p e al articulated i n S

howing Animals Respect is neither untenable

nor an obvious subterfug e to avoid federal review. S e e 166 Cal. App. 4 th at 819–20, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 1 38 (holding that the term “ advertising ” a pplies to both co m m e rcial a nd noncommercial speech). Therefore, absent convincing evidence that the California Supr e me Court would construe the term “ advertise” i n t h is situation differently

, we cannot depart from the c o nstructio n o f the California Court o f Appeal; n e i t

h er Appellant offers such evidence. A c cording ly

, we hold th a t the mobile b illboard bans reg u late the

m a nner—not the content—of affected speech. T h e ordinances address only the ty pes of s i gn

- bearing vehicles subject to reg ulation, and discrimina t e ag a inst p rohibited billboards on the b asis of their siz e and mobility alone, a nd

are thus content neutral. E v e n a reg ulated v e hicle bearing a blank sig n could conceivably violate the ordinances.

The Supreme Court’s recent d ecision i n Reed d o es not alter our conclusi on. 5 U nlike Reed

, the mobile billboard ordinances do not sing le o ut a s p e c ific subject matter for

5 In Ree d

, J us t i c e A lito

, j o in ed b y J u stices Ken n ed y an d So to m ay o r,

w ro te sep arately

to o p in e th at ru les reg u latin g th e “ size o f s ig n s” o r “ th e lo catio n s in w

h ich sig n s m ay b e p laced ,” i n clu d in g ru les th at “ d istin g u ish b etw een f ree- stan d in g sig n s an d th o se attach ed to b u ild in g s” w o u ld n o t b e

co n ten t b ased . 1 3 5 S. Ct. at 2 2 3 3 (A lito , J ., co n cu rrin g ).L O N E S T A R S E C

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differential treatment, nor is a ny ki n d of mobile billboard

ex e mpted from reg ulat ion b a sed o n its content. There has been no sug g estion that the ord i n a n ces apply differently to L one Star Security ’s p o l i t i cal e ndorsements than to its commercial p romotional campaig ns, f or ex a mple. Rather, an officer se e k i n g to enforce the non-motoriz ed billboard ord i n ances must decide only whether an offending vehicle constitutes a prohibited “ advertising display ” bec a use its primary purpose i s t o display messag es, as opposed to transporting passeng ers or carry ing carg o

. Cf. S.O.C., Inc. v

. County of Clark

, 152 F .3d 1 136, 1 145 (9th Cir. 1 998) (hol d i n g that a county ordinance that prohibited canvassing

o n public streets and sidewalks within the L as Veg as resort district was content based, f or Fi r st Amendment purposes, because any officer seeking to enforce the o rdinance would need to ex amine the contents of a leaflet to determine whether the ordinance prohibited its d istribution). I n the case o f the motoriz ed billboard ordinance, an enf o r cing officer would simply need to disting uish between sig ns that are p ermanent

or non-permanent, and larg er or smaller th a n the vehicles to which the sig ns are affix ed to determine whether the vehicle violates the o rdinance. See id

. Therefo r e , t he district court appropriately found the ordinances to be content neutral.

II. Narrow ly Tailored to a Signif icant G overnm ent Interest

The parties do not dispute that the cities’ stated interests in traffic control, public safety

, and aesthetics are sufficiently weig hty to justify content-n eutral, time, place, or manner restrictions on speech, nor c o uld they

. The Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly confirme d t hat local
g o v e r nments may ex ercise their police powers to advance these g oals b y prohibiti n g i n trusive or unsig htly forms o fL O N E S T A R S E C

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ex p ression. S

ee Taxpayers for Vincent
, 466 U.S. at 808; G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of

Lake Oswego
, 436 F .3d 1064, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2006). I nst ea d

, we focus on whether the mobile b illboard r e g ulations are narrowly tailored to the cit i e s ’ interests.

A speech reg ulation is narrowly tailored if it “ promotes a substantial g ove rnment interest that w ould be achieved less effective l y absent the reg ulation.” W ard v. Rock Against Racism
, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (19 8 9 ) (citation omitted). The fact that “the go v ernment’s interest c ould be adequately served b y some less-sp e e ch -restrictive alternative” will not invalidate an otherwise reasonab l e t ime, place, o r manner restriction “ [ s ] o long as the means c hosen are not substantially

broader than necessary .” I d

. at 800.

None o f the ordinances in this ca s e a r e “substantially broader than necessary

” to accomplish the cities’ g oals o f eliminating v i sual blig ht and p romoting the safe a nd convenient flow of traffic. Controlling c ase law compels our conclusion that the c ities’ interest in aesthetics alone justifies the ordinances. See Taxpayers for Vincent
, 466 U.S. at 808 (holding that a total rest r i c t i o n on a certain ty pe o f visual advertising is narrowly tailored because, by banning the ty pe of sig ns t h a t the city determined to c o n stitute “visual clutter and blig h t,” the city “did n o more than eliminate the ex act

source of the evil it soug ht to remedy”). Under this bindi n g precedent, it is therefore enoug h that the Appellees believed that the ad v ertising display s prohibited by the mobile billboard r eg ula t ions detract from the cities’ overall
appearance; the o u t rig ht ban directly serves this stated interest.L O N E S T A R S E C

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F urther, by removing from city streets vehicles that have

no p urpose other than advertising

, the mobile billboard
reg ulations a

re narrowly tailored to the cit i e s ’ i nterests in
p a r king control and reducing traffic haz ards. B ecause t h e utility of mobile billboards stems from owners’ ability to park
t h e m f or periods of hours or day s at a time, they reduce available on-str e e t p a

r k i n g

. N o n

- m otoriz ed mobile billboards

are a lso likely to impair pedestrians’ and drivers’ visibility and pose a safety risk to motorists who are force d to veer around them into the n ex t lan e o f t r affic to by pass them. And, they may roll onto the roadway

after being

parked.

I n addition, the motoriz ed billboard o rdinance serves L os A ng eles’s asserted interest in p ublic safety b y prohibiti n g non-permanently affix ed sig ns and permanently affix ed sig ns th a t a r e larg er than the dimensions of a vehicle. Temporary sig ns, by their nature, are impe r m a n e n t and thus pose a g reater dang e r to pedestrians and motor vehic l e s because o f the risk that they

will come detached. 6 Sig ns larg er than the dimensions of the vehicle are also mor e l i k ely to o bstruct traffic and impede drivers’ field of vision. F or instance, some of Ammari’s billboards blocked the side and rear windows o f his vans, reducing the oper a t o r ’ s a b ility to see passing cars, pedestrians, or other roadside haz a rds.

The cities’ g oals w ould be achieved l e s s effectively absent the challeng ed reg ulations. See W ard

, 4 9 1 U

. S

. at 799. Mobile billboards are d i f f i c u l t to control precisely

6 T h e C ity o f Lo s A n g eles o f f ered an o t h er ratio n ale f

o r § 8 7 .5 4 —th at tem p o rary sig n s p o se a saf

ety risk w h en t h e v eh icle is “ d riv en d u

rin g h ig h

w in d co n d itio n s.” A s § 8 7.5 4 is a p ark in g o rd in an ce, driv in g -r e l ated saf ety risk s are n o t su ff

icien tly n arro w ly t ailo red to j u stif y th e sp eech restrictio n s im

po sed b y th e reg u latio n

.L O N E S T A R S E C

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because they can be moved in and out o f a jurisdiction with

ease. As the Supreme Court has noted, if a municipality “has

a suffi c ient b asis for believing that billboards a re traffic ha z ards and are unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the problems they create i s t o prohibit them.” See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego , 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981).

III. Alternatives

L astly

, to satisfy the F irst Amendment, a time, place, a nd

manner reg u lation must “ leave open amp l e a lternative channels f

or communication.” Clark

, 468 U.S. at 293. “[ T] he F irst A mendment does not g uarantee the r ig ht to communicate o ne’s views at all tim e s a n d p laces or in any

manner that may be desired.” H effron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
, 452 U

. S

. 640, 647 (1981). However, “a restriction on ex pressive a ctivity may be invalid if the remaining modes o f communication are inadequate.” Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U.S. at 812.

The mobile b illboard ordinances leave open adequate alternative opportunities for advertising

. The challeng ed

r e g ulations f

oreclose only one form of ex pression—mobi l e billboards—by placing limited res t r ictions on the ty pes o f vehicles to w hich mobile billboards may be affix ed (vehicles whose primary purpose is something o ther than advertising ), and the manner in which billboar d a dvertisements can be display ed on a motor vehicle (in a permanent fashion and no larg e r th a n t h e dimensions of the vehicle). Appellants a re free to disseminate their messag es throug h my ri a d o t her channels, such as stationary billboards, bus benches, fly ers, newspapers, or handbills. Appellants may also paint sig ns on vehicles and a ttach decals o r b umper stickers. Althoug hL O N E S T A R S E C

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m o bile billboards are a unique mode of communicatio n , nothing in t h e r ecord sug g ests that Appellants’ overall “ability to communi c a t e e ff ec t i vely is threatened.” Taxpayers for Vincent
, 466 U.S. at 812. Therefore, g iven the ample alternative modes of a d vertising a vailable in the Appellee cities, we will not invalidate the mobile b illboard bans merely because they restrict A pp e l l ants’ preferred method o f communication. Id. ; G .K. Ltd. Travel

, 436 F .3d at 1074. The remaining alternatives for ex p ressive conduct a re sufficient to vindic a

t e A p p e l l a n ts’ F irst Amendment interests.

B e cause the mobile b illboard ordin a n ce s are c ontent

n eutral, narrowly tailored to serve the g overnmen t s ’ sig nificant a esthetic and safety interests, a nd leave open ample a lternative channels of c omm unication, the judg ment of the district court is AF F IRMED

.

OW ENS, Circuit J udg e, concurring :

I concur in the majority ’s opinion, as it faithfully follows the current controlling case law. I write s e p a r a tely because, in my view, the Supreme Court should take a second look at

an i m p o rt ant aspect of M embers of City Council o f City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U.S. 789 (1984).

This case is about ug ly sig ns on vehicles, and no doubt I would not want these vehicles a n d their sig ns parked in front of my house. B u t under t h e o r d i n ances at issue, a car with equally u g ly d ecals—including a d ecal o f a v e h i c le with an ug ly sig n—would no t “ g o to jail,” b ut instead treat my curb like the upper left corner of a Monopoly board.L O N E S T A R S E C

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I f “aesthetics” a

re to play a part in speech restriction, then such aesthetics should apply e qually

, decal or sig n. Yet under Taxpayers for Vincent , the Court rejected the very point that I now make. See 4 66 U.S. 8 1 0

– 1 2 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s holding that “a prohibition ag ainst the use o f unattractive sig ns cannot be justified on esthetic g rounds if it fails to a pply to all equally unattractive sig n s w h e rever they mig ht be located”). I

think our c ourt was rig ht then, and the Supreme Court should reconsi d e r t his portion of Taxpayers for Vincent

. As it currently s t a n d s, politicians c an use Taxpayers for Vincent and its b e holderish “aesthetics” to covertly ensure homog eneous thin k ing and political discourse. That is a dimension w e s h ould avoid. See The Twilight Zone: Eye of the Beholder (CB S television broadcast Nov. 11, 1960).