alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

May 4, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice 130194 & (53) Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. THE GREATER BIBLE WAY TEMPLE OF Stephen J. Markman, JACKSON, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 130194 COA: 250863 Jackson CC: 01-003614-AS CITY OF JACKSON, JACKSON PLANNING COMMISSION, and JACKSON CITY COUNCIL, Defendants-Appellants.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, th e motion to file amicus curi ae brief is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the November 10, 2005 judgme nt of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is GRAN TED. We further ORDER th at this case be argued and submitted to the Court together with the case of The Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson v City of Jackson (No. 130196), at such future session of the Court as both cases are ready for submission.

Other persons or groups int erested in the determination of the questions presented in this case may move the Court for perm ission to file briefs amicus curiae.

t0427 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

May 4, 2006

Clerk
#### Horace NELSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. 5063.

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

Nov. 13, 1980.

*481James H. Cannon, Asst. Public Defender, Fairbanks, and Brian Shortell, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.

Steven J. Call, Asst. Dist. Atty., Harry L. Davis, Dist. Atty., Fairbanks, and Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

OPINION

Before BRYNER, C. J., and COATS and SINGLETON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Horace Nelson was sentenced to life imprisonment following his conviction on a charge of second degree murder.1 He has appealed this sentence, contending that the lower court improperly discounted the possibility of rehabilitation and that it erroneously classified him a worst offender within the class of second degree murderers. This court has reviewed the record in this case and has decided that the trial judge was not clearly mistaken in imposing that sentence.

The facts of the case are particularly appalling. Nelson encountered a seventeen year-old girl at an all-night drinking party. In the early morning hours they went to a municipal baseball park, went into a baseball dugout, and had sexual intercourse. Mr. Nelson admits to intentionally strangling her in the dugout. She was found mostly undressed with her legs and hands tied and her breasts severely bitten.2

 The possibility of rehabilitation must be considered in every case. However, it need not be given the highest priority as a sentencing goal in all cases. The Alaska Constitution places equal emphasis upon protection of the public. *See*Alaska Const., art. 1, sec. 12. Even considering the fact Mr. Nelson was only 23 at the time of this crime, we do not believe that the court below erred in placing little emphasis on rehabilitation. Nelson was extensively involved in reformation programs at a variety of juvenile detention facilities both in and out of state prior to his reaching the age of 18. As an adult, he had several misdemean- or drug and alcohol convictions and one disorderly conduct conviction. The circumstances of the murder in this particular case indicate that Nelson is either severely mentally disturbed or is extremely callous towards the rights and dignity of other human beings. In either event, it seems clear that Mr. Nelson is a danger to the public, and the reality is that the prospect for his rehabilitation is not good.

The sentencing court had ample reason for stressing the need for protection of the public and for discounting rehabilitation. Furthermore, in light of Nelson’s pri- or record of antisocial behavior, the failure of prior correctional efforts, his drug and alcohol abuse, and his conduct on this occasion, the trial court was not clearly mistaken to classify him as a worst offender.

The sentence is AFFIRMED.

1

. *See*former A.S. 11.15.030.

2

. We have reviewed Mr. Nelson’s version of how those events took place. Judge Blair indicated that he believed Mr. Nelson did not or could not fully explain the facts of the murder.
PCA: 12-3J14-24-B-0126 January 9, 2024 

PURCHASE AWARD DESCRIPTION: Wild Rice, PCA, 12-3J14-24-B-0126 WBSCM Number 2000009758.

The USDA/Agricultural Marke�ng Service/Commodity Procurement Program (CPP) hereby announces it

has rejected offers received under WBSCM Solicita�on Number 2000009758 that was issued on

December 08, 2023, for Wild Rice. 

No offers received. 

Further Informa�on can be obtained from the Commodity Procurement Program, Agricultural Marke�ng

Service, USDA, South Building, Washington, DC 20250, telephone (202) 720 4517 or the website at 

htp://www.ams.usda.gov/selling-food.
**CERTIFICATIONS**

I, Serge Atlan, certify that: 

  1) I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of INverso Corp.;  

  2) Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;  

  3) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;  

  4) The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:  

  a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;  

  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based upon such evaluation; and  

  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal controls over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and  

  5) The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):  

  a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information and  

  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls over financial reporting.  

Date: January 26, 2005 

By:   /s/   Serge Atlan 

    Serge Atlan

    Chairman
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#### Rudy Bunny MARQUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alan CHARNES, Director of Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, State of Colorado, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 81CA0034.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

July 9, 1981.

Jon P. Lozow, Denver, for plaintiff-appel-lee.

J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard E. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant-appellant.

COYTE, Judge.

The director of the Department of Revenue appeals the trial court judgment directing reinstatement of plaintiff’s driver’s license. We reverse.

Plaintiff refused to take a chemical test in accordance with the implied consent law. The advisement form stated that plaintiff was driving a motor vehicle on a public highway, that he had bloodshot, watery eyes, a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, and his speech was slurred. When asked to perform a roadside sobriety test, he was unable to do so satisfactorily. There was no explanation in the advisement form as to why plaintiff was stopped in the first instance.

We hold that it is not necessary for the officer to set out the reason on the advisement form for stopping the driver. He is only required to give the reasons for believing the driver to be under the influence of alcohol. Thus, there is no merit to plaintiff’s contention that the officer could not testify as to his reasons for stopping plaintiff.

Section 42 — 4-1202(3)(b), C.R.S. 1973, requires that a driver must be informed orally and in writing of his legal rights and also provides that “such notice shall also state the circumstances on which he [the arresting officer] relies as reasonable grounds for believing the arrested person was under the influence of alcohol.”

Construing this notice requirement, this court, in *Lucero v. Charnes,*Colo.App., 607 P.2d 405 (1980), held that the advisement form must contain the officer’s reasons for believing a driver was under the influence of alcohol and that the officer could not later supplement those reasons by testimony at the implied consent hearing.

There is no statutory barrier to the officer testifying as to his reason for stopping the motorist even though such reason is not set forth in the advisement form. *See*
      *641
      *Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division,*38 Colo.App. 230, 556 P.2d 488 (1976).

Accordingly, since the only basis for reinstating plaintiff’s driver’s license was that the officer did not write on the advisement form his reasons for stopping plaintiff in the first instance, yet was allowed to testify as to why he stopped plaintiff, the judgment of the trial court reinstating plaintiff’s driver’s license is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to affirm the decision of the hearing officer revoking plaintiff’s driver’s license.

PIERCE and STERNBERG, JJ., concur.
No. 83081 

PLED 

JAN / 4 2022 

• A. BROWN 

PREPAE COURT 

AWA.41 

CLERK 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

COREY B. JOHNSON, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is a pro se appeal from a district court order denying a 

petition for a writ of mandamus and a petition for judicial review. Eighth 

Judicial District Court, Clark County; Susan Johnson, Judge. 

In his petitions, appellant challenged the revocation of his 

parole. However, neither a petition for a writ of mandamus nor a petition 

for judicial review are the appropriate vehicles in which to challenge the 

decision to revoke parole because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is an 

available legal remedy. See NRS 34.170 (providing that mandamus relief 

is not available when there is a plain, speedy and adequate legal remedy); 

NRS 34.020(2) (providing that the writ of review is not available where 

there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy); see also NRS 34.360 ("Every 

person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of his or her 

liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas 

corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint"); 

Hornback v. Warden, 97 Nev. 98, 100, 625 P.2d 83, 84 (1981) (parole 

'This appeal has been submitted for decision on the record without 

briefing or oral argument. NRAP 340)(3), (g); see also NRAP 31(d)(1); 

Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev. 681, 682, 541 P.2d 910, 911 (1975). 

z- OttiTY 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(01 1947A 40... 
C.J. 

Parraguirre 

J. 

J. 

revocation challenge raised in petition for writ of habeas corpus). Therefore, 

the district court did not err in denying these petitions. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Hardesty 

cc: Hon. Susan Johnson, District Judge 

Corey B. Johnson 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Attorney General/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVAOA 

2 

(DI 1947A 44Y6).
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

REBECCA L. JOHNSON,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 83 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

REBECCA L. JOHNSON,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 84 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

REBECCA L. JOHNSON,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 85 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM[ 83 MAL 2022, 84 MAL 2022 and 85 MAL 2022 ]

- 2

AND NOW , this 13th day of October, 2022

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Quarterly Report of Roebling Finanical Corp, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 (the “Report”) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, we, Frank J. Travea, III, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Janice A. Summers, Senior Vice President, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the company and furnished to the Securiteis and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.














/s/ Frank J. Travea, III

/s/ Janice A. SummersFrank J. Travea, III

Janice A. SummersPresident and Chief Executive Officer

Senior Vice President, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial OfficerMay 12, 2010
----

June 29, 2022

**Re: Zentek Ltd.**

We consent to the use of our reports to the shareholders of Zentek Ltd. (previously Zen Graphene Solutions Ltd.) (i) dated July 26, 2021 on the financial statements of Zentek Ltd., which comprise the statements of financial position as at March 31, 2021 and 2020, and the statements of loss and comprehensive loss, statements of cash flows and statements of changes in equity for the years then ended, and notes to the financial statements, including a summary of significant accounting policies and (ii) dated July 24, 2020 on the financial statements of Zentek Ltd., which comprise the statements of financial position as at March 31, 2020 and 2019, and the statements of loss and comprehensive loss, statements of cash flows and statements of changes in equity for the years then ended, and notes to the financial statements, including a summary of significant accounting policies, in the Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended March 31, 2022 to be filed by Zentek Ltd., with the Securities and Exchange Commission on EDGAR on June 29, 2022.

**McGovern Hurley LLP**

****

**Chartered Professional Accountants**

**Licensed Public Accountants**

****

----
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Appellant**

**v.**

**JAMES LEE,**

**Appellee :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 10 WAP 2014** 

**Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny**  **County entered February 12, 2014 at No.**

**CP-02-CR-0014746-2012**

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, **this 29th day of September, 2015, the Judgment of S entence of the** 

**Court of Common Pleas is** AFFIRMED

**.**
Request for Exemption to Part 91, SFAR no.108

SimCom Training Centers is a 14 CFR, FAR Part 142 training provider engaged in providing in-aircraft

training and is the sole source simulator based pilot training provider in the Mitsubishi MU-2B series

aircraft. 

According to SFAR 108, 5.(4), (b),(3)(ii) a simulator instructor must, within the preceding 12 months, 

have either 50 hours of MU-2B series airplane pilot-in-command experience or 50 hours providing 

simulator or flight training device instruction for the MU-2.

SimCom is of the opinion that 50 hours of instruction given in a simulator is reasonable as a recency-ofexperience requirement for an otherwise qualified instructor, but places an undue burden on us as an 

initial requirement. 

SimCom is seeking relief from this as an initial qualification requirement and offers an alternate means 

of meeting this requirement. 

At this time there are 248 MU-2 aircraft registered in the US and this number is decreasing steadily. As 

this number dwindles so does the pool of pilots and potential instructor candidates. From a business 

perspective, SimCom must rent an aircraft for a candidate instructor to accumulate the required time in 

aircraft making it an expensive proposition to hire zero or low time MU-2 pilot/instructors.

As a simulator- only instructor it is reasonable to assume the candidate instructor will not have flown 

the aircraft for 50 hours and cannot meet the instructor requirement without first being qualified to 

instruct which is precluded by the requirement except by flight in the aircraft.

To our knowledge requiring a simulator instructor to have time in type is unprecedented in the pilot 

training industry and while SimCom is certainly aware of the purpose of the SFAR as a safety mechanism, 

we feel that safety will not be compromised by granting this exemption. 

In lieu of this requirement SimCom proposes to substitute the 50 hour aircraft flight time initial 

requirement with 50 hours of supervised instruction. The supervisory instructor will be a qualified MU2B instructor. This supervised instruction will be recorded in the instructor’s training file for inspection.
EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
 (2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Date:  October 14, 2008
    /s/ Robert K. MoskovitzName:
    Robert K. MoskovitzTitle:
    Chief Financial Officer of the General Partner
#### STATE of Alaska, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Douglas J. SERDAHELY, Judge of the Superior Court, and the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, First Judicial District, Respondents. STATE of Alaska, Petitioner, v. George H. HOHMAN, Jr., Respondent, Michael DEMAN, Real Party in Interest.

No. 6370.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Nov. 10, 1981.

Timothy Petumenos, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, Dean J. Guaneli, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel W. Hickey, Chief Prosecutor, and Wilson L. Condon, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for petitioner.

Thomas Findley, Findley & Brinkman, Juneau, for real party in interest.

Jeffrey M. Feldman and James D. Gilmore, Gilmore & Feldman, Anchorage, for Arthur F. Kelly, II, as amicus curiae.

Before BURKE, C. J., RABINOWITZ, CONNOR and MATTHEWS, JJ., and MOORE, Superior Court Judge.*

*

 Moore, Superior Court Judge, sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 16 of the Constitution of Alaska.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

1. The Original Application for Relief filed in the Court of Appeals on October 26, 1981, certified to and accepted by this court pursuant to AS 22.05.015(b) and Appellate Rule 408(b), is granted.

2. The Order of the Superior Court of October 15, 1981 entitled Denial of State’s Application to Compel Testimony of Michael DeMan and Denial of State’s Motion to Stay Hohman’s Trial, is affirmed.

3. This court adopts pursuant to its supervisory powers as a rule of practice the provisions of Rule 732 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure including subsection (b) relating to the nature and scope of immunity for the reasons expressed in the commentary to the rule.

COMPTON, J., not participating.