1 The court below found that the vessel was operated by and

under the exclusive control of: Blue Streak Marine, Inc.; Blue

Streak Offshore, Inc.; Blue Streak-Gulf Island Marine

Operations, a partnership also known as Blue Streak/Gulf Island

Marine Operations, Inc.; and Blue Streak Operations, Inc. April

1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 93-3539.

GULF ISLAND-IV, INC. and Gulf Island IV a/k/a La Prt, PlaintiffsAppellants,

v.

BLUE STREAK-GULF IS OPS a/k/a Blue Streak Inc., et al. and Lloyds

Underwriters of London, Underwriters at Lloyds, London subscribing

to policy No. MC9792SAH, Defendants-Appellees.

July 5, 1994.

Appeals from the Un ited States District Court for the Eastern

District of Louisiana.

Before REAVLEY, JONES and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

The appellants, "G ulf Island," appeal from the district

court's entry of summary judgment based upon res judicata. The

appeal involves an attack on the district court's application of

the doctrine of res judicata. We reverse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 1985, the vessel L/B GUL F ISLAND IV capsized in the

Gulf of Mexico and suffered severe damage. In October 1985, after

the vessel had been repaired, Hurricane Juan overturned it, and the

vessel suffered additional damage. According to the parties on

appeal, a partnership known as Blue Streak Gulf Island Operations

(BS-GIO) was operating the vessel when it collapsed. 1 The entity30, 1993 Order at 1.

2 Gulf Island Marine, Inc., a general partner of Gulf Island

IV, is not a party to the case at bar.

2 of BS-GIO has dissolved.

The two appellants, Gulf Island IV, a Louisiana partnership

and owner of t he vessel, and Gulf Island IV, Inc., the managing

partner of Gulf Island IV, are referred to as "Gulf Island." 2 The

three appellees collectively referred to as "Blue Streak" are Blue

Streak Operations, Inc., Blue Streak Marine, Inc. and Blue Streak

Offshore, Inc. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London (Underwriters) had

underwritten an umbrella liability insurance policy for Blue Streak

and is now the fourth appellee.

In December of 1985, Gulf Island IV filed the first lawsuit,

alleging diversity and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, against

their own insurance carriers, Wausau and American Marine

Underwriters, Inc. (AMU), seeking damages due to the failure to pay

benefits under the hull policy for physical damage to the vessel as

a result of both of the above-described 1985 casualties and for

downtime of the vessel occurring after the damage wrought by

Hurricane Juan. The vessel was covered by two insurance policies,

a hull and machinery policy and a protection and indemnity policy,

which were issued by Wausau. Both policies listed the named

assured as: Gulf Island Marine; Blue Streak Gulf Island Marine

Operations, Inc. (Operator); and Oceanic Fleet, Inc. Ultimately,

the parties advised the court that the action had been settled,

and, as a res ult, the court, on September 29, 1986, issued a3 AMU is not a party to the case at bar.

4 The court below granted Wausau's motion for summary

judgment on the ground that the Protection and Indemnity policy

did not provide coverage for damage to Gulf Island IV because it

is a scheduled vessel. Wausau is not a party to this appeal.

3 sixty-day order of dismissal, expressly allowing the right to

reopen the action if the settlement had not been consummated. It

is undisputed that Gulf Island never moved to reopen the 1985 suit.

Additionally, while that suit was pending, it was consolidated

with several other suits, including a suit brou ght by Hope

Contractors, Inc. In the H ope suit, the plaintiff-contractors

named, among others, the following defendants, Gulf Island IV, Gulf

Island IV, Inc., Gulf Island Marine, Inc., and Blue Streak/Gulf

Island, which was identified as a Louisiana partnership. The Hope

contractors sought payment on an account for post-casualty salvage

and repairs to the vessel. Gulf Island impleaded AMU 3 and Wausau,

seeking coverage under the hull and machinery policy for the

salvage and repairs performed by the Hope contractors.

In June of 1988, Gulf Island brought the instant admiralty and

maritime suit against Blue Streak Marine, Inc., Blue Streak

Offshore, Inc., and Employers Insurance of Wausau 4 for negligence,

breach of warranty of workmanlike performance in regard to both of

the 1985 casualties, and for losses due to downtime of the vessel.

Blue Streak then filed a third-party complaint naming Underwriters

and seeking coverage under its umbrella policy. Blue Streak also

filed a cross-claim against Wausau seeking coverage under its own

protection and indemnity insurance policy, alleging that the policy4

required Wausau to prot ect and indemnify Blue Streak from the

claims asserted by Gulf Island. Gulf Island later supplemented its

complaint to name Underwriters as a defendant seeking the benefits

of coverage under Blue Streak's umbrella policy.

Blue Streak and Underwriters b oth filed motions for summary

judgment, arguing that res judicata applied as a bar to the

proceedings against them on the basis of the court's September 29,

1986 order of dismissal in the prior suit. The district court

agreed and granted summary judgment for Underwriters and Blue

Streak. Gulf Island now appeals, arguing that the district court

erred in find ing that res judicata barred the instant claims

against both underwriters and Blue Streak.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

When a summary judgment is appealed, this Court evaluates a

district court's decision to grant summary judgme nt by reviewing

the record under the same standards that the district court applied

to determine whether summary judgment was appropriate. H errera v.

Millsap, 862 F.2d 1157, 1159 (5th Cir.1989). Therefore, the

summary judgment will be affirmed only when this Court is

"convinced, after an independent review of the record, that "there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact' and that the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting B rooks,

Tarlton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. United States Fire Ins.

Co., 832 F.2d 1358, 1364 (5th Cir.1987) and Fed.R.Civ .P. 56(c)).

Fact questions must be considered with deference to the nonmovant.

Herrer a v. Millsap, 862 F.2d at 1159. Questions of law are5

reviewed de novo. Id.

As previously set forth, the district court found that the

claims were barred by res judicata. Federal law determines the res

judicata effect of a prior federal court judgment. R ussell v.

SunAmeric a Securities, Inc., 962 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1992).

In order for res judicata to apply, the following four requirements

must be met. First, the parties in the instant action must be the

same as or in privity with the parties in the prior action in

question. U

nited States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th

Cir.1994). Second, the court that rendered the prior judgment must

have been a court of competent jurisdiction. I d. Third, the prior

action must have terminated with a final judgment on the merits.

Id. Fourth, the same claim or cause of action must be involved in

both suits. Id.

III. BLUE STREAK'S CLAIM OF RES JUDICATA

Regarding the first requirement, Blue Streak argues that it

did not have to be a party (or in privity with a party) to the 1985

action. Instead, Blue Streak argues that only the party against

whom the plea of res judicata is asserted (in this case Gulf

Island) must be a party to the prior action. Contrary to Blue

Streak's assertion, both parties must be identical to or in privity

with the parties in the prior suit for res judicata to apply.

In support of the proposition that it did not have to be a

party to or in privity with a party to the prior action, Blue

Streak cites Blonder-Tong ue Lab., Inc. v. University of Illinois

Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971).6

Blue Streak's reliance on Blonder-Tongue is misplaced. In B londerTongue, the Supreme Court "eliminated the requirement of mutuality

in applying collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of issues

decided earlier in federal-court suits." A llen v. McCurry, 449

U.S. 90, 94-95, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (emphasis

added). As this Court has recognized, the doctrine of res

judicata, in its broadest sense, enc ompasses two distinct

preclusion concepts, claim prec lusion (res judicata) and issue

preclusion (collateral es toppel). U nited States v. Shanbaum, 10

F.3d at 310. "Unfortunately, the terminology used in this area of

the law often breeds confusion." I d. Thus, although the B londerTongu e opinion recites the term "res judicata," it apparently is

using it in its broad sense. As the Supreme Court stated in A llen

v. McCurry, supra, it was the mutuality requirement in the context

of collateral estoppel that was eliminated.

Recently, in Russell v. SunAmerica Securities, Inc., 962 F.2d

at 1172-76, this Court addressed the question whether res judicata

should have barred the suit against a defendant-appellee that had

not been a party to the prior suit. Addressing the identity of

parties requirement of res judicata, this Court explained that "[a]

non-party defendant can assert res judicata so lon g as it is in

"privity' with the named defendant." I d. at 1173. Blue Streak

thus cannot dispense with the requirement that "the parties must be

identical in the two suits." Id. at 1172.

Gulf Island argues that neither Blue Streak nor Underwriters

was ever a party to the prior 1985 suit. Gulf Island admits that7

"Blue Streak/Gulf Island" was named in the Hope action that was

later consolidated with Gulf Island's 1985 action. However, it is

undisputed that Blue Streak /Gulf Island was neither served nor

appeared in the 1985 suit. This Court has explained "that

"parties' for purposes of res judicata does not mean formal, paper

parties only, but also includes parties in interest, that is, that

persons whose interests are properly placed before the court by

someone with standing to represent them are bound by the matters

determined in the proceeding." Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

896 F.2d 979, 983 (5th Cir.1990) (emphasis in original) (internal

quotation mar ks and citations omitted). Therefore, assuming

arguendo that Blue Streak is in privity with the named but unserved

defendant (Blue Streak/Gulf Island) in the prior 1985 suit, because

that entity never was properly before the court in the prior suit,

the identity of parties requirement has not been satisfied.

Alternatively, Blue Streak argues that it was in privity with

Wausau, the insurer that Gulf Island sued in the 1985 suit. "A

non-party

... is adequately represented where a party in the prior

s uit is so closely aligned to her interests as to be her virtual

representative. [citations omitted] This requires more than a

showing of parallel interests—it is not enough that the non-party

may be interested in the same questions or proving the same facts."

Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir.1992) (citati o n

omitted). Gulf Island sued Wausau in the 1985 action n ot as a

third party complaining of the negligence of Blue Streak, but

rather as a named insured under its Wausau policy. Although5 In the court below Blue Streak filed a cross-claim against

Wausau, indicating the parties' interests were not identical.

6 Both Underwriters and the court below have expressly

recognized that Underwriters' liability is predicated solely on

the liability of its assured, Blue Streak.

8 Wau sau's interest in certain respects may have been parallel to

Blue Streak's in the prior suit, Wausau was not standing in the

shoes of Blue Streak, and its interests were not aligned with those

of Blue Streak as they conceivably would be in a third-party

action. 5 Rather, Wausau was protecting itself in a hull and

machinery insurance policy coverage dispute with one of its own

insureds. Consequently, the district court erred in finding that

Blue Streak satisfied the identity of parties require ment of res

judicata. Because Blue Streak does not meet the first requirement

of res judicata, it is un necessary to review the arguments

presented by the parties as to the other requirements of res

judicata.

IV. UNDERWRITERS' CLAIM OF RES JUDICATA

Finally, it must be determined whether Gulf Island's claims

against Underwrit ers were barred by res judicata. Underwriters

concedes that it was not a named party defendant to the prior 1985

suit. Nevertheless, Underwriters argues that it is entitled to

assert the defense of res judicata because Blue Streak is its

insured, and thus, it stands in the shoes of Blue Strea k. 6

Underwriters correctly states the proposition that "t he direct

action insurer stands as a party-litigant in exactly the same shoes

as the assured." Ex parte Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 322 F.2d9

113, 116 (5th Cir.1963); F ederal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mmahat, 960

F.2d 1325, 1330 n. 10 (5th Cir.1992). However, this argument

offers Underwr iters no succor in that this Court has determined

that Blue Streak was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis

of res judica ta. Because res judicata does not bar the suit

against Blue Streak, it does not bar the suit against its insurer,

Underwriters. Thus, Underwriters' assertion of res judicata must

also fail.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set f orth above, we REVERSE the district

court's s ummary judgment and REMAND the case for further

proceedings.