UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

LEONID SHIFRIN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-1345 

(D.C. No. 1:10-CR-00215-PAB-1) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Leonid Shifrin appeals from a district court order denying his motion to 

modify a condition of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, see United States v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 2011), 

and affirm. 

I 

 Shifrin pled guilty to one count of filing a false income tax return. He was 

sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment, to be followed by one year of 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

December 5, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

supervised release. He was also ordered to pay restitution of $873,340. The 

restitution order provided that “[a]ny unpaid restitution balance upon release from 

incarceration shall be paid in monthly installment payments during the term of 

supervised release,” with monthly installment payments to “be calculated as at least 

10 percent of the defendant’s gross monthly wages.” 

In December 2015, after Shifrin served his prison term, the district court 

revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment to be 

followed by six additional months of supervised release. The revocation order states 

that if restitution is required, “it is a condition of supervised release that the 

defendant pay in accordance with the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment.” 

The attached schedule of payments simply states: “The defendant shall pay the 

outstanding balance of the restitution in the amount of $868,520.00.” 

Shifrin filed a motion to reconsider this condition in August 2016, arguing that 

he will be unable to pay the full restitution award in six months. The district court 

denied the motion in a minute order, stating that “[f]ailure to pay the entire balance 

does not mean that supervised release will be revoked.” Shifrin timely appealed. 

II 

 We generally review a district court order imposing a condition of supervised 

release for abuse of discretion. See Lonjose, 663 F.3d at 1302. However, if a 

defendant fails to object to a condition at the time it is announced, we review only for 

plain error. United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 2011). “To establish 

plain error, the defendant must show: (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects 
3 

substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 691-92 (quotation omitted). 

In imposing restitution against a defendant, a district court is required to 

“order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as 

determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of 

the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). However, the court must also “specify in 

the restitution order the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the 

restitution is to be paid, in consideration of . . . the financial resources and other 

assets of the defendant.” § 3664(f)(2). If a defendant is ordered to pay restitution, he 

must “make such payment immediately, unless, in the interest of justice, the court 

provides for payment on a date certain or in installments.” § 3572(d)(1). 

 Based on the foregoing, the district court should have included an explicit 

payment schedule in its order revoking supervised release, which took into 

consideration Shifrin’s financial resources and ability to immediately pay the amount 

due. The government points to a separate condition of supervised release, which 

requires that Shifrin “apply any monies received from income tax refunds, lottery 

winnings, inheritances, judgments, and any anticipated or unexpected financial gains 

to the outstanding court ordered financial obligation in this case.” It contends that 

Shifrin’s payment obligation while on supervised release applies only to these 

financial gains. But the order does not suggest that Shifrin’s payment obligation is so 

limited; instead, this condition is separate and distinct from the schedule of 

payments. 
4 

 Nevertheless, even assuming the district court committed plain error, we 

decline to exercise our discretion to correct it under the fourth prong of the plainerror test. See United States v. Turrietta, 696 F.3d 972, 984 (10th Cir. 2012). To 

satisfy the fourth prong, a defendant must show that an error was “particularly 

egregious,” akin to a “miscarriage of justice,” such that it will “seriously affect[] the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotations 

omitted). Although the district court should have provided a schedule of payments 

properly reflecting Shifrin’s financial resources, it explained to Shifrin, in response 

to the present motion, that “[f]ailure to pay the entire balance does not mean that 

supervised release will be revoked.” Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that Shifrin 

will suffer any adverse consequence in the absence of an explicit schedule. Shifrin 

could appeal separately should such consequences eventually occur. See United 

States v. Morgan, 44 F. App’x 881, 887 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished). 

III

AFFIRMED. Shifrin’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge