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UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 11, 1963

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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota

SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota JACOB K. JAVITS, New York

ERNEST GRUENING, Alaska JACK MILLER, Iowa

EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island

THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire

ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut

DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland

WALTER L. REYNOLDS, Chief Clerk and Staff Director

ARTHUR A. SHARP, Staff Editor

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, Chairman

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota

EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island

ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut

DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland

DOROTHY FOSDICK, Staff Director

ROBERT W. TUFTS, Chief Consultant

RICHARD S. PAGE, Research Assistant

JUDITH J. SPAHR, Chief Clerk

LAUREL A. ENGBERG, Minority Consultant

II

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota

JACOB K. JAVITS, New York

JACK MILLER, Iowa

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144TTAN

CONTENTS

DECEMBER 11, 1963 Page

Opening statement, Senator Henry M. Jackson 357

Memorandum of the Honorable George F. Kennan on "Impressions of a

Recent Ambassadorial Experience" (with introductory note by Senator

Henry M. Jackson) 358

Memorandum of the Honorable Lincoln Gordon on "Organization and

Coordination of Foreign Policy and Oversea Operations" (with introductory note by Senator Henry M. Jackson) 364

Comments by the Honorable Dean Acheson on the training and experience

of foreign policy officers, in letter to Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations 378

ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECT'

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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1963

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMI1 LEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

STAFFING AND OPERATIONS,

Washington, D .0 .

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3112,

New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Muskie, Pell, Ribicoff, and Javits.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Robert W.

Tufts, chief consultant; Richard S. Page, research assistant; Judith

J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator JACKSON. The subcommittee will come to order.

In connection with our inquiry on the administration of national

security in this country and overseas, we have invited a number of

ambassadors to prepare memorandums covering points which they believe we might well consider in the course of our study.

The subcommittee is fortunate to have available for inclusion in its

record at this time two forthright and thoughtful statements submitted by the Honorable George F. Kennan, recently retired U.S.

Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and the Honorable Lincoln Gordon, U.S.

Ambassador to Brazil.

We are also pleased to be able to publish for the first time the important comments on the training and experience of foreign policy officers

made by the Honorable Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, in

a letter to Senator J. William Fulbright, printed here with their

permission.

We are grateful for these valuable additions to our testimony.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON

Ambassador Kennan has a distinguished record of over 25 years

in the Department of State and the Foreign Service. During critical

years after World War II he was Director of the Department's policy

planning staff, and then Ambassador to the Soviet Union, retiring

from the Foreign Service in 1953. In 1961 Ambassador Kennan again

answered the call of public duty, and served for 21/2 years as Ambassador to Yugoslavia, returning just this fall to his permanent professorship in the School of Historical Studies, the Institute for Advanced

Study, Princeton, N.J. For many years Ambassador Kennan has

been a source of thoughtful and critical comment on deficiencies in

the national policymaking process.

357
358 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

IMPRESSIONS OF A RECENT AMBASSADORIAL

EXPERIENCE

By Hon. George F. Kennan

(Former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia and permanent professor, School of

Historical Studies, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J.)

Memorandum for Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing

and Operations

(November 3, 1963)

I am happy to be able to submit my views to this subcommittee and

to contribute in this way to its important work.

Since I appeared before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery on May 26, 1960, I have served for nearly two and a half years

as Ambassador to Yugoslavia. I shall not attempt, in this statement,

to go over the same ground covered in the statement I made at that

time, but shall restrict myself, generally, if I may, to the impressions

of this recent ambassadorial experience.

1. THE POSITION OF THE AMBASSADOR WITH RELATION TO THE COUNTRY

TEAM

I assume that the members of the subcommittee will be interested,

in the first instance, to have my impressions about relations between

the Ambassador and other members of the country team, on the basis

of this recent experience as Ambassador in Belgrade. I must say at

once that I encountered no difficulty whatsoever in exerting what

seemed to me to be adequate authority over the entire American establishment in Yugoslavia. It may be that I was favored in being surrounded with a group of exceptionally able and loyal assistants, whose

abilities I myself admired, whose judgment I valued, and whose attitude toward myself was at all times eagerly and enthusiastically cooperative. But aside from this fortunate circumstance, I had the

impression that the authority of an Ambassador over official American

personnel stationed in his country is just about whatever he wants to

make it. So long as they are in his territory, they have to respect his

authority, if he insists they do so. This applies even to those who

represent other agencies.

If he requires them to do things they consider contrary to their

general instructions from Washington, or intrinsically unwise to an

intolerable degree, their recourse is in Washington. They can take

appeal, in effect, from the Ambassador's judgment; and if they are

upheld, appropriate instructions will eventually be issued from Washington to both him and them, and the matter will be settled. But so

long as they.are there, in his bailiwick, and so long as Washington

has not specifically overruled the Ambassador, they have to respect

his authority. Anything else would be insubordination; and in a case

of flagrant and persistent insubordination, he could require them to

leave the country. We, fortunately, had no such situations in Belgrade, and nothing even resembling one.
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 359

2. RELATIONS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN

WASHINGTON

A much more serious limitation on my own effectiveness in shaping

policy toward the country in which I was stationed was presented by

inability to get recommendations accepted in Washington. I rarely

had difficulty in this respect when it was a case of policy matters on

which the Department of State had discretion to act, although, of

course, there were such cases, too. The trouble usually occurred where

the Department of State, or at least its central organs, did not have

primary responsibility for the decision. The difficulties were greatest,

it seemed to me, when the matters in question were ones considered to

lie within the primary competence of AID, of the Pentagon, of the

budgetary or fiscal authorities, or of those authorities (I am ashamed

to say that I do not know exactly who they are) which backstop the

Department of State in, and in some respects control, such matters as

the issuance of passports, visas, reentry permits, etc.

With these latter, in particular, I felt the lack of any effective

liaison. They included, I suppose, people in the Immigration Service,

and in the FBI. I was never sure that they understood, or shared, or

respected, the policy determinations of the Department of State with

relation to Yugoslavia. I had the impression, perhaps erroneous, that

many of these people were going on the assumption that Yugoslavia

was a member of the Soviet bloc, a thesis contrary to our own observations and to the established analysis of the Department. This

hampered our operations and had, in a number of instances, what I

considered to be adverse effects on our operations in the field.

In budgetary and fiscal matters, again, the Ambassador was sadly

powerless. In general, he simply took what he got. The Department

of State might receive his recommendations sympathetically; but the

Department itself was too lacking in flexibility and authority to put

them into effect with any firmness or promptness. Such recommendations had a habit of trailing off into the mysteries of the Budget

Bureau, or the Treasury, or congressional appropriations committees,

to a point where all track of them was lost, where months and years

went by, and the Ambassador eventually either was transferred or forgot he had made them. At an early stage in my ambassadorship, I

made recommendations for new fencing around the residence in Belgrade, owned by our Government, also for a swimming pool for staff

recreational purposes, and for an extension of the Embassy residence.

The changes were obviously desirable. We had literally tens of millions of dollars piled up in local currency, which might have been

drawn on for most of the costs of these improvements, and much of

which, if not used in this way, will probably never be used at all by us.

Nevertheless, nothing actually occurred during my time there as Ambassador. Things are now about to occur, I understand; but the delays

were long and discouraging. I should think that if a man enjoys such

confidence on the part of his Government that he can be entrusted with

the responsibilities of an important diplomatic mission, it ought also

to be possible to entrust him with a limited control over funds, not

major funds, just governmental pocket money, so that he could at least

make minor dispositions affecting Government property at his post,

without waiting years for approval.
360 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

With the respect to matters falling under the competence of AID, I

found our governmental procedures slow and inflexible to an alarming

degree. In general, I felt that the time for aid to Yugoslavia had

passed. The aid programs were, in fact, generally dismantled during

the period of my service there; and this was in accordance with my

own recommendations. But there were times when a minor area of

discretion on the part of the Ambassador would have yielded dividends

from the standpoint of national interest, and when the absence of it

was frustrating and embarrassing. This, again, was primarily a matter of congressional policy—particularly of the existence of sweeping

and rigid restrictions on aid, or anything that smacked of aid, toward

Yugoslavia. As an example, we were seriously handicapped by these

legislative restrictions when it came to trying to render assistance in

the case of the Skoplje earthquake. This was surely unnecessary. If

the legislative stipulation had only allowed us a relatively small sum,

to be used at the discretion of the Ambassador or the Secretary of State

in instances when there appeared to be special need, we would have

been spared this sort of embarrassment.

3. RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

I mention with some hesitation these instances of the limitations

placed by legislative action on the ability of the Ambassador to play

his part effectively. I have no choice but to do so; for these were the

main impediments I experienced to the full deployment of my usefulness at my post. I do not need to remind you of the restrictions placed

last year, not only on the extension of anything under the heading of

aid, but even on the extension of normal trading facilities to Yugoslavia. These restrictions were adopted in the face of the most solemn

and formal sort of warnings and objections on my part, conveyed to

congressional leaders on many occasions and in many ways. It seems

to me that a problem is arising here to which we shall, all of us, have

to give attention sooner or later.

If I had known, for example. when I was offered the position of

Ambassador in Yugoslavia, how little value the Congress would assign

to my own judgment, in the light of an experience of nearly 30 years

in the affairs of the Eastern European area, I would not have accepted

the appointment; for without the support of Congress it was impossible to carry out an effective policy there. I do not know how this

sort of a situation can be avoided; but I think Members of Congress

might wish to bear in mind that there is usually a price to be paid, not

just in terms of the peace of mind of the person most affected, but in

terms of the national interest itself, when an Ambassador's recommendations are wholly disregarded on the legislative side of the

Government; for it is not just his usefulness in the given question,

but his usefulness as a whole, which is thereby affected.

4. LACK OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN FILES AT HOME

I found myself particularly handicapped, as Ambassador, by lack

of information as to what was going on at home in matters affecting

our work in Belgrade, or of information about Yugoslavia to which

other departments or agencies of the Government were privy. For
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECTJRITY 361

example, it was important to us, from the standpoint of determining

policy toward Yugoslavia, to know definitely whether the Yugoslays

were or were not conducting any sort of activity in this country to

which we could object. It was my impression they were not; and

if anything they were doing here lent itself to any such interpretation, this is something I think I could have discussed to good effect

with the Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade. But in the absence of

any sort of liaison with the internal security organs of our own country, we simply had to bat in the dark in all such matters. The same

was true with regard to the rather complicated affairs of the Serbian

church authorities in North America—affairs in which the patriarchate in Belgrade was intimately involved and which it fell to me to discuss officially, on more than one occasion, with the Serbian patriarch

in person. Again, although our naval authorities obviously had good

information on the question of the use, or nonuse, of Yugoslav vessels in trade with Cuba, and although this, too, was a matter which I

was obliged to discuss officially from time to time with the Yugoslav

authorities, I was never adequately informed even of what our Government knew about this subject. On all such matters, and others as

well, the Yugoslays with whom we had to deal were better informed,

as a rule, than we were.

I understand the reasons that impel our intelligence-gathering authorities to be cautious about divulging to anyone information they

have in their files. But the Department of State and the Foreign

Service cannot do their work properly if they are denied information,

already in the Government's files, which is pertinent to their determinations of policy. I am reluctant to believe that means could not

be found, compatible with governmental security, to keep the Foreign

Service at least as well supplied with such information as the governments with which it has to deal.

5. OVERSTAFFING

Members of this subcommittee may recall that I was one of those

who at one time expressed himself as being of the opinion that Department of State and Foreign Service were both greatly overstaffed.

I cannot speak, today, for the Department of State. But I should

like to say that so far as the official establishment in Yugoslavia was

concerned, I found myself in most respects corrected. It is true that

this establishment was a great deal larger than the Foreign Service

establishments in which I had served before the war. It included,

for one thing, a large USIS component—something which we did

not know at all in earlier days. The administrative section, too, was

larger than anything we knew in earlier days. There were also some

minor instances of what seemed to me to be excessive paternalism. But

when I looked around and asked myself where I could cut, beyond

those major cuts which attended the dismantling of the aid mission,

it was not easy to find the places. I could have objected to the size

of the informational establishment, had it not been for the fact that

these people were doing an extraordinarily perceptive and effective

job, and making, as it seemed to me, the fullest possible use of their

time and facilities. Either one wanted these things to be done, or

one did not. To me, they seemed obviously constructive and desir90-855-64-pt. 5-2
362 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

able; and they could hardly have been better accomplished than they

were. These activities were conducted by talented, devoted people

who gave all they had to the job. Who was I to complain?

It was difficult for me to judge the necessity for the relatively large

military staffs. I suspected they were larger than they needed to

be; but what was at issue here might have been a matter of two or

three people. A cut of this order would not have helped us much.

As for the administrative overhead, I am pleased to report that the

centralized administrative section, so unfamiliar to those of us who

were brought up in the old Foreign Service, actually proved to be a

timesaver to myself. It too, was well conducted; and it was quite

effective, as it was intended to be, in freeing my own time for substantive questions. In all instances, the redeeming feature was excellence of personnel and able executive leadership of the respective

sections. Perhaps the answer to quantity is quality; certainly, the

former without the latter is fatal.

6. QUALITY OF STAFF

I think I may have been particularly fortunate, in Belgrade, in

the quality of personnel assigned to work with me. In the case of

the regular Foreign Service officers, I cannot say whether this happy

result was achieved as a result of the arrangements for selection and

promotion with the Service, or in spite of them. I still have misgivings about a Service so large and so impersonal in its administration. I suspect that this feature—the feeling of being a lost cog in a

great machine where no one really knew you and your fate would

be decided largely by what came out of a business machine—rested

heavily, at times, on the morale of the men themselves. But in general,

the Foreign Service work breeds its own morale, outwardly undemonstrative, often not externally visible, but inwardly far tougher and

more devoted than is generally realized. I can only say that my

officers were, without exception, fine men, only too anxious to give

loyalty where loyalty was given in return, anxious to learn, to grow

in their work, and to serve effectively. If men of this caliber do not

become effective diplomats, the Government had best look to its own

procedures for handling, training, developing, and encouraging its

personnel. As of today, it seems to me that the country has a Foreign

Service second to no other, and better than it has a right to expect,

given the lack of appreciation and respect exhibited by the public at

large for its tasks and its achievements.

7. INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS

Shortly before my departure, the Belgrade Embassy was inspected.

I would like to say that I have never seen an inspection better conducted; that is, more thoroughly, more rigorously, yet with greater

tact or with greater benefit to the staff and to the functioning of the

mission. The Inspection Service of the Department of State has

come a long way from the days of the 1920's and 1930's; and the

results are beginning to make themselves visible. All that it needs

is what the Department and Foreign Service, in general, most desperately need; namely, a demonstration of Executive and congressional
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 363

confidence and above all a reasonable measure of administrative stability—the privilege of doing one thing long enough to let it work.

8. CAREER VERSUS NONCAREER

On the law of averages, professional training in the Foreign Service

should constitute the best preparation for service as chief of mission,

and the majority of our mission chiefs should normally be drawn

from this source. There will always be room, however, for people

who have come up other ladders, particularly when they enjoy a

special intimacy with President or Secretary of State and are well

qualified in other respects. In the course of a long career, I have

seen a number of talented people come into these positions from other

walks of life. In Belgrade, one did not have to go far to find such

an instance: we had, next door in Bulgaria, Mrs. Eugenie Anderson,

for whose performance there many of us felt much admiration. Any

system so rigid as to forfeit the services of such people would be

self-defeating. On the other hand, I am profoundly convinced that

the day has passed when the United States can afford to place in high

diplomatic positions people who represent anything other than the

best available talent for the work in question, whatever their origin,

their professional background, or their services to a political party.

9. TOURS OF DUTY

I feel that, in general, the ambassadorial tour of duty should be 3

to 4 years, at a minimum. The same is true of foreign service personnel who have special training in, and knowledge of, a particular area.

I felt that our performance in Belgrade was definitely weakened by

too rapid a turnover in qualified personnel.

10. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FROM STANDPOINT OF

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

It remains my view, as it has been for many years, that the President requires something in the nature of a prime minister for the

conduct, on his behalf, of the external affairs of the Nation, political,

economic, and military. To my mind, this can only be the Secretary

of State; and I would like to see him given the requisite authority.

Such a change implies, however, a readiness to establish and to maintain, not just in time of war but in time of peace as well, what the

German historian Meinicke described as the "priority of foreign

policy"—meaning the principle that the external problems of the

country should be given precedence over the internal ones, and that

foreign policy should not be -permitted to become a function of domestic-political convenience. To me, it seems urgently necessary that

this change, which is one of the state of mind rather than of administrative reform, come over us all at an early date, for our situation

now, in what is nominally a state of peace, is far more parlous than

it ever was, prior to 1945, in time of war. But obviously, such an

effort to centralize and strengthen the conduct of foreign policy will

never be effective unless it has the support of Congress and, to a limited

and reasonable extent, of the two great political parties.
364 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON

Ambassador Gordon is a noncareer appointee who comes to his post

of Ambassador to Brazil with a broad background of experience in

public service and academic life.

Since the formative period of the Marshall plan, Mr. Gordon has

been directly involved with problems of foreign policy coordination

and oversea organization. In 1951 he served as adviser to Mr. Averell

Harriman and then Assistant Director for Mutual Security, and from

1952-55 he was U.S. Minister for Economic Affairs and Director of

the U.S. Operations Mission in London. His professorship from 1955

to 1961 in the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration

included participation in the Graduate School of Public Administration and the Center for International Affairs.

ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION OF FOREIGN

POLICY AND OVERSEA OPERATIONS

By Hon. Lincoln Gordon

(U.S. Ambassador to Brazil)

Memorandum for Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing

and Operations

(November 24, 1963)

INTRODUCTION

I very much welcome the opportunity to submit to the Subcommittee

on National Security Staffing and Operations this informal statement

of my personal views on problems of organization and coordination

of foreign policy and oversea operations. I have followed with close

attention the hearings of the subcommittee and the documentation of

high quality developed for it.

Let me begin with a brief autobiographical note. Since 1936, when

I completed 3 years as a Rhodes scholar with a D. Phil. degree from

Oxford University, my working life has been almost evenly divided

between the academic world and the public service, the latter now being

somewhat in the lead. Before the war, my academic work was concentrated mainly in the border area between economics and political

science, focused on problems of government relations with the American economy but also including a strong interest in comparative government. My first tour of duty with the U.S. Government began in

late 1939 with the National Resources Planning Board, from which I

moved into industrial mobilization, serving during the war years in

the War Production Board.

After the war, my attention turned to the international field. My

chair at Harvard, based in the Graduate School of Business Administration but also including participation in the Graduate School of

Public Administration and the Center for International Affairs,

shifted from government and business relationships to the field of

international economic relations. On the public service side, I was a

member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 365

Commission in 1946 and 1947, and in the latter year became an active

consultant with the Department of State in the formulation of the

Marshall plan. I served with the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington and Paris in 1948, and then moved to Paris in 1949

as Director of the Program Division in the ECA's Office of Special

Representative in Europe, working directly under Ambassador Harriman. Late in 1950, I returned to Washington as Economic Adviser

to Mr. Harriman, who was then Special Assistant to the President.

I later became Assistant Director for Mutual Security, and in 1952

went to London as Minister for Economic Affairs in our Embassy and

Director of the U.S. Operations Mission.

I returned to Harvard in 1955, and for the next 5 years engaged in

occasional consulting assignments with the Government, including

work for the NATO committee of ministers on nonmilitary functions

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and work with the

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

various political-military problems, including NATO strategy, limited

war, and arms control.

Beginning in 1957, my academic work became increasingly directed

toward Latin American problems. In 1959, I began a study of relations between government and business in the process of economic

development in Brazil. Late in 1960, I served as a member of President Kennedy's task force on Latin American policy, and in early

1961 became a consultant to the Department of State in the development of the Alliance for Progress. I was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Economic Conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in

August 1961, and on August 24 I was nominated U.S. Ambassador to

Brazil. I have been serving in this capacity in Brazil since October

13, 1961.

Ever since the formative period of the Marshall plan, I have been

directly concerned with various aspects of foreign policy coordination

and oversea organization which are under review by the subcommittee. I helped to work out the formal relationships between the Department of State and the Economic Cooperation Administration in

1948, and subsequently had the opportunity to observe these arrangements from the three vantage points of the Washington headquarters,

the regional coordinating office in Paris, and the country mission in

London. In 1951, as adviser to Mr. Harriman and subsequently Assistant Director for Mutual Security, my responsibility included the

formulation of arrangements for coordinating economic, technical,

and military assistance on a worldwide basis. In 1955, I wrote the

prize-winning essay in the Foreign Service Journal's competition on

the subject of oversea and Washington coordination of foreign operations. In 1956, I contributed two chapters to the American Assembly's book on The Representation of the United States Abroad entitled

respectively "The Development of U.S. Representation Overseas," and

"Coordination of Oversea Representation."

Since October 1961, I have had the direct responsibility in Brazil of

implementing President Kennedy's letter to all chiefs of mission

of May 29, 1961, the historical background of which is fully set f write, in the study prepared for your subcommittee by the Historical s

Division of the Department of State on The Ambassador the c:\

Problem of Coordination. VFEB 21 196A

7,7,1
366 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

THE AMBASSADOR AND THE COUNTRY TEAM

The subcommittee has asked me to comment in particular on the

responsibilities of the Ambassador for coordinating and supervising

the whole range of U.S. official activities in the country of his assignment. Let me begin the discussion of this point with a lengthy quotation from what I wrote on this topic in 1956. This was long before it

occurred to me that I would ever be serving as a U.S. Ambassador.

With very little alteration, however, I would reiterate after 2 years'

direct experience what I wrote 7 years ago.1

COORDINATION AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL—THE ROLE OF THE AMBASSADOR

The Ambassador's responsibilities

Responsibility for coordination of oversea representation at the country level

is centered on the Ambassador. What are the tasks faced by a conscientious

Ambassador who takes his responsibilities seriously and who is placed in charge

of a medium- to large-sized mission in a country participating in the whole range

of U.S. foreign operating programs?

The Ambassador has, of course, many official duties which he must perform in

person. He must establish and maintain contact with the head of state, the

head of the Government, the foreign minister, and other principal cabinet members. If he is assigned to a democratic country with opposition political parties,

he must know the leaders of the opposition who may take office. He must come

to know the American press corps stationed in the country and the press corps

of the country itself. He must exchange formal visits with the other Ambassadors, entertain and be entertained by the rest of the diplomatic corps. The local

American business community and other resident Americans of influence must be

among his acquaintances. His range of contacts must extend beyond the official

sphere to all types of leaders—in business, in the labor unions, among religious,

civic, and educational leaders, agriculture, and other circles. He is called on for

a variety of speeches, some purely ceremonial but many of substance bearing on

the country's relationships with the United States. He must travel widely in

the country, learn of its internal problems, and meet leading citizens outside the

capital city. If he can command the language of the country, his influence may

be multiplied manifold.

The Ambassador's function of representation is further magnified by today's

ease of travel and the resulting large number of visiting Americans. Many of

them expect at least to be seen by the Ambassador, and preferably to be entertained by him. This is of course true of Senators and Congressmen, and of

traveling Washington officials from many departments; it is also true of many

private citizens. The Ambassador must also facilitate their contacts with the

country's government.

While much of the burden of day-to-day negotiations will be carried by his

staff, the Ambassador himself must take personal part in bilateral negotiations

which reach the Cabinet level. To perform his duties effectively, he must spend

a good deal of time keeping informed. This may mean reading hundreds of

cablegrams and dispatches each week going in and out of his mission, seeing the

local press, keeping abreast of news from home, and drawing information from

his innumerable personal contacts of all kinds, as well as from his own staff. He

must be prepared, often at very short notice, to return to Washington for consultation and perhaps for testimony before congressional committees.

This extraordinarily diverse range of personal functions is in addition to his

responsibilities for coordinating the work of American representatives in the

country. In sheer variety and demand on time and energy, although, of course,

not in responsibility for decision, the ambassadorial task is perhaps comparable

only to the Presidency. It can be properly carried out only by highly capable

Individuals, backed by effective and well-organized staff support. [There follows

a description of the typical country level organization, including embassy and

consular organization, semi-independent missions, military attaches and missions, etc.]

a The American Assembly, "The Representation of the United States Abroad," Columbia

University, New York, 1956, pp. 185-191.
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 367

The task of coordination

The task of coordination at the country level is to keep this large and diverse

bundle of activities and staffs working together in a harmonious pattern and in

accordance with the basic lines of American policy toward the country. As

executive tasks go, the numbers of personnel involved in foreign representation

in any country are not very large, but the variety and complexity of functions,

and the sensitivity inherent in international relations, pose a problem of effective

coordination wholly out of proportion to these mere numbers.

This function rests squarely with the Ambassador * * * [There follows a

discussion of the Presidential authority for ambassadorial coordination, including Executive Order 10575 of November 6, 1954.]

The net result is that the Ambassador does have a clear right and duty to coordinate, but he does not command. He certainly has weighty instruments of

control at his disposal, including his rank and prestige and the powerful sanction of asking for the withdrawal of any American official in his country. Whether or not he genuinely achieves a harmonious pattern of oversea representation activities, however, will depend at least as much on his personal qualities

and attitudes and on the effectiveness of his leadership as on these formal attributes of authority * * * [There follows a criticism of sec. 201 ( d) of the abovementioned Executive order, on the ground that its provision for nondelegation

of the coordinating role is unsound and unenforcible.]

It follows that the rather naive concept of harmonizing interagency relations

abroad by forbidding delegation of the Ambassador's coordinating responsibility

is simply not workable. There are, however, other and more affirmative ways

of meeting this objective. The basic point is that the Ambassador must himself feel that he serves the Government as a whole, and not only the special interests of the Department of State, and that he convey this attitude to all his

officers who share the coordinating task. He must have a positive interest in the

operating programs as well as in the more traditional duties of diplomacy, and

this sense of broad concern must likewise be conveyed to his subordinates. With

strong personal leadership, this is not impossible, but it is certainly not easy. It

is a viewpoint which does not come naturally to the professional Foreign Service

officer as the career service has operated in the past. It is obviously more difficult if the Foreign Service is narrowly based and if its range of responsibilities

does not extend into the newer spheres of foreign representation. This was one

of the considerations underlying the Wriston Committee's proposals for a broadened Foreign Service with a more balanced emphasis on experience in various

specialties early in an officer's career as a foundation for later general responsibility.

Also relevant to the subcommittee's current interests is a general

observation on coordination, made in the same chapter (p. 183) :

* * * Coordination is not the only goal. * * * Excessive emphasis on coordination in a merely formal or mechanical sense may mean the multiplication of

clearances and the deadweight of numberless committees or the imposition of

stultifying uniform personnel systems to the point where policy becomes frustrated by the very attempt to secure harmony. There is perhaps even some

inherent conflict between the objectives of effective action and of coordination

treated as an end in itself. The first requirement is the clear definition and

communication of policy; if that requirement is not fulfilled, coordinating

machinery may be worse than useless.

Since 1956, as the historical study prepared for the subcommittee

makes clear, there has been a further evolution of doctrine on ambassadorial responsibilities, all in the direction of greater authority. It is

noteworthy that President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961, refers to

the Ambassador's personal authority and responsibility, not only to

"coordinate" but also to "oversee" all the activities of the U.S. Government in the country of assignment. President Kennedy's letter goes

on: "You are in charge of the entire U.S. diplomatic mission, and I

shall expect you to supervise all of its operations. The mission includes not only the personnel of the Department of State and the

Foreign Service, but also the representatives of all other U.S. agencies
368 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

which have programs or activities in [name of country]." The only

exception is U.S. military forces under the command of a U.S. area

military commander.

THE CURRENT PRACTICE IN BRAZIL

Like most of the other Ambassadors who have made statements to

the subcommittee this year, I have not encountered serious difficulties

in carrying out this Presidential directive. There is a substantial

official family in Brazil—some 1,600 employees about equally divided

between Americans and Brazilians, including AID, USIS, and military missions which taken together are much larger than the State

Department group. Rio de Janeiro is also the headquarters of a

regional science office for South America.

In addition to the problems of interagency coordination, there are

problems of geographical coordination owing to the large size and

inadequate communications within Brazil. There is the special problem of a national government geographically divided between Rio de

Janeiro and Brasilia, where we maintain a small embassy branch under

the direction of a political officer with the rank of counselor. There

are consulates general in Sao Paulo and Recife (where there is also

a large branch AID mission for northeast Brazil) , and five other

consulates.

The essential mechanics of interagency coordination, developed by

my predecessors and maintained by me, consist of staff meetings with

variable participation depending on the issues under review. The basic coordinating group is a daily small staff meeting at 10 a.m. Mondays through Thursdays, including the deputy chief of mission, the Economic Minister-AID mission director, the USIS mission director

( who is also public affairs officer) , the political, economic, and administrative counselors, and the head of the consular section. On a

rotating basis, there is participation in these meetings once a week

by the agricultural, commercial, labor, and financial attaches and each

of the three military service attaches. On Fridays at 10 a.m. there is a

larger staff meeting, including all the above-named together with the

transportation and minerals attaches, the scientific attache (who also

coordinates the work of the regional science office), the heads of the

principal sections of the AID and USIS missions, the Director of

the Peace Corps, the Inter-American Geodetic Survey Director, and

the three flag officers (an Army major general, a Navy vice admiral,

and an Air Force brigadier general) who head the respective branches

of the U.S. side of the Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission.

The "country team" as a formal entity does not have stated meetings

at regular intervals. Once every 3 or 4 weeks, however, normally following the Friday staff meeting, there is a review of military assistance

problems including their overlap with AID problems. One of the

political officers maintains regular liaison with the U.S. side of the

Joint Military Commission (the U.S. side also serving as the MAAG) ,

and ad hoc meetings are held as required. In addition, for the periodic review of basic problems of U.S. policy and strategy in relation

to Brazil, I have formed a small group of senior civilian and military

officers corresponding to the executive committee of the National Security Council.
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 369

With this amount of daily or at the most weekly personal consultation, we have found it neither necessary nor desirable to develop formal agendas and minutes. An action officer is always designated to

follo:w up on any decision, and the deputy chief of mission is responsible for insuring that the required action does in fact take place

promptly. On specific issues involving interagency overlaps, such

as civic action, food for peace, and AID projects, or USIS publicity

for AID activities, or evaluation of political-military developments

by the political section and the service attaches, coordination is effected through direct collaboration in the preparation of reporting

documents or negotiating papers. Differences of opinion, which are

rare, are referred to the deputy chief of mission or the Ambassador

for resolution in consultation with the officers concerned.

None of these procedures involves any formal voting. The authority of the Ambassador is known to exist, appears to be fully respected by all members of the official family, and does not require

arbitrary decisions or action an his part to make its weight felt.

THE ROLE OF THE AMBASSADOR

The workability of this kind of informal coordination clearly depends on the attitude and spirit in which the Ambassador and his alter

ego, the deputy chief of mission, carry on their leadership. In this

connection, I cannot overemphasize the importance of the point made

in the quotation above "that the Ambassador must himself feel that

he serves the Government as a whole, and not only the special interests

of the Department of State, and that he convey this attitude to all his

officers who share the coordinating task."

In terms of their effective impact on the substance of BrazilianAmerican relations, it seems evident to me that the so-called operating

programs of economic and technical assistance, military aid, information, educational exchange, and cultural relations are at least on a

par with the more dinventional diplomatic relations, and they occupy

a correspondingly large proportion of ambassadorial time and attention. This does not mean interference with day-to-day operating responsibilities of the military, AID, or USIS mission directors, but

the same is true of operating day-to-day decisions by the Embassy's

consular, administrative or economic sections. For policy guidance,

and for the formulation of policy recommendations to Washington, it

is my understanding that the Ambassador is expected to be the active

leader of the whole group of component agencies in his official family,

and not merely the passive partner or resolver of occasional disputes.

The Ambassador has, of course, a relationship with the Department

of State differing in kind from his relationship with other agencies.

He is the President's personal representative, to be sure, but he receives his instructions from or through the Secretary of State, he reports to the Department of State, and his salary and administrative

support come from the Department of State. His most active working

counterpart in Washington, with whom he must maintain the closest

liaison, is the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the regional

bureau covering his country.

Notwithstanding these special relationships, it is essential that the

Ambassador consider himself also a servant of the interests and concerns of the other agencies responsible for official activities in his coun-
370 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

try of assignment. In a sense he is like a military officer heading a

unified command; he wears the uniform of the Department of State

but he must have an equal concern for the problems and responsibilities

of personnel under his command who wear the uniforms of other

agencies.

INTEGRATION OF EMBASSY RESPONSIBILILLES

In my essay for the Foreign Service Journal in 1955, I emphasized

as the essential principles for effective oversea representation the concepts of integration abroad and coordination at home. Within the

limits imposed by administrative and budgetary responsibility to a,

series of Washington agencies and inherent differences between military and civilian organizations, I believe that the administrative

organization within an embassy should reflect the principle of integration to the maximum possible extent. This is a consequence in

organizational terms of the philosophy reflected above—that all official

activities abroad of the U.S. Government are part of a unified policy.

In Brazil, the Embassy's economic section and the AID mission

are under the direction of a single officer, who is both Minister for

Economic Affairs and director of the AID mission. This practice

was widely employed in Europe at the end of the Marshall plan. I

myself served in London in such a dual capacity, and believe strongly

in its wisdom.

Nor should integration of the economic activities be limited to the

top level. For certain types of analytical reporting or strategy

formulation, the best working team may well be composed of the AID

mission program officer, the financial attache (who is appointed by the

U.S. Treasury) , and a State Department economic officer. The agricultural program of the AID mission can benefit greatly by advice

from the agricultural attache. Since effective publicity for AID

activities is one of the basic goals of the USIS program, arrangements

have been made for full-time work in this field by USIS officers in

both Recife and Rio de Janeiro. They are, in effect, the public relations officers of the two AID missions.

The philosophy of integration also has its counterpart in administrative arrangements and privileges and perquisites. Specialist

technicians are obviously not diplomats, but the generalist officers of

the AID and information missions should, in my opinion, be on a

par with State Department personnel, enjoying neither greater nor

lesser privileges and suffering from neither greater nor lesser restraints. The social welfare and other organized activities of the

wives of the official family should likewise not be divided on agency

lines.

In this connection, I find myself in disagreement with Ambassador

Berger's emphasis on the importance of a special assistant to the

Ambassador for aid matters. In any large embassy, the Ambassador

and deputy chief of mission will be greatly helped by a middle level

staff assistant. But there is no more reason for him to be an intermediary between the Ambassador and the AID mission director or

MAAG chief than for him to be an intermediary between the Ambassador and the political counselor. The mission directors should be

considered as much a part of the Ambassador's staff as are the Embassy section heads. The staff assistant should be a facilitating
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 371

agent for the whole range of supervisory and coordinating functions

of the Embassy's two top officers.

RELATIONS BETWEEN EMBASSY AND WASHINGTON

The subcommittee's document of January 18, 1963, on "Basic Issues"

contains an especially provocative discussion of the division of labor

between Washington and the field missions (pp. 14 to 15). In general, I concur that "the abilities of most missions are underemployed,"

especially with respect to the formulation of broad policy or strategy

in the relations between the United States and the country concerned.

There is in Washington a widespread tendency to regard the field

missions as the eyes and arms of U.S. policy, but taking no part in

the function of the brains. It should be obvious, of course, that

policy toward any country cannot be determined exclusively by the

field mission there. The relationship between the United States and

any other country in today's world is not merely a bilateral matter.

It must be placed within a framework of regional and global policy

and strategy. At the same time, the field mission has the great advantage over Washington of being in intimate contact with the whole

spectrum of relationships—political, economic, psychological, and

military, and the Ambassador is better placed than any single Washington officer to weigh together the various elements in a broad country strategy.

It follows that the field mission should be called upon to think in

strategic terms, and to recommend policies actively to Washington,

rather than merely serving as observer, reporter, and executant. This

is equally true of the component operating units in the aid, information, and military fields. At the same time, in order to maintain a

regional and global unity, the field mission should be kept abreast of

the evolution of Washington policies, with ample opportunity to comment on them and to participate in their formulation. Much has

been done in recent years to improve this relationship. The increased

speed of transportation has facilitated personal contact through periodic Washington consultations of the Ambassador and other senior

field officers and periodic visits from high Washington officials. I

have returned to Washington on the average at three monthly intervals, and consider this a highly desirable practice. Periodic consultations at less frequent intervals for deputy chiefs of mission would

also be a useful innovation.

It also follows that if policy formulation is treated as a joint

responsibility of Washington and the field missions, much greater

delegation of authority for specific actions within the established

policy directives is in order. Some administrative delegations have

been made, and a long overdue start has been made on greater

operating authority for aid and information missions, but this trend

could be pushed much further to the benefit of more effective oversea

operations.

NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL

Much comment has been evoked by the astringent comments of

Ambassador Briggs to the subcommittee concerning alleged overstaffing of our foreign operations. My own experience in London and
372 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Rio de Janeiro does not accord with his observations. We have been

somewhat understaffed, rather than overstaffed, in Brazil during my

tenure as Ambassador, not only in the State Department but also in

the AID and information missions, and have at times suffered badly

from the inability to man certain key spots. In general, improved

quality is even more important than larger numbers, but I have not

seen evidences of the kind of massive overstaffing suggested by Ambassador Briggs' testimony.

In Washington, on the other hand, I am persuaded that overstaffing

does exist in large measure, and that Parkinson's law is well exemplified both in the Department of State and other agencies concerned

with foreign affairs. This is, indeed, one cause of the tendency toward

excessive centralization of foreign policy and operating decisions.

THE NEW DIPLOMACY

Implicit in what has been said above is the conviction that what is

now commonly called "the new diplomacy" is here to stay for the foreseeable future. The first chapter of the Herter Committee's report

provides a concise summary of the fundamental changes in international relations and U.S. responsibilities signified by that term. Some

of the testimony before the subcommittee, vigorously critical of the

size of our oversea establishment and the participation in it of officials responsible to agencies other than the Department of State, has

in fact—although not in express terms—been based on a rejection of

all aspects of international relations other than the traditional bilateral negotiations between governments. Programs of economic aid, of

military assistance and training, of information and cultural exchange,

of scientific representation, and of multilateral regional and worldwide organization, have all been called into question.

Certainly the scope and adequacy of these operational and multilateral activities require constant review, both to eliminate activities

which are no longer useful but merely reflect bureaucratic survival

power, and to expand activities which are not geared up to the pressing

needs of foreign policy. In my view, however, the basic validity of

these newer instruments of foreign policy ought by now to be beyond

argument. How best to organize and man these functions is indeed

a serious question, and certainly the best solutions have not yet been

found. But it does not advance the national interest to characterize

oversea aid and information activities as "blowing soap bubbles."

To give only one example, one of the most marked developments in

public attitudes in Latin America in recent decades is the growth of

anti-American nationalism, heavily spiked with Marxist orientation.

This has become a pervasive (and in many cases a dominant) element

in the thinking of university professors and students, creative writers

and artists, journalists, and other intellectual and professional groups.

These views are generally accompanied by an extraordinary ignorance

of the nature of contemporary American society.

The deliberate distortions and misrepresentations propagated by

the small minorities who are Communist Party members are not surprising, but the spread of these distortions far beyond active Communist Party membership is deeply disturbing, especially in a region

where we have hitherto taken for granted a broad community of out-
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 373

look on liberal and democratic principles. While there are many

reasons for the growth of these attitudes, some of them rooted in the

socially backward conditions of many of the Latin American nations,

a substantial share of them must be recognized as being the fruits of

skillful Soviet activity of the "new diplomacy" type over several

decades, and a reflection of the inadequacy of our own actions in the

fields of information, education, and cultural exchange. There is still

a long uphill road ahead of us in these fields.

NONCAREER AMBASSADORS

As a representative of the group of noncareer Ambassadors, it is

with some diffidence that I comment on this topic. Like others who

have testified to your committee, I believe in a strong career service.

Such a service can attract and hold good men only if they have a legitimate expectation of coming to serve as chiefs of mission or Assistant

Secretaries of State. With over 100 posts abroad, I would normally

expect well over half of them to be headed by career officers.

I am not persuaded, however, that the interests of the United States

would be served by reserving all of these posts to career officers. The

exigencies of our oversea operations in today's world—and for the foreseeable future—sometimes require experience and qualifications which

occur only rarely among career officers. I have noted the distinction

made by some of your witnesses between purely political appointments, based merely on contribution to political party finances, and

semiprofessional appointments of men or women with broad experience

in public service as well as in civilian life. Like the other witnesses,

I am opposed to the former type of appointment, but see great merit

in the latter. Taking at random the names of a baker's dozen of men

out of personal acquaintance among present or recent Ambassadors,

I would offer for your consideration Ambassadors John Badeau,

Chester Bowles, David Bruce, Ellsworth Bunker, Charles Cole, James

Conant, John Ferguson, Kenneth Galbraith, Averell Harriman, Walter Howe, Henry Labouisse, George McGhee, and Edwin Reischauer

as examples of this semiprofessional category. To these male names

I would add those of Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Luce. All of them have

served with distinction, and very much to the positive interest of the

U.S. Government.

Even if we were recruiting into the Foreign Service the very best

young men and women available, occasions would often arise when

the particular needs of an Embassy in one or another country would

suggest appointing to it someone with specialized background and

skills not available within the Service. As a university professor with

a fair range of experience in observing career choices by exceptionally

able young persons, however, I must state candidly that while the Service is getting some very good ones, it is by no means always getting the

best. _Anyone familiar with the career choices of college seniors or

postgraduates at the better universities, observing the choices among

the classic professions, business, academic life, and the public service

is aware of this fact. One reason for this difficulty is the simple

bread-and-butter fact that the pay scales at the higher levels of Government service are no longer competitive with those of other occupations attractive to professional-type youngsters. The Herter Committee rightly stressed the importance of improving the quality of
374 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

recruitment, both at the junior level and through lateral entry at intermediate and higher levels.2

The basic guiding rule for the selection of Ambassadors, I believe,

should be to find the most competent people for the jobs. As the

quality of recruitment and career management in the Foreign Service

are improved, career officers should in increasing proportion come to

be the best qualified. In cases of close choice, I would give preference

to the career man. I should be surprised, however, if 20 to 30 percent

of the ambassadorial posts did not continue to be filled, under this

criterion, by semiprofessional candidates.

Many competent career officers have emphasized to me the benefits

which they themselves believe are brought to the career by the admixture of competent noncareer Ambassadors with a diversity of

backgrounds and experience, and do not seem to resent their presence

as unfair competition.

From the viewpoint of the noncareer Ambassador himself, there is

the advantage of the greater sense of independence he feels through

not having a vested interest in his own future within the career. If

he carries this to the extreme of developing a policy of his own, at

variance with the Government's policy, this independence can become

counterproductive. But if he exercises it constructively to contribute

to the formulation of policy jointly with his superiors in Washington,

it may prove a real asset in the management of our foreign relations.

WASHINGTON COORDINATION AND DIRECTION

Although I have been asked to comment mainly on the questions

of oversea operations and the role of the Ambassador, I should like

to include a brief observation on the problems of coordination and

direction in Washington. I am wholly in accord with your staff

study observation that interagency relations in the field are relatively

harmonious and free from the acute jurisdictional rivalry so evident

in Washington. Such rivalry, indeed, is perhaps the single most

serious obstacle to speed and clarity in decisionmaking.

The reasons for relative simplicity in the field are the small numbers

of people involved, their close contact with common problems, and

the fact of integrated direction by the Ambassador. Except for the

existence of ultimate Presidential authority in Washington, these

conditions cannot be reproduced there. As I have argued in previous

writings, and as the subcommittee's staff studies have well pointed out,

this problem cannot be resolved by the designation of a super Secretary of Foreign Affairs or the gathering of all foreign relations into

a single superdepartment. This is obvious in relation to military

functions, and should be evident on only moderate reflection with

respect to financial, commercial, agricultural, scientific, and other

activities where domestic and foreign interests of the United States

are bound to overlap. Hence the impossibility of applying in Washington the principle of integration, which is amply applicable abroad,

and the need instead for truly effective coordination.

The final responsibility for coordination of policy within the executive branch rests with the President. It would be a serious error, how2"Personnel for the New Diplomacy," report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Personnel, Dec. 1962, pp. 65-80.
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 375

ever, to depend mainly on the immediate Presidential staff or the

Executive Office of the President to assist him in carrying out this

vital function. Primary reliance for it should be placed squarely on

the Secretary of State and his Department, reserving the Presidency

for broad guidance and for resolving the irreducible minimum of interagency differences which the Department of State cannot handle, even

with ample Presidential backing.

A large proportion of potential interagency friction can be forestalled by effective arrangements for interagency collaboration in the

early stages of policymaking. If there is free interchange of people

and ideas at lower levels, it is much less likely that agencies will develop rigid and antagonistic positions like sovereign states gathered

at an international negotiating conference. In the relations between

the State and the Defense Departments, there has been an immeasurable improvement since the dark days of 1949, mainly as a result of this

practice. Training at the war colleges and elsewhere has given upper,

middle, and senior level officers a better understanding of the mixed

political-military-economic nature of many foreign policy decisions,

and this has been reinforced by interchanges of personnel and by formal and informal interagency teams and committees at the working

level.

Curiously enough, difficult jurisdictional friction has proved harder

to avoid in the relationships between the Departments of State and

Commercel Treasury, Agriculture and the various foreign aid agencies than in the State-Defense field where more friction might be

expected as a result of traditional differences of outlook between

civilian and military officials. It is especially paradoxical that such

friction should have persisted in relation to foreign aid even after the

International Cooperation Administration was placed nominally

"within" the Department of State. In the last 2 years, the back-toback physical arrangement of country desks and regional offices between the regional bureaus and Country desks of the Department of

State and the Agency for International Development has already

shown promising results. There is still much to be done, however, in

improving the working methods for cooperation between the State

Department and the other long-established Cabinet agencies with foreign as well as domestic economic interests.

Of great importance in this connection are the ground rules employed for the functioning of interagency committees. Except in

highly technical fields, such as atomic energy or geological surveys,

I believe that the State Department should provide the chairman for

all interagency committees concerned with foreign policy and operating matters. The function of these chairmen should be not simply

to seek a consensus at a lowest common denominator, but rather to listen

to and lead the discussion of the matter in hand, taking full account of

the views and special knowledge of other agency representatives, and

then to come to a conclusion. The chairman should not necessarily

have the positive concurrence of all the other committee members; all

that is required is their willingness to accept his decision without appealing to a higher level. If there is appeal to a higher level, the

same principle of State Department primacy should apply there, and

so on up until the rare case is reached requiring Presidential decision.
376 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

This would imply greater initiative, greater responsibility, and

greater willingness to make judgments than is now often the case with

middle and upper middle level State Department officers. It is, however, the only way to provide interagency coordination without the

stultifying effects of government by committee which Mr. Robert

Lovett so cogently set forth in his testimony to the earlier subcommittee. And there is no better way of training future Ambassadors

and Assistant Secretaries of State than having them learn by experience the painful process of decisionmaking. If they are unable to

do it well at midcareer, subject of course to guidance by higher authority, they are not good prospects for making their way to the top

of the career.

MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

Let me conclude with brief comments on other specific points which

have been discussed by the subcommittee with other witnesses.

FUSION OF MILITARY ELEMENTS IN EMBASSY

The suggestion that the MAAG and military attache work might be

combined under a single Defense Department representative would

clearly be impracticable in a country such as Brazil. Here the MAAG

is the U.S. element of a joint Brazil-United States military commission, with Brazilian and American officers working together in planning the military assistance and training programs and overseeing

their execution. The military attaches, on the other hand, have the

normal functions of liaison with the military services of the country

of assignment, as well as military advice to the Ambassador. These

are quite different types of function. Their confusion would weaken

the effectiveness of both and create serious difficulties in relations with

the host government.

NATIONAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS COLLEGE

Like most of your other witnesses, I am strongly opposed to the

creation of a Foreign Affairs Academy at the undergraduate level,

based on the example of the three military academies. It is highly

undesirable for the decision to seek a career in the Foreign Service to

be pushed back to the high school level, and it would be most difficult

to judge the qualities of applicants at that stage. Drawing the junior

recruits of the Service from the whole range of American colleges and

universities, and from many graduate schools as well, provides a far

broader base and much better prospects of highly qualified entrants

into the career.

Even at the graduate level, I am not persuaded that a foreign affairs

college would make a positive contribution to national needs. In its

chapter on this subject (pp. 105 to 111) , the Herter Committee lists

certain advanced training responsibilities which it believes should

be carried on by existing universities, and others which might best be

performed by a new national foreign affairs college. In my view, the

latter group could readily be handled by improvements in the present

operations of the Foreign Service Institute. As the Herter Committee

itself says, able men to staff such a new college are in short supply,
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 377

and it is difficult to see how they could be attracted to it in preference

to opportunities at the great universities. The latter institutions,

moreover, have the advantage of a reservoir of specialists in such fields

as economics, law, history, political science, and area studies which

could not be reproduced at a specialized foreign affairs college.

As a much superior arrangement, I believe, the Government should

seek to work out with a number of the major universities special training courses for midcareer Foreign Service officers, drawing on the full

resources of available faculties but adapting certain of the courses to

the special needs for midcareer training of foreign affairs practitioners.

TOURS OF DUTY AND CHARACTER OF ASSIGNMENT

Not only for Ambassadors, but for officers working abroad at all

levels, tours of duty have tended to be too short. On this point I am

strongly in accord with the views of Ambassador Briggs. As a general

rule, I would aim at 4-year tours, with provision for one home leave

in the middle. The practice, however, need not be uniform and should

take into account differing conditions in various countries of assignment.

Within Latin America, for example, a relatively short tour might

be appropriate for a very small Central American Republic. In.

Brazil, on the other hand, with its continental dimensions, great variety of conditions from region to region, and political, social, and

economic complexity, 2 years is certainly too short. There is also

the element of language competence, an absolute working necessity for

effective operation in this country. Portuguese is a relatively easy

language, but not being one of the recognized international languages,

it is rarely learned except by persons working in Brazil, Portugal, or

one of the Portuguese territories. For these reasons, an officer might

well spend as many as 8 years in this country, changing his location

and specialty at least once and perhaps twice, and still have ample

opportunity to broaden his experience as well as his usefulness to the

Service. Such an extended tour would not differ materially from a

series of tours in several Spanish-American countries, several Arab

countries, or several countries of southeast Asia.

In general, I believe that the early management of the "Wriston reforms" was handled in a somewhat arbitrary manner, moving officers from specialty to specialty and location to location as if they were

interchangeable parts who must all be exposed to an identical set of

career phases. This may simplify the administration of a personnel

system, but it is not nearly as productive as a more flexible system which

takes account of the varying needs and qualities of experience in different parts of the world, and the varying talents and interests of the

members of the Service. In a Service as large as ours, with the varied

responsibilities which it must face, we should have room for and make

full use of persons with special background and keen interest in particular regions or particular professional specialties such as economics

or political-military relations. Armies have long since learned that

even foot soldiers are not interchangeable parts. This is all the more

so of the gifted persons whom the United States should be attracting

to and maintaining in the exceptionally arduous tasks of foreign

policy making and oversea representation in the modern world.
378 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMENTS BY THE HONORABLE DEAN ACHESON ON

THE TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE OF FOREIGN

POLICY OFFICERS, IN LETTER TO SENATOR J.

WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS

JULY 29, 1963.

H011. J. W. FULBRIGHT,

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Senate,Washington, D .0 .

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: In your letter of June 10, 1963, you

asked me to submit to you, for use by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, my views on S. 865 of the current Congress, a bill to

provide for the establishment of the National Academy of Foreign

Affairs, and for other purposes. The bill and the report of the distinguished group out of which it grew had already come to my attention; you kindly made available to me a galley proof of testimony

taken by the Senate committee.

I am not in favor of the enactment of this bill for the reasons set

out below.

The bill would establish in the Washington area a National Academy of Foreign Affairs as a center of study and instruction for officers

of the Government and such private persons as might be "deemed in

the national interest." A Board of Regents, composed ex officio of the

Secretary of State as Chairman, and the Chancellor of the Academy,

together with five officers of Government serving indeterminately, and

five private persons serving for 5-year terms, would lay down policies

and guidance for the operation of the Academy.

The detailed plan for teaching, study and other work of the Academy is to await elaboration by the Chancellor, but enough is said in

the report of the Presidential Committee and the testimony before the

Senate committee to outline the general scheme, purpose and expectations. The Academy would consist of two main operating divisions—

one for instruction, the other for research.

The instructional part would take over and enlarge upon activities

of the existing Foreign Service Institute other than instruction in

technical aspects of State Department responsibilities such as consular

functions and visa and immigration administration. It would embrace: (1) Language instruction, (2) area studies, (3) orientation of

Government officers and employees designated for service abroad and

accompanying relatives, (4) orientation of new officers with responsibilities related to foreign affairs, and (5) courses roughly counterpart to those provided at the existing Institute for midcareer and

senior officers of this Government in agencies related to foreign affairs.

It is not, however, this work of instruction which is claimed as justification for the Academy. If this were all, it could be adequately,

done by the existing Institute with added funds for the desired enlarged student body and curriculum. And, indeed, it would be better

done in this way than it would be if involved with the rest of the

proposed Academy's projected endeavors. For this work embraces

indoctrination, training and instruction with few, if any, speculative

aspects and having negligible bearing on policy issues.
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 379

The work which is cited as justifying the Academy proposal is far

broader in character and presents quite different considerations. The

courses for midcareer and senior officers would be broadened into—as

one proponent put it—"a series of courses aimed at comprehensive

career development" and "specialized courses as needed to help officers * * * face and handle crises and adapt to new situations that cannot be covered within the framework of the regular courses." The

research component would, according to another proponent, engage

with such topics as: (1) The "global Communist menace, including its

theory, practices, resources, vulnerabilities, and techniques," (2) the

problem of "how industrialized nations can live and work together for

mutual benefit and security," and (3) the "less-developed nations, and

their problems of economic and social development, political evolution,

and internal defense."

It is because of this part of its work that proponents of the project

stress the particular academic character desired for the Academy. It

is to be "a graduate-type institution." Its autonomy is emphasized.

It is to be "a new and unique institution." It is expectantly described

as "topnotch." Though a Government enterprise, "it has to have freedom of inquiry." It is to enjoy "the advantages of the traditional

academic environment" along with access to official secrets. In prestige and efficacy, it is to be on a par with any of the great universities.

It will pool "the best of American minds." The bill anticipatorily refers to it as "a great institution," carrying forward "our American

tradition of academic freedom." Hence, published utterances and

writings of persons attending or serving the Academy are, according

to the bill, not to be considered publications of the Government with

respect to certain statutory restrictions.

If one asks why the proponents of S. 865 believe that this sort of an

academic institution can contribute to the national welfare and how,

being a governmental academy, it can hope to do what is expected of it,

the answer is found in certain presuppositions or assumptions either

explicitly stated or implied in the bill or testimony. As to the "why,"

the rationale is this: "The security and welfare of the United States

require that our commitment in the struggle for peace throughout the

world be strengthened" and that "integrated U.S. efforts overseas and

at the seat of Government" be intensified "by the development of better

trained and more knowledgeable officers of our Government and others

concerned with the increasingly complex problems of foreign affairs."

Formal, specialized, professional training with an increment of research is essential to produce these better trained and more knowledgeable officers. Training is as important for them as for military men.

Let us examine these assumptions. Few would doubt that we should

devoutly pursue the aim of strengthening and integrating our foreign

policy, commitments to peace and administration at home and abroad,

that all these matters are becoming increasingly complex, or that they

call for the best trained and most knowledgeable persons to cope with

them.

Yet, one should take care not to bank too heavily on the saving power

of mere intellectual improvement up and down the line. Not knowledge alone, but how it is marshaled by will and brought to bear in

action, must remain the determining consideration in the conduct of

foreign policy. Intellectual capabilities at what one may call the
380 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

officer level are not to be scorned. Indeed, they are to be valued and

cultivated, for they can contribute appreciably to the making of sound

and effective policy. In the face of an obdurate world, the critical

and central considerations must remain, however, the factors of insight and will at the top levels of political authority. With any deficiency in such factors where great decisions are disposed, mental grasp

of problems at subordinate levels avails little. When wisdom and

courage prevail at the top, such qualities will be generated all along

the line.

The bill and its proponents reflect unbounded confidence in educative

processes. The bill itself declares: "The United States can assure

that its position as a leader among nations shall be maintained and

improved by maximum utilization of its potential by pooling the best

of American minds and resources to create a great institution"—

namely, the proposed Academy. The language—specifically such

superlatives as "maximum utilization" and "the best of American

minds"—tends to weight the argument. Nevertheless, one may

venture a doubt.

Able individuals may indeed be improved by instruction as by

experience. Minds not instructible by events and disinclined to derive

wisdom and proficiency in policy from responsible contact with actual

problems are little likely to receive such qualities vicariously from

the lectern or the archives. This is not to decry formal instruction

and specialized study but only to put their utility in proportion.

Undoubtedly some substantial benefit comes from relieving officers

from their usual duties occasionally and affording them time and

opportunity for contemplative study. To assume, however, the existence within the academic realm of resources of transferable knowledge

such as to equip officers "to handle crises"—to quote one proponent

again—is an exaggeration of what can be done. A considerable burden of proof, moreover, should be placed on those who assert great

potential benefits to policy in the creation of yet another among all

the burgeoning establishments preoccupied with churning through

the data in the name of research. The in-boxes of bureaucracy abound

with their products. More papers, thoughtful and otherwise than a,

mind can cope with and books enough on foreign policy to fill a lifetime of reading are at hand. Whatever the national shortcomings in

foreign policy may be, they are surely not attributable to a lag in

scholarly inquiry or a lack of reading matter on foreign affairs in

general or on the three contemplated topics in particular.

Furthermore, it is seriously misleading to compare foreign policy

officers with members of the military profession in respect of time

spent in training. An advocate of the Academy project is quoted as

saying:

We are not keeping up with the armed services in this regard. The average

military officer spends approximately 12 percent of his career in formal training.

The comparable figure for a State Department officer is 5 percent.

The comparison is not materially significant. In times of peace a

military establishment is in-being but it is, in an ultimate sense, not

in operation. Its force is brought to bear through consciousness of

its potential rather than being actually employed. Such an establishment devotes its energies to readiness rather than to action. This

is not the case with a foreign policy establishment, which operates in
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 381

the fullest sense at all times, and specifically in peace. Military establishments must everlastingly prepare for hypothetical eventualities.

The State Department is unremittingly involved in actual politics.

The respective training requirements differ quite as the need of practice is unequal as between boxers and coal heavers.

For these reasons I remain highly skeptical of the premises upon

which are rested the value of the proposed Academy to the conduct

of our foreign relations. The next question is whether the Academy

can ever, as a practical matter, have the qualities or do the job expected

of it. The belief that it will is rested on the following propositions,

expressly stated: first, that the attainment of academic freedom for

the faculty of the Academy is an essential prerequisite; second, that

this achievement is practicable for the staff of an agency of Government responsive to politically accountable officials, all of whom—staff

and officials alike—are dealing with so inherently controversial a subject as foreign policy and third, that the privileges of official Washin inlife, including access to classified material in particular, are

su7 cient to attract the superlative talent desired for the Academy's

staff.

If the ambitions for excellence should not be realized—if the institution should prove to be of a mediocre sort—then difficult issues about

academic freedom might not arise. For the moment and for argument, however, let us assume the sufficiency of the alleged advantages

of the Washington scene for attracting first-rate pedagogical talents

from other institutional connections. Let us assume the "pooling of

the best of American minds"—whatever the phrase implies and entails—in a faculty of acknowledged preeminence. The question is

whether any administration would, in actuality, permit such free

public scope to the members of such an establishment. To doubt this

is not to impugn the sincerity of officials devoted to the project. But

one would be naive not to realize that here actuality is likely to differ

drastically from abstraction.

No one questions the importance of untrammeled critical analysis

of foreign policy. Indeed, even at a cost in occasional pain to pride,

those in supreme charge in foreign policy should give scope to critical

faculties among subordinates. Freedom to question accepted premises, to say so candidly and to tell why when things go amiss, and to

propose alternatives to what is being contemplated or undertaken is

essential to proper working of the policy apparatus. But to say this

should not blur the distinction between academic freedom and the

scope for critical faculties appropriate within a governing establishment.

For analogy, one can imagine one of the great motor companies permitting and indeed encouraging its engineers, designers, and other

experts to find fault with the current product and to propound ways

of improving on it in subsequent models, and even sending some of its

experts out to study in advanced institutions so as to learn to become

even more critical of what is, and more creative as to what ought to

be—even to outside institutions where faults of the company's product

are discussed without constraint. What is beyond realistic imagination is for such a company to permit its experts, even while on the

payroll, to publicize their views on what is wrong with what the

company is trying to market.
382 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The relevance of the analogy is underlined by Prof. Gabriel

Almond's comparison of foreign policies to marketed products:

* * * policies themselves are the products of leadership groups * * * who

carry on the specific work of policy formulation and policy advocacy. The public

share in policy decisions may be compared, with important qualifications, to a

market. It buys or refuses to buy the "policy products" offered by competing

elites.* * *

Foreign policy involves action. It relates to interactions of purpose among nations. It involves questions of delicacy and entails

risks. In sum, it is often controversial domestically as well as among

nations. The issues are often close. No administration is likely ever

to indulge its officers in the privilege of publicizing whatever views

they may have as to what is wrong with what the administration is

undertaking. An administration may accept their criticism within

channels. It may suffer and even welcome public venting of misgivings. It is not going to permit even a selected group of its own

servants freedom to assail as if they were in another status entirely.

Of that conclusion one may be certain.

Of another conclusion we may be equally certain. Just as no

administration will give its own servants freedom to assail its policies,

so Congress will not grant these same servants the immunity of academic freedom if they should choose to support the administration or

to propose a line or lines of their own. It does not take much imagination to picture the field day an Academy faculty—indulging its

academic freedom on say China policy, disengagement in Europe or

nuclear arms control—would have afforded the late Senator Joseph

McCarthy in his prime.

Academic freedom requires far more than an expression of good

intent. Where it is operative, it emanates from terms of contract

between a teacher and his institution. The bill, S. 865, gives no evidence of intention to grant relevant terms of tenure and other conditions necessary to academic freedom—nor is this observation to be construed as an argument that the bill should do so. Any such formal

attempt would only confuse the attributes of a university with the

characteristics of a training institute—to mix education with indoctrination.

Just as it is too much to expect a President or a Secretary of State

to suffer a band of professors on the Federal payroll to controvert

their decisions before the public or a group of subordinate officers on

sabbatical to enter the lists of debate against prevailing policies, so is

it unlikely that a future administration would permit continued sway

to a set of holdover policy critics put in position by its predecessor.

Not academic freedom but political turnover is implicit in the conditions affecting the Academy according to the terms of the bill—no

fixed tenure for teaching staff, a Chancellor subject to political appointment and removal, a Board of Regents headed by a politically'

accountable official and consisting of members subject to political appointment and senatorial confirmation, and a requirement of periodic

appropriations by Congress.

Proponents of the Academy emphasize the modesty of the sums

entailed against the general scale of governmental expenditures. The

question of economy, however, involves consideration not so much of

the dollars as of the thousands of man-years to be committed. The
ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 383

prudence of undertaking a new institution virtually from scratch, in

hope of attracting professorial talents away from existing establishments, needs to be weighed most carefully against the advantages of

programing fuller use of institutions that are already going concerns.

A further skeptical question pertains to the desirability of the Washington environment, with its distractions of daily detail, as a scene

for studious enterprise. Whether the Academy would realize the

proponents' design and whether the benefits accruing from the sums

and time to be spent would represent the best results achievable at the

price, are matters calling for serious doubt. The project requires

deeper consideration than is reflected in the case presented on its

behalf.

This bill, in short, is founded on what I believe to be wholly false

assumptions including the one that since all the military services have

undergraduate academies and graduate war colleges, the civilians

should have a synthesized equivalent. I suggest that a wiser course

would be to use and develop what is already available. This is good

now and can be made better. It consists of three principal groups of

institutions: First, the Foreign Service Institute and the Senior Officers Seminar, both of which do a good, if not excellent job, and have

no problems that a more generous budget would not solve. Second,

the service war colleges and the national war college. I have lectured

over many years at all of them and have been impressed not only by the

quality of faculty, students, and work done but by the tremendous

value of a year's joint study by officers of all services and civilians

from the departments concerned with foreign relations. These institutions could at minor cost be enabled to take a few more (and the

numbers involved are not large) graduate students from the civilian

departments.

Finally, there are existing academic institutions, state and private,

many of which offer excellent facilities, for advanced international

studies and research work. If funds were made available for the

tuition of officer students and outright grants to the universities for

increased overhead and faculty expense for, say, a period of 10 years,

both instruction and research under conditions of true academic freedom could be made available.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON.

(The continuation of this session of the subcommittee appears as

Part 6 of the hearings.)

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