No. 14756 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1979 

ODESSEY S. STAMATIS (Fatal) , JESSIE M. STAMATIS, 

Claimant and Appellant, 

BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION, Employer, 

and 

INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court 

Honorable William E. Hunt, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Lewis E. Brueggemann argued, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Marra, Wenz, Iwen and Johnson, Great Falls, Montana 

Charles R. Johnson argued, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted: September 20, 1979 

Decided: OCT 2 : 7979 
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Claimant appeals from a judgment of the Workers' 

Compensation Court denying Workers' Compensation benefits for 

the death of her husband. We affirm. 

Claimant's husband, Odessey S. Stamatis, was employed 

as an electrician by Bechtel Power Corporation at a plant 

near Colstrip, Montana, on March 3, 1976. He collapsed on 

the job, was taken by ambulance to a Forsyth hospital, and 

was pronounced dead on arrival. 

His widow filed a claim for benefits under the Workers' 

Compensation Act against Industrial Insurance Company, 

Bechtel's Plan I1 carrier. A hearing was held before the 

Workers' Compensation Court at which much conflicting evidence 

was introduced by the respective parties. 

Roderick Switzer, a fellow employee of decedent, 

testified they spent the morning of his death installing 

conduit sections weighing 10 to 15 pounds a piece and pulling 

several wires through 50 to 100 feet of the conduit. Switzer 

indicated this was very strenuous work involving lifting with 

your whole body on a pull from below your knees and crawling 

through a space of about three feet between the floor and 

bottom of a generator in the work area. Switzer testified he 

did not take his lunch break with decedent, but that when he 

returned to work thereafter he saw decedent collapse as he 

picked up some materials from a work bench. 

The other version of what happened on the day of 

decedent's death came from the testimony of Gordon Ziegeldorf, 

a fellow employee, and Michael Laslovich, decedent's foreman. 

Ziegeldorf testified that he and decedent worked 

together that day carrying light fixtures from a warehouse 

into the Bechtel plant and cleaning them preparatory to installation. 
This activity involved walking 50 to 100 yards from the plant 

to the warehouse, carrying a single light fixture weighing 

about 20 pounds back to the plant each trip, loading the 

fixtures on an elevator that transported them to the 120 foot 

level of the plant, and cleaning them with soap and water at 

the 120 foot level. Ziegeldorf testified the work was not 

strenuous, did not involve heavy lifting, and did not involve 

climbing stairs. According to Ziegeldorf, decedent at no 

time complained that the work was tiring or causing him any 

physical discomfort. Decedent and Ziegeldorf took a coffee 

break at about 2:30 in the afternoon and as they were returning 

to work thereafter, decedent collapsed while walking ahead of 

Ziegeldorf and fell back into his arms. 

Foreman Laslovich recalled that decedent worked with 

Ziegeldorf on the day of his death stocking and cleaning 

light fixtures. Laslovich testified that he saw decedent 

collapse in Ziegeldorf's arms as the men walked back to work 

following the afternoon coffee break. He stated that it was 

customary to assign decedent nonstrenuous jobs like bringing 

up fixtures because of decedent's age. The foreman never 

recalled assigning decedent to install conduit or pull wire, 

but admits decedent could have performed that type of work 

since his job as foreman did not require him to continuously 

supervise the men under him. 

After decedent collapsed, first aid consisting of 

cardiopulmonary resuscitation was administered on the job 

site. Decedent was taken by ambulance to a hospital in 

Forsyth, a distance of about 35 miles. Dr. Deone Hanson 

pronounced decedent dead on arrival at 4:45 p.m. The Rosebud 

County coroner examined the body and determined the cause of 

death to be acute coronary thrombosis. The coroner testified 

his examination was not extensive enough to rule out the 
possibility that decedent died of myocardial infarction rather 

than coronary thrombosis. No autopsy was performed, The 

body was cremated. 

The record shows that decedent was a large man standing 

6'2" and weighing 250 pounds. He was 54 years old at the 

time of his death and had no past medical history of heart 

disease. He smoked two packs of cigarettes a day and had 

been smoking since age 13. In the month preceding his death, 

decedent had worked 21 shifts totalling 190 hours for an 

average of about nine hours per shift. The Saturday before 

he died, February 28, he worked an eight-hour overtime shift. 

On the day of his death, the temperature at Colstrip, a few 

miles from the Bechtel plant recorded a high of +18OF and a 

low of -18OF, The temperature inside the plant was somewhere 

between +40°F and +50°F. 

The medical testimony conflicted at several points. 

Dr. Walter Degnan, a cardiologist, testified by 

deposition that decedent died of what is medically known as 

sudden death. Sudden death occurs when the patient dies 

within several hours of the onset of symptoms and is 

statistically related to coronary disease 80 percent of the 

time. According to Dr. Degnan sudden death frequently occurs 

without traumatic cause or previous symptoms. The doctor 

testified that while unusual strain increases the probability 

of sudden death, normal exertion will not produce a heart 

attack. He did not feel that the temperature the day of 

decedent's death had any relationship to his death. Responding 

to a hypothetical question based on the effect of stocking 

and cleaning light fixtures by a man of decedent's age and 

physical condition, Dr. Degnan testified that exertion was 

not a causal factor in his death. 

Dr. Patrick Byorth, a specialist in internal medicine, 
was also deposed. He agreed that decedent died from sudden 

death and that sudden death is related to a coronary incident 

in 80 percent of the cases. However, his opinion was that 

vigorous physical activity precipitated the heart problems. 

Responding to a hypothetical question encompassing the facts 

testified by witness Switzer, Dr. Byorth stated physical 

exercise was a probable contributing factor to decedent's 

death. When presented with a hypothetical question positing 

facts similar to the testimony of witnesses Ziegeldorf and 

Laslovich, Dr. Byorth testified that the physical exertion 

involved in decedent's activities contributed to precipitating 

the heart attack. The doctor further testified that working 

in cold weather could contribute to a heart attack. 

The essence of the findings of fact by the Workersv 

Compensation Court was that decedent had been engaged in the 

task of cleaning light fixtures in the few hours prior to his 

collapse after a coffee break at approximately 2:45 p.m. on 

March 3, 1976, and that his activity was not of a strenuous 

physical nature, nor was it unusual, nor was the outside air 

temperature a factor in precipitating his collapse. The gist 

of the court's conclusions of law was that the preponderance 

of competent and credible evidence failed to sustain a 

conclusion that decedent suffered a compensable injury as 

defined in the Workersv Compensation Act. Judgment was 

entered denying claimant any benefits thereunder or attorney fees. 

Two issues are presented for review in this appeal: 

1. The sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

findings of the Workers1 Compensation Court. 

2. Did decedent suffer a compensable injury under the 

Workers' Compensation Act? 

The test of sufficiency of the evidence is whether 

there is substantial evidence supporting the court's findings 
of fact. Head v. Larson (1979), Mont. , 592 P.2d 507, 

510, 36 St.Rep. 571, 575; Strandberg v. Reber Company (1978), 

Mon t . , 587 P.2d 18, 20, 35 St.Rep. 1742, 1745; Jensen 

v. Zook Bros. Construction Co. (1978), Mon t . , 582 

P.2d 1191, 1193, 35 St.Rep. 1066, 1068. This Court will not 

substitute its judgment for that of the Workers' Compensation 

Court concerning the credibility of the witnesses or the 

weight to be given their testimony. Dumont v. Wickens Bros. 

Construction Co. (1979), Mont. , 598 P.2d 1099, 1106, 

36 St.Rep. 1471, 1479-1480; Steffes v. 93 Leasing Co., Inc. 

(1978) I Mon t . , 580 P.2d 450, 452-453, 35 St.Rep, 816, 

818; Crittendon v. City of Butte (1977, Mont . , 559 P.2d 816, 817,/34 St.Rep. 3, 4. Thus, where the findlngs are ba-on 

conflicting evidence, our function of review is confined to 

determining whether there is substantial evidence supporting 

such findings. Jensen, supra, 582 P.2d at 1194. Conversely, 

our function is not to determine whether there is sufficient 

evidence to support contrary findings. 

Here the evidence is conflicting concerning the cause 

of death. Claimant's witnesses testified decedent performed 

strenuous physical activity on the job prior to his death and 

the exertion had a causal connection with his death. Respondent's 

witnesses testified that decedent did nothing strenuous or 

unusual and that his activities on the job in the hours 

preceding his death had no causal relationship to his collapse 

and subsequent death. The Workers' Compensation Court found 

respondents' witnesses more credible, gave greater weight to 

their testimony, and entered findings accordingly. Substantial 

evidence supporting such findings is found in the testimony of 

Ziegeldorf, Laslovich, and Dr. Degnan, summarized previously. 

The second issue for review is whether decedent suffered 

a compensable injury under the Workers' Compensation Act. This 

question has two facets: (1) Did decedent suffer an injury 
as defined by the Act? (2) Was such injury causally related 

to decedent's death? Dumont, supra, 598 P.2d at 1106-1109. 

The Act in pertinent part defines an injury in this language: 

"'Injury' or 'injured' means: 

"(1) a tangible happening of a traumatic nature 

from an unexpected cause or unusual strain resulting in either external or internal physical 

harm and such physical condition as a result 

therefrom . . ." Section 39-71-119(1), MCA. 

We have previously interpreted this language to mean 

that a claimant can recover if the physical harm suffered is 

unusual either from the standpoint of cause or effect. Love v. 

Ralph's Food Store (1973), 163 Mont. 234, 242, 516 ~.2d 598, 

602; Robins v. Ogle (1971), 157 Mont. 328, 333, 485 P.2d 692, 

695; Jones v. Bair's Cafe (1968), 152 Mont. 13, 19, 445 P.2d 

923, 926. However, claimant must still prove a tangible 

happening of a traumatic nature. Dumont v. Wickens Bros. 

Construction Co., supra, 598 P.2d at 1108; Erhart v. Great 

Western Sugar Company (1976), 169 Mont. 375, 380-381, 546 P.2d 

1055, 1058; Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Company (1975), 167 

Mont. 303, 306-307, 538 P.2d 344, 346. We have explained the 

meaning of a tangible happening of a traumatic nature in these 

words. 

"A tangible happening must be a perceptible happening. [Citations omitted.] Some action or 

incident, or chain of actions or incidents, must 

be shown which may be perceived as a contributing cause of the resulting injury. This court has 

found neurosis compensable, but a tangible, real 

happening must be the cause of the condition 

[Citations omitted.] . . . In the recent case of 

Love where a gradual buildup of back pain was 

found compensable, this Court emphasized two specific incidents of strain were perceptible from the 

record." Erhart, supra, 169 Mont. at 381. 

Here, there is no tangible happening of a traumatic nature. 

The Workers' Compensation Court found that claimant had been 

engaged in cleaning light fixtures preceding his collapse and 

that this activity was not of a strenuous physical nature, nor 
unusual, nor was the outside air temperature a factor in 

precipitating his collapse. Taking this view of the facts, 

there is simply no evidence in the record of any real, 

perceptible or identifiable incident, action or happening of a 

traumatic nature within the definition of injury in the Act. 

Finding no injury, the required causal connection 

likewise fails. Accordingly, we hold there is no compensable 

injury as defined in the Workers' Compensation Act. 

Affirmed. 

Chief Justice 

Justices 

I