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UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

GOVERNMENTS to rage

H E A R IN G

BEFORE T H E

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-NINTII CONGRESS

F IR ST SESSION

ON

EXECUTIVE A, 89TH CONGR ESS, 1ST SESSION

A P R IL 28 AN D 29, 1965

KSU LIBRARIES

Pri n te d fo r th e us e of th e Com mitt ee on For ei gn R el ati ons

47-378

U.S . GO VE RN MEN T PR IN TIN G O FFIC E 

W ASH IN GT ON : 19G5
JO H N SPAR KM AN , Alaba ma 

M IK E M ANS FI EL D, M on ta na 

WA YN E MO RS E, Oregon 

RU SS ELL B. LONG, Lou isia na 

ALB ER T GO RE , Te nn es se e 

FR ANK J. LA US CH E, Ohio

COM MIT TE E ON FO R EIG N REL ATI ONS

J. W. FU LB RIG H T, A rk an sa s, C hai rm an

BO UR KE B. HIC KEN LO OPE R, Iow aj 

GE OR GE D. AIK EN , Vermon t 

FRANK CA RLSON, K an sa s 

JO H N J. W IL LI AM S, Delaw are 

KA RL E. MU ND T, So ut h D ak ot a 

CLIF FO R D P. CA SE , New Je rs ey

FRANK CH UR CH . Id ah o

ST UA RT SY MI NG TO N, M isso ur i 

TH OM AS J. DOD D, Con ne ct ic ut 

JO SE PH S. CL AR K, Pen ns ylv an ia 

CL AI BO RN E PELL, Rh od e Is la nd 

EUGEN E J . MCCAR THY , M in ne so ta

Carl Marcy, C h ie f o f S ta ff

Darrell St . Cla ir e, C le rk

II
C O N T E N T S

Statem ent of—

Allen, George V., Wash ington, D.C., on behalf of the United World Page 

Fede ralists________________________________________________ 113

Cleveland, Harlan, Assistan t Secretary of State for Intern ational

Organization Affairs________________________________________ 42, 53

Cory, Robert, Scarsdale, N.Y., on behalf of the Friends Committe e on

National Legislation________________________________________ 119

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of Sta te________________________________ 9

Stevenson, Adlai E., U.S. Representative to the United Nations_____ 53

Weiner, Mrs. Robert J., Por tlan d, Oreg., on behalf of the American

Association of University Women_____________________________ 117

Insertions in the record:

Message from the Preside nt of the United States transm itting two

amendments to the Ch arter of the United Nations______________ 1

United Nations Procedures and Power Realities: “The Inte rna tional 

Apportionment Problem ” (address by Richard N. Gardner, April 

23, 1965)__________________________________________________ 21

Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, tex t of________________________ 30

Chart I, Effect of Am endm ent of the U.N. Cha rter on the distribution

of nonpermanent seats on the U.N. Security Council____________ 43

Chart II, Geographical Allocation of Security Council Seats_______ 44

Ch art III, Geographical Allocation of ECOSOC Seats_____________ 44

Voting Records of United Nations General Assembly____ l _______ 60

Estima ted scale of U.N. assessments for the calendar year 1965_____ 107

Sta tem ent of Mrs. Catherine Manno, Women’s Inte rna tional League

for Peace and F reedom ______________________________________ 124

Appendix:

U.S. position on article 19 issue__________________________________ 127

Sta tem ent by Ambassador Charles^W. Yost, Deputy U.S. Represe ntativ e in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,

April 22, 1965______________________________________________ 127

Financing of United N ations’ peacekeeping operations______________ 128

Sta tem ent by Ambassador Charles W. Yost, Deputy U.S. R epresentativ e in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,

April 29, 1965______________________________________________ 130

Activities in the field of arms control and disa rma ment during the

Johnson adm inistration______________________________________ 131

Analysis of the U.N. financial position as of December 31, 1964______ 135

Analysis of UN EF and ONU C recorded obligations as of December

31, 1965___________________________ ____ __________________ 136

United Nation s’ bond pledges a nd purchases_____________________ 137

h i

UNITED NAT ION S CHART ER AMENDM ENTS

WED NES DAY, A PR IL 28, 196 5

United States Sena te, 

Committee on F oreign Relations,

Washing ton, D.O.

Th e com mittee met, p ur su an t to notice, at 10 a.m., in roo m 4221, New 

Senate Office Bu ild ing , S en ator J. W. F ulb right (cha irm an ) presidi ng.

P re se nt: Se nator s F ulb ri ght (p re sidi ng ), Clark, Pe ll, Hic kenlo oper, 

'**' Aiken , C arlson , an d Case.

Th e Chairm an. Th e com mittee w ill come to ord er. Th e com mittee 

is m eet ing th is morning to rec eive testim ony on two amendme nts to the 

Uni ted Na tions Ch arter. Th ese are the first amend me nts ad op ted by 

th e Ge neral A ssembly since t he c ha rter was approv ed alm ost 20 years 

ago.

Th e ma in purpose of t he amend me nts is to increa se th e nu mber of 

na tio ns repres ented on t he S ec urity C oun cil fro m 11 t o 15, with a n in ­

crease in the v oting m aj or ity fro m 7 to 9 mem bers, an d to increase t he 

me mb ership of the Econo mic an d Soc ial Cou ncil fro m 18 to 27. Th e 

amend ments also make ce rta in changes in th e election pr ocedures to be 

followe d af te r the increase in m embership of th e two Co uncils.

(T he Pres id en t’s message fo llo ws:)

[Ex. A, 89th Cong., 1 sess.]

Mes sa ge F bo m t h e P res id en t of t h e Unit ed Sta te s T r a n sm it tin g T wo A m en dm en ts to t h e C harter of t h e U n it ed Na tio ns

Apr il 6, 1965.—Amendments were read the first time and, together with the message and accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee on Foreign 

Relations and was ordered to be printed for use of the Senate

T h e W h it e H o u se,

April 6, 1965.

To the Senate of the United States:

w

I request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of two amend­ ments to the Charter of the United Nations which are transmitted herewith along with a report to me from the Secretary of State. They are the first amendments adopted by the General Assembly since the founding of the United Nations. These amendments will strengthen the ability of the United Nations to act 

as a force for peace and the progress of mankind. They enlarge the membership of both the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to bring those bodies into balance with the enlarged membership of the United Nations itself.

h is t o r y of t h e a m en d m en ts

Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations must first be adopted by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, and then ratified by two-thirds of the member states, including all the permanent members, according to their constitutional procedure.
2 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

In late 1963, the General Assembly considered resolutions proposing the two 

amendments in question. These resolutions focused on three points :

First, that the text of the United Nations Charter be changed to increase the 

size of the Security Council from 11 to 15, to increase the voting majority of the 

Security Council from 7 to 9, and to increase the size of the Economic and Social 

Council from 18 to 27. In the Security Council, neither the seats nor the right 

of veto of the permanent members would be affected.

Second, the resolutions provided that members of the two Councils be elected 

on the basis of geographic distribution.

In the Security Council, the 10 nonpermanent members would include five 

from Africa and Asia, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America, and 

two from Western Europe and other ar ea s; the five permanent members would 

remain the same. The present nonpermanent membership of the Security Council includes two members from Africa and Asia, two from Latin America, one 

from Western Europe, and one seat split between Asia and Eastern Europe.

In the Economic and Social Council, there would be the United States, 12 

African and Asian states, five Latin American states, 3 Eastern European states 

(including the Soviet Union), and 6 states from Western Europe and other areas. 

The present composition of the Economic and Social Council, in addition to the 

United States, is five African and Asian states, four Latin American states, three 

Eastern European states (including the Soviet Union), and five states from 

Western Europe and other areas.

Third, the resolutions proposed that member states ratify the amendments by 

September 1,1965.

On December 17, 1963, the resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly. 

On the enlargement of the Security Council, the vote was 97 to 11, with 4 abstentions ; on the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council, it was 96 to 11, 

with 5 abstentions.

In those votes, the United States abstained, not because it doubted the principle of enlargement, but to maintain complete freedom of action while giving 

deliberate study to the effects of the specific proposals. The Soviet Union and 

France voted negatively. China voted for enlargement of the Security Council 

but abstained on enlargement of the Economic and Social Council. The United 

Kingdom abstained on both resolutions.

Since that time, 63 nations out of the required 76 have ratified the amendments. Other governments are now considering them. Of the permanent members of the Security Council, the Soviet Union has been the first to approve the 

amendments.

REASONS FOR RA TIF ICA TIO N

The United States should now move to ratify the charter amendments to enlarge the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

First, the amendments are realistic.

The membership of the United Nations has grown from 51 in 1945 to 114 in 

1965. Almost all of the newer members are nations which have gained their 

independence from the peaceful dismantling of empires—a process which brought 

nationhood to one-third of all the peoples of the world and which is here to stay.

We welcome this growth.

The peoples of the world are more directly represented in the General Assembly 

of the United Nations today than they were 20 years ago.

We want to work together and cooperate with these new countries, within the 

United Nations.

If there are differences among us, we want them to be aired and examined 

within the United Nations.

This is the way to a peaceful and cooperative world.

But jus t as we welcome the growth of the United Nations, we must also recognize tha t the present Security Council and the present Economic and Social 

Council do not now realistically reflect it.

An increase in the representations on both Councils is now clearly necessary 

to restore the balance which existed between the Councils and the General 

Assembly when the charter came into force. An expansion of 50 percent in the 

case of the Economic and Social Council and less in the Security Council is a 

reasonable way to adjust to a membership which has more than doubled. At the 

same time, the expansion is not such as to make the Councils unwieldy.

Second, the amendments are equitable.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 3

When the ch arter was signed in 1945, the member sta tes from Africa and Asia numbered 13 out of a total of 51—less than a thi rd. Today, the membe r sta tes from these gre at con tine nts number 61 out of a tot al of 114—more than a half. The General Assembly resolutions, necessarily and rightly, tak e thi s new ar it hmetic into account- Moreover, the exp licit allocation of the new sea ts to geogra phic areas, as pro ­ vided by Assembly resolution, is wise. It is designed to elim inate the conten­ tiou s problem of sha rin g an inadeq uate number of seats—which has led to pres­ sures again st existin g seats, to disp utes over the definition of geogra phic are as, and to spli t term s on the Secu rity Council to mee t competi ng claims for rep resenta tion.

Third, the a men dme nts full y pro tect the basic intere sts o f th e permanen t mem­ bers. While we have seen th at the work of the Security Council can be ham ­ pered seriou sly by the abus e of t he veto provision , it nevertheless rem ains a wise and realist ic fe atur e of the United Nati ons Charter. The veto provi sion is 

maintaine d.

Fou rth, because the ame ndments are at once rea list ic and equita ble, they will 

stre ngthen th e U nite d N ations . They will incr ease the vit ali ty of these Councils and to the United Nati ons it ­ self by per mit ting more of the newer members to tak e pa rt in the conside ration 

of m ajor wor ld problems. The amendments, whic h will insure t ha t t he Councils rep res ent th e whole Orga­ niza tion th ey ar e inte nde d to serve, will there by a lso insure th at t he Councils con­ tinue to earn the confidence and supp ort of the membership at large. Wi tho ut thi s confidence and supp ort, the Councils ca nnot be ful ly effective. The Organization as a whole will benefit from ful ler p art icipat ion in the work of the Councils by the new members who have much to con tribu te—as they will benefit from the exercise of sha red responsi bility .

Fifth and finally, the amendmen ts are a reflection and a dem onstration of both th e s tab ilit y and the ad apt abi lity of the Unite d N ation s C hart er. We Americans hav e always had a hea lthy resp ect fo r the sta bility of our ins titu tio ns and a wa riness of change for the sake of change. Our Ame rican Constitution, which ha s been amended only 14 time s since the Bill of Rig hts of 1791, has clea rly me t the tes t of sta bili ty. The fact th at the Unite d Nations Ch art er has rem aine d as it was wr itten 20 yea rs ago is ampl e evidence of its 

stability. At the same time, we Amer icans have alwa ys recognized the force s of change, and have always known instinct ivel y th at the abi lity of an ins tituti on to ad ap t to changed conditions is a relia ble mea sure of its capacity for sur viv al and growth. Our Ame rican Constitution, as evidenced by its amend ments, has 

clea rly met thi s t est of a dap tab ilit y. Now with its 20t h bir thd ay approaching, the United Nations is seeking the first two amendments to its basic ch art er. And this is welcome evidence of the inh erent flexibility of a no the r grea t institu tion.

TH E STATE OF TH E UNITE D NA TIO NS

As we consider the se first ame ndments to the United Nati ons Cha rter , it is fittin g to review brie fly the s tate of th e U nited Na tions its elf. The lim itat ion s of the United Nat ions are app are nt. It has not been able to prev ent aggr essio n in sou theast A si a; it has not been able to rid the world 

of poverty. Nor has the United Nations been able to solve all of its int ern al problem s. At the present time a serio us finan cial problem threa ten s the capa city of the General Assembly to perform it s s har e of peacekeeping. And if the lim itations are clear, the basic reas on is plain. The United Na­ tion s is not a world gover nm ent ; it is an organization of govern ments pa rti cipa t­ ing by consent. It can move only in the dire ctio n and at the pace th at its 

members w ant it to move. And yet the United Nati ons has served well the cause of world peace and progress—and, ther efo re, the nat ion al int ere st and the p erso nal inter est of every 

American.

KE EP ING TH E PEACE

Thro ugh the United Natio ns, the members have acte d to av er t w ars on a t lea st a dozen occasions—local wa rs which could have spread. In Kash mir, the United Nati ons obtained and s til l polices a cease-fire line r un ­

ning thr oug h a bitterl y contested are a.
4 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

In Suez, the United Nations deployed an Emergency Force which enabled the 

respective national military forces to withdraw.

In the Congo, the United Nations provided 20,000 troops, assisted a new nation to survive its birth, and forestalled an East-West confrontation in the heart 

of Africa.

In Cyprus, the United Nations h as stationed a force of 6,000 to strengthen that 

nation’s security.

The Office of the Secretary General has evolved into a sensitive listening post— 

an ever-ready channel of communication, a potential conciliation service open at 

all times to the international community of states.

ECO NOM IC DEVEL OPM ENT

At the same time, the day-to-day work of the United Nations is directed overwhelmingly toward building conditions which make the peace worth keeping.

United Nations experts are now at work in 130 countries or territories—bringing modern knowledge and technology to bear on the universal struggle to liberate man from the slavery of poverty.

The United Nations is in partnership with 89 nations and territories in cooperative preinvestment projects—surveying resources or training men and women 

in modern skills.

The development lending institutions affiliated with the United Nations have 

been investing some $1 billion annually in world development.

All in all, the level of development assistance flowing through the United Nations system of agencies now has reached some $1.3 billion a year.

TECHNOLOGIC AL COOPERATION

Meanwhile, United Nations agencies are performing the vital task of establishing cooperative ground rules which are required in the age of rapid interna tional 

transport and instant international communication.

Agencies affiliated with the United Nations have developed stan dards for international air traffic—and for the safety of life at sea.

They have arranged for orderly use of the airwaves by allocating available 

radio frequencies among nations and users.

They have promoted international weather forecasting and are pioneering in 

the development of a World Weather Watch of incalculable benefit to peoples of 

all nations.

They have developed and maintained uniform international quarantine regulations against the spread of communicable diseases—and liberated 800 million 

people from the threat of the greatest killer of all tim e: malaria.

In these and other ways—through peacekeeping, through nation building, and 

through international technical services—the United Nations serves it members. 

In doing so, the Organization serves the national interest of the Untied States. 

It helps us do things we could not do so well alone and encourages other nations 

to share the burdens.

CO NC LU SIO N

In one sense, the smallest members are in greatest need of the United Nations.

In another sense, the United Nations is of greatest service to the large st nations—for without the United Nations, the nations with the greatest resources 

would have to shoulder most of these tasks alone.

And in a combined sense, the United Nations serves simultaneously the large 

and the small, the rich and the poor—for the peace of one area is but par t of 

world peace, and the prosperity of one country is but an element of the world’s 

well-being.

This is why consistent and effective support for the United Nations has been 

near the he art of U.S. foreign policy for two decades.

This is why the Congress and the public, regardless of policies or party, have 

been ready to stick with the United Nations through thick and thin.

The Organization has reached a point where the Security Council and the 

Economic and Social Council need to be enlarged to take account of the great 

growth of the Organization in recent years.

The proposed amendments offer responsible and equitable plans for meeting 

this problem.

Because the United Nations will continue to be deeply needed by nations which 

seek peace, by all nations which seek to raise the levels of human welfare, by all 

nations which seek to cooperate in putting the achievements of modern techlr

V

w

*
U N I TE D N A TI O N S C H A R T E R A M E N D M E N T S

n ol o gy t o w or k f or all ma n ki n d, it is i n t he nati o n al i nter est of t he U nite d States 

t o rati f y t hese ste ps t o war d ma ki n g m ore effecti ve t he pri nci pal C o u ncils of t he 

Or ga nizati o n.

I t heref ore re q uest t he c o nse nt of t he Se nate t o ratificati o n b y t he U nite d States 

of t hese a me n d me nts t o t he C hart er of t he U nite d Nati o ns.

y n d o n B. o h n s o n

e p a r t m e n t o f St a t e , 

Was hi n gt o n, Marc h 12,1965.

h e Pr e si d e n t

T he W hite H o use:

I ha ve t he h o n or t o tra n s mit t o y o u, wit h a vie w t o t heir s u b missi o n t o t he 

Se nate f or its a d vice a n d c o nse nt t o ratificati o n, t he te xts of a me n d me nts t o t he 

C harter of t he U nite d Nati o ns a d o pte d b y t he Ge neral Asse m bl y of t he U nite d 

Nati o ns o n Dece mber 17, 1963. A c o py of Ge neral Asse m bl y Res ol uti o n 1991 

( X VIII), w hic h c o ntai n s t he te xts of t he a me n d me nts, is e ncl osed. Res ol uti o n 

1991 ( X VI II) als o c o ntai ns cert ai n ot her pr o visi o ns o n w hic h c o m me nt is ma de 

bel o w.

T he a me n d me nts, were t he y t o c o me i nt o f orce, w o ul d e nlar ge t he size of t he 

Sec urit y C o u ncil a n d t he Ec o n o mic a n d S ocial C o u ncil, a n d w o ul d i ncrease t he 

maj orit y re q uire d f or a d o pti o n of Sec urit y C o u ncil decisi ons.

Article 23, w hic h n o w pr o vi des t hat t he Sec urit y C o u ncil s hall c o nsist of 11 

me m bers of t he U nite d Nati o ns, w o ul d he ncef ort h pr o vi de t hat it s hall c o nsist of 

15 me m bers, 10 of w hic h w o ul d be n o n per ma me nt me m bers electe d b y t he Ge neral 

Asse mbl y. Article 23 w o ul d f urt he r pr o vi de t hat, i n t he first electi o n of n o n ­

per ma ne nt me m bers aft er t he i ncrease i n t he C o u ncil’s me m bers hi p, t w o of t he 

a d diti o n al me m bers s hall be c h ose n f or a ter m of 1 year ( me m bers ot her wise bei n g 

electe d f or 2 y ear s). Article 27, w hic h n o w pr o vi des t h at decisi o ns of t he Sec urit y 

C o u ncil s hall be ma de b y a n affir mati ve v ote of se ve n me m bers, w o ul d he ncef ort h 

pr o vi de t hat decisi o ns of t he Sec urit y C o u ncil s hall be ma de b y a n affir mati ve 

v ote of ni ne me m bers.

Article 61, w hic h n o w pr o vi des t hat t he Ec o n o mic a n d S ocial C o u ncil s hall c o n ­

sist of 18 me m bers of t he U nite d Nati o ns, w o ul d he ncef ort h pr o vi de t hat it s hall 

c o nsist of 27 me m bers, all of w hic h w o ul d be electe d (as at prese nt) b y t he 

Ge neral Asse m bl y. Ni ne, rat he r t ha n si x, me m bers w o ul d be electe d a n n uall y 

f or a ter m of 3 years. At t he first electi o n, afte r t he i ncrease i n t he C o u ncil’s 

me m bers hi p, t hree of t h e a d diti o nal me m bers w o ul d be electe d f or a 1- year ter m, 

t hree f or a 2- year ter m, a n d t hree f or a 3- year ter m.

Res ol uti o n 1991 ( X VI II) f urt he r pr o vi des f or ge o gra p hic distri b uti o n of t he 

electi ve se ats o n t he C o u ncils. I n res pect of t he Sec urit y C o u ncil, t he res ol uti o n 

s pecifies t hat t he 10 n o n per ma ne nt me m bers s hall be electe d acc or di n g t o t he 

f oll o wi n g patte r n :

(a) Fi ve fr o m Africa n a n d Asia n states;

( &) O ne fr o m East er n E ur o pea n states;

(c) T w o fr o m Lati n A merica n states ;

( </) T w o fr o m Wester n E ur o pea n a n d ot her states.

I n res pect of t he Ec o n o mic a n d S ocial C o u ncil, t he res ol uti o n s pecifies t hat, wit h ­

o ut prej u dice t o t he prese nt distri b uti o n of seats i n t he Ec o n o mic a n d S ocial 

C o u ncil, t h e ni ne a d diti o nal me m bers s h all be electe d acc or di n g t o t he f oll o wi n g 

patte r n :

( а) Se ven fr o m Africa n a n d Asia n states ;

( б) O ne fr o m Lati n A merica n states;

(c) O ne fr o m Wester n E ur o pea n a n d ot her states.

T he prese nt distri b uti o n of seats i n t he Ec o no mic a n d S ocial C o u ncil i s :

(a) Fi ve fr o m Africa n a n d Asia n states ;

( ft) F o ur fr o m Lati n A merica n st at es ;

(c) T hree fr o m Easte r n E ur o pea n state s (i ncl u di n g t he U. S. S. R.) ;

( d) Fi ve fr o m Wester n E ur o pea n a n d ot her states (i ncl u di n g t he U nite d 

Ki n g d o m a n d Fra n ce) ;

(e) T he U nite d States.

T he patt er ns of ge o gra p hic distri b uti o n deci de d u p o n b y t h e Ge neral Asse m bl y 

i n Res ol uti o n 1991 ( X VI II) w o ul d n ot be i nc or p or ate d i n t he c ha rter as a me n d ­

me nts t o it. Rat her, t hese decisi o ns w o ul d ha ve t he f orce of a Ge neral Asse m bl y 

res ol uti o n, a n d, as s uc h, w o ul d g o ver n t he Ge neral Asse m bl y’s elect oral pr ocesses. 

I n vie w of t he i m p orta nce of c o nsi derati o ns of ge o gra p hical distri b uti o n t o t he 

me m bers hi p, a n d t he precisi o n wit h w hic h t h ose c o nsi derati o ns are treate d i n
6 UN ITED NA TIO NS CHAR TER AM EN DM EN TS

the resolution which adopts the amendments, it is anticipated tha t the General 

Assembly will be guided by the specified criteria in electing members of the Councils. By the terms of article 18, paragraph 2, of the charter, such elections require a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.

Resolution 1991 (XVIII) fur the r calls upon the member states to ratify the 

amendments, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, by 

September 1,1965.

Article 108 of the charter provides :

“Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of 

the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the 

members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations, 

including all the permanent Members of the Security Council.”

I recommend that you transmit the foregoing amendments to articles 23, 27, 

and 61 of the charter to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification for 

the following reasons:

1. The membership of the United Nations has more than doubled since the 

formation of the Organization, while the size of the Councils has remained static.

The proportional representation of the membership on the Security Council and 

the Economic and Social Council has accordingly decreased by more than 50 percent. The coming into force of the amendments would go fa r toward restoring 

the balance which existed between the Councils and the General Assembly when 

the cha rter came into force. It would enable the membership to be represented 

on the Councils in a measure approximating the increased membership of the 

United Nations.

2. Such increased representation should enhance the vitality of the Councils 

and the confidence which the membership as a whole places in them. It should 

obviate pressures for a geographical reallocation of seats within the Councils as 

presently composed.

3. The enlargement of the Councils provided for by the amendments is not so 

great as to make either Council unwieldy or unmanageable.

4. The proposed voting majority in the Councils is workable and equitable.

The Economic and Social Council would, as at present, take decisions by a 

majority of the members present and voting. The required Security Council 

majority would be increased from 7 to 9, an increase which is consonant with the 

increase in the Council’s membership to 15. The veto provision of article 27, 

paragraph 3, is unaffected by the amendments.

5. The pattern of geographical distribution provided for by Resolution 1991 

(XVIII) is equitable in the light of the composition of the membership of the 

United Nations and compatible with the national interests of the United States.

Resolution 1991A was adopted by a vote of 97 to 11, with 4 abstentions ; Resolution 1991B by a vote of 96 to 11. with 5 abstentions. In those votes, the U.S.S.R. 

and France voted negativ ely; China voted for part A of the resolution concerning the Security Council, and abstained in the vote on par t B, concerning the 

Economic and Social Council; and the United States and the United Kingdom 

abstained on the whole of the resolution. The United States abstained not because it doubted the desirability in principle of enlargement but because agreement on the size of the enlargement of the Councils was reached so late and so 

suddenly that adequate consideration and consultation were precluded. However, the most careful consideration has been given to the amendments since 

their adoption in the light of the established sympathy of the United States for *

an enlargement of the Councils and of the precise terms of the amendments in 

question. It is on the basis of this consideration that I recommended th at you 

transmit the amendments to th e Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

A list of the members of the United Nations which have ratified the amendments as of this date is attached. w

Respectfully submitted.

D ea n R u s k .

(Enclosures: (1) Copy of General Assembly Resolution 1991 (XVIII) ; (2) list 

of U.N. members who have ratified amendments; and (3) present texts of articles 

23, 27, and 61 of the Charter of the United Nations.)
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 7

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the Special Political Committee (A/5675)]

1991 (XVIII), Question of Equitable Representation on the Security

Council and the Economic and Social Council

A

The General Assembly,

Considering t hat the present composition of the Security Council is inequitable 

and unbalanced,

Recognising tha t the increase in the membership of the United Nations makes it necessary to enlarge the membership of the Security Council, thus providing for a more adequate geographical representation of non-permanent members and making it a more effective organ for carrying out its functions under the 

Charter of the United Nations, Bearing in mind the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter,1

1. Decides to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations the following amendments to the Charter and to submit them for ratification by the States Members of the United Nations: (a) In Article 23, paragraph 1, the word “eleven” in the first sentence shall be replaced by the word “fifteen”, and the word “six” in the thir d sentence by 

the word “ten” ; (b) In Article 23, pargaraph 2, the second sentence shall then be reworded as 

follows: “In the first election of the non-permanent members af ter the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four addi­ tional members shall be chosen for a term of one year.” ; (c) In Article 27, pargaraph 2, the word “seven” shall be replaced by the word 

“nine” ; (d) In Article 27, paragraph 3, the word “seven” shall be replaced by the 

word “nine” ;

2. Calls upon all Member States to ratify the above amendments in accord­ ance with their respective constitutional processes by 1 September 1965;

3. Further decides tha t the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following p attern: (a ) Five from African and Asian Sta tes ; (b) One from Eastern European States; (c) Two from Latin American S tat es; (d) Two from Western European and other States. 1285th plenary meeting,

17 December 1963.

B

The General Assembly,

Recognising tha t the increase in the membership of the United Nations makes it necessary to enlarge the membership of the Economic and Social Council, with a view to providing for a more adequate geographical representation therein, and making it a more effective organ for carrying out its function under Chapters IX and X of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolutions 974 B and C (XXXVI) of 

22 July 1963,

Bearing in mind the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on arrangements for a conference for the purpose of reviewing the Charter,2

1. Decides to adopt, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations, the following amendment to the Charter and to submit it for ratification by the Member States of the United Nations:

“Article 61

“1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of twenty-seven Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly. “2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, nine members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of thre e years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate reelection.

1 A /5 48 7, par a. 9.

2

 A /5 487 , par a. 9.
8 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

“3. At the first election a fter the increase in the membership of the Economic 

and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven members in addition to the 

members elected in place of the six members whose term of office expires at the 

end of that year, nine additional members shall be elected. Of these nine additional members, the term of office of three members so elected shall expire at 

the end of one year, and of three other members at the end of two years, in 

accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

“4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.”

2. Calls upon all Member States to ratif y the above amendment in accordance 

with their respective constitutional processes by 1 September 1965;

3. Further decides that, without prejudice to the present distribution of seats 

in th e Economic and Social Council, the nine additional members shall be elected 

according to the following pattern :

(a ) Seven from African and Asian Stat es;

(b) One from Latin American S tat es;

(c) One from Western European and other States.

1285th plenary meeting,

11 December 1963.

Charter Amendment Ratification

Afghanistan Hungary Nigeria

Albania Iceland Norway

Algeria India Outer Mongolia

Austria Iran Pakistan

Brazil Iraq Philippines

Bulgaria Ireland Poland

Cameroon Ivory Coast Rumania

Canada Jamaica Rwanda

Central African Republic Jorda n Sierra Leone

Ceylon Kenya Sweden

Chad Kuwait Syria

Costa Rica Liberia Tanzania

Cuba Libya Thailand

Czechoslovakia Madagascar Togo

Denmark Mali Trinidad-Tobago

El Salvador Mauritania Tunisia

Ethiopia Morocco Uganda

Finland Nepal U.S.S.R.

Gabon Netherlands United Arab Republic

Ghana New Zealand Upper Volta

Guinea Niger Yugoslavia

Present Texts of Articles 23, 27, and 61 of the Charterofthe United Nations

article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. 

The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States 

of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General 

Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent Members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the 

first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the 

Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a 

term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, however, three shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not 

be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 9

ARTICLE 2 7

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on pro ced ural ma tte rs shall be made by 

an affirmative vote of seven members. 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all oth er ma tters shall be made by a n affirmative vote of seven members inclu ding the concurring votes of the perm a­ nen t me mb ers ; provided tha t, in decisions und er Cha pter VI, and und er pa ragraph 3 of Artic le 52, a party to a dispute sh all a bst ain from voting.1

ART ICLE 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of eighteen Members of the 

United Nations elected by the General Assembly. 2. Subject to the provisions of parag rap h 3, six members of the Economic 

and Social Council shall be elected each y ear for a term of three years. A retiring

w member shall be eligible for immediate re-election. 3. At the first election, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council 

shall be chosen. The term of office of six members so chosen shall expire at the 

end of one year, and of six other members a t the end of two years, in accordance 

with arr ang ements made by the General Assembly.

V 4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

The Chairman. Our witness this morning is Mr. Dean Rusk, the 

Secretary of State Tomorrow, at the request of the administration?

the committee wil 1

 receive testimony on this subject from Mr. Adlai 

E. Stevenson, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, and Mr. 

Harlan Cleveland, the Assistant Secretary of Statp for Internationa l 

Organization Affairs.

Mr. Secretary, you have a prepared statement, I believe?

Secretary Rusk. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF hON . DEAN .RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary Rusk. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee, I am very glad to be accompanied this morning by Assistant Secretary of State Harla n Cleveland who is in charge of our work 

in the United Nations in tha t department and Assistant Secretary 

of State Douglas MacArthur on my right.

I am here today, Mr. Chairman, to urge this committee to recommend tha t the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of 

the two amendments to the charter of the United Nations which were 

transmitted to the Senate by the President on April 6.

* These are the first two proposed amendments to the charter which

the members have been asked to ratify—and this is enough by itself to 

endow the event with a note of considerable significance.

I, therefore, have no doubt you will want to consider this matter

„ against the background of the current state of affairs at the United

Nations. Ambassador Stevenson, as you have indicated, will be here 

tomorrow, to give you some firsthand impressions as seen from New 

York.

I assume, as well, t hat you will want to weigh this request within 

the general context of our foreign policy. I, therefore, thought it

1

 Cha pter VI contains Articles 33-38 relatin g to Pacific Settlem ent of Disp utes. Pa ra­ graph 3 of Article 52, relatin g to Regional Arrangements, reads : “3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settleme nt of local disputes thro ugh such regional arrangem ents or by such regional agencies eit he r on the initiative of the sta tes concerned or by reference from th e Security Council.”
10 U N IT ED NATIO NS CHARTE R AM EN DM ENTS

would be appropriate for me to begin these hearings with a few comments on how the United Nations and its future development fits into 

our national objective of helping to create a more reasonable world 

order. With your permission, I shall address myself to this point 

in something of a summary fashion.

Mr. Chairman, as you well know, the first function of the United 

Nations is to help keep the peace and to help restore the peace if it 

should be breached.

Fifte en years of United Nations experience with peacekeeping problems have shown that the United Nations has been useful in minimizing the dangers of a g reat power collision, in smothering brushfire conflicts, and in supervising truces while negotiated settlements 

are being worked out.

U .N . PE AC EK EE PING MISSIONS

Experience over the past decade and a half also demonstrates how 

diverse the requirements for peacekeeping machinery turn out to be 

in practice. Peacekeeping missions have been performed—

By a handful of observers to report on compliance with ceasefires in Indonesia and Kash mir;

By a small band of military observers to supervise the truce on 

the Arab-Israel armistice lines;

By an observer corps to help expose and prevent illegal infiltration in Greece and Leb anon ;

By a security reserve for the United Nations temporary administration of West New Guinea;

By an emergency 5,000-man buffer force in Gaza and Suez;

By more than 20,000 troops from 28 countries to protect the 

territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo;

By a 7,000-man force to restore order and keep the peace in 

Cyprus; and

By a unified combat command from 16 nations under U.S. 

leadership in Korea.

There can be no doubt tha t in perform ing these peacekeeping tasks 

the United Nations has served the vital interests of the United States— 

for we have no greater national interest th an in preventing armed conflict and seeing to it tha t the great tides of change are kept within 

peaceful channels.

Expansion of available callup forces and improvement in procedures 

for financing and managing versatile peacekeeping machinery in the 

service of the United Nations would manifestly serve our interests in 

the future.

U .N . ECO NOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS

Our national interests are similarly and deeply engaged in the economic and social programs of the United Nations agencies. These are 

directed at things that make the peace worth keeping—and therefore 

can be thought of as preventive peacekeeping.

In point of fact, the peace and security matters which so preempt 

our time and thoughts and energies are but a small fraction of the 

United Nations work. Almost 17 of every 20 United Nations employees and nearly ninety-three cents of every United Nations dollar 

are engaged in economic, social, and technical enterprises.
U N IT E D NATI ONS CHARTE R AM EN D M EN TS 11

We have a direct national interest in the success of the United Na­ tions work with communicable diseases, with milk and malnutrition, with illiteracy and education, with overpopulation and underproduc­ tion, with the mechanics of trade and development. All the agencies of the United Nations family are dealing with one or another aspect of human security—the kind that comes from safety standards for the operation of steamships, aircraft, and atomic re­ actors ; or the kind of security tha t is reinforced by decent standards 

of nutrition and education. There is n either need nor time to delve more deeply into these in­ teresting and useful functions, except to say tha t these activities go on unabated because they are needed—and undebated because almost everyone knows they are needed. And I doubt if any thou ghtful person would quarrel with the conclusion that the economic, social, and technical services of the United Nations also serve our own national 

interests. We believe this will be so in the future as it has been in the past.

LIM ITATIO NS ON U .N . CAPACITY TO ACT

Nor is it necessary to deal at any length before this committee with the limitations which the U nited Nations has demonstrated in action. So, I shall confine myself to brief comments on four general but central points on this score. First, the scope of international organization, at this stage in his­ tory is limited by the stubborn persistence of a strong spirit of natio nalism—and not onlv in the newly independent areas. Most of the; peoples of this world appear to be ready to share their traditional sovereignty in cooperative enterprise only when the task at hand can­ not be done at all on a national basis or when the technical advantages of international cooperation are overwhelmingly clear. The political tradition s centering around the conception of unre ­

stricted national sovereignty place a strict and not altogether un­ desirable governor on the art of institution building in the inte rnational community. Second, the job of keeping the peace of the world turn s out, in practice, to be beyond the capacities of any one nation or any one institution. Any workable system of world order for the foreseeable future will be a pluralistic system in which the United Nations, regional organizations, bilateral diplomacy, and national defense forces play the ir several and sometimes mutually reinforcing parts. The problem is to avoid the use of the most dangerous and costly form of power—which is national armed force—whenever it is possi­ ble to persuade others to share the tasks and responsibility of peace 

keeping. Third, while the United Nations has been conspicuously successful in damping down conflicts tha t might easily have spread to world war, it has been less successful in resolving the underlying disputes. This suggests, not so surprisingly, tha t even a very efficient police force is not enough—that perhaps the United Nations should somehow move in the direction of a more systematic, sustained effort to sponsor conciliation of the political disputes that underlie tests of armed 

strength.
12 UN ITED NA TIO NS CHARTER AM EN DM EN TS

It would not be difficult to devise an agenda of, say, territorial 

disputes which have festered too long for safety.

Fou rth, we live in times of such pervasive change—such deep transformation—that any viable international institution has to be endowed with inherent flexibility to adapt to changing needs and conditions. In fact, the United Nations has shown just such a capacity. 

But if it is going to prosper in the years ahead, it must never be 

caught for long in a procedural or constitutional stra it jacket.

We are involved in just such a problem today.

These are, indeed, substantial limitations on the capacity of the 

United Nations to live up to the great vision of the charter.

But despite nationalism, the international community must continue 

to grow as science and technology continue to internationalize human 

affairs—and the United Nations is the principal foundation of world 

community.

Despite the need for pluralistic peacekeeping systems, the United 

Nations is an important—and perhaps indispensable—alternative for 

peacekeeping services in a security crisis.

Despite the fact that the United Nations has been better at damping down fires than in removing the sources of dispute, where else 

should we turn for more effective techniques of international conciliation ?

And despite the fact tha t adjustments are needed to take account 

of changing conditions over the past decade, the organization has 

proved remarkably flexible in the past and there is no inherent reason 

why it should not be in the future.

CO M M EN TS ON PROP OS ED AM ENDM ENTS

This brings me to the two charter amendments now being proposed—for they are concerned with one of the essential adaptations 

which the United Nations must make to meet changed conditions.

Whatever else has to be done—and whatever may be said about the 

complexity of the larger political environment—the justification for 

these amendments is simple and overwhelming: the membership of 

the United Nations has more than doubled while representation on its 

two major Councils has remained fixed in the pattern of 1945.

To redress this patent case of obsolete apportionment, the first of 

these amendments would enlarge the membership of the Security 

Council from 11 countries to 15 and raise the requisite majority from 

7 to 9 members. The other amendment would increase the size of 

the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 members.

The amendments were adopted by an overwhelming majority of the 

United Nations General Assembly in 1963 and require ratification by 

two-thirds of the membership, including all the permanent members, 

before entering into effect. Approval by the United States therefore 

is essential to give effect to the proposed amendments.

The General Assembly resolution requested all members to act by 

September of this year. Sixty-five of the required 76 members have 

already ratified, including the Soviet Union, which initially voted 

against these amendments. Another permanent member, the United 

Kingdom, has announced its intention to ratify.
UN ITED NATIO NS CH AR TER AM EN DM EN TS 13

Neither amendment would affect this country’s membership on these 

two Councils or alter our veto rights in the Security Council as established by the charter.

ADVANTAGES OE AMENDMEN TS

Mr. Chairman, the advantages of these amendments are quite clear and straightforw ard and the argument for them stands on its own 

feet. First, they would modernize the current obsolete apportionment of seats on the two Councils in line with the present membership. Second, they would add to the prestige of the Councils and to the confidence of the membership at large that they are fairly represented in these principal organs which are charged with serving the interests 

of all members. Third, they would alleviate the present severe pressures on the orig­ inal allocation of seats which has led to bickering and to such unsatis­ factory practices as split terms on the Security Council. Fou rth, the proposed distribution of seats in the enlarged Councils, which is included in the Assembly resolution, should help minimize contentious rivalries for seats on the Councils and help to assure that a greater number of countries over the years will have opportunity to 

participate in the affairs of the Councils. The proposed enlargements are reasonable and equitable without 

expanding the Councils to unwieldy sizes. The proposed voting majorities are fair and workable—and in our judgment would not materially change the voting alinement from the 

present situation. These, it seems to me, are persuasive arguments for U.S. ratification 

of the charter amendments. But let me also say, in a more general vein, that the United States welcomes the entrance of the new members into the open society of the 

United Nations. They have gained their full independence in the greatest sweep of 

national liberation in all history. They have knocked on the door of the world community and have been invited in to speak their pieces and make their contributions and take on whatever share of responsibility they are able and willing to 

shoulder. And our world is a better and a more democratic world because they have taken their righ tful places in the councils of our times. I am sure this committee agrees with me when I say that this is the last nation on the face of the earth to shun diversity, or to re­ ject the open forum, or to fear the growth of democratic practices. Expansion of the two Councils of the United Nations to take account of this welcome expansion of the United Nations is not only within the strict national interests of this country but is consistent 

with our longer range purposes. I have no reservations, Air. Chairman, in urging the committee to recommend the consent of the Senate to ratification of the first two amendments to be proposed to the Charter of the United Nations.

Thank you very much, Air. Chairman.

47-378—65----- 2
14 U N IT E D NA TI O NS CHA RTER AM EN DM ENTS

SO VI ET AND F R E N C H PO SIT IO N S ON AM EN DM EN TS

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

You said the Soviet Union had ratified these amendments.

Wh at about the French, have they ratified them ?

Secretary Rusk. We have not had a final and official view of the 

French Government expressed on this, Mr. Chairman, but we feel 

that in the case of F ranc e and China th at it would be very likely tha t 

they would join with the rest of the membership in ratification.

The Chairman. Which nations initiated this move to enlarge the 

membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social 

Council ?

Secretary Rusk. The principal impetus came from, of course, the 

Afro-Asian group which has felt for some time that they were badly 

underrepresented on the Security Council and Economic Council, and 

that the original distribution of seats did not take into account the 

interests of the new members, but it was also supported by those who 

benefited from that original distribution because they had found tha t 

the desire of the some 50 new members to get adequate representation 

put enormous pressure on the seats which they looked upon as their 

seats under the original distribution. So I would say, Mr. Chairman, that there was very broad interest in 

this throughout the Assembly.

PO SSIB IL IT Y OF FU TU R E A D JU STM EN T S

The Chairman. Do you anticipate tha t, for the foreseeable future, 

any further adjustm ents will be necessary because of increased size 

in the membership of the United Nations?

Secretary Rusk. This particu lar amendment comes about through 

the more than doubling of the United Nations since 1945. Now, we 

anticipate there will be some more additional members in the U.N.

The Chairman. How many more ?

Secretary Rusk. I should think perhaps a t least 10 or 12 along the 

way, th at kind of thing. T am a little hesitant about giving figures 

on tha t because when the United Nations instructed the architect to 

design the plans for the present headquarters of the United Nations, 

he was instructed to prepare the building for 60 members with the 

possibility of expansion to 75. We now have 114 members in the latest 

count of the members of the U.N. But I would not suppose, Mr. 

Chairman, that there is much likelihood of a sufficient increase in 

members to require the early reconsideration of the distribution of 

seats in these two Councils.

The Chairman. I note you say the Soviet Union voted against this 

originally when it was proposed and then ratified it.

Wha t happened, do you know ?

Secretary Rusk. We have not had an explanation from them on 

this point. I think tha t undoubtedly this was related to their view 

of the Afro-Asian group. You will remember, Mr. Chairman, tha t 

they have taken a position for some time th at there could be no charter 

amendment until the question of China was disposed of. but in this particular case they apparently decided to go ahead with this pa rticular amendment without insisting upon tha t point.
UN ITE D NA TIO NS CH AR TER AM EN DM EN TS 15

I might ad d th at we ourselv es at the tim e this was v ote d upon absta ined an d one of th e pr incipa l reasons fo r ou r abste nti on was th at 

there ha d no t been op po rtu nity fo r full consultation with the Senate 

at the tim e th e vote was cast.

Th e Chairman. We ll, th at is unusual deference to th e Sen ate. I 

never hea rd of t ha t before.

Se cretary R usk. I th ou gh t th e committee wou ld ap preciat e th at .

Th e Chairm an. I t is new s to me. I don’t kno w of any othe r in ­

stance fo r tha t. Where is the precedence for th at ?

Se na tor Aiken, do you have any que stions ?

ATT IT UDE ON AR TI CL E 19 IS SU E

Se na tor Aik en . Ju st one o r two.

Mr. Secre tar y, I don’t see any pa rtic ul ar ris k in a pp roving these tw o 

amend ments bu t I am ju st wo ndering, Ar e you intend ing to ins ist on 

a decisive vote on the enforc em ent of article 19 ?

Se cre tar y Rusk. Tha t m atter, Senator , as you know, led the Ge neral Ass emb ly into an imp asse at its las t session and it is now being 

discussed in a com mittee of 33 wh ich is mee ting reg ularly in New Yo rk, 

meetin g t his week, fo r e xam ple, an d the re are also quiet c onv ersatio ns 

going on on th at subje ct behind the scenes.

Am bassador Stevenson will be here tom orrow and I would hop e 

th at he would have a chance to go over the disc ussions on th at with 

the committee in executive session.

Bu t ou r attit ud e on the ar ticl e 19 questio n has been sta ted and 

affirmed. We do not yet see a com plete solution t o th at pro ble m but 

it is the subject of quiet discussion in New Y ork.

Se na tor Aik en . I t hi nk the re is a solu tion to it, prob ably only one.

QUES TI ON OF PE A C E K E E PIN G M IS SIO N I N V IE T N A M

I notice th at you set fo rth eigh t instances in wh ich pea cekeep ing 

missions hav e been perfo rm ed. W hy h as it n ot been possible fo r the 

Un ite d Nations to hav e a pea cek eep ing mission in Vietn am , fo r in ­

stance? There are at lea st eigh t oth er places where these have been 

perfo rm ed, why hav en’t they been able to do it in Vietn am ?

Se cretary Rusk. I th in k th ere hav e been sev eral reason s fo r th at , 

sir. Th e Vietnam ese que stio n ha s been before the Se cu rity Cou ncil 

fro m time to time. The lat est instan ce was a t th e tim e of the G ulf of 

To nk in a ffair. A t the time of t he G ulf o f To nk in a ffa ir when we p ut 

this m at ter b efore the S ecuri ty Council, you will rec all th at the Sov iet 

rep resentati ve recommended th at the rep resentati ve of Ha no i be in ­

vit ed to the Coun cil. We supp orted th at rec ommenda tion . Ha no i 

tu rn ed dow n the inv itatio n. Bo th Ha no i and Pe ip in g have made it 

cle ar in th eir pub lic sta tem ents in recent weeks an d mo nth s t hat the y 

do not con sider th at the U nited Na tions h as any role to p lay in South 

Vietn am . They have not welcomed the possibi lity of a visit by the 

Se cretary G ene ral, fo r examp le.

Now, t he y are v ery c ruc ial ly involve d in th is s itu ation and it is not 

cle ar to see how the United Na tio ns mi gh t move in resp ect to it if 

two of the pr incipa l pa rti es involved there rej ect the idea.
16 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

If we went into the Security Council there would be a veto, almost 

certainly, on the situation if an attempt were made to pass a resolution 

to take specific decisions about it.

There are two other aspects of it, however, Senator, tha t remain 

open. The Secretary General has considerable authority and responsibility under article 99. He is following this situation very carefully 

and has made it clear to all parties tha t he is prepared to be of any 

help that he can be in his role of Secretary General. It is entirely 

possible, although one cannot anticipate the futu re development of 

this point, it is entirely possible tha t if the matter moves toward a 

settlement the United Nations might be able to play something of a 

peacekeeping and peacewatching role as it has done in other situations 

and other places.

So, we have neith er excluded the United Nations nor expected it 

to take definitive action until there begins to be some indication that 

the matter can move toward a settlement.

Senator Aike n. In other words, the United Nations could not move 

effectively in any country th at was not a member of the United Nations 

if there were objection ?

Secretary Rusk. If there were objection.

Senator Aiken. Yes.

Secretary Rusk. And even only where there are members involved 

if there were strong objections.

You see, sir, I thin k the Korean war was something of a special 

case because, as you will recall, at the crucial vote there the Soviet 

Union was not present in the Security Council.

I think it is rather unlikely that the United Nations will inject 

itself into a situation where major lighting is involved. They have 

a somewhat different role to play.

Now, at the present time there is large-scale fighting, and it is 

unlikely that an international police force could do anything about 

tha t until there is agreement among all the parties and tha t means a 

first big step would have been taken toward peace.

Senator Aiken. That is right.

The United Nation’s potential could not come into play until there 

had been negotiations between the warring parties.

Secretary Rusk. I think tha t is correct.

Senator Aiken. I think there is no argument about that.

Q U ESTIO N OF PE ACE FORC E IN PA N A M A

Just one other thing, getting back to article 19 and its complications, 

would you, as a representative of the United States, be willing to 

pay 30 percent of the costs of a General Assembly peace force in the 

event that the General Assembly is willing to maintain one between 

the Canal Zone and Panam a 'i

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, that is a question which is shared 

both by you gentlemen up there and by me.

Senator Aiken. It is a good question, it is a very important question.

Secretary Rusk. That question is one of such difficulty that it will 

be my purpose to do everything we can to avoid tha t contingency 

arising and I think it is unlikely that we will be in that contingency 

for a long time to come.
UNITE D NA TIO NS CHARTER AM EN DM EN TS 17

But nevertheless, I would say quite sincerely, Senator, tha t is a 

question on which there is some identity of interest between ourselves 

and the Soviet Union, and the other permanent members of the Security Council.

Senator Aiken. Yes.

Secretary Rusk. We don’t underestimate the importance of tha t 

question, and particularly in the case of the Congo, I think it is worth 

bearing in mind tha t of the five resolutions on the Congo that proved 

to be the important resolutions, the Soviet Union voted for three of 

those resolutions, vetoed the fourth, and abstained on the fifth one, so 

we did not have the early registration there of the deep resistance of 

one of the permanent members.

We would like to see this matter discussed in some detail to see 

whether some understandings cannot be reached about how this question is handled in the future, perhaps to emphasize the importance of 

the role of the Security Council on the one side, and the gravity of an 

eventual decision by the General Assembly if it should move contrary 

to the strong objections of a permanent member of the Security 

Council.

Senator Aiken. Well, then, any future potential of the United N ations as a peacekeeping agency is pretty much dependent on reaching 

an agreement as to article 19 ?

Secretary Rusk. I think so, sir, as well as on the articles of the 

charter having to do with the character of the responsibility of the 

Security Council.

The charter at the present time uses the expression “primary responsibility” ; the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining the peace.

We feel that the General Assembly has a residual role to play if the 

Security Council is unable to act. I think it is fai r to say tha t the 

Soviet Union rather takes the view that the Security Council has the 

sole responsibility, and they have been pressing in tha t direction because there they would cast, of course, a decisive influence through the 

veto.

Senator Aiken. Yes.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Clark (presiding). Senator Carlson?

ARTICLE 19 ISSU E AN D EFFECTIVE NESS OF TH E U .N .

Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, just following along the same 

thought as the Senator from Vermont, can there really be any hope 

of substantial peacekeeping help in the United Nations unless we 

somehow solve the article 19 issue?

Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, tha t the problem on article 19 forces 

a clarification of the issues involved in peacekeeping and in the 

financing of peacekeeping. I think that breaks up into two imp ortant 

stages: One, what do we do about the situation up to this point and 

the present financial plig ht of the United Nations; second, whether we 

can work out an understanding on the matter of authority and on the 

matter of financing with respect to the future, which would represent 

a stronger consensus within the United Nations about how these m atters could be handled.
18 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

We feel, for example, that we ought to take into account the fact 

that 5 percent of the contributions to the United Nations can exercise 

two-thirds of the vote in the General Assembly.

Now, the principal contributors, as I say the 25 or 30 principal contributors, do in fact carry the major financial responsibility for the 

decisions of the U.N., and we have felt that some way ought to be 

found to see that the ir views are taken most seriously into account by 

the Assembly when the Assembly makes decisions in this field. But I 

do thin k tha t it is imp orta nt for everyone to understand just how 

we do proceed: tha t we not have double standards, tha t we not have 

assessments t hat are compulsory for some and voluntary for others; 

and tha t when votes are cast for operations tha t involve costs, tha t 

those who cast votes for them recognize that they have to be paid 

for and that they do involve the responsibilities and burdens of costs. »,

But these are matters which Mr. Stevenson is working on very hard 

day by day in New York. Tomorrow he will be with the committee—

I would hope pa rt of the time in executive session—to bring you up to

date on how those discussions are proceeding. W

Senator Carlson. I appreciate very much, Mr. Secretary, th at Ambassador Stevenson will be here tomorrow, and this is no time to get 

into all of the problems of the United Nations. But afte r all Congress 

is going to act upon these amendments—and personally I have no objection to them—and the question confronting me is the futu re 

effectiveness of the United Nations with or without these amendments.

Secretary Rusk. Eight.

Senator Carlson. And i t concerns me greatly. Tomorrow I assume 

we will discuss the percentage we contribute to the United Nations, as 

well as the number of nations tha t are not paying their share, and I 

shall not burden you with those questions. But I think it is important 

for this committee and the Congress to have a full picture of the future 

of the United Nations which we all hope will, as you say in your opening statement, help to create a more reasonable world order.

We are all for that.

But when you look around at Vietnam, at India and Pakistan, and 

Yemen, and one little problem tha t I noticed we had up at the United 

Nations in a dispute between Israel and Jordan , and now we have a 

little problem down in the Dominican Republic, we sometimes get 

concerned tha t we have a very great, but ineffective, agency and it 

bothers some of us. We would like to be of help.

Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Senator. I would like to emphasize 

that the very turbulence of this world scene to which you referred, <

does emphasize the importance of an institution which can apply some

poultices to the fevers.

If you look back over the agenda of the Security Council since 1945,

I th ink you can see there a record of a very important role played by 

the Security Council in talk ing things out, in holding things in some 

sort of manageable proportions while the processes of peace or of 

time take effect, to prevent some of these conflicts from growing into 

larg er conflicts.

Senator Carlson. Personally, I am one who feels we must have 

some organization where nations can gather and discuss their problems, 

and I would hope we can have one where we can reach some solutions
UNIT ED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 19

to them rather than just a debating society or a meeting of a board of 

governors or something without effectiveness.

I thank you very much.

Secretary Rusk. Thank you.

Senator Clark. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in connection with this proposed increase in the 

members of the Security Council, and as I understand it in the Economic and Social Council, greater emphasis is apparently given to 

the Communist bloc countries and to Asia and a reduced emphasis 

comparatively, at least, to Latin America.

Ho you think tha t will have a material effect upon the decisions and 

activities of these two bodies ?

Secretary Rusk. I don’t think so, Senator.

As you know, the change in the Security Council would move the 

majority from seven to nine. We believe that we can expect the additional members of the Afro-Asian nonpermanent membership of five

< at any given time to be a well-distributed membership in general orientation and attitude. It is our judgment, based upon an examination of 

past voting trends, as well as the attitudes of the Afro-Asian countries 

on major issues before the U.N., tha t tha t would not change the relative 

political weighting of the Security Council as compared with the 

present.

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, at least superficially it would seem 

to me that it would substantially change the weighted voting or the 

actual voting on determining issues.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think I m ight comment a little fu rth er 

on that point because it is a point of some importance. Of course, we 

could expect if the membership of the Security Council is not changed, 

tha t the Afro-Asian group would move in rapidly on the existing distribution of seats.

In other words, Africa and Asia membership in the United Nations 

has increased by 5 times from 12 to 60 between 1945 and 1965, and they 

will simply not accept the so-called gentlemen’s agreement distribution 

of 20 years ago.

Now, we believe tha t on some of the key issues between the free 

world and the Communist world, for example, th at as long as we have 

the West Europeans and the Latin Americans with us on a Council 

issue, thinking of it solely from a U.S. point of view, we would need 

only one African-Asian vote in order to make up the majority of nine

- required for the Security Council to take action. No Asian-African

vote will be needed to prevent the Council from tak ing action, tha t is 

to reach the “blocking” number, if we have the West Europeans and 

at least one Latin American with us.

In other words, we don’t believe that the voting pattern in the Security Council moves adversely to our interests by this enlargement 

procedure.

I think tha t it is becoming more clear in recent weeks even than it 

was before, that in a real sense there is no such thing as an AfricanAsian bloc except perhaps on strictly colonial issues, because there is 

great diversity. This was brought out even in the recent celebration
20 UN ITED NA TIO NS CHAR TER AM EN DM EN TS

of the 10th anniversary of Bandung in Jakart a. It was brought out in such meetings as the recent meetings of the Organization of African Unity in Nairobi. We think that, if anything, there will be less bloc voting among the so-called Africans and Asians than most people gen­ erally suppose. It is not our judgment tha t this expansion changes the political situation with respect to the Security Council. But, in any event, if there is a political problem we would have it with in­ creasing insistence even if we did not make these changes because the new members would move in on the seats of those who obtained seats under the original allocation. I would have to say, sir, that the two Latin American seats would be the subject of very great pressure. The Afro-Asians would be inclined to press very hard for one of those seats because the Latin American membership in the U.N. has moved from 20 to 22 while the Afro-Asians membership has moved from 12 

to CO.

Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I have no position of opposition to 

this proposal. I am still concerned with it as to what the overall re­ sults will be, especially in the Economic and Social Council, where so much of the money for its operations comes from the United States. Of course, that same thing applies to the United Nations generally, but I do have a concern as to the net result of this. I tend to agree that we have got to do something along this line in order to sustain a little more equality of voting and representation, and I can under­ stand the restlessness of some of these countries in this field. I don’t think I have any other questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Clark. Than k you, sir; Senator Case?

Senator Case. I have no questions.

Senator Clark. Gentlemen, I am aware of the 10-minute rule. I have some questioning of the Secretary which might take as much as half an hour or 45 minutes. I hope if any of you gentlemen desire to break in you will exercise your seniority privileges and do so. Mr. Secretary, I would like to state for myself that I don’t have any doubt at all about the desirability of these amendments to the charter, and I shall certainly support them both in committee and on the floor. I do, however, share Senator Carlson’s view that it is about time—and I think the Secretary has indicated to me informally tha t he shares it, too—that we have a good serious discussion in the Senate about the United Nations, where it is going, what its limitations 

are, and what its possibilities are. With respect to the matter immediately under consideration which has to do really with United Nations procedures and charter amend­ ments, I would like, with my colleagues permission, to enter into the record what I consider to be an extremely able address by Secretary Cleveland’s assistant, Air. Richard N. Gardn er, “United Nations Pro ­ cedures and Power Realities: The Inte rnation al Apportionment 

Problem.” I think, Mr. Secretary, you were present when he gave that address.

Secretary Rusk. Yes.

Senator Clark. And I believe you gave it your implicit blessing.

Secretary Rusk. Very able statement.

Senator Clark. So I will ask it be made a part of the record.
UN IT ED NATIO NS CH ART ER A M EN DM ENTS 21

(The address referred to follows:)

United Nations Procedures and Power Rea li ti es : The I nternational

Apportionment Problem

(Ad dress by Richard N. G ardn er, Deputy Ass ista nt Sec reta ry of Sta te for In ­

ter natio nal Organization Affairs, at the annua l banque t of the A meric an Society 

of I nte rna tio nal Law, Washingto n, D.C., Apr. 23,19 65.)

I have always looked f orw ard t o ann ual meetings of this society with anticipa ­

tion —but never more so tha n this year . One reaso n, of course, is the very gre at 

hon or of par ticipating in thi s evening’s program toge ther with the Secretary of 

State. The other reason is t he pa rtic ula rly timely and i mporta nt theme to which 

you are devoting th ese a nnu al meetings—“The Development o f I nte rnati on al Law 

by Inte rna tional Or ganizatio ns.”

Some people, to be sure, may hav e reservations abou t the decision to devot e 

all of your meetings this y ear to this p art icu lar su bj ec t:

On one side, th ere are those who may feel tha t the problems of in ter na tio na l 

orga nizations are not sufficiently legal to sus tain the intere st of pra cticin g 

lawy ers and law te ache rs.

On the other side, the re ar e those who may feel th at law and law yer s 

already have too much to do w ith foreign policy, in the field of int ern ati on al 

orga nizations and elsewhe re, and that this prog ram of yours is hardl y designed to keep them in t heir place.

Those who hold this la tte r view would probably agree with the judgm ent of 

Sir Harold Nicolson, the famous Br itis h wr iter on diplomacy, th at “the wo rst 

kind of diplo matists are m issio naries, fana tics, and lawy ers.”

For tunatel y, Sir Harold Nicolso n’s view on thi s subje ct has not prevail ed in 

the United States. Since 1789, 45 out of 52 of o ur Sec reta ries of State hav e been 

members of the bar. One mem ber of th at small band of seven who have n ot been 

lawy ers—the Secretary of Sta te we h onor here ton igh t—does not conceal the f ac t 

th at he was study ing law when the wa r interv ened. It cut off what undo ubtedly 

would have been a bri lliant caree r a t the bar—an d it no doubt made him Secretar y of S tate several y ears sooner.

My views on this subje ct are undou btedl y self-serving. I am a gre at belie ver 

in the deep involvement of law yer s in foreign policy, par ticula rly in the field 

of intern atio nal organ izatio n. Those laymen who complain about the law yer ’s 

role in this are a tend to thi nk of law as the mecha nical application of prin cipl es 

found in cases and textboo ks. Few lawye rs toda y would accept so res tricti ve a 

definition of the ir funct ion. Most of us like to thi nk of our selves as pra ctic ing 

wh at a colleague on the Ha rv ard law fac ulty has describ ed as “Eunom ics—th e 

science of good arrangem ents .”

It is not surprising th at in t he Dep artm ent of Sta te today the re are many more 

lawyers outsid e than inside the Legal Adviser’s Office. Several, like myself, ar e 

in the Bureau of Int ern ati on al Organization Affairs, tryi ng to apply “the science 

of good arra nge ments” to the ma jor task s of peacekeeping and nation bui ldin g 

which our cou ntry is un der tak ing on a mu ltil ate ral basis.

Toge ther with our colleagues in the Office of the Legal Adviser, we hav e been 

apply ing the lawyer’s skills in problem solving to some of the exci ting en ter ­

pris es underta ken dur ing t he K enned y and Johnson adm inis trat ion s—to developing the ins titu tional components for par tia l and general disarm am en t; to negotia tin g ground rules for U.N. peacekeeping fo rces; to draft ing principle s for the 

peace ful uses of outer space; to establish ing inte rim arra nge ments for globa l 

sat ellite com mun icati ons; to ina ugura ting a United Nations-Food and Agri cultu re Organization world food prog ram ; to c reating a world w eath er wat ch und er 

the World Meteorological Organization ; to laun chin g new United Nations tra de 

mac hin ery; and to ana lys is of the possible func tions of a Unite d Nat ions High 

Commissioner for Hum an Righ ts.

I

Of all our preoc cupa tions the se las t 4 years in the field of inter natio nal organi zati on the one w hich best ill us tra tes the relev ance of law and legal skil ls has 

been our effort to adapt the d ecisionmaking proced ures of the United Nati ons and 

its family of agencie s to tak e ade qua te accou nt of world power realitie s.
22 UN ITED NA TIO NS CH AR TER AM EN DM EN TS

The Secretary of State himself called special attentio n to this problem in his Ham marskjo ld lecture at Columbia University on Ja nu ary 10, 1964. He pointed out th at a two-thirds vote could now be put toge ther in the General Assembly, at lea st in theory, by members representing only 10 percent of the popu lation of U.N. members and 5 perc ent of contributio ns to the reg ula r budget. He noted th at the rapid a nd rad ica l expa nsion of the Orga niza tion may require some adap­ tat ion of procedures if the U.N. is to rem ain releva nt to the re al world and th erefore effective in th at world. The reason for our preoccup ation with thi s subject is obvious. The United Nation s has grown from 51 to 114 members in the las t 20 years. A p ara llel in­ crease has taken place in the membership of the specialized and affiliated agen­ cies. U.N. membership may reach a total of 125 to 130 before it finally levels off. What makes this ex tra ordina ry increa se in membership particu larly significant from a constitutional point of view is the simultaneous increase in the U.N.’s cap acity to act. The United Sta tes has played a lead ing role in the streng then­ ing of the action resp onsibilities of th e U nited N ations system in both peacekeep­ ing and development. We wan t to continue to play this role in the years ahead. It is obvious that, as the U.N. develops an increasing capacity to act, there will be increasing concern wi th the procedures by which th is capacity is exercised. The manife st disproportion between votin g power and rea l power is now a cen­ tr al preoccupation of persons concerned with the fu ture of the world organiz a­ tion. Unless we can find way s to allay the anx ieti es felt on this subject in the United States and in oth er countries, it will be increasingly difficult to use the U.N in the y ears ahead for important tas ks of peacekeeping and development. To be sure, it it important not to overstate the problem which is inherent in the present constitutio nal situ atio n. As Dag Hammarsk jold reminded us some years ago in an annual rep ort to the General Assembly, the members of the United Nations may have equal votes, but they are fa r from having equal influence : “The criticism of ‘one nation, one vote,’ irrespectiv e of size or strength, as con stituting an obstacle to arr iving at ju st and representative solutions, tends to exaggerate the problem. The General Assembly is not a parliam ent of elected individua l mem bers; it is a diplomatic meeting in which the delegates of mem­ ber sta tes represent governm enta l policies, and these policies are subject to all the influences th at would prevail in inter natio nal lif e in any case.” Anyone who believes th at U.S. influence in the United Nations is measured by the fac t that it has less than one-hundredth of the votes in the General Assembly fails completely to understand the rea lities of power as they are reflected in the world organization. These reali tie s include the fac t th at the United States is the principal con trib uto r to the U.N.’s reg ular budget, is by fa r the larg est supporter of the U.N.’s peacekeeping and development programs, and is making by fa r the lar gest individual contributio n to the defense and development of th e non-Communist world. On U.N. decisions of vital importance to the United State s, the voting of oth er cou ntries has been considerably influenced by U.S. views. Nevertheless, after these and other qualifications are made, it remains tru e th at the present procedures do need to be improved in the light both of the growth of U.N. membership and the grow th of U.N. responsibilities. The last UNESCO Conference, for example, voted a budget by a larg e majority of votes which repre sente d less than 30 percent of the funds th at had to be raised to make the budget a reality . And at the United Nation s Conference on Tra de and Development in Geneva last spring the re was a disturbin g tendency of the 75 (now 77) less developed cou ntries to use th eir automatic two-thirds majority to vote recomm endations for action in t rade and development over the opposition of the very minority of developed countries to whom the recommendations were 

addressed. On the whole, the ma jor ity of small countries have not behaved as irrespon­ sibly as the pessimists have predicted. We hope in the years ahead th at the “revolution of rising exp ectations” will be matched by an “evolution of rising responsibility.” But we can not base our par ticipation in the U.N. on hope alone. Sound p rocedural adapta tions can help make th is hope a reality. The constitutio nal problem here involved is not unique to the U.N. We have sometimes referre d to these difficulties in the U.N. as the “internationa l appor­ tionmen t problem”—because the word apportionm ent has a very p oignant mea n­ ing in our domestic political life through the recent actions of our Suprem e 

Court and S tate legislatures.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 23

Indeed, we are dealing here with problems in the management of power rem ­

iniscent of those which confronted our own Constitutional Convention in 

Philadelphia nearly 200 years ago. In Philade lphia then, as in the United 

Nations system today, the problem was how to reconcile the sovereign equ alit y 

of Sta tes with the fac t th at some States are very small and other Sta tes ar e 

very large. The sovereign equality of sta tes is one of the fundam ental principles of in ternational law. In the words of a famous case decided many years ago by the 

U.S. Supreme Court: “Russia and Geneva have equal rights .” Article 2, pa ra ­

grap h 1 of the United Nations Ch art er declares th at the U nited Nations is base d 

on the principle of sovereign equality.

The sovereign equality of states, however, has never meant the equal rig ht 

to particip ate in the decisionmaking process of international organizatio ns. The 

composition of the Security Council and oth er councils, the veto provision, the 

amendment process—these and oth er provisions of the ch arter all accord special 

privileges to certain members. So the str uctur e of the United Nations from

» the very beginning recognized the need to reconcile the principle of sovereign

equa lity with the uneven disposition of real power and rea l respo nsibility for 

implementing U.N. decisions. Appropriate means of balancing these considerations were also incorporated in the constitutions of the specialized agencies.

Quite ap art from charter provisions, procedures have been developed over

< the years to ada pt decisionmaking procedures to power realities. In the last

several years this cen tral problem has occasioned a vast amount of staff work 

in our own and other governments—and a considera ble amount of discussion 

and negotiatio n in the U.N. system.

We have explored with other nations many differen t procedures fo r ratio naliz ­

ing the decisionmaking process. We recognize th at no one procedure is appropriate for all cases:

Certain procedures may be appropriate for the voting of General Assembly 

resolutions which merely m anifest the views of members and have no binding 

legal effect.

Other procedures may be app ropriate when the General Assembly is exercising its mandatory power to assess.

Still other procedures may be app ropriate in specialized agencies lending sub stantial sums of money for exchange stabilization or economic development.

So ou r search for adequate procedures has been und ertake n on a case-by-case 

basis w ith special regard for the peculiaritie s of each case.

Before turnin g to a discussion of possible procedures, it may be useful to 

identify one solution to the problem which we have not considered. We h ave rejected the notion that most or all imp orta nt U.N. opera t'on s should be subject 

to the “princip le of unan imity.”

Specifically, we have reje cted the 20-year-old Soviet demand th at all peacekeeping operations of the U.N. should be under the exclusive jurisdictio n of the 

Security Council and thus subject to great-power veto. While recognizing th at 

the Security Council has the exclusive right to ini tia te mandato ry peacekeeping 

actio ns that impose binding obligations on states, we have consistently recognized the residual authority of the General Assembly to launch volu ntary peacekeeping operations. We have defended the ch arter power of the Assembly to 

assess the membership for such operation s—while recognizing th at in practic e

• many peacekeeping operations can be more app ropriat ely financed by methods

other t han by every-member assessment.

Some Americans, I know, feel strongly th at we must not expose the vital intere sts of the United States to the possibility th at the Assembly would lay mandato ry obligations on us again st our will. Fears have been expressed th at the 

United Nations would send a force into some are a against our political opposition—and make us pay for such ventures besides. It has been suggested th at 

in the arre ar s issue we are trying to enforce on the U.S.S.R. and France a p rin ­

ciple th at we would never allow to be enforced against ourselves.

There are several imp orta nt points to be considered in connection with thi s 

assertion. The Congo and Middle Eas t operation s were launched with the 

aquiescence of the Soviet Union and France. The General Assembly has never 

recommended any peacekeeping operation aga inst the negative vote of a big 

power. Indeed, the Assembly has only recommended a peacekeeping operatio n 

once, th e United Nations Emergency Force, and this was with the consent of the 

territo rial sovereign.
24 UN ITED NA TION S CH AR TE R AM EN DM EN TS

The Assembly cannot, in any case, init iate binding enforcement action requ ir­ ing members to contribute men and logistical support to military operations. It has never attempted to do this—and there is no reason to suppose it ever will. Moreover, the Assembly, indeed the U.N. is estopped by arti cle 2, par a­ graph 7 of the cha rter from unlawful in terven tion in m atters within a member’s 

domestic jurisdiction. Finally, in the light of article 19 experience, it is c lear that the Assembly will be very cautious in the fut ure in exercising its right to initia te and assess for voluntary peacekeeping operations. These considerations are usually overlooked by those who claim tha t the principle for which the United States has been con­ tending in the artic le 19 crisis is incompatible with our national interests. The argument that, if we were like the Soviet Union, we would not want to pay for peacekeeping operations we oppose, is unpersuasive for anothe r rea son: The policies we pursue do not lead the United Nations to undertake peacekeep­ ing actions directed against what we see as our vital interests. If the United State s were engaged in promoting the overthrow of foreign governments and institutions, it would have reason to fea r the effective implementation of United ,

Nations principles. But, in view of what in fact American principles and purposes are, we have every reason to uphold the auth ority of the United Nations. We have every reason to uphold the law, as the Inte rnat iona l Court of Justic e has found it to be. We have every reason to favor impa rtiall y applying the law of the charter, for we have no reason to fear impa rtial application of tha t law. If we seek a world ruled by law rather th an force, we natura lly must seek to apply and defend 

the law we now have. In short, the United States has been prepare d to take whatever risks are in­ heren t in the principle tha t voluntary peacekeeping operations may be in itiate d and financed by the General Assembly free from great-power veto because we recognize a long-term interest in developing this means of containing violence in the nuclear age. We w ant to minimize these risks, of course, but not at the cost of crippling the capacity of the United Nations to act for peace and 

security. To put it anoth er way, we are persuaded of the need to protect the interests of ourselves and other large and middle powers in the United Nations vehicle. But we do not want to do this by dra ining all the gasoline out of the motor. We pref er to keep the gasoline in—and to keep t he vehicle on the road through the 

introduction of “power steering.”

i i

How can “power steering” be built into the United Nations vehicle? Diplo­ mats and scholars have explored six main approaches to this problem:

1. Weighted voting

Most public discussion of the “internatio nal apportionm ent question” has fo­ cussed on proposals to introduce weighted voting in the General Assembly and in 

the conferences of the majo r U.N. agencies. Weighted voting exists, of course, in the four financial agencies of the United Nations system—the Inte rnation al Monetary Fund, the Internati onal Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter nati onal Finance Corporation, and the Internat iona l Development Association. In each of these, voting power is roughly proportionate to financial contribution. Weighted voting is also em- ployed in the main inter natio nal commodity arrange ments, where it is re lated to the size of partic ipatin g countrie s’ trade in the par ticu lar commodity. Except for these financial and trad e arrangements, it is not otherwise employed in the 

United Nations system. But most U.N. members, while willing to employ weighted voting for decisions H

on the disbursement of loans or the administra tion of commodity agreements, are not prepared to introduce this system across the board to cover recommendations of the General Assembly and other bodies. The obvious practical impediment to the introduction of weighted voting in the General Assembly is tha t it would require amendment of the U.N. Charter—and therefore the approval not only of the Soviet Union, France and other members of the Security Council, but also of two-thirds of th e membership of the General Assembly. In the present state of internatio nal relations, it is hard to imagine the permanent members of the Council and two-thirds of t he Assembly agreeing on any formula which would assign different weights to thei r share in the 

decisionmaking process.
UNIT ED NATI ONS CHA RT ER A M EN D M EN TS 25

The most likely consequence of pressi ng for a ch ar ter review conference to 

consider weighted voting, as some have urged, would be to provide a golden 

opportu nity for the Commun ist cou ntri es and oth er to press for amen dmen ts dimi nishing the powers th at the U.N. has developed und er the ch arter dur ing 

the las t 20 years and th at have gene rally promoted the objec tives of U.S. foreign 

policy. Even if it were possible to amend the cha rter to provide fo r weig hted voting, 

it is not at all certain th at our nat ion al inte rest would be served by the result. No system of weighted voting could conceivably be negotiat ed which did not weigh popul ation a s a m ajo r fact or. It is q uestionable wh eth er such an ar rang ement would suit a coun try like ours, which has only 6 perc ent of the wo rld’s population and which, toge ther with its NATO allies, has only 16 perce nt. If 

popu latio n were a prim ary crit erio n, Ind ia with its 45 0 million people and China with its 700 million people mig ht well end up with more votes tha n the United 

State s. Of course, it is alwa ys possible to construct hypo thetical systems of weighte d 

voting congenia l to our int ere sts based mainly on such fac tors as literacy, per cap ita income, and mil itar y power. Bu t such systems ar e simply not negotiable, 

at lea st not in the foreseeable future . The Dep artm ent of Sta te in 1962 conducted a study of various weighted votin g 

form ulas based on po pulation and c ontr ibutions to t he U.N. budget. When these 

form ulas were applied to 178 key vote s th at took place in the General Assembly between 1954 and 1961, it was found that, while they would have somewhat reduced the numbe r of reso lutions passed over U.S. opposition, they would have 

reduced much more the number of resol ution s supp orte d by the United Sta tes 

and passed over Communist opposition. The same conclusion was reached in 

projecting these form ulas to 1970, having reg ard to fu rthe r incr ease s in 

membership. The results of this study reflect the fac t tha t the desire for political indep endence and economic progress has put most U.N. members on the same side as the 

United Sta tes on most important ma tte rs—p art icu larly where action is involved 

as well as talk. We have, therefore, concluded th at any system of weigh ted voti ng tak ing population sub stan tially into accou nt—and , I repea t, no weig hted voting system would be ne gotiable t ha t faile d to do t his —would help Communist coun tries more 

tha n ourselves, by making it eas ier for them to achieve a blocking one-third vote 

on U.N. actions for peace and we lfare that are in the inter est of the United 

Sta tes and othe r nations of the non-Comm unist world.

2. Du al voting

Dua l voting—or a system of double m ajor ities—has recently been advanced by 

some comm entato rs as a possible answ er. Benjamin Cohen, for example, has 

proposed th at G eneral Assembly decisions on su bsta ntiv e ma tte rs should be made 

in the future by a two- third s ma jor ity of members pre sen t and voting, provide d 

th at the ma jori ty include s two-thi rds of the members of the Secu rity Council.

Dual voting has two gre at adv ant age s as compared wit h weighted vo tin g:

It does not offend directly the one-nation, one-vote principle.

It does not requ ire a comp licated negotiation involving national pres tige

in which different weights have to be assigned to diffe rent members.

Bu t most members of the Unite d Nati ons would probably feel that the introduction of dual voting on all sub sta ntive ma tters would require ch art er amend ­

ment. It is doubtful th at a sufficient con sensus on the des irability of dual v oting 

pres entl y exis ts for such a n a mendment to be approved.

It is alw ays possible, of course, th at dua l voting migh t be introduced in se lected area s of U.N. decisionmaking. At the U.N. Conference on Tra de and Development in Geneva last yea r the non-Com munist ind ustrial countrie s, in the closing 

weeks of the Conference, proposed a system of dua l voting for the new U.N. 

tra de m achin ery. Under this proposal, decisions on ce rta in imp ort ant ma tters in 

the perio dic Tra de and Development Conference were to be take n by a two-thirds ma jori ty, including a majori ty of developed countrie s and a ma jor ity of lessdeveloped co un tri es; in the Tra de and Development Boa rd such decisions would 

be take n by a plain majo rity, inclu ding a majori ty of developed coun tries and a 

majority of less-developed count ries.

Thi s propo sal found some su ppo rt not only among developed coun tries but also 

among less-developed countries, some of whom recognized the futil ity of voting 

self-serving resolu tions with out the concurren ce of at lea st a ma jor ity of those 

coun tries to whom the recom mendations were addre ssed.
26 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

But the idea involved too great a change in existing procedures to gain ap ­ proval at Geneva. And some of the Western industrial countries even developed 

second thoughts on the proposal—on the grounds tha t special voting procedures 

of this kind might cause gre ate r significance to be a ttach ed to U.N. recommendations than they were prepa red t o accept.

S. Bicameralism

Bicameralism in one form or other is an approach to the inter natio nal apportionment problem offering gre ate r possibilities in the short run than eith er 

weighted or dual voting. In its extreme form, bicameralism would mean trea ting the Security Council 

and the General Assembly as an “upper House” and a “lower House” and requiring tha t decisions on some or all matters would have to be passed by both of 

them. For example, the veto could continue to apply to enforcement actio n; but voluntary peacekeeping operations and perhaps recommendations in other 

areas could be adopted by two-thirds of the General Assembly and by 7 of the 11 

members of the Security Council (9 members of the enlarged Council of 1 5). Here again, this kind of proposal would probably require cha rter amendment.

It is, therefore, not a prac tical possibility in the foreseeable future. But more tent ativ e and informal steps in the direction of bicameralism may be possible. In September 1964, th e United States submitted to the Working Group of 21 a proposal covering arran gements for initia ting and financing U.N. peacekeeping V

operation s involving th e use of military forces. We proposed th at all proposals to init iate such peacekeeping operations should be considered first in the Security Council. The General Assembly would not authori ze or assume control of such operations unless the Council had demonstrated th at it was unable to 

take action. This proposal would work a change in presen t procedures. While under the charter, the Security Council would normally be expected to consider a thre at 

to peace and security in the first instance, there is no requirement tha t the Se­ curity Council should first consider a particul ar peacekeeping operation. In the 

Suez crisis, for example, the Security Council met before the General Assembly convened in emergency special session, but it did not consider th e proposal for the 

establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. This proposal was initiated in th e Assembly itself. A new arrangement by which proposals for the establishm ent of peacekeeping 

forces would first be submitted to the Council would be a step in the direction of strength ening the prim ary responsibility of the Council in the peacekeeping 

field. It should commend itse lf not only to those members who are seeking to 

strengthen the Council’s role but to all members who want to work out a rationa l distrib ution of powers between the Council and the Assembly.

The UNEF, Congo, and Cyprus operations illust rated the importance of get­ ting U.N. troops to world trouble spots without undue delay. Therefore, any 

proposal re quiring prior resort to the Council should contain safeguards—perhaps a fixed time limit—to avoid jeopardizing the ability of the Assembly to take 

timely action under its residual powers.

Enlargement of the Security Council could also aid our efforts to deal with 

the international apportion ment problem through measures of modified bicamer­ alism. If the Security Council is to discharge more effectively its primary responsibility in the field of peace a nd security, it must be sufficiently representative of the U.N. membership as a whole to have the confidence of the membership.

This is not possible without enlargement.

The General Assembly has approved the first cha rter amendments in the history of the United Nations—amendments enlarging the Security Council from 11 to 15 members and the Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27 members. „

The President of the United Stat es recently sent a message to t he Senate asking 

for advice and consent to the ratification of these amendments. Hearings will 

shortly commence upon them in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Affirmative action upon these amendments is clearly desirable.

The enlargement of the Security Council is designed to eliminate the conten­ tious problem of sharing an inadeq uate number of seats. The new understanding for the distribution of the elective seats embodied in the Assembly resolution 

proposing the amendment is reali stic and equitable. It allocates two seats to Western European countries and others, two to Latin America, one to Eastern 

Europe, and five to Africa and Asia. Enlargement should reduce the tendency 

to split terms in Security Council elections and should relieve mounting pressures 

against seats now held by Western European and Latin American countries.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 27

4. Committees with selective representation

Probably the most promising method yet devised for building greater responsibility into United Nations decisionmaking is tha t of committees with selective 

representation. The basic concept was provided in the cha rter provision for a Security Council 

with 11 members, including the five permanent members which bear the principal responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. The same concept is embodied in the charter of a number of the specialized agencies; for 

example, in the governing body of the International Labor Organization, the 10 

members of chief industrial importance have permanent seats.

Even where no specific provision is made for permanent seats for a certain 

category of members, elections to the executive boards of U.N. agencies have 

normally taken account of the special responsibilities of members in the particu­ lar functional area of cooperation; whether it be telecommunications, weather 

forecasting, or medical research. Presumably this will continue to be true in the 

futu re as well. In the case of the Security Council, the charter itself declares that due regard 

should be especially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of 

the United Nations to the maintenance of interna tional peace and security and 

to the other purposes of the organization as well as to equitable geographic distribution. This provision has not received the attention it deserves. It would enhance the effectiveness of an enlarged Council if this consideration could be 

adequately reflected in Council elections in the years ahead. The members of the United Nations have found committees with selective 

representation particularly useful in the financial field. The General Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Administration and Budgetary Questions bears responsibility for examining and reporting on the Secretary General’s U.N. budget estimates. The United States has supported the effective operation of this small 

12-man body, which is not merely representative of the major geographic groups 

in the United Nations, but also reflects comparative contributions to the U.N. 

budget. We have sought to strengthen the authority of similar groups in the 

specialized agencies, and we believe members might usefully consider the possibility of creating such groups in agencies which do not have them. We also favor use of a committee with selective representation in the peacekeeping field. Our working paper to the Committee of 21 last September proposed that the General Assembly establish a standing Special Finance Committee. The composition of this committee would be similar to tha t of the 

present Working Group of 21—it would include the permanent members of the Security Council and a relatively high percentage of those member states 

in each geographic area that are large financial contributors to the United Nations. The General Assembly, in apportioning expenses for peacekeeping 

operations, would act only on a recommendation from the committee passed by 

a two-thirds majority of the committee’s membership. One great advantage of the committee approach is tha t it does not require 

amendment of the U.N. Charter or the constitutions of the various specialized 

agencies. The proposed Special Finance Committee for peacekeeping operations, for example, could be constituted under and governed by firm rules of procedure 

by the General Assembly. In effect, the Assembly would be adopting a selfdenying ordinance to act only upon proposals first adopted in this new suborgan.

5. Inform al relations with international secretariats

Informal relations w’ith the international secretariats may also provide a 

useful approach. Obviously, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and 

the heads of the specialized and affiliated agencies engage in a continuous process of consultation with the membership. In these consultations they naturally take 

account of the differing responsibilities which the members have for supporting 

the work of their organizations.

During the United Nations operation in the Congo, for example, the Secretar iat systematically consulted an advisory committee of countries tha t contributed military personnel. More informally, consultation was carried on with 

key contributors of services and money. For example, the United States and 

other major contributors were in frequent touch with the Secretary-General 

and his staff in New York and with the chief of the U.N. Congo operation in 

Leopoldville. This was a truly international undertaking. At the same time, 

its conduct reflected the views of the major supporters of the operation.
28 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

So fa r the heads of U.N. agen cies have general ly paid close att entio n to the views of the countrie s wit h spec ial financial and oth er resp onsi bilities. The problem has mainly been the ina bility of these cou ntri es to orga nize themselves effectiv ely for the time ly transm issi on of th ei r viewp oints to the agency 

heads. In the recen t months, the U.S. Govern ment has made specia l efforts to dea l with this problem. We hav e sou ght to tak e a longer range view of in te r­ nation al orga nization activ itie s and to develop our own position on pro gra ms and budgets fa r enough in adv anc e so th at the execu tive head s of the agencies can tak e these views into acc oun t at the time the prog ram and budge t is being 

form ulat ed. Our objective here is to pu t th e execu tive heads of the agencies in a position t o tak e into accou nt the views of th ei r ma jor con trib uto rs ear ly in the budget cycle before th eir pro posals to the exec utiv e boa rds and conferences are frozen. Thi s is imm easu rabl y bet ter than havin g them for mu late their prog ram s and budgets in the dar k, only to be met sud den ly at the gen eral Conference wit h the opposition of majo r co ntri butors. Dur ing the pas t year, the United States has begun a syst ema tic series of con­ sul tation s with some of the othe r maj or contr ibu tor s in an effort to develop common positi ons on the pro gra ms and budgets of the int ern ation al agencies. We have found this process of consult atio n very usef ul. As gover nmen tal posi­ tions emerge on v ario us issu es fac ing the specialized agencies, they are pres ente d x

info rma lly to th e D irect ors-Gen eral. We believe tha t, in the long run , this exchange of views among governments and with secre tar iat s will mak e fo r more effectiv e partic ipa tio n by the lar ger con trib uto rs in the int ern ati on al organization s, and consequen tly for more rea lis ­

tic program proposals in the agenc ies.

6. Conciliation

The most recen t—and perha ps th e most origin al—proce dura l innov ation in U.N. decisionma king is the conc iliation proc edur e esta blis hed by the las t Gen­ era l Assembly for the new U.N. m achiner y in the field of tra de and development. The neefl for the con cilia tion proc edure became appa ren t dur ing the Unite d Natio ns Conference on Tra de and Developm ent at Geneva. In the closing days of UNCTAD, at which I serv ed as vice cha irm an of the U.S. delegation, the re was an enco uraging disp ositi on to reach a consensus on some subjects. Bu t the re were also insta nces when the voting bloc of less-developed coun tries pass ed reso lutions over the opposition of th e mino rity of indu str ial countri es on ma tte rs 

involv ing imp ort ant economic i nte res ts. Some delega tes argu ed th at thi s was no cause for concern, since th e reso lutions were recommendatio ns only—and any resolutio ns of the new tra de mach inery would be recom mendations only. But the United Sta tes and other countries point ed out th at the curren cy of such recom mend ation s would be hopelessly debased if they fail ed to reflect a sub sta nti al conse nsus among all countries, including particular ly the countrie s bear ing the princi pal responsibility fo r 

implemen ting them. Tra de ques tions have tra ditio na lly been dea lt with among nat ion s by negotia­ tion—not legislation. Undo ubtedly, the re is a con stru ctiv e role for ins titu tions whose pri ma ry purpo se is to ar tic ul at e thro ugh recommenda tions the measures which should be und erta ken by both developed and less developed coun tries to deal with the tra de problems of the lat ter . Bu t such insti tut ion s can only oper- •

ate through a process of p ersu asion. Persua sion is assiste d when dele gate s seek a consensus thr oug h conciliation and expr ess th at consensus in resolutio ns. If it is not assisted, it may even be set back by the passage of self-serving res olu tion s by aut om atic majorities. Public opinion in the ind us tri al cou ntr ies is likely to .react adve rsely to recom- » men datio ns th at are passe d over th e opposition of the indu str ial coun tries but 

call f or concessions by them. Wh at is wanted, in the las t ana lys is, is not voting, bu t resu lts. Because this was recognized by most dele gations, a las t-m inu te agre ement was reached at Geneva th at the new UNCTAD mac hin ery should con tain proce dures “designed to establis h a process of conciliatio n to tak e place before voting and to provide an ade qua te basis for the a dop tion of recom mendatio ns with regard to proposals of a specific n atu re for action su bs tan tia lly affec ting economic or financ ial inter ­

ests of pa rticu lar cou ntrie s.”
UN ITED NATIONS CH AR TER AM ENDM ENTS 29

The task of working out these procedures was left to a special committee appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations. I had the privilege of 

serving as the U.S. expert on this committee. The conciliation procedure which 

the committee devised will operate in the periodic Conference, in the Trad e and 

Development Board, and in its committees.

Under this procedure, conciliation can be initiated and voting suspended on any 

resolution, upon the motion of a very small number of countries (10 in the 

Conference, 5 in the Board and 3 in committees), or upon the motion of the 

President of the Conference or Chairman of the Board.

The initiation of conciliation is automatic. However, guidelines are provided 

defining the kind of resolutions which are appropriate for the conciliation 

procedure.

Following a motion fox conciliation, a conciliation group is appointed with 

adequate representation of countries interested in the subject matter. If the 

conciliation group cannot reach agreement a t the same session of the Conference 

or Board, it reports to the next session of the Conference or Board, whichever 

comes first.

If the conciliation group has reached agreement, the agreed resolution can be 

voted. If it has not, a decision can be taken continuing conciliation for a further 

period, or the original proposal, or some var iant thereof, can be voted in the 

normal way.

In the event th at a vote is taken afte r unsuccessful conciliation, the resolution 

will cite the report of the conciliation group (which may contain minority as 

well as majority views), and the records of the United Nations will show how the 

members voted on the resolution.

These procedures offer important benefits to all U.N. members:

For the minority of developed countries, they provide some safeguard 

against the voting of unacceptable resolutions by automatic majorities, and 

a “cooling-off” period of 6 months or more during which efforts at compromise can be sought through quiet diplomacy.

For the majority of less-developed countries, they afford a means of engaging the developed countries in a sustained debate during which the 

developed countries explain the reasons for their opposition to proposals of 

the majority.

It is too early to see j ust how the conciliation procedure will work in practice, 

but we may hazard one prediction: The main value of the new procedures may 

be less in their actual use than in the subtle way in which their mere existence 

influences member governments in the direction of compromise rathe r than 

voting on disagreed proposals.

h i

This catalog of procedures for coping with the “international apportionment 

problems” should serve to indicate four things :

First, that the United States and other countries are very much aware 

of the need to adapt U.N. procedures to take account of power realities.

Second, that a wide variety of alternativ e procedures can be developed 

to come to grips with the problem.

Third, that the most practical of these procedures can be put into effect 

without amendment of the U.N. C harter or of the constitutions of other U.N. 

agencies.

Fourth, that a great process of procedural adaptation and innovation is 

already underway throughout the U.N. system.

Of course, procedures in and of themselves are only part of the problem. 

What is really required is widespread recognition of the common interest in 

basing U.N. decisions on an adequate consensus, a consensus which includes 

the support of most of the countries bearing the principal responsibilities for 

action.

Will such a recognition be forthcoming? The cynic may ask why the majority of small countries should accept any restrai nt on the use of their voting 

power. The answer is clear enough.

If United Nations procedures cannot be adapted to take account of power 

realities, the large and middle powers will increasingly pursue their national 

interests outside the U.N. system.

If, on the other hand, the necessary procedural adjustments can be carried 

out, the United Nations and its agencies will be able to assume increasing responsibilities for action in both peacekeeping and development.
30 UN ITED NA TION S CHARTER AM EN DM EN TS

T h is is th e fu ndam enta l re as on why th e im p o rt an t pro ce dura l ad ju st m ents 

no w under w ay in th e U nited N ations se rv e th e en lighte ned long -term in te re st s 

of al l it s me mb ers .

Senator Carlson. Will the Senator yield at that point ?

Senator Clark. I would be happy to yield.

Senator Carlson. You mentioned this address by Secretary Gardner. li e wrote a book on the United Nations tha t I have read and I think it is a book tha t might well be read by people in the educational field and in the schools.

Senator Clark. And members of the Foreign Relations Committee

Senator Carlson. I have read it.

Senator Clark. I have read it, too; if it were not for my constant 

concern for the taxpayer I would put it in the record also.

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairm an, I will try to make that book available to members of the committee without burden upon the taxpayer.

Senator Clark. I think it would be very nice if the Secretary would 

autograph it.

Senator Hickenlooper. Who was i t tha t said, “Oh, that mine adversary had written a book.”

Senator Clark. I am ju st beginning to find that out.

Senator Case. I was just calling attention to it.

Senator Clark. You came pretty close to writing one yourself.

As the Secretary knows, for a good many years I have been active 

in sponsoring various concurrent resolutions usually designated 

“planning for peace” resolutions. I have had at least some mild encouragement from the Department, 

although never quite official, in presenting those resolutions. The 

latest one is Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 which is cosponsored 

by more than one-quarter of the Senate, 26 Members, and the Secretary , at least, gave me some encouragement in connection with explor­ ing matters which are in tha t resolution and I, therefore, would ask, with my colleagues’ permission, that a copy of the resolution may be 

put in the record at this point.

(The resolution referred to follows:)

[S. Con. Re s. 32, 89 th Cong., 1 se ss .]

CONCURREN T RES OLUTIO N

W her ea s it is th e po lic y of th e U nited Sta te s, as sta te d by P re si dent Jo hn so n 

in hi s co m m un icat io n to th e Con gr es s on arm s co nt ro l on Ja n u a ry 15, 1965, to be 

“v ig il ant fo r opport unitie s fo r im pr ov in g th e ho pe s fo r pe ac e” ; a nd

W he re as th e step s ta k en to w ard pe ac e in th e p a st fo u r yea rs , in cl ud in g th e 

ad option of t he l im ited n u cle ar te st ba n tr eaty , th e h ot line a gr ee m en t, th e U nited 

N at io ns re so lu tion ag ain st w ea po ns in spa ce, and th e p u rs u it of a po lic y of m u­ tu a l ex am pl e in re du ci ng ex ce ss iv e de fe ns e ex pen diture s, have c ontr ib ut ed to th e 

re la x ati o n o f in te rn ati o n al te nsi ons ; and

W he re as th es e de ve lo pm en ts have en ha nc ed th e pr osp ec t fo r th e ne go tiatio n 

of fu rth e r in te rn ati onal agre em en ts ba sed up on m utu al in te re st an d ca lc ul at ed 

to a dv an ce the ca us e of w or ld p e a c e ; and

W her ea s th e ba sic pur po se of U nite d S ta te s fo re ig n po lic y is th e ac hiev em en t 

of a ju st an d la st in g pe ace, w hi ch ca n be st be a tt ain ed th ro ugh th e de ve lopm en t 

of the r ule of law in t he in te rn ati o n al co mm un ity ; a nd

W her ea s th e U ni te d N at io ns G en er al A sse mb ly, a t it s fo urt eenth ses sio n, unanimou sly ad op te d “the go al of genera l an d co mpl ete dis arm am ent under effecti ve 

in te rn ati o n al co ntr ol” , and ca lled up on go ve rn m en ts “t o m ak e ev er y ef fo rt to 

ac hi ev e a co ns truc tive so lu tion o f t h is p ro bl em ” ; a nd
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 31

Whe reas Pr es iden t Eisenh ow er stated on Septe mb er 22, 1960, to th e Fifte en th 

Gen eral Assem bly, “Thus, we see as ou r goal, no t a su pe rsta te above na tio ns, bu t 

a wo rld com munity em bra cin g the m all, roo ted in law an d justice an d en ha nc ­

ing th e po tentialities an d comm on p urp oses of all peop les” ; and

Whe rea s Pr es iden t Ken ned y st at ed on September 25, 1961, th at we m us t c re ate 

“w orl dw ide law and law enforceme nt as we o utl aw w orl dw ide w ar a nd we apon s”, 

an d stat ed fu rthe r on Ju ne 10, 1963, th at “ou r pr im ary long-range in te re st ” is 

“gen eral a nd comp lete disa rm am en t—designed to take p lac e by stag es, p ermitt in g 

pa ra lle l political dev elopments to build the new in stitu tio ns of peace which would 

ta ke the p lace of arms” ; ami

Whe reas the U nited St ates p rogram f or general an d com plet e d isa rm am en t in a 

pe aceful world, int rodu ced of th e six teen th ses sion of th e Un ited Na tio n Ge neral 

Assembly, defined the o bje ctive of th e Un ited S tates a s “A world w her e t he re sh all 

be a perm an ent st at e of gene ral an d com plete disa rm am en t un der effective i nte rna tion al contr ol” and the “in st itu tion of effectiv e me ans fo r the enforcem ent of 

in te rn atio na l agreem ents, fo r th e settlem ent of dis putes , an d fo r the mainten an ce 

of peace in acc ord anc e with th e princi ple s of the Un ited Na tio ns” an d called for 

th e creatio n of an In te rn at io nal Disarm am en t Organiz ation to insu re com pliance 

w ith dis arm am ent obl iga tions, a United States Peace Fo rce to kee p th e peace 

du ring the period of disa rm am en t and th ere aft er; and imp roved pro ces ses for 

th e peaceful settlem ent of in te rn atio na l d is pute s; an d

Whe rea s Pr es iden t Ken ned y, in addressin g the eig htee nth session o f the U nit ed 

Nations General Asse mbly on Sep tem ber 20, 1963, called fo r th e rev ision of the 

Cha rter of the U nited N ati on s to p erm it the dev elopment of that body in to “a genuine world security syste m” , an d dec lared th at the pea cekeeping mac hine ry of 

th e United Na tions must be str engthene d by the adoptio n of sound fin ancia l 

arrang em en ts a nd the m ainten an ce of s tan dby peace for ce contin gents by member 

na tio ns and th at re so rt to special mission s fo r the concilia tio n an d ad ju di ca tio n 

of i nt er na tio na l d isp utes be i ncr ea se d; a nd

Wherea s the rea liz ation of these goals throug h in tern atio na l ne go tia tio ns, 

Un ite d Nations Cha rter rev ision, or otherw ise, is a m at te r of urg enc y because 

(1) technological an d po litica l developments have given ris e to new pe rils to 

pea ce through the inc reasing spread of nu cle ar wea pon s, as eviden ced by the 

suc ces sful deton ation of a nu clea r device by th e Chinese Com munists, th e contin ue d development of an ind ep ende nt nu cle ar de te rren t by Fra nce, an d th e possibility th at severa l o th er nations, which have the c ap ac ity to m ake n uc lear w eapons, will follow a sim ila r co ur se ; and (2) the increa sin g cost of th e ar m s race 

is preventin g hum an nee ds fro m bein g met in all th e co un tri es of the w orl d; and

Wherea s the Un ited Nations General Assembly, du ring rec ent sessions, ha s 

resolved to keep in being th e Com mittee on Arra ng em en ts fo r th e pu rpose of 

rev iew ing the ch ar ter, an d ha s fu rthe r resolved to ask th e Com mittee to subm it 

per iod ic rep orts, with rec om me ndations, to fu tu re sessions of the Gen eral Ass embly ; and

Wh ere as the ach ievement of an in te rn atio na l acc ord fo r general an d com plete 

disarm am en t un der effectiv e c on tro ls an d the dev elopment of in te rn at io na l peace ­

kee ping machinery requ ire no t only the su pp ort of th e Cong ress, bu t als o an 

inf orm ed public opinion in th e Un ite d States : Now, therefore, be i t

Resolved by the Se na te (t he House of Re pr esen tativ es co nc ur rin g) , T hat the 

Pr es id en t should be supp orted in his efforts to ach iev e pea ce an d di sa rm am en t 

un de r lega lly effective controls an d to develop in te rn atio na l in stitu tio ns capable 

of per ma nentl y keeping the peace.

Sec. 2. The Pr es iden t is hereby requested to fo rm ul ate as spe edily as possible 

specific and det ail ed prop osals f or t he imple me nta tio n of th e foreig n policy objectiv es o f t he Un ited St ates re ga rd in g the es tablish men t o f a n in te rn at io na l au th or ­

ity to keep the peace un de r conditions o f gen eral an d c om plete disa rm am en t effectiv ely gu aran tee d by ad eq ua te inspec tion an d con tro ls. In fo rm ul atin g suc h 

pro pos als, t he P resid en t is requ es ted to cons ider w he ther t he developm ent of effectiv e intern ationa l mac hine ry f or the sup erv ision of disarm am en t an d th e m ai nt ena nc e of peace, inc lud ing (1) an I nt er na tio na l Disa rm am en t Organiz ation ; (2) a 

pe rm an en t World Peace Fo rc e; (3) world trib un al s fo r the peacefu l se ttl emen t of all in tern atio na l disp utes n ot settled by ne go tia tio ns ; (4) ot he r in te rn atio na l institu tio ns nec essar y fo r the enforce me nt of wo rld peace un de r th e rule 

of la w ; and (5) ap pr op riat e an d reliab le financ ial arrang em en ts fo r th e su pp ort 

of such peacekeeping ma chine ry, may bes t be achie ved by revisio n of the C ha rter 

of th e United Nations, by a new trea ty , or by a comb ina tion of the two.
32 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

Sec. 3. The P re si dent sh oul d m ak e su ch pr op os al s avail able to th e Co ng res s 

an d to th e pu blic ge ne ra lly.

Sec. 4. The P re si dent is re ques te d to tr an sm it co pies of th is re so lu tion to th e heads of go ve rn m en t of all of th e nati ons of th e w or ld an d to urg e th em to in i­ ti a te w ithin th e ir gov er nm en ts st udie s of m att ers germ an e to t h is re so lu tion an d to fo rm ula te and m ak e gen er al ly av ail able re co m m en da tion s ba se d up on su ch 

st ud ie s.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATION AL ORGANIZATIONS

Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you to turn to 

page 4 of your prepared statement under the heading IV. Let me say, I find myself in ra ther complete accord with the four points you make 

in tha t subparagraph. You suggest, first, tha t the scope of international organization is limited by the stubborn persistence of a strong spirit of nationalism, and tha t the political traditio ns centering around the conception of un­ restricted national sovereignty place a strict—and then you say, and 

these are the words I question:

N ot alt o g eth er undes ir ab le gov er no r on th e ra te of in sti tu ti o n bu ildi ng in th e 

in te rn a ti o n a l co mm un ity .

Why do you think it is not entirely undesirable, as I do ?

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, I think tha t the point there is tha t 

we must be careful tha t a gap not develop between the theory, as it might be devised, of voting in an international meeting such as the General Assembly, on the one hand and the readiness and the reality of states in giving such resolutions their attachment and their support, 

in fact. Now, we are every day, in one sense, accepting limitations upon our complete freedom of action. If one wants to call tha t sovereignty one can do so. I am a little wary myself of debating this word “sovereignty ” too much. We have more than 4,200 treaties and international agreements, two- thirds of which have been entered into in the past 25 years.

Senator Clark. Each one of which limits to some extent our sovereignty, does it not?

Secretary Rusk. Each one of which at least limits our freedom of 

action. We exercise our sovereignty in going into these agreements.

Senator Clark. There are two schools of thou ght about this word 

“sovereignty.” One is it is such a faulty word we don’t ever dare men­ tion it because immediately people wrap the American Flag around themselves and resort to that form of patriotism which Samuel Joh n­ son once had referred to as “the last refuge of the scoundrel” and, therefore, we try to achieve the same result by using a different word— and maybe this is good tactics at the moment—but the fac t of the mat­ ter is, is it not, that unless we can find some method, such as the method which the Thirteen Colonies devised when they moved from the A rti­ cles of Confederation to the Constitution of the United States, for limiting the complete freedom of action of the Nation States, we are going to be in quite serious trouble as we move ahead, are we not?

Secretary Rusk. I think t hat is so, Senator, if I might make a moment’s comment on this. Surely we have learned in our own internal processes in our own so­ ciety, tha t law is a process by which we increase our range of free-
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 33

Sena tor Clark. But the law has to be enforceable, doesn’t it?

Secretary Rusk. It has to be complied with.

Senator Clark. Therefore, when it is broken it must be enforceable 

to perform th at function.

Secretary Rusk. All of us, for example, from the time we wake up 

until the time we go to sleep pass through literally hundreds of legal 

relationships in the course of the day. Most of those remain latent 

but many of them can be stirred up by our own action or by the action 

of somebody else.

Senator Clark. We take most of them for granted.

Secretary Rusk. But this is the p oin t: we are able to predict generally what others are going to do. So it is on the international scene. 

We are constantly making arrangements-----

Senator Clark. You are quite sure what the North Vietnamese are 

going to do?

Secretary Rusk. Well, there are exceptions, of course, just as there 

are here in our own society at times.

But we are constantly enlarging our own freedom by being able to 

predict what others are going to do, particula rly in those fields in 

which there are not high political controversies but where cooperation 

itself is necessary or contributes to accomplishing the objective.

There are no such things as sovereignty with respect to epidemic 

diseases, for example, because disease does not recognize political 

borders.

So, we get at that on an international basis with far-reaching measures for cooperating across national frontiers.

Now, this is the direction in which we have been moving very rapid ly 

and it is very seldom that, we ourselves, as a Nation, find th at these 

regulations or rules which we have entered into, in fact, limit us or 

bar us from moving in directions in which we would like to go in our 

own interest.

Senator Clark. Thank you, sir.

I see now tha t our chairman has returned.

The Chairman. Please continue.

Senator Hickenlooper. Would the Senator yield ?

Senator Clark. Yes.

THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIO NAL RELATIONS

Senator Hickenlooper. I thin k the discussion in the last minute 

or two is quite interesting on the theory that if laws are on the books 

they should be obeyed. I certainly agree with that. But it seems to 

run afoul of certain policies we see in the United States now where if 

people decide they don’t like a law they can violate other laws in 

protest. That isn’t quite compatible with the idea tha t laws ought 

to be obeyed.

I agree with the theory tha t laws ought to be obeyed but we seem 

to be tolerating disobedience of law all over the country under the 

guise of free speech or something else.

Senator Clark. I guess, Senator Hickenlooper, there would be no 

difference between you and me in our general theory that we have 

to live under a rule of law and it had better be enforceable. I suggest 

this is the requirement, and primary requirement, in international
34 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

affairs today. We haven’t got there yet. I don’t know whether you or Mr. Cleveland would like to comment on it, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Rusk. On the international side I made a reference the 

other day to a phrase used by Mr. Jenks who is the chief counsel of the International Labo r Organization who referred to the common law of mankind. In the opening chapter of a book by tha t title, he showed how the human race has been moving steadily, and in recent years more rapidly, to build up expected standards of conduct and instrum ents of cooperation. These are bring ing a great deal of orde r in international affairs, even in the face of some of these most violent ideological problems, and security problems, that we are all aware of. There has been a rap id buildup of tha t unseen development in the international community throu gh a development of what he called a 

common law of mankind. It is represented most dramatically in the economic, social, and tech­ nical work of the United Nations to which I alluded in my remarks. Our problem, Senator Clark, is t hat tha t movement is not moving rapidly enough to take hold of these great crisis situations, to bring them under the rule of law and the concept of peaceful settlement of 

disputes. But I have no doubt at all it is having a steady influence and is 

moving in that direction.

Senator Clark. I quite agree with you. It occurs to me, however, tha t the difference between us is the ques­ tion of speed. My criticism, as you know, has been t hat our Govern­ ment is not moving nearly rapidly enough, is not taking nearly enough initiative to bring forw ard tha t movement, tha t we have been too content to let it be a government of development by consensus, a development by unanimity, and there are problems. I am so happy to see the four comments which you made on page 4 of your statement, because I think this indicates an understanding on your par t, and that of your associates, of the need to move forward somewhat more 

rapidly in this.

Now, perhaps you want to make a comment on tha t ?

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, let me say just not as an alibi but 

as a reflection-----

Senator Clark. You have been rather busy.

Secretary Rusk. ----- of the environment in which we are having to

operate, these are not matters which we ourselves can solve alone. We have taken up, for example, in the disarmament discussions, some very key and fundamental issues in this field th at we must approach 

on a broad front. One is tha t we must improve the processes for the political settle­ ment of disputes and try to get some of the most dangerous disputes tha t are on the agenda out of the way by peaceful settlement, such 

things as a divided Germany and the problem of Berlin. Second, we must proceed as rapidly as we can with disarmament and at the same time, in parallel, strengthen the ability of the international 

community to keep the peace.
U N IT E D NATIO NS CHARTE R AM EN DM ENTS 35

D IS A RM A M EN T AN D AR MS CO NT RO L

Senator Clark. In other words, you would agree with me in pri nciple, I take it, tha t disarmament is really going to be quite ineffective, 

.and so is arms control, if we have to take the intermediate step, unless 

we get some type of international institution which can enforce the 

disarmament process and hopefully in the long run find a method of 

settling political disputes by mediation, conciliation, equity procedures, whatever you have, instead of throwing them over in the long 

run to the rule of force.

Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir, and we have made these points 

very insistently in the Geneva disarmament discussions.

Senator Clark. One th ing that concerns me, Mr. Secretary, is th at 

- there has been a backsliding in the Johnson administration since the

^assassination of President Kennedy. We all know those three grea t 

speeches which he made, two at the United Nations and one a t American University; we all know tha t he caused to be tabled—and you or 

v Mr. Cleveland played a major p art in d rafting it—our treaty of general and complete disarmament at Geneva which met the Russian pro ­

posal ; we all know the wide gap between the Soviet position and our 

•own, but since President Johnson went into the White House I have 

never heard the words general and complete disarmament uttered from 

his lips, your lips, or from anybody else, and my question is, Have we 

retreated from the position which President Kennedy placed us in ?

Secretary Rusk. We have not at all, sir, and the President is very 

much interested in it and concerned with the entire field of disarmament. We have, in fact, taken certain steps in connection with the 

reduction of the production of materials for weapons.

Senator Clark. All on fringes of arms control but we have never 

-gone back-----

Secretary Rusk. Oh, yes.

Senator Clark. ----- to general and complete disarmament so fa r as

I know at Geneva since President Kennedy was removed from the 

Wh ite House.

Secretary Rusk. We have not gone-----

Senator Clark. My understanding is, and you tell me if I am 

wrong: Since the death of President Kennedy the whole steam has 

gone out of bringing the Russians back and attempting to get together 

with them and, possibly, to see if we can’t bridge the gap between their 

plans for general and complete disarmament and our own.

* This seems to have been a casualty from the Kennedy, as distinguished from the Johnson, administration. I hope I am wrong.

Secretary Rusk. You are very wrong on t hat , Senator.

Senator Clark. Three cheers.

Secretary Rusk. This is not the point.

We ourselves have been pressing to get the Geneva discussions going again. It was the Soviet Union that elected to call for this present 

meeting of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations which 

is made up, as you know, of all the members, and constitutes a forum 

in which hard and serious negotiation is not likely to occur.

Senator Clark. You are aware, I am sure, tha t the Russian positio n has been given to some of our people as being that we were not 

seriously interested in a nonproliferation agreement, because if we
36 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

were, we would forg et about the multilateral force. This has been 

a deterrent to getting back to Geneva, and 1 take it you are telling me 

now, and I am delighted if it is true, that you would like to urge our 

people to get back to Geneva and see if we can’t come to at least some 

peripheral agreements with the Russians which will make it possible 

to get back to the trac k we were on in September 1961.

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, as recently as last December, which 

was the last time I had a chance to meet with Mr. Gromyko, we had 

about five meetings during the month while he was at the United 

Nations and we spent a great deal of time at those meetings trying to 

find some way in which we can proceed on fu rth er steps in disarmament.

But I will have to say, sir, that there are some major obstacles still 

rooted in the questions of assurance, inspection, and verification. 

Even on the subject of budgetary reductions on both sides we have not 

been able to talk seriously about such possibilities. And one o f the 

reasons is th at we have never been able to engage them in a discussion 

of what goes into a defense budget in our respective societies.

How comparable are defense budgets, what do they represent ?

We have suggested over and over again tha t our comptrollers of 

our defense departm ents get together and examine it because it doesn’t 

do very much good to have one side say, “Well, we are reducing our 

defense budget by $300 million,” and indicating an increase in the ir 

research and development budget of $300 million if both of those 

items are in our own defense budget in this country.

Senator Clark. I quite understand.

Secretary Rusk. So, there are problems of that sort.

MULT ILAT ERAL NUCLEAR FORCE AND NATO

Senator Clark. I know and they are very serious problems and I 

certainly appreciate, having been twice at Geneva myself and once 

to Russia, how very difficult and how mean and how discourteous the 

Russians can be and what tough antagonists they are.

My concern is, are we trying hard enough and isn’t it one of the real 

deterrents to getting back at the table in talking of it that we haven’t 

been able to come up with a satisfactory solution to the German problem and the one reason is because we have got them scared to death 

about the multilateral force.

In my book, as you know, and I have told you this before, I think 

if we would only get the multilateral force idea out of our head we 

might find ourselves in a position to make some progress on these other 

far more importan t matters.

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, on the multilateral force I think I 

should state for the record here now, that th e multilateral force is a 

false issue with respect to the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Senator Clark. Th at is our position, but with a little sense of 

empathy I think I can understand, and I think you can, where the 

Russians don’t agree w ith it.

Secretary Rusk. The Russians don’t agree with it for a variety 

of reasons. They don’t like NATO, they don’t wish anything to tie 

NATO countries together.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 37

Senator Clark. Which do you think is more important, coming to a 

comprehensive talk with Russia or shoring up a NATO organization 

which shows every sign of distintegrating ?

Secretary Rusk. I don’t believe there is a possibility of a detente 

with the Soviet Union unless there is a strong NATO. We didn’t 

come to a detente—if one wants to call even the present situation a 

mild form of detente—we did n’t come to th at by a general agreement 

with the Soviet Union. We came to it over a period of time because 

the West made it clear th at the alternative to a detente was not acceptable and could cause very, very severe damage for everyone.

Senator Clark. I quite agree.

We need to negotiate from streng th; we need our European allies 

to help us negotiate from strength. But it occurs to me that we are 

fa r more worried about a Russian movement west into Europe tha n 

any of our European allies who would be among the first to go there.

Even General de Gaulle, whom I know we don’t agree with on many 

matters, thinks tha t this is really a rather obsolete complex and I 

believe this is true of the British and many of our other NATO 

allies. Perhaps, you would comment on why we are so scared when 

they are not.

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, I think t hat we must bear in mind 

since 1947 the total defense budgets of the NATO alliance have been 

on the order of a trillion dollars. I think it would be a great d isaste r 

if we in the West should assume that somehow a new day has dawned 

and, therefore, we need not worry about the practical aspects of security if people on the other side change their minds.

Senator Clark. Let me interrup t to say I quite agree with you and 

I certainly am not a unilateral disarmer.

Secretary Rusk. Right.

Senator Clark. My only view is if the State Department and the 

Defense Department put as much effort in trying to figure out ways 

in which we could persuade the Russians to let down their guard as we 

do to try to persuade the West Germans to put up the ir guard we migh t 

get ahead faster.

DIS ARM AM EN T DI SC USS IO NS W IT H T H E RU SS IA NS

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, I will be glad to review with you 

at some stage the long, very long, discussions I have had in the last 4 

years with Mr. Gromyko, hour afte r hour, wTeek after week, month 

after month, trying to explore the possibilities of resolving some of 

these important differences, particularly afte r the nuclear test ban 

trea ty, trying to find new points on which agreement can be found.

(See p. 131 for chronological list of U.S. activities in the field of 

arms control and disarmament.)

Secretary Rusk. As you know, your committee is looking into the 

question of trade. In the disarmament field they have put forw ard 

approximately 11 points; in the general field of partial measures, we 

put forward about the same number. Unfortunately, still we are 

somewhat in the position of occupying each other’s rear. We have 

not yet found additional points where we can engage each other 

directly as we did in the case of the nuclear test ban treaty.
38 UNIT ED NA TI O NS CHARTE R A M EN D M E N T S

In the case of a comprehensive test ban, for example, their view 

is there can be no onsite inspections, and they pnt this on political' 

grounds, quite apart from what might be the technical or the scientific requirements.

Senator Clark. Aren’t they still talk ing espionage ?

Secretary Rusk. Undoubtedly.

Senator Clark. This is a pre tty obsolete concept in view of our 

methods of intelligence, isn’t it?

Secretary Rusk. Well, this is not espionage, because in connection 

with the test ban treaty it could be worked out in such a way t ha t no 

question of espionage could arise.

But you see in this whole field of inspection and verification, in one 

sense we are asking them for unilateral concessions because when they 

look at us, an open society, with a little persistent inquiry around the 

country, one might call it espionage, they can get pretty completeassurances about what we are doing. We c an’t do the same on their 

side. This is fa r more difficult, and unless we can devise some means for 

giving assurance, providing assurance, and there are improved technical means for putting tha t capability in the hands of international 

bodies.

Senator Clark. Or even into the hands of national bodies.

Secretary Rusk. Within some limits it does require, even so, a good 

deal of international cooperation, but until we can find some way to 

move with assurance, then these problems are going to be extremely 

difficult to work out.

We have made some progress on some points, and I hope tha t when 

we get back to Geneva we can make some additional progress.

Senator Clark. Do you think we will get back to Geneva?

Secretary Rusk. It is o ur hope tha t we can. I may be wrong on 

this, but I think it is probable th at at the end of this present discussion 

in New York th at there will be some further discussions at Geneva. I 

can’t say th at with assurance because we don’t have any agreement of 

those who would be needed to take part. We would be glad to be there.

Senator Clark. Let me say that I sympathize with you very fully.. 

I realize the frustrations in dealing with those very difficult people. I 

understand tha t it has been impossible to make a break. But I want to 

suggest to you th at you and some of your colleagues may be a little bit 

unduly concerned, and I hope Senator Hickenlooper won’t contradict 

me on this, in your almost phobia against Congress being unwilling to 

go along with any really peaceful measures, and I know t hat under our 

system of government you constantly have to be recognizing the hot 

breath of the Congress on your neck.

But I would hope that you would be a little bit more bold in the 

future, and th at some of us who have been coming along a little more 

recently will give you a little courage to move toward peace, because I 

am convinced we should be takin g the initiative there.

I don’t say this in sort of a flabby way of having no definite plan.

Secretary Rusk. I understand.

Senator Clark. You know pre tty well we have a very definite plan 

in this Resolution 32 and perhaps you might want to comment on that.

Secretary Rusk. Senator, let me say, I don’t believe that at the 

present time our problem is here at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue.. 

Our problem is with the other great states involved.
UNIT ED NA TIO NS CHARTE R AM EN DM ENTS 39

Senator Clark. Really one, isn’t it, Russia, and then in the background, China.

Secretary Rusk. In the case of-----

Senator Clark. And De Gaulle, too.

Secretary Rusk. In the case of nuclear testing there is a problem of 

F rance.

Senator Clark. Yes.

Secretary Rusk. And as you know France has not taken its seat at 

Geneva.

Senator Clark. I understand.

Secretary Rusk. The seat lias been vacant throughout this period. 

If in our discussions with the Soviet Union and others and in NATO, 

we saw some opportunities for a major step in the disarmament Held 

I can assure you we would be down here indicatin g we think this is 

possible and consult the Congress about the possibility.

In other words, I don’t think it is Congress that is a drag on progress 

in this field at the present time.

Senator Clark. You think it is the Russians ?

Secretary R usk. I th ink so, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Pell ?

QUEST IO N OF GE NE RA L CH ARTE R RE VI EW

Senator Pell. Secretary Rusk, I find myself in complete support 

of the general line of t hought and views expressed by my colleague, 

Senator Clark.

But to return to the subject of the hearing today, which is the amendments to the Charter of the U.N., my recollection, and having pa rticipated at San Francisco, as you have, was that when we were doing 

this, we were working with a rather imperfect instrument with the 

idea we would definitely have it reviewed within 10 years.

This period of time elapsed and we didn’t. Now we are changing it 

by bits and pieces.

I wonder whether any thought has been given to the idea of a constitutional convention, as we call it in the individual States of the 

United States, or to a general discussion of what changes were needed, 

and then instead of having one or two changes, go into it perhaps more 

comprehensively.

I am thinking of the fact that, as you know from Dumbarton Oaks, 

we rather supported the veto, and then we changed in San Francisco 

to opposing it.

At San Francisco we were all for the Security Council, and this we 

changed after Korea to the General Assembly where the general 

changes in thrust of our own national interests would seem to be answered by general discussion.

Secretary Rusk. Well, I think that we ourselves ought to have a 

continuing procedure within our own Government to examine how the 

United Nations is working and what changes might be effected. It 

is true tha t we modified our view, as you remember personally, sir, on 

the veto. We felt tha t we should retain it under chapter 7 of the 

charter with respect to compulsory action of a military character. 

We, however, were prepared to remove the veto under the Vandenberg and other leadership, on the peaceful procedure sections of the
40 UNIT ED NATI ONS CHARTE R AM EN D M EN TS

charter, chapter 6, and also on the question of new members, but the

Soviet Union indicated it would not accept such changes.

Now, I think it would be unlikely tha t there would be serious interest

in major revisions of the cha rter among the general membership. One 

can imagine, for example, that some would like to see the charter 

amended to take account of the imbalance now between the very large 

number of small countries in relation to those who are carrying the 

major responsibilities, say in the financial field.

But I don’t think tha t the Assembly will ever agree to change the 

situation by which 5 percent of the contributions or 10 percent of the 

population of the world can cast two-thirds of the vote in the General 

Assembly. Tha t would be like changing the arrangements, say, in 

the TT.S. Senate with the size and population of States. I don’t think 

that is a viable proposition.

Senator Pell. I must interpolate here, from the Federal viewpoint, 

we are doing it unilaterally with the States at this point.

Secretary Rusk. That is beyond my present ken, Senator—“ken” 

perhaps is not the word. ,

But now, on general charter review, there have been committee efforts from time to time in the U.N. to take a look at this, but i t has 

been made quite clear by those whose votes would be required, pa rticularly the Soviet Union, tha t a fundamental charter change is not 

in the cards.

I think I should repo rt to you there also have been some indications 

tha t we had better hold pretty closely to the c harter th at we have now, 

because if we were negotiating a charter today we couldn’t get agreement even on this charter.

So, I don’t myself agree that the political prospects for majo r 

changes in the charter are very good, although we ourselves would 

consider and accept a considerable number of changes that we thin k 

would improve the United Nations.

Senator Pell. Thank you, sir.

OU TL OO K ON ART IC LE 1 9 IS SU E

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, perhaps while I had to go out to 

testify fo r a few minutes, you discussed article 19.

Are you optimistic about the U.N. surviving this crisis ?

Secretary Rusk. Diplomacy has to move on the basis of optimism, 

Mr. Chairman, so that I am professionally committed to optimism. I 

do believe there is a serious desire on th e pa rt of all of the members 

to find some solution.

Now, this is easy to say, and easy fo r everybody to say, and it still 

doesn’t produce a solution. The Committee of 33 is at work as I reported to the committee while you were out. There also are private 

discussions among some of the key delegations.

Mr. Stevenson will be here this week and I would hope that he would 

have a chance for a few minutes with the committee m executive session to bring you up to date on the feel of those discussions tha t are 

going on in New York.

I th ink it is important and necessary for the United Nations to resolve this problem. I think i t will be resolved, but we are a long way 

from it at the moment. We don’t see the blue sky immediately ahead
UNITE D NATIO NS CHAR TER AM EN DM EN TS 41

USE OF VETO IN SECURITY COUNCIL

The Chairman. With regard to the veto, you said in your initial 

statement th at this in no way disturbs our right of veto in the Security 

Council.

Secretary Rusk. That is right, sir.

The Chairman. But haven’t we by long practice sort of prided ourselves in not having used it to the point where we are almost committed 

not to use it ?

Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, this is perhaps a little indiscreet, 

but-----

The Chairman. We would like for you to be indiscreet.

Secretary Rusk. But the Unite d States does feel very strongly t ha t 

particularly in those matters involving the peaceful settlement of disputes we should not inject the veto.

You remember the resolution proposed by this committee at one 

stage suggesting we change the charter to eliminate the veto from 

chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter, in effect, and from the question of membership. But I think it is fai r to say th at we have never 

been confronted with a situation th at was vital enough to our interests 

to require the veto—where we needed to use our veto to block the 

action that was beingproposed.

In other words, the voting situ ation in the Security Council did not 

really require consideration of the use of the veto.

The Chairman. You don’t think that we have created a situation in 

which we would be very embarrassed to use it in case the need arose?

Secretary Rusk. I think if we used the veto this would be looked 

upon as a major development but I would tell you th at under the law 

and the charter, I would not myself hesitate to recommend it if the 

situation required it in the national interests.

The Chairman. Do you have anything furthe r ?

I wonder if Mr. Cleveland wishes to carry on this morning? He is 

due to come tomorrow, but we have 40 minutes before noon, if you 

want to continue this morning. We could release the Secretary, if 

you are through with everything you wish to say.

Does any member of the committee wish to ask the Secretary anythin g further?

If not, we can go ahead with Mr. Cleveland and it will shorten 

tomorrow’s meeting.

Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, if I could make one remark along 

Senator Clark’s comment? We are now in the 20th anniversary year 

of the United Nations and although these particu lar amendments are 

fairly simple as far as the issues are concerned and quite stra ightforward as to their effect, I do hope that this will be the occasion for 

the Senate to give some thoughtful discussion to the United Nations, 

its role, and its future. If there are ideas about the way in which the 

United Nations might be improved or ideas about the way in which 

future charter amendments might be considered, we, on our side, 

would be glad to have those become a p art of the discussion.

The Chairman. Well, we will certainly be glad to do that.

My own private opinion is that the organization is not so bad. The 

difficulty arises from the wisdom of those who try to make it operate..
42 UNIT ED N A TIO N S C HA RTER A M EN D M EN TS

It is not the machinery t hat falls down every now’ and then. It is the 

people who operate it.

Secretary Rusk. That frequently happens in human affairs, Mr. 

Chairman.

The Chairman. I am a fraid it does.

Mr. Cleveland, is it all right for you to continue this morning?

Mr. Cleveland. I w ould be glad to.

The Chairman. Does anyone want to ask the Sec retary anything?

Well, you can go back and solve the Vietnamese crisis. I sure wish you would do something about that. We are giving you 

30 minutes extra. I want to announce that the Secretary will be meeting with the com­ mittee in executive session on Friday morning fo r a discussion on matters other than the one we had this morning. Mr. Cleveland, we are very fortunate in having you here. I see no 

reason why we shouldn't proceed, if it is agreeable with you.

STATEMENT OF HARLAN CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

STATE FOR INTERNATION AL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Mr. Cleveland. Mr. Chairman, I have no independent testimony 

or prepared statements beyond those th at the Secretary has given this 

morning.

The Chairman. 1 take it there is no difference between you and the 

Secretary about the wisdom of these amendments?

Mr. Cleveland. I agree with him thoroughly.

The Chairman. This time there is agreement within the administration.

Mr. Cleveland. I might suggest, Mr. Chairman, it might be useful 

to have in the record the three charts which w’e have up here on the 

easel, and perhaps I can say just a w’ord about them.

The Chairman. Certainly.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 43

/( T h e c h a rts r e fe rre d to f o ll o w :)

C h a r t I

EFFECT OF AMEHDMEHT OF TH E

U H CHARTER OH THE DI STRIS UT ION

OF HOH RERFAAHEHT SEATS OH THE

Present Membership of UN Excluding

5 Permanent Members of the Security Council

Original Membership of UN Excluding

5 Permanent Members of the Security Council

Total 4 6 Excluding the 5 Permanent

Security Council Members

Total 109 Excluding the 5 Permanent

Security Council Members

AVERAGE Distribution (1 960-1 965)

Non-Permanent Seats on the Security Council

FUTURE Distribution of Non-Perm anent

Total Non-Permanent Security Council

Seats a t Pre se nt- 6

LEGEND

00 X * Membership

00% ■ Security Council Seat*

Total Non-P erm anent Se curity Council

Seats under Proposed Amendment-10
44 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

Cha rt I I

GEOGRAPHICAL ALLOCATION O F SECURIT Y COUNCIL SEA TS

AL LO CA TIO N NUMBER OF MEMBERS I9 6 0 1961 19 62 1963 19 64 19 65

PRESENT AVER.

DISTRIBUTION

OF SEATS

FUTURf

distribution

W1T» ENLARGEMENT 1846 <966

PERM A N EN T

M E M B E R S

U.S.

U.K.

FRANCE

CH INA

US SR

5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

R E G IO N A L

A LLOCATIO N

WESTERN EUROPE

AND ‘ OTHERS' IO 18 ITALY IRELAND

(SPLIT TERM)

NORWAY NORWAY NETHERLANDS 1 2

L A T IN

A M E R IC A 20 22 ARGENTINA

ECUADOR

CH ILE

ECUADOR

CHILE

VENEZUELA

BRAZIL

VENEZUELA

BRAZIL

BOLIVIA

URUGUAY

BOLIV IA 2 2

A F R IC A

A N D

A S IA

12 60 CEYLON

TU NISIA

CEYLON

U.AR

LIBERIA

(PUT TERM)

TURKEY

(PUT TERM)

GHANA

U.A.R.

GHANA

MOROCCO

PHILIPPINES

(suit term)

IVORY COAST

MOROCCO

IVORY COAST

JORDAN

MALAYSIA

(SPLIT TERM)

Z'/i 5

EA ST ERN

EU RO PE 4 9

POLAND

(SPLIT TERM)

RUMANIA

(SPLIT TERM)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(SPLIT TERM) % 1

51 114 11 15

Cha rt I I I

GEOGRAPHICAL ALLO CAT ION OE ECOSOC SEA TS

ALLOCATION NUMBER OF MEMBERS 1965

PRESENT AVERAGE

DISTRIBU TION

OF SE AT S

F U T U R E

D IS T R IB U T IO N

1 9 4 5 1 9 6 5 WITH ENLARGEMENT

U .S . 1 1 U.S. 1 1

L A T IN

A M E R IC A 20 22

ARGEN TINA

C H IL E

E C U A D O R

P E R U

4 5

WESTERN EUROPE 

AN D‘ OTHERS" 

( including u. k . 

AND FRANCE)

12 20

U. K .

F R A N C E

A U S T R IA

LUXE M BOURG

C A N A D A

5 6

A F R IC A

AN D

A S IA

13 61

J A P A N

A L G E R IA

IR A Q

P A K IS T A N

G A B O N

5 12 rEA ST ER N

EUROPE

(INCLUDING USSR) 5

“ 5T

10

114

U S S R

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

R U M A N IA 3

18

3
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 45

DIS TR IB UTI ON OF N O N PE R M A N EN T SE CU RIT Y COU NCIL SE AT S

Mr. Cleveland. Mr. Chairman, this first one at first glance is a little 

complicated but I think it tells an interesting story.

This is an analysis of the original, and then the proposed, distribution of nonpermanent members of the Security Council. This analysis 

excludes the five permanent members to see how the rest of the percentage would come out.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Cleveland. The original membership of the U.N. excluding the 

5 permanent members shows that Latin America accounted for 43 

percent; 9 percent was Eastern Europe; 22 percent West European; 

and 26 percent Afro-Asian, the 12 Afro-Asians that the Secretary re-

„ ferred to.

The Chairman. Tha t is all of Africa and all of Asia?

Mr. Cleveland. All of Africa and all of Asia. There were only at 

tha t time two African States, the Ethiopians and Liberians who were

s, independent states.

The Chairman. This is when, 1946 ?

Mr. Cleveland. This is the original membership which signed the 

charter in 1945.

The present membership of the U.N., still excluding the 5 permanent 

members, shows more than h alf of the total as Afro-Asians, 55 percent, 

with only 22 Latin American States, just 2 more—Jamaica and Tr inidad and Tobago—than there were before; 9 Eastern European States, 

8 percent, and 18 Western European States and others.

This is a new form of words adopted in the resolutions on these 

charter amendments to cover in effect the old commonwealth; that is 

Australia, New Zealand, Canada, thrown into the pot with Western 

Europe, rather than with the Western Hemisphere in the case of Canada, and with Asia in the case of Australia and New Zealand.

Now, the average distribution in the last 5 years of these nonpermanent seats has worked out to the Afro-Asians having 42 percent of 

the seats as against their 55 percent in the General Assembly, the Latin 

Americans being in this sense overrepresented in 33 percent of the 

seats with 20 percent of the membership, and the Western Europeans 

and Eastern Europeans being roughly about rig ht in terms of the 

membership distribution.

The future distribution, as you will see, still underrepresents the 

Afro-Asian States by 5 perc ent; t hat is, they would have half of the

- nonpermanent seats in the Security Council, whereas they have 55 per ­

cent of the comparable seats in the General Assembly.

The Latin American States would be brought to 20 percent, which 

is just their percentage of the total membership.

. Eastern European States would have 10 percent and the Western

European and others would have 20 percent of the nonpermanent 

seats.

The Chairman. Does this amendment make it rigid with regard 

to geography ?

Mr. Cleveland. Yes; there is in effect a written gentlemen’s agreement now passed in the resolution by which the charter amendments 

were put-----

The Chairman. Heretofore there was no such requirement on geography. Just a gentlemen’s agreement ?

47-3 78— 65------ 4
46 U N IT ED NA TIO NS CHARTE R A M EN DM ENTS

Mr. Cleveland. It was a gentlemen’s agreement but also on a geographical basis.

Senator Pell. To interpolate, didn’t we violate the gentlemen’s 

agreement once ?

Mr. Cleveland. Well, ever since the gentlemen’s agreement was ar ­

rived at the gentlemen have been arguing about it.

The Eastern Europeans, for example, claim the gentlemen’s agreement reserved one seat for them but in practice they have only had a 

seat about half the time and the rest of the time the growing Asian 

group has managed to have the seat in the alternate years. This has 

resulted in these split terms that have become quite familiar.

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Cleveland a 

question ?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator H ickenlooper. I s it true, Mr. Secretary, that two-thirds of 

the members of the U.N., tha t is in numbers, represent only 10 percent 

of the world’s population and pay only 5 percent o f the U.N. budget?

Mr. Cleveland. Yes, sir.

Rather a little less than 5 percent of the budget. And this is the 

center of the apportionm ent problem. The political effect of the charter amendments here, of the enlargement of the councils, is to prevent 

a situation in which the general membership, the small countries in 

particular, lose their sense of participation in these smaller and more 

effective councils to such an extent tha t their cooperation with these 

smaller organs of the United Nations tends to fall off.

The other political effect is tha t since the distribution of seats is 

arrived at by an election held in the General Assembly without any 

veto applying, the General Assembly ma jority does in fact have the 

votes to raid seats previously allocated under the gentlemen’s agreement to L atin America and Western Euro pe if enough room isn’t created in these councils for the very large number of new states.

This chart here shows the increase in number of members by these 

geographical categories in which the present gentlemen’s agreement is 

described.

The Chairman. Wha t is the increase in Eastern Euro pe from four 

to n ine; who are the new ones ?

Mr. Cleveland. Well, some of the E aste rn Europeans weren’t in in 

the beginning, you remem ber; Hungary.

The Chairman. I see. They have been in sometime, though.

Air. Cleveland. Many of them were occupied a t the time and were 

not really independent countries at tha t moment in history.

The Chairman. Tha t is right.

So, your increase is prim arily in Africa and Asia?

Mr. Cleveland. Africa and Asia, it is the decolonization process, 

of course, that has created it.

The Chairman. Yes.

DIS TR IB U TI ON OF E CONOM IC AN D SO CIAL C O U N CIL SEAT S

Mr. Cleveland. The third chart is simply the same story for the 

Economic and Social Council where you don’t have a veto, of course, 

and where you operate not by two-thirds but by majo rity vote.

Here, again, are the number of members by geographical area. In 

this case the analysis includes the permanent members of the Security
UN IT ED NATI ONS CHARTE R A M EN DM ENTS 47

•'Council because they do n’t ha ve a ny special status in th e E con omic an d 

Social Council exc ept they are always elected to it.

The Chairman. Al wa ys members ?

Mr. Cleveland. Well, exce pt the Chinese. In recent ye ars t he C hi ­

nese Na tionalists hav e no t been elected to th e Eco nom ic an d Soc ial Council. They are v ery res entfu l o f t his , a nd indeed a bstai ne d on th is •ch arte r amend ment on th at gro und. Th ey agr eed to th e Se cu rit y Council one bu t absta ine d on the Eco nom ic and Soc ial Council one. We don ’t know wh at effect th at may hav e at the ratifica tio n stage. Th is is the presen t avera ge distr ibution of seats making up the 18 

in th e Economic an d S ocial Council. The Am eric an deleg ation has alw ays h ad one seat, L at in A meri cans four, W estern Eu ro pe five, Af ric a and As ia five, a nd Eas tern Eu ro pe inc lud ing the U SS R thr ee. The Comm unists wou ld sta y th e sam e; Africa and Asia, of course, would get the big boost, 12; W estern E u ­ rop e and others—6 to take care of the Comm onw ealth gro u p ; L at in Am eric a—5 as ag ain st 4; and, of cours e, the Am erican seat re pr es en ting the new tot al of 27. Tha t is all the dir ect testimo ny th at I th in k I need to ad d to wha t the S ecr etary lias said and what Am bassa dor Stevenson will be s ay ing 

tom orrow mo rnin g.

ARTICLE 19 CONTROVERSY

The Chairman. Do you have an yt hi ng to say abo ut th is artic le 19 

controv ersy , in ad ditio n to wh at the Se cretary ha d to say ?

Mr. Cleveland. Well , Mr. Ch air man, I th in k th at the im po rtan t 

thing abo ut it is to ma ke a pr etty cle ar distinctio n betw een wha t we would call the a utho riz ation stage an d wh at we w ould call the ap pro ­

pr iatio n stage of th e U.N. peacekeeping. As fa r as the au thor ization stage is conc erned as to who can auth or­ ize a U .N. pea cekeeping opera tion, I th ink we w ould have t o say th at th e pre sen t sit ua tio n is about righ t. T hat is, the Se cu rity Counc il is the first p ort o f call in a peace and sec urity m atter. Th ere is th e escape hatch of the u nitin g fo r peace res olu tion int o the Ge neral Ass embly. Th e Gen eral Ass emb ly does in fa ct hav e, and the Sovie ts ca n’t remove, the residu al powe r to act by recom mendatio n as it did, fo r exam ple, in th e only exam ple in h ist ory, in the case of the U.N. Em er ­

gency Force in the Mid dle Ea st in 1956. Of th e 12 peac eke eping opera tions, that is operat ion s using m ili ta ry pers onnel, in the U.N. ’s his tor y, only one has been au thorized by the 

General Assembly. Wh en you come to th e fina ncia l sta ge all larg e pea cek eep ing op era­ tions have had some element of vo lu ntar y co ntr ibu tio n, some of the m hav e been pa rtly or mo stly financed by assessmen ts in th e Ge neral Assem bly. Es senti all y the issue is ho w fa r will the Gener al Ass emb ly be willin g to use an d enforce its powe r to tax , if th at req uir es some enf orcement ag ains t a majo r power? Tha t, essentially, has been the political difficulty ri ght along in th e Ge ner al Assembly, and this 

is som ething t hat only th e Gener al Ass emb lv can decide.

W e can ’t, of course, decide th at all b y ourselves. The neg otiations will be continuing . Th e dea dlin e fo r some kind of resolution of th is pro blem is the 1st of Septe mb er when the 19th General Assembly reconvenes, a c oup le of weeks before the 20th Ge neral A ssembly g ets un derw ay late r th at same mo nth.
48 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

The Chairman. They are now negotiating about a possibility of 

some solution?

Mr. Cleveland. They are. Now, I think it would be fair to say that 

there are desultory conversations about a solution, focused particularly 

on the problem of how to get the U.N. back to reasonable solvency, and 

w’hat kind of a fund or what kind of contributions might be made by 

the Soviets and others to assist in doing that.

But we frankly don’t know whether the Soviets are going to be willing to pay something on their past debts or not, or to pay something on 

any basis.

But, regardless of what happens on that side, with respect to the 

past, it does seem to us to be important to preserve and enlarge, if we 

can, the capacity of the organization to build and pay fo r peace forces, 

because it looks as if there is going to be no lack of need for sitting on 

the lid in local and regional disputes here and th ere around the world 

as we go along.

The Chairman. Any questions ?

ADVISOR Y OPI NIO N OF IN TER NATI ONAL COURT

Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Cleveland, what can you tell us about 

the authority of an advisory opinion of the Internationa l Court, such 

as was given at the request of the General Assembly on the payment of 

peacekeeping assessments.

The charter, T believe, says that the General Assembly can ask for 

an advisory opinion from the Internation al Court of Justice, and in 

another provision it says tha t certain disputes shall be submitted to the 

Internatio nal Court of Justice.

Now, what is the difference? It seems pretty clear that under certain circumstances they have already agreed to submit certain things 

to the Internatio nal Court, and in other circumstances it seems that 

the General Assembly may ask for an advisory opinion from the In ­

ternational Court.

What is the attitude of the General Assembly on the sanctity of that 

advisory opinion or its authority ?

Do they recognize it, or do they say, “Th at is only an advisory 

opinion. It dosn’t mean anything. It is subject to acceptance or refusal of our various countries as they see fit.”

Mr. Cleveland. Well, of course, it is subject to acceptance by the 

General Assembly which asked for the opinion.

In the financing case, the General Assembly asked for the opinion 

and the opinion was given. The General Assembly then accepted th at 

by an overwhelming vote.

In other words, the General Assembly took the Court’s advisory 

opinion on the law and said this would be the policy for the General 

Assembly.

Senator H ickenlooper. On the question of acceptance, did they say 

that sometimes there is a dispute as to what the word “acceptance” 

means? Did they take it in the context of, “Well, we will receive the 

opinion and file it, or we will receive the opinion and abide by it as a 

governing rule of the General Assembly ?”

Mr. Cleveland. Well, it was understood that they were accepting 

it, and that this implied that the General Assembly would be guided 

by it.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 49

Now, there are two problems which have come up since then. One 

is the reluctance of the small country majority of the General Assembly to uphold that law and tha t policy when it came to a specific 

case in which article 19 would have to be applied to a major power, 

a permanent member of the Security Council.

And secondly, the Soviets and the French also have taken the line, 

in effect, tha t the advisory opinion was advisory, the acceptance by 

the General Assembly which can only make recommendations was 

a recommendation to governments, and they, for their p art, don’t accept the recommendation from the General Assembly. Therefore, 

neither the advisory opinion nor its acceptance by the General Assembly, against which they voted, is binding on the Soviets in their 

legal view.

Senator Hickenlooper. Yes; I understand that is their view, but 

do I also understand that the General Assembly has not officially taken 

the position tha t the advisory opinion of the Internatio nal Court is 

binding on the General Assembly so far as assessments are concerned ?

Mr. Cleveland. An advisory opinion is an authoritative statement 

of the law, but is not binding on governments in the way, for example, 

that a decision of the Court in a contentious case might be binding and 

enforceable since there are no contending parties in an advisory case 

on which the decision is binding.

It is advisory to an organ of the U.N., and it is up to that organ 

to decide what to do with that authoritative advice.

In this case, that organ, the General Assembly, took the advice, 

accepted it, and those of us who voted for tha t acceptance, I think, 

have a right to believe that the General Assembly would consider itself 

bound by th at law, even if individual governments who voted against 

it did not. The Secretary General has recently considered himself 

to be bound by the Assembly’s acceptance of the Court’s opinion.

But so far, at least, the General Assembly has n ot been willing to 

carry that law into practice in the particular case even though the 

particular case seems to us to be constitutionally and legally quite 

clear.

Mr. Schwebel, of the Legal Adviser’s Office is present; perhaps 

he should join me in this legal discussion.

NA TIO NS IN ARREARS ON PE AC EK EE PIN G ASSESS MENTS

Senator H ickenlooper. How many members of the United Nations 

are in default in their assessments for peacekeeping operations ?

Mr. Cleveland. There are 12 that are behind by in excess of the 

2-year rule in article 19. There are, of course, a great many more 

than tha t who are not fully paid up at any particular moment in 

history.

As a matter of fact, we, of course, have not in most years, we don’t 

pay our general budget assessment until the latter part of the year, 

so tha t-----

Senator Hickenlooper. Tha t comes from the appropriation process 

in this country. We have to wait until the authorization and the 

appropriation goes through Congress.

Mr. Cleveland. Yes, exactly.
50 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

Perhaps the way to look a t it is what countries have paid nothing on the Congo and the U.N. emergency force which are the two contentious items here. At the present time there are 18 countries tha t have never paid anything on the United Nations emergency force since it was set up in 1956, and 29 countries tha t have not paid anything on the Congo force. These figures are, of course, dramatically different, much lower than the number of countries tha t had never paid anything at the time tha t we were discussing the bond issue, the U.N. loan up here 3 years ago when as many as half of the total membership of 

the U.N. had not paid a dime on the Congo.

Senator H ickenlooper. Most of these countries still want the benefits, if any, of the U.N., but they want the United States and a few 

others to pay the bills, is tha t correct ?

U.S . CO NT RIBU TIO N TO U .N . BUDGET

Mr. Cleveland. Well, I think tha t there is tha t tendency in this 

club. By and large, I thin k that the amounts tha t we pay in the U.N. are quite fair and reasonable if you take the proportion that our production bears to the aggregate national products of all the U.N. countries. We come out at somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 percent or a little more, we have more than 40 percent of the 

tota l gross national product of all U.N. members. And our normal budget scale is 32 percent, a little less than 32 

this year.

Senator Hickenlooper. When you say 40 percent you are considering the special agencies and various others in addition to the normal 

assessments, aren’t you ?

Mr. Cleveland. What I am saying is, if you take our total production and compare it with the total production of all of the other U.N. members we are about 40 percent of the economic strength of 

the U.N. membership.

Senator Hickenlooper. But if you take our contributions to all of 

the agencies, the whole ball of wax, not a loan, but the specific assessments to the semi-independent, agencies or those th at we contribute to, 

doesn’t our contribution rise up above 40 percent of total ?

Mr. Cleveland. Oh, no, it would work out probably around 37 percent, somewhere in that area. Because we have placed a ceiling on nearly all of our voluntary contributions at 40 percent of the total and none of the assessed scales places us above our U.N. percentage, which is 32 percent, approximately, and in many of the specialized agencies we pay a good deal less, our percentage averages out at about 

37 percent. ILO we pay 25 percent, the Universal Postal Union we pay 4x

/2 

percent.

SALE OF U .N . BONDS

Senator Hickenlooper. How are we doing on the sale of U.N. 

bonds ?

Mr. Cleveland. Well, the period of the sale for the U.N. bonds 

has now run out, and the total tha t has actually been purchased is $169,910,000. (See p. 137 fo r information on U.N. bonds.)

Senator Hickenlooper. Wh at was the total authorized issue?
UN IT ED NA TI ONS CHARTE R AM EN DM ENTS 51

Mr. Cleveland. $200 million. And of th at we hav e bo ug ht $76.2 

million. We are no t quite up to the 50-percent match ing th at was 

autho rized. Th e form al position is th at we wou ld still be in a pos itio n to—this was an open ended ap prop ria tio n, we w ould still be in a 

position to ma tch u p to the to tal am ounts purc hased by ot he r na tio ns , 

dep end ing , however, on how thes e constituti onal an d financ ial questions work out an d wh eth er th at seems to be adv isable in th e fu tu re 

or not.

We have been repa id on our b ond s as have all the othe r bond ho lders, r ig ht on tim e and in full, fo r prin cipa l an d interest.

Se na tor H ickenlooper. Do they conte mp late an othe r bond issue 

at th e m ome nt ?

- Mr. Cleveland. N o; the re is no ta lk of a no ther bon d issue a t a ll.

Se nator H ickenlooper. How are they g oin g to pa y th ei r bills ?

Mr. Cleveland. Most of the ta lk up there in the course of these 

negotiations has been in term s of v olun tary c ontributio ns to a fu nd t o

'•* pu t the U.N . back in full solvency. W he ther such an arrang em en t

can be -worked out, o f course, d epe nds on whether the S oviets are go ing 

to be prep ared to pa y anything th at is usable fo r pa st debts in any 

form, which, so f ar , they have not been willing to do.

Se nator H ickenlooper. Th an k you.

The Chairman. Mr. Case?

Senator Case. No questions.

The Chairman. Tha nk you very muc h, Mr. Cleveland . I guess 

th at is all t his morning.

The com mittee is a djo urn ed.

(W her eup on, at 11 :50 a.m., th e com mittee adjou rned, to reconv ene 

at 10 a.m., Th ursd ay , A pr il 29,1965.)

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

TH U RSD AY , A PR IL 29 , 19 65

U nited States Sena te,

Committee on F oreign Relations,

Washington, D.G.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in room 

4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Ful bright (chairman) presiding.

Pres ent: Senators Fulbright, Church, Clark, McCarthy, and 

Carlson.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

The committee is meeting this morning to receive additional testimony on two amendments to the United Nations Charter which pro ­

vide for an increase in the membership of the Security Council and the 

Economic and Social Council.

Our witness today is Mr. Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. Representative 

to the United Nations.

We will also hear from public witnesses whose formal presentation 

will be limited to 10 minutes. Lengthier statements may of course 

be submitted and introduced in the record of the committee’s printed 

hearings.

Mr. Stevenson, we are very pleased to have you this morning. Do 

you have a prepared statement ?

STATEMENT OF HON. ADLAI E. STEVENSON, U.S. REPRESENTA TIVE

TO THE UNITED NATIONS; ACCOMPANIED BY HARLAN CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTE RNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION AFF AIR S

Ambassador Stevenson. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in his statement before this committee yesterday, the Secretary of State pointed out to you the very important part the United 

Nations plays in the conduct of our affairs and the way in which it 

helps to serve our national interests.

I would like to discuss with you today in somewhat more detail th e 

proposed charter amendments and how they would affect the work of 

the organization.

Before doing so, I feel it is necessary, however, to clear up one 

misapprehension tha t has had too much currency: Tha t is, due to the 

adjournment of the General Assembly this winter, due to unha ppy 

circumstances following its postponement, th at the United Nations is

53
.54 U N IT E D NATI ONS CHARTE R AM EN DM ENTS

a dead or dying institution. The fact is th at while the General Assembly has been inactive for some months, the United Nations is in 

full operation, in some respects on a scale greater than ever before. 

One might say simply that its parliamentary arm is temporarily 

disabled.

The United Nations and its subbodies continue to debate matters 

of moment, to administer aid and technical assistance programs which 

are of benefit to millions of people, to mediate disputes, to maintain 

peacekeeping operations and to carry out a multitude of continuing responsibilities conferred upon it by p ast General Assemblies.

H IS TO R Y OF CHA RTE R A M EN D M EN TS

Allow me now to review with you briefly some of the history behind 

the charter amendments which you are now called upon to approve 

for ratification.

When the charter was adopted in 1945, there were 51 members of 

the United Nations. The charter provided for a Security Council 

of 11 members, the 5 permanent members, the United States, the 

United Kingdom, France, China, and the Soviet Union; each with a 

veto, and 6 nonpermanent members, 3 elected each year for a 2-year 

term. It furt her provided for an Economic and Social Council of 18 

members, 6 elected each year for a term of 3 years.

In the Security Council, a 1945 “Gentlemen's Agreement," which 

I negotiated in London, governed the first, election of the six nonpermanent members. This agreement allocated two seats to Latin 

America (then the largest single group of members) and one seat 

each to Western Europe, the British Commonwealth, the Middle 

East and Africa, and Eastern Europe. This allocation was subsequently followed in most other elections, although with the growth of 

African and Asian membership and with the hostile attitude long 

shown toward the United Nations by the countries of Eastern Eu ­

rope, Asian and African countries often filled the seat originally allocated to Eastern Europe.

In 1946, there was only one Asian member (the Philippines) besides China and Ind ia (which was eligible for the Commonwealth 

seat), seven Middle Eastern members and two African members 

(Ethiopia and Liberia) in addition to South Africa, which was then 

eligible for the Commonwealth seat.

Since 1945, however, the membership of the United Nations has 

more than doubled to 114. Now the Africans and Asians, including 

those from the Middle East, constitute well over one-half (61) of the 

total membership, an d the size of the councils has remained precisely 

the same.

As the membership has grown, there have been constantly increasing 

pressures for enlargement of the two councils. The first proposal for 

enlargement came from the Latin American countries after 16 new 

members were a dmitted in 1955. Over the years, the United States 

has consistently supported a reasonable increase in the membership
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 55

of t he councils, bu t un til 1964 any increase was a lwa ys blo cked by the 

Sov iet Union , which con tended th at there could be no increa se unless 

an d un til Comm unist Ch ina was sea ted in the Un ite d Na tions.

As early as 1956, you may be inter ested to know, Vice Pr es id en t 

Hub ert Hu mph rey, then a S enato r and a member of our deleg ation to 

the 11th Gener al Assembly, said in plen ary session th at , an d I quote :

The United States was alre ady well disposed to an enlargement of the Security Council when so many new members were admitted.

We feel— 

he went on—

th at it is proper and just, in the intere sts of the main tenance of inter natio nal 

peace and secu rity th at such an increase should tak e place. We hope the General Assembly will approve the increase now.

As it t urne d out, how ever, the enlar gemen t resolu tion cal led fo r at 

the 11th G ene ral Assem bly was n ot pressed to a vote bec ause of Sovie t 

opp osition, and because m embers could no t a gre e on th e size of the enlargeme nt or on th e distr ibution of s eats on an enlar ged Cou ncil.

Wh en enlar geme nt amend ments came to a vote in the 18th Ge neral 

Asse mbly in Dec emb er 1963, the U ni ted St ates and the Uni ted K in gdom abs tained while th e Soviet U nio n a nd Fra nc e voted a ga inst. Ou r 

abs tention in 1963 was n ot, however, due to op position to th e sub stance 

of th e resolution s, bu t ra th er because the y wer e adopted at the end of 

the Assem bly session. Las t min ute changes w ere m ade in the p rop osed 

size of the e nla rgem ents and, in th e fast- mov ing pa rliam en tary situ ation , we ha d insufficient tim e fo r renewed consultations with Members of the Congress and our United Na tio ns allies. He nce we 

abstained.

ADVANTAGES OF SECURITY COUNCIL ENLARGEMENT

Allow me now to review briefly f or you the specific ad va ntag es wh ich 

we believe enlar geme nt of the Se curity Council wou ld bring an d to 

set them in the conte xt o f th e new voting alin ements they w ould create.

Th e Se curity Coun cil is the body p rim arily res pon sible f or pe ace and 

security problems. I f the enlarg em ent am end ments were to be ratified , 

the new geograp hic distr ibution of seats, wr itten into res olu tions 

adopted by the Assem bly, wou ld go into effect. Tha t new d istribut ion 

would be, in ad ditio n to th e pe rm anent m embers, five from Afric an and 

As ian states, one fro m Ea ster n Eu ro pe an states, two fro m Lat in 

Am eric a and two fro m wh at is called the “W estern Eu ro pe an and 

oth ers ” categ ory whic h includes t he old Commonwe alth m em be rs: th at 

is to say, Canada, A us tra lia , and New Zealand.

We conside r th is to rep res ent a fa ir alloca tion to im po rtan t geo ­

gr ap hic areas, a nd from the deb ate wh ich took place in 1963, we believe 

it both meets th e dem and s of tho se gr ou ps whose me mb ership has 

gro wn so quickly since the fo un ding of the Un ite d Na tio ns, and pr otec ts th e pr op er par tic ip atio n o f ot hers in th e Council.
56 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

Allow me to point out also that in the absence of an increase in the 

number of seats on the Security Council, the areas which now consider 

themselves underrepresented can be expected to seek to increase their 

participation by putting up candidates for seats now held by other 

areas. The Council has already seen cases in which such conflicting 

regional pressures have resulted in “split” seats in which one area 

shares one-half of a 2-year term with another. This has occurred in 

the following instances: 1956-57, Yugoslavia-Philippines; 1960-61, 

Poland-T urke y; 1961-62, Lib eria-Ireland ; 1962-63, R uma nia-Philippines ; 1964-65, Czechoslovakia-Malaysia.

As a permanent member, our seat is of course in no danger, but 

seats belonging to Latin America, Western Europe, and other firm 

supporters of the United Nations might be taken away in such an 

unpredictable situation, unless there was an increase in the membership.

VOTING AL INEM EN T ON SECURITY COUNCIL

. As for voting alinements, we face, as one does in any parliamentary 

situation, two contingencies: one, where we desire to have approved a 

resolution which we consider to be in the interests of international 

peace and security, and the opposite, where we wish to prevent passage of a resolution of which we do not approve. In both these situations, it is our considered judgment tha t the voting alinements under 

the new allocation, with a majority requirement of 9, would not differ 

materially from the present one, th e situation of 11 members and a 

majority of 7.

Why, one m ight well ask, is the voting majority of a 15-member 

council as low as 9 ?

We believe, as do a majority of United Nations members, tha t the 

Council’s ability to act in a positive way is enhanced by the 9-vote 

majo rity which was, during the negotiations on the resolutions, cut 

down from an earlier proposal for a 10-vote majority.

We have always played a major role in supporting the ability of the 

Council to act in a positive way; we have continually supported its 

authority; the United States has helped to make the Council work. 

And we believe t ha t under the proposed new voting balance we will 

be just as able as under the old arrangement to promote our national 

aims, and those of world peace thro ugh the Security Council.

The nine-vote majority will be a great aid to us and to other likeminded nations who wish the Council to act expeditiously in the cause 

of world peace.

There are, of course, resolutions introduced from time to time which 

we do not wish to see passed, resolutions which we believe to be contra ry to the development of orderly international relations. The veto 

is still available to us in order to defend our own national interests. 

But we expect that, as in the past, our policies would be in harmony 

with those of a majority of Council members and we would not, as a
UN ITED NA TIO NS CH AR TE R AM EN DM EN TS 57

result of Security Council enlargement, be more likely to have to cast 

a veto than now. If we wish to impede passage of a resolution without use of th e veto, the voting proportions to defeat a proposal in the enlarged Council would be substantially the same as they have been in 

the present one.

R E SPO N SIB IL IT IE S OF ECONOM IC AND SO CIAL C O U N CIL

Since the Economic and Social council is a somewhat less prominent 

United Nations body, I will describe to you briefly its areas of responsibility. Under the direction of the General Assembly, the Economic 

and Social Council operates in the fields of technical assistance, of the 

practical application of science and technology, and of the promotion 

and protection of human righ ts throughout the world. It initiates 

studies, recommendations, and conferences in these areas and coordinates the activities of all United Nations specialized agencies.

The Chairman. Does it deal with population control?

Ambassador Stevenson. Yes.

The Chairman. Has it done anythin g about it ?

Ambassador Stevenson. Well, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council have adopted several resolutions, some initi­ ated by the Population Commission—which has made important, 

significant, and, I think, majo r contributions to an understanding of 

the problem of population. The Commission is a highly qualified 

commission of demographic experts.

background on enlargement of economic and social council

With the expansion of United Nations membership, an Economic 

and Social Council made up of only 18 members has become less than 

sufficiently representative to carry out these tasks. It has been losing 

touch with some nations or groups o f nations, and it has been losing support and not accomplishing all that the United Nations and we 

could wish in the broad area of economic and social development.

This problem was recognized by the members of E COSO C as early 

as 1958. Again in 1963, as a culmination of this growing recognition, 

the Councii considered a resolution of the Economic Commission for 

Africa regarding African representation in the Council and urged the 

General Assembly to increase the membership of the Council “in order 

that it can remain the effective and representative organ envisaged in 

chapters IX and X of the charter.” The following December, at the same time it adopted the cha rter 

amendments, the General Assembly invited the Council to enlarge 

the membership of its sessional committees: The Economic Committee, the Social Committee, and the Coordination Committee. This the 

Council did at its resumed session only a few days later, increasing the 

membership in each committee from 18 to 27.
58 UN ITED NA TIO NS CH AR TER AM EN DM EN TS

As a re sult, dur in g th e 37 th session of the Econ omic a nd Soc ial Co uncil in the sum mer of 1964, th e three sessiona l com mittees consisted of 

27 mem bers , alt ho ug h the Counc il its elf still ha d only 18. Th e ni ne 

countries w hich were members of the com mittees b ut not of the Council its elf were ac cord ed observer s tatus at Cou ncil m eetings. Th e nin e 

ad ditio na l countrie s play ed th ei r fu ll role in the wo rk of t he c ommittees, and in ad d:

t ion they pa rtic ip at ed fu lly in Council debates bu t 

with ou t th e ri gh t to vote.

As a resu lt of these interim arrang em en ts, ou r deleg ation was able 

to jud ge the fu tu re o f an en lar ge d council ag ains t th e practic al yar dstick of the experie nce in the session last s umm er. Our exp erie nce at 

th at tim e confirmed our earli er view.

We are conv inced th at th e increased me mb ership of the EC OS OC 

sessiona l com mittees in cre ase d the effectiveness of the ir w ork. We b elieve th at a sim ila r increa se in the memb ership of th e Cou ncil itself 

would imp rov e the Co uncil ’s a bility to reflect the o pin ion s of a ll areas 

of t he wo rld in its rec om me ndations an d acti ons on the im po rtan t issues w ith which it deals.

Fi na lly, there is a ge ne ral reason wh y th e United States sho uld 

ra ti fy bo th these am endm ents wi th enthu siasm. We seek a wo rld of 

or de r and peace. We hav e e ve rything to gain from in tern ationa l cou ncils wh ich also seek these end s and which tr uly represen t the natio ns 

of the world. Th e Uni ted States is a na tio n which seeks only to 

str en gthe n the causes of justi ce and peace th ro ug ho ut the world, and 

has ev erything to ga in from in tern ationa l councils which also seek 

these e nds.

Hence , I join w ith th e Pre side nt a nd the Se cretary of St ate in ea rne stly se eking you r consent to thes e amend ments.

Tha nk you, M r. C hairm an.

Th e Cha irm an. Tha nk you very much, Mr. Am bas sad or. It is a 

very c lear and suc cinct state me nt.

Se na tor Church , do yo u h av e an y questions ?

NUMBER OF NATIO NS WHI CH HAVE RATIFIED AMEND MENTS

Se na tor Chu rc h. Mr. Am bassa dor, how ma ny members of the 

Uni ted Na tio ns hav e thus fa r ratified these pro posed amend ments?

Am bassa dor Stevenson. Six ty-f ive.

May I add th at 76 are requ ire d to ra ti fy , in or de r to br in g the 

am endm ent s in to effect.

Se na tor Chu rc h. Do you an tic ipate th at th at nu mber will be secured by the time th e G enera l Assembly n ex t meets ?

Am bassa dor Stevenson. I do an tic ipate it. I cannot, of course, 

gu aran tee it. Th e Sovie t Un ion has alr ea dy rat ifie d. Th e Un ite d 

Ki ng do m will ra ti fy I th in k alm ost co nc urrentl y with ou r ratifica ­

tion, if we do. An d I wo uld assume th at the constitutiona l processes 

of a good ma ny othe r co un tries du ring th is sp rin g, in th e sessions 

of th ei r pa rli am en tary bodies, wou ld tak e like action, an d we would
UN ITED NA TION S CH AR TER AM EN DM EN TS 59

have enough ratifications by the time the Assembly convenes in the 

middle of September.

Senator Ciiurcii. Has Fran ce ratified?

Ambassador Stevenson. Franc e has not ratified.

Senator Church. What is the French position ? Do you know ? 

Ambassador Stevenson. All I know about it is th at they have not 

interposed any serious objection to either of these enlargements.

DIS CUSSION OF POS SIBLE DISADVANTAGES OF ENLA RGED SECU RIT Y CO UN CIL

Senator Church. Do you see any possible disadvantage to the 

United States t hat could result from the enlarged membership ?

Ambassador Stevenson. No; as I have pointed out, I think on the 

contrary, there are more advantages than disadvantages. We have made very, very careful calculations over a period of 

many months as to the effect of the voting majorities, taking as illustrative a number of major issues over a period, say, o f 5 years, and tried to figure out what the consequences would lie as the result of the enlargement from 11 to 15, and the increase in the majority from 

7 to 9. As I said in this prepared statement, the conclusion is tha t it would 

have no perceptible difference on the experience of the past. And, sir, may I add, Senator, there is this real haza rd that we have 

now without enlargement—as long as the membership has increased 

from 51 to 114—that inevitably, the African -Asians will sta rt to raid the seats of other countries, and one could hardly blame them, feeling 

they are so grossly underrepresented, having more tha n half the mem­ bership, and not more than one or two members on the Council. So 

this imperils, of course, especially the seats of the Latin Americans.

BLOC VOTING IN THE UNIT ED NA TION S

Senator Church. There has been a frequent expression of concern 

in recent months over the growth of the Afro-Asian bloc in the 

United Nations. Has there been a great deal of bloc voting, monolithic bloc voting, 

up to the time tha t the General Assembly stopped meeting this year, 

to bear out this apprehension ?

Ambassador Stevenson. No. One has to be cautious in making any 

predictions. But on the basis of our experience to date, there is a good 

deal of misconception about the Afro-Asian voting. While they have 

a majority in the General Assembly now, actually the historical record is not one of solid bloc voting at all, and we have found in the Security 

Council, for example, that the African members who have sat there from time to time, the Afro-Asians, over the past, say 5 or 6 years, 

have in most cases, actua lly supported the position tha t the United 

States took. This contradicts, I think, what most people think. In 

some cases they have abstained.
60 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

I have statistics, by the way, on that, which might be of interest to 

the committee.

I have a review, fo r example, of 24 close votes on procedural and 

substantive issues in the Security Council since 1960, where the 

resolutions were not vetoed, which suggests tha t there probably would 

have been in virtually no case a change in the outcome of the vote on 

those issues had the Security Council been of the size and composition 

envisioned by these amendments, which I think is interesting.

There are certain cases, of course, as you well know, on what we call 

the colonial issues, where special interests are involved, especially the 

Africans, and where they vote with a solidarity tha t is not standard 

practice in other issues.

Senator Church. I think, Mr. Ambassador, whatever studies the 

Department may have made on voting patte rns since the Afro-Asian 

members have come to a majority in the General Assembly would be 

helpful to this committee in passing judgment on these amendments. 

If tha t information could be supplied, we would appreciate it.

Ambassador Stevenson. Yes, s ir; we would be very happy —if we 

cannot present it this morning, we can present it very shortly, and leave 

it with the clerk to be inserted in the record.

(The material re ferred to follows:)

Voting Records of United Nations General Assembly

1. The Afro-Asians numbered one-half of the membership in 1961. At that 

time the re were 52 Afro-Asian State s members of the United Nations out of a 

total memb ership of 105. In 1962, the re were 58 Afro-Asian members of the 

United Nation out of a tota l membership of 110. In 1963, the figures were 61 and 

113: In 1964, 62 and 115; in 1965, 61 and 114.

2. Atta ched are voting ch arts which record the positions of United Natio ns 

members on the most important and rep resentative issues brou ght to a rollcall 

at the 16th, 17th, and 18th General Assemblies. The charts do not purpo rt to 

show a country’s position in detail. There are a larg e number of hand votes on 

which th ere is no official record. In addition, a simple tabulation of votes fails to 

reflect the role p artic ular coun tries may play in pressing f or key language changes 

before a dra ft resolution reaches the floor of the Assembly. Nevertheless, the 

chart s are useful in correctin g a common misconception that Afro-Asians vote 

as a bloc or th at they generally oppose positions supp orted by the United States 

and its allies.

3. The Afro-Asian bloc includes sta tes of differing political tendencies. Some of 

these are close allie s of the United States and others like Outer Mongolia are 

eith er allied to the Soviet Union or highly sympathetic to its positions. Many 

adopt a pos ture of neutr ali ty between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Because of these differences, the Afro-Asian countries seldom vote as a 

bloc. At the 16th, 17th, and 18th General Assemblies, for instance, the votes 

of nearly half of the Afro-Asians coincided as often or more often with the vote 

of t he United States tha n with the vote of the Soviet Union. (One should note, 

however, th at the final outcome on these key issues was much more favorable 

to the United States tha n to the Soviet Union. The reason is th at even though 

the votes of the Afro-Asians were divided, the votes of the Latin Americans and 

West European States on these key issues generally coincided with those cast 

by the United S tate s.)

4. The area in which a larg e n umber of Afro-Asian States do tend to vote alike 

is colonialism. Bu t on colonial item s as on other matters, it is necessary to 

exam ine the voting record of cou ntries qua lita tively in order to avoid misleading impressions. Fo r example, th e voting chart s show th at a high proportion of 

the votes of Afro-Asian States on colonial issues coincide with the Soviet Union’s 

vote. However, thi s is not a case of Afro-Asian support for Soviet positions, but 

ra th er a demonstration of the fact t hat the Soviet Union has found it politically 

expedient to support some Afro-Asian positions on colonialism which the United
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 61

States, for one reason or another, could not support. Although the Soviet Union undoubtedly hoped that, in return, the Afro-Asians would give the Soviet Union greater support on issues on which it felt strongly, the ch arts would suggest th at the Soviets have not been successful in this tactic. 5. Fears about the Afro-Asian bloc are also misplaced from the theoretical standpoint. Article 18(2) of the United Nations Charter requires th at decisions of the General Assembly on importan t questions receive the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the members present and voting. It is unlikely tha t on an issue of vital importance to th is country, the United States could not rally a blocking thir d in the Assembly. Our friends in Latin America and Western Europe alone constitute more than one-third of the membership; we could expect to receive strong support not only from them but from other nations in Africa and Asia 

as well.

47-3 78 0 —6! 5
62 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

VOTING RECORDS AT THE l8TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1 96 3)

E x p la n a ti o n an d A d d itio n a l It em s

1 . The a tta c h e d v o tin g c h a r ts r e c o r d th e v o te o f e a c h U n it e d N a ti o n s 

member on 23 o f th e m ost Im p o rt a n t and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i s s u e s b ro u g h t t o a 

r o l l c a l l v o te a t th e 1 8 th G e n e ra l A ss em bl y. Eac h y e a r hu n d re d s o f v o te s 

a re ta k e n a t th e G e n e ra l Assem bly In c o n n e c ti o n v i t h th e v a r io u s It em s o f 

th e ag en d a. Mos t o f th e s e m a tte r s , ho w ev er , a r e d e a l t w ith b y a show o f 

han ds o r by a v o ic e v o te . C o n seq u en tl y , o f f i c i a l U n it e d N a ti o n s do cu m en ts 

r e c o r d o n ly th e t o t a l s an d do n o t in d ic a te th e v o te s o f in d iv id u a l c o u n tr ie s . 

T he se c h a r t s , th e r e f o r e , do n o t p u r p o rt t o g iv e a co m p le te p i c t u r e o f e ach 

c o u n tr y 's p o s i t i o n a t th e 1 8 th G en era l A ss em bly .

2 . An a n a ly s is o f th e s e le c te d I s s u e s show s t h a t th e m a jo r ity vi ew 

a t th e 1 8 th G e n era l A ss em bl y g e n e r a lly c o in c id e d w ith th e U n it e d S ta te s 

p o s i t i o n on m ost o f th e im p o rta n t q u e s tio n s b e f o r e th e s e s s io n . The 

p r i n c i p a l e x c e p tio n s w er e th e c o lo n ia l i s s u e s . (F iv e o f th e e ig h t is s u e s 

on w hic h th e p o s i t i o n o f th e U n it e d S ta te s d id n o t c o in c id e w ith th e 

m a jo r ity d e a l t a lm o st e x c lu s iv e ly w ith c o l o n i a l q u e s tio n s i n A f r ic a .)

The m a jo r ity o f th e A ss em bl y a g re e d w ith th e U n it e d S ta te s on su ch E a s tW es t is s u e s a s th e K ore an Q u e s ti o n an d C hin ese R e p re s e n ta tio n . A ls o, th e 

U n it e d S ta te s wa s in th e m a jo r ity on im p o rta n t p e a c e k e e p in g is s u e s l i k e th e 

c o n tin u a tio n o f UNEF an d th e e x te n s io n o f UNOC u n t i l Ju ne 30 , 1964. The 

r e s o lu tio n s on th e s e E ast -W est is s u e s w er e ap p ro v ed w ith th e e n t i r e S o v ie t 

B lo c in o p p o s itio n . M ea su re d s t a t i s t i c a l l y , th e p o s i t i o n o f th e m a jo r it y 

a t th e l 8 t h G en era l A ss em bl y c o in c id e d w it h t h a t o f th e U n it e d S ta te s 65% 

o f th e ti m e o r on 15 o f th e 23 is s u e s s e l e c t e d .

3 . The v o tin g r e c o r d o f an y c o u n tr y sh o u ld be a n a ly z e d q u a l i t a t i v e l y 

i n r e l a t i o n to th e i s s u e s in o rd e r t o a v o id m is le a d in g im p re s s io n s . F or 

ex an qa le , th e v o tin g r e c o r d o f m ost A fr o -A sia n n a tio n s on c o lo n ia l it e m s 

r e v e a ls a h ig h p r o p o rtio n o f v o te s w hic h c o in c id e w ith th e USSR v o te . T h is 

i s n o t an i n d ic a tio n o f A fr o -A sia n su p p o rt f o r th e S o v ie t p o s i t i o n , b u t 

r a t h e r a d e m o n s tr a ti o n o f th e f a c t t h a t th e S o v ie t b lo c f in d s i t e x p e d ie n t 

t o s u p p o rt some o f th e A fr o -A sia n p o s itio n s on c o lo n ia lis m w hic h th e U n it e d 

S ta te s , f o r on e re a s o n o r a n o th e r, c o u ld n o t s u p p o r t.

4 . The sp o n s o rs h ip o f a r e s o lu tio n i s so m etim es a more m ean in g fu l 

in d i c a t i o n o f a n a ti o n * s i n t e r e s t in an is s u e th a n a v o te in f a v o r o f th e 

r e s o l u t i o n . F o r ex am ple , o f th e 4 r e s o l u t i o n s l i s t e d in th e a tta c h e d 

v o tin g c h a r ts on w hic h b o th th e v o te o f th e U n it e d S ta te s and o f th e USSR 

c o in c id e d , o n ly on e wa s sp o n so re d by th e US an d no ne by th e S o v ie t U nio n.

5 . V ot e nu mbe r 10 , c o n c e rn in g th e D r a ft D e c la ra tio n on th e E lim in a tio n 

o f R a c ia l D is c rim in a tio n , r e q u ir e s a d d i t i o n a l e x p la n a tio n . The U n it e d

S ta te s a b s ta in e d on th e f i n a l r o l l c a l l v o te ta k e n on t h i s is s u e in Com m ittee 3 

l i s t e d a s v o te nu m be r 1 0 . But a f t e r a m in or a d ju s tm e n t i n t e x t , th e U n it e d 

S ta te s v o te d f o r th e D e c la r a tio n i n P le n a ry w ith th e r e s e r v a tio n t h a t in 

th e e v e n t o f a c o n f l i c t betw een th e p r o v is io n s o f on e p a ra g ra p h o f th e 

D e c la ra tio n an d th e p r i n c i p le o f f r e e sp e ech g u a ra n te e d by th e U .S . C o n s titu ­

t i o n , th e l a t t e r w oul d alw ays p r e v a i l i n th e U n it e d S t a t e s . The r e s o lu tio n 

i n P le n a ry wa s n o t b ro u g h t t o a r o l l c a l l v o te an d t h e r e f o r e c o u ld n o t be 

in c lu d e d in th e c h a r t s .

6 . A tte n tio n i s s p e c i f i c a l l y dr aw n t o th e p re fa c e t o th e c h a r ts 

w her e a nu mber o f e x tr e m e ly im p o rta n t r e s o l u t i o n s a r e l i s t e d . The se 

r e s o l u t i o n s , w h il e a d o p te d b y th e 1 8 th G e n e ra l Ass em bl y, w er e n o t 

b ro u g h t t o a r o l l c a l l v o te an d c o u ld n o t t h e r e f o r e be in c lu d e d among 

th e s e le c te d i s s u e s .
LIST OF IMPORTANT RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY 18TH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BUT NOT BROUGHT TO ROLL CALL VOTE

The ldth General Assembly adopted 113 resolutions; 66 were

adopted by a unanimous vote,by acclamation or without objection,

a large number of others by overwhelming majorities. Some of the

major resolutions passed by the l8th General Assembly, especially

in the field of disarmament and space, were never brought to a roll

call vote. Significant resolutions at the l8th General Assembly that

vere adopted unanimously, by acclamation, or by large majorities and

that, moreover, had the full support of the United States included the

following:

1. Question of General and Coeiplete Disarmament

(Bombs in Orbit resolution) - by acclamation.

2. Question of General and Complete Disarmament

(Approving work of 18 Nation Committee on

Disarmament) - unanimous.

3. Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and

Thermo-Nuclear Tests (Calling on all states

to become parties to the Limited Nuclear

Test Ban Treaty) - loU-1-3.

U. Draft Declaration of Legal Principles Governing

the Activities of States in the Exploration and

Use of Outer Space - unanimous.

5. International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses

of Outer Space - unanimous.

6. Report of the Commissioner-General of the UN

Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

in the Near East - 82-1-lU.

7. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

una nimous.

8. Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources

Released by Disarmament - unanimous.

10. Special Training Program for Territories under

Portuguese Administration - 102-2-1.

11. Budget for the Financial Year 196U: its three

parts - 96-10-3; 109-0-0; 97-11-1.

12. International Cooperation Year - unanimous.13- Question of Malta - unanimous.

lU. Question of Northern Rhodesia - unanimous.

13- Question of Nyasaland - unanimous.

16. International Cooperation in the Application of

Science and Technology to Economic and SocialDevelopment - unanimous.

17. Participation of Women in National, Social and

Economic Development - unanimous.

18. Terms and Conditions Governing the Issue of

United Nations Bonds 88 12-5•

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMEN DMENTS

9. United Nations Training and Research Institute

78-1-11

05

CO
L IS T 1

SEO RESL DOCUMENT * VOTE

L IS T 1

VOT ING PATTERN FOR 18TH REGULAR SE SS IO N

OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEM BLY

VOTE DATE F IN A L VOTE T I T L E

01 191 1 A5618 P 1 1 - 2 7 -6 3 09 1 000 015 DENU CLEA RIZA TION OF LAT IN AM ERI CA: RES EX PR ESSIN G HOPE LA STATE S WI LL IN IT IA TE 

ST UD IE S IEA DIN O TO LA DENU CLEARIZED ZONE

02 AL427 P 1 0 - 2 1 -6 3 041 0 57 012 CHINES E REPRES ENT ATION: ALBANIAN RESO LUTI ON CALLI NG FOR REMOVAL OF CHT 'N G K A ISHEK REPS AND IN VIT IN G PRC REPS TO OCCUPY CH IN A'S PLACE IN UN

03 1964 AC1L333 C 1 1 2 -0 9 -6 3 073 010 015 KOREA: OPER PARA 2 OF US RES IN VIT IN G ROK REP TO TAKE PART IN DI SC USS IO N OF

KOREAN QUEST ION

04 AC1L 33 4 C 1 1 2 - 0 9 -6 3 025 0 54 020 KOREA: MONGOLIAN RES IN V IT IN G NORTH KOREAN REPS TO PA RT ICIPA TE IN DI SC US SI ON

OF KOREAN QUEST ION

05 1964 A5666 p 1 2 - 1 3 -6 3 065 01 1 024 KOREA: lb-P OWE R RES CAL LIN G UPON NORTH KOREANS TO ACCEPT UN OB JE CT IV ES AND REQUE STIN G CONTINUATION OF UNCURK

06 19 12 A562 4 p 1 2 - 0 3 -6 3 0 7 9 00 1 018 PA IE ST IN E RE FUGE ES: OP PARA b OF US RES CALLING ON PCC TO CONTINU E IT S EFFO RTS

FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PARA 11 OF RES 19b ( I I I )

07 19 91 A5675 p 1 2 -1 7 -6 3 0 9 7 01 1 004 ENLARGEMENT OF SECU RI TY CO UN CIL : RES CA LLI NG FOR INC REA SE FROM 11 TO 15

MEMBERS

06 1991 A5675 p 1 2 - 1 7 -6 3 0 9 6 01 1 005 ENLARGEMENT OF EC OS OC : RES CAL LIN G FOR INC REA SE FROM 18 TO 27 MEMBERS

09 1992 A5 6S3A 1 p 1 2 - 1 7 -6 3 0 9 6 0 00 01 1 HBJIRGHCENT OF COMMITTEES OF ECOSOC; BE8 INV ITING ECOSOC ENLARGE COMMITTEES

10 19 04 A C 3L114 0 C 3 1 0 - 2 8 -6 3 0 8 9 0 0 0 0 17 DECLARATIO N ON THE ELIM INA TIO N OF AL L FORMS OF RA CI AL DI SC RI M IN AT IO N: DRAFT 

DECLARATION AS A WHOLE

1 1 19 83 A568 0 P 1 2 - 1 7 -6 3 06 1 011 034 UNE F: OP PARA 3 (SC ALE OF ASSE SSM ENTS) OF RES PRO VID ING FIN AN CIN G TOR 196b12 1983 A5 60O P 1 2 - 1 7 -6 3 0 7 7 011 020 UN EF: RES PRO VID ING FOR FIN ANC ING FOR 19 6b -

13 1885 A5567 P 1 0 - 1 8 -6 3 0 7 6 01 1 020 UNOC: FIN ANC ING FOR FI RS T S IX MONTHS OF 196b

14 1928 AC 5L01OR 1 C 5 1 1 - 2 9 -6 3 0 6 9 0 0 8 003 GEO GRAP HICA L DI STRIBU TION OF ST AF F OF SE CR ET AR IAT: 16-POWER RES ASKIN G SYO TO

TAKE MEASURES TO ACHIEVE "EQ UIT AB IE DI ST RI BU TI ON " OF POS TS

15 1956 AL443 P 1 2 -1 1 -6 3 0 9 5 000 0 0 6 RES CONTINUING CCMMITTEE OF 2b AND APPROVING IT S REPORT16 18 81 A5565 P 1 0 - 1 1 -6 3 106 00 1 000 THE P O L IC IE S OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVT OF THE RE PUBL IC OF SOUTH AF RIC A: RES CONDEMNING SA AND REQU ESTING RE IEAS E of all poli tical prisoners

17 1978 A 5 56 5 A 1 P 1 2 - 1 6 -6 3 0 9 9 002 000 POLI CI ES OF APARTHEID OF GOVT OF SA FRIC A : RES ASKIN G ASSIS TA NC E FOR FA M IL IE S OF 

PERSONS PERSECUTED BY OOVT OF SA FR ICA

IB 1899 A 5605 P 1 1 - 1 3 -6 3 084 0 06 0 17 SW AFR ICA : RES AFFI RMIN G RIG HT OF SELF- DETE RM INA TIO N, CONDEMNING GOVT OF SA FR IC A, 

CALLI NG FOR ARMS AND O IL EMBARGO

19 1979 A5 60 5A 1 P 1 2 - 1 7 -6 3 0 8 9 0 02 003 SW AFR ICA: RES FIN DIN G SIT UA TIO N IN SWAFR ICA I S SE RI OU SL Y DISTUR BIN G INTE RNAT IONA L 

PEACE & REQU ESTING SC CONSI DERA TION

20 1913 A5629 P 1 2 - 0 3 -6 3 091 0 02 o n PORTUGUESE TE RR IT OR IE S: RES NOTING REF USA L OF PORTUGAL TO IMPLEMENT PRIOR UN RESOLUT IONS AND REQU ESTING IMMEDIATE SC CONSIDERATI ON

21 1883 A556 4 P 1 0 - 1 4 -6 3 0 90 0 02 013 SOUTHERN RH OD ESIA: bb-PCW ER RESO LUTION IN V IT IN G UK NOT TO TRANSFER POWER TO PRESENT 

GOVT

22 1889 A55 64 A1 P 1 1 - 0 6 -6 3 0 7 3 0 02 01 9 SOUTHERN RH OD ESIA: RES URGING MEMBERS TO USE INFL UEN CE WITH UK 4 C A L U NG ON UK NOT

TO GRANT INDE P

23 1967

K

A56 71

1

P 1 2 -1 6 -6 3 0 65 0 15 0 27 FRIE NDL Y RE LA TION S: NETHERLANDS RES REQU ESTI NG STUD Y OF D E SI R A B IU T Y OF ES TA BL ISH ING 

SP EC IA L INTE RNAT IONA L BODY FOR FA CT -FIN DI NG

C *

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS
*

• c A

U S T 2

VO TI NG PATTERN FOR 18TH REGUL AR SE SS IO N

OF THE UN GE NE RA L ASSEM BLY

A F _ AFRICA COINCIDE WITH

SUBJ NO 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2 0 21 2 2 2 3 us USS R NE ITHE R BOTH

A LG E R IA A Y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A 3 9 7 4

BURUNDI A Y Y Y A AB Y V Y Y AB AB Y AR Y Y Y Y AB Y Y AB A 3 8 10 2

CAMEROON Y N Y N Y A Y Y Y Y Y V Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y A 10 6 5 2

c en tra l af Y N Y N Y A Y V Y Y Y Y Y AB AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 10 5 5 3

CHAD Y N Y N Y AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 10 6 4 3

CONGO BR AZ Y N Y A Y AB Y Y Y AB A Y Y AR AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A 7 4 9 3

CONGO LE OP Y N Y N Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y Y 10 6 5 2

DAHOMEY Y N Y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB A 8 5 7 3

E T H IO P IA Y AB Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y N 5 8 7 3

GABON Y N Y N AB AR Y Y Y Y AR AB Y AR AR Y Y Y AB Y Y AR Y 7 4 10 2

GHA NA Y Y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A 6 8 5 4

G U IN E A Y Y AP AB A Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A 4 7 8 4

IV O R Y COAS Y N V N Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB A 10 5 5 3

KE NY A Y Y Y AR AR - - - AB - Y - - - 1 5 1

L IB E R IA Y N Y A Y A V Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y Y 10 6 5 2

L IB Y A Y N AB AB A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A 6 6 7 4

MA LA GA SY R Y N Y N Y A Y Y AB Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 9 6 5 3

M A L I A Y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A 2 9 8 4

M A U R IT A N IA Y A Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y o 5 5 4

MOROCCO Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A AB AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 4 8 7 4

N IG E R Y N Y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y Y 10 6 5 2

N IG E R IA Y A A A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A 6 6 8 3

RWANDA Y N Y N Y AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y AB Y AB AB Y Y Y 10 5 7 1

SE NEG AL Y N A A A Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y 7 5 7 4

SIE R R A LE O Y A Y A Y AB Y Y Y Y A Y Y AR Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y 7 5 8 3

SO M A LIA Y Y AB AB Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y AB Y Y Y Y AB Y AB Y A 5 6 9 3

SOUTH A FR I Y N Y N AB AB A A AB AB A A AR Y A N N N N AB N N AB 9 14

SUDA N Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y V A A Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y A 5 8 7 3

TANG ANYIK A Y Y AB AB AB AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y V Y Y Y Y A 5 7 8 3

TOGO Y N Y N Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y Y Y Y Y AB A 10 4 6 3

T U N IS IA A Y Y A A Y Y Y Y Y V Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 7 8 4 4

UGANDA AB Y AB AB AB AB Y Y Y Y A Y Y AB Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A 3 7 10 3

UPPER VO LT Y N Y A Y A Y Y Y Y AR AB Y AB Y Y Y Y AB Y Y AB AB 6 5 10 2

ZA N Z IB A R AB AB AB A A - - - - AB - AB - - - - 7

UN I TEO ST A

U S S R

A Y

Y N

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

N N N N

VO TIN G T E Y : I ' - Y E S 1 - DI SA JM AM EN T/ TE ST INO ARE A TOT ALS ,

N - NO 2 -5 - EA ST WEST IS S U E S

A - ABS TA IN 6 - OTH ER P O L IT IC A L QU ES TI OR S

AB - ABS ENT 7 -9 - UN OR GA NI ZA TI ON

NP - NOT PA RT IC IP AT IN G 10 - EC ON DK IC AND S O C IA L AND HtMAN RIGH TS

- - TOTE TAKEN PR IO R I l - I L - UN A O G N IS T R A n O N AND F I NANCE

TO MEMBERS HIP 15 -2 2 - CO LO NI AL AND R ACIA L IS S U E S

23 - I£ G A L PE AC EF UL SET TIE MF NT

O i

Or
O i

L IS T .2

VOTING PATTERN FOR 18TH REGULAR SE SS IO N

OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLE

4 „ A - AMERICA N HEMISPHERE

S U R J NO 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16

A R G E N T IN A Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y

B O L IV I A Y N Y N Y AB Y Y Y Y Y Y AB AB Y Y

B R A Z IL Y N Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y A Y Y Y

C H IL E Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

C O L O M B IA Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y

C O STA R IC A Y N V N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y V Y Y

CUB A A Y AR AB N Y N N A Y N N N N Y Y

O O M IN tC A N Y N Y N Y A Y Y V Y Y Y Y AB Y V

ECUADO R Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AR Y Y

E L SA LVA O O Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB AR v

g u a t f m a l a Y N Y N Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y

H A I T I Y N Y N Y A Y Y Y AB AR A AB Y AR Y

HON D UR A S AB N Y N Y A Y Y Y AB Y Y Y Y AR AR

J A M A IC A Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y

M E X IC O Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

N IC A R A G U A Y N Y N Y AB Y Y AB Y Y V Y AB Y Y

PA NAMA Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y

PA R A G U AY Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y A AB Y AB

P E R U Y N Y N Y AR Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y

t r in id a o t Y A Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

URUG UAY Y N AB N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AR Y Y

V E N E Z U E L A A N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

U N IT E D STA Y N Y N Y Y A A Y A Y Y Y Y A Y

U S S R A Y N Y N Y N N A Y N N N N Y Y

VOTING KET : Y - ff iS

N - NO

A - ABSTA IN

AB - ABSENT

NP - NOT PA RT ICI PA TING

- - VOTE TAKEN PRIO R

TO MEMBERSHIP

17 IB 19 2 0 21 2 2 2 3 ns COINCIDE WITH USSR NEITHER BOTH

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 10 6 3 4

Y Y AH Y Y Y Y 9 6 6 2

Y Y Y A Y Y Y 9 5 5 4

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 11 6 2 4

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 6 6 5 4

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 11 6 2 4

Y Y Y Y Y Y N 1 7 2 4

Y Y AB AB AB AT Y 10 3 8 2

Y Y Y AB Y Y Y 10 5 4 4

AB AB Y AB AB AR Y 10 1 9 3

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 1 1 5 4 3

Y Y AB Y Y AB Y B 3 10 2

AR AB AB Y AB AB Y 10 1 12

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 10 6 3 4

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 1 1 6 2 4

AB AB Y AB AB AB Y 9 2 10 2

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y B 6 5 4

AB Y Y Y Y AB Y 8 5 R 2

Y Y Y AB Y Y Y 8 5 7 3

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 10 6 3 4

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 9 6 4 4

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 10 7 2 4

Y N Y A A A Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y N

TCTaIS : 2 0 0 1 1 9 1 1 6 71

1 - DI SA fM AM EN T/ lES TING 

2 -5 - EAS T WEST IS SU E S

6 - OTHER PO LI TI CA L QUESTIO NS

7 -9 - UN ORGA NIZAT ION

10 - ECONOMIC AND SO CI AL AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1 1 -I L - UN AM IN IS TRA TI ON AND F I NANCE

15 -2 2 - COL ONI AL AND RA CI AL IS SU E S

23 - LEGA L PEA CEFU L SETTLEMENT

UN ITED NATIO NS CH AR TER AM EN DM EN TS
LIS T 2

VOTING PATTERN FOR 18T H REGULAR SE SS ION 

OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLI

E U R - euroh:

S U B J NO I 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 1 0 1 1 12 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7

A L B A N IA AB Y N Y N Y Y Y AB V N N N AB Y Y Y

A U S T R IA Y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y • Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

B E L G IU M Y N Y N Y Y Y V Y A Y Y Y Y A Y Y

B U L G A R IA A Y N Y N Y N N A Y N N N N Y Y Y

B Y E L O R U S S I A Y N Y N Y N N A Y N N N N Y Y Y

CANA D A Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y A V Y Y Y Y Y Y

C 2 E C H 0 S L 0 V A Y N Y N Y N N A Y N N N N Y Y Y

DENM ARK Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

F IN L A N D Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

F R A N C E A N Y N Y Y N N A A A A A Y A Y Y

H U NG AR Y A Y N Y N Y N N A Y N N N A Y Y Y

IC E L A N D Y A Y N AB Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y AB Y Y Y

IR E L A N D Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

IT A L Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

LU XEM B O U R G Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y AB Y Y Y

N E T H E R L A N O Y A Y N Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

NOR WAY Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

PO LA N O A Y N Y N Y N N A Y N N N N Y Y Y

P O R T U G A L Y A AB A e AB A A A Y V A Y A Y AB AB N

R U M A N IA Y Y N Y N Y N N A Y N N N A Y Y Y

S P A IN Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y A A A Y A AB Y

SW EDEN Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

U K R A IN IA N A Y N Y N Y N N A Y N N N N Y Y Y

U N IT E D K IN Y Y Y N Y Y A A Y A Y Y Y Y A Y Y

Y U G O S L A V IA Y Y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y

U N IT E D ST A Y N Y N Y Y A A Y A Y Y Y Y A Y Y

U S S R A Y N Y N Y N N A Y N N N N Y Y Y

IB 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 US

COINCIDE WITH

USSR E IT H E R BOTH

Y Y Y Y Y N 14 5 4

A Y Y Y A Y 10 4 5 4

A Y A A A Y 16 3 4

Y Y Y Y Y N 1 9 4

Y Y Y Y Y N 1 9 4

A Y A A A Y 1 5 1 3 4

Y Y Y Y Y N 1 9 4

A Y Y Y A Y 12 4 3 4

A Y Y Y A Y 9 4 6 4

N A A A A Y 12 4 4 3

Y Y Y Y Y N I S 1 4

A Y Y Y A Y 10 3 6 4

A Y Y Y AB Y 12 3 4 4

A Y A A A Y 15 1 3 4

A Y A A A Y 14 1 4 4

A Y A A A Y 14 1 4 4

A Y Y Y A Y 12 4 3 4

Y Y Y Y Y N 1 9 4

N N N N N AB 7 1 15

Y Y Y Y Y N 1 1 7 1 4

N A N A A Y 12 1 8 2

A Y Y Y A Y 1 1 4 3 4

Y Y Y Y Y N 19 4

N A A NP NP Y 16 1 3 3

Y Y Y Y Y N 5 9 5 4

N Y A A A Y

Y Y Y Y Y N

AREA TOTALS: 2 0 3 19 0 8 9 9 2

TOTTSC KET: I - IBS

N - MO 

A - ABSTAIN 

AB - ABSENT 

NP - NOT PARTICIPATINq

- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR 

TO MEMBERSHIP

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMEN DMENTS

1 - DI SAMAME NT /TE STING 

2 - 5 - EAST WEST ISSU ES

6 - OTHER PO LITICA L QUESTIONS 

7 -9 - UN ORGANIZATION 

10 - ECONOMIC AND SOC IAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 

1 1 - U - UN A IK IN I STRATTON AND FINANCE 

1 5 -2 2 - COLONIAL AND RACIAL ISSU ES 

23 - LEGAL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
0 5

0 0

LIST 2

VOTIN G PATTER N FOR 18TH REGUL AR SESSI ON 

OF THE U N GE fER AL AS SEM BLE

N E A _ [EAR EA ST AN D SO UTH AS IA

S U B J NO 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 1 0 1 1 12 1 3 14 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 19 2 0 21 2 2 2 3

A F G H A N IS T A Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A C E Y L O N Y Y A Y A Y Y Y Y V Y Y Y Y Y Y Y V Y Y Y A C Y P R U S V N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y V Y Y G R E E C E Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y A A A Y IN D IA Y Y Y A V Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N IR A N Y N Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y V Y Y Y V Y Y Y Y Y Y IR A Q Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y Y AR Y Y Y A , IS R A E L Y A Y A Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y JO R D A N AR N A A AB Y Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A K U W A IT Y A AR AB AB Y V Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y AB Y Y AB Y Y A LE B A N O N Y A AR AB A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y y Y Y V Y Y N E P A L V Y A A A A Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AR Y Y Y Y P A K IS T A N Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y AB Y Y AB Y Y Y Y Y Y S A U D I ARAR Y A AR AB AB Y Y Y Y Y A A A AB AR Y AB AB Y Y Y Y A S Y R IA Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y AB A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A T U R K E Y Y N Y N Y Y V Y Y Y V Y Y Y V Y Y A Y A A A Y U N IT E D ARA Y y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y Y y Y Y Y A YE M E N Y V AR AB AB Y Y Y AB Y A A A AB y Y AB Y AB V Y V AB

U N IT E D S TA Y N Y N Y Y A A V A Y Y Y Y A Y Y N Y A A A Y U S S R A V N Y N Y N N A Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N

ARE A TOTALS:

COI NC ID E WIT H

US USS R NE ITHE R BOTH

6 8

6 8

t l 6

1 5 1

8 8

10 6

3 7

9 6

3 6

3 5

7 6

6 7

8 7

2 4

4 7

1 4 2

3 8

I 7

5 4

5 4

2 4

3 4

3 4

3 4

1 0 3

3 3

1 0 4

1 2 3

6 4

8 2

5 3

1 4 3

8 4

3 4

8 4

1 3 2

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1 1 9 1 0 9 1 2 3 6 3

V O TU D KET : T - I E S

N - NO

A - ABS TA IN

AB - ABS ENT

NP - NOT PA RTIC IP ATIN G

- - VOTE TAKEN PRIO R

TO MEMBERSHIP

1 - DISAR MA ME NT/TE STING

2 - 5 - east west issube

6 - OTHER P O LIT IC A L QU ES TION S

7 - 9 - UN OR GA NIZATIO N

1 0 - ECONOMIC AND SO CIA L AND HORAN HIG HTS

1 1 - 111 - UN A Q O N IS TR A TIO N AND FINANCE

1 5 - 2 2 - CO LONIAL AND RAOTAI IS S U E S

2 3 - LEGAL PEA CE FU L SETTLEMENT

1
F E - FAR EA ST

A U S T R A L IA

BURM A

C A M B O D IA

C H IN A

IN D O N E S IA

J A P A N

L A O S

M A L A Y S IA

M ONGOL I A

NEW Z E A L A N

P H I L I P P I N E

t h a il a n o

L IS T 2

VO TING PATT ERN FOR 18T H REGULAR S ESSIO N 

OF THE UN GENERAL AS SEM BL Y

1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 10 11 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3

C OIN CI D E WITH 

US US SR NE ITHE R BOTH

Y N Y N

Y Y A Y

Y Y A Y

Y N Y N

Y Y A Y

Y N Y N

AB Y AB AB

Y N Y N

A Y N Y

Y N Y N

Y N Y N

Y N Y N

Y Y Y

A A Y

A Y Y

Y Y Y

A Y Y

Y Y Y

AB Y Y

Y Y Y

N Y N

Y Y Y

Y A Y

Y Y Y

Y Y A Y

Y Y Y A

Y Y Y A

A Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y AB

Y Y Y Y

N A Y N

Y Y A A

Y Y Y A

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y A Y Y

Y Y AB Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

AB Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

N N N Y

Y Y A Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y A Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y A Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y A Y

Y Y Y Y

Y AB Y Y

Y A A Y

Y Y Y A

Y Y Y A

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y N

Y A A Y

Y Y Y A

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y N

Y A A Y

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

14

4

4

12

6

13

3

1 1

12

10

1 1

2

8

8

6

(

3

7

6

1 9

2

6

6

3 4

8 3

7 4

1 4

4 4

3 4

9 4

2 4

4

5 4

4 3

3 3

U N IT E D S T A Y

U S S R A

N Y

Y N

N Y

Y N

Y A

Y N

A

N

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A Y Y Y

Y N N N

Y A Y Y

N Y Y Y

N Y A A A Y

Y Y Y Y Y N

ARE A TO TA LS : 1 0 0 8 2 4 9 4 5

VO TIN G K EY : t - jfc S

N - MO

A - AB STAIN

AB - ABSENT

NP - NOT PA RT IC IP AT IN G

- - TOTE TAKEN PR IOR

TO MEMBERSHIP

J - DlSA JMA ME NT/ TES TrN G

Z -5 - EA ST WEST IS SU E S

6 - OTHER PO LI TIC A L QUE STION S

7 -9 - UN ORG ANI ZAT ION

10 - ECONOMIC AND SO CIA L AND HUMAN RIG HTS

11 -L U - UN AOGN IS TRA TI O N AND FINA NCE

15 -2 2 - CO LO NIAL AND RAC IA L IS SU E S

23 - LE GAL PE AC EF UL SETTLEM ENT

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS o
VO TI NG PATTER N FOR SIX TEENTH SE SSION OF UNITE D NATI ON S GEN ERAL AS SE MBLY (PAGE I)

AFRICA

o

KEXl I - YES

H - NO

A - ABS TEN TIO N

a - A BSE NT

NP _ NO T PA RTICIPATING

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25 -S TATE RE SOL UTI ON ON AT OM IC R ADIATIO N

CO MMITTEE RE PORT: IM PL ICIT CR IT IC IS M O F

USS R TESTING, 10/20/61 (RE SOL UTI ON 16 29 )(SPC)

CZE CH RE SO LUTION ME RE LY NO TI NG ATOMI C

RA DIATION CCM MITTEE RE POR T, 10 /2 0/61 (SPC)RE SO LUTION AP PEALING TO U SS R NOT TO

EXPL OD E 50-M EGA TON BONE , 10 /2 7/61

(RE SOL UTI ON 1632)

IND IAN .RESOLUTION CALL IN G FO R URGH IT,

UN CONTROLLED MO RA TORIUM ON NU CL EA RTESTI NG, 11/ 6/61 (RE SOL UTI ON 1648)US- UK RESOL UTI ON CALL IN G FO R NUC LE ARTE ST BAN TRE ATY WIT H EF FE CT IV E INTE RNA ­TIO NAL CONT ROL , 11/ 8/61 (RESOLU TIO N 1649)

AFRI CA N i&S OLUTICN CN CR EA TION O F

AFR ICAN D ENUCLEARIZED ZONE, 11/24/61

(RES OLUTION 1652)

AFR O-ASIAN RESOLUT ION C N B AN NI NG US E

OF NUC LE AR WEAPONS, ll /24/6l(RES0LUTIQN 1653)

SW EDISH RESOLUT ION CN AGREEilENT BY N ONNU CLEAR P OWE RS NO T TO A CQ UI RE NUCL EA R

WEA PON S OR AL LO W TEE M T O B E ST ATIONEDON THEIR T ERRITO RY, 11/30/61

COM MITTEE I (RE SOL UTI ON I664)CO LO NI AL IS M/ AR UC AN 1 T B 6

CE NSURE OF SOUTH AFR ICAN F ORE IGN MI NI ST ERLO UW FOR GENER AL DEBA TE SPEECH, I O / U / 6 1

Y Y Y a a a Y a - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I Y Y Y Y Y a Y Y - Y Y

N A Y a a a Y a - Y A A A 1 Y Y Y Y A A Y Y a Y Y - A A

Y Y Y Y a X Y Y Y Y Y Y X Y A a Y Y Y Y Y Y Y a Y - Y Y jY Y Y Y a a a Y Y a Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y N

Y a Y a Y Y a Y Y Y Y a A A A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y a Y - Y Y I

A A A A a A A A A A Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y A

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y a

A A A A A A Y A A a X a Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y A X X - Y Y A

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y

75 -0-17

33-22-37

87-1 1-1

71- 20-8

71- 11- 1555- 0-4455- 20- 26

57- 12- 32

67- 1-2 0

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS
■

RE SOLUTION ASK ING FRA NCE TO RE CO GN IZ E

IM PR ISONED ALGERI ANS AS P OLIT IC AL

PR ISONERS, 11/15/61 (RE SOL UTION 1650)

IND IAN RE SO LUTION ON WE ST NE W G UINEA

CALL IN G FO R D IR EC T NEG OT IATIONS BET WEE N

DUTCH AND IN DON ESI ANS , 11/27/61

FR ENCH-AFRICAN RES OL UTION ON WE ST NEW

GU IN EA ST RE SS IN G S ELF-DETERMINATION

AN D ESTABL IS HI NG UNI TED N ATIONSCCM U S S I Q N , 11/ 27/61

38- STATS RESOLUTION O N COLONI AL IS M

ES TA BL IS HI NG UNI TED NA TI ON S SPEC IA L

COMMIT TE E TO MA KE RECOMMENDATIONS ONGR AN TING IND EPENDENCE, 11/27/61

(RESO LUT ION 1654)

SO VI ET AMENDM EN T TO 38 -S TATE RESOLUT ION

ON COL ONIALISM, SE TT IN G 1 96 2 AS YEA R

OF ELI MI NA TI ON O F COLO NIA LISM, 11/27 /61

SANCTI ON S AND E XPUISION P ARAGRAPHS OF

AFR ICAN RESOLUTION O N APAR TH EI D IN

SOUTH AFRI CA, 11/ 28/61

IND IAN R ESOLUTION ON APA RTHEID, CON DhMNING SO UT H AF RI CA BU T W ITHO UT C AL L F OR

SANCTI ON S OR EXP ULS ION , 11/28/61

(RESO LUT ION 1663)

RE SO LUTION ON SOUTH WE ST AF RI CA

PR OC LA IM IN G R IG HT O F PEO PL E TO

INDEP END ENC E, 12 /1 3/ 61 (RES. 17 02 )CMTX IV

NO N- CO MP LI AN CE OF POR TU GA L WITH GA

RESO LU TI ON 1 542(XV) RE GA RD IN G R EPORT ING

TO UN ON ITS O VER SEA S TER RIT ORI ES,

12/19/61 (RE SOL UTI ON 1699)AL GERIA - R ESO LUTION C AL LI NG F OR RHIEWAL

OF NE GOTIATIONS | WITH SPEC IF IC R EFERE NCE

TO PGAR, 12/20/61 (RE SOL UTI ON 1724)

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

N.B. 1) Al l vote s ar e ro ll call T otal a nd wa re held In Pl enary S es si on (2/3 m aj or it y required) unless otherwi se Indica ted . Cosnitt ee

ro te s req uire onl y simpl e majorit y. •

2) Reso lu ti on nu mbers a re lnd loated for those r esolutions f orma ll y ado pted by GA. No number s are lnd loa ted fo r pro ce du ra l mo tions

or wbers res olu tions felle d of p assage.

3) So vi et bl oo oon slsts rf ten m embers i Alb ani a, Bul gar ia, By el orussian S.S.R ., Cseoboslo vak la, Hungar y, Outer Mo ngo lia , Poland,

Rum ani a, Ukr ainian S.S.R., USSR. Bl oo voted toget her on al l Issues.

4) Ahsenoes a re n ot l noluded In oonpara tlv e totals listed a t bo tt om of PAGE II.
VOTING PATTERN FOR SIXTEENTH SE SS IO N OF UNITED NATION S GENERAL ASoE FBLX (PAG E I I )

x . n s

N . NO

A . ABSTENTION

• - ABSENT

NP - HOT PA RTICIPATING

- VOTE TAKEN PRIOR TO

GA ri& IBER SW P

AFRICA

CO LONIAIJSM/AFR ICA N ITEMS

ANGOLA - BbLGAR IA-FOLA ND RES CALLING

FOR SANC TIONS AGA INST PORTUGAL, \ J y > / b a .

AN GOU - AF RO-ASIAN RES CALLING FOR SE L F -

DETERMINATION OF A N GOU , W / t O . (R E S . 1 7 4 2 )

RES CALLING ON UN CNTE OF 1 7 IO CONSIDER

WHETHER SOUTHERN RHODESIA I S FULLY SE LFGOVERNING, 2 / 2 3 / 6 2 ( R E S .1 7 4 5 )

RES ON RUANDA-URUNDI ENVISAGING TERMINATION

OF UN TRU STEESH IP ON 7 / 1 / 6 2 AND ALLOWING FOR

PO SS IB LE CONTINUED BELGIAN PRESENCE AFTER

INDEPENDENCE, 2 / 2 3 / 6 2 (R E S. 1 7 4 3 ) CMTE IV

EAST WEST I T B g

INSC RI PT IO N OF IT S 4 ON TIB ET, 9 / 2 5 / 6 1

IN SC RIPT IO N OF ITEM CN HUNGARY, 9 / 2 5 / 6 1

MONGOLIAN MOTION ON SEA TING 2 KOREANS AS

AMENDED, 1 2 / 1 3 / 6 1 CMTE I

UNITED STA TES MOTION NOT TO SEAT NORTH

KOREA, 1 2 / 1 9 / 6 1 CMTE I

KOREA - REAFFIRMING EARLIER UN RES AND

EXTBiDING UN CMTE FOR UNIFICATIC N AND

REH ABILITA TION , 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S. 1 7 4 0 )

RECOGNITION OF RIGH T OF SELF-DET ERM INATION

FOR TIB ET , 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S. 1 7 2 3 )

RES DEPLORING USSR AND HUNGARIAN LACK OF

COOPERATION WITH UN SP EC IA L REPRESENTATIVE

ON HUNGARY, 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S. 1 7 4 1 )

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 73

O' 3 ? 3

2 s I s a a 3 ST 8 £ 8T n TT OT ST 8 ST VuCOT 6T 6T 'TZ CZ 8T
VOTING PATTERN FOR SIX TEENTH SE SS IO N OF UN ITE D NA TIO NS GB4ERAL A S S E « L X (PA GE I I )

I - O S

N - NO

A - ABS TENTION

a . ABS ENT

NP - NOT PA RT IC IP AT IN G

VOTE TAKEN PR IO R TO

ga mem ber ship

m m AMO FAh MAST

C Q L Q E IA L IS M /A n u cM 1W&ANGOLA - BULG ARIA-P OLAND RES CAL LING

FOR SANC TIO NS AG AINST PORTUGAL, 1 / 3 0 / 6 2

X A A A X A X A A X A A A A A N A A N X X N A N A A A N N N N X 2 6 - 4 3 - 3 2

ANGOLA - AFR O-ASI AN RES CAL LING FOR SE L F -DETE RMINA TION OF ANGO LA, 1 / 3 0 / 6 2 (R E S . 1 7 4 2 ) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X I X X X X X X X X X

RES CALLING ON UN CMTE OF 1 7 TO CO NSIDERWHETHER SOUTHERN RHODESIA I S FU LL! S E L F -

GOVE RNING, 2 / 2 3 / 6 2 (R E S . 1 7 4 5 )

X X X X X X X X X X X X X A X A N X X X A A A X X X A N N I

9 9 - 2 - 1

5 7 - 2 1 - 2 4

RES ON RUANDA-UR UNDI ENVISAGING TERMINATION

OF UN TRUSTE ESHIP ON 7 / 1 / 6 2 AND ALLOWING FOR

POSS IB LE CONTINU ED BELGIAN PRE SENCE AFTER

IND EPENDENC E, 2 / 2 3 / 6 2 (R E S . 1 7 4 3 ) CMTE IV

A X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X I I X X X X X X X X X X A 8 7 - 0 - 1 1

EjAST WEST ITEM SIN SC RIP TI O N OF ITEM ON TIB ET , 9 / 2 5 / 6 1 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N I X X A A X X X X NIN SC RIP TI O N OF ITE M ON HUNGARX, 9 / 2 5 / 6 1 A a A A A A A A A A A X A X X A N X A X X X X X X X X N

MONGOLIAN MOTION ON SE AT ING 2 KOREANS AS

AMENDED, 1 2 / 3 1 / 6 1 CMTE I

N X X X A A A A A A N A • A N X X X A A A X X A X X N

4 8 - 1 4 - 3 5

5 1 - 1 5 - 3 0

6 3 - 1 8 - 1 9

UNITE D ST AT ES MOTICW NOT TO SE AT NORTH

KORE A, 1 2 / 1 9 / 6 1 CMTE I

N A A A A A A A A A N A A A X X A N I I X I A X X X N 5 4 - 1 7 - 2 2

KOREA - REAFFIR MIN G EA RLIER UN RES AND

EXTENDING UN CMTE FOR UNI FI CA TI ON AND

RJK ABI LIT ATI Q N, 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 7 4 0 )

A X A A A a A A A A A A A A A X X A A I X A X X X I I N 6 0 - 1 1 - 2 7

RECO GNIT ION OF RIGHT OF SELF-DE TE RM INATIONFOR T IB E T , 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 7 2 3 )

A X A A A A A A A A A A A A A X X X A A X X A A X X X N 5 6 - 1 1 - 2 9

RES DEPLORING USS R AND HUNGARIAN LACK OF

COOPERATION WITH UN SP ECIA L REPRESE NTA TIVE

ON HUNGARX, 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 7 4 1 )

N A A A A A A A A A A A A X X A N X A X X A X X X X 4 9 - 1 7 - 3 2
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 75

CH INES E REPRE SEN TAT ION t IMPORTANT QUES TION

R E S , 1 2 / 1 5 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 6 8 )

os •

• M

i 5

! U s

8 8
KEY) I - YES

N - NO

A . ABS TEN TIO N

* - ABSENT

NF . NOT PA RT IC IP AT IN G

- VOTE T A W PR IOR IO

GA MEiTBERSHIP

VO TING PATTE RN FOR SIXT EENT H SE SS IO N o F UN ITE D NA TIO NS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (PAG E I )

MIDDLE AND FAR EAST

h I H e s 3 §

•1

1

DISAR HA KE NI/NUCLS.1R TESTING

RADIATIO N IT B 1S

2 5 -S T A T I RES ON ATOMIC RADIA TIO N CMTX

REP ORT) IM PLIC IT CR IT IC IS M OP US SR

TE ST IN G , 1 0 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 2 9 ) (S P C )

CZECH RES MERELY NOTING ATOMIC

RADIATIO N CMTE REPO RT, 1 0 / 2 0 / 6 1 (S P C )

A < I I I A Y X Y Y Y A Y A A Y Y Y Y A A I Y Y I Y I Y I Y

RE S APPEALING TO USS R NOT TO EXPLO DE

50-ME GATCN BOMB, 1 0 / 2 7 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 3 2 )

IN DIA N RES CA LLING FOR URGENT,

UNCONTROLLED MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR

TEST IN G , 1 1 / 6 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 4 8 )

US-UK RE S CALLING FOR NUCLEAR TE ST

BAN TREATY WITH EF FE CT IVE INTE RNA TIO NAL

CONTROL, 1 1 / 8 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 4 9 )

AFRI CAN RES ON CREATION OF AFRICA N

DENU CLEARIZED ZO NE, 1 1 / 2 4 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 3 2 )

AF RO -ASIAN RES ON BAN NING USE OF

NUCLEAR WEAP ONS, 1 1 / 2 4 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 3 3 )

SWE DISH RE S ON AGREEMENT BY NONNUCLEAR POWERS NOT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR

WEAPONS OR ALLOW THEM TO BE ST ATIONED

ON THE IR TERR ITOR Y, 1 1 / 3 0 / 6 1

CMTX I (R E S . 1 6 6 4 )

I a Y I I A Y I A I I

I I I I a I I I I I I

I I I X I I I I I i i

A l l I A A I A I A A

I Y Y X I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I I I I I I

X I A I N I A A I I A A A A A N A A A

I I I I I I I X I I I I I I I I I I I

I A

I

I N

A I I I N I I N I I I I I I I I I I A N N

A l l I I I I I I A I I I I A I I I I I N

I I I * A I I A I I I A A a l l I I A

I I I I N I A N I I A A V • I A A A N

A I

I

I I I I A I I N I I A l l I I I A I N I X

7 5 - 0 - 1 7

3 3 - 2 2 - 3 7

8 7 - 1 1 - 1

7 1 - 2 0 - 8

7 1 - 1 1 - 1 5

5 5 - 0 - 4 4

5 5 - 2 0 - 2 6

5 7 - 1 2 - 3 2
C0LQMIA1.TSM/AFR ICAM ITEM S

47 -37 8

CENSURE OF SOUTH AFRICA N FOREIGN MIN ISTE R

LOUW FOR GENERAL DEBATE SP EE CH, 1 0 / 1 1 / 6 1 I X T X X I X . I X X X I A X A A X I X X X X X

I

RE S ASKING FRANCE TO RECOGNIZE IMPRISONED

ALG ERI ANS AS POLI TI CAL PR IS ONERS,

1 1 / 1 5 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 5 0 )

I I I I X X X X X I I X I I I

IN DIA N RES ON WEST NEW GUINEA CAL LING

FOR DIRE CT NEGO TIA TIO NS BETWEEN DUTCH

AND IN DONES IA NS, 1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1

I X I X I X X I I X A X I X

FW aC H -A IR IC A N RE S ON WEST NEW GUINEA

ST RES SI NG SE LF-DE TE RM INATION AND

ES TA BL ISHIN G UN ITE D NA TIO NS C C M O S SIC B ,

1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1

N N N N N N N N N N N N N N

A X X A X

N I X N X

I N N I N

X X A A I I

X A I 6 A X

N A X A A N

A I A X NP

X X I I A

I N X A N

N X N A X

I 6 7 - 1 - 2 0

I 6 2 - 0 - 3 1

I 4 1 - 4 0 - 2 1

N 5 3 - 4 1 - 9

3 8 -S T A T E RE S ON COL ONIAL ISM ES TA BL ISHIN G UN ITE D N ATI CMS SP ECIA L CMTE TO MAKE

RECOMMENDATIONS ON GRANTING INDEPENEKN CS,

1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 5 4 )

I X I . I X X X I I I X X X I

SO VI ET AMENDMENT TO 38 -S T A T S RES ON

CO LO NIAL ISM , SE TT IN G 1 9 6 2 AS XEAR OF

EL IM INAT ION OF CO LO NIAL ISM , 1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1

X A A A I A A A N X A A A A A

SANC TION S AND EXPULSION PARAGRAPHS OF

AFRICAN RE S ON APA RTH EID IN SOUTH AFRIC A ,

1 1 / 2 8 / 6 1

I X A X X I I X X X X A A X

IN DIA N RE S ON AP AR TH EID, CONDEMNING

SOUTH AF RI CA BUT WITHOUT CALL FOR

SANC TIO NS OR EX PULS IO N, 1 1 / 2 8 / 6 1 ( R E S .1 6 6 3 )

X I X X X I X X X X X X I

RE S ON SOUTH WEST AF RI CA PROC LAIMING RIGHT

OF PEOPLE TO IH D E P E N D B iC E ,1 2 /1 3 /6 1 (R £ 3 .r X B ) IV X X I X

NON-COM PLIA NCE OF PORTUGAL WITH GA RES

1 5 4 2 ( X V ) REGARDING REP ORTING TO UN ON IT S

OVER SEAS TERRIT ORIE S, 1 2 / 1 9 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 9 9 ) I I X I X X I X I X X X X

ALG ERI A - RES CALLING FOR RENEWAL OP

NE GO TIAT IO NS ) WITH SP E C IF IC REFERENCE

TO M U R , 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 7 2 4 )

I X X X X X I I X I I X I I

a i t

COI NCID E UN ITED ST AT ES

COI NCID E US SR

COI NCID E NE ITHE R

COI NC ID E BOTH

1 8

2 3 1 4

1 3 1 2

6 5

8 9 5 5 4

1 3 1 5 1 9 1 4 1 8

1 6 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 5

6 6 6 5 5

4

1 6

U

6

U 3

1 4 1 9

1 2 1 5

6 6

4 6 2

1 7 1 8 2

1 6 1 4 9

6 6 3

3 9 5

1 9 1 5 1 5

1 5 1 4 1 5

6 5 6

8

1 7

U

6

X X I X X X X I X X X I X X

N A N N A A N N N A A N N H

N A A N A I A X N A A X A A

X X X I I I X X I I I I X X

I X I X X X X I X • X I I I

I I X X X I X I X X X I I I

A I X A X I I A X X X I A X

2 5 1 7 2 3 3 2 6 5 2 4 2 7 2 7 2 0 8 1 6 2 3 2 3

1 1 0 8 0 1 8 2 4 7 3 3 A 1 4 1 1 5 7

1 0 9 6 4 1 3 8 6 8 8 1 0 1 6 1 0 1 0 8

7 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 4 5 6 5 5

X I

N N

N N

I X

I I

I I

I A

2 9

4

4

6

I 9 7 - 0 - 4

I 1 9 - 4 6 - 3 6

I 4 8 - 3 1 - 2 2

I 9 7 - 2 - 1

X 8 6 - 1 - 4

X 9 0 - 3 - 2

I 6 2 - 0 - 3 8

TOTAI.

3 9 2

3 6 7

3 3 4

1 7 0

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS
KE Y: I - YE S

N - NO

A - AB ST EN TION

a - AB SEN T

NP - NOT PA R T IC IP AT IN G

- VO TE TAKEN PR IO R TO

GA MEM BER SHIP

VO TI NG PATTER N FOR SI XT H W T H S E S S IO N OF UN IT ED NA TI ON S GEN ERAL A So B ff iL Y (P AG E I )

LA TIN AM ER ICA

* 4

00

DIS AR MA MSNT /NVCL EAR TES TI NG

WIATIW II » g

25 -S T AT E RES ON ATO MIC RA DI AT IO N CMTE

RE PO RT : IM P L IC IT C R IT IC IS M OF U SS R

T E ST IN G , 10 /2 0 /6 1 ( R E S . 16 29 ) (S P C )

CZ ECH RES MER ELY NO TING ATOMIC

RA DI AT IO N CMTE RE PO RT , 10 /2 0 /6 1 (S P C )

RES AP PE AL IN G TO US oR NOT TO EX PLOD E

50-ME GAT 0N BOMB , 10 /2 7/6 1 ( R E S . 16 32 )

IN D IA N RE S C A L LI N G FOR UR GE NT ,

UNCO NTRO LLED MORATORIUM ON NU CLE AR

T E ST IN G , 11 /6 /6 1 ( R E S . 16 48 )

U S- UK RES C A L LIN G FOR NU CLE AR TE ST

BAN TREA TY WITH E F F E C T IV E IN TE RN AT IO NA L

CO NT RO L, 11 /8 /61 ( R E S . 16 49 )

AF RI CA N RES ON CR EA TI ON OF AFR IC AN

DE NU CL EA RI ZE D ZO N E , 11 /2 4 /6 1 ( R E S . 16 52 )

AFR O-A SI AN RES ON BA NN ING U SE OF

NU CLE AR WE APO NS, 11 /2 4/6 1 ( R E S . 16 53 )

SW EDI SH RE S ON AGREEM ENT BY NONNUCLE AR POWERS NOT TO ACQ UI RE NU CLE AR

WEAPONS OR ALLOW THEM TO B E ST AT IO NE D

ON TH EI R TER R IT OR Y, 11 /3 0/6 1

CMTE I ( R E S . 16 64 )

UN ITED NATIO NS CHARTER AM EN DM EN TS

CO LO NI ALI SM /A FR IC AN ITEM S

CE NS UR E OF SO UI H AF RI CA N FO RE IG N M IN IS TER

LOUW FOR GE NE RA L DEB ATE S P E E C H , 1 0 / U / 6 1
RES ASKING FRANCE TO RECOGNIZE IMPRISONED

ALGERIANS AS PO LIT ICAL PR ISO NE RS ,

1 1 / 1 5 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 5 0 )

INDIA N RES ON WEST NEW GUINEA CALLING

FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN DUTCH

AND IN DO NE SIA NS , 1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1

FRENCH-AFRICAN RES ON WEST NEW GUINEA

STRESSING SELF-DETERMINATION AND

ESTABLISHING UNITED NATIONS COMMISSICW,

1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1

38 -S TATE RES ON COLONIALISM ESTABLIS HIN G

UNITED NATIONS SPEC IAL CMTE TO MAKE

RECOMMENDATIONS ON GRANTING INDEPENDENCE,

1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1 (R E S. 1 6 5 1 )

SOVIET AMENDMENT TO 38 -S TATE RES ON

COLONIALISM, SET TIN G 1 9 6 2 AS YEAR OF

ELIM INATION OF COLONIALISM, 1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1

SANCTIONS AND BXPLUSIC N PARAGRAPHS OF

AFRICAN RES ON APARTHEID IN SOUTH AF RICA ,

1 1 / 2 8 / 6 1

IND IAN RES ON APARTH EID, CONDEMNING

SOUTH AFRICA BUT WITHOUT CALL FOR

SANCTIONS OR EX PULSION, 1 1 / 2 8 / 6 1

(R E S. 1 6 6 3 )

RES ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA PROCLAIMING RIGHT

OF PEOPLE TO INDEPENDENCE, 1 2 A 3 / 6 1

(R E S. 1 7 0 2 ) CMTE IV

A X A A A A X A a A A a

N I A N N N Y A A A A A

X X I X X X N X A X A I

I X I X I X I X I I X I

N N N N N N I N N N N N

N A N N N a X N A A A X

X X X X X a X X X X X X

X X X X X a X X X a X X

a A a A a A A A A X

N A N A N N A A N X

I X I I I I I X I N

a X X X X X X X X X

a N N N N N N N N X

A A N N A A A A N X

X X X I X I X X I X

a l a l a l l l X I

6 2 - 0 - 3 1

1 1 - 4 0 - 2 1

5 3 - 4 1 - 9

9 7 - 0 - 4

1 9 - 1 6 - 3 6

1 8 - 3 1 - 2 2

9 7 - 2 - 1

8 6 - 1 - 1

NQN-CCMPLIANCE OF PORTUGAL WITH GA RES

1 5 1 2 (X V) REGARDING REPORTING TO UN ON

IT S OVERSEAS TE RR ITOR IES, 1 2 / 1 9 / 6 1 (R E S .1 6 9 9 )

ALGERIA - RES CALLING FOR RENEWAL OF

NEGOTIATIONS) WITH SP ECIF IC REFERENCE

TO PGAR, 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S. 1 7 2 1 )

X A I I I a X X I I I a X a I I I 9 0 - 3 - 2

A I A A A A X A A A A A a A A A A A A X 6 2 - 0 - 3 8

N .B . 1 ) A l l v o t e s a r e r o l l c a l l v o t e s and w a r e h e l d I n P le n a r y S e s s i o n ( 2 / 3 m a j o r i t y r e q u ir e d ) u n l e s s o t h e r w is e l n d l o a t e d . C o n s o lt te e

v o t e s r e q u i r e o n l y s im p le m a j o r i t y .

2 ) R e s o l u t i o n a r e l n d l o a t e d f o r t h o s e r e s o l u t i o n s f o r m a l l y a d o p te d b y GA. No nu m b ers a r e l n d l o a t e d f o r p r o c e d u r a l m o t io n s

o r w h e r e r e s o l u t i o n s f a i l e d o f p a s s a g e .

3 ) S o v i e t b l o c c o n s i s t s o f t e n m em bers: A lb a n i a , B u l g a r i a , B y e l o r u s s i a n S . S . R . , C s e c h o s lo v a k la , H u n g a r y , O u te r M o n g o lia , P o la n d ,

B iim .n l . , U k r a in ia n S . S . R . , USS R. B lo c v o t e d t o g e t h e r a n a l l i s s u e s .

1 ) A b s e n c e s a r e n o t I n c lu d e d I n c o m p a r a tiv e t o t a l s l i s t e d a t b o tto m o f PAGE I I .
KE Y : I - YE S

N - NO

A - ABS TE NTI ON

a - A BSE NT

NP - NO T P A R T IC IP A T IN G

- VO TE TAKEN PR IO R TO

GA ME MB ERSH IP

.V OT IN G PA TT ER N FOR SI XTEEN TH S E S S IO N OF UN IT ED NATI ONS GEN ERA L * r iy (p tr .g U )

LATIN AMERICA

00

o

CO LC M IA I.T SM /A FR IC AN ITEM S

ANGOLA - BU LG AR IA -P OLA ND R ES CALL IN G

FOR SA N C TIO NS A G A IN ST PO RT UG AL , 1 / y i / b S .

ANGOLA - A F R O -A SIA N R ES C ALL IN G FOR S E L F -

DE TE RM IN AT IO N OF AN GO LA , I j y z / t a . ( R E S . 1 7 4 2 )

RES C ALL IN G CN UN CMTE OF 1 7 TO CONSI DER

V H ET H St SOUTHE RN RHODES IA I S FU LL Y S E L F -

GO VER NIN G, 2 / 2 3 / 6 2 ( R E S . 1 7 4 5 )

COLOMBIA3

I 8

a 3

5 1

d I 3 I | I

» ft. ft.

1 0 s

B s §

RES ON RUAN DA-U RUND I E N V IS AG IN G TE RM INAT ION

O F UN TR U ST EESH IP ON 1 / \ / b 2 AND ALL OW ING FOR

P O S S IB L E CON TI NU ED BE LG IA N PRES ENCE AFT ER

IN D EPEN D EN C E, 2 / 2 3 / 6 2 ( R E S . 1 7 4 3 ) CMTE IV

E A ST WEST IT EM S

IN S C R IP T IO N OF IT EM ON T IB E T , 9 / 2 5 / 6 1

IN SC R IP T IO N OF IT EM ON HU NG AR Y, 9 / 2 5 / 6 1

MONGOLIAN MO TIO N ON SE A TIN G 2 KOR EAN S A S

AMENDED, 1 2 / 3 1 / 6 1 CMTE I

U NIT ED ST A T E S MO TIO N NO T TO SE A T NORTH

KO RE A, 1 2 / 1 9 / 6 1 CMTE I

KCREA - REA FFIR M IN G EA R LIE R UN R ES AND

EX TE NDI NG UN CMTE FOR U N IF IC A T IO N AND

R E H A B IL IT A T IO N , 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 ( R E S . 1 7 4 0 )

REC OG NI TI ON OF RIG HT OF SE LF-D ETERM IN A TIO N

FO R T IB E T , 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 ( R E S . 1 7 2 3 )

R ES DEP LO RI NG U SSR AND HUNG AR IAN LAC K OF

CO OP ER AT ION WITH UN S P E C IA L R EPR ES EN TA TI VE

ON HU NG AR Y, 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 ( R E S . 1 7 4 1 )

N A N N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N

X Y X I I Y X Y X Y X Y I Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

A A A A A A Y A A A A Y A A a A A A A A

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y a Y Y I Y a X Y Y Y Y

N Y

Y Y

N Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

I Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y

Y N

Y N

Y N

Y N

Y Y Y

Y Y Y

Y Y

X X

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y X Y N Y a Y Y Y a

X

Y X

Y Y

Y X

Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I Y

Y N

Y N

Y N

2 6 - 4 3 - 3 2

9 9 - 2 - 1

5 7 - 2 1 - 2 4

8 7 - 0 - U

4 8 - 1 4 - 3 5

5 1 - 1 5 - 3 0

6 3 - 1 8 - 1 9

5 4 - 1 7 - 2 2

6 0 - 1 1 - 2 7

5 6 - 1 1 - 2 9

4 9 - 1 7 - 3 2

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

> «
CHINESE REPRESENTATION: IMPORTANT QUEST!GN

RES, 1 2 / 1 5 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 6 8 )

CHINESE REPRESENTATION: SO VIET RES TO SEAT

CHINESE C a -M iN iS T S , 1 2 A 5 / 6 1

CUBAN CHARGES v s US - CZECH-RUMANIAN RES -

OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH URGING US TO STOP

INTERFERENCE IN CU BA 'S INTERNAL AFF AIR S,

2 / 1 5 / 6 2 CKTE I

CUBAN CHARGES v s US - MONGOLIAN RES STRESSING

PR IN CI PL E OF NON-INTERVENTION , 2 /2 Q /b 2 .

MISCEIJANEOUS ITEMS

ADMISSION OF MAURITANIA, 1 0 / 2 7 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 3 1 )

US RES ON UNRWA ENDORSING PCC EFFORTS WITHOUT

ARAB AMENDMENTS, 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 7 2 5 )

UNRWA: ARAB AMENDMENT RE PROPERTY RIGH TS,

1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1

16-POWER RES URGING DIRECT ARAB -ISRA EL

NEGOTIA TIO NS, 1 2 / 1 9 / 6 1 (S PC )

ARAB LEAGUE RES CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

IN OMAN AND WITHDRAWAL OF UK TROOPS, 1 2 / 1 4 / 6 1

RES AUTHORIZING ONUC FINA NC ING, FROM 1 1 / 1 / 6 1 -

6 / 3 0 / 6 2 , 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 7 3 2 )

RES AUTHORIZING UNEF FIN AN CING , FROM 1 / 1 / 6 2 - 6 / 3 0 / 6 2 , 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 7 3 3 )

RES REQUESTING IC J OPIN ION RE LEGAL OBLIGATION

OF ONUC AND UNEF PAYMENTS, 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S. 1 7 3 1 )

RES APPROVING 2 0 0 MILLION UN BOND IS SU E FOR

PE AC E-KE IPING OPERATIONS, 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S. 1 7 3 9 )

Y Y Y

N N N

N N N

N N N

Y Y Y

Y Y I

Y N A

A A I

A A A

Y I I

Y Y I

Y I Y

I Y A

I X X N X X X X X X X X X I X X I

N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N

N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N

N N N Y N N N N N N N N N N N N N

Y Y Y N Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y I

I X I A X A X I I a X X I I I X X

N N A X N A N N N a A N N N N N A

Y A Y N Y Y Y Y Y

N A a Y N A A A A

A Y Y Y A Y A

A N A A A A A

Y X X A A Y Y X a a X X X X I X I

Y Y a N A Y Y Y A a Y Y Y X A Y Y

Y Y Y A X X X X a

N A A A X A X I

a X I I X I X

A X X X X a X

COINCIDE UNITED STATES 2 9 2 7 2 6

COINCIDE USS R 2 3 3

COINCIDE NEITHER

COINCIDE BOTH 5 4 5

3 1 3 0 2 7 1 2 5 2 2 2 5 2 6 2 1 1 7 2 6 2 8 2 9 2 8 3 0 2 7 2 7

1 0 0 3 2 0 2 0 1 4 1 3 0 1 0 1 1 3

6 8 7 4 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 8 6 8 3 8 8 8 9 9

5 5 2 6 5 5 4 5 5 2 4 3 5 4 4 5 4

X N

N I

N I

Y A

Y A

N X

I N

X N

X N

X N

TOTAL

5 0 2

5 8

1 5 9

8 7

6 1 - 3 4 - 7

3 7 - 4 8 - 1 9

1 1 - 5 0 - 3 9

3 7 - 4 5 - 1 8

6 8 - 1 3 - 2 0

6 2 - 0 - 3 7

4 0 - 3 7 - 2 1

34-44-2 0

3 3 - 2 1 - 3 7

6 7 - 1 3 - 1 5

6 1 - 1 1 - 2 4

5 2 - 1 1 - 3 2

5 8 - 1 3 - 2 4

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMEN DMENTS 00
K EX: Y - YE S 

N - NOA - ABS TE NTIO N 

a - ABS EN T

N P - NOT P A R T IC IP A T IN G

- VO TE TAKEN P R IO R TO 

GA MEM BE RS HI P

V OTI NG PA TT ER N FU R SI X T E E N T H S E S S IO N O F U N IT ED NA TI O N S GE NE RA L A S S a iB L Y (P A G E I )

NEST EUR OPE AND OLD C OMM ONW EALTH 00

to

DISA RM AMEN T/ NUC LE AR T E ST IN GR A D IA TIO N IT E b E

2 5 -S T A T E R E S ON ATOM IC R A D IA T IO N CMTE R E PO R T : IM P L I C I T C R IT IC IS M O F U SS R 

T E S T IN G , 1 0 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 2 9 ) ( S P C )

CZ EC H R E S ME RELY N OTI NG AT OM IC RA D IA TIO N CM TE R E P O R T , 1 0 / 2 0 / 6 1 (S P C )

I X X X X X X X X X a Y X X X X X X X I X A 75-0-17

33-22-37

R E S A PP EA LIN G TO U SS R NOT TO EX PL ODE 

50- M EG A T0N BO MB, 1 0 / 2 7 / 6 1 ( R E S . 1 6 3 2 )

X I X X X X X X X X X X I X X X X X I I X N 87-1 1-1

IN D IA N R E S C A LLIN G FO R U RGENT, 

UN CONTROLL ED MORAT ORI UM ON NU CL EA R 

T E S T IN G , 1 1 / 6 / 6 1 ( R E S . 1 6 4 8 )

U S- U K R E S CA LLIN G FO R NU CL EA R T E ST 

BAN TR EA TY W IT H E FF E C T IV E IN TER NA TIO N A L 

CO NTR OL, 1 1 / 8 / 6 1 ( R E S . 1 6 4 9 )

A FR IC AN R E S ON CREATIO N O F AFR IC AN DEN UCLE ARI ZE D Z O N E , 1 1 / 2 4 / 6 1 ( R E S . 1 6 5 2 )

N X A X X X N X X N N A A X N A X N A XX X X X X A A X X X X X X X X X X X X A

A X A A X X A X X A A A A I A A I A A X

71-2 0-871-11-15

5 5 - 0 - 4 4

A FR O -A SIA N R E S ON BA NNIN G U SE OF NUCLE AR W EA PO NS, 1 1 / 2 4 / 6 1 ( R E S . 1 6 5 3 )

SW ED IS H R E S ON AGR EEMENT BX NONNU CLEA R POWE RS NO T TO A CQUIR E NU CL EA R 

WEA PONS OR ALLOW THEM TO BE ST A TIO N ED 

ON T H E IR T E R R IT O R Y , 1 1 / 3 0 / 6 1 

CMT E I ( R E S . 1 6 6 4 )

N A N

A X N

A A N A N

I X I N X X

N N N A N N A N N X N I 55-20-26

N N A X N N X A N X N I 57-12-32

c o tz a ir a iT S M /A r a iC A N I T M

CE NSU RE O F SO UT H A FR IC AN FO R EIG N M IN IS T E R LOUW FO R GE NE RA L DEB ATE S P f fiC H , 1 0 / 1 1 / 6 1

A A NP A NP A N P N P A A X A NP A A NP N HP X NP I 67-1 -20

UNIT ED NATIONS CHARTER AMEN DMEN TS
RES AS KI NG FR AN CS TO RECO GN IZE IM PR IS ON ED

AL GE RIAN S AS P O LIT IC A L P R IS O N E R S ,1 1 / 1 5 / 6 1 ( R E S . 1 6 5 0 )

IN DIA N RE S ON WES T NEW GU IN EA CA LL IN GFOR DIR EC T NEG OTI ATI ONS BETWEEN DUTCH

AND IN D O N E SIA N S, 1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1

FR EN CH -AFR ICAN RES ON WEST NEW GU IN EA

ST R ESS IN G SE LF -D ETE RM IN ATI ON ANDESTA BL IS H IN G UNIT ED NA TI ON S COM M IS SION,

1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1

3 8 -S T A T E RES ON CO LO NI AL ISM ESTA BLIS H IN G

UNIT ED NATI ONS SP E C IA L CMTE TO MAKERECOMMENDATIONS ON GRANTING IN DEP EN DEN CE,

1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1 ( R E S . 1 6 5 4 )

SO VIE T AMENDMENT TO 3 8 -S T A T E RES ON

COLO NIA LIS M , SE TT IN G 1 9 6 2 AS YEA R OFEL IM IN ATI ON OF COLO NIA LIS M , 1 1 / 2 7 / 6 1SA NC TI ONS AND EX PU LS IO N PARAGR APH S OF

AF RICA N RES ON AP AR TH EID IN SOU TH A F R IC A ,

1 1 / 2 8 / 6 1IN D IA N RE S ON A PAR THEID , CONDEMNING

SOUTH AFRIC A BUT WITH OUT CA LL FORSA NC TI ONS OR EX PU LSIO N , 1 1 / 2 8 / 6 1

(R E S . 1 6 6 3 )

RE S ON SOUTH WEST AFR IC A PR OC LA IM ING RIGH T

OF PE OP LE TO IN DEP EN DEN CE, 1 2 / 1 3 / 6 1

(R E S . 1 7 0 2 ) CMTE IV

I I X X I X A X I X X X X I a A I A A X I I

N A N N N A N N N N N N N N a N N N H I N X

N N N N N N N N N N N N N N M M N N N I M I

X I X X I X I X X X X X X X N X X N X X X X

6 2 - 0 - 3 1

5 3 - 4 1 - 9

9 7 - 0 - 4

1 9 - 4 6 - 3 64 8 - 3 1 - 2 2

9 7 - 2 - 1

NO N-C OM PLIANC E OF PORT UGAL WIT H GA RES

1 5 4 2 (X V ) REG AR DIN G RE PO RT ING TO UN ON

I T S OVERSEAS T E R R IT O R IE S, 1 2 / 1 9 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 6 9 9 )

X I I I I X A X I I I X I N * I N I X X X

AL GE RIA - RES CAL LING FC R RENEWAL OF

NE GO TIAT IO NS | WITH S P E C IF IC REF ERENCE

TO PG AR, 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 ( R E S . 1 7 2 4 )

A X A A X I X X A A A A X A A I a A X A X

9 0 - 3 - 2

6 2 - 0 - 3 8

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDME NTS

N .B . 1 ) A l l v o t e s a r e r o l l o a l l v o t e s a n d w e r e h e l d I n P l e n a r y S e s s i o n ( 2 / 3 m a j o r i t y r e q u i r e d ) u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e l n d l o a t e d . C o o a l t t e e

v o t e s r e q u i r e o n l y s i m p l e m a j o r i t y .

2 ) R e s o l u t i o n n u m b e r s a r e l n d l o a t e d f o r t h o s e r e s o l u t i o n s f o r m a l l y a d o p t e d b y G A . N o n u m b e r s a r e l n d l o a t e d f o r p r o c e d u r a l m o t i o n s

o r w h e r e r e s o l u t i o n s f a i l e d o f p a s s a g e .

3 ) S o v i e t b l o c o o n s l s t s o f t o n m e m b e r s ; n h a n t a , B u l g a r i a , B y e l o r u s s i a n S . S . R . , C s e o h o s l o v a k l a , H u n g a r y , O u t e r M o n g o l i a , P o l a n d ,

R u m a n ia , U k r a i n i a n S . S . R . , U S S R . B l o c v o t e d t o g e t h e r o n a l l I s s u e s .

4 ) A b s e n o e s a r e n o t I n c l u d e d I n o o s q i a r e t l v e t o t a l s l i s t e d a t b o t t o n o f PAGE I X .

0000
00

4^

KE Y: Y - YES

N _ NOA - AB ST EN TI ON

a - AB SE NT

NP - NOT PA RT IC IP AT IN G

VO TE TAKEN PRIO R TO

GA M Eb BE RSK IP

VO TIN G PAT TER N FOR SIXT EE NT H SE SS IO N OF UNIT ED NATI ONS GENE RAL A SS E iB L Y (P AG E I I )

WEST EUROPE AND OLD COMMONWEALTH

COL ONI ALI SM /A FR IC AN I I B 6

ANGOLA - BU LG AR IA -POL AN D RES CAL LINGFOR SA NC TI ONS AGA IN ST PO RT UG AL , 1 / 3 0 / 6 2

ANGOLA - AFR O-ASL AN RE S CAL LI NG FOR S E L F -DETERM INA TIO N OF ANGOLA, 1 / 3 0 / 6 2 (R E S . 1 7 4 2 )

N N N N N N N a N N N N N N a N N N N Y

Y Y Y Y . Y Y A a Y Y Y Y Y Y a K Y N Y Y

N I

I Y

2 6 - 4 3 - 3 2

9 9 - 2 - 1

RES CAL LING ON UN CMTE OF 1 7 TO CO NS ID ER

WKETHHi SOUT HERN RH OD ES IA I S FULLY S E L F -

GO VE RNING, 2 / 2 3 / 6 2 (R E S . 1 7 4 5 )

N N N N N N N A N N N N N N N N N N Y N Y 5 7 - 2 1 - 2 4

RES ON RU AN DA -URU ND I EN VIS AG IN G TERMINA TIO N

OF UN TR UST EE SH IP ON 7 / 1 / 6 2 AND ALLOUING FORPO SSI B LE CO NT INUE D BE LG IA N PR ES EN CE AFTERIN DE PE ND EN CE , 2 / 2 3 / 6 2 (R E S . 1 7 4 3 ) CMTE IV

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y a Y I Y Y Y Y Y Y a Y Y Y A 8 7 - 0 - 1 1

EA ST WEST ITE MS

IN SC R IP TIO N OF ITEM ON T IB E T , 9 / 2 5 / 6 1IN SC R IP TIO N OF I T B l ON HU NGARY, 9 / 2 5 / 6 1

MONGOLIAN MOTION ON SE A TIN G 2 KORE ANS ASAMENDED, 1 2 / 3 1 / 6 1 CMTE I

Y Y YY I YY A Y

Y Y AY Y AY Y A

A Y Y

Y Y YY Y Y

Y Y YY Y YY Y Y

Y NY N

Y N

UNI TE D ST ATE S MOTION NOT TO SE AT NORTHKOREA, 1 2 / 1 9 / 6 1 CMTE 1

Y A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y I Y Y Y a Y A Y Y N Y N

4 8 - 1 4 - 3 5

5 1 - 1 5 - 3 0

6 3 - 1 8 - 1 9

5 4 - 1 7 - 2 2

UNIT ED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDME NTS

a
85 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS
KEY! Y - YES

N - NO

k - ABSTENTIONa - ABSENT

NP - NOT P A RTIC IP ATIN G

VO TE TAKEN PRIO R TO

GA MEMBERSHIP

VO TIN G PAT TER N FOR SIXT EE NT H SE SS IO N OF UNIT ED NATI ONS GENERAL ASS EM BLY (P AG E I I )

MS51 autuffi W UM

0005

HTSEBJAtraWS IT B6

RE S RE QU ES TING IC J (P IN IO N RE LEGAL OB LIG AT ION

OF ONUC AND UN EF PA YM EN TS, 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 7 3 1 )

RES AP PROV ING 2 0 0 MXLLICN UN BOND IS S U E FOR

PE AC E- KE JS ’IN G Q P B U T IC K S , 1 2 / 2 0 / 6 1 (R E S . 1 7 3 9 )

COIN CID E U NIT ED ST ATE SCOINCIDE USSR

CO IN CU B NEITHER

CO INCU B BOTH

3 4 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 9 1 6 2 7 2 7 3 0 3 5 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 1 1 7 2 8 2 5 2 3 3 6

5

3 1 16 5

5 6 3

4 1 7 8

5 4 2

2 5

8 1 0 8 1 41 2 5 1

I i

TOTAL

5 5 1

6 6

1 2 5

8 4

5 2 - 1 1 - 3 2

5 8 - 1 3 - 2 4

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 87

VOTING RECORDS AT THE 17 th UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1962) 

Ex pla natio n and Add iti on al Items

1. The items li s te d on the vo ting ch ar ts inclu de the p ri n ci pal is su es which 

were brought to a r o ll c a ll vo te at the 17 th Assem bly. Twenty-n ine vo tes are 

li s te d from among the hundreds of vo tes tak en on ne ar ly 100 agenda items . The 

item s were se le ct ed on a basi s o f th e ir importan ce and on the a v a ila b ili ty of 

vo ting rec ords on a co un try -by-co un try b a sis . The gr ea t m aj or ity of vo te s 

taken in the GA are not recorded by coun try but on ly by to ta ls sinc e the vo ting 

is of te n by a show of hands. Co nsequ ently, thes e s t a t is t ic s do not purpo rt to 

show a complete pic tu re of each co un tr y' s p o si ti o n , or of the to ta l re su lt s.

2. In ge ne ra l, the outcome of the 17 th GA was su cc es sf ul from the US po int of 

vie w. On a la rg e m aj or ity of the is su es (22 out of the 29 li s te d and many 

ot he rs not li s te d ) the posi ti on of the m aj or ity in the GA co in cide d wit h th at 

of the US. The So vi et Union, however, was in a minority posi ti on in 16 of the 

29 vo te s ta bu la te d. The to ta l UNGA re su lt s rec ord ed in the low er rig ht-han d 

corner of each ch ar t show th a t, on tho se is su es where the US and USSR voted 

d if fe r e n tly , the to ta l vo te s which co in cide d wit h the p osi ti on o f the US were 

1,03 7 wh ile tho se co in ci di ng wi th the USSR were 496 or abou t 2 to 1 in fa vo r

of the US. On East-W est is su es, de sp ite a r e la tiv e ly hig h number of ab st en tion s, 

the American posi ti on was adopted in a l l ca se s at th is GA.

3. The vo tin g record of any coun try should be analy zed q u a li ta tiv e ly in 

re la ti o n to the is su es in orde r to avoid misleading im pressio ns. For example, 

the vo ting record of most Af ro -A sian na tio ns on co lo nia l item s re veals a hig h 

prop ortio n of vo tes which co in ci de wit h the USSR vo te . Th is is not an in dica tion of Afro -A sia n support fo r the Russian p osi ti on , but ra th er a dem onstration 

of the fa c t th at the Sovi et bl oc finds i t exp edien t to support some of the 

Afro- Asian pos itio ns on co lo nia lism which the United S ta t^ fo r one reason

or an othe r, cou ld not supp ort.

4. The spo nso rsh ip of re so lu ti on s is al so sig n if ic a n t beca use i t throws li g h t 

on the sou rce of prim ary in te re st in ce rt ain ite ms. For example, o f the 7 

re so lu ti on s li s te d in the atta ch ed vo ting ch ar ts on which both the US and the 

USSR voted a ff ir m a ti ve ly , 4 were spon sored by Afro- As ia ns , 1 by the US (UNRWA),

1 by Ind onesia and the Ne the rlands (on West New Guinea) and 1 by the nonpermanent members of the Secu ri ty Council (e le ct io n of U Th an t). The So vi et 

Union spon sored none of th es e. The end re su lt in each case was sa ti sfa cto ry 

to the US.

$. Add iti on al Item s: The Un ited Sta te s supported a number of important 

re so lu ti on s which were adopted by la rg e m ajo ri ties but on which th er e were 

no r o ll c a ll vo te s and th er ef ore cou ld not be inc lud ed in th e vo ting ch ar ts .

These re so lu ti on s in clud e:

(1 ) Gen eral and complete

disarmament (84 -0-1)

(2) Financing of UN Congo

op erati on (7 5- 12 -1 3)

(3) Financing UNEF (Gaza

str ip ) op erati on (7 6- 11 -8 )

(4) Pla ns fo r UN In sti tu te (85 -0-6)

(5) UN Conference on Trade (9 1- 0-1 )

(6) Po pu lat ion growth and economic

development (69-0-2 7)

(7) UN Marriage Convention (92-0-2 7)

(8) In crea se in UN Working

Cap ital Fund (9 1- 11 -3 )

(9) In te rn at io nal Cooperati o n in Pe ac ef ul Uses 

of Outer Space (Unanimous)

(10) Economic Consequences

of Disarmament (Unanimous)

(1 1) FAO World Food Program (Unanimous)
00

00

KEY: Y - YES

N - NO

A - ABSTENTION

a * ABSENT

NP - NOT PAR TIC IPA TIN G

- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR

TO GA MEMBERSHIP

VOTING PATTERN FOR SEVENTEENTH SE SS IO N OF UN ITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

AFRICA

EXPLANATION OF VOTING CHARTS

AND ADDITIONA L IT E IE - B e e P . 1

NUCLEAR TE ST IN G. RADIATION IT EIE

1 . T h i r t y - s e v e n p o w er Hea c o l l l o g

f o r c e s s a t i o n N u c le a r T e s t i n g by

J a n u a r y 1 , 1 9 6 3 , b a s e d o n e i g h t -

n a t i o n mem oran du m t o D is a r m a m en t

Cmte 1 1 / 5 / 6 2 ( R e s . 1 7 6 2 A)

2 . US-UK R es c a l l i n g f o r N u c le a r

T e s t B an T r e a t y w it h E f f e c t i v e

I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l 1 1 / 6 / 6 2

( R e s 1 7 6 2 B )

3 . R es o n A to m io R a d ia t io n Cmte

R e p o r t ! n o t i n g d a n g e r s n u c l e a r

t e s t i n g and a s k i n g WHO t o d e v i s e

sc h e m e f o r m o n it o r in g r a d i o a c t i v i t y1 1 / 2 0 / 6 2 (R e s 1 7 6 A )

SAST-R^T IWPA . I n s c r i p t i o n o f Ita m o n H u ngary

9 / 2 4 / 6 2

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

♦ »
5. Korea: USSR Motion on Se ating N

both North and South Korean Rape

12/11/6 2 Cate I6. Korea: U.S. Motion to eeat Y

South Korea Rep only 12 /11 /62 Cate I

7. Korea! Ree real firm ing earli er Y

UN Reaes and exten ding UK Cate fo r

Un ifi ca tio n and Reh ab ilitatio n

(Rea 1855)

8. Hungary: US Rea Giving SYG A

re ep on al blllty fo r Hungarianquestio n and re af fira in g ob je ctiv es

earli er UH Reaea 12 /20 /62 (Rea 1857)9> Chinese Representation! USSR H

Res to se at Chinese Communists usd

Expel Chinese Nat io na lists 10/ 30/62

OTHER POLITICAL ITEMS10 . U.S. Res on UNRWA: Opera tive a

para 2 thanking Pal es tine Con cilia tio n

Co bb, fo r eff orts aol ve refuge e problems

e tc . 12 /20 /62 (Ree 1856 Rev. 1)

11 . U.S . Rea. on UNRWA: Pina l Re solution A

(Ree 1856) req uestin g Pal es tine Con cilia tio n

Coon, to continue It s endeavors and continu ing

UNRWA u n ti l June 30 , 1965. 12/ 20/62

12. Arab League Res call in g fo r s e lf - a

determ ination In Oman and withdrawalUK troops U /2 8/ 62 SPC ( fa il ed get 2/3 In GA)

•■•K ADMUOoIRATIOK AM) FINANCING ITBS

13 . Res aooeptlng ICJ opin ion on

fin an cin g UH Peace-Keeping operations12/19/6 214 . Res es ta bl ishin g 21-Mbr Cate

to recommend sp ec ia l fin an cin g methods

fo r future peace-keeping operations12 /19/6 2 Cate V15 . El ec tio n of U Thant as Secretary

General of UN. 11/ 30/62 (Res 1771)

16 . Si x power Ree on equitab le

geo gra phical di st ri bu tion

Se cr et ar ia t st re ss in g Charter

A rt ic le 101 (3) and recommendinggu id elin es fo r improved di stri bu tion

11/28/6 3 Cmte V

H H a R R N N A H A R

Y a Y Y I P Y T Y A Y

T I Y Y Y Y Y Z Y A Y

A A A A a A A A A A A

R R R H R R R R R H RA T A a T P A A Y a Y

Y Y Y a Y Y Y Y Y a lA Y A A a a a Y Y Y A

Y Y A Y Y a a Y a Y Y aY Y a Y Y Y Y R Y Y Y a

Y I T T T Y T Z Y I Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y I Y I Y

A A A A A

A A A A aA A R HP A

Y Y T Y Y

A A A A A

Y Y Y Y YY A Y Y Y

A Y a a a

A Y A A AY Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y a

A Y Y A Y a A

A A a A Y a A

A A A A A A AT Y N Y R N A

A a Y Y Y A Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y a Y A A Y A

A Y Y Y Y Y Y

A a Y Y Y A YY Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y a Y Y Y Y Y

Y A A Y A A a A aY A A Y A a A A a

A A A Y A A A A AR Y Y R Y Y A Y YY a A a A A Y A a

Y Y Y a Y a Y Y Y

a A Y H ' Y A Y a

Y Y Y N A Y Y Y a

Y Y Y K A Y Y Y aY Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y a a Y Y a Y Y a

29-5 6-14

Y N 65-9-26

Y N 65-1 1-26

Y H 50-13-43

H Y 42-56-1 2

Y A 58-0-41

Y Y 100-J-?

R Y 41-1 8-36

Y N 76-17-8

Y K 78-17.-12Y Y 1C9-0-0

Y K 84-10-2

00

CO

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS
KEY: Y - YES 

1) - NO 

A _ ABSTAIN a - ABSENT

IIP - NOT PARTICIPATING

____VOTE TAKEN PR IC K •

TO GA MEMBERSHIP

VOTING PATTERN FCR SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 

AFRICA

CO

O

E x p la n a ti o n o f V oti ng C h art s 

and A d d it io n al Ite m s - see p . 1

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JS BB

17. Res re q u e sti n g a l l p o s s ib le 

a id f o r Chine se Refug ee s in Hong 

Kong 1 2 /7 /6 2 (Res 1784)18. Res on Pe rm an en t S ov ere ig n ty over N a tu ra l R es ou rc es 12/1 4/6 2 

(Res 1803)

19. Res on T ec hnic al and F in a n c ia l 

A ssis ta n c e to Ruanda and Bur un di 

Cmte I I 12/1 4/6 2

2 0 . Res n o ti n g w it h a p p re c ia ti o n 

"C ai ro D e c la ra ti o n o f D ev elop in g 

C o u n tr ie s" Cmte I I 11/8 /6 2 

COLONIALISM/AFRICAN HEMS21 • Res ta k in g n o te o f Du tch —Indo 

ag re em en t on Wes t New Gu inea and a u th o ris in g UN r o le In ag re em en t 

9 /2 1 /6 2 (R es 1752)

2 2 . A part heid in Sou th A fric a : Res recom mending sa n c ti o n s and p o ssib le SC a c tio n 11/6 /6 2 (Res 176 1)

Y Y Y a X a Y Y A A A A N N N N N N a Y Y v ^ Y A Y A N Y A A A A A

Y Y Y a Y a Y Y Y X Y Y ► I A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y a N a Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y a Y a Y Y Y a I Y Y a Y Y Y Y Y Y a Y Y Y a a Y Y Y a a

A A A A A A A A A A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y a Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y a Y Y Y Y Y

A A A a A A A A A A Y A - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y a Y Y A Y

Y a Y Y Y a Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y

34 -0 -1 589- 0- 1467 -1 6- 23

UNIT ED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS
23. Res on C olo nia lism Enlar ging

to 24 Hbrs UN S pecia l Cmte on Granting

Ind ependence! Vo te on Res as whole

withou t ta r g et dat e para 12/1 7/6 2

24. So. Rh od esia: Res c a ll in g fo r

L if ti n g o f Ban on 4APU P o lit ic a l

Pa rty and r e le a se o f 4APU P re si den t

10/1 2/6 2 (Re s 1755)

2 5 . So. Rh od esia! Res Re qu estin g

UK to br in g ab out new co n sti tu ti o n

fo r T err it ory and ex tend voti n g

r ig h ts to wh ole po pu la tion } req uest in g "good o ff ic es" o f SYG 10/3 1/6 2 (Re s 176 0)

26. South West A fr ic a! Res request in g Cmte 24 to take up quest io nSWAP and re ques ting SYG e sta b li sh

" e ff e c tiv e UN prese nce" in T er ri to ry

11/1 9/6 2

2 7 . Po rtug ue se T e r r it o r ie s! Res

ap pr ov ing re port o f S p e cia l Cmte

and re ques ti ng c e ssa ti o n sa le and

su pp ly o f arms to Por tu ga l 12/1 4/6 2

(Re s 180 7)

28. Po rtug ue se T e r r it o r ie s! Res

e sta b li sh in g UN ed uca ti onal program

fo r st udents o f t e r r it o r ie s and in ­

v itin g UN Hbrs to pr ov ide sc hola r­ sh ip s 12/1 2/6 2 (Res 1808)

29. An gola: Res su pp or tin g

Immediate independence and request in g SC a c tio n , in cl udin g

sa nct io ns

COINCIDE UNITED STATES (BUT NOT USSR)

COINCIDE USSR (BUT NOT USA)

I I Y a Y I I Y I Y

Y Y a Y Y a a a Y Y

Y Y Y Y a Y I Y I IT Y Y Y I T Y a l Y

Y I Y a Y Y Y I Y Y

I I Y a Y I I Y I Y

a l l l l a l l l l

11 11 9 6 10 7 11 10 8 1(

5 6 5 5 5 2 5 7 8 '

COINCIDE NEITHER 8 7 10 15 10 15 8 8 8

COINCIDE BOTH 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 4 5

Y I I I I Y I I I I Y I Y I a Y I A I I I Y Y Y I 10 1-0 -4

Y I I I a I I Y I Y I I a I a I I K I Y I Y a A Y 83 -2-1 1

I Y I I I I Y Y I I I Y I I Y Y Y N Y I I Y a A I C1 -2-19

I a I Y I I Y I Y Y I Y I I a I Y UP Y Y I Y Y Y Y 96-0 -1

Y I I I I I Y I Y I I a Y I Y I I N a I Y Y I N Y 82 -7 -1 3

a a a Y I I I I I I Y Y a Y a I a Y Y Y Y Y Y Y S6 -2- 1

a I I I Y I a I I Y I I a I a I a B Y Y a Y a N Y

ARFA

TOTAL

57 -14 -1

cr a; » “

6 8 4 5 4 3 3 4 6 9 8 12 6 7 11 6 3 u 3 4 7 5 233 .io ;?

6 6 10 11 10 11 9 11 6 6 8 4 5 5 3 7 10 2 7 10 4 9 21C 45 t

13 12 8 6 8 8 10 7 11 7 6 6 12 11 13 9 10 11 12 9 12 3 16 321 734

4 3 5 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 6 6 2 7 6 2 7 6 6 7 6 181 59C

953 2843

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

"THE GRAND TOTAL DOES NOT EjUAL THE SUM OF THE

AREA TOTAL. CH - F U I. 'l l ..73 LEC.ittiE TU BS 

1.T 1O T3 (3 U .L _ . ’l.R ) . I J. HAVE DEEN LISTED

Oi > . . . . . ? * . .'.t*. . u j . _iD . .. I _ IN C- CO
CO

to

KEY: Y - YES 

N - NO

A - ABSTENTION a - ABSENT

NP - NOT PARTICIPATING 

- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR 

TO GA MEMBERSHIP

EXPLANATION OB VOTING CHARTS 

AND ADDITIONAL. ITEMS - s e e P . 1

TOTIN' PATTERN FOR SE VE NT BN TH SE SS IO N OF UNITED NA TIO IB GENERAL ASSEMFI.T

NESTERN EUROPE AND OLD COMM3NTEALTH

NUCLEAR TES TING. RADIATION ITEMS1 . T h ir ty - s e v e n pove R es c a l l i n g f o r c e s s a t i o n N u c le a r T e s tin g by J a n . 1 , 1 9 6 3 , b a s e d on e i g h t - n a t i o n nem or ar du ra t o D is arm am ent Cmte 

1 1 /5 /6 2 (R e s . 1762 A)

2 . US-UK Res c a l l i n g f o r N u c le a r T e s tin g Ran T r e a ty w ith E f f e c t i v e 

I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n tr o l 1 1 /6 /6 2 

(R e s . 17 62 B)

3 . R es on A to m ic R a d ia tio n Cm te 

R e p o r t: n o tin g d a n g e rs n u c le a r 

t e s t i n g and a s k in g WMO t o d e v is e sc he m e f o r m o n ito rin g r a d i o - a c t i v i t y . 1 1 /2 0 /6 2 (R e s . 1761) 5ACT-UEST ITEMS

1 . I n s c r i p t i o n o f Ite m on •i p ti <

H ungary 9 /2 4 /6 2

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS
5. Korea: USSR Motion on 

Se atin g both Nor th and South 

Korean Raps. 12 /11 /62 Cmte I

6 . Korea: U.S. Motion to 

seat South Korea Rep onl y 

12/11 /62 Cmte I

7. Korea: Res re af firm in g e a rlie r 

UN Reses and exten ding UN Cmte 

fo r U nif ic at io n and R ehabil it ati on 

(Res 1855)

8. Hungary: US Res Giving 

•q SYG resp o n sib il it y fo r

Hungarian qu es tion and re af fi rm ­

ing ob je ct iv es e a rlie r UN Reses.

12/ 20/62 (Res 1857)

9 . Chin ese Re pr es en ta tio n:

USSR Res to se at Chinese 

Coranunists and Expel Chinese 

N ati onali st s 10 /30 /62 

O B LJP tfTK A L ITsre

10 . U.S, Res on UNRWA: op erat ive 

para 2 thank ing P al es tine Conci liat io n 

Conv. fo r e ff o rts solve ref ug ee pr oblems 12 /20 /62 (Res 1856 Rev. 1)

11• U.s. Res on UNRWA: FInA} Re so lutio n 

(Res 1856) re que st in g P al es tine C onc ilia tion 

'omm. to co nti nu e i t s end eavors and co ntin ui ng UNRWA u n til Jun e 30 , 1965. 12/20/62

12 . Arab League Res c all in g fo r s e lf - 

de term in atio n in Oman and withdraw al UK 

tro op s 11/ 28/62 SPC (F ai le d get 2/3 in GA) 

ffliAEHmiSnUHCN AND FINANCING ITO S

13 . Res ac ce pt ing ICJ op inion on 

fina nc in g UN Peace-Keepin g op er at ions

12/ 19/62

14 . Res esta bli shin g 21-Member Cmte to recommend sp ecia l fina nc ing methods 

fo r fu tu re peace-k eepin g op erat ions 12/19/6 2 Cmte V

15. Ele ct io n of U Thant as Sec re ta ry 

General of UH 11 /30 /62

16. Six power Res on eq ui ta bl e 

ge og raph ic al d is tr ib u ti o n fo r 

S ecre ta ri a t str essi n g Ch ar ter /i rti c le 

101 (3) and recommending gu id el in es 

fo r improved d is tr ib u ti o n Cmte V 11 /28 /62

47-37 8 0 —61

1! A

Y A

I I

II A

Y Y

Y Y

N A

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

I Y

N K

Y Y

Y Y

N N

A Y

A Y

Y Y

Y Y

H A

Y A

2 A

Y A

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

N N

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

N :i

Y Y

Y Y

Y I

II A

Y Y

Y Y

N N

H Y

H Y

Y Y

Y Y

T I

Il II

Y Y

Y Y

N N

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

29-5 6-14

65- 0-26

Y A Y

X X Y A Y Y Y Y 1 !

A 1! Y A K K Y Y Y

i i x a . a i y a

I I I . . Y I Y Y

H H N A K A :i

I I Y H U A Y Y A

X X X a N Y Y Y A

Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y

65-1 1-26

50-13-43

41-1U-36

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMEN DMEN TS

CO

00
TOTING PATTERN FOB SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL

I! - NO

A - AB STA IN 

a - ABSENT

,. P - :.OT PA RTI CI PA TIN G

. . VOTE TAKEN PR IOR 

TO GA MElB El iS HIP

WESTERN EUROPE . J O OL D CCHHONGEAI-TH

C O

EXPLANATION OF VOTING CHARTS

AND ADDITIO NAL IT EIE - s e e P . 1

1?

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ITEMS

1 7 . Re s r e q u e s tin g a l l p o s s ib le

a id o f C h in ese R efu gees In Hong

Kong 1 2 /7 /6 2 (R es 1784)

1 8 . Re s on Perman en t S o v e r e ig n ty

over N atu ral R eso urces 1 2 /1 4 /6 2

(B ee 1803)

1 9 . Res on T e c h n ic a l and F in a n c ia l

A s s is ta n c e t o Rwanda and Bu ru nd i

Cmte I I 1 2 /1 4 /6 2

2 0 . Rea n o tin g w it h a p p r e c ia tio n

"C air o D e c la r a tio n o f D evelo p in g

C ou n tr ie s" C at e I I 1 1 /8 /6 2

SQDONIAI,ISM/AFRICAN i r a e

2 1 . Res ta k in g n o te o f D utc h-I ndo

agre em en t on W est Nee Gui ne a and

a u th o r is in g UN r o le in ag re em en t

9 /2 1 /6 2 (R es 1752)2 2 . A p arth eid in South A fr ic a :

Re s re commending s a n c tio n s and

p o s s ib le SC a c t io n 1 1 /6 /6 2

(R ee 1761)

I I I

Y I IA I T

I I I

I I A

Y Y I

I I Y

Y Y I

I Y I Y

K i l l

Y a I IA Y I I

I Y

I Y

a Y

a Y

YI

A

I

Y A Y

Y a N

I a a

Y a a

Y A Y N Y

Y Y I Y II I A I 

1

Y I I Y 

1

N 53 -2 .7 22 6

A 8 7 -2 -1 2

A 6 0 - 0 - 1 3

Y 8 4 -0 -1 5

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

I I Y I Y Y A Y I Y Y I Y Y a l l Y Y I Y 8 9 -0 -1 4

N A N N A A N A N A N N A H N A N Y N Y 6 7 -1 6 -2 3
23, Res on C o lo n ia li sm E n la rg in g

t o 24 Mbrs ON S p e c ia l C ate on G ranti ng

In d ep en d en cej T ote on Res a s w hol e

w it h o u t t a r g e t d a te para 1 2 /1 7 /6 2

2 4 . S o . R h od esi a! Res c a l l i n g f o r

L if t in g o f Ban on Zapu P o l i t i c a l

P a r ty and r e le a s e o f ZAPO P r e s id e n t

1 0 /1 2 /6 2 (R es 1755 )

25 * S o . R h o d esi a ! R es R eq u est in g

OK t o b r in g ab o u t new c o n s t it u t io n

f o r T e r r ito r y and e x ten d v o tin g

r i g h t s t o w hole p o p u la tio n ; r e ­q u e s tin g "go od o f f i c e s * o f SYG1 0 /3 1 /6 2 (R es 1 760)2 6 . S o u th N e s t A fr ic a ! Res r e ­q u e s tin g Cmte 24 t o ta k e up q u e s tio n

SWAT and r e q u e s tin g SYG e s t a b lis h

• E f f e c t i v e ON p rese n ce* in T e r r it o r y

1 1 /1 9 /6 2

2 7 . P o rtu g u ese T e r r it o r ie s ! Resa p p ro v in g r e p o r t o f S p e c ia l Cmteand r e q u e s tin g c e s s a t io n s a l e and

su p p ly o f arms to P o r tu g a l 1 2 /1 4 /6 2

(R es 1807)

2 8 . P o rtu g u ese T e r r it o r ie s ! Res

e s t a b lis h in g ON e d u c a tio n a l program

f o r stu d e n ts o f t e r r i t o r i e s and in ­v i t i n g ON Mbrs to p r o v id e s c h o la r s h ip s 1 2 /1 2 /6 2 (R es 1808)

2 9 . A ngola ! Re s su p p o rtin g

ln s e d ia t e In dep en den ce and r e ­

q u e s tin g SC a c t io n , in c lu d in g

s a n c tio n s

Y Y IA Y A AA

Y A Y A

Y Y A

A A A A A A

I

Y Y YA Y A

COINCIDE UNITED STATES (BUT NOT USSR) 19 13 19 20 16 9 17 15 17

COINCIDE USSR (BUT HOT USA) 1 1 0 0 2 3 2 1 ’ 3

COINCIDE NEITHER 1 8 2 2 4 10 5 8 3COINCIDE BOTH 8 7 9 7 7 7 5 5 6

"THE GRAND TOTAL DOES HOT E l UAL THE SUM OF THE AREA TOTALS Oil

THE FOUR CKA'TS .ECAUSE THOSE NATIONS (SUCH aS THE UAR) 1HICHHAVE LEEK LISTED ON TOO AREA CHARTS HAVE BEE!.

- COUNTED CHLY

ONCE FOR THE GRAND TOTAL.

Y Y Y Y NP A A Y A Y Y X 1 0 1 -0 -/ ,

A A Y Y N N A Y HP Y A I 8 3 -2 -1 1

A A A Y N N A A HP Y A X 8 1 -2 -1 ?

a Y Y I A NP Y Y Y X Y Y 9 6 -0 -1

a A A A H 11 K Y 11 Y Y 8 2 -7 -1 3

Y a Y Y 11 K H Y Y Y Y Y 8 6 -2 -1

N N 11 A II 1. A Y

.iREA

TCT„L

Y 5 7 -1 4 -1 8

c.ia;. '-

17 19 18 15 9 14 18 13 17 4 307 1 .3 7

0 0 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 12 41 4 ' '• '6 3 2 4 17 11 4 6 3 6 10 7 7346 7 7 7 1 2 6 7 7 7 12 5

580 2.*‘S5

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMEN DMEN TS

C O
C O

C i

K E Y !- I - YES

A - ABSTENTION

a - ABSENT

NP - NOT PARTICIPATING- VOTING PATTERN FOR SEVEN'O SNTH SE SS IO N OP UNITED NATIONe GENERAL A S S E lB U

- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR

TO GA MEMBERSHIP

LATIN AMERICA

ex fian at ic n w v o t ik char ts

AND ADDITIONA L ITE1 E - s e e P . 1

NUCLEAR TE ST IN G. RAD IATION ITEMS

1 . T h i r t y - s e v e n p o w er R ea c a l l i n g

f o r c e s s a t i o n N u c le a r T e s t i n g b y

J a n . 1 , 1 9 6 3 , b a s e d o n e l g h t - n e t i o n

mem or an du m t o D is a r m a m en t Cmte

1 1 / 5 / 6 2 ( R e s . 1 7 6 2 A )

2 . US—UK R e s c a l l i n g f o r N u c le a r

T e s t i n g Ban T r e a t y w it h E f f e c t i v e

I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l U / 6 / 6 2

( R e s . 1 7 6 2 B)

3 . R e s o n A to m ic R a d i a t i o n Cmte

R e p o r t ! n o t i n g d a n g e r s n u c l e a r

t e s t i n g a nd a s k in g WHO t o d e v i s e

sc h e m e f o r m o n it o r in g r a d i o ­

a c t i v i t y . 1 1 / 2 0 / 6 2 ( R e s 1 7 6 4 )

EAST-W EST ITEMS

4 . I n s c r i p t i o n o f I t e m o n

H u n g a r y 9/> > 4 /6 2

o f I t e m o n

UNIT ED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

I I I I I N I I I I I I I a I I I I I I N 4 3 - 3 4 - 1 9

»
5. Korea: USSR Motion on

Seating both North and South

Korean Reps 12/ 11/62 Cate I. -

6 . Korea: U.S> Motion to

se at South Korea Rep only

12/11/6 2 Cmte I7 . Korea: Res rea ffir ming earl ie r

UN Reses and extendin g UN Cmtefo r Un ifi ca tio n and Re ha bilitation

(Res 1866)

8. Hungary: US Res Giving

SIC res p onsi bilit y for

Hungarian questio n and rea ffir ming ob je ctiv es earl ie r UN Re ses. 12/20 /62 (Res 1857)

9 . Chinese Representation:

USSR Res to se at ChineseCommunists and Expel Chinese

Na tlbn al lsts 10/30/6210 . U.S. Res on UNRWA: opera tive

para 2 thanking Pa lesti ne Co nc iliation

Conv. fo r eff o rts so lve refuge e problems 12/20/6 2 (Res 1856 Rev. l)

11 . U.S. Res on UNRWA: Fine! Res olu tion

(Res 1856) req uesting Pa lestin e CnwelH e t.Inn

Coram to continue it s endeavors and continuing

UNRWA u n ti l June 30 , 1965. 12 /20 /62

12 . Arab League Res nail in g fo r s e lf -

determ ination on Coan and withdrawal UK

troops 11 /28/6 2 SFC(fai led ge t 2/3 In GA)

UN ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING ITEKi

13 . Res accep ting ICJ opinion on

fin an cin g UN Peace-kee ping operations 12/19/6 2 k ■«

14 . Res es ta bl ishin g 21-Member Cmte

to recommend sp ec ia l financing methods

fo r future peace-keeping ope ration s

12/19/6 2 Cmte V

15 . El ec tio n of U Thant as Secreta ry

General of UN 11 /30 /62 (Res 1771)16. Si x power Res on equitab le

geogra phical di st ri bution fo rSe cr etar iat stre ss in g Charter Art ic le101 (3) and recommending gu id eli ne s

fo r Improved di stri bu tion Cmte V

11/ 28/62

RI

I

I

I

I

I

AY

I

II

R R R R R R R a

I I . . T X X X T a I I

I A T Y T I Y I Y Y

T I Y Y Y Y T Y Y Y

R N R R R H R A R R

X a Y Y Y X Y a Y a

T a Y Y Y Y Y a Y Y

Y T T T Y Y Y Y Y T

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y a Y Y Y a Y a a T

Y YT R

29-5 6-1465-9-2665-1 1-26

42-5 6-12

58-0-41

41-1 6-36

109 -0-0

84-10-2

UNIT ED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDME NTS

CD
KET: I - I F '

N - ID

A . ABSTENTION

a - ABSENT

NP - NOT PAR TIC IPA TIN G

- - VOTE TAKEN PRICR

TO GA MEMBERSHIP

VOTING PATTERN PCR SEVENTEENTH SE SS IO N OP UNITED NATIOIC GENERAL ASS EH BU

1AIIB AMBUCt

EXPLANATION OP VOTING CHARTSAND ADDITIONAL ITEMS - ! M P . 1

COoc

I

ssseqmip aml wm, nag

1 7 . R e s r e q u e s t i n g a l l p o s s i b l e

a i d o f C h in e s e R e f u g e e s i n Hon g

Kon g 1 2 / 7 / 6 2 (R e s 1 7 8 4 )1 8 . R e s o n P er m a n e n t S o v e r e i g n t y

o v e r N a t u r a l R e s o u r c e s 1 2 / 1 4 / 6 2

( R e s 1 8 0 3 )

1 9 . R es o n T e c h n i c a l a nd F i n a n c i a l

A s s i s t a n c e t o Rwan da a nd B u ru n d i

C a te I I 1 2 / 1 4 / 6 2

2 0 . R ea n o t in g w it h a p p r e c i a t i o n

" C a ir o D e c l a r a t i o n o f D e v e lo p in g

C o u n tr ie s " C a te I I 1 1 / 8 / 6 2

t9V>HIAUSIl/APRKAH ITBMS

2 1 . R e s t a k in g n o t e o f D u t o h - I n d o

a g r e e n e n t o n N e s t New G u in e a a n d

a u t h o r i s i n g UN r o l e i n a g r e e m e n t9 / 2 1 / 6 2 ( R e s 1 7 5 2 )2 2 . A p a r th e id i n S o u t h A f r i c a :

R e s r e o o m e n d ln g s a n o t l c s a nd

p o s s i b l e SC a c t i o n 1 1 / 6 / 6 2

(R e s 1 7 6 1 )

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

1 >
23 * Rea on C o lo n la lla e E n la rgin g

t o 24 Nb rs UN S p e c ia l C a te on G ranti ng

In d ependence! T ote on Re s a s w hols

w it h o u t t a r g e t d a te para 1 2 /1 7 /6 22 4 . S o . R h od esi a: Rea c a l l i n g f o r

L i f t i n g o f Ban on ZAPU P o l i t i c a l

P a r ty en d r e le a s e o f ZAPU P r e s id e n t1 0 /1 2 /6 2 (R es 1755)

25 * So * R hodeela t R es ca ln w g fo r

UE t o b rin g about new c o n s t it u t io n

f o r T e r r ito r y and ex te n d v o tin gr ig h t s t o w hol e p o p u la tio n ; r e ­

q u e s tin g "g oo d o ff lo e s " o f SYG1 0 /3 1 /6 2 (R es 1 760)

2 6 . S o u th W est A f r ic a : R es r e ­q u e s tin g C ate 24 t o ta k e up q u e s tio n

SWAP and r e q u e s tin g SYG e s t a b l i s h

" K ffs o tlv e UN p rese n ce* In T e r r ito r y

11/1 9/6 22 7 . P o rtu g u ese T e r r it o r ie s : Res

ap p rovin g r e p o r t o f S p e c ia l C at e

and r e q u e s tin g c e s s a t io n s a l e and

su p p ly o f e r a s t o P o r tu g a l 1 2 /1 4 /6 2

(R es 1807)

2 8 . P o rtu g u ese T e r r it o r ie s : Re s

e s t a b lis h in g UN e d u c a tio n a l prograa

f o r s tu d e n ts o f t e r r i t o r i e s and In ­

v i t i n g UN Nb rs t o p r o v id e sc h o la r s h ip s

1 2 /1 2 /6 2 (R es 1 808)

2 9 . A n g o la : R es su p p o rtin g

la a e d la t e In dep en den ce and r e ­

q u e s tin g SC a c t io n , in c lu d in g

s a n a tio n s

COINCIDE UNITED STATES (BUT NOT USSR)

COINCIDE USSR (BUT NOT USA)

14 11 14 H 15 13 1

3 4 3 3 3 3 165 8 6 5 4 7 4

COINCIDE BOTH 7 6

T O T A L D Q E 3 N O T E 3 “t L 7 1 1 SUM OF THE AREA TOTAIS

ON THE FOUR CHARTS BECAUSE THOSE NATIONS (SUCH AS THE UAR) °" W 0 AREA CHARTS*HAVE ^ O ^ T C D

ONLY ONCE FOR THE GRAND TOTAL.

I l la l aa I A

I l a

A a I

a l aA a a

15 13 15

0 2 1

11 7 9

3 7 4

I I II I II I II I II I II l aa I A

13 13 14

4 5 3

5 6 8

7 5 4

X I a

I l aI l aI l aI l a

I l a

a A a

10 14 12

4 4 1

8 4 12

6 7 4

X X IX I aX a aI a aI I I

A a a

I a A

14 12 14

4 2 1

5 11 9

6 4 5

I I II I II I II I II I II I II a Y

8 13 13

5 3 4

10 6 5

5 7 7

X I 1 0 1 -0 -4

A I 3 3 -2 -1 1A I 81 -2 -1 9

I I 9 6 -> ..

•’ I 82 -7 -1 3

X Y 36 -2 -1

II Y 57 -1 4- 18

AREA 3Fu .;iD« 

TOTAL

275 103 7

78 456

155 734

128 59 8

&36 3 5 5 " *

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDME NTS

coCO
o

o

K EIi I - YES

■ - NO

A - ABSTENTION

, . ABSENT

NP - NOT PA RTICIP ATING

- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR

TO GA MEMBERSHIP

TOTING PATTERN FOR SEVENTEENTH SE SS IO N OF ONITEE NATIONS GENERAL ASSE'.'BLT

MIDDLE AND FAR EAST

EXPLANATION OF VOTING CHARTSAND ADDITIONAL ITEHB - s e e P . 1

3

§

a

3

NOCUBAR TE ST IN G. RADIATION ITEM ?

1 . T h l r t y - e e v e n p o w e r R e s o a l l l n g

f o r c e s s a t i o n N u c le a r T e s t i n g b y

J a n . 1 , 1 9 6 3 , b a s e d o n e i g h t - n a t i o n

m em or an du m t o D is a r m a m en t Cmte

1 1 / 5 / 6 2 ( R e s . 1 7 6 2 A)

2. OS-O K R e s c a l l i n g f o r N u c le a r

T e s t i n g B an T r e a t y w it h E f f e c t i v e

I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n t r o l 1 1 / 6 / 6 2

( R e s . 1 7 6 2 B )

3 . R e s o n A to m ic R a d ia t io n Cmte

R e p o r t I n o t i n g d a n g e r s n u c l e a r

t e s t i n g a n d a s k in g WHO t o d e v i s e

sc h e m e f o r m o n it o r in g r a d io ­

a c t i v i t y . U / 2 0 / 6 2 ( R e s . 1 7 6 4 )

^AS T-W EST ITE KS

4 « I n s c r i p t i o n o f I t e m o nH u n g a r y 9 / 2 4 / 6 2

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS
5. Korea: USSR Motion on ” ' - y

Se ating both North and South

Korean Rape. 12/11/6 2 Cmte I

6 . Korea: O.S. Motion to A

se at South Korea Rep only

12/11/6 2 Cmte I

7. Korea: Res realf irm ing ea rli er A

UN Reses and exte ndin g UN Cmte fo r

Uni fic at ion and Reh ab ilitatio n

(Res 1855)

8 . Hungary: OS Res Giving A

SI G re sp onsi bilit y for

Hungarian qu estion and rea ffir min g ob je ct iv es earl ie r ON Re ses.

12/20/6 2 (Res 1857)

9 . Chinese Representation: y

OSSR Res to se at Chinese

Communists and Expel Chinese

N ati on al is ts . 10/30/62

OTHER POLITICAL ITEMS

10 . O.S. Res on UNRWA: operati ve A

para 2 thanking Pa lesti ne Con cil iatio n

Conv. fo r eff orts so lve refuge e problems 12 /20 /62 (Res 1856 Rev. l)

11 . O.S, Res. on UNRWA: Final Re solution y

(Res 1856) req ues ting Pa le stin e Co no iliation

Comm, to continue it s endeavors and continu ing

UNRWA u n ti l June 30 , 1965. 12/20/6 2

12 . Arab League Res call in g fo r s e lf - y

dete rmination la Qsan and vithdrawal

OK troops 11/ 28/62 ££C (f ail ed ge t 2/3 in GA)

ON ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCING ITEMS

13 . Res accep ting ICJ opinion on A fi n anc ing ON Peace-Keeping ope ration s

12/ 19/62

14. Res es ta bl ishin g 21-Member Cmte A

to recommend sp ec ia l fin an cin g methods

fo r future peace-kee ping opera tions 12 /19 /62 Cate T

15 . Election of 0 Thant as Secreta ry I

General of UN. 11 /30 /62 (Res 1771)

16 . Si x power Res on equitable y

geo gra phical di stri bu tion fo r

Se cr etar iat st re ss in g Charter Art icle

101 (3) and recomnending gu id eli ne s

fo r improved di stri bu tion Cmte V

11/ 28/62

. T A a a l s A T T T A

A l a a A a A A A A I

A l a a a a A A A A T

A A A A A a A A A A A

I N A N I A T T T T N

A A A A A A A A A A A

I I I I I T T I T T I

t t t t t i t t t i i

A N T T a N A a T A a

T * » 8 * a A A T A A

T T T I T T T T T T T

i T T T a T T T T T T

N A N A T N A N a

t t t t a t t t «

I T T I A I I I I

A I T I A I I I A

N A N I T N A N T

A I T T A T A T T

T I T I T I A T I

A T A A I I N A a

T I T I I I I T T

’ I T ’ T I T T T

1 I I T I I I I y

T I T I T I A I a

I T T 1

A A A A

A A A i

A A A I

I I T 1

A T T T

I T T T

I A I A

I T T I

I 7 T 7

T i l l

I t t t

■ T n W N N N I 29-5 6-14

T A • I I T I N 65- 9-26

T A T T T T T N 65-11-26

T A J T T T I W 50-13-43

A T T N N N N T 42-5 6-12

A A I T Y T T A 58-0-41

t t t t t t t t 100-0-2

A I T A A A N T 41-18-36

t t t i t t t k 74-17-0

T T T T T T T N 78-14-12

’ T T T T T T T 109 -0-0

T , T T T T T N 84- 10-e

UNI TE D NATIO NS CHARTER AM EN DM EN TS O
KEYi I - YES

R - NOA . ABSTENTION

* - ABSENT

NP - HOT PARTICIPATING

- - VOTE TAKEN PRIOR

TO GA MEMBERSHIP

EIPLANATION OP VOTING CHARTS

AND ADDITIONAL ITEIfi - s e e P . 1

TOTING PATTERN POR SE S8 I0 N O f DRITED RATION S GENERAL ASSEMBLY

irraeiK AND PAR EAST

o

t o

i S SAUDI ARABIA

£5*1 m OUT W U I U IU )

ECONCMC AND SOCIAL ITEM?

1 7 . Reo r e q u e s tin g a l l p o s s ib le

a id o f C h in ese R efu gees in HongKong 1 2 /1 /6 2 (R ee 1784 )1 8 . Res on Pe rm an en t S o v e r e ig n ty

over N a tu ra l R eso u rces 1 2 /1 4 /6 2

(R es 1803)

1 9 • Res on T e c h n ic a l and F in a n c ia l

A s s is ta n c e t o Rwanda and Bur un di

Cmte I I 1 2 /1 4 /6 2

2 0 . Res n o tin g w it h a p p r e c ia tio n

"Cai ro D e c la r a tio n o f D evelo p in g

C ou n tr ie s" Cmte I I 1 1 /8 /6 2

COLONIALISH/AraiCAi: ITEMS

2 1 . Re s ta k in g n o te o f D utc h-I ndo

agree m en t on W est New Gui ne a and

a u th o r iz in g GN r o le in ag re em en t

9 /2 1 /6 2 (R es 1752)

2 2 . A p arth eid in South A fr ic a i

Res recommending s a n c tio n s and

p o s s ib le SC a c t io n 1 1 /6 /6 2

(R es 1761 )

R A

I I

I a

I I

1 I

I Ia a

I I

I NT I

a T

I I

I A

I a

a I

I I

R A

I IA aI I

- T i l l I I I I I

H I A 'AI I I Al a I I

I I I II I I I

I A I A

T i l l

A I I I

I I I IT i l l

I I A I

T i l l

T i l l

I I I I

I I I I

I I a I

I I a I

I I a a

I I a II I I I

R A T T Ya I I r rI I I Y I

a I I I II I I I I

I N 5 8 -2 2 -2 6

Y A 8 7 -2 -1 2

I A 60 -0 -1 3

I I 84- 0- 15I I 8 9 -0 -U

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

Y I t I I I I I I I 6 7 -1 6 -2 3
♦ I

2 3 • R es on C o lo n ia li s m E n la rg in g

t o 24 Mbrs UN S p e c ia l Cat e on G ra n ti n g

In dep en den ce I V ot e oh Res a s w hol e

w it h o u t t a r g e t d a te pa ra 1 2 /1 7 /6 2

2 4 . S o . R h o d esia i R es o a llln g f o r

L if t in g o f Ban on ZAFU P o l i t i c a l

P a rty and r e le a s e o f ZAPU P r e s id e n t1 0 /1 2 /6 2 (R es 1755)2 5 . S o . R h o d esi a : R es R eq u e stin gUK t o b r in g ab o u t new c o n s t it u t io nf o r T e r r ito r y an d e x ten d v o t in g

r ig h t s t o w h ole p o p u la tio n ) r e ­

q u e s tin g "g ood o f f ic e s '* o f SYG

1 0 /3 1 /6 2 (R es 1760)

2 6 . S ou th W es t A fr ic a : R es r e ­

q u e s tin g C at e 24 t o ta k e up q u e s tio nSWAP an d r e q u e s tin g SYG e s t a b l i s h

• E f f e c t iv e UN p resen ce* In T e r r ito r y

1 1 /1 9 /6 22 7 . P o rtu g u ese T e r r it o r ie s : Res

ap p ro v in g r e p o r t o f S p e c ia l Cute

an d r e q u e s tin g c e s s a t i o n s a l e and

su p p ly o f e r a s t o P o r tu g a l 1 2 /1 4 /6 2

(R es 1807)

2 8 . P o rtu g u ese T e r r it o r ie s : Res

e s t a b lis h in g UN e d lo a t lo n a l pr ogramf o r stu d e n ts o f t e r r i t o r i e s an d In ­v i t i n g UN Mbrs t o p ro v id e s c h o la r s h ip e

1 2 /1 2 /6 2 (R es 1 808)2 9 . A n gola : R es su p p o r tin g

Im m ed ia te In d ependence an d r e ­

q u e s tin g SC a c t i o n , I n c lu d in g s a n c tio n s

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y T Y Y e 7 Y Y Y Y Y T Y Y Y Y Y Y T Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y a Y Y Y Y Y Y YY T T Y T T Y Y T Y Y

Y T Y Y Y Y a Y Y Y YY Y Y Y Y Y e e Y Y T e

• T a T a Y a T Y Y Y e

Y Y Y Y a a a Y Y Y Y a

Y

YT

Y

Y I I Y a A Y Y Y T T Y Y Y Y Y T A

Y I Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y I T Y A

8 3 -2 -1 1

8 1 -2 -1 9

N Y 8 2 -7 -1 3

CO UC H® UNITED STATES (BUT NOT USSR)

COINCIDE USSR (BUT NOT USA)

COINCIDE NEITHER

* * 8

1 0 10 8

8 8 7

5 6 3

7 5 910 12 10

4 3 3

7 7 12

13 12 7

5 * 6

9 11 48 7 15

COINCIDE BOTH 5 7 6 7 6 7 5 7 7 7 7 4

•THE GRAND TOTAL DOES NOT B3UAL THE SUM OF THE

AREA TOTALS ON THE FOIE CHARTS BECAUSE THOSE

NATIONS (SUCH AS UAR) WHICH HAVE EEEN LISTEDON TWO AREA CHARTS HAVE BEEN COUNTED ONLY ONCE

FOR THE (HIAND TOTAL.

Y

Y

697

7

Y I Y T I Y Y Y Y T Y s Y Y Y T T Y Y Y 8 6 -2 -1

T Y T A I A Y Y I Y A T Y T T y A R r Y 5 7 -1 4 -1 8

6 6 7 13 10 17 12 6 14 11 17 4 12 6 10 15 15 19

AREA

TOTAL

261

2UKD *

ICTaL

10 37

8 11 8 5 5 0 6 10 6 6 2 6 6 9 8 5 3 0 21 ? 496

8 5 7 3 7 4 4 6 2 7 3 15 4 8 4 2 4 2 21 9 734

7 7 7 8 7 e 7 7 7 5 7 4 7 6 7 7 7 8 20 5 59 3

89 7 2.365

UNIT ED NATIONS CHARTER AMEN DMENTS

o00
104 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

Senator Church. Thank you very much. That is all I have. 

The Chairman. Mr. Carlson.

AN Y DISADVANTAGES TO ENLA RGED SECU RITY CO UN CIL ?

Senator Carlson. Mr. Ambassador, I notice in your statement you 

spent considerable time mentioning the advantages to the United States 

of this enlarged council.

Now, what are the disadvantages?

Ambassador Stevenson. Well, to be very liomelv about it, Senator, 

the disadvantages are the unknown, as against the known, and the 

tried experience of the past,

I think in anything tha t is experimental like this, one has some misgivings that something may arise, th at you may not have made every 

calculation tha t you can, or taken every precaution tha t you can.

But beyond that, I must confess, w’ith respect to the Security Council, I see nothing but advantages, because I would be almost certain 

tha t if things went on as they are now, and there was insufficient representation of the Afro-Asian majo rity, very soon some of our friends 

would lose their seats.

Senator Carlson. Yesterday it was suggested that the La tin Americans might feel they would be disadvantaged in the new arrangement. 

Would that be a possibility ?

Ambassador Stevenson. Well, of course, Latin America now has 

a disproportionate representation, I must confess, with 20 percent of 

the membership, including Cuba. It has about 33 percent of the 

membership of the nonpermanent members. So it is disproportionately represented. And I think i t would be disadvantaged if we did 

not enlarge, because it would probably lose one of those seats through 

raiding by the Afro-Asian nations.

Senator Carlson. As I understand your statement, the Afro-Asian 

bloc has enough votes to change this, whether we want a change or not.

Ambassador Stevenson. I think th at is about it.

UN IT IN G FOR PEAC E RESOL UTION

Senator Carlson. I realize you are appearing here this morning in 

behalf of the two amendments that are proposed, and I want to say 

that personally I have no problem with the amendments. My problem, of course, is with the future o f the United Nations and its success 

in the peacekeeping operations.

If I remember correctly, the U nited States was one of the sponsors 

of the U niting for Peace resolution passed in 1950, which enabled the 

General Assembly to assume some jurisdiction over the financing and 

control of peacekeeping operations formerly reserved for the Security 

Council.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDME NTS 105

Now, in view of this increased membership in the United Nations, 

are we beginning to have second thoughts about the wisdom of this 

move ? After all, a t the present time, if I am not mistaken, a majority 

of the members of the United Nations is made up of what we might 

sincerely and honestly say are have-not nations.

Ambassador Stevenson. I do not share that apprehension about the 

Uniting for Peace resolution, Senator, myself.

After all, our interpretatio n of the c harter—and I think it is shared 

by the overwhelming majority of the members—is tha t the General 

Assembly has residual authority to authorize peacekeeping ope rations; 

that is, to recommend them. Their recommendations are only recommendations—they are not mandatory or obligatory, as in the case of 

enforcement actions in the Security Council.

This power exists in the General Assembly, that is indispensable to 

the United Nations as a peacekeeping agency, which could be pa ralyzed by a veto in the Security Council—and all the Uniting for Peace 

resolution does is to provide that, in the event the Security Council 

is unable to act because of a veto, the General Assembly shall consider 

the issue and make a recommendation.

It does not seem to me tha t this is harm ful, because that power 

exists anyway in the General Assembly.

May I revert for one moment, sir, to one question you asked me ?

One of my advisers here reminds me, the fact of the matter is th at 

the Latin Americans enthusiastically supported the enlargement of 

the Council for the very reason I told you. I think they were ap prehensive about the futur e of their seats.

U .s . CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN ITE D NAT ION S

Senator Carlson. What percentage does the United States contribute* to the cost of th e operations of the United Nations?

Ambassador Stevenson. We contribute 32 percent, approximately, 

of the general budget of the United Nations. In the case of peacekeeping operations, if you lump all of them, from the beginning to the 

present, our percentage was around 39 to 40 percent.

Senator Carlson. Well, is there not beginning to develop some feeling among the larger contributors to the United Nations tha t in view 

of their substantial contributions there ought to be a change in the 

voting in the United Nations ?

I am sure you have heard weighted voting discussed.

Ambassador Stevenson. Yes, we have had many discussions of 

weighted voting over the years. There has, I think, been a feeling 

shared more by the lay public than by the professionals within the 

organization tha t something should be done about it.

Actually, very careful studies tha t we have done, taking various 

possibilities, various formulas for weighted voting, do not reveal that
106 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

the results would be better from our point of view than they have been 

actually in the past.

There are a good many reasons why we have been loath to embrace 

any proposal for weighted voting.

It is politically unrealistic to expect that the preponderance of the 

small states which now enjoy the same vote as the great powers would 

voluntarily vote themselves out of this position of equality. And of 

course their vote would be required.

Weighted voting could only be instituted through charter amendment, and it seems to me unlikely tha t a two-thirds vote of all the 

members would be available for adoption of such amendments.

So much for the practical aspect of getting it done, even if we 

wanted to.

It is not clear tha t any scheme of weighted voting, I repeat, would, 

in fact, produce greater support for positions advocated by our 

country.

We have, in fact, fared very well in the United Nations on matters of 

vital concern to us, owing primarily to the support of our position by 

the smaller states. The population of the majo rity of members is small. The ir national income is low, as is the ir assessed share of the U nited Nations 

budget.

Senatorl Carlson. Mr. Ambassador, is it not a fact tha t about threefifths of these nations contribute a very small percentage to the cost of 

the operations?

Ambassador Stevenson. That is correct.

Senator Carlson. Would you be willing to submit for the record a 

statement on the contributions? I think it might be interesting and 

helpful.

Ambassador Stevenson. Th at is the percentages assessed 

against-----

Senator Carlson. Percentages expressed in dollars, if you would, 

please.

Ambassador Stevenson. Very happy to do that. Th at is published 

by the Secretariat.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 107

(The document referred to follows:)

Estima ted scale of United Nations assessments for the calendar year 1965

Me mbers (112) i Me mbers (112) 1

A fg ha ni stan .........................

A lb an ia ________________

Al ge ria ................................

Arg en tin a..............................

A us tral ia ...............................

A us tria ...................................

Be lgium................................

B olivia ..................................

Br az il......................................

B u lg ari a.................... ..........

B ur m a....................... ............

B uru ndi................................

Bye lorussian S .S .R ______

Cam bo dia_____ _________

Cam er oo n. _____________

C an ad a................................. .

Cen tral African R ep ubli c.

Ce ylon ...............................

C ha d.......................................

Ch ile .......................................

C hi na_____ _____________

Colom bia.................. . ..........

Co ngo (Brazzav ille)______

Congo (Leo po ldville )____

Costa R ic a______________

Cub a___________________

C ypru s........................ . ........

Czech oslov akia.....................

D ah om ey _______________

D en m ar k____ __________

Dom inican Rep ub lic_____

Ec ua do r..................................

E l S a lv a d o r.. .. ..................

E th io pia ________________

Fin la nd....................... ..........

Fra nce....................................

G ab on __________________

G hana____________ _____

Greece________________ _

G uate m ala ......... . ................

G ui ne a....................................

H a it i.......................................

H ondura s. .............................

H ungary ............................. .

Ic ela nd...................................

In d ia ........................................

In do ne sia 2...........................

Ira n .........................................

Ir a q .........................................

Ir ela nd...... ......................... ..

Isra el .......................................

It a ly .........................................

Iv or y C o ast. ..................... ..

Ja m aic a.____ ____________

Jap a n ........................ ..........

J o rd a n .. ................... . ...........

K enya.....................................

Pe rcent

A m ou nt

0.05 $51,500

.04 41,200

.10 103,000

.92 947,600

1.58 1,627, 400

.53 545,900

1.15 1,184,500

.04 41,200

.95 978,500

.17 175,100

.06 61,800

.04 41,200

.52 535,600

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

3.17 3,265,100

.04 41,200

.08 82, 400

.04 41, 200

.27 278,100

4.25 4,377,500

.23 236,900

.04 41,200

.05 51, 500

.04 41, 200

.20 206,000

.04 41, 200

1.11 1,143,300

.04 41,200

.62 638,600

.04 41, 200

.05 51,500

.04 41, 200

.04 41,200

.43 442,900

6.09 6,272,700

.04 41,200

.08 82,400

.25 257,500

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

.56 576,800

.04 41,200

1.85 1,905,500

.39 401,700

.20 206,000

.08 82,400

.16 164,800

.17 175,100

2.54 2,616,200

.04 41,200

.05 51,500

2.77 2,853,100

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

K uw ai t__________________

La os_____________________

Leb an on _________________

Lib er ia __________________

L ib y a .......................................

Lu xe m bo ur g...........................

M ad ag as ca r.............................

M al ay si a..................................

M al i..........................................

M au ri ta nia ..............................

Me xic o__________________

M on go lia ............. ...................

Mo rocco_________________

N ep al ___________________

Net he rlan ds ______________

New Z ea land _____________

N ic ar ag ua........ ........................

Nig er .........................................

Nigeria__________________

N or w ay ____ _____________

P a k is ta n .____ ______ _____

Panam a_________________

Par ag uay .................................

P e r u ........................................

Philip pin es ..............................

P ola nd__________________

P o rtu g a l. .______ _________

R um ania ________________

R w a n d a .. _______________

Sa udi A ra bi a........ ..................

S e n e g al. ............. . ..................

Sierra Le on e...........................

So malia__________________

So ut h Africa____ _________

S pain ____________________

Sudan___________________

Sw ed en ____________ _____

Syri a____________________

Tan gan yik a a nd Z an zi ba r..

T hailand________ ________

To go -------------- ------------ -

T ri nid ad a nd To ba go _____

T unis ia ................... ............

T urk ey ________________

U g a n d a .. .................................

U kra in e........ .......... ................

U .S .S .R ...................................

Uni te d Ara b R ep ub lic.........

Uni te d K in gdom ......... .........

U ni te d St at es .........................

U pp er V o lt a .. ____ _______

U ru g u a y .. .........................

Ven ez ue la________________

Y em en .......................... ...........

Yug os la vi a........ ......................

T o t a l..____ ________

Per ­

cent

A m ou nt

.06 $61,800

.04 41,200

.05 51,500

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

.05 51,500

.04 41,200

.15 154,500

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

.81 834,300

.04 41,200

. 11 113,300

.04 41,200

1.11 1,143,300

.38 391,400

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

.17 175,100

.44 453,200

.37 381,100

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

.09 92,700

.35 360,500

1.45 1,493,500

.15 154,500

.35 360,500

.04 41,200

.07 72,100

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

.52 535,600

.73 751,900

.06 61,800

1.26 1,297,800

.05 51,500

.04 41,200

.14 144,200

.04 41,200

.04 41,200

.05 51,500

.35 360,500

.04 41,200

1.97 2,029,100

14.92 15,367,600

.23 236,900

7.21 7,426,300

31.91 ’ 32,867,300

.04 41,200

.10 103,000

.50 515,000

.04 41,200

.36 370,800

100.00 103,000,000

1

 D oes n ot includ e M al ta , M alaw i, and Z am bia (a dm itte d to th e U .N . in D ecem be r 1964).

2

 Ind on es ia ha s w ithdra w n fr om the U .N .

’ I n ad di tio n, th e 19th Gen eral A sse mbly Is expected to a ut ho riz e ex pe nd itu re s of $17,300,000 for U nited 

Nat io ns Em erge nc y Fo rce for th e pe rio d January 1-Dec em be r 31, 1965. Th e U.S . assess ed sh are of th is 

1965 Un ite d N at io ns E m er ge nc y Force ex pe nd itu re wou ld be $5,485,000. Th e U ni te d Sta te s is also e ntitled 

to a cr ed it of $3,873,300 as th e 3d re pa ym en t o n i ts lo an to th e U ni te d Nat io ns . Th us , th e net c ont ribu tion 

for th e Uni te d St ates a m ou nts to $34,479,000.

Sou rce: OI A: Dec em be r 1964.
108 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

PRESENT STATUS OF U .N . FIN AN CE S

Senator Carlson. What is the present status of the United Nations 

finances?

Ambassador Stevenson. Well, the present status is tha t th e United 

Nations needs about $108 million. This is comprised of roughly— 

I will have to take these figures out of my head—roughly $50 million 

of indebtedness for the payment of unpaid peacekeeping obligations, 

about $40 million to replenish the working capital fund, and the balance for miscellaneous other obligations.

So the position, of course, is very bad.

As to what to do about it, as you well know, th at is a m atter of current discussion in New York in the Committee of 33 and in direct 

negotiations between the principals and the Secretary General and the 

President of the General Assembly.

Senator Carlson. May I ask this question ?

At the present time, are the operations of the General Assembly 

being financed by funds borrowed from other agencies or organizations 

in the United Nations.

Ambassador Stevenson. Not at the moment. This has been true in 

the past, in th at they have borrowed some money from the Special 

Fund, but it has been repaid. Bu t the Working Capital Fun d has 

been almost entirely depleted, from $40 million to a couple of hundred 

thousand dollars balance remaining now—which has been used to finance these peacekeeping operations.

Currently the Cyprus operation, for example, is supported by the 

participating states on a voluntary basis. It is no burden on the regular United Nations budget. And the current operations are being 

paid for by the members in the usual way, out of contributions on the 

basis of 80 percent of their assessments for 1964, which they are c urrently paying.

We hope when the next Assembly convenes, and we can begin to 

vote again, and adopt the budget fo r 1965, that additional money will 

then be available from th at source.

Meanwhile, the great hope for restoring the financial health and 

solvency of the organization is of course voluntary contributions by 

the members.

Senator Carlson. Are voluntary contributions being made at the 

present time, in addition to the assessments?

Ambassador Stevenson. No. One of the problems tha t the Committee of 33 is considering at this time is how tha t will be done and 

when. Certainly the Secretary General has in mind that there will 

be a pledging conference called sometime in the course of the summer, 

perhaps before August.

Senator Carlson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Clark.

Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I have a good many questions I 

would like to discuss with the Governor. Therefore, I would be happy 

to defer to you and the other members of the committee.

The Chairman. Do you want to take 10 minutes now ? We have 

three public witnesses we want to hear, and then if the committee 

wishes, we can have an executive session with Mr. Stevenson.

Senator Clark. Whatever the chairman desires.

The Chairman. All right.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 109

VOLU NT ARY CO N TRIB U TIO N S FO R PE A C E K E E PIN G OP ER ATI ONS

Senator McCarthy. Ju st one question.

Could you accept voluntary contributions from the nations to meet the expenses of the peacekeeping operations in A frica—that is, solicit voluntary contributions to pay off the Russian and French obligations ?

Ambassador Stevenson. Mr. Senator, would you be good enough 

to repeat that ?

Senator McCarthy. Could you accept voluntary contributions from 

other nations to meet the unpaid obligations of the French and Russians for the Congo operation ?

Ambassador Stevenson. Oh, yes.

Senator McCarthy. Technically you could. Would this be acceptable to the Russians ?

Ambassador Stevenson. Sir, I am sure the Russians do not care 

what is done with the money. Our problem is whether we get some 

voluntary contributions from the Russians.

Senator McCarthy. Thank you.

Senator Clark. Perhaps I could take just a couple of minutes, Mr. 

Chairman. I will be quite brief.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Clark. Governor, I have no doubt in my own mind about 

the desirability of these amendments to the charter. I shall certainly supp ort them. My concern is that they do not go far enough to remedy what to me at least seems to be an unsatisfactory condition with respect to the potential of the United Nations to achieve those peacekeeping functions which you, as one of the originators of the San Francisco 

Conference, have done so very much to promote. I am concerned tha t the U.N., as a major peacekeeping institution, is so handicapped by the one vote-one country rule in the General Assembly, p articularly since the arriv al of all the new A frica n and Asian nations; the veto in the Security C ouncil; the fact th at there is no automatic international method of providing the United Nations with funds to keep it going, so that we have these constant financial crises and the U.N. is not developing its peacekeeping functions the 

way one could hope. I appreciate fully the difficulty in dealing with the Russians, and to some extent the French; the limitations imposed by the fact that Communist China is not a member; and the constant outbreakings of 

confrontations all over the world, which make th is very difficult. 

DIS CUSS IO N OF SE NA TE CON CURREN T RE SO LU TI ON 32

You are familiar, I think, with Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, cosponsored by 26 Senators, the largest number we have ever had, in­ cluding four members of this committee—Senators Church, McCarthy, Morse, and myself. I think you are generally familiar with the pre ­

amble of that concurrent resolution. My concern is whether the policy of the United States, with respect to general and complete disarmament and with respect to peace­ keeping activities, has changed since the days of the Kennedy 

administration.
110 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

I raised this question with Secretary Rusk yesterday, and he, I 

thought, was of the view that our policy had not changed.

I would just like to ask you this sort of general question, and give 

you an opportunity to comment.

The preamble of the resolution—and shortly we shall have full he arings, within the next month or so—refers to the 14th General Assembly which unanimously adopted a resolution calling for general and 

complete disarmament under effective in ternational control, and calling upon governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive 

solution o f this problem. And then President Kennedy, on September 25, 1961, in his famous speech before the United Nations, said 

that we must create worldwide law and law enforcement as we outlaw 

worldwide war and w ar weapons:

Our p rim ary long-range intere st is g ene ral and complete disarmament, designed 

to tak e place by stages, permitting paral lel political developments to build institutions of peace which would tak e the plac e of arms.

I will not extend my comments by reading the other statements of 

fact in the preamble to Senate C oncurrent Resolution 32.

I am, however, acutely aware of the fact that since the United States 

tabled its Treaty of General and Complete Disarmament at Geneva 

in 1962, and since the last speech of President Kennedy in this regard , 

on September 20, 1963, before the United Nations, in which he called 

for the revision of the charter to permit the development of th at body 

into a general worldwide security system, we have had precious little 

from either the State Department or the White House indicating 

that tha t is still the fixed policy of the Government of the United 

States.

I wonder if you would comment on that.

Ambassador Stevenson. Senator Clark, I take it your question is 

my comment on what you have said generally about the problem of 

peacekeeping and disarmament.

Senator Clark. I wanted to give you the widest possible latitude to 

respond to my observations.

Ambassador Stevenson. Well, I appreciate that.

I might say tha t I am not unfamiliar with the speeches of President 

Kennedy at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Senator Clark. It might even be assumed you played some p art in 

dra ftin g them.

Ambassador Stevenson. Certainly, speaking for myself, I agree 

emphatically with the broad objective of Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, and continue to support, and indeed pray for, the ultimate 

goal of general and complete disarmament.

I think that we have a national purpose in this rega rd that has 

been expressed most effectively by President Kennedy, and also by, 

subsequently, President Johnson.

That we have not made more progress in this direction is discouraging to me, after the breakthrough with the test ban treaty.

I must say also th at I am not optimistic about the present situation 

after having been present at the meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York on Monday, where the Soviet delegate and I both spoke.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 111

Senator Clark. My understanding is th at tha t was one of the most 

disagreeable confrontations in your whole conduct of our affairs 

within the United Nations. Is th at correct ?

Ambassador Stevenson. It was very distressing—the resumption of 

what seemed to me the language of the cold w ar an d the temper of the 

cold war. I think there is an inextricable relationship between disarmament 

and the development of effective peacekeeping machinery. Our outline of a treaty for general and complete disarmament I believe is a helpful framework at least for consideration of steps in 

tha t direction. I do feel that it is quite appa rent, and has been for some time, th at general and complete disarmament is something you can obtain only a step at a time. You cannot arrive at tha t conclusion until you have passed through the intermediate steps. Emphasis, therefore, has to be placed, as we have, I believe, going back for quite some years, on initial, collateral arms control measures which can be implemented.

NEW CLIMATE NEEDED FOR DISARMA MEN T DISCU SSIONS

Senator Clark. Actually, Governor, what we need is to create a 

new climate, is i t not, not only with respect to the Russians, but p er­ haps with respect to our own aspirations and our own zeal in fo rwa rd­ ing the very fine objectives which President Kennedy so eloquently 

stated ?

Ambassador Stevenson. Yes. Certainly you cannot make any 

progress in disarmament without a better political climate than exists 

presently with the Russians.

I say this with some qualifications. Regardless of the extent of existing tension, it is possible to make steps in the field of disarmament where mutual interest is obvious. There have been illustrations of this before. It is only after the maxi­ mum tension of the Cuban crisis that we made any advances in a 

nuclear breakthrough.

Senator Clark. And the Berlin wall is anoth er example of how, 

just when thing s look blackest, suddenly we come up with an advance.

Ambassador Stevenson. Before you can arriv e at a state o f total, 

general, and complete disarmament, really there have to be a lot of 

political settlements th at have to precede it.

Senator Clark. Let me ask you whether you think the present intransigence of the Russians is influenced substantially by the situations 

in both Vietnam and Germany ?

Ambassador Stevenson. It is not for me to say what influences 

Russian decisions. Many people will say to you that it is competi­ tion with the Chinese more than anything else, and is unrelated to other things, and tha t they exploit other situations in order to advance their main objective. But I cannot speculate very intelligently on this 

subject. I have made an amateur sport of being a Krem linologist for a good 

many years, but I still consider myself an amateur.

Senator Clark. Perhaps it would be better to discuss this in executive session.
112 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

Ambassador Stevenson. I want also to say, if I could, in response 

to Senator Clark’s question, Mr. Chairman, tha t I think that there is 

no distinction tha t I have ever detected between the Johnson administration and the Kennedy administration—if there was any suggestion 

of a distinction—in the held of arms control.

Senator Clark. As far as I know, Governor, the words “general 

and complete disarmament” have never passed the lips of the President of the United States, and they certainly did with his predecessor. 

And may I say fo r the record I recall the difficulties I had as a member of the platform committee of the Democratic National Committee 

in gettin g some of President Kennedy’s words into the platform.

Ambassador Stevenson. Well, I must say tha t this adm inistration—at least it seems from where I sit—has very strongly supported 

the disarmament effort. In fact, I believe that the first law that 

President Johnson signed after taking office provided for authoriza ­

tion for the Disarmament Agency for 2 years.

He has talked to me about it on frequent occasions. Specifically, 

he has taken a personal interest and strongly supported efforts in th e 

18-nation Disarmament Commission to reach some concrete agreements. In his statement at the reconvening of the conference in 

Jan uary 1964 he proposed, as you well know, five major types of 

potential agreement. And during the talks last year our delegation 

to the Disarmament Commission set forth these proposals in great 

detail.

He has proposed urgently needed steps to prevent the spread of 

nuclear weapons, measures to cease th e production of fissionable materials, plans to decrease the danger of war, by accident, by surprise 

attack, and so on.

Much of the time has been devoted to a discussion of general and 

complete disarmament. I reaffirmed that. I have my speech here of 

only yesterday—Monday—in the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York.

Following the Russian speech I said:

We are determined to work for general and complete disarmamen t, as par t 

of our common long-term effort to achieve a better and safe r world through the 

application of the principles of the cha rter and the steady development of inte rnation al law and effective peacekeeping arrangeme nts. The outlined Treat y on 

General and Complete Disarm ament which the United States has submitted and 

discussed in Geneva would in our view provide a sound framework for this 

common effort.

Senator Clark. Who are you quoting from?

Ambassador Stevenson. Myself.

This speech, of course, was approved by the President before I 

gave it.

Senator Clark. I assume it was cleared by Mr. Cleveland and 

others.

Ambassador Stevenson. Let me conclude this, because I think it 

is relevant to what you said, sir.

If we are to achieve this goal, we must first hal t the progress of the arms 

race, and particular ly the nuclea r race, and turn it back. We must begin with 

those area s of ar ms control and reductions where agreement seems possible, and 

wre must begin now’. We must avoid the lure of easy slogans and deceptive 

generalit ies, and face the fact tha t agreements in this area involve complex 

ma tter s of milita ry balance, scientific technology, and, w’here necessary, verification.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 113

This approach was reflected in the program of action which the United State s placed betore the 18-nation conference in Geneva. Our proposals were outlined in President Johnson’s message of January 21, 1964, to the conference. As our President stated in the opening words of his message, there is only one item on the agenda of this conference, it is the leading item on the agenda of mankind, and that one item is peace. In that spirit President Johnson outlined five major types of agreement for study and negotiation.

Well, sir, I repeat this only because this has been the heart, if I can put it that way, of our approach to the whole problem of general and complete disarmament—that it must be attained, and the way to 

attain it is step by step.

Senator Clark. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, should these U.N. Charter amend­ ments be approved without reservations, understandings, or in terp retations ? In other words, if they are amended by the Senate, by reservation or other change, would this entail a renegotiation or not ?

Ambassador Stevenson. Well, if the reservation goes to the heart of the matter, then all of the members of the United Nations would 

have to accept it. If it does not go to the heart of the matter, it is probably not worth making. So I would think my answer is “Yes,” w ithout reservations.

The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you would mind stepping aside. We will have an executive session, if you have time to 

wait until we hear the public witnesses.

Ambassador Stevenson. Delighted; yes, sir.

The Chairman. The first public witness is Mr. George V. Allen, of 

Washington, D.C., on behalf of the United World Federalists. Mr. Allen, we are very pleased to have you. We have welcomed you 

to this committee many times in the past. Do you wish to read your statement, or to in sert it in the record and 

comment on it ?

Mr. Allen. I would like to read it more or less, Mr. Chairm an, if 

I may.

The Chairman. All right, you may proceed.

Mr. Allen. I would welcome interruption at any time.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE V. ALLEN, WASHINGTON, D.C., ON BE HAL F 

OF TH E UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS

Mr. Allen. In order to explain my position here, I would like to say to you and members o f the committee, my name is George V. Allen, Washington, D.C., and am appearing on behalf of United World F ed­ eralists as Chairman of the Policy Planning Committee and Vice Chairman of the National Advisory Board. I have devoted most of my life to the Fore ign Service of my country^ serving as Ambassador to Ira n, Yugoslavia, In dia, and Greece and twice as an Assistant Secre­ tary of State. I participated in the Foreign Ministers Conference in 

Moscow in 1943, the Roosevelt-Churchill Conference in Cairo in 1943, 

the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, and the Potsdam 

Conference in 1945. I served three times as Chairm an of the U.S. Delegation to UNE SCO Conferences and was Chairman of the U.S. 

National Commission for UNESCO d uring 1962 and 1963.
114 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

United World Federalists, Inc., is a nonpartisan, nonprofit membership organization incorporated unde r the laws of the State of New 

York. Our membership of 20,000 Americans is drawn from every 

State in the Union and we have 120 organized chapters.

From its inception in Asheville, N.C., in 1947, when five predecessor 

organizations joined to form United World Federalists, this organization has been primarily concerned with the development of the 

United Nations into an effective instrument for law and order in the 

world community. We have long sought to strengthen the United 

Nations as a keeper of the peace.

We have urged changes m the Charter of the United Nations through 

the amendment processes of articles 108 and 109 which, in our opinion, 

would make the United Nations better able to fulfill the high purposes 

set forth in the preamble of its charter.

REASONS FOR SUPPORT OF CHARTER AME NDM ENT S

We appear today in support of the first two amendments to the 

United Nations C harter du rmg its history of almost 20 years. We believe t hat these amendments, increasing the membership of the Security Council from 11 to 15 nations, and of the Economic and Social 

Council from 18 to 27 nations, are equitable, realistic, and sound. We 

believe th at adoption of these two amendments is in the best interests 

of the United States and the United Nations for the following reasons:

(1) These amendments will make the U nited Nations stronger and 

more effective because they will provide more realistic and equital representation of the member states. Since 1945, the United Nations has 

more th an doubled in membership growing from 51 to 114 members. 

By far the largest pa rt of the increased membership is made up of 

African and Asian states which were not in existence when the charter 

was drafted and accordingly, had no opportunity to contribute to its 

drafting.

The consideration given to enlarging these two bodies by the 18th 

United Nations General Assembly in 1963 showed clearly the high importance attached to equitable representation by the member states 

from Africa and Asia. It also showed that a mere reallocation of seats 

in the 11-nation Security Council would not meet the need felt by 

almost all members for an equitable voice on the Security Council. 

Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand urged expansion of these councils and not merely redistribution of seats. The 

United States took the same position.

The enlargement of the Security Council from 11 to 15 will m aintain intact the seats of the present 5 permanent members; double the 

seats for Western Europe from 1 seat to 2; increase the seats for Africa 

and Asia from 2 to 5, with the understanding tha t 3 shall be filled by 

African nations and 2 by Asian nations; give 1 seat to Eastern Europe 

in place of the often disputed seat which is present split between Asia 

and E astern Europe, and Maintain the present 2 seats for Latin America.

(2) As the United States will probably prefer, on most occasions, 

to have the Security Council exercise its primary responsibility for 

peacekeeping, despite potential obstruction by the veto and without 

prejudice to the residual righ ts of the General Asembly in this area,
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS 115

it is important that the Security Council represent as a equitable a cross section of the views of the members of the United Nations as 

feasible. (3) Since the cooperation of the newer nations has been essential to the proper constitution of the United Nations peace forces, it is just and prudent tha t they should have equitable representation on the Security Council which has primary responsibility for peacekeeping. (4) Enlargement of the Security Council may facilitate the kind of solution of United Nations peacekeeping financing which has been sought by the Un ited States. It will indicate, as the charter provides, tha t the United States regards the Security Council as having “pri­ mary responsibility for the maintenance of in ternational peace and se­ curity.” Some accommodation with the clear desire of substantial ma ­ jority of United Nations members for the enlargement of this Council is essential to the solution of future financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations. (5) These amendments will demonstrate the ability of the United Nations and the cha rter to adapt to changing circumstances in the light of new realities. It is important to establish the United Nations capacity to adapt to change as this is the measure of any organization’s ability to survive and to grow. As the U.S. Constitution has met the 

test of adaptability, so must the United Nations Charter. For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, we believe it is in the best interests of the United S tates and consonant with our own belief in democracy to recognize and supp ort the keen interest of an overwhelming ma­ jority of the member states of the United Nations in enlargement of 

the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

BACKGROUND ON NEED FOR CHARTER REVIEW

While we support these two first amendments to the United Nations Charter, Mr. Chairman, we do not believe tha t these changes alone will provide answers to some of the problems w’hich have become increas­ ingly apparent over the years since the charter was adopted at San 

Francisco on June 26,1945. During the present year, from June 24 to 26, the United Nations will again meet in San Francisco to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the signing of the charter. It will, however, be a very different United Nations and a very different world from tha t historic meeting in 1945 when the guns of war were still heard around the world and 

the atomic age was yet around the corner. We have now’ lived 20 years under what the late Secretary of State 

John Foster Dulles was wront to call a prcatomic charter. I would 

suggest that now’, in this Internationa l C< operation Year and as the United Nations begins its third decade—now is the time to begin a full evaluation of the United Nations in the light of both the hopes invested in it in 1945 and the requirements of international organiza­ tion for the protection of national security and the maintenace of 

peace in 1965. I am quite aware, Mr. Chairman, and members of this distinguished committee, of the problems inherent in political creation. I am aware tha t changes, no m atte r how desirable, do not come overnight. I am equally aware, however, and utterly convinced, th at desirable changes
116 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

in international institutions will not occur as readily or be as much 

to our liking unless we determine in a realistic and hardheaded manner what we want the United Nations to be, what is needed to make 

it thus, and then advocate our proposals with the same determination 

and the same tenacity with which other permanent members of the 

Security Council advocate their proposals.

Over the past 20 years, many prominent Americans, including many 

members of this distinguished committee, have voiced their concern 

with one aspect or another of the operation of the United Nations. 

While the United States has lived with the present charter and has 

supported a liberal interpretation of that charter, we have recently 

witnessed a United Nations constitutional crisis with respect to the 

financing of peacekeeping operations. This crisis points to the fact 

tha t changes will have to be constitutional, not alone interpretive, in 

the future. A constantly growing number of world leaders, including 

the Secretary General of the United Nations, are suggesting the need 

for revision of the charter.

I suggest tha t it would be highly desirable for your Committee on 

Foreign Relations to undertake a full review of the United Nations 

Charter, after 20 years of operation, similar to the Subcommittee on 

the United Nations Charter which conducted extensive studies and 

hearings in 1954 and 1955 as authorized by Senate Resolution 126 on 

July 28,1953.

In this regard, we welcome the recent introduction of Senate Concurrent Resolution 32 and its sponsorship by more than one-quarter 

of the Members of the Senate. We believe tha t this resolution is 

directed to the most important unanswered question facing U.S. foreign policy today, namely a thorough and specific determination of the 

kind of international authority that the United States deems necessary and is ready to advocate in order to implement our stated goal 

of—

a world which is free from the scourge of war and the danger and burdens of 

arm aments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law ; 

and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully. (Title I, sec. 2. Public Law 87-297, 87th Cong.)

We hope very much, Mr. Chairm an, tha t your committee or an 

appropriate subcommittee thereof will hold hearings on this impo rtan t resolution.

I appreciate this opportunity to ap pear before you and express the 

views of the United W orld Federalists in support of these first amendments to the United Nations Charter.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Than k you, Mr. Allen. I can assure you the committee will hold hearings on thr '©solution in the near future.

Mr. Allen. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Senator Clar. iy questions ?

Senator Clark. Thank you, Mr. Allen, fo r the plug fo r Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, which actually I think will give us an opportunity to look into these matters.

I was very happy to have the chairman make this statement. Secretary Rusk has also given his blessing to some consideration of these 

matters by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I thin k your 

testimony has been most helpful.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDME NTS 117

Mr. Allen. Thank you.

The Chairman. Tha nk you very much, Mr. Allen.

The Chairman. The next witness is Mrs. Robert J. Wiener, of P or t­ land, Oreg., on behalf of the American Association of University 

Women.

STATEMENT OF MRS. ROBERT J. WIENER, PORTLAND, OREG., ON

BEHALF OF THE AMER ICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVER SITY

WOMEN

Mrs. Wiener. Mr. C hairman, I have a prepared statement. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Mrs. Robert J. Wiener and I am here on behalf of the American Association of University Women, an organization with a membership of over 

166,000 organized into 1,560 branches in the 50 States, Guam, and the 

District of Columbia. The association has maintained an intense interest in international problems ever since the period of W orld War I, and an equally keen interest in means of achieving a more peaceful world. AAUW was vigorous in its supp ort of the proposed League of Nations and the Permanent Court of Internationa l Justice. It had a representative, an appointment made by President Hoover, in Geneva in 1932 at the 

World Disarmament Conference, just as it had official representatives 

in San Francisco in 1945, and a member on the U.S. delegation to the 

Bretton Woods Monetary and Financial Conference in J uly 1946. A 

former AAUW president is Vice Chairman of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, and our executive director was ap­ pointed by President Johnson to serve on the Advisory Committee on Educational and Cultural Affairs to the State Department.

As recently as Feb ruary 1962 the association presented a witness 

before this committee in support of the United N ations bond issue. Within our membership there are study groups in a large propor­ tion of our branches working to broaden understanding of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. AAUW members have con­ sistently supported United Nations Day and Week in their commu­ nities, and curre ntly are supporting Internation al Cooperation Year. We firmly believe that an international forum for the presenta­ tion and the working o ut of solutions to international problems and conflicts is imperative if any degree of peace in the world is to be maintained. It seems to us that economic and social development, the resolving of political problems, and the development of effective in­ ternational peacekeeping machinery are key responsibilities of the 

United Nations.

REASONS FOR URGING RATIFICATION OF AMEND MENTS

We are all acutely aware of the changes which have occurred in the world since the United Nations came into being 20 years ago, and therefore urge acceptance of the two amendments to the Charter of the United Nations which are under consideration by this committee— amendments which have been ratified by 65 of the 76 member naions 

required for adoption.
118 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

The membership of the United Nations has more than doubled since 

1945, but no change in these 20 years has been made in the Charter 

of the United Nations to reflect this difference. An increase in the 

size of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council 

would insure tha t these bodies come closer to representing the whole 

membership of the U nited Nations and would alleviate the pressures 

and the conflicts of recent years which have resulted from the efforts 

of new members to secure seats on the Councils.

The adoption of these amendments would act to restore the balance 

which was envisioned in 1945 between the Councils and the General 

Assembly by providing for additional representation. This is a m atter of obvious justice, as well as political wisdom. We believe the 

opportunity of serving on the Councils will prove to be a “school for 

diplomacy” for representatives of nations which have not had access 

to seats on the Councils in the past. We believe the work of the 

Councils will be more effective if they are enlarged as proposed.

In our opinion, the general United Nations membership will have 

greater confidence and an added sense of participa tion which should 

lead to greater support by the total United Nations membership for 

United Nations activities.

In the eyes of the association, the very fact tha t this is the first 

time the United Nations Charter has been amended is a tribu te both 

to its stability and its flexibility. We have noted tha t these amendments do not affect the basic interests or the veto power of the five 

permanent members of the Security Council.

We have also noted tha t there is no reason t ha t the proposed geographic distribution of seats outlined in the resolution adopted in 

December 1963 by the General Assembly should affect adversely the 

interests of the United States.

We urge ratification of these amendments as a means of strengthening the United Nations, an organization for which we see no substitute, and which we believe has a unique role to play in building a world 

community whose common interests are served through international 

cooperation on matters ranging from labor and trade, through space 

and atomic energy control, to feeding the undernourished, peacekeeping, and promoting economic and social development.

A distinguished member and former president of the AAUW, Dean 

Virginia Gildersleeve, served on the American delegation to the San 

Francisco Conference in 1945. We are proud to say that Dean Gildersleeve, as a member of one of the draftin g committees, was the 

primary author of the initial phrase in the preamble to the United 

Nations Charter, “We the peoples of the United Nations * * *.” We 

urge ratification of the two amendments under consideration by this 

committee in the spirit of this eloquent phrase.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Tha nk you very much, Mrs. Wiener. That is a 

very fine statement. I appreciate your taking the trouble to testify 

before the committee.

I think you have already sensed tha t the committee is very sympathetic to your position. Thank you very much.

The next public witness is Mr. Robert Cory, of New York, on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

Mr. Cory, we are happy to have you. Do you wish to proceed ?
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDME NTS 119

STATEMENT OF ROBERT CORY, NEW YORK, ON BEHALF OF THE 

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Mr. Cory. I wo uld like to file m y s tatm en t fo r the record an d ma ke 

some comments on it.

Th e Chairm an. I thi nk th at would be fine. The basic i nf or mation 

has alr eady been presented to the com mittee in several dif ferent ways. 

Th e whole sta temen t will be pu t in the rec ord , an d then you ma y 

com men t on it.

(T he pre pa re d sta temen t of M r. Cory fo llo ws:)

Statement of Robert H. Coby on Behalf of the Fbiends Committee on

National Legislation

w My name is Robert H. Cory, of Scarsdale, N.Y. I am program associate of the Quaker United Nations program where I have had the opportunity for the 

past 4 years to observe first hand the operations of the United Nations. I am appearing today on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation. This Quaker committee has on its policymaking general committee, Friends ap- • pointed from many Friend s bodies, but it does not claim to speak for all Friends. The Religious Society of Friends is a very democratic organization, and Friends 

cherish the right to t heir individual opinions. But it is clear tha t the United Nations commands broad support among most Friends and is regarded as the chief political institutio n in helping to build a 

peaceful world of law and order. I appear today to support Senate approval of the pending amendments to the U.N. Charter which would enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 and the 

Economic and Social Council from 18 to 27. At the annual meeting of the general committee of the Friends Committee on National Legislation, held March 19-21, 1965, a statem ent of legislative policy was adopted on “supporting and improving the United Nations” which begins 

as follow s: “Increasingly, the maintenance of world peace depends upon the United Na­ tions. The U.N. needs even greater support by the nations of the world to de­ velop into a more effective instrument for the establishment of world peace and 

justice under law. “In recent years, the United States has given increased moral and financial support to the United Nations. But all countries of the world, including the United States, need to make the United Nations the cornerstone of their foreign policy and seek to improve it as the major instrument of international justice. “Although the U.N. is not yet capable of handling all world problems, it has been frequently able to exert a moderating influence in situations of tension and crisis. In particular, the establishment of U.N. peacekeeping operations and observer groups in the Middle East, the Congo, and Cyprus has helped keep local conflicts from spreading and has reduced the danger of major war while allow­ ing time for basic solutions to be sought through negotiation or other peaceful means. The good offices and personal diplomacy of the Secretary General have

f

 been used constructively on many occasions. * * * “The United States can help the U.N. gain experience and function more suc­ cessfully by * * * approving the amendment to the U.N. Charter agreed to at the U.N. which would enlarge the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to reflect the expanded membership of the U.N.”

, We view Senate approval of the pending amendments to the U.N. Ch arter as one of the important next steps which the United States can take to help the 

U.N. function more successfully. The membership of the U.N. in the past 20 years has grown from 51 to 114 and may increase slightly in the near future. This increase in membership has come primarily from Africa and Asia, for in 1946 only Liberia, Ethiopia, India, and the Philippines were members; whereas now there a re 30 African States and 14 

Asian States in the U.N. Much of the work of the U.N. is done by organs on which members serve on a principle of equitable geographic distribution. Adjustments have already been made in those organs of the U.N. whose membership is not numerically deter­ mined by the charter. However, any adjustment in the membership of the Secu-
120 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

rity Council and the Economic and Social Council can only be achieved through 

char ter amendment. Amendments for these changes were adopted by the General Assembly, December 17, 1963, with the recommendation that all members 

of the United Nations ratify “in accordance with their respective constitutional 

processes by September 1, 1965.” As of April 2, 65 nations have ratified, but of 

the 5 permanen t members of the Security Council whose consent is obligatory, 

only the U.S.S.R. has ratified.

DISCUSSION OF AMENDM ENTS

Of these amendments, the most im portant one is tha t which expands the membership of the Security Council from 11 to 15. One of the distinguished scholars 

of U.N. affairs, Sydney D. Bailey, in his book, "The General Assembly of the 

United Nations,” concludes tha t “the position now is tha t it’s impossible to distribu te the six seats to be filled by election in such a way tha t all main groups 

are continuously represented.” Mr. Bailey points out tha t a considerable 

amount of time of the General Assembly has been absorbed in contests for these 

six seats, with resulting bitterness and tension. The amendment would be supplemented by a resolution indicating tha t the 10 nonpermanent members of the 

Security Council should be elected according to the following pa tte rn : 5 from 

African and Asian States, 1 from East European States, 2 from Latin American 

States, and 2 from Western European and other states. The veto power of the 

5 per manent members would, of course, not be altered, but on procedural matte rs 

9 members in 15 rat he r than 7 in 11 could decide.

The second amendment would increase the size of the Economic and Social 

Council from 18 to 27, and in so doing, allocate 7 of the additional seats to 

African and Asian States. The Economic and Social Council has increasingly 

tended to become a procedural body concerned with review and coordination of 

programs of work within the United Nations and its specialized agencies. 

Though i t can serve as an initiato r of new means of consultation and cooperation on economic and social questions, the authority to recommend lies with the 

General Assembly. Since 1962 the 18 seats have been distributed so tha t the 

Afro-Asians and the Latin Americans together had half the total. Though it 

is impossible to predict exactly the application of the new amendment, the AfroAsians and Latin Americans together would unquestionably have a clear majority . On the other hand, influence is not measured by votes and t he industrially 

developed countries have had a nd will co ntinue to have a dominant influence because of their financial power.

It appears then tha t these two procedural amendments are needed to reflect 

the basic change in the U.N. over the las t 20 y ea rs: the expansion of Afro-Asian 

membership. That process cannot be reversed, though a failure of these amendments at this time could inject disappointment and some bitterness. In any 

general review of the place of the United Nations in U.S. foreign policy, the total 

implications of this trend should be realistically assessed. In tha t assessment, 

it is important to realize the im portan t advantages of increased membership and 

the relatively minor disadvantages.

I feel tha t increased membership has enabled the U.N. to contribute to the nation-building process through aid in public administration as well as through 

technical assistance. It has widened the world view on the new nations, facing 

them with a global agenda. Though the General Assembly has become a somewhat procedurally unwieldly body, it has also become a more adeq uate means of 

expressing the needs and feelings of t he developing nations. I would hope tha t 

small nations, partic ularly in Africa, are finding common interests through such 

U.N. bodies as the Economic Commission for Africa—interests which may lead 

to the ultimate formation of larger, more viable political units. Meantime, U.N. 

research and data collection agencies now can piece together a more adequate, 

more statistically valuable picture of world problems.

VALUE OF REPRESENTATION AT U.N .

Representation at the United Nations is va luable to new sta tes as a means of 

trainin g diplomats in the issues and procedures of a global agenda. Delegates 

coming to the United Nations both for the permanen t missions and for the General Assembly return to their foreign offices and to important ambassadorial 

posts with the valuable experience of having worked w ith fellow delegates from 

all p arts of the world and with having wrestled with the intri cate an d often baffling problems of a world undergoing r apid change. While they are in New York,
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMEN DMENTS 121

they have an opportunity to observe and report on American society and to come in close contact with U.S. officials. Since many of these nations have only rudi­ mentary facilities for training of foreign service officers, access to U.N. bodies and to posts in the Secretariat can contribute to the quality of the new diplomacy. This is particularly true in the work of the Security Council, for here nations are forced to deal with some of the most difficult and intractable issues of international politics. In my opinion, it is a mistake to conclude th at there is a generally observable difference in judgment, maturity, and wisdom between the big powers and the small powers or between the original members and the new members of the U.N. A dispassionate examination of the record will, in my view, indicate that the new members have played as responsible a role in U.N. diplomacy as have the original members. Therefore, increasing their participation in the Security Council and in the Economic and Social Council should strengthen the U.N. As a nongovernmental observer a t the U.N., it is not within my competence to make any clear judgment on the performance of governmental missions a t the

• U.N. However, it is my personal opinion that there have been many specific in­ stances in which some of the newer nations have made unusual contributions. I have great admiration for the work of Chief Adebo, of Nigeria, as Chairman of the Committee of 21 on U.N. peacekeeping. I have known of the work of Mr. Malhotra on the Special Committee on Apartheid, whose careful research has

* won the respect of his colleagues. While everyone is aware of the skill of Mr. Quaison-Sackey, the President of the General Assembly, the high quality of some of the Ghanian diplomats is less know n; Mr. Johnson Appiah, of Ghana, for instance, did outstanding work in the planning for the Trade Conference. I have been impressed by the objectivity and skill of Ambassador Usher of the Ivory Coast as a representative of his country on the Security Council. In all these cases, it is often the respected and experienced delegate from one of the smaller nations who is chosen for the difficult job of drawing up resolu­ tions which bridge conflicting points of view and achieve the maximum con­ sensus. Though there may indeed be specific exceptions, the nations of Africa and Asia, in my judgment, have given a high priority to the quality of repre­ sentation at the U.N. Most of these diplomats are well aware tha t i t would be futile to pass resolutions, no matter how great the majority, which would become inoperative for lack of support from the major nations. I think it is also important to realize tha t Afro-Asian States have contributed some of the most qualified persons for the work of the international Secretariat. Not only do we have the present Secretary General as an example, but also a number of his chief executive officers. The diversity of nationality in the Sec­ ret ari at creates some obvious difficulties but in the long run strengthens the sense of objectivity and of confidence which enables the U.N. to serve all its 

members. Afro-Asian States have, by and large, policies of nonalinement. Therefore, they are often in the position of trying to arrange some compromise resolution when there is a deadlock between great powers in the Security Council. Since the United States retains a veto and since the United State s may on a number of issues wish to find a middle ground, the participation of more Afro-Asians can have very real advantages for the United States. In the Economic and Social Council the Afro-Asians could be expected to use their slightly increased ini fluence to push for cooperative ways of meeting the growing gap between the have and have-not nations. Here i t seems to the great advantage of the United States to have open discussion of methods of peaceful change and to support governments seeking evolutionary rather than revolutionary answers. This brief assessment of a change which has already occurred—the increased 

' membership of the Afro-Asian States—puts, in my opinion, the question of these two amendments in perspective. The United States will, in my opinion, gain in diplomatic influence by ratifying these amendments. To be a truly effective instrument for world peace and order the U.N. must reflect the world as it is. These charter amendments help to make these two vital U.N. bodies more representative. We strongly urge this committee and the Sen­ ate to ratify these amendments to th e U.N. Charter.

Mr. Cory. My name is Robert Cory. I am from Scarsdale, N.Y., and I am a member of the Scarsdale meeting of the Religious Society 

of Friends.
122 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

I have the privilege of being an accredited observer at the United 

Nations for an organization with consultation status with the Economic and Social Council.

I am here today on behalf of the Friends Committee on National 

Legislation to support these two amendments.

I think perhaps the contribution I can make, if any indeed, is on the 

question of the quality of participation of the Afro-Asian States and 

of the value in these amendments in furthering tha t participation.

If I could read briefly from my statement—I think the failure of 

these amendments a t this time would not reverse the process of wider 

representation, but could inject disappointment, bitterness, and procedural difficulties.

ADVANTAGES OF MEM BE RS HI P IN TH E U .N .

In any general review of the place of the United Nations in U.S. 

foreign policy, the total implications of this trend should be realistically assessed. In tha t assessment, it is important to realize the important advantages of increased membership and the relatively minor 

disadvantages.

I feel t hat increased membership has enabled the United Nations 

to contribute to the nation-building process through aid in public administration as well as throu gh technical assistance. It has widened 

the world view of the new nations, facing them with a global agenda. 

Though the General Assembly has become a somewhat procedurally 

unwieldy body, it has also become a more adequate means of expressing the needs and feelings of the developing nations.

I would hope tha t small nations, particula rly in Africa, are finding 

common interests through such United Nations bodies as the Economic Commission for Africa—interests which may lead to the ultimate formation of larger, more viable political units. Meantime, 

United Nations research and data collection agencies now can piece 

together a more adequate, more statistically valuable picture of world 

problems.

VALUE OF U .N . TO NE W NA TIO NS

Representation at the United Nations is valuable to new states as a 

means of training diplomats in the issues and procedures of a global 

agency. Delegates coming to the United Nations both for the permanent missions and for the General Assembly return to their foreign 

offices and to important ambassadorial posts with the valuable experience of having worked with fellow delegates from all parts of the 

world and with having wrestled with the intricate and often baffling 

problems of a world undergoing rapid change. While they are in 

New York, they have an opportunity to observe and re port on American society and to come in close contact with U.S. officials.

Since many of these nations have only rudimentary facilities for 

training of foreign service officers, access to United Nations bodies and 

to posts in Secretariat can contribute to the quality of the new diplomacy. This is particularly true in the work of the Security Council, 

for here nations are forced to deal with some of the most difficult and 

intractable issues of international politics.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMEN DMENTS 123

CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY NEWER NAT ION S

In my opinion, it is a mistake to conclude th at there is a generally observable difference in judgment, m aturity, and wisdom between the big powers and the small powers or between the original members and the new members of the United Nations. A dispassionate examina­ tion of the record will, in my view, indicate that the new members have played as responsible a role in the United Nations diplomacy as have the original members. Therefore, increasing their participation in the Security Council and in the Economic and Social Council should 

strengthen the United Nations. As a nongovernmental observer at the United Nations, it is not within my competence to make any clear judgment on the performance of governmental missions a t the United Nations. However, it is my personal opinion tha t there have been many specific instances in which some of the newer nations have made unusual contributions. In all these cases, it is often the respected and experienced delegate from one of the smaller nations who is chosen for the difficult job of drawing up resolutions which bridge conflicting points of view and achieve the maximum consensus. Though there may indeed be spec­ ific exceptions, the nations of Africa and Asia, in my judgment, have given a high prio rity to the quality of representation at the United Nations. Most of these diplomats are well aware tha t it would be futile to pass resolutions, no matter how great the majority, which would become inoperative for lack of support from the major nations. I think it is also im portant to realize tha t Afro-Asian states have contributed some of the most qualified persons for the work of the international Secretariat. Not only do we have the present Secretary - General as an example, but also a number of his chief executive officers. The diversity of nationality in the Secretariat creates some obvious difficulties but in the long run strengthens the sense of objectivity and of confidence which enables the United Nations to serve all its members. Afro-Asian states have, by and large, policies of nonalinement. Therefore, they are often in the position of trying to arrange some compromise resolution when there is a deadlock between great powers in the Security Council. Since the United States retains a veto and since the United States may, on a number of issues, wish to find a middle ground, the participation of more Afro-Asians can have very 

real advantages for tne United States. In the Economic and Social Council the Afro-A sians could be ex­ pected to use their slightly increased influence to push fo r cooperative ways of meeting the growing gap between the have and have-not n a­ tions. Here it seems to the great advantage of the United States to have open discussion of methods of peaceful change and to support governments seeking evolutionary rather than revolutionary answers. This brief assessment of a change which has already occurred— the increased membership of the Afro-Asian states—puts, in my opin­ ion, the question of these two amendments in perspective. The United States will, in my opinion, gain in diplomatic influence by ratifyin g 

these amendments. To be a truly effective instrument for world peace and order the United Nations must reflect the world as it is. These charter amend-
124 UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

merits help to make these two vital United Nations bodies more representative.

We strongly urge this committee and the Senate to ratify these 

amendments to the United Nations Charter.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Cory, for a very perceptive statement. I appreciate your taking the trouble to testify 

before the committee.

The committee will now adjourn to the anteroom for an executive 

session.

(Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee proceeded to executive 

session.)

(The following statement was subsequently received for the record:)

Statement of Mrs. Catherine Manno for the Women’s I nternational League

for Peace and Freedom, U.S. Section, Washington, D.C., in Sup- *

port of Senate Consent to Ratification of the Proposed Amendments to

the U.N. Charter

The U.S. section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 

urges the Senate to approve ratification of the proposed amendments to the U.N. *

Charter, for four reasons:

1. Enlargement of the two principal Councils will adap t the U.N. structure to the fact that membership has more than doubled since the charter 

was drafted. The specific geographic allocation of elective seats should 

facilitate elections and leave members better satisfied with the fairness of 

the results.

2. Even though these amendments will accomplish only a minor reform, 

ratification by the United States will indicate this country’s fait h in, and 

desire to strengthen, the United Nations.

3. It will also show our respect for the opinions of the rest of the world, 

since the amendments were voted by an overwhelming majority of countries 

and it appears likely th at the required approval of the other four permanent 

Security Council members will be given.

4. It would ill become the United States to hesitate to allow other U.N. 

members a few more seats on the two Councils when we have been privileged 

to be permanent members of both (by law in the Security Council and by 

practice in the Economic and Social Council). The continued pre-eminence 

of the permanent members in the Security Council is evident: they retain 

the veto right while not even a concurring majority of the votes of the nonpermanent members is needed for substantive actions supported by the Big 

Five. (Only 4 of the 10 elective members’ votes would be needed under the 

proposed voting majority requiring a tota l of 9 affirmative votes for such actions.)

The women’s International League for Peace and Freedom has no illusions 

tha t this small structural reform will substantially alleviate the crisis in which 

the U.N. now founders. Other steps toward strengthening the organization are 

urgently needed. They require the joint efforts of many nations, but the United 

States could assist such a progressive development in several ways: «

1. By continuing our financial commitment to the U.N.

2. By withdrawing our opposition to the seating of the Peoples Republic

of China, within the context of a settlement of the Chinese representation 

question that protects the interests of the people living under the government of the Republic of China. «

3. By removing the reservations we have placed on the jurisdiction of 

the principal legal organ of th e United Nations—the International Court of 

Justice. (The reciprocity principle prevents others from profiting from our 

fuller acceptance of international law unless they accept equal obligations.)

4. By displaying a greater willingness to use, or at least try to use, U.N. 

agencies and good offices in the settlement of disputes, and by encouraging 

others to do the same.

5. By a greater willingness to compromise those differences tha t can be 

compromised, recognizing tha t we cannot have every decision wholly our 

way, tha t others too must have an incentive to loyal participation, if the
UN ITED NA TIO NS CHARTER AM EN DM EN TS 125

United Nations is to grow in authority and resources. The Women’s In ter ­

national League believes t hat this includes the issue of U.N. arre ars, which 

should be solved by a compromise tha t preserves the universality principle 

and as much as possible of the collective-responsibility principle.

In conclusion, the league believes tha t the great task of our generation, if it 

is not to be the last generation, is to find methods other than war and threats 

of war for resolving differences between nations. The United Nations is an 

indispensable institutio n within whose framework such methods can evolve. 

The prompt ratification of these amendments would be a signal to the world 

tha t the United States intends to give its support to such an evolution.

♦

47 -3 78— 65 9

A P P E N D I X

U.S . P os ition P apers on Artic le 19 I ssue

The U.S. po sitio n in th es e neg ot ia tion s w as st ate d as re ce ntly as Apr il 22 

by A m ba ss ad or Yost be fo re th e Sp ec ial Com m ittee on Pe ac ek ee pi ng O pe ra tions 

(C om m itt ee o f 3 3) . In s um m ar y, th at po sition i s :

1. T h at th e C h art er sp ec ifi ca lly gi ve s th e Sec urity Co un cil “p ri m ary ” resp on -

<4 si hility f or th e m ai nte nan ce o f i n te rn ati o n al pe ac e an d se cu rity .

2. T hat th e C h art er spec ifi ca lly do es no t giv e th e Sec uri ty Cou nc il “e xc lu si ve ” 

re sp on si bi lity fo r de al in g w ith pe ac e an d se cu ri ty iss ue s. The G en er al Assem bly 

under th e C hart er has alw ays ha d au th o ri ty to m ak e re co m m en da tion s w ith re ­

sp ec t to th e m ai nte na nce of pe ac e an d se cu ri ty , in cl ud in g re co m m en da tion s fo r

• th e e st ab lish m en t o f U nited N at io ns p ea ce ke ep in g ope ra tion s.

3. T h at it wo uld he in th e in te re st of th e O rg an iz at io n to m ain ta in th e p ri n ­

cipl e of co lle cti ve fina nc ia l re sp on sibi lity fo r th e ope ra tions of th e O rg an iz at io n.

4. T hat th e G en er al Assem bly under th e C h art er h as ex cl us iv e au th o ri ty to 

ap port io n an d pa ss ass es sm en ts to co ve r th e ex pe ns es of th e O rg an iz at io n.

5. T h a t th e U nited S ta te s is pre par ed to co ns id er pro ce dura l mod ifi ca tio ns , 

pre se rv in g t he ba sic pri nci pl e of collectiv e fina nc ial re sp on sibi lity , if t he m em be rs 

th in k it de si ra bl e to ta ke in to ac co un t an y st ro ng pol itic al ob je ct io ns to pe ac eke ep in g oper at io ns on th e p a rt of a P erm anent Mem ber of th e Sec uri ty Co un cil.

6. T h at th e U ni te d S ta te s is pre pa re d to co ns id er an d negoti ate an y pr oposa ls 

co nsi st en t w ith th es e pr in ci pl es .

[U .S. Miss ion to th e U ni te d N at io ns , pr es s re le as e No. 453 1, Ap r. 22, 196 5])

Sta teme nt by Ambassador C ha rles W. Yost, Deput y U.S . Repre sent at ive, in

th e Specia l Com mitte e on P ea ceke eping Opera tion s, Apr il 22, 1965

The U.S . de lega tio n h as so of te n m ad e cle ar th a t it sh are s th e view s of th e 

v a st m ajo ri ty of m em be r sta te s co nc er ni ng th e ch a rt e r arr angem ents which 

go ve rn U ni te d N at io ns p ea ce ke ep in g oper at io ns t h a t we had no t in te nde d to s pe ak 

on th is su bje ct toda y. H ow ev er , in li ght of th e st ate m ents m ad e th is m or ni ng 

an d in ord er th a t th ere sh ould be no am bi gu ity about our po sition , I M ou ld like 

to sta te on ce mor e ve ry brief ly th e pri nci ple s which th e U nited S ta te s w ill co nti nue to su pport w ith re sp ec t to th e in it ia ti o n an d fina nc ing of U ni te d N at io ns 

pe ac ek ee pi ng act iv itie s.

F ir st, th e c h art er sp ec ifi ca lly give s th e Sec uri ty Co un cil p ri m ary re sp onsi bility 

fo r th e m ai nt en an ce of in te rn ati o n al pe ac e an d se cu rity . The au th o ri ty of th e 

Sec ur ity Co un cil sh ou ld in de ed be pri m ary in th is field and th e Sec uri ty Co un cil 

sh ou ld be loo ked to as th e p ri ncip al or ga n of th e U ni te d N at io ns fo r th is p ur po se . 

We sh ou ld mak e rene wed ef fo rts to ass ure th a t it w or ks well in carr yin g out th is 

re sp on sibi lity .

Second, th e ch a rt e r sp ec ifically do es not gi ve th e Sec uri ty Co un cil ex clus iv e 

re sp on si bi lity ov er pe ac e an d se cu ri ty , nor do we be lie ve it sh ou ld do so. The 

ex clus iv e po w er give n th e Sec uri ty Co un cil by th e c h a rt e r in th is field is to 

de cid e on m ea su re s— co mmon ly ca lle d en fo rc em en t ac tion s— fo r th e m ai nte nan ce 

of in te rn ati o n al pe ac e and se cu ri ty , de cision s which a re bi nd in g on mem be r 

st ate s. T his is th e ac tion w hi ch art ic le 11(3 ) of th e c h art er re se rv es to th e 

Sec uri ty Co uncil, as th e I n te rn ati o n al C ou rt of J u sti ce d et er m in ed .

The G en er al Asse mbly under th e ch art er ot he rw is e has al w ay s ha d, an d sh ou ld 

co nt in ue to ha ve , fu ll au th o ri ty to m ak e re co m m en da tion s w ith re sp ec t to th e 

m ai nte nan ce of pe ac e and se curi ty in cl ud in g re co m m en da tion s fo r th e in it ia ti on 

of U ni te d N at io ns pe ac ek ee pi ng op er at io ns . W e see no re as on a t al l why th is 

po wer, gra nte d to th e Assem bly by th e ch art er, sh ou ld he ab an doned and a sit u a ­

tion cr eate d whe reby an y nat io n, no m att er ho w p ow er fu l, co uld u n il ate ra ll y an d

127
128 UN ITED NATIO NS CH AR TER AM EN DM EN TS

tot ally preven t the orga niza tion from functio nin g in the most vita l area of its 

respo nsibi lity. Such an abdi cati on would cer tainly not be in the long-run 

int ere st of the ma jor ity of members of the dignity and autho rity of our 

organization. Third, we believe tha t, in the int ere sts of the organization , the expen ses of 

United Nati ons peacekeeping ope rations should be the collective financial respon sibility of the entire membership. It is on the basi s of this princ iple, we 

believe, th at the long-r un financial, and henc e pra ctic al, healt h of United Nati ons 

peacek eeping can bes t be a ssur ed. Our efforts in thi s comm ittee will be dire cted 

to pres erving this principle, not to finding way s in which to aband on or sid etra ck 

it. Fo urth and finally, only the General Assembly h as und er the c ha rte r the p ower 

to app ortio n the expenses of peacek eeping oper ation s among member states.

These are the basic princ iples which we believe mu st be applied.

Whil e we feel the pres ent prac tice s fo r implemen ting these principl es are 

sati sfa cto ry, we will be flexible in conside ring new ideas cons isten t with them, 

althoug h we do not wish at thi s stage in our deli ber atio ns to commit ourselve s 

to an y det ails a t t his point.

One new idea in the field of finance has alr ea dy b een pu t for ward—th e suggestion th at when the General Assembly in the fu tu re app orti ons the expens es of 

ma jor peacekeeping operation s, it should tak e into account any stro ng poli tica l 

objections to such oper ation s which had been voiced by a perm anent membe r of 

the Secu rity Council. Let me be cle ar on this point. We would pre fer to have 

full collective finan cial responsibil ity app lied to all membe r sta tes a nd we believe 

the princ iple of ful l collective financial resp ons ibil ity should continue to be the 

pres ump tive one for Unite d Nations peace keepin g operation s. Bu t if others 

feel a modification of this so rt is nec essary for the preservation of the basic 

principle of collective financ ial resp onsibility for United Nations peacekeeping, 

we would be willi ng to c onside r it. We certa inl y do not believe th at it is in the 

int ere sts of the organiz atio n to tak e the posi tion th at the only alt ern ati ve to full 

collective finan cial responsibil ity is to aban don the prin ciple altogeth er.

Mr. Cha irma n, on Septem ber 14, 1964, the U.S. delegation subm itted to the 

Work ing Group of 21 a paper (A/AC.1 13/ 30) on the financing of United Natio ns 

peacek eeping operatio ns. This pap er sets forth in more detail our views on 

fu ture arra ngem ent s for ini tia tin g and financ ing Unite d Natio ns peacek eeping 

oper ation s. Th at pap er and the p roposals it c ontains —such as th at for a special 

finance committe e—rem ain valid toda y and I would like th at pap er to be distrib ute d as a docum ent of th is committee. However, we a re p repared to consid er 

and attem pt to reach agre ement on any prop osals for future peacek eeping 

arra ngem ent s which reflect the gen eral prin cipl es I have mentioned ear lier.

In conclusion, I may emphasize th at we sha re the desire of the disti ngu ishe d 

rep res ent ative of the United Kingdom fo r a genuine negotia tion in mu tua l respe ct 

on these vit al ma tters. In th at sp iri t we will exam ine with pa rti cu lar car e the 

ideas and sugge stions which have been pu t for wa rd by the speakers today.

Spec ia l Co m m it tee on P ea ce -K ee pin g Oper a tio n s,

22 Apr il 1965.

F in a n c in g of U nit ed N a tio n s P ea ce -K eepin g Ope rati ons

Working pap er subm itted by the deleg ation of the Unite d Sta tes of America 1

The United Sta tes delegation has the hon or to pre sen t to the Work ing Group 

of Twenty-One the attached Work ing Pa pe r contain ing sugge stions for chang es 

in the arra ngem ent s and methods for initi ating and financing United Nations

peace-keeping o pera tion s involvin g t he u se of m ilit ary forces.

In March 1964, as members of the Working G roup are awa re, the United S tate s

and United Kingdom deleg ations ind ica ted th at the y were pre pared to explo re 

wit h oth er members of the United Nations, in the first instance those repr esen ted 

in the Work ing Group of Twenty-One, way s to rein forc e the capa city of the 

Unite d Nations to un dertake and finance such peace-ke eping operations in the 

fut ure . Accordingly the United Sta tes an d United Kingdom deleg ation s at th at

1

 P re vio usl y issu ed as a do cu men t, on Sep te m be r 14, 196 4. of th e W or ki ng Gro up on th e E xam in ation of th e A dm in is tr at iv e an d B udgeta ry Pro ce dure s of th e U ni te d N at io ns 

(A /A C .1 13/3 0).
UNI TE D NATIO NS CHARTER AM EN DM EN TS 129

time suggested certa in ideas for discussion, and explored those ideas, info rmally 

and in broad outline, with various members of the Working Group, including 

the Soviet deleg ation.

The attach ed Working Paper embodies the main lines of these ideas and the 

salient featu res of the suggestions then made, as modified by subs equent discussions. It is now subm itted by the United Sta tes for consideration and discussion in the Workin g Group.

These suggestions presuppose sett lem ent in some manner of arre ar s for pa st 

peace-keeping operations. Such payments may tak e any num ber of possible 

forms so long as they conform to the United Nations Ch arter and Fin ancia l 

Regulations.

Arra ngements and meth ods for initiating and financing United Nations

peace-keeping operations invo lving the use of military forces

A. To preser ve and reinforce the peace-keeping capacity of the United Nations, 

it is in the inter est of the entire membership of the Organization th at there be 

establish ed, within the fram ework presc ribed by the Charter, gene rally acceptable new procedures and methods for the future initiation of United Nations 

peace-keeping operation s involving the use of military forces and the obtaining 

of nec essary financing for such operations.

These procedures and methods must safeguard the capa city of the United 

’ Nations to underta ke and car ry on successfully such fu ture peace-keeping operation s. Within the scope of thi s objective, they should also tak e acco unt of the 

intere sts and cap acitie s of all Member States and the special sta tus under the

Ch art er of certain of them.

B. In esta blishing such procedures and methods, pa rticu lar con sideration 

should be given to the following principles :

1. Any new arrangements should make it possible to take due accoun t of 

the int ere sts and capacities of all Member States, but must not permit any 

Sta te to obs truct the United Nations in the discharg e of its peace-keeping 

responsibilities.

2. The Security Council has primary responsibility und er the Ch arter for 

the initiation of peace-keeping operations involving the use of military 

forces.

3. The General Assembly may recommend such peace-keeping operations, 

in th e even t th at th e S ecurity Council is unable to act.

4. All Member States have a responsibility und er the Ch arter to contribute to expenses of such United Nations peace-keeping operations when 

assessed by the General Assembly under Article 17.

5. In app ortioning expenses, account should be tak en of any excessive 

burden which the cost of expensive operations m ight impose on the economies 

of developing countries.

6. United Nation s procedures should be ada pted to tak e into acco unt the 

intere sts of those Members, inclu ding Per manen t Members of the Security 

Council, th at bear special responsibilities. Member States making large 

financial con trib utions for such peace-keeping operations should hav e an 

appro priate voice in the determ ination of meth ods of financing such opera ­

tions.

C. Arra ngements for embodying these considerations in the initiation and 

financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations involving the use of milita ry forces would include the following inte rdependent ele me nts :

1. All proposals to ini tia te such peacekeeping operations would be considered first in the Security Council. The General Assembly would not 

authorize or assume control of such peacekeeping operation s unless the

, Council had demonstrat ed that it was unab le to tak e action.

2. The General Assembly would esta blish a standing special finance 

committee. The composition of thi s committee should be sim ilar to th at of 

the present Workin g Group of Twenty-One: th at is, it would include the 

Permanen t Members of the Security Council and a relativ ely high percen tage of those Member States in each geographical area that a re la rge financial 

contributors to the United Nations. It would be constitu ted under and 

governed by firm rules of procedure of t he General Assembly.

3. In app ortioning expenses f or such peacekeeping operations, the General 

Assembly would ac t only on a recom mendation from the committee passed by 

a two-th irds m ajo rity of the committe e’s membership.
130 U N IT ED NATI ONS CHARTE R A M EN DM ENTS

4. In making recommendations, tlie committee would consider vario us 

alte rnative methods of financing, includin g direct financ ing by countries 

involved in a dispute, v oluntary contribution s, and assessed contribution s. In 

the event that the Assem bly did not accept a partic ula r recommendation, the 

committee would resume consideration of the matte r with a view to recommending an acceptable alter native.

5. One of the ava ilab le methods of assessm ent for peacekeeping operations involving the use of militar y forces would be a special scale of assessments in which , over a specified amount, Sta tes having grea ter abi lity to pay 

would be a llocated higher percentages, and States having less abil ity to pay 

would be alloc ated smaller percentages than in the regu lar scale of 

assessments.

6. Pend ing actio n by the General Assem bly on finan cial arrang ements for

such a peacekeeping operation initiated by the Secu rity Council or Gene ral 

Assem bly, the Secr etary Gene ral would contin ue to be authorized under the 

provisions of the ann ual resolution on unforeseen and extr aord inar y expend itures, to commit up to .$2 million (and with the concurrenc e of the Advisor y 

Committee on Adm inis trat ive and Bud get ary Question s up to $10 milli on) ’ ’

to finance the initial stage of an operat ion. Commitments and expend itures

above this initial amount could be made by the Secr etar y Gene ral only aft er

the Gene ral Assem bly had adopted a fina ncin g resolution on the basis of a

recommendation of the special finance committee. r

[U .S. Miss ion to th e U ni te d N at io ns , pr es s re le as e No. 45 37, Ap r. 29, 1985 ]

Statem ent by Ambassador Charles W. Yost. Deputy U.S . Representative in

th e Special Committee on Peace keep ing Operations

My delegatio n would like to make a few very bri ef comments on the dra ft resolution submitted on Apr il 23 by the distinguished representative of Ethiopia 

and c ircul ated as document L .l .

Wh ile the text of this resolution is by no means iden tical with what my own 

delegation would have drafted , we do believe tha t Amba ssado r Tes faye GebreEg zy has performed a valu able service by bring ing to the fore the urgent need 

for a solution of the finan cial difficulties of the orga niza tion. As his dra ft resolution indicates, there is indeed a consensus tha t this solution should be found 

as quickly as possible; tha t members should put aside their differences in the 

inte rests of the org ani zation : and that the organ ization should be brought to 

solvency by voluntary contrib utions . Such ideas had their origin in the suggestions first presented info rma lly by the Ambassadors of Afg hanis tan , Nig eri a, 

Norw ay, and Venez uela in November of last year . Subsequently they were fu rther developed in a proposal which you. Mr . President , made info rmally and 

which appeared to have the support of vir tua lly all the members of the org ani zation. In fac t, shortly before Christm as it appeared that there would be una nimous support for your proposal. Unfortun ate ly, the Soviet delegation felt obliged 

to re ject it.

We have one prel imin ary comment to make on the dra ft presented by the distinguis hed representative of Ethiopi a. Par agr aph 1 refers to the app lica bili ty of 

arti cle 39 of the Cha rte r of the United Nations . One member of the Comm ittee 

has even suggested tha t there should be fur the r references to tha t arti cle. Bu t 

in our view the applic abi lity of article 19 is a matter for the Assembly its elf and 

not f or this Comm ittee to determine.

The problems this Committee face s is essenti ally two fold: (1) to restore solvency to the org aniz ation, and (2) to discus s procedures for f utu re peacekeeping. 

We h ave alrea dy state d our position with respect to the future and are prepared 

to enter into nego tiatio ns aimed at reac hing a consensus. Wi th respect to the 

solvency, we believe tha t our efforts should be directed toward what all agree is 

the desired g o a l: tha t is, the resto ratio n of solvency throu gh volu ntar y 

contribu tions.

The distinguished representativ e of Eth iop ia pointed out tha t we are now 

work ing in a diffe rent context from that which face d us durin g December, 

Janu ar y, and Febru ary . For that reason we should not seek to reproduce the 

exa ct langu age of one version or another of the vario us proposals which had 

been previou sly considered. That approach wil l, I fea r, only take us back to 

difficulties which previ ously plagued us. Ra the r our efforts should be directe d
U N IT E D NATI ONS CHARTE R A M EN D M EN TS 131

toward see kin g a solut ion of the fin ancia l crisi s throug h vo luntary co nt ribu tio ns to resto re the Un ite d Na tio ns solve ncy. I wou ld th er ef or e ve ntur e to sugg est th at fa r fro m ad ding fu rt her pa ra gr ap hs on ar ticl e ID to the d ra ft reso lutio n before us, the be st co urse wou ld be to delet e the referen ce to a rtic le 19 in op erative pa ra gr ap h 1 of the dra ft resolu tion. I wou ld als o ve nt ur e to liojie th at we cou ld bef ore very long rec eiv e such vo luntar y co ntrib utions th at the Un ite d Nations 

would, in f act, be res to re d to so lvency. Let us pu t aside u nfou nd ed fe ar s and un necessa ry con tro versy . Le t us in stea d conc en tra te on achie vin g solvency thr ou gh cooperative effort and on re ac hing a rea sonable un de rs ta nd in g ab ou t fu tu re obligations of th e orga niza tio n re la ting to peacekeeping. If we can do th at—a nd I th in k we ca n—then we can all look fo rw ar d to a co ns tru ctive Assembly session th is fa ll an d to an increa sing ly 

effective U nited N ations orga niz ati on.

T h e Sec re ta ry of Sta te,

9 W ash in gto n, A pri l 28, 1965.

Ac tiv it ie s in t h e F ield of A rm s Con tr ol and D is a r m a m e n t D urin g t h e

J o h n so n A d m in is tr a tio n

• The first law signed by Pr es iden t John son af te r he took office w as Pu blic La w 88-186 pro vid ing a ut ho riza tio n fo r an ad ditio na l 2-y ear p eriod fo r the Arms Control an d Disa rm am en t Agency. On Dec emb er 5, 1963, Pr es id en t John son ad dressed th e principa l officers of the Dep artm en t of St ate. USI A, AID , ACDA, and th e Peace Corps. At th at meetin g he expre sse d his su pp or t fo r th e Arms Control an d Disa rm am en t Agency an d stated , “I str on gly supp orted th e lim ite d te st ban trea ty , and I wan t Bill Fos te r to know th at I look on his work as par t of na tio na l se cu rit y ju st as muc h as the 

wo rk of Se cretary Bob Mc Na ma ra an d the Jo in t Ch iefs of Sta ff.” On the wee ken d of Dec emb er 14—15 of 1903 P re side nt John son convened in th e W hite H ouse a me eti ng of the top officials in th e U.S. Go ver nm ent who de al t with the s ub jec t o f a rm s c on tro l a nd d isa rm am en t. Th is inc lud ed n ot only t he r an kin g officers of th e Arms Co ntr ol an d Disa rm am en t Agency bu t also officials of th e Dep artm en t of Defense, Jo in t Chiefs of Staff, AEC, th e Pre side nt ’s Ad vis er on Nationa l Se curity Affairs, and the Pre side nt ’s Ad vis er on Science and Te ch­ nology. Th is gro up held a weekend me eting in pr ep ar in g for th e opening of th e 18-N ation Disa rm am en t Comm itte e in Gene va. Pre side nt John son me t with th is gro up and cou nse led with them as to the wo rk they w ere doing in pr ep ar at io n fo r th e opening of the confe ren ce. A ch ronology of t he a ctions t ak en in the ye ar 1964 

an d so f ar in 1965 follo ws : Ja nua ry 8, 1964: In his st at e of the Union messag e. Pr es id en t Jo hn son an­ nounce d th at U.S. prod uc tio n of enric hed ur an ium will be red uced by 25 pe rcen t an d th at the Ato mic En ergy Com mission will close dow n 4 of its 14 re ac to rs pro ducin g plu ton ium fo r wea pons. He calls on th e Sovie t Union to ta ke sim ila r 

steps. Ja nuar y 18, 1964: Pr es id en t Joh nson, in his reply to Pr em ier Khr us hc he v’s le tter of Dec emb er 31, 1963, ur ging th e peacefu l se ttlem en t of te rr itori al di s­ putes, calls for a deem ph asis of Ea st- W est differenc es an d appe als to the Sovie t Union to supp ort co nc rete ste ps to str en gthe n peace, na mely: (1) pr even tio n of the spread of nu cl ea r weapons, (2) ce ssati on of the prod uctio n of fissionable m at er ia ls fo r we apons uses, (3) the tr an sf er of large am ou nts of fissio nable mater ia ls to peacefu l uses, (4) th e proh ibiti on of all nu clea r tests , (5) lim ita­ tio ns on nu clear weapons system s, (6) reducti on of the risk of w ar by ac cide nt 

or design, and (7) prog ress toward general dis armam en t.

* Comm enting on Khr us hc he v’s pro posal rega rd ing th e peacefu l se ttl em en t of te rr itori al dispute s, th e Pr es id en t em phasized th a t the princ iple of pe aceful se ttlem en t sho uld ap ply to all wars and propos es th e follow ing gu idelines: (1) All gover nm ents shou ld ab stain fro m th e direct or in dire ct th re at or use of force to cha nge in te rn at io na l boundarie s, othe r te rr it ori al or demarca tio n lin es es­ tablish ed by in te rn at io na l agreem ent or practice, the dis position s of truc e or m ilita ry armistic e agreem en ts, or arrang em en ts or procedures concern ing ac ­ ces s or passa ge ac ross ce rtain area s. Nor sho uld an y governm ent at te m pt to en large its te rr itory by ov erthrowing es tab lis hed au th or iti es . (2) Th ese lim ­ ita tio ns sho uld apply rega rd less of th e di rect or in di re ct for m th at a th re at or use of force might assume , inc lud ing th e clan de stine sup ply of arms . (3) Th e pa rtie s to any disp ut e sho uld seek a pea cef ul sol ution by peacefu l me ans—ne-
132 UN ITED NA TIO NS CHARTER AM EN DM EN TS

gotiation , mediation, jud icial settlement, action by an app rop riate regio nal or

U.N. organ, or other peaceful means of the ir own choice. (4) These obligations should be generally observed, and the inherent rig ht of self-defense th at

is recognized in the UN Ch art er would remain fully operative.

Janu ary 21, 1964: The 18 Nation Disarmame nt Committee (ENDC) reconvenes in Geneva. In a message to the Conference, President John son proposes 

five collateral m ea sures:

(1) Proh ibition of the th re at or use of force, directly or indirectly—wheth er 

by aggression, subversion, or the clan destine supply of arm s—to change boundari es or demarca tion lines, int erf ere with access to territory, or extend control 

over ter ritory by displacing established autho rities (2) a verified freeze of the 

number and cha rac teristics of strategic nuc lear delivery vehicles; (3) a verified 

agre eme nt on the cessation of the prod uctio n of fissionable ma terials for 

weapons use s; (4) creation of a system of observation posts to furth er reduce 

the dan ger of wa r by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack ; and (5) in 

ord er to ha lt the spread of nuc lear weapons, agreements th at: (a) nuclear 

weapons not be transf erred into the national control of sta tes th at do not now 

control them, (6) all tra ns fers of nuc lear materials for peaceful uses take ®

place und er effective int ern ational safe guards, (c) the m ajor nuc lear powers accept increasin gly for their peaceful nuc lear activities the same inspection they 

recommend for other states, and (d) all nuc lear weapons tests be banned under 

effective verification and control. *

In his budget message to the Congress, President John son announces th at 

U.S. defense expenditures for fiscal year 1965 ($51.2 billion) will be $1.1 billion 

less than those for fiscal year 1964.

Febru ary 6, 1964: At the ENDC, ACDA Directo r Fos ter says th at the United 

Sta tes will have private discussions with the Soviet Union in an effort to reach 

agreeme nt on a nondissemination agreement based on the Irish resolution. He 

says th at it is the declared policy of the United States not to tak e any actio n 

inconsistent with that resolution.

March 5, 1964: Deputy ACDA D irec tor Fisher tells the ENDC that the United 

Sta tes favors application of IAEA safegu ards to all intern ational nuclear tra ns ­

fer s for peaceful uses. He anno unce s th at the larg e Yankee power reactor at 

Rowe, Mass., will be inspected by the IAEA in order to assis t the IAEA in 

developing effective safegu ards and to set an example for other nuc lear powers 

to invite the application of IAEA safegu ards to the ir reactor facilities .

March 19, 1964: At the ENDC, Deputy ACDA Directo r Fis her proposed destruction of 480 U.S. B-47’s and 480 Soviet TU-16’s drawn from each side’s 

“operation al inventory” at the rate of 20 each per month over a 2-year period.

He says th at the United States would also be willing to destroy an agreed number of the same type of airc ra ft now “stored and preserved for emergency 

mobilization.” He believes th at this measure would insure th at the bombers 

could not be tra nsferre d to oth er nations and would thu s inhibit nuclear 

pro liferation.

Marc h 26, 1964: At the ENDC, the United Kingdom subm its a working paper 

outlining a plan for the esta blishment of a system of o bservation posts to guard 

again st wa r by accident, miscalculation, or surprise ataack . The posts would 

mon itor m ilitary movements by raid, road, air. and sea and would be manned on 

an “adv ers ary basis”, i.e., posts in the West would be manned by Warsaw Pact 

represe ntatives, an d posts in th e E ast would be manned by NATO represe ntatives.

Inter na tio na l observers would not be excluded. 

v

Deputy ACDA Director Fisher supports the United Kingdom plan on observa 

tion posts and sta tes th at Soviet efforts to link establishme nt of such posts with 

foreign troop withdra wals and German denucle arization have prevented the ho lding of fr uitfu l discussions on th e question.

April 16, 1964: In the ENDC, Deputy ACDA Directo r Fisher elab orates the »

U.S. proposal for a freeze of strate gic nuclear delivery vehicles. The freeze 

would cover five categories of missiles, bombers, and antimissile missile systems.

Prod uction of these vehicles would be stopped, except as requ ired fo r maintenance 

and replacement of m issiles expended in allowed confidence and tra ini ng firings.

The freeze would be verified by continuing inspection of declared production 

facilities, an ann ual quota of inspections to check undeclare d locations for possible violations, observation of space launching and allowed missile firings, and 

observation of the d estruction of vehicles and launch ers being replaced. Vertification would be less extensive than th at require d for general and complete disarm ament and would not involve a check on existing levels.
UN ITED NATIO NS CHARTER AM EN DM EN TS 133

April 20, 1964: President John son announces th at he has orde red “a fu rthe r 

sub stantial reduction ” in the production of enriched uran ium. Combined with 

the reduction announced las t Janu ary, the overall reduction in the prod uction 

of enriched ura niu m will be 40 percent over a 4-year period. Premie r Khrushchev announces th at construction of two new big atomic 

reactors will be discontinued, the productio n of uraniu m 235 in the next several 

years will be sub stantially reduced, and more fissionable mate rials will be 

allocated to peaceful uses. April 21, 1964: Prime Minister Douglas Home announces th at United Kingdom 

production of militar y plutonium will gra dually be term inated.

April 28,1964: The ENDC recesses.

Jun e 9,1 964: The ENDC reconvenes. June 11, 1964: The IAEA Board of Governors approves an agreeme nt between 

the United Sta tes and the Agency whereby four U.S. re actors will be placed under Agency safegu ards again st diversion to nonpeaceful ends. The largest of these 

reactors in the Yankee power rea cto r at Rowe, Mass. It is the first pow erplant 

with a thermal capacity of over 100 m egawatts to be placed und er the expa nded

* IAEA safegu ard s system, approved by the Board on Feb rua ry 26. Jun e 16,1964 : At the ENDC, ACDA Direc tor Fo ste r says t ha t the United States 

cann ot accept the Gromyko “nuc lear umbrella” proposal as the basis for setting 

up a working group on the problem of nulear delivery vehicles. Th at proposal, he

, points out, would require elim ination of about 97 to 99 pe rcen t of all nuc lear de­ livery vehicles in 18 mon ths and rapidly alter th e present m ilitary balance in favor 

of the Soviet Union. The United Sta tes cannot accept such unbalanced reduction s, 

particulalry wi tho ut ade qua te verification procedures or institutions capable of keeping the peace a nd preven ting the use of force in the resolution of d isputes.

The United State s agrees th at a technical working group should be esta blished 

to deal with the problem of nuc lear delivery vehicles, but it maintains th at the 

term s of reference for this group should be c onsistent with the agreed proc edure 

for work on gen eral and complete disarm ament and th at all releva nt proposals 

and ma tte rs should be open for discussion. June 25, 1964: At the ENDC, the United States presents a plan to provide 

vertification for a cutoff in the production of fissionable materi als for weapons. 

The plan provides for inspection of installation s but not of stockpiles, mines, or 

refineries, and it does not require disclosure of info rmation on the storag e and deployment of nu cle ar weapons. Fo r inspection of some production install atio ns, 

access to the inter ior of the facilities would not be necessary. July 7, 1964: The ENDC Cochairman (th e United States and Soviet represen tatives) anno unce they will hold bil ate ral ta lks in a n effort to agree on a basis for an ENDC working group to consider the elim ination of nuc lear delivery 

vehicles in the con text of a general disarm ament agreement.

Jul y 16, 1965: U.S. Ambassador Timberlake proposes procedures for verifying the destruc tion of equal numbers of United Sta tes B-47’s and Soviet TU-16 

bombers. The host country would supervise and pay for the destruc tion of its 

planes at a designated airfield. Destruction would be comprehensive enough to 

insu re th at each bomber could no longer be restored to flyable condition and its 

engines were no longer usable for propulsion. Befo re destruction, the host 

country could remove from the bombers whatever equipment and ins trume nts it wished to retain . Inspectors from the oth er cou ntry would have the rig ht to 

keep desig nated bombers u nder visual observation, witness the ir destruc tion, and

W make records. They would not have the rig ht to exam ine any bomber before it was destroyed or any of the equipment or ins trume nts removed. They would enjoy the same privileges and immunities accorded by the host country to diplomatic envoys. Observers designated by the non aline d members of the ENDC and 

by the U.N. Sec retary General might also partic ipate.

* August 27, 1964: In the ENDC, U.S. Ambassador Timberlake elabor ates the 

verificatio n th at would be required for a freeze of stra tegic nuc lear delivery 

vehicles. There would be continuing inspection of declared prod uction fac ilities, an a nnual q uota of inspections to check undecla red locations for possible violations, obse rvation of space launchings and allowed missile firings, and observation of the destruction of vehicles and launchers being replaced. These procedures, however, would not involve a check on existin g levels, would not distu rb 

the security of sensitive installations, and would be less intr usive than those 

requ ired for g eneral a nd complete disarmament.

September 17, 1964: In a message to the ENDC, Pre sident John son points to 

the cutbacks in prod uction of fissionable ma terials for weapons th at were an-
134 UNIT ED NATI ONS CH ARTE R A M EN DM ENTS

no un ee d by th e U ni ted Sta te s, th e So vi et Unio n, an d th e U nited Kingd om in 1964.

He sa ys th a t mor e co nc re te pro po sa ls fo r sa fe guar ded an d re ali st ic dis ar m am en t

were m ad e in 1964 t han in a ny o th er y ear sin ce b ef or e W orld W ar II .

Se pt em be r 17, 196 4: Th e EN DC adjo urn s under an arr angem ent under which 

it is to re su m e its m ee tin gs in Ge ne va as soo n as po ssible a ft e r co mpletion of the 

dis arm am ent de ba te a t th e 19th G en er al As sem bly , on a dat e to be decid ed by 

th e Coc ha irm en (U ni te d S ta te s and So viet Union ) a ft e r consu ltat io n w ith ot her 

EN DC m em be rs.

G en er al and co mplete d is a rm a m e n t: In ad ditio n to th e ab ov e ch rono logy , th e 

U ni te d S ta te s su bm itte d it s view s on th e qu es tion of gen er al and co mplete dis ­

arm am ent th ro ughout th e 1964 se ss io n of th e EN DC . T his di sc us sion occupie d 

ap pro xim at el y on e-ha lf of th e tim e of th e co nf er en ce duri ng 1964. in ac co rd an ce 

w ith th e ag re ed ag en da . In ac co rd an ce w ith th a t ag en da , mos t of th e disc us sion 

ce nt er ed on se ek ing ag re em en t on th e m ea su re s fo r st ag e I : ho wev er, muc h of 

th e di sc us sion also dea lt w ith th e que st io n of th e re la ti onsh ip be tw ee n de ve lopm en t of in te rn ati onal pe ac ek ee pi ng ar ra ngem ents and pr og re ss in dis ar m am en t.

In co nn ec tio n w ith th es e la tt e r dis cu ss io ns th e United S ta te s de le ga tio n po inted >

ou t th e defic ien cies of th e So viet pla n in th is re gar d an d em ph as ized th e need

fo r de ve lopm en t of in te rn ati onal pe ac ek ee pi ng m ac hi ne ry to ac co m pa ny pr og re ss

in dis ar m am en t. Th e U ni ted S ta te s de le ga tio n po inted ou t th a t as nat io ns

re du ce d th eir ow n m il it ary es ta bli sh m ents th ere wou ld be in cr ea se d ne ed fo r

se curi ty to be pr ov id ed by in te rn ati o n al in st it uti ons. D uring th e co ur se of th e *

di sc us sion s on ge ne ra l an d co m pl ete dis arm am ent th e U ni ted S ta te s ag re ed to

jo in in an exper ts w or ki ng gr ou p to st udy th e que st io n of re duc tion of nucl ea r

de live ry v eh icles in a d is ar m am en t pro gr am .

Nov em be r 1, 196 4: The W hite H ou se an no un ce s th a t P re si dent Jo hnso n ha s 

ap po in te d fo rm er Dep ut y S ecre ta ry of D ef en se Ros well L. G ilpatr ic to he ad a 

sp ec ia l pa nel to st ud y ne w po lic ies to p re ven t th e sp re ad of n ucl ea r we ap on s.

Dec em be r 1964: In se ve ra l ta lk s w ith Mr. Gr om yk o, in earl y Dec em be r 1964, 

th e Sec re ta ry of S ta te re it era te d our po sition on se ver al arm s co ntr ol an d dis ­

arm am ent issu es . In p art ic u la r, he sta te d :

(а ) The U ni ted S ta te s is re ady to m ee t w ith So viet ex pert s to re vi ew 

ou r re sp ec tive m il it ary budgeta ry p ra c ti c e s; th is is a nec es sa ry pre lim in ar y 

to di sc us sion of an y dis arm am ent ag re em en ts co nc erni ng re duc tion of m ilita ry b ud ge ts.

(б ) T he U ni ted S ta te s co nt in ues to seek a nuc le ar nonpro life ra tion ag re emen t. an d ur ge s th e U.S.S .R. to r ec onsi der its pos iti on .

(c ) The U ni ted S ta te s is not op po sed to, an d inde ed fa vo rs , nucl ea r fr ee 

zones in re gi on s w he re nucle ar wea po ns a re not p a rt of th e ne ce ss ar y 

se cu ri ty a rr an gem en ts , fo r ex am pl e in L ati n A merica.

Ja n u a ry 31, 1963: The m em be rs of th e G ilpat ri c pa ne l on nonpro life ra tion of 

nuc le ar wea po ns m et w ith th e P re sid en t to ad vi se him of th e ir vie ws .

W he n it be ca me cl ea r th a t th e G en er al Asse mbly wo uld no t be ab le to ho ld 

di sc us sion s on dis ar m am en t a t it s cu rr en t .session, Mr. Fos te r, in his ca pac ity as 

an EN DC Coc ha irm an , ur ge d, in p ri v ate co nv er sa tion w ith th e So viet re pre ­

se nta tive, ag re em en t on re co nv en in g of th e EN DC a t an ea rl y dat e. The So vie t 

Un ion , ho wev er, su bs eq ue nt ly in fo rm ed Mr. F ost er of So viet pre fe re nce fo r a 

m ee ting a t th e pr es en t tim e of th e U.N. D is ar m am ent Co mm ission .

M ar ch 31. 196 3: Th e So viet re pre se nta ti ve a t th e U ni te d N at io ns as ke d th e 

S ecr et ar y G en er al to conv en e th e U.N. D is ar m am ent Co mmiss ion in th e firs t 

h a lf of A pr il. *

The U.S . re pre se nta ti ve a t th e U ni te d N at io ns , A m ba ss ad or St ev en so n, sa id 

th a t al th ough th e U ni te d S ta te s wou ld pre fe r to reco nv en e th e EN DC , which in 

th e U.S . view w as a b ett er fo rm fo r neg otiat in g c on cr et e dis arm am ent pr op os als, 

it had no ob ject ion to th e pr op os ed m ee ting an d to givi ng all U.N. mem be rs an t

opport unity to ex pr es s th eir view s. H e st ate d th a t if a m ajo ri ty su pport ed such 

a mee tin g, th e U ni ted S ta te s wou ld p art ic ip ate co ns tr uct iv el y an d ho pe fo r th e 

em erge nc e of us ef ul and co nst ru cti ve id ea s th a t co uld th en be co ns id er ed in 

de ta il in th e END C.

A pr il 26, 1965: In a speech a t th e D is arm am ent Co mm iss ion , Amba ss ad or 

Steve ns on st re ss es th e ne ed fo r earl y ag re em en t on th e bas is of th e Ir is h reso ­

lu tio n, to h a lt th e sp re ad of nucle ar wea po ns . He sa ys th a t th e U ni te d Sta te s 

is de te rm in ed to wor k fo r genera l and co mplete dis ar m am en t an d th a t th e U.S. 

tr e a ty ou tlin e wou ld pr ov id e a so un d bas is fo r th is . To ac hi ev e th e goal, ho wev er. th e arm s ra ce m us t be h alt ed an d tu rn ed ba ck , as P re si dent Jo hnso n pro -
UNIT ED NA TI O NS CHARTE R A M EN DM ENTS 135

po se d to do in lii s m es sa ge of Ja n u a ry 21, 1964, to th e EN DC . A m ba ss ad or 

Steve ns on disc us se d th e pro po sa ls co nt ai ne d in th e P re sid en t’s Ja n u a ry 21. 1964, 

message , as we ll as su bse que nt ad dit io nal pr op os al s su bm itte d in th e EN DC 

by th e U.S . de lega tio n. A m bas sa dor St ev en so n urg es an earl y re su m ption of 

th e E ND C ne go tiatio ns .

A n a ly sis of t h e U n it ed Na tio ns F in a n c ia l P o si tio n a s of

D ec em be r 31, 1964

(P re p are d by th e U.N. Office of th e C ontroller )

As us ed he re in , th e te rm “u npai d o bliga tions ” m ea ns th e sum r ep re se nte d by th e 

unli quid ate d ob liga tion s ente re d on th e U ni te d N at io ns books of ac co un t, pl us 

th e am ounts th a t sh ou ld be in var io us su rp lu s ac co un ts, pl us th e am ou nt s 

bo rr ow ed from th e W ork in g C ap ital F und an d oth er sp ec ia l or tr u st fu nds an d 

ac co un ts in th e cu stod y of th e S ecre ta ry Gen er al. It ex clud es , ho wev er, th e

> unpai d ba la nc es of U nite d N at io ns bo nd s, th e U nite d N at io ns H eadquart ers

loan , an d cr edit s du e m em be r st ate s in re sp ec t to th e tr a n sfe r of Le ag ue of 

N at io ns as se ts.

The p os itio n as of D ec em be r 3 1,1 964, is est im ate d as follo ws : Million

U np ai d ob liga tions ____________________________________________________ $123. 4

Net ca sh re so urc es ____________________________________________________ 17 .1

Def icit___________________________________________________________ 106. 3

A bre ak dow n of th e figu re s fo r unp ai d obl ig at io ns as be tw ee n (a ) th e U ni te d 

N at io ns G en er al and W ork in g C ap ital Fun d, (&) UNEF, and (c) UNOC, in 

m ill io ns of U.S. do llar s, i s as fol lows :

Dec. 31, 1964 U.N . U N E F UNOC Tot al

Due to working ca pital fund . ______________ 21.3

4.0

5.4

18.5

1.1

12.8

39.8

36.9 

‘ 46.7 Su rplus (deficit) acco un ts___ ____ . . . __ 31.8

Ac co un ts pay ab le .- . _____________ ___ _ ___ 28.5

T ota l_________________________________ 30.7 32.4 60.3 123.4

i Inc lude s $5,233,000 owed to th e U nited States; $4,634,000 for serv ices rend ered U N O C an d $599,000 

serv ices re nd ered U N E F.

The br ea kd ow n of n et ca sh re so urc es an d defic it, in m illion s of U.S. do llar s, 

is as fo ll o w s;

Dec. 31, 1964 U .N . U N E F UNOC Tot al

Net c ash re so urces________ _____ ______ _ . 5.5 1.1 10.5 17.1

Deficit_____________________________________ 25.2 31.3 49.8 106.3
co

05

A naly si s of U N E F an d O N U C recorded obligation s as of Dec. 31, 1964

[I n th o u san d s o f U .S . do lla rs]

P ay ee

R o ta ti o n 

of conti nge nt s

O per at io n 

of ai rc ra ft R ati o n s

O per ati o n al su p ­

plies an d

se rv ices

T ra n sp o rt 

an d m is ­

ce lla ne ou s 

eq u ip m en t

P urc has e 

of ai rc ra ft

R eim b u rs em en t of 

ex tr a c os ts

O th er ac ­

co unts T o ta l

P a y an d 

al lo w ­

an ce s

C o n ti n ­

ge nt- ow ned

eq u ip m en t

O N U C

I. O w ed to gover nm en ts :

U n it ed S ta te s______________________________ 2,19 6

578

2,033

1,711

171610

6

515

228 

1,360

4,634 

18, 869 O th er g o v ern m en ts -. 333 6,640 7,12 2

T o ta l, al l govern m en ts ___________________

II. O wed to o th er pay ees ____ ___ _________ _____

I I I . T o ta l re co rd ed obli gat io ns___________ _____ ____

2,774

42

3,74 4

1,145

333

19

781

142

521

28

6,640 7,122 1,588 

i 3,63 2

23,5 03

5,008

2,81 6 4,889 352 923 549 6,640 7,122 5,22 0 28,511

U N E F

I. O w ed to g over nm en ts :

U n it ed S ta te s__________________ _______ . . . 108

5

189

130

91

26

211

82

599 

11,638 O th er g o v ern m en ts ______ ____________ . . . . 855 704 8,302 1,534

T o ta l, al l govern m en ts ___________________

I I . O w ed to o th er pay ees _______________________ __

I I I . T o ta l re co rd ed obli gat io ns___ . . . ___

855

9

704 113

24

319205

117

2

8,302 1,534 293

2 287

12,237 

527

864 704 137 524 119 8,30 2 1,534 580 12,764

1 In cl udes $2,375,000 u n d is tr ib u te d o u ts ta n d in g o bl ig at io ns in O N U C fie ld ac co un ts .

2 I ncl udes $219,000 u n d is tr ib u te d o u ts ta n d in g obligat io ns in U N E F fiel d ac co unts .

UN ITED NATIO NS CHARTER AM EN DM EN TS
UN ITED NA TIO NS CH AR TER AM EN DM EN TS 137

United Nations bond purchases and pledges, Dec. 31,1964

Afg ha nista n_____________

A us tral ia _______________

Aus tria ___________

Belgium ________________

B u rm a ____________________

Ca mb odia_______________

Cameroon_______________

Ca na da _________________

Ceylon__________________

C h i n a ______

Cy prus_________________

Den mark_______________

Et hiop ia________________

Fin land ________________

Ge rm any_______________

Gha na __________________

Gre ece__________________

Hon du ras_______________

Icelan d_________________

In di a___________________

In do ne sia _______________

Ir a n ____________________

Ir aq____________________

Ir el an d_________________

Is ra el __________________

It aly -----------------------------

Ivory Co ast_____________

Ja m ai ca ________________

Ja pan __________________

Jo rd an _________________

Korea __________________

Kuw ait_________________

Leb anon________________

Li be ria _________________

Liby a___________________

Lu xemb ourg____________

AC TU AL PU RCHASE S

$25, 000 

4, 000, 000

M ala y sia $340, 000 

M ali' __ __ _ __ 20,00 0

900, 000 M au rita ni a _ ______ 4, 082

1, 200, 000 Morocco __ _ 400, 000

100, 000 Nethe rla nd s ___ 2, 020, 000

5,0 00 New Z ea land ____________ 1, 000, 000

9, 569 Nigeria _ -- -------- 1, 000, 000

6, 240, 000 No rway ___ ___ 5, 700, 0(H)

25,000 P a k i s t a n _ ___ _ _ _ 500,000

500,000 Ph ilipp ine s ___ 750, 000

26,1 75 Saudi A rabi a — 20,000

5, 850, 000 Sierra Leo ne____________ 28,000

200, 000 Sud an ______ ___ 50, 000

1, 480, 000 Swe den _ _ __ __ 14, 470, 000

12, 000, 000 Switz er land _____________ 1, 900, 000

100,000 Tan za ni a ___ 2,8 00

10, 000 Tha ila nd __ 160, 000

10, 000 Togo _ __ ____ 10. 000

80,0 00 Trini da d an d Tobago __ 8, 750

2, 000,000 Tun isi a _ _ ____ 485, 000

200,000 Tu rkey _ _____ __ 100, 000

500,000 Ug anda __ 10, 000

100, 000 Un ite d Arab Re public____ 250, 000

300. 000 Un ited Kingdom_________ 12, 000, 000

200, 000 Venez uela 300, 000

8, 960. 000 Vie t-Nam ____ 10, 000

60,0 00 

20, 000

Yu goslavia _ ____ 200, 000

5, 000,000 Su btotal (f or 63

75,0 00 na tio ns ) 93, 647, 647

400, 000 Un ite d Sta te s (for 1

1,0 00,00 0 nati on) 76, 263, 276

8, 271 

200,000

Su btotal (for 64

25,0 00 na tio ns ) 169, 910, 923

100,000

PLEDGE

Un ited St ates : To match ac tu al pu rcha ses by oth er s__________ $17, 384, 371

To tal of announced pu rcha ses an d pledges (f or 64 n ati ons1) __ 187 ,295,294

1

 In cludes fo ur nonmembers (Ge rmany , Korea, Sw itz erland an d Vi etn am ).

Summ ary inf orm ation on U.S. purchases and pledges

To tal au th or iz ed _______________________________________ $100, 000, 000

Actua l pu rc ha se s:

Bond No. 33, Nov. 2, 1962_________________________________ 44,1 03. 000

Bond No. 43, Dec. 18, 1962_________________________________ 15, 569, 840

Bon d No. 53, Ma r. 7, 1963_________________________________ 5, 543, 000

Bon d No. 64, Ju ne 25, 1963________________________________ 6, 854, 082

Bon d No. 82, Dec. 31, 1963________________________________ 3, 423, 975

Bond No. 88, Ju ne 19, 1964________________________________ 769, 379

Su btotal_____________________________________________ 76, 263, 276

Pend ing (to ma tch a ct ua l pu rcha ses by othe rs n ot ye t m at ch ed )__ 17, 384, 371

Su btotal___________________________________________________ 93, 647, 647

Ba lan ce of au th or iz at io n no t used ___________________________ 6, 352, 353
138 UNIT ED NATI ONS CHARTE R A M EN DM ENTS

Repaym ents on U.N. bonds

P ri n cip al In te re st T o ta l

Jan . 15, 1963:

U nit ed S ta te s _____________________________ . . $1,84 9,8 58.04 

1,9 02,83 1.6 5

$19 9,621.95 

528,443. 26

$2,04 9,4 79.99 

2,4 31,27 4.9 1 O th er g o v ern m en ts ___________________

T o ta l_________________ _ __________ 3, 75 2,6 89. 69 728 ,065.21 4,4 80,75 4.9 0

Jan . 15, 1964:

U n it ed S ta te s . . . . . ________ __________________ 2,39 9,9 83 .65 

2,41 5,9 05 .70

1,3 24,15 7.4 0 

1,3 83, 945 .31

3, 724,141.05 

3, 79 9,85 1.01 O th er g o v ern m en ts _____________________

T o ta l_____________ ____ _ _______ . 4,8 15 ,88 9.3 5 2.7 08 ,10 2.7 1 7, 523 ,992.06

Jan . 15, 1965:

U nited S ta te s _________ _______________________ 2,4 39,65 5. 45 

2,9 42 ,666 .38

1,433,686 . 23

1,536,5 05. 75

3.8 73,34 1.6 8 

4,4 79,17 2.1 3 O th er g o v ern m en ts ________________ __________

T o ta l_________________________________ . . 5,3 82,32 1.8 3 2,9 70,19 1.9 8 8,352,51 3.8 1

Face value purchased

A s o f Ja n . 15, 

1964

P urc hase d, 

Jan . 16, 1964 

th ro ugh 

Dec . 31, 1964

T o ta l

U n it ed S ta te s_____________________ $75 ,493,897 

75,957 ,647

$769,379 

17,690 ,000

$76 ,263 ,276 

93,6 47,6 47 O th ers ____ __________________________ .

T o ta l________________ _______ . 151,451,544 18,459 ,379 169,910,923

o
i

*
u