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*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

**By order entered March 28, 2013, this appeal was deemed

suitable for submission without oral argument.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-12-1445-MkTaJu

)

JAMES W. SIMPSON, ) BK. No. 11-38929

)

Debtor. ) )

)

JAMES W. SIMPSON, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) MEMORANDUM*

)

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST )

COMPANY; JAN P. JOHNSON, )

Chapter 13 Trustee; KRISTIE )

PEREZ, Bankruptcy Specialist )

at Carrington Mortgage )

Services LLC, )

)

Appellees. ) )

Submitted Without Oral Argument

on May 16, 2013**

Filed – May 29, 2013

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Eastern District of California

Honorable Thomas C. Holman, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 

Appearances: Appellant James W. Simpson, pro se, on brief;

Nicolas A. Daluiso of Robinson Tait, P.S., on

brief, for Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust

Company. 

FILED

MAY 29 2013

SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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1

Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and

all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure, Rules 1001-9037.

2

Before: MARKELL, TAYLOR, and JURY, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 131 debtor James Simpson (“Simpson”) objected to the

claim of creditor Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as

Indenture Trustee for New Century Home Equity Loan Trust Series

2006-2 (“Deutsche Bank”) on the ground that Deutsche Bank did not

have standing. The bankruptcy court initially sustained the

objection, and it also entered an order disallowing the claim. 

After Deutsche Bank amended its claim and presented further

evidence, however, the court vacated its prior disallowance order

and overruled Simpson’s claim objection.

Simpson appeals from the order overruling his claim

objection and vacating the disallowance order. We AFFIRM, but

this affirmance is without prejudice to Simpson filing in the

bankruptcy court a § 502(j) reconsideration motion based on the

undisputed fact that, subsequent to the filing of this appeal,

Deutsche Bank foreclosed on the property securing its claim,

thereby extinguishing its claim.

FACTS

On August 2, 2011, Simpson filed his chapter 13 bankruptcy

petition in pro per. On September 29, 2011, Deutsche Bank timely

filed Proof of Claim No. 3-1 (“POC 3-1”) asserting a secured

claim in the amount of $605,614.27.
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2

Pamela Simpson is not a party to Simpson’s bankruptcy case.

3

Consistent with paragraph 13 of the Deed of Trust, the

parties treated the Note as the sole obligation of Pamela

(continued...)

3

In POC 3-1, Deutsche Bank identified itself as the creditor

and Carrington Mortgage Servicers (“Carrington”) as the Note’s

servicing agent. The basis for the claim was a note (“Note”)

secured by deed of trust (“Deed of Trust”) on real estate in Elk

Grove, CA (“Property”). Attached to POC 3-1 were copies of the

Note, the Deed of trust, an Assignment of the Deed of Trust (the

“Assignment”), and a legal description of the Property.

The Note was executed on May 26, 2006 in the principal

amount of $450,000. The Note identified New Century Mortgage

Company (“NCMC”) as lender and Simpson’s wife, Pamela Simpson, as

the sole borrower.2 The last page of the Note contains what

appears to be an endorsement in blank signed by an NCMC

executive. 

The Deed of Trust, also executed on May 26, 2006, was

recorded on June 1, 2006. The named beneficiary was the lender,

NCMC. Since they both held title to the Property, both Simpson

and his wife signed the Deed of Trust as “borrowers.” Under ¶ 13

of the Deed of Trust, co-signers like Simpson — those who execute

the Deed of Trust but not the Note — only pledge their interest

in the Property as collateral to secure the payment obligation

under the Note; they are not personally obligated to pay the sums

secured by the Deed of Trust. In other words, Simpson presumably

had no in personam liability for the debt evidenced by the Note;

it was nonrecourse as to him.3
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3(...continued)

Simpson. Nonetheless, the debt provided for in the Note may well

have qualified as a community claim, as it was incurred in a

community property state during marriage and related to the

primary residence of a married couple. See generally §§ 101(7),

541(a)(2).

4

The Assignment, executed on April 27, 2007, reflects NCMC’s

assignment of the beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust to

Deutsche Bank.

On November 8, 2011, Simpson objected to POC 3-1. He

asserted that (i) he did not list Carrington as a creditor on his

petition; (ii) neither Deutsche Bank nor Carrington had the right

to assert creditor status; (iii) he did not sign the Note;

(iv) Deutsche Bank committed perjury on behalf of Carrington by

submitting the Note which did not contain his signature;

(v) Deutsche Bank had submitted three different versions of the

Note with different stamps and markings; and (vi) Deutsche Bank

had never produced the original Note for inspection by Simpson

per his requests. Therefore, Simpson reasoned, Deutsche Bank had

not submitted the documentation necessary to demonstrate that it

was a holder of the Note.

One month later, Deutsche Bank opposed Simpson’s claim

objection. Deutsche Bank attached a declaration by Kristie Perez

(“Perez”), an employee of Carrington who declared that Carrington

was the servicer of the Note on Deutsche Bank’s behalf and that

true and correct copies of the Note and Deed of Trust were

attached as exhibits to her declaration.

On January 10, 2012, the bankruptcy court heard the claim

objection and sustained it, but also granted leave to amend. The
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4

According to Deutsche Bank, Proof of Claim 6-1 (“POC 6-1”)

was a misfiling, and POC 6-2 is the operative document.

5

The relevant content of POC 3-1 and POC 6-2 is identical,

including the creditor’s name, the claim amount, and the basis

for the claim.

5

bankruptcy court found that Perez’s declaration did not establish

that Deutsche Bank possessed the original Note. Thus, Deutsche

Bank had not demonstrated that it was the Note’s holder as

required for standing to enforce the claim. On January 13, 2012,

the bankruptcy court entered an order (“Conditional Order”)

sustaining the objection, but also giving Deutsche Bank until

February 7, 2012 to file an amended proof of claim. As specified

in the Conditional Order: “[i]f Deutsche fails to file an

amended proof of claim within the allowed time, [Simpson] may

submit an order disallowing [POC 3-1] . . . .” Civil Minute

Order (Jan. 13, 2012).

One week after the deadline, on February 14, 2012, Deutsche

Bank filed Proof of Claim 6-2 (“POC 6-2”).4 Deutsche Bank

indicated that this served to amend a previously filed claim, but

confusingly stated that it amended POC 6-1. Even if POC 6-2 was

intended to amend POC 6-1, the Panel understands that the

overarching intent was to amend POC 3-1.5 Deutsche Bank again

filed a declaration by Perez, but this time she also declared

that Deutsche Bank possessed the original Note and that she had

reviewed it.

On February 19, 2012, five days after Deutsche Bank’s

filing, Simpson filed a proof of service indicating that he had

served Deutsche Bank with his proposed order disallowing POC 3-1
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6

in accordance with the Conditional Order. Deutsche Bank opposed,

arguing that it missed the February 7 deadline only because of

technical glitches with the bankruptcy court’s electronic filing

system. Nonetheless, on March 19, 2012, the bankruptcy court

entered an order disallowing POC 3-1 (“Disallowance Order”). The

Disallowance Order said nothing about POC 6-2.

On June 5, 2012, Simpson objected to POC 6-2 and filed a

supporting memorandum of points and authorities. He contended

that POC 6-2 was untimely filed. He also restated his earlier

challenges to POC 3-1 and made various new contentions. The crux

of his substantive arguments was that Deutsche Bank did not have

standing to prosecute a proof of claim due to various infirmities

with the conveyances of the relevant interests in the Note and

the Deed of Trust.

After a hearing, the bankruptcy court found that Deutsche

Bank had established that it possessed the original Note, which

was endorsed in blank, and that it was the successor beneficiary

under the Deed of Trust. Accordingly, the court determined that

Deutsche Bank was the Note’s holder and thus had standing to

prosecute the proof of claim.

As to the timeliness of POC 6-2, the court stated that its

Conditional Order was not self-executing; it did not

automatically disallow POC 3-1. Rather, the Conditional Order

merely permitted Simpson to lodge a proposed order disallowing

POC 3-1 if Deutsche Bank did not meet the February 7, 2012

deadline. By the time Simpson had submitted his proposed order

on February 19, 2012, Deutsche Bank had already amended POC 3-1

by filing POC 6-2 on February 14, 2012. Given this sequence of
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events, the bankruptcy court determined that it had erred by

entering the Disallowance Order. Alternately, the court held

that the untimeliness of POC 6-2 was the result of excusable

neglect.

On August 16, 2012 the bankruptcy court entered an order

overruling Simpson’s objection to POC 6-2 and vacating the

Disallowance Order. In effect, the court determined that POC 6-2

was an allowed secured claim against the bankruptcy estate. 

On August 24, 2012, Simpson timely filed this appeal, BAP

No. EC-12-1445. He appeals the bankruptcy court’s order of

August 16, 2012, challenging Deutsche Bank’s standing and the

court’s decision to vacate the Disallowance Order.

On August 29, 2012, Deutsche Bank moved for relief from stay

to foreclose on the Property. The bankruptcy court granted the

motion on October 3, 2012. Simpson timely appealed the order

lifting stay, BAP No. EC-12-1527, but did not obtain a stay

pending appeal from either the bankruptcy court or the Panel. On

November 30, 2012, the Property was sold at a nonjudicial

foreclosure sale. After the sale, we dismissed this second

appeal, BAP No. EC-12-1527, as moot.

In this appeal, BAP No. EC-12-1445, Simpson first argues

that POC 6-2 did not amend POC 3-1, but rather was a new untimely

filed proof of claim. He next contends that the bankruptcy court

did not have sufficient grounds to vacate the Disallowance Order.

Relying on various alleged deficiencies in the Note, the Deed of

Trust, and the Assignment, Simpson also argues that Deutsche Bank

lacked standing. Finally, Simpson argues that the bankruptcy
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6Simpson also asserted on appeal that Deutsche Bank

committed bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157. But we cannot

rule upon this issue as bankruptcy fraud is a criminal matter not

within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court or this Panel. 

18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2012); see Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.),

895 F.2d 1503, 1518 (5th Cir. 1990).

8

court should not have found excusable neglect.6

Deutsche Bank argues that it had standing to pursue its

claim and that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that its

failure to meet the amendment deadline was due to excusable

neglect. Deutsche Bank further contends that the different

versions of the Note simply represented the state of the Note at

different points in time: pre- and post-endorsement, and with and

without a stamp indicating that a copy was certified.

JURISDICTION

 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(B). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 158.

ISSUE

Did the bankruptcy court err in vacating the Disallowance

Order and in allowing POC 6-2?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo

and its factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard.

Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R.

25, 32 (9th Cir. BAP 2008). A finding of fact is clearly

erroneous only if it is illogical, implausible, or without

support in the record. See Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d

1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). If two permissible views of the
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evidence are possible, the trial judge's choice between them

cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,

N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985).

DISCUSSION

A. General Legal Principles Regarding Bankruptcy Claims

Creditors may file proofs of claim. § 501(a). “A proof of

claim is a written statement setting forth a creditor’s claim.” 

Rule 3001(a). “A proof of claim executed and filed in accordance

with [the Bankruptcy Rules] shall constitute prima facie evidence

of the validity and amount of the claim.” Rule 3001(f). 

In a Chapter 13 case, the creditor must file a proof of

claim with respect to any unsecured claim. Rule 3002(a). Even

then, however, the claim must be “allowed” before it can serve as

the basis for any distribution. Allowance initially is not

difficult to obtain. “A claim . . . , proof of which is filed

under section 501 . . . , is deemed allowed unless a party in

interest . . . objects.” § 502(a).

“If [an] objection to a claim is made, the court . . . shall

determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the

filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such

amount[,]” with various exceptions. § 502(b). The only

exception relevant here is that a claim shall not be allowed if

“such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of

the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law . . . .” 

§ 502(b)(6). Put another way, “the court must allow the claim if

it is enforceable against either the debtor or his property.” 

Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 85 (1991) (emphasis in

original).
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The effect of an allowed claim is that the claimant is

deemed to have a valid “right to payment,” the claim’s amount is

established, and the claimant is entitled to a distribution from

the bankruptcy estate; however, if a claim is disallowed, that

disallowance is not a finding that the claimant engaged in any

illegal activity, such as wrongful foreclosure or fraud. See

§ 101(5); Rule 3021; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy v. Silver, 2012

WL 1657620 at *13 (E.D. Cal. 2012); In re Hudson, 260 B.R. 421,

430 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2001).

Secured creditors such as Deutsche Bank do not need to file

proofs of claim. Meadowbrook Estates v. McElvany, Inc.

(In re Meadowbrook Estates), 246 B.R. 898, 902 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.

2000) (citing In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464, 465 (7th Cir. 1984)). 

In the absence of a proof of claim, a secured creditor’s lien

passes through the bankruptcy and remains in place; “the debtor’s

[personal] liability for the secured creditor’s claim will be

discharged and the creditor will not receive a dividend from the

estate.” Id.; see also Johnson, 501 U.S. at 83. But when a

secured creditor wants to obtain a distribution under a confirmed

Chapter 13 plan, that creditor must file a proof of claim. See

Rule 3021; Dixon v. I.R.S. (In re Dixon), 218 B.R. 150, 151 (10th

Cir. BAP 1998) (applying Rule 3021 in a Chapter 13 case). 

A claim secured by property of the estate is bifurcated into

two claims if the value of the collateral is less than the amount

of the debt. § 506(a). There is a secured claim equal to the

value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the remainder

(the deficiency). Id. The creditor’s property right in the lien

is thus preserved. For the secured claim, the creditor can seek
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relief from stay to foreclose its lien or accept payment in the

Chapter 13 plan to protect its interest. The Chapter 13 plan

pays priority claims, and if proceeds remain, the plan generally

pays all or part of the unsecured claim. See § 1322(a)(2),

(b)(1), (b)(8). But see Downey Savs. & Loan Ass’n v. Metz

(In re Metz), 820 F.2d 1495, 1498–99 (9th Cir. 1987) (Chapter 13

plan with zero payments to unsecured creditors not necessarily

filed in bad faith so long as all of debtor’s disposable income

allocated to the plan). Any remaining portion of the unsecured

claim at plan completion is discharged. 1328(a); see also

Lawrence Tractor Co. v. Gregory (In re Gregory), 705 F.2d 1118,

1122 (9th Cir. 1983) (Chapter 13 discharge includes unsecured

debts even if none of the plan payments were allocated to those

debts so long as the plan “provided for” the debts under

Section 1328(a) by “deal[ing] with [them] or refer[ring] to

[them]”).

B. Simpson’s Contentions Regarding Deutsche Bank’s Claim

In this appeal, Simpson’s contentions boil down to three key

arguments: (1) the bankruptcy court should not have vacated the

March 19, 2012 Disallowance Order; (2) POC 6-2 should have been

disallowed as untimely; and (3) the bankruptcy court should have

sustained his objection to POC 6-2 for the same reason it

sustained his objection to POC 3-1, because Deutsche Bank did not

establish it was a person entitled to enforce the note and hence

lacked standing to file a proof of claim. We will address each

of these arguments in turn.

1. Vacatur of Disallowance Order

Simpson asserts that the bankruptcy court improperly vacated
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the Disallowance Order. Simpson claims, as a matter of

procedure, that the court should not have vacated the

Disallowance Order sua sponte and, in the alternative, should

have given him advance notice and an opportunity for a hearing on

the issue of whether the Disallowance Order should be

reconsidered.

We are not persuaded that Simpson’s procedural claims

justify reversal of the bankruptcy court’s decision to vacate the

Disallowance Order. Section 502(j) and Rule 3008 govern

reconsideration of claims, but neither provision indicates that

the bankruptcy court was prohibited from sua sponte reconsidering

the Disallowance Order. Moreover, another Bankruptcy Code

provision appears to explicitly give the court authority to act

on its own motion under such circumstances. See § 105(a); see

also, Kirwan v. Vanderwerf (In re Kirwan), 164 F.3d 1175, 1177

(8th Cir. 1999) (holding that bankruptcy court had authority to

sua sponte reconsider disallowance of claims); (Oudomsouk v. Bank

of America, N.A. (In re Oudomsouk), 483 B.R. 502, 514-54 (Bankr.

M.D. Tenn. 2012) (same).

As for the requirement of advance notice and a hearing, that

is a closer issue, because the bankruptcy court apparently raised

the issue of reconsidering the Disallowance Order for the first

time in its tentative ruling issued just before the August 14,

2012 hearing on POC 6-2. Rule 3008 and the accompanying Advisory

Committee Notes both generally indicate that advance notice and a

hearing are required. But notice and hearing under the

bankruptcy code are flexible concepts, see § 102(1)(A), and the

Ninth Circuit has held that defective notice and opportunity for
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hearing is not grounds for reversal unless the appellant

establishes prejudice. Rosson v. Fitzgerald (In re Rosson),

545 F.3d 764, 776-77 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, Simpson has not

demonstrated any prejudice. The bankruptcy court’s decision to

vacate the Disallowance Order was based on its interpretation of

another of its orders – the Conditional Order – and we must give

broad deference to the bankruptcy court in interpreting its own

orders. Rosales v. Wallace (In re Wallace), --- B.R. ---,

2013 WL 1562832 (9th Cir. BAP 2013) (citing Marciano v. Fahs

(In re Marciano), 459 B.R. 27, 35 (9th Cir. BAP 2011)). Simpson

has not pointed us to us any reason why the bankruptcy court’s

interpretation of the Conditional Order was erroneous. Nor are

we independently aware of any such reason. Accordingly, Simpson

has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the lack of

advance notice or the lack of an additional hearing, so the

reconsideration process, even if defective, would not justify a

reversal of the bankruptcy court. In re Rosson, 545 F.3d at

776-77.

2. Timeliness of POC 6-2

Simpson next asserts that POC 6-2 should have been

disallowed as untimely. According to Simpson, untimeliness

necessarily flows from his interpretation of the Conditional

Order as absolutely barring the amendment of POC 3-1 on and after

February 7, 2014. But the bankruptcy court disagreed with

Simpson’s interpretation of the Conditional Order. Instead, the

court in interpreting its own order determined that the

Conditional Order did not bar Deutsche Bank from filing POC 6-2

one week later, on February 14, 2012. As we discussed above, we
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In the alternative, the bankruptcy court found that

Deutsche Bank’s untimely filing of POC 6-2 was due to excusable

neglect. In light of our conclusion that the bankruptcy court

did not err in refusing to disallow POC 6-2 as untimely, we

decline to address the excusable neglect issue.

14

give deference to the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of its

own orders, and we are not aware of any sound basis for

concluding that the court misinterpreted its Conditional Order. 

Consequently, Simpson’s timeliness argument also fails.7

3. Deutsche Bank’s Standing

Simpson finally asserts that Deutsche Bank was not a person

entitled to enforce the note and thus lacked standing to file its

proof of claim. However, a creditor can establish that it is a

person entitled to enforce a note by demonstrating that it holds

the original note endorsed in blank. See Veal v. Am. Home Mortg.

Servicing, Inc. (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 897, 910-11 (9th Cir. BAP

2011). Here, the bankruptcy court found based on Perez’s

declaration that Deutsche Bank held the original Note endorsed in

blank. Nothing that Simpson alleges or argues persuades us that

the bankruptcy court’s finding was illogical, implausible or not

supported by the record. Accordingly, Simpson’s standing

argument lacks merit.

C. Harmless Error

As indicated above, none of Simpson’s arguments persuade us

that we should reverse the order appealed. But even if there

were some sort of error in the bankruptcy court’s decision, we

still would not reverse because we must ignore harmless error. 

See Van Zandt v. Mbunda (In re Mbunda), 484 B.R. 344, 355 (9th

Cir. BAP 2012). Any bankruptcy court error here would have been 
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We pause here to emphasize that, while the post-appeal

foreclosure does affect Deutsche Bank’s proof of claim, it does

not give Simpson valid grounds for reconsideration of either the

bankruptcy court’s prior relief from stay order or the

foreclosure itself.

15

harmless as to Simpson. As explained below, the undisputed fact

that the Property has been foreclosed upon subsequent to the

filing of this appeal provides Simpson with a complete defense

against Deutsche Bank’s proof of claim, which defense Simpson can

assert via a § 502(j) motion for reconsideration. As a result,

our decision affirming the bankruptcy court’s prior allowance of

Deutsche Bank’s claim should be of little concern to Simpson,

inasmuch as he now can assert in the bankruptcy court meritorious

grounds for reconsideration of the allowance of Deutsche Bank’s

claim.8

When a debt is nonrecourse as to the debtor, or the creditor

otherwise does not have a valid deficiency judgment against the

debtor, the creditor’s recovery is limited to the value of the

collateral upon its sale or to any plan distributions made on

account of the secured claim. In other words, the debtor has no

in personam liability related to the debt secured by the

property. See First Nat’l Bank of Cal. v. Weinstein

(In re Weinstein), 227 B.R. 284, 292 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (“[T]he

undersecured creditor with a nonrecourse unsecured claim would

not be entitled to a distribution in bankruptcy.”). If the lien

securing the secured claim is foreclosed and the property is

sold, then the secured creditor’s claim must be disallowed

because, to the extent that the claim was secured, it has been

satisfied by the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, and, to the
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extent that the claim was unsecured, it is unenforceable.

Applicable non-bankruptcy law gives particular significance

to Deutsche Bank’s post-appeal foreclosure. Under California

law, there can be no deficiency judgment after a nonjudicial

foreclosure sale such as occurred here after the notice of appeal

was filed. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 580d (West 2012)

(“Section 580d”). Section 580d thus extinguishes any in personam

liability that a borrower may have on a debt upon nonjudicial

foreclosure of real property collateral securing that debt.

Here, Deutsche Bank may have had an allowed secured claim

against the estate at the time of the petition filing and until

the foreclosure sale. That is the dispute the parties have

framed in this appeal. But Deutsche Bank’s nonjudicial

foreclosure largely renders irrelevant the issues raised in this

appeal.

The nonjudicial foreclosure, the occurrence of which is not

and cannot be disputed, raises the legal effect of Section 580d. 

The effect of this statute also is indisputable. In light of the

foreclosure sale, any in personam liability that Simpson or his

estate otherwise may have had was extinguished. This conclusion

is not affected by the possible community claim nature of the

debt underlying the Note. After the nonjudicial foreclosure,

Section 580d renders nonrecourse any debt evidenced by the Note —

for both Simpson and his wife.

In sum, Section 580d rendered unenforceable Deutsche Bank’s

post-foreclosure deficiency claim against Simpson and his

bankruptcy estate. As a result, the prior allowance of Deutsche

Bank’s claim is subject to reconsideration under § 502(j), and
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any error of the bankruptcy court in its prior rulings leading up

to the allowance of that claim would have been harmless.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy

court’s allowance of Deutsche Bank’s claim, without prejudice to

Simpson filing in the bankruptcy court a § 502(j) reconsideration

motion based on Deutsche Bank’s foreclosure on the Property,

which extinguished Deutsche Bank’s claim in its entirety.