UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4719

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TERRANCE RICHARDSON, a/k/a Squeaky, a/k/a L-Don, a/k/a Don,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 10-4825

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GREGORY SAULSBURY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District 

of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:09-cr-00288-WDQ-1; 1:09-cr-00288-WDQ-26)

Submitted: September 6, 2011 Decided: January 6, 2012

Before KING, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
2

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. James Roos, III, Towson, Maryland; Stephanie Gallagher, LEVIN 

& GALLAGHER LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Antonio J. Reynolds, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Terrance Richardson and Gregory Saulsbury appeal their 

convictions following a jury trial. The jury found Richardson 

guilty of conspiracy to participate in a racketeering 

enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006), and 

conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to 

distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2006). The district court sentenced 

Richardson to life on each count. Saulsbury was found guilty of 

conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to 

distribute controlled substances, and was also sentenced to 

life. We affirm.

On appeal, Richardson argues that the district court 

violated his rights by qualifying a police officer to provide 

expert testimony on the history, symbols, language, structure 

and operation of the Bloods gang. Because Richardson did not 

offer any specific grounds for his objection to the officer’s 

certification as an expert, the court reviews this claim for 

plain error. United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 157 & n.10 

(4th Cir. 2006). To succeed on this claim, Richardson must 

establish: “(1) error; (2) that is ‘clear or obvious, rather 

than subject to reasonable dispute’; (3) that affected 

substantial rights, ‘which in the ordinary case means . . . that 

it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings’; and 
4

(4) that ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Byers, 

649 F.3d 197, 213 (4th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) 

(quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S. Ct.

1423, 1429 (2009)).

The record belies Richardson’s claim that the officer

was unqualified to testify as an expert on the Bloods. The 

officer testified to ten years’ experience as a police officer, 

four years’ experience focused on gang investigations, extensive 

training on gang crime and its investigation, and numerous 

contacts with members of the Bloods. The record supports the 

district court’s qualification of the officer as an expert 

witness, and Richardson is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Richardson also contends that the district court erred 

in denying his motion for a new trial that was based on his 

claim that the Government violated his rights under Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing evidence about 

payments to a witness. Suppression does not occur “[a]s long as 

evidence is disclosed before it is too late for the defendant to 

make effective use of it.” United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 

1098, 1112 (4th Cir. 1992). Moreover, the volume and nature of 

the evidence against Richardson precludes a finding that earlier 

disclosure would create a reasonable probability of a different 

result, undermining confidence in the trial. Lovitt v. True, 
5

403 F.3d 171, 183 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 

U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995)). Because no Brady violation exists, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying the motion for a new trial. United States v. Stokes, 

261 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 2001).1

Finally, Saulsbury contends the district court abused 

its discretion in admitting evidence of his prior convictions. 

The Court reviews the admission of evidence under an abuse of 

discretion standard, reversing only where the decision to admit 

evidence was “arbitrary or irrational.” United States v. 

Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 2002). The Federal Rules of 

Evidence forbid the admission of evidence of previous crimes “in 

order to show action in conformity therewith,” but allow such 

evidence “for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

Evidence of prior distribution-related drug offenses 

can be relevant to establish knowing, voluntary, and intentional 

membership in a conspiracy to distribute drugs. United States

v. Mark, 943 F.2d 444, 448 (4th Cir. 1991). Saulsbury put these 

elements “directly in issue by his plea of not guilty.” Id. 

 1 We grant Richardson’s motion to file a supplemental pro se 

brief, but find no merit in his additional contentions.
6

The prosecutor merely read a summary of the convictions to the 

jury at the end of the Government’s case. Under the 

circumstances, the probative value of Saulsbury’s prior 

convictions was not “substantially outweighed by confusion or 

unfair prejudice in the sense that [they tended] to subordinate 

reason to emotion in the factfinding process.”2

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

 United States v. 

Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997). Moreover, we would 

affirm even if error existed because, in the context of the 

trial of a whole, the evidence of Saulsbury’s prior convictions 

“did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on 

the result.” United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 299 (4th 

Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED

 2 To the extent Saulsbury relies on the district court’s 

failure to give a limiting instruction contemporaneously, such

failure is not reversible error where, as here, counsel failed 

to request the instruction be given contemporaneously rather 

than during the instruction phase. Mark, 943 F.2d at 449 & n.2.