IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-30899

Summary Calendar

 

JOSEPH C. JONES, d/b/a MAKEDWE PUBLISHING 

COMPANY; RON PUBLISHING COMPANY; RIC

RECORDS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

JOSEPH S. RUFFINO, JR.,

Movant, Appellant,

versus

ALVIN LEE JOHNSON, SR.; CARNIVAL TIME RECORDS 

INC.; LYMAN L. JONES; PAUL M. LEE,SR.; PAUL 

LEE RECORD ONE STOP; UNITED RECORD PRESSING; 

GARY L. EDWARDS; GARY EDWARDS MUSIC; FLOYD 

SOILEAU; VILLE PLATTE RECORDING MANUFACTURER; 

ALL SOUTH DISTRIBUTING CORPORATION; WARREN 

HILDERBRAND; JEFFERSON JAZZ INCORPORATED; 

MARSHALL E. SEHORN; JERRY C. WILSON; COSIMO V. 

MATASSA; LEE RECORD DISTRIBUTOR, erroneously 

named as Paul Lee Distributor; MARDI GRAS RECORDS,

Defendants-Appellees,

DALVA ONE STOP RECORDS & TAPES,

Movant-Appellee.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 91-CV-879

 

May 6, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
 

*Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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PER CURIAM:*

This case is deja vu. The brief that Joseph C. Jones, d/b/a

Makedwde Publishing Company, has filed is a duplicate of a brief

that he filed in a previous appeal of the same case, a copyright

and trademark infringement action against attorney Lyman Jones and

several other defendants. The brief, a combination of grammatical

errors and stabs at legal argument, can of course succeed no more

this time than the last. It has inspired, however, a flurry of

motions, illustrating the litigation quagmire that can arise when

a pro se plaintiff understands neither the law nor even the concept

of finality. We will do our best, as we must, to keep up with the

Joneses, but we trust that our treatment of this appeal will

restrain the plaintiff Jones from further abuse of the judicial

process.

I

We first saw this case in 1992, after the district court

denied a motion by defendant Jones asserting that the claim was

time-barred. The district court certified the limitations issue

for interlocutory appeal, and we reversed. See Makedwde Publishing

Co. v. Johnson, 37 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 1994). Following the remand

of the case, the remaining defendants filed motions for summary

judgment, which the district court granted. The plaintiff Jones

then filed an appeal, using the same brief before us today. We
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concluded that the appeal failed to raise an issue of arguable

merit and dismissed it as frivolous. 

We also granted a motion for the imposition of sanctions and

directed counsel to submit affidavits showing their time expended

in defending the appeal and in submitting motions. The district

court scheduled a sanctions hearing, giving any party an

opportunity to oppose sanctions or challenge counsel’s affidavits.

In its July 16, 1997, order, the district court indicated that it

had not received any response, and awarded attorney’s fees

accordingly. This appeal timely filed.

II

As always, we must consider our jurisdiction. A multiparty

pro se notice of appeal is not effective as to any of the pro se

parties who did not sign the notice of appeal. See Carter v.

Stalder, 60 F.3d 238, 239 (5th Cir. 1995). Joseph Ruffino did not

sign the notice of appeal, and we therefore dismiss Ruffino’s

purported appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

III

Because Jones’s brief is a duplicate of his earlier foray into

the art of legal argument, he makes no reference to the sanction

order issued by the district court in it. Therefore, he has waived

any objection to the sanctions that he might have. See Brinkmann

v. Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Moreover, a pleading

once frivolous is still frivolous when filed again, indeed more

frivolous than before because irrelevant. Plaintiff Jones has

supplemented this argument with a reply brief that is not a mere
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xerox, but, even if his arguments in that brief were nonfrivolous,

arguments cannot be brought up for the first time in a reply brief.

See Baris v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 932 F.2d 1540, 1546 n.9 (5th

Cir. 1991). Likewise, a nonfrivolous argument in a reply brief

cannot save an otherwise frivolous appeal.

We therefore dismiss this appeal as frivolous. See 5th Cir. R.

42.2. The defendants have requested appropriate sanctions.

Recognizing that the previous imposition of attorney’s fees was

insufficient to deter frivolous filings, we impose sanctions of

double costs and attorney’s fees. See Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d

806, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1988). The district court shall make an

assessment after the filing of appropriate affidavits. 

We also have the authority to enjoin litigants from continuing

to file frivolous claims against the parties in the case. See

Farguson v. Mbank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1986).

We therefore enjoin plaintiff Jones from raising again the merits

of his case, including any issues pertaining to the statute of

limitations, because any pleadings discussing such issues, no

matter how well crafted, would remain frivolous. This case is

over. Of course, plaintiff Jones may still file a nonfrivolous

appeal related to the determination of the magnitude of sanctions

yet to be imposed on him (and is welcome to seek certiorari from

the Supreme Court with respect to this ruling). Further frivolous

appeals, however, will be dealt with harshly.

IV
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We need not belabor the remaining motions before us.

Plaintiff Jones’s motion to correct the caption of his case in the

district court is denied; the caption is correct, and in any event

does not matter. We deny as moot plaintiff Jones’s motion opposing

the appellees’ right to make an oral argument in the case; this

case is an excellent illustration of the genius of the summary

calendar. We deny plaintiff Jones’s motion for leave to supplement

the record to include the docket sheet of another copyright

infringement case and to include a statement by the President of

BMI before a House subcommittee; if these were relevant to our

legal analysis, we could take judicial notice of them. We also

deny plaintiff Jones’s objection to his opponents’ consolidated

brief; such consolidation is explicitly permitted under Rule 28(i).

Finally, and emphatically, we deny plaintiff Jones’s requests for

sanctions and disbarment of counsel, his motions to supplement the

record, and his motion to file supplemental record excerpts. In

sum, all of plaintiff Jones’s motions are denied.

APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS; SANCTIONS IMPOSED; INJUNCTION

ISSUED; REMANDED FOR ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT HEARING ON

SANCTIONS; ALL OTHER MOTIONS DENIED.