J-S55042-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER YOUNG

Appellant No. 615 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 24, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0503112-1999

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JANUARY 22, 2015

Christopher Young appeals, pro se, from the order entered January 24, 

2014, dismissing his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. Young seeks relief from the

judgment of sentence of an aggregate term of life imprisonment, imposed 

after his jury conviction of first degree murder, attempted murder (two 

counts), criminal conspiracy, and possessing an instrument of crime (PIC).1 

On appeal, Young contends the PCRA court erred in dismissing his PCRA 

petition based on the following: (1) he demonstrated a claim of actual 

innocence based upon an erroneous jury charge, (2) his sentence of life 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502, 901, 903, and 907, respectively.
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imprisonment without the possibility of parole violated both the 

constitutional right of equal protection and the prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment, and (3) he is entitled to a new trial with a “lifequalified” jury. Because we agree with the conclusion of the PCRA court that 

Young’s petition was untimely filed, we affirm.

The facts underlying Young’s arrest and conviction were summarized 

by this Court in a prior PCRA appeal as follows:

On December 12, 1998, Christopher Young, Dameon Ellis, 

and another unidentified man, clad in dark hooded sweatshirts 

and armed with semiautomatic weapons and a sawed-off 

shotgun, approached the corner of Park and Pike Streets in 

Philadelphia. A few days earlier, Young had encountered an old 

friend, Michael Brown, on the street. Brown informed Young that 

he recently had been winning money gambling on the corner of 

Park and Pike Streets. On the night in question, Young and his 

cohorts went to Park and Pike streets to rob Brown. The three 

men approached the group of street gamblers and asked Brown 

to take a walk to a darker area of the street. When Brown 

refused, Ellis pulled a gun. Brown then pushed Young, turned to 

run away, and was shot in the right buttocks. Another of the 

gamblers, Kasimir Devine, was shot in the chest and a third 

gambler, Shawn Pitts, was killed.

Commonwealth v. Young, 932 A.2d 266 [1557 EDA 2006], unpublished 

memorandum at 2 (Pa. Super. 2007) (record citations omitted).

Young was charged with first-degree murder, attempted murder (two 

counts), criminal conspiracy and possessing an instrument of crime. On 

November 13, 2000, a jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges, and, 

following a penalty hearing, returned a sentence of life imprisonment. The 
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trial court formally imposed sentence on January 24, 2001. In addition to 

the term of life imprisonment for first degree murder, the court imposed a 

consecutive term of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for conspiracy, concurrent 

terms of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for each attempted murder charge, 

and a concurrent term of one to two years’ imprisonment for PIC. The 

judgment of sentence was affirmed by this Court on February 15, 2002, and, 

following the grant of allocator review, affirmed by the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court on May 27, 2004. Commonwealth v. Young, 797 A.2d 

1027 (Pa. Super. 2002), aff’d, 849 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 2004).

On March 7, 2005, Young filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was 

subsequently appointed and filed two amended petitions raising numerous 

allegations of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On May 1, 2006, the 

trial court dismissed the petition without first conducting an evidentiary 

hearing. This Court affirmed the order on appeal, and the Supreme Court 

denied Young’s petition for allocator review. Commonwealth v. Young, 

932 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. 2007) (unpublished memorandum), appeal 

denied, 934 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 2007). 2 

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2

In that appeal, Young challenged trial and direct appeal counsel’s 

ineffectiveness for failing to raise claims regarding the sufficiency and weight 

of the evidence. Id., unpublished memorandum at 1. 
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On April 26, 2012, Young filed a second, pro se PCRA petition, 

asserting he was entitled to relief based upon an erroneous jury charge, and 

his actual innocence. Recognizing the potential timeliness issue, Young also 

asserted that pursuant to the recent decision of the United States Supreme 

Court in Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), he was 

denied his right to effective counsel in his first PCRA petition. On June 7, 

2012, the PCRA court sent Young notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, of its 

intent to dismiss his petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Thereafter, on June 20, 2012, Young filed a pro se response to the court’s 

Rule 907 notice, and on August 23, 2012, a supplemental PCRA petition. In 

the supplemental petition, Young, relying on Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 

132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), argued his sentence of life imprisonment without 

parole violated both the equal protection clause and the prohibition against 

cruel and unusual punishment. On January 24, 2014, the PCRA court 

entered an order dismissing Young’s initial and supplemental petitions as 

untimely filed. This timely appeal followed.3 

In his first issue, Young contends he is entitled to PCRA relief because 

of an erroneous jury charge. Specifically, he asserts the trial court “imputed 

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3 The PCRA court did not direct Young to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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to [him] the murderer’s intent to kill through criminal conspiracy thereby 

relieving the Commonwealth of [its] burden of proof that [Young] possessed 

the specific intent to kill[.]”4 Young’s Brief at 9-10. Further, Young claims:

This case is highly unusual in that it is undisputed that [Young] 

is actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted, 

namely first-degree murder where the main ingredient to 

establish a first degree murder conviction was erroneously 

imputed to [Young] though the trial court’s unconstitutional first 

degree murder jury instruction.

Id. at 12.5 Acknowledging his claim is potentially time-barred, Young 

argues his “actual innocence claim falls within the ambit” of the newly 

recognized constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s timing requirements. 

Id. at 13.

When reviewing an order dismissing a PCRA petition, we must 

determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by record 

evidence and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 

1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2010). “Great deference is granted to the findings 

of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be disturbed unless they have 

____________________________________________

4 Young does not provide a citation to the purported erroneous charge, nor 

does he recite the specific charge in his brief. Moreover, the notes of 

testimony from Young’s jury trial are not included in the certified record.

 

5 We note that neither the Commonwealth nor the PCRA court has conceded 

that Young is “actually innocent” of the crimes on appeal.
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no support in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 

680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). 

In the present case, the PCRA court determined that Young’s petition 

was untimely filed. The PCRA mandates that any petition for relief, 

“including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of 

the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b)(1). 

The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, 

a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the 

petition was not timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply 

to all PCRA petitions, regardless of the nature of the 

individual claims raised therein.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

omitted and emphasis supplied). 

Young’s judgment of sentence became final on August 25, 2004, 

ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on 

direct appeal, and Young failed to petition the United States Supreme Court 

for review. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup.Ct. R. 13.1. 

Accordingly, Young had until August 25, 2005, to file a timely PCRA 

petition.6 The present petition, filed nearly seven years later on April 26, 

2012, is patently untimely. 

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6 We note Young did file a timely PCRA petition on March 7, 2005.
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However, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545, an otherwise untimely 

petition is not time-barred if a petitioner can plead and prove that, inter alia, 

the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by 

the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Further, any petition invoking this exception 

must be filed “within 60 days of the date the claim could have been 

presented.” Id. at § 9545(b)(2).

While Young contends his “actual innocence claims falls within the 

ambit of the PCRA’s subsection 9545(b)(iii)” exception, he fails to set forth 

in his brief the “newly recognized constitutional right” that applies to the 

facts of his case, nor does he demonstrate that his petition was filed within 

the requisite 60-day time period. Young’s Brief at 13. Indeed, even a claim 

of “actual innocence” does not entitle a petitioner to relief if it was not raised 

in a timely filed PCRA petition. As the Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he “period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the 

doctrine of equitable tolling;” instead, the time for filing a PCRA 

petition can be extended only if the PCRA permits it to be 

extended, i.e., by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated 

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar. 
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Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted), 

cert. denied, 2014 WL 2881005 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2014). Accordingly, no relief 

is warranted on Young’s first claim.7 

Next, Young contends his sentence of life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole violates both the equal protection clause and the 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in light of the United 

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7 We note that in his PCRA petition, Young relied upon the United States 

Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 

1309 (2012), to overcome the time bar. He asserted that the Martinez

decision, filed less than 60 days before the present PCRA petition, permitted 

him to challenge the ineffectiveness of prior PCRA counsel for failing to argue 

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in not objecting to the alleged erroneous jury 

charge. See Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 4/26/2012, at 4. 

This Court, however, rejected a similar claim in Commonwealth v. 

Saunders, 60 A.3d 162 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 72 A.3d 603 (Pa. 

2013), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 944 (U.S. 2014), in which we 

held:

Martinez recognizes that for purposes of federal habeas 

corpus relief, “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initialreview collateral proceedings may establish cause for a 

prisoner's procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel.” Martinez, supra at 1315. While Martinez

represents a significant development in federal habeas corpus 

law, it is of no moment with respect to the way Pennsylvania 

courts apply the plain language of the time bar set forth in 

section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA

Id. at 165 (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, Young was not entitled to 

relief under Martinez, had he properly raised the claim in his appellate 

brief.
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States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 

S.Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012).8 

In Miller, the Supreme Court held that “mandatory life without parole 

for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” 

Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460 (emphasis supplied). Although the Court made 

clear that it was not foreclosing a trial court’s ability to impose a life 

sentence upon a juvenile convicted of murder, it imposed a requirement 

upon the trial court to “take into account how children are different, and how 

those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 

prison.” Id. at 2469. Therefore, it was the mandatory sentencing scheme 

that the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional when applied to juveniles, 

holding that “a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider 

mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for 

juveniles.” Id. at 2475.

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8 The Commonwealth contends this issue is waived since it was not included 

in Young’s original or amended PCRA petition. We disagree. In his amended 

petition, Young argued that he was entitled to relief under Miller, and 

checked the box indicating that his petition was subject to the newly 

recognized constitutional right exception to the timeliness requirements. 

See Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 8/23/2012, at 2, 3. Moreover, we 

note that Young filed the supplemental petition less than 60 days after the 

Miller decision was filed on June 25, 2012. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
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Preliminarily, we note the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that 

the Miller decision does not apply retroactively to benefit offenders seeking 

collateral review because it “‘does not categorically bar a penalty for a class 

of offenders.’” Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d. 1, 10 (Pa. 

2013) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2724 (U.S. 2014).9 

Therefore, Young’s collateral claim does not satisfy the “newly recognized 

constitutional right” exception to the PCRA timing requirements. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) (providing exception to the timing requirements 

when “the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the 

Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 

after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that 

court to apply retroactively”) (emphasis supplied). 

Moreover, Young concedes he was 20 years old at the time he 

committed the murders. Because the Miller Court specifically limited its 

decision to juvenile offenders, it simply does not apply to the facts of 

Young’s case. See Miller, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2469 (“We therefore hold 

that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life 

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9 We note that Young states in his brief, without any citation, that a case 

involving the retroactivity of the Miller decision is “presently pending in the 

United States Supreme Court.” Young’s Brief at 16. We decline his request 

to hold this appeal “in abayance” (sic) until the Supreme Court issues an 

opinion in that decision. See Young’s Brief at 16.
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in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”) (emphasis 

supplied); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(holding Miller decision inapplicable to appellant’s case when appellant was 

thirty-three years old at the time he committed murder). 

Young’s attempt to circumvent this obstacle to relief by invoking the 

Equal Protection Clause is similarly meritless. Young contends that 

Pennsylvania “draw[s] no distinction between juvenile and adult individuals” 

for purposes of a first-degree murder conviction and sentence of life 

imprisonment. Young’s Brief at 14. Therefore, because the offenders 

comprise a single class, Young argues “[u]nder the [E]qual [P]rotection 

doctrine, adults are no less entitled to special considerations than their 

juvenile counterparts, particularly where age is not a statutory factor.” Id. 

This Court rejected a similar claim in Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 

A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013). In that 

case, the co-defendants, who were 19 and 21 years old at the time they 

committed second degree murder, invoked the Miller decision in an attempt 

to overcome their untimely filed PCRA petitions. Although they recognized 

that they were not under the age of 18 at the time they committed the 

crime, they argued that the holding of Miller was applicable pursuant to the 

Equal Protection Clause. This Court disagreed:

Appellants ... contend that because Miller created a new Eighth 

Amendment right, that those whose brains were not fully 

developed at the time of their crimes are free from mandatory 
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life without parole sentences, and because research indicates 

that the human mind does not fully develop or mature until the 

age of 25, it would be a violation of equal protection for the 

courts to treat them or anyone else with an immature brain, as 

adults. Thus, they conclude that the holding in Miller should be 

extended to them as they were under the age of 25 at the time 

of the murder and, as such, had immature brains. However, we 

need not reach the merits of Appellants' argument, as their 

contention that a newly-recognized constitutional right should 

be extended to others does not render their petition timely 

pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(iii).

Id. at 764 (citation omitted and emphasis in original). Accordingly, Young is 

similarly entitled to no relief.

Lastly, Young argues he is entitled to a new trial with a “life-qualified” 

jury pursuant to the decision in Miller. For the reasons recited above, we 

conclude the Miller decision is inapplicable to the facts of Young’s case, and, 

in any event, the decision has not been held to apply retroactively. 

Accordingly, no relief is warranted.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/22/2015
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