In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-1930 

SHANIKA DAY, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v.

FRANKLIN WOOTEN, et al., 

Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:17-cv-04612 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 6, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 10, 2020 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit 

Judges. 

MANION, Circuit Judge. Terrell Day died tragically while in 

police custody on September 26, 2015. This occurred while his 

hands were cuffed behind his back after he had winded himself during a chase following an apparent shoplifting. The autopsy report concluded his cause of death was a lack of oxygen in his blood, caused in part by his obesity, an underlying 

heart condition, and restricted breathing due to having his 
2 No. 19-1930 

hands cuffed behind his back. In this § 1983 excessive force 

action brought against the arresting officers, the district court 

concluded the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity 

because “reasonable officers would know they were violating 

an established right by leaving Day’s hands cuffed behind his 

back after he complained of difficulty breathing.” For the reasons set forth below, we disagree with the district court’s conclusion of law and accordingly reverse. 

I. Background 

A. Assumed Facts 

Before relating the facts, we first address which facts we 

must accept or assume for purposes of this interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity. The plaintiffs argue 

we must accept both “the ‘facts that the district court assumed 

when it denied summary judgment,’ and ... ‘the plaintiff’s 

version of the facts.’” This misstates the standard established 

by our case law. We are instead presented with a choice between “[s]everal sources of undisputed facts [that] may frame 

our review” of the purely legal question presented by a denial 

of qualified immunity. White v. Gerardot, 509 F.3d 829, 833 (7th 

Cir. 2007). We may “take, as given, the facts that the district 

court assumed when it denied summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Washington v. Haupert, 481 F.3d 543, 549 n.2 (7th Cir. 

2007)). Alternatively, “we may conduct our review by ‘accepting the plaintiff’s version of the facts.’” Id.; see also Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 819 (7th Cir. 2008). And finally, whether we 

accept the district court’s assumed facts or the plaintiff’s version of the facts, we may also look to undisputed evidence in 

the record even if the district court did not consider it. White, 

509 F.3d at 833 n.5; see also Thompson v. Cope, 900 F.3d 414, 419 

(7th Cir. 2018). 
No. 19-1930 3

Although we are free to choose either the district court’s 

assumed facts or the plaintiff’s version, it is most often appropriate to accept the facts assumed by the district court in its 

denial of summary judgment. Haupert, 481 F.3d at 549 n.2. Accordingly, we accept the district court’s statement of facts. See 

Day v. City of Indianapolis, 380 F. Supp. 3d 812, 817–21 (S.D. 

Ind. 2019). In a few instances, which we note, we look to undisputed evidence not included in the district court’s order 

but provided elsewhere in the record. 

Terrell Day was eighteen years old and weighed approximately 312 pounds1 at the time of his death, with a history of 

obesity and an underlying heart condition. On September 26, 

2015, Day was confronted by a loss-prevention officer outside 

the Burlington Coat Factory at Washington Square Mall in Indianapolis after Day apparently shoplifted a watch from the 

store. Day returned the watch but refused to return to the 

store with the loss-prevention officer. A mall security officer 

who joined the confrontation noticed Day had a gun in his 

pocket. There are varying accounts of what occurred next, but 

it is undisputed that a chase ensued in which Day ran out of 

the mall, through the parking lot, and across a street to a gas 

station. He there collapsed on a grassy slope. Law enforcement soon arrived in response to a radio call describing an 

armed shoplifter. At this point, the gun was no longer on 

Day’s person, but was lying in the grass a few feet away and 

out of his reach. 

Officer Denny, the second officer to arrive on scene, handcuffed Day behind his back with a single set of handcuffs. He 

 1 Day’s approximate weight was recorded in the autopsy report. (Appellant’s Separate Appendix (“S.A.”) at 811.) 
4 No. 19-1930 

testified that Day’s hands came together easily behind his 

back. He noticed Day was overweight, sweating, and breathing heavily. Day told the officers he was having trouble 

breathing; Officer Denny told Day he had exerted himself by 

running and instructed him to take deep breaths in and out to 

slow his heart rate. Officer Denny otherwise did not observe 

any signs of distress or of Day’s trouble breathing. 

Officer Denny initially instructed Day to remain in an upright seated position, which he believed to be the most comfortable position for Day and ideal for the officers’ safety. 

However, Day would not maintain this position, but instead 

laid down and rolled down the slope. After two attempts to 

keep Day seated upright, Officer Denny instead positioned 

Day to lie on his side. Officer Denny believed this was the best 

course of action to prevent Day from asphyxiating by rolling 

onto his stomach. While repositioning Day, Officer Denny observed Day had defecated on himself. He attributed this to 

Day having over-exerted himself during the chase. 

Sergeant Wooten arrived shortly after Officer Denny detained Day. Sergeant Wooten monitored Day while Officer 

Denny completed his investigative duties as the arresting officer. Sergeant Wooten and other officers repositioned Day 

several times when he rolled onto his stomach. Day complained to Sergeant Wooten that he could not breathe; however, Sergeant Wooten was skeptical of these complaints because Day also claimed to have done nothing wrong and was 

asking to be released. All the same, Sergeant Wooten called 

for an ambulance to evaluate Day approximately five minutes 

after Day was initially detained. Sergeant Wooten observed 

that Day appeared to calm down and began to breathe normally. 
No. 19-1930 5

The ambulance arrived, and two paramedics examined 

Day. In response to their questions, Day told the paramedics 

he had no preexisting medical conditions. He was able to 

speak to them in clear, full sentences. Their examination involved multiple tests, including listening to Day’s breathing 

and checking his heart rate, respiratory rate, and blood oxygen saturation.2 Day’s hands remained cuffed behind his back 

throughout the examination. The paramedics concluded Day 

was breathing regularly and normally. Based on their examination, the paramedics believed Day did not need to go to a 

hospital. 

At that point, the paramedics asked Sergeant Wooten to 

sign a release form so they could transfer custody of Day back 

to law enforcement. Sergeant Wooten did so. The form he 

signed was called a “Treatment/Transport Refusal,” and is 

meant to be signed by a patient when he refuses to be transported to the hospital after being evaluated by paramedics. 

However, when the paramedics determine a handcuffed prisoner does not need to be transported to the hospital, they have 

an officer sign the form as a witness of the transfer, not as a 

representative of the prisoner. 

Officer Denny requested a “jail wagon” to transport Day 

to a detention facility. When the jail wagon arrived, the driver 

found Day unresponsive. At that point Day was lying on his 

back on the asphalt with his hands still cuffed behind his back. 

When the driver and Sergeant Wooten attempted to stand 

Day up, his legs straightened and his knees locked. When Day 

 2 The record is unclear on the duration of this examination, but at argument counsel for the officers estimated it occurred over the course of 

ten to fifteen minutes. 
6 No. 19-1930 

failed to respond either verbally or physically to two “sternum rubs” (a painful stimulus administered to an unresponsive subject’s chest to invoke a reaction), the driver asked Sergeant Wooten to call a second ambulance. 

The second ambulance arrived with a different team of 

paramedics, approximately forty-three minutes after the first 

ambulance had arrived.3 Sometime between the departure of 

the first ambulance and the arrival of the second, a second pair 

of handcuffs was added to Day’s wrists.4 When the paramedics arrived, Day’s eyes were open, and he was breathing, but 

his pulse was weak. Day was loaded into the back of the ambulance and the paramedics began to perform CPR. After attempting without success to revive Day for 30 minutes, he 

was pronounced dead. The coroner dispatched to the scene 

examined Day’s body and found no visible signs of trauma. 

However, the autopsy report listed his cause of death as “Sudden Cardiac Death due to Acute Ischemic Change.” Listed as 

contributory causes were “Sustained respiratory compromise 

 3 The Coroner’s Report records that the first ambulance arrived at “approximately 1:09 PM” and the second ambulance arrived at “approximately 1:52 PM.” (S.A. at 824–25.) Assuming the estimation that the first 

medical examination lasted approximately ten to fifteen minutes is accurate, we can surmise that roughly thirty minutes passed between the departure of the first ambulance and the arrival of the second. The exact 

amount of lapsed time, however, is not important for our purposes. 

4 Adding a second pair of handcuffs, by attaching one to each wrist 

and connecting them in the middle, is a method used on larger arrestees 

to make the arrestee more comfortable by lessening the restrictiveness of 

the handcuffs. See, e.g., Estate of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 

589 (7th Cir. 1997); Day, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 821. 
No. 19-1930 7

due to hands cuffed behind the back, obesity, underlying cardiomyopathy.” 

Throughout his time in custody, Day never complained 

the handcuffs were too tight. Day complained of trouble 

breathing, but never indicated this was caused or exacerbated 

by the handcuffs. The first team of paramedics never asked 

the officers to remove or modify the handcuffs or add a second pair. In addition to the coroner’s report that Day exhibited no visible signs of trauma, the autopsy report states there 

were no “encircling contusions” or lacerations around Day’s 

wrists.5 The only indication that the handcuffs were causing a 

respiratory issue was the autopsy report, which also identified for the first time his underlying heart condition. 

B. District Court Proceedings 

Day’s mother and father sued under § 1983 in September 

2017, and the defendants moved for summary judgment. Officer Denny and Sergeant Wooten asserted qualified immunity. After considering the summary judgment motion, the district court held Officer Denny and Sergeant Wooten were not 

entitled to qualified immunity. The court first determined it 

could not hold as a matter of law the officers had not violated 

Day’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure. 

Day, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 824–26. The court next concluded “reasonable officers would know they were violating an established right by leaving Day’s hands cuffed behind his back 

after he complained of difficulty breathing.” Id. at 827. 

In arriving at this conclusion, the district court cited an unreported district court case to establish that officers act 

 5 (S.A. at 811.) 
8 No. 19-1930 

unreasonably by failing to consider an injury or condition 

when handcuffing an arrestee. Id. (citing Salyers v. Alexandria 

Police Dep’t, 2016 WL 2894438, at *3 (S.D. Ind. May 18, 2016)). 

The district court also quoted a decision of this court for the 

proposition that using excessively tight handcuffs and yanking the arms of non-resisting, non-dangerous arrestees suspected of committing only minor crimes is clearly established 

as unlawful. Id. (quoting Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 780 (7th 

Cir. 2003)). Based on these cases, and the fact that Day complained of difficulty breathing and the officers “observed 

some signs of distress,” the court held the officers’ conduct 

was clearly established as a violation of Day’s rights. Id. at 828. 

The court denied qualified immunity. The officers appealed. 

II. Discussion 

A. Jurisdiction 

We first address jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of final decisions of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. Although we generally may not review a district 

court’s order until a final judgment is entered resolving all 

claims of all parties, the finality requirement is satisfied where 

a collateral order “conclusively determines a disputed question that is separate from the merits of the case and is effectively unreviewable on an appeal from the final judgment.” 

Jones v. Clark, 630 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Coopers 

& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). A summary 

judgment order denying qualified immunity to a public official defendant is such an order that can be immediately reviewable “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Id.

(citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528–30 (1985)). 
No. 19-1930 9

The plaintiffs assert we lack jurisdiction over this appeal 

because the defendants, despite claiming to concede the district court’s assumed facts viewed in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiffs, are asserting their own preferred version of 

facts on disputed questions. We have already discussed why 

the plaintiffs are wrong to argue that we and the defendants 

must accept the plaintiffs’ version of the facts in this appeal. 

It is true, however, that we cannot decide disputed fact questions in a qualified immunity appeal. We only have jurisdiction “when the party seeking to invoke it makes a purely legal 

argument that does not depend on disputed facts.” White, 509 

F.3d at 833. Therefore, we must first determine whether the 

defendants’ argument depends on disputed issues of fact, 

which would preclude our review. 

The primary factual dispute identified by the plaintiffs is 

whether the first team of paramedics’ medical evaluation was 

terminated because Day was medically cleared or because 

Wooten refused further medical treatment. They assert the 

district court acknowledged this as a disputed issue by stating 

“Plaintiffs believe Sergeant Wooten refused hospitalization 

on Day’s behalf, and had he not signed the Treatment/Transport Refusal form, the paramedics may have decided to transport Day to the hospital.” Day, 380 F. Supp. 3d 

at 820. At argument, the plaintiffs also pointed to evidence 

that the paramedics may have included false information in 

their medical report or may have been prevented from conducting a full examination due to Day’s hands being cuffed 

behind his back. 

As an initial matter, the suggestion that the paramedics included false information in their report or failed to properly 

complete a full evaluation are irrelevant to what Officer 
10 No. 19-1930 

Denny and Sergeant Wooten knew at the time of the incident. 

Our analysis hinges on whether reasonable officers under the 

circumstances would know their conduct violated a clearly 

established right. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015); 

Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(holding that, in an excessive force case, “the ‘reasonableness’ 

of the use of force is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene”). Therefore, the only relevant question is what the paramedics communicated to the officers at 

the scene. 

The district court recognized as undisputed that the paramedics concluded, based on their evaluation, “Day did not 

need to be transported to the hospital for medical treatment.” 

Day, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 820. The paramedics testified that law 

enforcement has no authority to refuse transport to a hospital 

if the medical personnel believe hospitalization is necessary. 

Sergeant Wooten could not terminate the examination because he had no authority to do so. The district court also 

found that when an officer signs for a handcuffed arrestee, he 

“signs this form as a witness to the transfer, not as a representative of the detainee,” and that the medics require an officer to sign the form “when [they] decide that a handcuffed 

prisoner is not going to go to the hospital.” Id. Thus, regardless of the title or intended use of the form Sergeant Wooten 

signed, there is no genuine dispute that the paramedics concluded their evaluation because they believed Day did not 

need further treatment. 

Moreover, even assuming a factual dispute exists regarding the termination of the examination, we need not resolve 

that dispute to reach our conclusion today. Even if the officers 

were not entitled to rely on the judgment of the medical 
No. 19-1930 11

professionals, they were still entitled to qualified immunity 

because there was no clearly established law to put the officers on notice that handcuffing Day under the circumstances 

of this case violated his constitutional rights. 

The plaintiffs also dispute whether a second pair of handcuffs was added to Day’s wrists and, if so, when it was added. 

But the district court assumed in its statement of facts that a 

second pair of handcuffs was added, and that the second pair 

was added before the second ambulance arrived. Id. at 821. 

Since we accept the district court’s assumed facts for this appeal, we assume this as well. Furthermore, as we explain below, the addition of the second pair of handcuffs does not 

change the outcome of this case. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to address the purely legal question presented by this 

appeal. 

B. Denial of Qualified Immunity 

We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary 

judgment on a qualified immunity defense. Rooni v. Biser, 742 

F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2014). As explained previously, we accept the facts assumed by the district court and the undisputed record evidence viewed in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiffs. White, 509 F.3d at 833 & n.5. 

A public official defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless two disqualifying criteria are met. First, the evidence construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

must support a finding that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right. Second, that right must have been 

clearly established at the time of the violation. Stainback v. 

Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2009). Courts may “exercise 

their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of 
12 No. 19-1930 

the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in 

light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). “A clearly established 

right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that 

right.’” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (emphasis added). 

The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s right to 

be free from unreasonable seizures of his person. U.S. Const. 

amend. IV. When an officer uses greater force than reasonably 

necessary to make an arrest, he violates the arrestee’s Fourth 

Amendment right. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 778 (7th Cir. 

2003). Importantly, “the ‘reasonableness’ of the use of force is 

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Sow, 636 

F.3d at 303. 

To defeat qualified immunity, however, the right must be 

defined more specifically than simply the general right to be 

free from unreasonable seizure. The Supreme Court has 

stated that “[s]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth 

Amendment context, where ... it is sometimes difficult for an 

officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). 

The district court defined the rights at issue as Day’s right 

to be free from excessively tight handcuffs and his right to 

have the officers consider his injury or condition in determining the appropriateness of the handcuff positioning. The court 

concluded that the officers’ conduct violated those rights. 

However, there is no Seventh Circuit precedent clearly establishing that the conduct the officers engaged in violated either 

of those rights. 
No. 19-1930 13

The plaintiffs point to Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 

2003), and identify it as the best case to clearly establish the 

right to be free from excessively tight handcuffs. The district 

court quoted and cited this case for that principle as well. In 

Payne, we established the following right: “it was unlawful to 

use excessively tight handcuffs and violently yank the arms 

of arrestees who were not resisting arrest, did not disobey the 

orders of a police officer, did not pose a threat to the safety of 

the officer or others, and were suspected of committing only 

minor crimes.” Id. at 780. In Payne, the plaintiff alleged (and 

we accepted for purposes of the appeal) that two police officers grappled and struggled over her arm for thirty minutes as 

they argued about who would handcuff her, jerked her arm 

behind her back, slammed handcuffs onto her wrist, tightened them so tight that she experienced pain and numbness 

in her hands, and refused to loosen them when she complained. Id. at 774–75. The plaintiff alleged she was treated 

this way even though she was not resisting and had committed no offense other than voicing disagreement with an irate 

officer’s racist remarks. Id.

Payne does not help the plaintiffs because it involves circumstances and conduct drastically different than this case. 

Day was suspected of shoplifting while armed with a gun, a 

much more serious offense than the plaintiff in Payne (who 

had allegedly done nothing wrong). It is also undisputed that 

Day was not cooperative: he repeatedly changed position despite the officer’s instructions to remain seated upright, and 

he argued with the officers to let him go. More importantly, 

Officer Denny and Sergeant Wooten did not violently yank or 

jerk Day’s arms and shoulders, or any of Day’s person for that 

matter. Furthermore, the handcuffs in Payne were much 

tighter than they needed to be to accomplish the purpose of 
14 No. 19-1930 

detaining the arrestee, to the point of causing visible physical 

injury. There is no suggestion that the handcuffs used on Day 

were any tighter than would have been typically used to restrain an arrestee in similar circumstances. In fact, the coroner 

noted no visible signs of trauma, and the autopsy report indicated no lacerations or contusions on Day’s wrists. The rule 

announced in Payne is inapposite. 

The other cases pointed to by the plaintiffs to establish a 

right to be free from excessively tight handcuffs—Tibbs v. City 

of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2006), and Rooni v. Biser, 742 

F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2014)—similarly fail to clearly establish that 

the officers’ conduct violated that right. Tibbs recognized that, 

under certain circumstances, the use of excessively tight 

handcuffs might constitute excessive force in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. 469 F.3d at 666 (citing Payne, 337 F.3d at 

767). However, we held the officer’s actions in that case were 

objectively reasonable where the plaintiff complained “once 

about his handcuffs without elaborating on any injury, numbness, or degree of pain.” Id. Thus, Tibbs establishes that, absent 

any indication an officer is aware the handcuff tightness or 

positioning is causing unnecessary pain or injury, the officer 

acts reasonably in not modifying the handcuffs. 

Likewise, Rooni establishes the right of a person “to be free 

from an officer’s knowing use of handcuffs in a way that 

would inflict unnecessary pain or injury, if that person presents little or no risk of flight or threat of injury.” 742 F.3d at 

742. Once again, the key fact is that the officer must know the 

handcuffs will cause unnecessary pain or injury. Rooni focused on the importance of multiple and specific complaints 

by the arrestee about the nature of his pain or injury. Id. at 

742–43 (collecting cases, distinguishing Tibbs because 
No. 19-1930 15

“plaintiff complained the handcuffs were on too tight but did 

not indicate the degree of pain,” and a case in which the plaintiff complained once but did not elaborate on degree or nature 

of pain). Because the plaintiff complained only once that the 

handcuffs were too tight without further elaboration, we concluded “there was nothing that would have alerted [the officer] to the fact that a constitutional violation was looming.” 

Id. at 743. 

Day never complained that the tightness of the handcuffs 

was restricting his breathing. The record contains no evidence 

that there was any indication the handcuffs were the cause of 

Day’s breathing difficulty until the autopsy report was released. Thus, Day’s right “to be free from an officer’s knowing 

use of handcuffs in a way that would inflict unnecessary pain 

or injury” was not violated.6

The closely related right asserted by the district court and 

the plaintiffs is the right to have the arresting officer consider 

the arrestee’s injury or condition when handcuffing the arrestee. The district court erred, however, by relying on Salyers 

v. Alexandria Police Department for the principle that “officers 

act unreasonably by failing to consider an injury or condition 

while handcuffing an individual.” Day, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 827. 

Salyers is an unreported district court opinion. We have conclusively stated that district court opinions cannot clearly establish a constitutional right because they are not binding 

precedential authority. Mason-Funk v. City of Neenah, 895 F.3d 

 6 We reach this conclusion even without relying on the additional facts 

that the first paramedic team found Day’s breathing and oxygen levels to 

be good, never requested or attempted to modify Day’s handcuffs, and 

concluded he did not need to be hospitalized for further medical treatment. 
16 No. 19-1930 

504, 509 (7th Cir. 2018). Therefore, if the right relied upon in 

Salyers is a clearly established one, it must be clearly established by some other source. 

Salyers relied on, and the plaintiffs direct our attention to, 

our 2009 decision in Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 

2009). That case involved an arrestee with preexisting armand-shoulder injuries that were exacerbated when law enforcement handcuffed him behind his back. The arrestee in 

Stainback complained the handcuffs were hurting his shoulders, but never told the officers of his preexisting injuries. If 

the officers had known of the preexisting injury, we agreed 

“they certainly would have been obligated to consider that information, together with the other relevant circumstances, in 

determining whether it was appropriate to handcuff” the arrestee. Id. at 773. However, we held the officers were entitled 

to qualified immunity because they did not use the handcuffs 

“in a manner that would clearly injure or harm a typical arrestee,” and it was not apparent to the officers, nor were they 

informed, that the arrestee had a preexisting condition that 

could be aggravated by the handcuffs. Id. “[A] reasonable officer cannot be expected to accommodate an injury that is not 

apparent or that otherwise has not been made known to him.” 

Id.

Thus, Stainback only clearly establishes the right to have a 

known injury or condition considered, together with other circumstances, by officers when handcuffing. Stainback fails to 

clearly establish that Officer Denny and Sergeant Wooten’s 

conduct was violative. Just as the arrestee in Stainback complained generally of shoulder pain but never explained the effect of the handcuffs on his preexisting injury, Day complained he was having trouble breathing but never 
No. 19-1930 17

complained that this was caused or exacerbated by his handcuffs as opposed to his exertion during the chase preceding 

his arrest. The officers (and apparently Day himself) were also 

unaware of Day’s underlying heart condition, which also contributed to his lack of oxygen according to the autopsy report. 

In Stainback, we acknowledged “in some cases, the fact that 

an act will cause pain or injury will be clear form the nature 

of the act itself.” Id. at 772. We concluded, however, that it 

would not be clear to the officers that the arrestee’s shoulder 

pain was caused by the act of cuffing his hands behind his 

back. Id. at 773. It is even less obvious under the circumstances 

of this case that Day’s trouble breathing was caused by handcuff positioning. The record does not show this would be apparent to the officers at the time of the arrest.7 Accordingly, 

like the right in Payne, Rooni, and Tibbs, the right at issue in 

 7 The plaintiffs suggest that the addition of a second pair of handcuffs 

before the second ambulance arrived is evidence of the officers’ awareness 

that the single pair of handcuffs had been restricting Day’s breathing. This 

is entirely speculative and goes well beyond a reasonable inference to 

which the plaintiffs are entitled. See White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 

841 (7th Cir. 2016). Adding a second pair of handcuffs indisputably provides more comfort to an arrestee; there is no reason to believe the second 

pair was added to relieve Day’s breathing as opposed to simply providing 

more comfort to an arrestee who, at that late point, was obviously suffering a medical trauma. In fact, the district court found the officers added 

the second pair of handcuffs at that point “because they believed Day was 

having a medical problem,” not because they specifically understood the 

handcuffs were causing his breathing difficulty. Furthermore, even if the 

addition of the second pair of handcuffs is evidence that the officers became aware that the first pair was restricting his breathing, it would then 

also be evidence that the officers did consider Day’s medical condition and 

modified the handcuffs when it became apparent they were causing a 

problem. Either way, this fact does not help the plaintiffs. 
18 No. 19-1930 

Stainback to have a known injury or condition considered by 

officers when handcuffing an arrestee is not implicated by the 

facts of this case. 

Given the facts as assumed by the district court and the 

information known to the officers at the time of the arrest, the 

only right plaintiffs can assert would be the right of an out-ofbreath arrestee to not have his hands cuffed behind his back 

after he complains of difficulty breathing. We find no Seventh 

Circuit precedent clearly establishing such a right. The cases 

relied upon by the district court and the plaintiffs present circumstances far different, and therefore cannot clearly establish that the officers’ conduct violated Day’s rights. 

One further point must be addressed. The Supreme Court 

has stated that even in the absence of existing precedent addressing similar circumstances, “there can be the rare ‘obvious case,’ where the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is 

sufficiently clear.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 

590 (2018). This case is certainly not one of those rare obvious 

cases. As already discussed, the handcuffs were used in a 

manner that would not have harmed an average arrestee, and 

there is no evidence the officers were aware the handcuffs 

were causing Day’s breathing trouble. The officers’ conduct 

under the circumstances was not obviously unlawful. 

III. Conclusion 

This case arose from an unfortunate tragedy. However, 

the officers did not violate any clearly established right. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment denying Officer 

Denny and Sergeant Wooten’s qualified immunity defense is 

REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.