misconduct, WCSD re-assigned•him to Silver Lake Elementary School 

(SLES). In November 2009, respondents Loretta Thomas, SLES principal, 

and Maryanne Robinson, SLES Coordinator and Director, worked with 

Davis to address Davis' failure to implement teaching strategies from his 

supervisors. As a result, SLES placed him on a Track III focused 

Professional Assistance Plan (Track 111). 2He remained on Track III until 

February 2011. 

In November 2011, Davis filed a complaint against WCSD 

alleging conspiracy, intentional interference with contractual relations, 

abuse of process, negligence, and violation of his First Amendment and 

due process rights. WCSD filed a special motion to dismiss under 

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, NRS 41.650 and NRS 41.660. The district 

court entered an order granting WCSD's motion, dismissing all five of 

Davis' claims. 

Davis now appeals, arguing that: (1) Nevada's anti-SLAPP 

statutes violate the separation of powers clause and the supremacy clause; 

(2) the district court erred in granting WCSD's special motion to dismiss 

because WCSD did not meet its burden to show that its communications 

regarding Davis were in good faith and in furtherance of the right to 

petition, and (3) even if WCSD met its burden, the district court should 

have denied the motion because Davis demonstrated a genuine issue of 

material fact for his five claims. 

Track III is a program where other teachers provide assistance to 

improve one's performance. 

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Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes are constitutional 

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. Silvar v. 

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 289, 292, 129 P.3d 682, 684 (2006). 

"Statutes are presumed to be valid, and the challenger bears the burden of 

showing that a statute is unconstitutional." Id. Further, we will not 

overturn precedent 'absent compelling reasons for so doing'" ArmentaCarpio v. State, 129 Nev. „ 306 P.3d 395, 398 (2013) (quoting Miller 

v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 597, 188 P.3d 1112, 1124 (2008)). It must be more 

than a mere disagreement, such that departing from the doctrine of stare 

decisis "is necessary to avoid the perpetuation of error." Stocks v. Stocks, 

64 Nev. 431, 438, 183 P.2d 617, 620 (1947) (internal quotations omitted); 

see also Miller, 124 Nev. at 597, 118 P.3d at 1124 ("Mere disagreement 

does not suffice."). 

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not violate the separation of powers 

clause 

Davis argues that NRS 41.650 violates the separation of 

powers doctrine because it interferes with discovery in a civil case by 

undermining the judicial procedural mechanisms of summary judgment. 

We disagree. 

The Nevada Constitution divided the government• into the 

Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial. Berkson v. LePome, 126 Nev. 

245 P.3d 560, 564 (2010) (citing Article 3, Section 1(1) of the 

Nevada Constitution). "[N]o persons charged with the exercise of powers 

properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any 

functions, appertaining to either of the others . . . ." Nev. Const. art. 3, § 1. 

The legislature violates the separation of powers clause if it "enact[s] a 

procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule." at 

245 P.3d at 565 (internal quotations omitted). Further, a statute is 

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unconstitutional if it "interferes with the judiciary's authority to manage 

the litigation process and [the] court's ability to provide finality through 

the resolution of a matter on appeal." Id. at , 245 P.3d at 566 

(concluding that NRS 11.340 was unconstitutional because it acts to 

"prolong previously resolved cases, resulting in unnecessary expenses for 

adverse parties and the diversion of time and scarce judicial resources 

away from undecided cases"). 

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, NRS 41.635-41.670, grant 

immunity to good faith communications that are "in furtherance of the 

right to petition." NRS 41.650. These statutes allow a party to file a 

special motion to dismiss, which the district court treats as a motion for 

summary judgment. NRS 41.660(2)-(3) (requiring the moving party make 

a threshold showing, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to 

show by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the 

claim). 

We conclude that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not 

interfere with the judicial branch. Unlike in Berkson, Nevada's antiSLAPP statutes actually assist the judiciary in managing cases by 

providing a vehicle to dismiss meritless claims. These statutes aid the 

judiciary by conserving judicial resources, saving the parties from 

incurring unnecessary expenses, and preventing the parties from 

prolonging meritless cases. Thus, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not 

violate the separation of powers clause. 

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not violate the supremacy clause 

Davis argues that this court should reconsider its decision in 

John u. Douglas County School District, 125 Nev. 746, 219 P.3d 1276 

(2009), and conclude that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes violate the 

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supremacy clause. We disagree and decline to overturn our holding in 

John. 

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes provide that "[a] person who 

engages in a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to 

petition. . . is immune from any civil action for claims based upon the 

communication." NRS 41.650. NRS 41.637(2) defines "good faith 

communication in furtherance of the right to petition" as "[c]ommunication 

of information or a complaint to. . . a political subdivision of this state, 

regarding a matter reasonably of concern to the respective governmental 

entity." School districts are included in "political subdivision." NRS 

41.0305; see also John, 125 Nev. at 761, 219 P.3d at 1286. Thus, these 

statutes protect good faith communications made to the school district. 

John, 125 Nev. at 761, 219 P.3d at 1286. 

"[Al state law that immunizes government conduct otherwise 

subject to suit under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 is preempted, even where the 

federal civil rights litigation takes place in state court, because the 

application of the state immunity law would thwart the congressional 

remedy." Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988). However, we have 

distinguished Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes from the statutes at issue in 

Felder and stated that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not afford 

absolute immunity from liability. John, 125 Nev. at 755, 219 P.3d at 1282. 

Instead, these statutes provide immunity only against meritless claims 

and "permit[] cases to proceed to discovery and trial after a nonmoving 

party makes an initial demonstration of merit." Id. The Nevada 

legislature intended these statutes to "filter[ ] unmeritorious claims in an 

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effort to protect citizens from costly retaliatory lawsuits arising from their 

right to free speech." 3 Id. 

A statute that is applied to federal claims in state court will 

not violate the supremacy clause if the statute is neutral and procedural. 

Id. at 756-58, 219 P.3d at 1283-84. In John, we determined that Nevada's 

anti-SLAPP statutes were procedural in nature because "the statutes 

create a procedural mechanism to prevent wasteful and abusive litigation 

by requiring the plaintiff to make an initial showing of merit." 125 Nev. at 

758, 219 P.3d at 1284. Further, we held that the statutes are neutral in 

application because they "appl[y] to both state and federal substantive 

claims raised by either a plaintiffs complaint or a defendant's 

counterclaim" and only apply when "[good faith communication[s] in 

furtherance of the right to petition" are at issue. Id. (quoting NRS 

41.637). Thus, we concluded that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes applied 

to federal claims in state court. Id. at 760, 219 P.3d at 1286. 

However, a statute violates the supremacy clause if it defeats 

a federal right or frustrates a substantive right created by Congress. 

John, 125 Nev. at 758, 219 P.3d at 1284. We noted that the purposes of 

anti-SLAPP statutes are to (1) dismiss meritless claims before trial, and 

(2) protect a citizen's right to petition his government without 

repercussion. Id. at 755, 219 P.3d at 1282. Based on these purposes and 

the appellant's failure to show a genuine issue of material fact, we 

concluded in John that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not 

undermine[ ] or frustrate[ ] any federal substantive claims." Id. at 760, 

3Further, we have determined that these statutes can be used by a 

government agency. John, 125 Nev. at 760-61, 219 P.3d at 1286. 

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219 P.3d at 1285-86 (noting that appellant "could have proceeded with his 

federal substantive claims had he shown a genuine issue of material fact"). 

We conclude that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes (1) are 

neutral and procedural, and (2) do not frustrate a substantive right. This 

is consistent with our holding in John. Therefore, we conclude that 

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes do not violate the supremacy clause. 4 

The district court properly granted Davis' special motion to dismiss 

"[T]he district court shall treat the special motion to dismiss 

as a motion for summary judgment, and its granting the motion is an 

adjudication upon the merits." John, 125 Nev. at 753, 219 P.3d at 1281. 

Therefore, this court reviews a district court's order granting an antiSLAPP special motion to dismiss de novo. Id. 

WCSD met its initial burden 

Davis argues that WCSD failed to show good faith 

communication as required to invoke the protection of the anti-SLAPP 

statutes. Thus, Davis argues that the district court erred in finding that 

WCSD met its burden. We disagree. 

"[W]hen a party moves for a special motion to dismiss . . . it 

bears the initial burden of production and persuasion." John, 125 Nev. at 

754, 219 P.3d at 1282. This burden requires the moving party to "make a 

threshold showing that the lawsuit is based on `[g]ood faith 

communication[s made] in furtherance of the right to petition' the 

4Further, Davis' argument that his federal claims are frustrated is 

meritless because he could have proceeded with these claims if he had 

shown a genuine issue of material fact on these claims. However, the 

district court found that he failed to meet this burden. 

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government." Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting NRS 41.650). 

The moving party can meet its burden by showing that the 

communications were made in the furtherance of an investigation. Id. at 

762, 219 P.3d at 1287 (concluding that production of documents showing 

that the "communications to or by the school district [were] in the context 

of various investigations" was enough to shift the burden of production to 

the plaintiff). 

WCSD provided the district court with evidence to show that 

its statements were protected under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute: (1) the 

Collective Bargaining Agreement between Washoe Education Association 

and WCSD, and the WCSD policies and regulations showing that the 

school district and employees were required to participate in the 

investigation; (2) a 2007 letter of admonition stating that an investigation 

revealed Davis made inappropriate sexual comments to fellow teachers; 

(3) a 2007 e-mail from Parks to Davis showing that Davis attempted to 

make a sexual harassment complaint about Edwards during the same 

time period of the school's sexual harassment investigation of him, 

however Davis never formally filed a written complaint; (4) a 2008 letter of 

admonition and intention to suspend stating that the investigation 

revealed that Davis had inappropriately touched students; (5) an amended 

intent-to-suspend letter following Davis' appeal, stating that he would be 

suspended for 10 days instead of 20 days and reiterating the inappropriate 

sexual actions that the investigation revealed; and (6) affidavits from 

Parks, Christiansen, Edwards, Cranmer, and Dugan, among others, 

showing that their investigations and statements regarding Davis were 

based on the reasonable safety concerns of each individual and the 

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district, were made in good faith and without malice, and were not made 

with the intent to harm or harass Davis. 

The district court found that "[WCSD'si communications were 

all made in the context of various investigations and evaluations of 

[Davis]." Further, the district court noted that the communications 

regarding Davis' conduct as a teacher "were of reasonable concern to 

[WCSD] because they addressed the school environment as it applied to 

staff and students and they impacted [WCSD's] potential legal liability.' 

(alterations in original) (quoting John, 125 Nev. at 762, 219 P.3d at 1287). 

The district court found that the statements qualified as good faith 

communications because they were "aimed at procuring any 

government . . . action, result or outcome." (quoting NRS 41.637(1)). 

We conclude that the district court properly found that WCSD 

met its burden. Like the school district in John, WCSD provided the 

district court with extensive documentation and evidence showing the 

statements were made for the purpose of an investigation by WCSD. 

Additionally, WCSD submitted affidavits that indicate good faith and are 

consistent with the other investigation documents. Therefore, we conclude 

that the district court did not err in finding that WCSD met its initial 

burden. 5 

5We note, however, that the district court incorrectly relied on NRS 

41.637(1) when determining that the statements qualified as anti-SLAPP 

communications because NRS 41.637(2) would have been more 

appropriate pursuant to this court's analysis in John. However, this error 

was harmless because the district court would have come to the same 

result. See Sengel v. IGT, 116 Nev. 565, 570, 2 P.3d 258, 261 (2000) 

(affirming a district court decision that reached the right result, albeit for 

the wrong reasons). 

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Davis failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact 

Davis argues that even if this court concludes that WCSD met 

its burden, the district court erred in granting the special motion to 

dismiss because he pleaded sufficient facts in his complaint to create a 

genuine issue of material fact. We disagree. 

Once the moving party has met its burden of showing that 

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes apply, the burden of production shifts to 

the nonmoving party, who must demonstrate a genuine issue of material 

fact. John, 125 Nev. at 754, 219 P.3d at 1282. If the district court 

determines that the nonmoving party has demonstrated a genuine issue of 

material fact, the case will then proceed to discovery. Id. However, if the 

nonmoving party fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact, the 

district court must dismiss the action. Id.; see also NRS 41.660(4) (noting 

that "the dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits"). 

When responding to a special motion to dismiss, the 

nonmoving party must provide evidence and may not merely present a 

narrative disagreement with the moving party. John, 125 Nev. at 762, 

219 P.3d at 1287. In John, this court concluded that the plaintiffs 

opposition to the defendant school district's special motion to dismiss (1) 

did not establish a genuine issue of material fact and "merely disagreed in 

narrative form with [the school district's] credible evidence," and (2) failed 

to "provide[ ] any evidence that the communications were untruthful or 

made with knowledge of falsehood." Id. Therefore, the district court 

properly granted the school district's special motion to dismiss. Id. at 763, 

219 P.3d at 1287. 

Further, in order to meet its burden of production, the 

nonmoving party must show that the communications were not a matter 

of reasonable concern to the moving party. Id. at 762, 219 P.3d at 1287. 

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In John, the school district's communications were part of an investigation 

of a school security officer for unprofessional conduct. Id. at 750, 219 P.3d 

at 1279. This court concluded that "[t]he matters communicated to the 

[school district] were of reasonable concern to the district because they 

addressed the school environment as it applied to staff and students and 

they impacted the school district's potential legal liability." Id. at 762, 219 

P.3d at 1287. When the burden shifted to the security officer to establish 

a genuine issue of material fact, he failed to show that "the 

communications were not matters of reasonable concern to the school 

district." Id. Therefore, this court concluded that the district court 

properly granted the school district's special motion to dismiss. Id. at 762- 

63, 219 P.3d at 1287. 

Davis has five claims that are the subject of his appeal: (1) 

Davis supports his conspiracy claim by arguing that the facts "create a 

reasonable inference of concerted action among [WCSD]", (2) he supports 

his intentional interference claim by arguing that the doctrine of equitable 

tolling applies, (3) he supports his abuse of process claim by arguing that 

WCSD "possessed an ulterior purpose" when investigating him, (4) he 

supports his negligence claim by arguing that the discretionary function 

immunity does not apply to WCSD, (5) he supports his First Amendment 

claim by arguing that his "expressive activity was of public concern" and 

his due process claim by arguing that the claim "survives under the 

conspiracy theory." The district court found that Davis failed to establish 

a genuine issue of material fact for any of his five claims. 

We conclude the district court properly found that Davis failed 

to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact for his claims. Davis 

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, CA. 

J. 

Saitta 

J. 

J. 

merely presents narrative disagreements with WCSD. Therefore, the 

district court did not err in dismissing Davis' claims. 

Accordingly, we ORDER the judgment of the district court 

AFFIRMED. 6 

Gibbons 

Hardesty 

titA)k oz-52CParraguirre 

6We have considered Davis' remaining arguments and conclude they 

are without merit. 

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cc: Hon. Steven R. Kosach, District Judge 

Second Judicial District Court Dept. 8 

David Wasick, Settlement Judge 

Jeffrey A Dickerson 

Washoe County School District Legal Department 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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