NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-4529

___________

BRUCE E. BALDINGER

v.

ANTONIO FERRI; MATTEO PATISSO;

NATIONAL FRAUD CONSTABLE a/k/a

THE NATIONAL FRAUD CONSTABLE

Matteo Patisso,

 Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 3:10-cv-03122)

District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 20, 2013

Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 27, 2013 )

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM

Pro se defendant-appellant Matteo Patisso appeals District Court orders relating to 

the entry of a default judgment against him. We will affirm.
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This convoluted case arises out of a diversity action filed by the plaintiff-appellee, 

attorney Bruce Baldinger.1 Baldinger accused the various defendants, but most notably 

Mateo Patisso, of disseminating false information and interfering with his business. 

Patisso was alleged to harbor an ongoing vendetta against Baldinger that manifested 

through stalking behavior, posting defamatory material on the Internet, intervening in 

cases brought by Baldinger, and so on. 

Throughout the litigation, Patisso did not fully comply with his discovery 

obligations. The District Court eventually instructed the Clerk to enter a default against 

Patisso pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi), relying in part on the six-factor test of 

Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). The District 

Court permitted Baldinger to move for default judgment, which he did in February 2012. 

(A default judgment had previously been entered against Patisso after he failed to answer 

the complaint; however, that judgment was later vacated when Patisso began to 

participate.) 

The District Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on Baldinger’s motion for 

July 2012. Shortly before the hearing was to be held, Patisso sent a letter to the Court in 

which he claimed that injuries from a motor-vehicle accident (occurring approximately 

two months earlier) would prevent him from physically attending court on that day. His 

letter did not request any alternative accommodations. Observing that the hearing had 

 

1 We discussed the early stages of this case in Baldinger v. Ferri, 483 F. App’x 708 (3d 

Cir. 2012).
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already been much delayed, and that the object of the hearing was simply to show 

damages, the Court decided to move ahead despite Patisso’s absence. On July 12, the 

District Court entered its final judgment, awarding more than a million dollars to 

Baldinger and imposing an injunction on Patisso.

Patisso moved to set aside the default judgment by filing a motion for 

reconsideration on July 30. He objected to the presentation of alleged hearsay and 

uncorroborated testimony at the hearing, which he claimed was conducted in violation of 

due process and his “right to confront,”2as well as numerous New Jersey laws. He also 

argued that the District Court violated the New Jersey Punitive Damages Act, N.J. Stat. 

Ann. § 2A:15-5.9 et seq., because the Court failed to “la[y] out the reasons” for imposing 

damages and “never addressed” Patisso’s ability to pay. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 

§ 2A:15-5.12(c)(4).3 Patisso also enclosed documentation relating to his alleged car 

accident: the May 4 incident report, a May 7 doctor’s note reflecting that Patisso was “not 

able to appear in court for at least ten days,” and a July 3 follow-up note establishing that 

Patisso could not travel any distances farther “than 30 minutes.” Patisso also filed a 

motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), attacking the merits of 

 

2 Of course, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment applies only to “criminal 

prosecutions.” 

3 We note that the issue of compliance with the Act was litigated below by Baldinger; in 

other words, the parties and the District Court were aware of their respective statutory 

obligations. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 

enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
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the underlying proceeding while alleging that Baldinger’s proffer amounted to a “fraud 

upon the court.”

At a hearing held on November 29, 2012, the District Court denied both motions. 

The motion for reconsideration was denied as both untimely (as it was filed after the 

fourteen days allowed by D.N.J. L. Civ. R. 7.1(i)) and meritless. With regard to the Rule 

60(b) motion, the District Court concluded that its original judgment was not void or 

otherwise infirm. The Court entered its orders on December 6; Patisso filed his notice of 

appeal on December 18.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.4 In his opening brief, Patisso 

identifies four orders that he wishes to contest: the order denying reconsideration, the 

order denying the Rule 60(b) motion, and two post-judgment orders related to discovery 

and contempt proceedings. Aside from a cursory mention, however, he does not discuss 

the latter two orders in his brief, so we will not consider them. See Ethypharm S.A. Fr. v. 

Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 231 n.13 (3d Cir. 2013).

Both the entry of default judgments and rulings on motions to set them aside are 

 

4 Although Baldinger argues to the contrary, we hold that we may exercise jurisdiction 

over the original default-judgment order, to the extent that Patisso also challenges it. 

Patisso’s motion for reconsideration, while possibly untimely under the District Court’s 

local rules, was timely filed if construed as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion, thereby tolling 

the time to file a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). The local rule 

itself explicitly provides for a fourteen-day reconsideration period “unless otherwise 

provided by statute or rule (such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, 52 and 59),” D.N.J. L. Civ. R. 

7.1(i), thereby avoiding an impermissible conflict with the twenty-eight-day period 

contained (for both filing and tolling purposes) in the Federal Rules of Civil and 

Appellate Procedure. Cf. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 459 (3d Cir.

2000).
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reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 

912, 919 (3d Cir. 1992); Farzetta v. Turner & Newall, Ltd., 797 F.2d 151, 155 n.3 (3d 

Cir. 1986) (explaining, however, that any associated questions of law receive plenary 

review); see also Zawadski De Bueno v. Bueno Castro, 822 F.2d 416, 420 (3d Cir. 1987) 

(discussing the consideration of a motion to set aside a default judgment). Because the 

District Court exercised diversity jurisdiction, it was required to “apply the substantive 

law as decided by the highest court of the state whose law governs the action.” Orson, 

Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 1996). Patisso’s 

challenges to the punitive-damage award receive plenary review to the extent that they 

pertain to legal considerations and abuse-of-discretion review to the extent that they 

pertain to factual issues. Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. Ebi Med. Sys., 181 F.3d 446, 464 

(3d Cir. 1999).

Echoing his submissions before the District Court, Patisso’s opening brief 

functions by and large as an attack on the merits of Baldinger’s case against him, as 

developed in both the complaint and, more generally, in the proof hearing that Patisso did 

not attend. For example, he continues to claim that the “litigation privilege” protected the 

speech alleged to have been defamatory; however, that a potential defense existed to the 

allegations contained in the complaint does not imply that Baldinger’s charges were 

deficient or not well pleaded. Cf. Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 

1392 (9th Cir. 1988). Indeed, his arguments miss the point, because the “facts” he relies 

upon are utterly irrelevant to the central reason for the default judgment’s entry: Patisso’s 
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failure to comply with his discovery obligations. The District Court gave reasons for 

entering a default judgment, such as Patisso’s pattern of delay and contumacious 

behavior, that facially support its decision to do so and which are proper bases for 

granting a default judgment. Cf. Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008)

(emphasizing that not every Poulis factor needs to be satisfied in order for the District 

Court to properly exercise its discretion). Patisso does not meaningfully contest these 

determinations.

Patisso also challenges the District Court’s decision to proceed without him at the 

proof hearing. As a preliminary matter, we do not agree with Patisso that his eleventhhour letter to the District Court revealed his clear desire to obtain another adjournment 

(or, for that matter, to participate by telephone). But in any event, the District Court 

operated well within its discretion in moving forward, given the pattern of delay 

identified and its apparent belief that Patisso would have little to offer at the hearing.

Finally, Patisso challenges the Court’s decision to award punitive damages, and, 

given the size of the damages in question ($537,500, equal to the amount of 

compensatory damages), we agree that this issue deserves further scrutiny. Patisso 

maintains that the District Court violated the New Jersey Punitive Damages Act by, inter 

alia, failing to consider his financial circumstances and by failing to enter its findings into 

the record. However, nothing in the Act appears to require the presiding judge to enter or 

announce his findings in any particular way. Patisso’s procedural objections are not 

based in the text of the Act. Otherwise, the size of the award was within permissible 
7

limits pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.14(b). And to the extent that Patisso argues 

that the Court failed to consider his financial status, we agree with Baldinger that Patisso 

obfuscated evidence of his actual means throughout this action; furthermore, Baldinger 

did introduce proof (albeit of a limited sort) in an attempt to show the extent of Patisso’s 

assets and specifically raised the issue of Patisso’s financial status in his final motion for 

a default judgment. Besides, the New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that a 

“defendant’s inability to pay . . . should not preclude a punitive damages award because 

the [Act] specifically lists other factors that the [fact finder] can consider[;] . . .

[e]vidence concerning the financial status of a defendant is simply one relevant 

consideration to be weighed when determining the amount of a punitive damages award.” 

Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 943 A.2d 866, 872 n.4 (N.J. 2008) (citations 

omitted). 

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s rulings.