```

[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                   SECURING OUR NATION FROM WMDs: A REVIEW 
                    OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECU-
                    RITY'S COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DE-
                    STRUCTION OFFICE

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                  EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 20, 2024

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-56

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                                     

       Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/

                               __________
                               

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
57-574 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                               

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
                 
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Thomas R. Suozzi, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
                                 ------                                

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

                 Anthony D'Esposito, New York, Chairman
Nick LaLota, New York                Troy A. Carter, Louisiana, Ranking 
Dale W. Strong, Alabama                  Member
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Daniel S. Goldman, New York
    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
                                         (ex officio)
               Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Staff Director
          Lauren McClain, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Anthony D'Esposito, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Emergency Management and Technology:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     3
The Honorable Troy A. Carter, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Emergency Management and Technology:
  Oral Statement.................................................     5
  Prepared Statement.............................................     6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     7

                               Witnesses

Ms. Mary Ellen Callahan, Assistant Secretary, Countering Weapons 
  of Mass Destruction, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     8
  Prepared Statement.............................................    10
Mr. Herbert O. Wolfe, MHS-PA, Acting Chief Medical Officer, 
  Acting Director, Office of Health Security, U.S. Department of 
  Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    15
  Prepared Statement.............................................    16
Ms. Tina Won Sherman, Ph.D., Director, Homeland Security and 
  Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
  Oral Statement.................................................    19
  Prepared Statement.............................................    21

 
 SECURING OUR NATION FROM WMDs: A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
        SECURITY'S COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE

                              ----------                              

                       Wednesday, March 20, 2024

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                      Subcommittee on Emergency Management 
                                            and Technology,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Anthony D'Esposito 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Representatives D'Esposito, LaLota, Strong, 
Brecheen, and Carter.
    Mr. D'Esposito. The Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology will come 
to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to provide Members the 
opportunity to evaluate the work of DHS's Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Office and the Office of Health Security to 
assess their respective roles in preventing, mitigating, and 
responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
threats.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Today the Subcommittee on Emergency Management and 
Technology will review the Department of Homeland Security's 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office and the Office of 
Health Security and examine their efforts to secure this great 
Nation from weapons of mass destruction.
    I would like to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for your 
work to protect this great Nation from chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear threats. We look forward to hearing 
from each of you.
    The Department of Homeland Security was created following 
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and brought 
together 22 Federal agencies to coordinate and streamline 
efforts to protect our homeland.
    Shortly after the Twin Towers collapsed, a series of 
letters laced with anthrax were sent to Congressional office 
buildings, news outlets, and postal facilities, killing 5 
Americans and injuring 17. The 2001 anthrax attacks highlighted 
the means to which bad actors will go to terrorize innocent 
people and the need for the U.S. investment in CBRN security 
and defense.
    Twenty-three years later, the risk of biological terrorism 
and weapons of mass destruction has not gone away. Recognizing 
the need to streamline and prioritize countering CBRN threats, 
the CWMD Office was established in 2017 and authorized by 
Congress and President Trump in 2018.
    The mission of the Department of Homeland Security's 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office is to reduce 
vulnerability and protect American cities from a WMD attack by 
supporting operational partners on the ground. For example, 
CWMD's Securing the Cities program has equipped State and local 
agencies with nearly 48,000 items and pieces of equipment with 
detection and deterrence capabilities to protect communities 
across this country from radiological threats.
    In October 2023, a Houston police officer discovered 
dangerous levels of radiation in a metal scrapyard after his 
STC-provided personal radiation detector detected radiation 
during his commute to work. The hazardous material was 
identified and safely removed. These capabilities are critical 
for safeguarding this great homeland.
    Last July, I attended the Securing the Cities annual 
conference, where emergency managers from across the country 
gathered for training and coordination. I was grateful to 
attend and proud of STC's work to fortify a network of State, 
local, and Federal partners that are committed to defending the 
United States of America from a potentially catastrophic 
nuclear or radiological attack.
    In October, CWMD held a ChemPrep program in Nassau County 
to review local chemical incident-related concerns, gaps, and 
vulnerabilities, to discuss potential opportunities to optimize 
local preparedness. I was very pleased with the local outreach 
and support to first responders on Long Island, the same island 
that Members of this committee on both sides of the aisle--
myself, Congressman LaLota, Congressman Garbarino, and now 
Congressman Suozzi--represent.
    With numerous bad actors and threats confronting our 
Nation, CWMD has provided U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
with radiation portal monitors to scan cargo for potential 
threats.
    While the CWMD Office plays an essential role in equipping 
State and local partners with equipment and training to counter 
CBRN threats, there are opportunities to improve the 
effectiveness of this office. Although the office was 
established to streamline internal DHS operations and 
coordinations with States and localities, many reorganizations 
have taken place, and workplace morale has consistently 
received low rankings by CWMD Office personnel.
    When the Department of Homeland Security Act was passed in 
2002, section 872 allowed the Secretary to reorganize, 
establish, or consolidate operations within the Department. In 
2022, the Secretary used this authority to reallocate some 
health security and biosecurity functions to the newly-created 
Office of Health Security, less than 5 years since the Office 
of Health Affairs was reorganized into CWMD. Such constant 
restructuring can be confusing and frustrating for employees 
and stakeholders. I'm looking forward to learning more about 
the Office of Health Security, the benefit of its move out of 
CWMD, and differentiating between the biodefense work of OHS 
with that of CWMD.
    I am also eager to hear an update on CWMD's BioWatch 
program, which is a monitoring system that collects and tests 
air samples for biological agents that may be used in a 
bioterrorism attack. This program has not kept pace with 
technological advancements since it was first created in 
response to the 2001 anthrax attacks and requires 12 to 36 
hours before successfully verifying a biological agent and 
warning the public.
    In 2019, DHS began a major acquisition program, Biological 
Detection for the 21st Century, BD21, to move toward the next 
generation of national biodetection. BD21 was intended to 
address some of BioWatch's limitations, including significantly 
shortening its time to detect. However, it seems that BD21 has 
been abandoned.
    The President's fiscal year 2025 budget request refers to 
the program as, ``obsolete,'' and states that CWMD will 
transition into a new, ``environmental biodetection capability 
development and maturation'' project. I would like to 
understand how this new project will be different. Ultimately, 
I hope that CWMD is on a fast track to finally obtaining the 
biological technology that America needs.
    Despite the obstacles the CWMD Office has faced, I believe 
that we should work together to remedy these challenges and to 
help the office succeed in its mission of enabling operational 
partners and preventing WMDs from ever harming this great 
country. That is also why I was proud to introduce H.R. 3224, a 
bill to extend the authorization of this office, and I urge my 
colleagues in the Senate to take up this bill immediately.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the 
opportunities and challenges confronting the CWMD Office as 
well as the Office of Health Security. Thank you all for this 
work in this field and for your commitment to this country.
    [The statement of Chairman D'Esposito follows:]
                Statement of Chairman Anthony D'Esposito
                             March 20, 2024
    Today the Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology will 
review the Department of Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office (CWMD) and the Office of Health Security and examine 
their efforts to secure our Nation from WMDs. I'd like to welcome our 
witnesses. Thank you for your work to protect our Nation from chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. We look forward 
to hearing from each of you.
    The Department of Homeland Security was created following the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and brought together 22 
disparate Federal agencies to coordinate and streamline efforts to 
protect our homeland. Shortly after the Twin Towers collapsed, a series 
of letters laced with anthrax were sent to Congressional office 
buildings, news outlets, and postal facilities, killing 5 Americans and 
injuring 17.\1\ The 2001 anthrax attacks highlighted the means to which 
bad actors will go to terrorize innocent people and the need for U.S. 
investment in CBRN security and defense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/amerithrax-or-anthrax-
investigation; https://nihrecord.nih.gov/2022/05/13/2001-anthrax-
attacks-revealed-need-develop-countermeasures-against-biological-
threats#:?:text=The%20attacks-%20lasted%20a%20few,doctors%20had- 
%20experience%20treating%20anthrax.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Twenty-three years later, the risk of biological terrorism and 
other weapons of mass destruction has not gone away. Recognizing the 
need to streamline and prioritize countering CBRN threats, the CWMD 
Office was established in 2017 and authorized by Congress and President 
Trump in 2018. The mission of the Department of Homeland Security's 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office is to reduce 
vulnerability and protect American cities from a WMD attack by 
supporting operational partners on the ground.
    For example, CWMD's Securing the Cities Program (STC) has equipped 
State and local agencies with nearly 48,000 items of equipment with 
detection and deterrence capabilities to protect communities across the 
country from radiological threats.\2\ In October 2023, a Houston police 
officer discovered ``dangerous levels of radiation'' in a metal 
scrapyard after his STC-provided personal radiation detector (RPD) 
detected radiation during his commute to work. The hazardous material 
was identified and safely removed. These capabilities are critical for 
safeguarding our homeland from WMDs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ CWMD Briefing. March 12, 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Last July, I attended the Securing the Cities annual conference, 
where emergency managers from across the country gathered for training 
and coordination. I was grateful to attend and proud of STC's work to 
fortify a network of State, local, and Federal partners that are 
committed to defending the United States from a potentially 
catastrophic nuclear or radiological attack.
    In October, CWMD held a ChemPrep program in Nassau County to review 
local chemical incident-related concerns, gaps, and vulnerabilities, 
and to discuss potential opportunities to optimize local preparedness. 
I was very pleased with the local outreach and support to first 
responders on Long Island.
    With numerous bad actors and threats confronting our Nation, CWMD 
has provided U.S. Customs and Border Protection with Radiation Portal 
Monitors to scan cargo for potential radiological threats.
    While the CWMD Office plays an essential role in equipping State 
and local partners with equipment and training to counter CBRN threats, 
there are opportunities to improve the effectiveness of this office. 
Although the Office was established to streamline internal DHS 
operations and coordination with States and localities, many re-
organizations have taken place, and workplace morale has consistently 
received low rankings by CWMD Office personnel.
    When the Department of Homeland Security Act was passed in 2002, 
Section 872 allowed the Secretary to reorganize, establish, or 
consolidate operations within the Department. In 2022, the Secretary 
used this authority to reallocate some health security and biosecurity 
functions to the newly-created Office of Health Security (OHS), less 
than 5 years since the Office of Health Affairs was reorganized into 
CWMD. Such constant restructuring can be confusing and frustrating for 
employees and stakeholders. I'm looking forward to learning more about 
the Office of Health Security, the benefits of its move out of CWMD, 
and differentiating between the biodefense work of OHS with that of 
CWMD.
    I am also eager to hear an update on CWMD's BioWatch program, which 
is a monitoring system that collects and tests air samples for 
biological agents that may be used in a bioterrorism attack. This 
program has not kept pace with technological advancements since it was 
first created in response to the 2001 anthrax attacks and requires 12-
36 hours before successfully verifying a biological agent and warning 
the public.
    In 2019, DHS began a major acquisition program, Biological 
Detection for the Twenty-First Century (BD-21), to move toward the next 
generation of national biodetection. BD-21 was intended to address some 
of BioWatch's limitations, including significantly shortening its time-
to-detect. However, it seems that BD-21 has been abandoned. The 
President's fiscal year 2025 budget request refers to the program as 
``obsolete'' and states that CWMD will transition into a new 
``Environmental Biodetection (EBD) Capability Development and 
Maturation'' project. I would like to understand how this new project 
will be different. Ultimately, I hope that CWMD is on a fast track to 
finally obtaining the biological detection technology that America 
needs.
    Despite the obstacles the CWMD Office has faced, I believe that we 
should work together to remedy these challenges and to help the Office 
succeed in its mission of enabling operational partners in preventing 
WMDs from ever harming our homeland. That is also why I was proud to 
introduce H.R. 3224, a bill to extend the authorization of this Office, 
and I urge my colleagues in the Senate to take up this bill. I look 
forward to hearing from our witnesses on the opportunities and 
challenges confronting the CWMD Office, as well as the Office of Health 
Security. Thank you all for your work in this field.

    Mr. D'Esposito. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 
gentleman and my good friend from Louisiana, Mr. Carter, for 
his opening statement.
    Mr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
    Good afternoon to our panel experts.
    I want to thank the witnesses for being here today to 
discuss the importance of countering weapons of mass 
destruction and the Office of Health Security.
    CWMD and OHS plays a critical role in fortifying our 
Nation's defense against threats that can pose considerable 
harm to our communities. CWMD improves our Nation's capability 
to plan for, detect, and guard against chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear threats.
    OHS is the central office. It serves as the principal 
medical work force, health and safety, and public health 
authority for some 260,000 Department of Homeland Security 
employees.
    Pursuant to CWMD Act of 2018, the office was set to sunset 
on December 21, 2023, but the sunset was subsequently extended, 
and now it's set to expire when the continuing resolution 
expires, which is on this Friday.
    I want to thank my friend and Chairman D'Esposito for 
working in a bipartisan manner in front to reauthorize CWMD. I 
am proud to cosponsor his bill, H.R. 3224, the Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Extension Act of 2023. As 
authorizers, we should do our part to make sure that all 
programs and offices have support and there is no question as 
to whether this office or any other office that protects the 
Nation from threats has an uncertain future.
    We should always--our No. 1 job is to make sure that we 
properly fund and provide the resources to keep America safe, 
notwithstanding whatever party or philosophical views we may 
have. This is, in fact, one of the most significant bipartisan 
issues that we have to undertake.
    CWMD operates critical programs like Securing the Cities, 
STC, which provides 14 local governments, including my home 
town. I was proud to be the lead sponsor on this bill.
    I know, Ms. Callahan, that you had the opportunity to visit 
New Orleans to do a walkthrough. So I hope you had a chance to 
enjoy the weather, the food, and, of course, the warm hearts of 
the people of New Orleans, my home town.
    With detection equipment, training exercise, support 
operation, technical subject-matter expertise, and programmatic 
support is so critically important to making sure that things 
like the Super Bowl and Mardi Gras and high-populated 
activities are safe, not just in New Orleans, but across the 
country, and certainly in the other 14 cities that are part of 
the STC. STC is working with New Orleans to prepare for the 
Super Bowl. We continue to support important events like Mardi 
Gras, Jazz Fest, the Sugar Bowl, any other reason.
    We have millions and millions of people who visit New 
Orleans for their--the hospitality and wonderful access to 
transportation and our world-class convention center. Shameless 
plug there. But we're also obviously very excited about having 
this extra barrier of protection because we know the threats 
are, in fact, real.
    I introduced H.R. 4403, the Securing the Cities Improvement 
Act, which passed the House earlier this month. My bill will 
help cities build and maintain their security capabilities 
against nuclear or radiological threats. I look forward to 
discussing the STC's impacts on domestic preparedness.
    While CWMD is doing great work, one concern that I have 
seen highlighted repeatedly in the Partnership for Public 
Service and the Government Accountability Office, GAO, report 
is internal morale issues.
    One GAO report highlighted the merger of predecessor 
offices under CWMD caused low morale and that the offices' 
missions were unclear under the new structure. Some employees 
had difficulty understanding how the missions should align 
under the new structure. However, a more recent GAO report has 
highlighted that CWMD is working on its work-force morale.
    I want to thank GAO for their work on helping the committee 
understand how this new office is functioning. I look forward 
to hearing today from CWMD how you have improved your work-
force morale.
    OHS is also an integral part of the Department and was 
formerly part of CWMD until 2022. As a separate component, OHS 
optimizes the health, wellness, and safety of the DHS work 
force and enhances efforts to counter health threats that pose 
risk to our Nation.
    In recent years, they have managed medical and public 
health initiatives to help thousands of people resettling in 
the United States through Operation Allies Welcome to--Welcome 
and Uniting for Ukraine. It is imperative to recognize and 
support the critical work carried out by both CWMD and OHS in 
securing our homeland.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today 
regarding the recent fiscal year 2025 budget request and any 
additional concerns and successes the office would like to 
discuss. We're here to serve. We're here to hear from you. 
We're here to determine how we as a committee can do more to 
make sure that your jobs are easier to do and that you are 
funded to do the things that you are Constitutionally-mandated 
to do, and that is to make sure that we have a safe and 
wholesome community.
    So with that, I yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Carter follows:]
                Statement of Ranking Member Troy Carter
                             March 20, 2024
    CWMD and OHS play a crucial role in fortifying our Nation's 
defenses against threats that could pose considerable harm to our 
communities. CWMD improves our Nation's capability to plan for, detect, 
and guard against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
(CBRN) threats. OHS is the central office that serves as the principal 
medical, workforce health and safety, and public health authority for 
the 260,000 Department of Homeland Security employees.
    Pursuant to the CWMD Act of 2018 the office was set to sunset on 
December 21, 2023, but the sunset was subsequently extended and is now 
set to expire when the continuing resolution expires, which is on 
Friday. I want to thank Chairman D'Esposito for working on a bipartisan 
front to reauthorize CWMD. I am a proud cosponsor of his bill, H.R. 
3224, the ``Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Extension Act of 
2023.'' As authorizers, we should do our part to make sure that all 
programs and offices have support and there is no question as to 
whether this office or any other office that protects the Nation from 
threats, has an uncertain future.
    CWMD operates critical programs, like Securing the Cities (STC), 
which provides 14 local governments, including New Orleans--my home, 
with detection equipment, training, exercise support, operational and 
technical subject-matter expertise, and programmatic support. STC is 
working with New Orleans to prepare for Super Bowl LIX (59) and 
continues to support important events such as Mardi Gras. To ensure 
such work is not hindered, I introduced H.R. 4403, the ``Securing the 
Cities Improvement Act,'' which passed the House earlier this month. My 
bill would help cities build and maintain their security capabilities 
against nuclear or radiological threats. I look forward to discussing 
STC's impact on domestic preparedness.
    While CWMD is doing great work, one concern that I have seen 
highlighted repeatedly in the Partnership for Public Service and the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports is internal morale 
issues. One GAO report highlighted that the merger of predecessor 
offices under CWMD caused low morale and that the Office's missions 
were unclear under the new structure. Some employees had difficulty 
understanding how their missions should align under the new structure.
    However, a more recent GAO report has highlighted that CWMD is 
working on its workforce morale. I want to thank GAO for their work on 
helping the committee understand how this new office is functioning. I 
look forward to hearing today how CWMD has improved workforce morale.
    OHS is also an integral part of the Department and was formerly 
part of CWMD until 2022. As a separate component, OHS optimizes the 
health, wellness, and safety of the DHS workforce and enhances efforts 
to counter health threats that pose a risk to our Nation. In recent 
years, they have managed medical and public health initiatives that 
have helped thousands of people resettling in the United States through 
Operations Allies Welcome and Uniting for Ukraine. It is imperative to 
recognize and support the critical work carried out by both CWMD and 
OHS in securing our homeland.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today regarding the 
recent fiscal year 2025 budget request and any additional concerns or 
successes the offices would like to discuss.

    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                             March 20, 2024
    The Department of Homeland Security's Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office (CWMD) and Office of Health Security (OHS) play 
vital roles in preparing the Nation against threats, whether natural or 
man-made. That is why I continue to be concerned about CWMD's 
authorization, which is currently scheduled to sunset on Friday.
    This committee has worked on a bipartisan extension for CWMD, but 
it is not yet law. Congress needs to pass a long-term reauthorization 
for the office. I look forward to arriving at a solution so CWMD can 
continue to fulfill its important role in homeland security.
    Under past leadership, there have been questions and criticisms 
about CWMD's technologies and workforce morale. In 2019, I worked on a 
bicameral, bipartisan effort with the Senate to encourage more 
transparency at CWMD and obtain information about the programs that 
were the subject of criticism. One such program was Biowatch, CWMD's 
premier biodetection program. This program is now over 20 years old and 
has not had significant updates during its life. CWMD initiated BD-21, 
an acquisition program to replace the aging BioWatch technology, but 
the anticipated upgrades have not come to fruition.
    Last year, the Department announced the Environmental BioDetection 
Capability Development and Maturation Project, which appears to be the 
next step in biodetection. I look forward to learning more about this 
project today. CWMD's workforce morale issues have repeatedly been 
identified as a concern, as I mentioned. Since its establishment, CWMD 
has been either ranked the lowest or close to the lowest in the annual 
Best Places to Work in the Federal Government survey. I look forward to 
hearing how Assistant Secretary Callahan has been working to improve 
employee morale and what plans there are for the future. The morale and 
mental health of the DHS workforce has long been a priority of mine.
    This Congress, I introduced H.R. 2577, the Suicide Prevention and 
Resiliency for Law Enforcement Act, which directs DHS to address the 
mental health and wellness of its agents and officers in a 
comprehensive manner to improve care and reduce the stigma associated 
with seeking help. H.R. 2577 would establish the Law Enforcement Mental 
Health and Wellness Program to be overseen by the Department's Chief 
Medical Officer, who we have before us today.
    Established in 2022, the Office of Health Security is tasked with 
ensuring DHS workforce resiliency and emergency response planning, 
policy, and oversight in collaboration with other agencies. In recent 
years, OHS has also overseen the medical and public health programs for 
tens of thousands of people resettling in the United States--these 
programs include Operations Allies Welcome and Uniting for Ukraine.
    I look forward to hearing today how OHS, while still very new, is 
pursuing its mission and working with other components at DHS.

    Mr. D'Esposito. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel 
of witnesses before us today on this very important topic 
critical to our national security.
    I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right 
hand.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Mr. D'Esposito. Let the record reflect that the witnesses 
have answered in the affirmative.
    You may be seated. Thank you.
    I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
    The Honorable Mary Ellen Callahan serves as the assistant 
secretary for the Department of Homeland Security's Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Office. CWMD leads DHS efforts to 
safeguard the United States of America against chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. Previously, Ms. 
Callahan served as the chief of staff to the deputy secretary 
of the Department.
    Dr. Herbert Wolfe is the acting chief medical officer and 
acting director of the Office of Health Security for DHS. He 
oversees the medical, public health, and work force health and 
safety activities across the Department. Prior to the 
establishment of OHS, he served as the deputy assistant 
secretary for health security within CWMD.
    Dr. Tina Won Sherman is the director in the Government 
Accountability's Office Homeland Security and Justice team. She 
oversees work on the protection of the Nation's critical 
infrastructure assets, the security of the United States 
transportation system, and additional equities within the 
Department of Homeland Security, including the CWMD office.
    I thank all the witnesses for taking the time and being 
here with us today.
    I now recognize Ms. Callahan for 5 minutes to summarize her 
opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF MARY ELLEN CALLAHAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 
  COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY

    Ms. Callahan. Chairman D'Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
inviting me to speak with you today. I appreciate the 
opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office and our efforts 
to safeguard the Nation from chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear threats, also known as CBRN.
    The DHS CWMD Office has a unique value proposition in the 
CBRN space. CWMD was created by Congress 5 years ago to be a 
single point of CBRN expertise within DHS. We are the hub for 
the Department's weapons of mass destruction, or WMD/CBRN 
activities, providing coordination, strategy, and policy 
guidance, intelligence analysis, operational support, and 
researching technologies. With your support, the creation of an 
office solely focused on CBRN threats streamlined the ability 
of DHS to resource and execute this critical mission.
    My priorities for the office include focusing on the 
outstanding CWMD employees and bolstering our relationships 
with our important State, local, and Federal partners. I have 
been leading CWMD for 8 months. The work force at CWMD is among 
the most talented, mission-focused, and knowledgeable work 
forces I have ever experienced. At its founding, however, the 
office faced challenges, including frequent leadership changes, 
faltering morale, and staff turnover.
    Therefore, my first priority at CWMD is to further build a 
collaborative, safe, and productive work environment. The CWMD 
team deserves this. With that said, the uncertainty around 
CWMD's future has had a devastating effect on the morale and 
retention of the office's highly-skilled and in-demand work 
force.
    My employee morale and well-being plan has three elements. 
First, we've been encouraging professional development, 
including individual development plans and professional 
training. We've just launched a mentoring program where I am 
among the mentors.
    Second, we are working to better integrate the activities 
of each of the 5 directorates to make sure that the CWMD staff 
has complete awareness of the office missions. As a result of 
education and communication, I've seen better synergies and 
coordination between and among the directorates, which leads to 
a more engaged work force.
    Third, we are looking for ways to connect with our 
colleagues on a more personal note. We host quarterly in-person 
get-togethers in our establishing interest groups. I hold 
weekly office hours to engage with the work force one-on-one.
    All of these actions are playing a significant role in 
improving CWMD's employee morale. However, without enduring 
reauthorization, CWMD will likely face steady attrition.
    In addition to better integrating my office, I'm committed 
to strengthening our assistance to and our relationship with 
our stakeholders, including our State, local, and Federal 
partners.
    CWMD has integrated the prevention and detection of all 
CBRN threats with our DHS partners through training, equipment, 
and technical assistance to CBP, HSI, TSA, Coast Guard, and 
Secret Service. We also serve as a peer organization to CISA 
and FEMA in the life cycle of CBRN incident management. We, of 
course, work seamlessly with our colleagues at the Office of 
Health Security on public health and biological threats.
    I'm working to further the operational--further integrate 
the operational support of all of these components with our 
planning, research, and support work at CWMD.
    Even with all this Federal activity, the most unique role 
CWMD plays in the CBRN ecosystem is our relationship with State 
and locals. CWMD provides radiological and nuclear detection 
capabilities in 14 high-risk regions in the United States 
through the Securing the City programs. Those regions are 
preparing to work seamlessly with the FBI and the Department of 
Energy in the event of an incident.
    On Monday, I was in New Orleans, along with Representative 
Carter's team and the FBI and DOE, in order to see a portion of 
the CBRN preparation for the 2025 Super Bowl, along with city 
and State teams. Last year, Securing the City trained over 
14,000 State and local first responders. Our BioWatch program 
is in over 30 jurisdictions. We are working to update our 
environmental biodetection capabilities, all while providing 
steady-state coverage for these jurisdictions.
    Between Securing the City and BioWatch, CWMD provides 
steady-state detection for 40 percent of the population. For 
the rest of the country, our mobile detection deployment team 
was deployed 188 times last year, providing support in 48 
States, 2 territories, and 1 Tribal unit. All of this work with 
our stakeholders is intended to prepare and promote collective 
readiness and to safeguard the Nation from CBRN threats in the 
homeland.
    Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you for this opportunity to 
speak with you today.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Callahan follows:]
               Prepared Statement of Mary Ellen Callahan
                             March 20, 2024
                              introduction
    Chairman D'Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and distinguished 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak with 
you today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office's 
(CWMD) efforts to safeguard the Nation from chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats.
    The DHS CWMD Office has a unique role and value proposition in the 
CBRN space. Established in accordance with Public Law 115-387, the 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018, (CWMD Act of 2018) 
CWMD is the single point of CBRN expertise within the Department and 
the linchpin to detect CBRN threats in the homeland. I thank our 
dedicated experts in CWMD, and our Federal, State, and local partners 
for their commitment to the Nation's security.
    CBRN threats present dynamic challenges to the Nation's security. 
These threats may emanate from nation-states, terrorists, lone actors, 
violent extremists, or natural causes. The risks are constantly 
evolving due to the evolution of technologies--for example, artificial 
intelligence (AI)--as well as the potential of spillover of animal 
pathogens to human populations.
    Responding to this threat environment, CWMD is the hub for the 
Department's WMD/CBRN activities, providing coordination, strategy and 
policy guidance, intelligence analysis, operations support, and 
developing and deploying CBRN technologies through our research, 
development, testing, evaluation, and acquisition initiatives. With 
your support, the creation of an office solely focused on WMD/CBRN 
threats has elevated and streamlined the ability of DHS to successfully 
resource and execute this critical mission, including further 
integrating the prevention and detection of all CBRN threats with our 
DHS stakeholders.
    CWMD is better able to protect the homeland through its 
relationships with State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) 
partners in order to equip them with CBRN training, equipment, 
technical assistance, and exercises. SLTT first responders are likely 
to be the first to identify a CBRN incident. As a Nation, we are better 
protected in light of CWMD's expansive relationships throughout the 
Nation-wide CBRN ecosystem. This enhanced protection is a direct result 
of the CWMD Act of 2018.
    I appreciate the subcommittee's leadership and bipartisan efforts 
to reauthorize CWMD and applaud House passage of H.R. 3224, the 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Extension Act of 2023. I look 
forward to your continued support and stand ready to assist in the on-
going CWMD reauthorization process. An on-going challenge is the 
termination of CWMD. I will reflect upon some of these challenges 
throughout this testimony.
    In August 2023, I assumed the role of assistant secretary for CWMD. 
My priorities for the Office are to (1) maintain a collaborative, safe, 
and productive work environment; (2) ensure risk-based mission 
capability across the broad spectrum of CBRN threats, including 
ensuring that CBRN detection acquisition programs are informed by both 
intelligence and stakeholder requirements; (3) further integrate CWMD's 
support and partnerships into DHS operational components and 
Headquarters offices, including the Science and Technology Directorate, 
and the Office of Health Security; (4) broaden partnerships across the 
Federal Government; and (5) strengthen assistance to and the 
relationships with SLTT partners.
    CWMD provides extensive training, equipment, and technical 
assistance to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Homeland 
Security Investigations, Transportation Security Administration, United 
States Coast Guard, and United States Secret Service. We also serve as 
a peer organization to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the life 
cycle of CBRN incident management.
    The President's fiscal year 2025 budget requests $418 million to 
support 259 Federal staff and the programs critical to the CWMD 
mission. CWMD allocates the $418 million across 4 appropriations: 
Operations and Support; Research and Development; Procurement, 
Construction, & Improvements; and Federal Assistance--largely to SLTTs.
    The programs, activities, and funding request that I will discuss 
today represent some, but by no means all of CWMD's work to mitigate 
the risks to the homeland.
         risk-informed approach to protect against cbrn threats
    CWMD conducts national and tailored threat- and location-dependent 
risk assessments to support decision making to protect the homeland 
from CBRN threats. Our capstone document, the CBRN Strategic Risk 
Assessment Summary (SRAS), provides a comprehensive, data-driven 
approach that integrates CBRN threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
information to inform DHS and SLTT stakeholder decision making related 
to risk. The outputs from the SRAS are used to analyze existing 
capability gaps identified within the CBRN defense architecture with 
the intent of reducing CBRN risk as well as assisting in resource 
prioritization for FSLTT partners.
    CWMD is building upon its long-standing, legislatively-mandated 
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture in developing chemical and 
biological defense architectures. These nascent architectures will 
allow CWMD to better understand the complex CBRN defense space by 
identifying key stakeholder capabilities needed to coordinate 
detection, analysis, and reporting of unauthorized uses of WMD/CBRN 
materials and weapons. The architectures will assist CWMD and our 
partners in conducting data-driven, defensible analytical activities 
such as capabilities-based assessments to identify and inform 
mitigation of capability gaps, including strategy, policy, operations, 
and resource allocation decisions.
            cbrn threats enhanced by artificial intelligence
    CWMD is evaluating emerging technology threats in WMD/CBRN, such as 
from AI. Responsible use of AI holds great promise for advancing 
science, analyzing large complex datasets beyond human cognitive 
abilities, solving urgent and future challenges, and improving daily 
life. However, potential AI misuse poses consequential risk, requiring 
society-wide mitigation efforts.
    The variety of publicly-available AI models provides physical and 
life science researchers the enhanced ability to ideate novel 
biological and chemical agents and design experiments and to 
troubleshoot experimental procedures encountered during experiments. As 
AI technologies advance, use of these tools will likely lower the 
barrier for all actors across the sophistication spectrum to 
conceptualize and conduct CBRN attacks. To contain these risks, 
government and industry must work together to reinforce policies and 
codes of conduct based on voluntary commitments to mitigate against 
misuse of AI and AI-enabled tools.
    Integration of AI into CBRN prevention, detection, response, and 
mitigation capabilities could yield important or emergent benefits. 
CWMD has already started applying AI to certain fields such as cargo 
screening, biosurveillance, and detection technologies, but other areas 
are fertile for further research in our mission. In each of these 
areas, developing an appropriate adoption strategy for next-generation 
AI-enabled technologies and interagency collaboration and lessons 
learned will be vital to implementation success.
    DHS, in coordination with the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy and the Department of Energy, is tasked with 
conducting an evaluation of the CBRN-specific risks of AI and how AI 
could be applied to mitigating CBRN threats. CWMD's centralized role 
and subject-matter expertise enable us to explore ways to leverage AI 
for our collective benefit while identifying novel CBRN risks to the 
homeland because of lower barriers to entry for malign actors. CWMD is 
supporting the Secretary's mandate in the Executive Order on Artificial 
Intelligence to evaluate the potential for AI to be misused to enable 
the development or production of CBRN threats.
   warning of biological threats and incidents in time to save lives
    CWMD's flagship biodefense programs aim to provide early warning of 
biological attacks or incidents with the goal of enabling a rapid 
response to save lives.
National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC)
    The National Biosurveillance Integration Center integrates, 
analyzes, and distributes information about on-going and emerging 
biological incidents to help ensure the Nation's responses at all 
levels of government are well-informed, save lives, and minimize 
economic impact. NBIC is unique in the biosurveillance community in 
that it looks across all biological threats--pandemics, accidents, and 
bioterrorism--and across multiple sectors--wildlife, human health, 
agriculture, and the environment. NBIC also provides deep analysis on 
the impact of these biological threats to homeland security.
    NBIC disseminates biosurveillance tools, analysis, and information 
to support common situational awareness and operational responses. NBIC 
is expanding its reach into partner biosurveillance organizations and 
systems to greatly enhance its analytic capabilities to handle the 
increasing complex information needs of leaders within the Department 
as well as our Federal and SLTT partners.
BioWatch
    As the homeland's only operational biodetection capability, CWMD's 
BioWatch Program gives warning of an airborne bioterrorist attack in 
over 30 major metropolitan areas across the United States, covering 
over a third of the U.S. population. Outward signs and symptoms of a 
biological attack may emerge slowly. BioWatch can detect the presence 
of certain biological agents in the air after release by a terrorist or 
other bad actor in order to marshal an earlier response.
    Managed by CWMD, the BioWatch program is locally operated and 
supports coordination among scientists, laboratory technicians, 
emergency managers, law enforcement officers, and public health 
officials. Partnerships developed through participation in BioWatch 
have led to vast collaboration and planning efforts across all aspects 
of the CWMD mission. This includes more than 300 trainings delivered by 
BioWatch staff annually to nearly 1,700 jurisdictional stakeholders and 
Federal interagency partners covering all aspects of CWMD's 
biodetection, incident characterization, and notification and response 
activities. CWMD's comprehensive CBRN mission provides training and 
layered defenses for all the BioWatch jurisdictions.
    Additionally, the program facilitates over 100 exercises and drills 
in the jurisdictions per year. These activities not only help the 
jurisdictional stakeholders in their individual preparedness efforts, 
but provide countless opportunities to engage with other stakeholders, 
establish relationships and communication strategies, and improve 
overall situational awareness of partner activities that is vital to 
enable an effective response to an incident of any kind.
    The BioWatch technology is proven, reliable, using polymerase chain 
reaction technology (PCR). PCR technology is the national standard and 
results are laboratory validated.
Environmental Biological Detection (EBD)
    CWMD has the mission to aid in the detection of biological agents 
that pose the highest risk to public health and safety. CWMD's EBD 
efforts attempt to expand capabilities using a risk-based approach and 
advance developments that enable broader detection capabilities and 
decrease the time line for treatment of aerosolized biological attacks.
    Current EBD activities include the development of capabilities to 
improve warnings to public health officials, better inform SLTT 
response, and accelerate treatment decisions. EBD is focused on 
developing and deploying near-term mature technologies to meet BioWatch 
enhancement recommendations from our recent Integrated Project Team 
review, completed with input from SLTT stakeholders. EBD will also 
incorporate developing modeling capabilities, cybersecurity 
capabilities, and technology solutions.
               chemical preparedness and chemical defense
Chemical Preparedness
    CWMD established the ChemPREP Program to partner with SLTT 
stakeholders to examine each local jurisdiction's unique chemical risks 
and vulnerabilities, evaluate their ability to respond, and provide 
training to enhance their readiness. ChemPREP also seeks to connect 
local jurisdictions with other Federal resources to improve 
coordination and overall preparedness.
    CWMD has conducted 7 ChemPREP engagements in 5 States (NY, MA, FL, 
AZ, TX) working with front-line responders from 14 Federal 
organizations and 109 State and local organizations and partners 
including from Nassau and Suffolk Counties in New York. We are planning 
with New Orleans, LA to assess and optimize security in the 
jurisdiction in advance of next year's Super Bowl. In an effort to 
accelerate and expand the chemical defense knowledge base throughout 
the country for our SLTT partners, in fiscal year 2024 CWMD is working 
with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers to develop 
standardized ChemPREP training for wider distribution.
Chemical Defense
    In response to a 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit, 
CWMD established the DHS Chemical Coordination Group (CCG) in 2019 to 
meet the evolving threat from chemical attacks and incidents. This body 
is composed of representatives from DHS offices and agencies with 
significant chemical defense equities and serves as the primary 
coordination mechanism for DHS chemical defense. CWMD has hosted 3 DHS 
Chemical Defense Program Reviews, bringing DHS components together to 
do deeper-dive discussions on topical areas.
                  intelligence and information sharing
    The Intelligence Division of CWMD serves as the departmental lead 
for intelligence support related to all CBRN threats while also 
providing intelligence support to the DHS Office of Health Security and 
other Federal agencies on food, agriculture, veterinary, and health 
security threats. The Division provides strategic and operational 
threat intelligence and expertise to ensure DHS and its Federal and 
SLTT partners are equipped with timely and accurate intelligence to 
plan for, detect, and protect against threats. Supporting national and 
Departmental strategic objectives, the Intelligence Division produces 
an annual CWMD Homeland Threat Assessment to inform senior leaders and 
policy makers.
    At the operational level, we provide threat intelligence on foreign 
and domestic CBRN threats; naturally-occurring environmental threats; 
and food, agriculture, veterinary, and health security threats. The 
Division also creates tailored products and presentations to Federal 
and SLTT partners and stakeholders upon request.
    In fiscal year 2023, the Division published its third annual 
program of analysis. Through more effective planning, the division 
increased overall production to 263 products from fiscal year 2022 to 
fiscal year 2023. The division also saw a significant increase in 
unique organizational customers; new customers included DHS operational 
components and headquarters offices, the Food and Drug Administration, 
and Department of State.
  detecting radiological and nuclear (r/n) threats to prevent attacks
    An act of radiological or nuclear (R/N) terrorism could have a 
devastating impact on the United States. DHS began the Securing the 
Cities (STC) Program to enhance the Nation's ability to detect and 
prevent terrorist attacks and other high-consequence events using 
nuclear or other radiological materials. CWMD provides detection 
equipment, training, exercise support, operational and technical 
subject-matter expertise, and programmatic support through a 
cooperative agreement grant process with eligible U.S. regions. STC is 
functioning in 14 high-risk areas across the Nation. The STC Program 
uses a regional approach to R/N detection that allows for a layered 
defense posture to increase the probability of detection. In addition, 
coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department 
of Energy, and their specialized teams ensures a timely hand-off and 
rapid response to possible terrorism.
    The program works close with STC stakeholders in these 
jurisdictions, including training and equipping first responders and 
law enforcement officials with specialized R/N equipment, and providing 
support for R/N detection exercises. Each region is creating its R/N 
training and detection protocols in consultation with CWMD. Several of 
the STC regions are sprinting toward maturation to be prepared for the 
2026 World Cup. In 2023, STC facilitated approximately 330 training 
courses with over 14,000 SLTT operators trained.
    CWMD's Mobile Detection Deployment Program (MDDP) enhances CBRN 
detection and R/N interdiction capabilities by deploying equipment and 
technical support for State and local surge operations and events of 
national significance. MDDP significantly expands our protective 
footprint to help support SLTT law enforcement in CBRN detection. In 
fiscal year 2023, MDDP was deployed 180 times into 42 States, 2 
territories, and 1 Tribal area.
      developing and deploying technologies to support operations
    CWMD works to ensure implementation of robust domestic CBRN 
detection architectures through deployment of technologies. CWMD's 
research and development (R&D) program manages efforts to develop and 
demonstrate science and technologies that address gaps in the detection 
architecture, improve performance of CBRN detection and analysis, and 
reduce the operational burden of detection systems in the field. CWMD 
R&D's mission is to provide novel solutions that can be implemented in 
the field, and at scale. CWMD's Test and Evaluation Division conducts 
rigorous and comprehensive assessments to ensure that the technologies 
acquired by CWMD are both effective and suitable for the CBRN detection 
and prevention mission.
    CWMD's Acquisition Division develops, acquires, and supports CBRN 
detection systems to deliver capabilities for operational partners to 
counter WMD threats. For example, CWMD's Acquisition Division is 
deploying 216 new enhanced Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) at specific 
high-volume ports of entry, improving detection capability and 
minimizing nuisance alarms. Moreover, CWMD is collaborating with CBP to 
minimize close-proximity interference between non-intrusive inspection 
equipment and existing RPM technology. CWMD acquires small-scale 
portable CBRN detection systems that can be carried, moved, or worn by 
the user. Most recently, from fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2024, 
CWMD procured over 36,000 new Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs) for 
the DHS operational components and STC partners.
                           the cwmd workforce
    The CWMD workforce is among the best and brightest in the Federal 
Government who work behind the scenes. The accomplishments of this team 
make the Nation safer.
    Initially, the office faced challenges, including frequent 
leadership changes, faltering morale, and staff turnover as discussed 
in the July 2022 GAO report, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
DHS Office Has Opportunities to Improve Partner Services and Employee 
Morale (GAO-22-106133), subsequently there were some promising signs in 
improving morale and stakeholder feedback.
    Uncertainty around CWMD's future reversed many of those gains and 
had a devastating effect on the morale and retention of the office's 
highly skilled and in-demand workforce. From October 2023 through 
February 2024, CWMD lost 24 Federal employees, approximately 10 percent 
of our Federal workforce, with 12 employees leaving in December 2023 
alone--more than 3 times the average loss in a month. This represents a 
loss over 300 person-years of CWMD/CBRN experience. Backfilling these 
critical vacancies should help morale, but a long-term or permanent 
reauthorization is paramount to attracting and retaining high-quality 
candidates.
    CWMD leadership recognizes that transparency and keeping staff 
informed are critical to an engaged workforce. Since September, I 
conducted 17 virtual town halls with an average of 450 staff and 
contractors. The primary topics for the town halls last autumn were 
related to potential office termination; since January, we have focused 
the town halls on mission highlights from the staff perspective, 
employee resources, our mentoring program, social events, and office 
engagements.
    I hold open office hours to engage with the workforce collectively 
and one-on-one in order to hear directly what is most important to 
them. I have also sent 25 weekly newsletters and bulletins highlighting 
the key work of the agency and upcoming events. Additionally, CWMD 
hosted 6 Lunch & Learns with an average of 130 participants.
    All these actions play a significant role in improving CWMD 
employee morale. However, without long-term or permanent 
reauthorization, CWMD will face steady attrition. The administration 
has long sought permanent reauthorization to ensure CWMD has a fully-
engaged workforce capable of continuing critical national security 
programs that support front-line operators and local communities.
                               conclusion
    CWMD remains focused on countering CBRN threats. While we are a 
relatively new office, we have matured quickly. We closely coordinate 
DHS efforts across the countering-WMD mission, provide our Federal and 
SLTT partners with CBRN detection equipment, and run programs to 
protect the Nation from CBRN security threats.
    CWMD's unique role and value proposition in the CBRN space is the 
cornerstone of providing layered prevention and detection of CBRN 
threats. CWMD is the linchpin between our DHS and SLTT stakeholders and 
the Federal partners who would provide the response in the event of a 
CBRN incident. We are maturing detection and preparation capabilities 
to support stakeholders, while also better integrating our unique 
expertise within the Department and the overall CBRN ecosystem. I am 
committed to ensuring the CWMD prevention and detection mission is 
well-integrated with our DHS operational components and offices.
    On behalf of the CWMD staff who work tirelessly to keep the 
homeland and the American people safe, I look forward to our continued 
work with Congress to achieve an enduring reauthorization of our 
office. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look 
forward to your questions.

    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Ms. Callahan, and thank you for 
your work.
    I now recognize Dr. Wolfe for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF HERBERT O. WOLFE, MHS-PA, ACTING CHIEF MEDICAL 
   OFFICER, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HEALTH SECURITY, U.S. 
                DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Wolfe. Chairman D'Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today about the great work being done by 
the dedicated personnel of the Office of Health Security, or 
OHS. It's truly an honor to be here today to talk about the 
work that we are doing.
    I have served as the acting chief medical officer and 
acting director since January 2023, and prior to that, as the 
deputy chief medical officer and deputy director since the 
office creation in 2022. I joined the Department in 2019 after 
nearly 30 years of Federal public service.
    The challenges of the past 5 years exemplify how nearly 
every homeland security threat has a health security nexus. 
From acts of terror to a global pandemic, surges in migration, 
cyber attacks directed at critical infrastructure, including 
health care, natural disasters across the country, to 
international response efforts spanning nearly every continent, 
DHS is at the center of it all and often operating as the lead 
Federal agency.
    To answer the enduring health security challenges we face, 
DHS established OHS in July 2022 to serve as the principal 
medical, work force health and safety, and public health 
authority for DHS. The dedication of our staff and our earnest 
response to these challenges reflect the earnest--or enduring 
impact, hope, and vision of OHS; one that is grounded in 
agility, subject-matter and technical expertise, deep 
relationships with our interagency and State and local 
partners, and an unwavering commitment to the physical and 
mental health resiliency of our work force in the Nation.
    Today, OHS positions the Department to have a proactive, 
unified, and robust response to the ever-evolving health 
security landscape. Health security is, after all, a core tenet 
of homeland security.
    The over 260,000 dedicated men, women, and working animals 
of the Department work tirelessly to secure the Nation from the 
many threats we face. The office that I am privileged to lead, 
which is comprised of exceptionally talented medical, public 
health, and work force and health safety experts, collaborates 
with leaders from across the Department, the interagency, and 
with our State and local partners to strengthen the Nation's 
health security while providing for a safer and healthier DHS 
work force.
    Health, after all, is our greatest possession, and I'm 
proud to serve alongside many who are leading and championing 
the physical, mental, and work-life health of the DHS work 
force, including those on the front line.
    Those in the work force that we serve include 90,000 front-
line law enforcement officers and agents, 44,000 U.S. Coast 
Guard uniform members, 4,000 EMTs and paramedics, 640 United 
States Public Health Service Commissioned Corps officers, 
60,000 civilian employees who are veterans, and 4,000 four-
legged employees of the Department. We also provide leadership 
and oversight of DHS, medical and public health policy, 
standards of care, and health care services provided to 
noncitizens, ensuring the delivery of high-quality care to 
those in our custody.
    I stand in awe and am humbled by the commitment of my OHS 
colleagues. I've had the privilege to lead them as we mobilized 
to stand up our domestic public health measures in response to 
the Ukraine-Russia conflict, to deploy to the Southwest Border 
to provide technical public health assistance and 
implementation of care improvement actions, to build on the 
lessons learned from Operation Allies Welcome, to work 
tirelessly with our partners on the food security is homeland 
security mission, to plan for and enable better preparedness 
and response to the health and medical impacts of CBRN, to 
ensure we optimize mental health and wellness resources for our 
work force, to leverage research and development and academic 
partners to develop approaches to known and novel health 
threats, to harness technology to provide high-quality data and 
analysis to program managers and decision makers, and last but 
not least, to assist our EMTs and paramedics on missions around 
the United States, and so much more.
    Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the subcommittee, 
on behalf of the incredible, talented, and dedicated team at 
OHS that works at the intersection of health security and 
homeland security, as well as all the public health, medical, 
and work force health and safety teammates across the 
Department, we thank you for your support. I look forward to 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Wolfe follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Herbert O. Wolfe
                             March 20, 2024
                              introduction
    Chairman D'Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and distinguished 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify 
today on the important work of the Department of Homeland Security's 
(DHS or Department) Office of Health Security (OHS). I appreciate the 
opportunity to discuss the workforce health and safety, medical, and 
public health activities of the Department.
    I have served as the acting chief medical officer and acting 
director of OHS since January 2023, and prior to that, as the deputy 
chief medical officer and deputy director since the establishment of 
OHS in July 2022. I joined DHS in 2019, after nearly 30 years of 
Federal public service across multiple U.S. Government agencies 
including the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the 
U.S. Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the 
intelligence community. I look forward to speaking about how DHS is 
strengthening our Nation's health security through leadership and 
partnership, a safer and healthier DHS workforce, and optimal care for 
those entrusted to us.
         health security at the forefront of homeland security
    The challenges of the past 5 years exemplify how nearly every 
homeland security threat has a nexus to health security. From acts of 
terror to a global pandemic, surges in migration to cyber attacks 
directed at critical infrastructure sectors such as health care, 
natural disasters across the country to international response efforts 
spanning nearly every continent--DHS is at the center of it all and 
often operating as the lead Federal agency. I want to start by 
highlighting the work we are doing to protect our greatest asset--the 
extraordinary DHS workforce.
    Each and every day, the over 260,000 dedicated personnel--in 
addition to nearly 4,000 working animals--perform remarkable duties at 
land, air, and sea, in disaster zones, and at the many offices that 
enable our frontline workforce to deliver services efficiently and 
effectively. This mission is both dynamic and relentless and OHS makes 
it a priority to protect those who protect the Nation.
    The Department effectuates our mission through an integrated 
framework of policies, programs, standards, and practices--recognizing 
an intrinsic linkage between psychological, physical, and emotional 
health. In addition to revitalizing the DHS Safety and Health 
Leadership Council, the Department became an affiliate member in the 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health's Total Worker 
Health Program in 2023 and continues to make significant enhancements 
to our workforce safety, protection, and resiliency programs.
    DHS prioritizes programs focused on mental health and wellness, 
particularly for law enforcement personnel serving on the front line 
and the nearly 60,000 veterans within the DHS workforce. We appreciate 
Congress' support for legislation to advance critical psychological 
readiness programs such as peer support, stigma reduction, lethal means 
safety, and our capabilities to understand and reduce suicides through 
a systematic, standardized, and data-driven approach. OHS led the 
revision and finalization of an updated DHS Workforce Health and 
Wellness Program that expands the category of health promotion 
activities to include mental health and new types of physical fitness. 
The inclusion of mental health into this new policy positions DHS as a 
leader across the Federal Government, offering the workforce dedicated 
time to address their mental wellness.
    We are also exploring innovative ways to expand and standardize 
Employee Assistance Programs, including for our international 
workforce, and Dependent Care Programs such as child care subsidy and 
emergency back-up care. DHS increased offerings of initiatives such as 
micro-workouts, mindful minutes, and Wellness Wednesdays that help 
employees and their family members balance work-life responsibilities 
and improve physical health. These programs--and many more--provide our 
operational components with front-line employees greater flexibility to 
implement workforce health and wellness programs consistent with and 
aligned to their specific mission, operational requirements, and 
workforce needs. Healthier and supported DHS employees keep the Nation 
and the communities in which we live and serve, safer.
    OHS works closely with diverse governmental and nongovernmental 
partners to promote the delivery of high-quality health care for those 
in our care and custody. This year, we look forward to operationalizing 
the DHS Child Well-Being Program. This program will deploy licensed and 
experienced mental health professionals across all U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) Southwest Border Sectors to support the well-
being of children in our care through trauma-informed, culturally-
sensitive support, and coordination. The Program will augment existing 
processes that impact children without increasing time in custody and 
enable CBP to focus its resources on those who pose a threat to our 
national security, public safety, and border security.
    To support medical and public health planning in the maritime mass 
migration environment, OHS collaborated with the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG) and Homeland Security Task Force--Southeast (HSTF-SE) to update 
Operation Vigilant Sentry (OVS), Annex Q for Medical, Health, and 
Safety for the first time in a decade. Since 2022, OHS brought together 
over 20 organizations--including many State and local agencies--via 18 
exercises and planning workshops, culminating in the finalization and 
issuance of a new Annex Q in May 2023. However, our work did not stop 
there; OHS and HSTF-SE partners continue to collaborate in a series of 
validation exercises and workshops.
    Alongside many partners, OHS had a significant role in coordinating 
domestic medical and public health activities during Operation Allies 
Welcome (OAW). In the months after, we found that many organizations 
shared DHS's desire to improve operations, implement changes based on 
the experiences, and strengthen preparedness for future medical 
operations during global mass movement of displaced individuals. In 
October 2023, OHS hosted a multi-agency workshop in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania with 40 attendees from 18 different agencies, including 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Administration for 
Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR), Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), and State and local partners--all collaborating 
on ensuring that lessons learned do not become lessons lost. Like OVS, 
we continue this important work and are excited to plan for the next 
in-person workshop in Philadelphia in May 2024.
    The Department also supports response efforts to mitigate the 
impacts of infectious diseases. OHS actively represents DHS equities in 
multi-lateral engagements related to global health security initiatives 
like the International Health Regulations, Pandemic Accord, and the 
North American Preparedness for Animal and Human Pandemics Initiative. 
In collaboration with the CDC, OHS co-leads an interagency effort to 
update the Federal coordination framework for mass isolation and 
quarantine in response to an infectious diseases event.
    OHS also coordinates the Department's food, agriculture, and 
veterinary (FAV) defense activities. Over the past 6 months, OHS led 
the development of the first national-level risk assessment for the 
food and agriculture sector in support of the November 2022, National 
Security Memorandum (NSM) 16 on Strengthening the Security and 
Resilience of U.S. Food and Agriculture. This assessment was conducted 
in coordination with Sector Risk Management Agencies to identify high-
consequence and catastrophic incidents impacting the sector's critical 
infrastructure, essential workforce, and consequences of climate 
change. This first risk assessment also establishes an iterative cycle 
to evaluate high-level risks to the food and agriculture sector. In 
partnership with agencies such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
we are also advancing other deliverables in NSM-16 that DHS will lead 
and partner on.
    OHS success is achieved through partnerships. For example, some of 
our closest partners within DHS include the Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office, the Science and Technology Directorate, the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, FEMA, and USCG. OHS 
works side-by-side with DHS components by providing the critical 
subject-matter expertise and technical assistance on public health and 
medical aspects of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, FAV, 
and global health security threats--a ``One-DHS-Health'' model of 
coordination.
              maturation of the office of health security
    July 2024 marks the second anniversary of OHS's establishment. 
Congressional support has helped to create and sustain an innovative 
organization that recognizes the interconnected nature of health and 
unites previously fragmented lines of effort within DHS to enable and 
oversee proactive and holistic health security preparedness, response, 
and recovery. OHS is uniquely positioned for highly-specialized 
missions including mobilization of expertise to improve medical 
operations management for DHS missions and to enhance DHS's role as a 
support agency for multiple Emergency Support Functions.
    OHS deeply appreciates working side-by-side with our operational 
partners. In order to meet mission requirements at the point of 
delivery, OHS is building its regional footprint by forward-deploying 
highly specialized clinicians to all 10 domestic geographic regions as 
defined by FEMA and ASPR. Currently, OHS has personnel rostered in 
regions 5, 6, and 9, with plans to further develop our regional 
footprint. Focusing on the nexus of public safety, medicine, and public 
health, these Federal personnel--with qualifications in areas such as 
emergency medicine, trauma and critical care, medical toxicology, and 
infectious diseases--serve as an important technical resource for DHS 
operational components and State and local, Tribal, territorial, and 
other stakeholders.
    OHS continues to make significant strides to unify and standardize 
the provision of health care services across the Department. For 
example, as part of our role in supporting the 4,000+ personnel of the 
DHS Emergency Medical Services (EMS) System, we reinstated the DHS EMS 
Training and Education Advisory Council (EMSTEAC). The EMSTEAC is the 
focal point for standardization of EMS-related protocols, procedures, 
austere medicine coursework and other training, and high-quality 
working dog handler medical care programs.
    OHS is advancing programs that unify and integrate DHS medical and 
public health data systems. On-going development of the Medical 
Information eXchange (MIX), the technology backbone of a unified 
electronic health record program, enables proactive identification, 
analysis, and decision making related to emerging health security 
issues within our workforce, those in our care, and the public we 
serve. The MIX will also serve as a fusion point for the total 
workforce protection mission, integrating systems like the DHS-wide 
Safety Data System that is currently in development.
    OHS also serves as the Department's Liaison to the Commissioned 
Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service. DHS counts over 640 Public 
Health Service Officers among its workforce serving across 10 different 
offices and components. These officers deliver or oversee critical 
health care, public health services, and preparedness and response 
activities during steady-state and crises--ashore and afloat.
    Our greatest asset is our workforce. In alignment with the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office's recommended best practices,\1\ OHS 
continues to implement enduring employee engagement programs such as 
monthly pulse surveys, a Culture Working Group and Champions Program, 
and continuous quality improvement to ensure we recruit and retain a 
world-class workforce that delivers high-quality, efficient, and 
effective programming, policy, and operational initiatives. The 2023 
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey and our internal programming 
indicates that OHS has consistently high morale and employees believe 
their work is impactful, meaningful, and contributes to the common 
good. I am proud to lead such a talented workforce of dedicated 
civilians and uniformed personnel that consistently meets the highest 
standards of public service.
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    \1\ Government Reorganization: Key Questions to Assess Agency 
Reform Efforts (GAO-18-427).
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    The programs and initiatives highlighted today represent only a 
portion of the work that OHS does as the principal medical, workforce 
health and safety, and public health authority for DHS. The President's 
budget requests $57.7 million in fiscal year 2025 funds to support 76 
Federal staff and the critical programs they operationalize. We look 
forward to working with Congress to secure the necessary resources that 
enables OHS to strengthen health security, advance our mission, and 
provide the appropriate oversight and operational expertise to ensure 
high-quality health programs for our workforce and those in our care.
                               conclusion
    Chairman D'Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and distinguished 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you again for holding today's 
hearing and for the opportunity to discuss OHS. Your on-going support 
for the Department's workforce resilience, public health, medical, and 
occupational safety, and health programs ensures that the Department is 
prepared and well-positioned for a proactive and agile response to an 
evolving health security landscape. Thank you for considering the 
legislative proposal to authorize OHS, which will codify and solidify 
those authorities, positions, and responsibilities aligned under OHS.
    I look forward to your questions.

    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Dr. Wolfe.
    I now recognize Dr. Sherman for 5 minutes to summarize her 
opening statement.

   STATEMENT OF TINA WON SHERMAN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 
  SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Ms. Sherman. Chairman D'Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today to 
speak on behalf of my agency, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office.
    The intentional use of chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear weapons remain real-world threats for those 
domestically and abroad. The risks posed by those weapons are 
significant, and each one is unique in terms of their ability 
to be detected, prepared for, mitigated, and recovered from.
    Five years into its existence, the Department of Homeland 
Security's Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office 
carries out the difficult mission of enabling operational 
partners at the Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial 
levels to promote the readiness for and prevention of the use 
of weapons of mass destruction against the United States.
    The last time GAO testified about CWMD in front of this 
committee in 2021, we reported that the office needed to help 
integrate and coordinate the Department's chemical defense 
activities. CWMD has efforts under way to identify and 
harmonize those activities across the Department. This is even 
more critical given the stoppage in chemical security 
inspections resulting from the lapse in authorization for DHS' 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program.
    We also told this committee that CWMD faced information-
gathering and collaboration challenges as part of the National 
Biosurveillance Integration Center. NBIC has since enhanced its 
ability to collect information using open-source data, and most 
of the stakeholders we recently spoke with found value in its 
written products. However, NBIC could take additional steps to 
assess the support it provides to its FSLTT partners.
    At that time, we additionally highlighted continued 
problems with BD21, the acquisition program to replace the 
existing BioWatch early warning system, such as the technical, 
readiness, and feasibility of the technologies for the program 
given the inherent limitations and uncertainties for use in 
biodetection. With the BD21 acquisition now canceled, CWMD will 
need to forge a new path forward to replace the 20-year-old 
BioWatch system still operating in major metropolitan areas 
Nation-wide.
    We also at the time shared with the subcommittee that the 
Securing the Cities program, which provides equipment and 
training for first responders, had not clearly communicated 
potential program changes to or addressed risks to sustain 
detection capabilities for the program.
    In the latest report GAO is issuing today, we found that 
CWMD has improved in these areas and recommended it better 
communicate expectations and measures to participants for how 
the office will assess them against their new implementation 
plan next fiscal year.
    Last, we reported in 2021 that CWMD's work force had 
continued to experience low morale, following the merger of its 
two predecessor components that held differing missions, 
expertise, and cultures. It has since also undergone another 
reorganization to establish the Office of Health Security, this 
all without permanent leadership. CWMD now has that leadership 
with Assistant Secretary Callahan and is continuing to take 
steps to strengthen employee engagement despite the uncertainty 
tied to CWMD's reauthorization.
    We remain hopeful that CWMD will remain responsive to GAO's 
recommendations as we continue to provide oversight support for 
the subcommittee, and clearly demonstrate its effectiveness in 
meeting its mission across the range of threats it was 
established to address.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Tina Won Sherman
                             March 20, 2024
                             gao highlights
    Highlights of GAO-24-107426, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Emergency Management and Technology, Committee on Homeland Security, 
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
    Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons have the 
potential to kill thousands of people. To manage threats in these 
areas, Federal statute established CWMD in December 2018 by 
reorganizing functions of predecessor offices in DHS.
    This statement describes findings from GAO's reports on CWMD's 
programs from August 2018 through March 2024. They address challenges 
and opportunities for the effective operations and implementation of 
CWMD's chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security 
activities.
    To conduct prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, policies, 
strategic plans, and other documents. GAO also interviewed Federal, 
State, industry, and other officials.
What GAO Recommends
    GAO has made 18 recommendations since 2018 to address the 
challenges discussed in this statement. As of March 2024, DHS has 
implemented 9 recommendations, partially implemented 1, and not 
implemented 3. GAO made 5 additional recommendations to CWMD in March 
2024. GAO will monitor CWMD's progress to implement all of the 
remaining recommendations.
weapons of mass destruction.--dhs has made progress in some areas, but 
                   additional improvements are needed
What GAO Found
    The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in 
addressing challenges that GAO identified related to the Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD). However, additional 
improvements are needed. The following summarizes progress made and 
challenges remaining in several of CWMD's key areas, reported by GAO 
since 2018.
    Chemical defense.--GAO reported on challenges and progress in 
CWMD's chemical defense efforts. In August 2018, GAO found that DHS had 
not fully integrated and coordinated its chemical defense programs and 
activities among its component agencies. By not doing so, DHS risked 
missing opportunities to leverage resources, share information, and 
improve its effectiveness in addressing chemical threats through 
improved integration and coordination. To address GAO's recommendation, 
CWMD issued a Chemical Defense Strategy in December 2019 that 
established goals and objectives that included integrating and 
coordinating DHS's chemical defense capabilities. DHS subsequently 
issued an implementation plan in September 2021 that involved CWMD and 
several participating DHS component agencies.
    Biodefense.--GAO reported on challenges with two of DHS's 
biosurveillance efforts that CWMD oversees--the Biological Detection 
for the 21st Century program and the National Biosurveillance 
Integration Center. In May 2021, GAO found that DHS did not (1) apply 
best practices when conducting technology readiness assessments for its 
Biological Detection for the 21st Century program; or (2) conduct these 
assessments before key acquisition decision points. In response, DHS 
revised its program guide to incorporate best practices, but as of 
March 2024, had not demonstrated that it is conducting such assessments 
before key acquisition decisions. In November 2023, GAO reported that 
the National Biosurveillance Integration Center documented its efforts 
to obtain adequate personnel and develop new technology, but did not 
clearly define performance measures and associated time frames in its 
strategic planning documents. As of March 2024, DHS reported it was 
developing a strategy and implementation plan for the center that will 
include milestones, actions, targets, and time frames. GAO will monitor 
DHS's efforts.
    Radiological and nuclear detection.--In March 2024, GAO reported on 
CWMD's Securing the Cities program, which is designed to enhance the 
nuclear detection capabilities in select cities. GAO found that CWMD 
took steps to strengthen program outreach among its partners, but had 
not clearly communicated performance expectations. GAO will monitor 
DHS's efforts to address these and other challenges.
    Chairman D'Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and Members of the 
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office (CWMD).
    Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons--
collectively known as weapons of mass destruction--have the potential 
to kill thousands of people in a single incident. A Federal statute 
established CWMD within DHS in December 2018 to plan for, detect, 
deter, respond to, and defend against the threats of such weapons. In 
carrying out this mission, CWMD coordinates with partners at the 
Federal, State, and local levels and provides them with technology, 
training, and information. CWMD's partners include DHS components, such 
as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard; other 
Federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the 
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration; and 
first responders and public health officials.
    Since its establishment, we have evaluated multiple aspects of 
CWMD. This statement describes our prior work on progress and 
challenges CWMD faces in managing key programs, including those related 
to chemical security, biodefense, nuclear and radiological security, 
and acquisitions. We also examine recent information regarding CWMD's 
employee morale.
    This statement is based on our prior work issued from August 2018 
through March 2024 on various CWMD efforts. It also includes updates on 
the status of previous recommendations we made during that time. To 
conduct our prior work, we reviewed relevant Presidential directives, 
laws, regulations, policies, strategic plans, and other documents, and 
interviewed Federal, State, and industry officials. More information on 
our scope and methodology can be found in each of the reports cited 
throughout this statement. The work upon which this statement is based 
was conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
                               background
CWMD's Formation
    The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 established 
CWMD in statute by consolidating functions that had been previously 
carried out by DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and Office of 
Health Affairs.\1\ CWMD's primary statutory missions are coordinating 
with other Federal efforts and developing a strategy and policy for DHS 
to: (1) plan for, detect, and protect against the importation, 
possession, storage, transportation, development, or use of 
unauthorized chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials, 
devices, or agents in the United States; and (2) protect against an 
attack using such materials, devices, or agents against U.S. people, 
territory, or interests.\2\
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    \1\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, title XIX, 
 1900-1931, 116 Stat. 2135, as added by the Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-387,  2(a)-(c), (e), (g) 
132 Stat. 5162 (classified at 6 U.S.C.  590-597, including  591 
notes). Prior to enactment, on October 6, 2017, DHS notified Congress 
of its intent to exercise its authority under 6 U.S.C.  452 to 
consolidate some offices having chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear functions into a new office, effective December 5, 2017. 
According to DHS officials, the formation of CWMD consolidated the 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, most of Office of Health Affairs, 
and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear policy functions 
formerly performed by the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, as 
well as elements of the Office of Operations Coordination. DHS 
subsequently abolished Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and Office of 
Health Affairs.
    \2\ 6 U.S.C.  591g, 592. The Assistant Secretary for CWMD reports 
to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See id.  591.
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CWMD Programs
    CWMD manages several programs specific to its mission to protect 
the U.S. against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
attacks.
    Chemical defense strategy.--Since the establishment of CWMD in 
2018, the CWMD has undertaken actions to address chemical threats. For 
example, according to CWMD officials, it engaged with 17 U.S. cities to 
provide training on chemical threats to the mass transit sector. CWMD 
also led the effort to develop DHS's Chemical Defense Strategy, issued 
in December 2019. Subsequently, in September 2021, DHS issued the 
Chemical Defense Strategy Implementation Plan, which CWMD also took the 
lead in developing, as part of a workgroup that involved 16 DHS 
component agencies.
    BioWatch.--In an effort to provide early warning, detection, or 
recognition of a biological attack, DHS created the BioWatch program in 
2003 in response to a perceived urgency to deploy useful--even if 
immature--technologies in the face of potentially catastrophic 
consequences. This perception led to the rapid deployment of the 
initial BioWatch system which modified existing air monitoring 
technology to collect biological aerosol samples for lab testing.\3\ 
Currently, the BioWatch program collaborates with more than 30 BioWatch 
jurisdictions throughout the Nation to operate approximately 600 
aerosol collectors. It is a Federally-managed, locally-operated system 
with collectors deployed primarily in outdoor locations.
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    \3\ According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an 
aerosol may be defined as a suspension of particles or droplets in the 
air and includes airborne dusts, mists, fumes, or smoke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to a 2011 report from the National Academies, DHS's rapid 
deployment of the system meant that BioWatch was deployed without 
sufficient testing, validation, and evaluation of its technical 
capabilities.\4\ In 2015, we reported on limitations to DHS's 
understanding of the system's capabilities. DHS began a new 
biodetection technology acquisition program in 2019 called Biological 
Detection for the 21st Century (BD21) to potentially replace the 
BioWatch program. Figure 1 depicts first responders practicing a 
BioWatch safety drill.
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    \4\ Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, BioWatch 
and Public Health Surveillance (Washington, DC: National Academies 
Press, 2011).

    National Biosurveillance Integration Center.--The Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission 
Act) established the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) 
within DHS.\5\ NBIC's objective is to integrate and analyze information 
from health surveillance systems across the Federal Government and 
support the interagency biosurveillance community. To achieve this 
objective, NBIC collaborates with Federal partners who have missions or 
resources that support NBIC's activities. The center also develops a 
range of written analytical products on biodefense for distribution to 
a broad range of stakeholders that include Federal partners, 
Congressional officials, private-sector and international recipients, 
as well as State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments.
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    \5\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, title XI,  1101, 121 Stat. 266, 375-79 
(Classified, as amended, at 6 U.S.C.  195b).
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    Securing the Cities.--DHS initiated the Securing the Cities (STC) 
program in fiscal year 2007 as a pilot in the New York City, Jersey 
City, and Newark region. The mission of the STC program is to enhance 
the ability of the United States to detect and prevent the malevolent 
use of nuclear and radioactive materials that pose risks to high-risk 
urban areas. As such, the STC program seeks to reduce the risk of a 
successful deployment of a nuclear or radiological weapon against 
cities and surrounding metropolitan areas in the United States. STC 
does so by providing, among other things, equipment and training to 
State and local partners to detect nuclear and radiological material 
before an incident involving these materials occurs. The STC program 
has expanded over the years and currently includes 13 participating 
regions across the United States.
    Technology acquisitions.--CWMD, like its predecessor agency--the 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office--acquires technologies to support 
partners in DHS components such as CBP and the Coast Guard, as well as 
State and local partners. Detection devices provided by CWMD to these 
partners include personal radiation detectors (cell phone-size devices 
worn by first responders to alert them when radioactivity levels exceed 
natural levels) and radiation isotope identification devices (detectors 
that can identify the specific material emitting the radiation). Figure 
2 shows examples of types of nuclear and radiological detection 
equipment.

   dhs has made progress addressing past challenges, but additional 
                     improvements are still needed
    Our past work, issued since CWMD's establishment in 2018, 
identifies progress and challenges in key aspects of CWMD's program 
areas, including chemical defense, biodefense, radiological and nuclear 
detection, acquisitions, and employee morale. Our work resulted in 13 
recommendations, and, as of March 2024, 9 were implemented, 1 was 
partially implemented, and 3 are not yet addressed. In addition, we 
have made 5 new recommendations to CWMD in our report issued today on 
STC.\6\ Below are examples of issues we've identified across CWMD's 
programmatic areas and the extent to which those issues have been 
addressed.
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    \6\ GAO, Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: DHS Has Strengthened the 
Securing the Cities Program, but Actions are Needed to Address Key 
Remaining Challenges, GAO-24-106922 (Washington, DC: Mar. 20, 2024).
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Chemical Defense
    In August 2018, we found that DHS consolidated some chemical 
defense programs and activities into CWMD, but DHS had not fully 
integrated and coordinated its chemical defense programs and 
activities.\7\ Several DHS component agencies--including CBP, the Coast 
Guard, and Science & Technology--conduct similar activities, such as 
acquiring chemical detectors or assisting local jurisdictions with 
preparedness, separately, without DHS-wide direction and coordination. 
As component agencies carried out chemical defense activities to meet 
their unique mission needs, there was a risk that DHS may miss an 
opportunity to leverage resources and share information that could lead 
to greater effectiveness in addressing chemical threats. Therefore, we 
recommended that the assistant secretary for CWMD develop a strategy 
and implementation plan to help DHS guide, support, integrate, and 
coordinate chemical defense programs and activities.\8\
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    \7\ GAO, Chemical Terrorism: A Strategy and Implementation Plan 
Would Help DHS Better Manage Fragmented Chemical Defense Programs and 
Activities, GAO-18-562 (Washington, DC: Aug. 22, 2018.)
    \8\ GAO recommended the Assistant Secretary for CWMD develop a 
strategy and implementation plan to help the Department of Homeland 
Security, among other things, guide, support, integrate, and coordinate 
its chemical defense programs and activities; leverage resources and 
capabilities; and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. 
GAO identified this as a priority recommendation and describes CWMD's 
actions to implement it in GAO, Priority Open Recommendations: 
Department of Homeland Security, GAO-22-105702 (Washington, DC: July 
15, 2022)
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    CWMD addressed the recommendation by issuing the Chemical Defense 
Strategy in December 2019. The strategy includes overarching goals and 
a range of related objectives establishing a departmental approach to 
combating chemical threats and incidents. The importance of a 
coordinated chemical defense strategy across DHS is especially 
important given that, as of March 2024, the statutory authority for the 
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program--DHS's primary 
regulatory program for chemical facility security--had not been 
reauthorized since expiring in 2023.\9\
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    \9\ In July 2023, the statutory authority for the Chemical Facility 
Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program (6 C.F.R. Part 27) expired. 
See Pub. L. No. 116-150,  1(a), 134 Stat. 679 (2020) (classified at 6 
U.S.C.  621 note). According to DHS, the Department cannot enforce 
compliance with the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 
regulations without Congressional authorization, which means that DHS 
cannot require facilities to report potentially dangerous chemicals or 
perform inspections.
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Biodefense
    CWMD manages two significant efforts to defend against biological 
attacks--BD21 and the NBIC.
    In 2021, we reported on DHS's effort to replace BioWatch with a new 
system--BD21.\10\ The BD21 program faces risks, such as the possibility 
of increased false alarm rates, due to technology limitations and 
uncertainties with combining technologies for use in biodetection. 
While we found that the BD21 program was following DHS acquisition 
policy and guidance, we identified limitations in the program's 
technology readiness assessments, which DHS uses to reduce risk within 
its technology acquisition programs. Specifically, DHS issued its 
technology readiness assessment/manufacturing readiness assessment 
guide in September 2020, but we found it did not follow some of the 
practices in GAO's best practice guide for technology readiness 
assessments.\11\ Therefore, we recommended that DHS fully incorporate 
the best practices outlined in GAO's guide into DHS's guide, such as 
including information about how the Department will ensure objectivity 
and independence. DHS addressed this recommendation by May 2022. We 
also recommended that DHS ensure the BD21 program conducts high-quality 
technology readiness assessments of all critical technologies for BD21 
before key acquisition decision points. As of March 2024, this 
recommendation has not been implemented.
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    \10\ GAO, Biodefense: DHS Exploring New Methods to Replace BioWatch 
and Could Benefit from Additional Guidance, GAO-21-292 (Washington, DC: 
May 20, 2021).
    \11\ GAO, Technology Readiness Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Evaluating the Readiness of Technology for Use in Acquisition Programs 
and Projects, GAO-20-48G (Washington, DC: Jan. 07, 2020). To develop 
the guide, GAO worked with practitioners and technology experts from 
across the Federal Government, commercial industry, nonprofits, and 
academia to ascertain the generally accepted best practices for 
conducting high-quality technology readiness assessments.
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    We also recommended in our 2021 report that the BD21 program 
address a key capability gap. Specifically, we found that existing BD21 
program acquisition documentation lacked sufficient detail describing 
how a ``situational awareness and common operating picture 
capability''--which DHS identified as a gap--will differ from or 
leverage the NBIC. Therefore, we recommended that DHS ensure the BD21 
program office clarifies--within its acquisition documentation--the 
``situational awareness and common operating picture capability'' 
identified as a gap. This clarification should include the specific 
functionality, sources of information, and distinction from existing 
common operating picture functions at DHS, such as NBIC. DHS has not 
implemented the recommendation as of March 2024.
    In November 2023, we reported that the NBIC--within CWMD--
identifies, tracks, and characterizes biological events using open-
source, Federal, and private-sector data sources.\12\ NBIC integrates 
these data to develop written products and support its information 
sharing and coordination activities. Additionally, in recent years, 
NBIC began taking steps to address challenges in accessing needed data, 
obtaining adequate personnel, and developing new technologies. NBIC's 
efforts were guided by two strategic planning documents, but these 
documents did not have clearly-defined performance measures and time 
frames for accomplishing milestones.\13\ For example, one milestone is 
to strengthen relationships with relevant DHS components. However, NBIC 
did not include information on the specific actions for achieving the 
milestone or how it would assess progress toward achievement.
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    \12\ GAO, Biodefense: National Biosurveillance Integration Center 
Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges, but Could Better Assess Results, 
GAO-24-106142 (Washington, DC: Nov. 29, 2023).
    \13\ Department of Homeland Security, Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office, Strategy for Integrated Biosurveillance, Fiscal 
Year 2018 Report to Congress, (Washington DC: July 30, 2019); 
Department of Homeland Security, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Office, Strategy for Integrated Biosurveillance--NBIC Implementation 
Plan Fiscal Year 2022-2023, (Washington, DC; Mar. 29, 2023).
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    We recommended that DHS ensure that NBIC develops future strategic 
planning documents with clearly-defined performance measures and 
associated time frames. DHS concurred with this recommendation and, in 
March 2024, reported that it is developing an NBIC strategy and 
implementation plan that will include performance milestones, actions, 
targets, and time frames. DHS expects to complete these actions by June 
2024 and GAO will monitor its efforts to do so.
Radiological and Nuclear Detection
    In May 2019, we identified several limitations in CWMD's efforts to 
implement the STC program.\14\ We found that CWMD did not collect 
information needed to fully track the regions' use of STC funds for 
approved purposes and to assess regions' performance in the 
program.\15\ We made 4 recommendations to CWMD, including that the 
agency more fully assess regions' performance by collecting data on 
achievement of key performance metrics and milestones and enforcing 
reporting requirements. DHS fully implemented the 4 recommendations as 
of October 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Terrorism: DHS Should Address 
Limitation to Its Program to Secure Key Cities, GAO-19-327 (Washington, 
DC: May 13, 2019).
    \15\ The STC program seeks to reduce the risk of a successful 
deployment of a nuclear or radiological weapon against select regions, 
consisting of cities and surrounding metropolitan areas in the United 
States. STC currently works with 13 participating regions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 also 
included a requirement for CWMD to develop an implementation plan, 
including the goals of the STC program and a strategy to achieve them. 
CWMD issued this plan in June 2021 and assessed the program's 
performance based on this plan in August 2022. The act also required 
that the CWMD assess performance of the STC program based on this plan, 
which it completed in August 2022. The act included a provision for GAO 
to evaluate CWMD's implementation plan and progress in achieving and 
sustaining STC program capabilities, which is the report we issued in 
March 2024.\16\
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    \16\ GAO, Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: DHS Has Strengthened the 
Securing the Cities Program, but Actions are Needed to Address Key 
Remaining Challenges, GAO-24-106922 (Washington, DC: Mar. 20, 2024).
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    We found in our March 2024 report that CWMD has taken multiple 
steps to strengthen the STC program and continues working with the 
regions to address challenges and ensure continued progress toward 
achieving and sustaining their detection capabilities. Specifically, 
CWMD has incorporated lessons learned from implementing the STC program 
over the years. Further, it has addressed our prior recommendations to 
strengthen the program, including increasing outreach, developing 
planning and reporting guidance, and providing long-term Federal 
sustainment funding. Along with these improvements, CWMD is working 
with the STC regions to address challenges they continue to face 
implementing their programs, such as staff attrition, training 
availability and scheduling, partner engagement, and expansion of their 
programs.
    We also found in our March 2024 report that CWMD's planned approach 
for assessing STC program performance, which includes its 
implementation plan with measurable outcomes, generally follows key 
practices we have identified in our prior work for building and using 
evidence to manage and evaluate results of Federal efforts.\17\ In June 
2023, CWMD released an updated version of its STC Implementation Plan 
detailing its current planned approach for implementing the program and 
assessing regional performance using a set of short-, medium-, and 
long-term outcomes. We compared CWMD's planned approach with 13 key 
practices and 29 supporting actions for using evidence to more 
effectively manage and assess the results of Federal programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ GAO, Evidenced-Based Policymaking: Practices to Help Manage 
and Assess the Results of Federal Efforts, GAO-23-105460 (Washington, 
DC: July 12, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Our analysis identified that CWMD's planned approach for assessing 
STC program performance generally follows 8 of the 13 key practices, 
and partially follows 5 of the practices. Furthermore, we found that 
the CWMD was incorporating 24 of the 29 key actions that supported 
implementing the 13 key practices. As CWMD is in the process of 
implementing its revised assessment approach, with plans to begin 
formally assessing regional performance in 2025, opportunities exist 
for it take additional actions to increase accountability for results 
being achieved through the STC program. We made 5 recommendations, 
including that CWMD clearly communicate performance expectations to the 
STC regions and improve its tracking of their progress. This entails 
ensuring that the STC regions are reporting consistent, complete, and 
accurate information in their quarterly performance reports so that 
CWMD can set reliable targets and benchmarks for the performance 
assessments. DHS concurred with these 5 recommendations and we will 
monitor DHS's efforts to implement them.
Technology Acquisitions
    In 2022, we found that CWMD continued to carry out functions of its 
predecessor offices, including the former Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office.\18\ For example, it continued to acquire nuclear and 
radiological detection technologies for partners in DHS components, 
particularly the Coast Guard and CBP. Officials from these DHS 
components provided examples of CWMD-provided technologies that meet 
their mission needs. For example, Coast Guard officials told us that 
CWMD provides hand-held radiation detectors as well as a new technology 
that allows them to transmit information from the detectors to one of 
CBP's offices for analysis. The Coast Guard officials told us that the 
new transmission system filled a gap in their capabilities by enabling 
more secure transmission of the information to CBP. CBP officials said 
that CWMD helped them obtain software developed by the Department of 
Energy that enhances their ability to analyze the data the Coast Guard 
provides. According to CBP and Coast Guard officials, without these 
enhanced capabilities, their ability to detect smuggled nuclear or 
radiological material would be diminished. From 2019 through 2021, 
according to CWMD officials, CWMD procured over 38,000 handheld 
radiation detectors for its Federal partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ GAO, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: DHS Could Improve 
Its Acquisition of Key Technology and Coordination with Partners, GAO-
22-104498 (Washington, DC: Apr. 19, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CWMD also continued to manage a program to acquire replacements for 
certain radiation portal monitors that CBP operates at high-volume 
ports. However, we found, at the time of our review in 2022, that these 
new radiation portal monitors were late to deploy and may not meet CBP 
needs. For example, CBP officials told us that tests of these 
replacement monitors resulted in higher nuisance alarm rates than 
originally anticipated. Nuisance alarms result from naturally-occurring 
radioactive materials in certain consumer goods, requiring CBP officers 
to conduct a secondary scan to determine that the source of the alarm 
is not a threat before a cargo container or vehicle can leave the port. 
Reducing such alarms is a key goal of the replacement program. 
Therefore, we recommended in 2022 that CWMD reassess its acquisition 
strategy for these replacement radiation portal monitors. CWMD 
implemented the recommendation by reassessing its acquisition strategy 
and ultimately deciding not to pursue a second phase of the radiation 
portal monitor acquisition that CWMD had been pursuing when we issued 
our report.
Employee Morale
    DHS has faced challenges with low morale and low employee 
engagement since its inception in 2003.\19\ CWMD ranked lowest of all 
DHS components in employee engagement in 2022 and ranked 430 of all 432 
Federal agency subcomponents in the 2022 Best Places to Work in the 
Federal Government rankings.\20\
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    \19\ The Office of Personnel Management defines employee engagement 
as employees' sense of purpose that is evident in their display of 
dedication, persistence, and effort in their work or overall attachment 
to their organization and its mission.
    \20\ The Partnership for Public Service and the Boston Consulting 
Group calculate these rankings using responses to questions in the 
Office of Personnel Management's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. 
Results for 2022 were the most recently available as of March 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We reported in July 2022 on steps CWMD had taken to help address 
morale problems resulting from merging predecessor agencies.\21\ 
Specifically, CWMD took steps to identify causes of morale problems and 
enhance employees' shared sense of mission. For example, CWMD used 
surveys and listening sessions to gather information on the causes of 
low morale. According to CWMD officials, one cause was different 
cultures within the predecessor offices that merged under CWMD.\22\ For 
example, CWMD officials said one of these offices coordinated with 
physicists and law enforcement officials and focused on detection and 
prevention; whereas another coordinated with public health officials 
and focused on preparedness and response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ GAO, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: DHS Office Has 
Opportunities to Improve Partner Services and Employee Morale, GAO-22-
106133 (Washington, DC: Jul 19, 2022).
    \22\ We have previously reported that successful agency reforms and 
reorganizations, including mergers, must involve employees and their 
representatives from the beginning to gain their ownership for the 
changes that are occurring in the organization. GAO, Results-Oriented 
Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational 
Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, DC: July 2, 2003). GAO, 
Government Reorganization: Key Questions to Assess Agency Reform 
Efforts, GAO-18-427 (Washington, DC: July 13, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to CWMD employees, another cause of morale issues was 
frequent leadership changes. As of August 2023, CWMD has had 3 acting 
assistant secretaries since its establishment in December 2018. CWMD 
employees said the different visions of the assistant secretaries 
contributed to confusion about the office's mission.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ CWMD's first permanent Assistant Secretary assumed the role in 
August 2023.
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                          gao acknowledgements
    Thank you, Chairman D'Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and Members 
of the subcommittee. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be 
happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Doctor.
    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their 
5 minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning 
may be called after all Members have been recognized.
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    My first set of questions is for Ms. Callahan. As I 
mentioned in my opening statement, section 872 of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 allows the Department to reorganize, 
establish, or consolidate operations. This authority was used 
to establish the CWMD Office in 2017 and then used again by the 
Secretary to establish the Office of Health Security in 2022.
    In your opinion, have the CWMD and OHS office 
reorganizations been successful?
    Ms. Callahan. Thank you, sir. Yes, I believe both 
reorganizations have been successful with regard to the CWMD 
office in the first instance, then it subsequently was 
authorized in 2018.
    Bringing together all threats--chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear--was crucial. It's important. It 
mirrors what other agencies are doing, and it brings together 
all elements to bear. It also helps support our operational 
components as well as our State and local stakeholders.
    With regard to the Office of Health Security, I'll defer to 
Dr. Wolfe if he thinks it's a success.
    Mr. D'Esposito. That'd be great.
    Ms. Callahan. Could I----
    Mr. D'Esposito. Of course.
    Ms. Callahan. But I will say--yes. I will say, I think that 
having the Office of Health Security outside of CWMD helped 
clarify several lanes. Obviously, they do public health, health 
security. We do biological threats. We work together 
seamlessly. Sometimes OHS takes the lead, sometimes we do. But 
I think getting the medical expertise outside of the office 
helps clarify OHS' role within the Department.
    Over to you, Dr. Wolfe.
    Mr. Wolfe. Thank you, Mary Ellen.
    Yes. Chairman, related to the establishment of OHS, prior 
to the establishment, when CWMD was created, it only took 
approximately half of the medical and public health folks in 
the Department. The remaining folks that focused on the health 
of the work force went to the management directorate under the 
chief human capital officer.
    As we progressed through the second and third year and then 
entered the pandemic, we learned that the medical and public 
health and work force health and safety expertise was very 
small compared to a Department that has 260,000 employees. So 
one of the great benefits of the OHS 872 was bringing together 
all the public health and medical activities of the Department 
under one office and under one leadership.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. As we've heard, you know, sometimes the 
work force--the dedicated work force that are affected by these 
changes, the morale has been not so great. It's been one of the 
things that we as a committee have wanted to address.
    So in addition to the morale--and, I guess, if you could 
just touch upon why you think that's a factor. What other 
challenges have we seen in the reorganization or the 
consolidation when decided by Secretary Mayorkas?
    Ms. Callahan. For Health Security?
    Mr. D'Esposito. It's really the same question for both of 
you.
    Ms. Callahan. Yep. The employee morale, one of--as I 
mentioned, I have three tenets: work on professional 
development, work on understanding the mission and how you fit 
into that mission and how you can advance, and then third, 
getting to know people on a personal level to reestablish 
esprit de corps. I think those are important elements.
    I also think transparency is crucial. That is one of my 
philosophies. I have fortnightly townhalls. I write a column 
every week in the bulletin. I try to be available. I have one-
on-one offices to go and make sure they know what's going on 
and that we can be transparent.
    I will note, my one last challenge is the threat of 
termination, what weighed heavily on us in the fall, and we can 
speak about that later.
    Herb.
    Mr. Wolfe. Yes. Chairman, one of the benefits we had at OHS 
is we got to do the 872 second after CWMD, and so one of the 
things we could do even prior to the establishment is use GAO 
best practices and learn from other Federal reorganizations. So 
we have not had the same challenge when it comes to morale.
    A few things that we've done. One is employee engagement. 
We've done a monthly survey prior to the establishment. We 
continue that today. The second thing we've done is we do a 
monthly all-hands.
    The last thing is our monthly poll survey, and the FEVS 
scores--which is the first time in 2023 that OHS was its own 
office--mirror relatively good scores. Our employee engagement 
and our employee experience index is above 75. We've had--
greater than 90 percent of the surveys in FEVS had a score 
greater than 74 percent.
    Then last, in the FEVS score, we had several that were 
above 90, and those, I think, are attributed to medical folks 
have a few core inherent missions. First, do no harm, and 
second, to help those that are in need. So there was a real 
attrition in there for that.
    To your question on challenges, I think the one we continue 
to face is just the enduring mission of DHS and making sure 
that we communicate to the team that we've got several 
communities to serve: those in our custody, the work force, and 
the Nation as a whole.
    Mr. D'Esposito. All right. Thank you, Doctor.
    My time has expired.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As I mentioned earlier, I find it concerning that the 
uncertainty surrounding the reauthorization of CWMD, along with 
reports of low morale, can be affecting staff retention and the 
effectiveness of CWMD's mission.
    Assistant Secretary Callahan, can you speak to how the 
reauthorization's uncertainty has impacted CWMD's employees and 
what a long-term extension or sunset repeal would mean for your 
office?
    Ms. Callahan. Thank you, Ranking Member. The threat of 
termination for the office created a great deal of uncertainty. 
It also created a distraction in the office in the fall. I 
ended up having--losing 10 percent of my staff, which equaled 
over 380 years of CBRN experience, Federal experience. That is 
a real loss.
    We are working quickly to replace them, but it would be 
difficult to recruit the talented and in-demand work force to 
ask them to come and join when we have, again, the potential of 
a threat of termination in 2 years hence.
    Also, with regard to our State and local partners, they 
experienced and expressed to me anxiety about the threat of 
termination, and, of course, several of them are working toward 
the 2026 World Cup. When I was in Boston and in New York 
recently, both of them asked about termination and looking 
forward.
    It is a concern. It is weighing on us. As I said, this is 
an incredibly talented and mission-focused office.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Carter. It's unfair to ask anybody to work under these 
uncertain terms. We have experts that are recruited to go other 
places. The talent pool is--particularly in specified areas 
like this--very thin. So we should always endeavor to give the 
security of our agencies the privilege and the authority to 
know that you will be able to continue to be funded and 
operated.
    I'm happy to hear that you say that. I know my colleagues 
are listening, and we will continue to endeavor to do just 
that, to fully fund and give you the security to be able to 
secure us.
    Ms. Callahan. Thank you.
    Mr. Carter. CWMD's Securing the Cities, STC, program 
provides funds for 14 local governments to counter successful 
deployment of nuclear and radiological weapons in the United 
States, including my home town of New Orleans. However, the 
program is limited to high-risk urban areas designated by FEMA, 
which can create uncertainty for local governments 
participating in the program.
    As you know, I introduced H.R. 4403, the Securing the 
Cities Improvement Act, which would provide more stability for 
STC participants. I was pleased that the bill passed the House 
earlier this month.
    Assistant Secretary Callahan, could you explain why this 
bill is critical for the securing of cities and programs more 
importantly?
    Ms. Callahan. Thank you, Representative. We support 
decoupling the Securing the Cities high-risk urban areas from 
the FEMA designation of UASI because it's CWMD grants. We can 
evaluate the threats and the CBRN risks, as we did with New 
Orleans, and we support having that flexibility to identify 
potentially new high-risk areas that may be included going 
forward.
    Mr. Carter. Dr. Wolfe, real quickly, are OHS and CWMD 
preparing for emerging biological threats? If so, how?
    Mr. Wolfe. Ranking Member, thanks for the question. 
Certainly, I believe that we are more prepared today than we 
were several years ago, but challenges remain. CWMD and OHS 
share a great relationship and a partnership. A few of the 
areas where I would say that we have done great are looking at 
emerging threats and forecasting, whether that is deliberative 
or whether that is unintentional.
    Secondarily, we've done a great job in the biological 
realms in the food, agriculture, and veterinary threat, both to 
food security as well as to the agriculture sector.
    Last, an area of concern that is shared across the Federal 
interagency is we've got a very taxed and strained public 
health and medical work force. Most of you know hospitals run 
at almost capacity and run day-to-day on a tight operating 
budget. Post-COVID, we've learned that the health and medical 
work force is resilient, but they are also vulnerable.
    So one of the areas that I share as a challenge is being 
sure that we are prepared, investing in the work force, so 
we're prepared for the next potential public health or 
biological incident.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you.
    Dr. Sherman, I've got just a few seconds left, but I'd love 
you to--first of all, thank you all for your incredible 
service. What's your greatest fear, and what should we know as 
a committee to help you allay those fears?
    Ms. Sherman. When it comes to the Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Office?
    Mr. Carter. Of course.
    Ms. Sherman. I think the main--I'm not sure if I'd 
characterize it as fear, but I think one area of----
    Mr. Carter. Concern. Concern.
    Ms. Sherman [continuing]. Concern, we'd like the office to 
continue to focus on demonstrating its effectiveness. There are 
a lot of activities and efforts under way, and the office has 
demonstrated----
    Mr. Carter. Let me real quickly. If one thing kept you 
awake at night, one thing that we as a Member of Congress can 
do--this committee more specifically--can do for you and your 
agency to make your life and our lives more safe.
    Mr. Chairman, I will yield after she answers.
    Mr. D'Esposito. All yours.
    Ms. Sherman. Yes. I'm not sure that I have a single fear 
that I can communicate, but I definitely feel that CWMD in 
particular has an important mission, and we definitely want to 
make sure to continue to, with the support of the subcommittee, 
you know, monitor its activities.
    Mr. Carter. So you just had a blank check in front of you 
and you didn't fill it in.
    Ms. Sherman. I'm happy to speak further about, you know, 
the work that we've done in this particular office. I think one 
of the kind-of main focuses we have is, you know, these threats 
are real, as I said in my opening statement, and we are 
concerned about how the Federal Government is taking steps 
across--not only within the homeland security enterprise but 
across the Federal Government and across Nation-wide to be able 
to help address those threats.
    One of the challenges that we feel is experienced as a 
result is the fact that there needs to be, again, a 
coordination, a real understanding of the range of threats to 
make sure that there aren't any specific capability gaps that 
exist, you know, as a result of the efforts that are under way. 
We--you know, we would like to continue to work to ensure that 
CWMD is helping to identify those gaps across the Federal 
Government, as well as with SLTTs, to be able to address those 
threats.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you very much, Mr. Ranking Member.
    I just want to point out--really, to Ms. Callahan's point 
and I think to concerns of all of you--the bill that--my bill 
that came out of this committee and then passed full committee 
in a bipartisan fashion. So I think that shows the commitment 
that this committee and this subcommittee has to the work that 
you do.
    It was actually a 7-year extension, but due to the CBO 
score, we also have to be realistic in what we could actually, 
as a committee and a subcommittee, can get onto the floor and 
pass. So that's why we're at the 2-year number. But this 
committee and my bill when it was originally drafted did have a 
7-year extension.
    With that, I recognize my good friend and fellow New Yorker 
and Long Islander, Mr. LaLota, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. LaLota. Thank you, Chairman D'Esposito, for your 
leadership and to our witnesses for being with us here today.
    Like Chairman D'Esposito, I am a proud New Yorker, a proud 
Long Islander, and I'm honored to represent the eastern end of 
Long Island. My district's about 50, 60 miles to the east of 
Manhattan, the heart of New York City.
    This coming September 11 marks the 23rd anniversary of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks in lower Manhattan, Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania, and here at our Nation's Capital. After that day, 
we as a Nation collectively vowed that we would never forget 
and that we would never allow another attack of that magnitude 
on American soil.
    However, Mr. Chairman, I'm becoming increasingly concerned 
that we are on the cusp of another major attack, and if we do 
not properly prepare, we could fail to prevent another 9/11.
    In fact, the director of the FBI, Christopher Wray, 
testified in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee back in 
December and warned Congress of another 9/11-like failure. 
During that hearing, he said, ``I see blinking lights 
everywhere.'' Ask any New Yorker, we know what that means, and 
we'll tell you plain and simple that we're in trouble.
    In addition to being a proud New Yorker, I'm a Navy 
veteran, the brother of a Marine, and I served this country in 
uniform with immense pride for 11 years. I can tell you from 
that experience, the most effective way to thwart an adversary 
and protect an asset, especially our people, is through 
deterrence, the action of deterring an action or an event by 
instilling doubts or fear into the consequences.
    Assistant Secretary Callahan, thanks so much for being 
here. As the assistant secretary for the Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Office, my first question is for you. It was 
only 5 years ago that the Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office within the Department of Homeland Security 
was established. Do you believe that the office has served as a 
deterrent for our adversaries in attempting to use a weapon of 
mass destruction on U.S. soil since the office was created?
    Ms. Callahan. Representative, I do believe it has served as 
a deterrent, and the way it has done so is by pushing out 
training, equipment, and exercises to the State and local first 
responders. They're going to be the ones who are going to come 
across a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear threat, 
and getting training and technology in their hands is how we 
cannot only identify but prepare and respond.
    Our mission is to prevent and deter CBRN threats, and I 
think we're doing so with regard to our relationship with State 
and locals--also in Nassau County as well as in Suffolk County, 
sir--and also with working with our operational components here 
in the Department of Homeland Security and then working in the 
interagency with FBI and DOE. Yes, sir.
    Mr. LaLota. Great. I know that Dr. Sherman resisted the 
temptation to answer the question about the blank checks, and 
then you referenced----
    Ms. Callahan. I'll write it.
    Mr. LaLota. You're going to get a shot at the same question 
then.
    How can you build on that success? Your answer just now, 
you said technology was a key part of what we ought to be 
focused on moving forward. Give Congress a sense of what else 
you think we ought to be leveraging, technology and otherwise, 
to be able to build on the success of the last 5 years.
    Ms. Callahan. Sir, it's technology, training, and equipment 
and exercises, getting the knowledge out for chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, understanding 
how to respond, do the training and exercises that I witnessed 
in New Orleans just this week--because it's the first 
responders. It's those State and locals who are going to be on 
the ground if indeed something happens, and we are working to 
get that knowledge out as far as we can.
    With regard to the check that I will write, the enduring 
reauthorization of the CWMD Office is crucial to make sure that 
we can be that linchpin for the entire CWMD ecosystem.
    Mr. LaLota. Thank you. I appreciate your feedback.
    You know, this committee, under Chairman D'Esposito's 
leadership, has a strong bipartisan approach to how----
    Ms. Callahan. We are very grateful.
    Mr. LaLota [continuing]. And we're going to continue that. 
We're committed to doing that.
    Ms. Callahan. Thank you.
    Mr. LaLota. I'm going to maybe go to a next round in the 
future, Mr. Chairman, so I yield.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. LaLota.
    I now recognize from Alabama and a first responder, Mr. 
Strong.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 
Member.
    I appreciate our witnesses for being here to discuss the 
important work each of you are doing to secure our Nation 
against weapons of mass destruction.
    As you all know, BioWatch is one of the programs used to 
carry out the mission of the CWMD Office by collecting and 
testing air samples for biological agents likely to be used in 
an act of bioterrorism.
    As technology evolves, so do threats to our country. For 
example, increasing access and affordability of unmanned 
aircraft presents ample opportunities for bad actors to cause 
harm and hysteria in our communities. Now more than ever we 
depend on efficiency and effectiveness of BioWatch. 
Unfortunately, this program is not operating like it should.
    From breakdowns to accurate information sharing to 
bureaucratic barriers and lagging procurements of biodetection 
technology, DHS has fallen dangerously behind. For this reason, 
I introduced the DHS Biodetection Improvement Act, which would 
direct DHS to use every tool in its disposal to develop an 
acquisition and procurement plan to meet the biodetection needs 
of the 21st Century. The House passed this legislation earlier 
this month, and I urge my Senate colleagues to do the same.
    First, Assistant Secretary Callahan, to what extent is 
BioWatch an operational program given past findings of its 
inaccuracy and timely detection, and what plan exists for 
improving it?
    Ms. Callahan. Thank you, Representative Strong. BioWatch is 
the only biodetection capability that this Nation has. It has 
existed. It is a stable and functional process. We are working 
on improving it and looking at technology and opportunities, 
but it is lab-based, lab-proven, and we've worked with over 30 
jurisdictions to make sure that we have an appropriate baseline 
and security. BioWatch is reliable, sir.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you. How long does it take from the 
moment a sensor registers a bioagent to when the data is shared 
with partners for response?
    Ms. Callahan. Yes, sir. The materials for BioWatch are 
collected either on a 12- or 24-hour basis and then are 
analyzed in the lab. From the time in the lab, it takes a few 
hours, somewhere between 2 and 4 hours to identify whether or 
not there is aerosolized biological materials in the air.
    Mr. Strong. Twelve to 24 hours, right?
    Ms. Callahan. That is for the collection time. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you. When dealing with the threats of 
bioterrorist attacks, every minute matters, every second 
matters.
    Ms. Callahan. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Strong. Chairman D'Esposito highlighted it can take up 
to 36 hours to get these results.
    How many times since the start of this program has there 
been a positive detection, and how many times has there been a 
false alarm?
    Ms. Callahan. In this room, sir, I cannot go into details, 
but I can talk about it in a different room, if that would be--
happy to take that off-line, if that's OK.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you.
    Dr. Sherman, thank you for your work on reports related to 
BioWatch. I understand that GAO has made multiple 
recommendations about changes that need to be made to the 
acquisition and procurement process.
    Has DHS implemented any of those changes?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes. DHS has taken steps to better inform its 
acquisition process. In fact, I think as a result of BD21--the 
BD21 program being canceled, it was informed in part by some of 
the questions that we had raised in prior work and 
recommendations that we had made regarding more informed 
decision making during the acquisition process and not moving 
forward with that process and spending additional funds until 
there's really kind-of clear evidence and documentation of 
effectiveness.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you. Other than passing the DHS 
Biodetection Improvement Act, what is the biggest thing DHS can 
do right now to improve BioWatch, in your judgment? What's the 
biggest thing they can do to improve biodetection--BioWatch?
    Ms. Sherman. I will say--yes, I will just say that 
biodetection is an incredibly challenging task, and, you know, 
we're talking about how long it takes to be able to capture a 
sample and test it and confirm results.
    You know, the extent to which there is a way to identify 
technologies that allow for increased efficiencies in those 
time frames, if those exist, then that is--you know, that would 
be something that I think would result in, you know, 
significant progress.
    But CWMD, given its current mission, you know, should be 
actively considering as it is how to continue their focus in 
biodefense.
    Mr. Strong. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, you've touched on it just a sec. It is unique 
that you worked as a fire chief. I've been a fire chief, 
police, first responders. We know first-hand how critical that 
is that we get that information. Forty years myself and 34 
years as an emergency medical technician.
    So it's so critical to our first responders, and I thank 
each of you for what you do to get that information as fast as 
possible.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Strong.
    I now recognize from Oklahoma, Mr. Brecheen.
    Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    So I want to ask Dr. Sherman representing the GAO with the 
homeland security specialty, tell me in terms of--efficiency is 
something that GAO is respected for, constantly analyzing. 
Where do you see resources being expended that the GAO would 
say may be inefficient and could be otherwise allocated?
    I'm really interested in the concept of the electric grid 
and hardening our transformers. I'd like to hear if you think 
that we're being inefficient in some areas and if some of those 
resources could be otherwise utilized to protect what I think 
is a very vulnerable grid.
    Ms. Sherman. Sure. So speaking to the acquisition piece, 
CWMD has gone through, not only in the biodefense space, but 
also in the radiation detection space, several acquisitions 
that have resulted in cancellation. I think I've mentioned it 
before, that's actually not necessarily a bad thing, because if 
it comes to a decision point where the office or the Department 
decides that they don't have enough information to move forward 
and to spend the taxpayer dollars for a particular program, 
then they should make a decision to not do that.
    So that is an area where I think the office has at least 
taken steps and demonstrated that the--you know, again, the 
kind-of efficiency piece is really critical and making sure 
that there isn't continued efforts over time and spending to be 
able to identify particular threats.
    I would also say, one of the themes that we have throughout 
the CBRN space for CWMD is going back to the message about 
effectiveness. Really understanding whether the programs and 
activities are working, whether the work that--in the case of 
Securing the Cities, the partners that are being carried out in 
the regions, having an understanding of whether or not the 
support that CWMD is providing--the money, the resources--is 
actually working and better protecting those regions across the 
country.
    So I think that that is a way to really understand whether 
or not money is being well-spent as it goes toward the various 
programs within CWMD.
    Mr. Brecheen. Can you expound upon that? So the expenditure 
funds going to localities, high-population areas, how is GAO 
determining whether or not that that is a good spend for the 
taxpayer? How do you run through the--how do you analyze that 
accurately?
    Ms. Sherman. Sure. So in the case of Securing the Cities, 
for example, last year, CWMD put out an implementation plan for 
its program--a new version of its implementation plan, and as 
part of that plan, it was to--the office was to collect 
information from the regional partners in terms of trainings, 
exercises, detections, efforts that they have made that have 
been tied to the resources that they've been provided to them.
    We have found that CWMD, over time, hasn't done as good of 
a job looking at that information, collecting that information, 
making sure that it's accurate through quarterly reporting 
requirements and others. So in this report that we issued 
today, we made recommendations around making sure that it has 
better data, it has better information from those partners to 
be able to say, OK, you are successful in the efforts that 
you're carrying out, being able to implement this program, 
being able to be prepared as a first responder for detection 
efforts, and you should be able to continue forward and ideally 
obtain sustainment funding as a result of that.
    Mr. Brecheen. Because I only have got 40 seconds left, Mr. 
Chairman, I wanted to ask, in regards to the expenditure--and 
next year we'll come back and have a conversation as to whether 
or not those suggestions from GAO were implemented.
    What are your thoughts, Ms. Callahan, in regards to--is 
there a better allocation of resources that may not be high-
population centers regarding our electric grid, the 
transformers?
    My understanding, there's some information floating around 
that says we have 20 transformers. That if they were all hit at 
the same time, whether it's gunfire, an EMP, somebody walking 
up with a device that exploded, that we could bring down our 
entire electrical grid, shut down traffic, shut down cell phone 
utilization. Can you speak to that?
    Ms. Callahan. Sir, we agree with all the GAO's 
recommendations with regards to Securing the Cities. With 
regard to the electrical grid, that would be my colleagues at 
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. I know 
they have spent a great deal of time on that and are working on 
hardening that, but I would have to defer to those colleagues.
    Mr. Brecheen. Thank you.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Brecheen.
    Ms. Callahan, as you mentioned in your testimony, CBRN 
threats present dynamic challenges to the Nation's security 
and, ``the risks are constantly evolving due to the evolution 
of technologies''.
    What steps has the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Office taken to coordinate the threat with the intelligence 
community so that the agency might better understand the 
current threat environment?
    Ms. Callahan. Thank you, sir. As you may know, we have a 
dedicated intelligence shop just focused on CBRN threats. They 
do an annual report that we're happy to brief to you and to 
your staff, the CWMD Homeland Threat Assessment.
    We work very closely with our intelligence community 
colleagues. We also are working--having a fledgling 
relationship with the National Guard Bureau and their 
intelligence shop, again, to get that information out to the 
first responders, to the folks in the field in the 57 
different, for example, civil support teams. So trying to get 
that information out.
    We're also working with our colleagues--Health Security 
among others--at analyzing the risks. So we've identified the 
threat, but we've also looked at the risk, which include the 
likelihood as well as the consequence and what the impact is. 
So we're trying to have a holistic view. Yes, sir.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. What's your interaction regularly with 
Customs and Border Patrol to make sure that our ports, our 
ports of entry, so that they have the information necessary to 
make sure that they can protect us as best they can?
    Ms. Callahan. Yep. Obviously, CBP is one of our biggest 
stakeholders. We support the radiation portal monitors, so 14--
almost 1,400 RPMs at the ports of entries. We also go and brief 
them on threats. We've done multiple trainings, not only at 
ports of entries, but also at the National Targeting Center for 
that as well.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Your testimony also speaks to chemical 
preparedness and chemical defense, and mentions the 
establishment of the DHS Chemical Coordination Group to, quote, 
meet the evolving threat for chemical attacks and incidents.
    How has the expiration of CISA's Chemical Facility's Anti-
Terrorism Standards program affected our Nation's chemical 
defense posture?
    Ms. Callahan. Yes. Thank you, sir. The termination of CFATS 
authorization--I know that's the wrong phrasing--but the end of 
CFATS authorization has, in my opinion, affected our chemical 
readiness with regard to identifying threats that would be in 
chemical facilities.
    CFATS and CWMD are siblings, and they work together 
closely, and we are missing them in this--in this whole-of-
Government threat.
    Mr. D'Esposito. I know we've briefly touched upon this in 
my first round of questioning, but I think it's important, 
because a lot of Federal agencies, especially when it comes to 
our enforcement agencies, Homeland Security, Customs and Border 
Patrol, Capitol Police, attrition and making sure that our work 
force stays, is a concern that we have.
    So in 2022, there was a ranking by Best Places to Work, and 
the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office ranked 430 
out of 432. Four hundred thirty out of 432. CWMD has 
consistently--has had low ratings. I know that we talked about 
this briefly, but I think it's extremely important.
    So you, I think, have--had identified in some cases why 
morale is so low. Is there anything that you weren't able to 
share in the first round of questioning? If we can go into--
because we have a little bit more time--what are the steps that 
you are taking to improve the morale to make sure that we keep 
our coworkers staying where they are? Because I think 
institutional knowledge is something that is so important.
    So what are we doing to make sure that they stay and are 
enjoying working for this great government?
    Ms. Callahan. Yes. Thank you, sir. Retention is crucial, 
and it's incredibly important, particularly for something as 
complex as CBRN threats, and we're working in multiple ways. I 
mentioned my kind-of 3 tiers of my morale plan. I won't rehash 
that, but I will say that we're looking for opportunities to 
cross-train, to have people work within the different 
directorates.
    What's interesting to me is that we've--because they came 
from different organizations, that in some ways they might not 
have known the other side of the CB and the RN threat, so we're 
looking at ways to integrate that better. We're doing 
presentations on what we're doing. We're looking to look for 
those synergies that were there but haven't been focused on 
yet.
    So, sir, I think it's professional development, I think 
it's office development, and it's, candidly, just getting to 
know us as people. We lost a lot of that during COVID, and 
we're trying to find ways to connect in a hybrid environment.
    Mr. D'Esposito. So I guess we're both confident that the 
next time Best Places to Work does their rankings, we'll be far 
better than 430.
    Ms. Callahan. Sir, I will say the FEVS are a lagging 
indicator and that it could be possible that the FEVS scores 
during my time may come out, you know, after I leave, depending 
on the election. So I want to say, I'm not here about FEVS 
scores. I'm here about the people.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Absolutely. I'm still confident. I'm 
rooting for you.
    Ms. Callahan. I appreciate the vote of support, and I also 
share that vote.
    Mr. D'Esposito. All right. My time's expired.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I suspect that when we have the security of knowing that 
people will get a paycheck, that we'll also have morale to go 
up, because Government should not run from continuing 
resolution to continuing resolution. We should have the 
security of people knowing that their Government and the full 
faith and credit of the Government will always be protected. So 
we will continue to fight to make sure that happens so you're 
able to do your job even more.
    So Representative Strong touched on a point that I wanted 
to go. Secretary Callahan, can you tell the subcommittee where 
CWMD is advancing in its biodetection capabilities?
    Ms. Callahan. Thank you very much, sir. As I mentioned, 
BioWatch is a reliable program right now, but we have to 
improve on it, as Dr. Won Sherman said. We've got to get--make 
sure that we have a shorter time period, if possible, with the 
same level of standard of clarity and of accuracy.
    We have looked at many opportunities. I'm happy to talk 
about BD21, but I'll put that to a side right now because it's 
an acquisition program. But we're looking at making a series of 
incremental improvements on environmental biodetection writ 
large, and that's our focus rather than kind-of to jump to the 
BD21 moonshot, so to speak. That's--one of the reasons BD21 
couldn't scale and couldn't be operational at this moment. But 
instead, we're looking at a wide range of technologies, 
opportunities, and resources to have the BioWatch steady state 
while we work on incremental improvements in terms of 
timeliness, response, efficiency, and so on.
    Mr. Carter. Are we keeping up with the bad guys?
    Ms. Callahan. We are working our darndest to keep up with 
the bad guys. As as Dr. Won Sherman said, biodetection at scale 
is really hard, and it's one of the reasons why BioWatch is the 
only program that we have right now. But we're looking at--
we're engaging our State and local stakeholders to make sure 
we're meeting their mission and their mark as we look to make 
these improvements on biodetection.
    But biodetection is hard. Bioattacks are also hard, I will 
say, and stop there in this room.
    Mr. Carter. That's an incredible challenge. So those are 
not trick questions. They're questions that----
    Ms. Callahan. Understood, sir.
    Mr. Carter [continuing]. One, we understand and appreciate 
the difficult task that you have. So we'll begin there. So the 
questions we ask, we come in peace, on how we can better serve 
you----
    Ms. Callahan. Understood, sir.
    Mr. Carter [continuing]. And you can better serve us.
    So what's your approach--you mentioned stakeholders. What's 
your approach to collect information, data, and to learn from 
and, more importantly, teach local stakeholders, and what 
relationship--and how--what does that look like?
    Ms. Callahan. Yep. So, first, our relationship with 
stakeholders are paramount. That's a crucial element. We are an 
operational support component supporting the 5 DHS operational 
supports, as well as all the State and locals that we've talked 
about. I have people on my team who communicate with State and 
locals every day to make sure we're transparent, we know what's 
going on, we're communicating.
    With regard to the GAO recommendations on data, I was 
thrilled to see that because it's very consistent with my 
philosophy, is that we have to have metrics. We have to have 
consistent metrics and we have to have repeatable processes. We 
also have the opportunity to learn from each other.
    One of the things that I witnessed when I went to the 
Securing the Cities meeting in Miami, which was the one after 
the Chairman came to St. Elizabeths, is that the State and 
locals are learning from each other. They're sharing 
information. They're supporting each other. They're going and 
saying, this is my best practice, this is how I work.
    Boston came down to New Orleans to support for Mardi Gras, 
and New Orleans is going up to support for the marathon next 
month. Working together and having the information sharing is 
crucial in order to have this layered defense that we've 
established.
    Mr. Carter. Excellent. Thank you very much.
    Dr. Sherman, what has GAO's report found regarding CWMD 
stakeholder outreach and engagement with SLTT partners?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes, absolutely. So both with Securing the 
Cities, as well as actually BioWatch and also the former 
Chemical Defense Demonstration Cities Initiative, we had 
previously found that the communication and engagement with 
stakeholders, not only the Federal, but the SLTT partners, was 
not as robust as it could have been. We have seen strides, 
which is very positive.
    There's been a lot of gatherings, meetings, sharing of 
information, and really, you know, kind-of an understanding 
that one participant in a program can learn from another.
    We also know in 2022 there was an SLTT engagement strategy 
that CWMD developed. We made some recommendations on how to 
improve that, but it was noticeable that they had pulled the 
strategy together, and so we were pleased to have seen that.
    Ranking Member, if you'll indulge me. I don't have an 
answer to the question regarding a blank check, but I will say, 
since we haven't dabbled in it, you know, the--something to 
keep me up at night would be the role of AI or the potential 
when it comes to producing CBRN threats. That is something 
that, of course, is part of the Executive Order, you know, will 
be implemented. DHS is going to be developing an analysis to 
take a look at that issue.
    GAO is starting to monitor the efforts within that 
Executive Order, and so I'm a little less scared at night 
because I know we're going to take a look at it, but that is an 
area, you know, of concern moving forward.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Dr. Sherman. My time is up.
    Mr. Chairman, if you would just indulge me one quick final 
question for Dr. Wolfe.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Sure.
    Mr. Carter. Same question on engagement. As we prepare for 
the next health security risk, share with us your method or 
matrix for engagement with other agencies to ensure that we 
have the best practices in place.
    Mr. Wolfe. Sure, Ranking Member. I'm from the northeast, so 
I'll talk fast on this one.
    The first with our other Federal partners. We are the 
supporting agency to ESF 8, which is--the lead is HHS. When 
you're a supporting agency, we need to do a better job. So the 
last few years with the creation of OHS, we've done a better 
job of being a solid partner for HHS ASPR and HHS CDC.
    We also sit on the PHEMCE, which is the Public Health 
Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise. That is how the 
Federal interagency decides what medical countermeasures we 
should develop and invest in. Certainly, related to Assistant 
Secretary Callahan's comment about BioWatch, right? We're 
detecting to treat, detecting to warn. We want to make sure 
we're leveraging medical countermeasures. Don't want to detect 
something and then not have a treatment for someone in New 
Orleans or somewhere else.
    In terms of State and local, a few things we do is we 
convene monthly with the fusion centers. We make sure that 
health analysts are understanding what's happening in the law 
enforcement mission. What we find a lot of times is health 
people tend to be called when the problem is known. So we're 
making sure that the fusion centers are leveraging their health 
analysts prior to any issue that arises.
    The other thing we do is we convene communities along the 
Southwest Border and interior communities to talk about 
challenges they are seeing across the community, whether that 
is with migrants, whether that is just State and local issues 
that they're devoting money from one program to another.
    The last thing we do is we've got the food security 
mission. We've done several tabletops, one in the State of 
Washington, one in Oklahoma. Both of those had good 
representation from the Tribes, which is one of our focal 
points for 2024, which is, as we know from COVID-19, for 
example, a lot of focus on Navajo Nation and making sure that 
we're including, when we say SLTT, that we don't forget the 
Tribal part of our State and locals.
    Thanks.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you. Thank you all very much.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
    I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the 
Members for their questions. The Members of the subcommittee 
may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we 
would ask that the witnesses respond to these in writing.
    Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will 
be open for 10 days.
    Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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