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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

FRANK DEYOUNG,

Appellant,

v. 

THE CITY OF MOUNT VERNON; and 

THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND 

INDUSTRIES,

Respondents.

No. 84561-6-I

DIVISION ONE

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR PARTIAL

RECONSIDERATION, AND 

WITHDRAWING OPINION, AND 

SUBSTITUTING OPINION

Respondent, Department of Labor and Industries, moved for partial 

reconsideration of, and moved to publish (together, the “motions”), the opinion filed 

on August 7, 2023. No opposition was filed. 

A panel of the court has determined that respondent’s motions should be 

granted, the original opinion should be withdrawn, and a substitute published 

opinion be filed. 

Now, therefore, it is hereby 

ORDERED that the Respondent’s motions are granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the opinion filed on August 7, 2023, is withdrawn; and it is 

further 
No. 84561-6-I/2

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ORDERED that a substitute published opinion be filed.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

FRANK DEYOUNG,

Appellant,

v. 

THE CITY OF MOUNT VERNON; 

and THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

AND INDUSTRIES,

Respondents.

No. 84561-6-I

DIVISION ONE

PUBLISHED OPINION

DÍAZ, J. — Frank DeYoung appeals the Department of Labor and 

Industries’s decision to deny his application for occupational disease benefits. 

DeYoung asserts that the 2018 amendments to the Industrial Insurance Act, which 

permit firefighters to file claims for posttraumatic stress disorder, apply retroactively

to allow his claim, which manifested before the amendments became effective. 

We agree with the Board of Industrial Appeals that the 2018 amendments apply 

prospectively only and hold that DeYoung’s claim is not viable under the applicable 

law. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

DeYoung was employed as a firefighter for the City of Mount Vernon from

August 2005 until November 2017. It is undisputed that, prior to June 2018, 
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DeYoung developed and showed symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder 

(PTSD) as the result of the traumatic events he witnessed as a firefighter.

In 2018, the legislature amended RCW 51.08.142 and RCW 51.32.185, 

both part of the Industrial Insurance Act (the Act). Previously where mental 

conditions and mental disabilities caused by stress were excluded from the 

definition of “occupational disease,” these amendments now created an exception 

applicable solely to firefighters and law enforcement officers permitting claims 

resulting from PTSD. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 264 § 2. These amendments went into

effect on June 7, 2018. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 264.

DeYoung filed an application for occupational disease benefits on August 

21, 2019. On October 4, 2019, the Department of Labor and Industries (the 

Department) issued a Notice of Decision initially allowing DeYoung’s claim. Two 

weeks later, on October 17, 2019, the Department canceled the October 4 

decision. On October 24, 2019, the Department issued a decision rejecting 

DeYoung’s claim for benefits, on the basis that PTSD is not an occupational

disease pursuant to Former RCW 51.08.140. Upon reconsideration, the 

Department reaffirmed the rejection, finding that the amendments to RCW 

51.32.185 were not retroactive.

DeYoung appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (BIIA). 

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The BIIA agreed with the 

Department, ruling that the statutory amendments were not retroactive. In so 

ruling, the BIIA held that the statutory amendments created a new right and were 

not remedial “because it does not relate to a practice, procedure or remedy.” It 
No. 84561-6-I/3

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therefore granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment, denied 

DeYoung’s motion, and affirmed the Department’s order rejecting DeYoung’s 

claim for occupational disease benefits. DeYoung then appealed to the Skagit 

County Superior Court, which affirmed the decision of the BIIA.

DeYoung appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

DeYoung’s entitlement to benefits depends primarily upon whether the

2018 amendments to RCW 51.08.142 and RCW 51.32.185 operate retroactively.1 

This is a pure question of law, which we review de novo. Weber v. State, Dep’t of

Corr., 78 Wn. App. 607, 609, 898 P.2d 345 (1995). We review the decision of the 

superior court rather than the Board’s order, though “our review is based solely on 

the evidence and testimony presented to the Board.” Smith v. Dep't of Labor &

Indus., 22 Wn. App. 2d 500, 506, 512 P.3d 566, review denied, 200 Wn.2d 1013, 

519 P.3d 588 (2022) (citing RCW 51.52.115; Bennerstrom v. Dep't of Lab. &

Indus., 120 Wn. App. 853, 858, 86 P.3d 826 (2004)).

“Where a statute is within the agency’s special expertise, the agency’s 

interpretation is accorded great weight, provided that the statute is ambiguous.” 

Postema v. Pollution Control Hr’gs Bd., 142 Wn.2d 68, 77, 11 P.3d 726 (2000)

(citations omitted). “Ultimately,” however, “it is for the court to determine the 

 1 As will be discussed below, DeYoung also argues that this court should not apply 

the “manifestation date” standard from an industrial injury to occupational injuries, 

such a PTSD, and argues that “Act is inherently remedial and that all amendments 

have retroactive effect unless otherwise specified.” However, both of these 

arguments, as DeYoung implicitly recognizes, are issues of pure law and 

secondary to a retroactivity analysis and will be analyzed as such.
No. 84561-6-I/4

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meaning and purpose of a statute.” Postema, 142 Wn.2d at 77 (citing City of

Redmond v. Central Puget Sound Growth Mgt. Hr’gs Bd., 136 Wn.2d 38, 46, 959

P.2d 1091 (1998).

In Washington, all workers are entitled to disability benefits under the Act, 

chapter 51 RCW, for occupational diseases. Occupational disease is defined by 

statute as “such disease or infection as arises naturally and proximately out of 

employment under the mandatory or elective adoption provisions of this title.” 

RCW 51.08.140. The exception to this rule is found in RCW 51.08.142.

Prior to 2018, RCW 51.08.142 stated, “The department shall adopt a rule 

pursuant to chapter 34.05 RCW that claims based on mental conditions or mental 

disabilities caused by stress do not fall within the definition of occupational disease 

in RCW 51.08.140.” In 2018, the legislature amended this statute to add a second 

subsection to exempt, among others, firefighters from the rule barring claims based 

on mental conditions. 

The amendment reads, in relevant part, as follows:

Except as provided in (b) and (c) of this subsection, the rule adopted 

under subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to occupational 

disease claims resulting from posttraumatic stress disorders of 

firefighters as defined in RCW 41.26.030(17) (a), (b), (c), and (h) and 

firefighters, including supervisors, employed on a full-time, fully 

compensated basis as a firefighter of a private sector employer’s fire 

department that includes over fifty such firefighters . . .

RCW 51.08.142(2)(a). In conjunction with this amendment, the legislature also 

added a prima facie presumption for firefighters “that posttraumatic stress disorder 

is an occupational disease under RCW 51.08.140.” RCW 51.32.185(1)(b). 
No. 84561-6-I/5

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The parties in this matter dispute whether these amendments operate 

retroactively to apply to claims that accrued prior to the amended statutes’s

enactment. 

“A statute is presumed to operate prospectively unless the legislature 

indicates that it is to operate retroactively.” Agency Budget Corp. v. Washington

Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 93 Wn.2d 416, 424, 610 P.2d 361 (1980) (citing Johnston v. 

Beneficial Management Corp., 85 Wn.2d 637, 641, 538 P.2d 510 (1975); Amburn 

v. Daly, 81 Wn.2d 241, 246, 501 P.2d 178 (1972)). “This presumption can only ‘be 

overcome if (1) the Legislature explicitly provides for retroactivity, (2) the 

amendment is ‘curative,’ OR (3) the statute is ‘remedial[.]’” Densley v. Dep’t of

Ret. Sys., 162 Wn.2d 210, 223, 173 P.3d 885 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 

DeYoung contends that the third exception applies here, i.e., that the 2018 

amendments to RCW 51.08.142 and 51.32.185 were remedial. As DeYoung 

notes, the Act “is remedial in nature,” as it was designed to create a remedy for 

injured workers where none previously existed. Ma’ae v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.,

8 Wn. App. 2d 189, 199, 438 P.3d 148 (2019). However, the fact that a statutory 

scheme is generally remedial in nature does not mean that all amendments to it 

are remedial for purposes of this retroactivity analysis. Rather, a statute is 

remedial if it “relates to practice, procedure, or remedies and does not affect a 

substantive or vested right.” Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wn.2d 170, 181, 685 P.2d 

1074 (1984) (citing Johnston, 85 Wn.2d at 641); see also Agency Budget Corp.,

93 Wn.2d at 425.
No. 84561-6-I/6

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The difference is perhaps best demonstrated by Loeffelholz v. University of 

Washington, 175 Wn.2d 264, 285 P.3d 854 (2012). In that case, an employee of 

the University of Washington filed a claim against her employer for discrimination 

on the basis of sexual orientation. In 2006, the legislature amended the 

Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW, to include 

sexual orientation as a protected class. LAWS OF 2006, ch. 4. Some of the 

incidents of discrimination that the employee listed in her complaint occurred prior 

to the effective date of the amendment, while only one had occurred after. 

Loeffelholz, 175 Wn.2d at 269.

The employee argued, as DeYoung does here, that the amendments to the 

WLAD were remedial because the WLAD is remedial in nature. Id. at 271. The 

Supreme Court rejected that argument. Id. The Court held that the statutory 

amendment was not remedial, and therefore not retroactive, based on both the 

plain language of the statute, which did not specify that it was to be applied 

retroactively, and on its legislative history. Id. at 271-72. Its legislative history 

indicated that the legislature recognized that it was creating a new cause of action,

as the legislature had stated that “the amendment ‘expanded [the WLAD] to 

prohibit discrimination based on a person's sexual orientation.’” Id. at 272 (quoting 

FINAL B. REP. ON ENGROSSED SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2661, at 2, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. 

(Wash. 2006)). Because amendments which create new causes of action are not 

considered remedial as they affect substantive rights, the court held that the 

amendments to the WLAD operated prospectively only and the employee could 
No. 84561-6-I/7

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only recover for the (single) incident that occurred after the statute’s effective date. 

Id.

The amendments to RCW 51.08.142 and 51.32.185 function in much the 

same way as amendments to the WLAD do. Like the 2006 amendments to the 

WLAD, the 2018 amendments to the Act add a new category of people who can 

file a claim – firefighters with PTSD. Legislative history supports this reading, as 

the final bill report states that the amendments “[a]llow[] industrial insurance 

coverage for posttraumatic stress disorders affecting law enforcement officers and 

firefighters.” FINAL B. REP. ON SUBSTITUTE S.B. 6214, at 1, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. 

(Wash. 2018). These facts strongly suggest that the legislature amended the Act

to create a new type of claim for a new kind of claimant, which had not existed.

In response, DeYoung asserts that the plain language of the statutes 

evinces the legislature’s intent for the amendments to apply retroactively. Namely, 

DeYoung points to section (5) of RCW 51.32.185, which states that the 

presumption that PTSD is an occupational disease “applies to active or former

firefighters.” (emphasis added). Id. We disagree. Former firefighters are included 

among those who may file a claim for PTSD for the same reason they are included 

under subsection (3) among those who may file a claim for cancer: given the nature 

of the condition, it is possible that the condition will not manifest itself until after a 

firefighter has left their employment. The language is not indicative of retroactivity.

DeYoung also asserts that the requirement in RCW 51.32.185(5) that a 

firefighter must have served at least ten years before they are eligible to make a 

claim indicates the legislature’s intent to apply the statute retroactively. According 
No. 84561-6-I/8

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to DeYoung, applying the statute prospectively would mean that no firefighter will 

be eligible to file a claim for occupational disease benefits for PTSD until 2028. Id. 

The plain language of the statute does not support such an interpretation. The 

statute establishes that only firefighters who have served the minimum number of 

years may file a claim for occupational disease benefits for PTSD. Nothing about 

the provision is indicative of retroactivity. 

Nor does subsection (2)(b) of RCW 51.08.142, which makes a 

psychological examination, if offered by the employer, a prerequisite for claims 

filed by firefighters hired after the statute’s effective date, evince an intent for the 

statute to apply retroactively. To the contrary, this provision evinces the precise 

opposite. By applying this provision only to those hired after the effective date, the 

legislature recognized that it would be inequitable to impose the same prerequisite 

on those currently employed firefighters whose PTSD manifested after June 2018. 

In other words, the legislature made the prerequisite applicable to only postamendment hires precisely because it was altering the substantive rights of 

firefighters. As an alteration of substantive rights, the 2018 amendments cannot 

be remedial such that they would apply retroactively.

Alternatively, DeYoung asserts that it is the date of the filing of the claim for

benefits, not the date of manifestation of the condition, that determines which 

version of the law controls. DeYoung attempts to distinguish a long line of cases 

holding otherwise by arguing that the date of manifestation rule applies only to the 

rate of compensation due to the employee, not whether the claim is allowable at 

all. Id. at 3-8.
No. 84561-6-I/9

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Our Supreme Court has long ago stated otherwise: “It has been firmly 

established in this state, by a consistent series of decisions of this court, that the 

rights of claimants under the [Act]

[2] are controlled by the law in force at the time of 

the person’s injury, rather than by a law which becomes effective subsequently.”3 

Ashenbrenner v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 62 Wn.2d 22, 25, 380 P.2d 730 (1963). 

And most devastatingly to DeYoung’s claim is that the fact that, for occupational 

diseases such as PTSD, the “time of the person’s injury” is considered to be the 

date at which the disease manifests. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Landon, 117 Wn.2d 

122, 125-26, 814 P.2d 626 (1991).

Otherwise, DeYoung identifies no case where the law applied to a claim 

under the Act was the law in effect at the time that the claim was made, rather than 

when it accrued, and we presume none exists. State v. Loos, 14 Wn. App. 2d 748, 

758, 473 P.3d 1229 (2020) (holding where a party fails to provide citation to support 

a legal argument, we assume counsel, like the court, has found none) (citing State 

v. Arredondo, 188 Wn.2d 244, 262, 394 P.3d 348 (2017)). 

 2 The Workmen’s Compensation Act was re-codified as the Act in 1961. LAWS OF 

1961, ch. 23.

3 For this proposition, the Ashenbrenner court relied upon multiple cases holding 

that, for worker’s compensation claims, the law in place at the time of injury is 

controlling. Not all of the cited cases concern the rate of compensation, contrary 

to DeYoung’s claim otherwise. For example, Sheldon v. Department of Labor &

Industries, 168 Wn. 571, 12 P.2d 751 (1932), concerned an amendment to the 

statute concerning what qualified as an “extra-hazardous” job. In another example, 

Bodine v. Department of Labor & Industries, 29 Wn.2d 879, 190 P.2d 89 (1948),

concerned an amendment to the Worker’s Compensation Act that granted the 

employee the right to recover attorney fees. Thus, despite DeYoung’s assertion 

to the contrary, the history of the “manifestation rule” does not demonstrate that 

our Supreme Court intended the rule to apply only to the rate of compensation.
No. 84561-6-I/10

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III. CONCLUSION

We agree with the BIIA’s interpretation that the amendments to RCW 

51.08.142 and 51.32.185 only apply prospectively. As such, the BIIA and the trial 

court did not err by denying DeYoung’s request for occupational disease benefits

and we affirm.

WE CONCUR: