# IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL S OF TEXAS

N O
. P D

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T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

v .
E R I C M I C H A E L H E I L M A N , A p p e l l e e

O N S T A T E ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W F R O M T H E N I N T H C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

J E F F E R S O N C O U N T Y

J O H N S O N 

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i l e d a d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n .
D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N

Whil e I ag ree that Eric Heilman is not entitled to relief on his “statute of limit ations” claim,

I cannot join the majority ’s opinion or its judg ment beca use it is neither nece ssary nor appr opriate

to overr ule our prior decision in Phillips v. State

. Her e, the defe ndant expli citly trade d his rig ht to 1



## make any “statute of limit ations” claim to the misdemeanor char g e of tampe r in g w it h a g overnme ntal

rec ord in exchang e for avoiding indictment for the corr esponding state-jail felony offe nse that was

not time barr ed. J ust as a d ef en dant who reque sts a jury char g e on a time-barr ed lesser- included

3 6 2 S

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offe nse waives his rig ht to later claim that his conviction on the lesser offe nse was bar red by

limit ations, so too a d efe ndant who expressly trade s his rig ht to a limit ations claim on a

2



## misdemeanor to avoid being char g ed with a felony waives his rig ht to later claim that his conviction

was barr ed by

limit ations. Heilman mig ht have c hutzpah, but he does not have a valid limit ations

claim. 3



## I

. Heilman, a member of the Be aumont Police Depa rtme n t, w a s in v e s ti g a ti n g a d r u g
- tr a f ficking

opera tion in October 2008. He, Of fice r B rad B eaulieu, a

nd a conf idential informant set up a sting

opera tion with a s u s p ec t ed d rug deale r, but their targ et left the scene without completing the

transac tion. Heilman and Be auli eu chase d the suspect and arr ested him. They seized cash and a larg e cac he of coca ine from him. But, in draf ting his probable -ca

use aff idavit, Heilman omitted any
ref ere nce to the confide ntial informant or the sting opera tion. The suspect eventua lly disclosed the

exis tence and par

ticipation of the conf

idential informant.

A specia l prosec utor was appointed, and a g rand jury investiga tion beg an. Acc ording to the

habea s court’s f

indings, He ilman’s depiction of the e vents was a s follows:

The investiga tion of Applicant [Heilman] continued throug h the fall [of 2010]. On November 23, 2010, Applicant is advised that the file of the Be aumont Polic e Depa rtment I nterna l Affa irs I nvestig ation was being subpoenaed to the J eff erson County Gra

nd J u ry

. On Dec ember 13 or 14, Applicant was advised that the gra nd jury had met and that he had an opportunity to plead g uilt y t o a m i s demea nor or proce ed to trial af

t er i n d i ctm ent on felony char g es. On Dec ember 17, 2010, Applicant was advised that he had until Dec ember 22, 2010 , to decide whether to

S e e S t a t e v

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. 1 9 9 3 ) ( w h e n d e f e n d a n t r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e j u r y b e 2 i n s t r u c t e d o n t h e l e s s e r
- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e , h e w a s e s t o p p e d f r o m c o m p l a i n i n g t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n o f t h a t l e s s e r o f f e n s e
w a s b a r r e d b y l i m i t a t i o n s )

.

I n f a c t , H e i l m a n d i d n o t o r i g i n a l l y r a i s e t h i s c l a i m ; t h e h a b e a s j u d g e d i d

. 3

## 3

enter a plea and ac cept the misdeme anor of fer

. The Spec ial Prosecutor f

illed in the events fr om his perspec tive:

On Dec ember 14, 2010 [applicant’s orig inal trial counsel] was advised that the g rand jury voted unanimously to indict both Eric Heilman and Br ad Be aulieu for the felony offe nses of tampering with g overnme ntal rec ords and, in the case of Br ad Be aulieu, ag g rava ted perjury

. At the reque st of and with the consent of the g rand jury , an offe r was extended to Heilman and B eaulieu thr oug h their attorne y
. . . to ple ad g uilty to [t he] misdemeanor offe nse of tampering with a g overnme ntal rec ord for defe rre d adjudication in lieu of being formally indicted on felony char g es. The plea offe r was conditioned on their express waiver of any statute of limit ations claim that they may have reg arding the misdemeanor char g es to which they would plead. The g rand jury adjourne d until Dec ember 22 to allow Offic ers Heilman and Be aulieu to consider the offe r.
On Dec ember 22, Offic ers Heilman and Be aulieu appea red bef o re the Court with
new attorney s, wer e proper ly admonished, waived their rig hts, expressly waived the statute of limit ations, and pleade d g uilty to the m i s d em ea nor char g e of tampering with a gover

nmental record. I n light of the pl eas, the g rand jury ’s t erm ex pired on Dec ember

31, 2010, without formally indicting e ither off

icer

. An information char g ing Heilman with the misdemeanor offe nse was filed in the co u nty

court on Dec ember 22, 2010. At the g uilty -plea hear ing on that day , Heilman and his attorney , along

with the specia l prosec utor and the trial judge , signe d the standard written documents,
admonishments, and waiver s. A handwr itten sentenc e at the bottom of the p age rea d, “I here by

waive all statute of limit ations.” Direc tly above that sentenc e are applicant’ s initials, as well as those

of his attorney

. On the officia l Def err ed Adjudication Orde r, next to three of t h e probation conditions, is the following stateme nt:

No State opposition to ear ly termination afte r six months[ .] Def ense will not file for
ear ly termination befor e six months[

. ] Def ense waives statute [of] limit ations per J udg e F lores[.]

Heil m an h ad n o rig ht of appeal and did not attempt to appea l. He followed his end of the barg ain and did not file for ear ly termination for six months. The s t at e fo l l o we d its part of the

## 4

barg ain and did not oppose ear ly termination. Howeve r, four months afte r discharg ing his probation

and obtaining a Def

err ed Adjudication Orde r of Dismissal, He ilman f iled an application for a writ

of habe as cor

pus claiming , inter alia , that he had e ntere d an involuntary plea.

The habea s judge , on his own, raised the issue of whether Heilman’s prosec ution was barr ed by the two-y ear statute of limit ations for the misdemeanor offe nse of tampering with a g overnme ntal

rec ord. Rely ing in part on this Court’s decision in Phillips v. State , he held that the two-y ear statute 4



## of limit ations barr ed applicant’ s prosec ution and that the ag ree ment to waive t h e s tatute of

limit ations was it self “void and a nullity .” He concluded that h e d i d n o t h av e authorit y to enter a
defe rre d-adjudica tion order as a matter of law. The judge dismiss ed the information and vacated the

defe rre d adjudication orde r.
The state a

ppeale d, and the c ourt of appe als aff irmed the ha

beas judg e.
I I

. The problem with the lower courts’ relianc e on Phillips is that, in Phillips , we explained that

a “matter of law” statute-of- limit ations claim is one in which the char g ing instrument shows on its

fac e that the prosecution is time-barr ed and that the defect is not “repara ble.” There is absolutely 5 

## nothing that the state can do to save its prosec ution; it is irrepa rably barr ed. For example, in Phillips , the defe ndant was char g ed with twelve counts of sexual offe nses committed in 1982 and 1983, but

no indictment was filed until 2007. The statute of limit ations for all twelve counts had run in 1993

under the then-e x isting ten-y ear statute of limit ations, and there was no other offe nse that had arisen

3 6 2 S

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. S e r e n d i p i t o u s l y , w e d e l i v e r e d o u r o p i n i o n i n P h i l l i p s j u s t n i n e d a y s 4 b e f o r e H e i l m a n ’ s p r o b a t i o n w a s f o r m a l l y d i s c h a r g e d

.

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. 5

## 5

from the same conduct with which to char g e him. There was nothing the state could do to resur rec t
those char g es, which had been time-barr ed for fourtee n y ear s. The problem was incura ble. Phill ips

was ther efor e entitled to pre vail on his ex post facto claim as a matter of la

w.
But if the pl ea d i n g i s “repara ble,” then the statute of limit ations is a fac tual aff irmative

defe nse on which the defe ndant bea rs the burde n of proof

. As we e x plained in Phillips , 6



## The pleading that g ives rise to a limit ations fac tual defe nse is repa rable

. The pleading that g ives rise to a statute-of- limit ations bar is not. The first is forf eited unless raised befor e or during the trial and cannot be raised in a pretria l writ. The second—a true ex post facto violation—is not forf eitable unde r Ieppe rt. 7



## I n this case , unlike Phillips , another offe nse that arose from the same conduct was not timebarred. Had Heilman said that he did not want to waive his statute-of- limit ations claim to the
misdemeanor, the prosec utor could s ay , “F ine. The g rand jury will retu rn a felony indictment this

afte rnoon.” This misdemeanor information was easily “re para ble” by char g ing the state-jail felony

offe nse of tampering with a g overnme ntal rec ord, which has a three -y ear statute of limit ations and

was not time-barr ed. Although the fac e of the indictment looks as if the char g e wer e time-barr ed, 8



## a g lance at the plea

paper s and defe rre d-adjudica tion judg ment and conditions of proba tion shows
that, unlike Phill ips, Heilman expli citly waived his rig ht to complain about the statute of limit ations

conce rning the misdemeanor in r eturn for the prosec utor’s act of not obtaining a felony indictment

for which the statute of limit at i o n s h ad not run. As the state has consistently arg ued, Heilman

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T E X

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. – H o u s t o n [ 1 s t 8 D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 9 , n o p e t

. ) ( “ T h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s f o r t h e s t a t e j a i l f

e l o n y o f t a m p e r i n g w i t h a g o v e r n m e n t a l r e c o r d i s t h r e e y e a r s

. ” )

.

## 6

“‘be nefitted handsomely from h is barg ain,’” and he cannot complain now. I n compar ison, Phill ips 9 1 0



## went to trial and benef

itted not at all. And, befor e this Court, the state, repr esente d by the State Prosecuting Attorney , conce ded that the state was mistaken at trial and on direc t appea l and that the

statute of limit ations had run in 1993, four y ear s befor e the L eg islature passed the extension of the

statute of limitations on which the state had r elied.

This s i t uation is the conver se of that addre ssed by the Supreme Court in Spaziano v.
Florida

. I n that case , the defe ndant was being tried on ca p i tal-murder char g es, but, at the jury

1 1



## char g e confe renc e, the trial judge ref used to char g e the jury on the lesser- included offe nses of murder

and manslaug hter beca

use the defe ndant ref

used to waiv e the statute of limit ations, which had

alre ady run on those offe nses. On appea l, the defe ndant complained that he should not be require d 1 2



## to waive one substantive rig ht–relianc e on the statute of limit ations–to obtain the benef it of another

substantive rig ht–instructions on lesser- included offe nses. The S upreme Court held that the 1 3



## defe ndant could not have his cake an d eat it, too. The defenda nt was entitl ed to make his choice :
instructions on the lesser- included offe nses if he waived the statute of limit ati o n s o n those lesser

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. 2 0 0 7 ) ( “ [ o ] n e w h o a c c e p t s t h e b e n e f i t s o f a 1 0 j u d g m e n t , d e c r e e , o r j u d i c i a l o r d e r i s e s t o p p e d t o d e n y t h e v a l i d i t y o r p r o p r i e t y t h e r e o f , o r a n y p a r t t h e r e o f

, o n a n y g r o u n d s ; n o r c a n h e r e j e c t i t s b u r d e n s o m e c o n s e q u e n c e s

. T h e o n l y e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s f o r c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e
s u b j e c t

- m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t r e n d e r i n g t h e j u d g m e n t

. ” ) ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s a n d c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d 

## ).

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## 7

offe nses or no lesser- included instructions if he did not waive the limit ations claim. We held the 1 4



## s am e i n S t a t e v. Y

ount; the defe ndant may either waive the statute of limit ations and obtain

instructions on lesser- included offenses or insist upon the s tatut e o f limit ations and foreg o lesserincluded instruction on offe nses that ar e other wise time-bar

red. 1 5



## The bottom line in those case s is that the sta tute of limit ations may be expressly

waived in specia l circ umstances when the limit ations statute does not protec t the defe ndant’s or society ’s

interests. As a public-policy matter, whe n the def

endant may

still be prose cuted f

or ac ts that are 1 6



## not barr ed by a statute of limit ations and arose from the same criminal episode, the limit ations statute does not provide f

ull protection to the defe ndant, and the r ationale f or the rule does not apply

. 1 7

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. a t 4 5 6

. T h e C o u r t e x p l a i n e d , 1 4 I f t h e j u r y i s n o t t o b e t r i c k e d i n t o t h i n k i n g t h a t t h e r e i s a r a n g e o f o f f e n s e s f o r w h i c h t h e d e f

e n d a n t
m a y b e h e l d a c c o u n t a b l e , t h e n t h e q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r B e c k r e q u i r e s t h a t a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n b e g i v e n , w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t b e i n g f

o r c e d t o w a i v e t h e e x p i r e d s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o n t h o s e o f f e n s e s , o r w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d b e g i v e n a c h o i c e b e t w e e n h a v i n g t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f

f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n o r a s s e r t i n g t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o n t h e l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s

. W e t h i n k t h e b e t t e r o p t i o n i s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t b e g i v e n t h e c h o i c e

.
I d

. A s t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t m a d e c l e a r , w a i v e r o f t h e s t a t u t e o f

l i m i t a t i o n s i n t h i s c o n t e x t m a y p r o t e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e j u r y a n d t h o s e o f s o c i e t y , a s w e l l a s t h e d e f e n d a n t

.

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. 3 , 2 0 1 4 ) 1 6 ( “ N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f a c t t h a t i n c e r t a i n s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e r e t h e b a r o f t h e s t a t u t e m a y b e e x p r e s s l y w a i v e d

w h e n i t d o e s n o t o p e r a t e i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s f

a v o r , . . . u n d e r o r d i n a r y c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e b a r o f t h e s t a t u t e i s n o t w a i v e d b y a m e r e f

a i l u r e t o a s s e r t i t , a n d t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s m a y b e p r o p e r l y a s s e r t e d o n a p p e a l o r i n a p e t i t i o n f o r p o s t

c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f

. ” ) ( c i t i n g S

p a z i a n o ; o t h e r i n t e r n a l c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ; C a r t a g e n a v

. S t a t e , 1 2 5 S o

. 3 d 9 1 9 , 9 2 1 ( F l a

. D i s t

. C t

. A p p

. 2 0 1 3 ) ( d e f

e n d a n t m a y e x p r e s s l y w a i v e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s i n r e t u r n f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s o n l e s s e r
- i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s i f c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r e s a r e f o l l o w e d ) ; P e o

p l e v

. B r o c k

s m i t h , 6 0 4 N

. E

. 2 d 1 0 5 9 , 1 0 6 5 ( I l l

. C t

. A p p

. 1 9 9 2 ) ( “ I f a d e f e n d a n t
w i s h e s t o s e e k a l e s s e r o f f e n s e a n d t r y f

o r t h e p o s s i b l e c o m p r o m i s e v e r d i c t , h e m u s t b e w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s
o f t h a t d e c i s i o n , e v e n i f

i t m e a n s c o n v i c t i o n o f

a c r i m e f

o r w h i c h t h e s t a t u t e o f

l i m i t a t i o n s h a s e x p i r e d

. ” ) , a f f i r m e d
, 6 4 2 N

. E

. 2 d 1 2 3 0 ( 1 9 9 4 )

. S e e g e n e r a l l y , A l a n L

. A d e l s t e i n , C o n f l i c t o f t h e C r i m i n a l S t a t u t e o f L i m i t a t i o n s w i t h L e s s e r O f f e n s e s a t T

r i a l , 3 7 W M

. & M A R Y L

. R E V

. 1 9 9 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ; T i m A

. T h o m a s , A n n o t a t i o n , W a i v a b i l i t y o f B a r o f L i m i t a t i o n s A g a i n s t C r i m i n a l P r o s e c u t i o n , 7 8 A

. L

. R

. 4 t h 6 9 3 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; A n n o t a t i o n , C o n v i c t i o n o f L e s s e r O

f f e n s e , A g a i n s t W

h i c h S t a t u t e o f L i m i t a t i o n s H a s R u n , W h e r e S t a t u t e H a s N o t R u n A g a i n s t O f f e n s e W i t h W

h i c h D e f e n d a n t I s C h a r g e d
, 4 7 A

. L

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. 2 n d 8 8 7 ( 1 9 5 6 

## ).

S e e C a r t e g e n a , 1 2 5 S o

. 3 d a t 9 2 1

. 1 7

## 8

There is no question that, if the specia l p ro s ec utor had indicted Heilman for the state-jail felony offe nse of tampering with a g overnme ntal rec ord (an offe nse that was not time-barr ed),

Heilman could and would have waived the statute of limit ations if he pled g uilty to t h e l es s erincluded misdemeanor offe nse even though it was technica lly time-barr ed. The reve rse is also true: 1 8



## I f an indictment or information char g ing the misdemeanor offe nse of tampering with a g overnme ntal

rec ord i s time-barr ed , b u t the s tate-ja il felony offe nse of tampering with a gover nmental record is
not, then a defe ndant m ay expressly waive relianc e on th e s t at u t e of l imitations and plead to the 1 9



## misdemeanor of

fense to avoid indictment and trial on the c orre sponding f elony offe nse.
I n s u m , He ilman could, and did, expressly waive his rig ht to rely upon the statute of

limit ations in pleading g uilty to the misdemeanor offe nse of tampering with a g overnme ntal rec ord

in exchang e for the state’s ag ree ment not to indict him on the state-jail felony tampering offe nse for

which the statute of limit ations had not run. But because the C ourt g oes t oo far and overrules the easily distinguishable Phillips, I must diss ent.

Filed: Mar ch 18, 2015 Publis h

“ B y s t a t u t e , a d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s p e r m i t t e d t o t r y a m i s d e m e a n o r t h a t i s i n c l u d e d w i t h i n a f e l o n y o f f e n s e , e v e n 1 8
t h o u g h t h e m i s d e m e a n o r w o u l d n o t o t h e r w i s e b e s u b j e c t t o t h a t c o u r t ’ s j u r i s d i c t i o n

. ” M c K i n n e y v

. S t a t e , 2 0 7 S

. W

. 3 d 3 6 6 , 3 7 6 ( T e x
. C r i m

. A p p

. 2 0 0 6 )

. S e e T E X

. C O D E C R IM

. P R O C

. , a r t s

. 4

. 0 5 ( j u r i s d i c t i o n o f d i s t r i c t c o u r t s ) , 4

. 0 6 ( w h e n f e l o n y i n c l u d e s m i s d e m e a n o r )

.

T h e p e r t i n e n t d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m i s d e m e a n o r a n d s t a t e
- j a i l f e l o n y o f f e n s e s o f t a m p e r i n g w i t h a 1 9
g o v e r n m e n t a l r e c o r d i s t h a t , t o e s t a b l i s h t h e f e l o n y , t h e s t a t e m u s t p r o v e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t e n d e d t o “ h a r m o r d e f r a u d

a n o t h e r ” w h e n h e m a d e a f a l s e e n t r y i n a g o v e r n m e n t a l r e c o r d

. T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 3 7

. 1 0 ( c ) ( 1 )

.