IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-1694

Filed January 24, 2018

IN THE INTEREST OF K.A.,

Minor Child,

S.W., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Barbara H. Liesveld, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights. 

AFFIRMED.

Jeannine L. Roberts, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John McCormally, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Robin L. O’Brien Licht, Cedar Rapids, guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
2

VOGEL, Presiding Judge.

A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights.1 She 

claims the State did not present clear and convincing evidence her child could not 

be returned home at the time of termination and challenges the finding she lacks 

the ability or willingness to respond to services. The mother also asserts

termination is not in the child’s best interest and her strong bond with the child

should preclude termination. We find there was sufficient evidence to terminate 

her parental rights, termination is in the child’s best interests, and the child’s young 

age and early removal from the mother override any bond the mother claims to 

have. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

K.A., born November 2016, came to the attention of the Iowa Department 

of Human Services (DHS) shortly after his birth due to concerns for his wellbeing 

and safety after the mother left K.A. under the supervision of other individuals. The 

mother and the father are unmarried, no longer in a relationship, and have a history 

of domestic violence. The mother takes medication for mental-health issues that 

date back to previous termination proceedings with her older children and their 

respective fathers.

2

 As with her previous relationships, most of which involved 

violence and no-contact orders, her relationship with K.A.’s father is not a healthy 

one. In December 2016, the father was arrested on a warrant for domestic 

violence against the mother that occurred in August 2016. Later that month, the 

 

1 The district court terminated the father’s parental rights, and he does not appeal.

2 Of the mother’s other children, her rights were terminated to two and one lives with a 

paternal great grandparent, who now has a guardianship.
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no-contact order against the father was dropped; however, the mother, the father, 

and the father’s new girlfriend continued to engage in verbal and physical 

altercations.

On December 9, 2016, K.A. was removed from the mother’s care. The child 

was placed with a foster family and remained there during the pendency of the 

case. K.A. was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA) on January 5, 

2017. 

The mother was offered services to correct the circumstances that led to 

the adjudication. While the mother participated in some visits, was occasionally 

employed, and engaged in supportive housing model services, she struggled to 

stay consistent with her mental-health medication and avoid confrontations with 

the father and his new girlfriend. Because the mother’s issues with domestic 

violence and mental health were not new, but rather they were continuations of the 

problems identified in her previous involvement with the DHS regarding her older 

children, the DHS was concerned with the mother’s current ability to demonstrate 

and maintain the appropriate changes so that K.A. could be returned to her care. 

Coinciding with the CINA dispositional hearing on May 5, the State filed a 

petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, which came on for hearing on 

June 15, 2017. On October 3, 2017, the district court entered an order terminating 

the mother’s rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) and (g) (2017). The 

mother appeals.

II. Standard of Review

The scope of review is de novo in termination cases. In re D.W., 791 

N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). Clear and convincing evidence is needed to 
4

establish the grounds for termination. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006).

We give weight to the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we are not bound by 

them. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).

III. Statutory Grounds

The mother asserts the State did not prove by clear and convincing 

evidence her parental rights should be terminated under Iowa Code section 

232.116(1)(h) and (g). The mother asserts the State failed to prove the fourth 

element of paragraph (h), which requires the State to establish, “[t]he child cannot 

be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at 

the present time.” The mother also asserts the State failed to prove the third and 

fourth elements of paragraph (g), which require the State to establish, “the mother 

continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which would 

correct the situation,” and “an additional period of rehabilitation would not correct 

the situation.” “When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than 

one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the 

sections cited by the juvenile court to affirm.” In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 1999). In this case, we will address the mother’s arguments regarding 

paragraph (h). 

Despite the mother’s preparedness and general improvement during visits 

with her son, the mother demonstrated no improvement in avoiding confrontation

and jeopardizing K.A.’s wellbeing that led to the DHS’s involvement. The mother’s 

disputes with the father, his on-and-off again girlfriend, and other persons 

continued to create an unsafe environment for the child. One caseworker indicated 

the mother had periods where she improved and was attentive to K.A.’s needs, 
5

often times when she was employed and had a set schedule; however, the mother 

then had down periods due to neglecting her mental-health issues. 

This neglect and inattentiveness of K.A. is corroborated by the DHS, which 

dealt with the mother in cases regarding her other, older children. The record is 

replete with evidence of the violence in the mother’s life including no-contact orders 

against the fathers of her older children, continued contact with those fathers

despite the no-contact orders, and an inability to stay consistent with her mentalhealth medication resulting in dramatic mood swings. Thus, there is clear and 

convincing evidence that K.A. could not be returned to the mother at the time of 

the termination hearing because of her lack of progress in distancing herself from 

altercations and violence, and from the threat they pose to K.A. See Iowa Code § 

232.116(1)(h)(4). 

IV. Best Interests

The mother claims termination of her parental rights was not in the best 

interests of the child. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Section 232.116(2) requires 

us to give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for 

furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, 

mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 

40 (Iowa 2010).

The mother has not demonstrated she is capable of attending to K.A.’s

safety and wellbeing by disassociating herself from individuals who elicit violent 

responses from her and by focusing on her own mental-health issues. K.A. was 

removed from the mother’s care and placed into a foster home on December 9, 

2016, less than one month after he was born. The mother has not dealt with her 
6

own anger issues so that she could provide a safe environment for K.A. in her 

custody. Although caseworkers and the DHS generally agree the mother does 

well with K.A. during supervised visits, until she displays the initiative to attend to 

her own issues, she cannot provide safe care to K.A. and is not the best placement 

for K.A.’s growth and development. We agree with the district court, termination is

in K.A.’s best interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

V. Permissive Factors

The mother claims she maintained a strong bond with K.A. that should 

preclude termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). The “exceptions” to 

termination are permissive and not mandatory. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 

113 (Iowa 2014). “The court has discretion, based on the unique circumstances 

of each case and the best interests of the child, whether to apply the factors in this 

section to save the parent-child relationship.” In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 475

(Iowa Ct. App. 2011). 

The mother loves K.A., and there may be a bond between them. However, 

due to K.A.’s young age, and the young age at which he was removed from the 

mother’s care, the bond is not so close that on balance, termination will be 

detrimental to him. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709 (“Although it is clear that [the 

mother] loves her son, our consideration must center on whether the child will be 

disadvantaged by termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the 

mother’s] inability to provide for [the child’s] developing needs.”). K.A. has relied 

on others to meet his needs throughout the pendency of these proceedings, and 

therefore, almost the entirety of his life. Thus, the bond between the mother and 
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K.A. is not so strong as to make termination unnecessary. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(3)(c).

VI. Conclusion

Because K.A. could not be returned to the mother at the time of termination 

due to her violent tendencies, unhealthy relationships, and mental health issues;

termination is in K.A.’s best interests; and there are no permissive factors to 

preclude termination, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.