`[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]







  EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: ARE 
                       FEDERAL BUILDINGS SECURE?

=======================================================================

                                (118-66)

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
    ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             JULY 23, 2024

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure






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     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation
                                   _______
                                   
                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
                 
57-589 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 2024 































             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
 Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking 
              Member
Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, 
  District of Columbia               Arkansas
Grace F. Napolitano, California      Daniel Webster, Florida
Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Thomas Massie, Kentucky
John Garamendi, California           Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaian Babin, Texas
Andre Carson, Indiana                Garret Graves, Louisiana
Dina Titus, Nevada                   David Rouzer, North Carolina
Jared Huffman, California            Mike Bost, Illinois
Julia Brownley, California           Doug LaMalfa, California
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Brian J. Mast, Florida
Salud O. Carbajal, California        Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Greg Stanton, Arizona,                 Puerto Rico
  Vice Ranking Member                Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Colin Z. Allred, Texas               Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Sharice Davids, Kansas               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire            Vice Chairman
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts      Tracey Mann, Kansas
Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Burgess Owens, Utah
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Patrick Ryan, New York               Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska         Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 Eric Burlison, Missouri
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio            Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Mike Collins, Georgia
                                     Mike Ezell, Mississippi
                                     John S. Duarte, California
                                     Aaron Bean, Florida
                                     Celeste Maloy, Utah
                                     Kevin Kiley, California
                                     Vince Fong, California
                                ------                               
                                
      Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and
                          Emergency Management

    Scott Perry, Pennsylvania, 
             Chairman
Dina Titus, Nevada, Ranking Member
Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Garret Graves, Louisiana
  District of Columbia               Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Sharice Davids, Kansas,                Puerto Rico
  Vice Ranking Member                Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon,
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana              Vice Chairman
Grace F. Napolitano, California      Anthony D'Esposito, New York
John Garamendi, California           Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Jared Huffman, California            Mike Ezell, Mississippi
Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) Celeste Maloy, Utah
                                     Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)





















                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress from the 
  Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency 
  Management, opening statement..................................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Nevada, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 
  Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, 
  opening statement..............................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     6

                               WITNESSES

David Marroni, Director, Physical Infrastructure Team, U.S. 
  Government Accountability Office, oral statement...............     7
    Prepared statement...........................................     9
Richard K. Cline, Director, Federal Protective Service, 
  Management Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
  oral statement.................................................    20
    Prepared statement...........................................    22
Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, U.S. 
  General Services Administration, oral statement................    25
    Prepared statement...........................................    27

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Post-Hearing Response to Hon. Garret Graves' Request for 
  Information from Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings 
  Service, U.S. General Services Administration..................    48

                                APPENDIX

Questions to Richard K. Cline, Director, Federal Protective 
  Service, Management Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland 
  Security, from Hon. Scott Perry................................    51
Questions to Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings 
  Service, U.S. General Services Administration, from Hon. Scott 
  Perry..........................................................    56

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                             July 19, 2024

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Economic Development, 
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 
Buildings, and Emergency Management
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Examining the 
Effectiveness of the Federal Protective Service: Are Federal 
Buildings Secure?''
_______________________________________________________________________


                               I. PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, 
and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure will meet on Tuesday, July 23, 2024, at 10:00 
a.m. ET in 2167 of the Rayburn House Office Building to receive 
testimony at a hearing entitled, ``Examining the Effectiveness 
of the Federal Protective Service: Are Federal Buildings 
Secure?'' The purpose of the hearing is to examine the Federal 
Protective Service's (FPS) protection of Federal buildings, 
focusing on a United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) study which will be released at the hearing. Members will 
receive testimony from the United States General Services 
Administration (GSA), the FPS, and the GAO.

                             II. BACKGROUND

THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

    FPS authority to protect Federal buildings can be traced 
back to the Federal Works Agency (FWA), an agency that was 
established under President Franklin Roosevelt with the purpose 
of consolidating the functions of other agencies dealing with 
public works into one organization.\1\ In 1948, Congress 
authorized the FWA to appoint uniformed guards to police public 
buildings.\2\ The FWA was dissolved in 1949, with all of its 
responsibilities then being integrated into GSA, an agency 
founded that same year through the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act (P.L. 81-152) to take over all real 
property authorities in the Federal Government.\3\ GSA 
continued carrying out the same responsibilities held by the 
FWA until 1961 when Congress authorized the GSA Administrator 
to appoint non-uniformed guards, in addition to the already-
serving uniformed guards, to conduct investigations, enforce 
Federal law, and make arrests without a warrant for offenses 
committed on Federal property.\4\ These law enforcement 
responsibilities came together in 1971, when GSA formally 
established the FPS as a Federal law enforcement agency to 
encompass those responsibilities and authorities.\5\ Following 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the passage of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) FPS was transferred to the 
then newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS).\6\ 
Currently, FPS is housed within the DHS Management Directorate, 
but the agency was previously housed under both the National 
Protection and Programs Directorate and United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Nat'l Archives, General Records of the Federal Works Agency, 
(July 2024), available at https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-
records/groups/162.html#::text=History%3A
%20FWA%20established%201939%20to,FEAPW)%3B%20the%20WPA%3B%20and.
    \2\ Shawn Reese, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (RS22706), The Federal 
Protective Service and Contract Security Guards: A Statutory History 
and Current Status, (Aug. 20, 2009), available at https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS22706/15.
    \3\ GSA, Who We Are, (July 2024), available at https://
disposal.gsa.gov/s/whoweare.
    \4\ Shawn Reese, Cong. Rsch. Serv., (RS22706), The Federal 
Protective Service and Contract Security Guards: A Statutory History 
And aurrent Status, (Aug. 20, 2009), available at https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS22706/15.
    \5\ DHS, FPS, Who We Are, (last updated June 17, 2024), available 
at https://www.dhs.gov/who-we-are.
    \6\ Id.
    \7\ Id.
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    FPS is responsible for the protection and security of 
approximately 9,000 GSA leased and owned facilities, divided 
into 11 regions Nationwide.\8\ FPS is entirely funded by the 
fees it charges to its customer agencies (GSA and tenant 
agencies) for the utilization of FPS services.\9\ The estimated 
budget for FPS for Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 is $2.2 billion.\10\ 
FPS has more than 1,300 employees, including Law Enforcement 
Officers, Security Specialists, Special Agents, and Mission 
Support Staff.\11\ However, FPS has only 881 law enforcement 
positions filled, despite a total authorized number of 
1,140.\12\ FPS additionally oversees more than 15,000 contract 
guards or Protective Security Officers (PSOs).\13\
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    \8\ FPS, FY 2025 Budget in Brief, (2024), available at https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/
2024_0311_fy_2025_budget_in_brief.pdf.
    \9\ GAO, GAO-21-311R, Federal Protective Service: Projected 
Outcomes of the New Fee Structure on Tenant Agencies' Costs (2021), 
available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-311r.pdf.
    \10\ FPS, FY 2025 Budget in Brief (2024), available at https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/
2024_0311_fy_2025_budget_in_brief.pdf.
    \11\ DHS, FPS, Operations, (last updated June 17, 2024), available 
at https://www.dhs.gov/fps-operations.
    \12\ E-mail from FPS Congressional Affairs to Staff, H. Comm. on 
Transp. and Infrastructure (Apr. 24, 2024, 10:22 a.m. EST) (on file 
with Comm.).
    \13\ Id.
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    FPS' role in protecting Federal buildings is not limited to 
providing a uniformed presence in those buildings, but also 
includes maintaining and managing the contracts with companies 
employing the contract guards for Federal facilities, 
conducting risk assessments of buildings, and providing 
recommendations to GSA and tenant agencies on any security 
improvements needed for particular buildings.\14\
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    \14\ Examining the Security of Federal Facilities: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 118th Cong. 
(Nov. 29, 2023) (statement of Richard K. Cline, Director, FPS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

RECENT INCIDENTS AT FEDERAL BUILDINGS

    Federal buildings have long faced a variety of threats, 
ranging from planes being crashed into them, to car bombings, 
to attempted and active shooters.\15\ It is the duty of FPS 
officers and PSOs to intercept these threats to protect the 
safety of Federal employees and the public.\16\ Recently, FBI 
field offices have faced several attempted breaches, including 
an incident in August of 2022, when PSOs contracted by FPS 
prevented an armed man from breaching the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation office located in Cincinnati, Ohio.\17\ The man 
would be later shot and killed by non-FPS police officers after 
engaging in a violent shootout with the officers.\18\ Prior to 
this incident, FPS has been involved in addressing a variety of 
violent attacks directed at Federal buildings, and in just the 
past five years, these attacks include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ See Michael Brick, Man Crashes Plane Into Texas I.R.S. Office, 
N.Y. Times (Feb. 18, 2010), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2010/
02/19/us/19crash.htm; FBI, Oklahoma City Bombing, (July 2, 2024), 
available at https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-
bombing; Andrew Welsh-Huggins & Patrick Orsagos, Man who tried to 
breach FBI office killed after standoff, AP, (Aug. 11, 2022), available 
at https://apnews.com/article/fbi-cincinnati-armed-man-
b4701596a0eb9770e3b29e95328f5704.
    \16\ Shawn Reese, Cong. Rsch. Serv., (R43570), Federal Building and 
Facility Security: Frequently Asked Questions, (last updated Mar. 6, 
2017), available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/
R43570/10.
    \17\ Andrew Welsh-Huggins & Patrick Orsagos, Man who tried to 
breach FBI office killed after standoff, AP, (Aug. 11, 2022), available 
at https://apnews.com/article/fbi-cincinnati-armed-man-
b4701596a0eb9770e3b29e95328f5704; see also Associated Press, Woman 
taken into custody after armed standoff at FBI building in Seattle, 
authorities say, AP, (June 12, 2024), available at https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/nation/woman-taken-into-custody-after-armed-standoff-at-fbi-
building-in-seattle-authorities-say; Ryan Young et. al., Police ID 
suspect after vehicle crashes into gate at the Atlanta FBI field 
office, CNN, (Apr 2, 2024), available at https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/
01/us/vehicle-rams-gates-of-fbi-field-office-in-atlanta/index.html.
    \18\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LOn April 20, 2022, a man armed with a knife 
entered the Edmund S. Muskie Federal Building in Augusta, 
Maine, and assaulted a guard employed by FPS.\19\ The man was 
subsequently shot by another FPS guard who was on duty in the 
building.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ WABI News Desk, Man shot after entering Augusta federal 
building with knife and physically assaulting guard, FBI says, WABI5, 
(Apr. 20, 2022), available at https://www.wabi.tv/2022/04/20/police-
presence-augusta-post-office/.
    \20\ Id.

     LOn July 21, 2020, FPS officers defended and 
protected the Federal Courthouse located at 100 SE 3rd Ave. in 
Portland, Oregon.\21\ At the time, numerous violent protesters 
were attempting to attack and enter the building, using methods 
including striking officers with blunt objects and setting off 
fireworks in the vicinity of the entrance.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ FPS Incidents Report, FPS, (July 21, 2020), available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/24_0202_fps-
incident_reports.pdf.
    \22\ Id.

     LOn June 17, 2019, a man opened fire outside the 
Earle Cabell Federal Building in Dallas, Texas was shot and 
killed in an exchange of gunfire with FPS officers who 
responded to the incident.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ The Latest Man who fired at Texas courthouse just graduated, 
AP, (June 17, 2019), available at https://apnews.com/article/
14fea70091344c74b328557e3bf474fb.

    Due to the nature of their mission, FPS officers and PSOs 
are constantly putting their lives at risk to protect Federal 
property, with seven sworn FPS officers and three PSOs having 
died in the performance of their duties throughout FPS' 
history.\24\ The most recent death in the line of duty occurred 
in May of 2020, when David Patrick Underwood, a PSO contract 
officer, was shot and killed by an assailant while protecting 
the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Building and United States 
Courthouse in Oakland, California.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Examining the Security of Federal Facilities: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 118th Cong. 
(Nov. 29, 2023) (statement of Richard K. Cline, Director, FPS).
    \25\ Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Two Defendants Charged with 
Murder and Aiding and Abetting in Slaying of Federal Protective Service 
Officer at Oakland Courthouse Building, (June 16, 2020), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-defendants-charged-murder-and-
aiding-and-abetting-slaying-federal-protective-service.
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         III. CHALLENGES FACING THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

    Over the years, GAO has conducted a number of 
investigations and issued a series of reports that identified 
key challenges and problems with respect to the FPS. Key 
problems that those reports have identified are:
     LFake bomb components, knives, and guns were 
secreted past security in a number of cases. Penetration 
testing conducted by the GAO and the FPS revealed serious 
deficiencies in building security.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ GAO, GAO-10-341, Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard 
Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract 
Guards (2010), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-341.pdf.

     LFPS has struggled to ensure that contract guards 
have the training they need, including active shooter training. 
FPS' paper-based system for auditing the required 
certifications and training records of contract guards resulted 
in a lack of quality control over whether guards were qualified 
and trained to protect Federal buildings.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Id.

     LThe systems FPS uses to track its contract guards 
have faced significant challenges. Some Federal tenant agencies 
have been forced to temporarily close their offices because of 
a lack of guard coverage.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Briefing from Staff, GAO, to Staff, H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure (June 5, 2024, 11:00 a.m. EST).

     LFPS has historically faced challenges in managing 
its human capital. In 2019, FPS was moved under DHS' Management 
Directorate to address some of those concerns; however, FPS has 
continued to face staffing shortages.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ GAO, GAO-23-105361, Federal Protective Service: More 
Collaboration on Hiring and Additional Performance Information Needed 
(2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/d23105361.pdf.

     LFacility security assessments used to evaluate 
the vulnerabilities at Federal facilities are often ignored. 
Additionally, the tenant agencies are not held accountable for 
failing to implement FPS' recommended security measures.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ GAO, GAO-23-105649, Federal Facilities: Improved Oversight Is 
Needed for Security Recommendations (2023), available at https://
www.gao.gov/assets/820/819849.pdf.

     LAgreements and partnerships with local law 
enforcement to respond to incidents on Federal property were 
lacking. State and local law enforcement agencies, which may be 
called to respond to a Federal building, often were not aware 
whether they could even respond to and enter a Federal 
building.\31\
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    \31\ GAO, GAO-12-434, Federal Protective Service: Better Data on 
Facility Jurisdictions Needed To Enhance Collaboration With State and 
Local Law Enforcement (2012), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/
gao-12-434.pdf.

     LFPS Law Enforcement Officers (LROs) are spread 
too thin, and FPS's non-core responsibilities have increased. 
LRO's have been increasingly deployed to protect Federal 
facilities during protests. Additionally, LRO's have also been 
called on to assist DHS with activities not related to FPS's 
core mission.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ GAO, GAO-22-106177, Federal Protective Service: Many Approved 
Security Recommendations Were Not Implemented and Preliminary Work 
Suggests Law Enforcement Deployments Have Increased (2022), available 
at https://www.gao.gov/assets/d23105361.pdf.
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   IV. RECENT COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT OVER THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

    On March 6, 2024, Subcommittee Chairman Perry, along with 
Subcommittee Members Chavez-DeRemer and Ezell, sent letters to 
the Director of FPS and the GSA Administrator.\33\ The letters 
outlined how in recent years, ``the rise in crime, drug abuse, 
and homelessness has created further challenges to the 
protection of Federal buildings and the safety of those that 
work and visit them.'' \34\ The letter also raises concern with 
regard to how increasing crime rates may be creating more empty 
and unused Federal building space.\35\ On May 29, 2024, FPS 
provided an interim response to the letter.\36\ According to 
FPS, from 2019 to March 21, 2024, there have been 6,929 
arrests/citations related to crimes in or around Federal 
buildings or involving Federal workers or visitors to Federal 
buildings, with 964 of those arrests consisting of 
assaults.\37\ In FY 2023, compared to FY 2022, FPS experienced 
a 138 percent increase in demonstrations at Federal properties, 
an 84 percent increase in violations of building rules and 
regulations, an overall 24 percent increase in assault on 
government employees, and a 13 percent increase in the number 
of inappropriate communications directed towards government 
employees.\38\ To date, FPS and GSA have provided responses 
that are not complete responses to the letters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Letter from Rep. Scott Perry, Subcommittee Chairman, H. Comm. 
on Transp. and Infrastructure, et. al. to Kris Cline, Director, FPS, 
(Mar. 6, 2024) (on file with Comm.); Letter from Rep. Scott Perry, 
Subcommittee Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, et. al. 
to the Honorable Robin Carnahan, Administrator, GSA, (Mar. 6, 2024) (on 
file with Comm.).
    \34\ Id.
    \35\ Id.
    \36\ Letter from Kris Cline, Director, FPS to Rep. Scott Perry, 
Subcommittee Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, et. al. 
(May 29, 2024) (on file with Comm.).
    \37\ Id.
    \38\ Id.
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     V. GAO'S RECENT EXAMINATION OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

    In the 117th Congress, the Committee requested that GAO 
conduct a review of the physical security of Federal buildings 
guarded by FPS.\39\ At this Subcommittee hearing, GAO will 
release the findings of that report. GAO focused on two key 
areas: (1) how effective are the PSOs in detecting prohibited 
items, and (2) how FPS has used data systems to improve 
oversight of the PSOs.\40\ GAO focused on building with public-
facing activities.\41\ GAO found some improvement in FPS's 
ability to detect prohibited items including knives, batons, 
and pepper spray.\42\ To test this, GAO conducted 27 instances 
of covert testing and reviewed the covert testing done by FPS 
that included improvised explosive device (IED) components and 
firearms.\43\ Both sets of results aligned with an average 
detection 50 percent of the time.\44\ The poorest results were 
in Washington, D.C.\45\ GAO noted some improvement since the 
last covert testing in 2009.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Letter from Peter DeFazio, Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, et. al. to Gene Dodaro, Comptroller General, GAO, (Aug. 
18, 2022) (on file with Comm.).
    \40\ Briefing from Staff, GAO, to Staff, H. Comm. On Transp. and 
Infrastructure (June 5, 2024, 11:00 a.m. EST).
    \41\ Id.
    \42\ Id.
    \43\ Id.
    \44\ Id.
    \45\ Id.
    \46\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Lastly, the GAO report also found that despite an 
investment of nearly $30 million in new tracking and management 
systems, FPS still has no meaningful way to monitor if a guard 
is not at post or has completed needed certifications and 
training--it remains largely paper-based.\47\ This lack of 
tracking has raised specific concerns with the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), which at times had to close 30 of their tax 
centers because an FPS guard failed to report to their 
post.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Id.
    \48\ Id.
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                             VI. CONCLUSION

    While FPS has made some improvements in detecting 
prohibited items like knives and pepper spray during covert 
testing, significant challenges still remain with FPS's 
protection of Federal buildings. Most notably, despite spending 
millions of dollars on new electronic tracking and management 
systems, the majority of tracking is still paper-based. This 
lack of effective tracking has only exacerbated the existing 
staffing shortage within the FPS and contract workforce. In 
short, the findings of the recent GAO report leave significant 
room for improvement for FPS.

                             VII. WITNESSES

     LMr. David Marroni, Director, Physical 
Infrastructure, United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO)
     LMr. Richard ``Kris'' Cline, Director, Federal 
Protective Service, United States Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)
     LMr. Elliot Doomes, Public Buildings Service 
Commissioner, United States General Services Administration 
(GSA)




 
  EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: ARE 
                       FEDERAL BUILDINGS SECURE?

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JULY 23, 2024

                  House of Representatives,
      Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 
               Buildings, and Emergency Management,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 
2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry (Chairman 
of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Perry. The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 
Buildings, and Emergency Management will come to order.
    The Chair asks unanimous consent that the chairman be 
authorized to declare a recess at any time during today's 
hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    The Chair also asks unanimous consent that Members not on 
the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As a reminder, if Members wish to insert a document into 
the record, please also email it to DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov.
    The Chair now recognizes himself for the purposes of an 
opening statement for 5 minutes.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
    CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC 
              BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

    Mr. Perry. Before I begin, I first want to thank the 
dedicated personnel of the Federal Protective Service who work 
to protect Federal workers and visitors to Federal facilities 
across our great country. Over the years, there have been FPS 
law enforcement and contract guards who have made the ultimate 
sacrifice to protect workers and visitors in Federal buildings.
    Since 2019, there have been nearly 1,000--1,000--assaults 
at Federal facilities and nearly 7,000 arrests. Because of 
this, it is critically important that the FPS law enforcement 
officers and the thousands of contract guards known as 
protective service officers, or PSOs, have what they need to do 
and complete their job. Given the importance of this issue, the 
committee requested that GAO review building security and, more 
specifically, conduct covert tests similar to the work done by 
GAO in 2009.
    Today's hearing will examine the findings of GAO's work and 
the current state of protection of our Nation's Federal 
buildings.
    FPS officers, along with more than 14,000 PSOs, are 
responsible for the protection of and the security at 
approximately 9,000 facilities, the majority of which are owned 
or managed by GSA. FPS law enforcement officers manage the 
PSOs, ensure they are properly trained, are at their post, and 
respond when needed to any incident. However, there have been 
ongoing challenges that impact the ability of law enforcement 
to do their jobs.
    Recently, there have been increasing rates of crime, drug 
use, and homelessness across the country that are impacting the 
safety of those who work and visit Federal facilities. For 
example, the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services office in San Francisco advised some Federal employees 
to work from home in light of conditions at the Federal 
building.
    Earlier this year, Representatives Chavez-DeRemer, Ezell, 
and I sent letters to the Director of FPS and the GSA 
Administrator to assess how the increasing levels of crime, 
drug abuse, and homelessness have impacted the protection of 
Federal buildings and the safety of those that work and visit 
them. The letter also raised concerns regarding how increasing 
crime rates may be leading to more empty and unused Federal 
building space. This is all happening while FPS is 
understaffed, with 259 law enforcement positions currently left 
unfilled.
    Additionally, in its recent work, GAO revealed that while 
there has been some improvement since building security testing 
in 2009, the success rate in identifying prohibited items, on 
average, is only 50 percent. I think we can do better.
    Compounding these challenges, the tools FPS needs to 
effectively manage the PSOs don't work. As GAO found in their 
latest report, the new data systems used by FPS law enforcement 
to oversee their contract guards or PSOs have significant 
flaws. Despite spending nearly $30 million of taxpayer funds on 
new electronic systems, FPS struggles to know if a guard is at 
their post or not, or if that guard even has the qualifications 
needed to detect dangerous weapons. This lack of reliable data 
tracking has raised concerns with customer agencies like the 
Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security 
Administration.
    And further, this lack of reliability has impacted the 
accessibility of services to the taxpayer. The idea that the 
IRS had to close 30--30--of their Taxpayer Assistance Centers 
and the SSA closed over 500 locations for full days because a 
contract guard failed to report to their post is absolutely, 
completely unacceptable.
    The GAO has issued report after report for years now on 
many of these issues, yet FPS has not yet resolved them. I look 
forward to hearing from our witnesses today on these issues and 
thank for them for being here.
    [Mr. Perry's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress 
 from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
    Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
    Before I begin, I first want to thank the dedicated personnel of 
the Federal Protective Service (FPS), who work to protect federal 
workers and visitors to federal facilities across our country. Over the 
years there have been FPS law enforcement and contract guards who have 
made the ultimate sacrifice to protect workers and visitors in federal 
buildings.
    Since 2019, there have been nearly 1,000 assaults at federal 
facilities and nearly 7,000 arrests. Because of this, it is critically 
important that the FPS law enforcement officers and the thousands of 
contract guards, known as Protective Service Officers or ``PSOs'', have 
what they need to do their job. Given the importance of this issue, the 
Committee requested that GAO review building security and, more 
specifically, conduct covert tests similar to the work done by GAO in 
2009.
    Today's hearing will examine the findings of GAO's work and the 
current state of FPS' protection of our nation's federal buildings.
    FPS officers, along with more than 14,000 PSOs, are responsible for 
the protection of and security at approximately 9,000 facilities, the 
majority of which are owned or managed by GSA. FPS law enforcement 
officers manage the PSOs, ensure they are properly trained, are at 
their post, and respond when needed to any incident. However, there 
have been ongoing challenges that impact the ability of FPS law 
enforcement to do their jobs.
    Recently, there have been increasing rates of crime, drug use, and 
homelessness across the country that are impacting the safety of those 
who work and visit federal facilities. For example, the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services' office in San Francisco 
advised some federal employees to work from home ``in light of the 
conditions at the federal building.''
    Earlier this year, Representatives Chavez-DeRemer, Ezell, and I 
sent letters to the Director of FPS and the GSA Administrator 
\\ to assess how the increasing levels of crime, drug abuse, 
and homelessness have impacted the protection of federal buildings and 
the safety of those that work and visit them. The letters also raised 
concerns regarding how increasing crime rates may be leading to more 
empty and unused federal building space. This is all happening while 
FPS is understaffed with 259 law enforcement positions left unfilled.
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    \\ https://transportation.house.gov/components/redirect/
r.aspx?ID=484010-71706684
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    Additionally, in its recent work, GAO revealed that while there has 
been some improvement since building security testing in 2009, the 
success rate in identifying prohibited items on average is only 50 
percent.
    Compounding these challenges, the tools FPS needs to effectively 
manage the PSOs don't work. As GAO found in their latest report, the 
new data systems used by FPS law enforcement to oversee their contract 
guards or PSOs have significant flaws. Despite spending nearly $30 
million of taxpayer funds on new electronic systems, FPS struggles to 
know if a guard is at their post or not, or if that guard even has the 
qualifications needed to detect dangerous weapons. This lack of 
reliable data tracking has raised concerns with customer agencies like 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Social Security 
Administration (SSA), and further this lack of reliability has impacted 
the accessibility of services to the taxpayer. The idea that the IRS 
had to close 30 of their Taxpayer Assistance Centers and the SSA closed 
over 500 locations for full days because a contract guard failed to 
report to their post is unacceptable.
    GAO has issued report after report for years now on many of these 
issues, yet FPS has not yet resolved them. I look forward to hearing 
from our witnesses today on these issues and thank them for being here.

    Mr. Perry. The Chair now recognizes the ranking member, Ms. 
Titus, for 5 minutes for her opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DINA TITUS OF NEVADA, RANKING MEMBER, 
  SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND 
                      EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling 
this important hearing. Thank you to our witnesses. Some are 
very familiar. They have been here before, and they always 
provide us with excellent information in a very professional 
way.
    It is very important to talk about the Federal Protective 
Service and all that they do to keep us safe in our Federal 
buildings, especially important in my district in Las Vegas, 
where we had the shooting at the Lloyd George Federal 
Courthouse. That was a number of years ago, but a security 
guard was killed there, and we never forget that.
    As the chairman said, you all are tasked with protecting 
more than 9,000 owned and leased facilities, and responsible 
for keeping those workplaces safe for people who work there, 
people who are contractors, people who come and visit, or who 
conduct business with those Government agencies. So, ensuring 
that you have the resources you need to keep people and 
property safe and secure while you are facing a wider range and 
growing number of threats is really critical to keeping our 
Government functioning and serving the public.
    In recent history, we have seen dangerous situations and 
threats posed to our Federal buildings. These have included 
plane crashes, car bombings, active shooters, you name it. It 
has practically happened there in a Federal building, and you 
need to be prepared to address any of these situations and 
more.
    Currently, DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency--CISA--heads the Interagency Security Committee which 
sets those standards that need to be met by our Federal 
facilities. And based on these standards, then the FPS can 
identify risks and recommend actions to mitigate those risks, 
including additional resources you might need such as screening 
equipment and security cameras.
    Among my many concerns is that, even though the FPS has 
sent thousands of these assessments to Federal agencies, many 
of their recommendations have just been ignored, and it is 
apparent that there are a number of vulnerabilities that could 
have been, but need to be, addressed.
    In reading the testimony of Mr. Marroni, I found it 
shocking to know that when the GAO conducted covert tests to 
test some of these vulnerabilities, FPS contract guards were 
unable to detect weapons ranging from batons to multipurpose 
tools with knives in half of the tests. Half of the tests. And 
what is more concerning is then when the FPS conducted its own 
covert testing, this time with firearms and components for 
making explosive devices, the detection rate was almost the 
same. So, this is just unacceptable and not good for anybody 
involved.
    I appreciate very much the work of the FPS and its 
contractors, and the potential harms that they face every day 
because they are on the front line. But these exposures have to 
be addressed, and that is why I am interested in hearing from 
you all just what the extent of the problem is, how we can 
address it, what resources you might need, and what changes in 
policy we should perhaps put forward. So, thank you for joining 
us, and I look forward to the hearing.
    [Ms. Titus' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress 
from the State of Nevada, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 
        Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witnesses for joining 
us today to discuss the state of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) 
and the security of our federal buildings.
    As the law enforcement agency tasked with protecting the more than 
9,000 GSA owned and leased facilities, the FPS is responsible for 
keeping these workplaces safe for the thousands of federal employees 
and citizens who visit every day.
    Ensuring the FPS has the resources it needs to keep people and 
property secure, while facing a wide range of threats, is critical to 
keeping our government functioning.
    In recent history, we have seen the dangerous situations and 
threats posed to federal buildings including plane crashes, car 
bombings and active shooters, and the FPS needs to be prepared to 
address any of these situations and more.
    Currently, DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
(CISA) heads the Interagency Security Committee which sets the security 
standards that need to be met by federal facilities. Based on these 
standards, the FPS can identify risks and recommend actions to mitigate 
those risks, including through additional resources such as screening 
equipment and security cameras.
    Among my many concerns is that even though the FPS has sent 
thousands of these assessments to federal agencies, many of their 
recommendations are ignored, and it's apparent that as a result there 
are numerous vulnerabilities that need to be addressed.
    In reading the testimony of Mr. Marroni, it is shocking to know 
that when GAO conducted covert tests to test some of these security 
vulnerabilities, FSP contract guards were unable to detect weapons 
ranging from batons to multipurpose tools with knives in half of the 
tests. What's more concerning is that when the FPS conducted its own 
covert testing, this time with firearms and components for making 
improvised explosive devices, the detection rate was almost identical.
    I appreciate the work of the FPS and its contractors, and the 
potential harms they face every day, but these exposures are 
unacceptable which is why I look forward to today's hearing so we can 
learn more on the extent of the problem and where changes should be 
made.
    I thank the witnesses for joining us today, and I yield back.

    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. The Chair now 
recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. 
Larsen, for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING 
     MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, subcommittee Chair 
Perry and subcommittee Ranking Member Titus, for calling 
today's hearing on Federal buildings. I want to thank our 
witnesses today.
    Commissioner and Director, I appreciate you once again 
making time to discuss Federal facility issues with the 
subcommittee. And Director Cline, I recognize you have very 
heavy demands on your time and attention, so, I appreciate your 
participation, as well.
    Prior to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building 
in Oklahoma City, the Federal Government had no established 
approach to security for federally owned or leased facilities. 
Immediately following the bombing, President Clinton directed 
the DOJ to assess the vulnerability of Federal facilities to 
terrorist attacks and to develop recommendations for minimum 
security standards.
    Despite agencywide coordination and the establishment of 
the Interagency Security Committee process, the ISC process, 
Federal facility security has remained on the Government 
Accountability Office's high-risk list for the past 21 years.
    In 2022, a GAO study found that from 2017 through 2021, FPS 
made more than 25,000 security recommendations at nearly 5,000 
Federal facilities. So, while Facility Security Committees 
approved 27 percent of those recommended countermeasures, most 
of those countermeasures were not implemented.
    The FPS has other significant challenges. Hiring and 
retaining law enforcement staff has been difficult. IT systems 
developed specifically to track and to verify guard training 
and certifications are not reliable. Entry access points are 
not always staffed, and GAO's covert testing program has found 
that contract guards did not consistently detect prohibited 
items when screening bags.
    Also of concern is a heightened risk of political protests 
at Federal facilities around the country and the use of drones 
near Federal facilities and high-profile public events.
    So, this hearing is taking place at a particularly 
important time of political and social unease, and I hope 
today's witnesses will share their ideas for improving the 
security of Federal buildings and the safety of the employees 
who work there.
    And with that, I want to thank the chair and yield back.
    [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress 
    from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Perry and Subcommittee Ranking 
Member Titus, for calling today's hearing on the security of federal 
buildings.
    Thank you, also, to our witnesses. Commissioner Doomes and Director 
Marroni, I appreciate you once again making time to discuss federal 
facility issues with the Subcommittee. Commissioner Cline, I recognize 
that you currently have heavy demands on your time and attention, so I 
appreciate your participation today.
    Prior to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in 
Oklahoma City, the federal government had no established approach to 
security for federally owned or leased facilities.
    Immediately following the bombing, President Clinton directed the 
Department of Justice to assess the vulnerability of federal facilities 
to terrorist attacks and to develop recommendations for minimum 
security standards.
    Despite agency-wide coordination and the establishment of the 
Interagency Security Committee (ISC) process, federal facility security 
has remained on the Government Accountability Office's High-Risk list 
for the past 21 years.
    In 2022, a GAO study found that from 2017 through 2021 FPS made 
more than 25,000 security recommendations at nearly 5,000 federal 
facilities. While facility security committees approved 27 percent of 
the FPS recommended countermeasures, most of those countermeasures were 
not implemented.
    The FPS has other significant challenges. Hiring and retaining law 
enforcement staff has been difficult. IT systems developed specifically 
to track and verify contract guard training and certifications are not 
reliable.
    Entry access points are not always staffed, and GAO's covert 
testing program has found that contract guards did not consistently 
detect prohibited items when screening bags.
    Also of concern is a heightened risk of political protests at 
federal facilities around the country and the use of drones near 
federal facilities and at high profile public events.
    This hearing is taking place at a particularly important time of 
political and social unease.
    I hope today's witnesses will share their ideas for improving the 
security of federal buildings and the safety of the employees who work 
there.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman. I now welcome 
our witnesses and thank them for taking the time to be here 
today, some of you more familiar than others, but I am still 
going to go through the process of explaining our lighting 
system to our witnesses, maybe for the benefit of everybody 
else here.
    There are three lights in front of you. Green means go, 
yellow means you are running out of time, and red means please 
conclude your remarks.
    The Chair asks unanimous consent that the witnesses' full 
statements be included in the record.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record of 
today's hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses 
have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to 
them in writing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record 
remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and 
information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in 
the record of today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As your written testimony has been made part of the record, 
the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 5 
minutes.
    With that, Mr. Marroni, you are recognized for 5 minutes 
for your testimony, sir.

 TESTIMONY OF DAVID MARRONI, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; RICHARD K. CLINE, 
 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE, MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE, 
   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND ELLIOT DOOMES, 
 COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES 
                         ADMINISTRATION

 TESTIMONY OF DAVID MARRONI, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
          TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Mr. Marroni. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member 
Titus, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here 
today to discuss FPS's efforts to secure about 9,000 Federal 
facilities and oversee the more than 13,000 contract guards who 
protect those buildings and their occupants nationwide.
    The security of Federal facilities has been a longstanding 
area of concern. Our work has highlighted several persistent 
challenges over the years. In particular, we have identified 
weaknesses in how contract guards detect and prevent prohibited 
items from entering Federal buildings. We have also identified 
significant and ongoing problems with the data systems FPS uses 
to oversee its security program. These challenges are a key 
reason that Federal real property management remains on GAO's 
high-risk list after more than 20 years.
    Continuing threats to Federal facilities make it absolutely 
critical for FPS to successfully resolve these issues. Doing so 
will best ensure that the men and women who protect these 
buildings have the training and tools they need to carry out 
their mission.
    At this committee's request, we have been reviewing how FPS 
is doing in addressing some of these persistent challenges. We 
focused on two areas: first, how effective contract guards are 
at detecting prohibited items; and whether FPS data systems 
have improved agency oversight of its contract guard program. 
While our final report will not come out until the fall, the 
bottom line is clear: FPS continues to face significant 
challenges on both fronts.
    In terms of detecting prohibited items, our investigators 
conducted 27 covert tests at 14 Federal buildings earlier this 
year. During those tests, they attempted to bring bags into the 
buildings with prohibited items like pepper spray, batons, and 
a multipurpose tool with a knife. The FPS contract guards 
detected those prohibited items about half of the time. 
However, the other half of the time the items got through.
    While we only did a small number of tests, our results are 
consistent with the results of FPS's own more extensive covert 
testing program. These results are cause for concern. To FPS's 
credit, they have several reform efforts underway that aim to 
improve the detection of prohibited items. For example, FPS is 
redesigning the initial training course for contract guards, 
and it is also working to identify common causes of covert test 
failures to better target potential remedies. These are 
positive steps. However, continued attention and sustained 
action in this area will be important.
    As for the data systems FPS uses to oversee its contract 
guard program, we found significant problems that continue what 
has been a very longstanding challenge for the agency. For 
example, FPS's Post Tracking System, which is meant to be the 
system of record for ensuring that every post is staffed by a 
qualified guard, was initially piloted in 2018. However, after 
6 years, it has yet to be fully implemented in any region. As a 
result, FPS still requires contractors to use an old, paper-
based system for billing and guard verification, which creates 
double work.
    Moreover, the system continues to have significant 
technology, data reliability, and interoperability problems, 
and has not delivered on its promised capabilities. The 
stubborn and ongoing problems with this and other FPS data 
systems undermine the agency's productivity and its oversight 
of contract guards.
    In conclusion, the security of Federal facilities remains a 
high-risk area. FPS and the contract guards it oversees play an 
essential role in ensuring the safety of those who work in and 
visit Federal buildings. If the persistent challenges I have 
described today are to be resolved, FPS will need to pay 
sustained attention to these issues and take deliberate action. 
By doing so, the agency will be able to best ensure the 
security of FPS protected facilities going forward.
    Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. I will 
be happy to take any questions you may have.
    [Mr. Marroni's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of David Marroni, Director, Physical Infrastructure 
              Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office
  Federal Facility Security: Preliminary Results Show That Challenges 
               Remain in Guard Performance and Oversight
                               Highlights
Why GAO Did This Study
    Federal real property has been on GAO's High-Risk List since 2003, 
in part due to threats to federal facilities. Past attacks on federal 
buildings demonstrate that the security of federal facilities remains a 
high-risk area. FPS, within the Department of Homeland Security, is 
responsible for protecting thousands of federal facilities. FPS employs 
contract guards at 2,500 federal facilities at a cost of almost $1.7 
billion in fiscal year 2024.
    This testimony discusses the preliminary results of an ongoing GAO 
review that focuses on (1) how effective FPS contract guards are at 
detecting prohibited items and FPS's efforts to improve detection, and 
(2) stakeholders' views on whether FPS data systems have improved 
oversight of the contract guard program.
    To determine the effectiveness of FPS guards in detecting 
prohibited items, GAO conducted 27 covert tests at a nongeneralizable 
sample of 14 federal facilities and analyzed data from FPS's covert 
tests. To obtain stakeholders' views on FPS's data systems, GAO 
reviewed information on the systems and interviewed stakeholders, 
including FPS officials, federal tenants, guard unions, and security 
guard companies.
    GAO provided a draft of this statement to FPS. FPS determined that 
some information was law enforcement sensitive. We withheld that 
information from this statement and incorporated other comments as 
appropriate. GAO plans to complete its work and issue a report on these 
issues by the end of the year.
What GAO Found
    To secure federal facilities and protect employees and visitors, 
the Federal Protective Service (FPS) manages and oversees more than 
13,000 contract guards, whose duties include controlling facility 
access and screening visitors to detect prohibited items. To determine 
if FPS was effectively protecting federal facilities, GAO investigators 
conducted 27 covert tests at 14 selected federal buildings in early 
2024. During these tests, GAO investigators had a prohibited item--a 
baton, pepper spray, or a multi-purpose tool with a knife--inside a bag 
that they attempted to bring into the building. FPS contract guards 
failed to detect prohibited items in about half of GAO's tests.
    FPS conducts its own covert tests, the results of which were 
consistent with GAO's tests. While FPS determined that the specifics of 
its testing program are law enforcement sensitive, FPS officials said 
they have several reform efforts underway to improve contract guards' 
detection of prohibited items. Those efforts include (1) redesigning 
the initial training course for contract guards, (2) increasing on-the-
job training, and (3) collecting covert testing data to identify common 
causes of covert test failures.
    Stakeholders identified data system challenges that undermine FPS's 
productivity and oversight of contract guards. FPS developed data 
systems to improve oversight of the contract guard workforce in 
response to previous GAO recommendations. The Post Tracking System, 
initially piloted in 2018, was expected to be the system of record for 
ensuring that every post was staffed by a qualified guard for the 
correct time frames, but it has yet to be fully implemented in any 
region. In addition, stakeholders said the system continues to face 
technology, data reliability, and interoperability challenges and has 
not delivered the promised capabilities. This negatively affects the 
productivity of FPS's oversight efforts, according to stakeholders. 
Some FPS officials also said they do not use the reports for billing 
the government because the data are inaccurate or incomplete. 
Consequently, even in areas that have deployed the system, FPS 
continues to use an old paper-based system for billing and oversight 
tasks.

                               __________
    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:
    Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our work 
on security at Federal Protective Service (FPS) facilities, in two 
areas: (1) detection of prohibited items by the guards who work under 
contract with FPS, and (2) FPS's oversight of Protective Security 
Officers (i.e., contract guards).\1\ For 21 years, managing federal 
real property has remained on GAO's High-Risk List, in part due to 
threats to federal facilities.\2\ Past attacks on federal facilities 
include the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building 
in Oklahoma City, in which 168 people died. More recent attacks--which 
were stopped by FPS contract guards--include a 2019 shooting at a 
Dallas federal facility, a 2021 shooting at a Social Security 
Administration facility, and an armed attempt to breach security at the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Cincinnati Field Office in 2022.
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    \1\ For the purposes of this statement, we call Protective Security 
Officers ``contract guards.''
    \2\ The Managing Federal Real Property area was added to GAO's 
High-Risk List in 2003 and remained on the most recent update to the 
High-Risk list in 2023. See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-
119 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1, 2003) and High-Risk Series: Efforts Made 
to Achieve Progress Need to Be Maintained and Expanded to Fully Address 
All Areas, GAO-23-106203 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FPS is within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is 
responsible for protecting about 9,000 federal facilities. FPS spent 
almost $1.7 billion on contract guards, which represented more than 76 
percent of its budget, in fiscal year 2024. FPS officers and more than 
13,000 contract guards control access to facilities, conduct access 
point screenings to detect prohibited items, and respond to safety and 
security emergencies.
    In our past work, we identified several challenges to the security 
of federal buildings. In covert tests conducted in 2009, we carried 
components of improvised explosive devices into federal facilities, 
undetected by FPS guards. In 2010, we reported that in FPS's internal 
covert testing, FPS guards identified prohibited items in 18 of 53 
tests. We found these security vulnerabilities were potentially caused 
by insufficient training for guards and FPS's failure to maintain a 
comprehensive system to ensure that guards were appropriately trained. 
Other challenges included staffing levels, human capital management, 
and inconsistent guidance about how and when guard inspections should 
be performed. We have made a number of recommendations to FPS to help 
address these issues, some of which FPS has implemented.
    Given the potential threats, it is imperative that FPS provides its 
more than 13,000 contract guards the training they need to secure 
federal facilities and protect employees and visitors. However, we have 
identified guard training and oversight weaknesses since 2008.\3\
    My testimony today provides our preliminary observations from our 
ongoing review of security at federal facilities and FPS oversight of 
contract guards. My statement focuses on (1) how effective FPS contract 
guards are at detecting certain types of prohibited items at selected 
federal facilities and FPS's efforts to improve detection, and (2) 
stakeholders' views on whether FPS data systems have improved oversight 
of the contract guard program. In reviewing a draft of this statement, 
FPS determined that some information was law enforcement sensitive. We 
withheld that information from this statement. In the coming months, we 
plan to finalize our review and issue a final report, which may include 
a restricted version.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces 
Several Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal 
Facilities, GAO-08-914T (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 18, 2008); GAO, Federal 
Protective Service: Actions Needed to Assess Risk and Better Manage 
Contact Guards at Federal Facilities, GAO-12-739 (Washington, D.C.: 
Aug. 10, 2012); GAO, Federal Protective Service: More Collaboration on 
Hiring and Additional Performance Information Needed, GAO-23-105361 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2022); GAO, Federal Facilities: Continued 
Oversight of Security Recommendations Needed, GAO-24-107137 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 29, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To determine how effectively FPS guards detected and excluded 
prohibited items from being brought into selected federal facilities, 
we conducted 27 covert tests by attempting to bring prohibited items 
(specifically, a knife, a baton, and pepper spray) into a 
nongeneralizable sample of 14 federal facilities.\4\ The Interagency 
Security Committee Standard for determining facility security levels 
outlines several factors facility managers should use, including the 
facility's population and facility size. Facility security levels range 
from level 1 (lowest risk) to level 5 (highest risk).\5\ These 
facilities had varying levels of security and screening procedures, in 
part because of their security level. We selected these federal 
facilities based on several factors, including public access, location, 
size, and the number of federal tenants in the facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Prohibited items used in the covert tests met the 
specifications of prohibited items listed in the following federal 
standard, Interagency Security Committee, Items Prohibited in Federal 
Facilities, An Interagency Security Committee Standard, (Washington, 
D.C.: 2022). In some cases, we conducted multiple tests at the same 
facility, which means that the number of tests is larger than the 
number of facilities tested. We conducted multiple tests in all high-
risk facilities, and in one low-risk facility, to test the ability of 
contract guards to detect different types of prohibited items. We 
attempted to smuggle one type of prohibited item during each test.
    \5\ Interagency Security Committee, The Risk Management Process: An 
Interagency Security Committee Standard, (Washington, D.C.: 2021). The 
Interagency Security Committee (ISC), housed within DHS's Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency, is responsible for developing 
federal security policies and standards to enhance the quality and 
effectiveness of security in, and protection of, civilian federal 
facilities. The ISC was established in 1995 under Executive Order 12977 
to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security in and protection 
of federal facilities in the United States occupied by federal 
employees for nonmilitary activities. Executive Order 12977, 
Interagency Security Committee, 60 Fed. Reg. 54411 (Oct. 19, 1995), as 
amended by Executive Order 13286, Amendment of Executive Orders, and 
Other Actions, in Connection With the Transfer of Certain Functions to 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 10619 (March 5, 2003). 
Executive Order 14111, Interagency Security Committee, issued in 
November 2023 supersedes Executive Order 12977. Executive Order 14111, 
88 Fed. Reg. 83809 (Nov. 27, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We also analyzed FPS data from fiscal years 2020 to 2023 about the 
outcomes of FPS internal covert tests. We assessed the reliability of 
the data by reviewing FPS guidance and processes for safeguarding and 
checking the data for accuracy and completeness. When we found 
discrepancies such as missing data or data entry errors, we brought 
them to FPS's attention and worked with FPS to correct the 
discrepancies before conducting our analyses.
    To collect stakeholders' views on whether FPS data systems have 
helped address challenges with overseeing the contract guard program, 
we interviewed FPS officials, federal tenant agencies, unions, and 
security guard companies about system capabilities that support 
contract guard oversight. We also observed the operation of the systems 
and reviewed agency policies and guidance related to oversight efforts. 
Specifically, we reviewed FPS guidance and documentation on several 
data systems to determine their purpose and the information used by 
agency officials.
    The ongoing work on which this statement is based is being 
conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We conducted our related investigative work in accordance with 
investigation standards prescribed by the Council of the Inspectors 
General on Integrity and Efficiency. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives.
                               Background
FPS Responsibilities
    FPS conducts physical security, law enforcement, and contract guard 
oversight activities at federal facilities across the country, a 
majority of which are under the custody or control of the General 
Services Administration (GSA).\6\
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    \6\ FPS is funded through fees it charges agencies for its services 
and does not receive a direct appropriation from the general fund of 
the Treasury.
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      Physical security activities. FPS develops individual 
facility security assessments to identify and assess threats to and 
vulnerabilities for about 9,000 facilities. FPS then recommends 
appropriate countermeasures, such as security equipment, to address 
those threats and vulnerabilities.\7\
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    \7\ In 2023, we recommended the Department Homeland Security 
improve its oversight ability to assess countermeasure implementation; 
GAO, Federal Facilities: Improved Oversight Needed for Security 
Recommendations, GAO-23-105649 (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2023).

      Law enforcement activities. FPS's law enforcement 
activities include patrolling facilities, responding to incidents, 
conducting criminal investigations, and making arrests.\8\
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    \8\ GAO-23-105361.

       Contract guard oversight. FPS manages and oversees contract 
guards for various federal agencies at roughly 2,500 of the overall 
facilities it protects.\9\ In its oversight role, FPS monitors vendor-
provided training, manages the contracts of vendors who provide 
contract guards, and conducts other oversight activities, such as post 
visits and post inspections. For example, FPS officials review the 
operational readiness of contract guards at posts by conducting post 
visits, during which they evaluate the contract guard's knowledge of 
post orders and operational readiness requirements.
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    \9\ FPS charges federal agencies additional fees for agency and 
building specific services beyond basic security, such as contract 
guards and security patrols.
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Staffing
    In fiscal year 2024, FPS employed about 1,260 staff across 11 
regional offices and headquarters.\10\ The FPS workforce consists of 
law enforcement and non-law enforcement staff (see fig. 1).
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    \10\ For fiscal year 2024, FPS was authorized for 1,692 positions, 
according to FPS officials.
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   Figure 1: Federal Protective Service Law Enforcement and Non-Law 
                           Enforcement Staff
 
 
 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Law enforcement staff include inspectors and criminal 
investigators. Non-law enforcement staff provide business support such 
as staff training, contract management, human capital services, and 
information technology.\11\ Both types of FPS staff provide oversight 
to over 13,000 contract guards.
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    \11\ GAO-23-105361.
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    The FPS Protective Security Operations Division is responsible for 
contract guard oversight. Figure 2 depicts staffing shortages among 
personnel who provide oversight to contract guards.

Figure 2: Selected FPS Protective Security Operations Division Program 
                                Staffing
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     Note: FPS officials said additional headquarters and regional 
officials also play a role in providing oversight of the contract guard 
          workforce but are not depicted in the above graphic.

    FPS Inspectors, Contracting Officer Representatives (COR), and 
Business Operation Managers (BOM) are responsible for managing contract 
guards. Inspectors conduct monthly post inspections, Contracting 
Officer Representatives verify guard training and certification 
monthly, and Business Operation Managers oversee contract 
administration.\12\ Contract guard vendors are responsible for training 
and documenting training and certifications in FPS systems.
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    \12\ Business Operation Managers provide oversight and monitoring 
over COR programs for FPS regions including budget, financial planning, 
revenue management, and acquisition.
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    In 2022, we reported FPS employed roughly 1,300 staff for fiscal 
year 2021, which reflected a staffing shortage of 21 percent.\13\ FPS 
has 409 vacant positions, as of July 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ GAO-23-105361.
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Contract Guard Responsibilities
    Approximately 13,000 contract guards control access to about 2,500 
federal facilities. Contract guards' responsibilities include screening 
at access points to prevent the entry of prohibited items, such as 
weapons and explosives, and responding to emergencies involving 
facility safety and security.
Prohibited Items
    The Interagency Security Committee, of which FPS is a member, 
issued the Items Prohibited in Federal Facilities, An Interagency 
Security Committee Standard, which establishes a baseline list of 
prohibited items that includes firearms, dangerous weapons, or 
explosives because those items are designed, redesigned, used, intended 
for use, or readily converted to cause injury, death, or property 
damage. The Interagency Security Committee's Items Prohibited in 
Federal Facilities Standard notes that prohibited items also include 
any item banned by any applicable federal, state, local, or tribal 
ordinance. According to this standard, the list of prohibited items 
applies to all facility occupants, contractors, and visitors.
    In some cases, the list of prohibited items is broader than what is 
legal to carry in the locations where federal facilities are located. 
For example, carrying pepper spray for self-defense purposes or 
pocketknives with a blade over certain lengths might be otherwise legal 
within a particular jurisdiction, but they are on the Interagency 
Security Committee's baseline list of items generally prohibited inside 
federal facilities. According to FPS officials, if an individual 
attempts to enter a federal facility with a prohibited yet otherwise 
legal item, the individual must remove the item from the property. 
Contract guards are authorized to detain individuals who refuse to 
comply with the contract guard's request to remove the item, according 
to FPS. FPS officials said that if an individual attempts to enter a 
federal facility with an illegal item, contract guards are authorized 
to seize the item; it is up to FPS personnel to issue a citation or 
arrest the individual if necessary.
Data Systems
    We have found longstanding challenges with the data systems FPS 
uses to oversee contract guards.
      In 2009, we reported that FPS was using the Contracting 
Guard Employment Requirements Tracking System to monitor and verify 
contract guard training and certifications. However, the system was not 
fully reliable.\14\ This system was replaced later that year by the 
Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP).\15\
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    \14\ GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal 
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered 
By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, GAO-09-859T 
(Washington, D.C.: Jul. 8, 2009).
    \15\ GAO-12-739.

      In 2010, we recommended that FPS verify the accuracy of 
guard certification and training data in RAMP.\16\
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    \16\ GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract 
Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of 
Contact Guards, GAO-10-341 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2010).

      In 2012, we reported that RAMP, which was expected to 
improve FPS employees' administrative worktime efficiency, was no 
longer used after 3 years due to system issues.\17\ FPS replaced this 
system with an interim vulnerability assessment tool, the Modified 
Infrastructure Survey Tool. This tool enabled FPS to conduct facility 
security assessments, but the program did not allow for oversight of 
the contract guard program. We recommended FPS address the Modified 
Infrastructure Survey Tool's limitations and develop and implement a 
new comprehensive and reliable system for contract guard oversight.\18\
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    \17\ GAO-12-739.
    \18\ GAO-12-739.

      In 2014, we found that FPS continued to lack a 
comprehensive and reliable contract guard management system.\19\
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    \19\ GAO, Federal Protective Service: Protecting Federal Facilities 
Remains a Challenge, GAO-14-623T (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2014).

    As part of its efforts to address two of our recommendations from 
these reports, FPS developed two separate data systems to conduct 
contract guard oversight: the Post Tracking System and the Training and 
Academy Management System. FPS also developed PostNow to provide post 
data for contract guards. See table 1 for information on selected FPS 
data systems.

                         Table 1: Selected Federal Protective Service (FPS) Data Systems
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                           Implementation Time
             Data System                     System Users            System Purpose               Frame
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Post Tracking System.............  Contract guard vendors,  Verifies individual      FPS expects all
                                        FPS employees.           contract guard           security contractors
                                                                 identities and           to be using the system
                                                                 requisite                in accordance with
                                                                 qualifications to        contractual terms by
                                                                 staff for a specific     the end of fiscal year
                                                                 post.                    2024.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PostNow..............................  FPS employees..........  Provides post data       Fully implemented.
                                                                 including type of
                                                                 post, type of security
                                                                 required, and assigned
                                                                 Contracting Officer
                                                                 Representative.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Training and Academy Management    Contract guard vendors,  Tracks and maintains     FPS expects this system
 System.                                FPS employees.           documentation for all    to be fully
                                                                 required contract        implemented by
                                                                 guard training and       calendar year 2025.
                                                                 certifications.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of FPS information. GAO-24-107599

 Contract Guards Regularly Failed Covert Tests at Selected Facilities, 
  but FPS Has Efforts Underway to Improve the Detection of Prohibited 
                                 Items
Contract Guards Did Not Detect Prohibited Items about Half the Time in 
        Covert Tests
    Our covert testing. In 13 of the 27 tests we conducted at selected 
locations, FPS contract guards did not detect the prohibited items we 
were attempting to smuggle into the facility. During our covert tests, 
our investigators had a prohibited item--specifically, a knife, a 
baton, or pepper spray--inside of a bag that they were bringing into 
the facility.\20\ See figure 3 for a photo of a contract guard who 
successfully detected one of those prohibited items.
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    \20\ Prohibited items used in the covert tests met the 
specifications of prohibited items listed in the following federal 
standard, Interagency Security Committee, Items Prohibited in Federal 
Facilities, An Interagency Security Committee Standard (Washington, 
D.C.: 2022). We packed each prohibited item in a backpack.
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   Figure 3: Contract Guard Detecting a Prohibited Item During GAO's 
                             Covert Testing
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


FPS Has Several Efforts Underway to Improve Detection of Prohibited 
        Items
    FPS has several reform efforts underway to improve contract guards' 
detection of prohibited items. These efforts include (1) redesigning 
the initial training course for contract guards, (2) adding more 
frequent opportunities for on-the-job training, and (3) collecting 
information about common causes of covert test failures.
    Redesigning the initial training course for contract guards. FPS is 
in the process of redesigning its National Weapons Detection Training 
Program (NWDTP) course, according to an FPS official. The NWDTP is a 
16-hour course that trains guards how to screen individuals at facility 
entrances and how to use tools--such as X-ray machines and metal 
detectors--to detect prohibited items. According to an FPS official, 
during the redesign process they reviewed industry standards, academic 
research about guards' use of screening tools, and leading screening 
practices that other federal agencies and the private sector have 
implemented. An FPS official said they plan to incorporate what they 
have learned into the updated course to ensure that guards are 
receiving the training they need to effectively detect prohibited 
items. According to an FPS official, they expect the updated course to 
be piloted by the end of fiscal year 2025.
    Adding more frequent opportunities for on-the-job training. To 
supplement the NWDTP training, FPS developed an on-the-job training 
program to provide contract guards with more frequent learning 
opportunities. In 2023, FPS added a requirement for inspectors to 
conduct an on-the-job training at every screening post at least once 
annually. In addition, vendors must provide 2 hours of on-the-job 
training every 60 days for all contract guards who work at screening 
posts.
    According to officials, FPS designed on-the-job trainings to 
reinforce NWDTP strategies and to provide contract guards with regular 
practice detecting prohibited items. FPS presents these trainings as 
learning opportunities; they are not covert tests. The on-the-job 
training kit includes several items that can be used in various 
training scenarios, such as a non-functioning firearm, a knife with a 
blade that is longer than 3 inches, and an inert pipe bomb. Inspectors 
use the items in the kit to evaluate guards' ability to accurately 
detect specific prohibited items, and to provide feedback if the guard 
has difficulty identifying the item. FPS is evaluating the 
effectiveness of its on-the-job training program and plans to use those 
findings to improve the program.
    Collecting covert testing data. FPS also regularly conducts covert 
testing to evaluate contract guards' ability to detect prohibited 
items. FPS's testing results were consistent with our results. However, 
FPS determined that the specifics of the tests were law enforcement 
sensitive.
    FPS currently compiles an internal covert testing database that 
houses information about the results of internal covert tests, causes 
for failures, and the types of remediation required when guards fail 
covert tests. However, based on our preliminary analysis, information 
in the database is inconsistent or insufficient in the following areas: 
data entry, information provided about root causes of failures, and 
information provided about remedial training for contract guards.
      Data entry. In our preliminary analysis of FPS data, we 
found that FPS staff enter covert test data inconsistently. For 
example, similar outcomes of similar tests are recorded differently 
(some appear as ``pass'' and some as ``fail''), narrative descriptions 
have inconsistent levels of detail, and labels for test scenarios do 
not always match the narrative descriptions. FPS agreed that additional 
data quality checks could catch data entry errors and improve the 
accuracy of the data in the dataset. In addition, FPS acknowledged that 
providing consistent levels of detail in the narrative descriptions 
would help FPS staff better determine the root causes for failures and 
appropriate corrective actions to address those failures.

      Root cause. According to our preliminary analysis of FPS 
data, the most common cause FPS listed in the dataset provides 
insufficient information about the root cause of a failure to detect a 
prohibited item. Specifically, when contract guards fail covert tests, 
FPS listed ``human factor'' as the cause more than 80 percent of the 
time.\21\ When ``human factor'' is listed as the cause, we found 
multiple instances when the narrative description indicated the cause 
could be more accurately described as being due to the following: 
equipment issues, guards' failure to conduct secondary screenings 
properly, guards' failure to notify officials after detecting 
prohibited items, or other factors. According to FPS officials, ``human 
factor'' is too broad to identify the root cause of the failure or 
proactive steps that could prevent similar failures in the future. FPS 
acknowledged that updating the term ``human factor'' could provide more 
specific information about the cause of the failure. However, according 
to FPS, it will take time and additional resources to update the 
dataset.
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    \21\ Although ``human factor'' is the most common cause, three 
other causes appear in the data set: ``training/process/technique'' (15 
percent), ``equipment'' (1 percent), and policy/post orders (0.4 
percent).

      Remedial training. In our preliminary analysis of FPS 
data, we found that vendors assigned remedial training for similar 
failures inconsistently, in part because the root cause of the failure 
is not clearly identified in the dataset. For example, the types of 
assigned remedial training--and the duration of that training--varied 
when guards failed to detect improvised explosive devices during FPS 
covert tests. Some guards received explosive detection remedial 
training that was clearly aligned with the failure, some received 
unrelated training that focused on screening sensitive areas of the 
body, and some were required to retake the entire NWDTP course, only 
part of which is directly related to detection of improvised explosive 
devices. In explaining the variation, FPS officials told us that they 
do not dictate the type of remedial training that vendors should 
provide. Instead, FPS allows vendors to determine what type of training 
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they will provide for their guards.

    Our forthcoming report will further address these issues.
 Stakeholders Identified Data Systems Challenges That Undermine FPS's 
             Productivity and Oversight of Contract Guards
    In response to our prior recommendations, FPS developed two systems 
to oversee its contract guard workforce.\22\ We previously recommended 
that FPS develop and implement a comprehensive and reliable system to 
provide oversight and verify that contract guards are current on all 
training and certification requirements.\23\ We reported in April 2023, 
that the Post Tracking System and the Training and Academy Management 
System were neither completely implemented nor interoperable.\24\ 
According to FPS officials we interviewed, the two systems FPS 
developed are unable to communicate with each other and have data 
reliability and technology challenges. In some cases, agency, union, 
and security guard contractors said these systems have not delivered 
promised capabilities and negatively affect the productivity of FPS's 
oversight efforts. Our forthcoming report will further address these 
issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Efforts Made to Achieve Progress Need 
to Be Maintained and Expanded to Fully Address All Areas, GAO-23-106203 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2023).
    \23\ GAO, Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Assess Risk 
and Better Manage Contract Guards at Federal Facilities, GAO-12-739 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 10, 2012).
    \24\ GAO-23-106203.
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Post Tracking System (PTS)
    Under development since 2013 and initially piloted in 2018, PTS was 
expected to be the system of record for ensuring that every post was 
staffed by a qualified guard for the correct time frames in every FPS--
protected facility.\25\ More specifically, PTS was to facilitate 
signing in and out of the guard post, remotely verify that guard posts 
are staffed as required, and track guard certifications to ensure that 
qualified and cleared guards staff FPS posts. PTS was also expected to 
verify billing for guard contracts and report prohibited items that are 
detected. PTS was intended to interface with other agency systems (see 
fig. 4).
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    \25\ FPS defines a post as a defined security function (e.g., X-
ray, magnetometer, Wand) for a guarded location.
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Figure 4: Federal Protective Service (FPS) Systems That Inform the Post 
                            Tracking System
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    The nationwide deployment of PTS is ongoing; however, the system is 
not fully functional in any region because of technology, data 
reliability, and interoperability issues identified by FPS and security 
guard contractor officials. According to FPS data, 61 security guard 
contracts require deployment of PTS. FPS plans to add these 
requirements to additional contracts by the end of fiscal year 2024. 
However, PTS usage by regions and contractors varies, and PTS is not 
the system of record for any guard contract according to FPS officials. 
More specifically, some FPS regional officials said PTS utilization is 
never higher than 60 percent and can fall as low as 20 percent 
systemwide due to functional challenges. In April and May of 2024, FPS 
reported average daily utilization percentages for guards standing post 
per contract ranging from zero to 95 percent for 61 contracts. Of those 
61 contracts, FPS reported most contracts had utilization percentages 
less than 75 percent.\26\ Consequently, even in areas that have 
deployed PTS, FPS continues to require use of its old paper-based 
system for billing and guard verification.
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    \26\ FPS data provided covered the week ending on May 26, 2024.
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    FPS and security guard contractor officials identified several 
challenges that continue to prevent PTS' successful deployment:
      PTS interoperability. According to the PTS Manual, the 
system is populated with data from five systems with information on 
training, security clearances, facilities, post responsibilities from 
contracts, and contractor information.\27\ However, an FPS official 
said PTS does not have full automated interoperability, requiring FPS 
staff to manually upload data from each of the five systems. Several 
regional FPS officials and security guard contractors said this effort 
causes delays and extra administrative work. Furthermore, officials 
noted that because PTS relies on manual uploading data, PTS is not 
operating with the real-time data needed to inform FPS officials 
whether contract guards are qualified to stand post. In addition, 
several FPS officials said that PTS is not a user-friendly system for 
exporting the information needed to support oversight capabilities. 
Contract guards can enter detected prohibited item reports in PTS; 
however, the information cannot be exported to other FPS systems. These 
reports are required weekly from each FPS region. One FPS official told 
us that it takes 2 to 3 days each week to meet the requirement because 
the reports must be manually entered into another FPS system.
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    \27\ The five systems are the Training and Academy Management 
System, Integrated Security Management System, Modified Infrastructure 
Survey, PostNow, and the Procurement Request Information System 
Management. In previous PTS manuals, PostNow was referred to as PostX. 
Federal Protective Service. Federal Protective Service Post Tracking 
System, User Manual for Administrator Contracting Officer 
Representatives (COR), Version 3.5. (Washington, D.C. Dec. 28, 2023).

      PTS technology issues. FPS officials told us that 
security guard contractors routinely inform them that PTS does not 
allow qualified guards to sign into the system due to technology issues 
with guard identification cards, vendor-supplied equipment, or Internet 
connection problems. Security guard contractors said that their guards 
become frustrated by the myriad of problems and give up on using the 
system. There is an FPS Help Desk to help with tech issues; however, 
FPS officials said that PTS is used infrequently and continues to 
require security guard contractors to complete paper forms to document 
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guard posts and work hours as an ongoing workaround.

       When multiple posts exist in one facility, FPS may set up a 
single post where contract guards sign in using PTS. However, according 
to a security guard contractor, the system sometimes crashes or stops 
working when multiple contract guards sign in or out around the same 
time. For example, one security guard contractor official said it is 
common for multiple contract guards to stand in line waiting to sign in 
or out creating a long delay during shift changes. Furthermore, the 
company official said that if the contract guard cannot sign out by the 
time their shift ends, the company pays overtime; an additional cost 
the company did not anticipate.

      PTS data reliability. FPS officials we interviewed 
identified numerous errors in PTS's underlying data, such as inaccurate 
descriptions of post requirements. Also, officials said the manual 
upload of data from multiple data systems into PTS can cause errors. 
For example, FPS is manually uploading information into PTS from 
another FPS system, PostNow, to indicate which posts need guard 
coverage and to outline the required guard qualifications for each 
post.\28\ However, several FPS regional officials told us that due to a 
lack of guidance or standards, the aggregated information causes errors 
once uploaded to PTS. FPS officials said these errors can incorrectly 
flag contract guards as not qualified to stand post. Furthermore, this 
information must then be corrected by FPS officials, which is a time-
consuming process.
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    \28\ PostNow is a system that provides information on FPS contract 
guard posts, responsibilities, type of security required, expenditures, 
facility number, and duty hours. It was initially developed as a stand-
alone financial system to track expenses by post and was not intended 
to be used for other FPS databases.

       Several FPS guard contractors we interviewed said they could not 
use PTS to document contract guards' time and attendance because the 
data are unreliable--too often they cannot connect to the server, or 
the system will not allow a contract guard to sign in due to a 
technical issue. A Help Desk provides support for technical issues, but 
all the security guard contractors we interviewed said they instead 
rely on the legacy paper process and their own company software to 
track time and attendance for contract guards. Furthermore, some FPS 
officials we interviewed said they do not use the reports from PTS 
because the data are inaccurate or incomplete for billing verification. 
According to security guard contractors we interviewed, FPS has not 
requested security guard contractors' feedback on deficiencies or 
evaluated deficiencies within the system. These officials said they 
continue to spend valuable time and resources troubleshooting 
technology issues. Two guard contractors said that they needed to 
assign additional IT specialists to exclusively troubleshoot PTS 
issues, further increasing costs for a system that they have no plans 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to use as the system of record.

    Due to the technology issues discussed in this section, FPS 
officials told us that PTS has not yet delivered on promised 
capabilities. According to the PTS Vendor Guide, the system should 
automate oversight of contract guards, including automatically and 
remotely monitoring guard posts in real time to ensure that the post is 
staffed as required by qualified and cleared guards.\29\ However, 
officials told us that PTS cannot remotely verify that guard posts are 
staffed based on real-time data. Tenant agency officials that have FPS 
contract guards protecting their facilities said that real-time 
information could inform FPS, security guard contractors, and tenant 
agencies. This in turn would allow them to reallocate resources to 
address a shortage of contract guards in specific locations.
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    \29\ Federal Protective Service, Federal Protective Service Post 
Tracking System, Protective Security Officer Vendor Guide, Version 3.0. 
(Washington, D.C. May 4, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, officials from two tenant agencies--Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) and Social Security Administration (SSA)--expressed 
frustration with the lack of contract guards available to stand post at 
federal facilities.
      IRS officials said that they do not receive timely 
communication about how guard shortages affect their facilities, often 
learning weeks later that posts were not staffed from local IRS agency 
officials. IRS officials said these guard shortages have caused 
problems, security vulnerabilities, employee delays, and increased 
traffic due to closed entrances. Since fiscal year 2022, IRS officials 
reported they closed 30 Taxpayer Assistance Centers for a full day 
because of the lack of contract guards. IRS officials said that real-
time information on post staffing and better communication would have 
allowed them to take proactive steps to limit such problems.

      SSA officials also said that FPS has been unable to 
provide a sufficient number of contract guards in the last 3 fiscal 
years, resulting in 510 offices that were closed for several hours or a 
full day.\30\ Consequently, contract guard shortages negatively 
affected the agency's ability to serve the public, specifically 
vulnerable populations that needed assistance.
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    \30\ SSA officials estimated in the last three years, there were 
approximately 15,000 hours that posts were unguarded by FPS contract 
guards.

    FPS officials said that open posts are due to security guard 
contractors hiring insufficient personnel to meet contract guard 
requirements to meet regional needs. However, security guard 
contractors said they face challenges in recruiting, training, and 
retaining contract guards. According to FPS officials, they prioritize 
open posts and address this issue with security guard contractors 
through corrective action plans.
Training and Academy Management System (TAMS)
    FPS implemented TAMS in 2019 to allow FPS personnel to track, 
monitor, and verify training records for FPS's contract guard 
workforce. Also, contract guard companies use TAMS to enter and update 
guard training and certification information, along with supporting 
documentation, such as electronic copies of training and certification 
records. FPS staff conduct oversight of guard training using TAMS. 
According to some FPS officials, TAMS is an improvement over the 
previous process, which did not provide a consolidated source for guard 
training records. However, other FPS officials have found the database 
inefficient in completing tasks because of data reliability and 
technology issues. While the system has been in use for more than 5 
years, FPS officials said TAMS guidance and directives remain in draft 
form. FPS officials said the guidance and directives will be submitted 
to the policy review process by the end of fiscal year 2024.
      TAMS data reliability. Stakeholders identified data 
issues that affect the quality of data in TAMS, including missing data 
for contract guards and a lack of controls to verify that vendors 
provided guards with required training. According to FPS headquarters, 
regional, and union officials, because TAMS depends on contractors to 
upload training records, that information could be susceptible to human 
input errors or manipulation. FPS officials cannot use this database 
independently to verify the accuracy of the training data for contract 
guards. Union and FPS officials said they still need to collect 
additional data from security guard contractors to have a complete 
picture of compliance with training requirements. For example, FPS 
reported 13,377 active contract guards in TAMS as of April 2024, but 
TAMS' training records do not reflect the necessary levels of training 
or documentation for all contract guards on staff.

       FPS officials said there were various reasons for not having 
training records for all 13,377 active contract guards. One reason is 
that security guard contractors had not entered all the records into 
TAMS. Another reason is that all contract guards had not yet completed 
the training courses and not all courses are mandatory. Furthermore, 
following our covert testing, we requested training records for the 
contract guards at the facilities that did not detect our prohibited 
items. FPS officials said they could not provide training records for 
some contract guards who were on duty during the time of our covert 
testing. FPS officials could not identify the appropriate contract 
guards on post based on PTS records, which identify the contract guards 
on duty. Officials said that since PTS has not been deployed to all 
guard contracts, they could not identify the names of the contract 
guards from PTS. Consequently, they could not collect the training and 
certification records for those contract guards in TAMS. FPS officials 
said if GAO had provided the names of the contract guards at the covert 
testing locations, they could have provided the training records for 
those contract guards. We did not gather the names of individual guards 
during our covert testing, since the purpose of the audit was to review 
FPS efforts to improve detection and data systems, not to investigate 
individual guard performance.

      TAMS system design. When conducting required quarterly 
training audits, FPS officials must access different parts of TAMS to 
confirm contract guard training requirements are met. This process is 
inefficient because it increases the time needed to complete each audit 
for thousands of contract guards. Some FPS staff said this design flaw 
makes it more time-consuming and difficult to use TAMS than traveling 
to the contractor's site to audit training files by hand, as they did 
before TAMS.

        An agency official said that while TAMS can collect a 
lot of information, it is poorly organized, affecting the system's 
performance and speed. For example, agency officials must confirm that 
contract guards have completed X-ray screening training, which produces 
a three-page report. According to a regional official, after running so 
many reports, the system runs out of storage space, and TAMS 
administrators must develop another file folder to save new reports. As 
a result, agency officials said they had to search five or six file 
folders to verify training information. Regional officials said it may 
take days to find pertinent information with a sluggish computer 
program.

        Several regional officials also mentioned that 
completing their work efficiently is difficult because the program is 
not user-friendly. An FPS official who was responsible for implementing 
TAMS in FPS said (1) the system was not intended for its current use of 
documenting all training requirements and (2) there are limits to how 
much the system can be modified for current FPS needs. While FPS 
officials have not addressed issues identified by stakeholders, FPS 
officials told us they are working to develop initiatives to capture 
technological best practices and enhance TAMS.

    In conclusion, as the agency responsible for protecting thousands 
of federal facilities nationwide, FPS relies heavily on more than 
13,000 contract guards. Failure to keep prohibited items out of federal 
facilities can compromise the safety of the people who work in and 
visit them. Moreover, threats to federal facilities persist even as FPS 
is experiencing a shortage of staff to provide oversight for the 
contract guard workforce. Therefore, it is essential that FPS improve 
the guards' success rate in detecting prohibited items and provide 
oversight of the contract guard workforce. Again, we plan to finalize 
our review of FPS's efforts to improve detection and data systems and 
issue a report later this year.
    We shared a draft of this statement with FPS, the Department of 
Treasury, the GSA, and the Social Security Administration. FPS provided 
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The remaining 
agencies informed us that they had no comments.
    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Marroni.
    Mr. Cline, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your 
testimony, sir.

  TESTIMONY OF RICHARD K. CLINE, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE 
 SERVICE, MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
                            SECURITY

    Mr. Cline. Good morning, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member 
Titus, and distinguished members of this subcommittee. My name 
is Kris Cline, and I have the privilege of serving as the 
Director of the Federal Protective Service, or FPS.
    I have served my country for the last 42 years in the Army 
and as a career civil servant, and I am honored to be here 
today to represent the outstanding men and women of our agency, 
and to discuss the critical mission of FPS, as well as the 
state of Federal facility security. I am pleased to be sitting 
alongside our partners from GSA, with whom we have an excellent 
and longstanding partnership, and the GAO, who provides 
impartial and independent reviews and recommendations for 
improving the operations of the agency.
    FPS is a Federal law enforcement agency of 1,642 Federal 
employees, including 1,140 Federal law enforcement officers and 
approximately 14,000 contract Protective Security Officers, or 
PSOs. FPS protects approximately 8,500 Federal facilities 
located in every State and Territory. We protect the Federal 
Government's infrastructure, employees, contractors, and 
members of the public seeking Government services, from 
incidents ranging from terrorist attacks to prohibited items in 
Federal facilities.
    Our most visible countermeasure is our contract PSOs, who 
are the front line of security at our Federal facilities. Our 
PSOs stand post at thousands of Federal facilities across the 
Nation, and are in daily contact with Federal employees and 
visitors. They conduct a variety of security functions such as 
visitor screening operations, roving patrols, and control 
center operations. FPS personnel conduct oversight inspections, 
on-the-job training, covert security tests, and administrative 
audits of the PSOs. Our contract PSOs work diligently to 
prevent dangerous items from entering Federal facilities. Every 
year, PSOs detect and prevent hundreds of thousands of 
prohibited items from entering Federal facilities. In the last 
year, more than 2,000 firearms were prevented from entering 
Federal facilities.
    Our dedicated Federal law enforcement officers and PSOs put 
their lives at risk every day to accomplish our mission. Over 
the last several years, our PSOs have been instrumental in 
stopping attacks at Federal facilities, placing themselves 
between an attacker and those we protect. Our law enforcement 
officers and PSOs have been shot, stabbed, and physically 
assaulted while performing their duties. Just 2 weeks ago, one 
of our PSOs was injured when an individual intentionally drove 
into him at a Federal facility in south Florida. I spoke with 
this PSO last week, and I am happy to report that he is 
recovering from his injuries.
    Since our inception in 1971, FPS has lost seven law 
enforcement officers in the line of duty. Since 2015, three 
PSOs have sacrificed their lives protecting Federal employees. 
Over the past few years, we have seen a significant increase in 
crimes at Federal facilities and, more importantly, threats to 
Federal civil servants. Last year, we noted a 29-percent 
increase in disorderly conduct incidents, an 84-percent 
increase in violations of Federal facility rules and 
regulations, and a 24-percent increase in assaults on 
Government employees.
    During this dynamic threat environment, we have increased 
our vigilance and coordination with Federal, State, and local 
law enforcement partners and stakeholders, and are prepared to 
respond quickly should a threat be identified. We are also 
working closely with GSA as co-leads of the Government Services 
and Facilities Sector, established under National Security 
Memorandum 22, which was issued in April of 2024. We firmly 
believe that our partnership under the Government Services and 
Facilities Sector will enhance the sector's security posture 
and resilience through enhanced collaboration and information 
exchange.
    During today's hearing, you are going to hear about 
additional improvements needed in the oversight and management 
of our PSO program. I am taking deliberate corrective actions 
to address GAO's findings, in addition to our routine program 
management improvement activities. However, make no mistake, it 
is our top priority to keep Federal facilities and employees 
safe. And every FPS employee and PSO is dedicated to public 
safety and security, and will continue to stand ready to 
protect our homeland.
    I would like to thank this subcommittee for your interest 
in the security of Federal facilities and allowing me the 
opportunity to testify on this critical role that the Federal 
Protective Service performs every day to ensure our Nation's 
overall security. FPS is and will continue to make a 
difference, providing a safe and secure work environment at our 
protected facilities across the Nation. I look forward to 
addressing any questions you may have.
    [Mr. Cline's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Richard K. Cline, Director, Federal Protective 
 Service, Management Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
                              Introduction
    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective 
Service (FPS) regarding FPS's critical mission to protect and secure 
federal government employees and the facilities in which they work.
    My name is Kris Cline, and I was appointed as the Director of FPS 
in January 2023. As Director, I am the Senior Law Enforcement Officer 
responsible for the protection of a nationwide portfolio of buildings, 
grounds, and properties that are owned, occupied, or secured by the 
Federal Government, as well as the persons on those properties. FPS is 
a recognized, award-winning leader in law enforcement and facility 
protection. It is my immense honor to lead the agency's great men and 
women, and I am inspired by their dedication, innovation, and 
achievements every day.
    Security of federal facilities is an important subject, and I am 
pleased to join the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and General 
Services Administration (GSA) for today's hearing. GAO's continued 
efforts to review our programs and identify recommendations that 
improve the security we provide are invaluable. Similarly, GSA is a 
critical partner in our shared vision of a safe and secure federal 
workforce. No matter how many times we get things right, it only takes 
one successful attempt by our adversaries to negate our efforts, which 
is why FPS relies on our federal law enforcement officers, armed 
contract security guards we call Protective Security Officers (PSOs), 
technology, training, and partnerships to detect and deter crime and 
keep people safe.
                              FPS History
    In 1790, six ``night watchmen'' were hired to protect government 
buildings in our newly designated nation's capital. Over time, a 
network of security guards evolved and was known as the U.S. Special 
Police. In 1971, the ``Federal Protective Service'' was established 
within GSA. FPS was transferred to DHS on March 1, 2003, pursuant to 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  101 et. seq) in 
recognition of its role in securing the homeland. FPS now resides under 
the Management Directorate within DHS Headquarters. FPS is 
headquartered in Washington, D.C., and it is organized across the 
nation into three zones and 11 regions for command and control and 
mission execution.
    FPS has a presence in every U.S. state and territory and is charged 
to protect more than 8,500 federal, non-military facilities and more 
than 1.4 million people who daily work, visit, or conduct business at 
these facilities. Our mission serves 66 federal agencies, ensuring safe 
work environments for federal employees performing essential duties 
that impact day-to-day lives of Americans. FPS continually adapts to 
meet threats, working with our federal, state, and local partners to 
ensure complete security coverage and efficient communication to 
protect people and property.
                            FPS Authorities
    FPS has broad law enforcement authorities and jurisdiction to 
prevent, investigate, mitigate, and protect against threats to federal 
property and people on federal grounds. Section 1706 of the Homeland 
Security Act, 40 U.S. Code Sec.  1315, grants FPS traditional police 
powers, including the authority to enforce federal laws and make 
arrests. In certain circumstances, FPS enters into agreements and 
utilizes other federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities 
and laws to protect federal property more fully.
    The Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 authorized the 
Secretary of Homeland Security with the statutory authority to counter 
credible threats from unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Within DHS, this 
authority was granted to FPS, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, and the U.S. Secret Service. Authorized actions 
include detecting, identifying, monitoring, and tracking UAS; 
disrupting control of UAS; seizing or exercising control of UAS; or 
confiscating UAS. DHS's current Countering UAS (C-UAS) authority is set 
to expire on October 1, 2024. Any lapse in DHS's current C-UAS 
authority would entail serious risks for our homeland security and 
FPS's missions. Specifically, FPS would have to cease existing C-UAS 
operations. Congressional action is required to prevent any lapse in C-
UAS authority on October 1, 2024.
                             FPS Workforce
    FPS is allocated 1,642 positions to execute our expansive mission. 
Of these, 1,140 are sworn federal law enforcement officers who perform 
vital functions, including enforcement of federal laws and regulations, 
conducting investigations into crimes and threats, conducting 
comprehensive security assessments to identify vulnerabilities at 
federal facilities, developing and implementing protective 
countermeasures, leading explosives detection canine teams, and 
providing uniformed police presence and response in support of the DHS 
and FPS missions. Our law enforcement officers risk their lives every 
day. Notably, amid the February 21, 2024, mass shooting during the 
Kansas City Chiefs Super Bowl parade, FPS law enforcement officers, 
assigned to protect nearby federal buildings, selflessly ran toward the 
gunshots, and detained two armed suspects to protect the public.
    Whether protecting U.S. Courthouses, Social Security Administration 
customer service centers, and all types of federal facilities in 
between, the level of dedication to our country's security comes with 
great sacrifice. Seven sworn FPS officers have died in the performance 
of their duties since FPS's formation. These tragedies serve as a stark 
reminder that the men and women who wear the FPS uniform are prepared 
to sacrifice all in service to our country and government, and we must 
ensure they are supported in every way possible to respond to and 
prevent threats against our nation's people, property, and 
institutions. FPS also employs more than 500 professional staff who 
provide essential mission functions, such as: intelligence analysis; 
human capital, financial, contractual and information technology 
management; security training; and additional disciplines.
              Responding to the Current Threat Environment
    Over the past year, we saw increased incidents at federal 
properties involving arson, burglary, robbery, larceny, motor vehicle 
theft, assault on government employees, and threats to harm government 
employees. Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 saw a 138 percent increase over FY 
2022 in demonstrations at federal properties, a 19 percent increase in 
alarm response incidents, a 29 percent increase in disorderly conduct 
incidents, an 84 percent increase in violations of building rules and 
regulations, a 24 percent increase in assault on government employees, 
and a 13 percent increase in the number of inappropriate communications 
directed towards government employees.
    We remain focused on harnessing efforts to counter these ever-
evolving threats to federal facilities and keeping people safe. In FY 
2023, FPS investigated 362 threats that led to seven convictions, 25 
arrests, and 10 citations for federal, state, and municipal penal code 
violations, U.S. District Court Notices of Violations, and criminal 
charges under Title 18 of the U.S. Code. To effectively operate in the 
current environment and moving into the future, FPS is emphasizing 
innovation and reinforcing our standards of excellence. We elevated our 
criminal intelligence capabilities by providing real-time operational 
intelligence and are sharing law enforcement intelligence with our 
officers and PSOs as well as with federal, state, and local partners to 
create an added layer of operational protection and insight.
                      Securing Federal Facilities
    FPS utilizes a layered approach to protect and secure federal 
facilities across the Nation, including our territories.
    Facility Security Assessments (FSAs) represent a cornerstone of our 
layered approach to comprehensive security. Our inspectors are 
rigorously trained to identify and mitigate potential facility 
vulnerabilities. Working with security specialists, countermeasure 
experts, and FPS leadership, our inspectors provide detailed reports to 
Facility Security Committees (FSC) and facility tenants as our expert 
recommendations for adequate building security and coverage. FPS 
designed and implemented the Modified Infrastructure Security Tool, or 
MIST, which is a certified and industry recognized, award-winning 
assessment program, to support evaluation and identification of 
potential threats at FPS-secured locations. Using both our inspectors' 
institutional knowledge and MIST's high-performance capabilities 
ensures our assessments are a trusted resource for providing our 
customers with the best possible security enhancement recommendations. 
In FY 2023, FPS made 4,102 recommendations to add or upgrade 
countermeasures at FPS-protected federal facilities. FPS also assisted 
the U.S. Marshals at Federal Courthouses nationwide during many high-
profile judicial proceedings.
    As with our relationship with GSA, FPS works closely with DHS's 
Interagency Security Committee (ISC), the organization that creates 
standards for security measures at federal facilities. Having a 
membership role on the ISC gives FPS access to and support from other 
leaders in the government security industry. In fact, Executive Order 
14111 names the FPS Director as a permanent voting member of the ISC.
    While FPS's recommendations address security enhancements, the ISC 
Risk Management Process requires the agency or agencies to accept and 
implement received FPS recommendations. GAO issued a report in May 
2023, examining FPS customer agencies' perspective on why they do not 
consistently implement recommended security measures to improve 
security at FPS-protected facilities. FPS continues to look for new 
strategies to support customer agencies and various FSCs responsible 
for making security countermeasure decisions that take into account 
risks associated with not implementing FPS security recommendations. 
One example of our approach is through evolving the FSA processes and 
associated training to enable our staff to develop more detailed cost 
estimates for recommended security measure improvements.
    We are also working with GSA and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) to implement the April 2024 GSA order requiring occupant 
agencies in GSA's federally owned facilities to provide funding to 
maintain and update Visual Surveillance Systems (VSS) and Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS), and to correct deficiencies identified by FPS 
of these two systems. The GSA order also requires all agencies that are 
part of an FSC in a multi-occupant facility, and the occupant agency in 
a single-occupant facility, to fund their portion of the purchase, 
installation, and replacement of VSS and IDS through a security work 
authorization agreement with FPS. In consultation with GSA, FPS 
identified and prioritized GSA-controlled federally owned facilities 
for FPS to implement VSS and IDS updates or new installation projects. 
We believe the order will enhance the security of the buildings we 
protect and those who work at and visit those facilities. Working with 
GSA, FPS developed a five-year plan to conduct these installation 
projects at 467 facilities, and work is underway now to start 
procurement actions on 43 projects during first quarter of FY 2025.
    Our most visible countermeasure are our armed contracted PSOs, who 
are in daily contact with our federal facility customers and visitors 
and are the front line of security in federal facilities. As such, PSOs 
put their lives at risk to accomplish FPS's mission. In recent years, 
FPS contracted PSOs were instrumental in thwarting attacks at several 
facilities, notably the FBI Cincinnati Field Office in Cincinnati, 
Ohio, in August 2022; the Edmund S. Muskie Federal Building in Augusta, 
Maine, in April 2022; and a Social Security Administration office in 
Norfolk, Virginia, in February 2021. Sadly, FPS has lost three PSOs in 
the line of duty since 2015, all of whom were tragically killed 
protecting federal facilities and employees.
    FPS oversees a PSO program that utilizes more than 90 contracts and 
is valued at $1.4 billion. Through this program, FPS works closely with 
commercial security vendors across the country to staff and train 
approximately 15,000 PSOs at 6,600 security posts. PSO vendors, as with 
many other industries, experience challenges in fully staffing their 
contracts resulting in open posts. Our manning analysis indicates FPS 
PSOs are on-post and available approximately 99.7 percent of scheduled 
post hours; however, we are sensitive to the concerns of all unstaffed 
requirements particularly when a service agency cannot open due to 
security gaps. In these instances, FPS is assessing the impact and 
alternative solutions, including having an FPS Officer take on those 
responsibilities.
    In addition to manpower availability, FPS must also verify and 
validate the quality of PSO services being delivered. To achieve this, 
FPS conducts a variety of compliance checks to provide oversight of the 
PSO program and individual contracts. Post visits and inspections 
provide an opportunity for FPS law enforcement officers to provide on-
the-job training to PSOs in various aspects of their duties. Post 
inspections are formal inspections of PSOs and PSO posts to ensure 
contractual compliance. FPS continues to implement the Post Tracking 
System to automate and create efficiency for FPS and PSO vendor 
personnel.
    FPS manages a National Weapons Detection Program to teach PSOs how 
to utilize technical countermeasures to screen personnel and packages 
for dangerous weapons and explosives. Since January 2024, FPS PSOs have 
prevented more than 346,000 dangerous and prohibited items (e.g., 
firearms, bladed items, club-like items, flammable items, and disabling 
chemicals) from entering federal facilities, but it is equally 
important to determine where prohibited items may not be detected by a 
PSO. To validate a PSO's capability to detect weapons and explosives, 
FPS employees operate a Covert Security Testing (CST) Program. These 
tests are conducted randomly and examine the ability of the PSOs to 
detect prohibited items from entering the buildings. Test results are 
shared with PSO vendors who are required to take appropriate steps to 
retrain personnel when necessary. FPS also reviews the CST data to look 
for trends to improve the program nationally. Further, as new threats 
are identified, updated guidance and requirements are built into the 
program to drive continuous improvement.
                              FPS Funding
    FPS does not receive a direct appropriation--the agency is entirely 
funded by the fees charged to the federal departments and agencies we 
protect to conduct our mission. There are three components to the fees 
charged to our customers: 1) a Basic Security Fee, which is the primary 
source of funding for FPS operations, and provides funding for 
statutory and regulatory service requirements from activities 
associated with law enforcement, threat management and information 
sharing, protective and criminal investigations, and risk management; 
2) agency-specific fees for security services performed for an 
individual customer through Security Work Authorization (SWA) 
agreements, as well as other reimbursable activities; and 3) building-
specific fees for security services to implement and maintain security 
requirements specifically designed for a particular facility.
                               Conclusion
    FPS continues to demonstrate its capabilities to deter and respond 
to threats directed toward federal employees, visitors, and facilities. 
As the law enforcement agency responsible for securing these sacred 
governmental institutions, FPS personnel must maintain constant 
vigilance to ensure the continuity of the U.S. Government and our great 
country. I am very proud of all that FPS has accomplished in its rich 
53-year history, and while there are ways to improve what we are doing, 
I know our talented and committed workforce will always ensure we are 
ready to meet our mission.
    I would like to acknowledge and thank the distinguished members of 
this Subcommittee for allowing me the opportunity to testify today, and 
I am pleased to answer your questions.

    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Cline.
    Mr. Doomes, as you know, you are now recognized for 5 
minutes for your testimony. You should almost get a time card 
in this place, I think. Good morning, sir.

  TESTIMONY OF ELLIOT DOOMES, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDINGS 
         SERVICE, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Doomes. Good morning, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member 
Titus, Ranking Member Larsen, and other members of the 
subcommittee. My name is Elliot Doomes, and I am the 
Commissioner of GSA's Public Buildings Service. Thank you for 
inviting me to appear before you today to discuss safety and 
security in Federal facilities. My testimony today will 
highlight some of GSA's roles and responsibilities in keeping 
Federal facilities secure.
    Executive Order 12977 established the Interagency Security 
Committee following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. The ISC was established to 
improve governmentwide coordination of security initiatives, 
and to address the need for increased security and protection, 
particularly in buildings housing Federal employees. The ISC 
also created standards for security measures at Federal 
facilities.
    Recognizing that we must balance protections for our 
Federal employees and contractors while keeping buildings 
accessible to the public, GSA has been an active participant in 
the development of these security standards, working with the 
Interagency Security Committee and other Federal partners. 
GSA's Office of Mission Assurance was established to integrate 
security, continuity, and readiness expertise within the agency 
and with critical stakeholders.
    In addition to OMA, the Public Buildings Service is 
continuously working with customer agencies to identify the 
best space to meet their mission needs, including physical 
security. GSA's physical security responsibilities include 
working with our security partners and tenant agencies to 
reduce the risk in GSA facilities. To provide these services, 
GSA works with tenant agencies in the planning stage of 
projects to ensure that its space has the proper security 
requirements to meet its missions needs.
    The ISC risk management process requires individual 
agencies, or the Facility Security Committee in multitenant 
facilities, to select the appropriate security countermeasures 
to achieve the highest level of protection, as determined by 
the facility security assessment. Although tenant agencies can 
select optimal countermeasures for their facilities, FPS and 
GSA are responsible for ensuring security countermeasures 
equipment conforms with ISC standards, as well as repairing and 
replacing security countermeasures.
    GSA has a longstanding partnership with FPS, which provides 
law enforcement and related security services for Federal 
buildings in all aspects of security. The Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts and the United States Marshals 
Service also serve as partners to deliver security services to 
the Federal judiciary and courthouses. To codify these 
partnerships, GSA currently has memorandums of agreement with 
FPS, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, and the 
United States Marshals Service outlining roles and 
responsibilities for security at GSA-controlled facilities, as 
applicable.
    FSCs are another way that GSA remains engaged in the 
decisionmaking process with FPS and tenant agencies to review 
building security. Facility Security Committees composed of and 
governed by the tenants in multitenant facilities hold the 
responsibility of addressing facility-specific security issues, 
including improving the implementation of security 
countermeasures recommended by FPS. When FPS completes an 
assessment and recommends security countermeasures for 
implementation, those recommendations go to the FSC for funding 
approval and implementation. If FSC does not approve the 
funding, those countermeasures go unimplemented, and the 
agencies in that individual building accept the security risk.
    GSA and FPS do consider certain minimum security standards 
for every Federal facility, and those can evolve over time. For 
instance, GSA recently collaborated with FPS, the ISC, and the 
Office of Management and Budget to implement an April 2024 GSA 
order making security camera and alarm systems part of the 
baseline minimum security standards for GSA federally owned 
facilities.
    GSA has also been working to enhance security at 
courthouses around the country in light of recent incidents. 
GSA is working in concert with the Administrative Office of 
U.S. Courts to modernize courthouse infrastructure, including 
building hardening such as replacing or adding break-resistant 
glass. And to date, GSA has received $15 million in fiscal year 
2022 and $12.5 million in fiscal year 2023 for the Judiciary 
Capital Security Fund to complete these projects. There are 
currently 67 courthouses undergoing this program, with 36 
projects in the design stage and ready for construction.
    GSA is also using landscape architecture to serve as 
perimeter security measures to discourage potential crime on or 
around our Federal facilities. Landscape architecture can 
provide natural barriers at Federal sites that prevent hiding 
places and restrict unwanted pedestrian access to building 
facades. This can be accomplished through the use of dense 
plantings, walls, fencing, topography, or other means. These 
features eliminate the need for separate, standalone security 
elements, saving money and making the areas around the 
facilities more aesthetically pleasing and inviting to 
visitors.
    To conclude, ensuring the safety of building occupants is 
paramount at GSA, and we take such matters seriously at all 
times. With congressional support of the fiscal year 2025 
budget request and legislative proposals, GSA will be one step 
closer to modernizing our Federal footprint, which will advance 
key security priorities in our facilities. Through continued 
partnership with agencies like the FPS, GSA will continue 
providing support to ensure security at every Federal facility 
across the country.
    Thank you for your time today, and I look forward to 
answering any questions that you may have.
    [Mr. Doomes' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings 
             Service, U.S. General Services Administration
                              Introduction
    Good morning Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Titus, and members of 
the Subcommittee. My name is Elliot Doomes and I am the Commissioner of 
GSA's Public Buildings Service (PBS). Thank you for inviting me to 
appear before you today to discuss safety and security in federal 
facilities. My testimony today will highlight some of GSA's roles and 
responsibilities in keeping federal facilities secure.
    GSA has custody and jurisdiction of more than 1,600 federally-owned 
and 6,500 leased facilities across the nation. Over one million federal 
workers, contractors and visitors access GSA-controlled facilities 
regularly to interact with the government. We take security at federal 
facilities seriously, and work closely with partners such as the 
Federal Protective Service (FPS), U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and 
others to ensure the safety of tenant agency personnel, contractors and 
visitors.
                        Establishment of the ISC
    Executive Order 12977 established the Interagency Security 
Committee (ISC) following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. The ISC was established to improve 
government-wide coordination of security initiatives, and to address 
the need for increased security and protection, particularly in 
buildings housing federal employees. The ISC also created standards for 
security measures at federal facilities.
    On November 27, 2023, President Biden signed Executive Order 14111 
(Interagency Security Committee) to enhance the quality and 
effectiveness of security and protection of buildings and facilities in 
the United States occupied by federal employees or federal contractor 
workers for nonmilitary activities. As a result, increased security 
standards continue to be developed to protect federal employees and 
contractors in all federally-occupied space. Regardless of whether GSA 
owns or leases a facility, a Facility Security Level (FSL), ranging 
from Levels 1-5, establishes the baseline level of protection and may 
warrant a specific countermeasure in the federal facility.
    Recognizing that we must balance protections for our federal 
employees and contractors while keeping buildings accessible to the 
public, GSA has been an active participant in the development of these 
security standards working with the Interagency Security Committee and 
other federal partners. GSA's Office of Mission Assurance (OMA) was 
established to integrate security, continuity and readiness expertise 
within the agency and with critical stakeholders. OMA provides services 
for all GSA staff, and GSA's owned and leased public buildings. These 
services include: (1) managing the vetting process for GSA employees 
(2) determining employee suitability for covered positions and (3) 
fitness determination for GSA contractors. In addition to OMA working 
to ensure safety and security for GSA employees and contractors, the 
Public Buildings Service (PBS) is continuously working with customer 
agencies to identify the best space to meet their mission needs, 
including security. GSA's goal is to provide a safe building 
environment allowing agencies to focus on their mission needs to ensure 
their employees, contractors and the visiting public are able to 
conduct their business.
                GSA's Role in Ensuring Building Security
    GSA's physical security responsibilities include working with our 
security partners and tenant agencies to reduce the security risk in 
GSA facilities. In order to provide these services, GSA works with 
tenant agencies in the planning stage of projects, resulting in 
proposed security requirements for new construction, renovation and 
leased space projects to ensure that its space has the proper security 
requirements to meet its mission needs. Because every facility has 
unique security and accessibility requirements, and tenant agencies 
have varying mission needs, the ISC risk management process requires 
individual agencies, or the Facility Security Committee (FSC) in multi-
tenant facilities, to select the appropriate security countermeasures 
to achieve the highest level of protection, as determined by the 
Facility Security Assessment. Although tenant agencies can select 
optimal countermeasures for their facilities, FPS and GSA are 
responsible for ensuring security countermeasure equipment conforms 
with ISC standards, as well as repairing and replacing security 
countermeasures.
    In addition to partnering with FPS, GSA also has a robust 
partnership with The U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Marshals 
Service (USMS) to deliver security services for the federal court 
system. Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) outline roles and 
responsibilities to provide law enforcement and related security 
services at federally-owned and leased facilities under the 
jurisdiction, custody or control of GSA.
    A MOA between GSA and FPS expands on 6 U.S.C. Sec. 232, detailing 
roles and responsibilities of each agency in order to protect federal 
facilities and grounds. While FPS is largely responsible for providing 
security, law enforcement and criminal investigations at federal 
facilities, the FPS also coordinates with GSA on crime prevention and 
security awareness training for GSA's tenant agencies and employees. 
GSA also coordinates with FPS when FPS performs routine vulnerability 
assessments that are submitted to FSCs.
                Role of the Facility Security Committee
    FSCs are another way that GSA remains engaged in the decision 
making process with FPS and tenant agencies to review building 
security. FSCs, composed of and governed by the tenants in multi-tenant 
facilities, hold the responsibility of addressing facility-specific 
security issues, including approving the implementation of security 
countermeasures recommended by FPS as noted in building security 
assessments. When FPS completes an assessment and recommends security 
countermeasures for implementation, those recommendations go to the FSC 
for funding approval. When the FSC approves funding for 
countermeasures, FPS or GSA, as applicable depending on the nature of 
the countermeasure, can move forward with implementation. However, if 
an FSC does not approve the funding, those countermeasures go 
unimplemented, and the agencies in that individual building accept the 
security risk. If an FSC makes the decision not to approve or provide 
funding for a countermeasure, the decision is documented.
    GSA and FPS consider certain minimum security standards for every 
federal facility, and these can evolve over time. For instance, GSA 
recently collaborated with FPS, the ISC and the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) to implement an April 2024 GSA order, making security 
camera and alarm systems part of the baseline minimum security 
standards for GSA's federally-owned facilities. The GSA order also 
requires tenant agencies in GSA's federally-owned facilities to provide 
funding to maintain and update Video Surveillance Systems and Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS), and to correct deficiencies identified by FPS. 
GSA is confident that this order and the continued collaboration with 
FPS, OMB and tenant agencies will improve the security of GSA's 
federally-owned facilities.
         Implementing Security Standards at Federal Facilities
    At owned and leased facilities as appropriate, GSA provides space 
for control rooms, screening stations, guard booths and other similar 
space, serving the security and infrastructure needs of tenant 
agencies. When recommended in the FSA and funded by the FSC, GSA 
provides physical security infrastructure, like vehicular barriers, 
exterior security specified doors, exterior and building common area 
security specified locks, HVAC security items, security specific 
exterior lighting, physical access control systems, security specified 
garage doors, security fencing and gates, and blast-resistant 
countermeasures. In these cases GSA also provides advanced notification 
of situations such as scheduled building maintenance that will affect 
the operation of building security equipment. For leased facilities, 
GSA follows ISC standards issuing leasing guidance and instructions for 
competitive lease procurements.
    Security implementation can vary greatly depending on factors like 
the location of a property, size of the facility and the tenant 
agency's mission. A FSL, ranging from Levels 1-5, is determined from 
five factors, based on mission criticality, symbolism, facility 
population, facility size and threats to tenant agencies. The FSL 
establishes the baseline level of protection and as the FSL increases, 
additional security measures, such as increased setbacks, site 
planning, facade hardening, and structural measures to prevent 
progressive collapse may be necessary. Setback requirements can result 
in agencies seeking space outside of urban areas and additional land 
acquisition costs for new facilities. GSA refers to ISC standards to 
determine if security barriers are needed based on the FSL. Currently 
GSA's security barrier inventory consists of over 14,000 security 
barriers of various types, providing tenant agencies with appropriate 
options to meet their facility needs.
    GSA also responds to feedback on ways to improve building security 
by participating in each facility's FSC or coordinating with a single 
occupant agency in its jurisdiction. For example, at a federal facility 
in California, there were concerns that illegal drug activity was 
taking place in the federal plaza after hours. In response to this and 
as a result of extensive community outreach efforts, a perimeter fence 
and locking gate were constructed at the perimeter of the plaza and 
operationally the site closes to the public during non-working hours.
                         GSA Child Care Centers
    GSA child care centers are designed to keep children safe within 
the center, to safeguard them from outside intruders, and to protect 
them from hazards, consistent with the established risk management 
process. GSA works with FSCs and sponsoring agencies to maintain 
security standards for child care centers in GSA-controlled facilities. 
Child care center entrances are secured at all times and parents, 
guardians and child care staff have immediate access through an 
electric strike release with a keypad or card reader. GSA provides 
electronic security systems for child care centers, including video 
surveillance systems (VSS) at all entrances and exits, including the 
playground area.
    GSA partners with FPS during the assessment process to identify 
security risks in child care centers based on the ISC risk management 
process appendix C. GSA uses these assessments to develop security 
mitigation projects. Typical projects include the installation, 
repairing, or replacing cameras, fences, blast protection and security 
countermeasures to safeguard child care centers from intruders.
    In FY 2022, GSA was appropriated $15 million for the Child Care 
Special Emphasis Program. The program is addressing the most important 
projects, and sought to reduce risks in the maximum number of child 
care centers in our inventory. Twenty-six projects received funding 
across 10 regions. As part of GSA's FY 2025 budget request, GSA is 
seeking $14.25 million to continue funding this Special Emphasis 
Program to expedite action to enhance security at all child care 
centers in GSA controlled buildings to the applicable security 
standards. GSA is committed to ensuring child care centers are 
maintained in safe locations that meet applicable security standards.
                         Security Enhancements
Courthouse Hardening
    In light of recent incidents, and continuing threats to our U.S. 
Courthouses, GSA is working in concert with the Administrative Office 
of the Courts to modernize courthouse infrastructure, including 
building hardening. Building hardening projects include; replacing or 
adding break-resistant glass or glass coverings for pedestrian-
accessible windows, hardening exterior doors with break-resistant glass 
or glass coverings, roll-down gates, and other capabilities, installing 
magnetic automatic door locks that can be engaged by security officers 
at their guard stations and from the control room, and installing 
temporary or permanent barriers and fencing, where appropriate, to 
protect the perimeter of the facility.
    GSA received $15 million in Fiscal Year 2022 and $12.5 million in 
FY 2023 from the Judiciary Capital Security Fund. There are currently 
67 courthouses receiving funding through this program, with 36 projects 
in the design stage and ready for construction. Two projects are 
finalizing construction in Portland, OR and San Francisco, CA.
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
    GSA is also working to design exterior landscapes that serve as 
perimeter security measures to discourage potential crime on or around 
our federal facilities. Good site design considers security in the 
overall landscape visioning. Landscape architecture can provide natural 
barriers at federal sites that can prevent hiding places without 
obstructing security cameras. Good landscape architectural design can 
also restrict unwanted pedestrian access adjacent to building facades. 
This can be accomplished through the use of dense plantings, walls, 
fencing, topography, or other means. These features eliminate the need 
for separate standalone security elements like continuous rows of 
bollards or planters, potentially saving money and making the areas 
around facilities more aesthetically pleasing and inviting to visitors.
    While security features such as bollards, planters, or jersey 
barriers can be important security measures, they can also be an 
eyesore in communities; they often clash with local streetscape 
standards and can impede pedestrian access and connectivity. GSA is 
working with designers to provide a better first impression at federal 
facilities while still enhancing security. An example of this was the 
modernization of the Columbus, New Mexico Land Port of Entry (LPOE), 
delivered in 2019, where a depressed stormwater management facility was 
used as an effective barrier between vehicular traffic and the main 
port building.
                               Conclusion
    Ensuring the safety of building occupants is paramount at GSA, and 
we take such matters seriously at all times. With Congressional support 
of the FY 2025 budget request and legislative proposals, GSA will be 
one step closer to modernizing our federal footprint, which will 
advance key security priorities in our facilities, particularly those 
in our child care centers. Through continued partnership with agencies 
like FPS, GSA will continue providing support to ensure security at 
every facility across the country. Thank you for your time today and I 
look forward to answering any questions you may have.

    Mr. Perry. Well, thank all of you for your testimony, and 
we would normally turn to questions right now. But as you can 
see, we are being informed that there will be a series of votes 
occurring on the floor starting now. So, at this time, the 
committee will stand in recess, subject to the call of the 
chair.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Perry. The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 
Buildings, and Emergency Management will reconvene the 
previously recessed hearing.
    Sorry for the delay. The Chair now yields himself 5 minutes 
for questioning.
    Director Cline, the FPS has spent $30 million on tracking 
and management systems. I mean, it blows my mind. I feel like--
probably just buy some off-the-shelf management system. It 
can't be the only one that is trying to track your employees. 
But the cost is probably actually more than that. But can you 
give us a date when these systems will be fully up and running 
so that your law enforcement officers can do their jobs better 
and manage the PSOs? Thank you.
    Mr. Cline. Thank you, Chairman Perry.
    So, the Post Tracking System began development back in 
2018/2017 timeframe, and it was designed to allow the PSOs to 
utilize their PIV card, their Personal Identification 
Verification card, to log in and enter a PIN number. And at the 
time, we also asked for a thumbprint for 100 percent, three-
factor authentication. We have allowed that to incrementally 
grow more than it needed to. We need to get back to the basics 
of the intention of the Post Tracking System. We want it to tie 
to our isthmus, our suitability program, to make sure the 
guards are fully certified, their background investigation is 
up to date.
    And also TAMS, our Training and Academy Management System. 
TAMS was designed for law enforcement. We are adding PSO 
records to that, and now we are blending the two together. So, 
I have recently assigned a senior advisor to take 
responsibility for this program. We have also directed the 
assignment of acquisition people, because this is an IT-based 
system--acquisition people to embed with the Post Tracking 
System team to continue the development of it. And we are 
prepared to initiate a tiger team to review the entire aspects 
of the Post Tracking System as soon as the GAO report is 
finalized.
    But we have already started to get this corrected, sir. 
Putting the right people in the right box to fix this, it is 
not a hard thing to fix, but it takes the people with the right 
responsibilities and the right----
    Mr. Perry [interrupting]. So, is there a particular region? 
And is there a timeframe where we can see some successful--you 
know, I get the mission creep, I get you want to use it for a 
lot of things, like do one thing right and then figure out the 
rest from there. But you've got to do one thing right.
    Mr. Cline. Absolutely, sir. The Post Tracking System is 
being deployed by region, so, we have 11 regions. On one 
contract, we are 98 percent deployed. Other contracts, we are 
zero percent deployed. And there are a variety of reasons, sir. 
It is no excuse, but there are connectivity issues, but--this 
is a cellular-based tablet that they are using to sign in. 
Connectivity issues, there are firewall issues----
    Mr. Perry [interrupting]. So, what do you project is the 
first region, and when they are going to be able to utilize it 
effectively?
    Mr. Cline. So, PSOs are using it now, but it is not being 
fully implemented----
    Mr. Perry [interposing]. Right.
    Mr. Cline [continuing]. On any of our guard contracts. To 
give you a date, sir, I need to dive back into this to give you 
an exact date. I would have to get back to you----
    Mr. Perry [interrupting]. Well----
    Mr. Cline [continuing]. With that information.
    Mr. Perry [continuing]. As a guy who served in uniform, the 
troops pay attention to what the commander is looking at.
    Mr. Cline. Right.
    Mr. Perry. So, you tell me what you are looking at, give me 
a date so--you have got a suspense date so we can all get 
there, we can know what the expectation is, and know when you 
are going to get there.
    Director, of the Law Enforcement Authority of FPS is 
section 1315 of title 40, United States Code. The authority is 
vested in the DHS Secretary, who can and has delegated the 
authority outside of the FPS in the past. There have been 
reports--and this is what I am trying to verify--that Homeland 
Security Investigations, or HSI, was involved in security for 
former President Trump's rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. Is 
FPS's law enforcement authority delegated to HSI?
    Mr. Cline. No, sir.
    Mr. Perry. OK. So, that is just a blanket answer. It is not 
delegated, so, we don't need to care who oversees it because 
you are--it is not being delegated.
    Mr. Cline. Right. Exactly, sir. We have not delegated this 
authority to anyone in DHS right now.
    Mr. Perry. Do you know if it has been--can you provide a 
list of the delegations in the past of FPS authority?
    Mr. Cline. Yes, sir. So, just off the top of my head, sir, 
so, during the summer of 2020, we coordinated with the 
Department to receive additional assistance from ICE, primarily 
ERO, the Border Patrol, primarily their tactical teams, the 
Federal Air Marshals, just to assist us in the protection of 
Federal facilities during the summer of 2020. Those 
delegations, we monitor those. We train the officers and agents 
on that delegation in what they can and can't do based on that 
authority. But there is a time that goes along with that, and 
all those have ended a year ago.
    Mr. Perry. OK. If you could, please, in the remaining time 
that I have, if you could at some point here--next 60 days or 
something--put a list together of when that delegation 
happened, when it started, who it was with, and when it ended. 
We want to make sure that we have a full view of how that has 
been used in the past, who has used it for what duration, and 
so on and so forth. You obviously understand that unresolved 
rumors with something so consequential as what happened in 
Butler are not good for the country, your agency, or the 
general public's viewpoint of things. So, we would like to make 
sure that that is cleared up.
    Mr. Cline. Absolutely.
    Mr. Perry. And with that, the Chair now recognizes the 
ranking member, Ms. Titus from Nevada.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Director Cline, after the assassination attempt on the 
former President, there was a lot of talk about drones and the 
Secret Service not using the drones, but the shooter did use 
the drones. FPS has counter-UAS authorities, thanks to an 
extension in the recent FAA bill. I wonder if you can tell us 
how you all use drones, and if the fact that this runs out 
pretty soon in October, will that make a difference in how you 
are able to or what you would like to do with the use of 
drones?
    Mr. Cline. Absolutely, ma'am. Our counterdrone program is 
essential for the safety and security of our Federal 
facilities. This is 6 U.S.C. 124(n), the Preventing Emerging 
Threats Act of 2018. And you are correct, ma'am, it does expire 
1 October. We request that that be extended or made into full 
legislation.
    We utilize that. We have a mobile system that we utilize 
when we work with the Marshals Service to protect a high-risk 
trial that is going on at a courthouse. The most recent one was 
in Brunswick, Georgia, for the Ahmaud Arbery civil rights trial 
that was held there. We put up our system, we mitigated seven 
drones that were there. Most of them were from news media 
trying to get a closeup of the family. But we were able to 
mitigate those.
    The mobile kit is very valuable for us. We can move that to 
courthouse to courthouse, and use it wherever we need it. We do 
have counter-UAS permanently implemented at a covered asset 
here in DC 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and we have eight 
personnel that man that system.
    Ms. Titus. Well, good. Thank you. Then we need to do what 
we can to extend that authority, right, come October?
    Mr. Cline. I am sorry, ma'am.
    Ms. Titus. I said then we need to do what we can to extend 
that authority.
    Mr. Cline. Absolutely, ma'am.
    Ms. Titus. All right, thank you. Another question I have is 
that in May of 2023, the Department of Homeland Security issued 
a National Advisory System Bulletin, and it warned--and this is 
quotes--``The United States remains in a heightened threat 
environment. In the coming months, factors that could mobilize 
individuals to commit violence include their perceptions of the 
2024 general election cycle and legislative or judicial 
issues.''
    Now, that bulletin expired in November 2023. Do you know 
why it wasn't extended, and should it be extended?
    And if it was in place, how would that make a difference 
with the way you operate?
    Mr. Cline. Thank you, ma'am. So, the NTAS did expire 
September 2023--or, I am sorry, November 2023. In September of 
2023, the 2023 Homeland Threat Assessment was put out. And I 
believe that Homeland Threat Assessment covered a wider variety 
and audience than the NTAS did. And I believe that is why the 
NTAS was expired, to allow the new Homeland Threat Assessment 
to replace it.
    Ms. Titus. So, you think that covers it adequately, we are 
not facing some problem with the upcoming election because this 
isn't in place?
    Mr. Cline. I think we are in a very dynamic threat 
environment right now, ma'am, you saw last Saturday. I mean, it 
continues throughout the country, different issues, different 
grievances that people have for one reason or another. I think, 
we are--for FPS, we are operating under this environment and 
prepared to respond as necessary, but I think that the reason 
that it was allowed to expire is because the Homeland Threat 
Assessment took it over.
    Ms. Titus. OK. Well, thank you.
    Mr. Marroni, when you talked about some of your studies of 
weapons that got through, and some of the way the guards on the 
scene missed some of this, I don't want to criticize the people 
who were there, but did you look at turnover, and did you look 
at the notion of if benefits were better for some of these 
guards, morale might be better and you wouldn't have turnover 
and you might have better results in the long run?
    Mr. Marroni. So, we didn't look at that. We didn't look at 
the causes behind the failures to detect that half of the items 
we tried to get through. That is an important piece of the 
analysis. FPS does have a more extensive covert testing 
program, where they try and get at the causes for testing 
failures, and that is important. That is--you need that data 
and to look at what are the root causes of why we are having 
this failure rate so they can remediate it.
    Ms. Titus. And does that have to do with turnover, or not 
adequate benefits for the people who are there?
    Mr. Marroni. I don't know.
    Ms. Titus. Mr. Cline, do you want to talk to that?
    Mr. Cline. So, ma'am, the contract guard program, 14,000; 
Federal facilities across the country, right now at this minute 
there are 6,250 guard posts that are open. A guard is standing 
at that post. If a vendor gets a new contract, and they are now 
paying $1 more per hour, then our PSOs will leave to go--I 
mean, it is----
    Ms. Titus [interposing]. Yes.
    Mr. Cline [continuing]. And it is a constant churn to keep 
them in one place.
    We renew contracts, there are 5-year contracts that are 
renewed every year, based on their performance that we have 
indicated in their Contract Performance Appraisal Rating 
System, CPARS. Whether they are going to be renewed or not is 
something that we work through.
    But it is a competitive, very competitive market. It is 
just like the market for hiring law enforcement. We are all 
fighting for the same person between all of our agencies. And 
it is very similar with the PSO program, because a guard 
company will have a new contract and they are going to start 
doing what they can to pull--especially if they meet all the 
training requirements. There are a number of requirements they 
have to meet for us. If they meet those requirements and this 
person gets a new contract, they are going to do what they can 
to hire them over. They don't have to train them.
    Ms. Titus. Salary, benefits----
    Mr. Cline [interposing]. Yes.
    Ms. Titus [continuing]. Retirement.
    Mr. Cline. Exactly.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    Mr. Perry. The gentlelady yields. The chairman recognizes 
the gentlelady from Utah, Ms. Maloy.
    Ms. Maloy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been sitting 
here listening, thinking how Americans expect to be safe in 
Federal buildings, and that is what you are tasked with. But we 
have got some holes here that need to be addressed. We have got 
some problems that need to be addressed. And to that end, I am 
going to yield the remainder of my time to Chairman Perry so he 
can follow up on the rest of the questions that he has.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Representative Maloy.
    Mr. Marroni, in your testimony you highlighted incidents 
where contract guards failed to be at their post, and as a 
result, both the IRS and the Social Security Administration had 
to close offices that serve the public. I know that both of 
those are critical in the district that I am honored to 
represent, and I hear regularly claims from constituents--my 
bosses--about their anger and their irritation about not being 
able to get their problems resolved for one reason or another. 
Nobody is at work, or they can't get a return phone call, or 
whatever, and this is part and parcel of that.
    Can you detail whether FPS was immediately aware of when a 
guard was not at his or her post?
    And can you further describe exactly what happened in these 
incidents?
    Mr. Marroni. So, they were not in these situations, not 
instantly aware, not in real time. And that was part of the 
issue, is that the tenants--SSA, IRS--didn't know what was 
going on. FPS didn't have that information in real time, 
either, which is a problem because then you can't mitigate, you 
can't come up with a solution quickly.
    In theory, PTS, the system we have talked about previously, 
could--was supposed to provide the capability remotely for FPS 
to see if these posts are being staffed. That would be an 
important capability, because then you could say, OK, this post 
isn't there, let's reach out to the vendor. Let's tell IRS and 
SSA. Let's figure out are there mitigations we can do.
    Mr. Perry. And then, Director Cline, look, it is hard to 
fix a problem that you don't know exists, right? You are 
wherever you are. Like you said, there are thousands of 
buildings across the country. Whether it is in the district I 
represent or somebody else's, if you don't know it is 
happening, you can't address it. But at the same time, it has 
to be addressed.
    And so, I am wondering. What are the steps taken to 
eliminate the problem? And surely, everybody must have known 
when you set the system up that sooner or later this 
eventuality is possible, right? And you have got to have, like, 
a backup. That is obvious. So, where do we stand?
    Mr. Cline. Yes, sir. So, typically, right now--so, the Post 
Tracking System is designed to notify us when someone is not on 
post. We are not there yet. So, the system we put in place--you 
mentioned the Social Security Customer Service Centers and the 
IRS Tax Assistance Centers. They won't open unless one of our 
PSOs is there, because they want to make sure there is security 
there.
    And if the office manager goes to the office and is waiting 
on the PSO to show up and they don't, they will contact us and 
say, ``Your PSO isn't here.'' We immediately coordinate with 
the vendor: What is going on? Where is your backup? Where is 
your other person? At the same time, now we are dispatching our 
law enforcement officers to respond to that location to either 
work to open the facility with the law enforcement officer 
there while we get a PSO on post, or get the PSO there 
immediately.
    It is not the final solution, but it is what we put in 
place now until----
    Mr. Perry [interrupting]. Yes, obviously, you need to fix 
in the meantime.
    Commissioner Doomes, was GSA aware of these occurrences, 
these failings, if so-called?
    And if so, is GSA engaged with FPS to ensure that the use 
of GSA facilities going forward is not impacted by the lack of 
security?
    Have you been involved in the process?
    Mr. Doomes. Thank you for that question, Congressman.
    We do have a memorandum of agreement with the Federal 
Protective Service and an ongoing relationship where we share 
information with them about who is in the building, who our 
leasing facility manager is, as well as they are sharing 
information with us about incident reports.
    When there is an incident in a building, the PSOs are often 
the first responders, and they are working with the Facility 
Security Committee and the tenant agencies to understand what 
the threat is, and whether there has been an incident, and 
whether there needs to be additional countermeasures. So, our 
Office of Mission Assurance is working on a consistent and 
regular basis with the Federal Protective Service.
    Mr. Perry. All right. Well, we have got to solve this 
problem, right? These offices can't go--they can't remain 
closed for lack of security. And so, we will probably look for 
kind of a review maybe after 6 months to see how that is 
working as we wait on other things, the other system, to come 
online more fully.
    Director Cline, an average 50 percent success rate in the 
covert testing is not really a success by anybody's measure. 
The FBI Director continues to sound the alarm. I am sure you 
know that terror threats are at an all-time high. Crime and 
drug abuse is out of control in many places. FPS law 
enforcement officers and contract guards are the first line of 
defense at these Federal facilities. And unfortunately, as you 
know, some have lost their lives. I can't imagine the numerous 
altercations on a probably regular basis.
    Can you talk just briefly about training, upgraded 
training, and then detecting threats and what they are advised 
to do when these things happen?
    Mr. Cline. Thank you, sir. So, first, we can talk about 
threats and how they go about detecting those.
    All the guard contractors are required to have radio 
communications to communicate to our dispatch centers. So, when 
an incident occurs, or there is a threat, or there is a 
suspicious vehicle, whatever it may be, they immediately notify 
our dispatch center and an officer is dispatched to that 
location. In some instances, it may be a city, county, or State 
officer, based on where our local police officer is staffed. 
But they have a process to use to report that type of activity.
    Sir, like you mentioned, the PSOs are the first line of 
defense. They are the ones who are getting shot, getting run 
over, getting stabbed on a daily basis. Their training--let's 
focus on their National Weapons Detection Training Program, how 
they detect prohibited items in screening. Right now, it is a 
16-hour training program that teaches them how to detect items 
in an x ray machine, and there is an 8-hour training program 
for the magnetometer.
    We have our Training and Professional Development 
Directorate working with academia to enhance that training to 
make sure that we are teaching adults how to properly detect 
that equipment. Our equipment is not much different than TSA's 
equipment. We are going to have our folks go to the TSA Academy 
and find out how they do their training. Is it something that 
we might be able to leverage, or at least get lessons learned 
from how they do it?
    We know we need to increase our ability to detect 
prohibited items. A big priority for us right now is to get 
this fixed. I mentioned before they are detecting 400,000 
prohibited items a year. But as was pointed out by the GAO, we 
are missing items that are prohibited, that they should pick 
up. We are actively working to enhance our training program, 
and then to get them through the training to make things better 
for the screening.
    Mr. Perry. Ms. Maloy's time has long since expired. The 
Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, 
Mr. Larsen from Washington.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Cline, the IG recommended after the 2020 Portland riots 
that there be an implementation of a process to improve 
preparedness for multicomponent response, including 
recommendations for FPS. Have you implemented any of those 
recommendations?
    Mr. Cline. Yes, sir. So, there are three recommendations. 
The first two have been implemented. The last one is a policy, 
a directive on our approach to public order. That policy is 
with the Department for review and signature, so, that has gone 
through now.
    A lot of lessons learned out of Portland. Our approach to 
civil disorder, the training that we have conducted to all of 
our employees now to redesign our approach has all been 
completed. We are just waiting on now the policy to be signed. 
And that policy will be for all of DHS, not just FPS.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thanks. Ranking Member Titus 
mentioned the counter-UAS, and you discussed it. And I think it 
is very important to have the coordination. In fact, the 
leadership of this committee, of the Homeland Security 
Committee, and the Judiciary Committee have a joint bill to 
extend those authorities through 2028, including, if I am not 
mistaken, to extend FPS authorities and expand them.
    Mr. Cline. Right.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. And I don't want to ask you a 
softball question to say can you tell us how great that is, but 
can you tell us how great that is?
    No, can you explain to this committee a little bit why FPS 
needs those expanded authorities, and how do you use them?
    Mr. Cline. So, sir, we think it is critical for our 
protection efforts of our Federal facilities.
    I did mention that we have implemented a 24/7 counter-UAS 
operation at a covered asset, a high-risk covered asset here in 
DC. And every day, that system is picking up drones. Typically, 
it is someone playing with a drone they got for their birthday 
or for Christmas. But there have been times when our folks have 
electronically mitigated those drones, and brought them down, 
and took control of those. Without that ability to do this, not 
only would our facilities be vulnerable, but a number of other 
facilities that have the authority right now to implement that: 
Secret Service, Coast Guard, CBP. If we all lose that 
authority, then I think there are a lot more vulnerabilities 
that we would have to deal with.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Commissioner Doomes, how has 
the underfunding of the Federal Building Fund impacted your 
ability to implement security standards that the ISC developed?
    Mr. Doomes. Thank you for that question, Ranking Member 
Larsen.
    The underfunding of the Federal Building Fund makes it 
difficult for us to optimize and modernize the portfolio. If we 
had fewer buildings, we think FPS might be able to secure those 
fewer buildings that are better utilized. We have been missing 
about $1 billion a year for the last decade. We have proposed 
in fiscal year 2024 and 2025 a fix for the Federal Building 
Fund that would allow us to spend all of the revenue that came 
in and to accelerate the modernization of our portfolio.
    Over the last 4 fiscal years, we have shed 8 million square 
feet of space, and that is with it being underfunded. But if we 
were able to get this fixed in the fiscal year 2025 legislative 
proposal, we could continue to shed space on a faster basis, 
get higher utilization at our buildings, and, frankly, give the 
Federal Protective Service fewer buildings that they have to 
actually defend and secure.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thanks.
    Director Cline, back to you. During the break, we chatted a 
little bit about the Paris Olympics coming up starting Friday, 
the L.A. Olympics in 2028. But in between, the U.S., Canada, 
and Mexico--but mainly U.S.--is hosting the 2026 World Cup. And 
the way it is described is that it is a Super Bowl in every 
city--in every host city--for, like, 3 straight weeks. You are 
talking about 85,000 to 90,000 people attending events, 
attending the event, plus maybe half of that outside each of 
the venues in large cities like Seattle and L.A. and others.
    Tell me it is on your radar. Tell me you are part of the 
planning team for the security in these cities, and that we can 
at least know that FPS is on top of this.
    Mr. Cline. Thank you, sir. So, the planning efforts 
continue for these events.
    I mean, they are all large events. Counter-UAS will be 
instrumental. Our focus, of course, will be the Federal 
facilities that are in the cities where those events will take 
place. We are planning and preparing for deployments of 
officers and agents to increase the protection efforts at those 
facilities.
    Just like we did last week in the RNC, all of our 
coordination efforts are in conjunction with the Secret Service 
as the lead for the NSSE-type event. We make sure that we are 
at the command post, we are working with all the partner 
agencies that are there. But, obviously, our focus is Federal 
facilities, but we also maintain awareness of what is going on 
within those locations.
    Planning efforts have already started, sir, and they are 
looking at who has the counter-UAS capability to go to all 
these locations. If we lose that authority, then obviously we 
lose the ability to do counter-UAS operations. But it has 
started. The DHS Special Events Working Group is already 
digging into it and preparing for those events.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Fair enough.
    Thanks, I yield back.
    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentlelady from Oregon, Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer.
    Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Thank you. I want to first thank 
Chairman Perry, Chairman Graves, and this committee for their 
support in helping me pass two bills through the House this 
past March: the FOCUS Act and the Impact of Crime on Public 
Building Usage Act.
    The GSA's Public Buildings Service exists to provide safe 
and effective workspace for Federal employees across more than 
100 Federal agencies at the best value for taxpayers. The 
Federal Oversight of Construction Use and Safety, or FOCUS, Act 
would make commonsense reforms to the GSA's real estate 
practices through information sharing between agencies and 
Congress, consolidating unused office space, reducing real 
estate costs, and saving taxpayers' dollars.
    With the new post-pandemic world we are now living in, it 
is time we review why taxpayers are paying for empty Federal 
office spaces, especially when, under this administration, 
there is now a work-from-home preference. Mr. Doomes, a recent 
tour of several Federal buildings this month by my committee 
staff revealed how few people are in many of their Federal 
buildings. Do you agree there is a need to review GSA real 
estate for consolidations and space reductions?
    Mr. Doomes. Thank you for that question, Congresswoman.
    What I will tell you, I agree that we should be reducing 
the footprint, and we should be optimizing and modernizing and 
get better utilization in our Federal buildings. And I 
appreciate any and all efforts in that direction.
    Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Thank you. In addition to the letter 
that Chairman Perry led to the GSA and FPS, my other bill that 
passed the House echoes the letter's concern and aims to 
address them. The Impact of Crime on Public Building Usage Act 
requires the GAO to study the impact of crime, including the 
use of fentanyl and other illicit drugs, on workers' 
utilization of these public buildings. It also requires the GSA 
to submit a report to Congress on the impacts and costs 
associated with building operations related to crime and public 
safety in and around those Federal buildings.
    Mr. Marroni, you submitted testimony identifying challenges 
that undermine FPS's productivity and oversight of contract 
guards at Federal buildings leading to instances of prohibited 
items entering buildings undetected. In this report, did you at 
all consider fentanyl or other illicit drugs having entered 
these public buildings due to the contract guard failures?
    Mr. Marroni. That was not a part of our study. We looked at 
weapons that were being brought in, but not at illicit drugs.
    Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Mr. Doomes, has concern of increased 
fentanyl use, crime, and homelessness negatively impacted the 
safety at Federal buildings?
    And if so, does the GSA have a concrete plan to address 
those concerns and keep our Federal workers safe?
    Mr. Doomes. I appreciate that question, Congresswoman.
    What I will tell you is that GSA is always concerned about 
the tenants that are coming into our buildings, as well as the 
American citizens that come to receive services in Federal 
buildings.
    Earlier this year, the Administrator of GSA issued a new 
minimum level of security for federally owned facilities where 
we said, if it is a GSA facility, we are going to have video 
security, as well as an alarm system on every building. And 
what I will say is that security in these buildings is not 
static. It is constantly evolving. And we are working with our 
partners at the Federal Protective Service.
    So, we understand that there is a need, that there is a 
problem, and we continue to work with the FPS, who has the 
primary responsibility for securing these Federal buildings.
    Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. So, to follow up on that ``minimum 
level,'' is technology replacing the contract guards?
    Mr. Doomes. No, it is there to complement that.
    Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Complement. OK.
    Mr. Cline, I do appreciate the attention that FPS is giving 
to ensuring Federal facilities are safe places to work as we 
deal with ever-changing threats. As part of these ever-changing 
threats, has FPS considered the rising antisemitic threats to 
Federal workers from pro-Hamas sympathizers, or possibly peer-
to-peer antisemitic threats to the individuals' safety?
    Mr. Cline. Thank you ma'am.
    So, we have a lot of demonstrations at Federal facilities. 
FPS was built in 1971 as part of GSA due to the large-scale 
demonstrations that were taking place in our country at that 
time. We deal with demonstrators on a daily basis. It is a 
First Amendment-protected activity. Normally, outside of DC, 
the Federal facility with the big flag in front represents the 
United States Government. And that is where people tend to 
demonstrate.
    We have had a 14-percent increase in demonstrations from 
last year to this year. Since October 7th, 652 demonstrations 
at our FPS-protected facilities. Some have included some level 
of violence, graffiti, breaking some windows, some attempted 
arsons, but all the demonstrations we approach the same way. It 
doesn't matter the topic, it doesn't matter the issue. We are 
there to protect the Federal facilities, to ensure that the 
employees can come and go.
    We have had some instances in the last 6 months where the 
demonstrators were blocking entrances, and we coordinated with 
the tenants in the building to make avenues of exit if they 
needed to leave, but we primarily just sheltered the building 
in place for an hour until the demonstration was over.
    It is something we focus on every day. This week here in 
DC, you know what is occurring tomorrow, the joint session of 
Congress. We have about 100 of our law enforcement officers 
here in town because Federal facilities are on each side of the 
Capitol that we are responsible for protecting, and we want to 
make sure that the demonstrations don't get out of hand.
    Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Thank----
    Mr. Cline [interrupting]. We did work with the Federal 
tenants in those buildings, and recommended maximum telework, 
not to bring people in to be confronted.
    Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Thank you, Mr. Cline. I am sorry, I 
see my time has gone past.
    So, with that, I yield back.
    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms. 
Norton.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Commissioner Doomes, we continue to miss your excellent 
work as a staffer on Capitol Hill. So, welcome.
    In November 2023, GSA announced plans to dispose of 23 
properties, including 2 in the District of Columbia: the Daniel 
Webster School and the DHS Nebraska Avenue Complex. In April 
2024, GSA announced plans to dispose of the Liberty Loan 
Building in DC. What is the status of those dispositions?
    Mr. Doomes. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    What I want to give an update to is on the Webster School, 
the Liberty Loan Building, as well as the Nebraska Avenue 
Complex, because we have heard the imperative from this 
committee to move forward on disposing of underutilized 
property.
    So, in terms of the Webster School, that facility has 
already been reported excess. Federal screening and the 
McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance screening have already taken 
place. Right now, we are screening for a possible public 
benefit conveyance. We expect that those application deadlines 
for those uses are on August 15 and August 16. If there is no 
application in that timeframe, we will move forward on a 
private sale. We have worked closely with the Department of 
Homeland Security in order to put in some security covenants 
that will run with the land, but that disposal is moving 
forward.
    In terms of the Liberty Loan Building, that asset has also 
been reported excess. And right now, we are engaged in due 
diligence activities such as environmental and title work. In 
March of 2025, we expect the employees in that building to be 
moved out of that building to a different location. And after 
those due diligence activities are finished, the Federal 
screening will commence, and we will move forward with that on 
a private sale, as well.
    In regards to the Nebraska Avenue Complex, this is where we 
are looking for some help from Congress. We are trying to 
finish the consolidation of the Department of Homeland Security 
at the West Campus. Right now, there is one agency component 
left on the Nebraska Avenue Complex, the Intelligence and 
Analysis Unit. We are working very closely with the Department 
of Homeland Security to put together a housing plan for that 
agency. While we are waiting for that, so that we can move that 
agency off the Nebraska Avenue Complex, I have directed the 
Assistant Commissioner of Dispositions to begin work with the 
District of Columbia to start the small area planning necessary 
for the Nebraska Avenue Complex because we think that is going 
to generate the best return for taxpayers. The District of 
Columbia has spoken loudly and definitively about what the use 
is for the Nebraska Avenue Complex, and therefore, generating a 
greater return for taxpayers.
    So, all three of those disposals are moving forward. But 
the Webster School is the furthest along, then the Liberty 
Loan, and we are planning for the Nebraska Avenue Complex 
disposal.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you for that statement. Given that the 
Webster School has been vacant since the 1980s, Chairman Perry 
and I introduced a bill to direct GSA to dispose of the 
property by December 31, 2025. The House passed the bill. The 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works passed the 
bill, and it is now pending on the Senate calendar. I hope the 
Senate will pass it soon.
    I thank the subcommittee for holding this critical hearing 
on protecting Federal employees and Federal buildings.
    I want to take a step back to discuss balancing security 
and public access to public property in a democracy. Since 
2000, I have introduced the United States Commission on an Open 
Society with Security Act, which would create a commission to 
investigate how we can maintain public access to public 
property while actively responding to substantial security 
threats. The impetus for this bill was the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1995. Its importance grew after the terrorist 
attacks on September the 11th, 2001, and it has reached a peak 
urgency since the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 
6, 2021.
    The succession of tragic events endured by our Nation has 
led to a series of sweeping security increases that are deemed 
both necessary and temporary in the moment but create lasting 
security infrastructure and practices that are difficult to 
dismantle on our open, democratic society. What we thought 
would be temporary infringements on our open society have 
turned into permanent restrictions on how citizens interact 
with each other and our democratic institutions. We must 
acknowledge and accept that we have entered an era of constant 
domestic and institutional threats, requiring ever-higher 
levels of security for our people and public spaces.
    However, because emergencies typically dictate security 
decisions, essential decisions on the proper balance between 
security, individual rights, and freedoms enjoyed in an open 
society have been repeatedly deferred. My bill would ensure 
that these long-overdue discussions take place in a public 
forum with experts drawn from across the spectrum. To date, 
security planning has been delegated almost exclusively to 
security intelligence and military experts. Although their 
input is indispensable, they cannot be expected to consider 
matters outside their expertise.
    To strike a better balance that gives sufficient importance 
to our democratic traditions, we must invite experts from 
diverse fields to do the same. Therefore, the commission would 
be composed not only of security, intelligence, and military 
experts, but also experts from such fields as business, 
architecture, technology, law, city planning, art, engineering, 
philosophy, history, sociology, and psychology.
    I urge the committee to take up this bill, and I yield 
back.
    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady as I channel my 
inner Garret Graves reasonableness. And now the Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Ezell.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
having this hearing today for us, and thank you all for being 
here today.
    This hearing comes at a very crucial time. As we deal with 
the assassination attempt on former President Trump, securing 
our Federal buildings is paramount. The Federal Protective 
Service must have the capability to respond and make decisions 
in the interest of security, and these decisions cannot be 
based on political bias.
    When I was a sheriff and an officer, recruiting, retention, 
and training was always at the top of my mind. However, these 
issues seem to have gotten only worse here over the last few 
years. The manpower challenges the FPS is facing, coupled with 
the difficulties faced by vacant buildings, the rise of 
homelessness, and drug abuse is deeply concerning. That is why 
I sent a letter, along with subcommittee Chairman Perry and 
Congresswoman Chavez-DeRemer, expressing concern and demanding 
answers to this.
    Director Cline, you stated in response to the letter, ``FPS 
experienced a 138-percent increase in demonstrations and an 
overall 24-percent increase in assault on Government 
employees.'' If you could, expand on this a little bit, and how 
has this impacted the health and safety of our law enforcement 
personnel and Protective Security Officers since 2020.
    Mr. Cline. Thank you, sir, I appreciate the question.
    First, the Protective Security Officers--the number of 
increased assaults that we have indicated, 85 to 90 percent of 
those are on either our uniformed police officers or our 
contract Protective Security Officers. And it typically occurs 
at an entrance or at a screening station when someone is just 
not happy with what is going on there, or they are not happy 
with a benefit that was either denied or reduced by a 
Government agency.
    Recruiting and retention is huge for us. We are competing 
in the same market as everyone else. I took over as the 
Director a year and a half ago. We had almost 500 vacancies. We 
are down to 409 vacancies today, and we continue to chip away 
at this. By the end of next month, we will have an additional 
67 new employees on board. We have five new police officer 
training classes scheduled for next year. We just offered 45 
tentative job offers at the DHS job fair out in Dulles a couple 
of weeks ago. And based on the shortage of staff that I have, 
we recently implemented a retention incentive to keep our 
current workforce with us until we get through the entire 
election cycle. You have seen what type of activity we have.
    Mr. Ezell. Right.
    Mr. Cline. We have got an election coming up, we have got a 
certification, we have got an inauguration. I need to keep as 
many people as I can on board until I can fill those current 
vacancies, and then we can get rid of the retention incentive.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
    Mr. Cline. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Ezell. I was even more surprised to learn that, despite 
your agency's recommendations to improve security, they often 
go ignored. In the time that we live in, we cannot afford to 
have lax security as we head towards November. In response, I, 
along with my colleague from Louisiana, Troy Carter, introduced 
the Federal Protective Service Reform Act, which requires each 
agency to provide a written reason as to why they did not 
implement FPS recommendations.
    Mr. Cline, do you believe that receiving similar responses 
will help you better protect your Federal buildings?
    Mr. Cline. Thank you, Congressman. Absolutely. Your 
introduction of your bill, the Senate-side introduction of a 
similar companion bill, GSA's recent order requiring the 
implementation of the video surveillance systems and the 
intrusion detection systems at GSA-owned facilities, and then 
the new ISC Executive order is really going to strengthen our 
position and strengthen the requirement for those agencies to 
fund the implementation of those countermeasures.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
    Mr. Marroni, you stated in your testimony, during your 
covert testing, approximately 50 percent of prohibited items in 
Federal buildings went undetected by FPS. Even so, 80 percent 
of the time, FPS blamed a human factor as the cause. While FPS 
has implemented several changes since this test, what do you 
think accounts for contract guards missing this inexcusably 
large percentage of hazards?
    Mr. Marroni. So, there could be a number of reasons. 
``Human factor'' is a pretty broad term. That could mean the 
person has been trained appropriately, but they just didn't 
carry out the techniques like they should have. It could mean 
there is an equipment issue. It could mean they didn't report 
properly in the system, and so, the data is not entirely 
correct.
    So, what is important there is for FPS to take deliberate 
actions, as they have already started to do, to figure out what 
are these issues, what are the root causes of items getting 
through at this rate, and then taking actions to address those 
specific issues. So, the data is a first step. The next step is 
to figure out what are the root causes.
    Mr. Ezell. Very good. Do you think hiring more Federal 
agents, rather than contracting guards, will help with the 
accountability issue?
    Mr. Cline.
    Mr. Cline. I am sorry. The beginning of your question?
    Mr. Ezell. Yes, yes. I have been responsible in my lifetime 
as a sheriff and as a chief of police of being in charge of 
making sure a building was secure. I always had full-time, 
State-certified law enforcement officers under my control and 
my staff. Nothing against security officers, but a lot of times 
these security officers do not have arrest authority like a 
police officer or a certified officer.
    So, my concern is that we have officers in place to protect 
a building or whatever it may be. They don't have arrest 
authority, so, that poses another issue. I would--and I know I 
am kind of talking a little bit about my feelings about this, 
but it is very important that we start looking at full-time 
certified officers to maybe transition into these part-time 
positions so that they can have the full authority that they 
need to get the job done. So, if you could, just talk about 
that a minute.
    Mr. Cline. Certainly, sir. That is a discussion we have had 
in the past. We mentioned before our contract PSOs. If another 
guard company takes another contract and they are offering 
$0.50 more per hour, or $1 more per hour, then we are probably 
going to lose that person to go to the other. It is a higher 
paying job.
    So, first, we have got some legislation we have pursued 
that would give our Protective Security Officers a little bit 
more of our authority, our Federal authority. Right now--you 
are correct, sir--they can only detain. They have the 
authority----
    Mr. Ezell [interposing]. Right.
    Mr. Cline [continuing]. To detain someone, not arrest them. 
The legislative proposal that we put forward would allow a 
couple of things.
    First, it would allow us to cross State lines with those 
PSOs. So, a good example is Superstorm Sandy in New York. We 
needed to bring in more PSOs to protect FEMA sites where they 
were bringing in equipment. We wanted to bring them in from 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh into New York. We had to get approval 
from the State attorney general's office to waive that 
licensing requirement to bring them in as armed guards. This 
legislative proposal we have submitted would allow us to 
delegate some Federal authority so we don't have to go and ask 
for approval to cross State lines.
    Secondarily, this new legislative proposal will also allow 
the Protective Security Officer to pursue an active shooter. 
Right now, they are licensed by the State. They can man a post. 
That is their duty assignment. In theory, they don't have the 
ability to run and respond to an active shooter. They would. We 
all know that no one is going to stand by while someone is 
getting shot. But this new authority will allow us to train 
them on offensive tactics to go and pursue an active shooter 
event.
    But I agree with you, sir. We have looked at and continue 
to look at the possibility. Do we Federalize some of this, some 
of the PSO functions? It is a big program, but we are 
considering what next steps to take to make it better.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you sir.
    And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana [presiding]. The gentleman's time, 
plus an additional 3 minutes and 41 seconds, have expired.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I want to thank you all for being 
here today.
    Mr. Marroni, I appreciate the work that the GAO has done to 
help identify some of these concerns to the Congress. I am 
curious about a few things. You all have done similar work at 
airports. And as you know, there are airports that have private 
contract security. Have you seen similar concerns or failures 
at airports at a rate that may exceed TSA, meaning private 
contractors failing at a higher rate than TSA?
    Mr. Marroni. So, we certainly have done work at the TSA. I 
am not your best expert on that, but I can get better----
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. OK, all right. I 
tell you what. We will follow up with a question for the record 
there.
    Mr. Marroni. Yes.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. So, you are not here to 
necessarily say that the contracting officers are the problem 
then, is----
    Mr. Marroni [interrupting]. Right.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. Let me ask you this question. 
How many failures would it take for us to have a potentially 
catastrophic incident?
    Mr. Marroni. Well, one failure could potentially----
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. That is right, one 
failure. And what you evaluated was nearly a 50-percent failure 
rate.
    So, another question--and I am not a math whiz, but as I 
recall, there was an assessment that was done by, I believe, 
GSA--and Mr. Doomes can correct me--that found that 17 of 24 
Federal buildings in the Washington, DC, area had occupancy 
rates of lower than 25 percent, some as low as 9 percent.
    So, let me say it again. I am not a math whiz, but if we 
actually consolidated the Federal space and shrunk the 
footprint that was required to be secure, would it be easier to 
better protect a smaller footprint?
    Mr. Marroni. It would certainly cost less. And it 
potentially--if you have a smaller amount of facilities to do, 
the shortage issues that Director Cline has discussed might be 
less of an issue.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Mr. Cline, would you agree with 
that?
    Mr. Cline. I would agree, sir.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. So, I just want to make note 
that that is something that we need to be more aggressive about 
in addition, obviously, to helping you fill your vacancies.
    Mr. Cline, have you seen any trends where the private 
contractors are less successful at providing security, compared 
to your own officers?
    Mr. Cline. No, sir. So, our law enforcement officers don't 
do the screening operations, x ray, mag, visitor check. It is 
done by the contract PSOs. Our responsibility is to oversee 
that, and to conduct on-the-job training, conduct compliance of 
contract staff.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, let me ask you to probably go 
a little bit outside of your scope then. What about CSOs for 
some of the Federal courts? Have you seen where the Federal 
employees that are working for the Marshals Service have a 
higher rate of success, compared to the private contractors?
    And if you don't know, that is a fine answer.
    Mr. Cline. I don't know, sir.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, OK. I would just ask Mr. 
Marroni and Mr. Cline if you could both look into that question 
and follow back up with us, as well. Mr. Marroni, that would be 
the second one for you.
    And then lastly for Mr. Cline, I assume that you are the 
contractor to these private security companies, is that 
correct?
    Mr. Cline. They are on contract from the Federal Protective 
Service.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. Is there any type of 
performance requirement to where taxpayers would actually save 
money as a result of these folks not doing their job?
    Mr. Cline. Yes, sir. So, when a PSO fails a covert test, we 
are deducting the hours that PSO has stood that post from the 
payment to the vendor. It takes a while to get that processed. 
There are a lot of hands involved in that pot.
    And it is the same with an open post. The chairman 
mentioned Social Security Customer Service Centers and IRS Tax 
Assistance Centers. When the vendor fails to post a PSO at that 
post, which is called an open post, we don't pay the vendor for 
those hours that were left open.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. So, I just want to make sure I 
understand before you get too far down.
    So, number one, you are not paying them during the periods 
when they are not there, which makes sense.
    Mr. Cline. Exactly, sir.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. But then you are also saying that 
you are not paying them during the periods when they failed.
    Mr. Cline. When they failed. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, so--but you are not doing 
anything to extrapolate out--for example, Mr. Marroni's team 
found that nearly 50 percent of the time, these folks are 
failing. So, you are not extrapolating that out and saying we 
are cutting half of your funding, correct?
    Mr. Cline. That is correct, sir, because it is multiple 
contracts that were in place when the GAO--and same with us 
when we do our----
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. You do see the 
concern that I am highlighting, though.
    Mr. Cline. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, all right. I do think that we 
need to be thinking about a remedy there, because there needs 
to be a performance--if people aren't performing, they 
shouldn't be paid. And all the people that work on our team, 
they know that. I say it every week. We don't pay them to sit 
there, we pay them to perform. And I think that is really 
important because, if they are failing 50 percent of the time 
when his teams are testing them, they are probably failing 50 
percent of the time.
    Mr. Cline. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. And I think we need to look at 
that.
    Mr. Doomes, it is good to see you again. We just need to 
get you a permanent seat here with a permanent nameplate. I 
hope you and your family are doing well. Again, good to see you 
again. Back to our dialogue about the footprint, and just--it 
would be easier to secure a smaller footprint, especially if it 
is not being needed because that way we save taxpayer money on 
the excess of space. We also can help Mr. Cline secure a 
smaller space by allowing him to focus on what truly needs to 
be protected, as opposed to vacant office buildings. Would you 
concur that that makes sense?
    Mr. Doomes. Congressman, I agree, and that is why in fiscal 
year 2025, we made a request for a $425 million space 
optimization program where we would be able, for the first time 
ever, to front the cost of furniture, fixtures, and equipment, 
and the move costs so we can move agencies out of buildings 
where they aren't fully utilizing into a building where we can 
get a higher level of utilization rate, which is why it is so 
important that we get full funding on the Federal Building 
Fund.
    We have done a pretty decent job of reducing the footprint 
over the last 4 fiscal years. We have gotten rid of 8 million 
square feet. We could do more if we have the money.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Mr. Doomes, you can understand, I 
am sure, my initial reaction when you said you needed money to 
save space. I am thinking that that seems a little bit 
backwards, in that it seems like saving space would actually 
result in cost savings. Can you help me understand, if we were 
to invest $425 million, what type of cost savings we would see 
over what period? Just a rough order of magnitude.
    Mr. Doomes. I believe we can save--I think the number is $6 
billion over 10 years.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. $6 billion over 10 if we--and 
again, ballpark, I am not going to hold you to it, but just a 
ballpark range.
    Mr. Doomes. Well, I will follow up with a precise number, 
sir.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, great, great. I would 
appreciate that.

                                 
 Post-Hearing Response to Hon. Garret Graves' Request for Information 
   from Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, U.S. 
                    General Services Administration
    The FY 2025 Optimization Fund has the potential to yield $1 billion 
in long-term federal taxpayer savings, if invested as proposed. GSA 
continues to identify projects that represent strong investment 
opportunities for the federal taxpayer.
    If GSA was provided full access to the annual revenues and 
collections deposited in the Federal Buildings Fund (FBF), GSA would be 
able to reduce the backlog of projects, deferred maintenance, and 
needed repairs that have accumulated as a result of chronic 
underfunding over the past 13 fiscal years.
    If the current funding levels remain, deferred maintenance, 
currently at $4.6 billion, is expected to exponentially increase. Since 
we cannot maintain our buildings sufficiently when needed, PBS has to 
delay repairs, which ultimately costs the government more money. As 
noted by the GAO in its November 2023 report, ``Federal Real Property: 
Agencies Should Provide More Information about Increases in Deferred 
Maintenance and Repair,'' GAO estimates that ``inflation from fiscal 
years 2017 through 2022 effectively eroded the purchasing power of 
maintenance and repair funding by about 26 percent, particularly in the 
past several years. Put another way, $1 million in funding in fiscal 
year 2022 would only accomplish what $740,313 would have accomplished 
in fiscal year 2017. These inflationary effects make it challenging to 
complete ongoing and deferred maintenance projects, placing further 
constraints on agencies' ability to address their DM&R backlogs.''
    Additionally, modernizing federally owned facilities will enable 
GSA to consolidate and reduce the Federal Government's heavy reliance 
on space leased from private lessors, which will provide cost avoidance 
many times over. Since 2018 through the end of 2023, GSA has achieved 
over $7.7 billion in lease cost avoidance. GSA will be able to maximize 
lease cost avoidance with full access to the FBF.
    Furthermore, GSA conservatively estimates that we could save at 
least $40 million per year if our prospectus threshold was increased to 
$10 million from the current $3.926 million to construct, alter or 
acquire federally owned facilities or to lease space. This higher 
threshold will allow GSA to more quickly tackle routine projects, which 
will reduce repair costs, shorten delivery times, and support agencies' 
mission needs more effectively.

    Mr. Doomes. But just for clarification, we can not only 
sell buildings, I mean, move people out of buildings where they 
are underutilized, we can turn around and sell those buildings, 
and we have got a pretty good track record. We put up 25 
buildings for sale in November 2023, or announced that we were 
moving them through the disposition process. We have got a 
great track record with the Volpe Project, where we disposed of 
10 acres and built on the other 4 acres and used the value 
there. And we are looking for other projects like that across 
the Nation.
    So, we are going to have to spend money in order to save 
money, but we have the track record, and we can provide you 
more details----
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. The rough order of 
magnitude of savings that you noted seems like it would be more 
than worth it, and I look forward to receiving your followup on 
that.
    Last question, Mr. Doomes. If there is an agency I don't 
like, could I get you to just get rid of their space, and then 
that way we can deal with them that way? Would that work?
    Mr. Doomes. I can't recommend that course of action.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Doomes.
    I want to thank Ranking Member Titus' patience as I went a 
little overboard, as well as a couple of others.
    Ms. Titus, Ranking Member Titus, do you have any followup 
or closing?
    Ms. Titus. No.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK, great. So, I yield back, and I 
don't think there are any further questions from the 
subcommittee. And so, that does conclude our hearing for today.
    I would like to thank each of the witnesses. As you know, 
the record remains open. There are some questions for the 
record that we have dialoged here, as well as others that will 
be submitted. But I appreciate you being here today.
    And the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


 Questions to Richard K. Cline, Director, Federal Protective Service, 
Management Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, from Hon. 
                              Scott Perry

    Question 1. The law enforcement authority for FPS is section 1315 
of title 40, United States Code. That authority is vested in the DHS 
Secretary, who can, and has, delegated the authority outside of FPS.\1\ 
There have been reports that Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) was 
involved in security for former President Trump's rally in Butler, 
Pennsylvania.\2\ During the hearing, you indicated that FPS' law 
enforcement authority is not delegated to HSI. You further indicated 
that the authority is not delegated to ``anyone in DHS right now.'' \3\ 
In the past, entities outside FPS within DHS were delegated authority 
under 40 U.S.C. Sec. 1315.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Dep't of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) Surveillance Technologies, (Jan. 
24, 2022), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf; Office of 
Inspector General, Dep't of Homeland Security, Management Alert--FPS 
Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal 
Properties under 40 U.S.C. Sec.  1315(b)(1), (Nov. 2, 2020), available 
at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-11/OIG-21-
05-Nov20.pdf.
    \2\ Letter from Sen. Josh Hawley, to the Honorable Alejandro 
Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, (July 19, 2024), 
available at https://www.hawley.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/
Hawley-Letter-to-Mayorkas-on-whistleblowers-re-assassination-attempt-
on-Trump.pdf.
    \3\ Examining the Effectiveness of the Federal Protective Service: 
Are Federal Buildings Secure? Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, of 
the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 118th Cong. (July 23, 2024)
    \4\ Dep't of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) Surveillance Technologies, (Jan. 
24, 2022), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
01/privacy-pia-ice061-hsisuveillancetech-january2022_0.pdf; Office of 
Inspector General, Dep't of Homeland Security, Management Alert--FPS 
Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal 
Properties under 40 U.S.C. Sec.  1315(b)(1), (Nov. 2, 2020), available 
at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-11/OIG-21-
05-Nov20.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Question 1.a. Please provide a list of past delegations of FPS law 
enforcement authority under 40 U.S.C. Sec.  1315 to entities outside of 
the FPS, and dates and details as to when those delegations were 
rescinded.
    Answer. As background, 40 U.S.C. Sec.  1315 authorizes the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to designate employees of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as officers and agents for the 
purpose of protecting federal property and people on the property. This 
authority is found at 40 U.S.C. Sec.  1315(b)(1). Additionally, 40 
U.S.C. Sec.  1315 authorizes the DHS Secretary to delegate 40 U.S.C. 
Sec.  1315 authority for the protection of specific buildings to 
another federal agency where, in the Secretary's discretion, the 
Secretary determines it necessary for the protection of that building. 
This authority is found in Historical and Statutory Notes to 40 U.S.C. 
Sec.  1315.
    Past authority to designate DHS employees under 40 U.S.C. Sec.  
1315 occurred in situations where the Federal Protective Service (FPS) 
did not have law enforcement resources to protect certain FPS-protected 
federal facilities and property. In the past, employees of U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration's Federal 
Air Marshal Service have been cross-designated with 40 U.S.C. Sec.  
1315 jurisdiction and police powers for specific FPS protected 
facilities and property. Homeland Security Investigations law 
enforcement personnel were not cross-designated under 40 U.S.C. Sec.  
1315 for former President Trump's rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, and 
there are no current cross-designations in place within the Department.
    The Secretary delegated 40 U.S.C. Sec.  1315 authority to two 
entities within DHS: the Office of the Chief Security Officer and FPS. 
Additionally, authority to designate employees of another federal 
agency outside of DHS was delegated to the Under Secretary for 
Management and the delegation process is the responsibility of FPS.
    There were 26 past delegations of law enforcement authority issued 
to four departments that have been rescinded. Some of those delegations 
were originally issued by the General Services Administration, which 
was the parent agency of FPS prior to the establishment of DHS.
    Law enforcement delegations are issued for specific locations. 
Often, as one delegation for a location expires, another one is issued 
for the same location. As such, over time, there are multiple 
delegations associated with the same locations.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Rescind
Department and Total # Delegations      Date(s)          Location(s)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)      1. 9/16/08   100 Bureau Dr,
 (8).                                  2. 12/3/10    Gaithersburg, MD;
                                      3. 11/28/11    325 Broadway St,
                                       4. 12/1/12    Boulder, CO; The
                                      5. 11/27/13    Table Mountain
                                      6. 10/27/18    Field Site & Radio
                                       7. 12/9/20    Quiet Zone, Plateau
                                       8. 7/10/23    Rd/N 39th St,
                                                     Longmont, CO
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of the Interior        1. 3/18/13   Hoover Dam, NV
 (DOI) (4).
                                       2. 2/16/15
                                        3. 2/8/18
                                   -------------------------------------
                                      4. 10/11/22   Chemawa Indian
                                                     School, OR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)       1. 10/1/93   J Edgar Hoover Bldg.
 (8).
                                   -------------------------------------
                                       2. 9/30/98   J Edgar Hoover
                                                     Bldg., Main Justice
                                                     Bldg.
                                   -------------------------------------
                                       3. 8/10/99   J Edgar Hoover
                                                     Bldg., Main Justice
                                                     Bldg., Lincoln
                                                     Place (VA), Control
                                                     Data (MD)
                                   -------------------------------------
                                       4. 7/26/17   J Edgar Hoover
                                                     Bldg., FBI Field
                                                     Office
                                   -------------------------------------
                                       5. 12/9/20   J Edgar Hoover
                                                     Bldg., FBI Field
                                                     Office, FBI Field
                                                     Office Automobile
                                                     Maintenance
                                                     Facility
                                   -------------------------------------
                                      6. 12/15/22   J Edgar Hoover
                                                     Bldg., FBI Field
                                                     Office, FBI Field
                                                     Office Automobile
                                                     Maintenance
                                                     Facility
                                   -------------------------------------
                                       7. 12/1/14   FBI Field Office, MO
                                   -------------------------------------
                                       8. 9/30/99   Bicentennial Bldg.,
                                                     DC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of the Treasury       1. 10/13/88   Internal Revenue
 (USDT) (6).                                         Service location in
                                                     WV
                                      2. 10/31/93
                                        3. 7/7/97
                                       4. 12/9/20
                                   -------------------------------------
                                      5. 5/11/18D   US Mint and Bureau
                                       6. 4/23/20    of Engraving and
                                                     Printing (BEP) six
                                                     locations in DC,
                                                     NY, PA, KY, CO, and
                                                     CA
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 1.b. In 2015, FPS authority had been delegated to 21 
departments and agencies outside of DHS.\5\ Are there currently 
delegations of FPS authority outside of DHS? If so, please provide a 
list of such delegations, including to which other departments and 
agencies. If not, please provide the dates of when such delegations 
were rescinded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Dep't of Homeland Security briefing materials for Staff of the 
H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (July 2015), Delegations of 
Authority (on file with Comm.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Answer. There are currently eight delegations of law enforcement 
authority issued to departments outside of DHS. Seven are renewals of 
prior delegations for the same locations.
      DOC (1)--renewal
      +  100 Bureau Dr, Gaithersburg, MD
      +  325 Broadway St, Boulder, CO
      +  The Table Mountain Field Site & Radio Quiet Zone, Plateau Rd/N 
39th St, Longmont, CO
      DOI (1)--renewal
      +  Chemawa Indian School, OR
      U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (3)--
renewal
      +  Bethesda and Poolesville Locations, MD
      +  National Cancer Institute at Ft. Detrick, MD
      +  Rocky Mountain Laboratory, MT
      DOJ (1)--renewal
      +  J Edgar Hoover Bldg., Washington, DC
      +  FBI Washington Field Office NW, Washington, DC
      +  Automobile Maintenance Facility, Washington, DC
      +  26 Federal Plaza Floors 20-29, New York, NY
      +  290 Broadway Floors 8-10, New York NY
      +  2400 Schuster Dr., Hyattsville, MD
      +  395 Patriots Plaza Floors 3-4, Washington, DC
      +  375 Patriots Plaza Floors 3-10, Washington, DC
      +  355 Patriots Plaza, Washington, DC
      USDT (1)--renewal--US Mint and BEP facilities
      +  BEP--three locations in MD, DC, and TX.
      +  US Mint--six locations in DC, NY, PA, KY, CO, and CA
      U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)--1--new
      +  Location in Bannister Federal Complex, MO.

    Question 2. Last year, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
issued a report highlighting how much space is being wasted at empty 
Federal buildings.\6\ For example, GAO's review of headquarters 
buildings in D.C. revealed that 17 of the 24 buildings had a 25 percent 
or less occupancy rate, with some as low as 9 percent.\7\ FPS spent 
almost $1.7 billion on contract guards--76 percent of FPS's budget in 
Fiscal Year 2024.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ GAO, Federal Real Property: Preliminary Results Show Federal 
Buildings Remain Underutilized Due to Longstanding Challenges and 
Increased Telework, GAO-23-106200 (July 13, 2023), available at https:/
/www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106200.
    \7\ Id.
    \8\ Examining the Effectiveness of the Federal Protective Service: 
Are Federal Buildings Secure? Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management of the 
H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 118th Cong. (July 23, 2024) 
(statement of Mr. David Marroni, Director, Physical Infrastructure, 
GAO).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Question 2.a. What is the average cost to protect a Federal 
building?
    Answer. The average annual cost of protecting a federal building is 
$176,490 regardless of occupancy rate. This reflects the total cost for 
all of FPS services divided by the total building count of 10,088. 
Tables 1 and 2 below provide greater detail explaining this average 
cost.

    Question 2.b. Provide a breakdown of the average costs of 
protecting a Federal building.
    Answer. Determining the average cost per building requires an 
assessment of FPS's building portfolio for all services. For example in 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, there were a total of 10,088 buildings with 
operating expenses for FPS protective services recorded against these 
properties; 3,023 of these buildings specifically had Protective 
Security Officers (PSO) support as a form of protective service; and 
672 of the 10,088 buildings had Technical Countermeasures (TCM) 
support. The tables below show various combinations and associated 
average costs.

                   Table 1: Breakdown of Average Cost per Program, Project, or Activity (PPA)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                       Building
                            FPS PPA \9\                              FY 2023 Total    Count per    Average Cost
                                                                      Cost Per PPA       PPA          Per PPA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operating Expenses................................................     $460,635,526       10,088      $45,661.73
Protective Security Officers......................................   $1,301,976,955        3,023     $430,690.36
Technical Countermeasures.........................................      $17,824,420          672      $26,524.43
                                                                   ---------------------------------------------
  Totals..........................................................   $1,780,436,901       10,088
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


             Table 2: Average Cost per Building by Scenario
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Combined
                        Scenario                           Average Costs
                                                           from Table 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operating Expenses Only.................................      $45,661.73
Operating Expenses + Protective Security Officers.......     $476,352.09
Operating Expenses + Protective Security Officers +          $502,876.52
 Technical Countermeasures..............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Question 2.c. Provide\\ the costs associated with protecting the 24 
headquarter buildings identified in GAO's 2023 report, including a 
breakdown by building, for the last full fiscal year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ FPS Operating Expenses:
      Salaries and Benefits for the federal staff;
      Protective Services for Law Enforcement Operations, 
Investigations, Criminal Intelligence, Information Sharing, K-9 
Operations, MegaCenter Operations, Critical Incidents and Special 
Security Operations, Fleet, and Facilities;
      Equipment for Law Enforcement including, firearms, body 
armor, protective eyewear, body cameras, dash cameras, and personal 
protective equipment;
      Training for Law Enforcement including entry-level 
training, Law Enforcement advanced and refresher training, Law 
Enforcement standards and certification training, and administrative 
training;
      Agency-wide support for Policy and Planning, Acquisition 
Management, Personnel Security (Background Investigations and 
Adjudications), Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD-12), 
Budget, Finance; and Revenue, Environmental Compliance, Workforce 
Planning (Human Capital), and Information; and
      Technology, Facilities and Fleet Management, Logistics, 
and other business support services.
    PSO: A nationwide program that provides professionally trained and 
certified contractor security guards stationed onsite at FPS-protected 
federal facilities. PSOs are trained in the protection of life and 
property and are certified in the use of firearms, batons, 
magnetometers, and X-ray machines.
    TCM: TCM constitutes capabilities or services that provide 
technical and subject matter expertise to the design, implementation, 
and operations and maintenance of TCM projects and equipment at FPS-
protected federal facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Answer. The following table provides the details requested for the 
24 Agency Headquarters Buildings identified in GAO's 2023 report.\\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Facilities with $0 in costs are included in response to the 
request. However, FPS did not provide services to these specific 
buildings and therefore no costs were incurred during the covered 
period.

                                                      Table 3: FY 2023 Buildings Costs by Category
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Building Data                                                        FY 2023 Cost by Building \10\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                         Operating                                       Total Cost Per
            Building Code                     Agency               Address/Name          Expenses           PSOs             TCMs           Building
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0459..............................  Multi-Tenant..........  1300 Pennsylvania Ave    $1,015,007.95    $32,382,098.43     $578,946.65    $33,976,053.03
                                                               NW/Ronald Reagan
                                                               Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0003..............................  U.S. Department of      1400 Independence Ave      $126,477.51                $-              $-       $126,477.51
                                       Agriculture.            SW/Whitten and South
                                                               Buildings.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0013..............................  Multi-Tenant..........  1401 Constitution Ave      $125,777.09                $-      $56,480.40       $182,257.49
                                                               NW/Herbert Hoover
                                                               Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VA0919..............................  U.S. Department of      4825 Mark Center                    $-       $119,652.94              $-       $119,652.94
                                       Defense.                Drive, Alexandria, VA/
                                                                The Mark Center.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0010..............................  Multi-Tenant..........  400 Maryland Ave SW/       $244,639.03     $3,645,311.44      $48,763.12     $3,938,713.59
                                                               Lyndon Baines Johnson
                                                               Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0093..............................  DOE...................  1000 Independence Ave      $153,557.88                $-              $-       $153,557.88
                                                               SW/Forrestal Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0115..............................  HHS...................  200 Independence Ave        $95,447.79                $-      $27,301.32       $122,749.11
                                                               SW/Humphrey Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0031..............................  Multi-Tenant..........  301 7th Street SW /        $376,986.19     $3,336,233.10      $39,588.84     $3,752,808.13
                                                               7th and D Streets.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0092..............................  U.S. Department of      451 7th Street SW /        $133,057.81    $10,386,472.40      $48,761.52    $10,568,291.73
                                       Housing and Urban.      Robert C. Weaver
                                                               Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0023..............................  DOJ...................  950 Pennsylvania Ave        $69,983.80                $-              $-        $69,983.80
                                                               NW/Robert Kennedy
                                                               Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0116..............................  U.S. Department of      200 Constitution Ave       $228,662.15                $-      $52,343.40       $281,005.55
                                       Labor.                  NW/Frances Perkins
                                                               Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0046..............................  Multi-Tenant..........  2201 C Street NW /          $89,835.01                $-      $52,343.40       $142,178.41
                                                               Harry S. Truman
                                                               Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0020..............................  Multi-Tenant..........  1849 C Street NW /          $70,162.96                $-      $38,721.72       $108,884.68
                                                               Stewart L. Udall
                                                               Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1500DC..............................  USDT..................  1500 Pennsylvania Ave               $-                $-              $-                $-
                                                               NW/Treasury Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0687..............................  U.S. Department of      1200 New Jersey Ave SE/     $33,957.50                $-              $-        $33,957.50
                                       Transportation.         William T. Coleman
                                                               Jr. Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0007..............................  Multi-Tenant..........  810 Vermont Ave / VA       $270,820.38     $2,713,667.02      $29,251.32     $3,013,738.72
                                                               Admin Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0028..............................  Multi-Tenant..........  1200 Pennsylvania Ave      $370,961.48     $3,185,632.74      $75,129.17     $3,631,723.39
                                                               NW/William J. Clinton
                                                               Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0021..............................  Multi-Tenant..........  1800 F St. NW / No         $542,043.54     $3,868,930.82      $20,078.64     $4,431,053.00
                                                               Name.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0369..............................  National Aeronautics    300 E Street SW / Mary      $36,857.99                $-              $-        $36,857.99
                                       and Space               W. Jackson Building.
                                       Administration.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VA1413..............................  National Science        2415 Eisenhower Ave /      $269,033.39     $3,149,276.95      $46,370.88     $3,464,681.22
                                       Foundation.             No Name.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MD0199 #1...........................  Multi-Tenant..........  11555 Rockville Pike,      $577,853.86     $6,776,656.92              $-     $7,354,510.78
MD0254 #2...........................                           Rockville, MD / White
                                                               Flint Buildings #1 &
                                                               #2.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0082..............................  Multi-Tenant..........  1900 E Street NW /         $211,083.45                $-              $-       $211,083.45
                                                               Theodore Roosevelt
                                                               Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DC0365..............................  Multi-Tenant..........  409 3rd St. SW / No        $243,066.38     $2,783,424.59      $20,078.64     $3,046,569.61
                                                               Name.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MD1295..............................  Social Security         1500 Woodlawn Dr,           $39,495.62                $-              $-        $39,495.62
                                       Administration.         Baltimore, MD /
                                                               Arthur J. Altmeyer
                                                               Building.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...........................................................................   $5,324,768.77    $72,347,357.35   $1,134,159.02    $78,806,285.14
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Questions to Elliot Doomes, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, 
      U.S. General Services Administration, from Hon. Scott Perry

    Question 1. In your testimony, you highlighted special emphasis 
programs to enhance security for childcare centers and at courthouses. 
What are the estimated total costs across GSA's inventory of needed 
security upgrades?
    Answer. GSA is committed to ensuring the safety of our tenants and 
visiting public. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, GSA received $15 million to 
address identified vulnerabilities for childcare centers to fund 26 
projects throughout GSA's inventory. The President's FY 2025 Budget 
also includes a request for an additional $14.25 million to continue 
addressing these security vulnerabilities.
    The Judiciary Capital Security Program (JCSP) received $15 million 
in FY 2022 and $18.5 million in FY 2023. The President's FY 2025 Budget 
Request includes $30 million for Judiciary Capital Security. To date, 
this program has received over $120 million since FY 2012. GSA is 
currently estimating a funding need of $130.5 million for four JCSP-
prioritized projects and plans to study an additional three locations. 
Cost estimates for the three additional locations will be developed as 
the studies progress.
    The GSA and Federal Protective Service are working closely to 
identify security costs associated with the upgrade of electronic 
countermeasures over the next 5 years. This will be a significant 
investment that will be funded by the tenants in each facility 
identified.

    Question 2. Crime in many areas has increased, impacting the use of 
Federal buildings. For example, last year, HHS's office in San 
Francisco advised its employees to stay home because of the public 
safety issues at their building.\1\ Is GSA, as landlord, tracking 
incidents when crime rises to a point that use and occupancy of GSA 
Federal buildings is impacted? What steps has GSA taken to address 
these issues?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Megan Cassidy, Crime is so bad near S.F. Federal building 
employees are told to work from home, officials said, San Francisco 
Chronicle, (Aug. 14, 2023), available at https://www.sfchronicle.com/
sf/article/drugs-crime-nancy-pelosi-federal-building-18292237.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Answer. GSA partners closely with FPS, the Department of Justice's 
U.S. Marshals Service, and others to ensure the safety of occupant 
agency personnel and visitors within facilities under GSA's 
jurisdiction, custody or control. FPS tracks incidents related to crime 
in areas where Federal buildings are located.
    The GSA Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings Service 
require that all Federal buildings must comply with the Interagency 
Security Committee (ISC) standards for non-military facilities as 
published in the ISC Risk Management process. GSA works closely with 
FPS to administer the ISC process, especially as it relates to the 
evaluation of Federal facilities. The ISC requires that every Federal 
facility be evaluated based on assessment factors and assigned a 
Facility Security Level (FSL). The security level determines the 
specific countermeasures recommended for the facility. These factors 
include the mission and criticality of the tenant agencies, possible 
threat to those agencies, and the facility's size, symbolism, and 
population. As part of this assessment process, FPS reviews crime 
statistics for the area around the facility and includes that 
information in their determination of the appropriate level of 
countermeasure to implement.
    Specifically for the Speaker Nancy Pelosi Federal Building, GSA, in 
coordination with FPS, employs a number of security protocols to ensure 
the building is safe. These protocols include FPS Protective Security 
Officers patrolling the building and stationing at secure checkpoints. 
GSA coordinated with FPS to have additional FPS officers onsite during 
commute times in the morning and late afternoon to enhance the safety 
of employees coming to and leaving from the building. GSA also placed 
temporary fencing in three strategic areas around the building to 
further increase security.
    GSA leadership continues to meet with FPS biweekly, and GSA 
conducts a bimonthly safety and security meeting with the Facility 
Security Committee representatives from all Federal tenant agencies at 
the Speaker Nancy Pelosi Federal Building. The meeting is coordinated 
with Federal and local law enforcement to share actions in the 
neighborhood aimed at improving conditions and increasing neighborhood 
safety awareness through programs such as the City of San Francisco's 
311 Community Ambassadors Safety Escort program. Further, when 
appropriate, GSA contracts with the Mid Market Community Benefit 
District to hire additional San Francisco Police Department officers to 
patrol the civic center area. Lastly, GSA has awarded a design contract 
to investigate additional ways to enhance the physical security around 
the perimeter of the building.

                                    



                        [all]`