In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-2331

DAMIEN G. TERRY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARK SPENCER, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 17-CV-1079 — Harold A. Baker, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED APRIL 12, 2018* — DECIDED APRIL 27, 2018

____________________

Before FLAUM, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Damien Terry, an Illinois prisoner

proceeding pro se, sued prison officials and corrections 

administrators under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that they were 

 * The appellees were not served and are not participating in this appeal. 

We resolve this case without oral argument because the appellant’s brief

and the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral 

argument would not aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 17-2331

deliberately indifferent to a painful tumor on his neck and 

prevented him from timely filing suit on that claim. A district 

judge screened the case, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, held a

“merit-review hearing,” see Hughes v. Farris, 809 F.3d 330, 334–

35 (7th Cir. 2015), and dismissed the complaint, ruling that it 

impermissibly joined two unrelated sets of claims against different defendants. The judge gave Terry 30 days to replead.

Terry instead moved for reconsideration, citing Rule 59(e) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He explained that his

claims were not unrelated and his complaint should not have 

been dismissed on that ground. The judge denied the motion, 

observing that Rule 59(e) does not permit reconsideration of 

a nonfinal order of dismissal. The judge then entered judgment ending the case, and Terry appealed.

We reverse. The judge misunderstood his discretion to 

entertain Terry’s reconsideration motion. Though Rule 59(e) 

did not apply, a district judge may reconsider an interlocutory 

order at any time before final judgment. And the judge should 

have done so here; reading the complaint generously, Terry’s 

claims are related.

We also note an anomaly in this record and invoke our supervisory authority to guard against its recurrence. We have 

upheld the use of so-called merit-review hearings at § 1915A 

screening, but we’ve cautioned that this unusual procedure 

must be strictly limited to “enabling a pro se plaintiff to clarify 

and amplify his complaint.” Id. at 335. We have also explained 

that a transcript or other recording must be made. Henderson 

v. Wilcoxen, 802 F.3d 930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2015). This record 

contains no transcript or digital recording of the judge’s 

merit-review hearing; indeed, it’s unclear from the docket 

whether it was recorded at all. We now require district judges 
No. 17-2331 3

who use this procedure to docket a transcript or a digital 

recording of the hearing.

I. Background

The complaint alleges two sets of facts, which we accept 

as true at this stage. See Oakland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Mayer 

Brown, LLP, 861 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2017). Terry claims that 

officials at two Illinois prisons—the Tamms Correctional 

Center and the Pontiac Correctional Center—were deliberately indifferent to his requests for treatment of a tennis ballsized growth on the back of his neck and head. The tumor, 

which he first noticed in 2006, caused “pain, blurred vision, 

lack of sleep, and mania.” He repeatedly sought treatment for 

the tumor and in 2012 specifically asked to be referred for surgery to remove it, but his requests were denied or ignored. 

Terry waited until 2017 to file this suit seeking relief for 

the failure to treat his tumor. The defendants are various 

prison officials and corrections administrators, including an 

unnamed Jane Doe. Terry alleges that some of the defendants 

were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and

others interfered with his right to file suit. Regarding the latter 

set of claims, Terry alleges that he tried to file suit in

December 2015 and March 2016 to redress the failure to treat 

his tumor but was stymied when prison staff intentionally 

“lost” his legal mail.

The judge screened the complaint and scheduled a meritreview hearing. Terry appeared from prison by videoconference. After the hearing the judge dismissed the complaint. As 

the judge understood the case, Terry was asserting two unrelated sets of claims—one for deliberate indifference to his 

serious medical needs and one for interference with his right 
4 No. 17-2331

to access the courts. The judge identified three deficiencies in 

the complaint: (1) it impermissibly “join[ed] unrelated 

defendants and unrelated claims into a single complaint”; 

(2) the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in 

Illinois barred the deliberate-indifference claims against some 

of the defendants, see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202; and 

(3) Terry’s claims against the corrections administrators failed 

because those defendants “had no constitutional duty to intervene, [to] respond to his letters, or to approve his grievances.”

Terry promptly filed a motion invoking Rule 59(e) and 

seeking reconsideration of the dismissal order. He argued

that all of his claims were in fact related because the interference with his right to access the courts both explained and excused the possible untimeliness of his deliberate-indifference 

claims.

On the day the 30-day period to amend the complaint 

expired, the judge denied Terry’s reconsideration motion in a 

cursory text order. The judge stated that because the court had 

not yet entered final judgment, “Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59 does not provide a basis for [p]laintiff to ask the 

Court to reconsider its Merit Review Order.” The order also 

said that Terry “should file an Amended Complaint that cures 

the deficiencies noted by the Court in its Merit Review 

Order.” A week later the judge closed the case, noting that 

Terry had not filed an amended complaint.

II. Analysis

Terry argues that the judge should have granted reconsideration and reinstated his case because the two sets of claims 
No. 17-2331 5

alleged in his complaint are factually and legally related. We 

agree. 

First, the judge correctly observed that Rule 59 is not the 

right procedural hook for seeking reconsideration of a nonfinal order. But pro se filings should be read liberally. Obriecht 

v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2008). Looking past the 

label, Terry’s motion plainly sought reconsideration of the 

judge’s nonfinal dismissal order, and district judges may 

reconsider interlocutory orders at any time before final judgment. See Mintz v. Caterpillar Inc., 788 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 

2015); Galvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Because the judge focused solely on the motion’s label rather 

than its substance, we cannot be sure that he appreciated his 

authority to revisit the interlocutory dismissal order. See Koon 

v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (recognizing that the 

trial court “by definition” abuses its discretion when it misapprehends law).

As for the substance of the motion, the judge should have 

granted reconsideration and allowed the case to go forward. 

The judge misread the complaint as alleging that the interference with Terry’s legal mail caused him to miss an unspecified court-imposed deadline. But what the complaint actually 

contends is that the interference with his legal mail prevented 

him from filing the tumor-related claims within the statute of 

limitations. Generously construed, the allegations about lost 

mail represent both a separate claim and an anticipatory

response to a statute-of-limitations defense to the deliberateindifference claims. The two sets of claims are against different defendants, but they belong in the same suit because they 

arise out of the same set of connected “transactions.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A); Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 
6 No. 17-2331

689 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Joining these related claims 

in one suit is not the “scattershot” litigation strategy we have 

criticized in the past. Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 436 (7th 

Cir. 2017).

The judge also prematurely concluded that the statute of 

limitations bars Terry’s deliberate-indifference claims. The 

judge correctly recognized that Terry’s complaint focuses 

mostly on events that occurred between 2006 and 2012. But as 

Terry pointed out in his motion to reconsider, “a federal court 

relying on the Illinois statute of limitations in a § 1983 case 

must toll the limitations period while a prisoner completes the 

administrative grievance process.” Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 

519, 522 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Terry alleges that despite his best efforts, he did not finish 

exhausting his administrative remedies until March 2014. His 

complaint further alleges that he would have filed suit within 

two years of that date if prison staff had not twice intentionally lost his legal mail. Given these allegations, which the 

judge did not acknowledge, we cannot say that a potential 

statute-of-limitations defense is “so plain from the language 

of the complaint ... that it renders the suit frivolous.” Gleash 

v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2002).

That said, Terry’s complaint does not appear to state a 

claim against several Department of Corrections administrators, and he does not challenge that aspect of the judge’s dismissal order. But if on remand Terry tries again to assert 

claims against the corrections administrators, he must explain 

how each personally participated in violating his rights. See

Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012); 

Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 462–63 (7th Cir. 2009).
No. 17-2331 7

One final matter remains. As we’ve explained, the judge 

dismissed Terry’s complaint after a so-called merit-review 

hearing. We have upheld the use of this unusual procedure, 

but only “for the narrow purpose of enabling a pro se plaintiff 

to clarify and amplify his complaint if it is confusing; the district judge may not use the hearing[] to cross-examine a plaintiff or elicit admissions.” Hughes, 809 F.3d at 334–35. We have 

also explained that the judge must ensure that the hearing is 

recorded either by a court reporter or a digital recording. See

id. at 334; Henderson, 802 F.3d at 932–33. This record does not 

contain a transcript or digital recording of the judge’s meritreview hearing. Nor does a transcript or a digital recording 

appear on the district-court docket. The docket does not show 

whether the hearing was recorded at all.

Our supervisory authority permits us to require district 

judges to observe “procedures deemed desirable from the 

viewpoint of sound judicial practice although in no-wise commanded by statute or by the Constitution.” Thomas v. Arn, 

474 U.S. 140, 146–47 (1985) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 

414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)); see also Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 

354, 356 (7th Cir. 1993). Invoking this authority, we now hold

that a judge who conducts a merit-review hearing in order to 

clarify a pro se complaint at § 1915A screening must docket 

either a transcript of the hearing, prepared at public expense

if the plaintiff’s indigency warrants, or a digital recording of 

the hearing.

We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.