In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 12‐3890

ED FIALA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

B&B ENTERPRISES, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 C 2895 — Gary S. Feinerman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 19, 2013 — DECIDED DECEMBER 26, 2013

____________________

Before POSNER, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises out of a RICO

class action suit that the district judge dismissed without de‐

ciding whether to certify it as a class action. The appeal is

from the judge’s denial of the defendants’ application for an

award of their attorneys’ fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

The principal defendant, B&B Enterprises, is a residential

real estate developer, mostly of high‐end custom‐home sub‐
2 No. 12‐3890

divisions. Active in Wasco, a community in northeastern Il‐

linois, in 1994 B&B (actually a company controlled by it but

we can ignore that detail) received from the Wasco Sanitary

District permits to connect to the district’s sewage system

almost 800 houses and other buildings that B&B and other

developers were building in a subdivision called Fox Mill.

(Some allegations concern other subdivisions in the same

general area, but, again to simplify the opinion, we’ll refer to

all the subdivisions as Fox Mill.) In 2010 plaintiff Fiala, the

owner of a home in Fox Mill, joined by Tim Kobler Custom

Houses, a homebuilder, brought this suit charging that B&B

(and other developers, whom we can ignore) had violated

RICO by engaging in a “pattern of racketeering activity” (in

RICO‐speak) consisting of bribery, theft, and fraud, all de‐

signed to deprive homeowners and builders of property. 18

U.S.C. § 1962. Kobler has since dropped out of the case, leav‐

ing Fiala as the sole plaintiff and appellee.

The alleged scheme involved what are called “Population

Equivalents” (“PEs”)—specified quantities of sewage (gen‐

erally 100 gallons per day) that a house or other building

(this case is just about houses, however) is estimated to

dump into the local sewage system. 225 ILCS 225/3(6); 35 Ill.

Admin. Code § 301.345. The more PEs that a house connect‐

ed to the system produces, the larger and so more costly the

system must be to handle all the wastewater discharged into

it, and therefore the higher the fee that the sanitary district

would be apt to charge for a permit to connect the house to

the district’s sewage system. The fee is charged to the build‐

er and thus becomes one of the costs that he tries to recoup

in the price that he charges for the house.
No. 12‐3890 3

The Wasco Sanitary District decided to allot 3.5 PEs to

each house that would be built in its district because that is

the allotment that the state recommends, though does not

require, for single‐family houses. 35 Ill. Admin. Code § 370,

Appendix A.

The complaint alleges that B&B had, mainly through

family connections, improperly taken control of the Wasco

Sanitary District and used that control to divert to itself

permit fees that should have gone to the district to finance

an expansion of its sewage system. As Fox Mill expanded,

the number of PEs that the sanitary district could grant

without having to expand its sewer system ran out; the sys‐

tem was surfeited. B&B, the suit charged, decided—so that it

could continue the expansion of Fox Mill—to “steal” PEs

from existing homes and sell the stolen PEs to builders, like

Kobler. The “stolen” PEs would enable the builder to obtain

a sewage permit for the buyer of each of the houses he built.

Why was B&B (allegedly) doing this?

Suppose a sewage treatment facility can process up to

20,000 gallons of wastewater a day—equivalent to 200 PEs.

A sanitary district that followed Illinois’s recommendation

to allot 3.5 PEs to every single‐family house would therefore

allow only 57 houses to be connected to the sanitary dis‐

trict’s sewage system. But 3.5 PEs per house is only an esti‐

mate of average wastewater discharge. Those 57 houses

might generate more, or fewer, than 20,000 gallons of

wastewater per day—fewer if 3.5 PEs per house is a con‐

servative estimate of the amount of wastewater discharged

by the average single‐family house. And probably it is, since

if it were an underestimate the sewage treatment facility

would be inadequate.
4 No. 12‐3890

B&B took advantage of the assumed conservative bias in

the estimate to allocate only 2.5 PEs per house. But the plain‐

tiff alleges that in order to obtain the required permits for a

residential development B&B represented to the sanitary

district that it was allocating 3.5 PEs to each house. This de‐

ceit would, in our example, allow B&B to build 80 rather

than 57 houses without necessarily straining the sewage

treatment facility—if indeed the average wastewater produc‐

tion per house is only 2.5 PEs. The sanitary district would

permit the fraud because it was controlled by B&B, and as

long as the sewage treatment facility was not strained, the

fraud, though creating a risk of harm, would impose no ac‐

tual harm on the development. Committing the fraud was

made easier by a long‐standing contract between B&B and

the sanitary district, under which B&B collected the permit

fees directly from the builders (as we noted earlier), and in

exchange promised to pay for the maintenance, and any

necessary expansion, of the district’s wastewater treatment

facility. (Whether the promise was real, given B&B’s control

of the district, is doubtful.)

B&B’s alleged wresting of control of the sanitary district

and use of that control to divert to itself fees that should

have gone to the district to finance any needed expansion or

improvement of the sewage system is the sort of conduct

that could if proved violate RICO. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v.

Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1989);

United States v. Genova, 333 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2003);

United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 80‐81 (1st Cir. 2004); Unit‐

ed States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1506–07 (9th Cir. 1992).

The district judge, however, dismissed the suit for want of

“RICO standing.” To obtain relief under RICO a plaintiff

must be “injured in his business or property,” 18 U.S.C.
No. 12‐3890 5

§ 1964(c). Because that’s a subset of all injury, RICO standing

(which really ought to be called a limitation on the relief

available for a RICO violation) is narrower than Article III

standing, which does not place limits on the nature of the

actionable injury but requires only a potentially redressable

“injury in fact” caused by the defendant’s alleged wrongdo‐

ing. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992), with Holmes v. SIPC, 503 U.S. 258, 265–66 (1992). The

question then is whether there was an injury to Fiala’s prop‐

erty or to Kobler’s business; the parties appear to assume

that if neither Fiala nor Kobler has RICO standing, no other

class member does either.

The district judge said that “Fiala’s PEs are not property

and cannot have been taken or stolen from him. The sup‐

posed theft therefore does not provide a basis for RICO

standing.” He was right. A PE is just a measurement unit

used to estimate the amount of wastewater that a single‐

family house is likely to discharge—an estimate for use by

the sanitary district in sizing its wastewater treatment facili‐

ty (for example to comply with environmental regulations,

see, e.g., 35 Ill. Admin. Code § 304.120(b)) and in pricing

sewage permits accordingly. A PE is not a right to discharge

a given amount of wastewater. To treat it as a right would

have the absurd consequence that if the district or state

agency decided that 3.5 PEs was too conservative an esti‐

mate of the amount of wastewater likely to be used by the

average single‐family home and reduced the allotment to 3

PEs, the homeowner could complain that a portion of his

property had been taken for a public use, entitling him to

compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s just‐

compensation clause, though in fact he’d sustained no loss.
6 No. 12‐3890

It would be different if by reducing Fiala’s allotment of

PEs the sanitary district reduced the amount of waste that he

could discharge into the district’s sewage system. For then

he might have to install a septic tank (if that were permit‐

ted), or limit the use of his kitchen and bathrooms, in order

to reduce his wastewater discharge—and those would be

costs. But, to repeat, the allotment of PEs to a house is not a

limit on how much wastewater it can discharge into the

sewage system. The fee for a sewage permit is not a fee per

PE. The permit entitles you to discharge any amount of

wastewater.

So PEs aren’t rights; but whether they are or not actually

is irrelevant. RICO doesn’t require a plaintiff to prove that

his property or business was taken; all that’s required is an

injury to property or to business. In Fiala’s case it would

have to be injury to his home. But no direct injury to his

home was possible, because the “theft” of one, or for that

matter all, of his PEs could not affect his access to or use of

the sewage system. He would still have the permit, and the

permit runs with the land. (An indirect injury to Fiala from

the reduction of his allotted PEs would be possible, howev‐

er, as we’re about to see.) As for Kobler, there is no reason to

think he paid more to B&B for “stolen” waste discharge

rights than he would have paid to the sanitary district.

Fiala could have been injured indirectly by the scheme if

it deprived the sanitary district of fees that could have been

used to expand or improve its sewage system or meet other

public needs that would benefit Fiala. For the deprivation

might have degraded the system, resulting in a backup of

wastewater into homes, or have caused the sanitary district

to increase taxes to make up for the lost fees. But these pos‐
No. 12‐3890 7

sibilities, though alluded to in the plaintiff’s briefs, are not

claimed to be a source of compensable injury to members of

the class. And any injury to the sanitary district itself is irrel‐

evant to this case, because the district is neither a plaintiff

nor a class member—it’s a defendant, alleged to be an ac‐

complice of B&B in the scheme to steal and resell PEs.  

Yet the district judge surprisingly remarked that the sani‐

tary district was the direct victim of the alleged scheme, that

it had been included in the litigation only as a “nominal” de‐

fendant, and that the “indirect purchaser” doctrine of anti‐

trust law, which forbids a purchaser from the victim of cartel

pricing to sue the cartelists even when the immediate victim

had passed on some or for that matter all of the cartel’s price

increase to its customers (the indirect purchasers), Illinois

Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746–47 (1977); In re Brand

Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.3d 599,

605–06 (7th Cir. 1997), applies to RICO claims as well, as in‐

deed it’s been held to do. Holmes v. SIPC, supra, 503 U.S. at

265–68; James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Construction Co., 453

F.3d 396, 403–04 (7th Cir. 2006); Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d

1173, 1175–76 (7th Cir. 1985); McCarthy v. Recordex Service,

Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 855 (3d Cir. 1996); Rand v. Anaconda‐

Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1986). Not that, so

applied, it is an indirect‐purchaser doctrine. The sanitary dis‐

trict hadn’t bought anything from B&B. But the reasons that

have been given for the indirect‐purchaser doctrine are ap‐

plicable to a case such as this: it simplifies litigation, avoids

the bother and uncertainty of trying to determine how much

of an injury to a first tier of victims was transmitted to a sec‐

ond tier, and maximizes the incentive of members of the first

tier to enforce applicable law. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, su‐

pra, 431 U.S. at 745; BCS Services, Inc. v. Heartwood 88, LLC,
8 No. 12‐3890

637 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2011); Adams v. Pan American

World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 2A Phil‐

lip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law § 346c, pp. 164–65 (3d ed.

2007).

But we don’t understand why the sanitary district—

B&B’s alleged accomplice—should be thought merely a

“nominal” defendant. The indirect‐victim doctrine (as the

indirect‐purchaser doctrine should be called when there’s no

purchaser) does not bar a suit against an accomplice. No

matter; the plaintiff has not challenged the district judge’s

indirect‐victim ruling. Nor has he presented any evidence of

any injury to himself or to the class members.

So the district judge was right to dismiss the RICO

claim—and the plaintiff has not appealed the dismissal. It’s

the defendants who have appealed, complaining—not about

the dismissal of course, but about the denial of their motion

for an award of their attorney’s fees as a sanction for what

they contend was a suit brought without ”an inquiry rea‐

sonable under the circumstances” to determine that the suit

was “not being presented for any improper purpose” and

was not frivolous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) and (2). We dis‐

cussed the plaintiff’s case at length only because it’s the es‐

sential background to the defendants’ motion.

The defendants have missed the boat—they have failed

to engage the district judge’s grounds for denying the mo‐

tion. On whether the suit was frivolous or had been brought

for an improper purpose, the judge said that the plaintiffs’

theory (on which the suit pivoted, given RICO’s requirement

that the plaintiff show an injury to business or property) that

PEs were property “was wrong ... but I don’t think it was so

wrong as to be sanctionable ... . Referring to PEs as property
No. 12‐3890 9

... was part of the vernacular. The district’s commissioners

thought that PE was property ... . PEs were apparently

treated as though they could be bought and sold.” And so

the plaintiffs’ suit, while meritless, was not frivolous. As for

its having been brought for an “improper purpose,” “cer‐

tainly, it is not improper to file a non‐frivolous claim in the

hope of getting paid.” Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th

Cir. 2003).

More troubling is the judge’s ground for rejecting the de‐

fendants’ argument that the plaintiffs had failed to conduct

an adequate pre‐complaint investigation, as required by Fed.

R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3), (4). The plaintiff’s complaint contained

supplemental state law claims for fraud and conspiracy,

claims that rested on the same facts as the main claim, the

RICO claim. When the judge dismissed that claim, he relin‐

quished supplemental jurisdiction over the state‐law claims

and remanded them to state court, where they are pending.

Having done so he denied the Rule 11 motion on the ground

that if he imposed sanctions for “objectively groundless fac‐

tual allegations of fraud and lying and conspiracy and theft

and it turns out that Mr. Fiala prevails in state court[,] I’d

look kind of foolish for jumping the gun, and I’d be stepping

on the toes of the state court judge, and I don’t think it’s ap‐

propriate to do that.” That was not a sound reason for deny‐

ing the defendants’ motion, for no basis is suggested for a

state court’s having jurisdiction to impose sanctions for mis‐

conduct committed in a federal proceeding.

What the district judge should have done, given his un‐

certainty about the merits of the motion and his belief that

the state court litigation might cast light on those merits, was

to stay action on the motion pending findings in the state
10 No. 12‐3890

case that might undermine or bolster it. That might seem in‐

consistent with Rule 11’s focus on the pre‐complaint investi‐

gation. But the question of the adequacy of that investigation

(which we address next) is different from whether the suit

was brought for an improper purpose, or was frivolous.

Whether the factual allegations turn out to be true is relevant

to that question. A complaint might be filed with no pre‐

complaint investigation whatsoever; but if the purpose was

not improper and all the alleged facts turned out to be true

and the plaintiff prevailed in the suit, there would be no ba‐

sis for imposing sanctions. So the judge wasnʹt wrong to

think that state court findings could affect the merits of the

Rule 11 motion, and therefore he could have waited to rule

on the motion, though he should not have denied it outright.

In the section of their brief that precedes the argument

portion and is captioned “The District Court’s Ruling,” the

defendants complain that “no determination whatsoever

was made [by the district judge] as to whether [class coun‐

sel] performed a reasonable pre‐filing inquiry.” But that

oblique complaint—that the judge should have made his

own determination rather than dumping the issue on the

state court—is neither elaborated, nor even mentioned, in

the argument portion of the brief. Not until their reply brief

do the defendants wake up and argue that the judge should

have made his own determination regarding the reasonable‐

ness of the pre‐complaint inquiry. There they point out that

“the district court’s ruling results in an automatic free pass

under Rule 11 for any plaintiff clever or lucky enough to

have coupled state law claims with [federal] claims.” That’s

a good point, but comes too late; an argument first made in

an appellant’s reply brief is forfeited. Georgou v. Fritzshall,

178 F.3d 453, 456–57 (7th Cir. 1999); EIMSKIP v. Atlantic Fish
No. 12‐3890 11

Market, Inc., 417 F.3d 72, 78 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.

Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2003); 16AA Charles A.

Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3974.3, pp. 277–82

(4th ed. 2008).

But this bobble by the defendants turns out not to matter,

because they have never made a persuasive case that the

pre‐complaint investigation had been inadequate. Class

counsel claims without contradiction to have devoted 170

hours to factual and legal research before filing the suit. The

fact that the research turned up negligible evidence of injury

to class members does not imply an inadequate investiga‐

tion, but merely a weak case. The builder Kobler may have

been injured by having to fork over $150,000 to B&B to re‐

ceive PE allotments that he needed in order to be able to ob‐

tain sewage permits, which he needed in order to be able to

build salable houses in Fox Mill. He testified that of course

the fees were costs to him and that he tries to recoup his en‐

tire costs in the price he charges for building a house, but he

was unclear whether he always succeeds in recouping the

fees. And though he agreed with the defendants’ lawyer at a

couple of places in his deposition that he had recouped

them, it’s unclear whether he understood the questions that

elicited that response. If the fees were higher than what the

sanitary district itself would have charged for permits, he

may have been hurt—anything that increases a seller’s costs

is likely to reduce his profits. For the tendency of an increase

in price is to reduce buyer demand, and the likelihood of

such a reduction may cause a seller to trim his price at some

sacrifice in profit to avoid losing customers. Kobler may

have thought that he had recouped the PE fees that he had

paid B&B but not some other cost. But maybe he hadn’t been

able to recoup the other cost because he he could not raise
12 No. 12‐3890

his price sufficiently to cover both it and the PE fees; in that

event any increase in those fees attributable to the alleged

RICO violation would have hurt him, albeit indirectly.

The complaint also alleged that B&B’s scheme “endan‐

ger[ed] the health and welfare of the plaintiffs and the citi‐

zens within the [sanitary district] and Illinois.” For both the

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and the Illinois

attorney general notified the Wasco Sanitary District that it

was violating federal and state pollution regulations, and

conceivably that was because the district had been denied by

the plaintiffs’ fraud the resources it needed to make its sew‐

age system comply with those regulations. There’s no evi‐

dence to support that conjecture, however, and even if there

were it would establish merely a personal injury, which is

not compensable under RICO. Evans v. City of Chicago, 434

F.3d 916, 926 (7th Cir. 2006); Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp.,

937 F.2d 899, 918–19 (3d Cir. 1991); cf. Reiter v. Sonotone

Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). Fiala presented no theory of

injury to his or the class members’ businesses or property

stemming from the effect of the defendants’ alleged conspir‐

acy on the district’s compliance with pollution regulations.

But all this is to one side of the alleged inadequacy of the

pre‐complaint investigation, which the defendants failed to

substantiate.

The district judge’s denial of the Rule 11 motion, though

based in part on an erroneous (but harmlessly so) ground,

must be

AFFIRMED.