Appellee s inc lu d e Wi ll ia m T ja r k s, Gayle Rankin and Wendy J ohnson, individually , as heirs 1 of June Bruc kmiller’s estate, a nd as beneficiar ies of t he Bruckmiller Trust. For c larity , we will re fer to appellee s collectively

as the Children. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00063- CV

Br e nda C . K

ir by, App e lla nt
v. William Tjar ks, Gayle Rankin an d Jun e Wendy Johns on, in divid ually, as Heirs of the Estate of Jun e Bruckm iller, Dec eased, and as Beneficiaries of th e Bruckm iller Trust, Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF LLANO COUNTY , 33RD JUDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. 11,800 , HO NORAB LE GUILFO RD L. JONES, II I, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Br enda K irby

appea ls the district c ourt’s judgme nt that she conver ted appellee s’ re al
and pe rs on a l pro pe rt

y . Ap pe lle e s ( the “ Chi ldr e n” ) are the be ne fi c iari e s o f t he B ru c kmi lle r T ru st, 1 an inter vivos trust established by their mother, J u n e Bruckmiller, and the ir step-father, Char les B ru c kmi lle r. Un de r t

he te rm s o f t

he tr us t, t he Chi ldr e n b e c a me be ne fi c iari e s u po n th e de a th o f t

he ir mother and step- fathe r; J une died first in 1993 and Char les died in 1997. After J une’s de ath, Charles partially revoke d the trust. I n order to eff ectuate t he partial revoc ation, Charles e venly divided the trust’s broker ag e ac count, placingone-ha lf in his personal broke rag e account and leavingthe otherWe will refer to appellant B renda

Kirby as “K irby ” and to he r husband by his full name. 2 The Children sued a g ainst Kirby , individually ; Kirby , as e x ec u t ri x of the B ruckmiller 3 E s t a t e ; t h e B r

u c km i l l e r E s t a t e ; an d

J e r o m e K i r

b y. 2 h a l f i nt h e t r u s t
. H e a l s o t r an s f

e r r e d t i t l e t o r e a l p r o p e rt y h e l d b y t h e t r u s t t o h i m s e l f

i n d i v i d u a l l y. Th e Ch il dr e n c la im th a t Ch ar le s v io late d th e te r ms o f th e tr

u s t b y r e mo v in g a s s e ts from June’s ir re vo c a ble int e re st i n th e tr

us t. After J une’s de ath, wit h the advice of his friend a nd attorney

J erome Kirby , Charles executed a ne w will, naming Jerome’ s wife B renda Kirby executrix of his estate (the “B ruckmiller Estate”) and g iving he r an unlimited power of appointment. After Charles’s d ea t h, Kirby 2
su bs e qu e ntl y

tr ans fe rr e d a ll o f t

he B ru c kmi lle r E state ’s a sse ts t o h e rs e lf
. Th e Chi ldr e n f

ile d s uit in dis tr ic t c ourt

se e kin g a

de c laratio n th a t th e B ru c kmi lle r Es tat e conta ine d a sse ts that la wf ull y belong ed to them as benef iciarie s of the Br

uckmiller Trust. The Children also claimed that Kirby 3
conver ted their property by transfe rring assets of the Bruckmiller Estate to herse lf. The district cour t de nie d th e Chi ldr e n’ s r e qu e st f or de c larator

y re lie f but re nd e re d ju dg me nt o n th e ir c on ve rs ion

c la im. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

awa rd e d th e Chi ldr e n mon e tary dama g e s and a on e -h a lf int e re st in t he re a l pr op e rt

y that Ch ar le s r e mo v e d

f r o m t h e B r u c kmi ll e r T r u s t. I na d d it io n , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt a w ar d e d the Children attorney ’s fe es.

K ir b y a p p e a ls th e d i s t

r i c t c o u r t ’ s ju d g me n t c la im in g th a t ( 1 ) T e xa s d o e s n o t r e c o g n iz e
a ca use of a ction for the c onversion of real property ; (2) there is no evidenc e to support the district court’s judg ment that she committed co n v er s i o n in her individual ca pacity ; (3) the Children we re estopped fr om claiming a n i n t er est in the Br

uckmiller Trust’s br okera g e ac count; (4) the district court’s judg ment is void beca use i t lacke d jurisdiction; (5) the Children ar e not entitled to attorney ’sI n light of ou r re v er s al o f the district court’s judg ment, we ne ed not re ach K irby ’s third 4 issue conce rning whether the C hildren were estopped from c laiming a n interest in the B ruckmiller Tr us t’ s b ro ke ra g e a c c ount. There is no evidence in the rec ord that title to the Fl o ri d a l o t was eve r transf err ed to the 5 B ru c kmi lle r T ru st, and

a ll p art ie s a g re e that the F lor ida lot wa s Ch arl e s’ s and

June ’s c omm

un ity 3 fe e s a s a matte r o f law; and

(6 ) s he is e nti tle d to a tto rn e y ’s fe e s und e r t he de c lara

tor y jud g me nts a c t. We hold that the district court had jurisdiction over the underlying litig ation beca use the Children’s suit concer

ned the i n t erp re tation of a trust instrument. We ag ree that rea l property cannot be
c on ve rt e d a s a m att er of law . F ur the rm or e , th e re c or d d oe s n ot c on ta in l e g a lly and fa c tua lly
su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh ing tha t th e Ch il dr e n w e re e nti tle d to po sse ssi on of any pr op e rt y individually held by Kirby , a require d element for a claim of c onversion. The ref ore, w e re verse and
re nd e r j ud g me nt t

hat K ir by did no t c omm it co nv e rs ion a s a matt e r of law. Ad dit ion a lly , w e re ve rs e 4 the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a

wa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.

BACK GR OUND On September

8, 1968, J une and Cha

rles Bruckmiller w ere marrie d in New Yor k. J une had t h re e children—William, Gayle, and Wendy —from a pr ior marr iag e; Charles ha d no
c hil dr e n. Th e B ru c kmi lle rs liv e d in Ne w Y or k unti l 19 86 wh e n th e y

mov e d to Te xas. I n 1992, the B ruckmillers established an inter vivos trust to which they transfe rre d
mos t of the ir se pa rate and c ommun ity

pr op e rt y . A lth ou g h th e c or

pu s o f t he B ru c kmi lle r T ru st i n c l u d e d n e ar l y a l l o f t h e B r

u c k m i l l e r s ’ a s s e t s , t h i s a

p p e a l c o n c e r

n s ( 1 ) J u n e ’ s s e p ar a t e p r o p e rt y, which co n s i s t ed o f s tocks and bonds she ha d inherited fr om her mother; a nd (2) the c ouple’s community

interest in their home in King sland, Texas, and a va cant lot in Flag ler County , Florida (t he “ F lor ida

lot ” ). Jer ome Ki rb y

pr e pa re d th e tr us t do c ume nts
. 5pr op e rt

y and no t an a sse t of

the tr us t. 4 Th e purp os e of

the tr us t w a s to mana g e the B ru c kmi lle r s ’ e s t a t e d u ri ngthe ir lif e tim e s. C h ar l e s an d

J u n e w e r e c o - t r

u s t e e s w i t h e qu a l a u t h o r i t y an d c o n t r o l o v e r

a l l t r u s tp r o p e rt y. Ad dit ion a lly , Ch arl es or J un e c ou ld r e vo ke , mo dif y , o r a me nd the tr us t at any tim e duri ngthe ir lifetimes. Upon th e d ea t h of the fir st spouse, the trust beca me irre vocable as to the dec ease d’s int e re st. Th e surv ivi ng sp ou se c ou ld r e vo ke or mod if y a ny po rt ion of the tr us t pe rt a ini ngto a sse ts that had bee n owned by

that spous e b ef

o re t h e trust was c reated. Any revoc ation or modification
c ou ld i nc lud e “ an und iv id ed on e ha lf of a ll i nc re a se s and

c ha ng e s in a sse ts thr ou g h tr a de s, sa le s,
e xch ang e s o r p ur c ha se s. ” A part ial re vo c a tio n c ou ld a ff e c t on ly the surv ivi ngsp ou se ’s se pa rate proper ty and one- half intere st in c o mmunity proper ty held in trust. Upon the death of the sec ond spouse, the Children would shar e equa lly all assets re maining in the B ruckmiller Tr ust. June die d in te state in O c tob e r 1 99 3. She ha d not r e vo ke d o r m od if ie d h e r i nte re st i n the trust. I n J anuar

y 1994, Charles dire cted Jerome Kirby to am end the trust to remove Charles’ s separ ate pr operty and his sha re of community proper

ty
. I n May

1996, Charles pa

rtially revoke d the trust as to these asse ts. To effe ct the chang e he divided the trust’s broker ag e ac count, leavingone half in the trust ac count and tra nsfer ring the other ha lf to his personal ac count. He a lso transfer red fu ll t itl e to t

he Ki ng sla

nd ho us e fr om h ims e lf

a s tr us tee of th e Bruck

mil le r T ru st t o h ims e lf i n d i v i d u a l l y.J erome Kirby testified that he did not ac tually draf t Charles’s will and that he hired a fellow 6 attorney , Wade Hutto, to draft and execute the document. Although there is a dispute in the rec ord a s to the ro le Jer ome Ki rb y pla y e d in this pr oc e ss, the re is litt le do ub t tha t he s e rv e d a s c ouns e l to Charles in initially

rec ommending the trust, in partially revoking the t rust, and g ener ally in manag ing his estate. 5

I n July 19 96 , Ch arl e s e xec ute d his ne w wi ll wi th Jer ome Ki rb y ’s he lp. I n the wi ll, 6 Cha rl e s app oi nt ed Jer ome Ki rb y ’s wi fe , B re nd a Ki rb y , in de pe nd e nt e xec utr ix wit h th e “ po we r t o appoint or desig nate those pe rsons or instituti ons . . . who are , in her so l e judg ment, justly or equitably entitled to rec eive or

oug ht to rec eive all or part” of his estate (the “B ruckmiller Estate ”). When Charles di ed in Dec ember 1997, his estate included the following assets: (1) the King sland house; (2) the Florida

lot; (3) approximately

$163,673 held i n fo u r separate bank ac counts; (4) Charles’s pe rsonal broke rag e ac count; and (5) various items of per sonal proper ty
. I n May

1999, as
e xec utr i x o f t h e B r

u c km i l l e r E s t a t e w i t h t h e p o w e r o f a p p o i n t m e n t , K i r

b y t r an s f e r r e d a l l of the se assets to herse lf. Shortly

afte r Charle s’s death, the broker ag e ac count re maining in the tr ust, valued at appr ox imately

$185,000, was distributed in equa l shares to the Children.
Coun ty court procee dings

Af te r h is d e a th i n 1 99 7, Ki rb y fi le d a n a pp lic a tio n f

or the pr ob a te of

Cha rl e s’ s w ill in the constitutional county court of L lano County . The c ounty cour t order ed that the will be admitted to probate, issued le tters testamenta ry , and appointed K irby

independe nt executrix of the B ru c kmi lle r E state . T he Chi ldr e n fi le d a mot ion se e kin gto r e mov e Ki rb y

a s in de pe nd e nt e xec utr ix of the e state. Kirby

then filed a

motion to t ransfer the pr obate pr ocee dings to district cour t. The county court gra

nted Kirby ’s m otion and transferr ed the case to district court for de termination ofTh e Chi ldr e n’ s su it w a s o ri g ina lly fi le d in Fort B e nd

Cou nty bu t w a s su

bs e qu e ntl y 7 tr ans fe rr e d to the L lano County dis tr ic t c ourt
. 6 all issues relating to the Children’s motion. At the time of this a ppeal, no a ction had bee n taken by the dis tr ic t c ourt on the se matte rs . I n 20 02 , Ki rb y fi na lly fi le d an inv e nto ry , a pp ra ise me nt, and

lis t of cla ims for the B ruckmiller Estate with the district court. District court proceedings

I n May 1998, the Children filed a separat e suit in district court ag ainst the Br uckmiller Estate; Kirby , individually a n d a s e x ecutr ix of the B ruckmiller Estate ; and J erome Kirby (collec tively

the “De fenda

nts”). The Children insisted that Charles im proper ly remove d from the 7 B ru c kmi lle r T rust J une ’s se pa rate pr op e rt

y and he r o ne -h a lf

int e re st i n th e c ou

ple ’s c omm

un ity proper ty . Specifica lly , the Children claimed that the Br uckmiller Trust’s br okera g e acco u n t was
or ig ina lly fu nd e d w ithJune ’s se pa

rate pr op e rt

y . T hu s, by

or de ri ngthat th e a c c ount b e div ide d in half, Char les remove d more than his community interest in “one half of a ll incr eases and cha ng es in assets throug h trade s, sales, exchang es or pur chase s.” In addition, the Children argued that the Ki ng sla nd ho us e wa s c omm

un ity pr op e rt y be lon g ingto t

he B ru c kmi lle r T ru st. Thus , Ch arl e s c ou ld not transfe r fr om the trust more than a n undivided one-ha lf interest in the home to himself. I n th e ir f o u rth a me n d e d p e ti ti o n , th e Ch il dr e n a ll e g e d s e v e n a lt e r n a ti v e the ories of
rec overy . I n Count 1, they reque sted that the district court c onstrue the trust docume nts and dec lare that (1) they

ar e t h e rig htful owners of the prope rty

and asse ts of the B ruckmiller Tr ust as of Cha rl e s’ s d e a th; (2 ) C ha

rl es ex c e e de d h is a

uth or ity by re vo kin g mor e tha

n h is i nte re st i n th e tr

us t afte r June’s death; (3) Charles i mproperly remove d J une’s separate property from the trust af ter he r7

death; (4) the inventory

of the B ruckmiller Estate wrong fully lists property

belong ing to the B ru c kmi lle r T ru st; and

(5 ) t he y c oll e c tiv e ly

ow n, as ben e fi c iari e s o f t he tr us t, Jun e ’s on e -h a lf community

proper ty interest in the King sland house and the Florida lot. I n Count 2, the Chil dren
a sse rt e d th a t th e De fe nd ants we re joi ntl y and se ve ra lly lia ble fo r co nv e rs ion

and tr e sp a ss t o c hatte l. I n Counts 3, 5, 6, and 7 , t h e Children ave rre d that the Def endants we re liable for tortious interfe renc e, money

had and r ece ived, civil conspirac y , and failure to make a complete a ccounting of the prope rty and accounts belonging to the Bruckmiller Trust. I n Count 4, the Chil dren c laimed that Ch arl e s v iol a te d th e tr us t c od e and

that, c on se qu e ntl y , th e B ruck mi ller Es tate is l ia

ble fo r h is
a c tio ns . At trial, the Children presented e x pert testimony and evide nce indicating that Char les
remove d J une’s se parate prope rty from the B ruckmiller Tr ust when he tra

nsfer red one half of the B ru c kmi lle r T ru st’ s b ro ke ra g e a c c ount t o h i s p e rs on a l a c c ount. B y e la bo ra te ly tr a c ingthe ow ne rs hip history of ce rtain stocks and bonds held by the Br uckmiller Estate, the Children claimed that it was possible to de termine what J une’s interest in the Br uckmiller Trust’s br okera g e ac count would have been w orth at the time Charle s died if he had not remove d her separate property
. The value of the br ok e ra g e a c c ount up on

Cha rl e s’ s d e a th i s im

po rt a nt b e c a us e that is wh e n th e Chi ldr e n b e c a me be ne fi c iari e s o f t

he tr us t. Ul tim a te ly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt re nd e re d ju dg me nt i n f

a vo r o f the Ch ild

re n “ on the ir claim of c onversion ag ainst Defe ndant B renda C. Kirby , i n her individual ca pacity only , as the
conver tor.” The district c ourt awa rded the Children $139,000 in damag es plus interest. The district court re ache d this fig ure by subtractingthe $185,000 pre viously distributed to the Chil dren f rom the8

am o u n tt h at t h e C h i l d

re n ’s ex p er twi t n es s cl ai m edJ u n e’ s i rr ev o cab l e i n t er es ti nt h e t ru s t ’s b ro k er age
acc ount w ould ha

ve been worth at the time Cha rles died, approximately $324,000. The district cour t additionally

awa rded the Children a one- half intere st in the Kingsland house and the F lorida lot, and attorney ’s fe es. The district c ourt denied a ll relief not gra nted in its judgment and or dere d that the Children take nothing from the B ruckmiller Estate , from Kirby in h er ro l e as ex ecutr ix of the Br uckmiller Estate, or

from Jerome Kirby , individually
. This appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N Jurisdi ction I n her f

ourth issue, Kirby claims that the district c ourt’s judgme nt is void because the constitutional county

court in L lano County had domi nant j urisdiction to deter mine the Children’s
c la ims pe rt a ini ngto p ro pe rt y he ld by the B ru c kmi lle r E state . K ir by ins ist s th a t be c a

us e the pr ob a te proce eding s were initiated prior to the filing of the Children’s suit, the constitutional county court had dominant jurisdiction over a ll matters apper taining to or

incident to the ad m i n i s tration of the Br uckmiller Estate. We disag ree .

As a g ener al rule, the court in which a suit is first filed acquir es dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. W yatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co. , 760 S.W .2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988); Sc hu e le v . S

c hu e le , 119 S.W .3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). Dominant jurisdiction, however , is a conc ept t hat applies whe n separ ate suits are filed in courts with conc urre nt j u ri sdiction. Sc hu e le , 1 1 9 S. W. 3 d a t 8 2 4
. T h e r e f

o r e , w e mu s t f

ir s t d e te r mi n e w h e th e r

th e L la no County Court ha d a ny a uth or ity to h e ar t he Chi ldr e n’ s su it.Since the fili ng of the Children’s suit, the leg islature has a mended pr operty

code se ction 8 115.001. See Act of Ma y 24, 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch . 148, § 22, 2005 Tex. Gen. L aws 294. Be cause the cha

ng es do not aff

ect our analy sis, we re fer

to the curr ent ver sion of the statute. 9 District courts and statutory probate courts are the only courts with jurisdiction over trust proce eding s. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 115.001 (West Supp. 2005); Sc hu e le , 119 S.W .3d 8 at 825. B eca

use the Children’s c ase involves the c onstruction of the Bruc kmiller Trust, the L lano County Court lacke d jurisdiction to consider the Children’s claims. Thus, despite the f act that the district court’s judg ment aff ects the a dmini s tr a

ti o n o f th e B r u c k miller Estate, the L lano County

Court did not acquire dominant jurisdiction over the Children’s suit. Kirby ’s fourth issue is over ruled. Conversion of real property

I n her f irst issue, Kirby

argues that the district court err ed by awa rding the Children
a o n e - h a lf in te r e s t i nth e K in g s la

n d h o u s e an d

th e F lo r id a

lo t b e c a u s e T e xa s la

w d o e s n o t r e c o g n iz e
a ca use of a ction for the c onversion of r ealty . Conversion is defined a s the wrong ful exercise of dominion and control over a nother’s pr operty i n d en ial of or inconsistent with his rig hts. Gree n In t’ l, I nc . v . S oli s , 951 S.W .2d 384, 391 (Tex. 1997); Bandy v . First Stat e Bank, 835 S.W .2d 609, 622 (Tex. 1992). Real pr operty cannot be conver

ted. See W

illiams v. Cit

y of Dallas , 53 S.W .3d 780, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pe t.) (def ining c onversion as una uthorized and unlawful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over personal property of anot her) ; Lig hth ou se C h urch v. Tex as Bank , 8 8 9 S
. W
. 2 d 5 9 5 , 5 9 9 n . 4 ( T e x. A p p . — H o u s t o n[1 4 t h D i s t
. ] 1 9 9 4 , w r it de nie d) ; Pierson v. GFH

Fin. Servs. Corp. , 8 29 S.W. 2d 31 1, 31 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 92 , no wr it) (noting that rea l property

cannot be conver

ted).I n their dec laratory claim, t he C hildren asked the district court to construe the terms of the 9 B r u c km i l l e r T r u s tan d t o d e c l a r e t h e i r r i g h t s t o p r o p e rt y

f o r m e r l y h e l d b y t h e B r

u c km i l l e r T r u s t
. In particula r, t h ey argued that the King sland house and the Florida lot were Charles’s a

nd J une’s community

proper ty and that June’s one-ha lf interest in community proper ty held by the B ruckmiller Trust bec ame irr evoca

ble upon her

death. He re, the Children aver that the di strict court’s awar d of the re a l pr op e rt

y int e re sts de mon str a te s th a t it de te rm in e d ( 1) the pr op e rt ie s w e re c omm un ity interests held by

the B ruckmiller Trust, (2) that Charles lacke d the authority to transfe r title to the proper ties, and (3) that they wer e entitled to J une’s irr evoca ble intere sts as benef

iciarie s of the Br uckmiller Trust upon Charle s’s death. 10

I n r e sp on se , the Chi ldr e n ins ist that the dis tr ic t c ourt a wa rd e d the m a

on e -h a lf int e re st in t he re a l pr op e rt

y purs ua nt t o t heir c la im f or de c lara tor y re lie f. We r e c og nize that, i n o rd e r t o

9 conclude that Kirby

was liable for conversion, the di strict court necessa rily construed the terms of the B ruckmiller Tr

ust and deter

mined the Children’s rig hts to certain pr operties. We also unde rstand that fac ts impl ied in support of the Children’s c onversion cla i m co u l d als o support the re quested de c larator y re lie f. How eve r, the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt s tate s, “ Th e c ourt he re by REN DE RS jud g me nt f

or P lai ntif

fs [the Chi ldr e n] on

the ir c la im o f c on ve rs ion

a g a ins t D e fe nd ant B re nd a C. Kirby , in her individual c apac ity only , as the conver tor.” The judgme nt is silent a s to the Children’s de c larator y c la im, e xce pt that it c on ta ins a Mo the r H ub ba rd c la us e de ny inga ll r e lie f n ot s pe c if

ic a lly g rante d. The Children did not appe al the denia l of their cla im for dec laratory relief , nor did they reque st that the judgme nt be modified to support the award of the real proper ty on g rounds other tha

n
c on ve rs ion . T he re fo re , w e wi ll n ot i mpl y re lie f o n g ro un ds ov e rr

ule d b y the tr ia l c ourt
. W e s u s t a i nK i r

b y’ s f i r s ti s s u e , t h a tr e a l p r o p e rt y c an n o tb e c o n v e rt e d
. A c c o r d i n g l y, we strike the district court’s a war d to the Children of a one-ha lf interest in the King sland house and the Flor ida lot beca

use t he awards do not comply as a matter of law with t he district cour t’s judgme nt that th e Chi ldr e n p re va ile d o n th e ir c on ve rs ion

c la im.11

Suf fi ciency of the evidence

I n h er s ec o n d issue, Kirby asser ts that there is no evide nce to support the district
c o u rt ’ s j u d g m e n tf

o r t h e C h i l dr e no nt h e i r

c o n v e r s i o n c l a i m a g a i n s t h e r i n h e r i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y. Specifica lly , she cla ims that there is no evidenc e in the record that c ould support a finding that she individually

conver ted a n y re m aini ng interest the Children may have ha d in stocks and bonds f o r m e r l y h e l d

b y t h e B r u c km i l l e r T r u s t
. T o e s t a

b l i s h a c l a i m f

o r c o n v e r s i o n o f p e r s o n a l p r o p e rt y, the Children must have prove n that: (1) they owned or

had leg al possessi o n o f the prope rty or entitlement to possession; (2) Kirby unlawfully

and without authorization assumed and e x erc ised dominion and control over the proper t y t o t h e ex clusion of, or inconsistent with, their rig hts as
owner s; (3) they

demande d return of

the prope rty ; and (4) Kirby ref used t o return the proper

ty
. See Smith v. Max imum Racing, Inc

. , 136 S.W .3d 337, 341 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). Kirby
c la ims that th e re c or d d oe s n ot c on ta in s uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to e sta

bli shany of the se e le me nts
. Kirby timely reque sted finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law pursua nt to Tex as R u l es o f Civil P roce dure 296 a nd 297; however , the district court did not file any finding s or conclusions. Tex. R. C iv. P. 296 & 297. Whe n a b en ch t ri al is conducted a nd the cour

t does not enter finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law to support its ruling, a ll facts nec essar y to support the judgme nt are i m p l i ed
. Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley , 1 11 S.W. 3d 46 , 5 2 ( Te x. 20 03 ); BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W .3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002 ). Be ca use the district cour t g rante d j udg ment for the Children on the ir conve rsion claim but did not enter spec ific finding s of fac t or conc lusions of la

w, we revie w Kirby ’s complaints under the presumption that all finding s and
c on c lus ion s w e re ma de in f a vo r o f t he jud g me nt.12 I mplied findings a

re not c onclusive and ma

y be cha lleng ed on the ba sis of leg al and fac tual insufficienc y

when the app el l at e record inc ludes the re porter’ s and cle rk’s re cords. BMC S o ft ware Belg. , 83 S.W. 3d

a t 79 5. We r e vie w t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s imp lie d f ind ing s b y

the same standards a

pplied in review ing the leg al a n d fac tual sufficie ncy of evide nce suppor

ting a jury ’s finding
. Lenz v. Lenz , 7 9 S. W.3 d 1 0, 19 (T e x. 20 02 ); Catali na v. Blasdel , 881 S.W .2d 295, 297 (T e x. 19 94 ). I n a

c ha lle ng e to le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y , we re vie w the e vid e nc e in t he light m os t f

a vo ra ble to the challeng ed findingand indul g e every rea sonable inferenc e that would support it. City of Keller v. W ilson , 1 68 S.W. 3d

80 2, 82 2 ( Te x. 20 05 ). We c re dit favorab le e vid e nc e if

a re a so na ble fa c tfinder c ould and disreg ard contra ry evidenc e unless a r easona ble fa ct-finde r could not. Id . at 827. The ev i d en ce is leg ally

sufficie nt if it would enable fa ir-minded people to rea ch the ve rdict under revie w. Id
. I n revie wing the fa ctual suff iciency of the e vidence , we c o nsider and w eig h all the evidenc e and should set a side the j udg ment only if it is so contrary to the overw helming w eig ht of the evidenc e as to be clea

rly wrong and unjust. Cai n v . B ain , 7 0 9 S. W. 2 d 1 7 5 , 1 7 6 ( T e x. 1 9 8 6 )
. We may not substit ute our own judg ment for that of the trier of fac t, e ven if we would have r eac hed a dif fe re n t re s u lt on the evidence
. Ma rit im e Ov e rse as Cor p. v . E lli s , 9 7 1 S. W. 2 d

4 0 2 , 4 0 7 ( T e x. 1998). Ther efor e, we will rever se onl y i f the ove rwhe lming we ight of the evidenc e indicate s the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt w a s c le arl y wr on g and

un jus t. Kirby argues that the re cord does not contain leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence to support the district court’s implied finding that the Children wer e entitled to a ny proper ty held by her indivi dually , which is the first ele ment of a c onversion cla im. See M aximum Rac ing , 136 S.W .3d13

a t 34 1. Th e Chi ldr e n ma int a in t hat Ch arl e s’ s p art ia l r e vo c a tio n o f t he B ru c kmi lle r T ru st r e su lte d in the improper a

nd unlawful re moval of a por tion of J une’s irr evoca

ble intere st in the Bruc kmiller Trust’s broke rag e ac count. The Children argue that evidenc e in the rec ord conc lusively establishes that the improperly

remove d portion of t he trust’s broker ag e account contained stocks and bonds that
wer e included in the Br

uckmiller Estate and wer e subsequently transfe rre d by Kirby to herself . The Children argue that evide nce in the r ecor d conclusively estab l ishes that the improperly remove d portion of the broke rag e ac count bec ame a n asset of the Br

uckmiller Est at e and that Kirby , as executri x o f t h e es t ate, tra nsfer red that asset to herse lf individually as bene ficiar

y . Fr om this, t he Chi ldr e n ins ist that Ki rb y ha s unla wf ull y e xer c ise d d omi nio n a

nd c on tr ol o ve r s toc ks and

bo nd s to wh ic h th e y

are le g a lly

e nti tle d a s b e ne fi c iari e s o f t he B ru c kmi lle r T ru st. The re cord c ontains evidenc e successfully trac ing cer tain stocks and bonds t o J une’s inheritanc e; she then c ontributed this separate prope rty to the Bruckmiller Trust. After June’s death, Charles wr ong fully

assumed that the trust wa s community proper ty and tra nsfer red ha lf of the br ok e ra g e fu

nd to his ind ivi du a l a c c ount. Ho we ve r, the tr us t sp e c if ic a lly pr ov ide s, “ No a c tio n s ha ll lie a t la w or in eq uit y in f a vo r o f b e ne fi c iari e s w ho may re c e ive futur e be ne fi ts [th e Chi ldr e n] a g a ins t benef iciarie s or their e states, who a re cu rr entl y rec eiving benef

its or have r ece ived bene fits in the past [C harle s or J une Bruckmiller], absent int entional fraud.” The trust also states, “No r emainder interest [th e Children] shall have a ca use of a ction ag ainst the Trustee s [C harle s or J une] or life estate be nefic iaries f

or wa ste.” Alvin Golden, co- counsel for appellant, a

rg ued that the pr imary

g oal of the Br uckmiller trust as written was to support Charle s and June during the ir lives, not to preser ve the14

assets for the C hildren. The two exculpatory provisions, insulating Charles a nd J une as truste es fr om
any su it b y the Chi ldr e n, are str on g e vid e nc e of thi s g oa l of the tr us t. T he le g isl a tur e ha s e xpre ssl y authorized the use of

such exculpato ry cl au s es, stating that they can r elieve a

n individual trustee fr om l ia bil ity fo r a ll a c tio ns ex cept a brea c h o f t ru st c omm itt e d in

ba d f a ith , in te nti on a lly

or wi th
rec kless indiffer ence to the interest of the benef iciary , or for any profit derive d by the trustee f rom a bre ach of

trust. See Act of May 27, 1983, 68th L eg ., R.S., ch. 567, art. 2 , § 2 , 1 9 8 3 T ex . Ge n. L aws 3332, 3358 repeale d byAct of May 12, 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 148, § 29, 2005 Tex. Gen. L aws 28 7, 29 6; se e als o Tex as Com me rc e Ba nk , N.A. v . G riz

zle , 96 S.W .3d 240, 249-50 (Te x . 2002). Currently , the trust code pr ovides t h at t h e t er m s of a trust pre vail over a ny provision found in the code, e x cept in limited circumstanc es not prese nt in this case . Tex. P rop. Code Ann. § 111.0035( b) (West Supp. 2005).

Neither C h ar l es n o r h is estate is subject to the leg al claims of the Children a bsent fra ud on his part. T h e C h i l d re n m ad e it clea r at trial that they

wer e no long er pur suing c laims of fra ud or breach of fiduciar

y duty ag ainst any of t he defenda nts. I f the Children c an esta blish that they
are leg ally

entitled to any portion of t he trust acc ount that wrong fully beca me par t of Charles’ s estate, they can pursue their claim to those assets that flow to the benef iciary of the estate. Howeve r, the Chi ldr e n are ba

rr e d by the e xcu lpator

y pr ov isi on

in t he tr us t f ro m br ing ingany

le g a l a c tio n a g a ins t Charles or his e state to establish their entitlement to trust assets wrong ly remove d; thus they

have no claim to any

of the e state’s a ssets in the hands of the be nefic iary , Kirby
. By assessing liability

only ag ainst Kirby

in her individual ca

pacity , the district court seems to have acknow ledg ed the ba r ag ainst suing Kirby as executor of the e state. B ut unless the15

Chi ldr e n c an e sta

bli shthe ir le g a l r ig hts to t he a sse ts h e ld b y

the e state , th e y

have no c la im t o th os e
a sse ts in the ha

nd s of the be ne fi c iary . B e c a us e of the e xcu lpator

y pr ov isi on in the B ru c kmi lle r T ru st, the Children could not sue Char les or hi s estate to e stablish their rig ht to possession of the stocks and bonds wrong fully

remove d from the trust by Charles. The Children sug g est that the Kirby s may have e x erc ised undue influenc e over Charles’s de cisions to amend the trust and rew rite his w ill. But there is a lso e vidence of Charle s’s natura l fee lings of ill will toward the Children. The re w ere alleg ations that one of the Children ma de
an o b s c e n e g e s tu

r e to w ar d h is mo th e r ’ s c a s k e t in Ch ar le s ’ s p r e s e n c e an d th a t an o th e r thr ew the elder ly Charles up a g ainst the wall during a phy sical alterc ation. Only one of the Children, Wendy J ohnson, visited C h ar l es after J une’s de ath; there is no indication in the recor d that the other Children had any

contac t with Charles. Moreove r, Charles spec ifically banned the Children from
a tte nd inghis fu

ne ra l se rv ic e . In the y e ars fo llo wi ngJune ’s de a th, it a pp e ars that th e Ki rb y s b e c a me Charles’s only

friends a nd family . Thus, Cha rl es co u l d have r easona bly intended to make the Kirby s, rather

than the Children, the be nefic iaries of his estate. I n the end, the Children can only claim an interest in the wrong fully remove d portion of the br ok e ra g e a c c ount a s futur e be ne fi c iari e s of the B ru c kmi lle r Tr us t; b ut t hat ve ry tr us t pr e ve nts
a futur e be ne fi c iary

fr om b ri ng ingany

le g a l a c tio n a g a ins t th e B ru c kmi lle r E state to e sta bli shthe ir alleg ed rig ht of possession to the stocks and bonds. I f t hey have no c laim ag ainst the estate, the y have no c la im

a g a in s t t h e a s s e ts o f

th e e s tate in

th e h an d s o f

it s b e n e f ic ia r y , K ir b y . T h e Children
w e r e l e g a l l y p r o h i b i t e d

f r o m e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e i r

e n t i t l e m e n t t o c e rt a i n s t o c k s an d b o n d s h e l d b y K i r b y.16

We sustain Kirby ’s sec ond issue and re verse the district court’s judg ment that Kirby conver ted persona l property

belong ing to the Children.

CO NC LU SION We reve rse the district c ourt’s judg ment and re nder judg ment that Kirby did not
c omm it c on ve rs ion

a s a matte r o f l aw. We a lso re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s awa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.

__________________________________________ Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P atterson a nd Pemberton Reverse d and Rende red Filed: Mar ch 23, 2006