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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETIETH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF CLARK M. CLIFFORD

TO BE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JANUARY 25, 1968

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•

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, Chairman

JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi

STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington

SAM J. ERVIN, in., North Carolina

HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

STEPHEN M. YOUNG, Ohio

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii.

THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire

DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland

HARRY F. BYRD, JR., Virginia

MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina

JACK MILLER, Iowa

JOHN G. TOWER, Texas

JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas

PETER H. DOMINICK, Colorado

WILLIAM H. DARDEN, Chief of Staff

CHARLES B. KIRBOW, Chief Clerk

(U)
NOMINATION OF CLARK M. CLIFFORD TO BE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THURSDAY, JANUARY 25, 1968

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room 318,

Old Senate Office Building.

Present: Senators Russell (presiding), Stennis, Symington

'

Jackson,

Cannon, Byrd (West Virginia), Young (Ohio), McIntyre, Brewster,

Byrd (Virginia), Smith, Thurmond, Miller, and Tower.

Also present: William H. Darden, chief of staff; T. Edward Braswell,

Jr., and Gordon A. Nease, professional staff members; Charles B.

Kirbow, chief clerk; and Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant clerk.

Chairman RUSSELL. The meeting will come to order.

The committee has before it this morning the nomination of the

Honorable Clark M. Clifford to be the Secretary of Defense.

Chairman RUSSELL. This nomination has not been pending for the

7 days required by the Standing Rules of our Committee but because

of the desirability of proceeding with the authorization hearings next

week the Chair, after conferring with Senator Smith, scheduled this

meeting in order that Mr. Clifford's personal appearance before us

may be accomplished without delay. In executive session the committee will discuss the timing of our action on the nomination.

Virtually all of the comments on this nomination that I have heard

have been highly complimentary to the nominee. The Chair has had

the pleasure of knowing Mr. Clifford personally for some years, and I

have a very high regard for his ability.

Even when our country is not involved in armed conflict, and confronted with the very grave dangers that we are dealing with today,

the Secretary of Defense is in a position requiring extraordinary

intellect and judgment and vitality, and I would say that today these

qualities will be required in even larger measure.

We welcome Mr. Clifford to this committee. We congratulate him

on being asked to fill a position that profoundly affects the lives of

every citizen of this republic.

(Nomination reference and biography of Clark Clifford follow:)

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

January 22, 1968.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed

Services:

Clark M. Clifford, of Maryland, to be Secretary of Defense.

JANUARY 29, 1968.

Reported by Mr. ,Brewster with the recommendation that the nomination be

confirmed.
2

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF CLARK M. CLIFFORD

Born Fort Scott, Kansas, December 25, 1906, son of the late Frank Andrew

Clifford and the late Georgia (McAdams) Clifford. Shortly thereafter the family

moved to St. Louis, Missouri.

Attended public schools and then went to college and law school at Washington

University in St. Louis, graduating in 1928.

Entered the practice of law in St. Louis in 1928 in association with J. M.

Lashly.

Volunteered for service in the United States Naval Reserve in 1943, and received commission of Lieutenant (j.g.) in early 1944. Served as special assistant

to Commander, Western Sea Frontier, later as assistant Naval Aide to the President, and as Naval Aide to the President.

Separated from the Service in 1946 with permanent rank of Captain.

Appointed Special Counsel to the President in June 1946 by President Harry

S. Truman. Served in that capacity until February 1, 1950.

In 1945, President Truman assigned him the task of conducting a study in

depth on the unification of the Armed Services. He worked with the War Department, the Department of the Navy, other departments and agencies involved,

•and the Congress for two years thereafter. There finally resulted the passage of

legislation in 1947 entitled "The National Security Act." Mr. Clifford was

one of the principal architects of this legislation.

Thereafter he served as liaison between the White House and the new Secretary

of Defense.

Again in 1949, he worked with the Secretary of Defense, other departments

and the Congress to obtain passage of the "National Security Act Amendments

of 1949", which greatly strengthened the authority of the Secretary of Defense

and changed the national military establishment into a regular executive Department of Defense.

In 1960 he served as a member of the Committee on the Defense Establishment,

appointed by Senator John F. Kennedy to survey the organization, management

and administration of the Defense Department. This committee was chaired by

Senator Stuart Symington.

In May 1961, President Kennedy appointed Mr. Clifford a member of the

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In April 1963, Dr. James

Killian of M.I.T. resigned as Chairman of the Board, because of ill health, and

Mr. Clifford was appointed Chairman by President Kennedy. He has continued

to serve in that capacity to the present time.

In 1965, Mr. Clifford made a trip to the Far East and visited certain countries

in his capacity as Chairman of the Intelligence Board.

In 1966, he served as an adviser to President Johnson at the Manila Conference.

In 1967, Mr. Clifford and General Maxwell Taylor visited a number of Southeast Asian and Pacific countries as personal emissaries of President Johnson.

Since leaving government service in February, 1950, Mr. Clifford has practiced

law in Washington, D.C. down to the present time.

Chairman RUSSELL. We have with us this morning the distinguished

Senator from Maryland, Senator Joseph Tydings, who claims Mr.

Clifford as a constituent, and we would be delighted to have the

Senator make any statement he sees fit before Mr. Clifford proceeds.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH D. TYDINGS, U.S. SENATOR FROM

THE STATE OF MARYLAND

Senator TYDINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Smith

and other distinguished members of the Committee on Armed

Services.

I am pleased to join in introducing a very distinguished Marylander,

Mr. Clark Clifford, at this hearing on his appointment to become

Secretary of Defense.

Of course, Mr. Clifford needs no actual introduction to the members

of this committee. No man in private life is better known than Clark

Clifford for his long association with national defense, with the laws

which govern it, and the men responsible for it. In Clark Clifford
3

President Johnson has nominated a man who for more than 20 years

has been an experienced and trusted advisor on national security to

Presidents, Cabinet officers, and from time to time Members of the

Congress and this committee.

My first knowledge of Clark Clifford dates from his work with my

father, the late Senator Millard Tydings. When my father was chairman Of this Armed Services Committee, Clark Clifford played a vital

role as you, Mr. Chairman, well know, and other members will recall,

in drafting the original National Security Act which unified the

armed services.

Again in 1949 he was called back to play a similar role in drafting

the first major amendments to that act, the basic document of our

defense and the charter for the very department he has now been

nominated to lead.

The extraordinary perception, ability and brilliance which earned

my father's confidence also has led Presidents Truman, Kennedy,

and Johnson to entrust to Clark Clifford the conduct of difficult,

delicate and vital matters of State such as only a handful of men in

our Nation's history have been called upon to accomplish.

Two decades of service both in crises and in complex tasks of

organizing and supervising vital governmental operations testify

more eloquently to the quality of the service Clark Clifford has brought

to our Government, and they testify as well that seldom has a man

come to the Department of Defense or indeed any other Cabinet

office so fully intimately and vigorously prepared to exercise his

responsibilities.

Clark Clifford played a major role in the creation of the Department of Defense. During the past 20 years he has also been continually

called upon by Presidents to help shape that department in the

operations and policies of other agencies essential to our national

security. He holds the high respect and admiration of Members of

Congress and private citizens throughout my State and indeed across

the spectrum of political belief and military viewpoint throughout

our Nation. I am pleased to present him and honored to know him

as a fellow Marylander, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you, Senator Tydings.

Mr. Clifford, it is the custom of this committee at this point to

request the nominees to positions requiring confirmation to give us

an oral statement in the nature of a biographical sketch, and we would

be happy to have you proceed with such statement as you may desire

to make.

STATEMENT OF CLARK M. CLIFFORD, NOMINEE TO BE SECRETARY

OF DEFENSE

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes, Senator Russell.

First, may I thank Senator Tydings for his exceedingly gracious

comments that he has made. I appreciate it so much particularly as

I had known his father for so many years.

I was born in Fort Scott, Kans., on December 25, 1906. Shortly

thereafter my parents moved to St. Louis

'

Mo., and I was raised there

and lived there until I left when I was 37 years old. I went to the

public schools in St. Louis, then to Washington University, which is
4

the leading college in St. Louis, I went both to college and to law

school, graduating from the law school in 1928.

I came to the bar in that year in St. Louis, and went into practice

with a distinguished member of the bar there, Mr. J. M. Lashly,

who sometime later became president of the American Bar Association. I volunteered for naval service in 1943, and was accepted and

given the rank of lieutenant junior grade.

One interesting chapter in my naval service, which was my first

contact with the organization of the military service, came in the

early part of 1944 when another young reserve officer and I were

assigned to go to the west coast and conduct a survey of all the naval

installations on the west coast. It took some 4 months to complete

that survey. Thereafter, we reported to the Assistant Chief of Naval

Operations, and as a result of that report, those units on the west

coast were all amalgamated under the heading of the Western Sea

Frontier. Adm. Royal Ingersoll was called in from his assignment as

commander-in-chief of the Atlantic Fleet and given the title Commander Western Sea Frontier. This other junior officer and I then

went on his staff and participated for the next year in unifying all the

naval installations on the west coast. This was an exceedingly valuable

experience for me to have at that early stage.

I came to Washington sometime later and went into the Naval

Aid's Office in the White House, and within a year became Naval

Aid to President Truman.

Thereafter, in June of 1946, I was made special counsel to President

Truman and served in that capacity for almost 4 years. My major

function was assisting the President, particularly in the field of

foreign policy and national security.

As previously mentioned it was one of my functions to conduct a

study and work on the legislation, together with the Congress, in

passing the first Unification Act in 1947.

Sometime after that, perhaps a year later, Secretary Forrestal

came to the White House and asked that I go in with him to President

Truman, at which time Secretary Forrestal demonstrated the kind

of man he was by saying:

I was wrong in opposing unification as Secretary of the Navy. I am serving as

Secretary of Defense, but I do not have sufficient power to perform the task.

I wish now to go to work to strengthen the power of the Secretary of Defense,

so that he can credibly perform the jobs.

Meetings were then started, and greatly assisted by Secretary

Forrestal, it led to the amendments of 1949 at which time the Defense

establishment became a real department, and instead of the

Secretary of Defense being merely a coordinator he became actually

the manager of the Department of Defense.

I remained in President Truman's service until 1950, at which time

I resigned from government service, went into the practice of law here

in Washington, D.C., and have continued to practice law down to the

present time.

I was called upon by President Kennedy for assistance from time

to time. One assignment which was valuable to me because of the

research it entailed, was to prepare for President Kennedy—the then

Senator Kennedy—in the summer of 1960, a blueprint of takeover

of the executive branch of the Government in the event that he was

elected. It necessitated a lengthy survey of all the different agencies
5

and departments so that in the event he was elected he would have a

course of conduct which he could follow. That was delivered to him

the day after the election, when he and his associates were up in

Hyannisport.

Thereafter, I served President Kennedy as the liaison between the

incoming Kennedy administration and the outgoing Eisenhower

administration. I had the privilege at that time of sitting in the

meetings between President-elect Kennedy and President Eisenhower

in going over the problems that existed.

Even then Vietnam was a problem. Laos also was a very serious

problem. The manner in which we were to meet the military responsibilities of the period were discussed in detail. I found that also a very

useful experience.

I have touched, Mr. Chairman, upon those phases of my experience

here which might have some bearing upon the position for which

President Johnson has nominated me.

The only other comment I have, Mr. Chairman, is that I have written a letter to Chairman Russell, which was delivered to him yesterday,

and for the benefit of the record, I would like to read that letter, if

I have the chairman's consent to do so.

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, indeed, you may proceed.

Mr. CLIFFORD (reading).

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,

Chairman, Armed Services Committee,

U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN: By this letter, I wish to set forth the manner in which I intend

to dispose of my private business affairs should I be confirmed by the Senate for

the office of Secretary of Defense. It is my intention to comply, in every detail,

with the law and the proprieties involving the assuming of this office.

If confirmed, I shall completely sever the relationship I have had with the law

-firm of Clifford & Miller, and I will withdraw from the private practice of law.

I have reached an understanding with my partners that, in the event of my

withdrawal, we will agree upon a fixed sum that will represent my equity in the

firm. I will not share in any fees received by the firm after my withdrawal, nor

will any development or occurrence taking place thereafter affect, in any manner,

the fixed sum agreed upon.

I shall withdraw from the business ventures I am now participating in, and

I will sell all securities in companies doing business with the Department of

Defense. I have conferred at length with representatives of the General Counsel's

Office of the Defense Department and have been informed that certain securities

may be held.

I attach herito a list of those securities which, with the consent of your committee, I shell continue to hold.

I shall reiign from the board of directors of the National Bank of Washington,

and from .,he board of trustees of Washington University in St. Louis, my alma

mater.

By taking the above actions, it is my intention to comply fully and completely

with the letter and spirit of our laws concerning conflicts of interest.

• Respectfully yours,

CL ARK M. CLIFFORD.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Clifford, have you placed any limitation

on the period of time that you are willing to serve as Secretary of

Defense?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I have not, Mr. Chairman.

When President Johnson asked that I serve, he did not place any

limitation, and I might say I am ready and prepared to serve for

whatever length of time he chooses me to do so.
6

Chairman RUSSELL. You realize better than most of our people

that if the Congress is to legislate effectively in the field of national

defense, it is necessary that we have the full and unintimidated views

of the senior military officers, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Can you assure the committee that these officers will not be discouraged from giving the committee their real views or not be penalized for giving their real views, even when they are in conflict with

your views or those of the President?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I would intend to make that the policy of the

Department of Defense; that when this committee calls upon members

of the military to testify before it, they shall be permitted to give

their frank and candid opinions on those subjects inquired into by this

committee.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Clifford, your predecessors have followed

the practice of meeting regularly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Have you had time to make a decision as to whether or not you would

care to continue that practice?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes. I have talked to Secretary McNamara in that

regard. I shall continue the practice of meeting regularly with them,

both formally and informally. I intend to maintain a close relationship with the Joint Chiefs.

Chairman RUSSELL. In 1960, I believe, you served as a member of a

committee that was to advise the then Senator Kennedy on the

reorganization of the Department of Defense.

As I recall, the report of that committee recommended that all of

the military departments be abolished and that the Secretary of

Defense directly administer all of the Armed Forces. What are your

present views with regard to that policy?

Mr. CLIFFORD. The major thrust of that report of the committee,

that became known as the Symington committee—

Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. CLIFFORD. It was appointed by Senator Kennedy in the fall

of 1960. The major thrust was an effort to recognize the change that

had taken place in the conduct of war in modern times, in the mid20th century.

Our concern was that whereas in World War I and II, this country

had some 18 months of prior notice in which to become prepared,

we recognized that in any future war, instead of 18 months, we might

very well have 18 minutes.

Also, we were deeply concerned over the length of time that it took

the armed services to agree upon weapons systems. Long delays were

taking place while arguments were being conducted among the various

services.

In the third place, we also felt a concern over the delay that occurred

between the time that a weapons system was selected and the time

that it actually became operative.

So this group of men, all of whom, I might add, had had substantial

experience in the Department of Defense, made an effort to seek the

ultimate and final solution which might find the answer to these particular problems. The effort was to establish within the office of the

Secretary of Defense sufficient power so that these decisions could

be made rapidly.

As you suggest, Senator Russell, the recommendation was made

that the three services, as separate departments should be abolished,
7

but that they should be retained as separate entities, under which

plan the authority would flow directly from the President to the Secretary of Defense, to the chief of the service. That was 7 years ago.

I might say at this time that in the past 7 years, with the continuing

experience I have had with the Defense Department, I have now

changed my mind. I do not recommend that far-reaching type of

change. I think we must still work towards the goals, referred to in

the report, but I do not recommend, with the additional knowledge

that I now have, the changing of the services from departments.

I would be perfectly willing at this time to continue the present

system as it exists and attempt to build upon it.

I might say, in conclusion on this particular point, that none of

the recommendations that the Symington committee made cOuld have

been carried out without the approval of the Congress of the United

States.

Chairman RUSSELL. You have been rather close to the Department

of Defense over the last 7 years. Do you have any remaining doubt

about the authority of the Secretary of Defense to control the decisions

of the Department or the subdivisions thereof?

Mr. CLIFFORD. No, sir. These last 7 years have been an interesting illustration of the ability of the Secretary to utilize the powers

that presently exist in order to make the principal decisions, that is,

of course, in conjunction with the President of the United States.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I believe you have been designated as chairman of a civilian group that has some supervisory

direction or connection with the Central Intelligence Agency. There

has been talk of abolishing the CIA or severely limiting or restricting

its operations.

Are you willing to give the committee your opinion as to the

effectiveness of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes, Senator.

I believe it might be of interest if I took just a minute to tell about

the birth of this organization.

Chairman RUSSELL. Take as much time as you desire.

Mr. CLIFFORD. That is the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

After the Bay of Pigs incident, President Kennedy asked that I

come over. He said at the time that he felt he could not survive another

catastrophe of that kind. He said:

The decision I made was based upon the information that I was given. That

information was wrong. The reason the information was wrong was because the

intelligence upon which it was based was incorrect.

Then, he said:

We cannot conduct the affairs of this Nation with that kind of machinery.

He added:

I am naming nine men who have had a lengthy experience in this entire field,

and I am assigning to this group the following three responsibilities: One, I want

the entire foreign intelligence activities of this Nation investigated in great depth;

second, I want this Board to come back to me with recommendations for the

improvement of that operation; third, I want the Board to be a continuing body

so that the Board can assure me that recommendations put into effect are actually

carried out.

S9-748-68--2
He said:

We all know of so many instances in which a board has been called, they make

a report, all the men go home, the report is put in a pigeon hole and nothing

happens.

The Board was constituted in the spring of 1961. Dr. James Killian,

the head of MIT, was Chairman. He continued to serve as chairman

until he became quite ill 2 years later. He had to resign, and President

Kennedy appointed me Chairman, and I have continued to serve in

that capacity.

We have become intimately acquainted with the operations of the

CIA. We recommended the establishment of the DIA, which is the

Defense Intelligence Agency.

We have become knowledgeable with many types of intelligence

that involve the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission,

the services; that is, the three military services.

In the last 7 years, I believe that this is in the record, we have made

215 recommendations to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson for changes

in the conduct of the foreign intelligence operations of this country.

We believe that it has been a period of substantial improvement.

Getting to your specific question, Senator Russell, I believe it is

necessary that the Central Intelligence Agency be continued. I believe

its operations have been proved to be valuable. I believe we have in

that agency many excellent professionals who serve in exceedingly

difficult tasks at compensation which certainly is far less than the

risks that they take. There are many dedicated men in this field.

I should like to suggest also that with the world in the present

posture that it is in, this Nation cannot endure without the best type

of intelligence operation that we can furnish to our country. I believe

that we have not reached that point, but I know that we have made

substantial progress.

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, as an outstanding lawyer you,

of course, are thoroughly familiar with the constitutional responsibilities of Congress in the field of national defense and in the operations of the armed services.

Could you give us just a brief statement as to your concept of the

proper relations with the committees of Congress in this field and the

obligations of a Secretary of Defense to those committees to enable

them to perform their function.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes, Senator.

I am conscious, as you suggest, of the requirements of the Constitution of the United States and the statutes that have been enacted.

I would expect that as Secretary of Defense I would have the

closest type of cooperation with the appropriate committees of the

Congress. I believe that at this particular time in our country's

history that such close association and coordination is more necessary

than ever before.

Some of you have been here longer than I, but I might say that I

do not recall a more perilous time confronting this Nation than that

which confronts it today.

I would expect and hope that as Secretary of Defense we might

approach these problems together, and with all the help that we

possibly can muster so that we can find the solutions to those problems.

If, by chance, any member of this committee should come to the

conclusion that such coordination and cooperation is not all that it

might be, I would consider it a personal favor if he would tell me.
9

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Clifford.

Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, do you favor cessation of bombing of North Vietnam?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I do not, Senator Smith. I believe that each time

the question of the bombing of North Vietnam has come up, it has to

be evaluated under the circumstances that exist at that time.

In the past, when it has come up, and on occasion I have been present

at some of those discussions, I have suggested that we ascertain what

the result of such cessation would be.

Up until now I have felt that it would be damaging to our cause.

The time might come, Senator, and I would hope that it would, when

it would be presented to us in such a manner that I could agree that

it was appropriate for there to be a suspension in the bombing. That

time certainly has not yet arrived as far as I am concerned.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Clifford, in view of the piracy in the capture of

the U.S.S. Pueblo, should the Reserves be mobilized?

Mr. CLIFFORD. The circumstances surrounding the incident which

are considered to be exceedingly grave are now under the closest

kind of consideration by the President and his chief advisers. He

asked that I sit in the meetings yesterday which were held from early

morning until late at night. I did so. That subject and a number of

others, Senator, are under immediate consideration.

If you would permit me to say so, I believe that I would not be at

liberty to comment on it at this time.

Senator SMITH. Under what conditions, if you care to state, do

you believe that the Reserves should be called up?

Mr. CLIFFORD. My answer would be general in that regard. If we

reach the stage where the threat to this Nation's safety is substantially

increased over that which exists now. This could come about as a

result of developments in the Far East or it could come about as a

result of developments following the incident involving the Pueblo.

At any stage, that this country's safety and security require it,

because of this type of incident which would indicate that additional

trouble lies ahead, I think the President could well call up the Reserves.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Clifford, President Johnson resigned from the

Naval Reserve, and it is my understanding he did so because he felt

because of his position it was appropriate for him to do so.

You are a captain in the Naval Reserve. Do you feel that you should

follow the policy of the President and resign from the Naval Reserve

upon becoming Secretary of Defense?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I had not thought so, Senator. I consider that at

my age, 61, my rank in the Naval Reserve is nothing more than an

honor. I would not expect ever to be called to active duty.

As a matter of fact, if confirmed, by the time I have finished this

job, I doubt if there will be anything left that I will be able to do.

[Laughter.]

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Clifford, I do not mean to unduly compliment you, but I do not know of any appointment since I have been

around that was hailed with more general satisfaction than was yours,

especially in this time of stress and strain, and I think it was of

particular satisfaction to those who are personally familiar with your

competence.
10

I think, you are coming to the second most difficult job in the

Government, second only to the Presidency and, perhaps, the second

most difficult job in the world. Senator Russell has aptly and ably

covered the two points that I had foremost in mind, and I thought

your answers were very good indeed.

First was the question concerning our efforts to get the facts, as

well as the honest, forth right, opinion of the military officers who

have been appointed to these top positions. You answered in the

affirmative about their having full leeway to give the facts as they

saw them, and their judgments as they formed them.

I assume that would apply, too, to many lesser officers who might

testify to highly important matters?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes Senator.

In that regard, I might sound a caveat. I would expect to follow

the practice that before important decisions are made within the Department of Defense, the military will be consulted and their views

will be given the most careful consideration.

Then, the decision will be made. They have the right, if they choose,

to come before this committee or any other congTessional committee.

I must say, however, that when the decision is made and their views

have been considered, but the decision is a final one, I expect they

will comply with that decision.

I do not believe a department can operate under any other circumstances.

Senator STENNIS. I fully agree.

You have stated it well. Another point is the general relations with

the Congress, and you have already covered that.

I think this committee feels this relationship should be one of mutual

confidence and two-way communication and I understand you fully

subscribe to that idea, too. We want this feeling of mutual confidence

and a mutual role.

Mr. CLIFFORD. I subscribe to that principle without qualification,

Senator.

Senator STENNIS. Yes. That is reassuring.

I believe that conditions have driven us to a situation where we

we are going to have to utilize more and more the trained talent that

we have with men in the Reserve and National Guard and keep them

in readiness.

I believe the demand for expensive weapons and the expense of

carrying on the regular Establishment is emphasizing the necessity

to have more of our strength represented in reserve forces, and I

think further, with all deference, I have not found many general

officers in the regular services who are very liberal in providing money

for these Reserve units, and I think that it is natural.

We passed a law last year in which we tried to recognize the need

for the Reserve, and for their equipment and supplies to be stepped

up, and that is written into the law as fast as it is possible, and the

officials in office then gave us their solemn promise in hearings that

they would carry it out.

Now, there is a change of personnel. I am sure you do recognize

the need for a strong, well-equipped, well-supplied number of units

of our Reserve system, including the Guard?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes; I do, and I have been gratified that what

appeared to be a substantial difference of opinion back in 1964 and

1965, now seems to be resolved.
11

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLIFFORD. And I would hope that from that basis we could

go on and build and strengthen our Reserve Forces in the future.

Senator STENNIS. That is a very fine answer.

Your purpose would be to carry out the spirit and letter of that

law.

Mr. CLIFFORD. That would certainly be my attitude in a general

way. I would be unable at this time to give specifics because I must

learn more about it.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLIFFORD. I am conscious of the fact that there is a major

strain upon how much of the dollar there is that can be divided among

the various activities. That would, of course, have to be watched with

great care.

Senator STENNIS. I am entirely satisfied with the answer. I was

not going to ask you for anything specific at this point.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I would gladly support this

nomination.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions. The capacity of the nominee to handle the job has been well

reflected in his replies to the questions that you and other members

of the committee have asked him this morning.

I congratulate President Johnson on the wisdom of this nomination,

and I congratulate the nominee on his courage and patriotism in

accepting it.

I have no further comment.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Miller.

, Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, I congratulate you on your appointment. It is nice

to have you before the committee.

Do you favor a merger of the Reserves and the National Guard?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I do not know enough about the background of that

entire subject give any decision on it at this time.

I know at one time it was suggested. I know that there was a substantial portion of opinign that thought that it would be exceedingly

difficult to do because of the inherent differences existing between the

two organizations. How you are able to merge the State organization,

which is headed by State officials, with a Federal organization which,

in effect, is headed by Federal officials, would seem to offer some extraordinarily difficult problems.

I would say that I do not have any specific opinion at this time,

other than I believe it would take quite a persuasive argument to

convince me that there should be a merger.

Senator MILLER. And if you were inclined to be persuaded, would

it be your intention to informally confer with key Members of Congress

on this to take some counsel on it so that the rapport between Congress

and your office would be maintained on this point?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes, because I believe if such a merger were contemplated, I doubt that it could be successful if it did not have the

support of the Reserve, the National Guard, and, of course, the

Congress. You might do it, but it would be in name only. To be

successful it would have to have a broad range of support.

Senator MILLER. Thank you.
12

You have a high regard for the National Intelligence Board

estimates?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Ordinarily I find them sound. I know of no better

system that we have been able to devise. Those estimates are reached

by human beings, and they are subject to the same human frailties

that are present in the decisions that all of us reach.

Over the years I would say generally they have been quite good.

There have been times that we would have wished that they would

have been better, but generally, I think, that they can be given good

marks.

Senator MILLER. Within the last 2 or 3 years would you say that

you had disagreed with any of the estimates?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I do not recall any basic fundamental disagreement.

I know there have been times that I have disagreed insofar as degree

is concerned.

Senator MILLER. Thank you.

Now, Mr. Clifford, you participated in the Manila conference. To

refresh my memory on this, is it true that one of the agreements

reached at the Manila conference was, if North Vietnam withdrew

from South Vietnam, withdrew its forces from South Vietnam, that

within 6 months thereafter the United States would withdraw its

military forces?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I recall the 6-month period.

Senator MILLER. Now, if your military advisers told you that we

could not withdraw our military forces under such circumstances

without the probable loss of South Vietnam to the Vietcong, would

it be your purpose to try to obtain a change in that agreement?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Senator, I believe no change in that agreement

would be necessary. There is protective language in there which could

be and would be very valuable to us.

The language, as I recall it, and it has been a year or more, sets up

certain condition precedents. One is, if the North Vietnamese withdraw; the second condition is, if all infiltration of men, material and

supplies, that is, if all infiltration ceases. There is a third qualification

that is a general one, that if it seems—this is a little too broad, but if

it seems safe to do so, that within 6 months our forces would withdraw.

So that I am not disturbed by the language because it is guarded,

those conditions are such that I assure you if there is any doubt at

all about the ability of South Vietnam to defend itself I would certainly cast my vote that we stay until we are sure that they can take

care of themselves.

None of us are going to have the sacrifices that we have made there

come to naught by that kind of withdrawal.

I say, however, that in that regard, one of our major tasks during

the present process is to build up the South Vietnamese strength.

Some progress has been made in that regard. I would hope greater

progress and more rapid progress would be made, so that my hope is

the day will come when they will be able to defend themselves.

Senator MILLER. Thank you for that excellent answer.

Would you please tell us what is your concept of our objectives in

the war in Vietnam?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes, sir.

First, we have a limited objective. Our limited objective is to assure

to the South Vietnamese people the right of self-determination, we
13

want to give them the right to select the type of government they

choose and to conduct it in the manner that they wish, without their

being forced by subjugation from within, or by application of force

from without, to have another kind of life in their country.

In that regard, it is not and certainly must not be our intention

to acquire any territory of any sort. I certainly don't wish to destroy

North Vietnam. I wish only, as far as my opinion is concerned, to

convince them they will never prevail in their efforts to conquer South

Vietnam. When that point is understood by them, and they realize

that we are determined and we are persistent and we are patient, then

the day will come when I believe that they find out the game is not

worth the candle and then I think we will have peace.

Senator MILLER. If those objectives that you have detailed are not

attained, if anyone of them is not attained, would you conclude that

we have not fulfilled our commitment to South Vietnam?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I am not a prophet or seer. I can't look that far

into the future. I do not know what is going to take place there. I

do not know what our obligations are going to be over the world. I could

say only that I believe that we shall continue until we have obtained

self-determination there, and I do not hear it suggested any place

within the executive branch that there should be any other goal. I

don't know any better way to answer your question.

Senator MILLER. Well, the question comes up about a possible

negotiated settlement of this war. It would seem that in view of what

you have said our objectives are, that the negotiated settlement must

encompass those objectives, otherwise we would have negotiated

away one or more of our objectives. And that, therefore, any negotiated settlement must encompass those objectives, otherwise, we

would have failed in our commitments.

Mr. CLIFFORD. I understand it now. I am in accord with what I

understand to be the thought that you are expressing. I am not in

favor of negotiations just for the sake of negotiations. I am not in.

favor of forcing upon the South Vietnamese people any kind of government that they do not voluntarily and independently choose. So that

I believe as we enter into that phase, that we, together with the South

Vietnamese, must find the answer which will preserve the independence of South Vietnam. If we do not do that, I believe we have not

reached our goal.

Senator MILLER. There has been much talk about winning the war

and there appears to be some confusion over this.

Would you say if we attained those minimal objectives we would

have won the war insofar as our objectives are concerned?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I would say generally, yes. It is a different kind of

war and that is one reason why it is difficult perhaps, for the American

people to understand it. We are fighting a limited war. We are not

fighting to destroy the enemy. We are fighting to persuade the enemy

to withdraw from South Vietnam and to leave it alone.

But I might say that insofar as a military victory is concerned, I

believe we have already attained a type of victory in South Vietnam.

I believe that our presence there, our successful presence there, has

many times justified the cost to us in our men and in our treasure.

As one travels in Southeast Asia he finds that this is the general

attitude. They have no hope in the French. The British are withdrawing from Malaysia and Singapore. If it were not for the United

States, there would be no hope there. To me it is not a question of
14

years, it is a question of weeks and months, if we weren't there until

Southeast Asia, nation by nation, succumbed. That is not happening

now, and it is not happening, in my opinion, because we are there,

and because we have extended this shield, and I believe we must

continue to do so.

Senator MILLER. Mr. Clifford, are you satisfied with the way the

war is being conducted now? And I think a yes or no answer would

suffice and I don't wish to ask you to go into specifics. I think I can

understand why you prefer not to.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Well, I thank you for the latter comment because

my answer is yes.

Senator MILLER. May I say, have you had an opportunity to

review the report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,

the recent report on the conduct of the air campaign over North

Vietnam?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I have not.

Senator MILLER. May I respectfully request that you take a

little time and read that one of these days?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I thank you and I shall certainly do so.

Senator MILLER. Are you satisfied that our air campaign over

North Vietnam has been effective in that it has impeded and slowed

the flow of troops, ammunition and supplies from the North to the

South?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes, I believe that it has. I believe it has served

some extremely useful purposes. Its major purpose, as you suggest,

has been to impede the flow of men and supplies, munitions and

armament to the South, and I might say, in that regard, the intelligence reports tell an exceedingly dramatic story of the value of the

bombing. We have information that plans have been made to launch

offenses in South Vietnam and they are either canceled or delayed

because of the lack of munitions and armament that have not reached

the forces so that the plans could be carried out. That is the major

benefit.

The second benefit is that over 500,000 persons are devoting their

time and effort to repairing damage that is taking place as a result

of our efforts to impede the flow of traffic into South Vietnam. Those

men are devoting their time to repairing rails, repairing plants,

repairing roads. If those men weren't engaged in that activity, many

of them would be fighting in South Vietnam at the expense of our

men whom we have there.

Also the bombing has been very effective in reducing the rolling

stock that North Vietnam has. The figures on the number of box cars

and locomotives and ships that have been destroyed are exceedingly

impressive. If one has any doubt at all about the efficacy of the

bombing, he need only direct his attention to what was published

in the press concerning the last 4-day TET holiday. Observation

planes took pictures of certain ports in North Vietnam one hour

before the TET holiday. There wasn't a ship in any of those ports.

One hour after the pause began in one port there were 42 ships. They

had spent months and months preparing the vessels, preparing

locomotives and rolling stock for the four-day suspension. The

volume of material that poured from North Vietnam into South

Vietnam was almost incalculable. It was in the tens of thousands of

tons, and it doesn't flow like that when our men in the Air Force

and in the Navy keep the disruptions going.
15

Senator MILLER. And then would you agree that this activity has

placed a ceiling on the numbers of enemy troops in the South or at

the DMZ which can be maintained?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I am not too clear on that. I don't know the figure.

I would say that it would generally follow, because we know that

certainly a difficult ceiling is being reached in that regard. Within

the last few months some prisoners who have been taken have been

15 years of age and some of them as young as 13 years of age.

Senator MILLER. There isn't any doubt in your mind, Mr. Clifford,

that a cessation of bombing under present circumstances would lead

to more casualties on our side and the side of our allies than would

otherwise take place, is there?

Mr. CLIFFORD. When you preface your question by saying under

present circumstances, I agree. Under present circumstances because

the North Vietnamese are willing to make no concessions whatsoever

for a cessation of the bombing I agree. It is my hope that the time

will come, and the sooner the better, when the North Vietnamese

will indicate some reciprocal action. We have not asked for much.

The President has placed it at almost an irreducible minimum. He

has said "If you will agree to talk promptly, and if you will agree

also not to take advantage of the suspension we will stop the bombing." It seems to me this is a minimal requirement. They have chosen

not to accept it. My hope is that they soon will, and I would be as

happy as anyone, to see the bombing stopped. But in my opinion it

can't stop with their present wholly and completely intransigent

attitude.

Senator MILLER. Mr. Clifford, as Secretary of Defense, would it

be your policy to regularly confer not only with the chairman of the

JCS, but with the other members of the JCS?

Mr. CLIFFORD. That would be my policy. I would expect to have a

regular meeting at a set time each week with the Chairman and the

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that there might be a full

exchange of views. In between such meetings obviously they would

have constant access to the Secretary of Defense.

Senator MILLER. I recognize and I appreciate that, but apart from

the access would it be your policy to invite the other members of the

JCS for informal visits from time to time to find out their views on

matters pertaining to their services in the conduct of the war or on

matters of importance.

Mr. CLIFFORD. I think it would be difficult to say ahead of time

how that would be effectuated. I would say only that I would intend to

maintain close liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator MILLER. Would it be your policy to invite not only the

Chairman of the JCS but the other members of the JCS to go with you

to the White House for conferences with the commander-in-chief on

very important matters affecting their services?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I would reserve the right to make that decision.

In those instances in which I thought their help would be valuable I

would take them. In those instances in which I thought their help

would not be valuable I would not take them.

Senator MILLER. Would it be your policy that the President should

himself invite not only the Chairman but the other members of the

JCS to confer with him on vital matters affecting their service, espe-
16

cially where you might be in disagreement? If such a disagreement

should occur?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I doubt that it would work that way, Senator. I

believe that the President looks to the Secretary of Defense as the

one man with whom he is in contact with reference to that Department. I might say, and I think this answers your question maybe

even beyond what you had in mind, I would consider it my duty to

the President and to this country, that if I disagreed on policy with the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would take the Joint Chiefs of Staff with me to

the President so that he might hear the disagreement.

Senator MILLER. And that would include not only the Chairman,

but the other members of the JCS?

Mr. CLIFFORD. If that seemed appropriate under the circumstances.

Senator MILLER. Now, do you believe—about the relations between

your office and the Commander in Chief, Admiral Sharp in the

Pacific and General Westmoreland, would it be your policy to confer

with them directly from time to time?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes, it would be. I think Admiral Sharp is due to

be relieved in a very few months but I would expect to maintain close

association with him and with his successor and with General Westmoreland. I might say that in my visits to Vietnam, I have already

established a relationship with General Westmoreland which, certainly

as far as I am concerned, has proved most valuable.

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Clifford. Mr. Chairman, I have

about 10 more minutes of questions and I do not think that it is fair

to the other members for me to put it at this time so I would rather

have the other members hal, e their opportunity and then come back

to me if that is permissible?

Chairman RUSSELL. All right, sir, you will have an opportunity to

ask the questions you desire. Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, first, I want to commend the

Secretary-designate for the articulate and forthright and, therefore,

most effective answers that he has given us to the questions that have

been put to him this morning. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, I

have known Mr. Clifford for 20 years. I know of no one more eminently

qualified for this high position by reason of his long and broad interest

and concern and experience in national security affairs than the Secretary-designate.

I want to ask just two questions, Mr. Clifford.

There has been one area in which there has been substantial difference between the Congress and the Defense Department over the

past 17 to 18 years. This is in the area of nuclear propulsion. You may

recall that in the 1950's the Congress took the lead to obtain nuclearpropelled submarines. In fact it was the Congress that forced the

cancellation of conventional type submarines and in lieu thereof

authorized and appropriated funds for nuclear propulsion. This was

in the 1950's.

In the 1960's, we have had a fight over the question of whether we

should have nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers. Again, the Congress

took the lead. The Department of Defense has finally come around to

support nuclear propulsion for aircraft carriers. Now, we are in a

dispute over the question of large surface vessels that are needed to

support and escort the carriers—whether these vessels should be

nuclear propelled.
17

i. would hope that you would look into this matter very carefully.

I am personally convinced that the news of the last 2 days in which

the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise was available to be assigned

to the area of North Korea, brings home once again the importance

and value of this type. of vessel, together with the value of the supporting nuclear propelled surface ships. Some of these factors, it seems to

me, Mr. Secretary, cannot all be spelled out in pure mathematics and

in terms of quantitative cost effectiveness studies. The fact that we

could move this carrier at full speed and have it off the shores of

North Korea in a relatively short period of time, I think, points up

the need to take into consideration the value of operational factors

and experience. I would only express to you the hope and wish that

you would review this matter carefully.

We have two nuclear frigates that Congress has authorized that

the Defense Department has not proceeded to construct.

Do you have any views on this at this time that you wish to express?

Mr. CLIFFORD. They would be views that would touch only on the

periphery of the problem. I know that it has existed. I know there

have been two schools of thought with reference to it. I know that

the question of cost of nuclear powered ships has been a matter of

concern to the budget officers in the government. I am conscious of the

fact that there is now a plan to build some more nuclear powered.

ships. I know that we have one or two frigates. I have some recollection that perhaps there are five nuclear-powered 'destroyers that are

being considered. I have the impression that there is a greater acceptance now of the concept of nuclear powered vessels. I could say only,

Senator, that I would be glad certainly to get into it in depth and would

look forward to the opportunity of discussing it with you further.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I wouldn't expect you to give a definitive answer to this problem

because naturally there are areas involved, that are not necessarily

"black or white" in my sense of that term.

Mr. Secretary, I know that you have followed very closely the

tremendous progress that the Soviet Union has made, especially in

the last 2 or 3 years, in the field of strategic weapons. I take it that

you are deeply concerned with the growing capability of the Soviet

Union vis-a-vis the United States in this regard.

Mr. CLIFFORD. I am greatly concerned, Senator, and I believe it

is a matter that the Defense Department and this committee must

give top priority to; I think we are all conscious of the fact that the

margin that previously existed is now in the process of being

diminished.

Senator JACKSON. And, therefore, it would be your policy, I take it,

to insist that we have the kind of nuclear deterrent that really deters

in a given situation?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Certainly.

And I would consider 

Senator JACKSON. I refer to a strategical nuclear deterrent that

is really effective and one that can indeed deter any adversary.

Mr. CLIFFORD. I shan't take the time now, I could not speak strongly

enough, however, with reference to that responsibility which I think

rests upon this committee and the Secretary of Defense. Our primary

joint responsibility is to assure this Nation that it shall be able to

-survive no matter what the strength of any of its enemies.
18

Senator JACKSON. That is an excellent answer.

Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the President on this nomination and to congratulate and extend best wishes to the Secretarydesignate.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Cannon.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, I want to join my colleagues in congratulating you

and commending the President for his nomination of you to this

very, very important position.

Mr. Clifford, it has been widely reported that the Defense Department planners have considered several military options that are open

to the United States, should diplomatic efforts fail to free the Pueblo.

Among those under most consideration, according to the reports, are

attempt to storm the Wonsan Harbor and forcibly retrieve the

vessel; seizure or destruction of one or more North Korean ships

as retaliation, or for potential bargaining power; aerial bombing and

sinking of the Pueblo at the Wonsan docks to, deny Communist

counter intelligence teams any further access to any electronic intelligence-gathering equipment that may be on board; or a naval blockade

of Wonsan and, perhaps, other North Korean ports.

Now, do I understand from your answer to Senator Smith that

you prefer not to discuss any of the alternatives that might be available

to the United States in view of the fact that they are still under

active consideration?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Yes; that would be my answer and must, of

necessity-, be my answer, Senator.

I would say only that I know the President is making every effort

to find a diplomatic solution because if one will analyze those courses

of action which you have just enumerated, none of those alternatives

get our 83 men back, and the President would like very much to get

these 83 Americans out of the hands of the North Koreans. I believe

that he will make every effort along the diplomatic front to achieve

that purpose.

Senator CANNON. IS it a fact, then, that in your opinion any overt

military move which we might be able to take now could very likely

jeopardize the safety and lives of the men on the Pueblo?

Mr. CLIFFORD. That is entirely possible, and I think that the President must be convinced that he has exhausted the diplomatic alternative before any other action is taken.

Senator CANNON. Without getting into possible solutions to the

problem, I would like to ask, in view of what has happened, whether

or not it would be your intention upon taking office immediately to

review the decisionmaking process and the authorities granted that

would permit a lightly armed U.S. ship, without protection, to sail

close to hostile shores even though in international waters?

Mr. CLIFFORD. The answer to that would be a simple "Yes." I

believe that the policy in that regard should be examined with meticulous care and might very well be reevaluated.

Senator CANNON. Mr. Clifford, many major decisions have been

made by your predecessor, and acted upon, or at least partially acted

upon, which are still under heavy controversy, such as the ABM

ystem, the nuclear ships that Senator Jackson inquired about, and

most active at the present moment, the controversy over the Navy

version of the F-111.
19

I would like to ask whether or not it is your intention to reevaluate

these major decisions or do you expect to carry out the decisions that

have been made by your predecessor and partially or completely

acted upon?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I believe it depends, Senator, upon the degree of

development or progress or the stage at which any of those controversial services have reached.

I think it is the responsibility of any incoming Secretary of Defense

to evaluate the situation that exists as of that time. I believe the

President is entitled to his independent judgment as to how he views

these particular matters.

I would expect to give him that independent judgment so that he

could take that into consideration, together with the judgment of

those who had gone before.

Senator CANNON. Thank you very much for your answers and for

your fine appearance here today. Again, my congratulations, and

as a member of this committee I look forward to working with you

in the future.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, I want to congratulate you upon being appointed

Secretary of Defense. You have a fine record, and I wish you much

success with the heavy responsibilities that rest upon you.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. I have just been notified that the President

has called up the Reserves. I do not know whether you knew that

was coming or not. Did you?

Mr, CLIFFORD. I was not at liberty to discuss it.

Senator THURMOND. I have always been a strong exponent of the

Reserves. I was a member of the Reserve for 36 years, and I have

always felt we should maintain a well-trained, well-equipped, combatready Reserve. These men can be maintained for about, I believe, onesixth or one-seventh the cost of the regular services.

From your past record I would assume that you are a strong supporter of a strong Reserve?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I support a strong Reserve. I had an experience as

a Naval Reserve officer which led me to an understanding and appreciation of their importance. I would expect to continue to support the

Reserve as one of the major elements of this country's strength.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, some of our Military forces,

not committed to the Southeast Asian Theater, have been cannibalized to supply men and equipment for the war in Vietnam. I presume

that as early as possible you will take steps to see that these units are

resupplied so that they will be ready in every respect to meet any

emergency that arises?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I do not have enough information in that regard.

I do not know why the cannibalization took place. I would have to

say only that I would be interested in maintaining the highest degree

of readiness, but I would have to have more facts.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Clifford, while we were delaying the

installation of our antiballistic-missile defenses, the Soviets tested

space weapons, experimented with the orbital bomb, and installed

antiballistic-missile defenses near major cities. While we cut back
20

our megatonnage delivery capability, the Soviets increased theirs.

In short, much of our nuclear advantage has slipped away.

Do you have any plans concerning these vital parts of our national

defense? I presume you will look into every facet of the things that I

mentioned and take such steps as are necessary to keep the United

States' advantage.

Mr. CLIFFORD. I should like to repeat, that despite the prominence

of the Vietnamese war, such incidents as the Pueblo, and other exacerbations of this kind, the statement that you have made constitutes

the basic, fundamental purpose and responsibility of the Secretary

of Defense. If we are derelict in this area nothing else really makes

very much difference.

We have made an examination this past year in depth in the Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board to ascertain if we were getting the

necessary information so that we could accurately gauge the strength

of other nations. I have some background in this regard, and I intend

to get into it much more deeply because of the basic significance of

this very point.

Senator THURMOND. I am very pleased to hear you say that.

Mr. Clifford, it is my understanding that the Navy version of the

F-111 is too heavy for aircraft carrier operations, and that modifications to lighten the aircraft results in poor performance, that is,

below specifications.

I presume that you will look into this situation and receive

suggestions from the Military people and experts who have worked

on this matter, and that you would keep your mind open and take

whatever course is necessary, even to the extent of cancelling those

contracts if it is in the best interests of our country in order to give

us an acceptable plane that can perform its mission for the Navy?

Mr. CLIFFORD. On that subject, I know only what I have read in

the newspapers. I have no independent information.

I know it is important. I know it is controversial. Because of those

factors, I would intend to learn all about it that there is to learn,

and take those actions which appear to be in the best interests of

our country.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Clifford, you may recall that in 1961 and

1962 an investigation was conducted on censorship rules. We have

all had experience with some degree of managed news from the Pentagon. I presume you will look into this area and be willing to give

the public as much news as possible, consistent with the security of

our national defense?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I subscribe to that attitude.

Senator THURMOND. I presume, further, that, at least is is my

opinion, and I have a feeling it would be yours, that any statement

that is made by a Defense Department official would be the truth,

and that under no conditions would statements be made that would

mislead the American people. Either no statement would be made at

all, or if the statement is made it will be the truth, upon which the

people could rely?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I would certainly hope that would be the case.

Senator THURMOND. The Secretary of the Army and General

Johnson testified before the Preparedness Subcommittee• of the

Senate, of which I am a member, some time back during the investigation of the air war in Vietnam, that the bombing had pinned

down 500,000 to 600,000 North Vietnamese.
21

He was speaking about the importance of the bombing. I believe

you have made a trip over there, and you have looked into the situation considerably.

This morning you testified about the large quantities of goods

that were brought in during the cessation of bombing, and in view of

your experience and your knowledge, and the statements you made

this morning, I presume that you would not favor cessation of bombing

where American lives would be jeopardized?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I would not favor the cessation of bombing under

present circumstances. I would express the fervent hope that we

could stop the bombing if we had some kind of reciprocal word from

North Vietnam that they wanted to sit down and, in good faith,

negotiate.

I would say only that as I go into this task, the deepest desire that

I have is to bring hostilities in Vietnam to a conclusion under those

circumstances that permit us to have a dignified and honorable result

that in turn will obtain for the South Vietnamese that goal which

we have made such sacrifices to attain.

Senator THURMOND. When you spoke of negotiating, in which

case you would be willing to have a cessation of bombing, I presume

you would contemplate that they would stop their military activities,

too, in return for a cessation of bombing.

Mr. CLIFFORD. No, that is not what I said.

I do not expect them to stop their military activities. I would expect

to follow the language of the President when he said that if they

would agree to start negotiations promptly and not take advantage

of the pause in the bombing.

Senator THURMOND. What do you mean by taking advantage if

they continue their military activities?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Their military activity will continue in South

Vietnam, I assume, until there is a cease fire agreed upon. I assume

that they will continue to transport the normal amount of goods,

munitions, and men, to South Vietnam. I assume that we will continue

to maintain our forces and support our forces during that period.

So what I am suggesting, in the language of the President is, that he

would insist that they not take advantage of the suspension of the

bombing.

Senator THURMOND. How would you keep them from taking

advantage if we had a cessation of bombing?

Mr. CLIFFORD. There is no way to keep them from taking advantage. If they state they are going to refrain from taking advantage,

and then refuse to do so, then they have not met their agreement,

and the conditions for the negotiations have failed.

Senator THURMOND. And then if they did violate that, you would

favor resuming bombing, I would presume.

Mr. CLIFFORD. I would assume we would have no alternative.

If they did not meet their obligations or we did not meet our obligations, then I assume there is absolutely no sense in negotiating.

It would be a useless task. To negotiate there has to be good faith if

any result is to be achieved and if, during the negotiations, bad

faith is evidenced then there is no need to negotiate.

Senator THURMOND. The testimony before the Preparedness Subcommittee by the military people last fall was unanimous on the
22

point that the bombing has saved American lives, and has promoted

the advantage of the United States in the war. It would certainly

be my hope that if any negotiations are held that we would be very

cautious. Further, if the enemy tries to take advantage of a bombing

pause we would resume bombing, if it had been stopped for a short

while pending negotiations.

Now, Mr. Clifford, in my judgment the goal of the Communists

has not changed. Their goal is still to communize the world. I

presume you are in accord with that thinking, are you not?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I do not believe you can be that broad about the

use of the word "communism"; I believe there are different types of

communism. I believe we have communism in Yugoslavia. I do not

believe there is any intention on the part of Yugoslavia to conquer

the world.

We have a different type of communism in Rumania, one in Poland,

one in Bulgaria, one in North Vietnam.

I would agree with you that there exists in the world today an

aggressive communism and that is the kind that confronts us in Vietnam, and that is the kind that I believe could subjugate that whole

part of the world were we not there helping those other nations.

Senator THURMOND. Well, I will pin it down to the Soviets and

Red China. Do you believe that it is the goal of the Soviets to communize the world and of Red China to dominate the world?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I make a distinction between Chinese communism

and Soviet communism. I believe that Chinese communism at the

present moment is going through its most aggressive stage. It is possible that Russian or Soviet communism has matured to a point

where I would hope that we could find a basis of detente with the

Soviet Union. I would hope that we would constantly and continually try, because that can be the ultimate solution for peace in the

world. I am not willing to proceed on the assumption that the Soviet

Union must always be our enemy.

Senator THURMOND. You, of course, having been to Vietnam and

being familiar with the Vietnam War, you do know, you have been

informed by the military people and experts, and Secretary McNamara

has even testified to this, that the Soviets are providing about 85

percent of the equipment to fight the war in Vietnam. They are

supplying the antiaircraft artillery, they are supplying the Mig planes,

they are supplying the surface-to-air missiles, they are supplying the

helicopters and the trucks and the communications system and the

radar system. There is no question in your mind about that, is there?

Mr. CLIFFORD. None whatever.

Senator THURMOND. And if they would cut off their supplies to

the North Vietnamese, since Red China is supplying only some small

arms, some ammunition and some machineguns, in all constituting

15 to 20 percent, if the Soviets would cut off the supply she is furnishing in one way or the other over land, over sea (coming through the

Port of Haiphong chiefly) , if she would cut that off altogether, the North

Vietnamese could not continue to fight this war, they would be bound

to throw in the sponge.

So in spite of the thinking on the part of some today that the Soviets

have reformed, I might mention I have not seen the reforms that some

people feel have begun or are taking place. The Soviets and Communists are responsible for the war in Vietnam. We did not win the
23

war in Korea and that is the reason we are fighting in Vietnam. If we

do not win in Vietnam, we will fight again and maybe next time

nearer home, and I am just hoping that our leaders in Government

will fully realize this Communist menace, and that we have got

to remain the strongest nation in the world in order to meet it.

I hope that you fully realize the danger from the Soviets. I am not

too sure from your answer that you feel the Soviets do constitute a

danger. Do you or not?

Mr. CLIFFORD. There is no doubt at all that the Soviets are supplying the North Vietnamese with materiel of war. There is no doubt at

all that they make trouble in many different parts of the world. I

went through the period with President Truman right after the Second

World War, in which the Communists had as their goal the subjugation

of the entire Mediterranean, and all of Western Europe.

I suggest to you that my experience in that regard would give me a

very clear understanding of the aggressive nature of communism.

I am merely expressing what I feel deeply, that while we accept

that concept, that they are extraordinarily difficult, and we have to

face up to that threat in many parts of the world. I am not willing to

give up the hope that we can find the means, by constant and consistent

and meticulous effort, to bring peace to this world without this constant

struggle and quarreling and loss of lives of our American boys. I shall

continue to have that feeling, and I shall carry it through, whatever

length of term that I serve in the Department of Defense.

Senator THURMOND. But you do acknowledge that the Soviets

are aggressive and that they are a threat to the world and the freedom of the world?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I do not intend to give any other answer, if you

please, sir, than I have already given to your questions.

Senator THURMOND. What about Red China?

Mr. CLIFFORD. Red China we know has a plan. It was enunciated

by one of its leaders, named Lin Piao. He suggests that communism

should rule the world. He says it must be conducted through what

are called wars of liberation. Those are not wars of liberation, those

are wars of slavery.

We must anticipate that Red China will do all in its power to

subjugate its neighbors and to cause us as much trouble as they

possibly can. This is what faces us over these next decades. Their

danger is increasing as they increase their nuclear and thermonuclear

capacity.

So that I say to you I am conscious of the threat of Red China,

and I say again that this country must make every sacrifice to be

sure that we are so strong that neither China nor the Soviet Union

dares to attack us. They must be sure that we are too determined

to be frightened and that we are too strong to be defeated.

Senator THURMOND. Even though you do have hopes, and we all do,

of course, for peace, you do realize the aggressive nature of the Soviets

and Red China, and you will stand for a defense system that will

protect the United States from any aggression by any nation in the

world?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I agree with that statement entirely.

Senator THURMOND. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Young.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
24

Mr. Secretary, I rejoice over the fact that President Johnson has

nominated you to be Secretary of Defense. Frankly, I know of your

fine service and association not only with President Johnson but with

President Harry S. Truman, and the reliance that both those Presidents have placed in you. And may I say that I regard former President Truman as one of the greatest men of our times, a very great

President of the United States.

Speaking personally, I know I would not be here today except for

the fact that Mr. Truman came into Ohio and spoke for my election

in 195S and again in 1964.

Mr. Secretary, I am assuming from what I know of you and of

your public service that you do have the character and tenacity to

assert at all times the constitutional civilian authority over the

military; is that correct?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I believe in that strongly. I have always believed

in it, and I might say that one of the aims of the group that drew

up the plans in the fall of 1960 was to increase the strength of the

civilian control of the military. I believe in it, and I shall follow it.

Senator YOUNG. Sir, I am glad to hear you say that.

Of course, we Americans like to feel that those people who toiled

over and wrote the Constitution of our country were divinely inspired

in that great task, and yet we know that Benjamin Franklin's motion

that each day's session commence with a prayer did not receive any

supporting votes, so if they had divine inspiration it was not of their

own choosing. But we do know, sir, and you will keep in mind, I

assume, at all times that in our Constitution one of the most important provisions is that civilian authority must always be supreme over

the military. Is that correct?

Mr. CLIFFORD. It is correct, and I shall keep it in mind.

Senator YOUNG. Mr. Secretary, I feel confident that if and when

the occasion might possibly arise when there would be a difference of

opinion between you as Secretary of Defense and the President of

the United States that you would place your own views persuasively

before President Johnson even if those views might run counter to

White House policy.

Mr. CLIFFORD. I would expect to place my views with complete

frankness for the consideration of President Johnson. Should he disagree with the views that I presented to him and make another

decision I would follow the decision that the President made.

Senator YOUNG. Yes, of course.

Now, Mr. Secretary, you have been asked a question regarding the

so-called thin ABM system to protect our cities such as my own

Cleveland and other cities of the United States with a thin net, socalled. I believe I understand your answer to that question. As one

who thinks this system we are now undertaking is just a waste of a

huge amount of the taxpayer's money and that the ABM's are likely

to be obsolete and valueless in a couple of years just as they would

have been had the Secretary of Defense not overruled the Joint Chiefs

of Staff back in 1962 and 1963, is it a fact that you intend to evaluate

all such systems and study such systems in depth before reaching

a final conclusion and making a final recommendation?

Mr. CLIFFORD. That would be my policy.

Senator YOUNG. Now, Mr. Secretary, within the last few days, I

have been disturbed over something I read in the Washington Post.
25

Last week, just before I left South Vietnam, General Westmoreland

was good enough to come some distance in his private plane to visit

with me at the Saigon airport before I left for Thailand, so I don't want

to seem too critical of him. I think he is a fine general and a fine leader.

However, I was disturbed to read in the Post that General Westmoreland spoke over a National Broadcasting Co. taped interview broadcast nationwide just recently, and one part of the statement made was

that a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam "would give the Communists a great political victory."

Now, in connection with that just a few days ago there was another

account in the Washington Post that General Johnson, appearing

before, I believe, the National Press Club here in Washington, made

some statements as to what he considered the proper foreign policy of

our country. For example, I personally have heard General Johnson

say that the Soviet Union, Communist Russia, as he called it, was

dedicated to bury us.

As a prelude to that, among the remarks and wisecracks of Nikita

Khrushchev was the one which most Americans remember is his

statement or threat, "We will bury you."

But Khrushchev at that time made it crystal clear, and again afterward that he did not mean war, he said, don't mean war, I mean

competition. You say your system is the best, we say our system is

the best, let's compete and see which is the best."

Yet, every now and then we hear the statement made that the

Soviet Union would bury us, and I think you put your finger on it

when, in answer to some questions, you indicated that the Soviet

Union is veering toward capitalism and you also mentioned that

when you were serving as an aide confidante to President Truman

that there was more grave danger at that time. Stalin was dictator

then, and at that time the Soviet Union was a have-not nation. Now,

it is a have nation.

What I am leading up to, sir, is this: Would you, as Secretary of

Defense, give consideration to the question of how much the generals

of our Armed Forces should in good taste and in all propriety, discuss

over NBC or through other channels or meetings, particularly the

foreign policy of the United States? Would you, sir, give thought to

this matter?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I certainly shall and I will be glad to, after giving

thought and investigating it, I would be happy to report back to this

'committee what the policy is going to be.

Senator YOUNG. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I have no

further questions.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Brewster?

Senator BREWSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, both Kansas and Missouri claim you as a native son,

but we in Maryland are very, very proud of you, too, as you reside in

Maryland now.

Let me congratulate you, sir, on your selection by our President for

the all important position as Secretary of Defense. Your ability and

qualifications are recognized by all members of this committee, and

certainly by our country. You have my very best wishes and support.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure that many members of this Committee

have some perhaps sensitive questions to address to Mr. Clifford

on the matter of the Pueblo. Did you plan to call the committee

into executive q- sion?
26

Chairman RUSSELL. I will be happy to do so if any members

request an executive session. Mr. Clifford has not yet assumed office,

and if we want to get the very latest information with respect to the

Pueblo incident, we could get it through the Secretary of Defense

or the Central Intelligence Agency. But if the Committee wants

an executive session with Mr. Clifford I will be glad to call one and

I am sure he would be glad to attend.

Mr. CLIFFORD. In that regard, Senator, I would not feel qualified

in my present status to speak for the administration.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is what I had reference to.

Senator BREWSTER. I do not make that request now, Mr. Chairman, and I, of course, leave that to your discretion. I will forego any

questioning with reference to the incident, other than this one general

question, if you have an opinion on it, Mr. Clifford: We are all deeply

concerned about the 83 men who have been taken, and, of course, we

all know that every possible diplomatic effort is being made to free

them. Should this fail, and should force then be used, as I think it

should be if that situation arises, would it be your thought that the

administration should first come to the Congress and consult with

the Congress before taking drastic forceful action?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I believe I am not in position to answer that

question. I am not now Secretary of Defense. That decision would

have to be made by the President. It would be my notion that in all

likelihood the Secretary of Defense would not even be consulted in

that regard. I think that is a matter that would rest between the

President and the Congress, and I would consider it presumptuous

on my part to volunteer any advice to him in that regard. For those

reasons, I think it best and perhaps inappropriate for me to give any

broader answer than that, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, sir, many of us have felt for a long period

of time that it would be wise to reduce our troop commitment to

NATO for a variety of reasons which I will not list here.

Will you give this matter your careful consideration or would you

care to comment on our position in NATO now?

Mr. CLIFFORD. It is a matter that I will give serious attention

and consideration to. It is becoming more and more important to this

country as our balance-of-payments problem comes into clearer

focus.

We now have over 200,000 American troops in Western Europe.

A very real question comes as to whether or not it is necessary to

maintain that size contingent. It has been suggested by knowledgeable

persons that the ability to transport troops is now progressing so

rapidly that that is a factor that might well be taken into consideration.

I assure you it will receive my very close study.

Senator BREWSTER. One last question, it is evident to all that

Great Britain is rapidly reducing its position in the East, and in a

matter of a few years will withdraw their forces there. Do you have

any comment that you would care to make on whether or not the

United States should assume greater military responsibility in the

East because of the withdrawal of British forces?

Mr. CLIFFORD. It is my opinion that the United States should not

assume the posture that Great Britain was occupying in the East.

I believe our commitments are such and our responsibilities are such

that that is not obligatory upon us nor would it be advisable.
27

Senator BREWSTER. I thank you very much, sir. And again I

congratulate you both on your appointment and on your most forthright and able answers to the questions propounded by the members

of this committee.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tower.

Senator TOWER. Mr. Clifford, congratulations on your appointment.

I have only a couple of brief questions.

First, I think we all agree that civilians should control the military

and that civilians should make policy. Once civilians have determined

that the policy should and must be implemented by military means,

do you not think that the great weight should be given to the judgment of the professional military men in the implementation of that

policy?

Mr. CLIFFORD. That is my feeling. These men are trained, they

have made it their life's study. Our country has an enormous investment in them represented by our military academies. It is my belief

that the opinions of these men should be given the most careful consideration and after they are considered, then it is the civilians who

have to make top decisions of policy.

Senator TOWER. What is your evaluation of the present quality

and judgment of our top professional military leadership?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I think it is excellent.

Senator TOWER. Mr. Clifford, to see if we can get perhaps a more

definitive answer to a question raised earlier by Senator Jackson, do

you believe that the strategic nuclear capability of the United States

should be in parity with or superior to that of the Soviet Union?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I believe it must be superior to it.

Senator TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Clifford. I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to congratulate President Johnson on his selection of Mr. Clifford, and I commend Mr. Clifford for the sacrifices

financial and otherwise, which he is making to assume this vitally

important and extremely difficult position. I have great confidence

in Mr. Clifford, and I have a feeling that he will bring a sense of

urgency to the civilian side of the Defense Department to bring the

Vietnam war to an early and honorable conclusion.

I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to support the

nomination of Clark Clifford.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Senator Byrd.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Miller, you said you •had some

further questions.

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Clifford, you stated that you hoped we could find a basis for

a detente with the Soviet Union. I must say that I certainly share

that hope. But in that expression, I take it that implies that we have

not yet found a basis for a detente.

Mr. CLIFFORD. We have not yet found that basis. I am saying that

I hope that we shall continue the search and trust that we shall some

day find it.

Senator MILLER. And since we have not found it, we do not have

a detente with the Soviet Union?
28

Mr. CLIFFORD. We do not at this time.

Senator MILLER. Do you favor a mutual disarmament program

with the Soviet Union?

Mr. CLIFFORD. It is too broad a subject to answer with a yes or no.

I would hope that the time will come when we will have an agreement with the Soviet Union and the other nations of the world that

these nations and we can start a program of disarmament with clear

and obvious knowledge of the steps that each country is taking.

To consider disarmmament without full and complete inspection

could very well be the road to disaster.

Senator MILLER. Would you favor program of unilateral disarmament of a very modest degree premised on the expectation or

hope that the Soviets would follow such an example, or do you think

that all disarmament should be on an agreed and a controlled and

inspected basis such as you have just referred to?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I would subscribe to the latter. I would be unalterably opposed to unilateral disarmament.

Senator MILLER. Do you favor a nuclear test ban treaty going

beyond the one that now exists without an effective method of

irspection and verification?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I do not. The key comes back to inspection. There

has to be clear and concise inspection, and as soon as we find that

there is any reneging upon it, then we had better be careful.

Senator MILLER. And to be clear and precise, does that mean on

the spot?

Mr. CLIFFORD. That is what it would mean to me.

Senator MILLER. Do you believe our military research and development program is adequately funded, adequately moving?

The reason I ask this is because there has been concern expressed,

and written, about the fact that the last year or two this has not been

adequately funded and that if we are not careful, the Soviet Union

may get ahead of us.

Are you concerned about this point?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I believe, Senator, that is a subject that is so peculiarly within the confines of the Pentagon that I do not have sufficient information to give a definitive answer.

I recognize its importance, and certainly shall give it immediate

attention.

Senator MILLER. Well, that is fair enough.

This question may cause you to answer the same way. Do you

believe we should be developing one or more fighter-bomber aircraft as a follow-on to those we now have?

Mr. CLIFFORD. My inclination, which is a visceral one, is to say

categorically, yes. However, I want to know more about it. My

inclination is to consider the fact that the B-52 is an old generation.

Senator MILLER. Excuse me. I was talking about a fighter-bomber.

Mr. CLIFFORD. You were?

Senator MILLER. And then a follow-on bomber.

MT. CLIFFORD. All right.

Senator MILLER. A fighter or a fighter-bomber.

Mr. CLIFFORD. I would have to say only, again I must find out what

the plans are within the Pentagon and what the future needs are.

Senator MILLER. Mr. Clifford, do you believe that the United States

should not arbitrarily cut back on foreign aid to countries to which
29

we are extending foreign aid merely because they have bought modern

military equipment to replace obsolete equipment?

Mr. CLIFFORD. I am unable to answer that. I do not have sufficient

background in the field of foreign aid. I know of the problems that

exist—that is, the conflict between economic foreign aid and military

foreign aid—and I would wish, Senator, to inform myself much more

fully on that whole subject before giving an answer.

Senator MILLER. Well, that is fair enough.

I say that this is of great importance with respect to a good manyof the countries with whom we have been enjoying a long-time military assistance program, and it is quite late in our relations on that

point.

Now, finally, do you believe the United States should sell military

equipment to Israel if Israel needs this to counterbalance equipment

of the United Arab Republic which has been furnished by the Soviet

Union?

Mr. CLIFFORD. It would be inappropriate for me to answer that

question because I know that it is a subject that President Johnson

and the Secretary of State are giving their closest attention to.

President Johnson and Mr. Eshkol discussed it at great length.

It is now in the process of determination and I am sure you would

agree it would be inappropriate for me to make a comment on it

while the matter is still at issue.

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Clifford, for your excellent answers, and I wish you the very best in what is, outside of the Presidency, probably the most important administrative post today,

certainly equal to that of the Secretary of State.

Mr. CLIFFORD. Thank you, Senator Miller.

Chairman RUSSELL. Are there any further questions? If not, the

committee will go into executive session and we will ask the guests

of the committee to retire from the room.

Thank you, Mr. Clifford, for your fine, forthright answers to these

questions.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee proceeded to executive

session.)

(The nomination of Clark M. Clifford to be Secretary of Defense

was subsequently unanimously approved by the committee in executive session and confirmed by the Senate on January 30, 1968.)

0