NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of the Estate of: 

RUMAIN BRISBON, Deceased.

_________________________________

NORA BRISBON, et al., Petitioners/Appellees,

v.

MYKEL CHAMBERS, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0711

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. PB2015-000082

The Honorable Edward W. Bassett, Judge Retired

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Jennings, Haug & Cunningham, LLP, Phoenix

By Hillary P. Gagnon 

Counsel for Petitioners/Appellees

Jenkins Law Firm, Phoenix

By LaShawn D. Jenkins

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 1-18-2018
BRISBON, et al. v. CHAMBERS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

T H U M M A, Chief Judge:

¶1 Mykel Chambers appeals the superior court’s order vacating 

her appointment as personal representative of the Estate of Rumain 

Brisbon. For the following reasons, the order is affirmed as modified to 

reflect that Chambers’ appointment was not void.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Brisbon was the father of four minor children. The month 

after Brisbon’s death, Chambers (the mother of one of his children)

petitioned the superior court to appoint her as personal representative for 

his estate. Chambers averred that her child would be entitled to priority for 

appointment as personal representative but for the child’s minor age, and 

that she had the right to stand in her child’s place. Chambers’ petition

identified as heirs three of Brisbon’s four minor children. The proof of 

mailing stated Chambers mailed a copy of the petition to her own child (in 

care of herself), to Brisbon’s mother and to two of the other three minor 

children, in care of an attorney.

¶3 After a hearing on the petition, attended by Chambers and the

mother of one of the other minor children, the court found Chambers had 

provided required notice and appointed Chambers personal 

representative. Chambers then filed a wrongful death action on behalf of 

the estate and Brisbon’s statutory beneficiaries.

¶4 The following year, Brisbon’s mother and the mothers of 

Brisbon’s other three minor children (collectively Appellees) filed a petition 

to remove Chambers as personal representative and appoint Brisbon’s 

mother as successor personal representative. They argued two grounds for 

Chambers’ removal: (1) her failure to give proper notice of her petition for 

appointment to any of the minor children (except her child) and (2) her 

alleged improper conduct as personal representative.
BRISBON, et al. v. CHAMBERS

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 After an evidentiary hearing, the court vacated the February 

2015 order appointing Chambers as personal representative, finding it was 

void because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over three of Brisbon’s 

children when it appointed Chambers. The court then appointed Brisbon’s 

mother as successor personal representative.

¶6 This court has jurisdiction over Chambers’ timely appeal

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(9)

(2017).

1

DISCUSSION

¶7 Chambers does not challenge the superior court’s decision to 

remove her as personal representative, but argues the court erred by ruling

that her appointment was void.2 This court reviews de novo the superior 

court’s legal conclusions. In re Estate of Rodriguez, 215 Ariz. 358, 362 n.3

(App. 2007).

¶8 Chambers initiated a formal proceeding for adjudication of 

intestacy and appointment as personal representative. See A.R.S. § 14-

3203(E)(2) (stating court must conduct formal proceedings for appointment 

of personal representative when priority is shared by two or more heirs and 

one or more has not renounced or concurred in nominating the person who 

has applied for appointment). Accordingly, Chambers was required to 

notify any interested persons of the hearing on the petition. A.R.S. § 14-

3402(A); A.R.S. § 14-1401(A). The record indicates she failed to do so, with 

this appeal turning on whether that failure means her appointment was 

void or voidable.

¶9 The applicable statutes do not state that the appointment of a 

personal representative is void if he or she fails to comply with the notice 

requirement. Indeed, notice to interested parties in a probate matter is non-

 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

2 Appellees move to strike Chambers’ reply brief, claiming it raises new 

issues and makes factual assertions not supported by the record. Although 

that motion is denied, this court limits its analysis to the issues raised in the 

opening brief. See Romero v. Sw. Ambulance, 211 Ariz. 200, 204 ¶ 7 n.3 (App. 

2005); GM Dev. Corp. v. Cmty. Am. Mortg. Corp., 165 Ariz. 1, 4 (App. 1990).
BRISBON, et al. v. CHAMBERS

Decision of the Court

4

jurisdictional and, therefore, an order issued without proper notice is 

“voidable but not void ab initio.” Matter of Ivester, 168 Ariz. 323, 327(App. 

1991).3 “A duly appointed representative of an estate, even if he should not 

rightfully be in that office, serves with authority until he is removed; his 

appointment is voidable, not void.” Duncan v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. 

ex rel. Estate of Pop, 228 Ariz. 3, 8 ¶ 20 (App. 2011) (quoting Bennett v. Nichols, 

250 S.W.3d 673, 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007)). As stated in Duncan, the failure to 

provide proper notice to potential heirs by an estate’s special administrator 

in seeking appointment “do[es] not render the appointment void.” 228 

Ariz. at 8 ¶ 20; cf. Matter of Wilcox Revocable Trust, 192 Ariz. 337, 340 ¶¶ 12-

14 (App. 1998) (ruling that a party’s failure to notify all interested parties of 

her request for a preliminary injunction restricting trustees’ actions did not 

negate the effectiveness of the injunction as to those non-notified persons).

¶10 That such an appointment is voidable but not void is

consistent with the Arizona Probate Code’s directive that a personal 

representative’s actions on behalf of an estate before he or she is properly

appointed are not void. See A.R.S. § 14-3701 (stating personal 

representative’s duties and powers commence upon appointment and 

relate back to give effect to acts performed prior to appointment that are 

beneficial to the estate); A.R.S. § 14-3702 (stating, when a court erroneously 

appoints a second personal representative before it terminates the first 

personal representative’s appointment, any acts of the second personal 

representative made in good faith without notice of the first appointment 

“are not void for want of validity of appointment”).

¶11 Given this authority, the order appointing Chambers was 

voidable (but not void), given the court lacked personal jurisdiction over 

the minor heirs whom Chambers failed to notify of her petition. The court 

had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings, see Ariz. Const. art. 6 

§ 14(8); A.R.S. § 14-1302(A)(1), and personal jurisdiction over Chambers,

A.R.S. § 14-3602. Arizona law did not require the court to obtain personal 

jurisdiction over all Brisbon’s heirs in order to appoint a personal 

representative or administer his estate. See A.R.S. § 14-3105(B) (stating 

superior court may determine any matter affecting the administration of a 

 

3 Appellees point out that the interested party in Ivester had actual—if not 

statutory—notice. That distinction, however, does not impact the court’s 

statement that personal notice of probate proceedings is non-jurisdictional.

See also Ray v. Sommer, 14 Ariz. App. 160, 162 (1971) (holding appointment

of estate administrator, without notice to decedent’s husband, was 

“voidable but not void”).
BRISBON, et al. v. CHAMBERS

Decision of the Court

5

decedent’s estate after notice to interested persons and the proceedings will 

bind notified persons, even if less than all interested persons received notice)

(emphasis added); see also A.R.S. § 14-3705 (requiring a personal 

representative to notify heirs and devisees of his or her appointment within 

thirty days and stating that failure to do so is “a breach of the personal 

representative’s duty to the persons concerned but does not affect the 

validity of the appointment or the personal representative’s powers or 

other duties.”). Accordingly, although voidable, the appointment of 

Chambers as personal representative was not void.

CONCLUSION

¶12 The order vacating Chambers’ appointment as personal 

representative is affirmed as modified to reflect that the original

appointment was not void. Appellees’ request for an award of attorneys’ 

fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-1105(A) is denied because Chambers 

has not acted unreasonably in this appeal. Chambers is awarded her taxable 

costs upon her compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 

21.