FILED

June 2, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

CITY OF LAFAYETTE, )

) Appeal No.

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 01A01-9901-CV-00056

) 

v. ) 

) Macon Circuit

MARK & RUBY HAMMOCK, )

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

)

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

APPEALED FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MACON COUNTY

AT LAFAYETTE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE BOBBY CAPERS, JUDGE

LISA COTHRON STINNETT

100 E. Locust street

Lafayette, TN 37083

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

WILLIAM JOSEPH BUTLER and E. GUY HOLLIMAN

FARRAR & HOLLIMAN

102 Scottsville Highway

P.O. Box 280

Lafayette, TN 37083

Attorney for Defendants-Appellees

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, JUDGE

CONCUR:

GODDARD, P.J.

CAIN, J.
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O P I N I O N

In its eminent domain proceeding, the City of Lafayette (City) took a

small strip of Mark and Ruby Hammock’s land along the City’s right-of-way for

an existing street.

The Trial Court awarded damages of $1,500.00 for the land taken,

and incidental damages to the remainder in the amount of $11,000.00.

The City has raised the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the Court abused is discretion by interfering with the

presentation of the City’s case?

2. Whether excessive weight was given to the testimony of an

unlicensed real estate broker?

3. Whether the Court erred by admitting as an expert on land

valuation, a real estate broker who was not licensed as an

appraiser, and who did not follow accepted appraisal

techniques in arriving at this opinion of value?

4. Whether there was any credible material evidence to support

the Court’s ruling as damage value.

Essentially, the City argues that the Trial Judge, by questioning

witnesses “interfered” with the presentation of its case. Our review of the record

does establish that the Trial Judge was proactive in questioning witnesses.

Tenness ee Rules of Evidence, Rule 614(b), permits the Judge to

interrogate witnesses, and it does not appear that the Judge’s questioning prevented

counsel from asking any questions of the witnesses, nor was any objection made to

the procedures. Judges have broad discretion in conducting trials. However, the

better practice is to permit counsel to present his or her evidence without

interruption, and if the Court then feels further information should be developed,
1

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the witness was “an unlicensed real estate

broker”.

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the Judge then can further interrogate the witness.

Since the City was not denied the right to offer evidence or question

its witnesses, we find this issue to be without merit.

The Hammocks called J.T. Shrum as an expert witness, and the City

asserts that it was error for the Court to allow Shrum to testify as an expert, and

further that “exce ssive weight” was given to his testimony.

The weight to be given to testimony is essentially for the trier of fact

to determine. See Kellerman v. Food Lion, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tenn.

1996). 

The witness testified that he had fifteen years experience as a real

estate broker1 in Macon County, had personally bought and sold real estate in that

county for several years, and that he had long been familiar with the particular

piece of property owned by the Hammocks. He also sta ted that he had previously

testified and been accepted as an expert witness on land valuations by numerous

courts, including that trial court and other trial courts in the district, as well as the 

Federal District Court. The Trial Judge properly permitted this witness to offer

opinions on value on the issue s before the Court. 

The City relies on Tenne ssee Code Annotated §62-39-103, as a basis

to disqualify Shrum from testifying because he does not hold a real estate

appraiser’s license. We c annot agre e. T.C.A. §62-39-335 allows a real estate

broker to offer an opinion of value in the courts of this State.

As to the final issue, the amount of just compensation is a question

of fact for the trier of fact to de termine . Schook & Fletcher Supply Co. v. City of
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Nashville, 47 Tenn. App. 339, 338 S.W.2d 237, 238-243 (1960).

We conclude the evidence does not preponderate against the awards

of damages, T.R.A.P. Rule 13(d). 

The property owner testified that the fair market value of the

property actually taken was $2,000.00 and the City’s appraiser testified that the

value was $550.00. The owners testified that the remainder of their property was

damaged between $20,000.00 and $30,000.00 and their expert Shrum offered his

opinion that the remainder of their property had diminished in value of $19,500.00,

which amount did include the property actually taken. The City’s appraiser was of

the opinion there were no incidental damages, although plaintiff offered proof of

severe flooding and erosion, due to the City’s project, and reduced access to the

remainder of their property. 

Hammock testified that after the City finished the project, there had

been severe erosion, and since the comple tion of the project, water had flooded his

driveway and accumulated near the rental house on the property on several

occasions. He testified that prior to the taking he had two sepa rate driveways to

his property, one to his home and the other to the rental house. The project had

restricted access to the property, i.e., one shared driveway and the City’s erection

of a guard rail had essentially eliminated any road frontage on the undeveloped

portion of his property, which could have been used as a building lot. We note that

Shrum, in arriving at his opinion of value, took into account the flooding testified

to by the owner, and he was further of the opinion that the lack of access to the

vacant lot rendered it no more than a “garden spot” in his calculation of values.

We affirm the awards of damages made by the Trial Court and

remand with costs of the appeal asse ssed to the appellant.
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________________________

Herschel P. Franks, J.

CONCUR:

___________________________

Houston M. Goddard, P.J.

___________________________

William B. Cain, J.