NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAMIE BOMO AKONJANG, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting 

Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-71981 

Agency No. A208-123-338 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 3, 2021**

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: W. FLETCHER, MILLER, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.

Ramie Bomo Akonjang, a native and citizen of Cameroon, seeks review of 

an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing Akonjang’s appeal from 

an immigration judge’s denial of his application for relief under the Convention 

Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 8 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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the petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding.

First, the Board concluded that Akonjang “could not consistently identify which 

bones were broken” during his alleged capture and beating and “ultimately 

admitted that he had hurt his ankle,” not his leg as he initially testified. While the 

immigration judge “consider[ed] it possible that [Akonjang’s] testimony was 

simply an attempt to narrow down the specific body part that was broken,” the 

immigration judge rejected that explanation because the inconsistency was similar 

to “other occasions throughout [Akonjang’s] testimony in which he quickly 

changed his answer to the questions posed.” Akonjang does not challenge that 

finding or otherwise attempt to explain this inconsistency.

Second, the Board found that Akonjang testified inconsistently about the 

existence of evidence documenting his broken bones. Akonjang claims that in 

testifying that such evidence existed, he understood the immigration judge to be 

asking about evidence of any injuries he sustained. But Akonjang answered “Yes,” 

in response to the direct question, “Do you have documentary proof that you had 

bones broken during this 21 day beating you suffered?,” even though he did not.

The record does not compel the conclusion that Akonjang testified consistently on 

this issue. See Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2007) (agency need 

not “interpret the evidence in the manner advocated by” the applicant). The 
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inconsistencies cited by the Board regarding the nature and extent of Akonjang’s 

injuries carry “substantial weight” and support the adverse credibility finding. 

Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).

Third, the Board concluded that Akonjang testified inconsistently by 

testifying that his uncle knew that Akonjang and his brothers were still alive, 

before admitting that he did not know whether that was true. Because this 

testimony concerned “whether his uncle continued to target him,” the Board 

concluded that it bore “directly on [his] claim.” This finding is supported by 

substantial evidence, and Akonjang does not contend otherwise.

Fourth, the Board did not err in considering the inconsistencies between 

Akonjang’s testimony and his affidavit regarding the length of his stay in Yaoundé, 

Cameroon and whether he worked while living in Senegal. Although these minor

inconsistencies, taken alone, might not be sufficient to support an adverse 

credibility finding, the agency “may consider any inconsistency” in its credibility

analysis. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010). Assuming, 

without deciding, that the agency erred in determining that Akonjang testified 

inconsistently on the separate issue of the length of his stay in Senegal, multiple

independent bases support the adverse credibility finding.

The record does not support Akonjang’s contention that the agency failed to 

consider evidence that he testified consistently. Nor does Akonjang identify facts 
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ignored by the agency that resolve the inconsistencies identified above. See 

Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044. To the extent Akonjang attributes those inconsistencies 

to a language barrier, the Board correctly deemed that argument to be waived,

because Akonjang had “confirmed on six occasions that he spoke and understood 

English,” and his “counsel did not raise any concerns about [his] fluency in 

English during the individual hearing.”

2. Akonjang argues that the agency incorrectly faulted him for lacking 

corroborating evidence without providing notice that such evidence was required. 

Although the immigration judge referenced the lack of corroborating evidence in 

evaluating Akonjang’s credibility, the Board upheld the immigration judge’s 

adverse credibility finding on the basis of “multiple grounds unrelated to [lack of] 

corroboration.” As discussed above, that conclusion is supported by substantial 

evidence. “Because the [agency] found [Akonjang’s] testimony not credible, the 

[agency] was not required to give [him] notice and an opportunity to provide 

additional corroborating evidence.” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th 

Cir. 2020). 

3. The Board separately concluded that the corroborating evidence 

Akonjang submitted did not, on its own, satisfy the standard for obtaining relief

under the Convention Against Torture. See Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927 

(independent evidence can support relief “even where an applicant has been 
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deemed not credible”). Akonjang does not challenge that conclusion. He contends 

only that the agency “overlooked” two documents showing that he is wanted by the 

Cameroonian authorities, but those documents were expressly considered by the 

Board and the immigration judge.

4. Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility 

finding, and because Akonjang does not claim that, excluding his testimony, he is 

otherwise entitled to relief, we need not reach the agency’s alternate finding that

Akonjang could safely relocate within Cameroon. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048–

49, 1048 n.6.

PETITION DENIED.