FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANTIAGO IBARRA RIVERA,

individually and as class

representative,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS

ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT; COUNTY OF SAN

BERNARDINO; SAN BERNARDINO

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-57037

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-01861-

PSG-DTB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 8, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed March 12, 2014

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Richard A. Paez,

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Paez
2 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in an action in which plaintiff, Santiago Rivera, alleged

multiple constitutional and state law violations arising out of

his mistaken arrest and month-long detention based on a 1989

warrant which had been issued for another person, also

named Santiago Rivera.

The panel rejected Rivera’s claim that Los Angeles

County violated the Fourth Amendment by issuing the 1989

warrant without including a number corresponding to the true

subject’s fingerprints. The panel held that the warrant

satisfied the particularity requirement because it contained

both the subject’s name and a detailed physical description. 

The panel held that even if the Fourth Amendment did require

Los Angeles County to include more detailed information in

the 1989 warrant, Rivera failed to show that the County had

a policy or custom of failing to do so.

The panel held that San Bernardino sheriff’s deputies

were not unreasonable in believing that Rivera was the

subject of the warrant at the time of arrest given that the name

and date of birth on the warrant matched Rivera’s and the

height and weight descriptors associated with the warrant

were within one inch and ten pounds of Rivera’s true size.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3

The panel held that Rivera’s detention did not violate the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The

panel determined that Rivera had not presented any evidence

that either Los Angeles County or San Bernardino County

knew that Rivera was not the true subject of the warrant. Nor

did the circumstances of this case suggest that further

investigation into Rivera’s identity was required, especially

given that he had been provided procedural protections and

court access.

Finally, the panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

Rivera’s state law claims on the basis of state law statutory

immunities.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Paez

stated that although he agreed with the majority that Rivera’s

Fourth Amendment claims against Los Angeles County and

San Bernardino County, his Fourteenth Amendment claims

against San Bernardino County, and his state law claims

against both counties must fail, he disagreed with the

majority’s analysis of the due process claim in this case. In

Judge Paez’s view, Rivera raised a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether Los Angeles County deprived him of

liberty without due process of law by failing to investigate his

claims of innocence.
4 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

COUNSEL

Donald W. Cook, Los Angeles, California, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for the plaintiff-appellant. With him on

the briefs was Robert Mann, Los Angeles, California.

Scott E. Caron, Lawrence Beach Allen & Choi, P.C.,

Glendale, California, argued the cause and filed the brief for

the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County

Sheriff’s Department. With him on the brief was Michael D.

Allen, Lawrence Beach Allen & Choi, P.C., Glendale,

California.

James H. Thebeau, DeputyCountyCounsel, San Bernardino,

California, argued the cause and filed the brief for the County

of San Bernardino and the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s

Department.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must deal with a case of mistaken identity arising out

of the arrest and detention of a person named on a warrant not

intended to describe him.

I

A

In July 1985, a Los Angeles Superior Court issued an

arrest warrant for “Santiago Rivera.” On June 18, 1989,

officers of the Montclair Police Department arrested Santiago
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 5

Rivera, the plaintiff in this case, on the 1985 warrant. 

Fingerprint analysis revealed, however, that the Santiago

Rivera who was arrested (“Rivera” or “the plaintiff”) was not

the Santiago Rivera sought by the warrant (“the subject of the

warrant”). Due to the risk of such mistaken identification

recurring, the municipal court issued Rivera a judicial

clearance form, which indicated that he was not the subject of

the warrant.

On July 6, 1989, the court reissued the warrant but did not

indicate that Rivera had been determined not to be its subject. 

The 1989 warrant described the subject as a Hispanic male

with brown hair and brown eyes, 5’5” tall, and 180 pounds in

weight. It included a date of birth matching Rivera’s and

suggested that the subject did not have visible scars or tattoos.

On March 7, 2009, deputies from the San Bernadino

Sheriff’s Department stopped a car in which Rivera was

traveling because it lacked a license plate. Using Rivera’s

identification to run a routine warrant check, the deputies

learned of the 1989 warrant for a “Santiago Rivera” with the

same date of birth as the plaintiff. Rivera informed one of the

deputies that he was not the warrant’s subject and had been

issued a judicial clearance form after the erroneous 1989

arrest. When asked to produce that form, however, Rivera

stated that he could not locate it.

Upon the deputies’ request, dispatch informed them that

the warrant was active and provided the physical description

from the warrant. Rivera’s driver’s license described him as

5’6” tall and as weighing 170 pounds. Believing Rivera to be

the subject of the warrant, the deputies arrested him and took

him to a detention center in San Bernadino, where his

fingerprints were taken. San Bernadino officials transferred
6 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

custody of the plaintiff to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s

Department two days later.

On the next morning, Rivera appeared in a Los Angeles

Superior Court. Represented by a public defender, he did not

tell the judge that he was not the subject of the warrant. At

his next hearing, on March 24, 2009, Rivera argued that he

was not the subject of the warrant. Because the court could

not determine whether he was the subject of the warrant at

that time, the court remanded Rivera to custody until April 7,

2009. As of April 7, 2009, the staff at the Los Angeles

archives had still been unable to locate the documents that

would contain the true subject’s fingerprints. The court again

remanded Rivera to custody while the search for the proper

documents continued. Two days later, the court released the

plaintiff after it was determined that his fingerprints did not

match the fingerprints of the true subject of the warrant.

To prevent mistaken identity in the future, the court

issued the plaintiff a new judicial clearance form and added

the plaintiff’s photograph and fingerprints to the case file. 

The court also reissued the warrant with the true subject’s

middle name, which differs from Rivera’s middle name.

B

In 2010, Rivera sued Los Angeles County, the Los

Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, San Bernadino

County, and the San Bernadino County Sheriff’s Department

(“the Counties”), alleging violations of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments, violation of the Bane Act

(California Civil Code § 52.1), and common law false

imprisonment.
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 7

The district court granted the Counties’ motions for

summary judgment on all of Rivera’s claims. The district

court also denied his motion for reconsideration. Rivera

timely appealed.

II

Rivera asserts that the district court erred in rejecting his

claims that the Counties violated his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights and that he can recover under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. His complaint alleged multiple constitutional

violations, all of which the district court rejected: (1) failure

to include biometric identifiers in the 1989 warrant, (2)

unlawful arrest based on the 1989 warrant, and (3) illegal

detainment after arrest.

A

Rivera first argues that Los Angeles County violated the

Fourth Amendment by issuing the 1989 warrant without

including a number corresponding to the true subject’s

fingerprints.1 The Fourth Amendment requires that any

warrant “particularly describe . . . the persons or things to be

seized.” U.S. Const. amend IV. Rivera’s argument amounts

to a claim that the particularity requirement of the Fourth

Amendment forbade Los Angeles County from issuing the

warrant without fingerprint information.

1 Rivera describes his claim as challenging the issuance of the warrant

rather than the sufficiency of the warrant to permit arrest. We assume,

arguendo, that Rivera may state a claim under § 1983 against Los Angeles

County for the issuance of an insufficiently particular warrant even though

the warrant was issued by a judge.
8 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

1

In United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.

1987), we evaluated a warrant under the particularity

requirement. The subject of that warrant was described as “a

male Latin, name unknown, referred to in affidavit as John

Doe # 1 . . . approximately 35 years of age, 5’8”/5’10”,

approximately 200 pounds with black hair and black full

beard.” Id. at 607. Despite the omission of the subject’s

name, we held that such description sufficed under the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 611. A warrant containing the subject’s

sex, race, hair color, as well as approximate height, weight,

and age, satisfied the particularity requirement when it was

accompanied by an affidavit listing places that the subject

might be found. See id. It follows that a warrant containing

the subject’s name, sex, race, hair color, eye color, and date

of birth (rather than approximate age), in addition to

approximate height andweight, is sufficientlyparticular, even

if it does not list places that the subject might be found.

Confirming such analysis, other circuits have held that the

inclusion of the subject’s name alone satisfies the

particularity requirement. Rejecting the contention that the

Fourth Amendment “impose[s] stringent requirements on

how warrants must describe their intended subjects,” the

Seventh Circuit has expressly noted that “an arrest warrant

that correctly names the person to be arrested is [generally]

considered constitutionally sufficient and need not contain

any additional identifying information.” White v. Olig, 56

F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Powe v. City of

Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1981). The Fifth

Circuit has also recognized the general rule that “the

inclusion of the name of the person to be arrested on the

arrest warrant constitutes a sufficient description to satisfy the
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 9

fourth amendment requirement that the person to be seized be

described with particularity.” Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d

675, 682 (5th Cir. 1980).

Thus, the 1989 warrant satisfied the particularity

requirement because it contained both the subject’s name and

a detailed physical description. That the plaintiff was

erroneously arrested based on the warrant simply does not

affect whether the warrant itself satisfied the particularity

requirement.

2

Moreover, municipalities, including counties and their

sheriff’s departments, can only be liable under § 1983 if an

unconstitutional action “implements or executes a policy

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially

adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690

(1978). A municipal defendant is liable only “where the

entity’s policies evince a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the

constitutional right and are the ‘moving force behind the

constitutional violation.’” Edgerly v. City and Cnty. of San

Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 960 (9th Cir. 2010).

Even if the Fourth Amendment did require Los Angeles

County to include more detailed information in the 1989

warrant in order to avoid the risk of repeated

misidentification, Rivera would have to show that Los

Angeles County had a policy or custom of failing to do so. 

This Rivera has not done. In fact, Los Angeles County had

a policy of including an “exoneration” entry that identifies

anyone mistakenly arrested on the warrant in the past. That

officials apparently failed to implement that policy properly
10 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

in this one instance is not sufficient for Los Angeles County

to be liable. A single instance is not sufficient to show that a

“practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.” Bd.

of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404

(1997).

B

Rivera also argues that San Bernadino sheriff’s deputies

violated the Fourth Amendment when they arrested him. The

deputies had probable cause to arrest the true subject of the

warrant but mistakenly believed that Rivera was that person. 

In such cases, the question is whether the arresting officers

had a good faith, reasonable belief that the arrestee was the

subject of the warrant. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797,

804 (1971) (“[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the

touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment

and on the record before us the officers’ mistake was

understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the

situation facing them at the time.”).

On the undisputed factual record, the deputies were not

unreasonable in believing that Rivera was the subject of the

warrant at the time of arrest. The name and date of birth on

the warrant matched Rivera’s exactly. The height and weight

descriptors associated with the warrant, although not

matching Rivera exactly, were within one inch and ten

pounds of Rivera’s true size. See id. at 803–04 & n.6 (ruling

that the officers reasonably concluded that the arrestee was

the subject of the warrant despite a difference of two inches

and ten pounds).

Rivera’s statement that he had been issued a judicial

clearance form but could not locate it did not make the
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 11

officers’ belief unreasonable. As the Supreme Court has

expressly recognized, police are right to be wary when

suspects claim mistaken identity. See id. at 803 (“That person

claimed he was Miller, not Hill. But aliases and false

identifications are not uncommon.”).

The deputies’ belief that Rivera was the true subject of the

warrant was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

C

Rivera also challenges his detainment after arrest under

both the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Precedent demonstrates, however, that post-arrest

incarceration is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment

alone. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979)

(assuming arguendo the ability to state a due process claim

for incarceration “pursuant to a valid warrant in the face of

repeated protests of innocence”); Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 683–85 (9th Cir. 2001) (separately analyzing

the initial arrest under the Fourth Amendment and the postarrest incarceration under the Fourteenth Amendment).

1

In arguing that his incarceration violated the Fourteenth

Amendment, Rivera relies chiefly on our decision in Fairley

v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2002). In Fairley, the

plaintiff, John, had been detained for twelve days “without

any procedural safeguard in place to verify the warrant he

was detained on was his and in the face of his repeated

protests of innocence.” Id. at 918. The Fairley court

emphasized that John had been detained on a warrant, the

subject of which was named “Joe” and differed from John in
12 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

weight by 66 pounds, despite the defendants’ awareness that

John had a twin brother. Id. at 915. John was never brought

before a judge to assert his claim of mistaken identity. On

such facts, we held “there was sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to find that John suffered a constitutional

deprivation under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 917.

Rivera’s reliance on Fairley is misplaced. Cases, like

Fairley, holding that an incarceration based on mistaken

identity violated the Due Process Clause are readily

distinguishable from this case. They involved circumstances

that might alert the defendants to a mistake of identity,

withholding of a judicial forum for raising a claim of

mistaken identity, or both.

2

The Supreme Court has suggested that incarceration

based on mistaken identity might violate the Due Process

Clause in some circumstances. In Baker v. McCollan, 443

U.S. 137, 140–41 (1979), a warrant was issued for “Linnie

McCollan” because the true subject of the warrant, Leonard

McCollan, used false identification. Police in Dallas later

arrested Linnie and transferred him to the Potter County

Sheriff’s Department after four days. Potter County officials

released Linnie three days later when a review of a file

photograph of the true subject revealed the mistake. Id. at

141. Linnie challenged his three-day detention in Potter

County under the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983. Id. at

143–44. The Supreme Court ruled:

We may even assume, arguendo, that,

depending on what procedures the State

affords defendants following arrest and prior
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 13

to actual trial, mere detention pursuant to a

valid warrant but in the face of repeated

protests of innocence will after the lapse of a

certain amount of time deprive the accused of

“liberty . . . without due process of law.” But

we are quite certain that a detention of three

days over a New Year’s weekend does not

and could not amount to such a deprivation.

Id. at 145. In Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th

Cir. 2001), which relied on Baker, we confirmed that such a

violation could occur and explained that a plaintiff’s burden

is to show that “it was or should have been known that [he]

was entitled to release.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 683 (quoting

Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993)).

3

Cases holding that an incarceration violated the Due

Process Clause because defendants should have known the

plaintiff was entitled to release fit at least one of two

categories: (1) the circumstances indicated to the defendants

that further investigation was warranted, or (2) the defendants

denied the plaintiff access to the courts for an extended period

of time.

But the “further investigation” cases have involved

significant differences between the arrestee and the true

suspect. In Fairley, for example, the plaintiff and the true

subject of the warrant not only had different first names but

also differed in weight by 66 pounds. 281 F.3d at 915. In

Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.

1993), the arrestee’s “driver’s license differed significantly

from the description provided for” the suspect and that the
14 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

arrestee’s “physical makeup did not match the physical

description for” the suspect.

And the “denied access” cases have involved significant

periods of deprivation. For instance, in Fairley, the plaintiff

was held for twelve days without a hearing or court

appearance. There, we held that the procedures employed

violated the Due Process Clause. Fairley, 281 F.3d at 915,

918. In Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir.

1992), the “plaintiff spent 114 days in jail without an

arraignment, a bail hearing, or a trial.” Again, we ruled that

the procedures that permitted such a delay denied the plaintiff

liberty without due process of law. Id. at 1477.

4

Rivera has not presented any evidence that the Counties

knew that Rivera was not the true subject of the warrant. Nor

do the circumstances of this case suggest that further

investigation into Rivera’s identity was required. Indeed, it

appears that the San Bernadino deputies reasonably believed

that Rivera was the true subject of the warrant from the time

they arrested him. The same considerations that made the

arrest reasonable bear on whether the circumstances of the

detention should have warned the Counties that Rivera might

not be the true subject of the warrant. In this case, the

warrant information gave no reason to suspect that Rivera

was not the true subject of the warrant since the name and

date of birth matched exactly while the physical descriptions

were quite similar.2

2 That Rivera’s address on his driver’s license in 2009 did not match the

address on the 1989 warrant would not give a reasonable officer pause in
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 15

Nor did Rivera’s two brief claims of mistaken identity

upon arrival at the Los Angeles facility indicate that the Los

Angeles defendants should have investigated more

thoroughly.

3 Claims of innocence are common in jails; a

jailor need not independently investigate all uncorroborated

claims of innocence if the suspect will soon have the

opportunity to assert his claims in front of a judge.4

Unsupported claims of mistaken identity, by themselves, do

not trigger a duty to investigate further.

Even assumingRivera’s two casual mentions of mistaken

identity suffice to make his incarceration “in the face of

identifyingRivera as the subject of the warrant. It is certainly common for

a person to have a different address than he did twenty years ago.

3 After his initial court appearance, Rivera failed to complain to

members of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department that he was not

the true subject ofthe warrant. That Rivera asserted to his public defender

(and possibly the prosecutor) that he was not the subject of the warrant is

irrelevant. Public defenders do not act under color of state law for the

purpose of § 1983 “when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as

counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson,

454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

4 The dissent would hold that a detainee’s uncorroborated claim of

mistaken identitycreates a constitutional obligation for the jailor to “check

readily available, exculpatory information.” Dissent at 23–24. Of course,

a great deal of information is “readily available,” and a jailor has no way

of knowing which evidence, if any, will be exculpatory before starting the

investigation. Such a requirement could be quite burdensome in the

aggregate. Because there is no principled distinction between claims of

mistaken identity and other claims of innocence, cf. Baker, 443 U.S. at

145–46 (equating claims of mistaken identity with other claims of

innocence); but see Dissent at 23 n.2, such reasoning would presumably

force jailors to investigate non–mistaken identity claims of innocence,

which would increase the costs of the rule even more. Contra Dissent at

23 (claiming “no great burden” would be imposed).
16 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

repeated protests of innocence,” the Due Process Clause was

not violated unless Rivera was held for a long enough period

of time without adequate procedures. Baker, 443 U.S. at 145

(assuming a violation could occur “after the lapse of a certain

amount of time” and “depending on what procedures the

State affords defendants following arrest and prior to actual

trial”). Rivera was taken before a judge the very next day, a

significant procedural protection. It is unclear why Rivera

did not assert his claim of mistaken identity at the March 10

court hearing, but the failure to take advantage of a

procedural protection does not disprove its availability.

Thereafter, he was no longer held simply on the warrant;

he was “held in custody pursuant to a court order.” If a

suspect is held according to court order, county officials are

not required to investigate whether that court order is proper. 

See Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2006)

(upholding a policy that “[i]gnore[s] all claims of

misidentification” after a judge commits a suspect to the

sheriff’s custody); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Rhodes, 403

F.2d 2, 7 (10th Cir. 1968) (“Certainly a jailer should not be

expected to go behind a court order of commitment to

determine whether a person presented for safekeeping has

been convicted as a result of some denial of his constitutional

rights.”).5 This fact removes this case from the realm

5 The dissent argues that our decision in Lee compels the conclusion that

“a detainee may still have a due process claim against his jailer despite a

prompt court hearing that results in his remand to custody.” Dissent at 22. 

Lee permitted a suit based on the pre-hearing detention; it did not purport

to impose liability for the post-hearing detention. In the section on which

the dissent relies, Lee merely explained why the one-day detention at issue

in that case could violate the Due Process Clause when the three-day

detention at issue in Baker did not. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 684–85

(distinguishing Baker, for due process purposes, because it involved
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 17

envisioned by Baker. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 145 (discussing

“detention pursuant to a valid warrant”). It also distinguishes

this case from those involving prolonged incarceration

without access to judicial process. See Fairley, 281 F.3d at

915; Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1473.

For the foregoing reasons, Rivera’s detention did not

violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.6 The district court, therefore, was correct to

grant summary judgment for the defendants on this claim.

III

Rivera has asserted claims under California law as well. 

First, he claims that the defendants committed the common

law tort of false imprisonment. Second, he asserts that the

defendants are liable under California Civil Code § 52.1(b),

the Bane Act, which is a cause of action for violations of

constitutional and statutory rights. Under California law, the

Counties, as public entities, are liable for the actions of their

employees. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a). To the extent their

incarceration on “a facially valid warrant” rather than detention of a

mentally incapacitated person in the absence of probable cause). Based

on a misreading of Lee and concerns about “unsound policy,” Dissent at

22, the dissent urges us to create a circuit split. This we decline to do.

6

In reaching a contrary conclusion, the dissent relies on Russo v. City

of Bridgeport. Dissent at 24 (citing 479 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2007)). That

case, however, ruled that the detention at issue violated the Fourth

Amendment, not the Due Process Clause. See Russo, 479 F.3d at 208

(“[W]e now conclude . . . that the right should instead by analyzed under

the Fourth Amendment.”). The dissent, however, agrees that the district

court was correct to grant summary judgment on Rivera’s Fourth

Amendment Claims. Dissent at 19 (“I agree with the majority that

Rivera’s Fourth Amendment claims . . . must fail . . . .”).
18 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

employees would be immune from liability, however, the

Counties are also immune. Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(b).

California law provides two types of immunity relevant

to this case. First, an officer is not liable for “an arrest

pursuant to a warrant of arrest regular upon its face if the

peace officer in making the arrest acts without malice and in

the reasonable belief that the person arrested is the one

referred to in the warrant.” Cal. Civil Code § 43.55(a). 

Second, an officer is not liable “for false arrest or false

imprisonment arising out of any arrest” that “was lawful, or

[that] the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had

reasonable cause to believe . . . was lawful.” Cal. Penal Code

§ 847(b)(1).

In Lopez v. City of Oxnard, 207 Cal. App. 3d. 1, 4 (Ct.

App. 1989), plaintiff Lopez had been arrested multiple times

on a warrant for which he was not the true subject because his

name, date of birth, address, and physical description

matched those on the warrant. After his first arrest, however,

the plaintiff obtained a “disposition sheet” from the court,

which explained that the plaintiff was not the true subject of

the warrant. Despite bringing this disposition sheet to the

officers’ attention, the plaintiff was detained twice more,

once for three days and once for three hours. Id. at 4–5. The

court held that the arresting officer was immune from liability

because “there is no factual question whether the officer had

a reasonable belief that Lopez was the person named in the

warrant.” Id. at 9. The court also held that the sheriff’s

department that jailed the plaintiff was not liable, despite

failing to consider the disposition sheet, because jail

personnel “are entitled to rely on process and orders

apparently valid on their face.” Id.
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 19

Because the employees relevant to this case would be able

to invoke statutory immunities to avoid liability, the Counties

can as well. Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary

judgment based on statutory immunities was correct.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the district court properly

granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.

PAEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part:

Although I agree with the majority that Rivera’s Fourth

Amendment claims against Los Angeles County and San

Bernardino County, his Fourteenth Amendment claims

against San Bernardino County, and his state law claims

against both counties must fail, I disagree with the majority’s

analysis of the due process claim in this case. In my view,

Rivera has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether Los Angeles County deprived him of liberty without

due process of law. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from

Part II.C of the majority’s opinion.

I.

As the majority acknowledges, after the lapse of a certain

period of time, “a detainee has ‘a constitutional right to be

free from continued detention after it was or should have been

known that the detainee was entitled to release.’” Lee v. City
20 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Cannon v. Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993)). 

The majority contends, however, that there are just two types

of scenarios where a jailer should know that a detainee is

entitled to release: (1) circumstances indicate that further

investigation is warranted, or (2) the detainee is denied access

to the courts for an extended period of time. Maj. Op. at 13. 

The existence of “significant differences between the arrestee

and the true suspect” may warrant additional investigation,

but “[u]nsupported claims of mistaken identity . . . do not

trigger a duty to investigate.” Id. at 13, 15. Finally, the

majority holds that after the detainee appears in court, county

officials can never have an obligation to further investigate. 

Id. at 16–17. Under this view, unless a detainee has the good

fortune to (1) exhibit obvious physical or biographical

differences from the true subject of the warrant, or (2) possess

support for his claim of mistaken identity, county officials are

free to ignore his complaints. Furthermore, even the limited

duty to investigate obvious indicia of mistaken identity is

extinguished once the detainee appears in court. Neither case

law nor logic compel such a cabined understanding of the due

process rights of detainees.

Our precedent does not delineate what circumstances

must exist before an officer or agency should know that a

detainee is entitled to release. It simply mandates that if an

officer or jailer should have known that the detainee was

entitled to release, “a detainee has ‘a constitutional right to be

free from continued detention . . . .’” Lee, 250 F.3d at 683

(quoting Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1563). The majority treats our

existing case law as the outer boundaries of when county

officials should have known that a detainee was entitled to

release. But we have had only three occasions to consider

such claims. See Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 915,
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 21

917–18 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Lee, 250 F.3d at

677–78, 683–84; Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1473–77

(9th Cir. 1992). In none of those cases did we suggest that

physical differences between a detainee and the true subject

of the warrant or lengthy detention without a court hearing

were requirements to a successful due process claim. The

examples cited by the majority are just that; they do not

provide a basis for concluding that no other set of facts could

sustain a detainee’s due process claim. Moreover, the

majority creates a bright-line rule that jailers owe nothing to

detainees whose claims of mistaken identity are

“[u]nsupported.” Maj. Op. at 15. We have never suggested

that a jailer’s duty to investigate is contingent on a detainee

first presenting his jailer with supporting evidence. Nor can

I see any logical basis for limiting a detainee’s due process

rights to these circumstances. The touchstone is simply

whether the jailer should have known, despite the existence

of probable cause at the time of arrest, that a detainee was

entitled to be released. This is inherently a fact-intensive,

circumstance-specific inquiry.

The majority’s next conclusion—anyduty the jailers have

to investigate terminates once a detainee is held pursuant to

a court order—is even less sound. See Maj. Op. at 16–17. 

The majority relies on several out-of-circuit cases to support

its conclusion, see id. (citing Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d

772, 776 (7th Cir. 2006) and Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v.

Rhodes, 403 F.2d 2, 7 (10th Cir. 1968)), but such a

conclusion cannot be squared with our precedent. In Lee, the

detainee, KerrySanders, who was mistakenly identified as the

subject of a warrant from the State of New York, had an

extradition hearing within one day of his arrest. 250 F.3d at

678, 684. At the hearing, after some dispute about the

validity of Sanders’s Waiver of Extradition form, the court
22 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

accepted the waiver. Id. at 678 n.3. Subsequent to the

hearing, Sanders, just like Rivera, was held pursuant to a

court order until New York state officials took custody of

him. See id.; Cal. Penal Code § 1555.1 (If a waiver of

extradition is executed, the “magistrate shall remand the

person to custody without bail, unless otherwise stipulated by

the district attorney with the concurrence of the other state.”). 

Nonetheless, in Lee, we specifically held that “[t]he argument

that Kerry Sanders’s due process claim must fail at the

pleading stage because he was incarcerated for only one day

before his extradition hearing is . . . unavailing.” 250 F.3d at

684. Under Lee, then, a detainee may still have a due process

claim against his jailer despite a prompt court hearing that

results in his remand to custody; the court order does not

necessarily obviate a county’s obligation to investigate the

validity of continued incarceration. Id.1 The majority’s

conclusion to the contrary is inconsistent with Lee.

Furthermore, exonerating a jailer of any obligation to

investigate once a court remands a detainee to custody is an

unsound policy. As this case demonstrates, if the detainee’s

only recourse is to seek court intervention to verify his

identity, he may languish in detention for weeks while the

court searches its records for dated physical files. In contrast,

county jail officials typically have instantaneous access to

extensive criminal history records and fingerprint databases. 

1 The majority reads Lee as permitting liability for only the pre-hearing

detention. Maj. Op. at 16 n.5. Lee specifically contemplates that the

defendants might be liable for “Sanders’s two-year incarceration,” not the

one-day pre-hearing detention. Lee, 250 F.3d at 685. Indeed, Lee holds

that certain New York state officials may be held accountable for

Sanders’s detention, and those officials only became involved inSanders’s

case after the extradition hearing. Id. at 678, 695.
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 23

It is no great burden to expect them to access these readily

available resources when appropriate.2,3

II.

The majority has imposed a variety of unjustified

restrictions on Rivera’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. In

determining whether a violation occurred, the only inquiry is

simply whether it “‘was or should have been known that the

detainee was entitled to release.’” Lee, 250 F.3d at 683

(quoting Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1563). I would hold that here,

Rivera’s complaints of mistaken identity, in conjunction with

Los Angeles County’s failure to conduct any investigation or

check readily available, exculpatory information, were

sufficient to create a genuine, triable issue of fact as to

whether the County should have known that he was entitled

2 This does not mean that jailers have a constitutional duty to scour

readily available databases for exculpatory information any time a

detainee claims that he is innocent, and I do not contend otherwise. 

Contra Maj. Op. at 15 n.4. Here, it is the failure to conduct any

investigation in response to Rivera’s complaints of mistaken identity that

creates a genuine issue of fact as to whether Los Angeles County should

have known that Rivera was entitled to be released. See Dissent at 23. If

a constitutional obligation can be inferred from the holding I would adopt,

it is that jailers must implement investigatory procedures to handle

complaints of mistaken identity.

3 Los Angeles County contends that once a detainee is held pursuant to

a court order, jailers lack the discretion to release him. Even so, this

would not prevent jailers from investigating and informing the detainee,

the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court, of any determination that

the detainee is not the true subject of the warrant.
24 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

to be released.4See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 148

(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[D]eliberately and

repeatedly refus[ing] to check the identity of a complaining

prisoner against readily available mug shots and fingerprints”

“might prove a due process violation.”); Russo v. City of

Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 201, 208 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding

that a detainee is protected from “a sustained detention

stemming directly from the law enforcement officials’ refusal

to investigate available exculpatory evidence” and allowing

an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the jailers to

proceed even though the detainee had numerous court

appearances during his detention).5

Rivera testified that, upon arriving at the Los Angeles

County jail, he complained to two Los Angeles County

officials that he was not the individual wanted in the warrant. 

4

I do not address whether San Bernardino County officials should have

known that Rivera was entitled to be released. Even assuming that San

Bernardino County officers should have known that Rivera was entitled

to be released, Rivera has offered no evidence of a municipal policy or

customthat was deliberately indifferent to complaints ofmisidentification. 

Rivera only argues that San Bernardino County does not require “positive

identification accomplished through the exchange of fingerprint

facsimiles.” But the failure to access fingerprint databases for every

individual arrested or detained does not evince deliberate indifference to

any constitutional right.

5 The majority’s attempt to distinguish Russo on the ground that it is a

Fourth Amendment case is unpersuasive. See Maj. Op. at 17 n.6. The

claim in Russo is the same claim we are faced with here. In the Second

Circuit’s view, recent Supreme Court case law has suggested that the

source of the right first recognized in Baker is the Fourth Amendment

rather than the Fourteenth Amendment; consequently, it analyzes Russo’s

claim under the Fourth Amendment. Russo, 479 F.3d at 208. The Fourth

Amendment claim discussed in the relevant portion of Russo is not, as the

majority wrongly insinuates, an unlawful arrest claim. See id. at 205, 208.
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 25

First, he informed a male official behind a window that he

was “being mistaken for another person.” The male official

wrote something down and directed Rivera to “[g]o to the

cell.” He took no further action. Rivera also informed

another official, a young woman behind a window, that “they

were confusing me with a person who had run over two

people here in Culver City.” The woman responded by

saying “I’m sorry,” but also took no further action. In my

view, a factfinder could reasonably conclude that such

complaints were sufficient to put an officer or county official

on notice that further investigation was necessary.

6

Had either officer followed up with Rivera or conducted

an independent investigation, the officer would have

discovered—with relative ease—that Rivera was not the true

subject of the warrant. A Los Angeles County official could

have searched the California Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System (“CLETS”), a statewide

criminal records database maintained by the California

Department of Justice. CLETS would have returned two hits

with distinct criminal information and identification (“CII”)

numbers. Although the record contains some evidence that,

occasionally, the same individual may be associated with two

CII numbers, as a general matter, CII numbers are unique

identifiers; two distinct CII numbers, then, would have alerted

the officer to the fact that there was likely at least one other

person who shared the warrant subject’s name and birthdate. 

The officer could have then run the two CII numbers through

CLETS, and received two distinct criminal history reports. 

6 The majority dismisses these complaints as “brief” and “casual,” see

Maj. Op. at 15–16, but it is the factfinder’s role to assess whether Rivera’s

pleas that he was being mistaken for another individual should have

prompted some action.
26 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

One report would have included a 1985 arrest for involuntary

manslaughter, and the other would not have. Even more

critically, the reports would have indicated that one of the

individuals had previously been exonerated of the very

charges for which Rivera was detained. The official would

have then had good reason to believe that the CII numbers

belonged to two different individuals. The official could have

confirmed this by running the two CII numbers through the

Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“AFIS”),

which would have returned two distinct sets of fingerprints. 

By comparing Rivera’s fingerprints to the fingerprints

associated with both CII numbers, the officer then could have

determined that Rivera was the individual who had previously

been exonerated of the charges, and not the true subject of the

warrant. When the failure to take these simple steps results

in a month-long detention of a man who twice alerted

officials that he had been mistaken for another individual, a

factfinder could reasonably conclude that a due process

violation occurred.

III.

Even if a factfinder were to conclude that Los Angeles

County officials violated Rivera’s due process rights, the

inquiry would not end there. A municipality is liable for

constitutional violations only where its policies or customs

“evince a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the constitutional right

and are the ‘moving force behind the constitutional

violation.’” Edgerly v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 599

F.3d 946, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Levine v. City of

Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2008)).

Rivera contends that Los Angeles County has a policy of

relying on the arresting agency’s identification. Los Angeles
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 27

County does not dispute that, as a general matter, it does not

verify the identity of individuals arrested by a different

agency; however, if an individual arrested by a different

agency complains that he is not the subject of the warrant,

Los Angeles County will conduct an investigation. Rivera

has not shown how the failure to conduct an investigation at

the outset for every person arrested by another agency is

deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s constitutional rights.

On the evidence presented, however, a factfinder may

nonetheless conclude that Los Angeles County’s policy is

deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s due process rights and

was the moving force behind the violation. Sergeant Angela

Becerra, the Document Control Sergeant at the Inmate

Reception Center of the Los Angeles County jail, described

the County’s policy as follows: When a detainee complains

that “he is not the subject of a warrant on which he has been

arrested or detained,” officials fill out a Disputed Warrant

Verification Form and begin an investigation. They compare

the detainee’s and the warrant subject’s physical

characteristics, dates of birth, CII numbers, and, if necessary,

criminal histories. However, Agent Becerra’s declaration

also states that this is a rare complaint, noting that many

inmates will complain “that they are ‘innocent’, that they

were arrested by ‘mistake,’ or that they are not the person the

police are looking for,” but not that they had been

“misidentified with a warrant.”

A factfinder could reasonably conclude from the above

that Los Angeles County has a policy of investigating only

those complaints of misidentification that have been phrased

in very precise, particular terms. Applying the Disputed

Warrant Verification Form procedures only when a detainee

specifically complains that he is not the subject of the warrant
28 RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

and ignoring the other, more common complaints may well

be deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s constitutional

rights. After all, a lay person has no means of knowing that,

to get an officer’s or county official’s attention, he must state,

in very specific terms, that he is not the true subject of the

warrant; instead, he may reasonably attempt to explain his

predicament by indicating that the police have mistaken him

for another person or that he is not the person the police are

seeking. It is entirely obvious that refusing to investigate any

but the most precise misidentification complaints will lead to

the unconstitutional detention of innocent individuals. See

Lee, 250 F.3d at 682 (“[D]eliberate indifference to a person’s

constitutional rights occurs when the need for more or

different action, ‘is so obvious, and the inadequacy [of the

current procedure] so likely to result in the violation of

constitutional rights, that the policymakers . . . can reasonably

be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.’”

(second alteration in original) (quoting Oviatt, 954 F.2d at

1477–78)).

If the factfinder were to conclude that Los Angeles

County has a policy of investigating only a narrow set of very

precisely-worded complaints, the factfinder could also

reasonably conclude that this policy was the moving force

behind the deprivation of Rivera’s rights. In order to be the

“moving force” behind a plaintiff’s injury, the “‘identified

deficiency’ in the County’s policies [must be] ‘closely related

to the ultimate injury.’” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev.,

290 F.3d 1175, 1196 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting City of Canton

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989)). Here, the statements

Rivera made to the Los Angeles County officials are

remarkably similar to Agent Becerra’s examples of

complaints that would be considered distinct from general

misidentification claims. A factfinder could reasonably
RIVERA V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 29

determine that Rivera’s complaints were therefore ignored

because of a municipal policy to not investigate such

complaints.

IV.

For the above reasons, I would hold that a genuine issue

of material fact exists as to whether Rivera’s due process

rights were violated and whether Los Angeles Countymay be

held liable for the violation. I would therefore affirm in part

and reverse in part the district court’s order granting summary

judgment in favor of Defendants.