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R el vas v. H o l d er UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 

## SUMMARY ORD ER
R UL I NG S B Y S UM M ARY OR DE R DO NO T HA V E P RE CE DE NT I AL E F F E CT . C I TATI ON TO A SUM M AR Y ORD ER FI LED A FTER J AN UA RY 1, 2007, I S PE RM I TTED AN D I S GOVERNED BY F EDER AL R ULE OF A PPELLATE P RO CED UR E 3 2 .1 A N D T H IS CO URT ’ S L OC AL R ULE 32. 1. 1. W HE N CI T I NG A S UM M ARY OR DE R I N A D OC UM E NT F I L E D W I T H T HI S CO URT , A PA RTY M UST CI TE EI THER THE F EDER AL A PPEND I X OF AN ELECTRO NI C D ATA BASE ( W I T H T HE NOT AT I ON “ S UM M ARY OR DER ” ). A PAR TY CI TI NG A SUM M AR Y ORD ER M UST S ERVE A C OPY OF I T ON A NY PA RTY NO T REPR ES ENTED BY CO UN SE L . At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pear l Street, in the City of Ne w York, on the 24 day

of June, two thousand ten. th PRES ENT: WI L FRED F EI NB ERG, ROBERT D. SACK, P E T E R W
. H A LL, Circuit Judges
.

_______________________________________________________ ARMA ND O RELVA S,

Petitioner , v. 09-4059-a g ERI C H. HOL DER, J R., Attorney Gene ral of the Un ite d St ate s, Re sp on de nt.

________________________________________________________ Appea ringfor Petitioner: J US TI N C ONL ON , L aw O ff ic e s o f M ic ha e l B oyle , N or th Have n, CT. Ap pe ari ngfo r R e sp on de nt: B ROOKE M. M AURER , Trial Attorne y , Offic e of Immigration L itigation (Tony West, Assist ant Attorney Gene ral, Richar d M. Evans, Assistant Direc tor, on the brief ), United States De partment of Justice, Washington, D. C.2

ON CONSI DERATI ON of this petition for re view of a decision of the B oard of Im m i g r at i o nAp p e a l s ( “ B IA ” ) , i ti s h e r e b y ORDERED, ADJUDG ED, and DE CREED that the pe tit ion fo r r e vie w i s DE NI ED
. Pe tit ion e r Arm and o Re lva s, a nativ e and

c iti zen of Por tug a l, s e e ks re vie w o f a

n Augus t 3 1 , 2 0 0 9 o rd er

o f t h e B IA a ff

i rm i n g th e S ep t em b er

1 , 2 0 0 6 d ec i s i o no f t h e Imm i gra t i o nJ u d ge (“I J ”) f inding Relva s removable as cha rg ed under

sections 101(a )(43) (M) a nd (U) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“ I NA”) , 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43) (M), (U ). See I n re Armando Relvas, No. A034 758 717 (B .I .A. Aug . 31, 2009), aff’g No. A034 920 641 (I mmig. Ct. Hartf

ord, C T , S e p t . 1 , 2 0 0 6 )
. W e a s s um e th e p art i e s ’ f am i l i ar i ty w i thth e f

a c t s an d p r o c e d ur a l h i s t o r

y, wh ic h w e re fe re nc e on ly

to t he e xtent ne c e ssa

ry to e xpla in t

he or de r o f t

his c ourt . Re lva s w a s o rd e re d r e mov e d f ro m th e Un ite d St ate s a s a n a g g ra vate d f e lon purs ua nt t o
su bs e c tio ns 10 1( a )( 43 )( M) and (U ) o f t he I NA , d e fi nin gan a g g ra

vate d f e lony a s a n o ff e ns e involving “f

raud or dece it in which the loss to the victim or victim s exceeds $10,000," or an
atte mpt or c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it s uc h a

n o ff e ns e . Re lva s ma int a ins that he is n ot s ub je c t to
re mov a l be c a

us e the c ri me to whic h h e ple a de d guil ty in 2 00 5, 18 U. S.C. § 3 71 , “ c on sp ir a c y to defr aud the United States,” and for which he w as orde red to pa y $82,643.63 in restitution to t he United States Small Business Association (“ SBA” ), wa s not an ag g ravated fe lony for the purposes of the I

NA. “A s a rule, f

eder al cour

ts lack jurisdiction to review f inal ag ency

order s of
remova l based on a

n alien’s c onviction for ce rtain cr imes, including a g g ravated fe lonies.” Vargas-Sarmiento v. U

.S. Dep’ t of Justice, 44 8 F .3 d 1 59 , 1 64 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ). Cou rt s o f a pp e a ls, howeve r, do re tain jurisdiction to consider “c onstitut ional claims or questions of law ,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2)( D), including , inter alia, “whe ther the c rime for which the individual was c harg ed3

constitutes an ag g ravated fe lony .” Dos Santos v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 81, 83 ( 2d Cir. 2006). Whe n th e B IA a do pts the re a so nin gof the I J and

e xpand s o n th at r e a so nin g , a s o c c ur re d in thi s instance, w e re view the de cision of the I J as supplemented by the B IA. W

ala v. Muk

asey, 511 F.3d 102, 105 ( 2d Cir. 2007). A c onvic tio n und e r 1 8 U .S. C. § 37 1 ma y be gro un de d o n “ de c e itf

ul or dis ho ne st ” conduct. United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827, 831- 32 (2d Cir. 1996) (e mphasis added) (explaining that a cts of “de ceit, cr aft or tr icker y , or at lea st [ those] that are dishonest” ma y incur liability under § 371) . Relvas asser ts that he was c onvicted under § 371 of dishonesty

and not dece it, and acc ording ly

his conviction under § 371 should not have been c onsidered one of “f raud or dec eit” under

8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43) (M) a nd (U). We a

pply a “modifie d cate g orica l approa ch” when “a

criminal statute enc ompasses diverse classes of criminal ac ts -- some of which would categ orica lly be g rounds for r emoval and othe rs of whic h would not.” Dickson v

. Ashcroft, 34 6 F .3 d 4 4, 48 -4 9 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 3) . In th e se ins tanc e s it is p e rm iss ibl e fo r t

he a g e nc y to consider the statute “divisible,” and the rea fter to “ ref er[] t o the re cord of

conviction for the lim ite d p ur

po se of de te rm ini ngwh e the r t

he a lie n’ s c onvic tio n w a s und e r t he br anc h o f t

he statut e that permits remova l.” Id; se e also Lanferman v. Bd. of Imm igration Appeals, 576 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2009) (pe r cur iam) (“ When we re view the r ecor d of convic tion, the [ modified] cate g orica l approa ch per

mits i nquiry

into the fact of conviction of a sp e c if ic of fe ns e but pr oh ibi ts ref ere nce to or

examination of the pa rti c ula r fa c tua l c irc um sta nc es underly ing that conviction.”) (interna l quotation marks omitted). “The r ecor d of convic tion includes, inter alia, the cha rg ing document, a ple a agree ment, a ver dict or judg ment of convic tion, a rec ord of the se ntence , or a plea c olloquy

transcr ipt.” W

ala, 511 F.3d at 108 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed).4

The B IA cor

rec tly applied a modifie d cate g orica l approa ch to its analy sis of Relvas’ § 371 conviction. The statute e stablishes liabilit y for de ceitful c onduct, potentially g iving r ise to an ag g ravated fe lony

under the I

NA, as w ell as dishonest conduc t, which would not. “Where , as here , the cha lleng ed convic tion is obt ained pur suant to a guilty plea, our consideration is l imited to the fac ts to which a def endant a ctually

and nec essar ily

pleade d in order to e stablish the elements of the offe nse, as indicated by a cha rg ing doc ument, written plea ag ree ment, or plea colloquy transcr ipt.” Almeida v. H older , 588 F.3d 778, 785 ( 2d Cir. 2009). The c riminal information in this inst ance char g ed Relvas with “know ingly and willfully

conspiringand ag ree [i ng ] wit h . . . others to make materially false, f ictitious, and fraudule nt statements and
re pr e se ntatio ns . . . a

nd to c on c e a l and

c ov e r u p b y tr ic k, sc he me , a

nd de vic e mate ri a l f

a c ts . . . to obtain an SBAloan in the amount of $1,750,000 to which [Relvas] [ was] not entitled.” Such
a c tio ns , th e B IA c or

re c tly de te rm ine d, “ are ind ic ativ e of de c e itf ul c on du c t, n ot m e re ly

dis ho ne st conduct.” In re Armando R elvas, No . A 03 4 7 58 71 7 ( B .I .A . Aug31 , 2 00 9) ; Cf. Ma tte r o f F lores, 17 I . & N. De c . 2 25 , 2 29 (B .I .A . 1 98 0) (“ [T]he of fe ns e of kn ow ing ly

makin gfa lse repr esentations in order to eva de military service involved moral turpitude bec ause it wa s an aff irmative ac t calculated to dece ive the g overnme nt and, there fore , was inher ently fra udulent.”). Indeed, w e note that Relva s was convic ted of “ Conspiracy to Defr aud the United States,” and that “[a]bsent any

rea sonable c halleng e to its validity , we think the cle ar la nguag e of the jud g me nt o f c onvic tio n s ho uld c ontr ol t he de te rm inatio n o f what of fe ns e an a lie n a c tua lly committed.” Kuhali v. Reno , 266 F.3d 93, 106 ( 2d Cir. 2001). Acc ording ly , the B IA did not err in ruling that Relvas’ convic tion fell into a branc h of § 371 that justifies remova l.5

Relvas asser

ts in the alternative that the BIA er red in fa iling to addr ess his arguments that (i ) “ a loa n d oe s n ot q

ua lif y a s a los s und e r t

he a g g ra vate d f e lony statut e ,” and

(i i) the re c or d d id
no t e sta bli shthat th e vic timof

Re lva s’ of

fe ns e , th e Un ite d St ate s g ov e rnme nt, su ff e re d a los s in
e xce ss o f $ 10 ,0 00 , a s r e qu ir e d b y § 1 10 1( a )( 43 )( M) . “ Th e B IA, wh e n c on sid e ri ngan a pp e a l, must actually

consider the evidenc e and a rgument that a par

ty prese nts.” Y

an Che n v . G onza le

s, 41 7 F .3 d 2 68 , 2 72 (2 d Ci r. 20 05 ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . T he re c or d in dic ate s, howeve r, that the B IA did consider a nd reje ct Relvas’ f

irst argument when it explained that pursuant to Nijhaw an v. Holder, 12 9 S. Ct. 22 94 (2 00 9) , “ a re sti tut ion

or de r i s a pp ro pr iate evidenc e of the amount of loss.” In re Armando R elvas, No. A034 758 717 (B .I .A. Aug31, 2009). The B IA took note that Relvas wa s order ed to pay $106,827.78 in restitution, id., and thus the BIA “e ng ag e[d] the evidenc e he pr esente d” and pr ovided Relvas with a “ rea soned analy sis” as to why

that evidenc e sug g ested a loss in ex cess of

$10,000, Mo hid

e e n v . G onza le

s, 416 F.3d 567, 571 ( 7th Cir. 2005). Turn ingto t

he me ri ts o f t

his argume nt, wh ic h Re lva s r e ne ws on pe tit ion to t his c ourt ,

“ [w]e mus t de fe r t o th e B IA' s d e te rm inatio n, in a c c or da nc e wi th t he Sup re me Court ' s d e c isi on in Che v ro n U

.S .A ., In c . v . NR

DC , 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L . Ed. 2d 694 (1984), when our jurisdiction depends on the de finition of a phra se used in the I NA, a statute that the B IA a dmi nis te rs , a

nd ‘whe n th e int e nt o f C on g re ss i s unc le ar a nd the a g e nc y ' s inte rp re tatio n is
rea sonable.’” Jame

s v. Muk asey , 5 2 2 F. 3 d

2 5 0 , 2 5 3 -5 4 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 25 8 F .3 d 5 2, 55 (2 d Ci r. 20 01 )) . Re lva s h a s o ff e re d n e ith e r a

uth or ity c ontr ary to Nijhaw an sug g estingthat an immigr ation court may not rely upon a re stitut ion order to de termine the amount of loss nor any showingthat the B IA’s interpr etation of § 1101(a )(43) (M) wa s6

unrea sonable. The BIA thus adequately considere d, and re asonably reje cted, Relva s’ claim that
re sti tut ion

re su lti ngfr om a

fr a ud ule ntl y ob ta ine d lo an d oe s n ot f

a ll w ith in t

he de fi nit ion

of “ los s” in § 1101(a)( 43)(M). Wit h respe ct to Relvas’ a rgument that no evidenc e wa s proffe red of any loss suffere d by the United States, the B IA noted that Relvas wa s convicted of conspiringto “def

raud the United States,” that the ba sis for Relvas’ c onviction was his attempt to acquire by fra ud a guara

nteed SB A l oa n in the amou nt o f $ 1, 75 0, 00 0, and

that Re lva s w a s o rd e re d to pa y $1 06 ,8 27 .7 8 in restitution -- $24,184.15 of that total to the CI T Small Business L endingCorporation and $82,643.63 to the United States Small Business Association. The or der of restitution, to which the B IA r e fe rr e d, state s th at “ [t]he amou nts or de re d r e pr e se nt t

he tot a l amou

nts du e to t

he vic tim s for these losses.” Ac cording ly , the B IA ade quately considere d and re asonably deter mined that the US g overnme nt was a vic tim of Relvas’ cr ime and suff ere d a loss in excess of $10,000. Relvas asser

ts that beca

use his indictment on the single char g e of c onspiracy included two objects and f

ive over t acts, the loss was not “tied to the spe cific c ounts covere d by the conviction” or

“tether ed to the off

ense of conviction.” Nijhaw an, 12 9 S. Ct. at 23 03 ; Nijhaw an v. Att’y G en., 523 F.3d 387, 397 ( 3rd Cir. 2008). The purpose be hind the ‘tether ing’ require ment is to avoid including in the $10,000 re quirement “ losses stemming fr om unconvicted of fense s.” Alaka v. Att’y

Gen., 45 6 F .3 d 8 8, 10 6 ( 3d Cir . 2 00 6) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . In th is instance the re is no question that the losses conside red by the I J and the B IA ar ose direc tly from the sing le conspira cy

offe nse for

which Relvas wa s convicted.7

For the fore g oing r easons, a

nd findingthe re mainder of petitioner’s a

rguments without merit, the petition for re view is DENI ED.

F OR TH E CO UR T: Catherine O ’Ha g an Wolfe, Clerk