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S. HRG. 114–214 

MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA– 

PACIFIC REGION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 17, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, Staff Director 

ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 25, 2015

Page 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS ................................................................ 1 

Shear, The Honorable David B., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian 

and Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ............................... 4 

Harris, Admiral Harry B., Jr., USN, Commander U.S. Pacific Command ......... 10 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 37 

(III) 

(1) 

MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE 

ASIA–PACIFIC REGION 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2015 

U.S. SENATE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain, chairman 

of the committee, presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators McCain [presiding], 

Inhofe, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Reed, 

Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, 

and King. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, good morning. 

The Senate Armed Services meets today to receive testimony on 

the U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region. 

I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing before 

us today and for your continued service to the Nation. 

America’s national interests in the Asia-Pacific region are deep 

and enduring. We seek to maintain a balance of power that fosters 

a peaceful expansion of free societies, free trade, free markets, and 

free commons, air, sea, space, and cyber. These are values that we 

share with increasing numbers of Asia’s citizens. For 7 decades, administrations of both parties have worked with our friends and allies in the region to uphold this rules-based order and to enlist new 

partners in this shared effort, an effort that now extends to states 

like Indonesia and Vietnam. 

No country has benefited more from a peaceful regional order in 

the Asia-Pacific region than China. I am betraying my advanced 

age when I say that I still remember being in the Great Hall of 

the People on the occasion of the normalization between our countries. Since then, China’s social and economic development has 

been remarkable, and it has added to the prosperity of the world. 

Unfortunately, we increasingly see a pattern of behavior from 

China that suggests that some of our highest hopes for our relationship are not materializing and that call into question for nations across the Pacific whether China’s rise will, in fact, be peaceful. Indeed, many of these troubling activities have only increased 

under the leadership of the new president, who will arrive here 

next week for a state visit. 

China’s military modernization continues with its emphasis on 

advanced systems that appear designed to project power, counter 

2 

U.S. military capabilities, and deny the United States the ability 

to access and operate in the western Pacific. At the same time, 

cyber attacks against the United States are growing in scope, scale, 

and frequency. Billions of dollars’ worth of intellectual property, including sensitive defense information, have been stolen. Many of 

these attacks, especially the recent breach at the Office of Personnel Management, are believed by everyone to have originated in 

China despite the administration’s unwillingness to say so. 

These growing threats are compounded by China’s assertion of 

vast territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, which are 

inconsistent with international law. In 2013, Beijing proclaimed an 

air defense identification zone over large portions of the East China 

Sea, including over territory claimed by Japan and South Korea. 

More recently China has reclaimed nearly 3,000 acres of land in 

the South China Sea, more than all other claimants combined and 

at an unprecedented pace. Last month, China’s foreign minister 

said it had halted these activities, but recently released satellite 

images show clearly that this is not true. 

What’s more, China is rapidly militarizing this reclaimed land, 

building garrisons, harbors, intelligence and surveillance infrastructure, and at least three airstrips that could support military 

aircraft. With the addition of surface-to-air missiles and radars, 

these new land features could enable China to declare and enforce 

an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea and to 

hold that vital region at risk. 

China is incrementally and unilaterally changing the status quo 

through coercion, intimidation, even force. Its goal appears clear: 

the assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea, a key economic artery through which approximately $5 trillion in ship-borne 

trade passes every year. As one Chinese admiral recently told a 

conference in London about the South China Sea, quote, it belongs 

to China. 

The United States has rightly rejected this view. As Secretary of 

Defense Ash Carter said in May, ‘‘turning an underwater rock into 

an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit.′′ Secretary 

Carter vowed that ‘‘the United States will fly, sail, and operate 

wherever international law allows, as U.S. forces do all over the 

world.′′ 

Unfortunately, it has been 4 months since that speech, but the 

administration has continued to restrict our Navy ships from operating within 12 nautical miles of country’s reclaimed islands. This 

is a dangerous mistake that grants de facto recognition of China’s 

manmade sovereignty claims. These restrictions have continued 

even after China sent its own naval vessels within 12 nautical 

miles of the Aleutian Islands as President Obama concluded his recent visit to Alaska. 

After that incident, United States officials emphasized that the 

Chinese ships did not violate international law, which allows countries to transit other nations’ territorial seas under what is called 

innocent passage. That is true, but we have not been asserting our 

rights just as forcefully. We must uphold the principle of freedom 

of the seas for commercial and military purposes on, under, and 

below the water. The best sign of that commitment would be to 

3 

conduct freedom of navigation operations within 12 nautical miles 

of China’s reclaimed islands in the South China Sea. 

More broadly, the United States must continue to sustain a favorable military balance in the Asia-Pacific region. We must remain clear-eyed about the implications of China’s rapid military 

modernization. We must take advantage of new and emerging technologies to preserve our ability to project power over long distances 

and operate in contested environments. We must invest in enhancing the resilience of our forward-deployed forces. We must continue 

to help our allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region to build 

their maritime capacity, an initiative that this committee seeks to 

further in the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act 

[NDAA]. None of this will be possible, however, if we continue to 

live with the mindless sequestration and a broken acquisition system. 

All of us want to ensure that we avoid miscalculation, but we 

only encourage miscalculation when there is a gap between our 

words and our actions. It is that gap that China has exploited to 

assert vast territorial claims, bully its neighbors, destabilize the region, and challenge the freedom of the seas. 

Ultimately, we need to think anew about deterrence. When it 

comes to China’s destabilizing activities, it is not that the United 

States is doing nothing. It is that nothing we are doing has been 

sufficient to deter China from continuing activities that the United 

States and our allies and partners say are unacceptable, the cyber 

attacks, the economic espionage and theft, the land reclamation, 

the coercion of its neighbors, and the assertion and attempted enforcement of vast, unlawful territorial claims. We need to develop 

options and act on them to deter these admittedly unconventional 

threats or else they will continue and grow. They will do so at the 

expense of the national security interests of the United States, the 

peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and a rules-based 

international order. 

With that, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today. 

Senator Reed? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let 

me first thank you for calling this important hearing on maritime 

security in the Asia-Pacific region and also thank the witnesses for 

appearing today. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to the Nation, to the Navy. Thank you both. 

When Senator McCain and I were in Vietnam, we heard concern 

from almost every single government official about the heightened 

tension in the South China Sea caused by China’s activities. Vietnam is not alone in this regard. For the last 2 years, China has 

undertaken extraordinary and unprecedented reclamation activities 

on disputed land features in the South China Sea that have 

alarmed all of the countries in the region, most of which would prefer to resolve these territorial disputes through legal means under 

the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. These activities appear to have just been the beginning as China has now 

turned to militarizing these features by building airstrips and surveillance towers that I believe will further destabilize the region. 

4 

While there has been some progress on the bilateral strategy to 

decrease tension between the United States Navy and the Chinese 

Navy for the establishment of new risk reduction mechanisms, 

such as engagement rules to air and maritime safety, our efforts 

to date do not seem to have had an impact on China’s aggressive 

tactics in the South China Sea. I would like to hear from the witnesses on what the Department believes is the best way forward 

to address this activity and whether current efforts are sufficient 

to deescalate tension and convince the Chinese Government to pursue a legal and diplomatic solution to its territorial disputes with 

its neighbors. 

I am also quite concerned with North Korea’s recent rhetoric that 

it is improving its nuclear arsenal in, quote, quality and quantity, 

further contributing to the heightened tensions in the region. Admiral Harris, I would especially like to get your assessment and 

update on the threat posed by the North Koreans and how we are 

addressing it. 

With that, gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony. 

Senator MCCAIN. I welcome the witnesses. Secretary Shear, it is 

nice to see you again and thank you for your continued outstanding 

service, including as our Ambassador to Vietnam. Admiral Harris, 

I know that you are relatively new in your job, and we thank you 

for the great job you are doing. We look forward to your testimony. 

We will begin with you, Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID B. SHEAR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary SHEAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, thank 

you, Ranking Member Reed, and all the members of the committee 

for inviting me to join you today. 

I am particularly pleased to be here discussing the Defense Department’s maritime security strategy for the Asia-Pacific region 

and to be alongside our very capable U.S. Pacific Commander, Admiral Harry Harris. 

Last month, the Department of Defense released a report detailing its Asia-Pacific maritime security strategy, which reflects both 

the enduring interest the United States has in the Asia-Pacific and 

the premium we place on maritime peace and security in this critical part of the world. This strategy is one element of the United 

States Government’s larger comprehensive strategy to uphold maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region and protect America’s principle interests in international law, freedom of navigation, 

unimpeded lawful commerce, and peaceful resolution of disputes. 

For 70 years, United States military presence in the Asia-Pacific 

has played an indispensable role in undergirding regional peace, 

stability, and security and will continue to protect these interests 

in the future. 

There are, as you know, growing challenges in maritime Asia, 

trends and behaviors that we detailed in the strategy report. Regional military modernization has increased significantly the potential for dangerous miscalculations or conflict in the maritime domain. Strong nationalist sentiments inflame passions over territorial disputes and discourage good faith negotiations to resolve 

5 

them. Competition abounds over significant but finite natural resources. In the South China Sea, China has almost completed 

large-scale efforts to reclaim land and construct artificial islands on 

disputed features in the Spratly Islands. 

While land reclamation is not new and China is not the only 

claimant to have conducted reclamation, as the chart to my right 

shows, China’s recent activities far outweigh other efforts in size, 

pace, and effort. We are concerned about China’s long-term intentions for these features and the potential for further militarization 

of the South China Sea. As we have stated clearly to the Chinese, 

these actions are not only unilaterally altering the status quo, they 

are also complicating the lowering of tensions and the peaceful resolution of disputes. 

Let me be clear. The Defense Department is not standing still in 

the face of these challenges. We are systematically implementing 

a long-term strategy aimed at preserving United States interests 

and military access, building the capability of our allies and partners, and preserving the stability of the Asia-Pacific domain. The 

Department’s strategy comprises four lines of effort. 

First, we are strengthening our military capacity to ensure the 

United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and respond decisively when needed. DOD [Department of Defense] is investing in new cutting-edge capabilities, deploying our finest maritime capabilities forward, and distributing these capabilities more 

widely across the region. 

Second, we are working together with our allies and partners 

from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their maritime 

capacity. We are building greater interoperability and developing 

more integrated operations with our allies and partners. We are 

also expanding our regional exercise program with a particular 

focus on developing new multilateral exercises and expanding 

training with Southeast Asian partners. 

The Defense Department is also implementing a new Southeast 

Asia maritime security initiative. This effort will increase training 

and exercises, personnel support, and maritime domain awareness 

capabilities for our partners in Southeast Asia. 

On that note, I would like to express our thanks and appreciation to the members of this committee for their work to include a 

South China Sea-focused maritime capacity- building authority in 

their draft of the fiscal year 2016 NDAA. I cannot emphasize 

enough how important maritime capacity-building is to our overarching strategy. 

Third, we are leveraging defense diplomacy and building greater 

transparency. We are trying to reduce the risk of miscalculation or 

conflict and promoting shared maritime rules of the road. The Department is actively seeking to mitigate risk in maritime Asia both 

for bilateral efforts with China, as well as region-wide risk reduction measures. 

These and other elements of United States-China defense diplomacy have yielded some positive results. United States and PLA 

[People’s Liberation Army] Navy vessels have now successfully employed the code for unplanned encounters at sea on multiple occasions during recent interactions. I would note that while the United 

States operates consistent with the United Nations Convention on 

6 

the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS], we have seen positive momentum 

in promoting shared rules of the road. Our efforts would be greatly 

strengthened by Senate ratification of UNCLOS. Mr. Chairman, I 

would like to thank you and other members for your support on 

this issue. 

Finally, we are working to strengthen regional security institutions and encourage the development of an open and effective regional security architecture. ASEAN [Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations] is an increasingly important DOD partner, and the 

Department is enhancing its engagement in ASEAN-based institutions. This includes efforts such as our decision to host ASEAN defense ministers for their 2014 U.S.-ASEAN Defense Forum, as well 

as Secretary Carter’s recent announcement of DOD’s commitment 

to deploy a technical advisor in support of ASEAN’s maritime security efforts. 

Throughout its history, the U.S. has relied upon and advocated 

for freedom of the seas. This freedom is essential to our economic 

and security interests and nowhere more so than in the Asia-Pacific. The Department is constantly working to evaluate the strategic environment to ensure we have the necessary strategy, resources, and tools to meet the challenges we face. We are cleareyed about the growing complexity of this task. Yet, we are making 

progress that, over the long term, will be significant in shaping the 

regional security environment. We are making calculated and careful investments. We are gaining unprecedented access in the region. Our relationships and interoperability with allies and partners are stronger than ever before. Moreover, partners across the 

region are enhancing their defense cooperation with each other in 

unprecedented ways. 

In short, we are deeply committed to the maritime security of the 

Asia-Pacific region. We do not discount the extent of the challenges, 

but we are undertaking a comprehensive effort to ensure that maritime Asia remains open, free, and secure in the decades ahead. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Shear follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. DAVID B. SHEAR

INTRODUCTION

Thank you very much Chairman McCain. Thank you also to Ranking Member 

Reed and other members of the committee for inviting me to be here to speak with 

you today. 

I am pleased to be here to discuss maritime issues in the Asia-Pacific and the Department of Defense’s new Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, which we released last month. This strategy reflects the enduring interests the United States 

has in the region and the premium we place on maritime peace and security in this 

critical part of the world. Throughout its history, the United States has relied upon 

and advocated for freedom of the seas, and this freedom is essential to our economic 

and security interests, nowhere more so than in the Asia-Pacific. 

It is important to note that while this strategy reflects the Defense Department’s 

maritime objectives and activities in the Asia-Pacific, DOD’s efforts are simply one 

aspect of a much broader U.S. strategy to protect America’s principled interests in 

upholding international law, freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, 

and peaceful resolution of disputes. The United States has a comprehensive strategy 

to uphold maritime security in the region—one that leverages diplomacy, multilateral institutions, commitment to international law, maritime capacity building, 

trade, and continued engagement across the region. 

7 

The Department of Defense plays an important part in supporting these goals. 

For seventy years, our robust maritime capabilities, and the presence of U.S. sailors, 

soldiers, Marines, and airmen, have helped protect the freedom of navigation and 

commerce upon which the United States and all Asia-Pacific nations rely. As we 

note in the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy report, ‘‘freedom of the seas’’ reflects far more than simply freedom of navigation for commercial vessels. It also implies all of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace, including 

for military ships and aircraft, recognized under international law. 

Unfortunately, in recent years, we have seen a number of changes take place in 

the maritime security environment that have the potential to undermine the freedoms and the peace and security the region has enjoyed for decades. So before I discuss the details of our strategy, allow me to offer some thoughts on the strategic 

context for this report. 

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Over the past several decades, the Asia-Pacific has experienced one of the most 

tremendous economic transformations in modern history, thanks in no small part 

to the growth of free and open trade across the region’s sea lanes. As Secretary Carter noted, this growth has been the result of a peaceful security environment. While 

regional trade and prosperity continue to grow, recent developments in the maritime 

domain, if left unaddressed, could challenge the stable security environment that 

has enabled this historic progress. These include rapid military modernization, 

growing competition for resources, and intensifying territorial and maritime disputes. 

In recent years, Asia-Pacific nations have significantly increased their surface, 

subsurface, and air capabilities, leading to a dramatic increase in the number of 

military planes and vessels operating in close proximity in the maritime domain. At 

the same time, this military modernization has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in regional law enforcement capabilities, which have become increasingly relevant as some countries, particularly China, are using their civilian 

assets to assert claims over disputed maritime areas. 

While military modernization efforts are a natural and expected element of economic growth, they also increase the potential for dangerous miscalculations or conflict. This places a premium on the need for Asia-Pacific nations to adhere to shared 

maritime rules of the road, such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea 

(CUES), and to pursue increased transparency and risk reduction mechanisms to 

ensure safe behavior in the maritime domain. 

The potential for instability is also exacerbated by the existence of long-standing 

territorial and maritime disputes across the region, most notably in the South China 

Sea. While we do not take a position on conflicting territorial claims in the South 

China Sea, we do emphasize that all maritime claims must be derived from land 

features in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea 

Convention, and any disputes should be settled peacefully and in accordance with 

international law. We have called for all claimants to reciprocally and permanently 

halt land reclamation, the construction of new facilities, and the further militarization of outposts on disputed features. We have also encouraged all claimants to conclude a Code of Conduct by the time of the East Asia Summit in November, one 

that would create clear rules of the road in the South China Sea. 

China’s large-scale land reclamation on disputed features over the past two years 

has brought concerns about regional stability into sharper focus. While land reclamation is not a new development, and China is not the only claimant to have conducted reclamation, China’s recent activities significantly exceed other efforts in 

size, pace, and effect. China has now reclaimed more than 2,900 acres, amounting 

to 17 times more land in 20 months than the other claimants combined over the 

past 40 years, and accounting for approximately 95 percent of all reclaimed land in 

the Spratly Islands. China has clearly stated that the outposts will have a military 

component to them, and by undertaking these actions, China is not only unilaterally 

altering the status quo in the region, they are also complicating the lowering of tensions and the resolution of South China Sea disputes. We continue to encourage all 

claimants to commit to reciprocally and permanently halt further land reclamation, 

construction, and militarization of outposts in the South China Sea, in order to create space for diplomatic solutions to emerge. 

DOD’S MARITIME STRATEGY

The Department has devised a comprehensive and systematic maritime strategy 

to meet these challenges. Our strategy is focused on three fundamental goals: safeVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:44 Mar 31, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99603 JUNE
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guarding the freedom of the seas; deterring conflict and coercion; and promoting adherence to international law and standards. 

In pursuit of these goals, the Department is: strengthening United States military 

capacity; building the maritime capabilities of allies and partners in maritime Asia; 

reducing the risk of potential conflicts by leveraging military diplomacy; and 

strengthening regional security institutions. 

Strengthening U.S. Military Capacity 

As part of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, we are strengthening our military capacity to ensure the United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and 

respond decisively when needed. To achieve this objective, the Department is investing in new cutting-edge capabilities, deploying our finest maritime capabilities forward, and distributing these capabilities more widely across the region. 

We also are enhancing our regional force posture—particularly air and maritime 

assets—to ensure our ability to execute key missions. We are deploying some of our 

most advanced surface ships to the Asia-Pacific, including replacing the aircraft carrier USS George Washington in 2015 with the newer USS Ronald Reagan; sending 

our newest air operations-oriented amphibious assault ship, the USS America, to 

the region by 2020; deploying two additional Aegis-capable destroyers to Japan; and 

home-porting all three of our newest class of stealth destroyers, the DDG–1000, 

with the Pacific fleet. Through these and other efforts, the U.S. Navy will increase 

the size of Pacific Fleet’s overseas assigned forces by approximately 30 percent over 

the next five years. 

This enhanced military capacity will allow the Department to maintain a higher 

tempo of routine and persistent maritime presence activities across the Asia-Pacific. 

In short, you will see more of the U.S. Navy in the region in the coming years. 

United States Pacific Command maintains a robust shaping presence in and around 

the South China Sea, with activities ranging from training and exercises with allies 

and partners to port calls to Freedom of Navigation Operations and other routine 

operations. These activities are central to our efforts to dissuade conflict, preserve 

our access to the region, encourage peaceful resolution of maritime disputes and adherence to the rule of law, and to strengthen our relationships with partners and 

allies. 

A key component of DOD operations falls under the Freedom of Navigation (FON) 

program, conducted in conjunction with our interagency partners. The Department 

is placing new emphasis on these operations, which challenge excessive maritime 

claims around the world and directly support adherence to international maritime 

law. Between 2013 and 2014, we increased global FON operations by 84 percent, 

the majority of which were conducted in the Asia-Pacific. As Secretary Carter has 

stated, the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, as U.S. forces do all around the world, and our FON Operations 

are a critical example of this. 

The Department is also enhancing its forward presence by using existing assets 

in new ways, across the entire region, with an emphasis on operational flexibility 

and maximizing the value of U.S. assets despite the tyranny of distance. This is why 

the Department is working to develop a more distributed, resilient, and sustainable 

posture. As part of this effort, the United States will maintain its presence in Northeast Asia, while enhancing defense posture across the Western Pacific, Southeast 

Asia, and the Indian Ocean. The cornerstone of our forward presence will continue 

to be our presence in Japan, and in an effort to ensure that this presence is sustainable, we have worked within the alliance to develop a new laydown for the U.S. Marine Corps in the Pacific. Through the bilateral Force Posture Agreement (FPA) 

with Australia and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the 

Philippines, the Department will be able to increase our routine and persistent rotational presence in Southeast Asia for expanded training with regional partners. 

Through these efforts, there should be no doubt that the United States will maintain the necessary military presence and capabilities to protect our interests and 

those of our allies and partners against potential threats in the maritime domain. 

Building Ally and Partner Capacity 

However, our strategy involves far more than U.S. capacity and presence. The 

bedrock of our approach in the region is our strong network of allies and partners, 

and the combined capabilities these relationships can bring to bear. Through regular 

and close consultations with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean, the Department of Defense is working to bolster the maritime capacity 

and capabilities of countries in the region. 

First, we are building greater interoperability and developing more integrated operations with our allies and partners. For example, with our close ally Japan, we 

9 

are working to improve the maritime-related capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense 

Forces. As Japan acquires advanced capabilities such as V–22 Ospreys, E–2D 

Hawkeyes, and Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, we are building a stronger 

and more interoperable alliance. Our expanded bilateral cooperation will now encompass a range of activities, from peacetime cooperation on shared maritime domain awareness, up to cooperation across a range of contingencies. In Southeast 

Asia, the Department is assisting the Philippines to more effectively establish a 

minimum credible defense, and we have established new bilateral working groups 

with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore to support their maritime defense requirements. In South Asia, we are working with the Indian Navy on aircraft carrier technology sharing and design; the United States-India Joint Aircraft Carrier Working 

Group (JACWG) had its first formal meeting in August, led by Vice ADM Cheema, 

the Commander in Chief of India’s Western Fleet. 

We also are increasing the size, frequency, and sophistication of our regional exercise program, with a particular focus on developing new exercises with Southeast 

Asian partners and expanding our multilateral exercise program. A large contingent 

of United States, Philippine, and Australian military personnel participated in this 

year’s exercise Balikatan in the Philippines, including observers from Japan. DOD 

is continuing to expand its maritime engagements elsewhere in Southeast Asia, with 

important partners like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. In Indonesia, the April 

2015 iteration of the Sea Surveillance Exercises included a flight portion over the 

South China Sea for the first time, and the United States Marine Corps participated 

in an amphibious exercise with the Malaysian Armed Forces. In Vietnam, we are 

rapidly growing our maritime training, and in just six years, our naval cooperation 

has grown from a simple port visit to multi-day engagements that allow our sailors 

to better understand each other’s operations and procedures. 

Our maritime capacity building efforts in Southeast Asia do not stop there. As 

Secretary Carter announced at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Department is implementing a new Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) that will increase 

training and exercises, personnel support, and maritime domain awareness capabilities for our partners in Southeast Asia. As part of MSI, DOD, in coordination with 

the Department of State, will consult with our allies and partners to define the requirements needed to accomplish the goals of MSI and explore other enduring opportunities for maritime collaboration. In the near term, we are focused on several 

lines of effort: working with partners to expand regional maritime domain awareness capabilities and develop a regional common operating picture; providing the 

necessary infrastructure, logistics support, and operational procedures to enable 

more effective maritime response operations; strengthening partner nation operational capabilities through expanded maritime exercises and engagements; helping 

partners strengthen their maritime institutions, governance, and personnel training; 

and identifying modernization and new system requirements for critical maritime 

security capabilities. I not only thank you for remaining focused on this important 

effort, but also urge your continued support as we move forward to implement this 

strategy. 

Reducing Risk 

In addition to our efforts to improve regional capabilities, the Department is also 

leveraging defense diplomacy to build greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the road. The Department is pursuing a two-pronged approach to achieve this objective, one focusing on 

our bilateral relationship with China, and the other focused on region-wide risk reduction measures. 

In recent years, we have reinvigorated efforts to expand bilateral risk reduction 

mechanisms with China, including the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement 

(MMCA) and the establishment of an historic Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU) on Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters in 2014. 

This MOU established a common understanding of operational procedures for air 

and maritime encounters to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding between the 

United States and Chinese militaries. The MOU currently includes an annex on 

ship-to-ship encounters and we are working to expand it further by the end of 2015. 

Already, United States-China defense diplomacy has yielded positive results; there 

have been no unsafe intercepts since August 2014. In further efforts to reduce risk, 

U.S. Navy and PLA Navy vessels have successfully employed CUES during recent 

interactions, lowering the likelihood of miscalculations that could lead to dangerous 

escalation. 

Of course, reaching agreement on bilateral risk reduction measures with China 

is necessary, but not sufficient. The Department is also working to help the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional partners establish reVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:44 Mar 31, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99603 JUNE
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gional risk reduction mechanisms, such as operational-level hotlines to establish 

more reliable and routine crisis communication mechanisms. As I mentioned, MSI 

will help develop a regional common operating picture to reduce risk, but we also 

encourage the efforts of countries that seek to reduce tensions through their own 

initiatives—such as Indonesia and Malaysia—who recently announced their intention to exchange maritime envoys in an effort to increase mutual transparency. We 

also have supported the efforts between China and Japan to do the same in the East 

China Sea. 

Building Regional Architecture 

Finally, we are working to strengthen regional security institutions and encourage 

the development of a transparent, integrated, and diversified effective regional security architecture. ASEAN is an increasingly important DOD partner, and the Department is continuing to enhance its engagement in ASEAN-based institutions 

such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM–Plus). To this end, 

Secretary Carter will travel to Kuala Lumpur in November for the next ADMM– 

Plus meeting. This will follow a host of new initiatives and engagements with various ASEAN-related institutions. For example, at the May 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the Secretary of Defense announced DOD’s commitment to deploy a technical advisor to augment the U.S. Mission to ASEAN in support of 

ASEAN’s maritime security efforts, and we are making progress toward that goal. 

We are also leveraging informal opportunities to strengthen regional cooperation, 

such as the first United States-ASEAN Defense Forum then-Secretary of Defense 

Chuck Hagel hosted in Hawaii in April 2014. Through these venues, we aim to promote candid conversations about ongoing challenges in the maritime domain, and 

encourage greater information sharing and cooperative solutions. 

At its core, any discussion about the future of the Asia-Pacific naturally involves 

a discussion about maritime security, given the defining characteristic of the maritime domain in the region. Our strategy enables countries in the region to have confidence in our conviction to uphold our principled maritime interests. Our strategy 

also is designed to strengthen the rules-based order, where laws and standards, not 

size and strength, determine outcomes to disputes. We are not alone in seeking to 

advance this vision for the region, which aligns our interests with our values; indeed, it is widely shared by countries across the region that eagerly support our efforts. Even as we address immediate challenges to our interests and those of our 

allies and partners, we remain committed to this longer term goal. 

CONCLUSION

The Asia-Pacific and its maritime waterways remain critical to United States security. The Department is actively working to stay ahead of the evolving maritime 

security environment in the Asia-Pacific by implementing a comprehensive strategy 

that will protect peace and stability in the maritime domain. Together with our 

interagency colleagues and regional allies and partners, the Department will help 

ensure that maritime Asia remains open, free, and secure in the decades ahead. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Admiral Harris? 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, 

COMMANDER U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, 

and distinguished members. It is my honor to appear once again 

before this committee. I am pleased to be here with Assistant Secretary Shear to discuss the Asia-Pacific maritime strategies. 

The United States is a maritime nation and the importance of 

the Asia-Pacific region to our Nation’s security and prosperity cannot be overstated. Almost 30 percent of the world’s maritime trade, 

as the chairman said, over $5 trillion, transits the South China Sea 

annually. This includes $1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound for 

the United States. The Asia-Pacific region is critical for our Nation’s economic future. 

For decades, this region has remained free from major conflicts, 

allowing the United States and other Pacific nations, including 

11 

China, to enjoy the benefits of its vast maritime spaces. However, 

the security environment is changing, potentially placing this stability at risk. Rapid economic and military modernization and a 

growing demand for resources have increased the potential for conflict. Peacetime freedom of navigation is under pressure. 

If not handled properly, territorial and maritime disputes in the 

East and South China Seas could disrupt stability throughout the 

region. Claimants to disputed areas routinely use maritime law enforcement and coast guard vessels to enforce their claims while 

nominally keeping these issues out of the military sphere. While no 

country appears to desire military conflict, tactical miscalculations 

can lead to strategic consequences. 

The United States does not take sides on issues of sovereignty 

with respect to these territorial disputes, but we do insist that all 

maritime claims be derived from naturally-formed land features in 

accordance with customary international law, as reflected in the 

Law of the Sea Convention. The United States also emphasizes the 

importance of peacefully resolving maritime and territorial disagreements in accordance with international law, and we oppose 

the use of intimidation, coercion, or aggression. The U.S. believes 

every nation, large or small, should have the opportunity to develop 

and prosper in line with international laws and standards. If one 

country selectively ignores these rules for its own benefit, others 

will undoubtedly follow, eroding the international legal system and 

destabilizing regional security and the prosperity of all Pacific 

states. Part of PACOM’s [United States Pacific Command] role in 

the Asia-Pacific maritime strategy will be ensuring all nations have 

continued access to the maritime spaces vital to the global economy. 

International recognition and protection of freedom of navigation 

is vital to the world’s economy and our way of life. To safeguard 

the freedom of the seas, PACOM routinely exercises with allies and 

partners, executes freedom of navigation operations, and maintains 

a robust presence throughout the region. These activities help build 

partner capacity to contribute to the region’s stability, enhance relationships, improve understanding of shared challenges, and message the U.S.’s resolve. 

The Asia-Pacific maritime security strategy outlines our plan to 

safeguard freedom of the seas, deter conflict, and promote adherence to international laws and standards. It reaffirms our commitment to the principles found in UNCLOS, and in accordance with 

this strategy and in pursuit of these goals, Pacific Command’s 

forces fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, 

while continuing to strengthen the relationships and rule of law 

that enabled the peaceful rise of every nation in the region. 

A fundamental factor in the feasibility of this new strategy has 

been the rebalance to the Pacific. The rebalance, initiated almost 

4 years ago by President Obama, set the conditions for the implementation of this strategy. The rebalance strengthened treaty alliances and partnerships, increased partner capacities and cooperation, improved interoperability, and increased security capabilities 

in the region. DOD’s new maritime strategy capitalizes on the momentum of the rebalance and continues with its initiatives. 

12 

In executing the new maritime strategy, PACOM will continue to 

employ the most advanced and capable platforms as they are deployed or assigned to the Pacific; use the forward presence of military forces to engage allies and partners to deter aggression; reinforce internationally accepted rules and norms, including the concepts of freedom of navigation and innocent passage; train and exercise with allies and partners to increase interoperability and 

build trust; implement risk reduction mechanisms such as the Code 

for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and the United States-China 

Confidence Building Measures to help prevent accidents and tactical miscalculations; and continue deepening alliances and partnerships through strategic efforts in places like Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, while building new and deeper relationships in places like Singapore, India, Vietnam, and other 

likeminded friends and partners. 

Thank you for your continued support to USPACOM and our 

men and women in uniform and their families who live and work 

in the vast Asia-Pacific region. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADMIRAL HARRY B. HARRIS, JR. 

Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and distinguished members, it’s my honor to appear once again before this committee. I am pleased to be here with Assistant Secretary Shear to discuss the Asia Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. 

The United States is a maritime nation and the importance of Asia-Pacific region 

to our Nation’s security and prosperity cannot be overstated. Almost 30 percent of 

the world’s maritime trade—$5.3 trillion—transits the South China Sea annually. 

This includes $1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound for the United States. The 

Asia-Pacific region is critical for our nation’s economic future. 

For decades, this region has remained free from major conflicts, allowing the 

United States and other Pacific nations, including China, to enjoy the benefits of 

its vast maritime spaces. However, the security environment is changing, potentially 

placing this stability at risk. Rapid economic and military modernization and a 

growing demand for resources have increased the potential for conflict. Peacetime 

freedom of navigation is under pressure. 

If not handled properly, territorial and maritime disputes in the East and South 

China Seas could disrupt stability throughout the region. Claimants to disputed 

areas routinely use maritime law enforcement and coast guard vessels to enforce 

their claims while nominally keeping these issues out of the military sphere. While 

no country appears to desire military conflict, tactical miscalculations can lead to 

strategic consequences. 

The United States does not take sides on issues of sovereignty with respect to 

these territorial disputes, but we do insist that all maritime claims be derived from 

naturally-formed land features in accordance with customary international law, as 

reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States also emphasizes the 

importance of peacefully resolving maritime and territorial disagreements in accordance with international law, and we oppose the use of intimidation, coercion, or aggression. The U.S. believes every nation, large or small, should have the opportunity 

to develop and prosper, in line with international laws and standards. If one country 

selectively ignores these rules for its own benefit, others will undoubtedly follow, 

eroding the international legal system and destabilizing regional security and the 

prosperity of all Pacific states. Part of PACOM’s role in the Asia-Pacific Maritime 

Strategy will be ensuring all nations have continued access to the maritime spaces 

vital to the global economy. 

International recognition and protection of freedom of navigation is vital to the 

world’s economy and our way of life. To safeguard the freedom of the seas, 

USPACOM routinely exercises with allies and partners, executes Freedom of Navigation operations, and maintains a robust presence throughout the region. These activities help build partner capacity to contribute to the region’s security, enhance 

relationships, improve understanding of shared challenges, and message the U.S.’s 

resolve. 

13 

The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy outlines our plan to safeguard freedom of the seas, deter conflict, and promote adherence to international law and 

standards. It reaffirms our commitment to the principles found in UNCLOS. In accordance with this strategy and in pursuit of these goals, Pacific Command’s forces 

will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, while continuing to 

strengthen the relationships and rule of law that enabled the peaceful rise of every 

nation in the region. 

A fundamental factor in the feasibility of this new strategy has been the Rebalance to the Pacific. The Rebalance, initiated almost four years ago by President 

Obama, set the conditions for the implementation of this strategy. The Rebalance 

strengthened treaty alliances and partnerships, increased partner capacity and cooperation, improved interoperability, and increased security capabilities in the region. DOD’s new maritime strategy capitalizes on the momentum of the Rebalance 

and continues with its initiatives. In executing the new maritime strategy, PACOM 

will continue to: 

• Employ the most advanced and capable platforms as they are deployed or assigned to the Pacific. 

• Use the forward presence of military forces to engage allies and partners and 

deter aggression. 

• Reinforce internationally accepted rules and norms including the concepts of 

freedom of navigation and innocent passage. 

• Train and exercise with allies and partners to increase interoperability and 

build trust. 

• Implement risk reduction mechanisms such as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and the United States-China Confidence Building Measures to help 

prevent accidents and tactical miscalculations. 

• Continue deepening alliances and partnerships through strategic efforts in 

places like Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, while building new and deeper military relationships in places like Singapore, India, Vietnam, and with other like-minded friends and partners. 

Thank you for your continued support to USPACOM and our men and women in 

uniform, and their families, who live and work in the vast Asia-Pacific region. I look 

forward to answering your questions. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, thank you, Admiral. 

Maybe I can begin with this news report out of Defense One, Defiant Chinese Admiral’s Message: South China Sea Belongs to 

China. There was a gathering I think in London, and there was 

Chinese and American and Japanese, as well as other military 

leaders. The admiral who commands the North Sea fleet for the 

People’s Liberation Army and Navy, South China Sea is the name 

indicated as a sea area. It belongs to China. 

What is our response to that, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary SHEAR. Thank you, Senator. 

The Chinese have said that before. It was nothing new for the 

admiral to have said that. If he was referring to the area of the 

South China Sea demarcated by the so-called nine-dash line, it is 

clear to us that that nine-dash line is not consistent with international law, and we do not recognize the Chinese claim to the 

area encompassed by the nine-dash line. 

With regard to our operations in that area, we sail and we fly 

and we operate within that area on a daily basis. Every time we 

do so—— 

Senator MCCAIN. You operate within that area, but you have not 

operated within 12 miles of these reclaimed features. Have you? 

Secretary SHEAR. We have conducted freedom of navigation operations. 

Senator MCCAIN. Have we gone within the 12 miles of the reclaimed area? The answer I believe is no. 

Secretary SHEAR. We have not recently gone within 12 miles of 

a reclaimed area. However—— 

14 

Senator MCCAIN. When was the last time we did? 

Secretary SHEAR. I believe the last time we conducted a freedom 

of navigation operation in the South China Sea was April of this 

year. 

Senator MCCAIN. Within the 12-mile limit. Come on, Mr. Secretary. I am very interested in the 12-mile limit because if you respect the 12-mile limit, then that is de facto sovereignty agreed to 

tacitly to the Chinese. 

Now, have we or have we not operated within the 12-mile limit 

in recent years? 

Secretary SHEAR. I believe the last time we conducted a freedom 

of navigation operation within 12 nautical miles of one of those features was 2012. 

Senator MCCAIN. 2012, 3 years ago. 

Secretary SHEAR. I might add, Senator, if I may, that freedom of 

navigation operations are one tool in a larger toolbox that we are 

going to need to use in fixing this issue. We are in the process of 

putting together that toolbox. As we move forward, we are going 

to consider freedom of navigation operations, along with a variety 

of other options to ensure that both the Chinese and the region understands that we can operate and we do operate anywhere we can. 

Senator MCCAIN. Then it seems to me that we ought to do it because you see the area that has now been filled in. Since the last 

time we operated within the 12-mile limit, that number of acres 

has been dramatically increased, and we have watched it and really—well, the best sign of respecting freedom of the seas is not to 

de facto recognize a 12-mile limit, and the best way you can make 

sure that that is not recognized is to sail your ships in international waters, which it clearly is—these are artificial islands— 

and pass right on by. That then puts the lie to the admiral who 

said the South China Sea is—he indicated it belongs to China. It 

does not belong to China. It belongs to the international waterways. If people are allowed to fill in islands and so, therefore, then 

they are subject to a 12-mile limit. The best way to prove that they 

are not is to go ahead and go in it. We have not done that since 

2012. I do not find that acceptable, Mr. Secretary. With all the 

other tools you have in the toolbox, the most visible assertion of 

freedom of the seas is to peacefully sail inside the 12-mile limit of 

artificial islands, which in any version of international law is not 

allowed to be sovereign territory of any nation. 

Secretary SHEAR. Well, I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that the 

South China Sea does not belong to China. We have in recent years 

conducted freedom of navigation operations in the vicinity of those 

features, and doing so again is one of the array of options we are 

considering. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, it is an option that has not been exercised 

in 3 years. 

15 


15-73_1a.eps
16 

Admiral Harris, what do you feel about it? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, I agree that the South China Sea is no 

more China’s than the Gulf of Mexico is Mexico’s. I think that we 

must exercise our freedom of navigation throughout the region. 

Part of my responsibility as the Pacific Command Commander is 

to give options to the President and to the Secretary, and those options are being considered and we will execute as directed by the 

President and the Secretary. 

Senator MCCAIN. I have gone over my time, but just very quickly, Mr. Secretary, with respect to China, do you agree with DNI 

[Director of National Intelligence] Clapper’s comments that the 

United States has no effective policy to deter China in cyberspace? 

Last week, he testified before the House Intelligence Committee. 

The United States lacked, quote, both the substance and the 

mindset of deterrence in cyberspace. 

Secretary SHEAR. I would refer to what the President said last 

Friday when he stated that we can have a competition in cyberspace with China or with other countries, but we will win. What 

we are seeking is understandings. 

Senator MCCAIN. Are we winning now? 

Secretary SHEAR. I agree with General Clapper that deterring actions in cyberspace is very difficult. 

Senator MCCAIN. Are we winning now? 

Secretary SHEAR. I think everybody knows that we have the capability to—— 

Senator MCCAIN. You know, Mr. Secretary, we have known each 

other a long time. I mean, are we winning now in your view? 

Secretary SHEAR. I think it is too early to tell, Mr. Chairman. We 

are doing our best. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Just to clarify the type of operations, have we conducted flyovers 

of these artificial facilities recently? When is the most recent flyover? 

Secretary SHEAR. I defer to the Admiral on that question, sir. 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator Reed, we have not conducted a flyover—a direct flyover—overfly of any of the reclaimed lands and 

territories that China has reclaimed recently. 

Senator REED. That is another option that you have, but you 

have not exercised that option. 

Admiral HARRIS. You are correct, sir. We have a lot of options 

that are on the table. 

Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, just stepping back a bit, one of the 

things that is happening in China now is extraordinary economic 

volatility, growth rates that are being challenged, which if you 

have an insight, if you do not, then let me know. This economic— 

and it may be long-term. It may be just something that is cyclic. 

Is it encouraging them or discouraging them when it comes to 

these policies in the South China Sea? Your insight. Is it something 

that—you know, they felt several years ago that they had sort of 

turned the corner, that their economic power was so great that 

they could begin to move forward. Are any of those questions being 

raised internally now in China about their capacity? Or the alterVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:44 Mar 31, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99603 JUNE
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native would be are they going to double down because they have 

had economic problems at home, and therefore, we can expect them 

to be even more provocative? Any insights. 

Secretary SHEAR. Those are all extremely relevant questions, 

Senator. I am not an economist and I am not an expert on the Chinese economy, but I think to the extent that the Communist Party 

relies on economic performance for its legitimacy, then I would suspect it is very concerned about recent overall economic performance. I think we have to be alert to the possibility that the Chinese 

might use a problem in foreign affairs to distract people’s attention 

from their domestic problems. 

On the subject of Chinese assertiveness, I think it is only natural 

for a country like China that is growing in wealth to turn to military modernization. I think Chinese military modernization and 

the growth of their defense budget has been extremely robust. We 

remain very concerned about the pace of growth in the Chinese defense budget and the lack of transparency and the overall effect 

that has on regional stability. Of course, as they modernize, one 

would expect them to become more assertive abroad, and that is 

just what we are doing and that is something that we are addressing with this regional security strategy. 

Senator REED. Admiral Harris, as I indicated in my opening remarks, there is concern about North Korea. In fact, I recall when 

we met in Singapore, you expressed significant concern. Can you 

just briefly give us your latest update about North Korean activities? Also I might add since China shares a border with North 

Korea, are they at all being helpful or do they recognize the threats 

that are posed by the regime in North Korea? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I believe, as I have said before, that 

North Korea is the greatest threat that I face in the Pacific as a 

Pacific Command commander. I think that you have a leader in 

North Korea who has nuclear weapons and is seeking the means 

to miniaturize them and deliver them intercontinentally, and that 

causes me great concern. He has got 20,000 to 30,000 artillery 

pieces within a range of Seoul, amounting to several hundred thousand rockets that place the 28,000 American troops plus their families and the 700,000 American citizens who live on the Korean peninsula in danger. So I view the threat from North Korea very seriously. 

I think that China’s influence on North Korea is waning, or 

China does not have the influence on North Korea that it had in 

the past. So that is also an area of concern. There are many areas 

globally where we cooperate with China, and one of the areas in 

the past where we have received cooperation from China has been 

to mitigate the behavior of North Korea. We are not seeing that 

today. That causes me great concern. 

Senator REED. So one of the initiatives that we have with the 

Chinese is not just checking their disregard for international law 

of the sea, et cetera, but also reengaging them to work together to 

face a very significant threat in North Korea. Is that accurate? 

Admiral HARRIS. You are correct, sir. I have been very critical of 

Chinese behavior in the last 2 years, but I have also been—I have 

acknowledged where China has been helpful. They have been helpful in removal of chemical weapons from Syria, in the counter-piVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:44 Mar 31, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99603 JUNE
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racy efforts off the Horn of Africa, and the search for the Malaysia 

airliner MH370 off of Australia, and the support to the Philippines 

in the November 2013 typhoon that hit that country. So we should 

acknowledge those good things that China has done. At the same 

time, I would be critical and hold them to account for those negative things they do. 

Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, do you have a quick comment? 

Secretary SHEAR. Sir, if I may add to that. We exchange views 

with the Chinese on North Korea regularly. I did so in Beijing with 

my Chinese PLA counterparts just 10 days ago. The Chinese reiterated to me, as they have in the past, that their influence with 

North Korea is limited, particularly under the new regime. During 

the recent crisis related to the North Korean provocation on August 

4, it was not clear to us that the Chinese had a lot of contact with 

the North Koreans or were able to significantly influence them. 

Senator REED. Are they worried about that? 

Secretary SHEAR. I think they are. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe? 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let us talk about assets, current and future. Admiral Harris, one 

of the DOD lines of effort in our Asia-Pacific maritime security 

strategy says by 2020, 60 percent of naval and overseas air assets 

will be home-ported in the Pacific region. Okay? 

Now, when you say that, right now in terms of our vessels, we 

have a fleet of 270. It should be 305. You are projecting now saying 

60 percent of what it will be in 2020. What kind of figures are you 

looking at in calculating that? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, the numbers you cited are correct. We 

have in the 270 range now, and by 2020, we should have a little 

over 300 ships, around 310. So we are talking 60 percent of actually a larger number, not a smaller. 

Senator INHOFE. A larger number that we would anticipate 

would be available by that time, and I hope you are right. 

Now, the source of those have to come up through other commands. Is that correct? If you increase to 60 percent, you will have 

to be taking some assets away from EUCOM [United States European Command], CENTCOM [United States Central Command], 

and other commands. Correct? 

Admiral HARRIS. Right. Those commands now have assigned 

naval forces. Only the Pacific has forces that are assigned to the 

Pacific Command. 

Senator INHOFE. They are using those assets. 

Admiral HARRIS. That is correct. 

Senator INHOFE. Are you coordinating with those when you make 

these assumptions and predictions as to what we should be doing 

in 2020 with the combatant commanders? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. As I have said before, the world gets 

a vote. So activities in Russia or other places could draw assets 

away. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, I understand that. 

Admiral HARRIS. 60 percent of the Navy’s combatants will be 

based in the Pacific at large by 2020. 

19 

Senator INHOFE. Admiral Harris, you have been around for quite 

awhile. You might remember what I refer to, sometimes not too affectionately, the Battle of Vieques. At that time—that was during 

the Clinton-Gore administration. At that time, the only place that 

we could identify in the world for integrated training was the Island of Vieques. You might remember that we had this big fight 

right here in this room. I will never forget it. It was primarily driven by Vice President Gore to do away with the live range down 

there. 

Now, interestingly enough, those things that we said were going 

to happen to Roosey Roads [Roosevelt Roads Naval Station] and 

other assets there became a reality, and now they are begging us 

to come back. 

Nonetheless, the point I am making is I went all over the world 

looking for areas where you can have this kind of integrated training. Where are we today in terms of our areas that we have available to us for the type of training that you have to have? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, in the Pacific, we have integrated 

ranges. In Hawaii, the Pacific missile range facility is one of the 

finest in the world. In Guam. We are building new range facilities 

in the Guam operating area. These ranges, as you said, are vital 

to our ability to train. We are working with the countries involved, 

the states involved, and environmentalists that are involved in 

order to do this in the right way to satisfy all of the constituencies 

that are there and get our training done. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. You talked, Secretary Shear, a little bit 

about some of our exercises that we have out there. RIMPAC [The 

Rim of the Pacific Exercise] is one of the big ones. 22 nations were 

involved in that, 49 surface ships, 67 marines, 2,200 aircraft, some 

25,000 personnel. It is a great exercise. I understand that. Do we 

have the assets now to continue that type of exercise for the near 

future? 

Secretary SHEAR. I believe we do, sir. You are absolutely right 

that RIMPAC is a vital and important exercise not only for the 

U.S. but for the region. We believe we have the resources we need 

to continue conducting that. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I would hope that would be the case. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for testifying today. 

Admiral Harris, in your testimony, you point out that we insist 

that all maritime claims be derived from naturally formed land features in accordance with international laws reflected in the Law of 

the Sea Convention. Are we in any kind of a disadvantage because 

we have not been a signatory to the Law of the Sea Convention? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I believe we are at a disadvantage because we do not have the moral high ground that other countries 

who are signatories, including China and Russia, have. So when 

China makes these outrageous claims in the South China Sea, and 

the Philippines, for example, challenges one of those claims in the 

international tribunal for Law of the Sea, and we support the Philippines right to make that claim, at the same time we are not a 

signatory. So that looks kind of strange. 

20 

When Russia makes these outrageous claims in the Arctic region 

in the Arctic Circle, and they tell us you have no standing on which 

to complain because you are not a signatory to the Law of the Sea, 

it puts us at a disadvantage. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I certainly agree. I would hope 

that we would reevaluate our position and become a signatory with 

most of the rest of the world of the Law of the Sea Convention. 

Senator Reed raised the threat from North Korea. Secretary 

Shear, earlier this year, Admiral Gortney assessed that North 

Korea has the ability to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile 

that could be capable of hitting the United States from a mobile 

launcher, and we saw right before Secretary Carter visited Japan 

that they launched two short-range missiles. You talk about China 

and their waning influence with North Korea. Are there other 

measures that we ought to be taking with respect to North Korea? 

Should we have any sense of optimism about the recent overtures 

between North and South Korea where they seem to be talking a 

little more? 

Secretary SHEAR. Thank you, Senator. That is an important 

question. 

We certainly support the efforts by the North and South to conduct senior-level dialogue. As with past efforts to conduct such dialogue, I think we need to be very cautions in how we view the prospects. I view this current effort to be a direct outcome of the very 

robust position the ROK took in negotiations with the North at 

Panmunjom to resolve the issue precipitated by the North Korean 

provocation of August 4th. So I think it is very important that they 

have embarked on this effort, but we are just going to have to be 

very cautious. We support the ROK very strongly in these effort. 

More generally, our approach to North Korea is a combination of 

diplomacy and pressure, and as we go forward toward a possible 

North Korean missile launch, for example, we are going to be engaging our Six Party partners, and we are going to be considering 

what extra pressure we might put on North Korea should they decide to conduct that missile launch. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I assume you do not want to talk publicly 

about what those additional pressures might be? 

Secretary SHEAR. Well, we put a great many sanctions on North 

Korea, and further sanctions would be one possibility. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Did you want to add anything, Admiral Harris? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure, Senator. I will just add that I think the 

key is to be ready for all outcomes regarding North Korea from a 

position of strength. So I tend to be a pessimist when it comes to 

dealing with the capabilities of other countries. So, again, it is best 

to be cognizant of all outcomes, and that is why things like ballistic 

missile defense are important and we strengthen South Korea’s 

ability in their BMD [Ballistic Missile Defence] systems. I personally believe the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] on 

the peninsula is important as well, the terminal high altitude missile defense system. 

Senator SHAHEEN. There has been a lot of discussion today and 

earlier this year. Admiral Roughead, for example, noted that for 

the last decade, the United States has flown with impunity in Iraq 

21 

and Afghanistan with no threat to anti-air weapons. He noted that 

our capabilities to do that will be threatened in the future as China 

has been able to field more capabilities. 

I guess I would first say do you agree with that assessment. 

Then can you talk about what that new technology that China is 

developing and our ability to stay ahead—how that is going to be 

affected by sequestration? I do not know which one of you wants 

to—— 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I will start. China fields a very modern 

military and they are growing in capability and capacity. We have 

a technological edge over them in almost every way, if not in every 

way. I am confident in our ability to take the fight to China, if it 

should come to that, and I certainly hope it does not. 

That said, we have to maintain that technological edge, and they 

are growing in their technological capability and that is of concern 

to me. I think we need to have fifth generation fighters, for example, and we need to have a lot of them. That is the Joint Strike 

Fighter, the F–35. We need to continue to upgrade our fourth generation fighters with fifth generation capabilities because we have 

a lot of them, and I think that is important. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Shear, I know I am out of time, but 

you just may want to add what you think, if cuts go back into effect 

for fiscal year 2016, what that would do to our ability to continue 

to have that technology. 

Secretary SHEAR. Well, we are certainly concerned about the possible effects cuts may have both on current operations and our ability to develop the new technologies we need to maintain our military dominance in the region. That is something that Secretary 

Carter is extremely interested in. Our defense innovation initiative 

is designed to develop those capabilities we are going to need to 

counter area access and denial strategies and to maintain our security already in the region. So we are committed not only to deploying our best capabilities to the region now, we are committed to devising the technologies we need to maintain our edge. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Ernst? 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. We appreciate it 

very much. 

It was reported earlier this week that Japan will be providing 

$832 million in infrastructure aid to Vietnam and another $1.7 million worth of ships and equipment to them as well to help counter 

the rising of China. So I am very glad that our allies are improving 

their relationships to counter the Chinese aggression. Both Japan 

and Vietnam are key allies for us here in the United States, and 

developing that strong security and economic partnership with both 

Japan and Vietnam will allow us to better check China’s aggression 

in that region. 

So for both of you, if you would, please, how will this new agreement between Vietnam and Japan improve that security situation 

in that region and also, under the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, what specifically is the Department doing to build 

22 

partner capacity and capability in Vietnam and in other Southeast 

Asia nations? 

Secretary SHEAR. Thank you, Senator. That is a great point. 

We strongly support Japanese efforts to coordinate with us in 

building partner capacity, particularly with countries like Vietnam, 

the Philippines, and probably in the future Malaysia. This is something that I worked on with my Japanese colleagues while I was 

Ambass ador in Hanoi, and I am delighted to see that it has come 

to fruition for the Japanese side. 

We are interested in taking similar actions, as you state, in our 

maritime security initiative which is in the fiscal year 2016 NDAA. 

That is a 5-year, $425 million program, and we greatly appreciate 

the committee’s support on this effort. Under that initiative, we 

hope to not only improve physical capacity of our partners in, say, 

providing, for example, coast guard vessels, but we want to improve their institutional capacity. We want to improve their sustainability, and that is something very important with the Philippines. We want to improve their professionalism. So this would 

be a very broad program designed to raise the level particularly of 

the maritime law enforcement capabilities of our partners in the 

region. 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I was in Vietnam in my previous assignment as the Pacific Fleet commander, and I just returned from 

the Philippines a few weeks ago. 

I welcome Japan’s overtures and their efforts to improve the capacity of both countries, Vietnam and the Philippines. I think Vietnam presents an ideal opportunity for us as we work more closely 

with them. I think that that is another indication of the response 

of the region to China’s bad behavior in the South China Sea where 

countries that previously were at odds with us or actually leaders 

of the Non-Aligned Movement are now coming to us for assistance 

and are opening themselves up to us. That is one of the costs that 

China has to bear for its bad behavior in the South China Sea region. 

Senator ERNST. Very good. Thank you. 

You have mentioned, both of you, the Philippines several times, 

and they have proven to be a great ally, whether it is the Global 

War on Terror, hurricane humanitarian relief efforts, and so forth. 

Are there specific steps that we can take or should be taking with 

the Philippines at this time to further develop those relationships? 

Secretary SHEAR. You are right, Senator. More can be done. 

When the President was in Manila last year, he stated publicly 

that our commitment under the Mutual Defense Treaty to the Philippines is ironclad, that no one should have any doubt about the 

extent of our commitment under that treaty. We are working with 

the Philippines both in terms of—we are already working with the 

Philippines, even before we implement the maritime security initiative, to increase their capabilities to train and operate with them 

and to overall strengthen their ability to resist Chinese coercion. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, gentlemen, very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Hirono? 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

23 

Thank you, gentlemen. Admiral Harris, thank you so much for 

the briefing you gave me last month in Honolulu. 

You mentioned, Admiral, that North Korea is the greatest threat 

that you face as Pacific Commander, and you noted that China’s 

influence in North Korea is waning. Is there another country, i.e., 

Russia, that is stepping into this vacuum in relationships with 

North Korea? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I do not know of any Russian overtures with North Korea other than what I have read in open 

sources where they have always had some relationships with them 

because of their histories. 

I believe that today the greatest threat I face is North Korea. 

North Korea today in my opinion is not an existential threat to the 

United States as Russia is. In the Pacific, as you know well, Russia 

has a long coastline. They have at least two major naval bases, including one for their ballistic missile submarines, two major air 

bases, and then a host of smaller operating bases in the Pacific. So 

these are things that I worry about as I look at the panoply of 

threats that the United States faces in the Pacific. 

Senator HIRONO. Secretary Shear, we read recently that the Russians have recently approved significant infrastructure projects in 

what the Japanese call the ‘‘Northern Territories.′′ There have been 

numerous visits to these remote locations by Russian leaders. So 

they are becoming active in that part of the world, not to mention 

in the Arctic. 

I do share the concern that Admiral Harris raised that we are 

at a disadvantage by not being signatories to the Law of the Sea. 

Would you share that assessment? 

Secretary SHEAR. I agree with you, Senator, on the importance 

of ratification of the Law of the Sea. I agree with the Admiral on 

his assessment of Russian activities in the Asia-Pacific. Let me 

stress that our maritime strategy is designed to encompass Russia, 

as well as China, as well as other challenges in the region. 

Senator HIRONO. What do you make of Russia’s activities in the 

Northern Territories? Is this for our domestic consumption, or does 

it have further reaching consequences? 

Secretary SHEAR. Well, I confess, Senator, that I am not familiar 

with all the details on the kinds of infrastructure that Russia is 

building in the Northern Territories, but we support the Japanese 

claim to the Northern Territories. We would be concerned if the 

Russians used this infrastructure to further militarize or to bolster 

their military strength in the region. 

Senator HIRONO. Admiral Harris, I was in Okinawa last month 

because, of course, part of the Indo-Asia-Pacific rebalance to this 

part of the world involves closing our Futenma facility. Most recently on Monday, Governor Onaga of Okinawa Prefecture proclaimed the he will proceed with canceling the landfill permit required for developing the alternative facility in Henoko. So for both 

of you, what does this proclamation mean for the Government of 

Japan and the Futenma replacement facility project that we need 

to get on with? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, we have a longstanding treaty, mutual 

security treaty, with Japan. Our obligation in that treaty is to provide the security for Japan. One of Japan’s obligations under that 

24 

treaty is to provide us bases from which to operate and do that. 

Okinawa is critical to our ability to defend Japan and our posture 

in the Asia-Pacific region. It is a Japanese national effort and a decision whether to override or overcome Governor Onaga’s objections 

to the Futenma replacement facility. They are working on that and 

I have confidence that they will achieve their national aims because that is their obligations under the treaty for us. 

Secretary SHEAR. If I may add to that briefly, Senator. We greatly appreciate the support the Government of Japan has given to 

the effort to find a replacement for the Futenma facility. We appreciate their effort to get construction going for the Futenma replacement facility, and we were glad this week when we were informed 

by the Japanese Government that construction-related activities 

have begun at the Henoko site for the Futenma replacement facilities. 

Senator HIRONO. So while there may be delays as a result of the 

Governor of Okinawa’s actions, you expect that the Japanese Government will continue to proceed with the replacement facility. 

Secretary SHEAR. I do, Senator. I want to stress that as we move 

forward on construction of the Futenma replacement facility, we, of 

course, as we always do, will continue to consider Okinawan sensitivities with regard to the general issue of our presence and our 

operations in Okinawa. 

Senator HIRONO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Lee? 

Senator LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Admiral Harris and Secretary Shear, for all you do. 

Thanks for being here to answer our questions. 

Admiral Harris, you have said that we need to ratify the Law of 

the Sea Treaty in order to acquire some type of moral high ground 

particularly relative to Russia and China. I am having a hard time 

seeing why it is that a country like the United States that has used 

its power, its blood, and its treasure to protect navigation all over 

the world for 200 years has to, in order to gain some moral high 

ground, ratify this particular treaty. Can you help me understand 

that? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure, Senator. 

The lack of signing the treaty does not affect our ability to be the 

strongest nation on the earth, but the lack of signing that treaty 

puts us at a disadvantage in discussions with most of the other 

countries of the world that have signed the treaty and moral standing, if you will. So we lose nothing by signing off on the treaty, but 

we lose a lot by not signing it. 

Senator LEE. What is the ‘‘it′′ that we lose? Part of what I would 

ask in connection with that, you know, one of the claims is that it 

might help us solve the South China Sea territorial disputes. All 

the nations in the South China Sea, including China, that have 

coastline along the South China Sea are members of the treaty. 

They are all parties to the treaty. The Philippines has brought a 

lawsuit against China under the treaty, and China, as I understand it, has basically ignored it. So how does that mean that this 

fixes the problem if we suddenly ratify the treaty? 

25 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I do not think it would suddenly fix the 

problem, but as you said, the Philippines has brought a case 

against China in The Hague in the International Tribunal for Law 

of the Sea on two issues: one, on the veracity of the nine-dash line 

claim itself. Then the second issue is whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to even judge that case. We have supported the Philippines? right to take the claim to the international tribunal, and 

in fact, we have praised them for doing so. Yet, we are not a signatory to the treaty itself. 

If you shift to the Arctic, if you look at the outrageous claims 

that Russia has made in the Arctic Ocean, they are making those 

claims under their interpretation of the Law of the Sea Convention. 

When we criticize them for those claims, they say that we have no 

standing to do so. I would submit that most of the rest of the 

world, who also has signed off on the treaty, would probably share 

that opinion or at least part of it. 

On the other side, we have agreed as a policy to follow the precepts in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. So 

we have that for us, but we are not a signatory to it. 

Again, I would say that in my opinion we lose nothing by signing 

it and we lose a lot of moral high groundedness, if you will, by not 

signing it. 

Senator LEE. If we are following the precepts in the treaty, notwithstanding the fact that we have not ratified it and we, therefore, are not formally a party to it, I struggle with how that 

changes the moral high ground, particularly when I do not think 

there is any country on earth that has a greater claim to moral 

high ground, particularly when it comes to navigational issues, 

when it comes to naval issues, than the United States, which for 

200 years has kept shipping lanes open and safe. 

Can you tell me what navigational rights, if any, does the Navy 

lack today that it would suddenly have if we were to ratify that 

treaty? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sir, the Navy would lack nothing whether we 

ratify the treaty or not. The United States would gain standing by 

signing off on the treaty. 

Senator LEE. How would that standing benefit us in a material 

way relative to our interests in that part of the world? 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, in some cases, under the—the convention 

sets up a framework for ocean exploration, for example, and it says 

that—we will not get into some of the real particulars—you go out 

to 200 miles and that is your exclusive economic zone, and then out 

beyond that is the open ocean zone, if you will. There are American 

companies today that will not explore out in that region beyond the 

200-mile exclusive economic zone because they are not sure whether any competing claim will have an effect on them or whether they 

will lose in this international tribunal or other places. So I think 

that we lose an economic opportunity by not signing off on the treaty because it places in jeopardy the legal question, not the military 

or the strength question, but it places in jeopardy the legal question of what happens out beyond the exclusive economic zone. For 

our companies, they will gain an economic benefit from that. 

Senator LEE. I see my time is expired. 

26 

I do not doubt the sincerity of your feelings on this. I would take 

issue with one aspect of what you said, though, that regardless of 

what benefits you might see from this, I would not say that signing 

onto a treaty is without any cost on our part without us giving up 

anything particularly, whereas here the treaty sets up a system 

that would, however incrementally, erode our national sovereignty. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Nelson? 

Senator NELSON. Gentlemen, thank you for your public service. 

Admiral, where we have had the near misses in the 200- mile 

area that China is challenging us both in ships and in airplanes, 

we have successfully avoided those near misses where they have 

challenged us. Do you want to give us some insight into what your 

instructions are to our pilots and our ship captains with regard to 

those kind of incursions? 

Admiral HARRIS. Sure, Senator. What I have told the component 

commanders, the Pacific fleet and Pacific air forces, to tell their pilots and crews to do is to continue to insist on our right to operate 

in international airspace and in maritime space. When challenged 

by Chinese fighter aircraft, our aircraft are to maintain professional flight profiles, predictable flight profiles, and we have means 

to record that activity and then we will see what happens. So the 

last time we saw a very dangerous event was in the middle of last 

year where the Chinese flew an aircraft over a P–8. They did a barrel roll over the top, which is a dangerous maneuver in acrobatic 

circles let alone in an intercept regime in the open ocean. We most 

recently have seen that again. I will give the system credit. For 

that intervening period of time, we have seen very few dangerous 

activities by the Chinese following that August 2014 incident. I 

think that is a tribute to the mil-to-mil relationship and the political relationship where we have worked with the Chinese to come 

to an agreement on the maritime and in the air spaces for confidence building measures. 

Senator NELSON. Well, that is good news. 

Now, is it going to be all the more strained given the 200-mile 

out from the China area? Now when you look at that map where 

they are filling in all of those islands and now they are claiming 

almost that entire ocean as theirs, are we going to see more and 

more of these incidents well beyond their 200-mile limit? 

Admiral HARRIS. Certainly the potential exists for more incidents. If they finish building the airfields, of which there is one 

there on Fiery Cross Reef on the side and up to two additional airfields of 10,000-foot length, then that gives me great concern in the 

South China Sea. You know, if you look at National Airport, for example, National Airport is only 6,700 feet long, capable of landing 

any commercial airplane that we have, and China is building three 

runways of 10,000 foot length, which is only 1,000 foot shorter than 

would be required to land the Space Shuttle. So I think that that 

gives me great concern militarily. 

They are also building deep water port facilities there, which 

could put their deep water ships, their combatant ships there, 

which gives them an extra capability. 

If you look at all of these facilities and you can imagine a network of missile sites, runways for their fifth generation fighters 

27 

and surveillance sites and all of that, it creates a mechanism by 

which China would have de facto control over the South China Sea 

in any scenario short of war. These are obviously easy targets in 

war. They will be what we call in the military ‘‘grapes,′′ if you will. 

Short of that, they pose a—militarization of these features poses a 

threat, and certainly it poses a threat against all other countries 

in the region. 

Senator NELSON. Speaking of those countries, to what degree are 

they vigorously stepping up with us to object to that kind of stuff? 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I think they are stepping up to the limits 

of their capabilities. So if you look at the Philippines, for example, 

they are doing it in probably the best way. They are taking it to 

an international tribunal for adjudication. I do not know how the 

tribunal is going to act or decide, and if they decide in the Philippines? favor, as Senator Lee said, I do not know if China is going 

to follow that. It puts China in a quandary if the international tribunal rules against China and China is a signatory to UNCLOS. 

So it gives the Philippines at least a moral high ground to make 

a claim. 

The other countries are doing what they can also. You know, 

Chinese behavior in the South China Sea has enabled us to have 

a closer relationship with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and 

I think that is very important. Those are costs that China is having 

to expend because of its bad behavior in the South China Sea. 

Secretary SHEAR. Sir, if I could just reinforce what the admiral 

just said. I, of course, share the admiral’s concern about the military implications of Chinese activities in the South China Sea. 

That is why we are calling for a halt to further reclamation, a halt 

to construction, and a halt of further militarization of those facilities. The Chinese have not yet placed advanced weaponry on those 

features, and we are going to do everything we can to ensure that 

they do not. This is going to be a long-term effort. There are no silver bullets in this effort. We are certainly complicating Chinese calculations already. 

If you pull back for a minute and look at our goals, which include 

safeguarding freedom of navigation and deterring coercion, I think 

we have made some gains in both these areas. We continue to operate freely in the South China Sea and we continue to prevent the 

Chinese from coercing our allies and partners into concluding deals 

that are not in their interests and not in our interests with regard 

to claims in the South China Sea. 

Senator MCCAIN. That we freely operate in the South China Sea 

is a success? It is a pretty low bar, Mr. Secretary. 

Senator Sullivan? 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

I think it is clear just from the testimony here and previous 

statements that we have a confused policy within the South China 

Sea with regard to the built-up islands. As you know, confusion can 

cause miscalculations. Let me just give you kind of the one example of it. 

We were in Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Secretary 

and Senator Reed, Senator Ernst, the chairman. Secretary Carter 

I thought had a forceful statement at the time. You know it, we 

28 

have seen it. We will fly, sail anywhere. Then he stated, quote, 

after all, turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does 

not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transport. A pretty strong statement in a 

very critical place. 

Admiral Harris, you later stated I think at the Aspen Forum it 

is United States policy to afford a 12-mile limit around all the islands that are in the South China Sea, and it has been longstanding policy not because they are occupied or built up by China, 

but just in general. So to me that is a dramatic contrast. You have 

the PACOM Commander saying something very different than the 

Secretary of Defense. That is confusion. 

We obviously have three policymaking centers going on here, the 

uniformed military, DOD civilians led by Secretary Carter, and the 

White House. In your professional opinion, Admiral Harris, should 

we sail or fly inside the 12-mile area with regard to those islands 

as Secretary Carter stated we should? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I believe that there is only one policymaking center, not three, and that runs through the Secretary of 

Defense and the President. 

Senator SULLIVAN. No, but I am asking your professional opinion 

as a military—— 

Admiral HARRIS. I believe that we should exercise—be allowed to 

exercise freedom of navigation and maritime and flight in the 

South China Sea against those islands that are not islands. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Inside the 12-mile limit. 

Admiral HARRIS. Depending on the feature. 

Senator SULLIVAN. What about that one? 

Admiral HARRIS. That one, yes. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Have you or Secretary Carter asked the 

White House for permission to do that? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, I have given policy options—military 

options to the Secretary, and I would leave it to the Secretary or 

the Ambassador to address—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. What has the White House said when you 

have asked permission to go within the 12-mile zone of a feature 

like that? 

Secretary SHEAR. Senator, PACOM, along with the Department 

of Defense, are options-generating institutions, and the Secretary is 

particularly interested in options with regard to the South China 

Sea in general. 

Senator SULLIVAN. I just asked a simple question. What did the 

White House say if you asked for permission to go within inside the 

12-mile limit? What did the White House say? 

Secretary SHEAR. Conducting that kind of freedom of navigation 

operation is one of the operations we are considering. 

Senator SULLIVAN. You are not answering my question. Did you 

ask the White House for permission to do this, and what did they 

tell you? 

Secretary SHEAR. Sir, I am not able to discuss current policy deliberations, but I can assure you that that is one of the options that 

the administration is considering. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. I appreciate you just answering the 

question. 

29 

Secretary SHEAR. Again, I am just not able to go into the details 

of policy—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. Well, I think when the Secretary of Defense 

makes a definitive statement like that at a very important meeting 

of defense ministers in Asia and then we do not follow up on it, 

it undermines our credibility. That is something that we cannot afford anymore. Our credibility is undermined everywhere in the 

world, and we do it here. 

It would be good if you could give me an answer to that question. 

You are obviously dodging it right now. 

Secretary SHEAR. Sir, I would be delighted to give you the best 

possible answer, and I think that is that I am just not able to—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. I want to turn real quick to the Alaska incident that the chairman mentioned. I thought our reaction was almost—it was immediate. It was muted. It was almost apologetic 

relative to the way the Chinese respond when we come within 12 

miles of one of their islands. 

The President of the United States was in Alaska at the time. 

Do you believe that that was a coincidence that he was there, or 

do you believe that was a provocation that the Chinese were aggressively off the coast of Alaska when the President of the United 

States was visiting? 

Secretary SHEAR. Well, I am not in a position to describe Chinese 

thinking on this, but—— 

Senator SULLIVAN. What is our analysis, either of you, from your 

perspective? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, they were conducting an exercise with 

the Russians in the northern Pacific. I believe—my opinion—is 

they went into the Bering Sea to demonstrate their capability to 

operate that far north, and then they decided to go home. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Do you think it was timed to coincide with 

the President of the United States—— 

Admiral HARRIS. No, I do not think it was—my opinion. I mean, 

I am not going into any intelligence matters at all. They were having an exercise with the Russians, and I think that exercise was 

long-planned. Then they decided to go into the Bering Sea. They 

were near there anyway. Then they turned south and headed 

home. I think it was coincidental, but I do not know that for a fact. 

Their transit south was an expeditious transit, innocent passage 

through two Aleutian Islands. That is their right to do under international law, as is our right to do in international law wherever 

we operate. 

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I thought it was more of a provocation and a 

demonstration of their interest in the Arctic. I am not sure that 

this White House would recognize a provocation if it was slapped 

in the face, and we need to be aware of that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. 

On behalf of the chairman, Senator Tillis. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Admiral Harris, thank you for the time that I was allowed to 

spend with you out in headquarters. We got a very thorough brief, 

so I am not going to cover that ground, but I appreciate it and I 

30 

know that in your public statement, or your opening statement, 

and in the conversation you covered some of it. 

I do want to get back and maybe build on questions that Senator 

Inhofe asked, and it had to do with the rebalancing where we are 

going out and saying that we are putting more assets as a percentage of the base into your area of command. We continue to miss 

the point that the base is shrinking. So part of what I am trying 

to do is get my head around a number of different variables that 

really let us measure the gap between China and the United States 

and our allies. You said when we were out there in the briefing 

that quantity has a quality of its own, so that right now we still 

continue to enjoy an advantage over the Chinese in terms of the 

assets we have in the region. 

When you start trending out to 2020 and beyond and you take 

into account that they may have more ships but their survivability 

does not compare to our own and the technology onboard does not 

compare to our own, at what point does the gap, if you were projecting assuming sequestration was going to be in place—I hope 

that that is not true, but let us assume that we are and the current 

plans for downsizing. At what point do we really reach a point to 

where it is a fair fight or we may be at a disadvantage? I do not 

want us to be in a fair fight, incidentally. So I want to know when 

it is and then at what point does it erode to where we have a quantitative or qualitative disadvantage against China. 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, sir. I am all for having unfair fights, and 

I think that those fights out to be unfair in our advantage. I believe 

that if we are continued to be sequestered through 2021, 2022, and 

China continues the pace of its building, that their quantitative advantage will be significant in the mid-2020’s. 

Senator TILLIS. To overcome our qualitative advantage? 

Admiral HARRIS. I think we will always have a qualitative advantage if we maintain the trajectory we are on. We have better 

trained people, better equipment, and all of that. As you said, 

quantity has a quality all its own. Their weapons systems and their 

ships and airplanes bristle with weapons, and they probably view 

them—view the loss of those ships in a much different way than 

we would view the loss of our ships and the sailors on them. So 

I am worried about the pace of the Chinese buildup against the 

likelihood or the possibility that we will continue to be sequestered, 

and I think that will pose a very real problem for us in the 2020’s. 

I think that we should look at that very closely, sir. 

Senator TILLIS. Has there been work done to try and put that on 

paper? It may not be appropriate for an open setting, but to take 

into account our own unilateral capabilities in the region, the 

added capacity of our allies. That is another advantage that we 

share there. We have allies. They do not really. Has there been 

anything at that level that I can put my hands on to really understand that and then the trending out into the mid-2020’s? Secretary? 

Secretary SHEAR. I think with regard to China, we put out the 

annual China military power report, and I think that is a good 

measure of where the Chinese have been and where they are going 

with regard to military modernization and their capabilities. 

31 

Senator TILLIS. Does that include a match-up against our projected capabilities assuming sequestration and the other policies 

that are the givens right now? 

Secretary SHEAR. It does not, sir. 

Senator TILLIS. That is more or less what I am talking about to 

try and figure out where the gap is and where we really have to 

sound the alarm that we are letting the margin of advantage erode. 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, the United States-China Commission, 

a body that is chartered by Congress, puts out an annual report 

that is exceptional in reading about China’s capabilities. So I would 

commend that to you as well. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

Admiral HARRIS. As far as the allies go, we have five treaty allies 

in the Pacific of varying degrees of capability, but whether they 

would be with us in every fight is a matter for them to decide in 

the fight at hand. So while I count the delta in numbers between 

us and China, I try not to count the quantity of assets our allies 

have because, depending on the situation at hand and their own 

national decisions, we might have to fight alone. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

Senator Reed, if I may. I do not think it came up in the discussion, but either for the Ambassador or for Admiral Harris, to what 

extent do you believe that the trade agreement—in this particular 

case, the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] and the partners there— 

is another key part of our military strategy down in the South 

China Sea and the Pacific? 

Secretary SHEAR. It is definitely a key part of our strategy, Senator. The TPP is not just economically beneficial, but it is strategic, 

and I think our partners understand that. The Vietnamese certainly understand it. When I was Ambassador in Vietnam through 

last year, the Vietnamese had an acute understanding of the strategic importance of TPP. It will be one of the ways in which we further knit together Southeast Asian integration and ASEAN 

strength. Not all ASEAN members are TPP partners, but TPP will 

certainly raise economic activity through the region, and countries 

like Vietnam are among those TPP partners which will benefit the 

most. 

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Tillis. 

I have been informed that some of our colleagues are returning 

from a vote on the floor and would like to ask questions. That gives 

me the opportunity to ask a few questions until they return. 

So, Admiral Harris, we have spent a great deal of time talking 

about the South China Sea, but India and Australia are actually 

conducting joint maritime exercises in the Indian Ocean, actually 

anti-submarine exercises, and presumably that is because of the 

presence more and more often of Chinese submarines in that area. 

So can you describe these operations? Does this represent another challenge to the existing security arrangements in the area? 

Admiral HARRIS. Senator, we are seeing Chinese submarine deployments extend further and further, almost with every deployment. It has become routine for Chinese submarines to travel to 

the Horn of Africa region, the north Arabian Sea in conjunction 

with their counter-piracy task force operations. We are seeing their 

32 

ballistic missile submarines travel in the Pacific at further ranges. 

Of course, all of those is of concern. 

With regard to India and Australia, Australia is one of our principal allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, certainly an ally with 

tremendous capability. India presents a terrific opportunity for us, 

and one of the PACOM lines of effort is an improved mil-to-mil relationship with India. I am excited by the opportunities that we 

have with India by the work that the Secretary of Defense has 

done and Assistant Secretary of Defense Kendall has done with regard to the DTTI [Defense Technology and Trade Initiative], the 

defense initiative with India, to help them build up their military 

and help them build an aircraft carrier capability. So India presents a wonderful opportunity for us. They share out values and 

our norms, and one of my objectives is to improve that relationship 

with India. 

Senator REED. This increased activity by Chinese submarines, 

both attack submarines and ballistic submarines—is that further 

stressing your submarine fleet in the Pacific, those ships that are 

available to you? 

Admiral HARRIS. It is. It is clearly stressing it. The new Russian 

submarines that are moving into the Pacific fleet area—their Pacific fleet area also places a stress on limited assets that we have. 

Senator REED. So we have to continue, obviously, to keep a robust submarine fleet, both attack submarines and ballistic submarines. 

Admiral HARRIS. Absolutely. 

Secretary SHEAR. Sir, I would like to—— 

Senator REED. Please. 

Secretary SHEAR. If I may, I would like to add a little more on 

India. 

When President Obama was in India for meetings with Prime 

Minister Modi in January, they issued a joint strategic vision on 

the Indian Ocean and East Asia. We are in the process of devising 

ways of implementing that joint strategic vision. I was in India 

through last Saturday for discussions with my counterparts on how 

to implement that vision. We already have a robust program, a robust bilateral cooperation with the Indians. The admiral mentioned 

DTTI. We also have a carrier cooperation working group that has 

begun to meet. I think cooperation in carrier technology and design, as well as in carrier operations, offers us a terrific opportunity to improve our ability to work with the Indians. 

We will be looking at other ways of strengthening our partnership. We conduct an annual exercise, the Malabar Exercise, in 

which we and the Indians have just decided to include the Japanese. So that will be every year now. That will be a strong trilateral exercise in the region. We are looking at other ways, particularly in maritime domain awareness, to strengthen what we do 

with the Indians because we have very strong common interests. 

Senator REED. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Just a further point—I have Senator Ayotte. If she is ready, I 

would be happy to yield. 

Senator AYOTTE. That would be great. If you want to finish your 

questioning—— 

33 

Senator REED. No. Thank you. At this point, let me, on behalf 

of chairman McCain, recognize Senator Ayotte. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank the ranking member. I appreciate it. 

First of all, Admiral Harris, I want to thank you for following 

through and visiting the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. I know that 

everyone at the shipyard was very appreciative of your taking the 

time to see the incredible work being done there on our attack submarine fleet. So thank you. We are grateful. 

I wanted to ask in follow-up on some of the questions that you 

have been asked, Admiral. I think I understand from the testimony 

you have given, but I want to make sure that we are clear because 

I know that you have been asked about the Asia-Pacific maritime 

security strategy, that China’s artificial islands could at most generate a 500- meter safety zone and that, of course, the Department 

of Defense had released a statement saying that these features 

under international law do not generate any maritime zones because you believe that they are not legitimate. What this means in 

practice is that the Navy actually can, as you know, sail its ships 

within 500 meters of these new land masses without violating the 

law because they are not legitimately there under international 

law. 

So I wanted to understand. Is the Navy sailing within 500 meters of China’s artificial islands at this point? 

Admiral HARRIS. No, ma’am. 

Senator AYOTTE. Has the Pacific Command at least sent Navy 

surface ships within 12 miles of China’s artificial islands? 

Admiral HARRIS. We have not. 

Senator AYOTTE. So I guess the big question I think many of us 

are trying to get at at this point—and I do not know, Admiral Harris, whether you or Secretary Shear are the appropriate person to 

answer the question. Why not? Saying we are going to sail and fly 

where international law permits and then not doing it I am concerned leaves China with the impression that we are again going 

to say something but not follow through on our actions, and we are 

going to invite more aggression by the Chinese with the activities 

they have been taking that are in violation of international law and 

building these artificial islands. So I wanted to get your answer to 

that. 

Secretary SHEAR. Let me elaborate a little on what the admiral 

said. In recent years, we have challenged every category of Chinese 

claim in the South China Sea, as recently as this year. We will continue to conduct freedom of navigation operations in the South 

China Sea. 

Let me be clear on this point. Freedom of navigation operations 

are important for demonstrating our rights under international 

law, but freedom of navigation operation alone will not stop Chinese activities on these features. Preventing the Chinese from further militarizing those features is going to take a range of options, 

including freedom of navigation operations, and we are in the process of considering those options now. 

Senator AYOTTE. Admiral, did you want to add to that? 

34 

Admiral HARRIS. I will just add that PACOM presents military 

options to the Secretary, and those options come with a full range 

of opportunities in the South China Sea. We are ready to execute 

those options when directed. 

Senator AYOTTE. So you are waiting for, obviously, the administration to make the call on that. 

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I mean, the freedom of navigation operation itself, as Secretary Shear said, is not a military-only device. 

It has a military component obviously because the military executes it. It has other elements to it which are derived by the Secretary and the White House. So we are waiting for direction, and 

I am comfortable and confident that the options that we presented 

are being considered equitably. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, as I look at the situation, though, I appreciate, obviously, Admiral, that PACOM—as the Commander, you 

would be waiting for direction from the White House. As I look at 

it, the Chinese have to be looking at this situation saying the 

United States has declared that under international law this is not 

legitimate and that we have the right to, obviously, put our vessels 

in these areas, but the Navy has not sailed within 12 nautical 

miles of the Chinese artificial islands at this point. So I think they 

get it both ways. So they are saying we are saying one thing, but 

we are certainly not willing to address where we have a free right 

to navigate. So I hope that we follow up with our actions on our 

words on this, otherwise I fear that the Chinese will continue their 

actions because otherwise they think, hey, why not? 

My time is up, but I am going to submit for the record, Admiral 

Harris—— 

Senator REED. Senator, if you would like to take some more time. 

Senator AYOTTE. Oh, thank you. I just had a follow-up on a totally different topic. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

I wanted to ask both of you on a different topic, which is about 

our POW–MIAs [Prisoner of War–Missing-in-Action] and our recovery efforts. This is a very important issue. I know Senator McCain 

and Senator McCaskill have been focused on this as well, and I 

have been appreciative of working with them. Obviously, the Department of Defense has reorganized its recovery efforts and stood 

up the new Defense POW–MIA Accounting Agency, the DPAA, in 

January of 2015, just the beginning of this year. One of the explicit 

purposes of this new organization is to effectively increase the 

number of missing service personnel accounted for from past conflicts. 

So I wanted to ask—of course, with your mission in PACOM, this 

is incredibly important because of our fallen heroes in the Asia-Pacific region including, according to DOD, over 83,000 Americans are 

missing in action, 73,000 from World War II, 7,500 from the Korean War. In New Hampshire, we had someone who was able to 

welcome home the remains of his uncle. This really moved me because we know how important it is to family members to have that 

kind of closure. Also 1,600 from Vietnam, including 42 from my 

State. 

So, Admiral Harris, I know this came up in your advance policy 

questions. Can you give me an update on how DPAA is doing, what 

efforts we are taking? If both of you could let me know your comVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:44 Mar 31, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99603 JUNE
35 

mitment, as we look at this. China has a very important role here 

in helping us recover our fallen heroes. So could you help me on 

this? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, ma’am. As you stated at the beginning, the 

Joint POW Accounting Command, JPAC, the chain of command 

was changed, and now it is DPAA. The chain of command—now it 

no longer reports to PACOM. It reports directly to an agency under 

DOD. 

My responsibility as PACOM is to be in support of DPAA. The 

people in Hawaii who actually work at the facility there, the DPAA 

facility now, are the same people, and I think they are doing a 

great job. They just recovered a bunch of remains in one of the Pacific island battles, including the remains of a Medal of Honor recipient. PACOM’s responsibility was to provide support for the airlift and all of that. I think that is a tremendous effort by them. 

I acknowledge the importance of going after every POW- MIA 

case that is extant. I think China—we need to continue to work 

with China and with North Korea and the other countries over 

which our fallen are from all the wars. 

Senator AYOTTE. One thing I wanted to also clarify, Secretary 

Shear—and I appreciate, Admiral Harris, your commitment to 

this—is I understand we do have an agreement that was formalized with the Chinese. At this point, we have been somewhat stymied of getting information that they may have about Korean War 

POW camp records. I understand that Mr. Linnington, who is the 

director of the DPAA, has or will be interacting with the Chinese 

Government. I wanted to know what efforts the administration will 

be making in supporting his efforts to facilitate that communication, as Admiral Harris says, to be able to bring those, our soldiers, 

home. 

Secretary SHEAR. Ma’am, I strongly support the efforts of the 

DPAA to make the fullest possible accounting of our missing personnel. As Secretary to Vietnam, I participated. I visited recovery 

sites. I participated in recovery ceremonies. As Assistant Secretary, 

I support the efforts of the DPAA just as strongly. I am aware of 

Director Linnington’s efforts in regard to China and more broadly. 

I support those efforts in discussions with my counterparts. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you both for that commitment. I appreciate it. We do not want to ever forget and make sure that we can 

bring as much closure to our families and bring our soldiers home. 

36 


15-73_1c.eps
37 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for 

your testimony this morning, and on behalf of Chairman McCain, 

let me now adjourn the hearing. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR WICKER

QUALITY OF LIFE

1. Senator WICKER. In March 2012, I expressed concern to Admiral Willard that 

certain below standard dormitory buildings at Osan Air Base did not receive military construction funding in the fiscal year 2013 budget. I was specifically concerned 

about significant plumbing, lead concerns, and mold issues at Building 746, Building 708, and Building 475. 

Will you provide the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee with an update on the overall status of enlisted dormitory 

housing at Osan Air Base as well as the specific status of Building 746, Building 

708, and Building 475? 

Admiral HARRIS. Building 475 has been demolished and Building 746 is unoccupied and scheduled for demolition. I am pleased to report that Building 708 has no 

record of lead or mold issues and its current HVAC and plumbing systems are fully 

mission capable. Additionally, all rooms in building 708 meet Air Force standards 

and are either occupied or ready for occupancy. The building is scheduled for a 

major overhaul in 2017 as part of a $4M dormitory refurbishment. 

2. Senator WICKER. Also, what is the wing commander’s assessment of the enlisted dormitory situation at Osan Air Base (active mission assigned personnel as 

well as support / tenant units)? 

Admiral HARRIS. Overall, the 51st Fighter Wing commander assesses the condition of the unaccompanied housing at Osan Air Base as adequate to good. The commander additionally assesses there is no difference in the quality of dorms between 

those assigned to the 51st Fighter Wing and those assigned to tenant units. For context, Osan Air Base has 35 dormitories, including 33 for the Air Force and 2 assigned to the Army. Osan recently opened two new dormitories—a Senior NCO dormitory with 277 rooms and an Airman dormitory with 156 rooms. The base has an 

extensive facility repair and renovation program, with at least one dormitory under 

renovation per year, and a very robust dormitory furniture replacement program. 

Some of the dormitories were constructed in the late 1980s, and some individual 

rooms are closed for maintenance, however, none of the rooms are substandard. Individual rooms continue to have normal wear and tear issues, and residents are relocated as needed. At this time, all major systems are functional. The wing commander stated they are heading in the right direction and expects significant improvements to continue. I will personally visit one of the dormitories when I next 

travel to Osan Air Base. 

3. Senator WICKER. Are there any plans to correct any substandard rooms remaining? 

Admiral HARRIS. Today, 100 percent of dormitory rooms on Osan Air Base meet 

Air Force standards. At any given time, roughly 5 percent of rooms are empty for 

maintenance. However, these issues are addressed directly and residents are not 

moved into a dormitory room until it is ready for occupancy. The 33 dormitories on 

Osan Air Base, totaling 4,697 rooms, are managed through a robust 5-year plan incorporating both routine maintenance and major refurbishment. In total, there is 

$166M programmed for Osan Air Base dormitory projects over the next 10 years, 

with $79M of those projects programmed within the next 5 years. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LEE

MODERNIZATION EFFORTS

4. Senator LEE. Admiral Harris, one of the themes of this week’s Air Force Association conference that is taking place just down the road is the need to modernize 

our nation’s air fleet to outpace the technological advances made by potential adversaries. In your opinion, looking at the current threat spectrum in the Pacific Command area of responsibility and the technological developments of militaries within 

38 

that area, how important is it that the service branches are given the funding and 

flexibility to modernize and address these threats? If you and future PACOM commanders are not receiving, training with, and maintaining the weapons systems 

that are designed to counter the types of military technology you will be facing in 

the future, what kind of risks will you be taking? 

Admiral HARRIS. Funding, in many respects, defines our total military capability. 

I appreciate the support of Congress, and the opportunity to comment on this important issue. Continuous changes in fiscal assumptions due to budget uncertainty 

hamper our ability to plan. The result is poor use of resources. These uncertainties 

affect our people, as well as our equipment and infrastructure by reducing training 

and delaying needed investments. They directly affect our ability to pace threats by 

slowing investments in future capabilities. Services must have predictable and persistent funding to properly man, train, and equip a ready force. Additionally, Services must have the flexibility to develop and execute long-range programs for modernization while meeting current readiness needs. Funding uncertainties reduce 

warfighting capabilities, further reduce contingency response force readiness, and 

jeopardize our ability to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance. Uncertainty over 

funding ultimately risks the DOD’s ability to fulfill USPACOM’s commitment to the 

President’s defense strategies. It jeopardizes our reach, and the lethality and technological edge we have today. It degrades our credibility as a reliable partner and imposes increased strain and risk to our service members. 

REGIONAL COMMERCE

5. Senator LEE. Secretary Shear, you are well aware of the importance that Western Pacific maritime access is to U.S. commercial interests. More than $5 trillion 

worth of international trade traverses the South China Sea annually and the area 

is a significant site for the exploration and transportation of energy resources. What 

impact has Chinese action in the South and East China Seas had thus far on the 

free flow of commerce through that area, and what future actions could negatively 

impact this commerce? 

Mr. SHEAR. Maritime Asia is a vital thruway for global commerce, and it will be 

a critical part of the expected regional economic growth. The importance of the AsiaPacific sea lanes for global trade cannot be overstated. Eight of the world’s 10 busiest container ports are in the Asia-Pacific region, and almost 30 percent of the 

world’s maritime trade transits the South China Sea annually. Approximately twothirds of the world’s oil shipments transit through the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, 

and in 2014, more than 15 million barrels of oil passed through the Malacca Strait 

per day. 

China is using a steady progression of small, incremental steps to increase its control over disputed areas East and South China Seas. This includes increasingly deploying the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) to enforce its claims. For instance, China 

has used maritime law enforcement ships to restrict Philippine commercial fishing 

in the area of Scarborough Reef. The growing efforts of claimants, including China, 

to assert their claims has also led to an increase in air and maritime incidents in 

the recent years. Furthermore, China’s land reclamation operations and infrastructure development over the last few years will enable it to establish a more robust 

power projection presence in the South China Sea. Broadly speaking, this has the 

potential to create uncertainty for not only the regional governments, but also for 

commercial entities operating in the region. 

6. Senator LEE. Admiral Harris, does the Chinese military have the ability to 

close down some of these maritime routes in the event of a conflict, and what do 

you think could spark such an action from the Chinese navy? How would the United 

States respond to such an event? 

Admiral HARRIS. [Deleted.] 

CYBER SECURITY

7. Senator LEE. Admiral Harris, the Chinese and North Korean governments have 

both been involved in cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage against the United States 

Government and American businesses, and we are aware that cyber warfare will 

only become further engrained into future military doctrines. As a Combatant Commander, with these specific cyber threats in your area of responsibility, what do you 

view as your role in detecting, defending against, and deterring cyber attacks on the 

military personnel and assets under your command? What resources and authorities 

are you in need of to enable you to address this threat more effectively and 

proactively? 

39 

Admiral HARRIS. My role is to identify capability requirements that lead to military dominance in every domain, including cyber. To that end, I coordinate with 

United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and United States Cyber Command (USCC) in the employment of cyber warfare teams to deliver the needed capabilities in the context of a broader military effort. In ongoing operations, my role 

is ensuring that cyberspace operations are integrated, synchronized, and coordinated between USPACOM, Service components, the Defense Information Systems 

Agency (DISA), USSTRATCOM, USCC, and interagency partners who contribute 

authorities, capabilities, and insights critical to protecting infrastructure and information, detecting attacks, and deterring adversaries in cyberspace. I appreciate 

Congress’ efforts to provide the resources that deliver technologies to provide strong, 

layered security and protection against the latest cyber threats. I am not aware of 

any unmet authority requirements that require Congressional attention at present. 

However, I urge Congress to continue to fund all cyber mission teams. While this 

may prove difficult under sequestration, it is vital to maintaining our ability to 

dominate in the cyber domain. 

PACIFIC PIVOT

8. Senator LEE. Secretary Shear, one of the key elements of the military’s strategy 

for shifting focus to the Pacific is having 60 percent of our naval and air fleets deployed to that region by 2020. Are we currently on schedule to meet this goal, and 

if the conflict against Islamic extremism continues at the same or an increased pace 

over the next 5 years, what impact will that have on the manpower and equipment 

levels available for operations in the Pacific? 

Mr. SHEAR. The Department of Defense has worked to consistently implement 

President Obama’s strategy of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region. Over the 

past six years, we have made our engagement and investments in the Pacific a top 

priority, even in the face of budget constraints. The rebalance is first and foremost 

a whole-of-government approach, and we view our efforts as working hand-in-hand 

with the many political, economic, and development initiatives underway across the 

region. 

To answer your question, the Air Force has already rebalanced to station 60 percent of its overseas air assets in the Asia-Pacific and Navy is on track to home-port 

60 percent of the fleet in the region by 2020. Still, the hallmark of the rebalance 

is the emphasis on the quality, and not the quantity of our military presence in the 

Asia-Pacific region. We are actively investing in the future capabilities that we will 

need in the Asia-Pacific, including high-end capabilities. We are pushing our most 

advanced existing technology to the Pacific and we’re finding new ways to use it. 

We’re adapting our overall defense posture in the Asia-Pacific to be geographically 

distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. We are increasing 

the tempo of training and exercises in the region. We are modernizing the alliances 

and reinforcing the partnerships that are the bedrock of everything we do in the 

Asia-Pacific. All of this continues to occur amid a context of continued engagement 

in Afghanistan, as well as emergent efforts to counter Islamic extremism in the 

Middle East and strengthen defenses in Europe in response to renewed Russian aggression. 

9. Senator LEE. Admiral Harris, the United States has longstanding alliances 

with many countries in eastern Asia from South Korean to India, and we participate 

in many military exercises, training events, military exchanges, and military assistance with these countries. What further benefit will the continuation of the pivot 

strategy offer the United States and our regional allies, considering the many engagements in which we are already involved? 

Admiral HARRIS. One of America’s key asymmetric advantages is that we have allies, partners and friends in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Our principal adversaries do not. 

The Rebalance is key to this. The Rebalance is a strategic, whole of government effort that recognizes the vital interest that Pacific nations play in our future. The 

world is inextricably interconnected—the best way to maintain security, prosperity, 

and prepare for the future security environment is to maintain the positive momentum of the Rebalance and actively shape our national interests. The Rebalance is 

building trust and deepening our partnerships in the region, and it is always in our 

interest to have more friends. Surveys and opinion polls in the region indicate a 

strong desire for continued U.S. leadership and engagement in the region. 

In recent years we have developed new or enhanced security relationships with 

most countries in the region, helped in no small part by our being a trustworthy 

alternative partner to offset China and North Korea’s coercive and often unpredictable behavior. We have also helped improve the effectiveness of regional organizaVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:44 Mar 31, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99603 JUNE
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tions and associated working groups under the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting 

Plus and ASEAN Regional Forum. These achievements, resulting from redoubled efforts under the Rebalance, are enhancing regional security and enabling regional 

militaries to contribute more in providing security in a region where complexity continues increasing. 

As an example, our friends and allies across the Indo-Asia-Pacific are investing 

their own resources toward increased United States access. Of the four largest 

United States military construction efforts since the end of the Cold War—all in the 

Asia Pacific—Korea and Japan are contributing 82 percent of the cost: $30 Billion 

of $37B (Camp Humphreys, Korea; MCAS Iwakuni, Japan; Futenma Replacement 

Facility Okinawa Consolidation; Guam). Elsewhere Japan is providing 97 percent of 

Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) construction funding in Japan ($16.9 B of 

$17.4B). U.S. investment in regional security is being reciprocated further by growing investments in U.S. military systems such as AEGIS ships, C–17, V–22, P–8, 

AH–64, UH–60, UH–72 and other aircraft, and other major hardware acquisitions 

that come with a decades-long partnership ‘‘tail’’ in training and logistics investments. The Rebalance is a sound investment that is paying dividends in terms of 

relationships, access, interoperability, stability and prosperity. 

China continues its unprecedented military modernization, as demonstrated in 

South China Sea land reclamation and military acquisitions. North Korean nuclear 

development and provocations continue. Global terrorist networks are evolving faster than our allies and partners can counter them. Given the expanding threat, there 

is growing demand from allies, partners, and regional institutions such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for engagement, partnering, training, 

and leadership from the United States. We must maintain our capacity to lead, further strengthen essential U.S. relationships, and shape the security environment. 

The Rebalance fulfills that need and is vital to our strategic future. 

10. Senator LEE. Secretary Shear, how have the Chinese reacted so far to our 

pivot strategy in the Pacific and the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy? Do 

they perceive this as a threat, and as we continue towards PACOM’s force structure 

goals, what further reaction can we expect from the Chinese? 

Mr. SHEAR. For the past 15 years, China’s military has pursued a comprehensive 

military modernization program focused on increasing its capabilities to conduct 

missions on its periphery and beyond to protect its perceived national interests and 

deter adversaries. We can expect this trend to continue for the foreseeable future, 

particularly because China’s leadership views the strengthening and modernization 

of the People’s Liberation Army as essential to China’s broad objectives of achieving 

great power status. 

The U.S. presence in the region has been a stabilizing factor since the end of 

World War II. Our presence is welcomed in the region by many because the military 

steps we are taking as part of the Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region are intended 

to reinforce a rules-based regional order that is conducive to stability and prosperity 

for everyone in the region, including China. China’s aspirations and the United 

States enduring presence in the Asia-Pacific region are not incompatible. We recognize that the United States-China relationship, as well as the military-to-military 

relationship, is characterized by elements of both competition and cooperation. Since 

2012, China has responded positively to military-to-military engagement, resulting 

in improvements in the pace and scope of sustained and substantive exchanges that 

focus on risk reduction, as well engagements that expand our ability to cooperate 

in areas of mutual interest, such as counterpiracy, humanitarian assistance, and 

disaster relief. We will continue to focus our military-to-military engagements in 

ways that ensure that China acts in a manner consistent with international norms, 

resulting in outcomes that best serve the interests of the United States and our allies and partners in the region. 

As the United States builds a stronger foundation for the military-to-military relationship with China, we will continue to monitor closely China’s evolving military 

strategy, doctrine, and force development. Furthermore, we will continue to work 

with our allies and partners in the region to sustain the regional rules-based security order that has resulted in unprecedented peace and prosperity in the region for 

the past 70 years. 

11. Senator LEE. Secretary Shear, how do you account for the possibility that such 

a large shift in military resources could inflame already tense regional problems? 

What will be our reaction if the Chinese military increases its military build-up in 

an attempt to offset our efforts? 

Mr. SHEAR. The relationship between the United States and China is the most 

consequential in the world today. Pursuing a productive relationship with China is 

41 

a critical element of the larger United States strategy for the Asia–Pacific region. 

The United States is a Pacific power that has vital interests in region, which we 

will protect through critical investments in our own capabilities, and the investments of our allies and partners. 

United States leadership in the Asia-Pacific region is grounded in our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand. We have been 

modernizing these essential partnerships to tackle a full range of regional and global challenges. These alliances are powerful platforms for advancing a rules-based 

international system. The United States insists upon and will continue to underscore its fundamental national interest—one shared by our allies and partners—in 

preserving freedom of navigation and commerce through some of the world’s busiest 

sea lanes. The United States will continue to sail, fly, and operate in accordance 

with international law in pursuit of our interests and those of our allies and partners. 

We also have been working across the region to invest in regional institutions to 

strengthen the development of an open and effective regional architecture with the 

capacity to resolve conflict, support development and economic prosperity, advance 

human rights, and ensure that all countries in the region play by the same rules. 

United States support and participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East Asia 

Summit (EAS), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PAF) groupings are examples of our 

commitment to managing and reducing regional challenges. 

The United States-China relationship is an integral component of our overall approach to the Asia-Pacific region. We recognize that there are elements of cooperation as well as competition in the relationship, which we will seek to manage 

through sustained and substantive dialogue and practical engagement in areas of 

mutual interest. The points of friction between China and the United States cannot 

be ignored, and we will continue to deal forthrightly with our differences. 

12. Senator LEE. Secretary Shear, the United States officially does not take positions on sovereignty issues with respect to territorial and maritime disputes in the 

East and South China Sea. However, we are obligated by defense treaties to a number of countries that are currently involved in territorial disputes in this region. 

How would the United States respond to a hypothetical conflict over the Senkaku 

Islands, given our treaty obligations to Japan? 

Mr. SHEAR. United States policy toward the Senkaku Islands, which was clearly 

stated by President Obama in April 2014, has not changed: Article 5 of our security 

treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands because they are under the administrative 

control of Japan. We consult regularly with our Japanese allies, and will oppose any 

attempts to change the status quo unilaterally. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CRUZ

CHINESE MISSILE CAPABILITIES

13. Senator CRUZ. In his opening remarks, Chairman McCain said that the 

United States needs to ‘‘think anew about deterrence’’ in our relationship with 

China. This admonition is especially timely in light of China’s recent military parade, an event which the People’s Liberation Army used to unveil a number of new 

and updated ballistic missiles. Among them was the DF–26C, an Intermediate 

Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) with a range of 3,000–4,000 km. Although concealed 

with a tarp during the rehearsal, reports indicate that the DF–26C appears to have 

three stages and a lengthy nose-cone. The latter feature suggests that the warhead 

may have a terminal guidance system, increasing its target accuracy. If true, this 

also introduces the possibility that China could introduce a fourth modification of 

the DF–26 similar to their ‘‘carrier killer’’ ballistic missile, the DF–21D. In 2012, 

The Diplomat highlighted the difficulty of AEGIS ballistic missile defense interceptors to engage a DF–21D in its midcourse flight due to possible decoys and in its 

descent phase due to its ability to maneuver at high speed. China reportedly tested 

the DF–21D successfully in 2014. The potential that the DF–26 now has a modification with terminal guidance introduces the troubling possibility that the United 

States is not only losing the anti-access/area denial competition in the South China 

Sea, but is actually ceding additional maneuvering space to the PLA. 

Are you concerned about the ability of U.S. missile defenses to intercept the DF– 

21D and DF–26C throughout their course of flight? 

Admiral HARRIS. [Deleted.] 

42 

14. Senator CRUZ. In Chapter 2, section 2 of the 2014 Annual Report to Congress, 

the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission notes the observation of Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project and the 

Federation of American Scientists, that the Department of Defense (DOD) began reducing information regarding an estimate of the number of ballistic and cruise missiles in the 2010 ‘‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’’ report to Congress. By 2013, this estimate had been completely removed from the annual report. 

Why did the Pentagon begin removing its estimates of China’s ballistic missile capacity in its 2010 report? 

Mr. SHEAR. The Department of Defense’s annual report to Congress on ‘‘Military 

and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’’ continues to 

summarize the size, location, and capabilities of Chinese strategic land, sea, and air 

forces. This report is provided to Congress in both classified and unclassified form. 

Details on China’s missile systems in the Department’s report have decreased as 

China has stopped publishing accurate figures on the numbers and types of its ballistic and cruise missiles. There are various unclassified estimates of China’s missile 

inventory we could draw from, but those sources are not authoritative and may be 

inaccurate. The Department aims to provide the most accurate information possible 

to Congress; however, we must also weigh the potential risks to intelligence sources 

and methods should we reveal details regarding our knowledge of specific numbers 

of China’s missile systems. 

The 2015 annual report noted that China possesses at least 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in its inventory, and has an arsenal of 50–60 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The report summarizes the estimated range, key 

developments, and implications of China’s ballistic missile systems. 

The report also describes China’s investment in anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) 

and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). ASCM and LACM systems are further described by system type, operating units, and delivery platforms. 

15. Senator CRUZ. Shouldn’t Congress have an unvarnished estimate of China’s 

military capabilities, particularly given their recent aggressive stance in the South 

China Sea and willingness to intrude into United States territorial waters off the 

coast of Alaska? 

Mr. SHEAR. In addition to recurring testimony before defense oversight committees by senior Department of Defense officials, DOD provides an annual report to 

Congress on ‘‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic 

of China.’’ This report is produced in partnership by the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense for Policy and the Defense Intelligence Agency. We coordinate the report 

with the Departments of State, Homeland Security, Energy, Commerce, and Treasury, and with the Intelligence Community and the National Security Council staff, 

so it reflects views that are held broadly across the United States Government. 

We intend the report to be factual, descriptive, and analytical. We try not to speculate, but we let the facts speak for themselves. This report highlights China’s military strengths and weaknesses, as well as the opportunities and the challenges that 

we see going forward. 

Although the most recent Chinese movement of ships off the coast of Alaska occurred outside the period covered by the 2015 annual report to Congress, the 2015 

DOD report did present a special topic section on ‘‘China’s Reclamation in the South 

China Sea.’’ That section described the size and potential uses of the reclaimed sites, 

and noted that ‘‘most analysts outside China believe that China is attempting to 

change facts on the ground by improving its defense infrastructure in the South 

China Sea.’’ 

RED FLAG AND RIMPAC EXERCISES

16. Senator CRUZ. On June 25, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson Yang 

Yujun expressed strong concerns at a monthly briefing about an amendment I introduced with Senators Inhofe and Wicker that called on DOD to invite Taiwan to Red 

Flag military exercises. In Yang’s words, ‘‘We are firmly opposed to any country’s 

military contact with Taiwan. Our position is consistent and clear.’’ I believe that 

further military integration with Taiwan is imperative in reassuring our friends and 

allies and deterring the PLA from using force against Taiwan. Red Flag affords Taiwan an opportunity to participate in military exercises that will improve their selfdefense capabilities and their ability to operate jointly with the United States, 

should that ever be required. 

43 

Do you plan to invite Taiwan to participate in the 2016 RIMPAC exercises? Do 

you plan to invite China? 

Admiral HARRIS. (U//FOUO) We invited China to RIMPAC 2016, but reserve the 

right to cancel that invitation should our relationship deteriorate. We did not invite 

Taiwan to RIMPAC 2016, nor do we plan to. The nature of the relationship between 

United States Pacific Command and Taiwan’s armed forces is not dependent on 

whether or not Taiwan is part of RIMPAC. Having said that, we will continue to 

maintain and deepen our strong military relations with Taiwan through continued 

exchanges and engagements in accordance with United States policy and the Taiwan Relations Act. I am a firm believer in, and supporter of, the Taiwan Relations 

Act. 

17. Senator CRUZ. Does DOD intend to invite Taiwan to participate in Red Flag 

exercises? 

Mr. SHEAR. The United States Government’s approach to Taiwan has as its foundation the three joint United States-China Communiques and the Taiwan Relations 

Act. This approach has been a constant for eight U.S. administrations and will not 

change. Maintaining and deepening strong unofficial relations with Taiwan is an 

important part of United States engagement in Asia, a region of great and growing 

importance to the United States. 

The Department of Defense engages closely with its Taiwan counterparts to support Taiwan’s development of defensive capabilities to deter and, if necessary, resist 

coercion today and in the future. The United States has made available to Taiwan 

defense equipment and services in order to enable the island to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 

This includes reviewing training opportunities for Taiwan to improve and maintain its readiness and operational capabilities. The Taiwan Air Force currently participates in several realistic and complex training scenarios each year at Luke Air 

Force Base with its F–16 aircraft that are designed to exercise defense counter-air 

tactics, formation flying, and attacks under simulated combat conditions. We do not 

believe it is necessary to invite Taiwan to Red Flag exercises at this point in time. 

We believe this tailored training meets Taiwan’s needs. We will continue to reassess Taiwan’s capabilities and readiness levels to ensure that it receives the necessary training to maintain an effective defensive capability. 

CHINESE LAND RECLAMATION

18. Senator CRUZ. Admiral Harris, when asked in Thursday’s hearing for your 

opinion on whether the United States should sail or fly within 12 nautical miles of 

China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea, you answered in part that the decision would ‘‘depend on the feature’’ of the land formation, referencing ‘‘islands that 

are not islands.’’ The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative lists seven Chinese outposts within the Spratly Islands that exist on reclaimed reefs, specifically Cuarteron 

Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson South, Hughes Reef, Gaven Reef, Mischief Reef, and 

Subi Reef. 

What is DOD’s definition of what is and isn’t an island? 

Admiral HARRIS. The Department of State, through its Office of the Geographer, 

establishes U.S. policy on the legal status of geographic features. The DOS–Office 

of the Geographer has not yet released an official position on the South China Sea 

features. There are certain features, such as Mischief Reef, that we believe were 

originally below water at high tide, prior to China’s massive reclamation. If that feature was originally underwater, then we can legally conduct normal operations, such 

as overflight and navigation in the vicinity of the features, including within 12 nautical miles. For other features that are legally characterized as either islands or 

rocks, we could not overfly within 12 nautical miles, but we could sail within 12 

nautical miles in innocent passage. 

The DOD definition of an ‘‘island’’ conforms to the definition stated in 1982 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although the U.S. 

is not a party to UNCLOS, it considers the navigation and overflight provisions reflective of customary international law and therefore acts in accordance with 

UNCLOS. According to Article 121 of UNCLOS, an island is ‘‘a naturally formed 

area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.’’ An island 

is capable of sustaining human life and the status of a feature is determined by its 

natural formation and not by man-made alterations. An island is entitled to a territorial sea, an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf. A rock is defined in 

Art 121 as a natural feature above water at high tide, which cannot sustain life on 

its own. A rock is entitled to a territorial sea, but not an exclusive economic zone 

or continental shelf. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which 

44 

is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. A lowtide elevation is not entitled to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Article 60 of UNCLOS clearly states that artificial islands, installations, and structures do not possess the status of islands and have no territorial sea 

of their own. Therefore DOD has the legal right to conduct normal operations within 

the vicinity of reclaimed features which were originally underwater. 

19. Senator CRUZ. Do these seven reclamation sites fall under DOD’s definition 

of an island? 

Admiral HARRIS. The Department of State, Office of the Geographer is responsible 

for determining the official U.S. position with respect to the legal characterization 

all features, including reclamation sites. The U.S. currently takes no official position 

on the legal character of these seven reclamation sites, however we do not believe 

that all of them meet the legal definition of an island. We encourage the Department of State to take a position on the status of these reclamation sites and other 

features in the South China Sea. I would like to reiterate my point in question 18 

that as a matter of international law, artificial islands and structures are not entitled to a territorial sea. We will conduct military operations in the vicinity of all 

features in accordance with international law. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SHAHEEN

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

20. Senator SHAHEEN. Assured communications, particularly for command and 

control (C2) networks, is critical for our maritime forces. Our adversaries are becoming increasingly capable in electronic warfare technology, threatening our military 

effectiveness. Can you comment on the need to upgrade systems like the Link-16 

with more advanced and adaptable anti-jam technologies while maintaining interoperability with legacy radios? 

Admiral HARRIS. It is critically important; highly resilient, anti-jam encrypted 

communication technologies are necessary for command and control of forces operating within the air, land, and maritime domains and today’s systems do not sufficiently repel efforts by adversaries to jam, exploit, or penetrate our legacy networks. 

Since Tactical Data Links (TDL) 16 and 22 are both based on technology developed 

decades ago, there is a pressing need to update or replace their technologies with 

new ones that will continue to be jam-resistant, provide cryptographic protection, 

and remain interoperable. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HIRONO

PHILIPPINES

21. Senator HIRONO. The Philippines is one of the United States defense treaty 

allies in the Asia-Pacific and also a party to the South China Sea dispute with 

China. United States and Philippine armed forces regularly conduct joint land and 

sea exercises to boost security cooperation. How does the United States alliance in 

the Philippines fit in the overall maritime security strategy in the Asia-Pacific? 

Admiral HARRIS. The United States-Philippines Alliance is a cornerstone of the 

Indo-Asia-Pacific security architecture, demonstrating the United States’s commitment to peace and security for over 65 years, and it has a bright future in regional 

security. Through our historically close ties, we have developed a strong and cooperative relationship, which enables United States training and operational access to 

the South China, Sulu and Celebes Seas. I appreciate the Congress’ creation of the 

Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, which will significantly enhance our 

partnership by enabling greater investment in the regional security architecture, including improvements to the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 

(AFP). The AFP’s modernization will not only contribute to the security of the Philippines, but also provide substantive support and collaboration toward a regionally 

shared Maritime Domain Awareness. Furthermore, we continue to applaud and encourage the Philippines’ use of international courts and arbitration to resolve maritime disputes. 

Mr. SHEAR. A key element of DOD’s approach to maritime security in Southeast 

Asia is to work alongside capable regional allies and partners. Through initiatives 

such as the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines, 

the Department will be able to increase our routine and persistent rotational presence in Southeast Asia for expanded training with the Philippines and other reVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:44 Mar 31, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\REIER-AVILES\BORAWSKI\JOBS SENT FOR PRINTING 2015\99603 JUNE
45 

gional partners. We are conducting more than 400 planned events with our treaty 

ally, the Philippines in 2015, and there is broad regional agreement on the importance of improving maritime security and maritime domain awareness capabilities 

in an effort towards promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia. In conjunction with the Department of State and the United States Coast Guard, we have dramatically expanded our maritime security assistance and capacity building efforts 

in recent years. In the Philippines, the Department is providing coastal radar systems and assisting the Department of State with naval maintenance capacity building as well as providing interdiction vessels, naval fleet upgrades, communications 

equipment, and aircraft procurement. The Department is also working with our allies, Japan and Australia, in a coordinated fashion to maximize the efficiency and 

effectiveness of our maritime security capacity building efforts in Southeast Asia, 

beginning with the Philippines. 

22. Senator HIRONO. Could you elaborate on how our recent sales of patrol vessels 

to the Philippine navy will enhance their capabilities and improve regional security? 

Admiral HARRIS. The recent sale of Hamilton Class patrol vessels to the Philippines provides an initial credible maritime security capability, enabling the Philippine Navy to monitor and respond to maritime incidents and crises in their territorial waters and economic exclusion zone (EEZ). In tandem with their improving 

maritime domain awareness assets and sensors, Hamilton Class patrol vessels will 

extend their patrol range and improve situational awareness within their EEZ and 

adjacent waters enabling them to better protect their interests. In fact, I support 

the sale of a third Hamilton Class patrol vessel to the Philippines, should the opportunity arise. I had the opportunity to visit their new National Coast Watch Center 

(NCWC) in Manila (funded largely by DTRA) and was impressed by the potential 

that exists there. I believe that linking the Hamilton Class cutters to the NCWC 

will dramatically improve Maritime Domain Awareness. 

Mr. SHEAR. The two United States Coast Guard High-Endurance Cutters (WHEC) 

that the Department of Defense transferred as excess defense articles to the Philippines in 2011 and 2013 supported a major non-NATO treaty ally and key alliance 

partner in the Asia Pacific region. The cutters’ patrol capabilities have enhanced the 

Philippines’ ability to contribute to humanitarian assistance and disaster response 

(HA/DR), respond to maritime domain awareness concerns, enhance interoperability 

with United States forces, and strengthen regional relationships by participating in 

multinational exercises. The United States and the Philippines also share the goal 

of ensuring freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce. By allowing the 

Philippines to patrol its Exclusive Economic Zone, the WHECs also support these 

shared principles and contribute to regional security. A combination of foreign military financing and Philippine national funds are being used to continue to enhance 

the capabilities of the WHECs. 

23. Senator HIRONO. In July I introduced a bipartisan bill that would include the 

Philippines in the group of allied nations eligible for expedited consideration provided by law of foreign military sales. Currently that group includes just NATO, 

Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Israel. Would you agree that the 

Philippines should be included in this group? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. I strongly support adding the Philippines to the select group 

of allied nations eligible for expedited foreign military sales (FMS). The Philippines 

has been a staunch ally in enhancing regional security and supporting PACOM regional presence. Reducing United States Government processing time for government to government sales and commercially licensed arms sales would deepen our 

relationship and further improve our military ties, while accelerating progression in 

the capabilities of an important ally and partner. 

Mr. SHEAR. Yes, the Department of Defense would fully support including our 

Philippine ally in the category of NATO countries for the purpose of congressional 

notification for foreign military sales. Although the Philippines is already designated a major non-NATO ally, inclusion in the NATO category would enable the 

Department, working with the State Department, to process Philippine foreign military sales cases more quickly by both increasing the threshold for congressional notification and shortening the timeframe of the required notification. Further, inclusion in this category would demonstrate the value and strategic importance of our 

Philippine ally. 

GUAM ENERGY

24. Senator HIRONO. On July 14th, the Energy and Natural Resources Committee 

on which I serve held a hearing to examine the energy challenges that come from 

46 

living in places that are not connected to the rest of the country, including Hawaii, 

Alaska, and the U.S. Territories. We heard from Robert Underwood, the Former 

Guam Delegate to the House of Representatives. He explained that Guam relies on 

imported petroleum to serve most of its energy needs and that the local power companies are challenged to keep power constant. I visited Guam last month and heard 

similar concerns. What plans does the Navy have to enhance the resilience of the 

energy infrastructure needed to support the expanded military capabilities needed 

to develop Guam into a strategic hub in the region? 

Admiral HARRIS. I appreciate the investments that Congress continues supporting 

on behalf of our national security interests in Guam, and I welcome every improvement that mutually benefits Guam and DOD. To that end, the Navy continues 

working with Guam Power Authority through master planning and partnerships 

that enhance the resilience of the Guam energy infrastructure. The Navy continues 

improving energy efficiency, reducing consumption, and partnering on renewable energy projects with Guam Power Authority, the responsible agency for Guam energy 

infrastructure. 

Mr. SHEAR. The demand for electrical power under the military build-up can be 

met by the current generation capacity on Guam. No power generation upgrades 

will, therefore, be required. However, consistent with Navy sustainability goals, a 

portion of the power demand will be satisfied by power generated from renewable 

energy sources, including photovoltaic solar panels on rooftops and acreage within 

the cantonment and/or family housing areas. 

We also plan to upgrade transmission lines and construct a new on-site substation. 

Additionally, both the Navy and the Marine Corps recognize the need to reach 

and maintain security and resilience of the energy infrastructure. The Marine Corps 

is actively pursuing suitable ways of achieving that goal as well as providing a sensible approach to implementing renewable energy, with an objective of identifying 

practical and feasible energy measures that are reliable and financially reasonable. 

FREELY ASSOCIATED STATES

25. Senator HIRONO. Last year I had the opportunity to speak with Secretary Carter, prior to his confirmation, about my concerns regarding our compacts of free association with the freely associated states (FAS) of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. We began 

our relationship with these nations after World War II, when we began testing nuclear weapons in the Marshall Islands. The U.S. was tasked with governing the region, then referred to as the Trust Territory of the Pacific, by the United Nations. 

It is worth noting that at one point the region was exclusively under the jurisdiction 

of the U.S. Navy. In 1986 these three nations gained their independence but remained strong allies of the United States through our compacts of free association. 

The compacts ensured the United States would retain exclusive military jurisdiction over the region. It also allowed FAS citizens the opportunity to enlist in the 

military and freely travel between our nations. Recognizing that certain jurisdictions would be more likely to see an influx of FAS citizens, Congress provided dedicated funding to Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the 

Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) to defray the costs associated with this ‘‘compact 

impact.’’ 

In 2010, the United States concluded renegotiating the terms of our compact with 

Palau, in which we promised to provide $215 million to Palau through fiscal year 

2024. While the compact is now in place, the United States has not ratified this 

agreement due to Congressional budgetary rules requiring a pay-for—in essence, the 

United States must find roughly $13 million annually to offset the costs of this 

promise. 

According to the Department of Defense, FAS citizens generally, and Palauans 

specifically, enlist in the military at a higher rate than citizens of any State in the 

United States. I have met with Palauan President Tommy Remengesau, who has 

enumerated his concerns about China’s growing economic influence and expansion 

in the Pacific and our seemingly lax attitude toward our compact with Palau. His 

concerns were clear: if the United States does not live up to its promises to Palau, 

how we will keep the region clear of China’s influence? 

I am sincerely concerned that our lack of action in this matter may pose a threat 

to our position in the region. This is especially worrying as China’s influence in the 

region continues to grow –a concern which I believe provided the most compelling 

reason for the Department to rebalance its forces to the Asia-Pacific region. I would 

like to continue my conversation with Secretary Carter, as well as Admiral Harris, 

47 

and Secretary Shear on this issue, and ask the Department to please consider the 

following questions: 

Given the above, can you please elaborate on whether, and how, the FAS play a 

role in the Department’s plans for its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific? 

Admiral HARRIS. Assured and exclusive access to the Freely Associated States 

(FAS) plays an important supporting role in United States efforts to maintain muchneeded influence from San Diego all the way to Southeast Asia which would be of 

vital importance in a contingency or conflict. The FAS are home to strategic facilities such as the Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site on Kwajalein, as well 

as key capabilities such as our Civic Action Team in Palau. FAS citizens are serving 

honorably in the U.S. military and beginning in 2010, are graduating from U.S. 

service academies. The FAS are strategically located and it is in our national interest to maintain strong ties with the FAS. The FAS will play an important role in 

the event of regional conflict as hubs to maintain open sea lines of communication. 

I support Congress’ efforts to ensure our relationships remain steadfast. 

Mr. SHEAR. Maintaining strong relationships with the Freely Associated States 

sends a strong signal about our commitment to the rebalance. As a whole, our three 

Compact agreements ensure that the United States has what essentially amounts 

to continuous air and sea access from the Philippines to Hawaii, which is important 

in supporting our ability to move forces in and out of the region freely. 

26. Senator HIRONO. Does the Department share my concerns, which echo those 

of President Remengesau, about China’s expansion into this region? 

Admiral HARRIS. [Deleted.] 

Mr. SHEAR. The Department of Defense is concerned with any activity, including 

Chinese activity, directed at disrupting United States relationships and access to 

the region. We welcome the appropriate involvement of other parties to address regional concerns, so long as their activities are conducted with transparency, accountability, and respect for international standards. 

27. Senator HIRONO. Has the Department given any consideration to what losing 

the support of Palau or the other freely associated states would mean for the security of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, or Hawaii? 

Admiral HARRIS. Losing the support of Palau and/or the other two Freely Associated States (FAS) would create an opportunity for another nation to offer increased 

assistance to these countries and build additional influence which, over time, can 

only work to the U.S.’s strategic disadvantage. China is clearly pursuing a strategy 

to that end through offers of loans and economic development. The Compact agreements are individual and bilateral, and, because of geography, losing the support 

of any one of the three FAS would reduce our ability to protect the remaining two— 

something the U.S. promised to do in the Compacts. The defense relationship that 

USPACOM built with the Palauan Government through semiannual bilateral meetings has improved my confidence that Palau would support United States defense 

interests in a contingency situation. I welcome and support efforts by Congress to 

further deepen our relationship with the FAS, to ensure that our commitment remains unquestioned. 

Mr. SHEAR. As a whole, our three Compact agreements provide the United States 

with what amounts to ensured air and sea access from Hawaii to the Philippines. 

Losing the support of Palau or the other Freely Associated States would lessen the 

broader strategic value of those arrangements in supporting our ability to pursue 

United States interests in the Asia Pacific region. 

28. Senator HIRONO. Does the Department have any plans to work with other 

agencies, such as the State Department or the Department of the Interior, to come 

up with a comprehensive strategy to ratify our compact with Palau and secure our 

standing in the region? 

Admiral HARRIS. DOD and USPACOM have a strong working relationship with 

Palau, and with both the Department of State and Department of Interior. I recognize Palau’s strategic importance and will continue working to ensure that our relationship remains strong. 

Mr. SHEAR. Congressional approval and implementation of the Agreement has 

been a priority for the Administration since the agreement was signed on September 

3, 2010. The Department of Defense has worked with the Department of State and 

the Department of the Interior on developing a strategy to obtain approval of the 

agreement and will continue working toward that end state in support of State and 

Interior efforts. 

48 

29. Senator HIRONO. Are there areas in which the Department can assist jurisdictions impacted by migration from the FAS to States and territories, specifically Hawaii and Guam, in providing housing, economic development, or employment solutions for this population? 

Admiral HARRIS. As you noted, we are fortunate that citizens of the Freely Associated States (FAS) take advantage of their opportunity to enlist in the United States 

military, serving honorably while supporting their families with military housing 

and other benefits. There is not a specific Department of Defense program directed 

towards the housing, economic development, or employment challenges facing the 

FAS population, but military commanders will continue their close coordination 

with local community leaders to explore mutually beneficial opportunities. 

Mr. SHEAR. DOD does not have efforts underway directed specifically toward 

housing, economic development, or employment solutions for Freely Associated 

States (FAS) populations migrating to U.S. States and territories. However, many 

FAS citizens do take advantage of the opportunity to seek employment and housing 

benefits by joining the U.S. military. 

30. Senator HIRONO. I’ve also recently met with businessmen from the CNMI, who 

discussed concerns with Chinese economic expansion in their territory—the same 

United States territory that is still without full power more than a month after a 

typhoon wiped out its power grid. I’m told that Chinese economic expansion in the 

region has been substantial. Would the Department consider economic expansion to 

CNMI a threat to security in the Pacific region? 

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. PACOM is concerned by the growing influence China may 

be gaining through its economic engagement in the Pacific Island Nations. Current 

Chinese economic engagement could facilitate Chinese strategic interests in the region (particularly in the FAS), leaving the United States with reduced levels of access and influence. Chinese economic investment can drive growth, but it has also 

left countries, particularly small countries, with unmanageable debt. 

Mr. SHEAR. The United States Government supports sustainable economic development for Palau. The Department of Defense is concerned about the possibility of 

any country, including China, using economic engagement to facilitate its strategic 

interests in a way that reduces United States access and influence. Although Chinese economic investment can potentially create growth, it may also burden countries, particularly small ones with unmanageable debt. Investment in CNMI by private Chinese enterprises obligations can be beneficial for economic development 

there, and in our view, would be compatible with our proposed military activities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KING

MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

31. Senator KING. What additional capabilities will the DDG–1000 class destroyer 

bring to our Pacific Fleet once in service, and how do you anticipate future commanders in the Pacific will employ these capabilities? 

Admiral HARRIS. As extremely capable multi-mission combatants, the DDG–1000 

class will provide future Pacific commanders a wide range of employment options 

to meet the challenging sets of warfighting and Theater Security Cooperation missions both on the open ocean and within the littorals. 

The DDG–1000 class is under construction, and the first ship, DDG–1000, is expected to be operational in Fiscal Year 2019. Once operational, DDG–1000s will provide the next-generation multi-mission surface combatant capabilities tailored to 

provide land attack and littoral dominance to defeat current and projected threats. 

In the littoral region, the DDG–1000’s two Advanced Gun Systems firing LongRange Land Attack Projectiles will triple naval surface fires coverage to meet validated Marine Corps fire support requirements. Employing active and passive sensors and a SPY–3 X–Band Multi-Function Radar, DDG–1000 will conduct area air 

surveillance, including over-land coverage, in the traditionally difficult and cluttered 

sea-land interface region. Its Integrated Undersea Warfare suite coupled with reduced acoustic output will significantly enhance the ships’ mine avoidance capability 

when operating in the littorals. DDG–1000 will also employ a composite superstructure which reduces radar cross section 50-fold. This, along with reduced acoustic output will make these ships harder to detect and improve survivability in an 

anti-access/area denial environment. I am excited about the operational capability 

these ships will bring to the Pacific. 

Æ