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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49693-2022 

LAURA MILUS, in her individual capacity 

and as Guardian of the Minor Child Plaintiff, 

D.L.J., 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 

SUN VALLEY COMPANY, a Wyoming 

corporation, 

 Defendant-Respondent.

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Boise, September 2023 Term

Opinion filed: December 19, 2023 

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 

Blaine County. Ned C. Williamson, District Judge. 

The decision of the district court is reversed. 

Rossman Law Group, PLLC, Boise, for Appellant. Mathew G. Gunn argued.

Lake City Law Group PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for Respondent. Katharine B. 

Brereton argued. 

 

ZAHN, Justice.

This case concerns the interpretation of the Responsibilities and Liabilities of Skiers and 

Ski Area Operators Act. Appellant Laura Milus brought a wrongful death action on behalf of 

herself and her minor child against Respondent Sun Valley Company after her husband’s death 

following his collision with snowmaking equipment while skiing at Sun Valley Ski Resort. 

Milus alleged that Sun Valley Company had breached a duty arising under Idaho Code 

section 6-1103(2) and (6). The district court granted Sun Valley’s summary judgment motion, 

holding that Sun Valley (1) fulfilled its duty under Idaho Code section 6-1103(2) to mark 

snowmaking equipment by surrounding the snowmaking equipment with yellow padding, and (2) 

did not have a duty under Idaho Code section 6-1103(6) to place a conspicuous notice at the top 
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of the ski trail because the snowmaking equipment was not actively discharging snow. We reverse 

the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 30, 2019, Stewart Milus (“Mr. Milus”) was skiing at the Sun Valley Ski 

Resort when he collided with snowmaking equipment identified as Snow Gun 16, located in the 

middle of the Lower River Run on Bald Mountain. Mr. Milus died as a result of the collision.

Snow Gun 16 was not actively discharging snow at the time of the collision. 

Laura Milus (“Ms. Milus”) is the widow of Mr. Milus and D.L.J. is the stepson of Mr. 

Milus. Ms. Milus filed a wrongful death action on behalf of herself and D.L.J. (collectively referred 

to as “Milus”) against Sun Valley Company (“Sun Valley”), the operator of the Sun Valley Ski 

Resort. Milus alleged that Sun Valley breached its duties under Idaho Code section 6-1103(2) and 

(6). Idaho Code section 6-1103(2) imposes a duty on ski operators to mark with a “visible sign”

or “warning implement” the location of snowmaking equipment on ski slopes and trails. Idaho 

Code section 6-1103(6) imposes a duty to place a conspicuous notice at or near the top of a trail 

or slope that is open to the public when snowgrooming or snowmaking operations are being 

undertaken.

Sun Valley filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it had satisfied its duty to 

warn of the snowmaking equipment under Idaho Code section 6-1103(2) because Snow Gun 16

was covered in yellow padding, which constituted a “warning implement.” Additionally, Sun 

Valley argued that it had no duty under Idaho Code section 6-1103(6) to place a notice at the top 

of the Lower River Run because no snowmaking was being actively undertaken on the day of the 

collision. Sun Valley further argued that, even if it did have such a duty, it complied with that duty 

by placing a sign that read “CAUTION SNOWMAKING IN PROGRESS” near what Sun Valley 

contends is the unloading area of the Lower River Run ski lift. Lastly, Sun Valley argued that,

under Idaho Code section 6-1106, Mr. Milus had assumed the risk of injury while skiing.

The district court granted Sun Valley’s motion for summary judgment in part, holding that 

the yellow padding on Snow Gun 16 satisfied the duty under section 6-1103(2) to mark 

snowmaking equipment with a “warning implement.” The district court interpreted section 6-

1103(6) as creating a duty only when snowmaking equipment is actively discharging snow and 

allowed discovery to take place regarding whether snow was being made on the day of the 
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accident. Following discovery, the district court granted Sun Valley’s renewed motion for 

summary judgment in full regarding section 6-1103(6), holding that Sun Valley had no duty to 

place a notice at or near the top of the ski run because no active snowmaking was being undertaken 

when the accident occurred. The district court held that Milus was unable to establish that Sun 

Valley breached a duty owed to Mr. Milus and therefore Milus’s claim failed. Having resolved 

the motion on other grounds, the district court did not rule on Sun Valley’s assumption of risk 

defense.

Milus timely appealed the final judgment.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred in holding that the yellow padding on Snow Gun 16

constituted a warning implement.

2. Whether the district court erred in holding that Sun Valley had no duty to provide a 

conspicuous notice at the top of Lower River Run because no snow was being actively 

discharged from the snowmaking equipment.

3. Whether Mr. Milus assumed the risk of his ski accident under Idaho Code section 6-1106.

4. Whether Sun Valley is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is the same 

standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the summary judgment motion.” Berglund v. 

Dix, 170 Idaho 378, 384, 511 P.3d 260, 266 (2022) (quoting Hoke v. Neyada, Inc., 161 Idaho 450, 

453, 387 P.3d 118, 121 (2016)). The trial court “must grant summary judgment if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a). “All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the 

non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn 

in favor of the non-moving party.” Manning v. Micron Tech., Inc., 170 Idaho 8, 12, 506 P.3d 244, 

248 (2022). “A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to 

create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment.” Finholt v. Cresto, 

143 Idaho 894, 897, 155 P.3d 695, 698 (2007) (quoting Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 

233, 238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005)). “If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, 

then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.” Arambarri v. 

Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2012).
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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Ski area operators are held to an ordinarily prudent person standard of care when 

undertaking the duties enumerated in Idaho Code section 6-1103(1) through (9). 

Before addressing the district court’s order dismissing Milus’s claim, we must first discuss 

the duties in tort and the corresponding standards of care encompassed by Milus’s claim. Milus’s

negligence claim is premised on duties arising under the Responsibilities and Liabilities of Skiers 

and Ski Area Operators Act (“Ski Area Liability Act”). See I.C. §§ 6-1101 through 6-1109. 

Idaho Code section 6-1103 is titled, “Duties of ski area operators with respect to ski areas,” 

and contains ten subsections. Subsections (1) through (9) each state a specific duty that a ski area 

operator has with respect to its operation of the ski area. Subsection (10) differs from the first nine 

because, after stating a duty, it then describes exceptions to that duty:

Every ski area operator shall have the following duties with respect to their 

operation of a skiing area:

. . . .

(10) Not to intentionally or negligently cause injury to any person; provided, that 

except for the duties of the operator set forth in subsections (1) through (9) of this 

section and in section 6-1104, Idaho Code, the operator shall have no duty to 

eliminate, alter, control or lessen the risks inherent in the sport of skiing, which 

risks include, but are not limited to, those described in section 6-1106, Idaho Code; 

and, that no activities undertaken by the operator in an attempt to eliminate, alter, 

control or lessen such risks shall be deemed to impose on the operator any duty to 

accomplish such activities to any standard of care.

I.C. § 6-1103(10). 

This Court interpreted section 6-1103(10) in Northcutt v. Sun Valley Company, 117 Idaho 

351, 787 P.2d 1159 (1990). We held that the Ski Area Liability Act limits the liability of ski 

operators to only the enumerated duties in section 6-1103(1) through (9) when acting to eliminate, 

alter, control or lessen the inherent risks of skiing. See id. at 354–55, 787 P.2d at 1162–63. 

Significantly, we also held that the Act eliminates any standard of care for a ski operator when 

undertaking any of the duties found in subsections (1) through (9). See id. (“We construe the last 

clause of this portion of [Idaho Code section] 6-1103(10) to eliminate any standard of care for a 

ski area operator in carrying out any of the duties described in [Idaho Code sections] 6-1103 and 

6-1104.”). In other words, even though ski operators owe a duty to perform certain tasks, there is 

no standard of care applicable to how they perform those tasks.
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Sun Valley argues that, under this Court’s holding in Northcutt, if a ski area operator takes 

any step to fulfill the duties enumerated under Idaho Code section 6-1103(1) through (9), any 

potential plaintiffs are barred from recovery. Milus argues that this Court’s interpretation in 

Northcutt makes it nearly impossible to hold a ski area operator liable, in contradiction with the 

legislature’s intent to “define those areas of responsibility and affirmative acts for which ski area 

operators shall be liable for loss, damage or injury . . . .” I.C. § 6-1101. We agree with Milus and 

hold that the ordinarily prudent person standard applies to the duties set forth in Idaho Code section 

6-1103(1) through (9).

A careful reading of Northcutt reveals that the standard of care portion of the decision

failed to draw a majority of votes and therefore is only a plurality holding. Justice Bakes’s special 

concurrence in Part II of the Northcutt opinion explains his disagreement with the plurality’s 

holding eliminating any standard of care for the duties enumerated in subsections (1) through (9):

Had appellant Northcutt’s injury been proximately caused by an inaccurate 

description of the relative degree of difficulty of the slope, or had the sign not been 

sufficiently “conspicuous” so that it could not reasonably have been observed, and 

as a result Northcutt descended a slope which exceeded his ability to negotiate, then 

in my view there would have been a violation of the duty provided in [section] 6-

1103(3) for which liability would be imposed under [Idaho Code section] 6-1107, 

and which would not have been excused by [Idaho Code section] 6-1103(10).

117 Idaho at 358, 787 P.2d at 1166 (Bakes, J., specially concurring) (emphasis added). Because 

the majority opinion in Northcutt is only a plurality holding on this issue, it is not binding precedent 

on this Court. 

A close reading of the separate clauses contained in section 6-1103(10) demonstrates that 

it does not eliminate any standard of care for the duties set forth in subsections (1) through (9):

Every ski area operator shall have the following duties with respect to their 

operation of a skiing area:

. . . .

(10) Not to intentionally or negligently cause injury to any person; 

• provided, that except for the duties of the operator set forth in subsections 

(1) through (9) of this section and in section 6-1104, Idaho Code, 

• the operator shall have no duty to eliminate, alter, control or lessen the risks 

inherent in the sport of skiing, which risks include, but are not limited to, 

those described in section 6-1106, Idaho Code; and, 

• that no activities undertaken by the operator in an attempt to eliminate, 

alter, control or lessen such risks shall be deemed to impose on the operator 

any duty to accomplish such activities to any standard of care.
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See I.C. § 6-1103(10) (emphasis added). Rather, a close examination of the language demonstrates 

that the duties set forth in subsections (1) through (9) and the first clause in subsection (10) are the 

only duties imposed on operators in section 6-1103, and that ski operators owe no additional duty 

to eliminate, alter, control, or lessen the risks inherent in skiing. The last clause in subsection (10) 

simply explains that, to the extent a ski operator undertakes an additional duty (which they are not 

obligated to), there is no standard of care applicable to the additional duty.

The plain language of section 6-1103(10) differentiates between the duties enumerated in 

subsections (1) through (9) and any additional duty to “eliminate, alter, control[,] or lessen such 

risks[.]” It only eliminates a standard of care for any additional duty not set forth in subsections 

(1) through (9), which the ski operator voluntarily undertakes. Therefore, we hold that ski area 

operators are held to a standard of care when acting to fulfill the duties enumerated in section 6-

1103(1) through (9).

The question now becomes what standard of care ski area operators are held to when acting 

to fulfill their enumerated duties under section 6-1103(1) through (9). “The second element of a 

negligence cause of action, that of breach of duty by the allegedly negligent party, requires 

measuring the party’s conduct against that of an ordinarily prudent person acting under all the 

circumstances and conditions then existing. What circumstances and conditions existed is a factual 

question to be determined by the trier of fact.” Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 490–91, 903 P.2d 

73, 79–80 (1995) (citations omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in 

Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. #25, 149 Idaho 679, 239 P.3d 784 (2010). Therefore, we hold that 

ski area operators are held to the standard of an “ordinarily prudent person acting under all the 

circumstances and conditions then existing,” id., when complying with the duties enumerated in 

subsections (1) through (9).

B. Whether the yellow padding surrounding Snow Gun 16 constitutes a “warning 

implement” under Idaho Code section 6-1103(2) is a question of fact for the jury. 

Having determined the applicable standard of care, we turn to the merits of Milus’s appeal. 

Milus filed a wrongful death action alleging Sun Valley breached its duty arising under Idaho Code 

section 6-1103(2). That section requires that ski area operators mark snowmaking equipment 

located on ski slopes and trails with a visible sign or warning implement. I.C. § 6-1103(2).

Sun Valley concedes that it did not mark Snow Gun 16 with a visible sign. Sun Valley 

argues that the yellow padding that surrounded Snow Gun 16 constitutes a warning implement

under Idaho Code section 6-1103(2). Milus argued that whether the yellow padding constituted a 
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warning implement was a question for the jury. The district court held that interpreting the phrase 

“warning implement” and whether it included the yellow padding was a question of statutory 

interpretation for the court and concluded that the yellow padding around Snow Gun 16 met the 

statutory requirement. We hold that the district court erred because the question of whether the 

yellow padding around Snow Gun 16 constitutes a warning implement is a question of fact for the 

jury.

The elements of a negligence action are “(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the 

defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal 

connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or 

damage.” Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 

175–76, 804 P.2d 900, 904–05 (1991). The district court treated the question of whether the yellow 

padding constitutes a warning implement as an issue of duty. “The existence of a duty is a question 

of law for this Court.” Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 138, 90 P.3d 884, 888 (2004); see

Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2001).

However, whether the yellow padding effectively constitutes a “warning implement” is not 

an issue of duty, but rather one of breach. By enacting section 6-1103(2), the legislature imposed 

on Sun Valley a duty “[t]o mark with a visible sign or other warning implement the location of 

any hydrant or similar equipment used in snowmaking operations . . . .” In light of our holding that 

ski area operators are held to an “ordinarily prudent person” standard of care when performing the 

duties enumerated in subsections (1) through (9), it is a question of fact for the jury whether the

yellow padding met the ordinarily prudent person standard of care to mark the gun with a visible 

sign or other warning implement. In this instance, breach is a question of fact for the jury. See 

Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 256, 678 P.2d 41, 48 (1984) (holding that “it is a jury question 

as to whether [a] duty was breached”); Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 557, 808 P.2d 1300, 

1302 (1991) (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment because whether the 

highway district had breached its duty by not maintaining the runaway escape ramp was a disputed 

question of fact); Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 

(1994) (concluding that summary judgment should have been denied solely because triable 

disputed factual issues existed whether a duty was breached). 

“[I]f the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the trial court should grant 

the motion for summary judgment.” Duncan v. Long, 167 Idaho 853, 856, 477 P.3d 907, 910 
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(2020). Sun Valley put forth an Incident Report describing the accident and an Incident Photo Log

with pictures of the yellow padding on Snow Gun 16 as evidence that the yellow padding 

constituted a warning implement. Milus presented a declaration by a ski area safety expert that 

snowmaking equipment should not be placed in the middle of a beginner level trail such as Lower 

River Run. There is a genuine issue of material fact whether Sun Valley breached its duty under 

section 6-1103(2) by wrapping Snow Gun 16 with yellow padding, and this question should go to 

a jury. Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed. 

C. Idaho Code section 6-1103(6) imposes a duty on ski area operators to place a conspicuous 

notice at or near the top of the trail or slope when snowmaking equipment is placed on 

the ski run or slope. 

Milus claims Sun Valley also breached its duty under Idaho Code section 6-1103(6), which 

requires ski operators to place a “conspicuous notice” at or near the top of a ski trail or slope under 

certain circumstances:

Every ski area operator shall have the following duties with respect to their 

operation of a skiing area:

. . . .

(6) To place, or cause to be placed, whenever snowgrooming or snowmaking 

operations are being undertaken upon any trail or slope while such trail or slope is 

open to the public, a conspicuous notice to that effect at or near the top of such trail 

or slope[.]

(Emphasis added.)

The district court held that the statutory language “snowmaking operations are being 

undertaken” is unambiguous and means “when snow is being made.” The district court concluded 

that the purpose of subsection (6) is to warn skiers of changed snow conditions or reduced visibility 

due to active snowmaking operations. Because no snow was actively being discharged from Snow 

Gun 16 on the day of Mr. Milus’s collision, the district court held that Sun Valley had no duty 

under section 6-1103(6) to place a notice at or near the top of the Lower River Run. Milus argues 

that the district court’s interpretation is too narrow because snowmaking equipment is dangerous 

both when actively shooting snow and when not actively shooting snow if the snowmaking 

equipment is in the middle of a beginner ski run. 

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.”

Est. of Stahl v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 162 Idaho 558, 562, 401 P.3d 136, 140 (2017) (quoting 

Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741, 748, 274 P.3d 1256, 1263 (2012)). “Statutory 

interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. If the statutory language is 
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unambiguous, we need not engage in statutory construction and are free to apply the statute’s plain 

meaning.” Nordgaarden v. Kiebert, 171 Idaho 883, 890, 527 P.3d 486, 493 (2023) (alteration 

omitted) (quoting Callies v. O’Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 847, 216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009)). However, if 

the statutory language is ambiguous, this Court must “look to rules of construction for guidance 

and consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations.” Id. (quoting City of Idaho Falls v. 

H-K Contractors, Inc., 163 Idaho 579, 582, 416 P.3d 951, 954 (2018)). “Statutory language is 

ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to its meaning.” Id. (alteration 

omitted) (quoting H-K Contractors, Inc., 163 Idaho at 582, 416 P.3d at 954).

The phrase “snowmaking operations are being undertaken” is ambiguous. The phrase 

“snowmaking operations” is broad and encompasses more than the discharge or production of 

snow. Interpreting subsection (6) as only applying when the snow was being actively discharged

would effectively eliminate the word “operations” from the statute. But the statute does not impose 

the duty when “snowmaking is being undertaken,” rather the duty applies when “snowmaking

operations are being undertaken.” When interpreting a statute, this Court has an obligation to give

effect to all the words and provisions so that none are rendered superfluous. Moser v. Rosauers 

Supermarkets, Inc., 165 Idaho 133, 136, 443 P.3d 147, 150 (2019). 

We are persuaded by Milus’s argument that subsection (6) creates a duty to warn skiers at 

the top of a ski slope or run of snowmaking equipment located further down the slope. Warning 

skiers of dangerous obstacles on the ski run or slope gives a skier the opportunity to choose a 

different ski run or to ski in a more cautious manner. The district court reasoned that this 

interpretation of section 6-1103(6) would be redundant because it would require two warnings for 

snowmaking equipment—one on the equipment itself, as required by subsection (2), and one at 

the top of the ski run, as required by our interpretation of subsection (6). This is not redundant—

both warnings serve a purpose. Providing a warning at or near the top of the ski run or trail gives 

a skier the opportunity to choose a different ski run or to ski more cautiously, while a warning on

or near the snowmaking equipment itself informs and warns the skier of the actual location of the 

snowmaking equipment on the ski run. 

D. There is a genuine issue of material fact whether Sun Valley placed a conspicuous notice

at or near the top of the Lower River Run trail on the day of the accident. 

In light of our holding that the duty to place a notice at or near the top of the ski run or trail 

under section 6-1103(6) applies even when snow is not being actively discharged from 
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snowmaking equipment, the question now becomes whether there is a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether Sun Valley complied with that duty. 

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Sun Valley submitted evidence that it 

placed a sign that read “CAUTION SNOWMAKING IN PROGRESS” at what it claims was the 

top of the River Run lift on the day of the accident. Sun Valley also submitted a declaration by 

Peter Stearns, the Director of Mountain Operations of Sun Valley Ski Resort, stating that, at all 

times during the ski season, the CAUTION SNOWMAKING IN PROGRESS sign is posted at the 

top of each ski lift. Additionally, Sun Valley presented a photograph showing the sign located at 

what it claims is the unloading area of the Lower River Run lift and a ski trail map showing the 

location of the sign relative to the top of Lower River Run. 

In opposition to the motion, Ms. Milus submitted a declaration stating she did not see the 

sign on the day the accident occurred. Milus argued that it was possible the sign had been knocked 

down on the day of the accident. Milus additionally argued that the picture of the sign presented 

by Sun Valley does not show that the sign was “at or near the top” of Lower River Run. 

The district court concluded that Ms. Milus’s statement that she did not personally observe 

a sign against Mr. Stearns’s declaration that a sign was posted at the top of every ski lift all season 

at Sun Valley only created a scintilla of evidence that would not preclude summary judgment.

On appeal, Milus argues that the district court erred because the evidence submitted was 

sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Sun Valley breached its 

duty under section 6-1103(6). We agree with Milus and reverse the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment on this claim.

For the reasons previously discussed, Sun Valley is held to the standard of care of an

ordinarily prudent person when complying with subsection (6). We hold there is a genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether the “CAUTION SNOWMAKING IN PROGRESS” sign met the 

applicable standard of care. Sun Valley did not present sufficient evidence that its sign is at or near 

the top of the Lower River Run. The picture presented by Sun Valley shows the loading area of 

the Lookout Express lift, not the top of the Lower River Run. The trail map presented by Sun 

Valley does not show the location of the sign or an accurate distance between the River Run ski

lift unloading area and the top of the Lower River Run. Moreover, Ms. Milus testified in her 

deposition that she did not see the sign on the day of the accident. As a result, there is a genuine 
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issue of material fact whether Sun Valley’s sign complied with the requirements of subsection (6). 

We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue. 

E. There is a genuine issue of material fact whether Sun Valley may avail itself of the 

assumption of the risk defense provided in Idaho Code section 6-1106.

Sun Valley argues that, under the plain language of Idaho Code section 6-1106, Mr. Milus 

expressly assumed the risk and legal responsibility of an injury that occurred from his participation 

in the sport of skiing at Sun Valley Ski Resort, including any injury caused by snowmaking

equipment. In response, Milus argues that the issue is not appropriately before this Court because 

it was not sufficiently addressed by the district court. Because the district court determined that 

Sun Valley had no duty or had fulfilled its duties under section 6-1103(2) and (6), the district court 

did not rule on the applicability of Idaho Code section 6-1106.

However, the district court’s failure to address the argument does not prevent us from 

considering it in this instance.

Idaho formerly required an appealing party to obtain an adverse ruling on 

an issue to preserve the issue for appeal. However, we have now rejected the 

adverse ruling requirement in favor of a broader standard where “[i]t is not 

mandatory for a party-appellant to obtain an adverse ruling from the trial court to 

preserve an issue for appellate review, so long as the party’s position on that issue 

was presented to the trial court with argument and authority and noticed for 

hearing.”

Rich v. Hepworth Holzer, LLP, 172 Idaho 696, 703 n.4, 535 P.3d 1069, 1076 n.4 (2023) (internal 

citations omitted). Both parties presented their positions to the district court with argument and 

authority. Therefore, Sun Valley’s assumption of risk argument was preserved for appeal. 

Additionally, because we apply the same standard as the district court on a motion for summary 

judgment, we can consider this argument in the first instance because “[w]e review a district 

court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and apply the same standard used by the district court 

in ruling on the motion.” Mattson v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 172 Idaho 66, 529 P.3d 

731, 737 (2023) (quoting Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161 Idaho 211, 214, 384 P.3d 975, 978 (2016)). 

Sun Valley contends that, even if we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

on its duties under section 6-1103, it is still entitled to summary judgment under section 6-1106, 

which describes the duties of skiers and provides that Mr. Milus expressly assumed the risk of 

injury resulting from skiing, and specifically the risk of injury from snowmaking equipment that 

was clearly marked in accordance with the provisions of section 6-1103:
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Each skier expressly assumes the risk of and legal responsibility for any 

injury to person or property that results from participation in the sport of skiing 

including any injury caused by the following, all whether above or below snow 

surface: variations in terrain; any movement of snow including, but not limited to, 

slides, sloughs or avalanches; any depths of snow, including tree wells, or any 

accumulations of snow, whether natural or man made, including snowmaking 

mounds; freestyle terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots, 

rocks, trees, other forms of forest growth or debris, lift towers and components 

thereof; utility poles, and snowmaking and snowgrooming equipment which is 

plainly visible or plainly marked in accordance with the provisions of section 6-

1103, Idaho Code. Therefore, each skier shall have the sole individual 

responsibility for knowing the range of his own ability to negotiate any slope or 

trail, and it shall be the duty of each skier to ski within the limits of the skier’s own 

ability, to maintain reasonable control of speed and course at all times while skiing, 

to heed all posted warnings, to ski only on a skiing area designated by the ski area 

operator and to refrain from acting in a manner which may cause or contribute to 

the injury of anyone.

I.C. § 6-1106 (emphasis added). Sun Valley argues that the plain language of section 6-1106 bars 

recovery by Milus as a matter of law because the snowmaking equipment that Mr. Milus collided 

with was plainly visible or plainly marked in accordance with Idaho Code section 6-1103. 

For the reasons discussed previously in this opinion, there is a genuine issue of material 

fact concerning whether the snowmaking equipment was plainly visible or plainly marked in 

accordance with section 6-1103(2). Because the defense is only available if the equipment was 

marked in accordance with section 6-1103(2), a jury will have to determine whether the 

snowmaking equipment met the requirements of that section before Sun Valley may avail itself of 

this defense. Therefore, Sun Valley is not entitled to summary judgment under section 6-1106.

F. Sun Valley is not entitled to attorney fees. 

Sun Valley requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121, which 

permits the prevailing party to recover its reasonable attorney fees if the Court finds that the 

nonprevailing party brought, defended, or pursued the case frivolously, unreasonably, or without 

foundation. However, Sun Valley is not the prevailing party on appeal and, therefore, is not entitled 

to an award of attorney fees under the statute.

V. CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sun Valley and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As the prevailing party, Milus is

awarded costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40.

Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BRODY, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.