```

[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       GOING NUCLEAR ON ROSATOM:
                     ENDING GLOBAL DEPENDENCE ON 
                     PUTIN'S NUCLEAR ENERGY SECTOR

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                         SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             March 12, 2024

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-88

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]        

       Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
                            docs.house.gov, 
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov                       
                       
                                __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
56-230XPDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                            
                      
                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

HRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	     BRAD SHERMAN, California	
DARRELL ISSA, California	     GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri		     WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida		     AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado		     JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee		     DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee	     TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky		     SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas		     DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California		     COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida	     ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan		     SARA JACOBS, California
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, 	     KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
    American Samoa		     SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas		          Florida	
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio		     GREG STANTON, Arizona
JIM BAIRD, Indiana		     MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida	             JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey         JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York	     SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
CORY MILLS, Florida		     JIM COSTA, California
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia              JASON CROW, Colorado
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas		     GABE AMO, rhode Island
JOHN JAMES, Michigan		     BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas			

                Brendan Shields, Majority Staff Director
                Sophia Lafargue, Minority Staff Director

                         Subcommittee on Europe

                 THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey, Chairman

JOE WILSON, North Carolina           WILLIAM KEATING, 
DARRELL ISSA, California                 Massachusetts,Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri		     DINA TITUS, Nevada
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan		     MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York	     JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas		     SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
KEITH SELF, Texas		     GABE AMO, Rhode Island

                   Katie Earle, Subcommittee Staff Director

                        
                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Albright, David, President, Institute for Science and 
  International Security.........................................     7
Ruggiero, Anthony, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense 
  of Democracies.................................................    17
Sabonis-Helf, Professor Theresa, Concentration Chair for Science, 
  Technology, and International Affairs..........................    31

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    48
Hearing Minutes..................................................    50
Hearing Attendance...............................................    51

                   MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Materials submitted for the record...............................    52

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    65

 
                    GOING NUCLEAR ON ROSATOM: ENDING
                      GLOBAL DEPENDENCE ON PUTIN'S
                         NUCLEAR ENERGY SECTOR

                        Tuesday, March 12, 2024

                          House of Representatives,
                             Subcommittee on Europe
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:23 p.m., in 
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas Kean, Jr. 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Kean. The Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee will come to order. The purpose of this 
hearing is to discuss how to use U.S. sanctions to ramp up 
pressure on Russia's state-owned nuclear energy monopoly, 
Rosatom, and prevent Vladimir Putin from using it as a tool for 
malign influence.
    I ask unanimous consent to enter a statement in the record 
from Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko on the 
threat Rosatom poses to Ukraine and the world, including the 
Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. In his statement, the 
minister makes the plea for tougher sanctions to slash the 
Kremlin's profits from Rosatom's operations, reduce Russia's 
share of the global civil nuclear market, and to spur western 
countries to step up and to replace Rosatom's nuclear goods and 
services.
    I also ask unanimous consent to enter a statement into the 
record from the Uranium Producers of America. Their statement 
commends the subcommittee for holding this hearing, highlights 
the malign activities of Rosatom and the Russian Federation, 
and supports our efforts to implement robust sanctions against 
Rosatom. Without objection, so ordered.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 
Unfortunately, last month, we marked the 2-year anniversary of 
Russia's unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. 
President Biden's sluggish policies have consistently prevented 
Ukraine's victory, given Putin room to breathe, and dragged out 
this conflict. He has slow-walked the critical weapon systems 
that Ukraine needs to win, like long-range ATACMS missiles. His 
Administration has only recently started pushing our European 
allies to transfer frozen Russian sovereign assets to Ukraine, 
which should have been done long, long ago.
    Finally, the sanctions against the Putin regime have not 
convinced him to end this gruesome war. For example, last 
year's Russian GDP growth of 3 percent exceeded all of the G7 
economies and is forecasted to do so again in 2024.
    This hearing will examine how to strengthen U.S. sanctions 
by ratcheting up pressure on one of the most nefarious tools of 
Russian malign influence: Rosatom. Let us review some of 
Rosatom's worst behavior: Its personnel are engaged in the 
Russian military occupation of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear 
Power Plant. It is working to help Putin's war machine evade 
western sanctions. It is supporting China's nuclear breakout. 
It has created dangerous dependencies around the globe that 
allow Putin to exert influence over U.S. and our allies. Like 
Nord Stream 2 and concerns over the west's dependence on 
Russian LNG, Putin has created a similar scenario with Rosatom 
and dependence on Russian nuclear fuel. It has played a key 
role in helping to develop Iran's nuclear program.
    Unfortunately, despite this litany of threats to U.S. 
national security, the U.S. has sanctioned only a handful of 
Rosatom's subsidiaries and corporate officers, while Rosatom 
itself remains untouched. We must get serious, and that is why 
I am holding today's hearing. I am in the process of drafting a 
tough sanctions bill that will mandate the Administration to 
decouple the U.S. and our allies from Rosatom; and U.S. and 
allied companies, from Westinghouse to Urenco, are taking big 
steps to providing western alternatives to Rosatom. Ukraine, 
for example, has freed itself from Rosatom's grip. Other 
allies, from Sweden to Finland to the Czech Republic, are doing 
the same.
    But tougher sanctions are needed to hasten this decoupling 
from Rosatom. Importantly, my sanctions bill will be 
complementary to my colleague's Chair McMorris-Rodgers' House-
passed bill, the Prohibiting of Russian Uranium Imports Act. 
Her bill prohibits the U.S. from importing Russian low enriched 
uranium with a waiver authority that terminates after 2027. My 
sanctions bill will certainly have a waiver authority to 
responsibly and rapidly and address dependencies, such as those 
related to medical and industrial isotopes, that will take 
slightly longer to unwind. But this authority will be narrow. 
These two bills together will send a much-needed market signal 
to the civil nuclear industry. The result will be a safer 
supply of nuclear fuel for the U.S. and its allies. That is why 
the Uranium Producers of America are aptly supporting our 
efforts to sanction Rosatom and Chair McMorris-Rodgers' bill. 
Every penny that Rosatom earns directly finances Putin's 
genocide in Ukraine and contributes to China's growing nuclear 
arsenal. The time to act is now.
    The chair will now recognize the ranking member, the 
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for any statement 
that he may have.
    Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Chairman Kean, for holding 
this hearing today, and thank you to our witnesses for being 
here and for your testimony.
    Over 2 years ago, on February 24th, 2022, Russia launched 
its unprovoked full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine. 
Thankfully, due to a global coalition formed by U.S. leadership 
and, most importantly, a determined and resolute Ukrainian 
population, Russia failed in this effort. Despite its failure 
on the battlefield, Russia has continued to succeed in its 
goals of spreading malign influence and undermining democratic 
governance.
    Today, we focus specifically on Rosatom, Russia's state-
owned corporation responsible for its civil nuclear program and 
military nuclear enterprises and an agent of influence headed 
by the Russian government. For decades, Rosatom has spread its 
malign influence through contracts in Europe and around the 
world to build nuclear reactors and provide nuclear fuel at 
cheaper prices. More recently, Rosatom's complicity and support 
of Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine, its occupation of 
Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, and its continued market 
share in the nuclear fuel establishment and fabrication 
sectors, have enabled Putin to recklessly use Rosatom to spread 
Kremlin malign influence and to push its imperialistic goals.
    Recognizing the threat of Rosatom, the Biden Administration 
and Congress have taken action, including by sanctioning 
Rosatom subsidiaries and cutting off key revenue streams. Putin 
uses these revenue streams directly for his war and his effort 
in aggression against Ukraine.
    For example, last year, President Biden worked with G7 
partners in Sapporo, Japan to mobilize $4.2 billion in 
government-led investments to develop a secure, reliable 
nuclear energy supply chain. Furthermore, in February 2024, the 
Administration initiated a critical minerals dialog with 
Central Asian partners through the C5+1 mechanism to increase 
Central Asia's involvement in global critical mineral supply 
chains and strengthen economic cooperation.
    These arguments followup historic partnerships between U.S. 
companies and governments, including Poland, Romania, and 
Bulgaria. Yet, while the world acts to lessen Russia's global 
sphere of influence, Putin and the Kremlin continue their 
brutal war in Ukraine, targeting energy supply lines, critical 
infrastructure, and holding Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant 
and its workers hostage.
    As Ukrainian prosecutor general Andriy Kostin told me, 
these attacks hit at the heart of Ukraine's environmental 
stability, as well. They seek to undermine and poison the 
bountiful and prosperous land Ukraine sits on and starve the 
Ukrainian people of the resources they need to thrive.
    As part of the efforts to seek out solutions to combat 
Russia's malign influence in the nuclear energy sector, I have 
worked with a ranking member of the full Committee, Meeks, on 
legislation to sanction the Rosatom officials who undermine 
Zaporizhzhia's stability and hold them accountable for the 
destabilizing actions they conduct. In addition to implementing 
further sanctions, where appropriate, we must also go on the 
offense and promote continued investment in capacity-building 
for alternative sources of nuclear energy and next-generation 
reactor designs, areas of the nuclear supply chain in which 
Russia has a significance presence today. These alternatives 
must be cost effective with competitive prices that will ensure 
their long-term success.
    We must also followup on Congress's investment of $700 
million in the Inflation Reduction Act in the development of 
High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium, known as HALEU. This HALEU 
fuel is used in many small modular and advanced reactors. 
Historic investments in infrastructure will pay dividends 
abroad and support not only Ukrainans' war effort but also 
combat Russia's malign influence.
    Finally, tomorrow marks 1 month since the Senate passed the 
national security supplemental package by a wide bipartisan 
margin. As the president said during his State of the Union 
address, history is watching. Yet, our most recent former 
president, Donald John Trump, told Hungary's autocratic leader, 
Viktor Orban, this week that he would not support a nickel for 
Ukraine. Even more, the Hungarian government welcomed Rosatom's 
CEO to Budapest today, on the 25th anniversary of Hungarian's 
membership in NATO, to discuss shared priorities. The contrast 
between this president's support for democracies and our former 
president's support for autocracies could not be clearer.
    It unfortunately bears repeating: the quickest and most 
direct way to combat Rosatom and Russia is to pass the 
supplemental request immediately, which includes almost $3 
billion to boost domestic nuclear fuel production and 
enrichment. If the House is truly serious about combating 
Russia's malign influence, we have no alternative. It is 
inexplicable that Speaker Johnson continues to hold up this 
spending package, which has the majority of support among 
members. We cannot defend democracy abroad when this single 
individual denies it at home.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from 
North Carolina, Mr. Murphy, be allowed to sit on the dais and 
participate following all other members in today's hearing. 
Without objection, so ordered. Other members of the 
subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be 
submitted for the record.
    We are pleased to have a panel of distinguished witnesses 
before us today on this important topic. Mr. David Albright is 
the President of the Institute for Science and International 
Security. Mr. Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow and senior 
director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the 
Foundation for Defense of Democracies. And Professor Theresa 
Sabonis-Helf is the Concentration Chair for Science, 
Technology, and International Affairs at Georgetown 
University's School of Foreign Service.
    Thank you all for being here today. Your full statements 
will be made part of the record, and I will ask each of you to 
keep your verbal remarks to 5 minutes in order to allow time 
for members' questions.
    I will now recognize Mr. Albright for his opening 
statement.

 STATEMENT OF DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE 
                   AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

    Mr. Albright. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, and 
members of this subcommittee, thank you for holding this 
hearing and inviting me to testify. Rosatom, its subsidiaries, 
and its senior personnel deserve far greater sanctions today. 
Rosatom is not just a benign commercial nuclear energy 
supplier.
    As has been pointed out, Rosatom has actively participated 
in the illegal seizure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, 
a seizure that we all recognize is causing an increased risk of 
a major nuclear accident. Rosatom officials are not authorized 
to operate these reactors. IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi 
has called the situation 'not sustainable`` and risks nuclear 
safety and security. Rosatom is also complicit in the human 
rights violations of Ukrainian plant personnel, violations that 
include torture.
    Rosatom actively contributes importantly to the production 
of Russian weapon systems used against Ukraine. A case in point 
is the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone that Russia has used to 
destroy much of Ukraine's civilian energy infrastructure and 
terrorize its population. Rosatom helps build the Shahed 136 
drones via its important subsidiary JSC Umatex at the Alabuga 
Special Economic Zone. JSC Alabuga, which runs the special 
economic zone, produces the Shahed 136 drones under a contract 
with the Russian Defense Ministry with extensive aid from Iran. 
Umatex is involved in providing carbon fiber to this plant that 
is making the Shahed 136 drones.
    Umatex is rightly sanctioned by the United States for its 
supply of carbon fiber to Russia's military industrial complex, 
as is JSC Alabuga and its subsidiaries. However, Rosatom has 
not been sanctioned for its support of Shahed 136 production 
or, more broadly, for its support of Russia's military 
industrial complex, which is growing by the day.
    Iran's Bushehr nuclear power reactor stands out as an 
example of the type of risk Rosatom and its predecessor 
organizations have undertaken to obtain lucrative contracts in 
countries not prepared institutionally or culturally to deal 
with the complex array of issues involved in operating reactors 
safely, preventing reactor accidents and preparing to deal with 
them if they occur. Russia's nuclear export enterprises also 
have shown their willingness, in their hunt for contracts, to 
ignore the Iranian regime's secret drive for nuclear weapons 
and its violations of International Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards.
    In the case of Iran, Rosatom provided a reactor with 
multiple safety deficiencies to a country with infrastructure 
too weak to support it. These deficiencies and the difficulty 
of fixing them have been well documented by the IAEA's 
operational safety review team's analysis and multiple 
assessments by the World Association of Nuclear Operators. One 
has to wonder if Iran's Bushehr power reactor is safe enough to 
operate today, despite years of intensive safety modifications 
and improvements. It should be noted that a major reactor 
accident risks spreading radiation over nearby Gulf states 
after only about 12 hours, and that is based on assessments by 
Rosatom companies.
    Many problems have resulted from Russia's and Rosatom's 
less-than-acceptable designs and parts. At Bushehr, the Iran 
reactor. This has necessitated years of replacement of faulty 
parts, creation of new operating manuals, and changes in 
operation, and creation of safety and emergency procedures, all 
aimed at bringing Bushehr up to something approaching modern 
safety standards. Yet, after more than 10 years since the 
Bushehr reactor started, the task remains incomplete.
    So from my point of view, countries should avoid Rosatom. 
For countries contemplating or building nuclear power reactors 
for the first time, Rosatom reactors, while economically 
appealing on the purchasing side, may turn out to be huge 
economic liabilities on the operational side, effects that 
would be aggravated enormously in the case of a serious reactor 
accident.
    While Russia has learned about handling severe nuclear 
reactor accidents the hard way, many of the developing 
countries contemplating nuclear power reactors do not have 
adequate supporting infrastructure and emergency response 
capabilities to deal with a major nuclear reactor, accident. 
And Rosatom seeks customers without proper regard for a 
country's stability or its ability to ensure the safety and 
security of the reactor.
    Now, moving from warning to sanctioning Rosatom may seem 
harsh, even with the necessary and appropriate waivers. These 
should include nuclear reactor safety, operating nuclear 
reactors, and a wind-down period for other existing foreign 
contracts with Rosatom. However, combined with Rosatom's role 
in illegally occupying the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and 
contributing importantly to outfitting Russia's illegal 
military attacks against Ukraine, sanctioning Rosatom, its 
subsidiaries, and its key personnel today is deserved and 
overdue. Thank you.
    [The statement of Mr. Albright follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Albright. I now recognize Mr. 
Ruggiero for his opening statement.

     STATEMENT OF ANTHONY RUGGIERO, ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW, 
             FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

    Mr. Ruggiero. Thank you, Chairman Kean, Ranking Member 
Keating, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank 
you for the opportunity to address you today on this important 
topic. My testimony is informed by my work on sanctions and 
proliferation issues at the Departments of State and the 
Treasury, as a foreign policy fellow for Senator Rubio, and in 
the White House National Security Council where I served as 
senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense.
    Russia invaded Ukraine more than 2 years ago, and Russia's 
state-run nuclear corporation, Rosatom, boasted that its export 
revenue increased 15 percent in 2022 with a 10-year portfolio 
of foreign orders worth $200 billion. The company forecasts 
that its 2023 revenue would increase by 40 percent.
    There are two main drivers for how the nuclear company of 
an aggressor State has expanding revenue while the country is 
largely shunned from the international community. First, the 
Biden Administration has not yet articulated a strategy for 
ensuring that America and its allies end their reliance on 
Russia's nuclear sector; and, second, Washington saw Russia as 
a partner in civil nuclear cooperation, allowing Rosatom and 
Moscow to undercut and decimate U.S. and western companies 
competing in the same market.
    Rosatom and Russia are also engaged in activities contrary 
to American foreign policy and national security interests. In 
my written testimony, I detailed how Rosatom and Sino-Russian 
nuclear cooperation plays a critical role in enhancing 
Beijing's nuclear weapons capabilities, including China's 
effort to build 1500 nuclear weapons by 2035. I also reviewed 
Rosatom's role in a potential nuclear disaster at the 
Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest nuclear plant in 
Europe.
    The Biden Administration started to use sanctions in 
February 2023 against a few Russian nuclear and Rosatom-linked 
individuals and entities, but these were not part of a 
coordinated strategy. For example, I note in my written 
testimony that the Administration has not sanctioned a single 
member of Rosatom's management board, even though the United 
Kingdom has sanctioned the entire board in March 2023.
    The Biden Administration understands the problem. A senior 
Energy Department official noted recently that it is 'gravely 
concerning`` that Russia supplies about 20 percent of the fuel 
used by U.S. nuclear reactors. Recent promising reports 
suggests that the Administration and the U.S. nuclear industry 
are warming to the idea of a ban on imports of Russian fuel.
    In my written testimony, I offered three recommendations 
for Congress and three recommendations for the Biden 
Administration. Specifically, Congress should mandate a 
strategy to end reliance on Rosatom. It should require the 
Administration to make a sanctions determination within 60 days 
on Rosatom, its management and supervisory boards, and related 
entities and individuals. The strategy should also include 
plans to respond to potential Russian retaliatory actions, 
including ending the export of enriched uranium and other 
products to the United States and its allies. Congress could 
also require a review of the U.S.-Russia civilian nuclear 
cooperation agreement to ensure that it is consistent with the 
new approach to civil nuclear cooperation with Russia.
    For the Administration, I recommend using existing 
sanctions authorities to prohibit activities with Rosatom, 
including purchases of reactor fuel, reactor services, and 
reactor construction, as well as other related services, over a 
one-to 4-year wind-down period and then using that time to work 
with allies in the nuclear industry to facilitate a transition 
to alternative suppliers. We need a coordinated strategy, an 
effort to reinforce that Washington and our allies will not 
return to business as usual with Russia when the war in Ukraine 
ends. This effort should incentivize a transition to U.S. and 
allied nuclear industries as alternative suppliers over a 4-
year period to end Russia's domination and ensure that China 
does not fill the void. If the Biden Administration is 
unwilling to pursue this path, Congress should mandate it 
through legislation.
    Thank you for inviting me to testify, and I look forward to 
addressing your questions.
    [The statement of Mr. Ruggiero follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Ruggiero. I now recognize 
Professor Sabonis-Helf for her opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR THERESA SABONIS-HELF, CONCENTRATION 
    CHAIR FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

    Ms. Sabonis-Helf. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to 
testify today on Russia's Rosatom Corporation.
    The Russian government's behavior in Ukraine and at home is 
shocking and infuriating. We struggle to find useful levers 
that might limit Russia's reach and ambition. Alas, sanctioning 
Rosatom may not be such a lever. Most sanctions against 
Rosatom, however intuitively appealing, will neither constrain 
Russia significantly, nor will they address the current nuclear 
fuel imbalance that the world faces. Sanctions could disrupt 
markets in ways that would boost Rosatom's revenue, while 
disadvantaging ourselves and our allies. Some sanctions, if 
applied incautiously, could even threaten nuclear power plant 
safety. Regarding your future moves against Rosatom, I urge you 
to consider three key factors: security of supply, the safety 
of nuclear energy, and the need to focus our efforts on 
developing a more resilient pool of nuclear fuel sources.
    Let's begin with security of supply. The EU shift to 
American natural gas was possible only because the U.S. had 
available supply. We do not have that kind of flexibility in 
nuclear fuel. Eighteen percent of European Union reactors are 
Russian or Soviet design. For these reactors, fuel rods are an 
issue. Westinghouse has developed substitute fuel rods for 
Ukraine but does not yet have capacity or licensing to supply 
all of Europe.
    Rosatom and its affiliates are also deeply embedded in fuel 
production and other services. Reliance on Rosatom is 
widespread globally, not only in Europe. Even the United States 
purchases 20 percent of its low enriched uranium from a Rosatom 
subsidiary. We are not yet in a position to meet all of our 
domestic nuclear fuel needs. We are definitely not in a 
position to extend nuclear energy supply security to our 
allies.
    Let us also consider the safety of nuclear energy. 
Criticisms of Rosatom are justified. It has been complicit with 
the Russian State in nuclear piracy, and it illegally manages 
the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. In spite of 
this, Rosatom's sustained relationship with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency plays an essential role in keeping Russian 
nuclear energy and the world safer.
    Rosatom's director general, Alexey Likhachev, met with the 
IAEA director eight times since March 2022 for discussions 
regarding Zaporizhzhia. Rosatom has certainly not responded to 
all of the IAEA's concerns, but it has taken measures to harden 
the facility; it has provided mobile diesel fuel boilers to 
enhance safety; and, most importantly, it has complied with the 
IAEA insistence that Zaporizhzhia not be used to generate 
electricity, a measure that both enhances safety and reduces 
the gains to Russia of occupying the facility.
    In a broader sense, using sanctions to isolate Rosatom is 
bad for global nuclear safety. Remember the tragedy of 
Chernobyl. Since the early post-Soviet era, the nuclear power 
community has made integration of Russian plant operators and 
leaders a high priority, raising standards and promoting a 
culture of safety. Because an accident or major incident 
anywhere affects confidence in nuclear power everywhere, 
keeping Rosatom and Russia tightly engaged in the international 
community of nuclear professionals is a safety imperative.
    At this time, our best path to enhance energy security in 
the nuclear sector comes from diversification of fuel sources. 
Concern about Russia has already sparked substantial innovation 
here and abroad. In the United States, our once-shuttered 
capacity to process enriched uranium is now licensed and 
produced 7,000 tons of uranium hexafluoride last year. Our 
production of HALEU fuel for the next-generation reactors is 
also underway. Overseas, Westinghouse is leading the way to 
replace Russian fuel rods. In a more distant region, Kazakhstan 
is finding a new path to market. Kazakhstan has long been the 
lead producer of world uranium but dependent on Russia for 
refining, enrichment, and transport. Now, France is expanding 
mining operations in Kazakhstan, increasing French enrichment 
capability, and shepherding an ambitious consortium to 
strengthen the Middle Corridor route, reducing the region's 
dependence on Russia for transport.
    Infrastructure realignment takes time. Reducing Rosatom's 
relative role in world nuclear energy production is essential 
but can best be accomplished not by sanctions but by 
aggressively expanding the field of viable, competent nuclear 
energy material producers. With China rising in this sector, 
the discipline of managed competition will serve us well for 
the next contest over nuclear energy's future. We should strive 
to engage that competition together with our European allies. 
Thank you.
    [The statement of Professor Sabonis-Helf follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Professor Sabonis-Helf. I now 
recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Ruggiero, 
can you characterize Rosatom's support for China's nuclear 
weapons program?
    Mr. Ruggiero. Yes. They have delivered fuel to some of 
China's nuclear reactors. The Department of Defense, the 
Assistant Secretary, I believe, for Space Policy testified 
before Congress about the role of those reactors in producing 
plutonium. And the department was so worried about this 
particular subject that it actually took that part of his 
testimony out and published a press release to highlight it for 
the public.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you. Mr. Albright, do you believe that a 
mandatory sanctions bill from the U.S. Congress is necessary to 
push the Biden Administration to ramp up pressure on Rosatom, 
its subsidiaries, and its corporate officers, and to help the 
U.S. and our allies reduce dependence on Rosatom? I'm sorry. If 
you can--please turn your mike on.
    Mr. Albright. Is it on now?
    Mr. Kean. Yes.
    Mr. Albright. OK. I think legislation would be very 
helpful. I think the Biden Administration has been slow to 
pursue this issue, and I think Congress can play a very useful 
role in increasing the sanctions on Rosatom and its 
subsidiaries and also play an important role in boosting our 
capabilities to replace Rosatom.
    Could I add one thing to Anthony's answer?
    Mr. Kean. Sure.
    Mr. Albright. Russia is supporting the construction of a 
breeder reactor in China. As far as we can determine, that will 
be China's only way to produce the plutonium it needs to 
increase its arsenal up to a thousand, let alone 1500. And as 
far as we can determine, we're still investigating it, Russia 
has not said that its assistance, peaceful in nature as it is, 
cannot be used, misused to produce plutonium for nuclear 
weapons. The U.S. has always taken that kind of position in 
supplying nuclear assistance, but Russia has not. And so, 
through Russia's assistance, China may be getting the only way 
it can to dramatically increase its nuclear arsenal.
    Mr. Kean. OK. Mr. Ruggiero, your answer to that question.
    Mr. Ruggiero. Sorry. Your first question----
    Mr. Kean. Regarding the necessity to push the Biden 
Administration to ramp up pressure on its subsidiaries, on 
Rosatom and its subsidiaries.
    Mr. Ruggiero. Right. As I noted in the oral testimony and 
the written testimony, this is all about a strategy. It really 
starts with a strategy, starts with the alternative suppliers 
that the professor mentioned. I wish this was easy. I wish it 
was as simple as just putting Rosatom and people on an entity 
list or, excuse me, on the SDN list. You could do that with 
some of the senior leadership, but it is going to require a 
plan, and it seems that the Administration is not on that 
pathway right now.
    Mr. Kean. To continue with you, any serious sanctions 
effort against Rosatom will require responsible but narrow 
waiver authority. How long do you assess such waivers need to 
be for different parts of the nuclear supply chain, 
specifically enriched uranium?
    Mr. Ruggiero. Right. You know, we have seen different 
reports about what that time line would look like. I have seen 
some reports of 2028 is one of the dates that is out there. 
There is more parts of the supply chain, unfortunately, that 
Rosatom is in. There is also carve-outs in the U.S. sanctions 
already that might be used by, whether it's the IAEA or other 
U.N. organizations, to continue working with Rosatom.
    Mr. Kean. Mr. Albright, in general, how would you assess 
Rosatom's commitment to nuclear safety and security, and what 
safety concerns exist over Rosatom-built plants still in 
operation in Europe and around the world?
    Mr. Albright. Well, I think, you know, we recently did kind 
of an in-depth look at safety concerns at the Bushehr reactor 
in Iran, and so it is a little hard for me to talk about 
Europe, but, at Bushehr, you could clearly see immense safety 
problems that were being pointed out by WANO teams, were 
pointed out by the IAEA investigatory teams. And it was based 
on Rosatom providing a deficient reactor.
    And so I think Rosatom lags behind modern safety 
considerations that are applied to western reactors, and so I 
think that Rosatom presents a safety problem. And with Bushehr, 
you do have to wonder if it could have a major nuclear reactor 
accident.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you. I now recognize Ranking Member Keating 
for any questions that he may have.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Senate-passed, 
House-held national security supplemental bill includes $2.72 
billion to support domestic uranium enrichment, $149 million 
for the National Nuclear Security Administration's ability to 
respond to the security situation in Ukraine, $98 million for 
investments in the development and production of isotopes.
    Professor Sabonis-Helf, how important is that work to this 
issue? How important is that bill to this issue?
    Ms. Sabonis-Helf. So I would say, particularly, the 
appropriations for the HALEU fuel is something we have to take 
very seriously. The United States is unable to move ahead with 
our small modular reactors without access to HALEU fuel, which 
we, up until now, have imported from Russia. So being able to 
ramp up our capacity to take leadership in this next generation 
of reactors is absolutely urgent.
    I would also concur that the other pieces of what you just 
described are critical components. And, sir, I also concur that 
releasing the resources for the actual defense of Ukraine is 
also an urgent piece of this puzzle.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you. And I spoke yesterday with the U.S. 
Ambassador to Poland, and we were commenting on what he termed 
one of the largest, you know, private-sector investments that 
we have been involved with in recent history with Poland in 
terms of their nuclear investment and how important that is. 
And similar activities going on with the U.S. and our European 
allies in Romania and Bulgaria, as well. Companies like 
Westinghouse have taken a lead in this regard. And this shift, 
you know, on the basics of suppliers for nuclear reactors is 
critical.
    So can you just comment, anyone, how important it is for 
the U.S. engagement itself, how important that is as a 
necessity in dealing with Russia's malign influence? Because we 
can sanction, but we can also control better, as well 
Professor, if you want to----
    Ms. Sabonis-Helf. Sir, the United States, under older OECD 
requirements, the amount of economic support we could lend to 
countries in developing nuclear was limited in an effort to 
keep European nations from competing against each other. The 
unfortunate longer-term downside of that was that both Russia 
and China offer substantial packages, which enable, in many 
cases, countries that are not ready for nuclear to embrace it.
    Our cooperation with Poland is absolutely essential. It is 
a new-to-nuclear nation that is ready for nuclear power, that 
experiences the kind of governance stability and the grid 
membership needed for nuclear to be successful. I think our new 
relationship with Poland on this next-generation nuclear is 
absolutely the model for how the United States can recapture a 
meaningful role in the export of essential nuclear energy 
technologies.
    Mr. Keating. And, also, I just want to comment, too, that, 
for those people that think this issue is remote somehow and it 
is not important to the U.S., which I just fail to understand, 
in terms of our own domestic security, could you comment, too, 
on the fact how important this is and the benefits we get from 
this kind of investment for jobs right here in America and 
America economic interests?
    Ms. Sabonis-Helf. We cannot treat nuclear energy as purely 
a commercial operation because it is so strategically critical. 
But in terms of the jobs that it represents, this entire new 
sector is rather extraordinary. We have just recently 
relicensed the largest facility in the United States. We are 
building new facilities. We are talking about jobs and not only 
good high-paying jobs but spread throughout the United States, 
rather than concentrated in one place. And I think that what we 
see here the importance of jobs my colleague's recommendation 
that we need a clear strategy here, that strategy needs to 
incorporate how we harness American expertise to recapture a 
role in this industry.
    Mr. Keating. Yes. And being a member of this committee, as 
well as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I'm also 
keenly aware of what our military has been telling us in terms 
of the effects of climate change and how important that is, as 
well. It is one of the existential threats we have in our 
country and in the planet, and it's also a very big military 
danger that we have to address. So this will do that, as well.
    I wish we could have some more time, but my time has run 
out, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Ranking Member Keating. I now 
recognize Mr. Self of Texas for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is the legislative 
branch. We have been looking for a way to change the behavior 
of the executive branch on several national security issues, to 
include the southern border. So I hear as background sanctions 
on Russian gas and oil have not worked. You, sir, mentioned 
discretionary sanctions authority that the executive branch has 
today that they have not used. They are not using what they 
have available to them today, so we are considering executive 
branch action, which I am not sanguine will change the 
executive branch behavior in this manner.
    I hear a lot about sanctions in this discussion. My concern 
is, according to the World Nuclear Association, my concern is 
how are we going to replace the sources? Because as of 2020, 
when we look at Russia is going to go down between now and 2030 
a substantial amount of their capability. Urenco, basically the 
west, is going to go down in their capability. That includes 
the U.S. France is going to stay steady. Others are going to go 
up eight times, and that includes such allies--excuse me, 
that's facetious--as Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, and 
Iran are going to increase eight times, as I said. The big one 
is China. China is going to go up three times.
    So while we talk about sanctions, how are we going to keep 
our nuclear industry viable if the only people that are going 
up subsequently in their capability to enrich are basically 
people who do not agree with us. Some are actual classified as 
adversaries. So please. Now, that's 2020 figures, but while we 
discuss sanctions, if we sanction this, how are we going to 
replace the needs of our own industry? Microphone, sir.
    Mr. Albright. The discussion is that two tracks are needed. 
I think Chairman Keating pointed out, or, I'm sorry, Chairman 
Kean pointed out that the sanctions can build a pressure to 
create the space and the incentive to create the alternatives. 
So I think they work together.
    Mr. Self. I appreciate your word strategy, sir. I really 
do. But a strategy has got to have something just beyond 
competition. Are we looking at Defense Production Act? What do 
you suggest? And I've read your three recommendations to the 
legislative branch, but, more than a strategy, how would we get 
there? Because a strategy has to have some capability backing 
it up.
    A long time as a military planner. A strategy is worthless 
without the capability to execute the strategy.
    Ms. Sabonis-Helf. Sir, I think that's why I emphasize 
replacement capacity over sanctions. I think that what has 
happened recently in Kazakhstan and, to a lesser extent, in 
Uzbekistan is extremely important. Kazakhstan produces more 
mined uranium for the world market than any other nation. Until 
recently, it has been fully captive to Russia because Russia 
does the enrichment, Russia does the transport.
    In the current situation, France has opened new mines, and 
together with both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is handling the 
transit route to France, and France is ramping up enrichment. 
That's one example of what has changed in the past 2 years, I 
think very much for the better.
    I do think that our pursuit of critical materials with 
Central Asia is a very important part of thinking about the 
future because bringing enrichment and processing back to the 
United States is more urgent, in my estimation, than enhancing 
mining in the United States. But I would also call your 
attention to the fact that, as you noted, China is very much on 
the rise. Now, we know that in, an earlier era, Chairman Mao 
Zedong was much more interested in nuclear weapons than in 
nuclear energy. But in recent years, beginning with its 11th 
five-yea plan in 2005, China as moved into a hyper-development 
phase of nuclear power. China now has 55 operable reactors and 
27 under construction, and so a lot of China's effort to 
buildup in this sphere is to meet its own rising demand. 
They're still finishing building their grid. They still have 
huge expansion----
    Mr. Self. My time is up. They are building not only nuclear 
plants, coal plants every week, solar, everything. Mr. 
Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Self. I now recognize Mr. Costa 
from California for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. So, Professor 
Sabonis-Helf and Professor Theresa--excuse me--and Mr. 
Ruggiero, you both talk about a strategy, and it seems clear 
from your comments that a strategy involves totally eliminating 
our need to rely on Russia for any future uranium enriched if 
we are going to maintain our own ability to have independence. 
Am I correct?
    Mr. Ruggiero. That's correct. In my recommendation, yes.
    Mr. Costa. Would you agree, Professor?
    Ms. Sabonis-Helf. Yes, I would.
    Mr. Costa. And I assume, Mr. Albright, you would agree, as 
well. What is a time line for those of us who are laypersons 
that it would take to develop this ability to remove our 
dependence from Russia and to develop our own capacity with 
ourselves and maybe in conjunction with some of our allies in 
Europe that use nuclear power?
    Mr. Ruggiero. Right. It also goes to the previous question, 
as well. I mean, in my view, these are mutually inclusive 
efforts, increasing alternative suppliers and getting smarter 
on sanctions. I think right now we're going after some of what 
we call the low-hanging fruit on sanctions. We're not focused 
on things that will have a real impact on the sanction side. 
And the sanctions will also give a market signal to the 
industry, as well. As I noted previously, 2028 is a date that 
has been put out there by industry in some circles, and that's 
only 4 years away. So that's why we have focused on the sort of 
one-to 4-year timeframe, depending on----
    Mr. Costa. That's by talking to people like Westinghouse 
and others that have experience and expertise in this in terms 
of developing our own independence. I'm sorry?
    Mr. Ruggiero. Urenco, Orano, what was mentioned previously, 
their increases, some of those are scheduled to come online----
    Mr. Costa. But we have to give the signals to the private 
sector, in fact, if we're going to develop this strategy to 
develop this independence, right?
    Mr. Ruggiero. Correct.
    Ms. Sabonis-Helf. To a certain extent, sir, that signal was 
already received before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The 
largest facility in the United States, which is marketed by 
Conver Dun, was mothballed. It was relicensed in 2021, and by 
the end of the past year succeeded in posting 7,000 tons of 
uranium hexafluoride. When that facility was at full capacity, 
the United States produced 20 percent of the world's 
hexafluoride, which is more than we need. So getting that 
facility fully up and running is one of the critical components 
here.
    Mr. Costa. And that's one of the steps on the way to 
developing the pellets?
    Ms. Sabonis-Helf. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Costa. So when you say in your comments that sanctions, 
if they are implied incautiously, what do you mean by 
incautiously?
    Ms. Sabonis-Helf. Sir, I mean that, as soon as Russia was 
convinced that Europe was taking strong measures in gas, they 
began manipulating prices significantly. Most nuclear power 
plants store two-to 3-years' worth of fuel at their site, and 
none of them will tell you exactly how much fuel they have 
stored. But the war has been unfolding for over 2 years now, so 
we have some real concern about the ability of the nuclear 
power plants in Europe to stay open.
    Mr. Costa. What concerns the three of you the most about--I 
mean, under the category of lessons learned, Russia's invasion 
of Ukraine, I think, besides the immediate need, in my view, 
and I associate my comments with the ranking member, Mr. 
Keating, about what we need to do to provide this supplemental 
package for Ukraine and for the other elements that are in that 
supplemental package, but what lessons do you think this has 
taught us in the last 2 years?
    Mr. Albright. Well, lessons learned, I think one is that it 
is critical to defeat Russia.
    Mr. Costa. We cannot be dependent.
    Mr. Albright. Well, and also that we should not be 
dependent----
    Mr. Costa. I've said it on the floor. I think President 
Putin is a war criminal for all the things that he's done, and 
I think Russia today is a syndicate masquerading or pretending 
to be a country run by a mob boss.
    Mr. Albright. And a mob boss who is ramping up its military 
production infrastructure in a very frightening way. I spend 
much of the year in Europe, in Germany, and we feel it deeply 
that lack of U.S. support for the Ukrainians is directly 
threatening Europe's security.
    Mr. Costa. It threatens Europe. It threatens all of us. It 
is a seminal moment in American and world history, and we are 
playing politics with this. My time has run out, but I will 
submit further questions, Mr. Chairman, for the record.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Costa. I now recognize Mr. Moran 
from Texas for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all to 
your, for your testimony here today. Very important subject. I 
am very concerned about the dependency on Russian uranium and 
on Rosatom being a major player across the globe in this area.
    Mr. Albright, I want to start with you and ask you a 
question. Then I will come over to Mr. Ruggiero--is that how I 
say it? Good deal.
    Mr. Albright, in your opinion, what are the strategic risks 
of the U.S. and Europe's continued reliance on Rosatom for 
nuclear energy products and services? And would you compare 
this reliance to Europe's crippling dependence on Russian oil 
and natural gas before the war in Ukraine began?
    Mr. Albright. I would compare it. I mean, at some point, 
Russia will probably play games with its supply, and it has 
been mentioned the need to start stockpiling critical resources 
in anticipation of that. But I think Europe will be facing 
similar struggles as it faced with Russia's cutoff of natural 
gas.
    Mr. Moran.  And what strategic risks do you think that 
poses both in Europe and the United States when we look at 
beyond just the economy, when we look militarily?
    Mr. Albright. Well, to deal with the situation is 
expensive, and it causes a lot of understated discomfort to the 
public. It was a tough winter after Russia cutoff the natural 
gas. So, I mean, it is absolutely necessary to prepare for 
that, and it causes effects that are hard to deal with 
politically and expensive to deal with.
    Mr. Moran. So, Professor, do you agree that we need to work 
toward independence from Rosatom as it relates to uranium 
production and provision?
    Ms. Sabonis-Helf. Absolutely. I think Russia's behavior 
will be greatly moderated if it is a much less important player 
in this game.
    Mr. Moran. Mr. Ruggiero, in your opening testimony, you 
referenced several efforts to increase U.S. and allied 
enrichment capacity. Companies in the nuclear fuel cycle will 
need to commit to investing potentially billions of dollars to 
replace Russian supplies. Would you agree that it is important 
for those companies to have certainty moving forward in the 
form of clear government policy and tough sanctions that a 
flood of Russian exports will not strain their assets in later 
years once they make this investment?
    Mr. Ruggiero. I agree. And that goes back to Congressman 
Costa's question of what do you worry about. What I worry about 
is we do not develop this strategy, and the war somehow ends, 
and then we go back to our reliance on Russia and we do not 
give that market signal. And they either invest things that are 
not needed or they wind up not investing it. I think that is 
why right now is the time to develop this strategy with both 
the sanctions and the alternative suppliers working together.
    Mr. Moran. Yes. Because this uranium production is not like 
making a peanut butter and jelly sandwich in my kitchen. It 
takes a lot of capital up-front, capital investment. It takes a 
lot of time, and it takes a lot of effort and risk, frankly, to 
enter that market. Would you agree with that?
    Mr. Ruggiero. That's right. And we have to get the balance 
between what we want here in the U.S. and what we want to work 
with our allies both in Canada and Europe and elsewhere. 
There's a good mix there, and it is going to take some time to 
get that right.
    Mr. Moran. Back to you, Mr. Albright. Stakeholders have 
predicted that building capacity in the United States and fully 
replacing Russian nuclear is a long-term project expected to 
take years, just like what I just referenced. What regulatory 
burdens stand in the way, and what are ways Congress can reduce 
the barrier to entry? And I will ask you the same question, 
Professor, once we get an answer. If you'll press your button, 
please.
    Mr. Albright. I am not sure I can address the regulatory 
issues, but, certainly, there needs to be support from the 
executive and the legislative branch that this is a priority 
and there will be some support, financial support, for these 
activities so that companies can be incentivized to take the 
risk. And so I think that's the critical part of it.
    And we have done this before. I mean, our nuclear industry 
has always, when it was growing, had tremendous support from 
the Federal Government.
    Mr. Moran. Professor, do you have a comment on the 
regulatory burdens that stand in the way?
    Ms. Sabonis-Helf. Actually, I would like to highlight one 
huge breakthrough, and that is that small modular reactors are 
licensed under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and it is the 
first time we have licensed a new design of reactor in a very 
long time. I do not think the United States is a credible 
salesman of these reactors in other countries if we do not have 
them on our own territory.
    So I think that the fact that we have made that move 
forward is an extremely important one, and I think that removes 
what would otherwise have been a huge barrier in terms of next 
generation.
    Mr. Moran. Mr. Ruggiero, real quickly, my last question. 
What global market implications do you predict during the 
process of winding down dependence on Russian nuclear fuel and 
sources?
    Mr. Ruggiero. Well, I think they understand, the industry 
understands that this is a conversation that is happening, and 
that is why I think you could do some sanctions now and some 
smarter sanctions in the short term to reinforce that, as well.
    Mr. Moran. Thank you all. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Moran. I now recognize Mr. Wilson 
from South Carolina for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses for being here today. And, Mr. Ruggiero, the Biden 
Administration has repeatedly waived sanctions against Rosatom 
in order to facilitate Rosatom's work with Iran's nuclear 
program. This is despite the fact that Rosatom has been 
credibly accused of providing material support to aid war 
criminal Putin's military invasion of Ukraine, which is 
sanctionable by U.S. law. Would you classify this scheme as a 
sanctions evasion?
    Mr. Ruggiero. Well, if they are getting waivers, I mean, 
there is always a question of why the Administration is still 
issuing the Iran waivers, you know, given the Iran subject. 
But, you know, we continue to work with Rosatom even though, as 
you noted, they work with the China nuclear program, they work 
with ZNPP. So, yes, I think moving along the pathway of ending 
reliance on Russia and Rosatom is the best way forward.
    Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate you clarifying. Thank you very 
much. And approximately how much money is the Biden 
Administration allowing the Kremlin and war criminal Putin to 
make through Rosatom's operations in Iran?
    Mr. Ruggiero. I am not sure about the specific number, but 
I am certainly happy to take that as a question for the record.
    Mr. Albright. My understanding is it is certainly not a 
public number, but we have been investigating internal Bushehr-
related documents that we found on the internet, and it is 
millions of dollars just in proving some of the safety 
conditions at the plant and writing manuals. But it is 
substantially larger than millions of dollars every 2 years or 
so.
    Mr. Wilson. It would probably be in, like, trade, too, of 
military equipment and----
    Mr. Albright. But also I should add they are building 
Bushehr 2 and 3 and that project is valued at about $8 billion. 
So it will probably be significantly higher. On Bushehr 1, 
which is operational, it is fixing the problems that came with 
buying that particular reactor and Iran coming to terms that 
its safety culture was woefully inadequate. It has a very poor 
regulatory environment, and so, as Iran tries to, in a sense, 
create a safer reactor, it is having to spend a considerable 
amount of money on that.
    Mr. Wilson. It is inconceivable to me that there would be 
waivers that could, in any way, benefit the regime in Tehran, 
particularly in light of just 6 weeks ago Iran provided drone 
attacks on American military, killing three Army reservists 
from Georgia, wounded another 40 people, Americans, and then 
over 150 drone attacks in the last 6 months. I just cannot 
visualize that a waiver would be in any way allowed by this 
Administration and with just 6 weeks ago three young Americans 
were murdered by the regime in Tehran.
    With that in mind, Mr. Albright, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear 
Power Plant contains sensitive export-control American nuclear 
technology. According to CNN, last year, the Biden 
Administration asked Rosatom not to touch the technology. Do 
you trust that Rosatom will respect the export control rules? 
How would that benefit them if they actually did?
    Mr. Albright. Just to reinforce your point, it was horrible 
with these drone attacks. And with Iranian assistance, they are 
happening all the time in Ukraine and terrorizing the 
population. And so Iran's drone program deserves much more 
attention.
    Now, on the technology, we work on sort of the more 
criminal side of nuclear supply chains, and I would assume 
Russia has already investigated whatever they could find, as 
much as they could. Regardless of what they say, they probably 
are trying to benefit from our technology----
    Mr. Wilson. Well, I just sincerely hope, bipartisan, that 
we can face that we are, sadly, in a war we did not choose, and 
that is with the dictators with rule of gun invading the 
democracies with rule of law beginning February 23, 2022 with 
war criminal Putin invading and then October 7th the Iran 
puppets invading and slaughtering the people of Israel. And so 
this should be bipartisan that we are working together because 
they do have a goal: death to Israel, death to America. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. I have one followup 
question to Mr. Albright regarding Rosatom's role in the Iran 
nuclear sector. Is this cooperation limited entirely to the 
civilian nuclear energy program?
    Mr. Albright. As far as I know, I do not know any evidence 
that Russia would convey nuclear weapons-related technology to 
Iran. Part of the problem, though, in Iran is that Bushehr is 
very, it is a modern, semi-modern nuclear reactor, and Iran is 
using that knowledge and will openly say to be able to build 
smaller research reactors, which could, in the future, produce 
plutonium for nuclear weapons.
    So I think Russia's technology is not well protected or 
controlled and----
    Mr. Kean. So it could, by that definition, be assisting, 
Rosatom could be assisting Iran in its goal of creating a 
nuclear weapon.
    Mr. Albright. Well, in the sense of producing plutonium for 
nuclear weapon and a future reactor in Iran, yes.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you. With no further questions--yes, do you 
have anything? With no further questions from members, I want 
to thank our witnesses for their valuable testimony and the 
members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee 
may have additional written questions for the witnesses, and we 
ask that you respond to these promptly in writing. Pursuant to 
committee rules, all members may have 5 days to submit 
statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record 
subject to the length limitations.
    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank 
you.
    [Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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