NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAMIE BOMO AKONJANG,

Petitioner,

v. ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 19

- 71981 Agency No. A208

- 123

- 338

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted February 3, 2021 * * Phoenix, Arizona Before: W. FLETCHER, MILLER, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges. Ramie Bomo Akonjang, a native and citizen of Cameroon, seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing Akonjang’s appeal from

an immigration judge’s denial of his application for relief under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 8 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports t he agency’s adverse credibility finding

. First, the Board concluded that Akonjang “could not consistently identify which
bones were broken ” during his alleged capture and beating and “ ultimately
admitted that he had hurt his ankle , ” not his leg as he initially testified

. While the immigration judge “consider[ed] it possible that [Akonjang’s] testimony was simply an attempt to narrow down the specific bod y part that was broken,” the immigration judge rejected that explanation because the inconsistency was similar to “other occasions throughout [Akonjang’s] testimony in which he quickly changed his answer to the questions posed

. ” Akonjang does not challenge that finding or otherwise attempt to explain this inconsistency. Second, the Board found that Akonjang testified inconsistently about the existence of evidence documenting his broken bones

. Akonjang claims that in testifying that such evidence ex isted, he understood the immigration judge to be
ask ing about evidence of any injuries he sustained. But Akonjang answered “ Y es,” in response to the direct question, “Do you have documentary proof that you had bones broken during this 21 day beating you su ffered? , ” even though he did not

. T he record does not compel the conclusion that Akonjang testified consistently on
this issue. See Don v. Gonzales , 476 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2007) (agency need not “interpret the evidence in the manner advocated by” the applicant). T he3

inconsistencies cited by the Board re garding the nature and extent of Akonjang’s injuries carry “substantial weight” and support the adverse credibility finding.
Manes v. Sessions , 875 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)

. Third, t h e Board concluded that Akonjang testified inconsistently by testifying that his uncle knew that Akonjang and his brothers were still alive,
before admitt ing th at he did not know whether that was true. Because this testimony concerned “whether his uncle continued to target him,” the Board
concluded that it bore “ directly on [his] claim

. ” This finding is supported by
substantial evidence , and Akonjang does not contend otherwise

. Fourth, th e Board did not err in considering the inconsistencies between Akonjang’s testimony and his affidavit regarding the length of his stay in Yaoundé,
Cameroon and whether he worked while living in Senegal. Although these minor inconsistencies, taken alone, m i ght not be sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding, the agency “may consider any inconsistency” in its credibility analysis. Shrestha v. Holder , 590 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010)

. Assuming, without deciding, that the agency erred in determining that Akonjang testified inconsistently on the separate issue of the length of his stay in Senegal , multiple independent bases support the adverse credibility finding. The record does not support Akonjang’s contention that the agency failed to

c onsider evidence that he testified consistently. Nor does Akonjang identify facts4

ignored by the agency that resolve the inconsistencies identified above. See
Shrestha , 590 F.3d at 104 4

. To the extent Akonjang attributes those inconsistencies to a language barrier, the Board correctly deemed that argument to be waived , because Akonjang had “confirmed on six occasions that he spoke and understood English, ” and his “counsel did not raise any concerns about [his] fluency in English during the individual hearin g
. ”
2. Akonjang argues that the agency incorrectly faulted him for lacking corroborating evidence without providing notice that such evidence was required. Although the immigration judge referenced the lack of corroborating evidence in evaluating Akonjang’ s credibility, the Board upheld th e immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding on the basis of “multiple grounds unrelated to [lack of]
corroboration.” As discussed above, that conclusion is supported by substantial
evidence. “ B ecause the [agency] found [Akonjang’s] testimony not credible, the [agency] was not required to give [him] notice and an opportunity to provide additional corroborating evidence.” Mukulumbutu v. Barr , 977 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2020).
3. The Board separately conclu ded that the corroborating evidence Akonjang submitted did not, on its own, satisfy the standard for obtaining relief
under the Convention Against Torture

. See Mukulumbutu , 977 F.3d at 927 ( independent evidence can support relief “even where an applicant h as been5

deemed not credible” )

. Akonjang does not challenge that conclusion

. He contends only that the agency “overlooked” two documents showing that he is wanted by the
Cameroonian authorities , but those documents were expressly considered by the
Board and the immigration judge.
4. Because substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding , and because Akonjang does not claim that, excluding his testimony, he is
otherwise entitled to relief , we need not reach the agency’s alternate findi ng that Akonjang could safely relocate within Cameroon. See Shrestha , 590 F.3d at 1048

– 49 , 1048 n.6

. PETITION DENIED.