U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

56–230XPDF WASHINGTON : 2024

GOING NUCLEAR ON ROSATOM: 

ENDING GLOBAL DEPENDENCE ON 

PUTIN’S NUCLEAR ENERGY SECTOR 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

March 12, 2024 

Serial No. 118–88 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

RONNY JACKSON, Texas 

YOUNG KIM, California 

MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, 

American Samoa 

FRENCH HILL, Arkansas 

WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio 

JIM BAIRD, Indiana 

MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida 

THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey 

MICHAEL LAWLER, New York 

CORY MILLS, Florida 

RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia 

NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas 

JOHN JAMES, Michigan 

KEITH SELF, Texas 

GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking 

Member 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY KIM, New Jersey 

SARA JACOBS, California 

KATHY MANNING, North Carolina 

SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK, Florida 

GREG STANTON, Arizona 

MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania 

JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida 

JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois 

SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California 

JIM COSTA, California 

JASON CROW, Colorado 

GABE AMO, Rhode Island 

BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Majority Staff Director 

SOPHIA LAFARGUE, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, North Carolina 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

MICHAEL LAWLER, New York 

NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas 

KEITH SELF, Texas 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts, 

Ranking Member 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania 

JIM COSTA, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

GABE AMO, Rhode Island 

KATIE EARLE, Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Albright, David, President, Institute for Science and International Security .... 7 

Ruggiero, Anthony, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ..................................................................................................................... 17 

Sabonis-Helf, Professor Theresa, Concentration Chair for Science, Technology, 

and International Affairs ..................................................................................... 31 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 48 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 50 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 51 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Materials submitted for the record ........................................................................ 52 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Responses to questions submitted for the record .................................................. 65 

(1) 

GOING NUCLEAR ON ROSATOM: ENDING 

GLOBAL DEPENDENCE ON PUTIN’S 

NUCLEAR ENERGY SECTOR 

Tuesday, March 12, 2024 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:23 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas Kean, Jr. 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. KEAN. The Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign 

Affairs Committee will come to order. The purpose of this hearing 

is to discuss how to use U.S. sanctions to ramp up pressure on Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy monopoly, Rosatom, and prevent 

Vladimir Putin from using it as a tool for malign influence. 

I ask unanimous consent to enter a statement in the record from 

Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko on the threat 

Rosatom poses to Ukraine and the world, including the 

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. In his statement, the minister 

makes the plea for tougher sanctions to slash the Kremlin’s profits 

from Rosatom’s operations, reduce Russia’s share of the global civil 

nuclear market, and to spur western countries to step up and to 

replace Rosatom’s nuclear goods and services. 

I also ask unanimous consent to enter a statement into the 

record from the Uranium Producers of America. Their statement 

commends the subcommittee for holding this hearing, highlights 

the malign activities of Rosatom and the Russian Federation, and 

supports our efforts to implement robust sanctions against 

Rosatom. Without objection, so ordered. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Unfortunately, 

last month, we marked the 2-year anniversary of Russia’s 

unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. President Biden’s 

sluggish policies have consistently prevented Ukraine’s victory, 

given Putin room to breathe, and dragged out this conflict. He has 

slow-walked the critical weapon systems that Ukraine needs to 

win, like long-range ATACMS missiles. His Administration has 

only recently started pushing our European allies to transfer frozen 

Russian sovereign assets to Ukraine, which should have been done 

long, long ago. 

Finally, the sanctions against the Putin regime have not convinced him to end this gruesome war. For example, last year’s Russian GDP growth of 3 percent exceeded all of the G7 economies and 

is forecasted to do so again in 2024. 
2 

This hearing will examine how to strengthen U.S. sanctions by 

ratcheting up pressure on one of the most nefarious tools of Russian malign influence: Rosatom. Let us review some of Rosatom’s 

worst behavior: Its personnel are engaged in the Russian military 

occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. It is 

working to help Putin’s war machine evade western sanctions. It 

is supporting China’s nuclear breakout. It has created dangerous 

dependencies around the globe that allow Putin to exert influence 

over U.S. and our allies. Like Nord Stream 2 and concerns over the 

west’s dependence on Russian LNG, Putin has created a similar 

scenario with Rosatom and dependence on Russian nuclear fuel. It 

has played a key role in helping to develop Iran’s nuclear program. 

Unfortunately, despite this litany of threats to U.S. national security, the U.S. has sanctioned only a handful of Rosatom’s subsidiaries and corporate officers, while Rosatom itself remains untouched. We must get serious, and that is why I am holding today’s 

hearing. I am in the process of drafting a tough sanctions bill that 

will mandate the Administration to decouple the U.S. and our allies from Rosatom; and U.S. and allied companies, from Westinghouse to Urenco, are taking big steps to providing western alternatives to Rosatom. Ukraine, for example, has freed itself from 

Rosatom’s grip. Other allies, from Sweden to Finland to the Czech 

Republic, are doing the same. 

But tougher sanctions are needed to hasten this decoupling from 

Rosatom. Importantly, my sanctions bill will be complementary to 

my colleague’s Chair McMorris-Rodgers’ House-passed bill, the Prohibiting of Russian Uranium Imports Act. Her bill prohibits the 

U.S. from importing Russian low enriched uranium with a waiver 

authority that terminates after 2027. My sanctions bill will certainly have a waiver authority to responsibly and rapidly and address dependencies, such as those related to medical and industrial 

isotopes, that will take slightly longer to unwind. But this authority will be narrow. These two bills together will send a much-needed market signal to the civil nuclear industry. The result will be 

a safer supply of nuclear fuel for the U.S. and its allies. That is 

why the Uranium Producers of America are aptly supporting our 

efforts to sanction Rosatom and Chair McMorris-Rodgers’ bill. 

Every penny that Rosatom earns directly finances Putin’s genocide 

in Ukraine and contributes to China’s growing nuclear arsenal. The 

time to act is now. 

The chair will now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman 

from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for any statement that he may 

have. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you, Chairman Kean, for holding this 

hearing today, and thank you to our witnesses for being here and 

for your testimony. 

Over 2 years ago, on February 24th, 2022, Russia launched its 

unprovoked full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine. Thankfully, due to a global coalition formed by U.S. leadership and, most 

importantly, a determined and resolute Ukrainian population, Russia failed in this effort. Despite its failure on the battlefield, Russia 

has continued to succeed in its goals of spreading malign influence 

and undermining democratic governance. 
3 

Today, we focus specifically on Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned 

corporation responsible for its civil nuclear program and military 

nuclear enterprises and an agent of influence headed by the Russian government. For decades, Rosatom has spread its malign influence through contracts in Europe and around the world to build 

nuclear reactors and provide nuclear fuel at cheaper prices. More 

recently, Rosatom’s complicity and support of Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine, its occupation of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power 

Plant, and its continued market share in the nuclear fuel establishment and fabrication sectors, have enabled Putin to recklessly use 

Rosatom to spread Kremlin malign influence and to push its imperialistic goals. 

Recognizing the threat of Rosatom, the Biden Administration and 

Congress have taken action, including by sanctioning Rosatom subsidiaries and cutting off key revenue streams. Putin uses these revenue streams directly for his war and his effort in aggression 

against Ukraine. 

For example, last year, President Biden worked with G7 partners in Sapporo, Japan to mobilize $4.2 billion in government-led investments to develop a secure, reliable nuclear energy supply chain. 

Furthermore, in February 2024, the Administration initiated a critical minerals dialog with Central Asian partners through the C5+1 

mechanism to increase Central Asia’s involvement in global critical 

mineral supply chains and strengthen economic cooperation. 

These arguments followup historic partnerships between U.S. 

companies and governments, including Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Yet, while the world acts to lessen Russia’s global sphere of 

influence, Putin and the Kremlin continue their brutal war in 

Ukraine, targeting energy supply lines, critical infrastructure, and 

holding Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and its workers hostage. 

As Ukrainian prosecutor general Andriy Kostin told me, these attacks hit at the heart of Ukraine’s environmental stability, as well. 

They seek to undermine and poison the bountiful and prosperous 

land Ukraine sits on and starve the Ukrainian people of the resources they need to thrive. 

As part of the efforts to seek out solutions to combat Russia’s 

malign influence in the nuclear energy sector, I have worked with 

a ranking member of the full Committee, Meeks, on legislation to 

sanction the Rosatom officials who undermine Zaporizhzhia’s stability and hold them accountable for the destabilizing actions they 

conduct. In addition to implementing further sanctions, where appropriate, we must also go on the offense and promote continued 

investment in capacity-building for alternative sources of nuclear 

energy and next-generation reactor designs, areas of the nuclear 

supply chain in which Russia has a significance presence today. 

These alternatives must be cost effective with competitive prices 

that will ensure their long-term success. 

We must also followup on Congress’s investment of $700 million 

in the Inflation Reduction Act in the development of High-Assay 

Low-Enriched Uranium, known as HALEU. This HALEU fuel is 

used in many small modular and advanced reactors. Historic investments in infrastructure will pay dividends abroad and support 

not only Ukrainans’ war effort but also combat Russia’s malign influence. 
4 

Finally, tomorrow marks 1 month since the Senate passed the 

national security supplemental package by a wide bipartisan margin. As the president said during his State of the Union address, 

history is watching. Yet, our most recent former president, Donald 

John Trump, told Hungary’s autocratic leader, Viktor Orban, this 

week that he would not support a nickel for Ukraine. Even more, 

the Hungarian government welcomed Rosatom’s CEO to Budapest 

today, on the 25th anniversary of Hungarian’s membership in 

NATO, to discuss shared priorities. The contrast between this 

president’s support for democracies and our former president’s support for autocracies could not be clearer. 

It unfortunately bears repeating: the quickest and most direct 

way to combat Rosatom and Russia is to pass the supplemental request immediately, which includes almost $3 billion to boost domestic nuclear fuel production and enrichment. If the House is 

truly serious about combating Russia’s malign influence, we have 

no alternative. It is inexplicable that Speaker Johnson continues to 

hold up this spending package, which has the majority of support 

among members. We cannot defend democracy abroad when this 

single individual denies it at home. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. KEAN. I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from 

North Carolina, Mr. Murphy, be allowed to sit on the dais and participate following all other members in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

We are pleased to have a panel of distinguished witnesses before 

us today on this important topic. Mr. David Albright is the President of the Institute for Science and International Security. Mr. 

Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow and senior director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. And Professor Theresa Sabonis-Helf is the 

Concentration Chair for Science, Technology, and International Affairs at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. 

Thank you all for being here today. Your full statements will be 

made part of the record, and I will ask each of you to keep your 

verbal remarks to 5 minutes in order to allow time for members’ 

questions. 

I will now recognize Mr. Albright for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE 

FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, and 

members of this subcommittee, thank you for holding this hearing 

and inviting me to testify. Rosatom, its subsidiaries, and its senior 

personnel deserve far greater sanctions today. Rosatom is not just 

a benign commercial nuclear energy supplier. 

As has been pointed out, Rosatom has actively participated in 

the illegal seizure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, a seizure that we all recognize is causing an increased risk of a major 

nuclear accident. Rosatom officials are not authorized to operate 

these reactors. IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi has called 

the situation ’not sustainable‘‘ and risks nuclear safety and secu-
5 

rity. Rosatom is also complicit in the human rights violations of 

Ukrainian plant personnel, violations that include torture. 

Rosatom actively contributes importantly to the production of 

Russian weapon systems used against Ukraine. A case in point is 

the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone that Russia has used to destroy 

much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure and terrorize its 

population. Rosatom helps build the Shahed 136 drones via its important subsidiary JSC Umatex at the Alabuga Special Economic 

Zone. JSC Alabuga, which runs the special economic zone, produces 

the Shahed 136 drones under a contract with the Russian Defense 

Ministry with extensive aid from Iran. Umatex is involved in providing carbon fiber to this plant that is making the Shahed 136 

drones. 

Umatex is rightly sanctioned by the United States for its supply 

of carbon fiber to Russia’s military industrial complex, as is JSC 

Alabuga and its subsidiaries. However, Rosatom has not been sanctioned for its support of Shahed 136 production or, more broadly, 

for its support of Russia’s military industrial complex, which is 

growing by the day. 

Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power reactor stands out as an example 

of the type of risk Rosatom and its predecessor organizations have 

undertaken to obtain lucrative contracts in countries not prepared 

institutionally or culturally to deal with the complex array of issues 

involved in operating reactors safely, preventing reactor accidents 

and preparing to deal with them if they occur. Russia’s nuclear export enterprises also have shown their willingness, in their hunt 

for contracts, to ignore the Iranian regime’s secret drive for nuclear 

weapons and its violations of International Atomic Energy Agency 

safeguards. 

In the case of Iran, Rosatom provided a reactor with multiple 

safety deficiencies to a country with infrastructure too weak to support it. These deficiencies and the difficulty of fixing them have 

been well documented by the IAEA’s operational safety review 

team’s analysis and multiple assessments by the World Association 

of Nuclear Operators. One has to wonder if Iran’s Bushehr power 

reactor is safe enough to operate today, despite years of intensive 

safety modifications and improvements. It should be noted that a 

major reactor accident risks spreading radiation over nearby Gulf 

states after only about 12 hours, and that is based on assessments 

by Rosatom companies. 

Many problems have resulted from Russia’s and Rosatom’s lessthan-acceptable designs and parts. At Bushehr, the Iran reactor. 

This has necessitated years of replacement of faulty parts, creation 

of new operating manuals, and changes in operation, and creation 

of safety and emergency procedures, all aimed at bringing Bushehr 

up to something approaching modern safety standards. Yet, after 

more than 10 years since the Bushehr reactor started, the task remains incomplete. 

So from my point of view, countries should avoid Rosatom. For 

countries contemplating or building nuclear power reactors for the 

first time, Rosatom reactors, while economically appealing on the 

purchasing side, may turn out to be huge economic liabilities on 

the operational side, effects that would be aggravated enormously 

in the case of a serious reactor accident. 
6 

While Russia has learned about handling severe nuclear reactor 

accidents the hard way, many of the developing countries contemplating nuclear power reactors do not have adequate supporting infrastructure and emergency response capabilities to deal with a 

major nuclear reactor, accident. And Rosatom seeks customers 

without proper regard for a country’s stability or its ability to ensure the safety and security of the reactor. 

Now, moving from warning to sanctioning Rosatom may seem 

harsh, even with the necessary and appropriate waivers. These 

should include nuclear reactor safety, operating nuclear reactors, 

and a wind-down period for other existing foreign contracts with 

Rosatom. However, combined with Rosatom’s role in illegally occupying the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and contributing importantly to outfitting Russia’s illegal military attacks against 

Ukraine, sanctioning Rosatom, its subsidiaries, and its key personnel today is deserved and overdue. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Albright follows:] 
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Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Mr. Albright. I now recognize Mr. 

Ruggiero for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY RUGGIERO, ADJUNCT SENIOR 

FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. RUGGIERO. Thank you, Chairman Kean, Ranking Member 

Keating, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to address you today on this important 

topic. My testimony is informed by my work on sanctions and proliferation issues at the Departments of State and the Treasury, as 

a foreign policy fellow for Senator Rubio, and in the White House 

National Security Council where I served as senior director for 

counterproliferation and biodefense. 

Russia invaded Ukraine more than 2 years ago, and Russia’s 

state-run nuclear corporation, Rosatom, boasted that its export revenue increased 15 percent in 2022 with a 10-year portfolio of foreign orders worth $200 billion. The company forecasts that its 2023 

revenue would increase by 40 percent. 

There are two main drivers for how the nuclear company of an 

aggressor State has expanding revenue while the country is largely 

shunned from the international community. First, the Biden Administration has not yet articulated a strategy for ensuring that 

America and its allies end their reliance on Russia’s nuclear sector; 

and, second, Washington saw Russia as a partner in civil nuclear 

cooperation, allowing Rosatom and Moscow to undercut and decimate U.S. and western companies competing in the same market. 

Rosatom and Russia are also engaged in activities contrary to 

American foreign policy and national security interests. In my written testimony, I detailed how Rosatom and Sino-Russian nuclear 

cooperation plays a critical role in enhancing Beijing’s nuclear 

weapons capabilities, including China’s effort to build 1500 nuclear 

weapons by 2035. I also reviewed Rosatom’s role in a potential nuclear disaster at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest 

nuclear plant in Europe. 

The Biden Administration started to use sanctions in February 

2023 against a few Russian nuclear and Rosatom-linked individuals and entities, but these were not part of a coordinated strategy. 

For example, I note in my written testimony that the Administration has not sanctioned a single member of Rosatom’s management 

board, even though the United Kingdom has sanctioned the entire 

board in March 2023. 

The Biden Administration understands the problem. A senior 

Energy Department official noted recently that it is ’gravely 

concerning‘‘ that Russia supplies about 20 percent of the fuel used 

by U.S. nuclear reactors. Recent promising reports suggests that 

the Administration and the U.S. nuclear industry are warming to 

the idea of a ban on imports of Russian fuel. 

In my written testimony, I offered three recommendations for 

Congress and three recommendations for the Biden Administration. 

Specifically, Congress should mandate a strategy to end reliance on 

Rosatom. It should require the Administration to make a sanctions 

determination within 60 days on Rosatom, its management and supervisory boards, and related entities and individuals. The strategy 

should also include plans to respond to potential Russian retalia-
16 

tory actions, including ending the export of enriched uranium and 

other products to the United States and its allies. Congress could 

also require a review of the U.S.-Russia civilian nuclear cooperation agreement to ensure that it is consistent with the new approach to civil nuclear cooperation with Russia. 

For the Administration, I recommend using existing sanctions 

authorities to prohibit activities with Rosatom, including purchases 

of reactor fuel, reactor services, and reactor construction, as well as 

other related services, over a one-to 4-year wind-down period and 

then using that time to work with allies in the nuclear industry to 

facilitate a transition to alternative suppliers. We need a coordinated strategy, an effort to reinforce that Washington and our allies will not return to business as usual with Russia when the war 

in Ukraine ends. This effort should incentivize a transition to U.S. 

and allied nuclear industries as alternative suppliers over a 4-year 

period to end Russia’s domination and ensure that China does not 

fill the void. If the Biden Administration is unwilling to pursue this 

path, Congress should mandate it through legislation. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify, and I look forward to addressing your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Ruggiero follows:] 
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Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Mr. Ruggiero. I now recognize Professor 

Sabonis-Helf for her opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR THERESA SABONIS-HELF, CONCENTRATION CHAIR FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

Ms. SABONIS-HELF. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to 

testify today on Russia’s Rosatom Corporation. 

The Russian government’s behavior in Ukraine and at home is 

shocking and infuriating. We struggle to find useful levers that 

might limit Russia’s reach and ambition. Alas, sanctioning 

Rosatom may not be such a lever. Most sanctions against Rosatom, 

however intuitively appealing, will neither constrain Russia significantly, nor will they address the current nuclear fuel imbalance 

that the world faces. Sanctions could disrupt markets in ways that 

would boost Rosatom’s revenue, while disadvantaging ourselves 

and our allies. Some sanctions, if applied incautiously, could even 

threaten nuclear power plant safety. Regarding your future moves 

against Rosatom, I urge you to consider three key factors: security 

of supply, the safety of nuclear energy, and the need to focus our 

efforts on developing a more resilient pool of nuclear fuel sources. 

Let’s begin with security of supply. The EU shift to American 

natural gas was possible only because the U.S. had available supply. We do not have that kind of flexibility in nuclear fuel. Eighteen percent of European Union reactors are Russian or Soviet design. For these reactors, fuel rods are an issue. Westinghouse has 

developed substitute fuel rods for Ukraine but does not yet have capacity or licensing to supply all of Europe. 

Rosatom and its affiliates are also deeply embedded in fuel production and other services. Reliance on Rosatom is widespread 

globally, not only in Europe. Even the United States purchases 20 

percent of its low enriched uranium from a Rosatom subsidiary. We 

are not yet in a position to meet all of our domestic nuclear fuel 

needs. We are definitely not in a position to extend nuclear energy 

supply security to our allies. 

Let us also consider the safety of nuclear energy. Criticisms of 

Rosatom are justified. It has been complicit with the Russian State 

in nuclear piracy, and it illegally manages the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. In spite of this, Rosatom’s sustained 

relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency plays an 

essential role in keeping Russian nuclear energy and the world 

safer. 

Rosatom’s director general, Alexey Likhachev, met with the 

IAEA director eight times since March 2022 for discussions regarding Zaporizhzhia. Rosatom has certainly not responded to all of the 

IAEA’s concerns, but it has taken measures to harden the facility; 

it has provided mobile diesel fuel boilers to enhance safety; and, 

most importantly, it has complied with the IAEA insistence that 

Zaporizhzhia not be used to generate electricity, a measure that 

both enhances safety and reduces the gains to Russia of occupying 

the facility. 

In a broader sense, using sanctions to isolate Rosatom is bad for 

global nuclear safety. Remember the tragedy of Chernobyl. Since 
30 

the early post-Soviet era, the nuclear power community has made 

integration of Russian plant operators and leaders a high priority, 

raising standards and promoting a culture of safety. Because an accident or major incident anywhere affects confidence in nuclear 

power everywhere, keeping Rosatom and Russia tightly engaged in 

the international community of nuclear professionals is a safety imperative. 

At this time, our best path to enhance energy security in the nuclear sector comes from diversification of fuel sources. Concern 

about Russia has already sparked substantial innovation here and 

abroad. In the United States, our once-shuttered capacity to process enriched uranium is now licensed and produced 7,000 tons of 

uranium hexafluoride last year. Our production of HALEU fuel for 

the next-generation reactors is also underway. Overseas, Westinghouse is leading the way to replace Russian fuel rods. In a more 

distant region, Kazakhstan is finding a new path to market. 

Kazakhstan has long been the lead producer of world uranium but 

dependent on Russia for refining, enrichment, and transport. Now, 

France is expanding mining operations in Kazakhstan, increasing 

French enrichment capability, and shepherding an ambitious consortium to strengthen the Middle Corridor route, reducing the region’s dependence on Russia for transport. 

Infrastructure realignment takes time. Reducing Rosatom’s relative role in world nuclear energy production is essential but can 

best be accomplished not by sanctions but by aggressively expanding the field of viable, competent nuclear energy material producers. With China rising in this sector, the discipline of managed 

competition will serve us well for the next contest over nuclear energy’s future. We should strive to engage that competition together 

with our European allies. Thank you. 

[The statement of Professor Sabonis-Helf follows:] 
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Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Professor Sabonis-Helf. I now recognize 

myself for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Ruggiero, can you characterize Rosatom’s support for China’s nuclear weapons program? 

Mr. RUGGIERO. Yes. They have delivered fuel to some of China’s 

nuclear reactors. The Department of Defense, the Assistant Secretary, I believe, for Space Policy testified before Congress about 

the role of those reactors in producing plutonium. And the department was so worried about this particular subject that it actually 

took that part of his testimony out and published a press release 

to highlight it for the public. 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you. Mr. Albright, do you believe that a mandatory sanctions bill from the U.S. Congress is necessary to push 

the Biden Administration to ramp up pressure on Rosatom, its subsidiaries, and its corporate officers, and to help the U.S. and our 

allies reduce dependence on Rosatom? I’m sorry. If you can—please 

turn your mike on. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Is it on now? 

Mr. KEAN. Yes. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. OK. I think legislation would be very helpful. I 

think the Biden Administration has been slow to pursue this issue, 

and I think Congress can play a very useful role in increasing the 

sanctions on Rosatom and its subsidiaries and also play an important role in boosting our capabilities to replace Rosatom. 

Could I add one thing to Anthony’s answer? 

Mr. KEAN. Sure. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Russia is supporting the construction of a breeder 

reactor in China. As far as we can determine, that will be China’s 

only way to produce the plutonium it needs to increase its arsenal 

up to a thousand, let alone 1500. And as far as we can determine, 

we’re still investigating it, Russia has not said that its assistance, 

peaceful in nature as it is, cannot be used, misused to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. The U.S. has always taken that kind 

of position in supplying nuclear assistance, but Russia has not. And 

so, through Russia’s assistance, China may be getting the only way 

it can to dramatically increase its nuclear arsenal. 

Mr. KEAN. OK. Mr. Ruggiero, your answer to that question. 

Mr. RUGGIERO. Sorry. Your first question—— 

Mr. KEAN. Regarding the necessity to push the Biden Administration to ramp up pressure on its subsidiaries, on Rosatom and its 

subsidiaries. 

Mr. RUGGIERO. Right. As I noted in the oral testimony and the 

written testimony, this is all about a strategy. It really starts with 

a strategy, starts with the alternative suppliers that the professor 

mentioned. I wish this was easy. I wish it was as simple as just 

putting Rosatom and people on an entity list or, excuse me, on the 

SDN list. You could do that with some of the senior leadership, but 

it is going to require a plan, and it seems that the Administration 

is not on that pathway right now. 

Mr. KEAN. To continue with you, any serious sanctions effort 

against Rosatom will require responsible but narrow waiver authority. How long do you assess such waivers need to be for different parts of the nuclear supply chain, specifically enriched uranium? 
39 

Mr. RUGGIERO. Right. You know, we have seen different reports 

about what that time line would look like. I have seen some reports 

of 2028 is one of the dates that is out there. There is more parts 

of the supply chain, unfortunately, that Rosatom is in. There is 

also carve-outs in the U.S. sanctions already that might be used by, 

whether it’s the IAEA or other U.N. organizations, to continue 

working with Rosatom. 

Mr. KEAN. Mr. Albright, in general, how would you assess 

Rosatom’s commitment to nuclear safety and security, and what 

safety concerns exist over Rosatom-built plants still in operation in 

Europe and around the world? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think, you know, we recently did kind of 

an in-depth look at safety concerns at the Bushehr reactor in Iran, 

and so it is a little hard for me to talk about Europe, but, at 

Bushehr, you could clearly see immense safety problems that were 

being pointed out by WANO teams, were pointed out by the IAEA 

investigatory teams. And it was based on Rosatom providing a deficient reactor. 

And so I think Rosatom lags behind modern safety considerations 

that are applied to western reactors, and so I think that Rosatom 

presents a safety problem. And with Bushehr, you do have to wonder if it could have a major nuclear reactor accident. 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you. I now recognize Ranking Member Keating 

for any questions that he may have. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Senate-passed, House-held national security supplemental bill includes $2.72 billion to support domestic uranium enrichment, $149 million for the 

National Nuclear Security Administration’s ability to respond to 

the security situation in Ukraine, $98 million for investments in 

the development and production of isotopes. 

Professor Sabonis-Helf, how important is that work to this issue? 

How important is that bill to this issue? 

Ms. SABONIS-HELF. So I would say, particularly, the appropriations for the HALEU fuel is something we have to take very seriously. The United States is unable to move ahead with our small 

modular reactors without access to HALEU fuel, which we, up 

until now, have imported from Russia. So being able to ramp up 

our capacity to take leadership in this next generation of reactors 

is absolutely urgent. 

I would also concur that the other pieces of what you just described are critical components. And, sir, I also concur that releasing the resources for the actual defense of Ukraine is also an urgent piece of this puzzle. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. And I spoke yesterday with the U.S. 

Ambassador to Poland, and we were commenting on what he 

termed one of the largest, you know, private-sector investments 

that we have been involved with in recent history with Poland in 

terms of their nuclear investment and how important that is. And 

similar activities going on with the U.S. and our European allies 

in Romania and Bulgaria, as well. Companies like Westinghouse 

have taken a lead in this regard. And this shift, you know, on the 

basics of suppliers for nuclear reactors is critical. 

So can you just comment, anyone, how important it is for the 

U.S. engagement itself, how important that is as a necessity in 
40 

dealing with Russia’s malign influence? Because we can sanction, 

but we can also control better, as well Professor, if you want to—— 

Ms. SABONIS-HELF. Sir, the United States, under older OECD requirements, the amount of economic support we could lend to countries in developing nuclear was limited in an effort to keep European nations from competing against each other. The unfortunate 

longer-term downside of that was that both Russia and China offer 

substantial packages, which enable, in many cases, countries that 

are not ready for nuclear to embrace it. 

Our cooperation with Poland is absolutely essential. It is a newto-nuclear nation that is ready for nuclear power, that experiences 

the kind of governance stability and the grid membership needed 

for nuclear to be successful. I think our new relationship with Poland on this next-generation nuclear is absolutely the model for 

how the United States can recapture a meaningful role in the export of essential nuclear energy technologies. 

Mr. KEATING. And, also, I just want to comment, too, that, for 

those people that think this issue is remote somehow and it is not 

important to the U.S., which I just fail to understand, in terms of 

our own domestic security, could you comment, too, on the fact how 

important this is and the benefits we get from this kind of investment for jobs right here in America and America economic interests? 

Ms. SABONIS-HELF. We cannot treat nuclear energy as purely a 

commercial operation because it is so strategically critical. But in 

terms of the jobs that it represents, this entire new sector is rather 

extraordinary. We have just recently relicensed the largest facility 

in the United States. We are building new facilities. We are talking 

about jobs and not only good high-paying jobs but spread throughout the United States, rather than concentrated in one place. And 

I think that what we see here the importance of jobs my colleague’s 

recommendation that we need a clear strategy here, that strategy 

needs to incorporate how we harness American expertise to recapture a role in this industry. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes. And being a member of this committee, as 

well as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I’m also keenly aware of what our military has been telling us in terms of the 

effects of climate change and how important that is, as well. It is 

one of the existential threats we have in our country and in the 

planet, and it’s also a very big military danger that we have to address. So this will do that, as well. 

I wish we could have some more time, but my time has run out, 

and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Ranking Member Keating. I now recognize Mr. Self of Texas for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SELF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is the legislative 

branch. We have been looking for a way to change the behavior of 

the executive branch on several national security issues, to include 

the southern border. So I hear as background sanctions on Russian 

gas and oil have not worked. You, sir, mentioned discretionary 

sanctions authority that the executive branch has today that they 

have not used. They are not using what they have available to 

them today, so we are considering executive branch action, which 
41 

I am not sanguine will change the executive branch behavior in 

this manner. 

I hear a lot about sanctions in this discussion. My concern is, according to the World Nuclear Association, my concern is how are 

we going to replace the sources? Because as of 2020, when we look 

at Russia is going to go down between now and 2030 a substantial 

amount of their capability. Urenco, basically the west, is going to 

go down in their capability. That includes the U.S. France is going 

to stay steady. Others are going to go up eight times, and that includes such allies—excuse me, that’s facetious—as Argentina, 

Brazil, India, Pakistan, and Iran are going to increase eight times, 

as I said. The big one is China. China is going to go up three times. 

So while we talk about sanctions, how are we going to keep our 

nuclear industry viable if the only people that are going up subsequently in their capability to enrich are basically people who do not 

agree with us. Some are actual classified as adversaries. So please. 

Now, that’s 2020 figures, but while we discuss sanctions, if we 

sanction this, how are we going to replace the needs of our own industry? Microphone, sir. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. The discussion is that two tracks are needed. I 

think Chairman Keating pointed out, or, I’m sorry, Chairman Kean 

pointed out that the sanctions can build a pressure to create the 

space and the incentive to create the alternatives. So I think they 

work together. 

Mr. SELF. I appreciate your word strategy, sir. I really do. But 

a strategy has got to have something just beyond competition. Are 

we looking at Defense Production Act? What do you suggest? And 

I’ve read your three recommendations to the legislative branch, 

but, more than a strategy, how would we get there? Because a 

strategy has to have some capability backing it up. 

A long time as a military planner. A strategy is worthless without the capability to execute the strategy. 

Ms. SABONIS-HELF. Sir, I think that’s why I emphasize replacement capacity over sanctions. I think that what has happened recently in Kazakhstan and, to a lesser extent, in Uzbekistan is extremely important. Kazakhstan produces more mined uranium for 

the world market than any other nation. Until recently, it has been 

fully captive to Russia because Russia does the enrichment, Russia 

does the transport. 

In the current situation, France has opened new mines, and together with both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is handling the transit route to France, and France is ramping up enrichment. That’s 

one example of what has changed in the past 2 years, I think very 

much for the better. 

I do think that our pursuit of critical materials with Central Asia 

is a very important part of thinking about the future because 

bringing enrichment and processing back to the United States is 

more urgent, in my estimation, than enhancing mining in the 

United States. But I would also call your attention to the fact that, 

as you noted, China is very much on the rise. Now, we know that 

in, an earlier era, Chairman Mao Zedong was much more interested in nuclear weapons than in nuclear energy. But in recent 

years, beginning with its 11th five-yea plan in 2005, China as 

moved into a hyper-development phase of nuclear power. China 
42 

now has 55 operable reactors and 27 under construction, and so a 

lot of China’s effort to buildup in this sphere is to meet its own rising demand. They’re still finishing building their grid. They still 

have huge expansion—— 

Mr. SELF. My time is up. They are building not only nuclear 

plants, coal plants every week, solar, everything. Mr. Chairman, I 

yield back. 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Mr. Self. I now recognize Mr. Costa from 

California for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. So, Professor 

Sabonis-Helf and Professor Theresa—excuse me—and Mr. 

Ruggiero, you both talk about a strategy, and it seems clear from 

your comments that a strategy involves totally eliminating our 

need to rely on Russia for any future uranium enriched if we are 

going to maintain our own ability to have independence. Am I correct? 

Mr. RUGGIERO. That’s correct. In my recommendation, yes. 

Mr. COSTA. Would you agree, Professor? 

Ms. SABONIS-HELF. Yes, I would. 

Mr. COSTA. And I assume, Mr. Albright, you would agree, as 

well. What is a time line for those of us who are laypersons that 

it would take to develop this ability to remove our dependence from 

Russia and to develop our own capacity with ourselves and maybe 

in conjunction with some of our allies in Europe that use nuclear 

power? 

Mr. RUGGIERO. Right. It also goes to the previous question, as 

well. I mean, in my view, these are mutually inclusive efforts, increasing alternative suppliers and getting smarter on sanctions. I 

think right now we’re going after some of what we call the lowhanging fruit on sanctions. We’re not focused on things that will 

have a real impact on the sanction side. And the sanctions will also 

give a market signal to the industry, as well. As I noted previously, 

2028 is a date that has been put out there by industry in some circles, and that’s only 4 years away. So that’s why we have focused 

on the sort of one-to 4-year timeframe, depending on—— 

Mr. COSTA. That’s by talking to people like Westinghouse and 

others that have experience and expertise in this in terms of developing our own independence. I’m sorry? 

Mr. RUGGIERO. Urenco, Orano, what was mentioned previously, 

their increases, some of those are scheduled to come online—— 

Mr. COSTA. But we have to give the signals to the private sector, 

in fact, if we’re going to develop this strategy to develop this independence, right? 

Mr. RUGGIERO. Correct. 

Ms. SABONIS-HELF. To a certain extent, sir, that signal was already received before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest 

facility in the United States, which is marketed by Conver Dun, 

was mothballed. It was relicensed in 2021, and by the end of the 

past year succeeded in posting 7,000 tons of uranium hexafluoride. 

When that facility was at full capacity, the United States produced 

20 percent of the world’s hexafluoride, which is more than we need. 

So getting that facility fully up and running is one of the critical 

components here. 
43 

Mr. COSTA. And that’s one of the steps on the way to developing 

the pellets? 

Ms. SABONIS-HELF. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COSTA. So when you say in your comments that sanctions, 

if they are implied incautiously, what do you mean by incautiously? 

Ms. SABONIS-HELF. Sir, I mean that, as soon as Russia was convinced that Europe was taking strong measures in gas, they began 

manipulating prices significantly. Most nuclear power plants store 

two-to 3-years’ worth of fuel at their site, and none of them will tell 

you exactly how much fuel they have stored. But the war has been 

unfolding for over 2 years now, so we have some real concern about 

the ability of the nuclear power plants in Europe to stay open. 

Mr. COSTA. What concerns the three of you the most about—I 

mean, under the category of lessons learned, Russia’s invasion of 

Ukraine, I think, besides the immediate need, in my view, and I 

associate my comments with the ranking member, Mr. Keating, 

about what we need to do to provide this supplemental package for 

Ukraine and for the other elements that are in that supplemental 

package, but what lessons do you think this has taught us in the 

last 2 years? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, lessons learned, I think one is that it is critical to defeat Russia. 

Mr. COSTA. We cannot be dependent. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, and also that we should not be dependent—— 

Mr. COSTA. I’ve said it on the floor. I think President Putin is 

a war criminal for all the things that he’s done, and I think Russia 

today is a syndicate masquerading or pretending to be a country 

run by a mob boss. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. And a mob boss who is ramping up its military 

production infrastructure in a very frightening way. I spend much 

of the year in Europe, in Germany, and we feel it deeply that lack 

of U.S. support for the Ukrainians is directly threatening Europe’s 

security. 

Mr. COSTA. It threatens Europe. It threatens all of us. It is a 

seminal moment in American and world history, and we are playing politics with this. My time has run out, but I will submit further questions, Mr. Chairman, for the record. 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Mr. Costa. I now recognize Mr. Moran 

from Texas for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all to 

your, for your testimony here today. Very important subject. I am 

very concerned about the dependency on Russian uranium and on 

Rosatom being a major player across the globe in this area. 

Mr. Albright, I want to start with you and ask you a question. 

Then I will come over to Mr. Ruggiero—is that how I say it? Good 

deal. 

Mr. Albright, in your opinion, what are the strategic risks of the 

U.S. and Europe’s continued reliance on Rosatom for nuclear energy products and services? And would you compare this reliance 

to Europe’s crippling dependence on Russian oil and natural gas 

before the war in Ukraine began? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I would compare it. I mean, at some point, Russia 

will probably play games with its supply, and it has been men-
44 

tioned the need to start stockpiling critical resources in anticipation of that. But I think Europe will be facing similar struggles as 

it faced with Russia’s cutoff of natural gas. 

Mr. MORAN. And what strategic risks do you think that poses 

both in Europe and the United States when we look at beyond just 

the economy, when we look militarily? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, to deal with the situation is expensive, and 

it causes a lot of understated discomfort to the public. It was a 

tough winter after Russia cutoff the natural gas. So, I mean, it is 

absolutely necessary to prepare for that, and it causes effects that 

are hard to deal with politically and expensive to deal with. 

Mr. MORAN. So, Professor, do you agree that we need to work toward independence from Rosatom as it relates to uranium production and provision? 

Ms. SABONIS-HELF. Absolutely. I think Russia’s behavior will be 

greatly moderated if it is a much less important player in this 

game. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Ruggiero, in your opening testimony, you referenced several efforts to increase U.S. and allied enrichment capacity. Companies in the nuclear fuel cycle will need to commit to 

investing potentially billions of dollars to replace Russian supplies. 

Would you agree that it is important for those companies to have 

certainty moving forward in the form of clear government policy 

and tough sanctions that a flood of Russian exports will not strain 

their assets in later years once they make this investment? 

Mr. RUGGIERO. I agree. And that goes back to Congressman 

Costa’s question of what do you worry about. What I worry about 

is we do not develop this strategy, and the war somehow ends, and 

then we go back to our reliance on Russia and we do not give that 

market signal. And they either invest things that are not needed 

or they wind up not investing it. I think that is why right now is 

the time to develop this strategy with both the sanctions and the 

alternative suppliers working together. 

Mr. MORAN. Yes. Because this uranium production is not like 

making a peanut butter and jelly sandwich in my kitchen. It takes 

a lot of capital up-front, capital investment. It takes a lot of time, 

and it takes a lot of effort and risk, frankly, to enter that market. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. RUGGIERO. That’s right. And we have to get the balance between what we want here in the U.S. and what we want to work 

with our allies both in Canada and Europe and elsewhere. There’s 

a good mix there, and it is going to take some time to get that 

right. 

Mr. MORAN. Back to you, Mr. Albright. Stakeholders have predicted that building capacity in the United States and fully replacing Russian nuclear is a long-term project expected to take years, 

just like what I just referenced. What regulatory burdens stand in 

the way, and what are ways Congress can reduce the barrier to 

entry? And I will ask you the same question, Professor, once we get 

an answer. If you’ll press your button, please. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I am not sure I can address the regulatory issues, 

but, certainly, there needs to be support from the executive and the 

legislative branch that this is a priority and there will be some support, financial support, for these activities so that companies can 
45 

be incentivized to take the risk. And so I think that’s the critical 

part of it. 

And we have done this before. I mean, our nuclear industry has 

always, when it was growing, had tremendous support from the 

Federal Government. 

Mr. MORAN. Professor, do you have a comment on the regulatory 

burdens that stand in the way? 

Ms. SABONIS-HELF. Actually, I would like to highlight one huge 

breakthrough, and that is that small modular reactors are licensed 

under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and it is the first time 

we have licensed a new design of reactor in a very long time. I do 

not think the United States is a credible salesman of these reactors 

in other countries if we do not have them on our own territory. 

So I think that the fact that we have made that move forward 

is an extremely important one, and I think that removes what 

would otherwise have been a huge barrier in terms of next generation. 

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Ruggiero, real quickly, my last question. What 

global market implications do you predict during the process of 

winding down dependence on Russian nuclear fuel and sources? 

Mr. RUGGIERO. Well, I think they understand, the industry understands that this is a conversation that is happening, and that 

is why I think you could do some sanctions now and some smarter 

sanctions in the short term to reinforce that, as well. 

Mr. MORAN. THANK YOU ALL. I YIELD BACK, MR. CHAIRMAN. Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Mr. Moran. I now recognize Mr. Wilson 

from South Carolina for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses for being here today. And, Mr. Ruggiero, the Biden Administration has repeatedly waived sanctions against Rosatom in 

order to facilitate Rosatom’s work with Iran’s nuclear program. 

This is despite the fact that Rosatom has been credibly accused of 

providing material support to aid war criminal Putin’s military invasion of Ukraine, which is sanctionable by U.S. law. Would you 

classify this scheme as a sanctions evasion? 

Mr. RUGGIERO. Well, if they are getting waivers, I mean, there 

is always a question of why the Administration is still issuing the 

Iran waivers, you know, given the Iran subject. But, you know, we 

continue to work with Rosatom even though, as you noted, they 

work with the China nuclear program, they work with ZNPP. So, 

yes, I think moving along the pathway of ending reliance on Russia 

and Rosatom is the best way forward. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate you clarifying. Thank you very 

much. And approximately how much money is the Biden Administration allowing the Kremlin and war criminal Putin to make 

through Rosatom’s operations in Iran? 

Mr. RUGGIERO. I am not sure about the specific number, but I 

am certainly happy to take that as a question for the record. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. My understanding is it is certainly not a public 

number, but we have been investigating internal Bushehr-related 

documents that we found on the internet, and it is millions of dollars just in proving some of the safety conditions at the plant and 

writing manuals. But it is substantially larger than millions of dollars every 2 years or so. 
46 

Mr. WILSON. It would probably be in, like, trade, too, of military 

equipment and—— 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. But also I should add they are building Bushehr 

2 and 3 and that project is valued at about $8 billion. So it will 

probably be significantly higher. On Bushehr 1, which is operational, it is fixing the problems that came with buying that particular reactor and Iran coming to terms that its safety culture was 

woefully inadequate. It has a very poor regulatory environment, 

and so, as Iran tries to, in a sense, create a safer reactor, it is having to spend a considerable amount of money on that. 

Mr. WILSON. It is inconceivable to me that there would be waivers that could, in any way, benefit the regime in Tehran, particularly in light of just 6 weeks ago Iran provided drone attacks on 

American military, killing three Army reservists from Georgia, 

wounded another 40 people, Americans, and then over 150 drone 

attacks in the last 6 months. I just cannot visualize that a waiver 

would be in any way allowed by this Administration and with just 

6 weeks ago three young Americans were murdered by the regime 

in Tehran. 

With that in mind, Mr. Albright, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power 

Plant contains sensitive export-control American nuclear technology. According to CNN, last year, the Biden Administration 

asked Rosatom not to touch the technology. Do you trust that 

Rosatom will respect the export control rules? How would that benefit them if they actually did? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Just to reinforce your point, it was horrible with 

these drone attacks. And with Iranian assistance, they are happening all the time in Ukraine and terrorizing the population. And 

so Iran’s drone program deserves much more attention. 

Now, on the technology, we work on sort of the more criminal 

side of nuclear supply chains, and I would assume Russia has already investigated whatever they could find, as much as they 

could. Regardless of what they say, they probably are trying to benefit from our technology—— 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I just sincerely hope, bipartisan, that we can 

face that we are, sadly, in a war we did not choose, and that is 

with the dictators with rule of gun invading the democracies with 

rule of law beginning February 23, 2022 with war criminal Putin 

invading and then October 7th the Iran puppets invading and 

slaughtering the people of Israel. And so this should be bipartisan 

that we are working together because they do have a goal: death 

to Israel, death to America. I yield back. 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. I have one followup question 

to Mr. Albright regarding Rosatom’s role in the Iran nuclear sector. 

Is this cooperation limited entirely to the civilian nuclear energy 

program? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. As far as I know, I do not know any evidence that 

Russia would convey nuclear weapons-related technology to Iran. 

Part of the problem, though, in Iran is that Bushehr is very, it is 

a modern, semi-modern nuclear reactor, and Iran is using that 

knowledge and will openly say to be able to build smaller research 

reactors, which could, in the future, produce plutonium for nuclear 

weapons. 
47 

So I think Russia’s technology is not well protected or controlled 

and—— 

Mr. KEAN. So it could, by that definition, be assisting, Rosatom 

could be assisting Iran in its goal of creating a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, in the sense of producing plutonium for nuclear weapon and a future reactor in Iran, yes. 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you. With no further questions—yes, do you 

have anything? With no further questions from members, I want 

to thank our witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee may 

have additional written questions for the witnesses, and we ask 

that you respond to these promptly in writing. Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, 

questions, extraneous materials for the record subject to the length 

limitations. 

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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