### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 19
- 00356
- CR

Wesley Eugene Perkins , Appellant

v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF BELL COUNTY NO S . 3C17
- 01209 & 2C17
- 02820 1 , HONORABLE JO HN MICHAEL MISCHTIAN , JUDGE PRE SIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Wesley Eugene Perkins , a c t i n g pro se at trial , was convicted by a jury of the Class B misdemeanor offense of driving while license invalid with a prior conviction. See Tex.
Trans p. Code § 521.457 ( a) (2) , ( f) ( 1)

. The trial court assessed punishment at seventy days in jail plus a $100 fine and rendered judgment on the jury ’ s verdict

. See Tex. Penal Code § 12. 2 2

. Perkins presents fourteen issues i n t his pro se appeal challengi ng his conviction , man y of which

1 The reco rd reflect s that this case was ori ginally filed as a Class C misdemeanor in the tri al court under cause number 3C17

- 01209 and then re f iled as a Class B m isdemeano r in cause numbe r 2C17

- 02820 , c harging the same offense but allegi n g the aggr avati ng fact or of a prior c onviction

. See Tex. Tra nsp. Code § 521.457(f )( 1) ( elevat in g offense from Class C misdemeanor to Class B misdemeanor when State shows at trial that defe ndant “ has previ o usly been convicted of an o ffense under this sect i on ” )

. Aft er Pe r kins filed notices of appeal from both cause numbers, we consolidated hi s appeal s. See Perkin s v. State , No s . 03

- 19

- 00356

- - 00357

- CR , 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7697, at * 1 (Tex. App.

— A u stin Aug. 27, 2 019) (mem. op., not designated for publi cati on).2 we re rejected in his appeals f rom prior convictions for the same offense

. W e will affirm the trial

c ourt ’ s ju dgment

.

B ACKGROUND In December 2016, a Belt on police officer s topped a 2006 Dodge Caravan driving directly in front of him along the I n terstate Highway 3 5 access road in Belton after seeing that the Cara van had a n inva lid makeshift lic ense plate

. The d ash

- cam video t h a t was admitted into evidence depicts the Cara van being dri ven on the road and the events o f Perkins ’ s arre st. The v ide o shows th a t once the officer activat ed his patr o l car ’ s flashing lights , the
Caravan pull ed into a Whataburger parking lot

. When the police officer approached the
Caravan , Perkins remained o n the driver ’ s s ide be h ind the ste er ing wheel , while his wife an d four children exited the van ’ s passenger - front door and passenger - side door , respectively

. The police officer asked Perkins about the lack of plates on the Caravan and requested his license and ins urance
. Perkin s re spo nded , “ T his car is not in trans por tat ion , ” and c l a imed , “ I d o not require a driver ’ s license. ” A Belton police sergeant arrived , requested Perkins ’ s license and in surance, and arrested Perkins for not having registr a tion on th e Caravan

. When Perkins ’ s wif e returned , she provided the polic e with Perkins ’ s Texas identification card

. The p olice called a dispatcher , who reported that P erkins ’ s driver ’ s license was suspen ded , th at his license suspension had not expired, and that Perkins had two prior drivi ng - wh ile

- lic en se - invalid co nvictions

. Before trial, Pe rkins filed a special appearance and a plea to the jur isdiction with the trial court and then a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court , all of which were denied. During trial, Perkins objected t o use of the wor ds “ drive, ” “ driver, ” “ d ri ving, ” “ motor vehicle , ”

“ operating, ” “ transportation , ” and “ vehicle, ” which the trial court overruled. The trial court3 sustained t he State ’ s objections to ce rtain l etters that Perkins claimed to have sent to the T exas D epartment of Motor Vehicles

. Aft e r t rial, t he jury convicted Perkins as charged . The trial court

assesse d punishment and entered judgment on t he jury ’ s verdict

. Perkins fi led a motion fo r new trial that was denied by op eration o f law. Th is appeal follo wed.

D ISCU SSION P erkins ’ s appell ate issues 2 include jurisdictional concerns , constitutional challe nges to statutes on c rim inal procedure and criminal offenses , complain ts about t he trial
court ’ s rulings on d iscovery and evidence , and the re petition of ar guments re jected in appeals from h is prior convictions. 3 None of these require reversal of his conviction. See Tex. R. App.
P. 44.2

. First and twelfth issue s : Amount in controvers y and charac teri zation as “ civil ” app eal Perkins ’ s first a nd twe lfth iss ue s c ha r acterize th is appeal and t he prosecution below as “ civ il ” proceedings

. In his first issue , Pe rki ns presents a mistaken jurisdictional

concern that t he “ a mount in controversy ” here is below the $100 minimum for appeal of “ civ il ”

2 We fairl y construe t he a rgumen ts that Perkin s presents in thi s appeal , several of which are i ncomprehensible

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38 .1 (i) (requiring briefs to con tain “ cle ar and concise a r gument ” for contentions made, along with appropriate citati ons to auth oriti es and to re cord ). Pr o se defendants are held to the same stan dards as licensed at torney s and must comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. P erez v. S tate , 261 S.W.3d 760, 763 n.2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008 , pet. ref ’ d )

. 3 Se e, e. g. , Perkins v. State , No. 03

- 15

- 00702

- CR, 2016 Te x. App. LEXIS 8645, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Austin Aug. 11, 2016, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op., not designated f or public ation); Perkins v . State , No. 03

- 1 4

- 00733

- CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1730 (Tex . App.

— Aust in Fe b. 19, 2016, p et. deni ed ) (mem. op., not designat ed for publica tion); P erkins v. Stat e , Nos. 03

- 14

- 00305

– 00310

- CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6426 (Tex. App.

— Aus tin June 25, 2015, pet. de nied) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

.4 matters

. I n his tw elfth is sue, Perkins conten d s that all cases are civil “non

- cases” until the “plaintiff proves jurisdiction

. ”
P erkins ’ s stated c once rn about an amount in controver sy below $100 may ref er to the mi nimum set forth in statutes applicable to munici pal

- court conv ic tions

. See Tex. Gov ’ t Code § § 30.00001 , .00027(a)(1) (providing tha t party can appeal municipal

- court conv iction to court of appeals if fine assessed exceeds $100 and judgment was affirmed by county court at law in its appellate capacity ), ( a)(2) ( provi di ng that party may challenge constitutionality o f statute on which mu nicipal

- court conviction was based irre spective of amount of fine ); see also Canada
v. State , 547 S.W.3d 4, 11 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2017 , n o pet. ) ( addressing “ f u r t h e r a p p e l la te review ” by co urt of appeals under chapte r 30 for municipal

- court conviction s )

. H owever, t his appeal is not from a convi ction in municipal court

. The referenced minimu m “amount in controversy” exceeding $100 is inapplicable here

. Further, to the exte nt that P erkin s contends that an appeal fro m a conviction for driving while license invalid with a prior conviction for the same offense is a “ civil ” non - case, he is mistaken. As we stated in Perkins ’ s appeal of his prior driving

- while

- license

- invalid

con viction , the c la ssification of a case as “ c riminal ” is determined by th e n ature of the proceeding. Perkins v. St ate , No. 03

- 14

- 00733

- CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1730, at * 10

- 11 (Tex. App.

— Austin Feb. 19, 2016 , pet. denied ) (noting that certain “ failure s alle ged m ight defe at

a prosecution , but they do not convert the case to a civil case ” )

. Th e State initiated this case by a charging instr ument alleg ing that Perkins committed an offense against the peace and dignity of the State with a prior conviction for dr iving whi le li ce nse invalid , a jury found P erkins g uilty as charged , a n d Perkins received a jail sentence

— all hallmarks of a criminal caus e of action. See id. ; see also Tex. Penal Code § § 1.07 (defining “ [m] isdemeanor” as “ an offense so designated by5 law or punish able by fine, by confinement in ja il, or by both fine and confine ment in jail ” ) , 12 .22 ( setting fo rth punishment for Class B mi sdemeanor offense s ) ; Tex. Transp. Code § 521.457 (e), (f) ( providing that Class C mi s demeanor offense of driving while li cense inv alid is Class B
mi s demean or with p rior offense under that section ); s ee also Mergerson v. State , N o. 12

- 12

- 00347

- CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9558, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Tyler July 31, 2013 , no pet. ) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ( appeal from convictio n for Class B misdemeanor offense of driving while license invalid )

. Given th e na ture of this case, Perkin s ’ s appeal is properly designated with th e “

- CR ” suffix “ for a crim inal case. ” See Tex. R. App. P. 12.2(a)(4). Because we conclude that th e referen ced m in imum “ amount in controvers y ” exceeding $100 is inapplicable here and because this is a n app eal from a criminal conviction , we overrule Perkins ’ s first and twelfth issue s
. Second issue: J udgment did not require correction as to plea of “ not guilty ” Perk in s contends that the trial c ourt ’ s judgment “ reports the case fals ely ” because

“ Perkins never ‘ joined issue. ’ ” We construe this issue , briefed without citation to authorities, as a complaint that his judgment of conviction shows his plea of “not gui lty

. ” See Tex. R. App. P.
38. 1( i) (requiring briefs to con tain proper citations to authority ) ; C antu v. State , 939 S.W.2d 627, 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ( stating that c h a r g i n g i n s t r u m e n t m u s t b e r e a d a n d d efendant ’ s plea must b e entered bef ore j ury “ for the issue to be joined ” )

. 4 Pe rk in s ’ s judgment of conviction show s his plea of “ not guilty ” b ecause the trial court e ntered that plea for him when Perkins

re fused to plead “ guil ty, not guilty, or no contest

. ” See Tex. Co de Crim. Proc. art. 27.16 ( “ The ple a of not guilty may be made or al ly by the de fendant or by his counsel in open court. If the

4 Perkin s ’ s chargin g ins trument, the i n f ormati on, was read before the ju r y.6 defendant refuses to plead, the plea of not guilty shall be entered for him by the court. ” ) ; Coyle v.
State , 775 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1 989 , n o pet. ) ( r ejec ting contention that tria l

co urt erred by enter ing not guilty plea under article 27.16 for defendant who refused to plead based on her claim that she had not “ violat [ed] the contract with the State of Texas ” ) ; see also Perkins v. State , Nos. 03

- 14

- 003 05

– 00310

- CR, 2015 Tex. App. LE XI S 6426 , at * 4 (Tex. App.

— Austin June 25, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ( noting in Perkins ’ s appeal of his conviction s for driving with expired registration and expired inspect ion sti cker and fail ing to maintain financial resp onsi bi lity that while Perkins did not actually say “ not guilty, ” effec t of his refusal to enter any plea t o charges was that he entered pl ea of not guilty)

. Thus, w e conclude that the judgment in this case contai ned no fal sification requiring correction.
W e ov er rule Per kin s’s second issue. 5

Third and fo urth issues: Discovery complaints and constitutional challenge to art . 39.14( d) Perkins ’ s thi rd and fourth issu es raise complain ts about discovery and the
const itutionalit y of the stat ute governing discove ry i n cr iminal cases

. In his third issue, Perkins contends generally th at the trial court “ abuse [ d its ] discret ion regarding [his] discovery requests. ” However, Perkins ob ta ined an adverse rul ing only as to th ree requests

. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) ( ad dre ss ing error preservatio n generally ) ; State v. Arizmendi , 519 S.W.3d 143, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) ( requiring adverse ruling from trial court to preserve error ). Those r equests sought : (1) the part of a po li ce trainin g manual focusing on train ing for dealing w it h

“ sovereigns ” ; (2) the part of a police training man ual focusing o n “ the difference between

5 Perkins also contends withi n this issue that the judgment of conviction “reports the case falsely” b ecause “ [ a] llocution not mentioned.” Th is vagu e content io n is not further explained and is waived as inade quately briefed

. See Tex. R. App. P. 38. 1( i).7 ‘ transportation ’ and ‘ travel ’ ” ; and (3 ) a list of persons that t he State 6 “ contends ” to be a beneficiar y o f t he trust relationship established when the manufact ure r ’ s st at ement or certificate of origin is traded for a certifi cate of title. The State said that it did not have anything responsive to the first or second request s , further that the s econd request wa s i rreleva nt to the allegations
aga inst Perk ins in the charging instr u m ent and was irrelevant to any element of the offense, and that the third request was incomprehensible. As to the remainder of discovery that Perkins sought , the trial court rul ed tha t the State w oul d make items available for ins pection by P erkins , accompanied by o ne of its investigators , on a date set by the trial court

. Article 39.14 (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure govern s discovery in criminal

ca ses involv ing a pro s e defenda nt . Tex. Co de C rim. Proc. art. 39.14 (d). It provides that if the trial court ord er s the St ate to produce and permit the inspection of a document , item, or information under subsection (d) , the S tate shall permit the pro se defendant to inspect a nd review t he docum en t, i tem, or information but is not required to allow electronic duplic at ion

. Id. Under a rticle 39.14 generally , defendants are entitled to discovery that i s in the State ’ s possession , custody, or control and that is material to any m atter inv ol ved in t he act ion

. Watkins
v. State , 619 S.W .3d 265 , 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) . The Court of Crimina l Appeals recently held that “ material ” as used in article 39.14 means “ having some logical connection to a fact of
consequen ce ” and is “ synonym ous wi t h relevant. ” Id. at 29 0 , 2 91

. Reviewing court s must conduct a h ar m analysis before determining whether rever s al is proper f or violation of article
39.14. See i d. at 291.

6 Perkins erroneously re fer s to the State as “ Plain tiff , ” referencing t he c lassifica tion of p arties to civil litigation

. As previous l y discussed, we reject Perkins ’ s co ntentio n th at th e prosecution r esultin g in his conviction of a Class B misdemea nor offense and sentence under s ection 12.22 o f the Penal Code was a nything but a c riminal c ase.8 Here, a s to the three denied request s , Perkins failed t o show that the req uested di scovery

— ass uming the existence of responsive portions of a p oli ce training manual about dealing with “sovereigns ” and about “the difference between ‘transportation’ and ‘travel’ ” and the existence of a l ist of pe ople that the St ate “contends” are b enefi c ia r ies of Per kins’s described “trust relationsh ip”

— had “ some logi ca l connection to a fact of consequence ” in Perkins ’ s prosecution for the Class B misdemeanor o f f e n s e of driving while license invalid

. See id. at 290,
291

. Furthe r, Perkins made no argume n t about how t he discovery he sought was “ materi al

. ” See
B r anum v. State , 5 35 S.W.3d 217, 22 4

- 2 5 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 201 7 , n o pet. ) (noting that defendant bears burden of sho w ing that di sc overy soug ht is “ material ” ) ; see also United States v. Agurs , 427 U. S. 97, 109

- 10 (1976) ( “ The m ere possibility t hat an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or mi ght have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘ ma te riality ’ in the constitutional sense. ” ).
A s to t he remainder o f th e discover y , the prosec utor brought the State ’ s file and its investigator to a n August 23, 2017 pretria l hearing and gav e Perkins the o pportunity to review the file with the investigator a nd to view the video at the prosecutor ’ s of fi ce , but Perkins decli ne d th ose off er s
. When the trial court asked P erk ins about review ing what t he State had for
him , Perkins re plied only , “ I would reject the in

- person review option. And I would object to th at discovery limitation. ” Recognizing Perkins ’ s choice , the trial c ourt stated , [I] f you don ’ t want to review t h ose disco very [items] , you don ’ t have to review the discovery

— t h a t ’ s y o u r d e c i s i o n t o m a k e

— t he State ’ s got [it] here today available for you r review if you want. But if you don ’ t want to, you don ’ t have to. Y ou can ’ t be forced to do that.9 At the next pretrial hearing on Octo ber 4, 2017 , the trial court again asked Perkins ab out the
State ’s offer to review discovery items in accordance with t he appli cab le discovery rules : “ Mr. Perkins, do you have

— do you st il l persist i n rejecting the State

— rejecting th e opportunity to revi ew the discovery? Are you still saying you don ’ t want to do that? ” Perkins re plied, “That ’s
correct. ” Perkins made n o a rgument challenging the constitutionality of article 39.14 or its

s ubsections a t the earliest opportunity, during either of the t wo pretrial hearings discussing d iscove ry . Instead , Perkin s waited unt il after his conviction , raising it in his motion for n e w trial

. In his fourth issue, Perkins contends t hat the dis cov er y statute go v erning cri minal proceedings in ar ticle 39.14 does not apply t o this “ civil ” case , but if it d oes, article 39 .14 (d) is unconstitutional either facially or as applied because it al lows for disparate treatment of pro se defendants as compared t o those repres ented by counsel

. But Perkins rai se d this contention too late. He made no complain t to t he trial court that article 39.14 was unconstitutional faciall y or as applied until Ap ril 19, 2019, when he fil ed his motion for new trial

. A specific ob jec tion must be made at the earliest opportuni ty, as soon as the basis for the objection becomes apparent. See
Tex. R. A pp. P. 33.1(a); Colone v. State , 573 S.W.3d 249, 260 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. 2019) ( “ A defendant may not raise a matter for the first time i n a m otion for new trial if he had the opportuni ty to rai se it at trial

. ” ); Estrada v. State , 313 S.W.3d 274, 306 (Tex. Crim . App. 2010) (noting that defendant failed to preserve for appeal h is facial constitutional challenges to sentencing statute ) ; Alexa nd er v. State , 137 S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. App.

— Ho uston [1st Dist.]
2004 , pet. ref ’ d ) (concluding that defendant who first ass erted constitutional objections i n his motion for new trial did n ot timely assert his complaints and failed to preserve error for ap pe llate review ) ; see also McNamara v. State , No. 02

- 16

- 00422

- CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3520, at * 16 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 17, 2018, pet. ref ’ d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)10 ( holding that defendant forf eited his constitutional c hallenge to st a tute all owi ng evidence of certain extra neous offenses by raising it too late in his motion for new trial)

. On this recor d, we conclude that the grounds for Perkins ’ s challenge s to ar ti cle
3 9.14 became apparent d uring the pretrial hearings whe n disco ve ry was offere d to him under the provisions of t hat statute

. Perkins failed to make a ti m ely and specific objection at that t ime. Thus, Perkins has forfe ited his complaint challenging th e constitutionality of ar ticle 39.14. See
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); C olone , 573 S.W .3d at 260 ; Alexander , 137 S.W.3d at 131 ; see also
McNamara , 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3520, at * 16

. We overrule Per kins ’ s third and fourth i ssues.
Fifth iss ue: C hallenge to con st itutionality of art . 25.04 Next, Perkins challenges the con st it utio nality of article 25.04 of the Code of Crimi nal Procedure, contending that it “ facially violate [ s ] Due Process

. ” Art icle 25.04 provid es ,

“ I n misdemea nors, it shall not be necessary be fo re trial to furnish the accused with a copy of the indictment or i nformation; bu t he or his counsel may demand a c opy, which shall be given as early as possible. ” T ex. Co de Crim. Proc. art. 25.0 4. “When considering a statute’s constitutionality, we be gin with the presumption that the statute is valid.” Allen v. S ta te , 614 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. 201 9 )

. A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is an at tack on the statute itself, rather than a particular application, and requ ir es the challenger to establish that “ no set of circumstances exi st s under which [ the ] statute would be v alid. ” I d

. a t 740

- 41 (internal quotation omitted )

. Thus, if there is any possible constitutional application of th e statute, a facial challenge fail s. Id. at 741

.

“ Given this high burden, a facial challenge is ‘ t he most difficult challenge to mount successfully. ’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745 ( 1987) ).11 We rejected a facial challenge t o the constitutionality of article 2 5.04 in Perkins ’ s prio r appeal of a driving

- wh ile

- license

- invali d conviction

. Per kins , 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1730, a t * 7

- 9

. We noted that t he lan guage of article 25.04 follows the Texas Constitutional requirement that the accused in a criminal prosecution “ shall have the right to demand the nature and the cause of the a ccusation agains t him, and t o have a copy thereof. ” Id. at *8 (c iting Tex. Const. art. I, § 10 ) ; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.01 ( providing f or notice to defendant of charges against him by requiring that in “ all misdemeanor cases punish able b y imprisonment, th ere shall be an arraignment ” ). In this appeal, as in th e pri or one , the record reflect s that Perkins knew the charge that was pending against him. Id. at *8

- 9 ; Perkins ’ s signature appears on a December 2016 cash bond stating t hat he is ch arged with the m isdemeanor of “ DWLI w/prev convict ions

. ” See id. at *8 (noting similar document ). He filed a special appearance and plea to the jurisdicti on in March 201 7 rais ing several issues presented in his brief here. See i d. (noting si milar plea di ngs ). Further, at a heari ng held more than a year and a hal f before trial, the trial
court and P e r kins had this discussion :

T he Court: And you understand the nature of t he charges against you [?] The charge against you is driving while licens e invalid w ith prior convic tion [.] It ’ s a Class B misdemeano r with six months in jail, a fine up to $2,000 or both or any combinat ion of the two and conviction co uld result in suspen si on of driving privileges potentially for an additional period of time. D o you u nd erstand the natu re of the o ffense against you?
Pe rkins: I believe I do. The Court: And do you also understand the ran ge of punishment if you were found to be guilty?
P er kins: Yes.12 We con clude that Perkins failed to meet his “ high burden ” of show i ng that article 25 .04 is faci ally unconstitution al

. See Allen , 614 S.W.3d at 740

- 41; see also Perkins , 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1730, at * 9 ( r e a c h i n g s a m e c o n c l u s i o n )

. W e overr ul e his fifth issue

. Sixth issue: Denial of s pecial appearance Perkins contends i n his sixth issu e tha t the trial court erred by de nying his spec ial
appear ance , a lleg ing that the trial court never acquired personal jurisdiction over him because there wa s “ n o evid ence ” of : (1) “ tra nsportation ” ; (2) “ c onsent ” ; and (3) a “ vehic le. ” T hi s contention fails for severa l rea sons. T he spec ial appearance pleading is speci fic to civ il cases , which Perkins ’ s
pro se cution for a Class B misde meanor offense was not

. A s pecial appearance in civil cases allows a defendant to appear and at tack the co urt ’ s jurisdicti on over his person without subject ing himself to the jurisdict ion of that court generally. T ex. R. Civ. P. 120a ; Coyle v. State , 775 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex. Ap p.

— Dallas 19 89, no pet.) ; see Jenkins v. State , 592 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Te x. Crim. Ap p. 2018) (noting that cri mi nal cases are unlike ci vil cases, “ where personal jurisdiction over a party may be had merely by that party ’ s appeara nce before the court ” ).
Fur th er, Perkins’s “no evidence” argument in his “ special appearance ” is unp ersuas ive b ecause he made th at filing before trial, when not h i ng had yet been admitted into “evidence

. ” Finally, i n misdemeanor cases, “ [p] ersonal jurisdiction is conferred upon the co u rt by the filing of an informati on. ” See Tex. Const. art. V, § 12(b); Ramirez v. State , 105 S.W.3 d 628, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ; Estrada v. State , 148 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Te x. App.

— El Paso 2004 , no pet. ) ; see also Gray v. State , N o. 03

- 09

- 00408

- CR, 2010 T ex. App. LEXIS 6777, at * 6

- 7 (Tex. App.

— Austin Aug. 18, 2010 , no pet. ) (mem. op ., not designated f or publica t ion)

. As we have noted , Perkins was charged by information with the Class B misdemeanor offense of driving while13 license invalid . He was convict e d in t he C ounty Court at Law No. 2 of Bell County , a statutory
count y court tha t ha s jurisdiction over misde meanor offenses. See Te x. Const. art. V, §§ 16, 17;
Tex. Gov’t Co de §§ 25.0003 (a) , .0161 (2) , 26.045(a)

. B ecause Perkins was charged by
i nformat i on with the Class B misdemeanor offense of driving while license invalid , the Cou nt y Court at Law N o
. 2 of Bel l County had personal ju risdiction in this case. S ee Gray , 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 6777, at *7 (rejecting similar challenge to trial court ’ s person a l jurisdicti on over defendant convict ed of driving w ith suspended licens e ). We o ve rrule Perkins ’ s s ixth iss ue
. Seventh , tenth, eleven th, thirteenth , and fourteenth issue s : Burden of proof The substance of Perkins ’ s complaint s in these f ive issues is whether the State carried its burden of proof. Th ese issues stem from P erkins ’ s th eory that he was n ot engage d in

“ transportation , ” as he defines it. His theory is that “ transportation ” requires proof of a

“ vehicle, ” “ motor vehicle, ” “ driver, ” or “ opera t or , ” which in turn depend on proof of h is removing people and/or propert y from on e place to another f or hire , h is consent to being
regu lated , and evidence of that consent through an “ active certificate of title trus t ” to his car. Specifically, Perkins co n tends in his seventh iss ue t hat the trial court erred by denying his ple a to the ju risdiction because the Stat e did not demonstrat e i ts standing b y proving “ transportation ” ; his tenth issue challenges the denial of his re - as se rt ed p lea to the jurisdiction at the close of the
State ’ s case ; his eleventh issue contends that the t rial cour t erred by submitting “ jurisd ictional questi ons ” involv ing “ transportation , ” “ consent , ” and “ vehi cle ” to the jury ; h is thirtee n th issue contends that the trial court improper l y relieved the State , “ as Plai ntiff , ” of its burden to prove the existen ce of a “ tr ust ” showing hi s li ability as a “ fiduciary ” ; and his fourteenth issue contends that because the State lacks evidence of “transportation , ” “consent , ” or any “vehicle , ” “ it f o llows14 that the compelled consen t, compelled commerce foundation of [ the ] State’s wi tch hunt agenda is quite pl ainly unconstitutional. ”
H owever, contrary to Perkins ’ s theory , the elements of proof for the Class B mi sdemeanor of d riving while license in v alid d o not require showing the defendant ’ s consent to being regulated , a certifi ca te of titl e trust, the defe ndant ’ s ownership of the v ehicle, or that the vehicle was being used to remov e people or property from one place to another for hire

. Rather, th e State had to show only th at Perkins “operate[d] a motor vehicle on a hi ghway . .

. during a period th at [ his ] driver’s license or privi lege [was] suspended or revoked ” and that he had at least one prior conviction for that offense. See Tex. Tra nsp. Code § 521.457(a)(2), (f ). We have rejected arguments that Perkins repeats h ere as su pp ort for his c lai m t hat the State fell short of
pro vin g the charged offense , including arguments that :

• “ transportation ” must involve moving people or goods for hire and app lies only to

“ com mercial act ivity , ” s ee Perkins , 2 015 Tex. App. LEXIS 642 6, at * 6

- 8 ;

• matters outside t he penal code are not criminal but are breaches of fiduciary duty or trust , Perkins , 2016 Te x. App. LEXIS 1730, at *11 ;

• ab sent proof of “ transportation ” and “ commerce , ” the case sh ould not be submitted t o the jury , i d. ; and

• ab sent pr oo f of “ transportatio n , ” a tr ial court improperly relie ve s the Stat e of its evidentiary burden , id. at *17. 7

7 W hen ruling on a civil

- rights suit that Perkins filed based on the c onvicti on appealed here , t he Fifth Circ uit no ted that he viola ted the Transportation Code ’ s “ plain meaning ” :
Perkins violated [the Texas Transportation Code] according to [its] plain me aning. And his counter

- argument that he is not governed by the statutes is unconvincin g. I t is simply inco rrect “ that to be regulated under the Transportatio n Code, one must assert ‘commercial consent,’” as Perkins maintains. Perkins rests his argument on Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach , in which the Supreme Court ruled that tr ansportatio n in a vessel may be shown for15 During trial, t he State introduced documentary evidence that Perkins ’ s d river ’ s license was suspended indefinitely and that he had at l east one p ri or conviction for d riving w hile license inva lid

. Als o, t he State introduced testimony that Perkins had operated a motor vehicle on the access roa d portion of Inter state H ighway 35 after his driver ’ s license s uspension

. Accor d i ngly, t he State met its bu rd en of proo f by provi d ing ev idence on the elements requ ired by the law properly interpreted

. Tex. Transp. Code § 521.457(a)(2), (f). And t he jury , as “ the exclusiv e judge of facts ” in the criminal prosecution below, could have reasonably concl ude d that th e Dodge Caravan tran sportin g Perkins, his wife , and th eir four children on the access road portion of IH

- 35 wa s a “ vehicle , ” and that Perkin s , who was in the driver ’ s seat behind th e steering wheel when the Caravan was stopped , w as the person w ho “ operat ed ” th at vehicle as al leg ed i n the charging instrument

. See T ex. Code Crim. Proc. art . 36.13 ; see also Arroyo v.
State , 559 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) ( “ A court ’ s role on appeal is restricted to guarding agai nst the rare occurrence w hen the fa ct finder does not act rationa lly ” ). B ecause Perkins inc orrectly contend s that the State did not meet it s burden of proof at trial, we overrule Perkins ’ s sev enth, ten th, eleventh, thi rteenth , and fourteenth issues.

the purposes of 1 U.S.C. § 3 by the “conv eyance (of things or persons) from one place to another.” Perkins contends that because he was n ot transporting passengers or cargo, he was not operating a “vessel,” and th us he may n ot be arrested for vi olatio ns of law governing vehicles

— a kind of “vesse l.” But Lozman never once speaks of anything resembling “commercial consent.” And its holding c overs vessels “capable of being used . . . as a means of transportation on w ater,” not motor vehicles. The latter are regulated by the Texas Transportation Co de, and the district court correctly applied the law.
Perkins v. Ivey , 772 F. App ’ x 2 45, 246

- 4 7 (5th Cir. 2019); see Perkins v. Brewster , No. 20

- 50678, 2021 U.S. App. LEX IS 10541, a t *2

- 3 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 2 021) (noting that “one need not ‘consent’ to the Transportation Code to be bound by it”).16 Eighth issue: O verruling objec tions to wi tness testimony
In his ei ght h issue, P erkins contend s that the t rial court erred by overruling his object ions to witness testimony using the words “ vehicle , ” “ moto r vehicle, ” “ driv e, ” and

“ operate , ” which he says are “ legal conclusions

. ” Ho we ver, Perk in s failed to properly preser ve this complaint by object ing each time the compla i ned

- of testimony was offered. See Leday v.
State , 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App . 1998) ( stating that overruled objection to evidence will not result in reversa l when ot he r such evidence was receive d without objection either before or after complained

- o f ruling); Washington v. State , 485 S.W.3d 633, 638

- 39 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist .] 2016, no pet.) (concluding that error in admission of evidence may be rendere d harmles s when substantially s ame evi dence is admitted elsewhere without objection)

. Here, t he officer who sto pped Perkins testif ied without objection on direct examination t hat while in Bell County, he had seen Perkins “ driving ” and “ operating ” the “ mot o r vehicl e ” :
Q. All right. Now , when you observed Mr. Perkins dr iving and operating the mot or vehicle, was this in Bell County? A. Yes, in the City of Belton. Q. Okay. Was it in Bell Count y, though? A. Yes, sir. Q. And in the State of Texas?
A. Yes , sir.

Th is testimony from the o ffic er was substantially similar to the testimon y that had d rawn an objection f rom Perkins beforehand and that the trial court had overruled

. B ecause Per kins raised no objection to this testimony , w e conclude that he fail ed to pre se rve his com plaint for appel late17 review

. S ee Leday , 983 S .W.2d at 718 ; Washington , 48 5 S.W.3d at 638

- 39

. We o verrule his eighth issue. Ninth issue: Sustaining Stat e ’ s evidentiary o bjections to let t ers Perkins ’ s ninth and la st remaining issue contends t ha t the trial court e rred b y sustai ning the State ’ s obj ection to the relevancy of c ertain letters that P erkins off ered into evidence , which he claimed to have sent t o the Tex as Depar tment of Motor Vehicles . Th ose letters

— which have no postmark showing p ro of of m ailing and no return receipt showing delivery

— di scuss vehicle titles and Per kins ’ s understanding of the Texas Trust Code. We review the trial court ’ s ruling admittin g or excl ud ing evidence under an abuse

- of

- discr etion standard and will n ot revers e th at ruli ng unless it is ou tside the zone of reasonable disagreement

. Henley v. State , 493 S.W.3d 77, 82

- 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

. Finding a pi ece of evidence to be relevant is the first step in a determination of whether the evidence should be admitt ed before the jury. Id. at 83. Eviden ce is rel evant if i t has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable t han it would be without the evidence. Id. We uphold the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it is correct on any theory of l aw applicable to the cas e. Id. at 93.
Mat ters of vehicl e title and Perkins ’ s under standing of the Trust Code did not have any tendency to make a fact of cons equence m ore or less probable in the u nderlying trial for the Class B misdemeano r offense o f dri ving while license inv a l id

. See id. Further, the trial

c ourt had not hing establishing that the proffered letters were stamped, mailed , or received by the addr essee
. C f. Smith v. Holmes , 53 S.W.3d 815, 817 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2001 , no pet. ) (noti ng th at pa rty presented United S ta tes Postal Service return receipt containing s ignature indicating that mailed letter arrived at addressee ’ s location)

. O n this record, w e conclu de that t he tri al18 court ’ s ruling sustaining the State ’ s objections and declining t o adm it the se letters into ev id ence

was not outside the zone o f reasonable disagreement

. We overrule Perkins’s ninth issue. 8

C ONCLUS ION We affirm the trial court ’ s judgmen t

.

_______________ _

__________________________ Da rlene By rne , Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Byr ne, Justices Triana and Smith Affirme d Filed: May 28, 2021
Do Not Pu blish

8 Perkins ’ s May 17, 2021 motion for judicial notice regarding the van involved in th e stop is d enied.