2020 IL App (4th) 200173-U 

NOS. 4-20-0173, 4-20-0174, 4-20-0175, 4-20-0176, 4-20-0177, 4-20-0178 cons. 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re N.C.P., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois,

 Petitioner-Appellee, 

 v. (No. 4-20-0173) 

Nakia P., 

 Respondent-Appellant). 

_______________________________________________

In re N.R.P., a Minor 

(The People of the State of Illinois,

 Petitioner-Appellee, 

 v. (No. 4-20-0174) 

Nakia P., 

 Respondent-Appellant). 

_______________________________________________

In re Nai. H., a Minor 

(The People of the State of Illinois,

 Petitioner-Appellee, 

 v. (No. 4-20-0175) 

Nakia P., 

 Respondent-Appellant). 

_______________________________________________

In re Neh. H., a Minor 

(The People of the State of Illinois,

 Petitioner-Appellee, 

 v. (No. 4-20-0176) 

Nakia P., 

 Respondent-Appellant). 

_______________________________________________

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Adams County 

No. 16JA3 

No. 16JA4 

No. 16JA5 

No. 17JA21 

FILED

August 20, 2020

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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In re Nay. H., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois,

 Petitioner-Appellee,

 v. (No. 4-20-0177) 

Nakia P., 

 Respondent-Appellant). 

_______________________________________________

In re Nas. H., a Minor 

(The People of the State of Illinois,

 Petitioner-Appellee,

 v. (No. 4-20-0178) 

Nakia P., 

 Respondent-Appellant).

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No. 17JA22

No. 17JA23 

Honorable 

John C. Wooleyhan, 

Judge Presiding. 

 JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Turner and Holder White concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, granting appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and 

finding the trial court’s decision to deny respondent’s motion for change of venue 

and grant the State’s motion terminating respondent’s parental rights was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 2 In January 2018, we affirmed the trial court’s adjudication of neglect and 

revocation of respondent Nakia P.’s continuance under supervision order. In re N.C.P., 2018 IL 

App (4th) 170710-U. This matter proceeded toward resolution, with the State filing a motion for 

termination of parental rights against respondent-mother in June 2019. After several 

continuances at respondent’s counsel’s request, and after a full hearing, the court granted the 

State’s petition for termination of respondent’s parental rights in February 2020. 

¶ 3 On appeal, respondent’s appointed counsel filed a “Motion to Withdraw as 

Counsel on Appeal,” pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating he “was 

unable to construct an argument on behalf of respondent in support of a meritorious claim in her 
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appeal.” In a supporting brief, appellate counsel explained why he concluded respondent’s 

claims present no potentially meritorious issues for review. 

¶ 4 On May 19, 2020, we notified respondent of appellate counsel’s motion and 

indicated she could file a response thereto by June 9, 2020. The notice came back undeliverable 

and with no forwarding address. Respondent filed no response. Therefore, we grant appellate 

counsel’s unopposed motion to withdraw from representing respondent, proceed to the merits, 

and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 We first note a more detailed recitation of facts preceding the appeal of the initial 

adjudication and disposition was presented in N.C.P., 2018 IL App (4th) 170710-U and will not 

be repeated except where relevant to the court’s ruling. There, we affirmed the trial court’s 

January 2018 order revoking a previous “Continuance Under Supervision” order as well as the 

dispositional order finding the minors neglected and placing custody and guardianship with the 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). In the matter currently before us, the 

termination of respondent’s parental rights relate to N.C.P. (born in 2006), N.R.P. (born in 2007), 

Nai. H. (born in 2009), Neh. H. (born in 2012), Nay. H. (born in 2014), and Nas. H. (born in 

2014). 

¶ 7 A. Termination of Respondent’s Parental Rights

¶ 8 In June 2019, the State filed a motion for termination of parental rights, seeking a 

finding of unfitness and termination of parental rights of respondent. Specifically, the State 

alleged respondent (1) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the 

basis for the removal of the child from the parent and (2) failed to make reasonable progress 

toward the return of the child within two specific nine-month time periods after an adjudication 
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of neglect under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq.

(West 2018)). In July 2019, the trial court held a hearing on respondent’s motion for a change of 

venue regarding respondent’s two children in residential placement. After arguments, the court 

denied the motion and set the case for a future status date. In November 2019, the State filed an 

amended notification alleging only one nine-month time period between March 3, 2019, and 

December 2, 2019, where respondent failed to make reasonable efforts and progress. The State’s 

petition asked that termination be found to be in the best interests of the minors and requested

DCFS retain custody and guardianship over the minors with the authority to consent to their 

adoption. 

¶ 9 After several continuances, the trial court held a fitness hearing in February 2020. 

By this time, the only father who had been specifically identified and present for some of the 

proceedings had already executed surrenders of parental rights as to his children. None of the 

other alleged fathers ever appeared. Respondent failed to appear for this hearing; her attorney, 

representing she moved out of the area, requested a continuance. The trial court noted the case 

had been pending for some time, having been open since January 2016, with the State’s motion 

for termination being filed June 2019. The court further noted the last order of the court sent to 

respondent was returned “showing that it could not be delivered as addressed and it was unable 

to be forwarded.” After citing the numerous delays by the parties and that proper notice was 

provided to respondent, the court proceeded with the hearing. At the request of the State, the 

court took judicial notice of the petitions for adjudication, the order of findings and adjudication, 

the dispositional order, and that respondent’s visitation rights were suspended in May 2019 and 

never reinstated.
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¶ 10 The State’s first witness, Robin Lease, was a visitation specialist for Chaddock 

Foster and Adoption (Chaddock), responsible for transporting children to visits with their 

biological parents and observing their interactions. She assisted in visitation supervision for the 

minors and respondent. She testified she was scheduled to supervise a visit between respondent 

and the minors on March 6, 2019, but respondent failed to attend. Respondent was scheduled to 

have two other visits in March, but they never took place because respondent failed to contact 

the agency and confirm the visitation appointment as she was required to do. Due to her previous 

failures to appear for visitation, respondent was to contact the visitation supervisor to confirm 

she would appear. Lease recalled three other visits scheduled for April 2019, and ultimately 

canceled due to respondent’s failure to contact the agency and confirm them. All visits were to 

be supervised and respondent never progressed to the point where she had unsupervised 

visitation. Lease explained how sometimes when respondent failed to show up for visits, the 

minors were already transported to the scheduled meeting place waiting for her. Initially, the 

minors would be upset their mother failed to arrive, but eventually they were “used to the parents 

not coming to see them.” She did not supervise any more visits after April 2019 because 

respondent’s visitation was suspended. 

¶ 11 Katie Brink, another visitation specialist at Chaddock helped coordinate and 

supervise visits from February 2019 to April 2019. She testified she informed respondent she 

was responsible for bringing a meal for the children during visits. She recalled a visit in March 

2019 where respondent brought hair products but no food. Instead, Brink obtained sack lunches 

for the children because they were hungry. During the time Brink supervised visits, respondent 

failed to show for four visits in March and four visits in April. Like the scheduled visits with 

Lease, the minors would arrive at the scheduled meeting destination waiting for respondent, who 
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never came. Brink said when respondent failed to show up, the minors were “sad, they would 

cry, they felt let down.” 

¶ 12 Christopher Powell, a child protection specialist at Chaddock for the previous 

seven and a half years, was assigned to provide case management services to respondent and her 

children. He was present and able to verify the surrenders executed by respondent-father, I.H., 

with regard to four of the six children. He explained the process for conducting an integrated 

assessment and formulating a service plan. Powell explained how the terms of respondent’s 

September 5, 2019, service plan included cooperating with the agency, maintaining consistent 

appointments with the caseworker, complying with court orders, maintaining stable and 

appropriate housing to suit the needs of the minors, and to cooperate with any assessments or 

evaluations for mental health counseling, parenting classes, or domestic violence services, 

perform random drug screens, and complete any recommended services. Powell testified 

respondent was rated unsatisfactory as to parenting and visitation because “she had missed 

several of her visits with her children” and some of the visits she did attend were terminated 

early due to her behavior. She was never consistent in attending visits, which resulted in the 

suspension of visitation “because of her lack of involvement in her visits.” Powell testified he

also rated her unsatisfactory for her cooperation with the agency. He stated she was very 

unreliable in meeting with him on a consistent basis and, when they did meet, she was difficult to 

engage and very uncooperative. He also rated respondent unsatisfactory in housing, mental 

health, and domestic violence services. He stated that her small one-bedroom apartment was 

often dirty and unsuitable to house her six children. She was inconsistent in her attendance for 

her mental health treatment to the point where she was unsuccessfully discharged, and she never 

engaged in domestic violence services. Powell said the permanency goal by the time of the 
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September 5, 2019, service plan had been changed by the trial court to “substitute care pending 

court determine [sic] of termination of parental rights.” 

¶ 13 Powell also said during the time he was supervising her case, respondent would 

not provide reliable telephone numbers and he could not conduct a home visit since she was 

never present and would not contact him after he left contact information for her to do so. He 

described his unsuccessful attempts to notify her of an administrative case review meeting and 

provide her a copy of her service plan, testifying that even after scheduling a home visit with 

respondent, she failed to appear. When he was eventually able to contact her and express his 

concern for her failures to appear at scheduled visits, she acknowledged receiving the copy of the 

service plan; however, she explained that “she was mad at the format of how the visits were set 

up.” Powell said she was scheduled to see two children each visit with three visits scheduled 

during any given week. This came about because of the “chaotic” nature of visits if they were all 

together, as well as “concerns with some of the older children sexually perpetrating on the 

younger children.” He said respondent had been asked to provide a copy of her work schedule 

and never did. When she expressed “disagreements” with her service plan, she was advised to

attend the family team meeting to address her concerns. She did not attend. When she said she 

had “health issues” which prevented her from attending many of the missed visits, Powell 

testified he told her he “needed medical records to verify any visit or any meeting that she had 

missed that would correlate and correspond with a medical event.” Although respondent said she 

understood and would provide the necessary documentation, other than one record, which did 

not correspond with a missed visit, she failed to do so. When she provided the same excuse for 

missing the family team meetings where she could discuss her concerns with DCFS staff, Powell 
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informed her of the need to provide documentation of the medical reasons for her absence, which 

again was never forthcoming. 

¶ 14 In April 2019, Powell was eventually successful in conducting a home visit of 

respondent’s apartment, which he found “cluttered,” and “things were kind of piled up and 

packed together.” He also found she was using the stove as a heat source for the apartment 

because she had no electricity. Returning in May 2019, Powell again advised her to clean up the 

residence. When he saw her in July 2019, during a visit with one of the fathers, respondent said 

she was not staying in her own apartment at that time because she had no electricity. His efforts 

to meet with her in September, October, and November 2019 were unsuccessful. Although he 

attempted to contact respondent using the telephone numbers she provided, he was not able to do 

so. Respondent’s last contact with Powell was an e-mail at the end of November 2019 to inform 

him she was no longer in the Quincy area. She refused to provide him with an address or 

location. 

¶ 15 No other evidence was presented. The trial court noted the adjudication took place 

on August 10, 2017, and the dispositional hearing was on September 18, 2017 (two years and 

five months before). After finding each putative father unfit, the trial court looked to the relevant 

nine-month period from March 2019 to December 2019, and it found the evidence indicated the 

mother’s failure to attend visits during the months of March and April 2019 resulted in visitation 

being suspended “pending further order of the Court until such time as the mother would become 

fully engaged in services. That apparently never happened.” The court went on to point out that 

after the visits were suspended, they were never reinstated and “there was no request for 

reinstatement of services by the mother after May of 2019.” Her contact with her caseworker was 

sporadic, and the caseworker went to great lengths in his attempt to contact her through personal 
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visits, e-mail, and phone calls, which usually went unanswered. The mother never maintained 

suitable housing, participated in mental health or domestic violence counseling, and lacked 

sufficient progress to return the minors back to the home. The court noted one of the very few 

times respondent contacted the caseworker was to inform him that she left the area and would 

not provide him with any contact information or where she was staying. The court found each of 

the allegations of unfitness alleged in the motion was proved by clear and convincing evidence, 

specifically finding respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to correct conditions that 

formed the basis for removal and failed to make any reasonable progress to warrant the return of 

the minors within the relevant nine-month time period. 

¶ 16 B. Best-Interests Hearing

¶ 17 After a brief recess in the proceedings, the court proceeded to a best-interests 

hearing. The State recalled Christopher Powell, who described where each of the respondent’s 

six children were placed, noting “they all have some behaviors and have some issues” that 

require some level of specialized care. They all exhibited medical or mental health problems 

when they came into foster care. 

¶ 18 Powell testified Nay. H and Nas. H., both five years old, have been in their 

original specialized foster care placement since May 2017 and they have a relationship with their 

foster parents that is “extremely good,” viewing them as “mom and dad.” Powell visits them 

three times a month. Powell described them as being in a nurturing environment where their 

educational, medical, and mental health needs are being met. They were both diagnosed with 

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and Nay. H. also has an oppositional defiant 

disorder (ODD) diagnosis. They have been integrated into the extended family. They have 

individualized education plans, and their foster parents follow up with all necessary 
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appointments and services, taking part in their education and their overall well-being. The foster 

parents have expressed a willingness to adopt. Powell described Neh. H., age seven, similarly, 

testifying his foster parents “give him a lot of affection,” are involved with his education, and 

make sure all of his medical and counseling needs are met. He has been at this placement 

approximately one and a half years, having been moved several times due to difficult behaviors. 

Powell sees him “at least once a month.” Neh. H. has gone on family vacations with his foster 

family and is very close to them as well as their extended family. Neh. H. was discovered to have 

ADHD, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and reactive attachment disorder once he 

came into care. His foster parents ensure he receives the necessary therapy and counseling to 

address his mental health issues, as well as his psychiatric medication management. They follow 

up with all his appointments and participate in his education and have also expressed a 

willingness to adopt. Nai. H., age 10, has been at her residential facility placement for 

approximately one and a half years. She previously had very aggressive behaviors in foster care, 

which led to residential placement. Powell sees her once a month and testified she “seems to be 

pretty happy” in her current placement. Although it was an adjustment, Powell said “she is very 

bonded to staff there,” has good peer relationships, and is having all her medical, emotional, and 

educational needs met. She has contact with her extended family and has regular communication 

or visits with family or previous foster parents. Nai. H. has a diagnosis of ADHD and ODD. She 

is receiving therapy, counseling, and psychiatric medication management. The residential staff 

ensure she attends all counseling and appointments. For the future, DCFS is looking at 

specialized foster care for Nai. H. Powell testified N.R.P, age 12, is placed at a residential facility 

in Peoria, where he has resided for the last two years. Because of developmental delays and some 

aggressive behaviors, his need for a more structured environment with additional services 
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eventually ruled out foster placement. Powell sees him once a month. He continues to need “a lot 

of services,” and although he has “a few” positive staff relationships, they are more so at school 

than in his “cottage” or home. He has been approved for a psychological evaluation, which 

should help determine his needs. N.R.P. has some contact with an aunt who talks to him by 

phone and has visited and has other aunts from his father’s side of the family who have shown an 

interest. N.R.P. has a diagnosis of ADHD and ODD and receives therapy, counseling, and 

psychiatric medication management through the facility. DCFS is currently investigating a “step 

down” placement, which could involve guardianship by a relative or possible foster placement 

with fictive kin. N.C.P., who is 14 years old, initially had a number of different placements due 

to her behaviors, both in school and at home, but has “really excelled with her maternal 

grandmother” in Indiana since May 2019 according to Powell. He sees her every six months 

since hers is an interstate compact case, monitored monthly by the Indiana Department of Child 

Services. Since residing with her grandmother, N.C.P.’s behaviors, health, attitude, and grades 

have improved. She continues to have contact with extended family. N.C.P. is the only child who 

does not have a mental health diagnosis. The grandmother has expressed her willingness to 

adopt. Powell stated none of the minors have had contact with respondent since May 2019 after

her visitation was suspended. 

¶ 19 The trial court found that the four children who reside in foster placements have 

bonded with their foster parents and family, that all of their needs are being met, and the foster 

parents have stated a willingness to provide permanency for those minors through adoption. 

Regarding the two minors in residential placements, the court found they are bonding with 

people in their respective placements and those placements are meeting all their needs. The court 

acknowledged the agency’s plan to have them transition to “non-residential placements of a pre-
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adoptive nature.” The trial court found there was no evidence showing respondent had a recent 

relationship with any of the children or would be able to provide them a permanent and stable 

home anytime in the near future. Noting the statute requires the minors to receive permanency as 

soon as possible, the court found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence it is in the 

best interests of the minors to terminate respondent’s parental rights and their best opportunity 

for permanence is with their current respective placements. 

¶ 20 This appeal followed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 On appeal, respondent’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel with a

supporting memorandum. 

¶ 23 In the matter before us, respondent’s attorney suggests any appeal in this cause 

would be frivolous because he found no appealable issues in this case. Reviewing the 

proceedings on the motion for change of venue, the unfitness hearing, and the best-interests

hearing, counsel saw no irregularities in the trial process or other potential errors that could be a 

basis for a meritorious argument on appeal. Furthermore, counsel noted the State’s evidence 

during the unfitness and best-interests hearing went uncontroverted since respondent failed to 

appear for both proceedings. Our review of the record and the applicable law leads us to 

conclude counsel is correct. Accordingly, we grant his motion to withdraw. 

¶ 24 A. Venue 

¶ 25 Counsel argues there are no appealable issues extant in the trial court’s denial of 

respondent’s venue motion. We agree. The Juvenile Court Act states venue lies in the county 

where the minor resides or is found. 705 ILCS 405/2-2(1) (West 2018). Section 2 relates to 

transfers, providing: “If proceedings are commenced in any county other than that of the minor’s 
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residence, the court in which the proceedings were initiated may at any time before or after 

adjudication of wardship transfer the case to the county of the minor’s residence ***.” 705 ILCS 

405/2-2(2) (West 2018). “[T]he legal residence of the child does not technically affect the 

jurisdiction of the court [considering a neglect petition], so long as the child is physically present 

within the State.” In re Gonzales, 25 Ill. App. 3d 136, 143, 323 N.E.2d 42, 47 (1974). 

¶ 26 Although the record does not contain respondent’s motion for change of venue, it 

does contain the proceeding and the trial court’s ruling of July 11, 2019. From the record, it 

would appear respondent’s counsel filed, on the day the matter was set for appearances on the 

termination motion, a motion for change of venue as to two of the six children due to their thencurrent residential placement outside the county. The trial court correctly noted the transfer of 

venue was permissive, not mandatory. Further, since neglect proceedings are considered civil in 

nature, even improper venue would not deprive the court of jurisdiction to decide the motion for 

termination. See In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 543, 232 N.E.2d 716, 720 (1967). The court also 

indicated the children were currently placed in residential facilities outside the county but that 

there was no indication in the record how long those placements might last. Since the granting or 

denial of a petition for a change of venue will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion 

(Gouker v. Winnebago County Board of Supervisors, 37 Ill. 2d 473, 475, 228 N.E.2d 881, 882 

(1967)), there is nothing in this record to suggest it was an abuse of discretion to deny the 

motion. The case was, and had been, pending in Adams County since its inception. The four 

remaining children were all placed locally, and service providers were local as well. The court’s 

decision to deny the motion was a proper exercise of its discretion. We agree with appellate 

counsel that it would be fruitless to pursue this issue on appeal. 

¶ 27 B. Termination of Parental Rights
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¶ 28 Appellate counsel also found no arguable issues in either the procedure or the trial

court’s findings at the termination hearing. We agree. The Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption 

Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2018)) govern how the State may terminate parental rights. 

In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 494, 777 N.E.2d 930, 940 (2002). Together, the statutes outline two 

necessary steps the State must take before terminating a person’s parental rights—the State must 

first show the parent is an “unfit person” and then the State must show terminating parental 

rights serves the best interests of the child. D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 494-95 (citing the Adoption Act 

(750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998)) and the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 

1998))). “A parent’s rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is 

supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 349, 830 N.E.2d 

508, 514 (2005). A trial court’s finding of parental unfitness will not be overturned unless the 

finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208, 752 

N.E.2d 1030, 1045 (2001). “Under a manifest weight of the evidence standard, we give 

deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position to observe the 

conduct and demeanor of the parties and the witnesses ***.” D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 498-99. In 

relevant part, section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018)) 

provides: 

“D. ‘Unfit person’ means any person whom the court shall find to 

be unfit to have a child, without regard to the likelihood that the 

child will be placed for adoption. The grounds of unfitness are any 

one or more of the following, except that a person shall not be 

considered an unfit person for the sole reason that the person has 

relinquished a child in accordance with the Abandoned Newborn 
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Infant Protection Act: 

* * * 

(m) Failure by a parent *** (ii) to make reasonable progress 

toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month 

period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor 

under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent 

minor under Section 2-4 of that Act.” 

¶ 29 Only evidence within that nine-month period alleging the respondent failed to 

make reasonable progress toward the return of the child may be considered by the trial court. 

In re Brianna B., 334 Ill. App. 3d 651, 656, 778 N.E.2d 724, 729 (2002). 

¶ 30 We have provided the following guidance for evaluating reasonable progress. 

“ ‘ “Reasonable progress” ’ is an objective standard which exists 

when the court based on the evidence before it, can conclude that 

the progress being made by a parent to comply with directives 

given for the return of the child is sufficiently demonstrable and of 

such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to 

order the child returned to parental custody. The court will be able 

to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future 

because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the 

directives previously given to the parent in order to regain custody 

of the child.’ ” (Emphases in original.) In re A.P., 277 Ill. App. 3d 

592, 598, 660 N.E.2d 1006, 1011 (1996) (quoting In re L.L.S., 218 

Ill. App. 3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (1991)). 
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¶ 31 We first note respondent failed to appear for the unfitness and the best-interests 

proceedings. During the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from two different visitation 

specialists that during March and April 2019, respondent failed to appear for approximately 12 

visits with her children. Respondent’s failure to show up for visits upset her children. When she 

did participate in visits, she failed to see the children’s needs were met, i.e., she failed to provide 

them with food. Due to respondent’s constant failure to appear at visitation appointments, her 

visitation privileges were suspended in April 2019 and never reinstated. 

¶ 32 The trial court also heard evidence from respondent’s caseworker about her 

missed visitation appointments and her overall inconsistent visitation attendance. During the 

numerous times he confronted her and expressed concerns about her failure to visit her children, 

respondent provided a variety of excuses to explain her absence. At different times, she told her 

caseworker she was upset with the manner in which visitation was structured, she had medical 

appointments (for which she provided no verification), or that “it had been crazy busy.” Also, 

even when she did attend, the visits sometimes had to be cut short due to her behavior. He stated, 

“her visits ended up being suspended because of her lack of involvement.” On several occasions 

she would not be at her residence during a scheduled home visit and was uncooperative with him 

when they did meet. She was financially unstable and had a one-bedroom, often dirty apartment, 

not suitable to house six children. She was unsuccessfully discharged from her mental health 

counseling and failed to engage in any domestic violence services. The caseworker attempted to 

make contact with her during the months of September and October 2019, without success. The 

last communication he received from her was in November, when she informed him she moved 

from the area and refused to provide her current address or contact information. All of this 

evidence was uncontroverted. Her absence from the area was further corroborated by the court’s 
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observation at the outset of the hearing that the last order entered by the court had been sent to 

her last known address and returned as undeliverable and unable to be forwarded. Accordingly, 

based on the record before us, we cannot find the trial court’s finding of unfitness was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, and therefore, we agree with appellate counsel this is not a 

meritorious issue to pursue on appeal. 

¶ 33 C. Best-Interests Hearing

¶ 34 Counsel likewise finds no appealable issues in the trial court’s best-interests 

hearing or its ruling, and we agree. Once a trial court finds a parent an “unfit person,” it must 

next consider whether terminating that person’s parental rights serves the child’s best interests. 

“[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship 

must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364, 

818 N.E.2d 1214, 1227 (2004); see also In re Julian K., 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶ 80, 966 

N.E.2d 1107 (stating once the trial court finds the parent unfit, “all considerations, including the 

parent’s rights, yield to the best interests of the child”). When considering whether termination of 

parental rights serves a child’s best interests, the trial court must consider several factors within 

“the context of the child’s age and developmental needs.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). 

These factors include: 

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of 

the child’s identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious 

background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including 

love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least 

disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes and longterm goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for 
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permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of 

relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of 

every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and 

(10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child.”

In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1072, 859 N.E.2d 123, 

141 (2006); see also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). 

¶ 35 A trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best 

interests will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

In re Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53, 74 N.E.3d 1185. The court’s decision will be 

found to be “against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is 

clearly apparent or the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” In re

Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16, 73 N.E.3d 616. 

¶ 36 During the best-interests hearing, the caseworker described how each of the 

minors were doing in placement. All of the minors have positive relationships of varying levels 

in their current placements and are having their needs met. Even those with problems sufficiently 

severe to require structured residential placement were doing better and were ensured to be 

receiving all necessary services. The respective foster parents have signed written permanency 

commitment forms with a willingness to adopt the minors. None of the children have had contact 

with respondent since May 2019. This evidence was also uncontroverted. The trial court noted 

how the minors in foster placements have bonded with the families, who are willing to provide 

permanence, and the minors in residential placement have bonded with staff and are having their 

needs provided. There was no evidence that respondent was going to be able to provide a stable 

home anytime in the near future. Based on this evidence, the trial court agreed it was in the 
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minors’ best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Accordingly, we cannot find the 

trial court’s decision terminating respondent’s parental rights to be “unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

not based on the evidence.” Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16. For this reason, we agree 

with appellate counsel that an appeal in this cause would be frivolous and presents no 

meritorious issues. 

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we grant respondent attorney’s motion to withdraw and 

affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 39 Affirmed.