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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

April 21, 2015 

v No. 313449 

Wayne Circuit Court 

ROY LEE BLACK, LC No. 12-000945-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: TALBOT, C.J., and MURPHY and GLEICHER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 A jury convicted defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), 

felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the 

commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, for the shooting death of Marlon 

Jones. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s failure to warn him of the prejudicial 

effect of appearing before the jury in his jail uniform and the seating an alternate juror on the 

second day of deliberations. This Court previously remanded to develop the record in relation to 

the alternate juror issue. People v Black, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered 

March 7, 2014 (Docket No. 313449) (Black Order). We now discern no prejudicial error in the 

conduct of defendant’s trial and therefore affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On the afternoon of January 4, 2012, Marlon Jones drove to Superior Street in the city of 

Detroit with his friend Eugene Rice to purchase drugs. Rice exited the vehicle and traversed a 

vacant lot to meet a drug dealer. Defendant then drove up alongside Jones’s vehicle, with 

Gregory Currie in the passenger seat. All four men were acquainted, but defendant and Jones 

had a falling out the previous year. Defendant and Rice exchanged greetings as Rice returned to 

Jones’s car. Despite the presence of witnesses, defendant removed a handgun from his left 

sleeve and shot Jones in the head three times. Rice ran away and called 911. Currie claimed that 

he was so intoxicated that he slept through the incident, barely hearing the gunshots. Another 

witness, George O’Neal, testified that he saw the shooting from the porch of a vacant home he 

had visited that day to use heroin. Authorities arrived approximately 30 minutes later and 

pronounced Jones dead at the scene. 
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II. JAIL GARB 

 On the first day of the jury trial, defendant appeared at the courthouse in a yellow 

jumpsuit bearing the word “jail.” The trial court sua sponte questioned defendant about his 

apparel, and defendant explained that his jailhouse jumpsuit was the only clothing he had. It 

appears that defendant had traded his street clothes for “[m]oney for the commissary.” The court 

offered defendant a suit, shirt, and tie that he could wear during trial, but defendant refused. 

Upon questioning, defendant informed the court that he was 57 years old, had been in court twice 

before, and had worn civilian clothes on at least one of those occasions. The court queried, “But 

now you don’t want to wear civilian clothes?” and defendant responded, “What’s wrong with 

these your Honor.” The court stated its belief that defendant was “creating appellate issues” and 

“strongly recommend[ed] that [defendant] wear civilian clothes,” but declared that defendant 

was old enough and sufficiently familiar with the criminal justice system to make his own 

decision regarding his apparel. 

 Defendant now contends that the court denied him due process of law by failing to 

explain the prejudicial effect of wearing his jail uniform in front of the jury. 

With respect to a defendant’s physical appearance during trial, we . . . review the 

trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. We defer to the trial court’s 

superior opportunity to observe the defendant and to determine whether the 

defendant’s appearance prejudicially marks him or her as a prisoner. [People v 

Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 186; 774 NW2d 714 (2009), citing People v Harris, 

201 Mich App 147, 151-152; 505 NW2d 889 (1993).] 

 “A criminal defendant generally has the right to appear before the court ‘with the 

appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man.’ ” Payne, 285 Mich App at 

187, quoting People v Shaw, 381 Mich 467, 474; 164 NW2d 7 (1969). A defendant is “ ‘entitled 

to wear civilian clothes rather than prison clothing at his trial’ ” and “ ‘[i]t is improper’ ” to bring 

the defendant before the jury “ ‘clothed as a convict.’ ” Shaw, 381 Mich at 474, quoting 21 Am 

Jur 2d, Criminal Law, § 239, pp 275-276. Accordingly, “[a] defendant’s timely request to wear 

civilian clothing must be granted.” Harris, 201 Mich App at 151. However, failure to raise a 

timely objection to wearing jail clothing “waives any defects as to a defendant’s appearance 

before the jury.” People v Harris, 80 Mich App 228, 230; 263 NW2d 40 (1977). Moreover, “[a] 

prisoner who voluntarily chooses to stand trial in jail clothing cannot be heard to complain on

appeal.” Id. at 231 (emphasis added). 

 Defendant waived any claim of error by rejecting the court’s offer of civilian clothing and 

choosing to proceed to trial in his jail jumpsuit. Defendant’s decision was an “intentional 

relinquishment or abandonment” of his right to appear before the jury dressed as a civilian in the 

face of the trial court’s “stong[] recommend[ation]” that he wear something else. People v 

Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Defendant’s failure to object to wearing 

prison clothes, and indeed conscious decision to remain in his jumpsuit, was “sufficient to negate 

the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.” Estelle v Williams, 

425 US 501, 512-513; 96 S Ct 1691; 48 L Ed 2d 126 (1976). Simply stated, defendant cannot 

explicitly choose to wear his jail-issued uniform and then complain that the court 

unconstitutionally forced him to do so. 
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 Even if defendant had not waived his claim of error, he would not be entitled to relief. 

The trial court bore no duty to specifically warn defendant about the danger of prejudice facing a 

criminal defendant appearing before the jury in jail garb; that duty rests with defense counsel. 

As stated by the United States Supreme Court: 

Nor can the trial judge be faulted for not asking the respondent or his counsel 

whether he was deliberately going to trial in jail clothes. . . . Under our adversary 

system, once a defendant has the assistance of counsel the vast array of trial 

decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during trial rests 

with the accused and his attorney. Any other approach would rewrite the duties 

of trial judges and counsel in our legal system. [Estelle, 425 US at 512.] 

Defendant has not contended that defense counsel failed in his duty to advise him of the 

importance of appropriate attire at trial. We discern no error in this regard. 

III. SEATING OF AN ALTERNATE JUROR 

 At the close of arguments, the trial court instructed the jury and then randomly chose two 

jurors—Andrew Nagy and Aed Dudar—to excuse as alternates. The remaining jurors retired to 

the jury room to begin deliberations. They were dismissed for the day a half hour later. The 

following morning, October 12, 2012, court was allegedly delayed “several hours” because one 

of the jurors failed to appear. The court did not properly document subsequent events, but it is 

clear on the preremand record that one of the alternate jurors—Dudar—was called back to court 

to deliberate with the remaining jurors. At 1:24 p.m., this newly constituted jury returned to the 

courtroom to enter its verdict. 

 Defendant contended on appeal that the trial court violated his constitutional right to an 

unbiased jury, and the strictures of MCR 6.411, by seating an alternate juror without ensuring 

that the alternate juror had not been subject to outside influence in the interim. Upon initial 

review, this Court “remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to develop the record 

with respect to the issue of an alternate juror being used during deliberations,” and “direct[ed] 

the focus of the evidentiary proceedings to include the trial court’s compliance with the 

procedures set forth in MCR 6.411.” Black Order (Docket No. 313449). 

 On remand, the trial court conducted its evidentiary hearing over five days in October 

and November 2014. Both Dudar and Nagy testified, as well as the jury foreman, Joseph 

Bauman. The prosecutor, defendant’s trial counsel, and defendant also took the stand. The trial 

court ultimately concluded that it had followed the procedures of MCR 6.411 and the jury had 

“rendered a fair and unanimous verdict.” 

 Defendant now challenges the trial court’s factual findings, with some merit, and 

continues to argue that the court was lax in its duties. He further complains that he was excluded 

from the October 12, 2012 unrecorded proceedings during which the court and the attorneys 

decided how to resolve the missing juror situation. The lack of consultation deprived defendant 

of counsel, he asserts. In considering these issues, we begin with a general discussion of the 

applicable law. 
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 A criminal defendant has the right to a fair and impartial jury. US Const, Am VI; Const 

1963, art 1, § 20. This includes “a fundamental interest in retaining the composition of the jury 

as originally chosen.” People v Tate, 244 Mich App 553, 562; 624 NW2d 524 (2001). It is not 

always possible to maintain the integrity of the original jury. And defendants have “an equally 

fundamental right to have a fair and impartial jury made up of persons willing to cooperate, a 

right that is protected by removing a juror unable or unwilling to cooperate.” Id.; see also MCL 

768.18 (the trial court may excuse jurors for “any condition aris[ing] during the trial . . . which in 

the opinion of the trial court justifies the excusal . . . from further service”). Jurors who are 

unable or unwilling to deliberate may be replaced with an alternate. E.g., People v Mahone, 294 

Mich App 208, 215-217; 816 NW2d 436 (2011). 

 The power to impanel extra jurors at the start of a criminal trial arises from MCR 6.411, 

which provides: 

The court may impanel more than 12 jurors. If more than the number of jurors 

required to decide the case are left on the jury before deliberations are to begin, 

the names of the jurors must be placed in a container and names drawn from it to 

reduce the number of jurors to the number required to decide the case. The court 

may retain the alternate jurors during deliberations. If the court does so, it shall 

instruct the alternate jurors not to discuss the case with any other person until the 

jury completes its deliberations and is discharged. If an alternate juror replaces a 

juror after the jury retires to consider its verdict, the court shall instruct the jury to 

begin its deliberations anew. 

 “The trial court’s decision whether to remove a juror is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion,” while “[c]onstitutional issues, such as the right to a fair trial, are [generally] 

reviewed de novo.” Mahone, 294 Mich App at 215. Defendant failed to preserve his challenge 

with a timely objection, first raising the issue on appeal. Our review is therefore limited to plain 

error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764-765, 774; 

597 NW2d 130 (1999). But we review for clear error defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s 

factual findings at the hearing on remand. MCR 2.613(C). 

A. MCR 6.411 

 MCR 6.411 permits criminal courts to “impanel more than 12 jurors.” The trial court 

was therefore within its right to impanel 14 jurors at the onset of trial. The trial court also 

complied with MCR 6.411’s mandate to reduce the jury size to 12 prior to deliberations through 

random selection. At the close of trial, the court read final instructions to the jury. The court 

continued: 
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 Now ladies and gentlemen as you have already been informed the jury can 

only have 12 members to deliberate and arrive at a verdict.[1]

 At this time, my clerk will blind draw the names of two jurors who will be 

excused with the thanks of the Court. 

 MCR 6.411 next describes that “[t]he court may retain the alternate jurors during 

deliberations.” The trial court did not technically retain Dudar and Nagy. Instead, the court 

excused the alternate jurors, telling them “you are free to go.”2 This Court’s decision in Tate

provides an example of how a court should proceed on the record to retain alternate jurors. In 

Tate, the trial was heard by 13 jurors, who had been instructed from the beginning not to discuss 

the case with anyone. Tate, 244 Mich App at 555. During final instructions, the court informed 

the panel that one member would be “blind drawn” to be removed from deliberations. Id. The 

court continued: 

 However, I am going to ask that person whose name is drawn to please 

give me your name and a number where you can be reached tomorrow during the 

day, so that in the event that we are unable to continue with the 12, we will be 

able to call that alternate in and have that person deliberate. [Id. at 555-556.] 

Here, the court excused the alternates with no indication on the record that they might be 

recalled. Indeed, neither Dudar nor Nagy could recall such information being given even off the 

record when questioned at the evidentiary hearing. 

 The court rule continues by providing that if the court exercises its discretion to retain the 

alternate jurors, it must “instruct [them] not to discuss the case with any other person until the 

jury completes its deliberations and is discharged.” The trial transcript reveals that such 

instructions were given to the entire jury at the beginning of trial: 

 Now until this case is submitted to you at the conclusion of the Court’s 

final instructions you must not discuss it with anyone, not even with members of 

your families or your fellow jurors. 

 After it is submitted to you, you may discuss it only when the Court so 

instructs you and only in the jury room in the presence of all your fellow jurors. 

* * * 

 

1

 Our review of voir dire and opening jury instructions revealed that the court had not previously 

advised the jury on the record that two members would later be selected as alternates while the 

other 12 would deliberate the case. 

2

 Defense counsel testified that he recalled the court “reminded [the alternate jurors] that they 

still could be called and they should be available and not to discuss the case.” This testimony 

was corroborated by no other witness and contradicts the transcript of the proceedings. 
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 If anyone attempts to say anything to you or in your presence about this 

case, tell them that you are on the jury trying the case and ask them to stop. 

 No complementary instruction appears in the transcript of the final jury instructions. At 

the evidentiary hearing, Nagy recalled that the judge instructed him not to discuss the case with 

others, but he was unsure whether the trial court gave this instruction before or after he and 

Dudar were chosen as alternates and excused. He did not remember personally speaking to the 

judge or the court clerk before he left the building. Dudar believed the judge provided additional 

instructions when he was released as an alternate: “I think I was told not to discuss the case with 

anyone any family members or anybody outside of the courtroom outside of the jury room 

besides the jurors.” 

 This Court has previously found a trial court’s initial instructions not to discuss the case 

sufficient to inform an alternate juror that has been retained by the court. See Tate, 244 Mich 

App at 555. In Tate, however, the court had also given a specific instruction to retain the 

alternate jurors until the completion of deliberations. Id. at 555-556. When the alternate juror 

was recalled to join the jury in Tate, the court engaged in an inquiry on the record to ensure the 

juror had not discussed the case outside of court and had not been influenced. Id. at 557. Given 

the starkly different circumstances in this case, we cannot find the jury’s initial instruction 

sufficient to advise the alternate jurors. 

 Finally, MCR 6.411 demands that the court “instruct the jury to begin its deliberations 

anew” when an alternate juror joins their ranks. Absent a transcript of that portion of the 

proceedings, the attorneys questioned Dudar and Bauman, the jury foreman, to piece together 

events. Dudar did not recall any instructions being given in the courtroom; he remembered only 

being taken into the jury room. Bauman testified that the entire jury was brought into the 

courtroom and seated in the jury box. Bauman continued, “I believe the Judge gave us 

instruction as to how we were suppose[d] to go about with our deliberations but I don’t 

remember exactly what he said.” The prosecutor mirrored Bauman’s memory: “I believe that the 

rest of the jurors were brought out and then they were all instructed to go in and deliberate 

together.” As did defense counsel: “He advised them [the jury assembled in the jury box] . . . 

that this alternate juror would now become part of the jury. And there was some discussion as to 

how they would proceed. I don’t have any independent memory of the exact verbiage but I can 

say . . . I was satisfied.” Defense counsel reiterated that he was satisfied with the instructions 

after acknowledging his awareness that the jury should be directed to restart deliberations. 

While such an instruction was likely given, we have no way to verify this on the record as it 

stands. 

 Yet, relief is not warranted in this case. The trial court’s failure to properly inform the 

alternate jurors that they were being retained for service and to instruct the alternates upon 

excusal not to discuss the case with anyone, and even the potential error in failing to advise the 

jury to start deliberations anew with the newly seated juror, were not outcome determinative. At 

the hearing, Dudar expressly denied that he had spoken to anyone about the case between being 

released and then recalled to join the deliberating jury. Accordingly, the failure to properly 

retain and instruct Dudar in this regard did not affect the jury deliberations. 
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 Moreover, the jury did not begin their substantive deliberations until Dudar was seated. 

Bauman testified that in the half hour the jurors met on October 11, 2012, the jury selected him 

as the foreman, they read the instructions, and “discussed what evidence we may want to ask to 

have recalled for us to see.” The jury “had not even really started any meaningful deliberations 

before [they] were excused.” Bauman indicated that Dudar approved the jury’s choice of 

foreman and was fully involved in the deliberation process. The jury began discussing the 

charges against defendant and taking polls on his guilt only after bringing Dudar up to speed. 

Dudar was present when the jury “spent a lot of time going over” the elements of the offenses. 

As a result, this error was also harmless. See Tate, 244 Mich App at 567-568 (finding harmless 

error even in light of the court’s specific instruction not to begin deliberations anew).3

B. DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT 

 Defendant also contends that he was excluded from the courtroom on the morning of 

October 12, and that defense counsel failed to consult with him. As a result, defendant 

complains that his constitutional rights to be present during the proceedings and to effective 

assistance of counsel were violated. This issue was not raised until the third day of the 

evidentiary hearing. Defendant testified that he did not learn about the missing witness situation 

until noon when a deputy visited defendant in the holding cell, and was not returned to the 

courtroom until the verdict was read. Defendant claimed that his lawyer never discussed the 

issue with him. Defense counsel, on the other hand, “believe[d] [his] client was there” when the 

alternate juror arrived and was impaneled. Defense counsel admitted that he did not consult with 

his client about proceeding with “13 jurors” versus recalling the alternate and dismissing the late 

juror. However, he could not recall whether he had discussed the situation with defendant in any 

form. 

 A criminal defendant has both a statutory and constitutional right to be present during his 

trial. People v Kammeraad, 307 Mich App 98, 116-117; 858 NW2d 490 (2014), citing MCL 

768.3, and People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229, 246 n 10; 365 NW2d 673 (1984). This right 

extends to “all critical stages of the trial.” Rushen v Spain, 464 US 114, 117; 104 S Ct 453; 78 L 

Ed 2d 267 (1983). The constitutional right is implied in the Confrontation, Due Process, and 

Impartial Jury Clauses. Kammeraad, 307 Mich App at 117. 

A defendant has a right to be present during the voir dire, selection of and 

subsequent challenges to the jury, presentation of evidence, summation of 

counsel, instructions to the jury, rendition of the verdict, imposition of sentence, 

and any other stage of trial where the defendant’s substantial rights might be 

adversely affected. [Mallory, 421 Mich at 247.] 

 

3

 Defendant argues that because “a constitutional right [was] invaded,” the prosecution should 

bear the burden of demonstrating an absence of prejudice. However, when an issue is 

unpreserved, “[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of 

persuasion with respect to prejudice,” regardless of whether the issue involves a constitutional 

right. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764, quoting United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 734; 113 S Ct 

1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993). 
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It has also been described that a criminal defendant has a due process right to be present during 

his criminal proceedings “ ‘whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the 

fulness [sic] of his opportunity to defend against the charge.’ ” United States v Gagnon, 470 US 

522, 526-527; 105 S Ct 1482; 84 L Ed 2d 486 (1985), quoting Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 US 

97, 105-106; 54 S Ct 330; 78 L Ed 674 (1934). A defendant’s absence even at a critical stage of 

the proceeding does not mandate automatic reversal; rather, the defendant must establish 

“whether there is ‘any reasonable possibility of prejudice’ ” to merit relief. People v Morgan, 

400 Mich 527, 536; 255 NW2d 603 (1977). 

 No precedential opinions in this state categorize as a “critical stage” a proceeding in 

which the court decides how to proceed when a juror fails to appear during deliberations. The 

California Court of Appeals has declared that the seating of alternate jurors is not a critical stage, 

and there is no constitutional violation even defense counsel is absent when a decision is made. 

See People v Dell, 232 Cal App 3d 248, 257; 283 Cal Rptr 361 (1991). The Colorado Court of 

Appeals agreed with this description, stating “While the selection of a jury is a critical stage of 

the proceeding at which a defendant or his counsel has a right to be present, replacing a juror 

with an alternate is more in the nature of an administrative task,” and a defendant must show 

prejudice from his absence in order to merit relief. People v Anderson, 183 P3d 649, 651 (Colo 

App, 2007). Similar results have been reached in Kansas and Nebraska. See State v Davis, 284 

Kan 728; 163 P3d 1224 (2007) (holding that a trial court conference with a juror charged with 

bias is a critical stage, but suggesting that the substitution of a juror for a benign reason like 

illness is not); State v Marks, 286 Neb 166, 173; 835 NW2d 656 (2013), citing Snyder, 291 US 

97 (finding that defendant’s presence would have been “useless” and therefore was not 

constitutionally mandated where defense counsel was present in the courtroom and agreed to the 

procedure to substitute an alternate juror for a sitting juror who “would have suffered a harm had 

he continued to serve”). 

 While initial jury selection is a critical stage of the proceedings, there is no legal support 

for describing as critical the juror substitution proceeding in this case. The substitution was more 

akin to an administrative task following the absence of a seated juror. And defendant’s attorney 

was present to protect his rights if need be. Accordingly, we find no prejudicial violation of 

defendant’s right to be present. 

C. ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

 Defendant also challenges defense counsel’s failure to consult with him before agreeing 

to recall an alternate juror. Defendant failed to preserve this issue by seeking a new trial or an 

evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance grounds.4

 As a result, our review is limited to 

mistakes apparent on the existing record. See People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 

NW2d 96 (2002), citing People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 

 

4

 The evidentiary hearing on remand was limited to the trial court’s compliance with MCR 

6.411. No record was created regarding counsel’s performance. 
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 Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed 

question of fact and constitutional law. People v Lockett, 295 Mich App 165, 186; 814 NW2d 

295 (2012). We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error, and constitutional 

determinations de novo. Id., citing People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 

(2002). 

 “Most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the test developed in 

Strickland [v Washington, 466 US 668, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984)].” People v 

Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713 (2007). Under Strickland, it is a defendant’s burden 

to demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and, (2) there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 

466 US at 694; People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 51; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). The defendant 

must rebut the strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance. People v Vaughn, 

491 Mich 642, 670; 821 NW2d 288 (2012); LeBlanc, 465 Mich at 578. The United States 

Supreme Court described in United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 659-660; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L 

Ed 2d 657 (1984), that there are “three rare situations in which the attorney’s performance is so 

deficient that prejudice is presumed.” Frazier, 478 Mich at 243. 

 Defendant characterizes his claim as falling under the first Cronic scenario: the complete 

denial of counsel at a critical stage in the proceeding. Cronic, 466 US at 659-660. This simply 

is not accurate. Defendant had counsel and that counsel was present at the proceeding. 

Defendant’s real complaint is the failure of counsel to consult with him. This falls squarely 

under Strickland. 

 “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel should not be translated 

into a right to be present at counsel’s side wherever and whenever instantaneous consultation 

may be helpful to the defense.” Mallory, 421 Mich at 266. But when defendant cannot be at 

counsel’s side, there are times when defendant needs to be consulted. “From counsel’s function 

as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant’s cause and 

the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the 

defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution.” Strickland, 

466 US at 688. “An attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the client regarding 

‘important decisions,’ including questions of overarching defense strategy. That obligation, 

however, does not require counsel to obtain the defendant’s consent to ‘every tactical decision.’ ” 

Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175, 187; 125 S Ct 551; 160 L Ed 2d 565 (2004). 

 There is no legal support for treating the decision made in this case—whether to call an 

alternate juror to replace a late juror—so important that counsel was required to consult with 

defendant. This was not a matter of “overarching defense strategy.” And there was no reason to 

assume that the jurors had gotten far in their deliberations given that they had only been in the 
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jury room for half an hour. This was a simple administrative decision made to avoid further 

delay of the trial. Accordingly, we discern no error in counsel’s performance. 

 We affirm. 

/s/ Michael J. Talbot 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher