```

[Senate Hearing 118-508]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                        S. Hrg. 118-508

              U.S. STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 14, 2024

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]       

                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                  
                              __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
57-663 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                       

                COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman        
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey            JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          

                              (ii)        

  
                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland.............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Kritenbrink, Hon. Daniel J., Assistant Secretary of State for 
  East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 
  Washington, DC.................................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Ratner, Hon. Ely, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific 
  Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC...     8
    Prepared Statement...........................................    10

Schiffer, Hon. Michael, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for 
  Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC    13
    Prepared Statement...........................................    15

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by:

    Senator Benjamin L. Cardin...................................    40

    Senator James E. Risch.......................................    43

    Senator Robert Menendez......................................    49

    Senator Pete Ricketts........................................    51

Response of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to a Question Submitted by 
  Senator Todd Young.............................................    52

Responses of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Tim Scott..............................................    52

Responses of Mr. Ely Ratner to Questions Submitted by:

    Senator Benjamin L. Cardin...................................    53

    Senator James E. Risch.......................................    54

    Senator Pete Ricketts........................................    56

Response of Mr. Ely Ratner to a Question Submitted by Senator Tim 
  Scott..........................................................    57

Responses of Mr. Michael Schiffer to Questions Submitted by:

    Senator Benjamin L. Cardin...................................    57

    Senator James E. Risch.......................................    59

    Senator Robert Menendez......................................    60

Legislative History Memorandum, Compact of Free Association 
  Amendment Act of 2024, submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin.    63

                                 (iii)

  

 
                             U.S. STRATEGY
                     IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION

                              ----------                              

                        THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2024

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin J. 
Cardin, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Menendez, Kaine, 
Schatz, Van Hollen, Duckworth, Risch, Romney, Ricketts, Young, 
and Hagerty.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    For thousands of years Pacific Islanders have been masters 
of the sea, navigating oceans by canoe guided only by the 
stars. With climate change and globalization hitting their 
shores, they have become innovators on how to save their 
heritage.
    There are over a million and a half Americans of Pacific 
Island ancestry and over 1,000 citizens from Freely Associated 
States serving in the United States Armed Forces.
    This puts people to people ties at the heart of our 
relationship to a part of the world that has been vital to the 
strategic interests of the United States.
    During World War II the U.S. Navy built an airstrip on what 
is now the Nation of Kiribati. But today it is the People's 
Republic of China that has planned to rebuild the former 
American airstrip.
    Beijing is signing policing deals to provide cybersecurity 
and community policing assistance in the region. Since the 
Solomon Islands changed their recognition from Taiwan to China, 
PRC nationals have moved to the islands, flooding the market 
with low cost goods, extracting timber and fish and other 
resources, bringing in tourism practices that threaten the 
natural environment, in some cases setting up transnational 
criminal operations that evade the limited capacity of local 
law enforcement.
    All this compounds the forces that drive young people to 
search for economic opportunities elsewhere, developments that 
are deeply concerning to the United States and our allies in 
the region like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.
    At the same time Pacific Island nations are on the front 
lines of the climate crisis. Many are only a few feet above sea 
level. This makes them particularly vulnerable to extreme 
weather events brought on by climate change.
    Not only does this mean many of these nations could be 
uninhabitable in coming decades, it presents serious threats to 
important sensitive American military installations.
    Earlier this year a series of extreme waves damaged a U.S. 
military base at the Marshall Islands, a base used as a space 
and missile test range for the United States Department of 
Defense with some of the Army's most sophisticated tracking 
equipment.
    So I am pleased that the Biden administration has 
prioritized our engagement in the region. Building new 
embassies is not easy--we all know that--especially where land 
and domestic capacity is limited and ocean levels are rising. 
But I want to encourage the department to be creative and to 
move as quickly as possible.
    Beijing will not slow down its efforts to gain influence in 
this important region. Neither should we. Congress recently 
passed and funded for all three Compact of Free Association 
nations, and we are glad that the COFA was finally enacted.
    For more than 40 years COFA agreements have governed these 
critical relationships. The Biden administration has called 
these COFA the bedrock of the U.S. role in the Pacific.
    I want to thank Senator Manchin, Barrasso, and Ranking 
Member Risch for their bipartisan leadership in getting COFA 
agreements across the finish line and signed by the President. 
I also want to acknowledge the leadership of Senator Schatz and 
Senator Hirono in regards to that agreement.
    I wish the same spirit of cooperation applied to our China 
bill and the Administration's outcompete China proposal which 
has been proposed again in this year's budget.
    U.S. competition with China concerns almost every single 
member of our committee as well as most members of the U.S. 
Senate.
    I appreciate the staff on both sides getting us to about 80 
percent there. We now need to reach the finish line. But if we 
are serious about countering China, I ask the ranking member to 
work with me and every member of this committee to finish the 
job in the next work period.
    I also want to thank our witnesses for appearing before us 
today. We have a distinguished panel of witnesses, and I look 
forward to your presentations.
    I hope you will speak about how we can speed up the 
expansion of our diplomatic presence, how do we work with 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan and others to support and 
foster economic opportunities in the Pacific Islands, what we 
can do to climate proof our military installations to defend 
our national security interests in the years to come, 
recognizing the great risks there.
    And finally, I ask that you lay out what is at stake for 
the United States military in the region if we fail to engage. 
I look forward to your testimony.
    With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member 
Senator Risch.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Before I start on my prepared remarks, let me say that on 
the China issue, like the issues we are talking about today, 
this is a bipartisan issue, and we should do that.
    On February 6, as you know, I wrote you a letter about 
this, and we have not had a response to that yet. But we should 
air these things privately, and that will continue on, I am 
sure. But these are bipartisan issues--nonpartisan issues, not 
partisan issues.
    We have had a long history of friendship with the Pacific 
Islands, and this hearing comes as we usher in the next chapter 
of U.S. commitment to the region. Just last week Congress acted 
to renew the Compacts of Free Association.
    As you noted, Mr. Chairman, these agreements are foremost a 
promise to the three compact countries--Micronesia, the 
Marshall Islands, and Papua. Through these compacts we partner 
with them to advance economic prosperity, provide for U.S. 
military veterans from these nations, provide cooperation in 
areas of law enforcement and judicial training, and much more.
    Further, our security partnership with these states are 
critical. In World War II we fought our way across the Pacific, 
costing significant American blood and treasure. We have been 
in that region for decades, and with these agreements we stay 
for years to come. They are a strategic investment in our 
national defense and in our partners in the Indo-Pacific 
region.
    However, in order to maximize these partnerships the 
Administration must adjust its policies to demonstrate U.S. 
focus and commitment are not going anywhere. First, our 
diplomatic presence in this region still need serious work. We 
have been too slow to get our diplomats permanently on the 
ground to push back against Chinese influence.
    I am also concerned about the lack of support for the 
diplomats we do have in the Pacific. Nowhere is this more 
evident than the Solomon Islands. By the time the State 
Department started paying attention, China was already signing 
a major security agreement.
    When the department asked for personnel for the post it did 
not ask for a single public affairs officer to push back 
against the Chinese propaganda.
    This is a large globe. There is a lot of countries. But my 
staff has been monitoring this particular region for the 
numerous important reasons that I just mentioned.
    This is not just about getting our people on the ground. 
Once there they must be able to do their job and advance U.S. 
interests. It is clear we are moving at the speed of 
bureaucracy and not the speed of relevance.
    I have sent five letters to Secretary Blinken urging a 
nuanced expeditionary approach to our diplomatic expansion. I 
have encouraged using these flexibilities that my Secure 
Embassies Construction and Counterterrorism Act provides to 
stand up our diplomatic presence and creating a South Pacific 
management platform to improve support to these remote 
missions.
    The Solomon Islands example brings me to a second issue, 
security cooperation. In addition to greater Chinese military 
and law enforcement presence in the Solomon Islands, other 
nations continue to explore security arrangements with China.
    Luckily, in May 2022 Pacific Island countries came together 
and rejected China's push for a region wide security agreement. 
That was proof of what dedication to sovereignty and regional 
unity can achieve.
    Papua New Guinea, which just signed a new security pact 
with us last year, has been approached by China about new 
security and policing arrangements. Chinese police are present 
in Kiribati and we know China has set its sights on other 
nations.
    I would like the Departments of State and Defense here 
today to discuss the implementation of our security pact with 
Papua New Guinea and help the committee understand how this 
agreement serves our interests region wide.
    I would also like an update on where Chinese security 
cooperation initiatives are causing the greatest concern and 
how we are working with our partners to address it. I would 
especially like the Defense Department to discuss Australia's 
role in security for the Pacific Islands. We all know about 
AUKUS, but there is certainly more to it than that.
    Finally, I would like an update on economic development in 
this region. I am aware of our work on undersea cables and 
illegal fishing but want to know what other concrete projects 
we are pursuing.
    I want real details on this, not just descriptions about 
creating an enabling environment or building stakeholder 
networks, et cetera, et cetera. We know that some Chinese 
projects, like a hospital in Fiji, did backfire. But this means 
the U.S. and our partners need to get our act together more 
quickly.
    With that, I will turn it back to the chairman.
    Thanks, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. I thank Senator Risch for his opening 
comments, and we will always attempt to work together on all 
issues, including this region.
    I want to welcome all three of our witnesses to today's 
hearing. I will introduce you, and then you will have 
approximately 5 minutes to give your opening statements. Your 
entire statements, without objections, will be made part of the 
record.
    Welcome, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink.
    He is a career member of the senior Foreign Service and has 
been an American diplomat since 1994. He has served in numerous 
posts in the Indo-Pacific region including most recently as the 
former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam.
    Assistant Secretary Ratner, welcome.
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security 
Affairs and also along with this committee under then Chairman 
Biden.
    So you get special privileges. You can speak for 5 minutes 
and 10 seconds.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. He has also served as a senior adviser on 
China to the Secretary of Defense.
    And then we have Assistant Administrator Schiffer who is no 
stranger to this committee, and we welcome his return to SD-419 
in his capacity at USAID to talk about his work in the Pacific 
Island region.
    Again, as alum you get the extra--we will give you an extra 
15 seconds because you and I worked together when I was chair 
of that subcommittee.
    Mr. Schiffer is a former senior advisor and counselor on 
the Foreign Relations Committee covering issues related to the 
Indo-Pacific, so he in theory should be able to anticipate and 
answer every one of our questions.
    Mr. Schiffer also brings an abundance of experience prior 
to his service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
East Asia and as program officer at the Stanley Foundation 
responsible for the foundation's Asia programs.
    With that, we will start.
    Senator Ricketts. Mr. Chairman, can I interrupt for just a 
moment?
    The Chairman. Certainly.
    Senator Ricketts. I would like to note that Assistant 
Secretary Kritenbrink is actually from Nebraska so maybe he 
should get 10 seconds for that.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Absolutely.
    Senator Risch. This committee is getting a little out of 
hand.
    The Chairman. I can understand that.
    Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
 STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                     STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, good morning.
    Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, members of this 
committee, thank you very much for convening this hearing and 
for the opportunity to testify on U.S. strategy in the 
strategically important Pacific Islands region.
    I am honored to be joined by my colleagues from the 
Department of Defense and USAID today, and I understand my good 
friend, the Pacific Island former Secretary General Henry Puna, 
is here as well and honored by his presence as well.
    The United States is a Pacific nation, and we share 
longstanding historic and cultural ties with our Pacific Island 
neighbors. As Vice President Harris said in 2022, the history 
and future of the Pacific Islands and the United States are 
inextricably linked.
    U.S. prosperity and security depend on the Pacific region 
remaining free and open, prosperous, secure, and resilient. The 
Pacific Islands are important partners on many global issues, 
from standing together at the U.N. on human rights and opposing 
Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine to 
contributing to global security through peacekeeping operations 
and to tackling the climate crisis as well as combating 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.
    The Pacific Islands face significant challenges to their 
security and their prosperity, including from climate change 
and economic shocks, making the region more vulnerable to 
influence from the PRC.
    As Secretary Blinken has said the PRC is the only country 
with both the intent to reshape the international order, and 
increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and 
technological power to do it.
    That certainly holds true in the Pacific. Through foreign 
assistance, elite capture, and robust public messaging 
campaigns, the PRC has moved aggressively to assert itself in 
the Pacific Islands.
    In addition, in recent years three Pacific Island countries 
have switched diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the PRC. And in 
2022, as the chairman and ranking member noted, the Solomon 
Islands signed an unprecedented security agreement with the 
PRC, the details of which have not been publicly released.
    Of course, as we have often said, we are not in the 
business of forcing countries to choose, neither in the Pacific 
nor anywhere else. But we do want to ensure that countries in 
the Pacific have a choice and the ability to make their own 
sovereign decisions free from coercion.
    Under the Administration's Indo-Pacific strategy and 
Pacific Partnership Strategy the United States has expanded its 
diplomatic and development engagement with the Pacific Islands.
    President Biden has convened two summits to engage with 
Pacific Island leaders on shared priorities including climate 
change, trade and investment, and a free and open Pacific 
region.
    Since the first Pacific Island summit in 2022 we have 
announced plans to work with Congress to provide over $8 
billion in new funding and programs. We opened embassies in the 
Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2023, and we will open an embassy 
in Vanuatu later this year.
    We also continue to work with the government of Kiribati on 
our plan to open an embassy there. We recognize the Cook 
Islands and Niue as sovereign and independent states. Peace 
Corps volunteers have returned to Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga, and 
they are planning to return to Vanuatu later this year and 
Palau in 2025.
    We appointed the first ever U.S. envoy to the Pacific 
Islands Forum to enhance cooperation with the region's leading 
foreign policy body.
    We have also increased our presence and assistance through 
the U.S. Coast Guard and maritime domain awareness programs.
    In 2023 we signed the Defense Cooperation Agreement with 
Papua New Guinea, which will increase our engagement with the 
region's most populous country. We are also working with 
partners to increase internet access in the Pacific, and 
together with Australia have pledged $65 million to finance 
future submarine cable connectivity for Pacific Island 
countries.
    We have announced our intention to request from Congress 
$600 million over 10 years beginning with the fiscal year 2024 
request in support of a new economic assistance agreement 
related to the South Pacific tuna treaty, which is crucial to 
the region's economy and has been a cornerstone of our 
relationship in the region for over three decades.
    Our strategy is also multilateral. In 2022 the United 
States, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom 
launched the Partners in the Blue Pacific, an informal 
strategic coordination initiative guided by Pacific priorities.
    Since its inception the grouping has expanded to include 
additional partners and has announced tangible initiatives on 
disaster relief, disaster resilience, cybersecurity, and ocean 
and fisheries research.
    The U.S. shares especially close relationships with the 
Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and 
the Federated States of Micronesia. Our Compacts of Free 
Association with these three countries and the economic 
assistance we provide in support of those compacts are key to 
maintaining the stability and prosperity of our closest Pacific 
Island partners and to safeguarding our shared long term 
defense and strategic interests in the region.
    I want to sincerely thank the Congress and the members of 
this committee for approving the compact agreements and 
authorizing the necessary funding and authorities on a 
bipartisan basis that will allow us to move steadily ahead in 
our partnership with these vitally important countries.
    In conclusion, I wish to reiterate the Pacific region's 
critical importance to the United States and our long term 
strategic interests. I look forward to working with Congress 
and this committee to continue our renewed engagement across 
the Pacific in an era of increased geostrategic competition.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Kritenbrink follows:]

            Prepared Statement of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink

    Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
committee, thank you for convening this hearing and for the opportunity 
to testify on U.S. strategy in the strategically important Pacific 
Islands region. I'm pleased to be joined today by Ely Ratner, Assistant 
Secretary for Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, and Michael 
Schiffer, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Asia at USAID.
    The United States is a Pacific nation, and we share longstanding 
historic and cultural ties with our Pacific Islands neighbors. As Vice 
President Harris said in 2022, ``The history and future of the Pacific 
Islands and the United States are inextricably linked.'' U.S. 
prosperity and security depend on the Pacific region remaining free and 
open, prosperous, secure, and resilient. The Pacific Islands are 
important partners on many global issues, from standing together at the 
U.N. on human rights and opposing Russia's illegal and unprovoked 
invasion of Ukraine; to contributing to global security through 
peacekeeping operations; and to tackling the climate crisis as well as 
combatting illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.
    The Pacific Islands face significant challenges to their security 
and prosperity including from climate change and economic shocks, 
making the region more vulnerable to influence from the PRC. As 
Secretary Blinken has said, the PRC is the only country with both the 
intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the 
economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. That 
certainly holds true in the Pacific. Through foreign assistance, elite 
capture, and robust public messaging campaigns, the PRC has moved 
aggressively to assert itself in the Pacific Islands. In addition, in 
recent years, three Pacific Island countries have switched diplomatic 
ties from Taiwan to the PRC. And in 2022, Solomon Islands signed an 
unprecedented security agreement with the PRC, the details of which 
have not been publicly released. Of course, as we have often said, we 
are not in the business of forcing countries to choose--neither in the 
Pacific nor anywhere else. But we do want to ensure that countries in 
the Pacific have a choice, and the ability to make their own sovereign 
decisions, free from coercion.
    Under the Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy and Pacific 
Partnership Strategy, the United States has expanded its diplomatic and 
development engagement with the Pacific Islands. President Biden has 
convened two Summits to engage with Pacific Islands leaders on shared 
priorities, including climate change, trade and investment, and a free 
and open Pacific region. Since the first Summit in 2022, we have 
announced plans to work with Congress to provide over $8 billion in new 
funding and programs. We opened embassies in Solomon Islands and Tonga 
in 2023 and intend to open an embassy in Vanuatu later this year. We 
also continue to work with the Government of Kiribati on our plan to 
open an embassy there. We have recognized the Cook Islands and Niue as 
sovereign and independent states. Peace Corps Volunteers have returned 
to Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga, and are planning to return to Vanuatu later 
this year and Palau in 2025. We appointed the first-ever U.S. Envoy to 
the Pacific Islands Forum to enhance cooperation with the region's 
leading foreign policy body.
    We have also increased our presence and assistance through the U.S. 
Coast Guard and maritime domain awareness programs. In 2023, we signed 
a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Papua New Guinea, which will 
increase our engagement with the region's most populous country. We are 
also working with partners to increase internet access in the Pacific 
Islands, and together with Australia have pledged $65 million to 
finance future submarine cable connectivity for Pacific Island 
countries.
    We have announced our intention to request from Congress $600 
million over 10 years, beginning with the fiscal year 2024 request, in 
support of a new economic assistance agreement related to the South 
Pacific Tuna Treaty, which is crucial to the region's economy and has 
been a cornerstone of our relationship in the region for over three 
decades.
    Our strategy is also multilateral. In 2022, the United States, 
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom launched the 
Partners in the Blue Pacific, an informal strategic coordination 
initiative guided by Pacific priorities. Since its inception, the 
grouping has expanded to include additional partners and has announced 
tangible initiatives on disaster resilience, cybersecurity, and ocean 
and fisheries research.
    The United States shares especially close relationships with the 
Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the 
Federated States of Micronesia. Our Compacts of Free Association with 
these countries, and the economic assistance we provide in support of 
those Compacts, are key to maintaining the stability and prosperity of 
our closest Pacific Island partners and to safeguarding our shared 
long-term defense and strategic interests in the region. I want to 
thank Congress for approving the Compact agreements and authorizing the 
necessary funding and authorities on a bipartisan basis that will allow 
us to move steadily ahead in our partnership with these countries.
    In conclusion, I wish to reiterate the Pacific region's critical 
importance to the United States and our long-term strategic interests. 
We look forward to working with Congress to continue our renewed 
engagement across the Pacific in an era of increased geostrategic 
competition. Thank you.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Ratner.

 STATEMENT OF HON. ELY RATNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Ratner. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting 
me to testify today about how the Department of Defense is 
contributing to peace and security with U.S. partners across 
the Pacific Islands.
    I am here with my good friends Assistant Secretary 
Kritenbrink and Assistant Administrator Schiffer to underscore 
the Administration's whole of government approach.
    From a national security perspective the Pacific Islands 
form an essential part of a strategically vital region. The 
U.S. military's access and posture in the Pacific Islands are 
crucial for our logistics, sustainment, and power projection 
throughout the region.
    Moreover, hundreds of billions of dollars in maritime trade 
flow through the Pacific Islands, and our partners there 
provide critical linkages between the continental United States 
and our allies across the Indo-Pacific.
    That is why the United States is strengthening our 
diplomatic, economic, and security ties throughout the Pacific 
Islands, and it is why DOD plays a significant role in 
deepening these partnerships and sustaining our defense posture 
and presence.
    Importantly, this also includes our posture in Hawaii and 
the territories of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. To highlight a few areas, 
the department is doubling down on our relationships with the 
Freely Associated States, and we are capitalizing on our 
momentum with Papua New Guinea after concluding a landmark 
defense cooperation agreement last year.
    We are building capacity through security cooperation, and 
we are conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
activities with our partners.
    We are also working together with allies and partners like 
Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. More than ever, we are 
devoting attention and resources that reflect the strategic 
significance of this region.
    Mr. Chairman, I would also like to take a moment to 
underscore the importance of our Compacts of Free Association 
with the federated states of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, 
and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.
    For decades our relationships with these partners have been 
anchored in the economic assistance that the United States has 
delivered under the compacts. Thanks to strong bipartisan 
support from Congress including critical leadership by members 
of this committee, that economic assistance will now extend to 
the 2040s through the appropriations bill that President Biden 
signed last week.
    Last year our friends at the State Department negotiated 
strong deals with each of the Freely Associated States to renew 
our compacts. Providing the necessary funding was one of the 
most important things Congress could do this year to advance 
our priorities in the Indo-Pacific.
    Defense experts, diplomats, senior military officials, and 
friends in the region all agreed that we had to get this done 
and because of you, we did. The compacts ensure that the United 
States can maintain a military presence in the Freely 
Associated States, and they enable FAS citizens to serve in the 
U.S. military.
    These agreements provide assured access for our operations, 
and they prevent would be adversaries from accessing sovereign 
FAS land, airspace, and territorial waters.
    The bottom line is that the compacts help secure a part of 
the Indo-Pacific that is larger than the continental United 
States.
    Mr. Chairman, we also know that the PRC is drawing from a 
range of coercive tools in an attempt to erode long standing 
U.S. partnerships and advance China's own influence.
    In recent years these activities have included covert 
efforts to bribe local officials, economic pressure against 
sovereign nations that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 
and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing that harms 
both the environment and local economies.
    But Mr. Chairman, our commitment to the Pacific Islands and 
to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, 
will endure. The Department of Defense looks forward to 
continue to work with Congress in this endeavor.
    What we have achieved with our Pacific Islands partners in 
recent years would not have been possible without your support, 
and delivering meaningful results in the years ahead will 
continue to require urgency, attention, resources, and strong 
partnership with Capitol Hill.
    Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward 
to your questions, and I yield back my alumni 10 seconds.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Ratner follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Mr. Ely Ratner

    Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of the 
Committee: thank you for the opportunity today to discuss how the 
Department of Defense (DoD) is contributing to peace and security with 
U.S. partners across the Pacific Islands region.
    I am pleased to testify today alongside Assistant Secretary of 
State Kritenbrink and Assistant Administrator Schiffer, underscoring 
DoD's commitment to advancing the Administration's whole-of-government 
approach to this vital region.
      recognizing the strategic importance of the pacific islands
    Peace, stability, and prosperity in the Pacific Islands are 
essential for advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. 
economy--and indeed, the global economy--relies upon hundreds of 
billions of dollars in maritime trade that flows through the Pacific, 
with the Pacific Islands forming a strategically critical geography. 
Additionally, as the broader Indo-Pacific region's populations and 
economies continue to grow, the millions of people who live across the 
Pacific Islands make important cultural and economic contributions in 
the world's most dynamic region. That is why the United States has 
committed to strengthening our diplomatic, economic, and security ties 
with partners across the Pacific Islands, and the Department of Defense 
is proud to play an important part.
    The United States is a Pacific power. Our defense posture in the 
Pacific Islands countries, ranging in levels of presence from a 
permanent footprint to rotational forces is critical for U.S. military 
logistics, sustainment, and power projection. This also includes our 
posture in Hawaii and the territories of Guam, the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. The Department of Defense 
is supporting U.S. efforts to strengthen our partnerships across the 
Pacific Islands, including through our defense and security ties with 
the Freely Associated States (FAS), capitalizing on momentum with Papua 
New Guinea following the signing of a landmark Defense Cooperation 
Agreement in 2023, building partner capacity through security 
cooperation, and conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief. Importantly, we will also continue to work with U.S. allies and 
partners across the broader Indo-Pacific region as they deepen their 
connections with the Pacific Islands.
       strengthening u.s. partnerships across the pacific islands
    Our strategic approach to the Pacific Islands region draws strength 
from our longstanding partnerships, as well as the geographic proximity 
of Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and other U.S. territories. We share 
common concerns for our security and prosperity. And when it comes to 
honoring our shared history, our Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, for 
example, benefits from the strong cooperation of eight Pacific Island 
countries in their critical mission to provide the fullest possible 
accounting of missing DoD personnel from World War II.
    Across the region, the Department of Defense is supporting the 
Administration's efforts to deliver on an unprecedented commitment to 
our relationships with the Pacific Islands.
               renewing the compacts of free association
    The Department of Defense was pleased to see Congress recently pass 
the Administration's Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024 
with a strong bipartisan majority--and we thank the many Members of 
this Committee who played a pivotal role in advocating for this 
legislation until its final passage.
    The U.S. Government has provided economic assistance to our 
partners in the Freely Associated States (FAS) for the last four 
decades; the vast majority of this assistance has been provided under 
the Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) and related agreements between 
the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Republic of Palau (Palau), 
and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). This assistance 
supports education, the environment, healthcare, and civilian 
infrastructure--and it provides a strong economic anchor that 
complements our defense and security partnership. Last year, the 
Administration reached agreements with the FAS partners that would 
extend U.S. economic assistance for an additional 20 years.
    Importantly, the Compacts ensure that the United States--and only 
the United States--can maintain a military presence in the FAS, and 
they allow FAS citizens to strengthen our All-Volunteer Force through 
dedicated military service in the U.S. Armed Forces. As part of these 
agreements, the U.S. military serves as the defense force for FSM, 
Palau, and RMI, which in return grant the United States assured access 
for our military operations, as well as sites for critical defense 
posture in the region. In particular, the Marshall Islands hosts the 
Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll; Palau 
will soon host the highly anticipated Tactical multi-Mission Over-the-
Horizon Radar (TACMOR); and we are exploring opportunities for new 
cooperation, including with FSM on Yap island. The Compacts also limit 
the access of third country militaries or their personnel, including 
would-be adversaries from accessing FAS land, airspace, and territorial 
seas, securing a key area of the Indo-Pacific region. Crucially, FAS 
citizens serve in the U.S. Armed Forces at higher proportionate rates 
than most American States, and we are proud of and grateful for their 
service.
    Failure to extend the economic assistance related to the Compacts 
would have had serious consequences for the economies of our FAS 
partners, our strategy in the broader Pacific Islands region, and, 
ultimately, our national security. However, Republicans and Democrats, 
diplomats and defense experts, and senior U.S. civilian and military 
officials all agreed: U.S. partners in the FAS--and broader U.S. 
defense priorities in the Indo-Pacific region--simply could not wait 
any longer. That is why passing the Compact of Free Association 
Amendments Act of 2024 marked one of the 118th Congress' most 
significant achievements to advance U.S. strategic priorities in the 
Indo-Pacific region.
              deepening defense ties with papua new guinea
    In 2023, the U.S. defense and security relationship with Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) broke new ground in historic ways. We entered into a 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with PNG that will deepen bilateral 
security cooperation, strengthen the capacity of the PNG Defence Force, 
and increase regional stability and security. The agreement will 
facilitate bilateral and multilateral exercises and engagements in 
support of regional capacity building priorities and enables the United 
States to be more responsive in emergency situations, including through 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). Secretary Austin 
also had an opportunity to discuss the importance of our new DCA with 
senior leaders in Port Moresby, where he made history as the first U.S. 
Secretary of Defense to visit Papua New Guinea.
             building capacity through security cooperation
    The Department of Defense works with countries bilaterally and on a 
regional basis to build partner capacity in critical areas like 
maritime domain awareness, maritime security, border security, and 
advancing women, peace, and security initiatives. DoD allocated more 
than $27 million to building partner capacity through Title 10 
programming in Fiscal Year 2023. A significant amount of this maritime 
security-focused assistance can also support regional partner capacity 
to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which 
has serious economic, environmental, and security consequences for 
Pacific Island partners.
    The important work of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's Joint Interagency 
Task Force West (JIATF West), as well as the U.S. Coast Guard, also 
helps strengthen maritime domain awareness in the Pacific Islands. In 
Fiji, for example, JIATF West has supported the local government's 
Maritime Surveillance and Rescue Coordination Center with computer 
equipment and updated software for maritime surveillance activities. 
Meanwhile, across the region, maritime law enforcement (or 
``shiprider'') agreements with over one dozen partners in the Pacific 
Islands allow the Coast Guard to help patrol local exclusive economic 
zones with counterparts. Together, these efforts help the United States 
maintain a robust presence, deepen defense and security ties with 
partners, and help uphold the rule of law in the region.
    The Department's security cooperation efforts extend beyond the 
maritime sphere. The DoD State Partnership Program plays an important 
role in the Pacific Islands, enabling the establishment of enduring 
people-to-people ties while building partner capacity and improving 
interoperability. The Nevada National Guard is partnered with Tonga, 
Fiji, and Samoa, and the Wisconsin National Guard is partnered with 
Papua New Guinea. We are excited to expand the Guam/Hawaii partnership 
with the Philippines to the Republic of Palau this year. Another of our 
most enduring programs is our Civic Action Team in Palau--a tri-
military service initiative that supports the community through 
construction projects, medical civic actions, and community relations.
         conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
    The Department also continues to strengthen U.S. ties across the 
Pacific Islands through supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief activities, in close partnership with our counterparts at the 
Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID). In January, the nineteenth iteration of our Pacific 
Partnership mission concluded after 4 months of strengthening disaster 
response preparedness and providing critical medical support across the 
Pacific Islands region. In August 2023, USAID requested the unique 
capabilities of the Department in response to a request of the 
Government of Papua New Guinea to support humanitarian assistance 
following volcanic eruptions at Mount Bagana. The Department was able 
to provide heavy lift rotary wing and tiltrotor support to USAID 
through the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, moving personnel and 
supplies in and out of the affected area. In 2022, the USS SAMPSON 
supported a multinational humanitarian assistance effort alongside 
France, Australia, New Zealand, the UK, Japan, and others, following a 
volcanic eruption in Tonga. These operations demonstrate U.S. 
commitment and strengthen relationships in moments when our partners 
need us most.
    In addition to responding in times of need, we are also working to 
build our partners' own resilience to respond to such events, including 
by prioritizing HA/DR-focused exercises to build interoperability and 
share best practices. By joining with allies and partners in efforts to 
enhance resilience, we will both strengthen defense relationships and 
reduce requests for U.S. forces to respond to instability and 
humanitarian emergencies.
  connecting the pacific islands with the broader indo-pacific region
    As the United States deepens our longstanding relationships with 
the Pacific Islands, the Department is encouraged by how likeminded 
allies and partners across the broader Indo-Pacific region are also 
taking important steps to further strengthen ties with the Pacific 
Island countries. These efforts exemplify how, across the Indo-Pacific 
region, the United States can work with our allies and partners as they 
advance a shared vision for peace and stability.
    In recent years, for example, the Department has launched the Indo-
Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) alongside the 
Indo-Pacific Quad partners Australia, India, and Japan. The IPMDA 
initiative uses cutting-edge technology, including space-based 
commercial platforms, to deliver a sharper common maritime operating 
picture throughout the Indo-Pacific region. With radio frequency data, 
Pacific Island countries are gaining the ability to address potential 
violations of fisheries regulations in their waters by detecting 
vessels that have turned off their transponders. In a region as vast as 
the Pacific Ocean, where IUU fishing and trafficking remain persistent 
challenges, the IPMDA initiative will equip the Pacific Islands to 
protect fish stocks, ensure sustainability, and strengthen the 
livelihoods of local communities. We are also working on countering IUU 
fishing and strengthening maritime domain awareness through Partners in 
the Blue Pacific alongside Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom.
    Additionally, the United States and key Indo-Pacific allies and 
partners are delivering targeted economic and security assistance to 
strengthen resilience across the Pacific Islands. In 2020, for example, 
the United States joined with Australia and Japan to support a crucial 
undersea cable project for Palau that will promote connectivity and 
protect against interference. Australia has pledged to deliver patrol 
boats and related infrastructure upgrades to our FAS partners under 
Australia's Pacific Maritime Security Program. Meanwhile, Japan has 
also helped donate equipment to the FAS, and assisted with the 
construction of Palau's Maritime Coordination Center. When our 
countries work together in these ways to expand our capabilities and 
connections with each other, we are advancing our shared vision for a 
free and open Indo-Pacific region.
    The United States and our partners, however, are not the only 
countries that recognize the strategic importance of the Pacific 
Islands. According to the 2022 National Security Strategy, the PRC ``is 
the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international 
order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and 
technological power to do it.'' That assessment remains true when it 
comes to the PRC's approach to the Pacific Islands, where the PRC seeks 
to erode longstanding U.S. partnerships in the region. In recent years, 
the PRC has drawn from a range of diplomatic and economic tools to 
advance its foreign policy goals. This includes through infrastructure 
projects that lack transparency, pressure against sovereign nations 
that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan instead of the PRC, and 
support of distant water fleets engaged in harmful practices like IUU 
fishing throughout the region.
                               conclusion
    Mr. Chairman, the achievements in the Pacific Islands region that I 
have just described would not have been possible without bipartisan 
attention and robust resources from Congress. At the same time, we also 
know that continuing to deliver meaningful results will require even 
greater urgency in the years ahead.
    The Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy concludes by stating 
that the region's future ``depends on the choices we make now.'' The 
Department of Defense remains committed to working alongside our 
partners across the executive branch, as well as every Member of 
Congress, in support of strong U.S. partnerships across the Pacific 
Islands and the broader Indo-Pacific region.
    Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to your 
questions.

    The Chairman. All right. You are very mindful of this 
committee's protocol. You know how to get on the good side of 
the committee.
    Administrator Schiffer, there is no pressure on you on 
time.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL SCHIFFER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE BUREAU FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Schiffer. Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, 
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify 
on the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands and how 
USAID is working to deepen U.S. engagement in the region.
    The only way for us to tackle the complex problems of the 
Indo-Pacific is to align the three Ds of diplomacy, defense, 
and development, drawing on our successful whole of government 
approach, as Assistant Secretary Ratner offered.
    We have learned the hard way that one D without the others 
or even two Ds without the third is not a sustainable pathway 
to success. As a steadfast partner to the Pacific Islands USAID 
plays a key role in advancing a free and open, connected, 
prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo-Pacific region.
    Our relationships are based on mutual respect, shared 
history, and our shared values of diversity, fairness, and 
freedom, and consistent with the Pacific way, it starts with 
listening.
    Last August I had the privilege of joining USAID 
Administrator Power at the opening of our Pacific Islands 
mission in Fiji at our country representative office in Papua 
New Guinea.
    It was a critical milestone delivering on a promise made by 
the President, illustrating that USAID is on the ground to 
listen, partner, and deliver together with the people of the 
Pacific Islands. And we have demonstrated that the United 
States has heard our Pacific partners loud and clear.
    Enduring presence matters. Our vision for the Pacific, 
embodied in our first ever strategic framework for the Pacific 
Islands, approved in March 2022, reflects our shared 
aspirations.
    It is about listening to the voices of the region and 
rolling up our sleeves to partner and deliver on our 
commitments, and we are ensuring that our engagement with the 
region is guided by the Pacific Islands, respects the existing 
regional architecture, and delivers sustainable, tangible 
benefits to Pacific Islanders, a contrast to the approach of 
the People's Republic of China.
    While we are clear eyed about PRC capabilities and intent, 
as Secretary Blinken has offered, we have no objection to the 
engagement in the Pacific by any country, including the PRC. On 
the contrary, if it helps generate a race to the top, that is a 
good thing.
    However, in recent years we have seen a range of 
increasingly problematic PRC behavior in the region: Predatory 
economic activities including illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing, and investments that undermine good 
governance and promote corruption.
    USAID offers Pacific Island countries a different way, a 
tailored development model responsive to their needs and their 
aspirations rooted in economic trade and integration, in 
inclusivity, in locally led solutions, and in the democratic 
values that can positively transform our shared planet.
    USAID's work is designed to address what the region itself 
has defined as its own most pressing challenges in climate, 
health, democratic governance, infrastructure, and economic 
growth.
    Meeting these goals depends on enhancing our cooperation 
with local communities, individual countries, as well as 
Pacific led organizations including the Pacific Island Forum in 
the Pacific community.
    In Papua New Guinea, USAID is expanding access to renewable 
energy, protecting the country's environment, combating the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, addressing gender based violence, and 
promoting peace and stability.
    In Palau, we have partnered with Australia and Japan to 
support the development of an undersea cable spur that will 
connect the country to the world's longest undersea cable and 
increase reliable, safe, and secure internet bandwidth to spark 
economic growth.
    In the Solomon Islands we work with partners at all levels 
to advance the country's economic competitiveness and 
inclusiveness with specific emphasis on developing the 
agribusiness sector and improving natural resource governance.
    Through the USAID climate ready activity we have mobilized 
more than $550 million for Pacific Island countries to improve 
access to climate finance from various institutions such as the 
Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund, and the Global 
Environmental Facility.
    We are also responding directly to requests from Pacific 
Island governments to expand opportunities for economic growth. 
At last year's U.S. Pacific Island Forum summit, President 
Biden announced the U.S. will launch a flexible micro finance 
facility valued at up to $50 million to expand access to fair 
and competitive finance for micro, small, and medium 
enterprises in the Pacific Islands.
    USAID and the Development Finance Corporation are now 
bringing together our comparative advantages to fulfill this 
commitment.
    Last, the United States remains one of the largest 
bilateral humanitarian and disaster donors in the Pacific, 
providing year round disaster preparedness, responsiveness, and 
resilience to enable the Pacific Island nations to more 
effectively lead their own disaster responses.
    Across all these efforts USAID works directly with like 
minded allies and partners through mechanisms such as the Quad 
and Partners in the Blue Pacific, and we do so to ensure that 
our work is complementary and led and guided by the Pacific 
Islands.
    Mr. Chairman, Senator Risch, members of the committee, 
USAID's investment in the Pacific Islands regions are a 
critical part of the U.S. vision for a free and open Indo-
Pacific, a vision that animates our activities not just in this 
region but around the globe.
    Thank you for your support and providing us the necessary 
resources to implement our strategy and our policy with our 
partners in the Pacific and the opportunity to share with you 
today what USAID is doing in this important region of the 
world.
    I look forward to your guidance and to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Schiffer follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Mr. Michael Schiffer

                              introduction
    Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and Members of the 
Committee: Thank you for inviting me to testify on the strategic 
importance of the Pacific Islands and how USAID is working to deepen 
U.S. engagement in the region.
    The only way for us to tackle complex problems in the Indo-Pacific 
is to align the three D's of diplomacy, defense, and development, 
drawing on our successful whole-of-government approach. We have learned 
the hard way that one `D' without the others--or even two `Ds' without 
the third--is not sustainable and not a pathway to success.
    As a Pacific nation with a state and territories in the region, the 
United States is committed to, and has a vested interest in, our 
neighbors' success. We consider our Pacific neighbors to be essential 
partners in fostering a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
    The United States--through USAID and its support from Congress--
partners with 12 Pacific Island nations to bolster their ability to 
lead their countries to democratic, resilient, and prosperous futures. 
USAID's support to improve the well-being of the Pacific's diverse 
communities spans the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Marshall Islands, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
    Hosting a vast proportion of the world's shipping and global 
fisheries, Pacific waters supply food and income to millions of people 
in Pacific Island nations and beyond. Yet, being surrounded by these 
same waters exposes these nations to catastrophic climate-change risks 
that threaten their very existence. With some Pacific Island nations' 
highest point only 15 feet above sea level, the most subtle 
environmental changes--from coastline erosion to storm surge to 
rainfall--can translate into catastrophic consequences for communities 
and livelihoods. As natural disasters grow more severe in intensity and 
frequency, these effects are compounded. Furthermore, the Pacific 
Islands face numerous challenges to economic development due to 
distance and disconnection from major markets, inefficiencies related 
to economies of scale.
                     usaid strategy in the pacific
    Our vision for the Pacific Islands is about listening to the voices 
of the region and rolling up our sleeves to partner and deliver on our 
commitments. We are ensuring our engagement with the region is guided 
by the Pacific Islands, respects the existing regional architecture, 
and delivers sustainable, tangible benefits to Pacific Islanders--a 
contrast to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) approach.
    The PRC is seemingly intent on rewriting, for its own narrow 
advantage, the international rules-based order that has for decades 
provided a free and open architecture for peace, security, and 
prosperity. In contrast, USAID offers Pacific Island countries a 
tailored development model not rooted in debt and dependence, but in 
economic trade and integration, inclusivity, locally led solutions, and 
the democratic values that can positively transform our shared planet.
    The PRC government has capitalized on instability and natural 
disasters in this vulnerable region to make inroads that often come 
with additional problematic costs For example, in Tonga, a country with 
a high level of PRC-financed debt, the PRC touted the speed and extent 
of its humanitarian assistance vis-a-vis other donors in the wake of 
the volcanic eruption and tsunami in January 2022, but Tonga is saddled 
with a high level of PRC-financed debt and the PRC followed up the next 
year proposing security agreements tailored to PRC's unilateral 
regional security interests In contrast, USAID formed partnerships with 
organizations in Tonga that allowed USAID to swiftly build a $2.6 
million multi-sector response and recovery effort that also prepares 
Tongan communities to be more resilient to future disasters.
               expansion of usaid presence in the pacific
    We have heard the importance of robust presence from Pacific Island 
leaders. Last year, USAID re-opened its Pacific Islands regional 
mission in Suva, Fiji and we elevated our presence in Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu to a Country Representative Office based 
in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. This allows us to benefit more 
Pacific Islanders, strengthen our actions on the ground, and build an 
enduring and genuine partnership with the region.
    USAID's work is designed to address what the region itself has 
defined as its most pressing challenges, specifically to solve urgent 
climate challenges; strengthen global health security; strengthen 
democratic values, good governance, and human rights to counter rising 
autocracy; expand secure and environmentally sustainable digital 
infrastructure; and develop stronger, inclusive economies. USAID's 
first-ever Strategic Framework for the Pacific Islands, approved in 
March 2022, reflects a shared aspiration to advance a more resilient, 
prosperous, and Pacific Islands region.
    Meeting these goals and driving sustainable development progress 
depends on enhancing our cooperation with individual Pacific Island 
countries as well as Pacific-led organizations, including the Pacific 
Islands Forum and the Pacific Community. In addition to reinforcing 
Pacific regional organizations, USAID is also supporting the Partners 
in the Blue Pacific, which is a group of likeminded countries committed 
to more effective development coordination on Pacific-identified 
priorities. Under Partners in the Blue Pacific, USAID is supporting an 
initiative that will enhance Pacific Island countries' disaster 
preparedness and resilience by building national humanitarian 
warehouses.
                    usaid's programs in the pacific
    USAID has reaffirmed its commitment to help our Pacific Island 
partners address existential climate threats, including through 
additional investments as part of the USG's Pacific Partnership 
Declaration and the President's Emergency Plan for Adaptation and 
Resilience (PREPARE). We continue to unlock public and private funding 
that will preserve the region's rich biodiversity, assist low-lying 
communities threatened by rising sea levels, and help farmers adopt 
climate-smart agriculture practices--including those that rehabilitate 
soil, which improves the quality of crops and, in turn, boosts 
nutrition and food security. USAID is also partnering with local civil 
society organizations under our regional grant facility known as the 
Pacific American Fund to advance Pacific-identified and led solutions 
to complex development challenges.
    In Papua New Guinea, for instance, USAID is expanding access to 
renewable energy, protecting the country's environment, combatting the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, bolstering gender equity, and addressing gender-
based violence. USAID's work promoting peace and stability is one facet 
of the 3D approach under the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and 
Promote Stability (SPCPS) in Papua New Guinea, which aims to strengthen 
regional partnership and elevate locally led efforts to address the 
shared objectives of strengthening community capacity to prevent, 
mitigate, and respond to violence; supporting sustainable and equitable 
economic growth; and improving justice systems and professionalizing 
security forces. In Palau, USAID partnered with Australia and Japan to 
support the development of an undersea spur cable--Palau's second--that 
will connect the country to the world's longest undersea cable and 
increase the internet bandwidth needed to spark greater economic 
growth. In the Solomon Islands, USAID works with partners at all levels 
to advance the country's economic competitiveness and inclusiveness, 
with specific emphasis on developing the agribusiness sector and 
improving natural resources governance.
    USAID's environment and climate readiness work remains a top 
priority. Through the USAID Climate Ready activity, which ended only a 
few months ago, we mobilized more than $550 million dollars for Pacific 
Islands countries to improve access to climate finance from various 
climate institutions such as the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation 
Fund and the Global Environment Facility. Building on the success of 
Climate Ready, USAID is developing a new climate finance activity that 
will seek to unlock resources from additional sources, bringing 
traditional multi-donor sources together with private sector and 
foreign direct investment to become more resilient to climate change 
and disaster risks.
    We are also responding directly to requests from Pacific Island 
governments to expand opportunities for economic growth. At last year's 
U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Summit, President Biden announced the U.S. 
would launch a flexible Pacific Microfinance Facility valued at up to 
$50 million to expand access to fair and competitive finance for micro, 
small, and medium enterprises (MSME) in the Pacific Islands. USAID and 
the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation are now bringing 
together our comparative advantages to fulfill this commitment. We have 
received more than a dozen expressions of interest and are now in the 
process of identifying viable financial institutions to partner with.
    Last year, Pacific Island countries joined together to develop, 
endorse, and launch the Unlocking Blue Pacific Prosperity Initiative. 
This initiative, led by the Pacific Community, sets a clear and bold 
vision to protect the region's ecosystem, which is five times the size 
of the United States, as well as ensure food security and livelihoods 
for Pacific Islanders. USAID is supporting this Pacific-led initiative 
by working with the Pacific Community to align donors behind this 
vision, utilizing our convening power, and by ensuring that UBPP is 
complementary to other important initiatives in the region. The Pacific 
Islands Forum Leaders Meeting later this year is a key opportunity for 
donors, including the United States, to coalesce and to follow through 
on supporting Pacific-led priorities.
    The United States remains one of the largest bi-lateral 
humanitarian and disaster assistance donors in the Pacific. In addition 
to our efforts to build countries' resilience through PREPARE, advance 
progress on shared development priorities, and strengthen our enduring 
bonds across the region, we provide year-round disaster preparedness 
and resilience assistance, which enables Pacific Island nations to more 
effectively lead their own disaster responses.
    We do this by supporting early recovery, risk reduction, and 
strengthening resilience throughout the Pacific Islands. This allows 
partner countries to lead in figuring out solutions to lessen the 
impacts of natural hazards and respond more effectively to disasters. 
USAID's three-pronged approach--to enhance early warning systems, 
improve disaster preparedness, and strengthen first-responder 
capabilities--helps Pacific Island nations to strengthen national 
disaster risk management capacities.
    Last year, tropical cyclones Judy and Kevin made landfall over 
Vanuatu between February 28 and March 4, and affected more than 85 
percent of the country's population. USAID responded swiftly by 
supporting the distribution of emergency relief items and coordination 
for the humanitarian response. USAID provided a total of $3.2 million 
in humanitarian assistance for shelter so that communities could start 
rebuilding their homes; water, sanitation and hygiene assistance 
including safe drinking water and supplies; support for humanitarian 
coordination and assessments; nutrition services; and protection for 
the most vulnerable people affected by the storms.
    Across all of these efforts, USAID works directly with like minded 
allies and partners in the region, as well as through coordinating 
mechanisms such as Partners in the Blue Pacific and the QUAD. By doing 
so, we are able to leverage each other's resources and technical 
expertise, while ensuring USAID's work is complementary, respects 
existing regional architecture, and is led and guided by the Pacific 
Islands.
                                closing
    Mr. Chairman, USAID's investments in the Pacific Islands region are 
a critical part of the United States' vision for a free and open Indo-
Pacific that contributes to greater global security and prosperity.
    Thank you for your support in providing us the necessary resources 
as well as the opportunity to share what USAID is doing in this 
important region. I look forward to your counsel and questions.

    The Chairman. Again, I want to thank all three of our 
witnesses, not just for their appearance here but for what you 
do.
    It is true that the United States is a Pacific nation, but 
we have one Pacific Island State, and I am going to yield the 
place in order for questioning to Senator Schatz who has been 
our leader on Pacific Island issues.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 
Member, and thank you all for being here. I also want to 
recognize Secretary General Puna for our continued and 
productive engagement--he is in the audience--and also the 
finance minister of Tonga, Mr. Tiueti, for being here.
    I want to start with Mr. Kritenbrink. The United States has 
provided $4.5 million to the Pacific Resilience Facility. Can 
you talk about the importance of PRF and how you see it as a 
mechanism for the kind of engagement that Secretary Blinken and 
President Biden have talked about, and I think we are all on a 
bipartisan basis in the middle of executing.
    But as I talk to the PIF, they are prioritizing the Pacific 
Resilience Facility, and I would like you to just talk about 
why we made that first investment and maybe why we should 
consider continued investments.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for the 
question and for the opportunity to be here today.
    I would just underscore what you have said. Our whole 
approach to the Pacific Islands is to listen to the Pacific 
Island leaders what their top needs are, to study the Pacific 
Island Forum's own 2050 strategy for the Blue Pacific 
continent, and then to make sure that we meet the needs that 
are outlined in that strategy, and the number one need that 
they have outlined is the existential challenge of climate 
change.
    So the Pacific Resilience Facility is one of several steps 
we have taken to show our support for meeting the Pacific 
Islanders where they live, so to speak. That initial investment 
is designed to build local resilience and capacity to help 
combat climate change, but I do think it is just the beginning 
of what we are doing and what we need to do, and we will need 
to do more, going forward.
    My colleague Michael Schiffer may have more details on the 
actual implementation on the ground. But I could not agree 
more, Senator, with the importance of the climate issue.
    Senator Schatz. Sorry. Mr. Schiffer, I actually want to 
pivot a little bit to something that you said in your testimony 
about predatory economic arrangements with Pacific Island 
nations, and I think our theory of the case at least in the 
last 3 or 4 years has been to really listen, to try to respond, 
to understand these are sovereigns--they are not colonies, they 
are not insular areas--and to be more sensitive to that, and to 
understand that they--as sovereigns--get to have whatever 
economic partnerships that make the most sense to them.
    I would like you to make the case a little more explicitly 
about how these predatory economic arrangements are, in the 
end, bad for some of our friends across the Pacific.
    Mr. Schiffer. Thank you for that question, and let me 
underscore from the outset, and as Assistant Secretary 
Kritenbrink offered, we fully recognize that our partners in 
the Pacific are sovereign that they can make their and should 
make their own choices and that our role is to support them in 
that process, and that is what we seek to do.
    But as we look around at PRC behavior in the Pacific we see 
that the PRC is violating many of the rules and norms that have 
been established by the international community for its own 
benefit. And that negatively impacts the work that we do, 
including in the Pacific Island in the economic growth and the 
development sphere.
    So, for example, we have seen a surge in investment by the 
PRC in the telecommunications sector in recent years, which can 
leave nations vulnerable to cybersecurity risks and other 
national security concerns.
    And so we see our role as partnering with like minded and 
partnering with our Pacific Island friends to ensure that they 
have the options that they need for fast, secure, and reliable 
connectivity.
    Senator Schatz. Mr. Schiffer, sorry to interrupt. I just 
want you to get to what is the catch here? When you go into a 
partnership with PRC on a harbor or whatever it may be, what is 
the catch on the back end?
    Mr. Schiffer. The catch on the back end for the partners is 
that oftentimes the PRC is not motivated by developing an 
economically viable and sustainable program, but is motivated 
by other geostrategic considerations and will work to create a 
project that is not economic, not sustainable, and leaves a 
partner saddled with debt on the back side.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
    A final question for Mr. Kritenbrink.
    This is either yes or no or as quick as you can do. How 
important is it to--I guess it is not yes or no--how important 
is it to ratify the Law of the Sea?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, Senator, I think Secretary Blinken 
has spoken to this before. It would be very effective to our 
diplomacy in the region.
    And maybe just on the previous question to underscore my 
colleague's point where, of course, countries make their own 
decisions and their own choices. We want to make sure that they 
can do that freely.
    Oftentimes, we find that deals with the Chinese can 
undermine a country's sovereignty and can lead to giving China 
leverage over a country that undermines their position.
    Thank you, sir.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Kritenbrink, can you describe for us challenges if 
there are any or difficulties there are of attracting diplomats 
to serve in the EAP area that you oversee?
    Is it difficult? Is it challenging? What is unique about 
it?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. The challenges of recruiting diplomats to 
serve in the Pacific?
    Senator Risch. Yes, correct.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I would say two things. I think there are 
certain challenges because we need to make sure we have 
diplomats who are ready to serve, who are truly creative and 
expeditionary and can serve in some of our most important but 
some of our smallest environments.
    But I have been really gratified, Mr. Ranking Member, that 
thus far there has been a lot of enthusiasm for service in the 
Pacific.
    As I noted, in addition to our previously operating six 
embassies, we have opened two new ones, and we have two more on 
the way, and I have been gratified that we have had people step 
up in every instance and including both at the senior level and 
at the working level.
    Senator Risch. Well, we appreciate that, and we have tried 
to help.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Risch. You know, I passed the Secure Embassy 
Construction and Counterterrorism Act--I assume you are 
familiar with that--and it was in 2022, and it provides State 
with much needed flexibilities to stand up our overseas 
missions----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Risch [continuing]. Which is especially useful in 
the Pacific Islands.
    Well, since you are here, and your boss is not, you get the 
opportunity to explain to me why he has only answered two out 
of the five letters I have written about that subject to him, 
and one of those two that he answered we just got this week. 
So----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I see.
    Senator Risch [continuing]. It has been over a long period 
of time.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Ranking Member, I will----
    Senator Risch. When you see him tell him I want to chat 
with him about it.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I will look into that immediately. We are 
grateful to you and other members of this committee for your 
support.
    Because of your support we have been able to open our two 
new embassies in the Solomons and Tonga in record speed, and I 
am confident we will do the same in the very near future in 
Vanuatu, and we are still working on Kiribati. But grateful for 
the support.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that.
    Second, that law that we just discussed requires that the 
Secretary issue official guidance on implementing it. That has 
not been done, and I do not suppose you can enlighten me as to 
when that might be done. That is something that----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I cannot, Mr. Ranking Member, but I will 
look into it immediately.
    Senator Risch. Would you take that for the record, please?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
    Senator Risch. And I would like to hear about that.
    OK.
    Mr. Ratner, I have been intrigued by the fact that the 
Chinese have been modestly successful in these policing 
agreements that they have entered into with some of the 
countries.
    When we go out to try to work with another country, we 
offer things in food or medical area or education or human 
rights or things like that. But the Chinese focus on policing 
agreements. I think I know why, but can you enlighten us a 
little bit maybe why the Chinese focus on that?
    Mr. Ratner. Senator, I believe the PRC is focused on 
policing agreements because it is a mechanism through which 
they can support and gain leverage over host regimes.
    Senator Risch. And the population itself. Would you agree 
with that?
    Mr. Ratner. Yes.
    Senator Risch. Have we thought about at all offering the 
same kind of services? Because, look, certainly for the people 
who run the country, obviously, security becomes number one, 
particularly their own security, and hopefully, being able to 
stay in office.
    So it seems like that is a pretty attractive bait to put 
out there for getting countries to bite. So have you guys 
thought at all about making some kind of offers like that in 
the same lane?
    Mr. Ratner. The Defense Department has a number of security 
cooperation activities and military to military cooperation 
activities with countries in the Pacific Islands. We do not do 
internal policing support in that regard. So I would defer to 
Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to talk about some of our 
programs there.
    Senator Risch. Right. And I understand that, by the way. 
There are two different lanes, the military and the police in 
very, very different lanes, obviously, one being domestic one, 
one not. But maybe you could----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I could speak to that very briefly, Mr. 
Ranking Member----
    Senator Risch. Sure.
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. That we have increased our 
own law enforcement assistance in the region. But I think 
perhaps even more importantly we work together with partners in 
the Pacific family--Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New 
Zealand--who have a long standing tradition of helping 
countries in the region with security and with policing, and I 
think that has been quite effective to show that there are, 
obviously, alternatives to PRC policing agreements, which are 
opaque, and we think, deeply concerning.
    Senator Risch. Yes. I think we are all concerned about that 
when they first started popping up. I would strongly suggest 
that you guys revisit your efforts in that regard and see how 
you might be able to make them more attractive so when they do 
bite on the hook that it is our hook and not the Chinese.
    So thank you. My time is up.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
    Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Kritenbrink, is it fair to say that China remains 
an important market for Pacific Island countries' natural 
resource exports and tourism?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir, Senator. I think that is an 
accurate statement for probably the majority.
    Senator Menendez. And is it also right that 10 Pacific 
Island countries have joined China's Belt and Road Initiative 
which promotes PRC backed infrastructure development?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I do not know that figure, but I would not 
dispute it. Happy to look into that. I will take that at face 
value. Yes, sir.
    Senator Menendez. I would commend it to you. I am pretty 
sure it is 10.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Menendez. So is it also fair to say that since 
China is the economic force within that region that we are 
challenged in terms of our own national interests in meeting 
that economic force with one that can compete with it?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, I would agree with that. But I 
would say having engaged intensively with our Pacific Island 
leader friends over the last couple of years the demand signal 
for U.S. engagement is probably as strong as I have ever seen 
in any region.
    Certainly, there are economic engagements with China that 
are important to these countries, and we are not asking 
countries to choose. But it is clear to us that our Pacific 
Island friends want to have options. They have a desire to 
partner with the United States, and we are doing everything we 
can to do that.
    Senator Menendez. I agree with you they would like to have 
options. The problem is is that we provide them no option in 
terms of an economic or trade agenda. There is no trade agenda 
of consequence with the Pacific Island countries, and for so 
long as they therefore do not have an option for their economic 
vitality and well being of their citizens, they are somewhat 
hostage to China.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We have certainly tried to meet their 
needs, and in----
    Senator Menendez. How so?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, as I indicated, sir, our strategy is 
based on meeting their needs in terms of security, combating 
climate change, infrastructure investment, and the like.
    So our focus has been primarily in those sectors. We also 
promote good governance and people to people ties as well. But 
those would be the priority sectors.
    Senator Menendez. And I appreciate--those are all 
worthwhile things, Mr. Secretary, some of the things that I 
have advocated for for the better part of nearly two decades of 
being here in the Senate and three decades in Congress.
    But we have to be realistic that if we do not have a robust 
trade agenda in the Pacific Island countries that they will not 
by desire, maybe, but by default ultimately deal with the 
Chinese.
    And the urgency of climate change; there is a lot more that 
we should be doing as it relates to climate change, which is in 
our collective interests as well as a global interest that we 
have, but which is really an existential challenge to our 
Pacific Island neighbors.
    And so I just hope the Administration gets to a better 
place because IPEF is a nice framework, but it does not deal 
with any market access, at the end of the day, and without 
market access I think that we are going to be at a competitive 
disadvantage with China.
    Mr. Schiffer, it is good to see you back before the 
committee. I see you have adopted the State Department's ways 
of expanding beyond the 5 minutes. But I hope that is the only 
thing that you adopt from that experience.
    Let me just say--I think our colleague was trying to get to 
this--at the end of the day is it not what China often does 
through its Belt and Road Initiative, is to trap many of these 
countries in debt diplomacy?
    Mr. Schiffer. That is exactly the behavior pattern that we 
have seen where China offers what appears to be an attractive 
proposition but the back side of debt and entrapment, and then 
the leverage and the additional openings for corrupt practices 
create serious problems down the line.
    Senator Menendez. And they entrap them not only in debt, 
but then entrap them in their political diplomatic questions.
    Mr. Schiffer. Yes. Beijing is very, very skilled at using 
the leverage that it finds itself to have available.
    Senator Menendez. Finally, Secretary Ratner, in March 2022 
the Solomon Islands and China signed a security agreement 
ostensibly aiming in part to address, quote, ``internal 
threats'' including protecting Chinese owned businesses in the 
country.
    In 2023 the two countries signed a deal on police 
cooperation as part of their comprehensive strategic 
partnership. And while I certainly applaud last year's opening 
of an embassy in the Solomon Islands, what tools is the United 
States using and utilizing to encourage the Solomon Islands' 
commitment to continue working with the United States and 
Australia as security partners?
    Mr. Ratner. Senator, again, I would defer to Assistant 
Secretary Kritenbrink particularly on the question of policing.
    But as it relates to the Department of Defense's role 
throughout the Pacific Islands, much of our cooperation depends 
on the nature of the island, the size, and their resident 
forces.
    There are, of course, three Pacific Islands that have 
militaries--so PNG, Tonga, and Fiji--and we maintain military 
to military relations with them and maintain status as partner 
of choice there.
    We have a number of Section 333 capacity building programs. 
We have DOD-State partnership programs through our National 
Guard programs. We do a number of regular exercises with 
Pacific Island partners, and we are deeply engaged with 
Australia, New Zealand, France, Japan, and other partners from 
a multilateral----
    Senator Menendez. My time has expired, but that is not the 
question I was seeking an answer to.
    For the record, Mr. Secretary, since my time has expired 
would you respond to that question for me, what are we doing to 
get the Solomon Islands to be aligned with us, particularly in 
our security partnership with Australia?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Menendez. I would appreciate hearing that.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Actually, Senator Menendez, I am actually going to follow 
up with Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink on that as well with 
regard to the--if you could go into more details.
    We have covered a number of the countries already like the 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, that have 
established these security arrangements with the People's 
Republic of China.
    Can you talk more in detail what we are doing to, say, for 
example, supply the training or international standards, 
working with our allies like Australia and New Zealand to be 
able to counter some of the things that the PRC is doing?
    You can certainly, again, understand countries wanting to 
have security but, obviously, the malign influence that the PRC 
can do once they have a whole security apparatus.
    So maybe you could hit upon what we are trying to do to 
counter it, and also talk a little bit about what the PRC does. 
For example, we have seen them be able to extradite people from 
Fiji--Chinese dissidents and so forth--about how that once the 
PRC gets a hold of that security forces what kind of malign 
influence they can exercise in those countries.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
    As we indicated, it is deeply concerning when we see these 
agreements inked because they are opaque. They have caused 
concern both within the individual countries and across the 
region as well, and I think our most effective approach in 
every instance is we continue to engage with every partner in 
the Pacific, including those who have signed these agreements.
    But I think we are most effective when we work together 
with others in the region who share those concerns, who can 
also quietly convey the depth of our concern and to offer 
alternatives.
    And I think, really, that is the crux of our entire 
approach. We have to give these countries options.
    Senator Ricketts. Can you get into some of the alternatives 
that you are offering some of these countries?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, for example----
    Senator Ricketts. What can we do to counter China saying, 
hey, we are going to provide you people that can be on the 
ground? What can we do to counter that?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We have our own law enforcement training 
programs active throughout the Pacific but is providing us an 
explicit alternative and boots on the ground, so to speak, of 
security forces that can help these countries.
    That is really where partners like Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
Australia, and New Zealand, they actually have police forces on 
the ground in many of these countries.
    I think that is the most effective way forward, and again, 
finding that solution that is comfortable with friends in the 
Pacific I think is the most effective way forward, and 
including in the Solomon Islands itself where those countries 
that I have mentioned have helped to provide security even 
after this PRC----
    Senator Ricketts. So are we offering new training in places 
like the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu and----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I would have to look at the details of 
each country, but yes, we do provide training in the region, 
and again, our partners in the Pacific in particular are very 
active because they actually have police forces on the ground 
in many of these places.
    Senator Ricketts. OK. Can you also talk a little about PRC 
linked organized crime in these places, and again, how it 
undermines the security? Can you talk about what we know about 
that and how that may relate to the security issues?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, I do not have a great deal of 
depth on that. I would probably have to bring that back.
    But certainly, when you think about some areas where 
countries ought to be cautious about their engagement with 
China, part of it is the leverage and the coercive avenues that 
are opened up for the government, but part of it is related to 
organized crime as well.
    But for any details I would have to take that back, but I 
would be happy to do so.
    Senator Ricketts. Can you talk in a little detail about, 
again, when security forces are on the ground in some of these 
countries and how the PRC then uses that to suppress their 
dissidents who may be there, or anything like that?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, that is the concern, Senator, the 
very clear concern voiced by partners, citizens of countries 
where these forces have been and others in the region.
    I am not sure if we have seen much of that yet, but that is 
certainly the concern, and I think as Assistant Secretary 
Ratner indicated, when we have seen China do this elsewhere 
oftentimes they are looking for an avenue to get in the door, 
so to speak, and to expand security arrangements from there. 
And so that would be of deep concern, I think, to many in the 
region, including ourselves.
    Senator Ricketts. OK.
    I am going to switch gears on you just a little bit here. 
Can you talk about--obviously, after the Taiwan elections Nauru 
switched their diplomatic ties against----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Ricketts [continuing]. Taiwan to the PRC. How much 
awareness do we have of that in the State Department? And 
obviously, this is not the first time it has happened. What are 
we doing to maybe try and flip them back to Taiwan recognition?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, there is a history for some of these 
countries flipping back and forth, so there is that precedent. 
I think what disappointed us in that move is the way it was 
done, the excuses that were used by the PRC including certain 
economic inducements and U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758, 
which was misused and misinterpreted.
    But our message to Nauru and then to the three remaining 
partners of Taiwan in the region is, again, countries ought to 
be careful and clear eyed about entering in these arrangements 
with China.
    China will often make many promises that remain unfulfilled 
and that can have negative consequences. And then with those 
three remaining partners--three formal diplomatic partners of 
Taiwan--we worked very carefully and closely with them to make 
sure their needs are met, and that we try to close off any 
opportunities for--that China could exploit.
    Senator Ricketts. But do we know that that was going to 
happen? Did we know that Nauru was going to do that right after 
the Taiwan elections? Because were they not just talking a lot 
about it----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. For----
    Senator Ricketts [continuing]. Flights and so forth right 
before that?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We had known for some time that there were 
concerns in Nauru, and we were working with partners to meet 
those.
    But in this instance they decided to flip. There is a 
history in some of these places of going back and forth, and we 
will have to see. But I would just say, again, we issued a 
public statement right after this was done. Every country has 
the sovereign decision to make their own decision including on 
these recognition questions. But we do encourage countries to 
be cautious and careful given the track record of the PRC.
    Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Assistant Secretary.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Kritenbrink and Administrator Schiffer, I want to 
ask you a question related to the local media and information 
space.
    We talk a lot about the need for Western engagement on 
infrastructure. We recognize that in many cases that China 
might be the only player in town to deal with some of the 
infrastructure projects, and therefore, they give a deal that 
is too good to believe, and it turns out not to be what they 
thought it was going to be, and then you have the debt 
diplomacy issues.
    But it also seems like the PRC is actively engaged in 
influencing local media and information in the region, and what 
is the United States doing to try to counter that activity?
    Let me start with the secretary.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Very important question. I will mention two critical 
efforts at the outset.
    First is in every place where we have a presence, and we 
are on the ground, we are active in the local media space and 
through our own public diplomacy to make sure that there is 
alternative messaging to the PRC there so, again, our partners 
in the region have choice and have accurate information.
    And second, we are working on programs to provide many of 
our partners in the region with access to credible news wires 
and the like, the AP and others.
    So, again, a newspaper, for example, on the ground in 
island countries not completely dependent on Xinhua for its 
news but has other options. Those are the two that I would 
mention at the outset, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Schiffer. Sure, and if I can build on that, Mr. 
Chairman.
    In addition to the cable spur project that I had talked 
about earlier and the work that we have done with other 
partners on the East Micronesia cable, we have also been 
extraordinarily active working with our Department of State 
colleagues supporting free and independent press in the region, 
including through a number of journalism fellowships, 
particularly targeting journalists who are interested in 
working on natural resource management as that addresses a 
number of the corruption and governance concerns that we have.
    And then we also recently launched with the University of 
the South Pacific a digital cyber connectivity partnership that 
allows us to step into the digital space in a more forward 
leaning way, responsive to the requests that we are getting 
from our partners to provide them the digital services that 
they need to be able to control their own information 
destinies.
    The Chairman. I think this is an area that we really need 
to work on.
    I am going to turn the gavel to Senator Kaine. I have to be 
on the floor in regards to our nominee for Haiti. We will be 
voting on confirming an ambassador for Haiti which, obviously, 
is extremely important in our foreign policy decisionmaking.
    So let me thank you all, and I will recognize Senator 
Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I do not watch as closely as I am sure you do to see just 
what China is doing, but I must admit it strikes me that they 
have a very comprehensive plan to establish global leadership 
and to replace us, whether that is in international 
institutions where they insinuate themselves into people in 
leadership, whether it is the movement away from democracy 
generally and the growth in autocracy. Freedom House indicates 
that trend continued again this year.
    They dominate certain raw materials that are the raw 
materials of the future, whether it is nickel or magnesium or 
rare earths, and so forth. They either dominate the mining of 
those things or the processing of them.
    They put in place the rail lines to get the raw materials 
to their ports. They own the ports to get the products to their 
market. Of course, then they have TikTok which allows them to 
gather data on the American people and to provide propaganda, 
as they did in the Taiwan election with the TikTok algorithm 
there.
    They, of course, likewise have Huawei. I mean, you could 
look through the things they have done. They dominate the--I 
should not say dominate--they lead in a number of the new 
technologies and businesses whether it is electric vehicles or 
solar panels. They have invested in hypersonics, which allow 
them potentially to threaten our fleet.
    I mean, you look at the things they do, and it is a 
comprehensive plan and appears to be a very effective strategy. 
If we have a strategy to counter China, it is not working.
    So 2 years ago or longer the chairman of this committee and 
I drafted legislation requiring the State Department to gather 
internally and with external input experts with different 
points of view to create options and to develop a China 
strategy.
    We included that in legislation that was passed. It was due 
to be provided to this committee and to the Congress in July 
2022. So it is, obviously, late.
    Now, call me old fashioned--I thought that when we passed a 
law and required the State Department to do something, that 
they would do it and the State Department has not, or someone 
has not, and I do not understand why.
    Now, I can understand people say, hey, we are late--we will 
get it to you. But apparently the work has been done, but this 
has not been provided. By the way, if it is classified, let it 
be classified.
    But China, from what I can tell, has a game plan, and it is 
succeeding. We do not have a game plan I recognize, and whether 
we do or not, we are not succeeding.
    So, Mr. Kritenbrink, why do we not have this in hand, and 
when will we?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much.
    Senator Romney. You know that was coming, by the way.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. It is good to see you. Thank you, Senator.
    I will say two things. We do have a strategy. We have 
talked about publicly the pillars of that strategy--invest, 
align, and compete. I would----
    Senator Romney. Three words does not make a strategy. I 
mean, it is a wonderful headline--invest, align, compete--and 
the Secretary gave a speech of that nature over 2 years ago--3 
years ago. And I said, that is terrific. That is exactly right.
    But we need a comprehensive strategy. I have just described 
a few things China has in their strategy. We do not have that, 
at least it has not been provided to this committee or to the 
U.S. Congress or the American people, and we are losing, if you 
will, on the strategic battlefield.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, I will take this back 
immediately. I have committed to you before to provide this 
report, and I apologize that that has not been done, and I 
commit to doing so, number one.
    Number two, the point I would take issue with our strategy, 
it is a lot more than those three elements, and I think if you 
look at the actions that this administration is taking, 
investing in our sources of strength at home, and you are aware 
of that agenda.
    The align piece, which I think has been unprecedentedly 
successful, all the alignment with our allies and partners and 
friends around the world in the Indo-Pacific and especially in 
the Pacific Islands, and then the actions we have taken to 
compete against China including protecting the sources of our 
economic strength at home but in many other domains as well.
    So I am confident that we have a strategy. I am confident 
that our China strategy is succeeding--has been successful and 
is succeeding. But this is an unprecedented challenge. But I 
commit to being responsive to your request, Senator. Thank you.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Kaine [presiding]. Senator Duckworth.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
to all the witnesses for being here today.
    To start, I would like to say congratulations to Special 
Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations Joseph Yun and the 
team that worked for more than 2 years to successfully 
renegotiate the Compacts of Free Association with the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and 
Palau. This is critically important to our national security, 
and I am glad we can highlight it today.
    Over a thousand citizens at the Freely Associated States 
serve proudly in the United States military. They are more than 
just good neighbors in the Pacific. They serve alongside us, 
study, innovate, and trade together with us, and they should 
not be put in a position to doubt our commitment to continuing 
our decades long partnership nor our willingness and ability to 
make right the wrongs of the past, including providing 
compensation for damages caused by past nuclear testing.
    Secretary Ratner, I want to dive in a bit more on DOD's 
vision for Joint Task Force Micronesia. As you know, the fiscal 
year 2024 NDAA mandated an assessment on the implementation of 
JTF Micronesia. While we await the results of that report and 
the related assessments pertaining to Guam, I want to make my 
interest in this issue clear.
    While our plans and reports recognize the vastness of the 
Pacific, we have to make sure our structure and resourcing also 
reckons with that vastness sufficiently. For example, our Coast 
Guard has realigned assets to Honolulu to better meet the 
heightened demand signal, a signal that is not only coming from 
our planning process but from our allies and partners who are 
asking us for more opportunities to work together.
    Secretary Ratner, what are your thoughts on the question of 
how our resourcing in that region currently aligns with the 
actual vastness of the scale of the region?
    Mr. Ratner. Well, thank you, Senator.
    And I will tell you that the department is currently 
looking at the evolution of our command and control structures 
throughout the Indo-Pacific, not just as it relates to current 
structures but potential reforms of that.
    So what that looks like down the road is something we are 
taking a look at including as it relates to how we operate in 
the Pacific Islands.
    The National Defense Strategy is laser focused on the PRC 
as the pacing challenge, and that has informed a lot of our 
resourcing as it relates to the Pacific Islands, including in 
major posture initiatives throughout the Pacific Islands, and 
we have ongoing exercises, and as Assistant Secretary 
Kritenbrink has said, we are doing everything we can to 
leverage our allies and partners who have great contributions 
to make down there.
    So we have stepped up our game. We are doubling down in 
places like Papua New Guinea, and we are looking for additional 
opportunities.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    I sit on both SFRC and SASC. I feel a special 
responsibility to ensure there is strong interagency 
coordination to address pressing national security challenges, 
and last week I spoke to the commanders of CENTCOM and AFRICOM 
about how important it is to do this in their areas of 
responsibility.
    Secretary Ratner, what can you say about how Joint Task 
Force Micronesia may include liaisons not only from across the 
different service branches but also the interagency to ensure 
robust coordination across diplomatic, developmental, and 
defense functions directly from the region, as it is already 
being done at INDOPACOM complementing the work that is done at 
JIATF West?
    Mr. Ratner. Well, thank you, Senator. I will refer to 
INDOPACOM on the specific staffing. But I a hundred percent 
agree with your point, and it is a broader point to make here 
today is that even as it relates to our security issues the 
work that USAID is doing, the work the State Department is 
doing, and other departments and agencies are fundamental 
contributions to our security in the region.
    So when we when we talk about concerns about China's 
influence, concerns about China's military, resourcing and 
funding some of our economic and assistance programs are 
critically important, and we work very closely with the State 
Department and USAID.
    I know Admiral Aquilino hosted a regional ambassadors 
conference recently where Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink 
attended, and we are taking every chance we get opportunities 
to integrate our posture and our military strategy with our 
assistance and diplomacy.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I think that speaks very 
strongly to the importance of our presence in the region.
    Secretary Kritenbrink and Administrator Schiffer, I would 
like to stay on the topic of this interagency cooperation when 
it comes to implementing the Indo-Pacific strategy through our 
engagement with the Pacific Island countries in particular and 
in the context of COFA specifically.
    We know that our failure to pass a budget on time did 
nothing to help make the case for U.S. leadership and 
reliability in the world, including in the Pacific. But now 
that COFA funding has passed, I want to understand your 
assessment of whether the U.S. Government is presenting a 
unified, consistent presence to our allies and partners, 
particularly the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau.
    In your opinion is the United States building strategies 
that project not only our strength but our values that makes a 
case that the United States is a responsible Pacific power and 
that democracy actually does deliver because you know that the 
PRC is making the opposite argument?
    Our investments and commitments need to be visibly 
American, and what more can we do to reinforce our reputation 
as a reliable partner of choice?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for the 
question, for your leadership and support on these issues.
    On the issue of our interagency cooperation and 
implementing the COFA agreements, I am very confident in the 
work that the three of us have done at this table together with 
our colleagues at the White House, especially Senior Director 
Mira Rapp-Hooper, our colleagues at the Department of the 
Interior as well.
    So I am very confident about that, going forward. I fully 
agree with your point about that our values have to be on 
display as well.
    But Senator, I think my experience over the last couple of 
years dealing with friends in the Pacific, I feel very well 
aligned for the most part with many of the leaders and most of 
the peoples on the ground, and where we do have concerns we 
worked in particular to build the capacity of our partners.
    But I could not agree more. I want to thank you and the 
Congress for the leadership. Passing the COFA was one of the 
most important things that we could have done, I think, in the 
last decade to demonstrate our commitment to this vitally 
important region. Very, very grateful to you.
    Mr. Schiffer. And I will add very briefly to Secretary 
Kritenbrink's comments.
    I think we have had exceptional interagency cooperation 
over the past several years under the Biden-Harris 
administration really linking together all of the elements of 
our national security community to be able to deliver to our 
partners and as you offered, Senator Duckworth, to be able to 
present that unified face that demonstrates America's added 
value as a partner and a friend in the region.
    As I offered earlier, our approach has been to listen, 
partner, and deliver, and to your point delivery is just as 
critical as any of the other pieces, and I think we have 
stepped up our game in the past couple of years.
    Senator Kaine. And if I could ask you to summarize. We are 
over time----
    Mr. Schiffer. Sure.
    Senator Kaine [continuing]. And I want to have Senator 
Hagerty----
    Mr. Schiffer. My apologies, Mr. Chairman.
    I was just going to offer that when the President has made 
commitments at our recent Pacific Island summits, both the 
State Department, USAID, the Department of Defense, and other 
elements of the U.S. Government have moved out quickly to 
implement and to make sure that we are showing up in tangible 
ways.
    Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
    I apologize to Senator Hagerty.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you. Good discussion.
    Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, 
Administrator Schiffer, Secretary Ratner, Secretary 
Kritenbrink. It is good to see all three of you.
    I would like to talk with you about the investment strategy 
that we do undertake. I know that each of you have different 
tools.
    Secretary Ratner, you have got the Office of Strategic 
Capital I would like to hear about.
    Administrator Schiffer, you have got the microfinance 
program that you are dealing with.
    And Ambassador Kritenbrink, we talked about the strategy 
document that you are putting together.
    I am deeply concerned about our ability to show up, 
particularly when it comes to hard infrastructure in the 
region, and I may have shared this with some of you, but when I 
was in my previous role as Ambassador to Japan I was literally 
reading in Nikkei Asia about a bankruptcy that was underway in 
the Philippines. The old Subic Bay Port, the Hanjin shipyard 
there--a South Korean shipyard--was in bankruptcy.
    The two bidders' names were of concern to me, and I reached 
out to the appropriate people and found out that those two 
bidders were both affiliated with the PRC. They were trying to 
take control of a very strategic shipyard, one that had been a 
U.S. Navy post back in the 1980s when I lived in Japan the 
first time, and I was deeply concerned about that and what we 
might be able to do.
    I will not go into the details of it here, but we put a 
tremendous amount of effort into trying to address that 
situation, and that asset now is called Agila shipyard. It is 
now a U.S. asset. It is a very strategic asset for us in the 
region.
    And the way we got that done was by me making a lot of 
phone calls, the State Department, the Department of Defense 
coming together on an ad hoc basis, Cerberus Capital Management 
in New York taking a very important leading role in doing all 
of this, and the Japanese government stepping up and helping us 
as well.
    We worked with the Philippine government, with the Japanese 
government, certainly with the U.S. Government to make all this 
happen. It probably took the better part of 2 years to get it 
to work, and the Development Finance Corporation, which I 
thought would be the tool that we could use to really step up 
the U.S. Government's participation, was unable to participate 
in this.
    In fact, we were not able to get any U.S. Government direct 
participation. A lot of effort and a lot of elbow grease, but 
not direct participation.
    So I would like to come to you, and I will start with you, 
Secretary Ratner, to talk about the new Office of Strategic 
Capital. Is this a means, a tool, by which you might be able to 
do hard infrastructure?
    I know you talk about technology here, but is that a tool, 
or are there other tools where you could step up and play a 
more direct role?
    Mr. Ratner. Yes, Senator, I will get back to you 
specifically on the Office of Strategic Capital as it relates 
to the Pacific Islands.
    What I will say related to infrastructure we have a number 
of major posture initiatives underway throughout the Pacific 
Islands, obviously, in U.S. territories such as Guam and CNMI, 
in the COFA states, in Marshall Islands and Palau we have some 
major projects underway, and of course, last year concluded a 
defense cooperation agreement with Papua New Guinea and have 
already had one INDOPACOM site survey team down and another one 
on the way to start looking at some of the infrastructure 
projects that we can do there.
    So we do see this as a huge priority. It connects to the 
development and economic issues that we have been talking about 
this morning, and we are looking to do more throughout the 
region, and some of those projects are included in the 
President's fiscal year 2025 budget request.
    Senator Hagerty. I would encourage you to take a very hard 
look at the Philippines, too. There are more assets there that 
I am sure you are aware of. The Chinese Communist Party has 
great interest in that region. We should have a great strategic 
interest in projecting our own relationship.
    I have been very happy, frankly, with the relationship that 
we have built with the Philippine government and the direction 
that is going, but I think we have a lot of opportunity there.
    Secretary Kritenbrink, could you speak to this in terms of 
your thoughts, and as you prepare the strategic document that 
you promised to Senator Romney, I would love to hear how this 
infrastructure piece may fit in.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, Senator Hagerty, first of all, thank 
you for your leadership on the Philippines example you 
mentioned. It is still one of the best textbook examples we 
have of a success story.
    I would say what we are doing right now is we are focused 
especially with other partners on trying to catalyze investment 
in key infrastructure in the region.
    Certainly, the subsea cables is probably the place where we 
have been most active--the East Micronesia cable, work on the 
Google cable, and elsewhere.
    We have also partnered with Australia. We announced in 
October that we were going to co-finance maritime 
infrastructure in Kiribati including at Canton wharf and 
Charlie wharf. So, certainly, we are focused on the 
infrastructure issues, and again, giving countries options in 
the region.
    Second, to underscore what Assistant Secretary Ratner said, 
in the President's fiscal year 2025 budget request there is a 
$4 billion discretionary request and a $4 billion mandatory 
funding request, and the mandatory funding in particular is 
designed to allow the United States to be able to fund hard 
infrastructure projects and to invest in what we call these 
strategic connectivity projects in the region.
    Senator Hagerty. If you all could get back to me with a 
little more detail on that. I would be very interested to see--
--
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, Senator. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty [continuing]. How your plan is unfolding.
    Thank you all.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you to the witnesses.
    I will do my questioning now and then call on Senator 
Young.
    I am a big fan of the AUKUS framework in the Indo-Pacific. 
I think this announced framework by President Biden of a couple 
years ago can be extremely powerful, going forward.
    I have some home state equities involved as well because 
the pillar one submarine portion of the deal will involve a lot 
of work at the shipyard in Newport News, Virginia.
    I want to tell a funny story about AUKUS that is sort of a 
thank you to this committee.
    Secretary Ratner, about 10 days before the Defense 
Committee marked up our NDAA in June, the Pentagon sent a group 
over to meet with me in the SCIF and said, you are the chairman 
of the Sea Power Subcommittee--we need to get all of this 
legislative language in the NDAA. Will you help us?
    And I said, no, I am not going to help you. And they said, 
wait a minute. You are an AUKUS supporter. I said, I am. Why 
will you not help us? Because none of this is jurisdictional in 
the Armed Services Committee. I cannot get it in the NDAA. It 
is all on the Foreign Relations Committee.
    We then worked together, great members on this committee. 
Senators Cardin, Senator Menendez, and others really helped get 
the AUKUS framework through the Foreign Relations Committee so 
that by the time the NDAA hit the floor we were able to attach 
the AUKUS legislative framework to the defense bill on the 
floor.
    And so I want to thank this committee for working very 
expeditiously to make that happen. Obviously, we are still in 
process in this way while the NDAA has been signed. We have a 
supplemental bill that is pending in the House that passed the 
Senate by a 70 to 29 vote, and the one piece of that 
supplemental that has not proven controversial is the portion 
dealing with the AUKUS framework, the investment that needs to 
be made in the submarine industrial base, to make sure that we 
can match with our investment what the Aussies are putting in 
to grow an industrial base to enable us to complete this 
important part of the project.
    Secretary Ratner, just from the Pentagon's standpoint, I 
would like you to talk about the importance of the AUKUS 
framework in terms of stability and deterrence in the Indo-
Pacific because I do think we need to do more education of the 
American public and others about this.
    So talk about why this is such an important priority for 
the Administration.
    Mr. Ratner. Well, thank you, Senator.
    This is an absolute top priority insofar as our undersea 
capabilities are critical to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, 
and they are an area of U.S. overmatch, and it is essential 
that we keep it that way. And when we apply our allies and 
partners to that overmatch it is even more powerful deterrence.
    So maintaining our undersea advantage is going to be key to 
maintaining peace and stability in the region. The AUKUS 
legislation helps to do that.
    You mentioned submarine building. The President's budget 
request for fiscal year 2025 would provide $4 billion toward 
the submarine industrial base and the national security 
supplemental on top of that, and that will be critical to keep 
pace with the challenge.
    Senator Kaine. Just one quick story about submarine 
building.
    The Navy has stood up a manufacturing Center of Excellence 
in Danville, Virginia, to train the submarine industrial base, 
and on my last visit to the center it was pretty heartwarming 
to walk into these classrooms and see not only U.S. 
shipbuilders from around the country, but also Aussies, Aussies 
who have been dispatched here from Australian companies to 
learn side by side with their American counterparts.
    And the other thing that I noticed is each of the 
classrooms I went into also included a number of Afghans, 
Afghans who served bravely with United States in Afghanistan. 
They moved to the United States. They are looking for a new 
career, and they have decided, I am going to be a shipbuilder.
    And watching the Aussies and the Afghans and the young 
people from Danville with all their conflicting accents 
learning side by side to become part of the U.S. submarine 
industrial base and the Australian submarine industrial base 
was really positive.
    Secretary Kritenbrink, the other piece of AUKUS is the 
pillar two, which means sort of anything else. Pillar one is 
about subs, but pillar two is focused on cybersecurity, AI, 
advanced technologies, innovation, and one of the opportunities 
there is for partnerships between research universities in the 
U.S., Australia, and the U.K., and innovative companies.
    My sense is in the same way that the U.S. has alliances 
that are strong and that that is seen by China as kind of 
threatening, we also have deep ties between universities in our 
country and Australia and the U.K. and other nations, and I 
think that is a kind of an alliance that is pretty powerful.
    From the State Department standpoint looking at pillar two, 
what do you see as ways we can cooperate with Australia and the 
U.K. to find new, innovative technologies on which we can 
cooperate to promote stability in the region?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, I completely agree with the way 
that you framed it, the tremendous opportunities, I think, 
under pillar two as well for broader base technological 
cooperation, certainly among our three countries, as you have 
outlined, between our universities and our companies.
    And as you know, we have also indicated we are open to 
potentially cooperating with other countries in pillar two as 
well. So I think this is quite an exciting and strategically 
important area. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine. Well, if the big 12 can have 16 teams, then 
the Quad can have eight members or AUKUS can have nations whose 
names are not in the title.
    So I am going to now go to Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman, and I was really 
encouraged that you asked about pillar two of AUKUS. I have it 
right here, pillar two. That is what I also was going to follow 
up on, just emphasizing the importance of that piece of the 
AUKUS relationship.
    There has been a lot less attention focused, at least in 
the media, on pillar two, but I think the tech sharing 
opportunities between our research institutions and high tech 
companies are just--it is really exciting to me. So thank you 
to the State Department for your emphasis on implementing that.
    I would like to turn to the topic of illegal fishing 
activities. China has by far been the leading aggressor in 
illegal fishing throughout the region.
    It has affected the economies of each country that relies 
on this important industry. China, through their illegal 
activities, have diverted all manner of economic resources, and 
therefore, our armed forces have been doing their part to help. 
They have conducted missions to counter what we have come to 
call illegal, unreported, and unregulated, or IUU, fishing.
    Mr. Kritenbrink, what diplomatic efforts has the State 
Department been leading to challenge Chinese IUU fishing in the 
region, and has any notable progress been made especially on 
what we call shiprider agreements with our Coast Guard?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you. Really important 
question, and that was where I was going to go first, that I 
think our Coast Guard has been most effective here in the 
shiprider agreements in particular.
    I do not have in front of me the list of all the countries 
that we have shiprider agreements with, but I think our Coast 
Guard's presence in the region, cracking down on illegal 
fishing, especially through shiprider arrangements, helping 
countries in the region understand what is happening in their 
maritime domains and to defend their rights is probably the 
most important thing that we can do. But I could get back to 
you on those details.
    I would say, second, what we have done just across the 
board more broadly speaking is we have tried to increase 
partners' maritime domain awareness through the Indo-Pacific 
maritime domain awareness initiative.
    Again, the theory of the case is that when countries 
understand what is happening in their domains, they can better 
protect them.
    And then, third, I think the more we can do to publicize 
and shine a bright light on this activity. You are correct that 
we believe that the PRC is by far the country that carries out 
the vast majority of illegal fishing in ways that is really 
detrimental to the economies of the region.
    Senator Young. Thank you. If you would kindly get whatever 
information you have.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Young. The list of shiprider agreements----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Young [continuing]. Would be a great start to the 
committee. We will take a look, please.
    And then by way of follow up, when the Chinese government 
does nothing to control its fishing fleets engaged in illegal 
fishing, maybe you can tell us how does the U.S. Government 
differentiate our adherence to international conventions on 
fishing and maritime boundaries?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I am sorry, Senator. I did not catch the 
last part. My apologies.
    Senator Young. When they respond--when they do absolutely 
nothing to control----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Young [continuing]. The fishing fleets that are 
engaged in this sort of illegal fishing, does that make it 
difficult to follow international conventions on fishing and 
maritime boundaries?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir, I understand.
    Yes, sir. So I really appreciate your question. I think 
there are two challenges.
    Yes, there is shiprider agreements and our other actions to 
try to help countries to control their maritime domains, and 
then there are also waters on the open sea that are overfished 
and over utilized in ways, again, that is detrimental to the 
region.
    So our effort there is, one, through shining a bright light 
on these issues, and again, second, trying to build the 
capacity of partners in the region to understand that in 
addition to our own operations.
    Senator Young. Thank you.
    So staying on this topic, the Coast Guard is currently 
analyzing what resources they require to increase their 
presence and increase their operational tempo in the Western 
Pacific.
    This follows a directive that I secured in the recent Coast 
Guard authorization, and these findings should become available 
and reported to Congress and the State Department as we hit the 
end of this year.
    So can I have your commitment to review those findings as 
soon as they become available?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Absolutely, Senator, and can I say Coast 
Guard leadership in the Pacific has been absolutely tremendous? 
And when we did the second Pacific Island summit, one of the 
most effective events we had was at Coast Guard headquarters, 
and I think our Pacific Island partners were really encouraged 
and impressed by the resources and capabilities we can bring to 
bear.
    Senator Young. Thank you. We will look forward to those 
findings and also any counsel you might have about how this 
committee can be helpful and informed by those findings, doing 
whatever is needed to empower State and our Coast Guard to help 
address illegal fishing activities moving forward.
    Thank you so much, Chairman.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all 
of you for your testimony and your service, and I just want to 
say amen to Senator Young's questions regarding maritime 
security and protecting fisheries.
    And I know a lot has been covered in this hearing already, 
and I just want to stress, and I know you all know this, that 
when we are dealing with China's influence in the Pacific 
Island region, it cannot just all be no, do not work with 
China. In fact, quite the opposite.
    We need to provide a better alternative both in terms of a 
vision of the future but also material support. You cannot beat 
something with nothing. And again, I want to just encourage all 
of you to continue to use all the tools at our disposal--
economic tools, whether the DFC or other agencies, to put 
forward proposals that support people in this region.
    Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I do have a specific 
question about Kiribati, and I know it has been referenced 
the--China's police presence there. I also know there is an IT 
component, I understand, to their involvement.
    So one question is what are we doing to counter PRC 
influence in Kiribati, but the larger question is how can we 
anticipate these kind of challenges and not play whack-a-mole 
after they come up?
    In other words, how can we be proactive rather than just 
reactive?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you. Fantastic question, 
really, and thank you for your leadership and support.
    I think the number one thing that we need to do is to be 
present, to be active in all of these countries, and to, as you 
said, offer alternatives. Specifically in the case of Kiribati 
our accredited Ambassador who is a resident in Fiji, Marie 
Damour, who I understand is visiting right now, again, to hear 
the needs of our friends in Kiribati and to determine the best 
way forward.
    I know our friends at the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
have a threshold compact of about $30 million, if I remember 
correctly, again, focused on education and building local 
capacity.
    I mentioned a little while earlier some of the work we are 
doing together with friends in Australia to refurbish the 
Canton wharf and another wharf there.
    And also we are following up on the agreement we have from 
Kiribati leadership to establish a U.S. embassy in Kiribati as 
well. So getting that permanent presence on the ground, working 
on all those alternatives from infrastructure to other areas 
across the board I think that is the best way.
    Both with our friends in Kiribati but across the board in 
the Pacific we have to be present, we have to be active, and we 
have to bring alternatives to the table. We think our strategy 
is designed to do just that.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. In terms of the 
diplomatic presence, as you say, if we are not there on the 
ground, we are not going to be in the game, cannot offer 
proposals or engage.
    Can you just give a brief update on how we have expanded 
our diplomatic presence in the region and what more we need to 
do?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
    We have identified four countries in which we want to 
establish new embassies. We have successfully done so in the 
Solomon Islands and in Tonga. We will be open imminently in 
Vanuatu, and then, as I said, we are working diligently to 
follow up on Kiribati and will need parliamentary approval for 
that. But we are working actively on that.
    In each instance of the two new embassies we have opened 
thus far, we opened an immediate presence very quickly, and now 
we are moving to build out that staff, build out the permanent 
facilities--the long term facilities in which our staff will be 
there, and then we are also working on the personnel side.
    To get opened quickly we basically had to find temporary 
duty personnel to get boots on the ground and plant our flag, 
and now we are following up with the full time staff and also 
together with this committee we hope to be nominating 
ambassadors to these new countries as well.
    But as you said, there is no substitute for presence, and I 
am confident we will be present in these four countries, and 
then we will build out that presence. I think it will make a 
huge difference and already is in the Solomons and Tonga.
    Senator Van Hollen. Very good. Thank you.
    And I do have one last question on the implementation of 
COFA for you, Dr. Ratner. I know that Senator Duckworth raised 
this issue, and I think her focus with some of the work that 
AID is doing in the aftermath of passing funding for the 
Compacts of Free Association.
    On the defense side what kind of measures are you taking 
now that that has passed?
    Mr. Ratner. Senator, we obviously have a range of 
activities associated in terms of exercises and operations 
rotating through the compact states. In terms of major 
investments underway, we have a couple specific major posture 
initiatives there and posture sites.
    In RMI, Republic of Marshall Islands, hosts the Ronald 
Reagan Ballistic Missile Testing Site at U.S. Army garrison on 
Kwajalein, which is a really important location as it relates 
to space operations and space situational awareness.
    And then, of course, we have the TACMOR radar--the Tactical 
Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar--in Palau, which is going 
to give the department and the U.S. military unprecedented 
situational awareness over a huge swath of the Pacific. So 
really important posture initiatives underway there.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate it. Thank you.
    Thank you all.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Kaine. We have been informed that Senator Cruz is 
on his way, and I am going to give him 2 minutes. So play 
quietly at your desks, and if he is here within 2 minutes then 
he will be up next, and then we will conclude the hearing. And 
if he is not, I will gavel us to a close.
    But I will say while we are waiting and those 2 minutes are 
running, we had an Armed Services Committee hearing right 
before this and two of the Armed Services members, Senator 
Ernst and Senator Hirono, had been quite involved in the 
CONVENE Act, which was very much focused on security agreements 
with the COFA nations.
    I was a co-sponsor of that.
    Senator Van Hollen, I think you were as well, and that 
CONVENE Act was largely included in the NDAA and when I told 
Senator Hirono that I was coming up to this hearing that was 
focusing upon the Pacific Islands and strategy and that it was 
to my recollection the first time that we have had a hearing on 
this topic in this committee during the time I have been on it, 
Senator Hirono was very glad and said it is about time.
    So there were some happy Armed Services Committee members 
knowing that this hearing was happening today, too.
    And the ranking member and I will now patiently wait for 
now--I think it is 62 seconds now--to see if Senator Cruz 
arrives.
    [Pause.]
    Senator Kaine. As we are counting down I will do the 
homework, which is there may be members of the committee that 
want to submit questions in writing, including Senator Cruz.
    We will keep the record of the hearing open until the close 
of business on Friday, March 15. If members do submit questions 
we would encourage you to respond promptly and thoroughly.
    There is a vote ongoing on the Senate floor right now and 
an important one with respect to our nominee to be ambassador 
to Haiti--a very timely one. And with that, though, and with 
the concurrence of the ranking member----
    Senator Risch. Is your guy coming? OK. He is in this 
building.
    Senator Kaine. OK.
    With the concurrence of the ranking member we will be 
slightly graceful to a colleague who is said to be in the 
building, so and we will wait just a bit longer.
    Mr. Ratner. Senator Kaine, do you have any more AUKUS jokes 
while we are waiting?
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Kaine. I thought that story would be appreciated. 
It is a great initiative, and good work moving out on it so 
quickly.
    Mr. Ratner. Yes. Thank you so much for your support on 
that. That legislation was really critical.
    Senator Kaine. Australian sailors training with in the 
nuclear power program in South Carolina with U.S. sailors. To 
take a nation that only has--the only nuclear in Australia is 
medical isotopes, and to go from that to the ability to 
operate, maintain, and eventually build nuclear subs, the most 
complex items manufactured on the planet Earth, that is a lot 
of work. But it is going to be great work to be able to do 
together.
    With that, I am going to decide that the hearing is now to 
be adjourned.
    With the thanks of the committee for your appearance we 
adjourn, and please do follow up on questions if they are 
submitted.
    [Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                              ----------                              

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

          Responses of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

                          topic: prc influence
    There is rising concern among some Pacific Island nations regarding 
the growing influence of the PRC in the region. We've seen the PRC use 
economic inducements, threats and economic coercion, disinformation, 
and old-fashioned corruption in attempts to expand its foothold. 
Beijing's influence extends beyond infrastructure projects and security 
agreements to PRC state engagement in the local media and information 
space.

    Question. Given very small media markets and limited journalistic 
capacity in the Pacific Islands region, what is the United States doing 
to promote a strong and professional media? How do our efforts compare 
to those of our strategic adversaries?

    Answer. The United States supports a free media in the Pacific 
Islands through access to credible sources of news, journalism, and 
media training opportunities, and by creating strong communities of 
practice. The State Department provides Pacific Islands journalists 
regular access to visiting U.S. officials and selects journalists to 
participate in media-focused exchange programs and trainings.
    The United States is working to build capacity through programs 
including USAID's PROJECT Governance, which has provided financial and 
investigative journalism training for Pacific Islands reporters and 
media literacy courses for civil society organizations and academia.
    Through the Young Pacific Leaders' initiative, the State Department 
offers workshops and other engagements for emerging Pacific leaders on 
a variety of civic leadership issues, including journalistic ethic and 
media literacy.
    Last year, the State Department launched the Digital Communication 
Network (DCN) in EAP that focuses on building networks within the 
Pacific Islands. The DCN aims to create a lasting impact by empowering 
a new generation of global voices to promote ideas in the digital 
space.
    The State Department also recently launched an initiative intending 
to strengthen balanced media environments in the Indo-Pacific. It will 
aim to provide free independent wire content to local media outlets and 
to build their capacity through training, equipment provision, 
mentoring, and network building. The goal of this program is to 
strengthen local media outlet resilience as to ensure that the sources 
available to them are diverse and accurate.

    Question. How are we countering the PRC's growing influence in 
Pacific Island media markets? What more can we be doing to implement a 
pro-active public diplomacy strategy in the region?

    Answer. In addition to the activities described above to promote a 
free media in the Pacific Islands through access to credible sources of 
news, journalism, and media training opportunities, and by creating 
strong communities of practice, the State Department has doubled its 
number of academic exchange opportunities for Pacific Islands 
countries, including the U.S. South Pacific Scholarship Program, 
Fulbright, and the Global Undergraduate Exchange Program. We are 
working closely with interagency partners to coordinate messaging and 
promote the full breadth of USG assistance programming and other 
activities in the Pacific Islands region, including through human 
interest stories that will connect with communities across the Pacific.
                      topic: information security
    Outlets such as Radio Free Asia are attempting to expand its 
capacity to cover events in Pacific Island countries for their 
populations.

    Question. How important is the information space in the Pacific 
Islands region, and what is the Administration doing to support access 
to reliable, timely journalism and news in these places where the PRC 
is exerting its influence?

    Answer. The information space is extremely important in the Pacific 
Islands region. The United States is working to build capacity through 
programs including USAID's PROJECT Governance, through which we have 
provided financial and investigative journalism trainings in-region for 
Pacific Islands reporters in addition to media literacy courses for 
civil society organizations and academia.
    Last year, the State Department launched the Digital Communication 
Network (DCN) in EAP that focuses on building networks within the 
Pacific Islands. The DCN aims to create a lasting impact by empowering 
a new generation of global voices to promote ideas in the digital 
space. Since its establishment in 2015, the DCN has created a global 
network of over 10,000 digital communicators and influencers working 
together to provide accurate and authentic reporting, strengthen 
independent journalism, support civil society, and advance democratic 
values.
    The State Department also recently launched an initiative intended 
to strengthen balanced media environments in the Indo-Pacific. It will 
aim to provide free independent wire content to local media outlets and 
to build their capacity through training, equipment provision, and 
mentoring/network building. The goal of this program is to strengthen 
local media outlet resilience and make sure that the sources available 
to them are diverse and accurate.
   topic: increasing u.s. diplomatic presence in the pacific islands
    The Administration has been committed to increasing our diplomatic 
presence in the region, including opening embassies in the Solomon 
Islands and Tonga, and is considering additional locations globally. 
However, the Department is not practiced at opening new embassies, and 
particularly not in small island states. As a result, it's taken far 
too long for us to establish a presence in Honiara and Nuku'alofa. The 
template for U.S. embassies are large and medium sized embassies with 
state-of-the-art security standards and room for a significant 
interagency compliment--not agile and quick-to-open ``micro-missions.''

    Question. For U.S. interests in the Pacific Islands region, what is 
most important? To what do you attribute the delays in establishing the 
two new missions in the Pacific Islands region? Do we need to establish 
small traditional embassy, or is a ``micro-mission'' approach more 
appropriate?

    Answer. Maintaining a robust and agile diplomatic presence and 
reinforcing U.S. credibility by living up to our commitments are most 
important in the Pacific Islands region. Enacting COFA-related 
legislation this year was a significant milestone in advancing these 
goals. EAP's approach to the Pacific Islands region is guided by the 
National Security Strategy, Indo-Pacific Strategy and Pacific 
Partnership Strategy, the first U.S. strategy for the Pacific Islands.
    We opened two new missions in 2023: Embassy Honiara in January and 
Embassy Nuku'alofa in May. Our missions in Honiara and Nuku'alofa 
opened less than 1 year after announcing our plans to open them. 
Consistent with the objectives of SECCA 2022, the Department rapidly 
processed SECCA waivers and OSPB exceptions to the maximum extent 
possible, enabling the opening of the missions and ensuring limited 
staff, per the OSPB exceptions, work from a safe and secure facility 
until the Department completes construction on longer-term lease-fit-
out facilities.
    Although the Department has already established its presence in 
Honiara and Nuku'alofa under the existing opening process, we are 
developing the Micro Mission operating framework as a new embassy 
designation for select countries where the Department does not yet have 
an Embassy presence or where we envision the longer-term presence will 
remain small. The Micro Mission model has the potential to address some 
concerns around staff workload at small new missions. The Department is 
still developing the concept and has not implemented a Micro Mission 
model but will consider it for future missions.

    Question. What existing authorities is the Department exercising to 
accelerate the expansion of U.S. diplomatic personnel in the region? 
What additional authorities are needed?

    Answer. The Department has used SECCA 2022 authorities in opening 
new posts in Honiara, Solomon Islands, and Nuku'alofa, Tonga. As part 
of the ongoing implementation process, the Department also streamlined 
the SECCA waiver process, reducing approval times to 60-90 days. 
Seventeen SECCA waivers were processed in 2023, more than any other 
year. An additional five have been processed as of February 2024.
    The Department used tools such as the streamlined SECCA waiver 
process to open embassies in Honiara and Nuku'alofa, putting staff on 
the ground quickly and safely. We are working toward the same approach 
for future embassy Port Vila, Vanuatu, which we plan to open later this 
year.

    Question. What can we learn from your experience opening embassies 
in the Pacific Islands that can be applied to small missions being 
contemplated in other regions, such as South Asia, Africa, and the 
Western Hemisphere?

    Answer. The Department continued to refine and expedite its new 
post opening process using lessons learned and best practices. This 
includes an accelerated site selection process, phased opening, SECCA 
2022 flexibilities, and increased coordination with host governments. 
The Department is concurrently developing a new model (Micro Missions) 
for rapidly establishing smaller embassies, incorporating lessons 
learned from the recent new post openings in the Pacific Islands.
                           topic: peace corps
    The U.S. has historically had a number of Peace Corps programs in 
the Pacific Islands, but that number has dwindled over the years for a 
variety of reasons. When I hear from our Ambassadors in the field, they 
all say that one of the issues our partners most frequently raise is to 
bring the Peace Corps back to their country.

    Question. What are our plans for expanding Peace Corps presence in 
the islands? What impediments currently exist to realizing these goals 
and what is State and the Peace Corps doing to work through them so 
that we can field volunteers?

    Answer. The Peace Corps currently operates posts in 13 countries in 
the Indo-Pacific: Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Philippines, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Vanuatu, 
and Vietnam, and is in the process of re-establishing a presence in 
Palau, which will be supported by the Peace Corps/Philippines post. The 
Peace Corps recently welcomed back Volunteers to service in Fiji, 
Samoa, and Tonga and anticipates a return to Vanuatu later this year 
and to Palau in 2025.
    The Peace Corps has received many invitations to initiate or resume 
Peace Corps programming. Placing Peace Corps Volunteers in remote 
Pacific islands is both expensive and challenging. The Peace Corps 
considers invitations from host countries on an individual basis in the 
context of overall demand, conditions on the ground, and agency 
resources. There is significant demand from around the world for Peace 
Corps Volunteers, particularly in the field of English-language 
instruction, given the youth bulge.
    Acknowledging these challenges, the Peace Corps is exploring 
innovative ways to support countries around the world. The agency 
launched a Virtual Service Pilot (VSP), in which participants donate 
their time to provide virtual support to counterparts around the world. 
Even as Volunteers return to in-person service, the VSP has proven to 
be very successful, particularly in remote regions such as the Indo 
Pacific. In addition, last year the Peace Corps launched the Blue 
Pacific Youth Initiative, a collaborative, pan-Pacific network of 
programs and activities that mobilize young leaders in support of 
environmental resilience.
    The Peace Corps is a vital part of building strong people-to-people 
connections between the United States and the Pacific Islands. The 
agency has and continues to contribute to capacity building, increasing 
opportunities for youth, and supporting countries around the world to 
innovate and adapt to our much-changed world.
                 topic: public diplomacy/public affairs
    The Biden Administration has significantly increased attention to 
and investment in the Pacific Islands, including through the 
announcement of an annual fellowship called the U.S.-Pacific Institute 
for Rising Leaders. Because of our history, shared values, and strong 
diaspora ties, we get a disproportionate return on our people-to-people 
investments.

    Question. Given the remote and distributed nature of the Pacific 
Islands region, what are the most effective strategies for doing public 
diplomacy outreach?

    Answer. Because of our history, shared values, and strong diaspora 
ties, the United States benefits tremendously from its people-to-people 
programs. The State Department is working to increase its physical in-
person presence and its number of exchange and cultural program 
offerings across the Pacific Islands region. The United States has 
doubled the number of academic exchange opportunities for Pacific 
Islands countries, including the U.S. South Pacific Scholarship 
Program, Fulbright, and the Global Undergraduate Exchange Program.
    Under the Young Pacific Leaders' (YPL) initiative, the State 
Department has fostered new collaborations between the Pacific Islands 
and the United States by working with a growing alumni network. The YPL 
program connects the North Pacific--Palau, Guam, Hawaii, the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, and the Republic of Marshall Islands--to the South Pacific, 
where the United States has historically had a smaller physical 
presence.
    YPL alumni have pioneered public diplomacy programs in areas where 
the United States lacks diplomatic presence. With additional funding, 
the Department could grow this network and establish a YPL Regional 
Think Tank for greater alumni engagement in addition to an annual YPL 
train-the-trainer program for alumni to maximize their impact in the 
region.
    The YPL brand is well-recognized in the region. Other governments, 
regional organizations, and private sector entities have approached YPL 
alumni for their expertise, knowledge, skills, and connections. Co-
branding YPL with other U.S. Pacific programs and fellowships could 
enhance its reach and impact. Current co-branding opportunities include 
Oceania Professional Fellows Program, U.S.-Pacific Institute for Rising 
Leaders Fellowship (Johns Hopkins), Resilient Pacific Islands Leaders 
Fellowship (East-West Center), Tourism Professional Fellows (East-West 
Center), Pacific Islands Media Initiatives (East-West Center), Blue 
Pacific Youth Initiative (Peace Corps), SUSI, and Fulbright.

    Question. What more can we be doing to implement a proactive public 
diplomacy strategy in the region?

    Answer. We are working to establish Public Affairs Officer 
positions at each of our new embassies across the Pacific. The Public 
Affairs Officer for Honiara, Solomon Islands arrives in April 2024, and 
others are scheduled to arrive in the coming months. We are working 
closely with interagency partners to coordinate messaging and promote 
the full breadth of U.S. assistance programming and other activities in 
the Pacific Islands region, including, through human interest stories 
that will connect with communities across the Pacific.
          topic: u.s. development finance tools in the pacific
    One of the most challenging aspects of working in the Pacific 
Island region is that is that, with a few notable exceptions, it is 
very challenging to incentivize U.S. investment in the region due to 
the distance, size and scale of the economies. There are challenges 
with cyber and digital connectivity, challenges with access to banking 
and finance, and challenges related to construction capacity and land 
availability. The PRC is active in these economies, but we have not 
figured out how to incentivize U.S. private sector investment.

    Question. As we look to reauthorize the Development Finance 
Corporation this year, how should we be thinking about encouraging 
finance and investment in the Pacific Islands region? In addition to 
the U.S. private sector, what more could we be doing to catalyze the 
private sectors of U.S. partners and allies?

    Answer. Investments made by the U.S. International Development 
Finance Corporation underscore that the private sector, and not only 
PRC state-owned enterprises, can finance the world's infrastructure 
needs as DFC provides a quality-based alternative to PRC financing. We 
are directing U.S. assistance to improve the investment environment for 
the private sector so that we can advance DFC's investment capabilities 
across the Pacific. Currently, DFC's investments have primarily been in 
Papua New Guinea, the region's largest market, but DFC is working to 
expand its reach across the region, especially through DFC's and 
USAID's newly launched Microfinance Facility for the Pacific Islands 
and by utilizing partnerships with Australia, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan 
to identify co-investment opportunities.
    Additional authorities are needed for DFC to expand support for 
strategic private sector investment projects that, due to distance, 
size, or other barriers, cannot attract commercial interest in the 
region. The State Department also encourages Congress to consider 
urgent short-term authorities, including allowing development finance 
loans under certain conditions to support public infrastructure. We 
encourage Congress to consider modifying DFC country eligibility; for 
example, Palau and Nauru have gone in and out of the World Bank income 
classification in recent years due largely to their small population 
size (10-15,000 people), but the ``high income'' label does not reflect 
their actual level of development or government capacity.

                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    It is clear that the Department needs to streamline and simplify 
the process for opening new embassies. We need people on the ground 
quickly, but also with the tools they need to get in the game.

    Question. Do you support an ``embassy in a box'' concept for small, 
remote posts? This would support new embassies regionally and waive 
certain processes and procedures to prevent small posts from being 
hamstrung by bureaucracy.

    Answer. EAP fully supports exploring a broad spectrum of presence 
alternatives for small posts in remote locations. EAP also endorses 
initiatives to support embassies regionally and waive certain processes 
and procedures so that our people can arrive on the ground quickly and 
follow through on top U.S. foreign policy goals.

    Question. What are you doing to clear the red tape, so we don't 
lose more ground to the Chinese?

    Answer. EAP is strategically shifting all post operational 
management responsibilities for new posts to the Manila Regional 
Support Service (MRSS). This shift in responsibilities enables 
diplomats based in these new posts to focus on competing with the PRC. 
The operational management responsibilities encompass functions such as 
human resources, financial systems, information systems, and general 
services (housing, vehicles and transportation, travel, warehouse 
management, and supplies). Currently, MRSS is supporting all the new 
embassies, and all management support will fully transfer to MRSS by 
September 30.

    Question. How is your bureau supporting getting our diplomats on 
the ground as soon as possible?

    Answer. Currently, the newly established embassies in Solomon 
Islands and Tonga have four diplomats on the ground--Solomon Islands 
have two diplomats on long-term temporary duty (TDY), and Tonga has one 
diplomat on long-term TDY and another who is the first U.S. Direct Hire 
assigned to Tonga. By the summer of 2024, Solomon Islands will have 
three U.S. Direct Hires on the ground and Tonga will have two. Among 
the three is the Public Affairs Officer, who is scheduled to arrive in 
Solomon Islands as early as next month, April.
    For future embassies in Vanuatu and Kiribati, EAP has been 
proactive in both sending long-term TDYers and staging U.S. Direct 
Hires in neighboring countries. For Vanuatu, there are currently two 
long-term TDYers. Additionally, one U.S. Direct Hire will be based in 
Papua New Guinea. As soon as the embassy in Vanuatu is opened, this 
person will be deployed to Vanuatu. For Kiribati, one U.S. Direct Hire 
is based in Fiji, and another will arrive this summer. As soon as the 
embassy in Kiribati is opened, both will be deployed to Kiribati.

    Question. Is EAP having any trouble attracting diplomats to these 
new posts?

    Answer. For this most recent bidding cycle, all seven available 
positions throughout the new posts were filled--three are for Solomon 
Islands, two are for Tonga, one is for Vanuatu, and one is for 
Kiribati. Those assigned to Vanuatu and Kiribati will stay in 
neighboring countries (Papua New Guinea and Fiji, respectively) until 
these embassies are opened.
    Among the seven are the Deputy Chief of Mission positions in 
Solomon Islands and Tonga. Each received four to five bidders. For the 
other five positions, which are mid-level, they also received multiple 
bidders.

    Question. What is EAP doing to support these new embassies so 
diplomats on the ground can focus on diplomacy and not bureaucracy? 
Please be specific.

    Answer. Manila Regional Support Service (MRSS) has made great 
strides in providing support for the new posts, ensuring that diplomats 
on the ground can focus on diplomacy.
    MRSS's Human Resources (HR) section has already hired, onboarded, 
and is providing online training for 17 local staff in Solomon Islands 
and Tonga. MRSS H.R. is also in the process of advertising for local 
staff in Vanuatu. MRSS Financial Management section has already 
submitted the first budgets and financial targets for all the new 
posts. MRSS Information Systems has deployed Star Shield in Tonga and 
is preparing to deploy it to all the new posts to ensure connectivity 
to these far-flung posts and plans to purchase vehicles for all the new 
posts.
                   topic: establishing new embassies
    It is clear that the Department needs to streamline and simplify 
the process for opening new embassies. We need people on the ground 
quickly, but also with the tools they need to get in the game.
    My Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 
(SECCA 2022) provides State much-needed flexibilities to quickly stand 
up our overseas missions, which is especially useful in the Pacific 
Islands.
    Kiribati is only a 3\1/2\ hour flight from Hawaii. Following 
Kiribati's switch to recognize the PRC instead of Taiwan in 2019, the 
PRC has aggressively courted Kiribati elite, and Beijing is increasing 
security and police cooperation with Kiribati's government.

    Question. What is the status of PRC influence in Kiribati? Beyond 
getting permanent U.S. diplomats to Tarawa, what are we doing to 
provide a true alternative to China there?

    Answer. We continue to engage with the Government of Kiribati on 
our interest in opening a U.S. Embassy as a matter of priority. One 
U.S. Direct Hire in Embassy Suva is wholly dedicated to U.S.-Kiribati 
relations and travels to Kiribati regularly. This officer's tireless 
work this February enabled the Coast Guard to conduct its first 
shiprider operation since 2017.
    We are also working to enhance our relationship with Kiribati 
through bilateral and multilateral cooperation on priority projects. 
Together with Australia and Japan, we are funding the East Micronesia 
Cable Project, which will support increased economic growth, drive 
development opportunities, and help improve living standards. At last 
year's U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Summit, the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation and the Government of Kiribati signed a $29.1 million 
threshold program grant agreement to advance economic growth in 
Kiribati to promote safe, accessible, decent, and inclusive employment 
opportunities for Kiribati workers and empower youth.

    My Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 
(SECCA 2022) provides State much-needed flexibilities to quickly stand 
up our overseas missions, which is especially useful in the Pacific 
Islands.

    Question. Why hasn't the Secretary followed the law and issued 
official guidance on implementing SECCA? Can you tell me exactly when 
we will see the Secretary's guidance released?

    Answer. As part of its work toward full implementation of SECCA 
2022, the Department issued interim implementation guidance in March 
2023 that exempted posts rated low across the Security Environment 
Threat List (SETL) from SECCA setback-equivalence requirements and 
delegated authority to approve SECCA setback waivers for chanceries and 
consulates to the Under Secretary for Management, except for High 
Threat/High Risk posts. The Department remains committed to using the 
full spectrum of authorities afforded by SECCA 2022, to include 
establishing engineering equivalency design requirements to provide a 
commensurate level of blast protection at reduced setback distances.

    Question. How are you and the Department using SECCA to open 
embassies faster in the Pacific?

    Answer. To date, the Department has used SECCA 2022 authorities in 
opening new posts in Honiara, Solomon Islands; Troms, Norway; Victoria, 
Seychelles; and Nuku'alofa, Tonga. As part of the ongoing 
implementation process, the Department also streamlined the SECCA 
waiver process, reducing approval times to 60-90 days; in extremely 
urgent cases, such as Honiara and Nuku'alofa, approval was obtained 
within 35 days. Seventeen SECCA waivers were processed in 2023, more 
than any other year. An additional five have been processed as of 
February.
    The Department utilized tools such as the streamlined SECCA waiver 
process to open embassies in Honiara and Nuku'alofa prior to executing 
a lease fit out of the facilities, thus putting staff on the ground 
quickly and safely. We are working toward the same approach for Port 
Vila, Vanuatu.
    A key function of our new embassies in the Pacific Islands is to 
deepen U.S. ties with the people of those countries. But both Solomon 
Islands and Tonga lack consular services, meaning that people of those 
countries wishing to apply for a visa to travel to the U.S. need to go 
to other countries to do so--greatly increasing the frictions for 
business development, education exchange, and people-to-people 
connections.

    Question. When can the people of Solomon Islands and Tonga expect 
in-country consular services?

    Answer. We are committed to providing consular services as we 
continue to evaluate options to increase our presence and enhance 
services in Solomon Islands and Tonga, where we already provide 
periodic American Citizen Services. With multiple U.S. embassies 
opening in the Pacific Islands, the Department of State's Bureau of 
Consular Affairs is evaluating how best to provide in-person 
nonimmigrant visa (NIV) services. We are committed to enhancing 
services, are actively exploring how best to do so, and have already 
begun offering in-country processing in Tonga for NIV applicants who 
qualify for interview waivers.
                   topic: u.s. relations with the fas
    Question. What kinds of U.S. assistance to support the development 
of National Security Councils in Micronesia and the Marshall Islands 
are being provided, as required under the CONVENE Act?

    Answer. The Department continues to engage closely with the 
governments of Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands on our interest in supporting them to stand up 
National Security Councils as entities that can help provide 
coordination and information sharing across a range of topics. Now that 
negotiations on most of the COFA-related agreements have been 
completed, we intend to prioritize this line of effort.

    Question. What support is State providing to the existing National 
Security Coordination office in Palau?

    Answer. The State Department supports Palau's National Security 
Coordination office (NSCO) through the Global Defense Reform Program 
(GDRP), funded by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of 
Global Programs and Initiatives (PM/GPI). In support of Palau's 
National Security Strategy, this project aims to strengthen Palau's 
maritime governance (including efficiency, effectiveness, and 
accountability) and improve maritime-related interagency coordination. 
Under GDRP, PM/GPI sends an adviser to embed with the Department of 
Marine Law Enforcement. The Advisor works with NSCO, the Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ) including the Office of the Attorney General, and the 
Bureau of Public Safety's Division of Maritime Security & Fish and 
Wildlife Protection on the development and implementation of strategy 
and policies focused on maritime governance, maritime safety, maritime 
response and recovery, interagency cooperation and coordination, 
information sharing, and other objectives identified by the NSCO, the 
MOJ, and other maritime stakeholders. Since December 2020, the GDRP 
program has contributed to Palau's increasing capability to detect and 
interdict illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing vessels, and 
detect illegal PRC undersea terrain and mineral surveying vessels. 
Among other things, the Advisor has developed a country action plan 
that will identify initiatives to strengthen Palau's institutional 
capacity in maritime domain awareness.

    Topic: While the U.S. values its ties with all Pacific Islands, our 
relationships with the Freely Associated States are fundamentally 
different. Citizens from the FAS can live and work in the U.S. and 
serve in the U.S. military at very high rates. They also host U.S. 
troops and form part of our extended defense infrastructure. Now that 
we are shifting to implementation of the Compacts of Free Association, 
getting that right will be critical as we develop our ties with the FAS 
over the next 20 years and seek to compete with an aggressive China.

    Question. How will State stand up the new Office of Freely 
Associated States?

    Answer. The Department of State has taken a number of measures to 
reflect the priority we place upon the relationship with Pacific Island 
nations writ large and with the Freely Associated States (FAS) 
specifically. The Office of Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Affairs 
(ANP) within the Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
now has a Pacific bilateral team and a Pacific regional team to 
increase available resources that address this priority, which includes 
planning for the implementation of the latest Compact of Free 
Association-related agreements. ANP team members provide leadership 
including through membership on and staffing for the Joint Economic 
Management and Trust Fund Committees for the FSM and RMI, as well as 
the annual economic consultations with Palau. We intend to implement 
all the requirements in the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act 
of 2024, and the Department intends to focus resources and time to 
these issues.

    Question. What will State do to ensure that the FAS are given the 
dedicated attention they deserve, separate from our broader engagement 
with the Pacific Island Forum and other Pacific Island states?

    Answer. The United States remains strongly committed to the 
Compacts of Free Association (COFA) and related agreements with the 
Freely Associated States of the Federated States of Micronesia, the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau.
    In 2023, we finalized new Compact-related agreements with all three 
countries, which are key to maintaining the stability and prosperity of 
our closest Pacific Island neighbors and partners. I want to thank 
Congress for passing the associated funding, which demonstrates our 
commitment to the region and our ability to follow through on what we 
promise.
    Extending Compact-related assistance is a critical component of the 
Administration's Pacific Partnership, Indo-Pacific, and National 
Security Strategies. The 20-year duration and commitment of mandatory 
funding is reflective of our steadfast commitment to these 
strategically important friends and partners.
    Our focus is on bringing these new agreements into force and 
providing the Compact-related assistance, including through continuing 
efforts in the office of Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Islands in 
the EAP bureau as well as through the Interagency Working Group on the 
Freely Associated States. We continue to engage regularly and at a 
high-level with the Freely Associated States to demonstrate our 
longstanding commitment.

                       topic: economic engagement
    Question. What are 2-3 concrete economic projects we are currently 
spearheading in the Pacific Islands, and what tangible effects are 
those projects having?

    Answer. We are working with a growing number of trusted likeminded 
government and private sector partners on undersea cable projects to 
provide Pacific Islands with vital and secure connectivity and digital 
infrastructure. These initiatives, which will have outsized economic 
benefits around the Pacific but especially in countries being connected 
to high-speed Internet for the first time, have demonstrated to our 
Pacific Islands partners that we can be responsive to their needs and 
provide a true alternative to the PRC.
    We are working with Australia to jointly fund port refurbishments 
in Kiribati, including Kanton Island. The projects will unlock key 
sources of economic growth for Kiribati and advance strategic 
connectivity with Kiribati's trading neighbors.
    The United States is working to expand economic engagement in 
Tuvalu in areas that respond to key Pacific priorities, as identified 
by the islands themselves. We are working to help Tuvalu access quality 
internet infrastructure, develop community-level solutions to rising 
domestic fuel costs, and increase its resilience to economic coercion 
and sea-level rise.
    Fundamentally, we have proven that we can coordinate and pool 
funding with allies, likeminded partners, and private sector partners 
to provide a strong alternative to the PRC in the infrastructure space.

    Question. Which U.S. Government economic agencies are the most 
active in the Pacific Islands, other than State and USAID?

    Answer. The United States has adopted a whole-of-government 
approach to expand our influence in the Pacific Islands. The 
Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Transportation, the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, and the Development Finance Cooperation, among 
others, have all made recent and important contributions to our Pacific 
Partnership Strategy.
    Recent contributions from USTDA, in particular, have accelerated 
U.S. assistance for infrastructure projects. As we work to secure 
additional funding for projects, USTDA's project preparation work has 
allowed us to identify projects and take initial steps early in the 
development so that we can later find ways to support development of 
those projects with the private sector, pool funding with partners, or 
transfer the project to a trusted partner.
    Apart from economic agencies, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and DOD are 
also very active in the region. For example, USCG has shiprider 
agreements with 12 Pacific Islands countries. DOD engages in a variety 
of ways, most notably in the Freely Associated States, conducts 
training exercises with militaries in the region, and implements the 
State Partnership Program through the National Guard.

    Question. Are there any needed changes in authorities that would 
make it easier for the United States to increase economic and 
commercial engagement in the Pacific Islands?

    Answer. The mandate of the Development Finance Cooperation and our 
Export Import Bank underscore that only the private sector, and not PRC 
state-owned enterprises, will be able to finance the world's 
infrastructure needs. We are directing U.S. assistance to improve the 
investment environment for the private sector so that we can deploy DFC 
and EXIM in additional markets in the Pacific. At present, DFC and EXIM 
assistance has primarily been in Papua New Guinea, the region's largest 
market.
    However, additional authorities are needed to expand support for 
strategic economic projects that, due to distance, size, or other 
barriers, cannot attract commercial interest. The President's fiscal 
year 2025 Out Compete China proposal requests the authorities and 
resources required to achieve vital national security interests. We 
also encourage Congress to consider urgent short-term authorities, 
including allowing development finance loans under certain conditions 
to support public infrastructure. Finally, we encourage Congress to 
consider expanding DFC eligibility to high income Pacific Islands 
countries; Palau and Nauru have gone in and out of this classification 
in recent years due largely to their small population size (10-15,000 
people), but the ``high income'' label does not reflect their actual 
level of development or government capacity.
                      topic: prc policing presence
    Question. Which policing agreements between the PRC and Pacific 
Island nations are of greatest concern to the United States, and why?

    Answer. We are concerned about the potential implications that 
security agreements, including on policing, with the PRC may have on 
the sovereignty and autonomy of Pacific Islands nations.
    This is due to the vague, opaque nature of such agreements, 
including the absence of knowing what was promised by supported 
governments, in exchange for PRC support. Additionally, such agreements 
allow for the PRC to increase its security and surveillance 
capabilities in countries where it has agreements, which actively 
facilitates PRC government efforts to repress members of ethnic and 
religious minority groups. Furthermore, since only three Pacific 
Islands countries have military forces, policing agreements with the 
PRC may serve as an entry point for the eventual establishment of dual-
use facilities that would threaten U.S. national security. We do not 
believe importing PRC security forces or policing methods will help any 
Pacific Islands country, and our assistance provides an alternative. I 
would be happy to discuss potential security concerns pertaining to the 
PRC and specific countries in a classified setting.

    Question. Please provide a full accounting of all judicial and law 
enforcement training provided by the Department of State over the 
previous 3 fiscal years. Please include: Numbers broken down by Pacific 
Island country; illustrative examples of judicial and law enforcement 
training and their impact; any relevance to countering PRC inroads via 
policing agreements, if applicable.

    Answer. In the last 3 years, the Department of State has obligated 
over $34 million in INCLE-funded assistance to the judicial and law 
enforcement sectors across 13 Pacific Islands countries. Most INCLE 
programs in the Pacific are regional efforts that cover multiple 
countries, allowing our programs to be more efficient and effective. 
Papua New Guinea received more than $9.1 million overall in bilateral 
INCLE programs over the last 3 years, the largest share among the 
Pacific Islands, due mainly to its status as a priority country 
identified in the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote 
Stability under the Global Fragility Act. The rest of the Pacific 
Islands benefit from an overall $23 million in regional INCLE projects 
to advance the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which amounts to an average of 
$1.7 million per country over 3 years.
    An illustrative example includes U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) led 
trainings on maritime law enforcement that cover 13 Pacific Islands 
countries. Enabled by mobile training teams (MTT), funded by the Bureau 
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), this 
assistance has improved maintenance and operations of maritime assets, 
as well as increased enforcement capabilities, most notably when 
trainings are paired with USCG shiprider operations. One recent MTT in 
Vanuatu involved the successful boarding of several PRC-linked fishing 
vessels suspected of engaging in illegal, unregulated, or unreported 
fishing in February 2024. The USCG training and subsequent shiprider 
operations demonstrated to ni-Vanuatu officials the severity of the 
PRC's encroachment and may strengthen Vanuatu's reported intent to 
remove long-term PRC police presence seeking to establish agreements 
with the Vanuatu Police Force.

    Question. Has the Department of State, in conjunction with other 
partners, considered providing policing services in any Pacific Island 
countries?

    Answer. The United States supports law enforcement training and 
capacity building programs in several Pacific Islands countries, as 
detailed above. Many such programs are coordinated closely with our 
likeminded partners and with regional security organizations. The 
Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL), in general, does not utilize INCLE funding 
to directly fund police operations, salaries or associated services. 
INL-provided training and provision of equipment leads to improved 
police capacity and more efficient police operations, thereby enabling 
more sustainable and effective method of strengthening police, along 
with enhanced interoperability with U.S. Federal law enforcement and 
the police forces of likeminded partners.

    Question. Since fall-out from the unrest in the Solomon Islands in 
2022, have partners such as Australia and New Zealand been providing 
any policing services? Are there other nations that would be better 
placed to do so?

    Answer. The Solomon Islands International Assistance Force, 
comprised of police from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New 
Guinea, have been committed security partners on policing with Solomon 
Islands. They will stay in Honiara to assist with security until a 
prime minister is elected and a government is formed. Australia and New 
Zealand also have long-term policing capacity building programs in 
Solomon Islands.

    Question. Other than the public statements by Deputy Secretary 
Verma and others, how is the United States engaging with Papua New 
Guinea in light of news that China has offered a policing agreement to 
them?

    Answer. The United States has consulted with the government in 
Papua New Guinea to identify opportunities to pursue under the Defense 
Cooperation Agreement and shiprider agreement. Following a successful 
initial engagement in 2023 to assess unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
contamination hazards, the United States is facilitating Papua New 
Guinea's request for more persistent conventional weapons destruction 
(CWD) programming to address UXO priorities and reduce illicit 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Additionally, INL is 
actively negotiating a bilateral Letter of Agreement with the 
Government of Papua New Guinea, which would expand law enforcement and 
security assistance in PNG and establish an INL section at the U.S. 
Embassy in Port Moresby.

                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

                   topic: nauru recognition of china
    In January, Nauru switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to 
the PRC, a significant move as Taiwan's remaining allies in the Pacific 
now include the Marshall Islands and Palau. This diplomatic realignment 
underscores the intensifying competition between Taipei and Beijing for 
regional support and influence. In light of these developments, it 
becomes imperative to examine the implications of Nauru's decision on 
the broader strategic objectives of the United States in the Indo-
Pacific.

    Question. How does Nauru's diplomatic shift from recognizing Taiwan 
to China affect the broader strategic interests of the United States in 
the Indo-Pacific region, and what steps is the Administration taking to 
mitigate challenges?

    Answer.. The opaque inducements that Beijing offers to countries to 
switch diplomatic ties are extremely concerning. These deals are highly 
transactional in nature and are designed to benefit the PRC first and 
foremost. The PRC often makes promises in exchange for diplomatic 
relations that ultimately remain unfulfilled. Moreover, it is in the 
U.S. interest to encourage more countries to work closely with Taiwan 
because it is a force for good in the world.
    The United States offers alternatives consistent with Pacific 
Islands countries governments' national priorities and the Pacific 
Island Forum's 2050 Strategy for a Blue Pacific Continent. We are 
listening to the region and, working with our likeminded partners, 
responding to their asks.

    Question. Given the Compacts of Free Association with countries 
like the Marshall Islands and Palau, what measures is the 
Administration implementing to ensure the security and stability of 
these nations while safeguarding U.S. interests in the region?

    Answer. The United States remains strongly committed to the 
Compacts of Free Association and related agreements with the Federated 
States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the 
Republic of Palau.
    For decades, our relationships with the Freely Associated States 
(FAS) have contributed to a secure, stable, and prosperous Pacific. 
Under the terms of the Compacts, we have full responsibility and 
authority for security and defense matters in or related to these three 
countries.
    In 2023, we finalized new Compact-related agreements with all three 
FAS, which are key to maintaining the stability and prosperity of our 
closest Pacific Island neighbors and partners. The 20-year duration and 
commitment of mandatory funding is reflective of our steadfast 
commitment to these strategically important friends and partners.

    Question.. How can the United States address the financial 
vulnerabilities that is forcing Pacific islands to deepen relations 
with the PRC, especially with China being a main trading partner and 
source of investment and infrastructure for countries throughout the 
region?

    Answer. The United States is stepping up its efforts to help meet 
the most pressing infrastructural and economic challenges in the 
Pacific. Our efforts support increased economic growth, drive 
opportunities, and help to improve living standards. For example, we 
are enhancing secure, resilient digital connectivity, including through 
working with likeminded partners to support new undersea cables, 
working with private sector partners including Google and APTelecom. In 
the Freely Associated States, we provide annual grants for key 
infrastructure, including for schools and hospitals. Through the 
Pacific Islands Infrastructure Initiative, the U.S. Trade and 
Development Agency is supporting project preparation for a range of 
regional infrastructure and development projects.
    We are also supporting enabling environments and technical 
assistance on infrastructure for economic development. Through the U.S. 
government's contribution to the IMF's Pacific Technical Assistance 
Center, we are promoting macrofinancial stability and capacity, 
strengthening the resilience of Pacific Islands economies against 
economic shocks, and promoting inclusive growth. The United States also 
recently renewed our commitment to provide funding in connection with 
the Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility (PRIF), which provides 
regional technical assistance and capability building to support 
climate-resilient infrastructure development.
            topic: china-solomon islands security agreement
    In March 2022, the Solomon Islands and China signed a security 
agreement, ostensibly aiming in part to address ``internal threats,'' 
including protecting Chinese-owned businesses in the country. In 2023, 
the two countries signed a deal on police cooperation as part of their 
comprehensive strategic partnership.

    Question. What tools is the United States utilizing to encourage 
the Solomon Islands' commitment to continue working with the U.S. and 
Australia as security partners?

    Answer. The United States has significantly increased its 
engagement with Solomon Islands in recent years and continues to do so. 
We opened a new embassy in Honiara in January 2023 and are working to 
increase its staffing and grow its footprint in Solomon Islands. We 
have also engaged at a high level with the Government of Solomon 
Islands at the 2022 and 2023 U.S.-PIF Summits in Washington, DC, and in 
the region in 2023.
    The United States is expanding its cooperation with Solomon Islands 
on several areas of mutual interest, including unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) removal in coordination with the Royal Solomon Islands Police 
Force, growing USAID presence in the country, and the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation signing a $20 million Threshold Agreement with 
the country in 2022. These tangible outcomes, which are coordinated 
with our likeminded partners, such as Australia, strengthen our 
bilateral ties with Solomon Islands and encourage ongoing cooperation.
    Pacific leaders have consistently said Pacific Islands countries 
have the capability and proven record of meeting the region's policing 
and broader security needs. PIF members Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, 
and Papua New Guinea have long been committed security partners on 
policing with Solomon Islands and continue to provide support via the 
Solomon Islands International Assistance Force.

    Question. What are the national security implications if China uses 
the agreement to establish a military foothold in the Solomon Islands?

    Answer. The Administration takes the PRC's expansion of its 
overseas logistics, basing, and collection infrastructure extremely 
seriously. As the Department of Defense has assessed in its 2023 China 
Military Power Report, the CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the 
capability to project power outside China's borders and immediate 
periphery to secure the PRC's growing overseas interests and advance 
its foreign policy goals. To respond to this challenge, the Department 
of State works closely with interagency partners, including the NSC, 
the Department of Defense, and IC to address this governmentwide 
priority.
    The Department of State maintains awareness of and takes action in 
response to proposed PRC military installations abroad in multiple 
regions of the world. The Office of China Coordination and regional and 
functional bureaus work collectively to address PRC efforts to gain 
access. We continue to engage at high levels with governments that are 
considering hosting PRC military installations and share information 
with them about the risks, and we coordinate with allies and partners 
to amplify those concerns.
                   topic: u.s. indo-pacific strategy
    In February 2022, the Administration published its Indo-Pacific 
Strategy, which includes the goal of promoting a free and open Indo-
Pacific. However, this goal is unattainable with the PRC's continued 
encroachment in the region through its diplomatic, economic, and 
military efforts. Analysts have consistently noted that Chinese foreign 
investment projects through their Belt and Road Initiative often carry 
heftier price tags than advertised, engaging in ``debt-trap'' 
diplomacy. Furthermore, many of these projects serve a dual purpose, as 
they provide the PLA's air and naval forces potential centers of 
operation, expanding their capacity to position military resources in 
these countries.

    Question. How does China's expanding influence in the region impact 
the U.S.'s goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific region? What steps is 
the Administration considering to prevent other nations from aligning 
with the PRC?

    Answer. We have seen a range of increasingly problematic behavior 
from the PRC in the broader region, including entering into opaque 
security arrangements with Pacific Islands countries, predatory 
economic activities including IUU fishing; environmental degradation; 
and investments that undermine good governance and promote corruption.
    Additionally, we do not believe importing PRC security forces will 
help any Pacific Islands country. We reiterate our concerns over the 
expansion of the PRC's internal security and surveillance apparatus, 
which actively facilitates PRC government efforts to repress members of 
ethnic and religious minority groups. We are concerned about the 
potential implications that security agreements with the PRC may have 
on the sovereignty and autonomy of Pacific Islands nations. We will 
continue to engage with Pacific Island countries' governments on these 
concerns. At the same time, we will continue to build on our strong 
relationship with the region, in response to the demand signals and 
priorities expressed by Pacific Islands countries.

                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Pete Ricketts

    Topic: In April, the Solomon Islands will hold a general election 
that will be critical for the trajectory of the country. Under Prime 
Minister Sogavare, the Solomon Islands has strengthened its 
relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC), including 
switching its diplomatic recognition and establishing a comprehensive 
strategic partnership. This has concerningly led to a secret security 
pact and policing agreement with the PRC. The PRC is fully aware of 
what's at stake in this election, and in the past, has resorted to 
bribes and other forms of malign influence to meddle in Solomon Islands 
affairs.

    Question. Are there actions that we or our allies and partners in 
the Pacific Islands Forum are taking to limit the PRC's malign 
influence in these elections to ensure that they are both free and 
fair?

    Answer. We are coordinating closely with our likeminded partners to 
support free and fair elections in Solomon Islands. Australia and New 
Zealand are providing significant electoral support to the Government 
of Solomon Islands. USAID also plans to send elections observers to 
monitor conditions on the ground.
    The United States is also supporting a free media in Solomon 
Islands through support to local outlets to access credible sources of 
news, for example the Associated Press.

    Question. Are you concerned that Prime Minister Sogavare will 
utilize PRC security forces in the event of any unrest or to crack down 
on political opposition during or following the election?

    Answer. The Solomon Islands International Assistance Force (SIAF), 
composed of police from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Papua New 
Guinea, will continue to operate in Honiara through June 2024 to assist 
with security for the national elections. These efforts by our 
likeminded partners should be sufficient to quell any potential unrest, 
mitigating the need for PRC assistance.
    We do not believe importing PRC security forces will help any 
Pacific Islands country. We reiterate our concerns over the PRC's 
expansion of internal security and surveillance apparatus.

    Question. If so, what plans are we developing with our allies and 
partners in the region to address this contingency?

    Answer. We are coordinating closely with Australia and New Zealand, 
both of which are contributing contingents of police officers to the 
Solomon Islands International Assistance Force that will continue to 
operate in Honiara through June 2024 to assist with security for the 
national elections.
    We continue to communicate to the Government of Solomon Islands our 
concerns over the expansion of the PRC's internal security and 
surveillance apparatus.

                                 ______
                                 

          Response of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to a Question 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. What Pacific Islands countries does the United States 
Coast Guard have shiprider agreements with?

    Answer. In the Pacific, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has 12 
bilateral maritime law enforcement ``shiprider'' agreements. These are 
with Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. USCG has C175 authority to negotiate and 
conclude these agreements.
    Shiprider agreements are valuable tools for the United States to 
engage with Pacific Islands countries and are popular in the region. 
These agreements respond to a tangible need for Pacific Islands to 
better monitor their large EEZs to promote economically viable 
fisheries, enforce immigration and customs policies, and counter drug 
trafficking and transnational crime.

                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Scott

    Topic: In 2022, China and the Solomon Islands signed a security 
pact granting China the right to conduct naval visits, logistical 
operations, and potentially station military forces in the Solomon 
Islands. This agreement has raised questions about the possibility of 
China establishing a military presence in the Solomons.

    Question. Which other Pacific Island nations are considering 
similar arrangements?

    Answer. The United States respects the right of nations to make 
sovereign decisions in the best interests of their people. 
Nevertheless, we are concerned about the potential implications that 
any security agreement with the PRC may have for any Pacific Islands 
nation's autonomy, security, and data privacy.
    The PRC's pattern of offering vague, confidential deals with little 
regional consultation has provoked public concern in the United States, 
in Pacific Islands countries, and around the globe. I would be happy to 
discuss potential security concerns pertaining to the PRC and specific 
countries in a classified setting in conjunction with my DoD 
colleagues.

    Question. What are China's immediate strategic objectives, and how 
do these fit into its long-term strategy in the South Pacific region?

    Answer. The Indo-Pacific region faces mounting challenges, 
particularly from the PRC. The PRC is combining its economic, 
diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of 
influence in the Indo-Pacific. The PRC's attempts to undermine 
international norms and standards span the globe, but they are most 
acute in the Indo-Pacific.
    As Secretary Blinken has said, the PRC is the only country with 
both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, 
the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. 
That certainly holds true in the Pacific. Through foreign assistance, 
elite capture, and robust public messaging campaigns, the PRC has moved 
aggressively to assert itself in the Pacific Islands region. In 
addition, in recent years, three Pacific Islands countries have 
switched diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the PRC. And in 2022, Solomon 
Islands signed an unprecedented security agreement with the PRC, the 
details of which have not been publicly released. Of course, as we have 
often said, we are not in the business of forcing countries to choose--
in the Pacific or anywhere else. But we want to ensure that countries 
in the Pacific have a choice, and the ability to make their own 
sovereign decisions, free from coercion.
    I would be happy to discuss this question in more depth in a 
classified setting.

                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Mr. Ely Ratner to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Importance of the Pacific Islands to the U.S. Military: The Pacific 
Islands region is important to the U.S. military for a variety of 
reasons from force projection to transit and resupply--and the same is 
true for the PRC Navy and Coast Guard.

    Question. Why does the Department of Defense view the Pacific 
Island region as so strategic? What is at stake for the U.S. military 
if we do not maintain a relationship with these countries, who instead 
choose to work more closely with China?

    Answer. Peace, stability, and prosperity in the Pacific Islands are 
essential for advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Our 
defense posture in the Pacific Islands, ranging in levels of presence 
from a permanent footprint to rotational forces, is critical for U.S. 
military logistics, sustainment, and power projection.
    We know that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is using all 
tools available--including coercive economic and political measures--to 
advance its interests in the region. We are particularly concerned by 
PRC efforts to develop policing arrangements with the Solomon Islands, 
and increase the presence of PRC police elsewhere, like in Kiribati. 
These arrangements often lack transparency and could be used to 
undermine the sovereignty of Pacific Island nations. Importantly, the 
PRC likely seeks to use these arrangements to justify other 
destabilizing security activities in the region.

    Question. From the U.S. military side, given how few militaries 
there are in the region, what does our engagement with Pacific Island 
nations look like?

    Answer. There are three Pacific Island countries with militaries: 
Fiji, Tonga, and Papua New Guinea (PNG). We have regular exercises with 
these nations, these nations also participate in larger exercises 
alongside several partners, and other exercises routinely take place in 
the Pacific Islands. Finally, PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP remains a hallmark of 
U.S. engagement in the region; the 19th iteration of the exercise 
concluded in January after the USNS MERCY hospital ship made stops in 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Palau, and the 
Federated States of Micronesia.
    In addition, we have robust security cooperation engagements with 
partners in the Pacific Islands. The Department of Defense State 
Partnership Program has partnered the State of Nevada with Fiji, Tonga, 
and Samoa; the State of Wisconsin with Papua New Guinea; and most 
recently, the State of Hawaii/Guam with Palau. These partnerships 
promote enduring people-to-people ties, military-to-military 
engagements, and important community projects. Meanwhile, security 
cooperation programs under 10 U.S.C. 333 have built partner capacity to 
address a range of issues in the Pacific Islands.
    Finally, our defense posture in the Pacific Islands region is 
critical for U.S. military logistics, sustainment, and power 
projection. Through the defense provisions of the Compact of Free 
Association, the Department retains the right to establish defense 
sites in the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), Palau, and the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). RMI hosts the U.S. Army Garrison 
at Kwajalein and the Ronald Reagan Test Site. We are working to 
establish additional defense sites within the Compact States under this 
framework. In addition, we signed a landmark Defense Cooperation 
Agreement with Papua New Guinea in 2023, which will deepen bilateral 
security cooperation and strengthen the capacity of the Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force.

    Compact of Free Association Agreement (COFA): The Congress recently 
passed legislation that renews and fully funds the Compacts of Free 
Association (COFA) agreements with the Republic of Palau, the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM). Text was ready for inclusion in last year's NDAA, but an 
insistence of an offset in the House delayed its passage. The delay 
raised questions about U.S. commitment to the three COFA States and the 
region more broadly and served as an entry point for PRC encroachment. 
This is an exercise that we go through only once every 20 years, and it 
was a much smoother process this time than it was previously.

    Question. For the record and for colleagues that will be here in 20 
years when these agreements come up for renewal again: could you 
explain the strategic value of the COFA agreements from DOD's 
perspective?

    Answer. The U.S. Government has provided economic assistance to our 
partners in the Freely Associated States (FAS) for the last four 
decades; the majority of this assistance has been provided under the 
Compacts of Free Association (COFA) and related agreements between the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Republic of Palau (Palau), and 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). This assistance supports 
education, the environment, healthcare, and civilian infrastructure--
and it provides a strong economic anchor that complements our defense 
and security partnership. Last year, the Administration reached 
agreements with the FAS partners that would extend U.S. economic 
assistance for an additional 20 years, and the enactment of the Compact 
of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024 marked one of the 118th 
Congress' most significant achievements to advance U.S. strategic 
priorities in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Importantly, the Compacts ensure that the United States--and only 
the United States--can maintain a military presence in the FAS, and 
they allow FAS citizens to strengthen our All-Volunteer Force through 
dedicated military service in the U.S. Armed Forces. As part of these 
agreements, the U.S. military serves as the defense force for FSM, 
Palau, and RMI, which in return grant the United States assured access 
for our military operations, as well as sites for critical defense 
posture in the region. The Compacts also limit the access of third 
country militaries or their personnel, including would-be adversaries, 
from accessing FAS land, airspace, and territorial seas, securing a key 
area of the Indo-Pacific region. Crucially, citizens of the FAS serve 
in the U.S. Armed Forces at higher proportionate rates than most 
American States, and we are proud of and grateful for their service.

    Question. Would it be possible to replace the benefits we receive 
from this arrangement if our COFA agreements were to disappear in the 
future? How would this impact our broader national security interests?

    Answer. Failure to extend the economic assistance related to the 
Compacts would have had serious consequences for the economies and 
security of our FAS partners, our strategy in the broader Pacific 
Islands region, and, ultimately, our national security. Failure to 
renew the Compacts would have sent the wrong message not only to the 
Compact States, but to the broader Indo-Pacific region. It could have 
also aided PRC efforts to build ties with these countries by providing 
an alternative to lost U.S. assistance. The strategic value of our 
presence in this key geographic area cannot be replaced.

    U.S. Security Alliances in the Region: Beyond our partnerships with 
Pacific Island nations, our continued engagement with close allies in 
the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, among 
others, establishes a broader security architecture that will maintain 
peace and stability in the region and deter PRC aggression.

    Question. Given the absorptive capacity of the islands, are we 
paying close attention to coordinating and scaling the assistance we 
provide?

    Answer. We are working with our regional partners--including 
Australia, France, Japan, and New Zealand--to synchronize our 
programming while continuing to emphasize the importance of right-
sizing and sequencing our own security cooperation programs and 
activities in accordance with Pacific Island partners' absorptive 
capacity.

    Question. What can we be doing more effectively with our partners 
to mitigate the PRC's influence in the region?

    Answer. The Department is focused on strengthening the capacity of 
our Pacific Island partners, including in the areas of maritime domain 
awareness, maritime security, cybersecurity, humanitarian assistance/
disaster response, and defense force professionalization. We are also 
coordinating with other likeminded partners in the region--including 
Australia, France, Japan, and New Zealand--to determine where we can 
complement each other's unique authorities and capabilities to maximum 
strategic effect. Together, we are committed to advancing a shared 
regional vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, including with our 
Pacific Island partners.

                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Mr. Ely Ratner to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

                        topic: papua new guinea
    Question. How does our security agreement with Papua New Guinea 
support U.S. defense requirements, and how is implementation going?

    Answer. The Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) is a foundational 
agreement that enables the United States to greatly strengthen its 
security cooperation with Papua New Guinea (PNG) by modernizing and 
clarifying the commitments underlying our partnership. The DCA will 
deepen ties with PNG, strengthen cooperation between our forces, and 
help the United States more effectively support humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief and other regional crises. It also allows the 
Department of Defense to invest in infrastructure projects, and U.S. 
Indo-Pacific Command has conducted a site survey to scope potential 
requirements with plans for follow up surveys to establish requisite 
needs. The DCA will further allow us to increase the scale and scope of 
our joint exercises with PNG, including in conjunction with Australia.
                      topic: fas national security
    Question. What is being implemented in terms of U.S. assistance to 
support the development of National Security Councils in Micronesia and 
the Marshall Islands, as required under the CONVENE Act?

    Answer. The Department of Defense is standing by to support the 
Department of State with implementation of the CONVENE Act as needed. 
DoD is a strong proponent of the establishment of ``national security 
councils'' or similar formal coordinating bodies in both the Federated 
States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

    Question. Relatedly, what support is the Department of Defense 
providing to the existing National Security Coordination office in 
Palau?

    Answer. In establishing the National Security Coordinator position 
in Palau, DoD offered resources through the Asia-Pacific Center for 
Security Studies to support the establishment of a National Security 
Policy, alongside the Department of State. DoD does not otherwise 
provide material or financial support to Palau for the National 
Security Coordination office, but, when appropriate, liaises closely 
with the office to coordinate on defense-related issues.

    While the U.S. values its ties with all Pacific Islands, our 
relationships with the Freely Associated States are fundamentally 
different. Citizens from the FAS can live and work in the U.S. and 
serve in the U.S. military at very high rates. They also host U.S. 
troops and form part of our extended defense infrastructure. Now that 
we are shifting to implementation of the Compacts of Free Association, 
getting that right will be critical as we develop our ties with the FAS 
over the next 20 years and seek to compete with an aggressive China.

    Question. As we begin working on implementing the renewed COFA 
agreements, what will the Department of Defense do to ensure that the 
FAS are given the dedicated attention they deserve, distinct from our 
broader engagement with the Pacific Islands? Are current U.S. military 
installations in the FAS adequately resourced?

    Answer. The Freely Associated States (FAS) are a priority for DoD 
because they are home to existing installations, like the U.S. Army 
Garrison at Kwajalein and the Ronald Reagan Test Site RMI. The 
exclusive access and strategic denial rights we enjoy in the FAS make 
them a focus for future defense site designation. We also implement 
security cooperation programming focused on the FAS, in addition to 
broader regional efforts.

    FAS citizens serve in the U.S. military at the highest rates per 
capita. When they return home, they often encounter serious problems in 
getting the care they were promised as veterans.

    Question. How does DOD work with Veterans' Affairs to address those 
issues?

    Answer. DoD is grateful to citizens from the FAS who have or are 
currently serving in the U.S. Armed Forces. We have an obligation to 
ensure that those who wear the U.S. military uniform and other eligible 
DoD beneficiaries have access to care. For veterans not otherwise 
eligible to receive care from DoD, we respectfully refer your question 
to the Department of Veterans Affairs.

    China-linked organized criminal organizations are all over the 
Pacific Islands.

    Question. How can the Department of Defense assist the FAS to 
combat PRC-linked organized crime, which often functions as an enabling 
force for strategic corruption?

    Answer. DoD provides support to the FAS as part of a broader, 
whole-of-government effort. This activity occurs primarily through 
Joint Interagency Task Force-West programming.

    Question. How can Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-West), 
JAGs, or others from DoD work with the FAS to give them the legal tools 
they need to combat PRC strategic corruption?

    Answer. In carrying out its counter-drug mission, Joint Interagency 
Task Force-West (JIATF-West) supports U.S. law enforcement working with 
the FAS by providing both information related to criminal activity and 
capacity building efforts to counter it. JIATF-West provides 
information support to counter-drug and related investigations to the 
FAS upon the request of a U.S. law enforcement agency. This information 
support furthers investigations by identifying maritime transit routes, 
container shipments of interest, and criminal networks.
    JIATF-West also bolsters the capability and capacity of law 
enforcement agencies in the FAS through partnerships with U.S. law 
enforcement and U.S. embassies. Over the past several years, for 
example, JIATF-West has facilitated counterdrug-related courses for FAS 
law enforcement partners.
    JIATF-West also supports the Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA), headquartered in Honiara, Solomon Islands, to support its 17 
member nations with enhanced maritime domain awareness and information 
sharing. The FAS are members of the FFA and benefit from the enhanced 
maritime domain awareness that assists with countering illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing as well as any associated and other 
transnational organized crime.

    Question. Please describe the role the Department of Defense can 
play within the interagency in combating PRC political warfare in the 
Pacific Islands, with a particular emphasis on the FAS.

    Answer. DoD is working as part of a whole-of-government effort to 
strengthen relationships and people-to-people ties with our partners in 
the FAS, including through security cooperation programming. Beyond the 
FAS, in Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, and soon in Palau, the 
DoD State Partnership Program supports an enduring U.S. presence 
focused on long-term relationships with eligible security forces of 
partner nations in Oceania.
                   topic: prc dual-use infrastructure
    Question. What are the most concerning PRC dual-use infrastructure 
projects either completed or under development, from the perspective of 
the Department of Defense?

    Answer. The Report on Military and Security Developments Involving 
the People's Republic of China underscores that the PRC seeks to expand 
its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to sustain military 
power at greater distances. We also know that the PRC is very likely 
already planning for additional military logistics facilities to 
support power projection, and has considered Pacific Island countries 
for potential locations. Specifically, the PRC is likely considering 
locations in Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands, using 
its growing defense relationships with these countries to advance its 
military logistics goals.
    The Department is also particularly concerned by policing 
arrangements offered by the PRC, which often lack transparency and seek 
to undermine the sovereignty of Pacific Island nations. These 
arrangements can also be used to justify destabilizing People's 
Liberation Army security activities and access in the region.

                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Mr. Ely Ratner to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator Pete Ricketts

                    defense vulnerabilities of guam
    Guam is the westernmost part of the U.S. and houses Naval Base 
Guam--the Navy's only submarine base in the western Pacific--as well as 
Anderson Air Force Base--which hosts strategic bombers and fighters. 
However, despite its importance, Guam remains surprisingly vulnerable. 
For decades, the PRC has developed both ballistic and cruise missiles 
that could strike Guam. While the U.S. has missile defense 
capabilities, there are still significant gaps in our ability to defend 
Guam against PRC cruise missiles. The threats don't stop at just 
missiles--they also exist in the cyberspace. Last year, PRC state-
sponsored hacking group, Volt Typhoon, targeted unnamed critical 
infrastructure organizations on the island, including those in the 
communications, maritime and government sectors. These cyberattacks 
could sabotage any U.S. response to a PRC invasion of Taiwan

    Question. What is the administration doing to ensure Guam is 
properly protected from all forms of PRC missile attacks?

    Answer. As the Missile Defense Review makes clear, Guam is a part 
of the United States and any missile attack on Guam or any other U.S. 
territory would be met with an appropriate response. The Department's 
efforts include active missile defenses, enhanced regional deterrence 
and defense posture, ally and partner assurance measures, and increased 
readiness.

    Question. What is the administration doing to strengthen the 
cybersecurity of our critical systems and infrastructure in Guam in the 
wake of these cyberattacks?

    Answer. Enhancing cybersecurity of critical systems and 
infrastructure on Guam is an important issue and a priority for the 
Department. The Department is diligently working across the U.S. 
Government to synchronize efforts. I can offer more details at a 
classified level.

                                 ______
                                 

               Response of Mr. Ely Ratner to a Question 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Scott

    Question. Since fiscal year 2011, the Navy has been procuring two 
Virginia-class submarines annually to bolster its submarine fleet. 
However, the recent fiscal year 2025 budget request includes plans for 
only one Virginia-class submarine. Please explain the reasoning behind 
this decision.
    Additionally, how will this impact our strategy to counter China's 
growing naval capabilities?

    Answer. This decision directly supports U.S. strategy to maintain 
military advantages. The fiscal year 2025 budget is a strategy-driven 
budget that reflects the prioritization and significant investment of 
undersea warfare capabilities, and prioritizes reaching a production 
cadence of one Columbia-class and two Virginia-class submarines (SSN) 
by fiscal year 2028. The President's budget funds 9 SSNs across the 5-
year budget and contains $11.4 billion in Submarine Industrial Base 
(SIB) funding to ensure the Navy, working with industry, can get SSNs 
on track by 2028. There are currently 14 SSNs in various stages of 
construction, of which 6 are beyond their contracted delivery date. The 
President's budget maintains advanced procurement funding to ensure 
stable and predictable work for smaller subcontractors. Not procuring a 
second SSN in fiscal year 2025 will help the SIB address the current 
backlog and will allow the U.S. SIB to produce at the level needed to 
enhance combat credible deterrence.

                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Mr. Michael Schiffer to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. Building Climate Resiliency: The Pacific Islands are on 
the frontline of climate change, facing rising sea levels, increasing 
temperatures, and extreme weather events that threaten the very 
survival of its nations. Given the strategic significance of the 
region, U.S. engagement on climate change initiatives is also critical 
for bolstering regional stability and security. By working closely with 
Pacific Island nations, the United States can help build resilience 
against climate change impacts, while also strengthening alliances and 
fostering cooperation in a region increasingly influenced by 
geopolitical competition.
    Could you provide an overview of USAID's strategies and initiatives 
aimed at addressing climate change in the Pacific Islands?
    How does this engagement support the U.S.'s broader objectives of 
enhancing regional resilience, securing alliances, and promoting 
stability in the face of evolving environmental and geopolitical 
challenges?

    Answer. The Pacific Islands' vulnerability to threats from climate 
change rank as the region's top priority and is a prevailing challenge 
to the region's resilience and stability. Furthermore, the magnitude of 
the challenge requires that a broad and diverse network of partners, 
including host country governments, communities, development partners, 
and other organizations, join together to build the region's climate 
resilience. USAID's long-standing partnership with Pacific Island 
countries on climate and disaster preparedness is foundational to 
establishing an enduring and credible partnership with the region as 
well as supporting broader U.S. efforts and objectives in the region, 
including building the region's long-term resilience and prosperity.
    For example, USAID is supporting Pacific regional organizations and 
initiatives that are led and owned by the region, such as Unlocking 
Blue Pacific Prosperity (UBPP). UBPP is driven by the Pacific Community 
(SPC), the region's leading technical organization and aims to achieve 
100 percent effective and sustainable ocean management, healthy and 
productive Pacific people with robust food systems, and fit-for-purpose 
financing to support sustained efforts. USAID is collaborating closely 
with SPC and Pacific leaders to coalesce development partners like 
Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Canada around the expanding 
initiative as well as bringing to bear our proven climate finance 
expertise and other assistance on coastal fisheries and food security.
    Recognizing that climate and disaster risks are the greatest 
existential threats to the Pacific, USAID has been partnering with 
countries in the region for more than a decade to build their 
resilience to climate impacts through a robust climate, environment, 
and disaster assistance portfolio. We have designed our programs to 
respond to the needs and priorities that Pacific Island leaders, civil 
society, and communities have identified. Among these include unlocking 
climate finance, and preventing ocean plastic pollution across the 
Pacific, and protecting Papua New Guinea's vulnerable biodiversity and 
expanding their energy access.
    USAID is currently at the final stages of designing two new climate 
finance initiatives announced at the August 2024 Pacific Islands Forum 
Leaders Meeting in Tonga. The activities will be: (1) a 5-year effort 
to help Pacific nations access and manage climate finance; and (2) a 
new Climate Finance Development Accelerator, aimed at partnering with 
the private sector in Fiji and Papua New Guinea to scale local climate 
solutions. These new initiatives will build on USAID's track record of 
success under its now-closed Climate Ready activity, which mobilized 
over $562 million for adaptation projects from major international 
financial institutions like the Green Climate Fund, the Global 
Environment Facility, and the Adaptation Fund. USAID also supports 
local solutions and organizations through the Pacific American Fund, 
which provides small grants to locally led projects.
    Papua New Guinea is one of 17 ``megadiverse'' countries, containing 
approximately 7 percent of the world's biodiversity and with forests 
covering approximately 60 percent of the land and storing carbon. PNG 
is a Tier 1 country under USAID's Biodiversity Policy, meaning it is 
among the highest priorities for Agency conservation investments. This 
ranking is based on the Global Environment Facility's Global Benefits 
Index for Biodiversity and the list of globally significant ecoregions 
as determined by the World Wildlife Fund's Global 200 list. USAID 
implements two bilateral biodiversity programs in PNG. USAID's Lukautim 
Graun Program (LGP) aims to reduce threats to PNG's rich biodiversity 
by focusing on the management of customary lands and waters in key 
biodiversity areas and strengthening local knowledge and capacity for 
greater conservation, governance, and livelihood development. USAID's 
Sustainable Landscapes program is helping to reduce the drivers of 
deforestation that generate greenhouse gas emissions by strengthening 
landscape governance and providing sustainable economic alternatives.
    Through the global Clean Cities, Blue Oceans program, USAID is 
piloting localized approaches to address waste management challenges in 
the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, and PNG. USAID is 
implementing holistic strategies that address each step in the waste 
value chain--from production to end use--prioritizing the most 
inclusive, economically viable, and environmentally sustainable 
solutions.

    Question. Supporting Sustainable Fisheries: The economy and 
vitality of the Pacific Islands is inextricably linked to the health of 
their marine ecosystems, which support local economies, cultures, and 
livelihoods. Sustainable fisheries are essential for the food security 
and economic stability of Pacific Island nations. However, the threat 
of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, particularly 
activities attributed to PRC fishing fleets, undermines these 
objectives, leading to overfishing, habitat destruction, and 
significant economic losses. In this context, the United States' 
engagement in promoting sustainable fisheries and combating IUU fishing 
is crucial.
    How does USAID's programs foster sustainable fisheries management 
in the Pacific Islands?
    How does our work on fisheries management and maritime domain 
awareness tie into our larger objective of supporting Pacific Island 
nations sustain their diverse ocean ecosystems and counter the PRC's 
and other countries' IUU fishing?

    Answer. USAID partners with the Pacific Islands to counter illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing by strengthening sustainable 
community-driven fisheries management and improving broader national 
and regional level fisheries protection.
    USAID's OurFish OurFuture activity addresses the drivers of IUU 
fishing overfishing that are degrading coastal fisheries and 
biodiversity, negatively impacting community livelihoods, impacting 
food security for communities, and threatening maritime security and 
sovereignty in the region. The program uses a culturally sensitive and 
ecosystem-scale fisheries governance system through: (1) inclusive and 
transparent decisionmaking processes that are informed by traditional 
knowledge and science, and (2) increased stakeholder engagement with 
measures to address IUU fishing and other threats to ecosystem-level 
biodiversity. Additionally, USAID is strengthening the resilience and 
engagement of marginalized actors (e.g., women and youth) in 
sustainable coastal fisheries.
    To combat IUU fishing, an area where we have seen increasingly 
problematic behavior by PRC, USAID is working with Pacific Island 
partner governments to increase their capacities for monitoring, 
control, and surveillance (MCS) of their fisheries. Through the Pacific 
Coastal Fisheries Management and Compliance activity, USAID supports 
fisheries agencies to have appropriate MCS programs with the capacity, 
training, and systems to support sustainable coastal fisheries co-
management at all levels, improves coordination mechanisms with civil 
society to support local-level coastal fisheries co-management, and 
supporting the development of MCS frameworks, best practice guidelines, 
operating procedures, and training and outreach materials.
    USAID is also partnering with Pacific Island countries and the 
private sector, including Walmart, to expand investment in fisheries 
and dock-related infrastructure across the region so that local 
communities can benefit from sustainable use of their natural 
resources. USAID is helping to prepare Pacific International Inc. 
(PII), a private sector company in the Marshall Islands (RMI), to 
secure financing to expand its current dock infrastructure, which will 
allow RMI to land and offload tuna to supply Walmart stores under the 
Pacific Island Tuna initiative. Through leveraging the purchasing power 
of the private sector, this partnership has increased sustainable 
fishing practices, promoted improved monitoring, helped RMI adopt other 
sustainable practices throughout the supply chain, and ensured a 
continuing market for RMI fishers. To build on this work, USAID aims to 
leverage private sector resources to scale these efforts across other 
target countries in the region. USAID plans to organize a series of 
virtual roundtable discussions to convene public, private, and civil 
society stakeholders focused on supporting Pacific Island countries' 
increased participation in the tuna fisheries value chain.

    Question. Branding and Communications on U.S. Assistance: The 
United States provides a lot of assistance per capita in the Pacific, 
including through multilateral channels, but we do a poor job of 
``taking credit'' for the assistance that we provide. One way to 
address this is through updating our branding policy and deploying more 
effective communications strategies.
    How are we thinking about the issue of branding and communication 
in the context of the assistance that we provide in the Pacific Islands 
region? How does this shape the way that our assistance is perceived in 
the region?
    What should we be doing more, differently or better?

    Answer. To maximize visibility and amplify public acknowledgement 
of the re-establishment of USAID's Pacific Islands Mission and the 
elevation of our presence in the Pacific, USAID has been prioritizing 
affirmative messaging that clearly communicates the tangible benefits 
of our development and humanitarian assistance at the government and 
community level. USAID is currently planning procurement for media 
products, unprecedented in their amplitude, that will reach multiple 
audiences across the Pacific. In addition, USAID has established 
staffing positions to expand our public outreach and communications 
across the region.

                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Mr. Michael Schiffer to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. What are 2-3 concrete economic projects we are currently 
spearheading in the Pacific Islands, and what tangible effects are 
those projects having?

    Answer. Across the region, USAID is partnering with like-minded 
countries to deliver on Pacific priorities by leveraging our tools and 
pooled resources to provide viable alternatives to PRC investments. In 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), USAID is part of a multi-country partnership, 
alongside Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, that is supporting the 
Government of PNG to meet its goal of expanding access to electricity 
from 13 percent of the population in 2018 to 70 percent by 2030. 
USAID's PNG Electrification Partnership (PEP) activity is facilitating 
new on- and off-grid household electricity connections, supporting the 
financial viability of the state-owned power authority, PNG Power 
Limited (PPL), and strengthening the institutional capacity of the 
newly established regulator, the National Energy Authority. Since 2020, 
USAID's PEP activity has helped increase the number of people with 
electricity and improved energy services for more than a million people 
in PNG.
    In Palau, USAID has partnered with Australia and Japan to support 
the development of an undersea spur cable--Palau's second--that will 
connect the country to the world's longest undersea cable, increasing 
the internet bandwidth and extending connectivity to remote areas to 
spark greater economic growth. Additionally, USAID has partnered with 
Australia and Japan on the East Micronesia Cable, which will connect 
the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, and Nauru; and provide 
faster, higher quality, and more reliable and secure communications to 
approximately 100,000 people across the three countries.
    USAID is also partnering with Pacific Island countries to foster 
economic growth through tailored programs that deliver sustainable, 
tangible benefits to Pacific Islanders, providing a contrast to the 
PRC's approach. In the Solomon Islands, USAID works with government and 
private sector partners to advance the country's economic 
competitiveness and inclusiveness, with specific emphasis on developing 
the agribusiness sector and improving forest management. USAID's 
largest bilateral activity in the Solomon Islands is the Strengthening 
Competitiveness, Agriculture, Livelihoods and Environment (SCALE) 
Program. Through SCALE, USAID has helped 40 community groups and 
organizations formally register and provided small grants to pursue 
locally identified environmental and livelihood activities. For 
example, the largest cocoa exporter in Solomon Islands is working with 
local farmers to extend their network into previously unserved areas, 
and public, private, and CSO partners have worked together to identify 
11 agribusiness infrastructure projects across the pilot province.
    In Papua New Guinea, USAID worked to establish the latest American 
Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in the region, AmCham Coral Sea, in 2022. 
As part of this initiative, USAID provided expert consultancy to help 
AmCham Coral Sea refine its mission, plot a strategic pathway, and 
design tailored services and solutions to bolster U.S. corporate 
engagement in the Pacific Islands. This partnership is aimed at 
bolstering sustainable economic growth, driven by the private sector. 
Through this initiative, we are promoting a development vision that 
empowers local and international businesses to play a pivotal role in 
regional development.

    Question. Which U.S. Government economic agencies are the most 
active in the Pacific Islands, other than State and USAID?

    Answer. The Pacific Islands face numerous constraints to economic 
growth including geographic distance, small economies, and dispersed 
populations, which requires a whole-of-government approach.
    USAID has been strengthening its partnership with interagency 
partners, including the International Development Finance Corporation, 
to bring to bear our unique tools in the Pacific Islands. USAID and DFC 
are helping micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSME) expand their 
access to financing critical to support and build their businesses. 
USAID and DFC are launching a flexible Pacific Microfinance Facility 
valued at up to $50 million to expand access to fair and competitive 
finance for MSMEs in the Pacific Islands.
    USAID has also utilized the Transaction Advisory Fund (TAF) to 
provide legal and technical assistance needed to ensure sustainable, 
transparent, and high-quality infrastructure development in the Pacific 
Islands. USAID implements TAF in close coordination with the 
interagency, including State, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, 
and the Treasury Department. USAID is supporting the project management 
unit to lead the management and implementation of an undersea cable to 
Palau and legal advisory support for the East Micronesia Cable, which 
will connect the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, and Nauru. 
In the Marshall Islands (RMI), USAID is also using TAF assistance to 
help prepare a private sector company to potentially secure financing 
from the DFC to upgrade a dock. The project will allow RMI to increase 
its capacity to land and offload sustainably caught tuna as well as 
enable better catch documentation and enforcement of legal fishing.

    Question. Are there any needed changes in authorities that would 
make it easier for the United States to increase economic and 
commercial engagement in the Pacific Islands?

    Answer. For the Pacific Islands, there are no changes in authority 
needed. The only restrictions for fiscal year 2024 we are closely 
tracking are for PNG (Trafficking In Persons for which there is a 
waiver) and Nauru, which has a restriction on assistance for the 
central government and no waiver as it is in violation of Sec. 7047(c) 
for recognizing the occupation of Georgian territories of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia.

                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Mr. Michael Schiffer to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy: In February 2022, the 
Administration published its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which includes the 
goal of promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific. However, this goal is 
unattainable with the PRC's continued encroachment in the region 
through its diplomatic, economic, and military efforts.
    How can the United States address the financial vulnerabilities 
that is forcing Pacific islands to deepen relations with the PRC, 
especially with China being a main trading partner and source of 
investment and infrastructure for countries throughout the region?

    Answer. Pacific Island countries (PICs) are vulnerable to PRC 
economic coercion given their limited economic diversification, vast 
geographic expanse, and dependency on loans and assistance. The United 
States offers attractive alternatives to PRC investment by 
strengthening collaboration between USAID and the International 
Development Finance Corporation (DFC). For example, USAID and DFC 
launched a Pacific Microfinance Facility at the September 2023 U.S.-
Pacific Islands Forum Summit. This facility will mobilize up to $50 
million in loans, loan portfolio guarantees, and technical assistance 
to support the growth of micro, small, and medium enterprises across 
the region. By providing targeted financial support to these 
businesses, the initiative strengthens local economies, fosters 
inclusive growth, and enhances economic stability across the region, 
reducing economic dependency on the PRC.
    Additionally, USAID focuses on driving high-quality public and 
private sector investments into the fisheries sector, as this is a key 
source of economic benefit for numerous PICs. In the Marshall Islands, 
USAID and DFC are working to develop a fisheries dock infrastructure 
project at the Port of Majuro, which will allow RMI to derive more 
economic benefits as a part of the tuna value chain. USAID is providing 
business and financial advisory services to prepare a local 
Marshallese-owned company to potentially receive DFC financing to 
upgrade and expand their fisheries dock. USAID is working to identify 
additional opportunities to scale fisheries investment, so more PICs 
can participate in the lucrative global tuna trade.
    Through these investments, USAID is providing credible, 
competitive, and transparent financial alternatives and facilitating 
targeted investments in critical sectors, like fisheries, which build 
trust in U.S.-backed efforts and diminish the appeal of PRC's often 
opaque and debt-laden investment practices.

    Question. How effective has the opening of the USAID/Pacific 
Islands Mission been in advancing the economic and social development 
goals of Pacific Island countries?

    Answer. Since opening the Pacific Islands Mission August 2023, 
USAID has been focused on building a lasting partnership with the 
region and individual countries by listening to and partnering with the 
region's priorities laid out in the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific 
Continent. To do this, USAID has been expanding its physical presence 
and development programming. On presence, USAID anticipates growing to 
at least 51 positions by August 2025, with 30 positions under the 
Pacific Islands Mission and 21 positions under the Country 
Representative Office in Papua New Guinea. These new staff are critical 
as PICs value consistent, on-the-ground relationships as foundational 
to effective, long-term partnerships with governments, leaders, civil 
society organizations, and communities.
    USAID is already deepening relationships with key regional 
organizations like the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and the Pacific 
Community (SPC) and delivering on their requests for USAID support. For 
example, USAID has been supporting SPC's Unlocking Blue Pacific 
Prosperity (UBPP) from the early days including by providing guidance, 
strategic planning, and utilizing our convening power to coalesce 
support among development partners for the initiative. At the August 
2024 PIF Leaders Meeting in Tonga, USAID rallied Australia, Canada, 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea to endorse a partner statement in 
support of Pacific-led initiatives like UBPP. This marked a significant 
step in uniting international support for Pacific-led efforts to 
improve the lives of people across the Blue Pacific Continent, and it 
underscores that USAID is a trusted partner who listens to and 
prioritizes the region's development aspirations and respects their 
values, culture, and traditions, which is a contrast to other actors 
like the PRC.
    In terms of programming, USAID focuses on the areas of climate 
resilience, sustainable fisheries, good governance, economic growth, 
access to transparent and high-standard infrastructure financing, 
digital connectivity, and health systems strengthening, which align to 
the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. Building the region's 
resilience to the impacts of climate change remains among the top 
priorities given the region's unique vulnerabilities. USAID has been 
responding to the region's calls to scale up sustainable climate 
finance by mobilizing over $550 million from various international 
funds to help Pacific Island governments and regional bodies receive 
accreditation to be able to access multi-donor funding resources that 
have historically been difficult to access given the complex 
application process and limited institutional capacity.
    At the 2024 PIF Leaders Meeting, USAID announced the launch of two 
new complementary climate finance activities, which will build on our 
previous track record of success. The first is a new 5-year effort to 
help Pacific countries and regional institutions access and manage 
climate finance from a variety of sources, including multi-donor trust 
funds, bilateral donors, philanthropies, and the private sector. The 
second is a new line of effort through the USAID Climate Finance 
Development Accelerator to catalyze new partnerships with the private 
sector to scale up successful local solutions and approaches to climate 
change adaptation in Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

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