Filed 12/2/21 P. v. Harris CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMES HARRIS, JR,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B312318

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. ZM020470)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Robert S. Harrison, Judge. Affirmed.

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Michael Katz, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
2

Following a bench trial, the trial court extended James 

Harris, Jr.’s commitment for criminal insanity for two years

under Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b). Harris’ sole 

claim on appeal is that the trial court improperly induced his jury 

trial waiver when it informed him that jury trials were 

indefinitely delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but that the 

court could schedule a bench trial within a few weeks.

Because the trial court’s advisements were neither coercive 

nor otherwise defective, we affirm the recommitment order.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2012, Harris was committed to a California state 

hospital pursuant to Penal Code section 1026, after being found 

not guilty by reason of insanity of several violent offenses. Since 

then, his state hospital commitment period has been extended 

numerous times, with the most recent petition having been filed 

on February 2, 2021, and sustained by the court on April 20, 

2021, following a bench trial

At the April 20, 2021 bench trial, the court heard testimony 

from two psychological evaluators, who both opined that 

continued hospitalization was appropriate due to Harris’

continuing instability and the potential risk of violence. Harris

testified on his own behalf, stating he was on various psychiatric 

medications, believed some were helpful, and that he wanted to 

move to a board and care facility. He denied hearing voices and 

testified his mood is presently stable. Following the testimony, 

the trial court ordered Harris recommitted for a two-year term 

through April 19, 2023.

DISCUSSION

Harris contends the trial court improperly induced his jury 

trial waiver by highlighting the scheduling advantages of 
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choosing a bench trial over a jury trial. As explained below, we 

find no merit in this contention.

A. Relevant Proceedings

At a March 16, 2021 pretrial conference, the prosecutor 

advised the trial court that “[w]e need to set a trial date,” and

that the maximum date was April 19, 2021.1 The court then 

asked Harris’ counsel if he was available on April 6, 2021, and, 

after counsel replied in the affirmative, the court asked counsel if 

it was going to be a court or a jury trial.

The prosecutor responded that it was going to be a court 

trial, but stated to Harris’ counsel, “[w]e don’t have a waiver, 

though.” Thereafter, a colloquy between the trial court and 

Harris ensued, as follows:

“The Court: . . . So, Mr. Harris, we’re setting your case for 

a court trial today for April 6th at 1:30 p.m. But you need to 

know that you have a right to have your case tried to a jury of 12 

members of the community. And—however, if you choose that 

option in lieu of having a court trial, we probably won’t be able to 

give you a trial date until sometime in—When, [the court clerk]?

“The Clerk: For a jury trial?

“The Court: Yeah. For a jury trial.

“The Clerk: I have no idea. I don’t know when they’re

setting those.

“The Court: Yeah. Because of COVID, sir, I don’t know if

we’re setting jury trials in this courthouse. So your case would be 

in a state of limbo for a while if you were to choose a jury trial. 

So I just want to make sure you understand that option. If you 

1 The prosecutor’s reference to the maximum date of 

April 19, 2021, referred to when Harris’ present commitment 

term was set to expire.
4

want to have your case heard on April 6th and decided by a 

judge—in this case it will probably be Judge Harrison—I need 

you to agree to give up your right to a trial by a jury. Do you 

want to give up your right to a jury trial and have your trial on 

April 6th before Judge Harrison or whatever other judge is 

available?

“[Harris]: Yes.

“The Court: Okay. All right. The court finds the 

defendant has knowingly waived his right to a jury trial. This

matter is set for a court trial on April 6th.”

B. Governing Legal Principles

Under Penal Code section 1026.5, a defendant in an

extended commitment proceeding has a right to jury trial, and

must be advised of that right by the trial court upon the filing of

an extended commitment petition. Penal Code section 1026.5,

subdivision (b)(3), specifically provides that “[w]hen the petition 

is filed, the court shall advise the person named in the petition of 

the right to be represented by an attorney and of the right to a 

jury trial,” while section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(4) provides that 

“[t]he trial shall be by jury unless waived by both the person and 

the prosecuting attorney.”

In People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, our high court 

interpreted the above sections to hold that the trial court must 

personally advise the defendant in a Penal Code section 1026.5 

proceeding of his or her right to a jury trial and must elicit any 

waiver of that right on the record—unless there is substantial 

evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a 
5

knowing and voluntary waiver.2 (Tran, supra, at pp. 1166-

1168.)3

A waiver is knowing and intelligent when it is made with a 

full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned 

and the consequences of the decision to abandon it, and 

“ ‘voluntary’ ” when it is “ ‘the product of a free and deliberate

choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.’ ”

(Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 573 [107 S.Ct. 851, 93 

L.Ed.2d 954]; People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 305

(Collins).)

“ ‘No particular language is necessary to waive a jury trial 

so long as the words employed disclose in their ordinary, common 

sense, fair meaning and context an intention to be tried by the 

court sitting without a jury.’ ” (People v. Doyle (2016) 19 

Cal.App.5th 946, 952; cf. People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 

151, 168 [“ ‘[t]he United States Supreme Court has never held 

that a defendant, when waiving the right to a jury, 

2 In the latter instance, control of the waiver decision shifts 

to counsel. (People v. Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1167.)

3 In Tran, our high court noted that the statutory language 

regarding jury trial waivers under Penal Code section 1026.5 is 

virtually identical to the language addressing that right in the 

context of Mentally Disordered Offenders (MDO) cases and,

accordingly, applied the same interpretation as in its MDO 

companion case, People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113. 

(People v. Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 1167-1168; Blackburn, 

supra, at pp 1124-1137.) In light of these statutory protections, 

the Blackburn court did not decide whether the constitutional 

right to a jury trial afforded to criminal defendants also applies to 

commitment extension proceedings. (Blackburn, supra, at 

p. 1120.)
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constitutionally is entitled to be canvassed by the trial court, let 

alone to require a specifically formulated canvass’ ” “and [the 

California Supreme Court] ha[s] never insisted that a jury waiver 

colloquy invariably must discuss juror impartiality, the 

unanimity requirement, or both for an ensuing waiver to be 

knowing and intelligent”].)

C. Harris’ Jury Trial Waiver Was Neither Coerced nor 

Otherwise Defective

Harris acknowledges the trial court personally elicited his 

waiver on the record and further concedes that he is “not 

contend[ing] that the admonitions regarding the right to a jury 

trial were insufficient.”4 Instead, Harris contends that his 

waiver was involuntary because the trial court “secured [Harris’] 

acquiescence by emphasizing the disadvantages of a jury trial.”

Specifically, Harris claims that the trial court’s comments 

“reflected that [Harris] would be punished for exercising his right 

to a jury trial by being unable to secure that right for the 

foreseeable future, while receiving a benefit, i.e.[,] a speedy court 

trial, for waiving that right.” In so arguing, Harris relies heavily 

on Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th 297. Collins is inapposite.

In Collins, our high court reversed a conviction where the 

trial court informed a criminal defendant that he would receive 

“ ‘some benefit’ ” if he waived his right to a jury trial. (Collins, 

supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 302, italics omitted.) Although the trial 

court could not yet specify the benefit, the court assured the 

defendant that his willingness to waive jury trial—and “ ‘not 

tak[e] up two weeks’ time to try the case’ ”—would have “ ‘some 

effect on the court’ ” and expressly stated to the defendant “ ‘that 

4 Nor does Harris contend that he lacked the capacity to 

enter into a knowing and voluntary waiver.
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by waiving jury, you are getting some benefit.’ ”

5 (Ibid., italics 

omitted.)

On review, our high court observed that appellate courts in 

California and elsewhere “ ‘have vacated sentences when the trial 

court has apparently used its sentencing power, either more

severely or more leniently than the norm, in order to expedite the

resolution of criminal matters’ ” (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 

p. 307, quoting In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 279), and 

that “[t]he impropriety of a trial court’s explicit promise of more 

lenient treatment in sentencing if the defendant waives trial by 

jury is comparable to the impropriety of harsher treatment 

imposed because of the defendant’s having invoked his or her 

right to trial by jury.” (Collins, supra, at p. 307.)

Our high court explained that, although the trial court had 

properly advised the defendant about the right that he was 

waiving, it also had “announc[ed] its intention to bestow some 

form of benefit in exchange for [the] defendant’s waiver” and thus 

“acted in a manner that was at odds with its judicial obligation to

remain neutral and detached in evaluating the voluntariness of 

the waiver.” (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 309.) This “form of 

the trial court’s negotiation with [the] defendant presented a 

‘substantial danger of unintentional coercion,’ ” and effectively 

5 The defendant, who was facing a maximum potential 

sentence of 41 years in state prison, ultimately received a total 

term of 24 years in prison. (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 303.) 

At sentencing, the defense counsel had suggested that the 

“defendant’s waiver had benefited the minor victim by reducing 

her ‘exposure to presentation of traumatic events.’ ” (Id. at p. 315 

(conc. opn. of Brown, J.).)
8

resulted in an offer by the trial court “to reward [the] defendant 

for refraining from the exercise of a constitutional right.”6 (Ibid.)

Unlike in Collins, the trial court here did not engage in 

“negotiation” by offering to “bestow some form of benefit in 

exchange for [Harris’] waiver.” (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 

p. 309, italics added.) The trial court merely apprised Harris of a

circumstance that was admittedly beyond the court’s own 

control—i.e., the halting or delay of trials due to the pandemic.7 

Nothing in the court’s statements indicate that it strayed from its 

“judicial obligation to remain neutral and detached” (ibid.) or

otherwise engaged in the type of coercion defined and explained

in Collins.

Harris also points out that prior to taking his waiver, the 

parties and the court discussed potential bench trial dates which, 

according to Harris, “reflected . . . an understanding, and an 

assumption that [Harris] would waive his right to a jury trial”

and deprived him of “the opportunity to make a reasoned decision 

whether to seek a court or a jury trial.” We disagree.

The record demonstrates Harris was personally informed of 

his right to a jury trial, and that he clearly and unequivocally 

waived that right. Harris’ assertions that this process was “at 

6 The court pointed out that, while the prosecutor and a 

defendant may negotiate a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 

which involves the relinquishment of the constitutional rights 

attending a trial, the trial court may not engage in negotiations

in order to secure a jury trial waiver. (Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th 

at p. 309 & fn. 4.)

7 Harris does not challenge the truth or accuracy of the 

trial court’s comments about the pandemic’s impact on jury trials, 

and neither he nor his trial counsel sought further clarification of 

the court’s jury trial scheduling procedures.
9

best a formality” or “at worst a sham” are speculation and refuted 

by the record. In multiple previous commitment hearings, Harris

requested a bench trial and waived his right to a jury trial after 

being advised of his rights—including advisements more 

extensive than those provided here. Harris was therefore well 

aware of his right to proceed to a jury trial and his ability to 

exercise that right. (Cf. People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 

302-307 [whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary must be 

evaluated under the “totality of the circumstances,” including 

prior experience with criminal justice system].)

In sum, Harris has failed to demonstrate that his jury trial 

waiver was involuntary, or otherwise defective. Accordingly, we 

affirm the trial court’s recommitment order.

DISPOSITION

The recommitment order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CRANDALL, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.