RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 11a0211p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DARRELL D. WALKER,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 09-6498

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Tennessee of Chattanooga.

No. 09-00032-001—Curtis L. Collier, Chief District Judge.

Decided and Filed: August 11, 2011 

Before: KEITH, CLAY, and COOK, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Mary Ellen Coleman, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN

TENNESSEE, INC., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. James T. Brooks,

ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

COOK, Circuit Judge. Federal prisoner Darrell Walker challenges the

substantive reasonableness of his thirty-six-month sentence for escape. Finding that the

district court impermissibly lengthened Walker’s sentence to promote his rehabilitation,

we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

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No. 09-6498 United States v. Walker Page 2

I.

Walker’s history of chronic drug abuse and mental illness has resulted in

numerous criminal charges. His current conviction stems from an escape from

supervised release, an action he partially attributes to issues with his medication. The

district court summarized the uncontroverted facts surrounding the offense:

On or about September 15,[] 2005, Darrell Walker was sentenced

by United States District Judge R. Allen Edgar to a term of 36 months for

two felonious counts of credit card fraud . . . . On or about January 23,

2009, Walker was assigned to the Salvation Army Halfway House in

Chattanooga, Tennessee. While at the Salvation Army Halfway House

in Chattanooga, Tennessee, Walker was lawfully confined at the

direction of the Attorney General and thereby remained in the custody of

the Attorney General by virtue of the above described felony convictions. 

On or about January 29, 2009,Walker signed himself out of the Salvation

Army Halfway House in Chattanooga, Tennessee and knowingly and

willfully failed to return by 5:00 p[.]m. Walker’s failure to return by

5:00 p.m. was a willful failure to remain within the extended limits of his

confinement and constituted an escape. Walker wil[l]fully remained

outside the extended limits of his confinement until he was apprehended

on February 19, 2009.

Once in custody, Walker pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement.

Walker’s presentence investigation report started with a base offense level of

thirteen, but applied two reductions—four levels for escape from non-secure custody and

two levels for acceptance of responsibility—to arrive at a total offense level of seven. 

His twenty-three criminal history points yielded a criminal history score of VI. 

Together, these figures gave rise to an advisory guidelines range of fifteen to twenty-one

months’ imprisonment.

Prior to sentencing, Walker moved for an additional downward departure or

variance, citing his diminished mental capacity and cooperation with law enforcement. 

The court, however, noted that it was considering an above-guidelines sentence in light

of Walker’s record (which included twenty-nine prior convictions—all but two for drugrelated offenses), the nature of the offense, and Walker’s need for drug treatment

spanning longer than the guidelines’ recommended sentence. During its colloquy, the
No. 09-6498 United States v. Walker Page 3

court reasoned that a longer incarceration would best serve both Walker and society by

ensuring that he received “the benefit of all that the government can offer” in terms of

treatment. Following this explanation, the court announced a thirty-six-month sentence. 

Walker now appeals.

II.

We review a district court’s sentencing decision under a two-part test, ensuring

first “that the district court committed no significant procedural error,” and second that

the sentence imposed was substantively reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

51 (2007); see also United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 385 (6th Cir. 2005) (providing

examples of substantive unreasonableness such as “selecting the sentence arbitrarily,

basing the sentence on impermissible factors, failing to consider pertinent § 3553(a)

factors, or giving an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor” (footnote

omitted)). Neither party raises procedural challenges, and our own parsing of the

sentencing-hearing transcript reveals no evidence of such error. We therefore move

directly to substantive reasonableness, which we review “under a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 41.

Walker attacks his sentence on two grounds: first, the sentence “is greater than

necessary to fulfill the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” and second, the court

improperly rooted its upward variance in concerns for Walker’s psychiatric and

rehabilitative needs.

We reject Walker’s first argument, which conflates the district court’s sentencing

mandate with the appellate court’s scope of review. While § 3553(a) requires that the

district court “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply

with its purposes, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “[r]easonableness[—not parsimony—]is the

standard appellate courts use to evaluate the district court’s accomplishment of its

sentencing task,” United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007). “The fact

that the district court did not give the defendant the exact sentence he sought is not a

cognizable basis to appeal, particularly where the district court followed the mandate of

§ 3553(a) in all relevant respects.” United States v. Dexta, 470 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir.
No. 09-6498 United States v. Walker Page 4

2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. TrejoMartinez, 481 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The mere fact that [a defendant] desired

a more lenient sentence, without more, is insufficient to justify our disturbing the

reasoned judgment of the district court.”). Walker’s primary contention thus provides

no independent grounds upon which to dispute the reasonableness of his sentence on

appeal.

We move to Walker’s second challenge—that, in deciding to sentence above the

guidelines, the court improperly relied upon Walker’s need for rehabilitation and

psychiatric treatment. Although § 3553(a)(2)(D) requires that sentencing courts consider

a defendant’s need for “educational or vocational training, medical care, or other

correctional treatment,” § 3582(a) cautions “that imprisonment is not an appropriate

means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” The Supreme Court recently

resolved any potential conflict between these provisions, holding that “a court may not

impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment

program or otherwise promote rehabilitation.” Tapia v. United States, No. 10-5400,

2011 WL 2369395, at *9 (June 16, 2011) (emphasis added). And, upon reviewing

Walker’s sentencing transcript, we find that the court did precisely what Tapia forbids. 

In light of this intervening precedent, we conclude that the district court “bas[ed] the

sentence on impermissible factors,” see Webb, 403 F.3d at 385, thus rendering its

decision substantively unreasonable. 

III.

We accordingly vacate Walker’s sentence and remand his case for resentencing

consistent with this opinion.