### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 10, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. WILLIAM D. PE ND ERG RA SS

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Hickman County No. 02-5096CR -II Russ Heldman, Judge

No. M2003- 01769-CCA -R3-C D - F iled March 3, 2004

The de fenda

nt was co n v i ct ed o f t hird offe nse driving under the influence (DUI ) and dr iving on a revoke d license. He co ntends on appe al that (1) the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial co u rt er red in deny ing his motion to suppress bec ause the deputy did not h a v e r e a s o n a

b le s u s p ic io nto in it iate th e s to p , and ( 3 ) th e d e p u ty ’ s me n ti o no f th e h o r iz o n ta l g a ze ny stag mus (HGN) test during his testimony entitled the def

endant to a mistrial. Concluding that no

re ve rs ibl e e rr or

oc c ur re d, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ourt

.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J OE G. R I L EY and R O BERT W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Ke nn e th K . Cr ite s, Ce nte rv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, Willi a m D . Pe nd e rg ra ss.

Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Kathy D. As lin g e r, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ronald L . Davis, District Attorney Gene ral; and Micha el J . Fa hey , I I , Assist an t District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F oll ow inga

jur y tr ia l, t he de fe nd ant, Willi a m D . Pe nd e rg ra ss, wa s convic te d o f t hir d o ff e ns e dr ivi ng un de r the inf

lue nc e (D UI ), a

Cla ss Amis de me ano r, and dr ivi ngon

a re vo ke d li c e ns e , a

Cla ss B mis de me ano r. He wa s se nte nc e d to e le ve n mo nth s, tw e nty -n ine da y s f or his DU I c on vic tio n, to be suspende d afte r ser

vice of 120 day s, and he was fined $1100. He wa s sentence d to six months for his driving on a re voked license conviction, to be suspende d afte r ser vice of 130 day s, and he w as fined $500. T h e d e f

e n d an t ti me ly f

il e d h is n o ti c e o f a

p p e a l. H e c o n te n d s o n a p p e a l th a t ( 1) the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support the convic tions, (2) the trial cour t erre d in denying his motion to suppress bec ause the deputy did not have re asonable suspicion to ini t i at e t he stop, and (3) the deputy ’s mention of the horizontal g aze ny stag mus (HGN) test duri n g h i s t es t imony entitled the de fe nd ant t o a

mis tr ia l. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ourt

.-2- F acts

During the late a fternoon hour s of Aug ust 18, 2001, Depu t y C ar l M ark Hooper of the Hickman County

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment, rec eived a

dispatch that a r ed Chevrole t had bee n involved in a h i t an d run accident in the a rea wher e the de puty

was patrolling. The deputy pulled into the parkinglot of a chur ch and be g an to observ e t raf fic, looking for the suspe ct vehicle . As he wa s stationed in the parkinglot, a vehicle, mat ch i n g t h e d escription given by dispatch, passe d by

the deputy ’s location. He pulled in behind t he vehicle and called in the license plate number to confirm whether it was the same ve hicle that wa s repor ted ea rlier. Dispatch conf

irmed the i d en t i t y of the vehicle a nd also noted that the license tag actua lly belong ed to another

vehicle. T he deputy

followed the ve hic le fo r a

pp ro xima te ly

on e or tw o mi le s. Th e de pu ty

ob se rv e d th e ve hic le c ro ss t he do ub le
y ellow line and then w eave all the way back a cross the w h i t e l i n e on sever al occ asions. After observingthe er

ratic dr iving, the de puty

initiated a stop of the vehic le.

T h e d e p u ty a

p p r o a c h e d th e v e h ic le an d a s k e d th e dr iv e r , w h o w a s late r id e n tif ied as the de fe nd ant, fo r h is lic e ns e . The de fe nd ant s ta te d th a t he did no t ha ve a dr ive r’ s li c e ns e . T he de pu ty observe d an open c ontainer of alcohol in the floorboa

rd of the ve hicle. He als o n o t i ce d t hat the defe ndant had bloodshot ey es and smelled of alcohol. The deputy asked the defe ndant if he ha d been drinking , and the de fenda nt stated that he ha d consum ed fo ur or f ive bee rs. A che ck of the defe ndant’s driving status reve aled that his license was re voked. After reque sting that the def endant step out of the vehicle, the deputy administered sever al field sobriety tests, inc luding the he el-to-toe
te st a nd the on e le g sta

nd . A c c or din g to t

he de pu ty , th e de fe nd ant w a s una ble to s uc c e ssf

ull y complete a

ny of the tests. I t was the de puty ’s opi nion that the defe ndant was dr iving unde r the influence of alc ohol. The deputy arr ested the de fenda

nt and aske d the def

endant if he wished to take a blood alco h o l test. The def endant r efuse d to submit to a blood alcohol test and w as transpor ted to j a il. Th e de pu ty

ne ve r d e te rm ine d w he the r t he de fe nd ant’ s v e hic le wa s in vo lve d in an a c c ide nt.

Mark Smit h testified on behalf of the de fenda

nt. The def

endant wa s pulled over in fr ont of the witness’s house. The witness observe d the def endant afte r he ha d been pla ced unde r ar rest. The deputy allowed the de fenda

nt to leave his ele ctrica l tools with the wit ness. According to Smi th, the defe ndant did not appea

r to be unde r the influenc e. The witness testified that he ha d known the defe ndant since he was a

child.

The de fenda

nt testified at t ri al t h at, on the day he wa s arr ested, he had consume d approximately

four be ers dur ing a

four or five-hour

period. He also admitted to h aving an open

c on ta ine r o f b e e r i n h is v e hic le . T he de fe nd ant d id n ot r e c a ll p e rf or min g any fi e ld s ob ri e ty

te sts

. He de nied cr ossing ove r any lines prior to being stopped by the deputy

and denie d that he wa s intox icated.-3- Ana lys is

I . Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e

I n the def endant’ s Statement of I ssues, he lists sufficienc y of the e vidence as one of

the issues

on a pp e a l. H ow e ve r, the re is no furt he r me nti on of su ff

ic ie nc y in his br ie f. He ha s w a ive d a pp e llate revie w of the sufficie ncy issue by failing to pr ovide any argument, citation to the rec ord, or c itation to leg al authority . See Te nn. Ct. Crim . App. R. 10(b). I n any event, afte r revie wing the re cord, w e conclude that there is sufficient evide nce to support the de fenda nt’s convictions. When a def endant challeng es the suff

iciency of the e vidence , the standa rd o f re view is whethe r, af ter view ing the evidenc e in the lig ht mos t fa v o ra b l e t o the State, any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential ele ments of the cr ime bey ond a re asonable dou b t

. T en n

. R . App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. E vans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-91 (Tenn. 1992). O n appea l, the State is entitled t o t h e s t ro ng est leg itimate view of the e vidence and all re asonable or leg itimate infere nces w hich may be dra wn there from. State v. Elkins, 102 S.W .3d 578, 581 (Tenn. 20 03 ). T h i s C o u rt w i l l n o t r e

- w e i g h t h e e v i d e n c e , r e e v a l u a t e t h e e v i d e n c e , o r s u b s t i tu t e its

e vid e nti ary

inf e re nc e s f or tho se re a c he d by the jur

y . St a te v. Care y , 9 14 S.W. 2d 93 , 9 5 ( Te nn . Cr im. A p p

. 1 9 9 5 )

. F u rth e r

m o r e , i na c r i m i n a l t r i a l
, g r e a t w e i g h t i s g i v e nt o t h e r e s u l tr e a c h e d b y t h e j u r y. State v. J ohnson, 910 S.W .2d 897, 899 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.

On c e a pp ro ve d b y

the tr ia l c ourt , a

jur y ve rd ic t a c c re dit s th e wi tne sse s p re se nte d b y the Sta te and re solves all conflicts in favor of the State. State v. Wil liams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983)

. The c redibility

of witnesses, the w eig ht to be g iven their testimony , and the r econc iliatio n of conflicts in the proof

are matters entr

usted exclusively

to the jury

as trier of fac t. State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W .2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984) ; State v. Bre wer , 932 S.W .2d 1, 19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). A jury ’s g uilty verdic t remove s the presumption of i nnocenc e enjoy ed by the defendant at trial and raises a presumption of g uilt. S tate v. Tug g le, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . The de fenda nt then bears t he burden of overcoming this presumption of guilt on appea l. State v. Blac k, 815 S.W .2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991)

.

De pu ty Ho op e r o bs e rv e d th e de fe nd ant dr ivi ng e rr a tic a lly and ini tiate d a

sto p. As the de pu ty approa ched the vehicle, he noticed an open conta iner of a lcohol in the floorboar d of the ve hicle. The defe ndant admitted to consuming four or five be ers. The deputy

testified that there was a

smell of alcohol comingfrom the de fenda nt and t hat t he defenda

nt had bloods hot ey es. I n Deputy Hooper ’s
op ini on , th e de fe nd ant f

a ile d th e he e l- to- toe te st a nd the on e le g sta

nd . T he jur

y ob vio us ly

c ho se to

cre dit the testimony

of the de puty

over that of the def

endant a nd Smit h. As to the driving on a revoke d license c onviction, the defe ndant admitted on the day of t his incident that his license wa s revoke d. After revie wing the record, we conclude that there was suff icient evidenc e to support the convictions for dr iving unde r the influenc e and dr iving on a revoke d license.-4-

I I . Reasonable Suspicion

Th e de fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by de nying his mot ion to s up pr e ss b e c a

us e the stop of the def

endant’ s vehicle was not based on rea sonable suspi cion. The findings of fac t made by the trial cour

t at the hea

ring on a m o t i o n to suppress ar e binding upon this Court unl ess the evidenc e conta ined in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst them. State v. Ross, 49 S

. W

. 3 d 8 3 3
, 839 (Tenn. 2001)

. The preva iling party is e ntitled to the stronge st leg itimate view of the e vidence and all rea sonable a

nd leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn from that evidenc e. S tate v. Hicks, 55 S.W .3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001) . Howeve r, the application of the lawto the fac ts found by the trial

c ourt are qu e sti on s o f l aw that th is C ourt re vie ws d

e novo

. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 423 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 )

. A b s e n t a s h o w in g b y th e d e f e n d an t th a t th e e v id e n c e p r e p o n d e r a te s a g ainst the judgme nt of the trial cour t, this C ourt must defer to the ruli ng of the trial c ourt. State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W .2d 773, 795 (Tenn.1998)

.

The F ourth Amendment to the United States Constit ution g rants the rig ht to be secur e fr om

unrea sonable sea

rche s and seizures and prohibits the issuance of wa rra nts without probable ca

use. Ar tic le I , § 7 o f t

he Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion is i de nti c a l in

purp os e and

int e nt w iththe F ourt

h Amendment. State v. Trox el l
, 78 S.W .3d 866, 870 (Tenn. 2002) . Under both constituti ons, a

war rantless sea

rch or seizure is pr esumed to be unrea sonable, and the r esulting e vidence is subject
to s up pr e ssi on

un le ss t he State de mon str a te s t hat th e se arc h o r s e izur e wa s c on du c te d p ur su a nt t o one of the narr owly define d exceptions to the war rant re quirement. State v. B inette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000)

.

Th e se con sti tut ion a l pr ote c tio ns a g a ins t unre a so na ble se arc he s and

se izur e s a lso a

pp ly to

ve hic le s. Tr oxe ll, 78 S.W. 3d a t 87 0- 71

. I n or de r to sto p a ve hic le
, a law e nf or c e me nt d e pu ty

mus t have pr obable c ause or rea sonable suspicion suppor ted by specific and ar

ticulable fa cts to believe an off ense ha s been or

is about to be co m m i t t ed

. S tate v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tenn. 2002). In deter

mining whe ther reasona

ble s uspicion exis ted for the s top, a cour t must consider the totality of the c ircumstance s. Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 219.

Whe n a tr a ff ic sto p is an inv e sti g a tor

y sto p, the sc op e of

the de pu ty ’s a c tio ns mus t r e a so na bly relate to the circ umstances which prompted the stop; the detention must last no longer than nec essar

y to e ff e c tuate the purp os e of

the sto p. Tr oxe ll, 78 S.W. 3d a t 871. Th e of fi c e r mus t e mpl oy

the le a st intrusive means re asonably available to investigate his or her suspicions in a short period of time. Florida v. Roy er, 460 U .S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L . Ed. 2d 229 (1983). The proper inquiry is w hether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to c onfirm or dispel their suspicions quickly . State v. Simps on, 968 S.W .2d 776, 783 (Tenn. 1998)

.

The de fenda

nt mai n t ai n s t h at his vehicle w as stopped base d solely on the content of

an anony mous phone call repor

ting a hit and run a ccide nt. Howeve r, De puty Hooper ’s testimony

at the suppression hearing contra dicts this asser tion by the defendant. Hooper testified at the suppression hear ing that he followed the defe ndant’s vehicle for approximately one or two miles befor e initiating the stop. The deputy

testified that the stop of the de fenda nt’s vehicle w as b as ed on the deputy ’s-5-

observations of the defe ndant’s veh i cl e cr ossing the double y ellow line, then we aving all the way back a cross the r oad, and c rossing the whi t e line on sever al occ asions. The trial c ourt found the deputy ’s testimony

to be cr edible and f

ound t h at t h er e was re asonable suspicion for the stop. Nothing in the r ecor d preponde rate s ag ainst the finding s of the trial c ourt or the court’s denial of the
mot ion to s up pr e ss. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

I I I . H or izon ta l G a ze N y sta g mus Te st

The d ef endant nex t contends that the de puty ’s mention of the horizontal g aze ny stag mus (HGN ) test during his testimony entitled the def

endant t o a m i s t ri al. Duringthe State’s dire ct examination of Deputy

Hooper , the following colloquy occur red. Q. What did y ou have him do fie ld sobriety -wise? A

. Ih a d

h im d o thr e e ta s k s , th e f

ir s t o n e w a s a

- - it’ s a

h o r iz o n ta l g a ze ny sta g mus te st. Q. Well, why

don’t we - - let me ask y ou this: Did y ou have him do any phy sical
te sts ? A. Ye s. The HG N test was not mentioned in the pr esenc e of the jury at any other time, and the deputy never testified as to the re sults of the test. L ater , during the deputy ’s testimony , the def endant objec ted, and the jury was ex cused. The defenda nt asked the court for

a mistrial based on the witness’s ea rlier mention of the HGN test. The cour t denied the de fenda

nt’s reque st for a mistrial.

The de termination of whe ther to g rant a mistrial r ests within the sound discretion of the tr ial court. State v. Smith, 871 S .W.2d 667, 672 (Tenn. 1994). The revie wing court should not overturn that decision abse nt an abuse of di scre tion. State v. Hall, 947 S.W .2d 181, 184 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). The bur den of establishing the nece ssity for mis trial lies with the party seekingit. St ate v. Wil liams, 929 S.W .2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). I n making this determination, no abstrac t fo rm ula sh ou ld be me c ha

nic a lly a pp lie d, and a ll c ir c ums tanc e s sh ou ld be take n in to a c c ount. State v. Mounce, 859 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tenn. 1993).

I mmediately

following the deputy ’s re fer ence to the HGN test, the State move d on to the other tests per formed by

the deputy

. There was no sug g estion of t he re sults of the HGN test and no further mention of the test in front o f t h e j u ry

. T he deputy testified that his opinion of the de fe nd ant’ s in toxic a tio n w a s b a se d o n th e de fe nd ant’ s bloo ds ho t ey e s, the od or of a lc oh ol, and

his failure to properly

perf orm the one le g stand and the he el -t o -t o e t est. I n view of the se matters, a s well as the ove rwhe lming evide nce of g uilt, we conclude that the refe re n ce t o the HGN te st was ha rm le ss a nd the de fe nd ant w a s n ot u

nd uly pr e jud ic e d by the de pu ty ’s br ie f re mark . Thi s is su e is wi tho ut m e ri t.-6- Conclusion

Ba sed on the for eg oing r easoningand the r ecor d as a whole, the judg ments of the trial c ourt

are aff irmed.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI L L I AMS, J UDGE