NO. 93-404 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

STATE OF MONTANA, 

### -. Plaintiff and Appellant,

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Gallatin, The Honorable ThomasA. Olson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Chris Tweeten (argued), Chief Deputy Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mike Salvagni, Gallatin County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Richard Ranney (argued) and Shelton Williams, Williams & Ranney, Missoula, Montana Noel K. Larrivee, Larrivee Law Offices, Missoula, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Lon J. Dale, Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, Missoula, Montana (Montana Shooting Sports Association, Inc., Western Montana Fish and Game Association, Inc., and Michigan United Conservation Clubs)

Filed: Submitted: April 19, 1994 Decided: June 9, 1994Justice 

### Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant John Lilburn was charged in the Gallatin County Justice

### Courtwith the offenseof

### hunterharassment 

### inviolation of 5 87-3-142(3), MCA. He 

### was convicted 

### of that charge following 

### a jury trial and appealed his conviction to the District Court for the Eighteenth Judicial District in Gallatin County. The District Court held that 5 87-3-142, MCA, in its entirety, 

### is facially unconstitutional in that it is both overbroad and vague, impermissibly infringing on 

### the First Amendment right to free speechand the FourteenthAmendment right to dueprocess guaranteed by the United States Constitution, We reverse the District Court. The State raises 

### the following 

### issues on appeal: 1. IsMontana's Hunter Harassment Law, found at 5 87-3-142, MCA, void because it is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution? 2. Is 1 87-3-142, MCA, void because of vagueness 

### in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution? In March 1990, the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks (DFWP) allowed three persons whose names had been drawn from a permit pool to hunt bison which had migrated from Yellowstone National 

### Park. One of 

### the persons who received a permit was Hal Slemmer

# . On the morning of the hunt, when the DFWP personnel located the bison, 

### a group of 11 persons on snowmobiles and cross-country skis 

### were seen attempting 

### to herd the bison back into the park.The demonstrators were warned that this was a legal hunt, and were told not to interfere with the hunters. The hunters were also warned about the presence of the demonstrators and were cautioned to conduct the hunt safely. Warden David Etzwiler of the DFWP accompanied Slemmer to a clearing where the bison were crossing. When one of the animals

was in sight, Slemmer sighted his rifle and prepared to pull the trigger. At that time,John Lilburn, one of theprotesters,moved in front of Slemmer, placing himself between Slemmer and the targeted bison at a distance of 10 to 12 feet from the muzzle of Slemmerlsrifle. Slemmer lifted his rifle when he saw Lilburnls head and shoulders come into the scope of the gun. Warden Etzwiler approached Lilburn and told him that thiswas a lawful hunt and not to interfere. Slemmer moved about six feet to his left and selected another bison from the group. He raised his rifle and took aim through the scope. Lilburn again moved in front of Slemmer. Slemmer testified that when he saw Lilburn's face inhis scope, he "jerked the gun up quickly because Ihad been squeezing

on the trigger.

## '' Warden Etzwiler and Slemmergot on their snowmobilesand moved to a different area where Slemmer shot and killed a bison before Lilburn and the other protesters caught up with them. No arrests were made at that time. However, after DFWP officials conferred with the Gallatin CountyAttorney, Lilburnwas charged with the offenseof harassment,amisdemeanor, inviolation of 5 87-3-142(3), MCA. The complaint filed against Lilburn in the Gallatin County Justice Court alleged that he disturbed a hunterwith the intent to dissuade or prevent the taking of a bison when he placed himself between the bison and the hunter who was aiming

a loaded rifle at the animal. None of the other protesters were charged with a violation of this same statute. Lilburn filed a declaratory judgment action in Federal District Court challenging the constitutionality of 

### 5 87-3-142(3), MCA, on a FirstAmendment basis. The U.S. District Court dismissed Lilburn's complaint, holding that there were no special circumstanceswarranting federal intervention in an ongoing state criminal action, and therefore, Lilburn's case did not merit an exception to the abstention doctrine enunciated in Youngerv.

### Harris (1971), 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669. AS a basis for its conclusion, the Federal Court concluded that the goal of the statute "is clearly reasonablen because "hunting is a legitimate activity which the state may protect in any reasonable and constitutionally permissible manner" and that this statute primarily Itproscribes behavior which interfereswith an individual actually engaged in the lawful taking of a wild animal." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the U.S. District Court's dismissal of Lilburn's constitutional challenge. Lilbumv.Racicot (9thCir. July 13, 1992),No. 91-35310. Lilburn was convicted following a jury trial in Gallatin County Justice Court. He appealed his conviction to the District Court and alleged that the harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. By order dated June 24, 1993, the District Court reversed the convictionand dismissed the complaint 4brought against Lilburnbased on its determination that 5 87-3-142, MCA, is unconstitutional on its face, and therefore, is invalid. The State appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW A legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional and will be upheld on review except when proven to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. CilyofBillingsv.Laedeke (1991)

## , 247 Mont. 151, 154, 805 P.2d 1348, 1349 (citingFallonCounty

### v.State (1988), 231 Mont. 443, 445-46, 753 P.2d 338, 339-40). ISSUE 1 IsMontana's Hunter Harassment Law, found at 5 87-3-142,MCA, void because it is overbroad inviolation of the FirstAmendment to the United States Constitution? The statute at issue in this appeal, commonly known as Montana's Hunter Harassment Law, provides as follows: 87-3-142. Harassmentprohibite&. (1)No personmay intentionally interfere with the lawful taking of a wild animal by another. (2) Nopersonmay,with intent toprevent orhinder its lawful taking,disturb a wild animal or engage in an activity or place in itsway any object or substance that will tend to disturb or otherwise affect the behavior of a wild animal. (3) No personmay disturb an individual engaged in the lawful taking of a wild animal with intent to dissuade the individual or otherwise prevent the taking of the animal. (4) Nothing in this section prohibits 

### a landowner or lessee from taking reasonable measures to prevent imminent danger to domestic livestock and equipment. Lilburn was convicted of violating subsection (3) of this statute because he twice disturbed Slemmer's attempt to lawfully shoot a bison when he placed his body between Slemmer and the animal. The District Court, in its analysis of subsection (3) foroverbreadth, concluded that 

### 5 87-3-142(3)

## , MCA is "obviously content-based" because it "prohibits communication which is intended to dissuade a person from hunting, while allowing communication which encourages hunting." The court further concluded that the statute's prohibition would encompass "all verbal and expressive conduct which has the intention to dissuade from hunting," and therefore, such things as "prayer vigils at trailheads, the singing of protest songs or the burning of hunting maps, if done with the intent to dissuade a hunter, would be violations of the statute." Therefore, the court held that to the extent the statute "implicates constitutionally protected speech and expressive conduct, it is overbroad." On appeal, the State contends that the court erred when it invalidated 5 87-3-142(3)

## ,MCA, on thebasis of overbreadthbecause the statuteprimarily proscribes conduct rather than speech,and to the extent that protected expression is reached, it regulates on a content-neutral basis only the time, place, and manner of expression. The State asserts that the statute is not overbroad because anypotential unconstitutionalapplicationsare speculative and insubstantialwhen judged against theplainly legitimate scope of this statute which is to promote safety in sport hunting and protect those engaged in lawful activities from interference. We agree. We note first that Lilburnhas raised a facial constitutional challenge and does not aver that the statute, as applied to him, unconstitutionally abridges his First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. Lilburn was not charged on the basis of anyidea or view that he expressed, and he does not contend that his

own conduct,which formed the basis of the charges brought against him,was constitutionallyprotected. Instead, he contends that the statute, as written, could potentially reach a substantial amount of protected speech or expressive conduct. A facial overbreadth challenge is an exception to the general rule that statutes are evaluated in light of the situation and facts before the court. RA.Kv.St.PauI (1992), 120 'L.Ed. 2d 305, 336, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2558 (J. White, concurring) (citingBroadrick



### v. Oklahoma (1973), 413 U.S, 601, 610, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830, 838-39). This Court has similarly recognized that

a statutewhich canbe appliedtoconstitutionally protected speech and expressionmay be found to be invalid in its entirety, even if it could validly apply to the situation before the court. 

### Cityof Wzitefihv.OgShaughnessy (1985), 216 Mont. 433, 704 P.2d 1021. In his overbreadth challenge, Lilburn disputes the State's assertionthat the statuteprimarily regulates conductbut contends that it criminalizes a broad category of speech and expressive conduct based on its content. He claims that the law reaches primarily conduct which conveys an anti-hunting sentiment, while allowing,under exactly the same circumstances, conduct and speech which conveys any other message. Lilburn cites

### RAY

### v. St.Paul, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 316, 112 S. Ct. at 2542, for the proposition that the statute is "facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwisepermitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses."

### Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 601, is the leading case addressing the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. In 

### Broadrick, the Supreme Court clarified that a statute or government regulation should be invalidated on the basis of facial overbreadth in only limited situations: In such cases, it has been the judgment of this Court that the possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility thatprotected speechof othersmay bemuted and perceived grievances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.



# . . .

. . . Application of the overbreadth doctrine in thismanner is, manifestly, strongmedicine. Ithas been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort. Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting constructionhas been or could be placed on the challenged statute. [Citations omitted]. 

### Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612-13. The Court in 

### Broadrick adopted limitationson the overbreadth doctrine "particularlywhere conduct and not merely speech is invol~ed,~~ and held that a statute which has constitutional applications may be facially invalidated for overbreadth only if its overbreadth is "real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 

### Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. The Court made clear that the existence of imaginarypotential unlawful applications does not by itself render a statute facially overbroad. 

### Broadrick, 413 U.S. at

In

### MembersoftheCityCouncilv.

### Taxpayers forfincent (1984)

## , 466U.S. 789, 800-01, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 2126, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772, 783-84, theSupreme Court further explained the parameters of the overbreadth doctrine: It is clear 

# . . . that the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applicationsof a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. On the contrary, the requirement of substantial overbreadth stems from the underlying justification for the overbreadth exception itself--the interest inpreventing an invalid statute from inhibiting the speechof thirdpartieswho are not before the Court.



# . . . In short,theremust be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds. After reviewing the statute in question and the arguments set forth by Lilburn, we conclude that this is precisely the type of situationwhere the limitations imposedby the Supreme Court on the overbreadth doctrine must be carefully applied. Before the hunter harassment statute canbe invalidated on its face, theremust be a clear showing that the potential invalid applications of the statute be both "real and substantial." For the reasons stated below, we conclude that no such showinghas beenmade in this case. Under the tests articulated inBroadrick and TaxpayersforVincent, we must determine whether there is a real and substantialprobability that 5 87-3-142(3),MCA,will compromiserecognizedFirstAmendment protections when judged in relation to any "plainly legitimate sweep1'of the statute. The District Court based its holding regarding overbreadth on itsdetermination that the statute is llobviously content-based1# and could potentially proscribe all verbal and emressiveconductwhichhas the intention to dissuade from huntina. Conduct such as prayer vigils at trailheads, the singing of protest songs or theburning of hunting maps, if done with the intent to dissuade a hunter, would be violations of the statute.

[Emphasis added]. It was the court's opinion that the statute prohibits communication which is intended to dissuade a person fromhunting, while allowing a communication which encourages hunting, even if such communication prevents or distracts a hunter from taking the prey. While this analysis was not necessary to an overbreadth analysis under Broadrick, we also disagree with this interpretation of the statute. All statutes carry with them a presumption of constitutionality and it is a duty of the courts to construe statutesnarrowlytoavoid constitutional difficulties ifpossible. Montana Automobile Associationv.Greely (1981)

## , 193Mont. 378, 382, 632 P.2d 300, 303; Statev. Ytterdahl (1986), 222 Mont. 258, 261, 721 P.2d 757, 759. This Court made clear that, when construing a statute, it must be read as a whole, and terms used in the statute should not be isolated from the context in which they are used by the Legislature. McClanathanv.Smith (1980), 186 Mont. 56, 61, 606 P.2d 507, 510. Furthermore, a statute must be construed according to the plain meaning of the language used therein. NorfolkHoldings,Inc.

v.DepamentofRevenue (1991), 249 Mont. 40, 43, 813 P.2d 460, 461. Section 87-3-142(3), MCA, prohibits a person from disturbing another individual engaged in the lawful taking of a wild animal with intent to dissuade the individual or otherwise prevent the taking of the animal. The term "wild animal" is defined to mean "any game animal, fur-bearing animal, or predatory animal," and a''takingft is defined to include "pursuit, hunting, trapping, shooting, or killing of a wild animal on land upon which the affected person has the rigfitor privilege to pursue, hunt, trap, shoot, or kill the wild animal." Section 87-3-141,MCA. The plain language of the statute, considered in light of these limiting definitions, makes clear that the statute's proscriptions reachonly activities which occur inthe field during

an otherwise lawful hunt. While the disturbance which is prohibited may, under other circumstances, result from a verbal utterance, it makes no difference what the content of the verbal utterance is. The language of the statute does not support the assertion that the statute is aimed primarily at pure speech and expressive conduct conveying only an anti-hunting sentiment. The disturbance could just as well be caused by shouting "fire!" Lilburn disagrees that the statute regulatesprimarily conduct and claims that the Legislature's inclusion of the word "dissuade" demonstrates that the intent of the statute is toproscribe only a very small class of expressionwhich isuttered or carried outwith the intent to dissuade a hunter from taking an animal. He contends it is the Legislature's use of the term "dissuade" that renders this a content-based regulation. The Supreme Court has provided clear guidelines for distinguishing a content-neutral regulation from one which is impermissibly content-based: The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality 

# . .

# . iswhether the governmenthas adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that servespurposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakersor messagesbut not others. [citationomitted]. Wardv.RockAgainstRacism (1989), 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S. ct. 2746, 2754, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 675. The determination of whether a regulation is content-based turns not on whether its incidental effects fall more heavily on expression of a certain viewpoint,but rather on whether the governmental purpose to be served by the regulation is not motivated by a desire to suppress the content of the communication. 

### CityofRentonv.PlaytimeTheatres,Znc. (1986)

## , 475 

### U.S. 41, 106 S. Ct. 925, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29. Therefore,even if a statute has a discriminatory impact, it can be determined to be content-neutral if its objective neither advances nor inhibits a particular viewpoint. Neither of the parties dispute the fact that safety and an orderly regulation of hunting are legitimate state goals. This Court hasmade clear that "[i]n the area of wildlife regulation, it is sufficient to state the Legislature may impose such terms and conditions as it sees fit, as long as constitutional limitations

are not infringed. Statev.Jack (l975), 167Mont. 456, 460, 539 P.2d 726, 728. Here, the legislative history demonstrates a motivation for adoption of this statute which is unrelated to the suppression of speech based on content. The Legislature was aware that confrontations between hunters and opponents of sport hunting, particularly with respect to the controversial bison hunts, could

occur in the field when hunters were armed and actively pursuingtheir

### prey. It

### was recognized that this posed a- serious danger to both the hunters and those interfering with their activities. Contrary to the court s conclusion that the legislation was obviously content-based because it was prompted by past activities opposing the bison hunts, the legislative history supports a conclusion that the motivation was to prevent violent confrontations and toprevent interference with lawful activities. Moreover, we do not find any support in the legislativehistory for the contention that this was an attempt to silence the views of those opposed to the bison hunt or other types of sport hunting. It was recognized that persons opposed to sport hunting had the right to express theirviews,but that therewere other forums more suited to political discourse. While Lilburn asserts that the use of the word udissuadel* relates the statute entirely to speech and expressive conduct, we note that the Legislature did not use the word "dissuade" in isolation. Reading the statute as a whole, it is clear that the conduct proscribed is the "dist~rbance~~ of a hunter engaged in a lawful 

### activity,when it 

### is donawith the 

### intent to either dissuade 

### the hunter or to prevent the taking of the animal. The fact that speech or actions may disturb a hunter 

### is not dependent on the content of what is expressed, or whether it isprompted by an anti-hunting sentiment. 

### A person could blurt out anything at the moment 

### a hunter 

### is trying 

### to shoot, and this could l1disturbW the hunter by distracting him or her, or by scaring the animal away. The content of what was said would be irrelevant. Or, persons could attempt to

### prevent the taking of the animal for reasons otherthan opposition to hunting, such as a desire to shoot the animal themselves. Furthermore, in either of these instances, before the conductwould be culpable, the necessary scienterwould have to be proven. We recognize that the consequences of this statute may fall

more heavily on persons opposed 

### to hunting than on those with different viewpoints, but this does not by itself render the statute content-based. The existence of a content-neutral motivation for the statute is all that is required under 

### Ward and Renton to refute the characterizationthat the statute impermissibly regulates speech or conductbased on the message conveyed. We are satisfied that such a motivation exists in this instance. Therefore, we reject the District Court's conclusion that the statute is content-based. Even though we disagree with the District Court's rationale for aholding of overbreadth, we realize, as concededby the State, that there may be instances where protected expression or pure speechmay violate the statute. However, before invalidating the statute on the basis of overbreadth, we must consider the limitations set forth in Broadrick to determine if the possible unconstitutional applications are real and substantial when judged in relation to the plainly legitimate scope of the statute. Lilburn contends that there are a significant number of situations where the law could be applied in an unconstitutional

manner and urges the Court to "use our imagination to think of the various ways the statute might be applied against speech orexpressive conduct." However, the test is not whether hypothetical remote situations exist, but whether there is a significant possibility that the law will be unconstitutionally applied. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. Based on our conclusionthat the plain language of the statute is directed primarily at conduct and if at speech, then without regard to its content, we conclude, in the absence of evidence otherwise, that Lilburn has not shown that any overbreadth of the statute is "substantial 

# . . . judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.I' Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. Finally, we address the District Court's comparison of the Montana statute to a Connecticut hunter harassment statute which

washeld unconstitutional onthebasis of overbreadth. Dormanv.Satti

(D. Conn. 1988), 678 F. Supp. 375, affpd, 862 F.2d 432 (2nd Cir. l988), cert.denied (1989), 490 U.S. 1099, 109 S. Ct. 2450, 104

L. Ed. 2d 1005. The Federal District Court, when it rejected Lilburn's constitutional challenge, noted that Montana's hunter harassment statute is distinguishable from the Connecticut statute, and does not unconstitutionally interfere with free speech. InDorman, the statute reached conduct which interfered with both the actual taking of game and with "acts in preparationn for the taking of game. The courtheld that the statutecould legitimatelyproscribe interference with "lawful taking,"but not "acts in preparation": So long as the legislature elects to permit hunters to pursue their activity on property, during times, and under circumstances set aside for that purpose, it mayalso regulate the conduct of nonhunters in those contexts. Considerations of safety,alone,would justify such regulation, even if it impinges incidentally upon protected speech. On the other hand, the propriety of hunting and taking wildlife is a fair subject for spirited debate. Once a hunter is outside the scope of his g*lawfulhunt" he is no different from any other unreceptive listener who must, "in vindication of our liberties,Irbe Ifexposedto the onslaught of repugnant ideas." [Emphasis added]. Dorman, 678 I?. Supp. at 383. The statute at issue in this case, 5 87-3-142 (3), MCA, is clearly limited in scopeto activities which interferewithpersons actively engaged in the lawful taking of an animal and does not suffer from the same overbreadth as the statute inDorman. We hold that 5 87-3-142 (3), MCA, is not unconstitutionally overbroad. To the extent that the statute may reach constitutionally protected expression, we conclude, as did the Supreme Court in Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16, that whatever overbreadthmay exist shouldbe cured throughcase-by-case analysis of the fact situations where the statute is assertedly being applied unconstitutionally. ISSUE 2 Is 

### 5 87-3-142, MCA, void because of vagueness in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution? The District Court also invalidated the hunter harassment statute on the basis of vagueness. The court concluded that several key terms are left undefined, and that the statute impermissibly leaves to the discretion of law enforcement and the courts, without specific statutory guidance to law enforcementofficers or the public at large, what type of conduct is prohibited. In VZageofHoffmanEstatesv. Flipside,Hoffman Estates,Inc. (1982) 

### , 455 U.S. 489, 497, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371, the Supreme Court set forthguidelines for analyzing a facial challenge

on the basis of overbreadth and vagueness. When such a challenge is raised, 

### a court must first determine whether the enactment reachesa substantial amountof constitutionally protected conduct. Here we have concluded that the statute does not, and that the overbreadth challengemust fail. The Supreme Court has also made clear that if the challenged statute is reasonably clear in its applicationto the conduct of theperson bringing the challenge, it cannot be stricken on its face for vagueness. HoffmanEstates, 455 U.S. at 494-95. "One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness. Parker 

### v. Levy

(1974), 417 U.S. 733, 756." HoffmanEstates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7. In this instance, regardless of the hypothetical situations that may exist, Lilburnts conductwas unquestionably proscribed by the hunter harassment statute. Lilburn intentionally twice stood between Slemmer and the targeted bison, directly in the line of fire, in order to prevent the animal from being shot. It is difficult to conceive of an argument that Lilburndid not I1disturbtt Slemmer while Slemmer was engaged in the lawful taking of a wild animal with the intent to prevent or dissuade him from making the shot.We conclude that Lilburn does not have standing to raise a facial vagueness challenge. The court's order with respect to the issue of vagueness is reversed on this basis. We reverse the District Court's conclusion that the statute under which Lilburn was charged is impermissibly overbroad and vague, and vacate the court's dismissal of the charges brought against Lilburn. Furthermore, although Lilburn's constitutional challenge focused only on subsection (3) of the statute, the language of theDistrict Court's order invalidated 5 87-3-142,MCA, in its entirety. We find no basis in the record for the court's determination that the remaining sections of the statute are constitutionally deficient. We, therefore, reverse the order of the District Court with regard to all parts of 

### 5 87-3-142,MCA. This case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.June

### 9, 1994 CERTIFICATE

### OFSERVICE IherebycertifythatthefollowingcertifiedorderwassentbyUnited Statesmail,prepaid,tothe followingnamed:

Hon.JosephP.Mazurek,AttorneyGeneral ChrisTweeten,Deputy JusticeBldg. Helena,MT 59620 MikeSalvagni GallatinCountyAttorney 615S.16thAve.,Rm. 100 Bozeman,MT 59715 NoelK.Larrivee hive 

### LawOffices 334E.Broadway Missoula,MT 59802 RichardRanney WILLIAMS&RANNEY,P.C. P. 0. Box9440 Missoula,MT59807 

### LonJ.Dale,Esq. MILODRAGOVICH,DALE&DYE

### P.C. P.O.Box4947 Missoula,MT 598064947 EDSMITH 

### CLERKOFTHE

### SUPREMECOURT STATEOFMONTANA