NO. 03-15-00335-CV IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 

AUSTIN, TEXAS 

 

 

HERBERT ROLNICK, 

Appellant 

v. 

 

SIGHT’S MY LINE, INC. A FLORIDA CORPORATION; STEWART LANTZ; RIGGS, 

ALESHIRE & RAY; BLAZIER, CHRISTENSEN, BIGELOW & VIRR; AND ADAMS & 

GRAHAM, 

 Appellees

 

 

Interlocutory Appeal from the 200th Judicial District Court

in Travis County, Texas, The Honorable Tim Sulak, Presiding

 

 

APPELLANT’S BRIEF 

 

 RUTH G. MALINAS 

 Texas Bar No. 08399350

TIM T. GRIESENBECK, JR. 

 Texas Bar No. 08454450

 SCOTT M. NOEL 

 Texas Bar No. 00797158

 PLUNKETT & GRIESENBECK, INC. 

 Catholic Life Building, Suite 900 

1635 N.E. Loop 410 

 San Antonio, Texas 78209 

 (210) 734-7092 (telephone) 

 (210) 734-0379 (facsimile) 

rmalinas@pg-law.com

 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 

 HERBERT ROLNICK 

APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT 

ACCEPTED

03-15-00335-CV

6008822

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

7/9/2015 11:24:41 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/9/2015 11:24:41 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
i

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL 

APPELLANT

APPELLATE AND TRIAL COUNSEL 

FOR APPELLANT

 

Herbert Rolnick Ruth G. Malinas (Lead Appellate)

Texas Bar No. 08399350

Tim T. Griesenbeck, Jr. (Trial)

Texas Bar No. 08454450

Scott M. Noel (Trial)

Texas Bar No. 00797158

Plunkett & Griesenbeck, Inc.

Catholic Life Building, Suite 900

1635 N.E. Loop 410

San Antonio, Texas 78209

RMalinas@pg-law.com

TGriesenbeck@pg-law.com

SNoel@pg-law.com

 

APPELLEES/PLAINTIFFS

APPELLATE AND TRIAL COUNSEL 

FOR APPELLEES/PLAINTIFFS 

 

Sight’s My Line, Inc., a Florida 

Corporation

Stewart Lantz

Brandon Duane Gleason

Texas Bar No. 24038679

J. Hampton Skelton

Texas Bar No. 18457700

Skelton & Woody

248 Addie Roy Road, Suite B-302

Austin, TX 78746

hskelton@skeltonwoody.com 

bgleason@skeltonwoody.com 

Craig S. Hilliard (Pro Hace Vice in 

Trial Court)

Stark & Stark

P.O. Box 5315

Princeton, NJ 08543-2315

chilliard@stark-stark.com

 

 
ii

APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS 

APPELLATE AND TRIAL COUNSEL 

FOR APPELLEES/DEFENDANTS 

Riggs, Aleshire & Ray Scott R. Kidd

Texas Bar No. 11385500

Scott V. Kidd

Texas Bar No. 24065556

Kidd Law Firm

819 W. 11th Street

Austin, TX 78701

scott@kiddlawaustin.com

svk@kiddlawaustin.com

Blazier, Christensen, Bigelow & 

Virr

Michael B. Johnson

Texas Bar No. 24029639

Salvador Davila

Texas Bar No. 24065119

Thompson, Coe, Cousins & 

Irons, LLP

701 Brazos, Suite 1500

Austin, TX 78701

mjohnson@thompsoncoe.com

sdavila@thompsoncoe.com

Adams & Graham Robert E. Valdez

Texas Bar No. 20428100

Jose “JJ” Trevino, Jr.

Texas Bar No. 24051446

Valdez, Jackson & Trevino, PC

1826 North Loop 1604 West, 

Suite 275

San Antonio, TX 78248

revaldez@vjtlawfirm.com

jtrevino@vjtlawfirm.com
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL...............................................i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....................................................................iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................vi

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................vii

ISSUES PRESENTED.......................................................................... viii

STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................................................................1

I. UNDERLYING FACTS....................................................................1

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY...............................................................5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..........................................................5

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES .........................................................7

I. Standard of Review ..........................................................................7

II. Burdens of Proof...............................................................................9

III. The Trial Court Erred In Denying Rolnick’s Special 

Appearance.....................................................................................10

A. General Principles Governing Personal 

Jurisdiction over a Nonresident ...........................................10

B. Rolnick Lacks “Minimum Contacts” with Texas..................12

C. The Evidence Is Legally Insufficient to Support 

Specific Jurisdiction over Rolnick in This Case ...................15

D. Even If Rolnick had the Requisite Minimum 

Contacts, Exercising Personal Jurisdiction over 

Him Would Offend Traditional Notions of Fair 

Play and Substantial Justice ................................................26

IV. Conclusion and Prayer ...................................................................27

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE........................................................28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.................................................................29

APPENDIX 
iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 

Page 

CASES

Abilene Diagnostic Clinic, PLLC v. Paley, Rothman, Goldstein, 

Rosenburg, Eig & Cooper, Chartered, 364 S.W.3d 359 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland 2012 no pet.)..............................................................17

Ahrens & De Angeli, P.L.C. v. Flinn, 318 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) ..........................................................17

Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 

83 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. 2002) ..............................................................11,12

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 

480 U.S. 102 (1987)..............................................................................16

Bergenholtz v. Cannata, 

200 S.W.3d 287 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)...............................24

BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 

83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002) ...........................................................7, 8, 12

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,

471 U.S. 462 (1985)........................................................................11, 12

City of Keller v. Wilson,

168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) ..................................................................8

Croucher v. Croucher, 

660 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1983) .....................................................................9

CSR Ltd.,

925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1996) ...............................................................105

Curocom Energy, LLC v. Young-Sub Shim, 

416 S.W.3d 893 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st ...........................................22

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 

___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) ......................................................15

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 

___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) ....................................................15

Gordon & Doner, P.A. v. Joros, 

287 S.W.3d 325 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).................23, 25

Guardian Royal Exch. Assur., Ltd. v. English China Clays, 

P.L.C., 

815 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1991) ..................................................... 12, 13, 16

Hanson v. Denckla,

357 U.S. 235 (1958)..............................................................................11
v

Horowitz v. Berger, 

377 S.W.3d 115 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th dist.] 2012, no 

pet.).......................................................................................................22

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 

465 U.S. 770, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984).......................13

Kelly v. Gen’l Interior Constr., Inc., 

301 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2010) .............................................................9, 10

Markette v. X-Ray X-Press Corp., 

240 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th dist.] 2007, no 

pet.).......................................................................................................17

Proskauer Rose, LLP v. Pelican Trading, Inc., No. 14-08-00283-

CV, 2009 WL 242993, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th dist.] 

Feb. 3, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.)..........................................................17

Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 

278 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. 2009) .............................................................9, 21

Scott v. Huey L. Cheramie, Inc., 

833 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no 

writ)........................................................................................................9

Siskind v. Villa Found. For Educ., Inc.,

642 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1982) ...................................................................9

Walden v. Fiore, 

134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).................................................................. passim

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 

444 U.S. 286 (1980)..............................................................................12

STATUTES

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(7)..................................................8

RULES 

Tex. R. App. P. 28.1(c)...............................................................................8

Tex. R. App. P. 9.4...................................................................................28

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Tex. Const. art. I, §19..............................................................................11

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1.....................................................................11

OTHER AUTHORITIES 

Robert W. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” 

Points of Error, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 361, 362-363 (1960)................................8
vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Nature of the Case: This interlocutory appeal arises from 

legal malpractice claims appellees 

Sight’s My Line, Inc. and Stewart 

Lantz brought in Texas against three 

Texas law firms and appellant Herbert 

Rolnick, a Florida lawyer. Rolnick 

timely filed a special appearance to 

challenge the trial court’s exercise of 

personal jurisdiction over him. SML, 

Lantz and the Texas law-firm 

defendants opposed Rolnick’s special 

appearance.

 

Trial Court: 200th Judicial District Court, Travis 

County, Texas, the Honorable Tim 

Sulak presiding. 

 

Trial Court Disposition: The trial court denied appellant 

Rolnick’s special appearance.

 
vii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 

Oral argument would greatly assist the court in this case, because 

new opinions from the United States Supreme Court have not yet been 

applied by Texas Courts under facts similar to those present in the 

instant case. Moreover, oral argument will give the Court the opportunity 

to question the parties regarding the facts and applicable law. Because 

personal jurisdiction is a fact-intensive inquiry, appellant respectfully 

requests oral argument in this case. 

 

 

 

 
viii

ISSUE PRESENTED 

This case presents the following issue and all fairly included 

subsidiary issues:

Did the trial court err in denying Rolnick’s special 

appearance?
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS1 

I. UNDERLYING FACTS

Appellee Stewart Lantz resides in Coral Springs, Florida and is the 

sole shareholder of appellee Sight’s My Line, Inc. (“SML”), a Florida 

corporation. CR:137. SML owned and operated several retail eyeglass 

stores in Texas. CR:139. Lantz decided to sell the Texas assets of SML

midway through 2012. CR:382. He hired a broker with whom he 

previously had done business to assist him in selling the business. 

CR:382-83. The buyer the broker found was American Optical Services, 

L.L.C. (“AOS”), a Delaware limited liability company having its offices in 

Nevada. CR:383, 166. 

Lantz had an ongoing attorney-client relationship with Florida 

attorney Herbert Rolnick, who also lives in Coral Springs, Florida. 

CR:382, 502. Appellant Rolnick graduated from law school in 1980. He 

was admitted to the Florida Bar in January 1981 and has never been 

licensed to practice law in any other state. CR:503. Since then, Rolnick’s 

law practice has been located in Broward County, Florida. CR:503. In 

1998, Rolnick started representing Lantz individually and entities with 

which Lantz was associated in various matters. CR:382, 503. 

 

1 The appellate record consists of a clerk’s record (cited as “CR:[page #]”) and a onevolume reporter’s record (cited as “RR:[page#])”
2

Lantz asked Rolnick to represent SML and him with regard to the 

asset sale to AOS. CR:503. AOS provided the first draft of the asset 

purchase agreement. CR:387, 504. Rolnick reviewed the AOS draft, 

discussed it with Lantz, and negotiated terms with AOS. CR:505. When 

Rolnick communicated with AOS employees, those employees were in 

Nevada and Rolnick was in Florida. CR:515. AOS and SML ultimately 

agreed that Nevada law would govern the Asset Purchase Agreement,

but Texas law would control the enforceability of the promissory note and 

security agreement and thus any foreclosure actions. CR:460, 480, 488. 

Lantz wanted to be sure that he could foreclose on the Texas assets 

in the event AOS defaulted on the promissory note. CR:506. Because he 

was not familiar with Texas law, Rolnick advised Lantz to hire Texas 

counsel to ensure that the security agreement, promissory note, and a 

lease complied with Texas law and properly protected SML’s and Lantz’s

interests. CR:506. 

Lantz told Rolnick he wanted to use Jason Ray, a Texas attorney 

with the firm Riggs, Aleshire & Ray (“RAR”). CR:384. Ray, who is boardcertified in administrative law, was representing Lantz and SML in a 

Texas Medicaid investigation and audit. CR:548. Lantz and Rolnick 

contacted Ray and told him about the transaction between SML and 

AOS. CR:384. A few days later, Rolnick’s legal assistant sent Ray an 

email confirming that Ray’s representation of SML and Lantz would 
3

entail reviewing the promissory note and security agreement, ensuring 

that the documents complied with Texas law, and making sure Lantz’s 

and SML’s rights to the collateral were protected in the event of a default:

Mr. Rolnick would like you to review the Security 

Agreement and Promissory Note and confirm that 

these are acceptable for Texas law, i.e. that they 

can be recorded and that they would enable us to 

foreclose in the event of a default.

CR:320. Included with the email were copies of the security agreement, 

promissory note, and executed asset purchase agreement. CR:476, 333, 

444. 

Apparently, unbeknownst to the plaintiffs or Rolnick, Ray had no 

experience in transactions such as the one between SML and AOL. 

CR:548. Ray sent the documents to Paul Browder, a lawyer with the firm 

Blazier, Christensen, Bigelow & Virr (“BCBV”) and asked him to review 

them. CR:549-50. Browder sent the documents back to Ray with 

comments and questions. CR:550. Ray then sent Browder’s comments 

and questions to Rolnick as if they were his own.2 CR:550, 554. 

 

2 Although Ray claimed he told Lantz and/or Rolnick that his lack of transactional 

experience would require him to consult with another lawyer, Lantz and Rolnick both 

testified they did not know about the other lawyer, that it would be Browder, or that 

Browder had supplied the comments and questions Ray sent as his own. CR:517. Ray 

sent his bills only to Lantz. CR:551. Browder sent his bills to Ray who then added 

Browder’s work to his own bills. CR:553. Ray did not open a new matter for the work 

done on the SML-AOS transaction; rather, he placed entries for that work under the 

same client and matter number used for the Medicaid audit work he had done for 

SML. CR:556. 
4

The draft documents Rolnick sent to Ray stated the security 

interests would be perfected by filing a UCC-1 in Delaware where AOS 

was located. CR:333. The comments Ray sent back to Rolnick in Florida, 

however, included one indicating the UCC-1 instead should be filed in 

Texas where the assets at issue were located. CR:336. Rolnick 

accordingly changed the promissory note to state that the UCC-1 would 

be filed in Texas. CR:516. Rolnick also incorporated into the final 

documents the other comments/suggested changes on the drafts Ray sent 

back to him. CR:516. Rolnick sent the original UCC-1 to Ray for filing in 

Texas. CR:510. No UCC-1 reflecting the security interest in the SML 

assets was filed in Delaware, the jurisdiction in which AOS was located 

under the Texas Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). CR:383. 

AOS defaulted on the promissory note. CR:141. Ray referred Lantz 

to appellee Adams & Graham to represent Lantz and/or SML in enforcing 

the security agreement and promissory note. CR:387. AOS ultimately 

filed a bankruptcy petition in Delaware. CR:141. Lantz learned from 

SML’s bankruptcy lawyer that its security interest had not been 

perfected, because Texas law actually required that the UCC-1 be filed 

in the jurisdiction in which the debtor was located, i.e., Delaware, rather 

than where the assets were located. CR:142. Instead of having a perfected 

security interest in the assets, SML ended up with an unsecured claim in 

the AOS bankruptcy. CR:142. 
5

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

SML and Lantz filed suit against RAR, BCBV, and Adams & 

Graham, the three Texas law firms who had done work in Texas in 

connection with SML’s sale of assets to AOS and attempts to enforce the 

plaintiffs’ security interests against AOS. CR:3. On the same day it 

answered the suit, RAR filed a third-party petition against Rolnick. 

CR:17. Rolnick timely filed a special appearance and original answer 

subject thereto. CR:23, 134. Shortly thereafter, SML and Lantz amended 

their petition to name Rolnick as a defendant. CR:137. After the parties

conducted limited discovery solely on the jurisdictional issue, the trial 

court held a hearing on the special appearance for which there is a 

reporter’s record filed with this Court. The trial court took the special 

appearance under advisement and later denied it. CR:697. The order does 

not specify the basis for the ruling. CR:697. This interlocutory appeal 

followed. CR:698. 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 

The United States and Texas Supreme Courts have clearly 

articulated the Constitutional boundaries of personal jurisdiction in 

Texas. Plaintiffs and the Texas lawyer defendants have asserted legal 

malpractice/contribution claims against Rolnick, alleging that his 

provision of legal services to plaintiffs in Florida caused the harm about 

which plaintiffs complained. It is undisputed that Rolnick is a Florida 
6

resident whose practice of law is limited to Florida. It is also undisputed 

that Rolnick and appellee Lantz had an ongoing attorney-client 

relationship since 1998. The evidence before the trial court and this Court 

conclusively establishes that all of the legal services Rolnick provided to 

plaintiffs Lantz and SML (both domiciled in Florida) occurred in Florida. 

All of the legal services provided by Rolnick about which plaintiffs 

complain involve SML’s sale of its Texas assets to a Delaware corporation 

with offices in Nevada. Lantz hired a Texas lawyer with whom he had an 

on-going relationship to review a promissory note and security 

agreement to ensure they complied with Texas law, which SML and the 

buyer had agreed would govern that part of the transaction. Although 

Rolnick communicated and exchanged drafts with the Texas lawyer, he 

did so for the benefit of plaintiffs and as part of his representation of them 

in Florida. It is undisputed that Rolnick never went to Texas and did not 

perform any of the legal work for plaintiffs in Texas. 

Texas cases have held that the personal jurisdiction analysis in 

legal malpractice cases against nonresident lawyers or law firms must 

focus on where the legal services were provided. This is so even when the 

client is a Texas resident and the lawyer has communicated opinions to 

a Texas client. The court so holding have reasoned that the claims arise, 

not out of any contacts the nonresident lawyer purposefully directs to 

Texas, but, rather, from the lawyer’s exercise of judgment and provision 
7

of legal services outside Texas. A similar analysis is used when plaintiffs 

attempt to sue nonresident physicians for medical malpractice that 

involved treatment provided outside of Texas.

In recent Texas Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court 

cases, the jurisdictional analysis has been clarified. Both courts have 

rejected arguments based on conduct characterized as directing a tort to 

a Texas resident. Moreover, the United State Supreme Court has held 

that the specific jurisdiction question is not where the plaintiff suffered 

an injury or effect, but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to 

the forum State in a relevant and meaningful way. Stated another way, 

when the plaintiff is the only link between the defendant the forum, a 

Texas court does not have specific jurisdiction over the nonresident 

defendant. 

Under the analysis used in these cases, the trial court erred in 

denying Rolnick’s special appearance. This Court should reverse the trial 

court’s order and render judgment dismissing the claims against Rolnick. 

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 

I. Standard of Review 

“Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a 

question of law” (BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 

789, 794 (Tex. 2002)) that an appellate court reviews de novo. See Moki 

Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007). The 
8

resolution of the jurisdictional question, however, may require 

determinations of fact to which the law is then applied. See BMC 

Software, 835 S.W3d at 794. 

If, as here, the trial court does not issue findings of fact and 

conclusions of law,3 this Court must assume that the lower court 

impliedly found all the facts necessary to support the challenged order. 

See id at 795. Because the appellate record in this case includes the 

reporter’s record of the special appearance hearing, the implied findings 

are not conclusive. See id. Rather, the implied findings can be challenged 

for legal and factual sufficiency. See id. 

A legal sufficiency complaint must be sustained if:

the record discloses one of the following situations: 

(a) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; 

(b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence 

from giving weight to the only evidence offered to 

prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove 

a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; (d) the 

evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of 

the vital fact.

City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Robert 

W. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, 38 

Tex. L. Rev. 361, 362-363 (1960)). A factual insufficiency challenge must 

be sustained if a review of the entire record reveals that an implied

 

3 The trial court need not make findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to 

an interlocutory order that can be immediately appealed. Tex. R. App. P. 28.1(c). 

Denial of a special appearance is such an order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 

§ 51.014(7). 
9

finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence or 

is not supported by factually sufficient evidence. See Croucher v. 

Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983).

II. Burdens of Proof 

Under Texas law, the plaintiff has the initial burden to plead 

sufficient allegations to confer personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state 

defendant under the Texas long-arm statute. See Retamco Operating, 

Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. 2009). The burden 

then shifts to the defendant challenging personal jurisdiction to negate

factually or legally those bases for personal jurisdiction the plaintiff has 

alleged.4 See Kelly v. Gen’l Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658, 

659 (Tex. 2010). If the plaintiff fails to plead that the defendant 

committed any purposeful acts in Texas, the defendant carries its burden 

simply by establishing that he is a nonresident. See Siskind v. Villa 

Found. For Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1982). 

The defendant negates jurisdiction factually by producing evidence

establishing he “has no contacts with Texas, effectively disproving the 

plaintiff’s allegations.” Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659. The defendant negates 

jurisdiction legally by showing that: (1) even if the plaintiff’s 

 

4 Some cases have stated the defendant’s burden is to negate “all bases of personal 

jurisdiction.” See, e.g., This does not mean, however, the nonresident defendant “must 

negate every possible ground in the universe[;]” rather, the defendant must negate 

only those bases alleged by the plaintiff to support personal jurisdiction. See Scott v. 

Huey L. Cheramie, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 240, 241 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, 

no writ).
10

jurisdictional allegations were true, those alleged facts cannot support 

personal jurisdiction; or (2) the evidence is legally insufficient to establish 

jurisdiction. See id.

III. The Trial Court Erred In Denying Rolnick’s Special Appearance 

A. General Principles Governing Personal Jurisdiction over a 

Nonresident 

The constitutional standards for determining personal jurisdiction 

are well-settled in Texas. “A court may assert personal jurisdiction over 

a nonresident defendant only if the requirements of both the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the 

Texas long-arm statute are satisfied.” CSR Ltd., 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 

(Tex. 1996). The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the Texas longarm statute “to reach as far as the federal constitutional requirements of 

due process will allow.” Id.; see also Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 657; Moki Mac, 

221 S.W.3d at 575 (citing other cases). As a result, if the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction comports with due process limits, the requirements 

of the Texas long-arm statute are likewise satisfied.5

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a 

defendant’s liberty interests in not being subject to the binding 

judgments of a forum with which it has established no meaningful 

 

5 The Texas Supreme Court has cautioned that simply because allegations satisfy the 

Texas long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction may still be improper over a particular 

defendant. See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc., v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 784 

(Tex. 2005). The court based that analysis on the rule that the long-arm statute can 

extend no further than the U.S. Constitution allows. See id. 
11

contacts, ties, or relations. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 

462, 471-472 (1985); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1; Tex. Const. art. 

I, §19. In applying that limitation, “the constitutional touchstone remains 

whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in 

the forum State.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. 

Minimum contacts establish personal jurisdiction if a nonresident

defendant “‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 

activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws.’” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (quoting Hanson 

v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)); see also Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 

784. The nonresident defendant’s activities “must justify a conclusion 

that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas 

court,” whether those activities occur within or outside Texas. See Am. 

Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. 2002). 

The “purposeful availment” inquiry has three parts. See Moki Mac,

221 S.W.3d at 575. First, only the defendant’s contacts with Texas count. 

See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785. The unilateral activities of other 

parties are irrelevant. See id.

Second, the conduct relied upon to establish minimum contacts 

must be “purposeful,” not fortuitous, random, or attenuated. See id.

When analyzing contacts, courts must focus on the quality and nature of 

the contacts, rather than the number of contacts or whether the contacts 
12

included tortious conduct. See Am. Type Culture, 83 S.W.3d at 806. 

Finally, the nonresident defendant must have sought some benefit, 

profit, or other advantage by “availing” himself of Texas. See Michiana, 

168 S.W.3d at 785. This particular aspect of “purposeful availment” is 

“premised on notions of implied consent[.]” See id. In other words, “by 

invoking the benefits and protections of a forum’s laws, a nonresident

consents to suit there.” Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) and Am. Type Culture, 83 S.W.3d at

808).

Even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities, 

the exercise of jurisdiction still must comport with traditional notions of 

“fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-478. This 

inquiry requires an appellate court to consider several factors, including 

the burden on the nonresident defendant and the forum state’s interests, 

if any, in resolving the dispute. See Guardian Royal Exch. Assur., Ltd. v. 

English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 228, 231 (Tex. 1991).

B. Rolnick Lacks “Minimum Contacts” with Texas 

Under modern minimum contacts analysis, a nonresident

defendant’s conduct is evaluated under two jurisdictional theories: 

specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction exists 

if the nonresident defendant’s “alleged liability arises from or is related 

to an activity conducted within the forum.” BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 
13

796. The minimum contacts analysis for specific jurisdiction focuses “on 

the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation.” 

Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 228; see also Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 

575-576 (reaffirming Guardian Royal analysis). In order for litigation to 

arise from or relate to a nonresident defendant’s contacts, there must be 

a substantial connection between those contacts and the operative facts 

of the litigation.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585. 

Barely a year ago, the United States Supreme Court addressed 

what contacts qualify as “minimum contacts” necessary to create specific 

jurisdiction. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014). In its 

unanimous opinion, the Court explained that the nonresident’s “suit 

related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum 

State.” Id. The Court reaffirmed that the specific-jurisdiction inquiry 

must focus on “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, in the 

litigation.” Id. (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 

775, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984) (internal quotations 

omitted). The Court in Walden first held that this relationship has to 

arise out of contacts the defendant himself created with the forum State. 

See id. at 1122. Walden reiterates that contacts between the plaintiff or 

third parties and the forum State will not satisfy the defendant’s focused 

“minimum contacts” requirement. 
14

In Walden, the Court further held that the “minimum contacts” 

analysis must look to “the defendant’s contacts with the forum State 

itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id. at 

1122. In other words, when the plaintiff is the only link between the 

defendant and the forum, specific jurisdiction is lacking. See id. at 1122-

1123. The Court emphasized that, although “a defendant’s contacts with 

the forum State may be intertwined with his transactions or interactions 

with the plaintiff or other parties [,]” due process principles require that 

personal jurisdiction over a defendant be “based on his own affiliation 

with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ 

contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the 

State.” Id. at 1123. Finally, the Court clarified that the same analysis 

applies when intentional torts are alleged, and more importantly, 

rejected the argument that a defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct that 

causes the plaintiff to suffer an injury in the forum State is enough. The 

Court held that the “proper question is not where the plaintiff 

experienced a particular injury or effect, but whether the defendant’s 

conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.” Id. at 1116 

(emphasis added). This analysis confirms the analytical framework 

adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in the Michiana and Moki Mac

cases. 
15

General jurisdiction, on the other hand, subjects a nonresident

defendant to causes of action that do not arise from or relate to the 

defendant’s purposeful conduct within Texas. As a result, the minimum 

contacts analysis for general jurisdiction has always been more 

demanding than for specific jurisdiction. See CST Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 

595. Although Texas cases had previously required only “continuous and 

systematic contacts” with Texas to support general jurisdiction, two 

recent United States Supreme Court cases have clarified that general 

jurisdiction requires even more. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. 

___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 757 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. 

v. Brown, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011). “For an individual, 

however, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is 

the individual’s domicile[.]” Id. 

It is undisputed that Rolnick’s domicile is Florida. It is thus not 

surprising that appellees asserted only specific, rather than general, 

jurisdiction. CR:261, 659.

C. The Evidence Is Legally Insufficient to Support Specific 

Jurisdiction over Rolnick in This Case 

Specific jurisdiction exists when “the defendant’s alleged liability 

arises from or is related to an activity conducted within the forum.” CSR 

Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at 595. Any actions taken outside the forum can 

constitute minimum contacts only when those actions are “purposefully 
16

directed toward the forum state.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior 

Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987); see also Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 

227. The Texas Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that jurisdiction 

turns on a defendant’s contacts, not where the defendant “directed a tort.” 

Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 790.6

In Michiana, the Texas Supreme Court disapproved those cases 

holding that “(1) specific jurisdiction is necessarily established by 

allegations or evidence that a nonresident committed a tort in a 

telephone call from a Texas number, or that (2) specific jurisdiction turns 

on whether a defendant’s contacts were tortious rather than the contacts 

themselves.” 168 S.W.3d at 791-792. Moreover, the court thoroughly

explained why personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant cannot 

be based on where a tortious injury will be felt by the plaintiff. See id. at 

788-792. Thus, while allegations that the defendant committed a tort in 

Texas can satisfy the Texas Long-Arm Statute, such allegations do not 

necessarily satisfy the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 788.

In Texas, the focus of the personal jurisdiction analysis in a legal 

malpractice suit against a nonresident attorney focuses on where the 

nonresident attorney performed legal services, which in this case is 

Florida. See Abilene Diagnostic Clinic, PLLC v. Paley, Rothman, 

 

6 As a result, any reliance on cases finding personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 

defendant because tortious conduct was “directed” to Texas from outside Texas would 

be misplaced. 
17

Goldstein, Rosenburg, Eig & Cooper, Chartered, 364 S.W.3d 359, 365-66 

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2012 no pet.); Ahrens & De Angeli, P.L.C. v. Flinn,

318 S.W.3d 474, 484-485 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied); 

Proskauer Rose, LLP v. Pelican Trading, Inc., No. 14-08-00283-CV, 2009 

WL 242993, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 3, 2009, no pet.) 

(mem. op.); Markette v. X-Ray X-Press Corp., 240 S.W.3d 464, 468-69 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th dist.] 2007, no pet.). In all of these cases, the 

appellate courts held there was no specific jurisdiction over nonresident 

attorneys and law firms where the lawyer exercised his legal judgment, 

formed his legal opinions, and did the legal work for the client in states 

other than Texas. The courts so held even when it was undisputed that 

the work product of the nonresident attorney was sent to Texas or done 

for a Texas client. See Abilene Diagnostic, 364 S.W.3d at 364; Proskauer, 

2009 WL 24293, at *4; Markette, 240 S.W.3d at 468 & n.2.

This same analysis has been used to preclude personal jurisdiction 

over a nonresident physician in a Texas suit arising from treatment the 

physician provided in Michigan. See Brocail v. Anderson, 132 S.W.3d 552, 

563 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). The 

patient/plaintiff was a former professional baseball player whose initial 

treatment by the physician in Michigan. See id. at 555. After the plaintiff 

moved to Texas for rehabilitation, the nonresident physician prescribed 

follow-up treatments to be administered by physicians in Texas. See id. 
18

at 55-56. Plaintiff sued the physician in Texas, claiming that the doctor’s 

conduct in faxing prescriptions to Texas and communicating with his 

Texas physicians justified specific jurisdiction. See id. at 558. The Texas 

Supreme Court in Moki Mac cited and discussed Brocail with approval 

agreed with the court of appeals’ conclusion that the tort about which 

Brocail complained occurred in the exercise by the physician of his 

medical judgment in Michigan. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 588. The 

analysis in Brocail approved and applied by the supreme court applies 

with equal force to the instant case. 

The record before the trial court in the instant case included the 

entire depositions of Rolnick, Lantz and Ray, affidavits, and documents. 

The following undisputed evidence establishes that Rolnick lacked 

minimum contacts with Texas under the analysis used in the above cases:

• Rolnick has been a Florida resident for approximately 

35 continuous years (CR:35); 

• He has never lived in or even visited Texas (CR:35);

• He is a lawyer licensed to practice in Florida and is a 

partner in a Florida law firm, the only office of which is 

in Florida (CR:35);

• He has never been licensed to practice law in Texas and 

has never appeared pro hac vice in a Texas court 

(CR:35);

• No lawyer associated with Rolnick’s law firm has been 

licensed to practice law in Texas, has practiced law in 

Texas, or has appeared pro hac vice in a Texas court 

(CR:35);
19

• Rolnick does not have a registered agent for service of 

process in Texas (CR:35);

• He has never had any bank accounts in Texas (CR:35);

• Rolnick has never owned or leased any real property in 

Texas, does not conduct business in Texas, and has 

never paid or been required to pay taxes in or to Texas 

(CR:35);

• He does not have any employees, agents, books, records, 

mailing addresses, or telephone listings in Texas 

(CR:36);

• Rolnick has never sold, consigned, or leased any tangible 

or intangible property in Texas (CR:36);

• He has never advertised for, recruited, or solicited 

clients, employees, or customers in Texas (CR:36);

• Rolnick had represented Lantz since 1998 in individual 

matters and matters involving Florida-based companies 

Lantz has owned (CR:382, 503);

• Lantz, who resides in Florida, asked Rolnick to 

represent him in the sale of SML’s assets in Texas to 

AOS (CR:503);

• SML is a Florida corporation that owned and operated 

retail eyeglass businesses in Texas (CR:139);

• AOS is a Delaware limited liability company with its 

offices in Nevada (CR:166);

• When SML and AOS agreed that Texas law would 

govern the enforceability of the promissory note and 

security agreement in favor of SML, Rolnick advised 

Lantz to obtain Texas counsel to advise Lantz on how to 

protect his interests under Texas law. Rolnick did so 

because he was not familiar with Texas law (CR:39);

• Lantz chose Ray as his Texas counsel, because Ray had 

been representing him and/or SML in a Texas Medicaid 

audit. Rolnick did not solicit or hire Ray or his firm 

(CR:384, 389, 386-87); 
20

• According to Ray, Lantz insisted on hiring Ray, even 

though Ray’s expertise was in administrative law rather 

than transactional law (CR:549);

• Lantz admitted that Rolnick did not identify or solicit 

Ray as Texas counsel for the transaction (CR:386-87); 

• In the past, when legal issues had arisen regarding 

SML’s Texas operations, Lantz had hired a Texas 

lawyer to resolve them (CR:390);

• All of the legal work Rolnick did in connection with the 

SML-AOS transaction took place in Florida in the course 

of his representation of SML and/or Lantz (CR:37);

• Rolnick communicated from Florida with the AOS 

representatives, who were in Nevada (CR:37,505);

• Rolnick never spoke with, met with, or sought legal 

services from appellees BCBV and Adams & Graham, 

either for himself or any of his clients, including Lantz 

or SML (CR:515, 517); 

• Ray admitted that: (1) Lantz was his client (CR:550); (2) 

he asked a BCBV lawyer to review the documents 

(CR:553); (3) he passed off as his own the BCBV lawyer’s 

comments and questions regarding the documents 

(CR:550, 554); and (4) he sent his bills to Lantz (CR:551);

• Ray admitted that he did not have an attorney-client 

relationship with Rolnick (CR:551-52);

• Rolnick confirmed in writing that Ray’s work for Lantz 

and SML was to “to review the Security Agreement and 

Promissory Note and confirm that these are acceptable 

for Texas law, i.e. that they can be recorded and that 

they would enable us to foreclose in the event of a 

default” (CR:320);

• The draft promissory note Rolnick sent to Ray for review 

stated that the UCC-1 would be filed in Delaware 

(CR:333);

• Rolnick interpreted the comments Ray emailed back to 

Rolnick as indicating the UCC-l should instead be filed 
21

in Texas, so Rolnick revised the promissory note to 

reflect perfection of the security interest by filing the 

UCC-1 in Texas rather than in Delaware (CR:336, 516); 

• The work that Ray and the other Texas lawyers did in 

connection with the SML-AOS transaction was for the 

benefit of Lantz and SML (CR:556); 

• Rolnick’s “contacts” with Texas with regard to the SMLAOS transaction were limited to emailing the 

transactional documents to Ray, having a few telephone 

conferences with Ray to discuss the comments Ray sent 

back to Rolnick, and mailing the original closing 

documents to Ray to record (CR:160);

• Ray introduced plaintiffs to Adams & Graham (CR:387); 

and

• Rolnick did not benefit or gain any advantage from his 

incidental contacts with plaintiffs’ lawyers in Texas 

(CR:386).

Plaintiffs and defendant Adams & Graham filed responses to 

Rolnick’s special appearance.7 None of the arguments made in the 

responses takes the instant case out of the general rule that a Texas court 

does not have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident lawyer sued for 

malpractice, when all of the legal work done for the client takes place 

outside of Texas. 

For example, plaintiffs place much emphasis on the fact that the 

SML-AOS transaction involved the sale of businesses and leases located 

in Texas. Although a defendant’s purchase or sale of real property located 

in Texas can constitute purposeful availment (see Retamco, 278 S.W.3d 

 

7 Defendants RAR and BCBV did not file responses. 
22

at 340), a nonresident defendant’s communications about or involvement 

in a transaction involving Texas real property does not constitute 

purposeful availment when the defendant does not have an interest in 

the property. See Curocom Energy, LLC v. Young-Sub Shim, 416 S.W.3d 

893, 897-898 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (holding that 

Texas court lacked jurisdiction over nonresident defendant in suit 

alleging fraud in connection with sale to plaintiff of oil and gas interests 

in Texas, where fraudulent conduct took place in Korea and defendant 

had no ownership interest in the land at issue); Horowitz v. Berger, 377 

S.W.3d 115, 125 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th dist.] 2012, no pet.) (holding 

there was no personal jurisdiction over Israeli promoter of Texas real 

property because alleged fraud occurred exclusively in Israel and

emphasizing that promoter never owned an interest in the property). 

That is the case here. All of Rolnick’s legal work involving the sale of 

SML’s assets took place in Florida, and there is no evidence that Rolnick 

owned any interest in SML or any of the Texas assets. 

Plaintiffs also argued that Rolnick “quarter-backed” the 

transaction and thus his actions were directed towards Texas. This 

argument too is defeated by the analysis adopted in 2007 by the Texas 

Supreme Court in Michiana and Moki Mac, as well as the analytical 

frame work required by the recent United States Supreme Court decision 

in Walden. It is undisputed that all of the work Rolnick did with respect 
23

to the transaction was done for the benefit of Lantz and/or SML, his 

Florida clients. All of that work was done in Florida, and involved no 

travel to Texas. As the Court explained in Walden, it is the defendant’s 

contacts with the forum, not with a person living there that are 

jurisdictionally relevant. Simply put, appellees’ reliance on the activities 

of the Texas lawyers are not relevant to the minimum contacts analysis. 

Gordon & Doner, P.A. v. Joros, 287 S.W.3d 325 (Tex.App.—Fort 

Worth 2009, no pet.) illustrates the point. In Gordon, a Florida resident 

sued a Florida law firm and a Texas law firm alleging legal malpractice 

in connection with the plaintiff’s claim for injuries allegedly caused by a 

prescription drug. See id. at 328. The plaintiff hired the Florida lawyer 

to file suit on his behalf in multi-district litigation pending in a New York 

federal district court. See id. The Florida lawyer referred the case to the 

Texas lawyer. See id. The Florida and Texas lawyers allegedly entered 

into a written agreement to jointly represent the Florida client. See id.

According to the Florida client, the Texas lawyer would be lead counsel, 

with a substantial portion of the legal services to be done by the Texas 

lawyer in Texas. See id. According to the alleged agreement, however, 

the Florida and Texas lawyers “would remain jointly responsible for [the 

plaintiff’s] case.” Id.

Although both lawyers allegedly told their Florida client his case 

would be filed “soon,” the claim was never filed. See id. at 328-29. The 
24

client filed the legal malpractice suit in Texas state district court. The 

Florida lawyer filed a special appearance, which the trial court denied.

See id. at 330.

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed and rendered a judgment 

dismissing the Florida client’s claims against the Florida lawyer for want 

of jurisdiction. See id. at 336. Although the court held that the contract 

between the Florida and Texas lawyers satisfied the “doing business” 

requirement of the Texas long-arm statute, the court relied on Moki Mac

in holding that satisfying the Texas Long-Arm statute is not sufficient.

See id. at 332. The court then conducted the minimum contacts analysis 

required by federal due process principles. Relying on cases holding that 

merely contracting with a Texas resident was insufficient, the court 

rejected the argument that the contract between the Florida and Texas 

lawyer supported the exercise of specific jurisdiction. See id. at 332. The 

court also rejected the Florida client’s argument based on the fact that 

the parties intended most of the legal services on the case to occur in 

Texas. The court held that those services, which were to be performed by 

the Texas lawyer, were not relevant to the minimum contacts analysis. 

See id. at 333.8

 

8 See also Bergenholtz v. Cannata, 200 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2006, no 

pet.) (plaintiff’s receipt of legal advice, billings, and correspondence in Texas from 

nonresident lawyer not relevant to jurisdiction). 
25

Moreover, the Gordon analysis and holding conclusively rebuts 

appellees’ argument in their response that collaboration between a 

Florida lawyer and a Texas lawyer can confer personal jurisdiction on the 

Florida lawyer, particularly when the two lawyers represent the same 

Florida client. Gordon’s holding that there was no jurisdiction over the 

Florida lawyer, despite the fact that most of the legal work for the client’s 

litigation would be done in Texas (albeit by the Texas lawyer) applies 

with particular force here, since the legal work done by the Texas lawyer 

in the instant case was far less. 

Furthermore, it is undisputed that any phone calls between Rolnick 

and Ray, emails between them transmitting documents, and Rolnick’s 

participation in negotiations with AOS are not minimum contacts by 

Rolnick with Texas. This is particularly true, since the phone calls and 

work done in Texas by Ray and the other Texas lawyers and by Rolnick 

in Florida was for their Florida client’s benefit. 

Finally, the record in this case conclusively establishes that, from 

Rolnick’s perspective, his contacts with the Ray were the sort of 

fortuitous, random, or attenuated contacts that Walden teaches cannot 

support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, such as 

Rolnick. Rolnick’s contacts with Ray were fortuitous, because they 

resulted from the fact that the SML assets being sold were in Texas. 

There is no evidence that Rolnick had any interest in those assets or any 
26

part in the decision to sell them. The choice of Texas law was also 

fortuitous from Rolnick’s perspective, because that choice was made 

because plaintiffs wanted to be able to foreclose on those assets, which 

were to be located in Texas after the sale.9

D. Even If Rolnick had the Requisite Minimum Contacts, 

Exercising Personal Jurisdiction over Him Would Offend 

Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice 

Even when a defendant has minimum purposeful contacts with a 

state, the state court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the 

defendant if doing so would offend traditional notions of fairness. See 

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-478. Texas courts evaluate several factors 

in determining whether asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident 

defendant would be fair and just, including: (1) the burden on the 

defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute; 

(3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) 

the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient 

resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several 

States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Guardian 

Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 228, 232. In this case, the relevant factors show 

 

9 Plaintiffs also made a strange argument that personal jurisdiction over Rolnick 

could be established by agency principles. CR:281-282. He further admitted that he 

became involved in the sale of SML’s assets through a phone call he received from 

Lantz, who asked him to look at the sale documents and work with Rolnick. CR:549. 
27

that asserting jurisdiction over Rolnick would indeed violate traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.

The burden on Rolnick to litigate in Texas would be significant. His 

law practice is located in Florida, the only place in which he is licensed 

to practice law. As explained previously, Rolnick has no property, 

employees, or assets in Texas. 

Texas has no interest in adjudicating any dispute between Rolnick 

and plaintiffs, both of whom are domiciled in Florida. This is especially 

true, because it is undisputed that all of Rolnick’s legal work for plaintiffs 

took place outside of Texas in Florida. Since Rolnick and plaintiffs are 

residents of Florida, that state would be a much more convenient forum 

for all of them.

IV. Conclusion and Prayer 

For all of the reasons given above, the trial court erred in denying 

Rolnick’s special appearance. Appellant Herbert Rolnick respectfully 

prays for the Court to reverse the trial court’s order, render judgment 

dismissing the claims against him for lack of personal jurisdiction and 

for such other relief to which he may be entitled. 

 
28

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4, the 

undersigned certifies this Appellant’s Brief complies with the typevolume limitations of that rule. The undersigned prepared the 

Appellant’s Brief using Microsoft Word 2013 and is relying on that 

software’s word-count function.

Exclusive of the exempted portions listed in Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 9.4, the brief contains 6,439 words. 

 /s/ Ruth G. Malinas 

RUTH G. MALINAS
29

Respectfully submitted,

 

 RUTH G. MALINAS 

Texas Bar No. 08399350

 Plunkett & Griesenbeck, Inc. 

Catholic Life Building, Suite 900

1635 N.E. Loop 410

San Antonio, Texas 78209 

 (210) 734-7092 (telephone)

(210) 734-0379 (facsimile)

rmalinas@pg-law.com

 /s/ Ruth G. Malinas 

RUTH G. MALINAS 

 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 

HERBERT ROLNICK 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

This will certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

Appellant’s Brief has been forwarded this 9th day of July, 2015, to the 

following attorneys of record via the method stated:

J. Hampton Skelton

Brandon Duane Gleason

Skelton & Woody

248 Addie Roy Road, Suite B-302

Austin, TX 78746

hskelton@skeltonwoody.com 

bgleason@skeltonwoody.com 

Attorneys for Sight’s My Line, Inc.,

a Florida Corporation and

Stewart Lantz
30

Scott R. Kidd

Scott V. Kidd

Kidd Law Firm

819 W. 11th Street

Austin, TX 78701

scott@kiddlawaustin.com

svk@kiddlawaustin.com

Attorneys for Riggs, Aleshire & Ray

Michael B. Johnson

Salvador Davila

Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, LLP

701 Brazos, Suite 1500

Austin, TX 78701

mjohnson@thompsoncoe.com

sdavila@thompsoncoe.com

Attorneys for Blazier, Christensen, 

Bigelow & Virr

Robert E. Valdez

Jose “JJ” Trevino, Jr.

Valdez, Jackson & Trevino, PC

1826 North Loop 1604 West, Suite 275

San Antonio, TX 78248

revaldez@vjtlawfirm.com

jtrevino@vjtlawfirm.com

Attorneys for Adams & Graham

 /s/ Ruth G. Malinas 

RUTH G. MALINAS 
Appendix
697

DC BK15135 PG738 

No. D-1-GN-14-004583 

SIGHT'S MY LINE, INC., et al § 

§ 

v. § 

§ 

RIGGS, ALESHIRE & RAY, et al § 

Filed in The District Court 

of Travis County, Texas 

MAY 1 4 2015 

At lf '.Q.g:.p M. 

Velva L. Price1 District Clerk 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT 

TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 

200th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

ORDER OVERRULING SPECIAL APPEARANCE 

On the 14th day of May, 2015, came on for hearing the special appearance 

filed by Herbert Rolnick. Having considered the pleadings, special appearance, 

evidence, and argument of counsel, the court concludes that the special appearance 

should be overruled. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Herbert Rolnick's special appearance be, 

and the same is hereby, overruled. 

Signed this t 'fZ_y of May, 2015 

I llllll lllll lllll lllll lllll lllll lllll lllll lllll llll llll 

004028458