SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1050 

CAF 15-01559 

PRESENT: CARNI, J.P., DEJOSEPH, NEMOYER, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF MATIGAN G. AND TATUMN G. 

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ONONDAGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT; 

 

SARA E.W.-G., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (NANCY FARRELL OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

ROBERT A. DURR, COUNTY ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (MAGGIE SEIKALY OF COUNSEL),

FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. 

LAURA ESTELA CARDONA, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN, SYRACUSE. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Onondaga County (Julie

A. Cecile, J.), entered August 11, 2015 in a proceeding pursuant to

Family Court Act article 10. The order, among other things, adjudged

that respondent neglected the subject children. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs. 

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act

article 10, respondent mother appeals from an order finding her in

neglect of her two youngest children as the result of her mental

illness.

The mother contends that her mental illness was not causally

related to any actual or potential harm to the children. We reject

that contention. The evidence at the hearing established that the

mother exhibited bizarre paranoid delusions during the late hours of

January 16, 2015, which continued into the early morning of January

17, 2015 (see Matter of Thomas B. [Calla B.], 139 AD3d 1402, 1403). 

Specifically, the mother believed she had seen and heard several

intruders in her home, and they had intended to kill her (see Matter

of Kiemiyah M. [Cassiah M.], 137 AD3d 1279, 1280). The mother was

subsequently transported to a psychiatric facility, where she was

diagnosed with bipolar II disorder and tested positive for

amphetamines, cocaine, and cannabinoids. The mother continued to

experience episodes of vivid paranoia after her discharge from the

facility, but she refused to seek additional treatment (see Matter of

Jesse DD., 223 AD2d 929, 931, lv denied 88 NY2d 803). 
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CAF 15-01559 

While there was conflicting testimony whether the subject

children were present during the mother’s episodes of paranoid

delusions, the statements of the mother’s two older children

describing the harmful emotional impact they experienced as a result

of the mother’s behavior during her delusions demonstrated the risks

faced by the subject children should they be similarly exposed to such

behavior. Furthermore, the evidence established that the subject

children had been present during a prior incident in which the mother

called the police with a complaint of footprints outside her home, but

no such footprints were found by the police. We therefore conclude

that the evidence at the hearing established that “the mother engaged

in bizarre and paranoid behavior toward the older child[ren] . . . and

that such behavior took place in the presence of the [subject

children] at times and thereby exposed [them] to a[n imminent] danger”

of their physical, mental or emotional condition becoming impaired

(Thomas B., 139 AD3d at 1403 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Moroever, in our view, a reasonable and prudent parent would have

accepted the recommendation to seek additional mental health treatment

under these circumstances (see generally Nicholson v Scoppetta, 3 NY3d

357, 370). The record establishes that the mother’s older children

had been upset by the mother’s previous irrational and impulsive

behavior, the mother continued to experience episodes of vivid

paranoia even after years of treatment with her personal psychiatrist,

and she relapsed immediately after she was discharged from the

psychiatric facility. In addition, the mother repeatedly defended the

substance of her paranoid episodes during these proceedings by

attempting to explain that what she saw and heard was real. We

conclude that the foregoing demonstrates that the mother “displayed a

lack of insight into the effect of her illness on her ability to care

for the [subject] child[ren]” (Matter of Lakiyah M. [Shacora M.], 136

AD3d 424, 425).

Lastly, although we agree with the mother that the statutory

presumption of neglect for repeated misuse of drugs is inapplicable to

the facts of this case (see Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [iii]), we

nevertheless conclude that Family Court could properly consider

evidence that the mother voluntarily possessed and used illegal

substances in conjunction with her mental health prescription

medication during the episode of paranoid delusions on January 16,

2015 (see generally Matter of Andrew DeJ. R., 30 AD3d 238, 239), and

that she subsequently told an investigator that she “believed that

other people were administering [drugs] to her so that she would test

positive so that she would appear crazy.”

Thus, in light of the evidence of the mother’s mental illness,

and “[g]iven the absence of adequate proof as to the [mother’s]

willingness to accept medical treatment, or as to the efficacy of

whatever treatment might exist,” the subject children would be faced

with a “ ‘substantial probability of neglect’ ” should they be

released back to the mother (Matter of Baby Boy E., 187 AD2d 512,

512). We therefore conclude that the court properly determined that

the children were neglected as a result of the mother’s mental illness

(see Thomas B., 139 AD3d at 1403; see generally Nicholson, 3 NY3d at
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CAF 15-01559 

368).

Entered: December 23, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court