UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2181

ADRIS ABDUS-SHAHID; BAIYINA JONES,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE,

Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District 

Judge. (1:15-cv-01972-JFM)

Submitted: October 6, 2016 Decided: January 4, 2017

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jennifer S. Lubinski, LAW OFFICE OF JENNIFER S. LUBINSKI, 

Columbia, Maryland, for Appellants. Nicholas C. Sokolow, 

Assistant Solicitor, BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF LAW, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Idris Abdus-Shahid and Bayina Jones appeal the district 

court’s dismissal of their claims against the Mayor and City 

Council of Baltimore (“the City”). Abdus-Shahid’s1 Complaint

alleged violations of state and federal law based upon the 

City’s policy of requiring its employees to submit proof of 

their recorded civil marriage certificate in order to establish 

a spouse as eligible for health insurance coverage. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court dismissing the Complaint.

I.2

In 1998, Abdus-Shahid and Jones were married in an Islamic 

ceremony performed in Baltimore, Maryland. They are Muslims 

who, as part of their faith, “believe that their relationship is 

governed by Islamic law and that a civil, or secular, marriage 

license is both unnecessary to their union and contrary to their 

 1 For simplicity, when referring to Abdus-Shahid and Jones 

as parties in this case, the opinion will refer to them 

collectively as “Abdus-Shahid.” 

2 Because the district court decided the case on a Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we “assum[e] 

all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the” 

Complaint and attached exhibits are true. Burnette v. Fahey, 

687 F.3d 171, 180 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Tallabs, Inc. v. 

Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)

(discussing use of exhibits attached to a complaint).
3

religious beliefs.” App. 6, ¶ 7. Accordingly, they did not 

obtain a civil marriage license prior to their religious 

ceremony, nor have they obtained a civil marriage certificate.

In 2008, Abdus-Shahid began working as a civil engineer for 

the City’s Department of Transportation. As part of his 

employment, Abdus-Shahid was provided the opportunity to 

participate in the City’s health insurance program, including 

coverage for his spouse and children. He enrolled Jones and 

their children without objection for several years.

In 2013, after a city-wide audit of the City’s employee 

health insurance program, the City revoked Abdus-Shahid’s family 

health insurance coverage. Although Abdus-Shahid was 

subsequently allowed to re-enroll his children, the City refused 

to allow him to re-enroll Jones because he could not “provide an 

‘Official Court-Certified State Marriage Certificate (must be 

Certified and dated by the appropriate state or County official, 

such as the Clerk of Court) From [sic] the court in the County 

or City in which the marriage took place’” (“the policy”). App. 

7-8, ¶ 16. Abdus-Shahid attempted to file his religious 

marriage certificate with the Clerk of the Baltimore Circuit 

Court, but the Clerk refused to accept it for recording because 

it was not a civil license and had not been obtained from the 

Clerk prior to the ceremony. In August 2014, Abdus-Shahid 

filed a charge of religious discrimination with the Baltimore 
4

Community Relations Commission, the City’s equivalent of the 

federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and also 

with the EEOC (“EEOC charge”). Abdus-Shahid listed the 

“particulars” of his charge as follows:

I. . . . In or about July 2013, an audit 

was conducted which resulted in my family 

being dropped from my health insurance 

without explanation. . . . When I completed 

the forms to [re-enroll] my family, I was 

informed my Islamic marriage is not 

recognize[d]; therefore, I have been unable 

to reinstate my wife to my health insurance 

plan. . . . I am aware of another employee 

who is experiencing the same issue.

II. I have been given no explanation for 

the employer’s actions.

III. I believe I have been discriminated 

against in violation of Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 

regarding benefits because of my religion, 

Muslim.

App. 18. 

After receiving a letter from the EEOC dismissing the 

investigation and informing Abdus-Shahid of his right to sue, he

filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The 

City removed it to the United States District Court for the 

District of Maryland. The Complaint alleges three claims: (1) 

infringement of the free exercise of religion, in violation of 

the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; 

(2) deprivation of religious freedom and due process, in 

violation of Articles 24 and 36 of the Maryland Constitution’s 
5

Declaration of Rights; and (3) religious discrimination with 

respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges 

of employment, in violation of Title VII, as amended. 

The Complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the City’s 

refusal to recognize Abdus-Shahid’s marriage violates the U.S. 

Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights, an order 

directing the City to recognize his marriage (“and the lawful 

marriages of other Muslims whose marriage certificates have not 

been recorded by a clerk of the court”), and other monetary 

damages, costs, and fees. App. 8-13.

The City moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the constitutional claims 

should be dismissed because the City’s policy was facially 

neutral and did not prohibit the free exercise of religion; the 

state-law claims should be dismissed because Abdus-Shahid failed 

to follow the requisite statutory notice provisions to bring 

suit; and the Title VII claim should be dismissed because the 

Complaint did not allege any evidence of intentional 

discrimination. 

In response, Abdus-Shahid contended he had sufficiently 

pled each claim. Citing the fundamental constitutional right to 

marry and to exercise his religious beliefs, he argued the 

City’s policy served no legitimate purpose and was not a neutral 

law of general applicability. Furthermore, Abdus-Shahid claimed 
6

the policy imposed an unfair burden on religious adherents of 

any faith who sought religious rather than civil marriages. He

also asserted his state-law claims were not subject to the 

statutory notice provisions because he only sought declaratory 

relief. In the alternative, he asserted substantial compliance 

with any state-law requirements. Lastly, Abdus-Shahid

maintained that his Title VII claim alleged disparate impact 

discrimination rather than intentional discrimination and thus 

should be allowed to proceed. 

The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss as 

to all claims. It held that the City’s policy “is neutral on 

its face,” and “is reasonable since it provides a common 

standard by which to determine whether spouses should be 

afforded health insurance coverage.” App. 39. It also 

concluded Abdus-Shahid’s state-law claims were barred by the 

Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”), which 

applied because he sought more than declaratory relief. And it 

held Abdus-Shahid’s Title VII claim based on disparate impact 

could not proceed because he had not exhausted his 

administrative remedies as to that claim. 

Abdus-Shahid noted a timely appeal, and we have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
7

II.

On appeal, Abdus-Shahid challenges the dismissal of each of 

his claims. We address each issue in turn, reviewing de novo 

the district court’s grant of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss. Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 315, 320 

(4th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must “provide enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face,” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 

F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009),3 meaning that it must “plead[]

factual content [that] allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

“[P]laintiffs may proceed into the litigation process only when 

their complaints are justified by both law and fact.” Francis 

v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). 

A. Federal Constitutional Claim

Abdus-Shahid contends the district court erred in 

dismissing his claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Pointing to Maryland and federal case law discussing civilly 

recognized marriages and the fundamental right to marry, he

asserts that the City’s policy contradicts state law concerning 

 3 We have removed internal alterations, citations, and 

quotations throughout this opinion, except as otherwise noted. 
8

what it means to be married and it impermissibly divides 

marriage into two tiers, marriages that are entitled to coverage 

and marriages that are not. He submits that “intentionally or 

not,” the City has “unconstitutionally burdened his free 

exercise of religion” by failing to recognize his religiousbased marriage and that the district court’s dismissal of this 

claim should be reversed.

We disagree with Abdus-Shahid; the district court did not 

err in dismissing this claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The 

arguments Abdus-Shahid makes do not address the proper analysis 

for a Free Exercise claim. Instead, he points to Maryland case 

law concerning when individuals are deemed to be “married.” 

Those cases simply have no bearing on the matter before the 

Court, which is whether the City’s policy violates the Free 

Exercise Clause. Similarly, his arguments relying on case law 

concerning same-sex civil unions and marriages ignore that those 

discussions occurred within the context of civil marriages. Yet 

again, these cases have no applicability to the Free Exercise 

claim Abdus-Shahid pursues.

Reviewed in light of the applicable Free Exercise Clause 

case law, Abdus-Shahid failed to articulate a constitutional 

claim based on his right to free exercise of religion. The 

First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 

prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. U.S. Const. amend. 
9

I. This provision applies to states and localities through the 

Fourteenth Amendment. See Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 380 

(4th Cir. 2003) (“The Free Exercise Clause of the First 

Amendment, applicable to states through the Fourteenth 

Amendment, forbids the adoption of laws designed to suppress 

religious beliefs or practices unless justified by a compelling 

governmental interest and narrowly tailored to meet that 

interest.”). The Free Exercise Clause “does not,” however,

“relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid 

and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the 

law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 

prescribes (or proscribes).” Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 

872, 879 (1990). The City’s requirement for a court-issued 

certificate before recognizing any marriage for purposes of 

health insurance coverage eligibility is just such “a valid and 

neutral law of general applicability.”

Abdus-Shahid does not dispute that the City’s policy 

requiring a civil marriage certificate to demonstrate 

eligibility for spousal health insurance coverage is generally 

applicable to City employees. Instead, he maintains that the 

City’s policy is not neutral toward religion because it has the 

effect of prohibiting Abdus-Shahid from enrolling Jones for 

insurance coverage despite her being his spouse based on an 

Islamic marriage ceremony. But that is not the test for 
10

neutrality. The Supreme Court has held that a law lacks 

neutrality if it “target[s] religious beliefs” or if its “object 

. . . is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their 

religious motivation.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 

City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). The City’s policy is 

silent as to religion or religious practice and thus is facially 

neutral. See id. The City allows individuals of all faiths or 

of no specific faith to enroll a spouse for coverage upon 

presenting a civil marriage certificate. In so doing, it 

simultaneously bars all employees from enrolling an individual 

as his or her spouse if that employee cannot provide the 

required documentation, regardless of the reason. See Liberty 

Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 99 (4th Cir. 2013) (observing 

that a neutral law of general applicability will have “no object 

that infringes upon or restricts practices because of their 

religious motivation and impose[] no burden . . . on conduct 

motivated [only] by religious belief”). And while facial 

neutrality does not end the analysis, Abdus-Shahid did not 

allege any facts from which it could be inferred that the policy 

was implemented with an improper motivation. See Lukumi Babalu 

Aye, 508 U.S. at 534 (observing that the Free Exercise Clause 

forbids “target[ing] religious conduct for distinctive 

treatment” through “subtle departures from neutrality” and 

“covert suppression of particular religious beliefs”). 
11

Because the City’s policy is generally applicable and 

neutral toward religion it “need not be justified by a 

compelling governmental interest even if [it] has the incidental 

effect of burdening a particular religious practice.” Id. at 

531. Thus, as the Complaint failed to state a claim for the 

violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the district 

court did not err in dismissing the claim.

B. State Constitutional Claim

Abdus-Shahid next asserts the district court erred in 

dismissing his state constitutional claims for failure to comply 

with the notice provisions of Maryland’s LGTCA. See Ransom v. 

Leopold, 962 A.2d 1025, 1030-31 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) 

(observing that the LGTCA’s requirements apply to all torts, 

including constitutional ones). He contends that the LGTCA 

notice provisions do not apply to his claim because he only 

sought declaratory relief for the alleged violations of state 

law. Alternatively, he alleges he substantially complied with 

the LGTCA’s requirements.

Under the version of the LGTCA applicable to Abdus-Shahid’s 

claim, before suing the City for “unliquidated damages” he was

required to provide the municipality written notice of his

claimed injury within 180 days of that injury. Md. Code, Cts. & 

Jud. Proc. § 5-304 (2013). That notice must “state the time, 

place, and cause of the injury,” “be given in person or by 
12

certified mail, return receipt requested, bearing a postmark 

from the [post office],” and, in the case of the City, be given 

to the City Solicitor. Id. Abdus-Shahid does not allege that 

he, in fact, fulfilled these specific requirements.

The district court did not err in concluding that the 

LGTCA’s notice provisions apply to Abdus-Shahid’s state-law 

claims because the Complaint specifically asks, in relevant 

part, “that the Court determine the respective rights and 

remedies of the parties hereto with respect to the[]” state 

constitutional claim. App. 11, ¶ 33 (emphasis added). 

Elsewhere, the Complaint plainly contemplated an award of 

damages to compensate for the sums Abdus-Shahid was having to 

pay for out-of-pocket medical expenses. See App. 8, ¶ 18 

(“Plaintiffs are currently expecting and, as a result of the 

City’s refusal to recognize their marriage, Baiyina Jones is 

without health insurance coverage. As a result, Plaintiffs are 

incurring out-of-pocket healthcare expenses and expect to 

continue to incur such expenses until Baiyina Jones is properly 

insured.”); App. 10, ¶ 30 (expressly incorporating the 

allegation in paragraph 18 into the state law claim); see also

App. 12-13 (plea for relief, containing a free-standing request 

for “[a] judgment for monetary damages”). Moreover, as the 

district court correctly surmised from these allegations, AbdusShahid is “requesting that the City reinstate Jones’s health 
13

insurance and pay the City’s portion of Jones’s premiums,” a 

request that also involves more than “solely . . . declaratory 

relief.” App. 38. 

Based on the foregoing, the Complaint contemplates the 

possibility of more than solely declaratory relief related to 

the state law claim. As such, the district court did not err in 

concluding that Abdus-Shahid was required to comply with the 

notice provision of the LGTCA prior to bringing his state law 

claim and that he did not do so. Cf. Rounds v. Md.-Nat’l 

Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 109 A.3d 639, 646 n.10 (Md. 

2015) (concluding plaintiffs sought unliquidated damages –- and 

thus fell “under the purview of the LGTCA” -– despite labelling 

their claim as one for “Declaratory Judgment” -- because they 

sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages arising

from the alleged violation). 

Abdus-Shahid does not contend he strictly complied with the 

LGTCA’s provisions. Instead, Abdus-Shahid argues the district 

court erred by not considering whether he had substantially 

complied with the LGTCA’s provisions. He asserts that had the 

district court done so, it would have concluded he had 

substantially complied by filing the EEOC charge and therefore

could proceed with the state law claim. 

To be sure, Maryland courts do not require strict

compliance with the LGTCA’s notice provisions. See Faulk v. 
14

Ewing, 808 A.2d 1262, 1275 (Md. 2002) (“[W]here . . . [a] 

claimant provides the local government, through the unit or 

division with the responsibility for investigating [such] claims 

against that local government, or the company with whom the 

local government or unit has contracted for that function, the 

information required by § 5-304(b)(3) to be supplied, who thus 

acquires actual knowledge within the statutory period, the . . . 

claimant has substantially complied with the notice provisions 

of the LGTCA.”). That legal principle has no effect here, 

however, because Maryland courts also require plaintiffs to 

plead their strict or substantive compliance with the LGTCA as 

part of their state-law claims. See Hansen v. City of Laurel, 

25 A.3d 122, 137 & n.16 (Md. 2011). Failure to do so makes the 

claim “subject to a motion to dismiss . . . based on a failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. at 137.

Here, the Complaint fails to plead any compliance with the 

LGTCA. Although Abdus-Shahid attached a copy of the EEOC charge

to his Complaint, he failed to allege any facts directly in the 

Complaint from which his compliance with the LGTCA -–

substantial or otherwise -- could be gleaned. 

In any event, we readily conclude that the documentation 

Abdus-Shahid attached to the Complaint does not constitute 

substantial compliance under Maryland law. The substantial 

compliance exception is “narrow,” Huggins v. Prince George’s 
15

County, 683 F.3d 525, 538 (4th Cir. 2012), and must be 

demonstrated with respect to each of the LGTCA’s requirements,

see Moore v. Norouzi, 807 A.2d 632, 643 (Md. 2002).

Here, the EEOC charge alleges religious discrimination in 

employment practices, in violation of Title VII, but it does not 

necessarily follow that claim adequately alerted the City to a 

potential claim based on violations of Maryland’s constitutional 

guarantees of religious freedom and due process. Faulk, 808 

A.2d at 1272 (observing that substantial compliance requires 

fulfillment of the notice requirement’s purpose, which is “to 

apprise [the] local government of its possible liability” such 

that it can, among other things “ascertain the character and 

extent of [its] responsibility”). Moreover, because the charge 

alleges discrimination that began in November 2013 and the 

charge was not filed until August 12, 2014, it was not provided 

to the City until well after the 180-day period in which notice 

is to be provided under the LGTCA. Abdus-Shahid does not offer 

any explanation for this delay, nor does he claim he should be 

excused from the statutory deadline requirement. Cf. Rounds, 

109 A.3d at 652-54 (analyzing whether “good cause” excused 

plaintiff’s failure to comply with the LGTCA’s notice deadline). 

On this record, the EEOC charge was not sufficient to constitute 

substantial compliance with all of the LGTCA’s requirements. As 
16

such, the district court did not err in dismissing AbdusShahid’s state-law claims for failure to comply with the LGTCA. 

C. Title VII Claim

The final issue Abdus-Shahid raises on appeal challenges 

the district court’s dismissal of his Title VII claim for 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. He maintains that 

“the City’s policy disparately impacts [him], and other 

religiously observant employees and their families, by requiring 

that they either engage in conduct that interferes with their 

religious beliefs or forego the privileges ordinarily accorded 

to married people.” Appellants’ Opening Br. 16. He argues that 

this claim was adequately alleged in his EEOC charge, which 

referred to “religious discrimination,” and he urges that it 

requires too much of the non-lawyers filling out EEOC charges to 

require more than a layman’s explanation of the conduct at 

issue. 

Title VII authorizes two causes of action against 

employers: disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) and 

disparate impact. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 

U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). Although they are 

similar in their objectives, each cause of action has different 

elements. A disparate treatment claim requires proof of 

discriminatory motive, “although [that impermissible motive] can 

in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences 
17

in treatment.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 

U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). A disparate impact claim, in 

contrast, does not require proof of discriminatory motive. Id. 

Instead, disparate impact claims “involve employment practices 

that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups 

but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and 

cannot be justified by business necessity.” Id. 

In order to promote voluntary compliance with the law, 

Title VII claimants must pursue their administrative remedies 

before filing a lawsuit. Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., 

711 F.3d 401, 406-07 (4th Cir. 2013). They do so by filing a 

“charge” with the EEOC “notif[ying] the charged party of the 

asserted violation” and “bring[ing] the charged party before the 

EEOC.” Id. at 407. “[A] federal court may only consider those 

allegations included in the EEOC charge.” Id. Any other claims

that “would naturally have arisen from an investigation” are 

procedurally barred and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider 

them. Id.

On appeal, as he did in opposing the motion to dismiss, 

Abdus-Shahid repeatedly disavows raising a disparate treatment 

claim in his Complaint. E.g., Appellants’ Opening Br. 9 

(“Abdus-Shahid’s claim is based upon disparate impact 

discrimination, not disparate treatment discrimination.”); 

Appellants’ Opening Br. 16 (“Appellants do not allege that the 
18

City deliberately targeted Islam for attack.”). Instead, he 

maintains that he is relying solely on disparate impact 

discrimination. E.g., App. 33 (“This is a case of disparate 

impact discrimination.”); Appellants’ Opening Br. 16 

(“Appellants . . . allege that the City’s policy disparately 

impacts them[.]”). In light of Abdus-Shahid’s clear position

from the opposition to motion to dismiss stage and through to

appeal, we will not address any arguments related to a disparate 

treatment claim because that is a cause of action he represents 

he is not seeking to bring. 

Turning to whether Abdus-Shahid’s disparate impact claim 

can survive the motion to dismiss stage, we conclude it cannot. 

Even construing the EEOC charge broadly, we agree with the 

district court that it fails to assert a disparate impact claim. 

“Central to proof of a prima facie case under th[at] theory” is 

proof of a policy or practice, “which, though facially neutral 

or even benign in actual purpose, nevertheless imposes a 

substantially disproportionate burden upon a claimant’s 

protected group as compared to a favored group within the total 

set of persons to whom it is applied.” Wright v. Nat’l Archives 

& Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711 (4th Cir. 1979). AbdusShahid’s allegations in the EEOC charge sound as a disparate 

treatment or intentional discrimination claim rather than a 

disparate impact claim: he claims he has been denied insurance 
19

and believes that he is being “discriminated against . . . 

because of [his] religion, Muslim.” App. 18. Critically, the 

EEOC charge does not identify any policy (neutral or otherwise) 

being challenged as discriminatory in its effect, and, in fact, 

it asserts Abdus-Shahid had “been given no explanation for [his] 

employer’s action.” App. 18 (emphasis added). 

Abdus-Shahid also did not assert any facts that would allow 

a conclusion that Muslims were being disproportionately impacted 

by the City’s actions. While he claims another employee 

experienced the “same issue,” that allegation is vague and does 

not suggest anything more than discrete discriminatory acts. 

E.g., Wright, 609 F.2d at 712 (“The policy or practice 

contemplated by disparate impact doctrine consists of more than 

the mere occurrence of isolated or . . . sporadic discriminatory 

acts, having reference instead to an employer’s standard 

operating procedure[; it concerns] the regular rather than the 

unusual practice.”).4 Lastly, in his brief on appeal, Abdus-

 4 Abdus-Shahid’s brief goes even farther in suggesting that 

the City’s policy does not disparately impact Muslims, but 

rather affects anyone who elects not to obtain a civil marriage 

certificate for whatever reason. E.g., Appellants’ Opening Br. 

15 (“Any religious person who chooses [to forego the state 

licensing requirement for marriage] will, upon accepting 

employment with the City of Baltimore, be impacted by the City’s 

discriminatory health insurance coverage policy.”). Even 

assuming that Abdus-Shahid could assert a disparate impact claim 

on behalf of “devout religious adherents” of multiple faiths, 

Abdus-Shahid offered no contentions in his EEOC charge as to any 

(Continued)
20

Shahid contends that the “heart” of his disparate impact claim

is a failure to accommodate, Appellants’ Opening Br. 17, but the 

EEOC charge does not provide any information suggesting that to 

be the case. To be clear, the problem is not –- as Abdus-Shahid 

incorrectly suggests the district court held –- that his EEOC 

charge lacked any specific legal terminology. Abdus-Shahid is 

correct that “the exhaustion requirement should not become a 

tripwire for hapless plaintiffs [and that] we may not erect 

insurmountable barriers to litigation out of overly technical 

concerns.” Sydnor v. Fairfax Cty., 681 F.3d 591, 594 (4th Cir. 

2012). Rather, the problem is that the words used in the EEOC 

charge do not correlate to the sort of assertions and facts from 

which a future cause of action based on disparate impact can be 

discerned. See, e.g., Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 

509 (4th Cir. 2005) (observing “the factual allegations in the 

administrative charge [must be] reasonably related to the 

factual allegations in the formal litigation” to satisfy the 

exhaustion requirement). 

Abdus-Shahid thus failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies with respect to a disparate impact claim under Title 

VII and the district court did not err in dismissing this claim. 

 

effect on such non-Muslims who also do not possess a civil 

marriage certificate. 
21

See, e.g., Burgis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63, 71 

(2d Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of disparate impact claim 

for failure to exhaust where the EEOC charge “complain[ed] of 

individualized disparate treatment”); Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 

F.3d 783, 792 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding plaintiff failed to 

exhaust remedies as to a disparate impact theory where the EEOC 

charge “facially alleged disparate treatment,” “identified no 

neutral employment policy,” and “complained of past incidents of 

disparate treatment only”). 

III.

For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the 

district court is 

AFFIRMED.