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[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                 CLOSING THE SKIES, LIBERATING UKRAINE

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

            COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

                        U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                              MAY 16, 2024
                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
                                 Europe

                              [CSCE118-3]
                              
                              
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                              

                       Available via www.csce.gov
                       
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
55-703                     WASHINGTON : 2024                          
                       
                       
                       
            COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

                        U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION

             U.S. HOUSE			        U.S SENATE

JOE WILSON, South Carolina Chairman	 BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland Co-
					     Chairman
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee Ranking 
    Member				 ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama		     Ranking Member
EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri		 RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona			 JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina		 TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York		 JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
VICTORIA SPARTZ, Indiana		 TINA SMITH, Minnesota
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas			 THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
					 SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
                                                                                                            
                            EXECUTIVE BRANCH
                   Department of State - Erin Barclay
               Department of Defense - Celeste Wallander
                  Department of Commerce - Don Graves

                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                             COMMISSIONERS

Hon. Joe Wilson, Chairman, from South Carolina...................     1

Hon. Marc A. Veasey, from Texas..................................     2

Hon. Steve Cohen, Ranking Member, from Tennesee..................    11

Hon. Richard Blumenthal, from Connecticut........................    15

Hon. Victoria Spartz, from Indiana...............................    17

Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse, from Rhode Island.......................    19

                         OTHER MEMBERS PRESENT

Hon. Jim Costa, from California..................................    23

                               WITNESSES

Nataliya Bugayova, Non-Resident Fellow, Institute for the Study 
  of War.........................................................     4

Ambassador John Herbst [ret.], Senior Director, Atlantic Council.     7

Michael Ryan, Former Deputy Assistant, Secretary of Defense......     9

 
                 CLOSING THE SKIES, LIBERATING UKRAINE

                              ----------                              

   COMMISSION ON SECURITY & COOPERATION IN 
                                    EUROPE,
                          U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION,
                                  HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
                                            Thursday, May 16, 2024.

    The hearing was held from 2:06 p.m. to 3:24 p.m., Room 
2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Representative Joe Wilson 
[R-SC], Chairman, Commission for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, presiding.

    Committee Members Present: Representative Joe Wilson [R-
SC], Chairman; Representative Steve Cohen [D-TN], Ranking 
Member; Representative Marc Veasey [D-TX]; Senator Richard 
Blumenthal [D-CT]; Representative Victoria Spartz [R-IN]; 
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse [D-RI].
    Other Members Present: Representative Jim Costa [D-CA].
    Witnesses: Nataliya Bugayova, Non-Resident Fellow, 
Institute for the Study of War; Ambassador John Herbst [ret.], 
Senior Director, Atlantic Council; Michael Ryan, Former Deputy 
Assistant, Secretary of Defense.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF JOE WILSON, CHAIRMAN, U.S. HOUSE, FROM 
                         SOUTH CAROLINA

    Chairman Wilson: The good thing is that, indeed, with the 
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe this is 
bipartisan, bicameral. We are really hoping that members of the 
Senate might be able to come across to be.
    The bottom line, we are grateful to be here with all of 
you. I am looking forward to our ranking member, Congressman 
Steve Cohen, to be here. As we proceed I want to thank all of 
you for coming--to be here today on behalf of the United States 
Helsinki Commission.
    This hearing comes at a critical time for the people of 
Ukraine and the urgent defense against war criminal Putin's 
genocidal invasion. Ukrainians continue courageously to fight 
for their lives, their families, and their homeland.
    As we speak war criminal Putin is relentlessly attacking 
Kharkiv with a population of 1.5 million innocent civilians. 
The need for a vital air defense and long-range munitions has 
never been more dire.
    I am grateful that President Biden has provided long-range 
missiles but Ukraine must be able to legitimately defend itself 
from attacks launched from within the borders of the Russian 
Federation.
    We have seen a clear and repeated pattern when Putin 
attacks. The mass murdering Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad 
welcomed Putin's involvement to quash the Syrian revolution of 
2015. Putin's atrocities committed against innocent Syrians are 
being replicated to murder innocent Ukrainians, including 
chemical weapons and incendiary munitions.
    War criminal Putin is also known for the double tap strikes 
which gruesomely target emergency personnel, medical personnel, 
police, fire, and volunteers as they search for survivors 
following the first round of attacks.
    The once vibrant city of Aleppo in Syria had a population 
of 2.5 million people before it was decimated to rubble by war 
criminals Putin and Assad. This was done also in Mariupol, 
sadly, with a once-vibrant population of half a million people.
    Now war criminal Putin threatens Kharkiv, the population of 
the second largest city of Ukraine of 1.5 million people, which 
historically at one time was the capital of Ukraine, and has so 
many beautiful historical artifacts and indications such as the 
beautiful Orthodox churches and libraries and museums and 
universities. We, sadly, know the intent of war criminal Putin 
is to create total rubble, which is inconceivable in the 21st 
century, of targeting civilian targets.
    With speaker Mike Johnson's leadership, I am grateful for 
the passage of the significant support for Ukraine. Now it is 
time to expedite what Ukraine needs and remove arbitrary 
restrictions that tie the hands of the Ukrainian defenders.
    Make no mistake, without shortages and delays Ukrainian 
victory could have already become a reality. Europe also should 
be recognized for being fully engaged in Ukraine as America is 
sixteenth in order of aid per gross domestic product. We are 
behind Lithuania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, and Romania.
    With military aid to Ukraine back online there is renewed 
hope that we can ensure that every assistance package to 
Ukraine matters and is tied very specifically to Ukrainian 
victory with the defeat of war criminal Putin and his thugs.
    We have it with us today, and I appreciate that Congressman 
Veasey found it right away, this is a fragment of a Russian 
Kalibr, a cruise missile that was fired upon the homes of 
innocent Ukrainians in the city of Kherson shortly after it was 
liberated by Ukrainian forces in late 2022.
    I want to pass this around to our colleagues to have a 
closer look and be careful, indeed, it has jagged portions to 
its--edges. The cost of one of the Kalibr missiles is over 
seven million--seven million dollars--fired purposely at 
Ukrainian civilians simply to exist as Ukrainians.
    That is the enemy that Ukraine is facing, one that is so 
invested in their physical, cultural, and political destruction 
that they will spend enormous sums to build advanced weapons of 
war--by the Putinists to rain down on Ukrainian families. When 
they run out they are supplied by the terrorist regime in 
Tehran and the maniacal regime of Kim Jong-un of DPRK, North 
Korea.
    Clearly, with war criminal Putin and Beijing today the axis 
of evil has never been clearer than dictators with the rule of 
guns invading democracies with the rule of law. War criminal 
Putin comes up with false excuses every day for his mass murder 
to further his expansionist goals.
    His August 2021 treatise was clear and that is he believes 
that--and wants to ensure that Ukraine does not exist as he 
attempts to recreate the evil empire of the Soviet Union. Last 
May while I was in Berlin I was really disturbed and shocked to 
see the massive Russian embassy there it still has on top of it 
a hammer and sickle, and to me, that is the equivalent of 
having a swastika.
    The thought that there would be the existence of a hammer 
and sickle is amazing, and we must face reality. Despite 
enormous casualties and equipment losses, Russia continues to 
press on with a full war economy while oppressing the people of 
Russia itself.
    The Ukrainian victory will happen, not because Putin comes 
to his senses but when Ukraine has achieved clear military 
superiority in their country, diminishing Russian ability to 
wage war effectively and establishing territorial integrity. 
Every aid package should be tied to the objective of 
territorial integrity.
    I now yield to Congressman Marc Veasey of Texas.

      STATEMENT OF MARC A. VEASEY, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TEXAS

    Representative Veasey: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I 
appreciate that. I am glad that we are having these hearings 
and I am glad to see that you are steadfast and nonwavering in 
your commitment to maintaining freedom in Europe.
    I really wish that everyone would go back and listen to 
Ronald Reagan's entire speech when he said, "Mr. Gorbachev, 
tear down this wall" because people hear that part of the 
speech but they forget about what was the contents of the 
speech, and he talked about the checkpoints. He talked about 
people's lack of freedom.
    People forget that in--literally, in East Germany they had 
an organization known as the Stasi that spied on people, that 
spied on its own citizens, and if they would do things like 
politically gather and protest they would keep secret files on 
these people.
    We know that countries that do things like that are evil 
and that countries that spy on their own people are bad, and I 
really wish that people could go back and just, again, listen 
to the contents of that speech because it was talking about 
America's unwavering commitment to freedom and democracy in 
Europe, and that is important.
    One of the things that I wish that the president would do 
is talk more about the fact that energy--because of the record 
amount of oil and gas that President Biden has produced, a lot 
more than his predecessor, has helped keep Europe and has 
helped keep Putin at bay.
    This would be a lot worse. If you want to stop death and 
destruction and you want to really squeeze Putin let him not be 
able to control the flow of energy in Europe and right now he 
is not. He thought he was going to be able to. He thought that 
there was going to be one harsh winter and that was going to be 
it and it did not happen, and we should be grateful for that 
because it could have been a lot worse. It could have been a 
lot worse.
    We need to continue having conversations about that. If we 
can squeeze Putin without having to squeeze U.S. triggers 
ultimately then that is a good thing.
    In closing, Joe and I have been to several of the Helsinki 
meetings and the winter meetings that they have--annually in 
Vienna and, of course, the other meetings that they do in the 
summer that move from different European countries.
    The officials and the people--they are the PMs in those 
countries and the electeds in those countries and the business 
leaders in those countries--they want to know that our country 
is committed to maintaining peace and prosperity in Europe.
    They want to know that we are committed to making sure that 
this does not spread beyond Ukraine because if we do not stop 
Putin now and this spreads beyond Ukraine and it goes into 
Romania and it goes into Estonia we are going to have a lot 
more bloodshed and there will not be anything that anybody can 
do about it.
    We need to make sure that this is the end, and when Joe and 
I go to Europe this summer I want to be able to tell those 
officials that we are going to meet with in Romania that we are 
committed to making sure that it does not go whether for any 
administration, that it stops now, that this is it and that we 
are committed to making sure that Ukraine can defend itself 
against this unlawful invasion and that they can continue to 
experience and get back to having peace and prosperity and 
rebuilding that country.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and thank you for 
putting this hearing together today.
    Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, and thank you, 
Congressman Veasey.
    We now have the--as the witnesses today we have Nataliya 
Bugayova, the nonresident fellow of the Institute of War. 
Additionally, I am grateful we have Ambassador John Herbst, who 
is the senior director of the Atlantic Council; and we also 
have Michael Ryan, who is the former deputy assistant secretary 
of defense.
    Each one of you is welcome to be here today and it is 
wonderful that we have a free speech for Nataliya to begin. 
Thank you. [Laughter.]

TESTIMONY OF NATALIYA BUGAYOVA, NON-RESIDENT FELLOW, INSTITUTE 
                      FOR THE STUDY OF WAR

    Ms. Bugayova: Thank you, Chairman, and thanks for the 
opportunity to be here and contribute to the discussion.
    I will start by saying that the battlefield situation will 
likely get worse for Ukraine before it gets better. Russia is 
exploiting vulnerabilities across the entire front line, in 
large part because of the delays in Western aid. The Kremlin's 
main objective is to convince the U.S. that U.S. aid will not 
make a difference, especially as we approach critical 
milestones such as the NATO summit and the U.S. elections.
    In our assessment, Ukraine, however, will be able to 
stabilize the front line and blunt the incoming Russian 
offensive as the aid arrives. Where we go from there and 
whether Ukraine is on the path to victory depends in large part 
on whether the U.S. learns critical lessons from the last two 
years of this war, and I would like to focus on two larger 
points in this respect.
    The first one is that U.S. interests and the most 
advantageous outcome for the U.S. in this war remain the same. 
Russia is a self-declared adversary to the U.S. and any 
effective U.S. strategy to counter this challenge will 
recognize that the outcome of this war is the center of gravity 
of Russia's power and its ability to threaten our interests.
    Russia's ability to reconstitute, confront NATO, to 
contribute militarily to its partners like Iran, all depends 
disproportionately on whether Russia keeps or loses its gains 
in Ukraine but, it is not just about capability. It is also 
about the intent.
    This war has empowered a nationalist community inside of 
Russia that believes in expansion by force and it is inherently 
anti-Western. If Russia is defeated in Ukraine the next after 
Putin may or may not be worse.
    If Russia prevails in Ukraine the next after Putin will 
most certainly be like Putin or worse because of the political 
imperatives that this empowered nationalist community will 
generate. Given these realities, the most dangerous outcome for 
the U.S. is allowing Russia to win this war. The risk of a 
Russia-NATO war will rise exponentially and U.S. will face a 
reconstituted Russia that is also more determined to undermine 
the U.S.
    In an alternative scenario in which Russia gets reprieve on 
the battlefield--in an alternative scenario in which Russia 
gets a reprieve on the battlefield either as a result of a 
premature ceasefire or insufficient Western aid that outcome is 
still far more costly for the United States than helping 
Ukraine to continue to fight because in this case Russia will 
have ability to rebuild and attack Ukraine again, which means 
U.S. will face the same problem under worse escalation risk, 
higher costs, and conditions that favor Russia.
    The most advantageous outcome for Ukraine--for the U.S. 
remains helping Ukraine liberate its territory and its people 
as the only path to an actual durable peace and not a temporary 
respite, and then helping rebuild Ukraine and putting the 
largest combat-capable friendly military at the forefront of 
the NATO's defense.
    As long as this outcome remains Ukraine's choice the most 
prudent U.S. strategy is helping Ukraine actually achieve it, 
which brings me to the second issue, what will it take at this 
point to reset Ukraine on the path to victory, I would like to 
highlight a couple of key requirements.
    The first one, after Ukraine stabilizes the alliance, the 
priority should be helping Ukraine restore its ability to 
maneuver on the battlefield. This will require a lot more 
ground-based long-range strike capability.
    Second, we must deny Russia sanctuaries. Russia is not 
entitled to sanctuaries when it is trying to erase a nation. 
Right now, as we speak Russian Air Force is conducting live 
bomb attacks from Russia's aerospace sanctuary on Kharkiv and 
it can do so indefinitely, as my colleague George Barros has 
written this week. We must abandon the Russian information line 
that Russia can somehow demand immunity from being attacked 
when it is waging an unprovoked war.
    We must remove any existing constraints on Ukraine to 
target Russian legitimate military and defense industrial 
capabilities inside of Russia. This is critical if we are 
actually serious about imposing strategic costs on Russia 
across the board.
    The third is that we must really think beyond the standard 
force ratios and focus on asymmetries. Ukraine's effort in the 
Black Sea is a quintessential example of an effort producing 
outsized effects, effects the Kremlin, by the way, is going out 
of its way trying to downplay.
    With more resources, this effort can have even larger 
effects including on-the-ground war. Other asymmetric 
opportunities include helping Ukraine scale its rapid 
innovation through--essentially helping Ukraine scale its rapid 
innovation and helping Ukraine's defense industrial base reach 
its potential. Ukraine's minister of strategic industry 
estimates that Ukraine has 10 billion dollars in additional 
production capacity if properly resourced.
    The final point I will mention is that we also must surge 
our own capacity. Figuring out how to creatively allocate 
resources that we have while gradually aiding capability is 
important but that is not the main problem that we need to 
solve.
    The U.S. needs to lead a global coalition of partners in 
Europe and Asia to dramatically increase the overall stack of 
capabilities that matter in Ukraine but they will also matter 
for our own ability to deter and fight future wars.
    Look, the combined [GDP] Gross Domestic Product of the 
U.S., our European partners, and our Asian allies is on the 
order of 63 trillion dollars. Russia's GDP is around 1.9 
trillion dollars. Iran and North Korea add little.
    China is an enabler of Russia, but it has not mobilized, 
and if we mobilize and lean in Russia loses, and mobilizing 
means not just a surge in production, sparing more of the 
existing capabilities, but also accepting the higher threshold 
for pain and risk now to avoid more risk, more cost, and higher 
pain in the future.
    The final point I will make is that the U.S. should also 
recognize that the spirit of decision-making has been a 
critical, at times the most critical, factor in this war. The 
key successes of Ukraine and its partners in this war have 
resulted from strategic clarity and lost opportunities have 
resulted from the inability to connect the ground truth to our 
interests and capabilities fast enough to act.
    The front line would look different now had the U.S. 
proactively invested in Ukraine's initiative in the winter of 
2023 or passed the supplemental earlier. Russia learned that 
lesson very early, so much so that Russia's entire strategy for 
the last two years has been focused on deterring and delaying 
U.S. decision-making.
    We should learn that lesson, too, and recognize that we 
should plan to proactively resource multiple Ukraine campaigns, 
not expecting any single operation to have a decisive outcome. 
The U.S. should also expand its knowledge sharing with 
Ukrainian partners including growing physical presence in 
Ukraine to connect the ground truth to our decision faster, 
recognizing that the outcome of this war depends as much on our 
decision-making speed as it does on the military capability.
    Thank you very much.
    Chairman Wilson: Thank you so much, Ms. Bugayova, and I 
told you all--I am correct again that the ranking member Steve 
Cohen would be here. Now, I did not realize he was going to be 
bringing his fan club with him, too. [Laughter.] That is proof 
of his effectiveness and so that he would attract such a crowd.
    With this in mind, Ambassador, we will proceed and what we 
will do, everybody at five minutes and then so that we can 
have--and even the politician is going to be held to five 
minutes and Stephanie Pendarvis is going to make sure that the 
timing is correct.
    As we proceed, thank you, Ambassador.

 TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR JOHN HERBST [RET.], SENIOR DIRECTOR, 
                        ATLANTIC COUNCIL

    Mr. Herbst: I just want to quickly--[off mic]--[comes on 
mic]--with Nataliya. Okay.
    The greatest national security challenge that we face is 
the partnership of aggressive authoritarian regimes seeking to 
undermine our global leadership. The larger longer-range 
threat, of course, is China with a real economy but the 
greatest short-term danger comes from our peer nuclear power 
Russia which is conducting a savage war of conquest to 
subjugate Ukraine in Europe and would like to restore control, 
at a minimum, over all the territory of the former Soviet Union 
which happens to include three NATO allies.
    Ukraine is the place where we can and must deal a decisive 
blow to our adversaries. If we help Kyiv defeat Putin in 
Ukraine we prevent further Russian aggression to the west and 
send a cautionary message to Xi to lay off Taiwan.
    It would also make it harder for Moscow to enable further 
Iranian aggression in the Middle East, a key factor in Hamas 
assault on Israel and the Houthis attacks on global shipping. 
What does this mean for U.S. policy now that Congress has 
passed the aid bill?
    First, the administration must identify what is at stake in 
Ukraine clearly. The problem is not a war in Ukraine but a 
nuclear power seeking to subjugate Ukraine and then move 
further west.
    Two things flow from this. First, we need a policy of 
containment for Russia, a position endorsed by representatives 
from 10 think tanks here on Capitol Hill in early February. The 
place, again, to defeat and contain Moscow is Ukraine, a large 
country fighting for its right to live free as proud 
Ukrainians.
    Stopping Moscow there does not involve American soldiers. 
If our need is to contain and defeat Russia so that we can 
enjoy a free society allowing people like that who do not 
understand but have a clear point of view to speak, yes.
    Providing $40 billion a year in aid to Russia--to Ukraine 
is not a gift to Ukraine. It is the smart way to defend the 
United States, to defend our security and our prosperity, and 
it represents, roughly, four percent or less of our defense 
budget. That is first. We need to understand that we have a 
problem containing this nuclear rogue power.
    Secondly, we need a clear power towards Moscow's war on 
Ukraine. The administration has frequently said we would stay 
with Ukraine as long as it takes. That is not good enough. We 
need a clear signal to defeat Russia to enable victory in 
Ukraine for Ukraine.
    What does this look like? The first order of business is to 
enhance Ukraine's defensive line, so Russia does not add to the 
incremental gains when American military aid is in doubt. They 
are right now bombarding Kharkiv 30 kilometers from Ukraine's 
border with Russia. They are also making incremental gains 
around Kharkiv.
    Though, lately, the administration has moved smartly to get 
ammunition and artillery to Ukraine. But it needs to do much 
more to protect Kharkiv and other Ukrainian cities, Ukrainian 
critical energy infrastructure, from Moscow's massive aerial 
assault. This means more air defense systems, Patriots, and 
French SAMP/Ts. Ukraine has three Patriot batteries. They need 
at least nine more. There is a--our allies, some of them could 
help fill this void.
    There is a second dimension to this problem coming from 
American reluctance until mid-last year to back sending of F-
16s to Ukraine even from European countries. Allies are now on 
track to deliver about a brigade's worth of aircraft. Ukraine 
needs well over a hundred.
    With that, they could stop the successful glide bombs 
Moscow was using to pound Kharkiv and other places in Ukraine. 
Those F-16s will be essential to Ukraine's offensive in 2025. 
The White House needs to decide how to arrange the transfer of 
that many F-16s with all the necessary avionics and missiles.
    Kyiv will choose the target of its next offensive but 
Moscow's greatest achievement in its 10-year war on Ukraine is 
the seizure of Crimea. That is also its greatest liability 
because Crimea needs to be supplied by the Kerch Bridge and by 
the land bridge from Donbas-occupied Donbas to Crimea.
    If we give Ukraine the necessary weapons, the longer-range 
fires, the artillery, the tanks, the airplanes, they can 
seriously disrupt if not deny supply of those weapons to 
Ukraine, forcing Ukrainian troops--Russian troops to retreat 
from south mainland Ukraine and posing a severe political 
problem for Putin.
    We need to do this. A strong policy to promote Ukrainian 
victory would not just involve sending the right weapons 
Ukraine needs but we need to change our rules of engagement. 
Allow Ukraine to strike Russian tower targets in Russia which 
are currently pounding Ukraine. Ukraine--again, Kharkiv is less 
than 30 miles--excuse me, 20 miles from Russia.
    Russian forces are massed within Russia along the border. 
Russian airplanes flying in Russian air space are pounding 
Odesa--excuse me, Kharkiv as well as Odesa. That is a different 
story.
    We need to allow the Ukrainians to strike back at them. We 
must also organize ourselves to meet the current security 
challenge. I have got about one more minute.
    We need to ramp up our arms production. Arms--we learned in 
Ukraine that a major power war is heavily arms-intensive. We 
need that not just to help Russia lose in Ukraine, to help 
Ukraine defeat Russia, but so we can deal with a confrontation 
with China or Russia.
    We also need to be flexible in the way we run this war. We 
need a senior official responsible for overall coordination of 
our policy on this war, meaning ramping up arms production, 
meaning making sure Ukraine gets the weapons it needs, meaning 
making sure the American government can react properly to 
changes on the battlefield.
    Our obsolescence rule that Ukraine cannot use American 
weapons to strike Russia should be gone now that we are 
watching what has happened in Kharkiv. Hopefully, it will 
change but we need a senior administration official responsible 
for that.
    Finally, Congress. Congress has been strong pushing the 
administration to do more. It got the aid package passed. 
However, we need greater flexibility in the way we allocate 
appropriate weapons. American weapons, even new ones, are 
facing challenges with electronic warfare in the battle space. 
We need to in the appropriations process agree to changes in 
weapons design to meet those challenges on the battlefield.
    All right. Basic point--we have done this before. We 
defeated massive armed aggressors in World War II. We can do 
this now.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Wilson: Ambassador, thank you so much. As we 
proceed, I would like to point out that despite the fan club 
members of Mr. Cohen we do not want to have people harassed as 
they are coming into the building or into the room, and that--
anyone obstructing needs to know that obstructing the entrance 
is a fire code violation and they will be removed.
    With that in mind, we now proceed to Secretary Michael 
Ryan.

 TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL RYAN, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT, SECRETARY 
                           OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Cohen, and Congressman 
Veasey, I am honored to testify today.
    Ukraine has a pathway to victory with our support. Kyiv's 
challenge is simply this--how does a smaller force fighting for 
its survival defeat a genocidal Goliath?
    It is clear President Putin is in it to win it. He has no 
other option. Our strategic objective, therefore, must be a 
Ukrainian victory on Kyiv's terms. To achieve this there is 
much we must do. It is in our vital interest to do so.
    Together with our European and global partners, we must 
give Ukraine decisive advantages in munition stockpiles, rates 
and ranges of fires, speed and skill of maneuver, air defense, 
air offense, and intelligence while compensating for Ukraine's 
relative lack of manpower and Russia's resurgent defense 
industry bolstered by the unholy alliance of China, Iran, and 
North Korea.
    We must also find ways for Ukraine to hold Russian forces 
at risk wherever they may be. Time is of the essence. This 
summer may be decisive. By the fall it could all be over. 
Therefore, we must rapidly adapt before it is too late. 
Strategic and operational success requires that we do three 
things.
    First, clearly and publicly state our strategic objective, 
the defeat of Russia, so we can comprehensively plan for 
success and let Mr. Putin know he cannot win.
    Second, we need to substantially resupply Kyiv in the next 
weeks to two months where a Russian breakthrough on the 
battlefield is possible. Russia has the initiative. The 300-
plus missile and drone attack on Israel on April 13 happens 
every week in Ukraine but with greater ferocity.
    Third, we need to intelligently tailor our assistance to a 
specific strategy and plan that will bring victory to Ukraine. 
Ukraine cannot win on defense. They must take the fight to the 
enemy. Rapid resupply from our own stocks is imperative on par 
with the 1973 resupply of Israel during the Yom Kippur War.
    We need to give Ukraine a Patriot battery now. This could 
be the difference between winning in the long run or losing 
this summer. Ukraine needs more weapons and better tactics. To 
provide the weapons we should fully exploit the Defense 
Production Act and appoint a weapons czar to bring the industry 
in line with our strategic objective.
    Russia's economy is on a war footing. Ours is not. We can 
help Ukraine help itself. American companies should partner 
with Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian warehouses are full of damaged 
equipment. American companies can repair this equipment.
    A specific strategy and plan for victory includes tactics 
and knowing how to beat your enemy. Tactics inform 
requirements. Combining existing methods in innovative ways can 
be decisive.
    To that end, former NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose 
Gottemoeller and I wrote an article in Foreign Policy titled 
"Ukraine has a Pathway to Victory" that lays out how Ukrainian 
forces can recombine existing tactics and technologies into a 
new scheme of maneuver based on our Cold War Joint Air Attack 
Team, or JAAT, concept. As Russian forces move out from behind 
their prepared defenses, the updated eJAAT, as we call it, is 
an ideal counteroffensive tactic to blunt and defeat their 
advance. To win, Ukraine needs localized and temporary air and 
electromagnetic superiority at points of its own choosing. 
Fighter unmanned aerial vehicles that can autonomously find and 
destroy Russian surveillance and attack drones, could sweep the 
skies. Such systems should be rapidly developed and fielded.
    Ukrainian "Wild Weasel" missions for suppression of enemy 
air defense are already active using U.S.-provided missiles and 
with the support of the eJAAT. The F-16 will enhance the 
effectiveness of this mission. The threat of Russian aircraft 
could be mitigated by UAVs, such as MQ-9s armed with air-to-air 
missiles. European leaders are now suggesting that NATO air 
defense could help clear the skies in Western Ukraine.
    Electromagnetic superiority is a thornier problem. The work 
under the DOD Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy 
should be fully exploited.
    All this we must do--and more. For the want of a nail, the 
horse was lost. If Ukraine loses, which they could very well do 
this summer, the very expensive and dangerous implications are 
that, in his newly acquired position of strength, President 
Putin will not negotiate. Rather, he will push for total 
victory. His air force and navy are largely intact, as are his 
Strategic Rocket Forces. If Ukraine loses, tens of thousands of 
Russian troops will be on the borders of Poland, Slovakia, 
Hungary, and Romania. The Black Sea will be a Russian lake. 
Russia will no longer be fighting Ukraine and degrading its own 
capabilities, but instead, its wartime economy will be 
restoring its strength, particularly in drones, cruise 
missiles, and hypersonics, which threaten all of NATO's 
European territory.
    Most destabilizing in the short term would be the five to 
15 million Ukrainian refugees flooding into Europe. In the long 
term, the damage to U.S. and NATO credibility will affect the 
Middle East, Africa, and most importantly, Taiwan and the South 
China Sea. The entire global security dynamic will change. 
NATO's 75th Anniversary Summit is this July in Washington. 
Ukraine back on the offensive would be the perfect backdrop; 
Ukraine in retreat would not.
    China is watching. The world is watching. The choice is 
ours. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 
Indeed, each of your statements--it is so refreshing. I agree 
with everything you said, okay? I have never been to a hearing 
like that.
    Then it would be interesting to find out now if people of 
another political party feel the same way, so I will refer to 
opening statements by Congressman Cohen.

      STATEMENT OF STEVE COHEN, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TENNESSEE

    Representative Cohen: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I do not know 
if I need--really need to do an opening statement. I would just 
as soon move into the five minutes and just do that now.
    Chairman Wilson: You see what a great team member he is, 
and another team member is here all the way from Indiana, and 
that is Congresswoman Victoria Spartz, Indiana by way of 
Ukraine. We are delighted to have Congresswoman Spartz here.
    We will begin with the five minutes, and hold everybody--
beginning with me--to the five minutes.
    Indeed, your comments were so important, but my hopes for 
the people of Ukraine--when I was there in December, before the 
invasion, it was--at that time, the planning was for resistance 
and guerrilla warfare. Well, the people of Ukraine have done so 
much better than that, and so just perceived that they could be 
overrun with mass slaughter. The people of Ukraine stood firm, 
and so we need to be doing that.
    Then I appreciate, indeed, something that all of us have 
seen, and that is that we are talking about Ukraine, but it 
goes far beyond, and the implications are really clear. We have 
been together at the Narva River there in Estonia, and war 
criminal Putin--one time by accident a couple of months ago--by 
accident said how much he really appreciated Narva. You know, 
he does. That is called--NATO it is called Article 5, and we 
need to avoid it.
    Then as specific as you were talking, and that is, with 
Transnistria of Moldova, with obsession with Abkhazia of 
Georgia, he already illegally occupies other countries. With 
4,000 troops in Armenia that are there for peacekeeping, they 
could be an occupation force so, it just keeps on going.
    For people not to realize the implications of how far this 
could go--and so many of us--and you are going to see it, I 
believe--and that is, it is bipartisan. I truly want Mr. Biden 
to succeed, and I am glad about the change of policy about the 
long-range missiles. I am hoping for other policies. I hope for 
expediting equipment. Then I am really pleased--bipartisan--we 
had--I would say we would get 300 votes for aid; no, it was 
311, and so--and Speaker Mike Johnson did a great job.
    Over and over again, it has been bipartisan. President 
Trump himself placed Javelin missiles in Ukraine to try to 
deter this. President Trump put American troops in Poland--so 
historically significant--and President Trump is the one who 
warned Angela Merkel that Nord Stream 2 was going to finance 
the capitulation of Western civilization to Putin.
    Over and over again, we see coming together--and beginning 
when--and Nataliya, I would like your point of view on the 
impact that you see--how important for success for the people 
of Ukraine.
    Ms. Bugayova: Thank you.I think two points on that--first 
of all, for Ukraine, this remains to be an existential war, and 
the choice is actually very simple, and it has never been just 
about choosing between Russia and the West. The choice remains 
about the way of life, and we see the two ways of life that 
Ukraine is choosing between on two sides of the front line: On 
one side a Russian occupation where you have atrocities on a 
daily basis committed against civilians, where you have 
extrajudicial killings, torture, deportation; and then on the 
other side you have Ukraine, that is free, unoccupied, and as 
imperfect as it is, striving to be a better state every day. 
Therefore, what stands in between those two ways of life is 
essentially Ukrainian armed forces, supported by the population 
of Ukraine, and its partners like the United States. For 
Ukraine, the choice remains clear.
    I think there is a lot more at stake in this war than the 
existence of Ukraine, as we discussed, including vital U.S. 
national security interests, but also the future of NATO 
because, as you know well, Article 5, or NATO border, are not 
magic shields, and NATO's decision-making depends very much on 
the perceptions and assessments of individual member states, on 
the credibility of other member states in the alliance.
    Chairman Wilson: Hear, hear. Ambassador?
    Mr. Herbst: Again, I agree with what Nataliya said. The 
Ukrainian people have no choice. Putin has made clear--and our 
intelligence agencies brilliantly picked this up before the big 
invasion--their intention to impose their vision of what 
Ukrainians should be, which is--to use a historic and not 
much--appreciated phrase in Ukraine--little Russians, not to 
have their own identity as a separate people.
    We see this in the brutal war crimes that are being 
conducted in occupied Ukraine against Ukrainians who want to 
speak the Ukrainian language, and who do not want to worship in 
the Russian Orthodox Church, so Ukraine had no choice. The 
people understand that, and even though they are suffering 
greatly, they do not have an alternative but to fight on 
because, as the former leader and her son said to me 18 months 
ago, living under Russian bombs is bad, but living under 
Russian occupation is far worse.
    They are in this to the end, and they will win if we 
provide the necessary support--which again, as all three of us 
have made clear--is critical to American interests. It is a 
smart way to deal with a rogue nuclear superpower.
    Chairman Wilson: Hear, hear.
    Mr. Herbst: Beat them in Ukraine.
    Chairman Wilson: Hear, hear.
    Mr. Secretary?
    Mr. Ryan: Sir, I completely agree with the two other 
witnesses. I would just add, as an attacker, Russia has two 
choices because Ukraine is fighting for its survival. It can 
either capitulate or annihilate, and they are on track to try 
to annihilate, and therefore it is extremely important that we 
do everything possible now to prevent that from happening. 
Thank you.
    Chairman Wilson: Thank you so much, I am really grateful 
that we have been joined by Congressman Jim Costa from 
California, and I am really grateful that we have with us 
Senator Richard Blumenthal, all the way from Rhode Island.
    Senator Blumenthal: Connecticut.
    Chairman Wilson: That is okay--[laughter]--it is one of 
those assorted--hey, it is one of those assorted northeastern 
states, okay? [Laughter.] They get confused.
    Aside from that, before I embarrass myself again, we will 
proceed now. We have--beginning with Congressman Cohen.
    Representative Cohen: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Let me ask--we started off--first, let me say what I think 
is--Ambassador Herbst, did you say that Congress moved the 
administration along to get the security bill passed?
    Mr. Herbst: No. What I was referring to was they said that 
the--excuse me, the bill that was passed encouraged the 
administration to send--[off mic]. Now, of course, the 
administration sent--
    Representative Cohen: No, I am not talking about that; I am 
talking about the security package. I thought you said that 
Congress had done some things, and one of the things they did 
was they helped the administration get that.
    Regardless, the administration was for it; Congress was 
slow, and if it were not for Congress, we could have got that 
done three months earlier. Okay, good. Pass without a--
    Chairman Wilson: We all agree.
    Representative Cohen: Yes, let me ask you this. We started 
off with the sanctions. Do you think the sanctions worked?
    Mr. Herbst: I do not have any doubt that the sanctions have 
cost the Russian economy 2 or 3 percent of growth annually, and 
perhaps a little bit less over time as Moscow has adjusted to 
it and Moscow's pals have adjusted to it. What it has not done, 
of course, is force Putin to end the war.
    There is a lot of controversy about statistics regarding 
Russian economic growth. You could say according to 
[IMF]International Monetary Fund and the World Bank the Russian 
economy grew more than 3 percent last year. The problem is that 
those statistics are essentially based on Russian economic 
numbers. Russia puts out statistics designed to meet the 
political needs of the government.
    Representative Cohen: Kind of like Hamas and Palestine 
saying how many children have been killed every week.
    Mr. Herbst: Civilian casualties. U.N. agencies accept it as 
real.
    Representative Cohen: Well, last week the U.N. said that 
they were not right and there were about 5,000 people that they 
said were dead, they have no conclusion that is dead and that 
the children were a greater number than ever. The New York 
Times just had not picked up on that yet.
    Mr. Herbst: Indeed.
    Representative Cohen: Anyway, so sanctions, you think they 
have helped.
    Mr. Herbst: Correct.
    Representative Cohen: Nevertheless, they were not the 
panacea. They did not effectively kill the Russians--
    Mr. Herbst: The advocates for sanctions were not saying 
they would be a panacea. They were saying they would place an 
immediate and a long-term cost. Perhaps the most effective of 
the sanctions, although not as effective as we like, have been 
the technology control sanctions. They have clearly made it 
much harder for Moscow to develop weapons, or rather to produce 
weapons that are effective. Of course, they are finding ways 
around it, especially with help from China.
    Representative Cohen: I agree with you we need to have--
allow Ukraine to use weapons to go into Russia. It makes no 
sense, them coming and destroying all of the utilities, energy 
sources, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and then Ukraine's 
got their hands tied behind their back. Putin's not thinking 
nicely of us--we give $60 billion; he is going to think, oh, 
but we let them shoot weapons into Belgorod or whatever it is 
called.
    Mr. Herbst: There is no doubt about that. All of us agree 
on it. I would just note that when the House finally passed the 
aid package, a lot of people in Moscow were unhappy and they 
did not hide it.
    Representative Cohen: I am sure they were unhappy. Let me 
ask you this: We passed the aid package. We need to get them 
weapons on the front line to protect Kharkiv and areas on their 
eastern front, but at the same time, we need to get them the 
Patriot missiles and defensive missiles. Do we have any idea 
what is been prioritized and what has not?
    Mr. Herbst: Sadly, our--we are providing merely missiles 
for Patriot batteries, as opposed to batteries themselves.
    Representative Cohen: Oh.
    Mr. Herbst: I think--I am not an expert on this but I 
believe we have like 19 or 20 Patriot batteries ourselves. I do 
not know if we believe we can spare that. Some of those are 
protecting our troops in the Middle East so that is work that 
has to be done. They need to be there. We know that some of our 
allies who are not in any danger right now have one or two or 
three that could be provided. I think the administration could 
be stronger in pushing for that.
    Representative Cohen: Yes, I think--I think it was Romania 
offered some of their batteries, one of the Eastern Bloc 
countries.
    Mr. Ryan, do you have any thoughts on that, about the 
ability to get them batteries or Patriot missiles, defensive 
missiles?
    Mr. Ryan: Yes, sir. The most important near-term thing we 
could do: Spain has a Patriot battery in Turkey; it is been 
there for a long time. We could get the Spanish to move that 
into Ukraine and then we could put one of our batteries there, 
which helps us in the Middle East with the problem Ambassador 
Herbst was talking about. That we could do fairly quickly.
    Representative Cohen: Thank you. Thank you.
    I appreciate what is been done. Are you from Russia?
    Ms. Bugayova: No, I am not. I am an American and I grew up 
in Ukraine.
    Representative Cohen: You grew up in Ukraine. Okay, well 
there was something in there, your biography, that made me 
think about that and I was just thinking about Vladimir Kara-
Murza and how much--he is still imprisoned and we need to get 
him free and it is awful. I mean, Russia just--thank you.
    Yield back.
    Chairman Wilson: I do not want to ruin Congressman Cohen's 
reputation but he was thinking of Vladimir Kara-Murza and I was 
thinking of Alexei Navalny, so there are brave Russians.
    With this, we now proceed to--this is bipartisan, 
bicameral, and so we are so grateful to have Senator Richard 
Blumenthal, Connecticut. You all are familiar with that. It is 
the Nutmeg State. [Laughter.]

 STATEMENT OF RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, U.S. SENATE, FROM CONNECTICUT

    Senator Blumenthal: Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate 
your letting me ask just a few questions and the courtesy of my 
House colleagues. Thank you for conducting this hearing.
    Thank you for being here. Each of you has very 
extraordinary knowledge and experience in this area, and I 
think you are united in the sense that we need to defeat 
Russia. Our own national security is at stake, and we ought to 
do everything possible.
    I want to ask you about something unrelated to the arms. I 
think we need to do more long-range artillery, the F-16s, 
whatever is necessary to extend the field of battle, even into 
Russian territory, so as to disrupt their command and their 
supply of weapons, and we need to do it quickly because 
obviously, the offensive is coming. But there are two areas 
where I would like you to comment.
    Number one: How effective have our sanctions been? On the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in the Senate, we are 
doing an investigation of violations of sanctions, how 
countries like Uzbekistan--you are very familiar with that 
country, Mr. Ambassador--are potentially, whether purposefully 
or unwittingly, providing a means for sending semiconductors, 
parts, components that have been found in the weapons used 
against Ukraine. They have been found by the Ukrainians. Last 
time I was in Ukraine I sat across from President Zelensky. I 
have been there five times and met with him over each of those 
meetings, and the last time he handed me photographs, and 
documents in a file on what they found in terms of components 
and parts made by Americans in Russian weapons.
    The second relates to financial resources that we could 
use, Russian assets. The REPO Act--you may be familiar with 
it--endeavors to take--seize and use those Russian assets to 
support Ukraine, and whether there is more we can do to push 
our allies in Europe to side with us in this effort. I think 
they have been the reluctant party. Our government was 
reluctant for a long time but I think they have demonstrated 
more resolve.
    Mr. Herbst: There is no question that there have been 
unusual changes, increase in trade between, say, Kyrgyzstan and 
Russia, some of the other Central Asian republics and Russia, 
Georgia, and Russia, maybe Turkey and Russia, and they may well 
be explained by sanctions evasion. Therefore, yes, we need to--
we need to have a very serious conversation with all of the 
countries in question--of course, with China, which apparently 
Secretary Blinken did a few weeks ago. In fact, Chinese-Russian 
trade dipped somewhat in March and April, which may have 
reflected those efforts. We need to do more, for sure. For 
sure. Because Russia is not really high-tech in the way we are, 
and so they need those components to run their weapons so, we 
should do more.
    On the frozen Russian state assets, I agree with you. We 
need to do a lot more on this. I credit the administration, 
Daleep Singh, for his initiative, which is to allow the use of 
interest--20 years' worth of interest from the 300 billion of 
frozen state assets, so they can--Ukraine could receive $50 
billion in the next few months if everybody agreed. Sadly, this 
is the U.S.--I mean, it is good it is the U.S. position; my 
understanding is that London and Ottawa are also in favor of 
this, and the rest of the G-7 are not. I know that Singh has 
been arduously pushing this agenda. I think he could use some 
help from the most senior members of the administration, 
starting with his boss, Secretary Yellen, but also the 
president. I think if we pushed hard, we might be able to 
persuade our allies to do this.
    I also think that this is an even better idea than the one 
that Daleep Singh is pushing. This is an idea associated with 
Philip Zelikow, Bob Zoellick, and Larry Summers, to simply 
transfer almost all of that 300 billion to Ukraine. There 
have--there is a justification for this. I know that there is 
interest in this elsewhere. However, if we could start with 
what I call the Singh issue, that would be wonderful. To the 
extent that Congress can encourage the administration to use 
its vast influence to persuade the allies, that would be 
welcome.
    Senator Blumenthal: Thank you.
    Ms. Bugayova: I would add, on the sanctions part, I think 
the core question is how do we assess the effectiveness of the 
sanctions, and whether we assess them on trying to affect 
Russia's intent to wage the war, or Russia's actual capability 
to wage the war. I think if we try to assess from the 
perspective of intent, that is not necessarily the most helpful 
metric, because Russia's objectives remain maximalist. Very few 
things are capable of changing them.
    However, sanctions certainly degraded Russia's ability to 
an extent to conduct the war. Russia's defense industrial base 
and its ability to surge its production is not without 
constraint, and it is not without limitation. I think the issue 
is that the sanctions are A, insufficient; second, it is--a lot 
of it is cat-and-mouse, as Russia adapts to the sanctions. For 
them to be more effective, they have to be increasingly 
proactive, and they have to be increasingly tied with other 
efforts, including the military campaign, the questions of the 
global contested logistics, and the question of the Russian 
shadow fleet. It is a question of proactiveness and 
comprehensiveness. But they certainly have an effect on 
Russia's ability to sustain the war.
    Senator Blumenthal: Thank you.
    Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, Senator.
    Senator Blumenthal: Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Wilson: Indeed, we have discovered the senator 
from Rhode Island--[laughter]--okay, Senator Sheldon.
    Senator Whitehouse: It is quite near Connecticut. 
[Laughter.]
    Chairman Wilson: Might I--
    Senator Whitehouse: Kind of our western suburb, in fact. 
[Laughter.]
    Chairman Wilson: Hey, that--
    Senator Blumenthal: I want to just tell my colleague from 
Rhode Island that I was mistaken for him--
    Chairman Wilson: No, no--no--no, no--the--hey, the--please, 
the states were confused. Because of the assorted northeastern 
states. We cannot remember all of them, okay? [Laughter.]
    Senator Blumenthal: They were all so close together, right?
    Chairman Wilson: Quite close.
    Keeping all this in order, somehow, I want to--indeed, we 
are delighted, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, who is going to soon 
be the incoming co-chair of the OSCE. What a northern gentleman 
he is. He is going to be deferring to Congresswoman Virginia--
Victoria Spartz of Indiana.

     STATEMENT OF VICTORIA SPARTZ, U.S. HOUSE, FROM INDIANA

    Representative Spartz: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I will try to make a brief statement. My question is going 
to have quick five parts. I mean, from my perspective, we 
either did not have a strategy or had a bad strategy, because 
the situation tilted in the direction of Russia.
    You know, so in five items, I want to get your assessment 
of where we are positive and negative on these five items 
related to Ukraine. You know, I understand Ukraine did a lot of 
changes. They changed generals, and a lot of things happened. 
They still did not put the country in war mode. Russia did; 
Ukraine did not. Can you assess what is happening in Ukraine?
    The United States. Obviously, we did not give--[laughs]--
you know, the cluster munitions for no reason. We also did not 
really supply--resupply and did not put our industry in the 
proper mode to be able to have even--if we plan to have long 
wars, which I do not think is a good idea. I think decisiveness 
and speed benefit the West much more.
    Then China, what is happening in China, your assessment of 
where they are with this. They facilitated this war for Russia.
    Europe. Europe does a lot of grandiose talk, but generally, 
all ends in grandiose talk and a lot of statements.
    Then the rest of the world and Global South, what is 
happening in Africa, Global South, and the rest of the world. 
What are the dynamics right there?
    On these five items--Ukraine, USA, Europe, China, Global 
South, and the rest of the world--if you can just--we can start 
maybe with Mr. Ryan.
    Mr. Ryan: Thank you. Perfect. Clearly, they are all 
related. As was said earlier, Ukraine, the situation there is 
the center of gravity for our interests, and the interests of 
our allies and partners in Europe, and in the Asia-Pacific 
region.
    Start with the Global South: They are watching. They are 
being played by both China and Russia, who are both trying to 
change the rules-based world order to one more favorable to 
autocracy, and they are offering autocracy as a better way to 
meet the needs of the people and ensure peace in the world. 
That is a narrative that we have to defeat. Defeating Russia in 
Ukraine will help us defeat that narrative.
    In Europe, the narrative has not taken place. Europe has 
transitioned significantly, as Ambassador Herbst said earlier, 
well beyond what we thought they would do. They are slowly 
getting things forward, but I would note the Germans are now 
putting together an initiative across Europe for air defense in 
Ukraine. Therefore, there are some positive signs coming 
forward.
    China is playing its own game, of course. They need Russia 
to be able to push their narrative around the world, that they 
are the best form of government, and everyone should be like 
them. Without Russia, that is going to start to fall on deaf 
ears, and China's interests will be lessened.
    Now, in the United States, we are starting to come to 
grips, as we always do, slowly--but now that we are getting 
together on the same sheet of music if you will, we have the 
opportunity to invoke our industrial might, as we have in the 
past. Because this next year on the ground in Ukraine, is going 
to be an industrial competition between what Russia can do with 
Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean support, and what we can do 
with our European friends. We really need to move forward in 
that area.
    In Ukraine, as we all know, Ukraine has done a spectacular 
job. The beginning of your question, I think, was exactly 
right. We did not start with a strategy. At first, we thought 
Ukraine would lose, then when they started to win, we were late 
to need, and we were not able to reinforce their success. That 
gave the Russians time to dig in. Then we just assumed that the 
Russians were going to be bad forever, and the Ukrainians were 
undefeatable. The counteroffensive did not go as planned, 
because we did not diligently get in there, and tie our 
assistance to the strategy and the tactics employed on the 
ground. Now, it is a moment of reset, and everyone is looking. 
We need to reset correctly and go on the offensive as soon as 
possible. In the very near term, we need to get as much 
assistance, as intelligently as possible, to the forces in 
Ukraine so that they can start to turn the tide.
    Representative Spartz: What--if you would say, what top 
three things that need to be done in the immediate term better? 
What needs to be done? Three things, if you just--
    Mr. Ryan: We need to provide long-range fires for the 
Ukrainian military, so they can interdict Russian forces 
wherever they are, including in the Russian Federation, in 
order to stop the destruction of Kharkiv, and to regain the 
initiative. Because once Russia can no longer supply its 
troops, and they can no longer sustain their command and 
control--in other words, we can--Ukraine can destroy their 
headquarters--then the Ukrainian army is more motivated and 
better trained, and they will start to prevail.
    The next thing is to provide air defense because we need to 
protect Ukrainian cities and the Ukrainian population. The 
third thing is we need to get in, with the Ukrainians, provide 
a strategy for victory, one that is tied to our industrial 
support, our political support, our ability to marshal allies, 
particularly in Europe, to align the Europeans' effort to areas 
where we are not as strong as they are, and they can get in and 
do it as well.
    Also, listen to our Eastern European counterparts, because 
they know the situation better than anybody. They were proven 
right.
    Representative Spartz: Right. I know the strategy not to 
lose if you--how might lose, but you will never win. You have 
to have a strategy and action to win.
    Mr. Ryan: Exactly.
    Representative Spartz: Thank you so much, sir.
    My time has expired, so I yield back.
    Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, Congresswoman Spartz.
    We will now proceed to Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode 
Island.

STATEMENT OF SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, U.S. SENATE, FROM RHODE ISLAND

    Senator Whitehouse: Thanks very much, Chairman.
    While I am here among so many House members, may I take a 
moment to thank all of you for seeing to it that the REPO Bill 
got into the supplemental. I know it is always a little bit of 
a challenge when House members have to put a Senate bill into 
something that they have been working on. Chairman Wilson, you 
all should know, was an extremely powerful voice for getting 
that done.
    Chairman Wilson: Thank you.
    Senator Whitehouse: A sponsor of the bill over on this 
side. I just want to express appreciation to the House in 
general for achieving that, and to the Chairman in particular--
    Chairman Wilson: Thank you.
    Senator Whitehouse: For his leadership and oomph, to get 
that done.
    Ambassador Ryan, I am delighted to hear--[laughs]--you 
think that we would add strategic value to the Ukrainians as 
they find their way to victory. So far, we have managed to--
seem to have gotten most things wrong. I hope that, as we 
support the Ukrainians on their path to victory, we are a lot 
more humble about deferring to their good judgments, rather 
than insisting on our own. We do not have much a--of a track 
record right now, beginning with that horrible, huge briefing 
over in the joint secure space here, in which every single 
member of the executive branch said they had five days to two 
weeks, and then it was all done. There were people in the 
audience who did not believe that. I was one of them, and sure 
enough, here we are.
    Senator Blumenthal : I remember it well.
    Senator Whitehouse: I am trying to--yes, was not that an 
awful moment?
    Anyway, on--right now, I think a key focus is air defense. 
I am not a defense expert, a strategy expert, a weapons expert. 
What do you think is the best place to go for a comparison 
between what Ukraine has, and what it needs to provide its own 
Iron Dome-equivalent, to be able to defend its territory from 
air attack most effectively? Is there some published resource 
that is best at that? Or who should I ask?
    If you know, just go ahead and give me the answer. I 
suspect this is not the panel for that detailed question.
    Mr. Ryan: Thank you for the question, sir. I would 
suggest--General Dave Allvin, the chief of staff of the United 
States Air Force. I used to sit beside him every day when we 
were stationed together at U.S. European Command. He gets it.
    Air defense is a layered--a multisystem approach.
    Senator Whitehouse: Yes.
    Mr. Ryan: Therefore, at the high altitude, to intercept the 
most dangerous payloads, that have the largest bang, Patriot is 
absolutely outstanding for that.
    Senator Whitehouse: Yes.
    Mr. Ryan: Some of the European systems, including former 
Soviet-made systems, like the S-300, all integrate it together, 
so to have the launchers is necessary. To have the radar that 
can see through the clutter of the electromagnetic jamming, so 
that they can then engage those targets, is extremely 
important. Then ground-based air defense, so nearer into the 
targets, to get that last mile. The way the Israelis do it, is 
the Iron Dome, then they have David's Sling, which is the next 
layer out. Then they have the David--the Arrow system--
    Senator Whitehouse: Yes.
    Mr. Ryan: --Which is even further, and then we supplement 
that with our own assets.
    It has to be layered. It has to be supported by outstanding 
radars. It has to have an electromagnetic aspect to it. 
However, General Allvin can give you the best answers on that.
    Senator Whitehouse: I could not help but notice that when 
Iran rocketed Israel, a phalanx of allies was able to come 
together, and pretty much knock every missile out of the sky. 
That was a stark comparison to what Ukraine is experiencing.
    In your view, if 10 is the best-quality interception and 
defense capability against incoming artillery and missiles, 
where have we left Ukraine right now, in terms of the 
equipment? Are they at two? Are they at four? Are they at six? 
How big is the hole that we need to fill to protect their 
skies?
    Mr. Ryan: The answer varies based on geography. Kyiv is a 
10. Other parts of Ukraine are a two. It is the scope and 
scale, and what Russia has been doing is trying to get maximum 
effect in areas that have the least amount of defense. To 
have--as Ambassador Herbst mentioned earlier--nine Patriot 
batteries forward, really is the way you protect the rest of 
Ukraine. It is like a hockey goalie coming out of the goal.
    Senator Whitehouse: Yes.
    Mr. Ryan: You take--you cut the angles down, and then you 
can defend with less. We need to do that. That means we need to 
have security forward, which means the Ukrainian army--as they 
push forward, we can push the air defense forward. It is that 
capability that we are after.
    Senator Whitehouse: Did you notice the hockey goalie 
example, for New--for New--we New Englanders? [Laughter.] [Fed 
?] right to us.
    Chairman Wilson: Yes, you and Tom Emmer an example to me 
later. [Laughter.]
    Senator Whitehouse: All right.
    Well, thank you all very much. I think if there has been 
one concern that I have had, it is that we have always been 
there to give the Ukrainians what they needed, and we have 
always been there six months late. I hope that we can pick up 
our pace so that they are not crying for Javelins, and then 
crying for HIMARS, and then crying for Abrams, and crying for 
ATACMS, and crying for 300s, and now F-16s--always there, 
always late, seems to be our practice. I hope we can fix that.
    Thank you very much, Chairman.
    Chairman Wilson: Hey, thank you so much, soon-to-be Ranking 
Co-Chair.
    Very important, very perceptive, as an identification of 
the phalanx of countries coming together. One of those, 
incredibly enough, was France. I was really grateful, last 
week, to be with the senator for the 80th anniversary reception 
at the French ambassador's residence. As an indication that all 
Americans should see how Europe is coming together, at home is 
a huge copy of the Statue of Liberty. On this, at the 
ambassador's residence, is also a Ukrainian flag. If the people 
wonder about countries coming--Europe coming together, it is 
real, and we have had the opportunity to see that.
    Also, real--I want to credit Congressman Marc Veasey for 
his being here first. Congressman Veasey.
    Representative Veasey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to 
thank the panel for being here, as well.
    I was hoping that you could give us some examples--because 
I think that this is important, as we sort of move forward, 
when we have to come back for--and ask for funding in the 
future. Can you provide some really specific examples of how 
the bipartisan foreign aid package that was passed, how it is 
already tangibly helped Ukraine against capabilities for 
Russia's unlawful invasion? Is there anything that is very 
tangible, that we can like, take away, and go back and share 
with our constituents?
    Mr. Herbst: Tangible. There is no question that once the 
bill passed the House, right, before it became law, Ukraine 
began to reduce its rationing of ammunition and other weapons 
supplies. It took another step towards reduced rationing after 
the bill became law, and the administration has moved, I think, 
almost as quickly as possible, to get stuff out. Would still--
they are still a way in the hole because we are months behind 
but, they have done things.
    Beyond that, it is hard to say. Well, actually, there are 
two other points. The Russians were clearly deeply unhappy 
about this. They were sort of counting on this to continue. 
However this had--may have had a perverse impact on their 
operations. They see this as a window closing, and this may 
have persuaded them to push a little bit harder, especially in 
the northeast around Kharkiv. However, that is the only--that 
is the only thing I can see.
    Representative Veasey: Yes. Yes.
    Ms. Bugayova: I can--I can elaborate on that point.
    Representative Veasey: Yes, please.
    Ms. Bugayova: I think three additional points. First of 
all, before the aid package was passed, actually, we were in a 
moment where the range of possibilities was exceptionally wide. 
It actually included the most dangerous scenario, of Russia 
essentially putting Ukrainian forces on the path of collapse. 
With the aid package being passed, that most dangerous scenario 
is not presently on the table, and it reset the range of 
outcomes that are possible in this war, that still includes 
Ukraine's victory.
    I think secondly, more concretely, the aid package is also 
exceptionally important for Ukraine's ability to plan 
operations ahead. Third, it does matter also for Ukraine's 
ability to resolve its manpower issues. Ukraine has taken 
concrete steps legislatively and practically, but having the 
ability to plan around concrete aid deliveries will also help 
units who have limited capabilities to be able to relieve from 
the front, and essentially participate in training. It is also 
very important for the manpower planning component.
    Representative Veasey: Thank you very much. Yes, that is 
very helpful.
    Ambassador and Mr. Ryan, I was hoping that maybe you could 
also tell us what sort of dangers, or problems may occur for 
Russia's sustained use of Iranian and North Korean weaponry and 
technology in this conflict. I know that there has been some 
talk about that and was hoping that you could shed some light 
on how that may further--or how that could hurt us in the 
future if they are going to continue to use these weapons, and 
how that is giving Russia, or any of these other countries, 
some sort of a military advantage.
    Mr. Ryan: Thank you, Congressman.
    Proliferation around the world of these types of weapons, 
that contribute to instability in Africa, South America, and 
other parts of the world, generally comes from North Korea and 
Iran. By funding their arms production, through Russian 
acquisition, the Russians are actually enabling their ability 
to be more disruptive in more places in the world, which 
creates a greater problem for us. President Putin early on 
decided--and this was in Secretary Ash Carter's memoirs--that 
he needed to oppose U.S. policy everywhere in the world and 
create as many problems for us as he could. Using North Korean 
and Iranian proliferation of weapons does that. When we look at 
the domino effect of coups in Africa, it is directly related 
back to that Russian policy dictated by President Putin, and as 
enabled by Iranian and North Korean shipments.
    Representative Veasey: Okay.
    Mr. Herbst: I would add that Iran has long sought more 
advanced Russian weapons technology--planes, and missiles. The 
Russians have been somewhat reluctant to do that. Yet, Russia 
has been dependent on Iranian drones since Month Two of the big 
invasion. This has enhanced Iranian leverage to, for example, 
maybe get the technology, and start producing more and more 
advanced Russian jets with Iran.
    As far as I know, this has not happened yet. This is--I 
mean--I mean, you can--you can go to the intel community, and 
find out where this stands. This is certainly something Iran is 
trying to get from Russia, and for that matter, the North 
Koreans, as well. When Putin went hat in hand for artillery 
from North Korea, a lot of which are to have proved to be duds, 
the North Koreans were also asking about ramping up their 
missile technology with Russia. I am not sure the Russians have 
done anything yet. Again, this stuff is in play.
    Representative Veasey: Yes. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, Congressman Veasey.
    Again, I want to recognize Congressman Veasey as the first 
person here, so that should be remembered. We appreciate it.
    As we conclude, it really is--I hope people see 
symbolically that what we have is--again, recognition from 
California, with Jim Costa.

      STATEMENT OF JIM COSTA, U.S. HOUSE, FROM CALIFORNIA

    Representative Costa: I wanted to thank--
    Chairman Wilson: Now, I want to point out, that he is with 
the Trans-Atlantic Dialogue, okay? He is very perceptive.
    Thank you.
    Representative Costa: Well, thank you very much, my friend. 
I appreciate your leadership, as was noted before, on these 
efforts.
    I think there is a lot of consensus here, is what we are 
hearing. I think learning the lessons of the last two-and-a-
half years is what is critical for the purpose of the testimony 
here. As we go forward, not to recount, well, if we coulda, 
shoulda, woulda, that is fine but, that is in the past.
    My questions are directed toward the short term, with the 
passage of this package, and the longer term, and how we put 
together a concentrated bipartisan effort to support Ukraine. 
We have got 10 members of their parliament here this week. They 
are aggressively trying to seek support, both in the short term 
and the long term, as we all should be doing. I have worked 
with two of you here before. We have gone to Ukraine several 
times, three times for me in the last 18 months. Just came back 
in February.
    My question is, how do we focus on doing everything we can? 
The administration is, as has been noted, has done the right 
thing, but oftentimes, three and six months too late. This 
micromanaging, this tending of micromanaging the Ukrainians' 
efforts from the West Wing has got to change. I do not know 
what advice you might have to suggest on how we do that in a 
way that does not politicize this thing because obviously, that 
will have other impacts that we--I do not want to see take 
place.
    What would your priorities be? Ms. Bugayova, we will start 
with you, in terms of recommendations to us in Congress, in 
terms of short-term and long-term efforts and priorities? I 
want to ask the same question with you, my friend, Ambassador 
Herbst.
    I want to end with Mr. Ryan there on F-16s.
    Ms. Bugayova: Thank you.
    To recap, I think there are concrete steps, and also a 
change in approach that is required, based on the lessons 
learned from the last two years. I think the concrete steps are 
providing Ukraine with what it needs to help Ukraine restore 
its ability to maneuver on the battlefield. That is the 
priority, which requires a lot more ground-based long-range 
strike capabilities.
    We discussed about denying Russia sanctuary space, and that 
is to the question of air defense that was asked earlier. No 
amount of Patriot batteries will solve the glide bomb problem 
that Russia is--that Ukraine is experiencing right now in 
Kharkiv. Ukraine has to be able to strike Russian targets 
inside of Russia.
    Representative Costa: No, absolutely. I mean, this is the--
they are offensive. They are the aggressor, and I do not see 
how you can conduct any legitimate counter-strategy without 
doing that.
    Ms. Bugayova: Yes. I will say, the final point, in terms of 
the change of the approach, as we learned, the decision-making 
speed is a critical asset in this war. I think it, for the 
U.S., is really important to be able to connect the ground 
truth to our capabilities and interests fast enough. That 
requires expanding knowledge-sharing with Ukrainians, including 
potentially expanding U.S. ground presence in Ukraine, 
recognizing that decision-making speed will determine the 
outcome of this war, very much so, as well.
    Representative Costa: Thank you.
    We will follow up, Ambassador Herbst.
    Mr. Herbst: It would start with the administration wanting 
victory as a policy goal, and deciding it was a critical 
interest of the United States to accelerate that victory. When 
we--when we--when we talk about our--when we talk to Ukraine 
about their campaign plans, we follow the battlefield closely. 
We send them the weapons they need to achieve the objectives 
that we understand make sense to win this war quickly. You need 
to have someone at a--at a very senior level in the 
administration, maybe even a special--a special manager for the 
overall Ukrainian--win the Ukrainian war effort. They are--they 
make sure that weapons that Ukraine needs are gotten there in 
time, that we are looking proactively to how we can help with 
this, as opposed to waiting for simply Ukrainian requests. They 
also make sure that we ramp up our arms production, which we 
have been talking about for two years, and have not done much 
to do. These--we decide this is a--we decide this is a priority 
for us. We will organize ourselves to win. If--that is what the 
Biden administration did with passing the IRA, that is what 
happened with COVID on the previous administration, we can do 
this. Of course, we have won--
    Representative Costa: The world has changed since February 
24, 2022.
    Mr. Herbst: Right.
    Representative Costa: We recognize that, and now we need to 
act on it.
    The Air National Guard in California has been working, as 
you know, my friend for 23 years. We have been trying to 
coordinate this transfer and training of pilots for the F-16s. 
It has been slow, terribly slow. It looks like we have maybe 
close to 16 pilots training. We need to fund these. The amount 
of the inventory of these platforms, I understand, is there. 
How would you offer the best way to accelerate this effort? 
Are--my friends on our side say they would never urge an 
offensive like we--the Ukrainians tried last year without an 
air offensive. I mean, it was just crazy. We would not do it. 
However yet, we expected the Ukrainians to make a miracle out 
of this without the proper air cover.
    Mr. Ryan: Yes sir, absolutely correct.
    First, I would say, all of the above. If we do those 
things, then we are in a position to utilize the F-16s 
appropriately. The thing that underpins that, which we often 
miss in the debates, is the supply chains, the logistics, the 
maintenance, and the repair of damaged equipment, all of which 
are part of a long-term strategy to make the F-16 a winning 
contribution to the war effort in Ukraine. I know the 
California National Guard has been working that with the 
Ukrainians for a very long time. We have to do those things.
    As an A-10 pilot, I actually flew the F-16 once. It is easy 
to fly. It is very hard to employ it in a way that we employ 
it, in a very complex air scenario that supports ground 
maneuver. That is where we need to get the Ukrainians to 
because you are absolutely right. Without that cover for their 
ground maneuver, they are not going to win. With it, they are 
going to win. That is why we need to do that.
    The funding is very important. The number of pilots is very 
important. Experienced pilots can learn the aircraft very 
quickly; new pilots can learn it relatively quickly. We need to 
get them--
    Representative Costa: I hear they have good pilots.
    Mr. Ryan: They have very good pilots. We need to get them 
into the mission scenarios where they actually learn to employ 
the aircraft effectively. They are already doing that with the 
suppression of enemy air defense with their own aircraft, with 
our missiles. That is great training for them to transition to 
the F-16.
    Representative Costa: They are the original MacGyvers.
    Mr. Ryan: They are, yes, sir, absolutely.
    Taking the picture holistically as part of a winning 
strategy based on a clear objective will allow us to put the 
training resources against the F-16 requirements of the 
Ukrainians, get the Europeans fully involved in supporting 
those aircraft on the ground, getting them bedded down where 
they can be useful--
    Chairman Wilson: Hey, Mr. Secretary, I want to take a quick 
picture. I want the three of you to come here. We want to get a 
picture while the senator is still here.
    Please, you all come around, but--and we shall--
[laughter]--hey.
    Mr. Ryan: I was finished.
    Chairman Wilson: Trans-Atlantic Chairman, thank you. We now 
will be concluding, and--but hey, to him--
    Senator Whitehouse: Stand in front of the podiums here, 
or--
    Chairman Wilson: I was going to get them and we will stand 
right here. We want that backdrop behind us, okay? [Sounds 
gavel.]
    [Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the hearing ended.]

                  ADDITIONAL STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

  opening statement of co-chairman cardin, u.s. senate, from maryland
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing is both timely and crucial. 
As leaders of the Helsinki Commission, all of us here are keenly aware 
that Russia's war against Ukraine is a crisis for human rights and a 
humanitarian catastrophe.
    The Helsinki Final Act, adopted in 1975 between the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and 33 other states, gave rise to the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as our own Commission. 
This seminal agreement articulated ten distinct principles: Sovereign 
equality; non-use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial 
integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in 
internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
self-determination of peoples; cooperation among states; and 
fulfillment of obligations under international law.
    At no point since the adoption of the Helsinki Accords have these 
principles been more thoroughly and egregiously tested. Today, in 
Ukraine, Russia is clearly violating every single one of these 
principles. Every single one.
    Any pretense of good faith that Russia once projected around its 
Helsinki obligations has not only been undermined--but completely 
shredded. It is an aggressor against Ukraine, posing a major threat to 
Europe as a whole, as it pursues a campaign against Ukraine's people 
and their very nationhood itself. It is no exaggeration to say that the 
Ukrainian victory is the most urgent human rights cause in Europe 
today, and that cause only can advance with the provision of Western 
arms.
    Meanwhile, Russia clearly has broader imperial ambitions in Europe. 
Its soft annexation of Belarus, its influence campaign undermining 
Georgia, and its many threats against the free nations of Europe 
demonstrate that it does not intend to stop with Ukraine. Europe's 
peace, which the United States relies on for our own security, is being 
defended today by Ukraine and its heroic people. We must support them 
in this fight.
    I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses to hear 
more about how we can better support Ukraine during this critical and 
dangerous time. Thank you.
     testimony of isw non-resident russia fellow nataliya bugayova
    Thank you, Chairman Wilson and honorable members of the Commission 
for the opportunity to contribute to this critical discussion.
    The battlefield situation in Ukraine will likely get worse for 
Ukraine before it gets better. The delays in Western materiel 
deliveries came at the cost of Ukraine's advantage. Russia is 
exploiting vulnerabilities across the frontline. Russia seeks to 
achieve battlefield effects in the remaining window of opportunity 
before Western military assistance reaches the frontline at scale.
    Russia's main objective, however, is to falsely convince the United 
States that the aid will not make a difference--especially amid 
upcoming political milestones, such as the NATO summit, European 
Parliament elections, and US elections.
    Ukraine is likely to be able to stabilize the frontline and blunt 
the Russian offensive as the aid arrives and Ukraine continues to 
address its manpower shortages. The supplemental aid package helped 
avoid a path to the most dangerous outcome and reset a range of 
possible outcomes for the war that still includes a Russian defeat and 
Ukrainian victory. Which outcome Ukraine is moving toward depends in no 
small part on the US learning lessons of the last two years.
    Lesson #1: US interests in this war remain unchanged, and so does 
the most advantageous outcome for the US. This will likely remain true 
regardless of the ebbs and flows on the battlefield.
    Russia is a self-declared adversary to the United States. Any 
effective US strategy to counter the Russian challenge will recognize 
the outcome of this war as a center of gravity of Russia's power and 
Russia's ability to threaten US interests. Russia's ability to 
reconstitute, to subjugate its neighbors, to confront NATO, to 
cooperate militarily with its partners like Iran, disproportionately 
depend on whether Russia keeps or loses its gains in Ukraine. It is not 
just about Russia's capability; it is about Russia's intent too. Putin 
is not seeking any offramps from his objectives to erase Ukraine a 
State, to fracture NATO, and to undermine the US. Moreover, the war has 
empowered an ultra-nationalist community inside of Russia that believes 
in expansion by force and is inherently anti-Western. If Russia is 
defeated, the next Russian leader may or may not be worse than Putin. 
Russian victory in Ukraine is a nearly guaranteed path to another Putin 
or worse because of the political imperatives that an empowered 
nationalist community would create.
    Given these realities, the most dangerous outcome for the United 
States is allowing Russia to prevail in this war. The United States 
would face the worst threat from Russia since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, as a victorious Russia would emerge reconstituted and 
more determined to undermine the United States--and confident that it 
can. The risks of a Russian attack against NATO will rise. The 
challenge of defending the Baltic States could become almost 
insurmountable. A Russian victory would diminish America's deterrence 
around the world. If Russia wins in Ukraine as a result of diminished 
US aid, our adversaries would learn that the US can be manipulated into 
abandoning its interests in a winnable fight. Russia prevailing in 
Ukraine would constitute a convincing argument for the effectiveness of 
nuclear blackmail and would likely accelerate nuclear proliferation.
    A scenario in which Russia gets a reprieve via a premature cease-
fire or insufficient Western aid that halts Ukraine's advance is far 
more costly than continuing to help Ukraine fight. This scenario would 
simply allow Russia to rebuild, launch new attacks on Ukraine, and 
confront NATO. The United States would face another invasion but at a 
higher cost of Ukrainian lives and US taxpayer dollars, worse 
escalation risks including those that could risk American lives, and 
under conditions that favor Russia, including a strengthened Putin 
regime, a stronger Russian military that is experienced in fighting a 
NATO-supplied adversary on a contemporary battlefield, more 
advantageous starting lines for Russia compared to February 2022, and 
higher Russian immunity to coercive measures.
    The most advantageous outcome remains helping Ukraine liberate its 
territory and people, as it is the only path to a durable peace, rather 
than a temporary respite; and then helping Ukraine rebuild, putting the 
largest and most powerful friendly military in Europe at the forefront 
of NATO's defense.
    As long as this course of action remains Ukraine's choice and will, 
the most prudent US strategy is helping Ukraine achieve it and 
accepting the short-term risks of helping Ukraine liberate itself to 
decrease the chances of a larger risk of escalation and costs in the 
future.
    Lesson #2 Putting Ukraine on the path to victory requires more 
capabilities but also different approaches. More capabilities are 
needed because delays of materiel provision have come at a cost of 
Ukraine's advantage and because they provided Russia with time and 
space to adapt. Ukraine and its partners also require new approaches in 
this phase of the war:
    Helping Ukraine restore its own ability to maneuver on the 
battlefield, after it stabilizes the lines, is a priority. Achieving 
this objective will require more capabilities and an evolving 
warfighting concept to overcome positional warfare. A key task will be 
achieving temporary effects of air superiority without having what is 
conventionally defined as air superiority. This will require a much 
larger scale of ground-based long-range strike capabilities. Ukrainian 
forces may be able to restrict movements of Russian troops and supplies 
within a selected area of the front provided they have a sufficient of 
quantity of long-range precision strike missiles, for example. Ukraine 
may also be able to innovate, achieve, and exploit a version of air 
superiority at lower altitudes if its partners continue to support its 
unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities.
    Ukraine needs additional air defense capabilities deployed at the 
frontlines to deny and contest Russia's ability to maintain localized 
air superiority. In sum, Ukraine needs capabilities to protect 
Ukrainian forces during maneuver, disrupt Russia's reconnaissance 
strike complex, employ offensive and defensive electronic warfare at 
scale, defend Ukraine's airspace, disrupt Russian rear areas--including 
rear areas in Russia itself.
    Denying Russia's sanctuaries. Russia is not entitled to sanctuaries 
when it is trying to erase a nation. As we speak, the Russian Air Force 
is conducting glide bomb attacks from Russia's airspace sanctuary on 
Kharkiv Oblast and can do so indefinitely, as my colleague George 
Barros has written. The West must abandon the Russian information line 
that Russia, having launched an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, can 
somehow demand immunity from attack on the Russian rear with Western or 
Ukrainian weapons. The US must remove any existing constraints on 
Ukraine to target legitimate Russian military and defense industrial 
capabilities in Russia. The West should also develop a long-term 
strategy against ``sacred Russian cows'' in the West, such as the 
Russian State nuclear energy corporation Rosatom. Shrinking Russia's 
sanctuary spaces in Russia and globally is key to imposing strategic 
dilemmas on the Kremlin.
    Thinking beyond standard force ratios and focusing on asymmetries. 
Ukraine's effort in the Black Sea is a quintessential example of an 
effort producing outsized effects across multiple domains. This is 
exactly the kind of effort that the US needs to amplify with more 
resources--given its potential to have an even larger effect, including 
on the ground war. Other asymmetric opportunities include helping 
Ukraine scale its rapid innovation cycle, as well as helping Ukraine's 
defense industrial base [DIB] realize its potential. Ukraine's Ministry 
of Strategic Industries estimates that Ukraine has additional ten 
billion in production capability, if resourced properly.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\  https://kyivindependent.com/minister-ukraine-to-produce-more-
weapons-worth-10-billion-if-financed/ ; https://
www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-
russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Surging Western capabilities. Figuring out how to creatively 
allocate existing Western military assets while gradually adding new 
capability is important, but it is not the main problem we need to 
solve. The United States needs to lead a global coalition of partners--
both in Europe and Asia--to dramatically increase the overall stock of 
capabilities that are making the difference in Ukraine, but which are 
also likely to matter to US efforts to deter and fight future wars. The 
West's existing and latent capability dwarfs that of Russia. The 
combined GDP of NATO countries, non-NATO EU states, and our Asian 
allies is over $63 trillion. The Russian GDP is on the close order of 
$1.9 trillion. Iran and North Korea add little. China is enabling 
Russia, but it is not mobilized on behalf of Russia. If we lean in and 
mobilize a higher percentage of our latent capacity, Russia loses. 
Mobilizing would mean surging military production, sparing more of our 
existing military capabilities and economic assets, but also accepting 
a higher threshold for pain and risk now to avoid more cost and pain 
and risk in the future.
    Lesson #3: Decisionmaking speed has been a critical factor defining 
successes and failures in this war.
    The key successes achieved by Ukraine and its partners have 
resulted from strategic clarity. Lost opportunities have resulted from 
the West's failure to connect ground truths to our interests quickly 
enough to act. The world had a moment of clarity in February 2022, 
recognizing Russia's true intent and the stakes of the war. This 
clarity informed a myriad of actions by individuals and leaders in 
Ukraine, in the United States and globally. These actions helped 
Ukraine defeat Russia in the Battle of Kyiv, which meant the difference 
between the world's largest present-day war and what would have been 
the world's largest insurgency. Conversely, the West's slow decisions 
about materiel delivery in part driven by the Russian manipulations of 
Western perception, cost Ukraine on the battlefield. For example, US 
failure to proactively resource Ukraine's initiative after two 
successful counteroffensive operations in the fall of 2022 contributed 
to a missed opportunity for Ukraine to conduct a third phase of 
counteroffensive operations in the winter of 2022-2023. This reprieve 
allowed Russia to build its defenses in depth and to shore up manpower, 
making Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive an extraordinarily difficult 
undertaking.
    The frontline as of May 2024 would look different had the US 
proactively invested in Ukraine's initiative in 2022, had the US 
delivered advanced capabilities or passed the supplemental earlier.
    Russia has learned this lesson early. So much so that the Kremlin's 
main effor--since its failed ``three-day war''--has focused on 
targeting US decisionmaking with the goal of slowing down Western 
support.
    The United States should learn this lesson as well and plan to 
proactively resource multiple Ukraine's campaigns and not expect any 
single operation to be decisive. A sustained US effort will also grant 
Ukraine the certainty about resourcing so Ukraine can plan for future 
operations and disabuse Putin of the notion that he can outlast the 
West.
    The United States should recognize that the speed of knowledge 
transfer and decisionmaking matters disproportionately in this war, as 
Russia is using perception manipulation to achieve goals beyond the 
limits of its real capability. The US should improve knowledge sharing 
with Ukraine and its partners, including by increasing physical 
presence in Ukraine to connect the ground truth to our decisions and 
capabilities fast enough to act. The US must also build resistance 
against Russian influence campaigns that aim to manipulate US 
decisionmaking, including the current Russian information operation 
supported by its intensified military action in Ukraine.
    Lesson #4: The West has the advantage over Russia; it needs to 
choose to use it.
    The gap that Ukraine and its partners need to close to help Ukraine 
liberate its territory and people is smaller than the gap that Russia 
needs to close to achieve its unchanged objectives of subjugating 
Ukraine. Make no mistake--the Kremlin intends to close this gap. Putin 
has additional resources he can and will mobilize. The recent 
appointment of an economist, Andrei Belousov, to lead Russian Ministry 
of Defense is another indicator of Putin's prioritization of Russia's 
defense industrial base.
    Nevertheless, Russia's surge capacity is neither unlimited nor 
without constraints. ISW has continued to observe the indicators of 
these limitations. For example, recent satellite imagery indicates that 
Russia is largely sustaining its war effort by pulling old armored 
vehicles from storage and modernizing them rather than producing new 
vehicles and weapons systems at scale. What the Kremlin has mobilized 
to date is orders of magnitude higher than what the West has mobilized 
on behalf of Ukraine. Russia had every advantage in the last 10 years 
and occupied 18 percent of Ukraine at an enormous cost.
    The Kremlin cannot accomplish its maximalist objectives in Ukraine 
if Ukraine's will to fight persists alongside Western support. The 
Kremlin's main effort--in addition to ramping up its own capacity--is 
to convince us that Russia prevailing in Ukraine is inevitable and that 
we must stay on the sidelines, allowing Russia to fight Ukraine in 
isolation. The notion that the war is unwinnable because of Russia's 
dominance is a Russian information operation, which gives us a glimpse 
of the Kremlin's real strategy and only real hope of success--a 
strategy that the US has the power and vital interest to deny.

                                 [all]
                                     

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