[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-15972

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cr-00003-LSC-SGC-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROBERT LELAND GRANT, JR., 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(May 19, 2017)

Before MARTIN, FAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Robert Leland Grant, Jr. appeals his conviction for receiving child 

pornography and his restitution order, following his guilty plea. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2013, Grant, a teacher at John Carroll Catholic High School (“John 

Carroll”), and a minor student, MC,

1 started having sexual contact. Their 

relationship primarily occurred in the summer of 2013, when MC was 17 years old. 

Grant and MC frequently text messaged and met outside of school on a number of 

occasions and would go for drives together. On these drives, they would hold 

hands and kiss; there also were instances where Grant touched MC on her breasts 

and genitals. Sexually explicit videos and images were exchanged by text. 

Grant started sending MC pictures of himself in March 2013, when MC was 

16 years old, but she did not receive any nude pictures of him until the summer of 

2013, when she was 17 years old. Grant sent approximately ten nude images and 

three or four nude videos of himself to MC. MC sent three or four nude pictures 

and one nude video of herself to Grant during the summer of 2013. She took the 

nude photos and video using her cellular phone and sent the photos to Grant by text 

message. 

On February 12, 2014, the Jefferson County Sherriff’s Office received a 

report Grant may have had inappropriate relationships with minor students at John 

 1 MC, also referred to in the record as MC1 and MC#1, was born in 1996.

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Carroll. The next day, Grant met with Charles McGrath, the principal of John 

Carroll, and Michael Callahan, a retired law enforcement officer, to discuss the 

allegations. Grant provided a signed, notarized statement to Callahan and admitted 

to text-message exchanges with MC that involved sharing sexually explicit photos 

and videos. Grant gave Callahan his cellular phone during the meeting. Principal 

McGrath and Callahan then gave the cellular phone and a copy of Grant’s 

statement to Sergeant Michael House. 

On February 19, 2014, Grant met with Sergeant House at the Sherriff’s 

Office. Sergeant House informed Grant he was not under arrest and could leave at 

any time. Sergeant House read Grant his Miranda2 rights; Grant orally confirmed 

he understood. Grant then signed a Miranda waiver, showing he understood his 

rights and confirming no one had forced, threatened, or promised him anything in 

exchange for the waiver. Grant again admitted to having a relationship with MC

between June 2013 and February 2014 and having received nude pictures of 

female students as young as 16 years old on his cellular phone. Grant discussed 

his meeting with Principal McGrath and Callahan and stated he voluntarily gave 

his cellular phone to Callahan. Grant assumed Callahan had given the cellular 

phone to law enforcement to conduct a forensic analysis; Grant confirmed law 

enforcement could perform a forensic analysis and gave Sergeant House the access 

 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).

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code. Grant told Sergeant House he was trying to get a replacement cellular 

phone. He also told Sergeant House he would try to bring in his wife’s cellular 

phone, which previously had belonged to him. 

Grant signed a written form consenting to the search of his and his wife’s 

cellular phones. The forms advised Grant he could revoke his consent at any time.

Grant told Sergeant House that Principal McGrath and Callahan had stated his 

cooperation could work in his favor and asked whether this was true. Sergeant 

House told Grant he could not promise anything but would make Grant’s 

cooperation known. The next day, Grant delivered his wife’s cellular phone to the 

Sherriff’s Office and signed another form consenting to the search of the device. 

On March 10, 2014, law enforcement obtained a state warrant to search Grant’s 

cellular phone. The warrant was returned on May 12, 2015.3

In January 2016, Grant was charged with two counts of sexual exploitation 

of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) (Counts 1 and 2), and one 

count of receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) 

(Count 3). Grant filed a motion to suppress evidence arising from the state-issued 

search warrant supporting the analysis of Grant’s cellular phone and the fruits of 

that search, including Grant’s statements. He argued the warrant was void,

 3 Although the execution date was identified as April 15, 2014, the government, during the 

hearing on the suppression motion, stated new evidence showed the warrant was executed on 

March 10, 2014.

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because it was not executed within the ten days prescribed by state law. He also 

contended the search was unreasonable, because law enforcement failed to file a 

return of the warrant within a reasonable time. He argued the delay in returning 

his cellular phone unreasonably infringed on his possessory interest. Grant also 

contended his statements were involuntary, and he did not consent voluntarily to 

the search of his cellular phone.

A magistrate judge conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress. The 

government introduced a video recording of Grant’s interview with Sergeant 

House. Sergeant House and Grant also testified at the hearing. Sergeant House 

testified he did not induce Grant in any way by threatening or telling him to 

consent, making any promises, or otherwise convincing Grant to consent. Sergeant 

House told Grant he could not promise anything in exchange for consent. Grant 

never asked Sergeant House for his cellular phones to be returned, revoked his 

consent, or placed any limits on his consent. Although Sergeant House testified he 

could not recall having any communication with Principal McGrath and Callahan 

prior to their interview with Grant, he did speak with them when they turned over 

the cellular phone and Grant’s written statement.

Grant testified he respected Principal McGrath. During his meeting with 

Principal McGrath and Callahan, they talked extensively about Catholicism, sins,

confession, and forgiveness to encourage Grant to make a statement. Callahan told 

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Grant judges often show leniency to people who cooperate in criminal 

investigations; Grant therefore assumed it was in his best interest to cooperate. 

Grant testified, but for the declarations about his faith and leniency, he would not 

have made a statement or handed over his cellular phone; he would have gotten an 

attorney immediately. Grant was not Mirandized before speaking with Principal 

McGrath and Callahan but did receive his Miranda warnings from Sergeant House. 

Grant verified the signature on the consent forms was his signature. Grant stated 

Sergeant House made no promises to him; he told Sergeant House he understood 

no promises were made. Throughout his interview with Sergeant House, Grant 

stated he still was reflecting on what Principal McGrath and Callahan had said to 

him, and it had weighed on him because he already had given a full confession to 

them.

The magistrate judge wrote a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 

establishing the facts based on the testimony of Sergeant House and Grant and the

video recording of their February 2014 meeting. The judge recommended a denial 

of the motion to suppress statements and evidence. The judge concluded Grant’s 

consent to search his cellular phone was voluntary, because he told Callahan he 

assumed he would give it to law enforcement, he executed written-consent forms, 

he was aware of his ability to revoke his consent but elected not to do so, and he 

told Sergeant House of his intent to obtain a replacement cellular phone. 

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The magistrate judge also concluded Grant, a high school teacher, 

understood Sergeant House did not make any promises to him in order to induce 

him to make a statement; Callahan also did not promise or otherwise coerce Grant. 

Grant’s conversation with Principal McGrath and Callahan was incident to Grant’s 

employment. The judge stated Sergeant House’s credible testimony supported the 

finding he did not use Principal McGrath and Callahan to extract evidence 

unlawfully from Grant, because he could not recall ever having a conversation with 

them prior to their meeting with Grant or instructing them to talk to Grant; they 

had an independent reason to question Grant, because Grant’s actions involved a 

student at their school. The judge noted Grant had made statements only to 

Sergeant House after he waived his Miranda rights; the statements he made to 

Principal McGrath and Callahan, because they are private actors, do not implicate 

Grant’s constitutional rights. The magistrate judge did not reach the issue of the 

validity of the warrant, because Grant made knowing and voluntary statements and 

voluntarily consented to the search of his cellular phones.

The district judge adopted the R&R in its entirety and overruled Grant’s 

objections. Grant subsequently signed a plea agreement. He agreed to plead guilty 

to Count Three, receiving child pornography in violation of § 2252A(a)(2); the 

government agreed to dismiss Counts One and Two. Grant agreed “to pay 

restitution as determined by the court,” and he waived his right to appeal his 

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“conviction and/or sentence . . . as well as any fines, restitution, and forfeiture 

orders that the Court might impose.” Am. Plea Agreement at 1, 9 (Apr. 27, 2016). 

Grant expressly reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 

The judge sentenced Grant to 60 months of imprisonment and ordered $8,341.25 in 

restitution to cover MC’s legal fees. Grant appeals the order denying the motion to 

dismiss and his restitution order for MC’s legal fees.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress

On appeal, Grant argues the district judge erred in denying his motion to 

suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his cellular phone and the 

statements he made to the police and private actors. He argues he did not make 

voluntary statements and did not consent to search of his cellular phones; even if 

he did, the search warrant obtained was not validly executed. A district judge’s 

ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. United 

States v. Timmann, 741 F.3d 1170, 1177 (11th Cir. 2013). We review a district 

judge’s factual findings for clear error and the judge’s application of the law to the 

facts de novo. Id. We accord deference to a district judge in reaching credibility 

determinations with respect to witness testimony. United States v. McPhee, 336 

F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003).

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1. Consent

We review voluntariness of consent to search for clear error. United States 

v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 1999). Under the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments, “a search conducted without a warrant issued upon 

probable cause is per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established 

and well-delineated exceptions.” United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 360 (11th 

Cir. 1989) (citation, internal quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted). One exception 

is a search “conducted pursuant to voluntary consent.” Id. Consent is voluntary if 

it is “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” Id. A mere 

indication a defendant’s cooperation could be helpful does not render the 

defendant’s consent to search involuntary. See United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 

1349, 1364-65 (11th Cir. 1983).

“The government bears the burden of proving both the existence 

of consent and that the consent was not a function of acquiescence to a claim of 

lawful authority but rather was given freely and voluntarily.” United States v. 

Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1151 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). “A district court’s determination that consent was voluntary is a 

finding of fact, that will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear error.” United 

States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2001). We must consider the 

totality of the circumstances, when determining “whether there were any 

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limitations placed on the consent given and whether the search conformed to those 

limitations.” United States v. Blake, 888 F.2d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 1989). 

Grant voluntarily consented to the search of his cellular phone. He gave his 

cellular phone to Callahan with the understanding he would turn the phone over to 

the police, he voluntarily signed a consent form for the forensic search of his 

cellular phone after waiving his Miranda rights, he gave Sergeant House the 

password to his cellular phone, and he returned to the police station the following 

day to deliver his wife’s cellular phone. While Grant signed consent forms 

notifying him he could revoke or limit his consent, he never did. See Blake, 888 

F.2d at 798. He also did not ask Sergeant House to return his cellular phone. 

Neither Sergeant House, Principal McGrath, nor Callahan coerced Grant into 

consenting to the search. Any statement Principal McGrath or Callahan made that 

cooperation could help Gant did not render his consent involuntary. See Vera, 701 

F.2d at 1365-65. While Principal McGrath and Callahan spoke about leniency for 

cooperation, they were private actors and were not in a position to make promises 

about his prosecution.

4

 A review of the totality of the circumstances shows 

Grant’s consent was “essentially [a] free and unconstrained choice.” Garcia, 890 

F.2d at 360. The judge did not clearly err in finding Grant voluntarily consented, 

 4 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656-57 (1984) (holding 

the Fourth Amendment restrains only the government, not private actors).

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orally and in writing, to the search of his cellular phones.5 See Zapata, 180 F.3d at 

1240-41.

2. Statements

The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Fourteenth 

Amendment guarantee of due process require an incriminating statement to the 

government be voluntary. United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 

2010). “[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a 

confession was not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.” 

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S. Ct. 515, 522 (1986). The totality 

of the circumstances determines whether an incriminating statement is voluntary. 

United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1319 (11th Cir. 2010). 

In Miranda, the Supreme Court held “the prosecution may not use 

statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial 

interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 

safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. 

436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). Custodial interrogation occurs “after a 

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 

 5 While Grant argues any prior consent does not survive the issuance of a search warrant and the 

validity of the warrant alone controls the legality of the search, this argument fails, because we 

affirm on other grounds. See United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(recognizing we affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the 

record).

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in any significant way.” Id. Whether a suspect is in custody is an objective 

inquiry that goes beyond whether a reasonable person would have felt free to 

leave. United States v. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d 876, 881 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2010). 

The proper question is whether “a reasonable person would have understood his 

freedom of action to have been curtailed to a degree associated with formal 

arrest.” Id. at 881 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining 

whether a suspect was in custody, we consider the totality of the circumstances. 

Id. We are “much less likely to find the circumstances custodial when the 

interrogation occurs in familiar or at least neutral surroundings, such as the 

suspect’s home.” Id. at 882 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Grant’s statements to Sergeant House were voluntary and subject to the 

procedural safeguards contemplated by Miranda. See Lall, 607 F.3d at 1285. At 

the motion hearing, Sergeant House and Grant testified Grant was read his 

Miranda rights prior to making any statements, and he signed a waiver. Sergeant 

House further testified he did not induce Grant in any way by making promises to 

convince him to consent; instead, he told Grant he could not make any promises. 

Grant also confirmed Sergeant House did not make him any promises. Grant does 

not argue, nor do the facts suggest, he felt his freedom of action was curtailed. See

Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 881. He was not in custody at the time he made 

statements to Sergeant House, who had told him he was not under arrest, and he 

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was free to leave at any time. Grant left at the conclusion of the interview and 

voluntarily returned the following day with the second cellular phone.

The magistrate judge concluded Grant’s confession to Principle McGrath 

and Callahan did not implicate his Fifth Amendment privilege, because she 

credited Sergeant House’s testimony he had not spoken with Principal McGrath 

and Callahan prior to their interview with Grant, asked them to interview Grant, or 

directed them on how to interview him. Grant, a high school teacher, was 

interviewed at the school, a familiar setting, and Grant did not testify Principal

McGrath and Callahan forced or required him to stay put and answer questions. 

See Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 882. Grant’s interview by private actors at the high 

school where he worked did not impinge on his Fifth Amendment right. See 

Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166, 107 S. Ct. 521 (“The most outrageous behavior by a 

private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that 

evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause.”). Because Grant made 

knowing and voluntary statements to private actors, Principal McGrath and 

Callahan, and he waived his Miranda rights before making a voluntary statement 

to Sergeant House, the judge did not err in finding, under a totality of the 

circumstances, Grant’s statements were voluntarily and knowingly made. See

Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d at 1319.

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B. Restitution Order

Grant argues the district judge erred in requiring him to pay restitution for 

MC’s legal expenses, because his conviction for receipt of child pornography was 

not the “proximate cause” of the expenses and the government did not provide a 

rationale for why MC required counsel. Br. of Appellant at 15. The government 

argues Grant’s appeal waiver expressly includes a provision about waiving his 

right to appeal a restitution order. The government requests this issue be 

summarily dismissed or, alternatively, denied on the merits, because attorney’s 

fees are expressly included under 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b).

1. Appeal Waiver

“We review the validity of a sentence-appeal waiver de novo.” United 

States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence-appeal 

waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. 

Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish the waiver was made 

knowingly and voluntarily, the government must show either (1) the district judge

specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver during the plea colloquy, or 

(2) the record makes clear the defendant otherwise understood the full significance 

of the waiver. Id. at 1351. A district judge’s “generalization that the defendant 

could appeal his sentence under some circumstances” has been found to be 

insufficient. Id. at 1353.

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The judge expressly found Grant understood the consequences of his plea 

agreement. Although the judge did not explain the waiver terms to Grant, he

generally did confirm Grant understood the appeal waiver. The judge, however, 

did not provide a sufficient explanation of the appeal waiver during Grant’s plea 

colloquy. See id. at 1352-53. While the judge specifically questioned Grant about 

signing the sentence-appeal waiver, his explanation was brief and vague, asking 

only whether Grant had understood by signing the waiver he had given up his right 

to appeal except in the limited number of circumstances explicitly set forth in the 

plea agreement. The judge also specifically did not mention Grant had waived his 

right to appeal a restitution order or state what expenses would be included in a 

restitution order. Because the judge did not fully apprise Grant of the scope of his 

sentence-appeal waiver in order to satisfy the first prong of Bushert, we will 

review the merits of Grant’s arguments. See id.

2. Restitution for Victim’s Legal Fees

We review for plain error if the defendant raises an issue for the first time on 

appeal. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776

(1993). When analyzing a claim under the plain-error standard, this court will look 

to see (1) whether the district judge committed error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that 

affects substantial rights, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. LejardeCase: 16-15972 Date Filed: 05/19/2017 Page: 15 of 17 
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Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003). Plain error cannot be established 

where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not resolve an issue and there 

is no precedent from the Supreme Court or our court directly resolving it. Id. at 

1291. 

Chapter 110 of Title 18 of the United States Code involves crimes related to 

the sexual exploitation and other abuse of children, including 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252A(a)(2), receipt of child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260a. It 

requires the district judge to order restitution for any offense in the chapter, for 

“the full amount of the victim’s losses.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), (b)(1), 

(b)(4)(A). The victim’s losses, as determined by the judge, “include any costs 

incurred by the victim for— (E) attorney’s fees, as well as other costs incurred.” 

§ 2259(b)(3). Victim is defined as “the individual harmed as a result of a 

commission of a crime under this chapter, including, in the case of a victim who is 

under 18 years of age, . . . the legal guardian of the victim.” § 2259(c). 

In applying § 2259, the Supreme Court held the government must prove the 

defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of the victim’s losses in order to 

impose a restitution order for those losses. Paroline v. United States, __ U.S. __, 

__, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (2014). The Court reasoned the first five categories of 

§ 2259(b)(3), including the provision identifying attorney’s fees, give “guidance to 

district courts as to the specific types of losses Congress thought would often be 

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the proximate result of a Chapter 110 offense and could as a general matter be 

included in an award of restitution.” Id. at 1721. Section 2259 clearly states, for a 

crime under the chapter, the district judge must order restitution for the full amount 

of the victim’s losses, including attorneys’ fees. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), (b). 

Paroline identified attorney’s fees as a loss specifically contemplated by Congress 

that would be “the proximate result of a Chapter 110 offense.” 134 S. Ct. at 1721. 

MC, the victim, went to an attorney after her relationship with Grant was 

discovered in order to determine what legal remedies were available. The district 

judge found the attorneys were present during the victim’s interviews, 

demonstrating the fees were proximately caused by Grant’s crime. Paroline 

confirms Congress contemplated attorney’s fees to be the proximate result of a 

conviction under Chapter 110, which includes § 2252A(a)(2). Because the explicit 

language of a statute and Supreme Court case law have resolved restitution under § 

2259 may include attorney’s fees, and Grant had failed to object at the close of the 

hearing to the calculation of the fees, the district judge did not plainly err in 

awarding restitution for the victim’s legal fees. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731-32, 

113 S. Ct. at 1776; Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d at 1291. 

AFFIRMED.

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