J-A06044-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BRANDON CARGILE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1267 WDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 4, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0014493-2013

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JUNE 14, 2022

Brandon Cargile, pro se, appeals from the order dismissing, without a 

hearing, his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On appeal, Cargile chiefly contends 

that the lower court erred by not recusing itself from his case. Given the 

juxtaposition of when his judgment of sentence became final, approximately

six years ago, and the date that he filed the present PCRA petition, some three 

years ago, Cargile’s petition is patently untimely. Through the most thorough 

reading of Cargile’s brief and reply brief, we are unable to discern him having 

demonstrated any exception to the PCRA’s time bar. As such, we are without 

jurisdiction to consider the merits of his appeal, and we affirm the order 

dismissing his petition. 

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 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Reproduced from his appeal of a prior PCRA petition:

[i]n 2013, [Cargile] was charged with criminal attempt to commit 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child (attempted 

IDSI), unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of a minor, 

indecent exposure, and endangering the welfare of a child.[1]

This matter proceeded to trial[,] and the jury found [Cargile]

guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced [Cargile] to serve 

consecutive terms of 10 to 20 years of incarceration for attempted 

IDSI and unlawful contact with a minor. The trial court imposed 

no further penalty for the remaining offenses. [Cargile] did not file 

post-sentence motions. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed 

[Cargile’s] judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied 

[Cargile’s] petition for allowance of appeal on April [1]3, 2016. 

Commonwealth v. Cargile, 52 WDA 2015 (Pa. Super. Dec. 30, 

2015) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 136 A.3d 

978 (Pa. 2016).

Commonwealth v. Cargile, 2018 WL 2251071, at * 1 (Pa. Super. May 17, 

2018) (footnotes omitted). Following denial of his petition for allowance of 

appeal, Cargile did not seek further review from the United States Supreme 

Court. 

Cargile filed the current PCRA petition on May 9, 2019, which was 

dismissed roughly six months later. “In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, 

we examine whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the 

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 114 A.3d 401, 

409 (Pa. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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[1] See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 3123(b); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1); 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127(a); and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

4304(a), respectively. 
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For a petitioner to seek relief under the PCRA, he or she must satisfy 

the jurisdictional requisite of timeliness. See Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 

148 A.3d 849, 853 (Pa. Super. 2016). Specifically, PCRA petitions must be 

filed within one year of the date a judgment of sentence becomes final. See 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007); 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, 

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

However, there are three exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar, which 

involves a petitioner asserting: (1) newly-discovered facts; (2) interference 

by a government official; or (3) a newly-recognized constitutional right. See 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). If the claim predicated on one of these three 

exceptions arises on December 24, 2017, or thereafter, a petitioner must file 

his or her petition “within one year of the date the claim could have been 

presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).1 Regardless of the claim’s genesis 

date, “[o]ur Supreme Court has repeatedly stated it is the petitioner’s burden 

to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.” 

Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 155 A.3d 1054, 1060 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

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If the claim arises prior to December 24, 2017, it is subject to the dictates 

of this subsection’s prior wording, which provided a sixty-day filing period from 

the date the claim became known. 
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(citation omitted).

Cargile’s judgment of sentence became final in July 2016, which is 

ninety days after our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of 

appeal, and nothing more was sought from the United States Supreme Court. 

See Sup. Ct. R. 13(a) (“A petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a 

judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discretionary review by the 

state court of last resort is timely when it is filed with the Clerk within 90 days 

after entry of the order denying discretionary review.”). As such, because 

Cargile’s instant PCRA petition was filed in 2019, it is facially untimely. 

In this appeal, Cargile claims that the lower court: (1) erred by not 

recusing itself due to bias; (2) erred by “holding voir dire in front of a jury”; 

(3) erred by sentencing him in the aggravated range without adequate 

reasons; and (4) erred by denying his trial counsel’s motion to withdraw 

without a hearing. Appellant’s Brief, at 5. In his reply brief, Cargile asserts 

that he has satisfied an exception to the PCRA’s time bar because the court’s 

“bias and prejudice were brought to the light by this said court. Calling into 

question all the cases [it] presided over in such fashion.” Appellant’s Reply 

Brief, at 1 (unpaginated). 

In response, the Commonwealth indicates that Cargile “has failed even 

to address the subject of the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions, must less 

demonstrate how he has fulfilled one of them.” Appellee’s Brief, at 5. We 

agree.
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Although Cargile, in his first argument section, avers that the lower 

court “held an aggressive bias toward any and all sex offenders even if they 

were guilty or not,” Appellant’s Brief, at 10, he does not illuminate which 

exception to the PCRA’s time bar this claim falls under, nor does he establish 

when he became aware of this alleged bias. 

His other arguments suffer from the same, or similar, deficiencies. In 

his second issue raised, Cargile’s declares that the lower court “purposely held 

a competen[]cy/voir dire in front of the jury to bolster the testimony of the 

witness.” Id., at 11. Correspondingly, Cargile claims the court violated 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 601(b). Much like his first contention, Cargile 

provides no discussion of the PCRA’s time bar nor any indicia of when he 

became aware of the court’s so-called erroneous actions. 

In his third issue, Cargile maintains that the court abused its discretion 

in crafting his aggregate sentence. The appropriateness of raising such an 

argument in his present PCRA petition aside, it strains credulity that Cargile 

would not have been aware of his own sentence at his sentencing hearing. 

Stated differently, Cargile has provided no excuse as to why he could not have 

raised a timely challenge to his sentence within sixty days or one year from 

the point at which his judgment of sentence became final. Moreover, none of 

the three exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar are fairly suggested in this section 

of his brief. 

Finally, his fourth contention deals with a January 13, 2014 motion to 
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withdraw filed by his trial counsel. Again, there is no mention as to the basis 

under which he is attempting to circumvent the PCRA’s time bar. 

While Cargile had an additional opportunity to provide at least some 

level of clarity on the basis or bases relied upon, his reply brief is, much like 

his primary brief, insufficient. As stated, supra, although it purports to satisfy 

the requirement necessary to get around the PCRA’s time bar, Cargile utilizes 

his reply brief to again baldly and vaguely assert that the lower court was 

biased and prejudiced toward both him and similarly situated defendants. 

As Cargile has failed to discuss, much less prove, that his claims fall 

under the auspice of one of the PCRA’s three time bar exceptions and because 

it was his burden to do so, we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits 

of his underlying claims. Consequently, we are constrained to affirm the PCRA 

court’s order dismissing his petition.2

Order affirmed. 

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2

In its opinion, the trial court identifies that Cargile was directed to file a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal and even 

given an extension of time to do so, but that he never filed such a statement. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 7/26/21, at 1 (unpaginated). Cargile’s reply brief 

asserts that he “did file a concise statement of errors on June 13, 2021.” 

Appellant’s Reply Brief, at 2. In addition, Cargile included his monthly account 

statement purporting to demonstrate that he paid for postage in conjunction 

with filing his concise statement. Given our disposition in finding that Cargile 

failed to overcome the PCRA’s time bar, it is unnecessary to resolve this 

ambiguity. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/14/2022