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UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

74

Ufl 35 /9

GO V E RN M EN T

Storage

HEARING

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOR EIGN RELATIO NS 

UN ITE D STATES SEN ATE

EIGH TY -EIG HT H CONGRESS

F I R S T S E S S IO N

KSU LIBRARIES

P ri n te d f o r th e us e of th e Com m itt ee o n Fore ig n R el at io ns

94929

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1963
S nV

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

J. W. FULB RIG HT, A rk an sa s, Ch airm an

JO H N SP AR KM AN , Al ab am a 

HUBER T H. H U M PH R EY M inne so ta

M IK E M ANSF IE LD , M on tana 

WA YN E MO RS E, Orego n 

RUSS EL L B. LONG , Lou isiana 

AL BE RT GO RE, Te nn esse e 

FR ANK J. LA US CH E, Ohio 

FR ANK CH UR CH , Id ah o 

ST UA RT SY MING TO N, M iss ou ri 

TH OM AS J. DOD D, Con ne cticut 

GE OR GE A. SM AT HE RS , Flo rida

BO UR KE B. HIC KEN LO OPE R, Io w a 

GE OR GE D. AIK EN , Vermon t 

FR ANK CARLSON, K an sa s 

JO HN J. W IL LI AMS, Delaw ar e 

KA RL E. MU ND T, So ut h D ak ota

Carl Marcy, C hi ef of St aff

.Darrell St. Claire, Clerk

Subcommittee on I nternational Organization Affa irs

FRANK CH UR CH , Id ah o, Ch airm an

HUBER T H. HU MPH RE Y, M in ne so ta FR ANK CARLSON, K an sa s

RUSS EL L B. LONG, Lou isia na JO HN J. W IL LI AMS, Delaw ar e

Donald G. Henderson, S ta ff A ss is ta n t

Note.—Sections of t his hearing have been deleted in the in ter est 

of nation al sec urity and foreign policy. Deleted ma ter ial is indicated by the notatio n “[D ele ted ]”.

ii
C O N T E N T S

Sta tement of— Gardner, Richard N., Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs; acompanied by Frank K. Hefner, Dire ctor, Office of International Adm inistration, and Nat McKitterick, Direc­ tor, Office of Intern ational Economic and Social Affairs-------------- 1

Insertions for the rec or d: List of members of the Governing Council of the United Nations

Special Fund______________________________________________ 6 Table of Cuba’s U.N. obligations and paymen ts------------------------------- 15 List of countrie s receiving Special Fund assistance with pledges out­ stan ding for 1961 or prior years, as of November 20, 1962-------------- 19 Statement made on the proposed Cuban project by Philip Klutznick, U.S. representative to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations__________________________________________________— 25 Statem ent on valuation of Soviet Union ruble contributions to Special Fund_____________________________________________________ 40 Summary index__________________________________________________ 43

h i

UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

MOND AY , F E B R U A R Y 18, 19 63

U nit ed S ta te s S en ate,

S ub co mmitte e on I nte rnati onal Org an izat io n A ff air s,

C om mit te e on F or eig n R el ati ons,

Wasliington, D.G.

The subcommittee met, p ursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room S-116,

U.S. Capitol Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Senators Church (presiding), Sparkman, Lausche,

Symington, Aiken, and Williams.

Senator Ciiurcii. Other members will be coming, but I think in the 

interest of time we ought to st art because we have a good deal to cover 

this morning.

Do you have a statement, Mr. Secretary ?

Mr. Gardner. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

(Mr. Gardner’s prepared statement follows:)

Statement of Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

for I nternational Organization Affairs, Before the Subcommittee on

International Organizations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

in Executive Session, February 18, 1963

I am here today at your invitation to discuss the United Nations Special Fund project in Santiago de las Vegas, Cuba. In order to understand that project, it 

may be useful to recall a bit of background. The Special Fund, as you know, was established by the United Nations at the initiative of the United States. The U.S. proposal for a Special Fund was presented originally in 1957 by Congressman Walter Judd, who was serving as one of the U.S. delegates to the 12th session of the General Assembly. A resolu­ tion embodying the U.S. proposal in all its essential aspects was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1957. In 1958, in his letter of tran smittal accompanying the annual report by the President to the Congress on U.S. participation in the U.N., President Eisenhower 

wrote : “Economic development was the subject of one of the outstanding United Nations achievements of 1958—the establishment by the General Assembly of 

the Special Fund, originally proposed by the United States.

* * * * * * *

“The establishment of the Special Fund is thus a significant step forward in the perennial efforts of the United Nations to relieve hunger, disease, and ignorance. I am especially gratified that it begins its life under the able guidance of Paul Hoffman, of the United States, its first Managing Director.” The General Assembly Resolution 1240 (X III ) establishing the Special Fund provides th at assistance by the Fund “shall not be a means of foreign economic and political interference in the internal affairs of the country * * * concerned and shall not be accompanied by any conditions of a political natu re.” This provision embodies a principle of all United Nations economic assistance which has been supported by the United States through the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations. It has assured the integrity of the Special Fund in a number of cases, such as a project for the Republic of China approved over Soviet objections, and a project fo r Israel approved over the objections of an Arab country. 1
2 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

The Special Fund makes grants for “preinvestmen t” projects in less-developed 

countries. These projects are of three kinds—resource surveys and feasibility 

stud ies; manpower traini ng ; and researc h designed to promote better use of local 

resources, better marketing, high er productivity, and improved management. 

All these are called preinvestmen t projects because they are designed to provide 

the “seed money” to confirm and enla rge the possibilities for public and private 

investment.

The Special Fund is directed by a Governing Council composed of the representatives of 18 States, half from the developed countries, half from the lessdeveloped countries. I have here a table showing the composition of the 

Council in May 1961 (when the project in Cuba was approved) and at present, 

which I should like to have included in the record at the end of my statement. 

The Governing Council normally meets twice a year, and exercises the immediate policy control over the operations of the Special Fund, including approval 

of projects.

The Managing Director of the Special Fund, Paul Hoffman, has the responsibility for the operation of the Fund with the sole autho rity to recommend to 

the Governing Council projects sub mitted by governments.

Since the Special Fund began operations on Janu ary 1, 1959, the Governing 

Council has approved 288 projects costing the Fun d $253,928,400. A furth er 

$335 million in local support comes from the recipie nt governments.

The Special Fund is financed by voluntary contributions. The United States 

contributes 40 percent of the total actually contributed to the Fund, not counting 

the local resources made available for projects by recip ient governments. In 

other words, for every $2 p ut up by the United States, other contributors put 

up $3 and the recipient countries put up some $6 wo rth of their own resources.

The Special Fund project in Cuba was approved by the Governing Council 

in May 1961. This project, for which the Food and Agriculture Organization 

is the executing agency, calls for an allocation of $1,157,000 from the Special 

Fun d (including $114,500 which will be paid by Cuba in cash) to ass ist in the 

expansion of an agricultura l expe rimenta l station in Santiago de las Vegas, 

Cu ba; $763,500 of the $1,157,000 is for exports, $50,000 for fellowships, $200,000 

for equipment, $45,600 for miscellaneous expenses, and $98,500 f or the overhead 

cost of FAO.

The research work involved here is to concentrate on livestock production, 

soil classification, conservation, and crop diversification. The project is intended to las t for 5 years and the Cuban Government is to make available as a 

cou nterpart contribution of personnel, services, land, and buildings, the equivalent of $1,878,000. No U.S. dollars, personnel, materials, or services will be used 

in the project.

The United States opposed thi s project when it was put up for approval 

in May 1961; we have reiterate d our opposition on several occasions sin ce ; we 

are still opposed. Our policy tow ard Cuba involves opposition to any source of 

aid and comfort to the present regime. We pursue this policy in the United 

Natio ns and elsewhere by all means ava ilable to us.

You will be fam ilia r now with the details of our objections to this project, 

objections which we believe are justified by the technical, economic, and organ izational criteria of the U.N. Special Fund—the flight of qualified personnel 

from Cuba, the wanton slau ghter of cattle and misuse of other agricultural resources, the influx of Communist techn icians dedicated to imposing on Cuba 

the tried and disproven theories of Communist agriculture ; the stateme nts of 

Cuban Government officials themselves attesting to the chaos in the Cuban 

countryside and the leth argy among the Cuban farm ers. I have with me the 

statement made by our representativ e in the Governing Council in May 1961 

expressing our opposition to the proje ct on these and other grounds and I should 

like to place th at in the record at the conclusion of my statement.

These objections, in our view, add up to a very important prin ciple: We 

believed in May of 1961 and we believe now that the Cuban Government has so 

subo rdinated the economic and social welfare of the Cuban people to the narrow 

political aims of the present leadership that the minimum stan dards of efficiency 

and effectiveness which must guide the implementation of cooperative development projects—whether with in the U.N. system or without—cann ot possibly be 

met.

The basis of inte rna tional cooperation under the United Nations in the field 

of development must res t on some reasonable separation of technical conside rations and political considerations. However, the United States did not 

intro duce political considerations into this m at te r; the Cuban Government did. 

The Cuban Government deliberately set out to erase the line between technical
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 3

doctrine and political doctrine in the field of agriculture. While the char ter of the Special Fund provides tha t aid may not be accompanied by conditions of a political nature, an obligation clearly exists to take account of all circumstances, including political, which affect the economic feasibility of the project under 

consideration. One of our problems h as been the opinion of many members of the U.N. tha t we ar e attaching more importance to this project than it deserves: a few thou­ sand dollars of laboratory equipment, some books and visual aid equipment, a few fellowships, and experts in such fields as plant pathology, grasslands man­ agement, and horticulture are not going to affect the economy of Cuba for at least 5 years. But the principle is one on which we must insist—and will con­ tinue to insist in the case of this project and any others of a similar natu re which may come up for consideration in the futu re. The necessary one-third of the votes to block the project when it was first considered in 1961 was not forthcoming; the necessary two-thirds vote which would have subsequently forced a reconsideration was also absent. This lack of support did not stem from any consideration for Cuba, but rath er from fears tha t if this project were stopped it might jeopardize other projects of close concern to some members. It should be remembered t hat the Special Fund has projects totaling $7.5 million in Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam which Soviets do not support, and which are being carrie d out today over their misgivings. Since the Governing Council authorized the Cuban project, Paul Hoffman, as Managing Director of the Fund, has no real choice but to do what his board of directors instructed him to do. Our guess is tha t there is still a considerable time gap between Mr. Hoffman’s decision to go forward with the prelimin ary phase of the project, subject to a review of its feasibility, and the actual opera­ tion of the project in Cuba because it is by no means clear tha t the situatio n 

in Cuba will, in fact, allow the project to go forward. I believe tha t our stand in this mat ter will be salutory in the long run. Meanwhile, I hope the excellent record of the Special Fund, from our point of view, over the past few yea rs will not be eclipsed in the public mind by this single action. The Special Fund has been a great asset for the free world through its efforts to promote the materia l basis for free institutions. Even on the narrowest of political calculations the free world has got more out of the Special Fund than it has put in, while the reverse is true of the Communist bloc. The bloc countries have contributed some $7 million to the Special Fu nd ; with this project in Cuba added to two previous projects in Poland they will have received $3 million in return. If you add Yugoslavia, Communist contributions add up to $8 million, projects in Communist countries to $6 million. Out of the 288 Special Fund projects authorized, 282 have been in non-Communist countries. In financial terms, some $248 million of the grand total of $254 million of Fund 

projects—over 97 percent—go to the non-Communist world. I also hope this project in Cuba will not obscure the great usefulness of the United Nations to the U.S. national interest in promoting peace and freedom in recent years. In the Congo, the U.N. played a vital role in thwarting Com­ munist penetration and restorin g law and order. In the Cuban crisis, the United Nations proved of unique value to the free world as a forum to expose the Communist conspiracy and as a center of negotiation to remove Soviet offensive weapons once the power and determination of the United S tates and its allies had been dem onstrated in the quarantine. And when Cuba rejected on-site inspection by the U.N., this helped to put an intern ation al label of outlaw on 

the Castro regime.

S en at or Cii u r c h. I w on de r if yo u w ou ld pro ce ed to re ad th a t 

st at em en t.

STATEMENT OF RICHAR D N. GARDNER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNAT IONA L ORGANIZATION AFFA IRS;

ACCOMPANIED BY FRA NK K. HEF NER , DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

INTERNATIONAL ADMIN ISTRATION; AND NAT McKITTERICK,

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTER NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

AFFAIRS

M r. Gardne r. M r. C ha ir m an , I am ap pear in g to da y a t th e re qu es t 

of th e Sec re ta ry of S ta te i n t he a bse nce o f H a rl a n Cleve land , wh o ha s
4 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

just returned from the Congo this weekend and is recovering from a 

slight illness.

The Secretary would have been here himself but for an overriding 

commitment at the White House, and he has asked me to express his 

willingness to appear later this week before you if you should so desire.

Mr. Cleveland will also be available later on this subject, should you 

wish to hear him, and he would also be grateful for the opportunity 

to tell you about the U.N. operations in the Congo about which he is 

completing a report to the President. .

I am here today at your invitation to discuss the United Nations 

Special Fund project in Santiago de las Vegas, Cuba. In order to 

understand that project, it may be useful to recall a bit of background.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIT ED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

The Special Fund, as you know, was established by the United Nations at the initiative of th e United States. The U.S. proposal for a 

Special Fund was presented originally in 1957 by Congressman Walter 

Judd, who was serving as one of the U.S. delegates to the 12th session 

of the General Assembly. A resolution embodying the U.S. proposal 

in all its essential aspects was unanimously adopted by the General 

Assembly on December 14,1957.

In 1958, in his letter of transmittal accompanying the annual report 

by the President to the Congress on U.S. participation in the U.N., 

President Eisenhower wrote:

Economic development was the subject of one of the outstanding United 

Nations achievements of 1958—the establishment by the General Assembly of 

the Special Fund, originally proposed by the United States.

The establishment of the Special Fund is thus a significant step forward in 

the perennial efforts of the United Nations to relieve hunger, disease, and 

ignorance. I am especially gratified tha t it begins its life under the able 

guidance of Paul Hoffman of the United States, its first Managing Director.

WORDING OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO SPECIAL FUND

The General Assembly Resolution 1240 (X II I) establishing the 

Special Fund provides that assistance by the Fund—

shall not be a means of foreign economic and political interference in the internal affairs of the country * * * concerned and shall not be accompanied by 

any conditions of a political nature.

Senator Church. May I interr upt there to ask if this provision was 

written in upon the motion of the United States? Was it at tha t 

time a part of the recommendation of this Government as to the 

manner in which the Fund was to conduct its activities ?

Mr. Gardner. The United States supported the inclusion of this 

provision in the resolutions establishing the U.N. Special Fund.

A similar provision appears in the charters of all the U.N. economic 

agencies concerned with economic development.

Senator Church. Would you reread the language of that provision. 

You say the United States supported its inclusion.

Mr. Gardner. That is correct.

Senator Church. Again, what is the language of it?

Mr. Gardner. Assistance by the Fund— 

shall not be a means of foreign economic and political interference in the internal affairs of the country concerned * * * and shall not be accompanied 

by any conditions of a political nature.
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 5

I might add, Mr. Chairman, I have just now quoted from General 

Assembly Resolution 1240 of the X II I General Assembly. The previous year, in which Congressman Ju dd took the initiative in proposing the Special Fund, the resolution passed then, 1219 of the X II Assembly, had a similar provision tha t I think is worth 

quoting :

Assistance from the Special Fun d shall be given only to projects which would make a contribution to the economic development of the requesting country or countries. The operation of the Fund shall be in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and shall not be influenced by political 

considerations.

It is not quite the same language, but it is in the same sense as 

Resolution 1240 which passed the year afterw ard.

Senator Ciiurch. I wonder if, for Senator Lausche’s benefit, you 

could reread tha t language. The Secretary has just commenced his 

report, Senator Lausche.

Senator L ausche. I thin k I get the trend of what he is saying.

Senator Sparkman. I think you would like to hear the one in a later 

resolution. It is the same substance.

Mr. Gardner. General Assembly Resolution 1240 of the X II I Assembly provided that assistance by the Fund—

shall not be a means of foreig n economic and political inte rference in the in­ ternal affairs of the country concerned * * * and shall not be accompanied 

by any conditions of a politic al nature.

May I continue, Mr. Chairman ?

Senator Church. Yes; please do.

Mr. Gardner. This provision embodies a principle of all United 

Nations economic assistance which has been supported by the United States through the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations- It has assured the integ rity of the Special Fund in a number of cases, such as a project for the Republic of China approved over Soviet objections, and a project for Israel approved 

over the objections of an Arab country.

'TYPES OF SPECIAL FUND PROJECTS

The Special Fun d makes gran ts for “preinvestment” projects in less developed countries. These projects are of three kinds: resource surveys and feasibility studies; manpower trainin g; and research designed to promote better use of local resources, better marketing, higher productivity, and improved management. All these are called preinvestment projects because they are designed to provide the “seed money” to confirm and enlarge the possibilities for public and private 

investment.

COMPOSITION OF SPECIAL FUN D’S GOVERNING COUNCIL

The Special Fund is directed by a Governing Council composed of the representatives of 18 states, h alf from the developed countries, half from the less developed countries. I have here a table showing the composition of the Council in May 1961 (when the project in Cuba was approved) and at present, which I should like to have included in the record at the end of my statement.

Senator Church. Without objection it will be included. Do you 

have copies for the members of the committee to see?

94929—63---- 2
6 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

Senator Aiken. Wh at is it you want in the record?

Mr. Gardner. Senator, this is a list of the countries represented on 

the Governing Council of the U.N. Special F und in May of 1961 when 

the Cuban project was approved, and a list of the members who are 

now on the Governing Council.

Senator Aiken. I have no objection. I just wanted to see what 

it was.

Senator Church. Would any of the other Senators here care to see 

it before it is included in the record ?

Senator Lausciie. May I take a look at it? I have no objection. 

(The table referred to follows:)

Members of the Governing Council of th e United Nations Special F und

May 1961— At present—

Argentina

India

Pakistan

Thailand

Yugoslavia

Brazil

Indonesia

Philippines

Poland

Uruguay

Canada Cana da

France France

Ghana Ghana

Guatemala Guatema la

Japan Ita ly

Italy Japa n

Mexico Mexico

Netherlands Netherlands

Senegal Senegal

Sweden Sweden

United Kingdom United Kingdom

United States United S tate s

U.S.S.R. U.S.S.R.

FUN CTIONS OF GOVERNING COUNCIL

Mr. Gardner. The Governing Council normally meets twice a year, 

and exercises the immediate policy control over the operations of the 

Special Fund, including approval of projects.

The Managing Director of the Special Fund , Paul Hoffman, has 

the responsibility for the operation of the Fund with the sole authority to recommend to the Governing Council projects submitted 

by governments.

Since the Special Fund began operations on Jan uary 1, 1959, the 

Governing Council has approved 288 projects costing the Fund $253,- 

928,400. A further $335 million in local support comes from the 

recipient governments.

Senator Church. May I have those figures again, please.

Mr. Gardner. 288 projects, costing the Fund $253,928,400.

COMPOSITION OF GOVERNING COUNCIL 

1 Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question about this 

Senator Church. Yes; certainly.

Senator Aiken. It seems to me divided into two sections. Are 

some of the countries on the Governing Council permanent members 

and others not ?
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 7

Mr. Gardner. I believe they are elected by the Economic and Social 

Council. There are no permanent members but, as a practical matter, 

the United States and the Soviet Union are always elected as are the 

other large countries.

Senator Aiken. According to the list, all but five of the present 

members are the same as they were in May of 1961. There were five 

changes: Argentina was changed to Brazil, India to Indonesia, Pakistan to the Philippines, Thailand to Poland, Yugoslavia to Uruguay.

Senator Lausciie. Senator Aiken, from what line are you reading ?

Senator Aiken. I am reading from the list of members of the Governing Council of the U.N. which he asked to have p ut in the permanent record, and there is a dividing line between the first five members 

and the others. The members in the first group seem to be the same 

as they were in May of 1961. Five members were changed.

Senator Ciiurcii. With out objection, the two lists will be included 

in the record.

Mr. Secretary, would you care to continue ?

u.s. contributions to the special fund

Mr. Gardner. The Special Fun d is financed by voluntary contributions. The United States contributes 40 percent of the total actually contributed to the F und, not counting the local resources made 

available for projects by recipient governments. In other words, for every $2 p ut up by the United States, other 

contributors put up $3 and the recipient countries put up some $6 

worth of their own resources.

COMMUNIST COUNTRIES5

 CONTRIBUTIONS TO SPECIAL FUND

Senator Church. What portion of the balance of the F und is contributed by Communist governments ?

Mr. Gardner. Well, the Soviet Union contributes $1 million to the 

Fund , and the other Soviet bloc countries an additional sum which 

comes to something less than tha t per year. The total bloc contribution since the Fund was started totals $8 million-----

Senator Sparkman. Just a minute, before you get away from that. 

The figures of the other countries, you say, is less than $1 million. 

IIow much less, roughly ?

Mr. Gardner. Roughly it is about three-quarters of a million.

Senator Sparkman. $750,000?

Air. Gardner. Yes. Out of something like $50 million a year. In 

other words, you might say that the Soviet Union contributes about 2 

percent of the total, and the other Soviet bloc countries another iy 2

percent, something like that.

COMM UNIST CONTRIBUTIONS IN INCONVERTIBLE CURRENCIES

Senator Aiken. Does the Soviet Union contribute with the understanding that their contributions will be spent in any partic ular manner, or are they pooled with the rest ?

Mr. Gardner. As you know, Senator, there is not a complete pooling 

of these contributions. This is not an undifferentiated fund. Air. 

Hoffman maintains national contributions in a segregated form.
8 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

For exa mple, Swedis h k roner, It ali an lir e, ou r d oll ars , Tu rk ish lire, 

are dep osited separately in diffe ren t accounts, and these different accou nts of dif fer ent members are subject to different kind s of condition s. Som e cou ntries have not made th eir currencies conv ertib le. 

Th e S oviet contr ibu tion, of co ur se , is n ot convertible; the Soviet r uble 

is not con vertible.

Se na tor Aik en. Tha t is wh y I ask ed th e question.

Mr. Gardner. Tha t is ri ght; an d th at means th at the Sovie t contri bu tio n is t o th at exte nt less u sable th an m oneys t hat are comp letely 

con vertible.

Se na tor Ciiu rc h. Ea ch co un try contribu tes in its own currency, 

the n ?

Mr. Gardner. Tha t is correct.

Se na tor Aik en . Soviet bloc currenci es are no t con vert ible . Are 

most of th e other contr ibu tions conver tible ?

Mr. Gardner. Most of the othe r contr ibu tions fro m the developed 

cou ntries are convertible. In othe r words, most of the —le t me pu t 

it th is w ay : Most of the $50 mi llio n th at is put in is in con vertible 

currency. Th e contr ibu tio ns fro m th e less deve loped countrie s, who 

are pr incipa lly recipients he re, are very small. Most of the m are n ot 

con vertible because the currenc ies of these countrie s are no t convertible.

Se na tor Laus ciie. W ha t about th e cu rrency given by th e C ommunist 

bloc cou ntries?

Mr. Gardner. I t is no t convertible, Senator , and th at mea ns it is 

restr icted in its usefulness and , as a practic al matter , can o nly be used 

to ob tai n tec hnicians and equip me nt fro m the Sov iet bloc.

Se na tor Aik en. An d supplies.

Se na tor L ausche. Tha t wou ld mea n th at n one of the money given 

by the Com munist countries is con ver tible ?

Mr. Gardner. Yes ; that is correct.

determination of prices of sup plies, equ ipm ent, and personnel

Se na tor Aik en. Wh en Sov iet bloc currency is spent fo r sec uring 

sup plies or spent for securing equ ipm ent or tec hnicians fro m those 

cou ntries, who fixes the pric e pa id or the rat e ch arg ed ?

Mr. Gardner. Th e pric es fo r the equip me nt and the salaries of the 

tec hnicians are reached as a res ult o f negotiations between the Special 

Fun d an d th e co untry in question.

Se na tor Aik en. W ha t about the price of supplies ?

Mr. Gardner. I think th at is also the result of the negotiations.

Se na tor Aik en. How does the cost of a gallon of gasolin e fro m 

Ru ssi a c ompar e with the cost of a gallon of gasoline fro m the Br iti sh 

or the Du tch holdings in the Middle Eas t of com par abl e qu ali ty?

Mr. Gardner. I am no t fa m ilia r wi th th at , bu t I would no t be 

surpris ed if Sovie t prices were hi gh er and th at Sovie t equ ipm ent 

was overp riced r ela tiv e to the wo rld price. I would not be surpris ed 

bu t I do not have it.

Se na tor Aik en. Do the Sov iets designat e wh at countries their 

cre dit can be used in ?

Mr. Gardner. I am not sure I un de rstand th at , Senator.

Se na tor Spark man. As I u nd erstan d it, it is only to the ex ten t th at 

th ei r curre ncy is not con vertible. Th en it would be up to a local 

country as to w hethe r or not it would use it.
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 9

Senator Aiken. There is not any of it convertible ?

Senator Sparkman. None of the Communist currencies.

Senator Aiken. Tha t is right.

Senator Sparkman. No.

COMMUNIST VOTING STRENGTH AND CONTRIBUTIONS IN TIIE U .N .

Senator Church. Let me pursue this point now. We have established that the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc countries contribute about 3 percent of the annual contribution to the Fund; is 

that correct ?

Mr. Gardner. Something slightly less than that.

Senator Church. All of these contributions are voluntary contributions ; is that correct ?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct.

Senator Church. With respect to the amount tha t each member 

country pays to the regular budget of the United Nations, there is, 

as I understand it, a formula that is supposed to make each country's 

contribution roughly proportionate to its size and wealth in the 

world.

Mr. Gardner. That is correct.

Senator Church. And the United States presently pays a little 

over 32 percent ?

Mr. Gardner. Thirty-tw o percent.

Senator Church. I would like to know how many Communist governments there are in the United Nations and what percentage they 

pay of the contributions of the total membership.

Mr. Gardner. Counting Cuba and Yugoslavia which, of course, if 

the question is Communist countries, we must count, and Albania, 

which we must count-----

Senator Church. Yes.

Mr. Gardner. There are 12 Communist countries in the United 

Nations, and altogether I would estimate their tota l assessed share——

Senator Church. That is what percentage of the total membership ?

Mr. Gardner. Of the membership, it is a little over 10 percent, because there are 110 countries.

Senator Aiken. However, isn't it a fa ct th at Yugoslavia frequently 

squares off against the Soviet bloc in the U.N. ?

Mr. Gardner. That is why I qualified my answer.

Senator Aiken. You might say Moscow has 11 votes. She has 

some of the others a lot of the time, but she can consistently cast 11 

votes, now tha t Outer Mongolia is a U.N. member.

Mr. Gardner. Actually, Senator, during this last Assembly there 

were some occasions in which the Soviet Union lost some votes of 

even the bloc countries; tha t is, the voting pattern has demonstrated 

in the last year or two tha t even Poland has occasionally voted differently than the Soviet Union. But essentially they have 11 votes they 

can count on for major cold war issues.

Senator Aiken. When she loses a vote it is usually because Hu ngary or some other country absents itself at the time the vote is taken.

I have seen Hungary do it two or three times. I do not know why.

Senator Church. Let me pursue this to get this point established, 

if I may. What percentage of the regular budget do these Communist countries now contribute in accordances with the formula for
10 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

assessments to the general fund? What percentage of the general 

fund is contributed by the Communist countries ?

Mr. Gardner. You are speaking of the regular budget?

Senator Church. Yes; which is based upon an assessment which 

is supposed to have some proportionate relationship to the size and 

wealth of these Communist countries.

Mr. Gardner. That is correct; close to 20 percent.

Senator Aiken. Ask what percentage they receive from the Fund. 

Senator Church. I was going to get to that, Senator. These countries now contribute about 20 percent to the general fund; in other 

words, they contribute about 20 percent of the regular, dues of the 

United Nations?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct; although they contribute only about 

3 percent to this Special Fund.

Mr. Chairman, that is correct.

Senator Church. All right.

special fund contributions of, and projects in , communist

COUNTR IES

Of the 288 projects that the Special Fund has approved during the 

period of its existence, what percentage of these have been in Communist countries and what percentage of the money spent by the 

Special Fund has been spent in Communist countries ? This was the 

question you asked, Senator.

Senator Aiken. Yes. I assume Outer Mongolia gets a contribution, 

and Cuba would get something out of it.

Air. Gardner. Yes. I have this-----

Senator Aiken. I do not know about the others.

Mr. Gardner. I am going to get to this in my statement, Senator, 

but I am glad to answer it now.

The bloc countries have contributed, all told, since this fund was 

started, some $7 million. Counting this project in Cuba in addition 

to two previous projects in Poland, they will have received $3 million 

in return.

Senator Church. The bloc countries have contributed about $7 

million all told?

Mr. Gardner. $7 million in the history of the Special Fund, and if 

you add this project in Cuba to the previous ones in Poland, they will 

have received $3 million in return.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if you add Yugoslavia to that, then the Communist contributions add up to $8 million all told, and projects in 

Communist countries to $6 million.

Senator Lauscite. Explain tha t $8 million and the $6 million.

Mr. Gardner. Yes.

This includes Yugoslavia as a Communist country, and if you 

include Yugoslavia, then the contributions, all told, from Communist 

countries add up to $8 million, and the projects in Communist countries add up to $6 million. In other words, on this calculation they 

are getting out of the Fund less than they are putting in.

Out of the 288 Special Fund projects so far authorized, 282 have 

been in non-Communist countries and 6 in Communist countries.

Senator Church. Let me have that figure again, please.
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 11

Mr. Gardner. Yes. Out of 288 Special Fund projects so far authorized, 282 have been in non-Communist countries, and 6 in Communist 

countries. In financial terms, some $248 million out of the grand total of $254 

million of Fun d projects, over 97 percent, have gone to the non-Communist world.

Senator Sparkman. And $6 million to the Communists ?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct.

Senator Church. Or about 3 percent ?

Mr. Gardner. Yes.

Senator Church. Then actually, according to those figures, the 

Communist countries have received about the same proportion or 

possibly a little less then they have contributed.

Mr. Gardner. They pu t in $8 million and have taken out $6 million. 

They have gotten out a little bit less than they put in.

Senator Church. But in the percentage figures we had you said 97 

percent have gone to non-Communist countries, and about 3 percent to Communist countries, and tha t is what they are contributing.

Mr. Gardner. I said over 97 percent. I did not want to split it, 

but they have gotten out less than they have put in, somewhat less.

Senator Church. Yes.

Senator Sparkman. Since we are dealing in these fractional figures, 

according to your earlier statement, the Communist countries are 

contributing 3y2

 percent.

Senator Church. That is correct.

Mr. Gardner. Three and a half.

Senator Church. So t ha t makes the dollar figures roughly in balance with the percentage figures.

Mr. Gardner. Tha t is correct.

Would you like me to continue?

Senator Church. Yes; please do.

PURPOSE OF SPECIAL FU ND

Senator Lausciie. While we are on this subject, is this Fund 

intended to help the nations that are in distress ?

Mr. Gardner. That is the purpose of it, Senator.

Senator Lausche. Does Red China contribute anything ?

Mr. Gardner. Red China is not a member of the U.N. and therefore 

is not eligible to participate in the Special Fund.

Senator Lausciie. So we can assume that this money has been given 

primarily to nations in distress ?

Mr. Gardner. It is given primarily to less developed countries.

Senator Lausche. All right.

Mr. Gardner. Their degree of distress may vary. They are all 

poor. They all need external help in building their economies, and 

all of i t is going to countries of th at kind.

free world contributions tospecial fund

Senator Lausciie. Now, then, as between the Communist bloc na ­

tions tha t contributed and the free bloc nations tha t contributed to the Fund, which was the most liberal proportionately with its gifts?

Mr. Gardner. Well, there is no question but that the free world does
12 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

much more than the Communist world, not only in this program but 

in all U.N. voluntary programs.

Senator Lausciie. Therefore, the leading countries in making the 

gifts—the United Kingdom, France, the United States—gave far more 

liberally and received less back by way of goods than the Communist 

countries got back ?

Air. Gardner. I would agree, Senator, with the first part of that 

statement, but I could not agree with the second.

In other words, the U.N. voluntary programs are, in fact, run largely 

by the free world countries. They give most of the money, and most 

of the money, in turn, goes to the free world and is used in support of 

free world objectives.

Cuba’s failure topaypledged amounts tofund

Senator Lausciie. Cuba paid in $25,000 in 1962 and has pledged 

$25,000 for 1963. How much is it going to get back out of this project ?

Air. Gardner. AVell, this project calls for an allocation of $1,157,000 

for Cuba.

Senator Symington. How much have they put in ?

Air. Gardner. Their annual pledge, their last annual pledge, was 

$25,000.

Senator Symington. I am not asking what they pledged. What did 

they actually put in ?

Senator Sparkman. The cumulative total ?

Senator Symington. Yes, cumulative total.

Air. Gardner. Well, they have, since the Fund was started, they 

have pledged a total o f-----

Senator Symington. I am not asking what they pledged. What did 

they put in ?

Air. Gardner. They have not actually paid in on their pledges.

Senator Sparkman. Nothing a t all?

Senator Lausciie. They put in nothing.

Senator S ymington. Air. Chairman, may I make an observation ?

Senator Ciiurch. Yes.

Senator Symington. I had a comparable discussion the other day 

here with Air. Ball. What we want to know, based on Senator 

Lausche’s questions, was what they actually put in, not what they 

pledged. If you will be frank with this committee, you will get more 

support out of this committee. That is my opinion.

Air. Gardner. Senator, it is my intention to be frank with the 

committee, and I am not withholding information.

Senator S ymington. Let me ask you how much Cuba has pledged, 

all told ?

Air. Gardner. They have pledged $55,000.

Senator Symington. Thank you.

Air. Gardner. Since the Special Fun d began; and they are delinquent in their payments on the pledges.

Senator Lausciie. So they paid in nothing and they are getting 

back what?

Air. Gardner. $1,157,600, of which Cuba is supposed to pay 

$114,500 in cash in support of the foreign experts who come to this 

project.
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 13

Senator Church. But let us get this perfectly clear on the record 

so t hat there is no confusion. 1 understood you to say that although Cuba has pledged a total of $55,000 since the inception of the Special 

Fund, it actually has not paid in a cent; is t hat correct?

Cuba's delinquency on u.n. accounts

Mr. Gardner. That is correct. If the chairman will permit me, 

may I make a general statement about Cuba’s delinquency on U.N. accounts? 1 know it is of interest to Senator Symington and all members of the committee, and 1 want to make it clear tha t I have no desire to withhold any information. I am trying to put it on the record, but it is sometimes difficult, when I have not completed 

an answer, to do so. Cuba has a very bad record of payment on these voluntary pro­ grams, and on this one they have paid nothing that they have 

pledged. This is standard practice for Castro. Castro’s Cuba has not paid 1 cent on the Congo and Middle East military operations for which it has been assessed. They are in arrears on that to the tune of—well, I will give you the figures since 

this question has come up. On the Congo they are in arrears $205,598. They are in arrears on 

the Middle East operation $191,001. On the regular budget, the regular U.N. budget, they have also been in arrears. They have paid some for past years, but they are behind, and they now owe on the regular budget $199,464. To sum up, on these assessments for the regular budget and the two military operations they are in arrears a total of $596,063.

Cuba’s possible loss of u.n. vote

If they do not pay these arrears by the first of Jan uar y of next year, they stand to lose their vote under article X IX of the U.N. Charter, as will several of the other members of the Soviet bloc.

Senator Churcii. That is not exactly accurate, is it, Mr. Secretary? Is not the accurate statement tha t if they fail to pay their arrears with respect to the regular budget and the special assessments, they may stand to lose their vote, but they could continue to be in arrears with respect to the Special Fund and any other voluntary 

fund without placing their vote in jeopardy ?

Mr. Gardner. Yes.

Let me state it again, if I may. If they pay nothing additional on account of these assessed budgets for the regular budget and the military operations, if they pay nothing additional on those, they stand to lose their vote under the provisions of article XIX of the United Nations Charter with which this committee is, of course, 

familiar.

Senator Lausche. You have told us how much they are in arrears 

and they paid nothing into the Special Fund.

Mr. Gardner. Nothing.

Senator Lausche. They have also paid nothing on the special operations ; that is correct, isn’t it ?

Mr. Gardner. Nothing on the military and peace-keeping operations.

04929— 63 3
14 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

Senator Lausche. How much have they paid in to the United 

Nations since Castro has been the head of that Government?

Mr. Gardner. We will have to supply that for the record, Senator. 

Senator Sparkman. May I ask if you know whether they have paid 

anythin g ?

Mr. Gardner. I am informed they have paid something.

Senator Lauscue. It is very vital that we get that information.

Mr. Gardner. Well, we will have that directly for you at the conclusion of this hearing.

Senator Aiken. 'Will you yield, Fra nk ?

Senator Lauscue. Yes.

RE DU CT IO N OF A SS ES SM EN TS F OR S PE CIA L U .N . OP ER AT IO NS

Senator Aiken. We paid 80 percent of Cuba's assessments on the 

Congo and the Middle Fast, so they were behind 20 percent of their 

assessment: is that right ?

Senator Lauscue. Correct.

Mr. Gardner. May I comment on that, Mr. Chairman ?

Senator Church. Yes.

Mr. Gardner. With all respect, I cannot agree with you.

Senator Aiken. I know you won't, but it is a fact.

Mr. Gardner. As the Senator knows, in the Congo and the Middle 

East operations, a General Assembly resolution authorized a reduction in the assessments of all the small, less-developed countries. I 

think there were some 60 or 70 countries involved.

Senator Aiken. Seventy-six.

Mr. Gardner. Seventy-six.

Senator Aiken. We paid 80 percent for 76 countries, and 50 percent 

for 5 others.

Mr. Gardner. Senator, we did not pay anybody’s assessment. It 

was a General Assembly decision that for these large peace-keeping 

operations which added a great additional burden on the membership, for those and those alone, the 76 less-developed countries should 

be given a reduction of the share they normally pay to the U.N. regular 

budget. This affected 76 countries, of which 3 or 4 were Communist— 

Albania, Cuba, and perhaps 1 or 2 others.

But I want to explain the basis for that.

Senator Aiken. We contributed enough so tha t the assessment was 

reduced 50 percent for five others. It was our $15 million that made 

it possible for them to reduce their assessments; 80 percent fo r 76, and 

50 percent for 5.

Cuba’su.n. obligationsandpayments

Senator Church. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask, do you have an 

answer to Senator Lausche's question? If you do, let us get it in the 

record at this point.

Mr. Gardner. The question, as I understand it, Mr. Chairman, is 

whether, since Castro took power, Cuba has paid anything to the 

U.N. I am afraid I cannot answer tha t at this moment. I will 

supply the answer directly upon the conclusion of this hearing.

Senator Church. Can we get it now for the record ?

Mr. Gardner. Yes.
UN IT ED NATI ONS SP EC IA L FU ND 15

(The information referred to is as follows:)

Cuba—Obligations and paymen ts, 1960, 1961, and 1962

I960 1961 1962

U .X . re gula r b u d g et as se ss m en ts (n e t) ..............................................

P aym ents :

Ju n e 18, 1962..................................................................................

Dec . 11. 1962..................................................................................

$122,794

75.0 00 

47,794

$148,757 $132,913

Bal an ce due Dec . 31. 1962,

U X E F :

A ss es sm en ts ( n e t ) . . ______ ______________________________

P ay m e n ts 1______________________________________________

B al an ce due D ec . 31 ,196 2----------- ----------------------------------

U X O C :

A ss es sm en ts (n e t) ______________________ _____ __________

P a y m e n ts ,. ....................... ....... ......................... ............... .................

B al an ce due D ec . 31, 1962...................................... .....................

U .X . te ch nic al as si st an ce : P le d g e s., .................................. ................... ........... ............... ..............

P a y m e n ts ............. ................... ................................... - ............. ..........

B al an ce d u e X ov. 30. 1962----------------------------------------------

24,6 79

24.6 79

121,080

121,080

125,000

125,000

82.206 

66,551

46,7 78

46,7 78

49,529

49,529

100,000

100,000

132,913

4,0 08

4,008

34,9 89

34,989

25,0 00

25,000

U .X . Sp ec ial F u n d :

P le d g e s 2____________ _____ ______________________________ 5,000

P a y m e n ts _____________________________________________________________

B al an ce d u e N o v . 30, 1962______________________________ 5,000

25,000

25,000

1 D uri ng N ovem ber 1957 C u b a p aid $27,000 on i ts 1957 U N E F as se ss m en t w hi ch w as $39,662.

2

 C uba h as p le dged $25,000 f or 1963, m ak in g to ta l u n p aid ple dges e q u al $55,000.

Senator Church. Now, Senator Symington.

ALLOCATION OF COSTS FOR CUBAN PROJEC T

Senator Symington. The second pa ragraph says the Special Fund has put in $253 million, but is getting back locally $335 million. That, would appear to mean tha t fo r every dollar p ut in by the U.N. Special Fund the local people would put in $1.40. But if we put up $1,157,(500, and the Cubans $114,000 the Cubans will put up less than 10 cents for 

every dollar they receive; is that correct?

Mr. Gardner. No ; it is not, Senator.

Senator Symington. Would you explain that to me ?

Mr. Gardner. I will indeed. I will try to. This project calls for an allocation from the Special Fund of 

$1,157,600. '

Senator Symington. Right.

Mr. Gardner. The Cuban Government will make a counterpart con­ tribution of its local currency and equipment and services of Cuban 

citizens in the amount of $1,878,000. Now, in addition, and above and beyond that $1,878,000 of local contributions to this project, the Cuban Government will pay $114,500, representing 15 percent of the estimated gross expert cost of the foreign experts in this project, and that is included in the $1,157,600 

of Special Fund allocation.
16 UN IT ED NATI ONS SP EC IA L FU ND

Senator Symington. II ow do they put that in ?

Mr. Gardner. This is paid into an account opened by the Special 

Fund in Cuba and merged with the other moneys, and the purpose of 

tha t-----

Senator Symington. I mean, what currency do they use when they 

put it in ?

Mr. Gardner. Cuban pesos.

Senator Symington. What currency do they use when they say they 

will pu t in $1,878,000?

Mr. Gardner. These are pesos or the peso valuation of services and 

equipment arrived at upon agreement between Cuba and the U.N. 

Special Fund.

QUEST IO N OF USE OF U .S . FU N D S IN CUBAN PRO JE C T

Senator Symington. Let me ask one more question and then I want 

to yield back.

This Special Fund which is run by Mr. Hoffman has approved the 

payment to Cuba of this $1,157,600. Wh at percentage of tha t is 

American money ?

Mr. Gardner. Xot one American dollar is going to be used in this 

project, but we contribute 40 percent of the total of the Special Fund.

Senator Symington. Don’t you think—and this is my last question—don’t you think it pre tty ridiculous for us to write back to our 

constituents and say we are putting up 40 percent of the money in the 

Special Fund, but not putting a single do llar into the $1,157,600 being 

given Cuba out of the Special Fund? Would you like to try to write 

tha t letter for me in reply to a great many letters I am getting on this 

subject?

Mr. Gardner. Senator, we opposed this project.

Senator Symington. I understand that. But that is not my point. 

I am asking this technical question.

You say we are putting up 40 percent of all the money tha t goes 

into the Special Fu nd ; but you also say we are not putting up $1 of the 

$1,157,600 to Cuba. I wish you would explain tha t from a bookkeeping standpoint.

Mr. Gardner. Senator, well, first, let me say that we agree that this 

is a deplorable situation. We opposed the project when it came up 2 

years ago. We opposed it since, and we oppose it today.

Senator Symington. I do not say it is deplorable, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Lausche. I do.

Senator Symington. All I want to know is all the facts. How can 

I answer the statement that we put up 40 percent of the money for 

the Special Fu nd, but not $1, American dollar, goes into the $1,157,600 

tha t goes to Cuba out of the Special Fund ?

What is the practical answer?

Mr. Gardner. Tha t question can be answered, Senator: I will be 

happy to answer it now.

Senator Symington. Let us talk about the stra ight accounting 

aspect of it.

Mr. Gardner. The answer is th at the contributions to the Special 

Fun d paid in by the contributing countries are not merged in an undifferentiated pool of currencies. These are separate, at least most of
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 17

them are ; in other words, there are separate accounts for—and I will 

give you some examples—for the United States, Sweden, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Japan, 

India, Germany, Norway, Denmark, and Turkey.

Senator Symington. Are you saying that when we put money into 

the Special Fund we reserve the right to say where tha t money is to 

go : to what country ?

Mr. Gardner. We have made no such formal reservation.

What I am saying, Senator, is th at we have received assurances in this case tha t the American dollars in our segregated account will not be used, and tha t Mr. Hoffman intends to use the currencies of other 

countries.

Senator Symington. Doesn't tha t automatically mean therefore, 

tha t more of our American dollars will go to other countries?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct.

Senator Symington. Then the statement is ridiculous from the 

technical standpoint of bookkeeping.

Mr. Gardner. But the other countries are not Communist, so tha t 

no American dollars or personnel or equipment will be used in this 

project.

Senator Sparkman. Do you still have the floor ?

Senator Lausche. Yes.

Senator Sparkman. Would you yield it to me?

Senator L ausche. Surely, I will yield.

Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, I see a technical explanation of 

this, but I join with the Senator from Missouri in saying tha t for practical purposes I do not believe the American people can be sat­ isfied on this at all. And it seems to me that the Cuban situation is different from what was contemplated under tha t resolution. There is the situation of Cuba not having met its obligations to the U.N. all across the line, and it seems to me that based on tha t it certainly should 

have been held up. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention this p oint: O f course, we have no right to ask Mr. Hoffman to come in. He is not a U.S. employee. But I was quite hopeful that Mr. Hoffman, himself, might 

come here.

Senator Ciiurcii. Let me say, in response to that inquiry, Senator— 

and I am glad you brought it up because I had meant to mention this 

to the committee at the outset—Mr. Hoffman will be here to lunch 

with us today, and every member of the committee is invited to attend 

that luncheon.

ATT ITUDE OF AM ERICAN PEO PLE TOWARD CUB AN PROJECT

Senator Sparkman. Very good.

If I may jus t add this, I am trying to look at this th ing purely from the practical standpoint. I have supported the U.N. from the very beginning, and I have argued for it. I had some pretty tough fights 

on the floor of the Senate. In the past session of Congress when the Chairman was away, I had to handle the bill there—in connection with the U.N. bond 

issue—but I want to say to you tha t I think at no time since the 

U.N. Charter was adopted has there been as much feeling among the
18 UN IT ED NATI ONS SP EC IA L FU ND

people back home as there is at the present time, and this is simply 

adding fuel to the fire.

I say in all conscience, that 1 do not know that the Congress will 

approve a 40 percent voluntary contribution to the Special Fund if 

this project goes through, and I do not know what effect it is going to 

have on U.N. funds generally.

1 really think—1 am saying this in all seriousness—I think it is a 

dangerous situation so far as our support of the U.N. is concerned, 

because the people back home are speaking up on it. That is all. 

Thank you.

EXTENT TO W H IC H CUB A HAS PA ID U .N . AS SE SS M EN TS

Senator Church. I wonder if 1 may suggest th at in order to get on 

with the presentation of the full story if we would hold back questions 

as much as posible. I think that you do have an answer to Senator 

Lauscbe’s earlier question.

Mr. Gardner. I have that now.

Senator Church. I wonder if we could put that in the record at 

this time.

Mr. Gardner. On the 11th of December 1962, Cuba paid $130,000 

toward its regular budget assessment.

Senator Williams. Was that paid in dollars ?

Mr. Gardner. Yes.

Senator Church. Paid how much?

Mr. Gardner. $130,000 for the regular U.N. budget.

Senator Aiken. I thin k Cuba has kept up on her regular assessments.

Senator Williams. Was (his paid in dollars and not in their own 

currency ?

Mr. Gardner. Yes.

Senator Sparkman. All payments to the regular budget have to be 

in dollars ?

Mr. Gardner. There is an obligation that all payments to the regular U.N. budget have to be in convertible currency.

Cuba's failure to pay u.n. assessments for special operations and

AM OUNTS PLEDGED TO FU ND

Senator Church. Apa rt from the contributions to the regular general budget, Cuba lias made no payments ?

Mr. Gardner. Castro's Cuba lias not paid to the Special F un d; they 

have not paid anything for their assessments to the Congo and the 

Middle E ast operations. They have boycotted these just as the Soviet 

Union.

Senator Church. And they have not paid anything to the Special 

Fund?

Mr. ( tardner. They have not paid in support of their pledges of 

$55,000 to the I ’.N. Special Fund.

SP EC IA L FU N D PLED GE S OU TS TA NDIN G

Senator Church. May I ask this: Have other countries received 

aid from the Special Fund who have pledged to support it but who 

have failed to meet their pledges? Is this a common practice?

Mr. Gardner. We will have to supply the details on that, if you wish 

them.
UN ITED NA TIO NS SPE CIA L FU ND 19

(The information referred to is as follows:)

U nit ed N a tio ns Spe cia l F un d

COUN TR IE S RE CE IV IN G SPE CIA L FU N D A SSIS TA N C E , W IT H PL ED GE S OUTS TA NDIN G FOR 

19 0 1 OR PR IOR YE AR S AS OF NO VE MB ER 2 0 , 1 9 0 2

A rg en tina

Boliv ia

Cu ba

E cuad or

G uat em ala

Gui ne a

H ait i

H ondura s

U ru gu ay

U .S . CONTR IB UTI ONS IN TE RM S OF F U N D ’S CO NVE RT IB LE CU RRE NCY

Senator Williams. Did I understand yon to say that all the contributions were in convertible currencies?

Mr. Gardner. For the regular budget.

Senator Williams. The Russians do not make their contributions 

in convertible currencies at all nor do their satellites.

Mr. Gardner. They do for the regular budget.

Senator William s. But for this budget about which we are talking, they do not?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct; and not to special programs of a voluntary character. The resolution authorizing the establishment of the Special Fund referred only to usable, not convertible, curren­ cies, and where the programs are voluntary programs for economic development, as this one is, it is a general rule in the F.N ., which, I might say, we do not like, but it has been the practice, to put up 

inconvertible currencies so long as they are usable.

Senator Willia ms. So, in effect, we are paying more than 40 percent in convertible currency.

Mr. Gardner. We are paying more than 40 percent of the convertible currencies, but the Special Funci has been able to use nonconvert­ ible currencies because it is required that they be usable. They are drawn down regularly by Mr. Hoffman for experts and equipment.

Senator William s. In other words, Russia’s contributions are used 

to pay for some of the technicians and supplies in Cuba, and we are 

giving her credit.

Mr. Gardner. This project has not begun, so there are no Russian 

technicians in Cuba under this project. It is true that Russian contributions are used to pay for Russian 

experts.

Senator W illiams. So that it boils down to the fact that 40 percent 

is merely a fictitious figure because we, in effect, pay more than 40 

percent of the free currencies that are used in there.

Well, do we or don’t we ?

Mr. Gardner. We. pay 40 percent of the total usable contributions. 

We pay more than 40 percent of the convertible contributions.

Senator Williams. That is right. You pay more than 40 percent 

of the convertible currencies.

Senator Sparkman. It is 40 percent of usable currencies.

Senator W illiam s. Not freely usable currencies.

Senator Sparkma n. Well, they are free so far as the country that 

is getting the project is concerned. In other words, it has to arrange 

to use currencies that are available: isn't that right ?
20 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

Mr. Gardner. The commitment of all the participants in the Special Fund is to contribute usable currency, and that means currencies 

which, even if inconvertible, Mr. Hoffman can put to work.

Senator Williams. By taking Russian technicians and paying for 

their going into Cuba, and paying Russia for some of the supplies they 

put in there.

Mr. Gardner. That is correct; for a technician or supply from another part of the bloc, I think there is some tra nsferability within the 

bloc.

Cuba’s arrearage on u.n. regular and special assessments

Senator Lausciie. Mr. Chairman, may T finish my questioning 

here ?

Senator Ciiurcii. All righ t, Senator.

Senator Lausciie. I just want to summarize this now. In December 

of 1962 Castro paid $130,000 as his responsibility for the general operation of the United Nations?

Mr. Gardner. Tha t is correct.

Senator Lausciie. How much is th at $130,000 of the total amount 

that Cuba owed for the general operation?

Mr. Gardner. Senator, I do not have the total amount of what 

Cuba’s assessments are. I have the figures for what they are in 

arrears. They are in arrears of $199,464 on the regular budget.

Senator Lausche. How much ?

Mr. Gardner. $199,464 on the regular budget.

Senator Lausciie. Is that as of today ?

Mr. Gardner. That is as of today, despite th at payment of $130,000.

I should say Cuba’s annual assessment for the U.N. regular budget 

is $163,073. So they are a little over a year behind on that. Tha t is 

the regular budget. They paid $130,000 in December 1962.

Senator Lausche. Is that the only amount that Castro paid in?

Mr. Gardner. I cannot say whether they ever paid anything before 

that, hut we know he paid $130,000 in December 1962. Cuba still is 

behind $199,000 on the regular budget, which is a little over a year 

behind.

Senator Lausche. All right.

So he is in arrears $199,464 on the regular budget, and nothing of 

the $55,000 pledge to the Special Fund has been paid: is tha t correct?

Mr. Gardner. Tha t is correct.

Senator Lausciie. He has paid nothing of his assessment on the 

Gaza and the Congo?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct.

Senator L ausche. Now. then, do you know whether there was any 

talk with Castro or his representative to the effect that “you had better 

pay something on your obligations; you are getting $1,157,600: there 

is going to be a cry in America if we go before the public without 

your having paid anything in ?”

Is it possible that he paid in this $130,000 to give a better facade 

to the United Nations giving him $1,157,600 ?

Mr. Gardner. I do not know what the motive of Mr. Castro was 

in paying in $130,000. 1 think it was probably to keep Cuba from

falling under the rule of article X IX and losing its vote, as they would 

have done if he had not paid tha t in.
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 21

Senator L ausche. Well, under article X IX lie is still out, liecause 

the only one you exclude is the voluntary contributions. If you 

include Gaza and the Congo, isn't he now ineligible?

Mr. Gardner. No. He will only be ineligible as of J anu ary 1, 1964.

Senator Lausche. All right.

Senator Church. May I suggest at this point two things: First 

of all, I think tha t the general sentiment in this committee is clear. There is a general feeling tha t it is a very regrettable thin g for the 

United Nations that this project has been approved at this time. I think the testimony makes clear that a very strong case could have been made against the project in view of the failure of Cuba to honor its own pledges to the Special Fund, and in view of its arrearages, and 

for other considerations as well. Now, what I would like to ge t a t is what efforts our own delegates 

at the United Nations made to avoid this decision. However, before we get into that, I should like to say for the benefit 

of the committee that it had been my intention to publish—because I think tha t the American people should have all of the information tha t we are able to fe rret out on this situation—to publish a transcript of the hearings today in accordance with our established practice of having it first reviewed for extrasensitive disclosures or any classified information, by the State Department and by the staff of this committee, and then released to the public. Now, I want you gentlemen to understand this, and if you have any 

comment to make with respect to it, please feel free to do so. You understand, Mr. Secretary, the ordin ary practice of the committee is to make the trans cript available for the review of your own 

staff before it is released to the public?

Mr. Gardner. Yes, sir.

Senator Sparkman. I assume you would extend that also to permit 

any Senator to review it?

Senator Church. Yes, indeed; but I would like to have an understanding of the subcommittee here tha t we are going to proceed in 

this wav so tha t there will not be any question raised later.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Church. Very well, then. If there is no objection on the 

part of the members of the subcommittee, we will proceed to handle 

the tran script in this fashion.

Senator Lausche. What is th is $596,000 figure that you gave? Is 

tha t the arrearage on th e Congo operation ?

Mr. Gardner. That is the grand total of all arrearages of Cuba— 

the Congo, UNEF, and re gular budget—$596,063.

Senator Lausche. Do you have there the total of assessments that 

it would have had to pay? $596,000 is the arrearage?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct. You are asking now for the ir assessments on these different accounts?

Senator Lausche. If you do not have it, can we get it ?

Mr. Gardner. The answer on UN EF and the Congo is easy. On 

UN EF they paid nothing, so their assessments as well as their arrears are $191,001. On the Congo, similarly, their assessments as well as 

their arrears are $295,598.

Senator Sparkman. And th at first figu re yo u gave was Gaza ?
22 UN IT ED NATI ONS SP EC IA L FU ND

Mr. Gardner. $191,001 is on Gaza, and on the regu lar bud get th eir 

assessment fo r 1962 was $163,073. Th eir assessment fo r calen da r 

1961 fo r the regu lar bu dg et was $171,738; in othe r words, a total of 

some thing like $330,000 fo r the 2 yea rs, and the y are in arrears 

$199,464, or som eth ing over 1 year.

Se na tor Williams. May I ask just one question ?

Se na tor Chu rc h. Yes, S enato r.

APPROVAL OF CU BAN PRO JEC T

Se na tor W illiams. 1 came in late . Do I un de rstand Mr. Hoffm an 

appro ved of this proje ct ?

Mr. Gardner. No, th at is not correct. Mr. Ho ffm an is Managing 

Di rec tor of the Fund .

Se na tor Williams. Di d he vote a gains t it ?

Se na tor Ciiu rc ii. I f I may expla in, Senator , he has no vote. The 

vote in approv ing proje cts is lef t to a com mittee of 18 countrie s, and 

1 thought we might get into th at because these c ountr ies appro ved the 

pro jec t.

Se nator William s. We do not have a vote in th is g roup o f 18 c ountries?

Se na tor Churc h. Ye s; we do.

Se na tor Williams. Di d o ur dele gates vote f or it ?

Mr. Gardner. We did not vote fo r it.

CO MM ITT EE PR(ICF.DURE

Se nator , m ay I p erha ps be permitted to finish the sta tem ent ? Some 

of these question s may be answe red by th e statement.

Se na tor C hurc h. I th in k it wou ld be well fo r you to do th at.

May I say to the mem bers of the com mittee th at we had pla nned 

to go into the UNES CO m atter, but I am af ra id the time will run out, 

an d we oug ht to get throug h this if we can, and we can pu t the 

UNES CO matter on fo r next week or an othe r meetin g of the 

subcommittee.

W hy don't you proceed with the balance of yo ur statem ent so th at 

we can have a full presentat ion by you before we ask any more 

questions.

DESCR IPTION OF C UBAN PRO JEC T

Mr. Gardner. Th an k you, Mr. Ch air man.

Th e Spe cial Fu nd proje ct in Cuba was appro ved by the Go verning 

Cou ncil in May 1961. Th is proj ect, fo r which the Food and Agr icul ­

ture Or ga niz ati on is the exe cut ing agency, calls for an allo cation of 

$1,157,600 from the Special Fu nd (in clud ing $114,500 which will be 

pa id by Cu ba in cash) to assist in t he e xpa nsion o f an ag ric ultural experim ental s tat ion in Sa ntiago de las Vegas, Cuba. Of the $1,157,600, 

$763,500 is fo r experts, $50,000 fo r fellow ships, $200,000 fo r equip ­

ment, $45,600 fo r m isce llaneous expenses, a nd $98,500 f or th e overhead 

cost o f FAO .

Th e rese arch work involved here is to concentrate on livestock pr oduction, soil clas sification, co nservation , and c rop diversificatio n. Th e 

pro jec t is intended to last fo r 5 years an d the Cuban Government is 

to make ava ilable as a co un terp art co ntr ibuti on o f pers onnel, services,
U N IT ED NATIO NS SP EC IA L FU ND 23

land, and buildings, the equivalent of $1,878,000. No U.S. dollars, personnel, materials, or services will be used in this project.

U N IT E D ST AT ES OPP OSI TIO N TO CUBAN PR OJE CT

The United States opposed this project when it was put up for 

approval in May 1961; we have reiterated our opposition on several 

occasions since; we are still opposed. Our policy toward Cuba involves opposition to any source of aid and comfort to the present, 

regime. We pursue this policy in the United Nations and elsewhere 

by all means available to us.

You will be familiar now with the details of your objections to this 

project, objections which we believe are justified by the technical, 

economic, and organizational criteria of the U.N. Special Fund—the 

flight of qualified personnel from Cuba; the wanton slaughter of 

cattle and misuse of other agricultural resources; the influx of Communist technicians dedicated to imposing on Cuba the tried and disproved theories of Communist agriculture; the statements of Cuban 

Government officials themselves attesting to the chaos in the Cuban 

countryside and the lethargy among the Cuban farmers. I have with 

me the statement made by our representative in the Governing Council of the Special F und in May 1961 expressing our opposition to the 

project on these and other grounds and 1 should like to place that in 

the record at the conclusion of my statement. It was then Mr. Philip 

Klutznick, our representative to the Economic and Social Council, 

who also represented us in the Special Fund.

(Mr. Klutzn ick’s statement appears on p. 25.)

Senator Churcii. Without ob jection, the statement will be included.

Mr. Gardner. These objections, in our view, add up to a very important principle: We believed in May of 1961 and we believe now that 

the Cuban Government has so subordinated the economic and social 

welfare of the Cuban people to the narrow political aims of the present 

leadership that the minimum standards of efficiency and effectiveness 

which must guide the implementation of cooperative development 

projects—whether within the U.N. system or without—cannot possibly be met.

The basis of international cooperation under the United Nations 

in the field of development must rest on some reasonable separation of 

technical considerations and political considerations. However, the 

United States did not introduce political considerations into this m atter ; the Cuban Government did. The Cuban Government deliberately 

set out to erase the line between technical doctrine and political doctrine in the field of agriculture. While the charter of the Special 

Fun d provides that aid may not be accompanied by conditions of a 

political nature, an obligation clearly exists, in our view, to take account. of all circumstances, including political, which affect the economic feasibility of the p roject under consideration, and we so stated 

in the Governing Council in May of 1961.

One of our problems, Mr. Chairman, has been the opinion of many 

members of the U.N. that we are attaching more importance to this 

project than it deserves: a few thousand dollars of laboratory equipment, some books and visual aid equipment, a few fellowships and 

experts in such fields as plant pathology, grasslands management and 

horticulture are not going to affect the economy of Cuba for at least.
24 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

5 years. But the principle is one on which we must insist—and will 

continue to insist in the case of this project and any others of a 

similar nature which may come up for consideration in the future.

The necessary one-third of the votes to block the project when it 

was first considered in 1961 was not forthcoming; the necessary twothird s vote which would have subsequently forced a reconsideration 

was also absent. This lack of support did not stem from any consideration for Cuba, but rath er from fears that if this project were 

stopped it might jeopardize other projects of close concern to some 

members. It should be remembered tha t the Special Fun d has 11 

projects, totaling $7.5 million, in Korea, free China, and Vietnam, 

which the Soviets do not support—and which are being carried out 

today over their misgivings.

Since the Governing Council authorized the Cuban project, Paul 

Hoffman, as Managing Director of the Fund , has no real choice but 

to do what his Board of Directors instructed him to do. Our guess 

is th at there is still a considerable time gap between Mr. Hoffman’s 

decision to go forward with the preliminary phase of the project, 

subject to a review of its feasibility, and the actual operation of the 

project in Cuba, because it is by no means clear that the situation in 

Cuba will, in fact, allow the project to go forward.

RECORD OF T H E SP EC IA L FU N D

I believe th at our stand in this matter will be salutory in the long 

run. Meanwhile. I hope the excellent record of the Special Fund, 

from our point of view, over the past few years will not be eclipsed 

in the public mind by this single action. The Special Fun d has been 

a great asset for the free world through its efforts to promote the 

material basis for free institutions. Even on the narrowest of political 

calculations the free world has got more out of the Special Fund 

than it has put in, while the reverse is true of the Communist bloc. 

The bloc countries have contributed some $7 million to the Special 

Fun d: with this project in Cuba added to two previous projects in 

Poland they will have received $3 million in return. If you add 

Yugoslavia, Communist contributions add up to $8 million, projects 

in Communist countries to $6 million. Out of the 288 Special Fund 

projects so far authorized, 282 have been in non-Communist countries, 6 in the Communist countries. In financial terms, some $248 

million of the grand total of $254 million of Fund projects—over 97 

percent—go to the non-Communist world.

USE FU LN ESS OF T H E U N IT E D N A TIO N S TO U .S . N A TIO N A L IN TEREST

Tn conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I also hope that this project in Cuba 

will not obscure the great usefulness of the United Nations to the 

U.S. national interest in promoting peace and freedom in recent years. 

Tn the Congo, the U.N. played a vital role in thwartin g Communist 

penetration and restoring law and order. In the Cuban crisis, the 

United Nations proved of unique value to the free world as a forum 

to expose the Communist conspiracy and as a center of negotiation to 

remove Soviet offensive weapons once the power and determination 

of the United States and its allies had been demonstrated in the quar-
UN IT ED NATI ONS SP EC IA L FU ND 25

antine. And when Cuba rejected on-site inspection by the U.X., this helped to put an international label of “outlaw” on the Castro regime. 

That concludes my statement. (Mr. Klutznick’s statement referred to previously follows:)

Statement By Me. Klut zn ick, in th e Governing Council of th e Special F und, 

on th e I ’roposed Cuban Project

The U.S. Gove rnment wishes to explain its view with reg ard to the proposed Special Fun d allocati on of $1,157,000 to an agric ult ura l researc h pro ject in Cuba. This proj ect propose s to ass ist in the expansion of agric ult ura l researc h in the cen tral expe rimenta l sta tio n in Santiago de las Vegas, with pa rti cu lar attentio n to livestock produ ction , soil classif ication , conservation, and crop divers ificati on. It is our und ers tan din g th at the pro ject would last for 5 yea rs and th at the Cuban Government w ould expect to con trib ute $1,878,000. The Government of the United Sta tes who lehearted ly endor ses the purpose for which the pro ject is proposed. We have a long and affection ate frie nds hip with the people of Cuba. We warm ly sup por t their asp irations for high er living stan dar ds, social just ice, and f ree po litic al ins titu tion s. We believe th at div ersi­ fication and mod ernizatio n of Cuban agric ulture are esse ntia l steps tow ard thes e objectives. We will sup por t any tech nica l assista nce pro ject in Cuba or else­ where th at holds reas ona ble promise of prom oting these high aims. Nevertheless , the U.S. Govern ment can not approve thi s project. The re are a numb er of rece nt developments quite unrelate d to the det erio rati on in our re la­ tions with the Cas tro governm ent, which raise serio us questions about whe ther th at government is willi ng or able to make effective use of the resou rces which 

this p roject would p ut at its disposal. These developments—which I shal l describe in a moment—should be stud ied in the ligh t of the c rit er ia for selectin g project s for the Special Fun d laid down in the Manag ing Di rec tor ’s exp lana tory pap er SF /1 of Janu ary 1. 1959. Among 

these crite ria a re the fol low ing : The urgency of the need of the requ esting country for the pro ject in 

question . The prospect t hat the pro ject will le ad to ear ly results and have the w idest possible im pact in adva ncing the economic, social, and techn ical developm ent of the coun try—in pa rti cu lar by fac ilitat ing new cap ital investment. The technical, orga nizational, and financial problems likely to be en­ coun tered in execu ting the proje ct. Among the prin cipa l fac tor s to be take n into acco unt und er thi s cri terion are wh eth er the proj ect will enjoy the full particip ation of the recipie nt government and wh eth er tra ine d personnel will be made availab le to assum e responsib ility when the pro ject 

is completed. Recen t develop ments in Cuba rais e sub sta nti al ques tions as to whethe r the above-mentioned crite ria are satisfied with respect to the proj ect before us. Many of these developments have occurred, or have come to ligh t or have been sub stantially agg rav ated since the pro ject was subm itted by the mana ging di­ recto r and his staff. We do not believe th at the pro ject should proceed until the staff of the Special Fun d is in a positio n to determin e th at such developments will not fr us trat e the objectives which the pro jec t is designed to serve. The developments to which I ref er are the follow ing : 1. The fai lur e of the Cuban Gover nment to ava il itse lf of existin g mu lti­ lat eral sources of technical assistance. A number of reports have come to our att ent ion in recent weeks which rai se ques tions about the willingness of the Cuban Governm ent to avail itself of the k ind of assista nce here proposed. Foreign exp erts sen t to Cuba by vari ous intern ationa l orga nizations to work on proj ects sim ilar to the one before us toda y have encou ntered serio us dif ­ ficulties. These difficulties include not merely the uns ettled economic and polit­ ical conditions in the country , the diso rgan izat ion of Cuban agr icu lture, the absence of tr ain ed Cuba ns with whom to work, but, above all, the lack of intere st and cooperation on the pa rt of the pre sen t Cuban authoriti es. As a res ult of these fac tor s a number of technician s who have been sen t to Cuba und er int erna ­ tion al auspic es to work on ag ricult ura l project s have not found the ir missions 

productive. We have ju st receive d rep ort s from foreig n agric ult ure exp erts who were recently in Cuba und er intern ational ausp ices th at the Govern ment's agricul-
26 U N IT ED NATI ONS SP EC IA L FU ND

tu ra l se rv ic es g en er al ly —a nd p art ic u la rl y th e c entr al ex per im en ta l st ati on which 

th is pro je ct is su pp os ed to aid —a re ba dly di so rg an ized . The se ex pert s en co un ­

te re d se ri ou s diffi cu lties in th e w or k w ith Cub an G ov er nm en t pe rson ne l. Th ey 

wer e in ph ys ic al da ng er a t wor k an d a t ho me and w er e w ithout adeq uat e polic e 

pr ot ec tion . Th ey wer e fr equentl y hara ss ed by m ilitia . On th e ba sis of th is 

ex pe rien ce , th ey ex pr es s th e view th a t any te am of fo re ig n exper ts br oa dl y 

re pre se nta ti ve of U ni ted N at io ns mem be rs wou ld find no t on ly lack of co op er atio n hu t ope n ho stility.

Clear ly , th ou gh we reco gn ize th e ne ed fo r ch an ge , we wou ld be in vitin g fr u str ati o n if not actu al dan ger fo r th is pr oje ct if we pr oc ee de d w ithout revi ew in g 

th e r ec en t ex pe rien ce o f f or ei gn te ch nic ia ns in Cu ba und er i n te rn ati o n al au sp ices , 

in cl ud in g th e ci rc um st an ce s I hav e ju s t de scrib ed .

The lack of co op er at io n by th e Cub an G ov er nm en t w ith te ch nic al as si st an ce 

pro je ct s of in te rn ati onal org an iz at io ns has been part ic ula rl y se riou s in th e ca se 

of th e In te r-A m er ic an In sti tu te of A gr ic ultur al Sc ien ces, a sp ec ializ ed ag en cy 

of th e O rg an iz at io n of A m er ic an Sta te s. R ep re se nta tives of th e In sti tu te in 

Cub a ex ec ut in g pr oje ct 39—a sp ec ia l pro je ct of te ch ni ca l co op er at io n co nc erne d 

w ith agri cult ura l im pr ov em en t th ro ughout th e Americas — ha ve fo un d them se lves 

ho pe less ly fr u st ra te d . L ast m on th th e In sti tu te w as su dd en ly ev icted from 

it s pr em ises in H av an a w ithout an y ad va nc ed no tifica tion and it s st af f has sin ce 

bee n ob liged to co nd uc t its te ch ni ca l ass is ta nce op er at io ns from pri vate q u art ers 

w ithout th e use of office re co rd s, eq uipm en t, an d fu rn it ure .

I sh ou ld em ph as ize her e th a t sinc e H avana w as th e nort hern zo ne hea dq u art ers of pr oj ec t 39 fo r th e C ar ib bea n an d C en tral A m er ic an are a th e ac tion 

o f th e Cub an Gov ernm en t has ad ve rs ely affected th e wor k of th e in sti tu te in 10 

L ati n American co un tries.

So fa r I ha ve spok en gen er al ly of th e fa il u re of th e Cub an Gov ernm en t to 

co op er at e w ith in te rn ati onal org an iz at io ns su pp ly in g te ch ni ca l as si st an ce . I 

w ish now to ca ll to th e att en ti o n of th e mem be rs of th e Gov erning Co un cil to 

on e addi tion al m att er which co nc erns no t mer ely in te rn ati o n al in st it uti ons 

ge ne ra lly but th e Sp ec ial F und of th e U ni ted N at io ns itse lf.

As my co lle ag ue s are aw ar e, th e Gov erning Co un cil a t it s 5t h se ss ion in 

Dec em be r of la st year ap pr ov ed an al lo ca tion of some $4 mill ion fo r th e 

In te r-A m er ic an In sti tu te of A gri cu lt ura l Sc ien ces in o rd er to st re ngth en ag ri ­

cu lt u ra l ed uc at io n an d re se arc h in L ati n American co un trie s. Thi s pro je ct 

ca nn ot go fo rw ard unti l th e 18 American Rep ub lic s wh o are mem be rs of th e 

In sti tu te ra ti fy a 1958 pr otoc ol st re ngth en in g th e In sti tu te ’s str u ctu re an d 

per m it ti ng it to ex pa nd it s pro gr am an d bu dg et. It has re ce nt ly com e to ou r 

att enti on th a t th e protoc ol has been ra tified or th a t step s ha ve been ta ken 

to w ard ra ti fi ca ti on by al l th e re pu bl ics co nc erne d w ith th e sole ex ce pt ion of 

Cu ba. A pp ar en tly th e G ov er nm en t of Cu ba in te nds to de pr iv e no t m er ely it se lf 

bu t oth er U ni ted N at io ns m em be rs of tech ni ca l as si st an ce in agri cult ure mad e 

av ai la ble th ro ugh a pro je ct of th e Sp ecial Fu nd . We do no t see how th e 

pro je ct be fore us ca n go fo rw ard so long as th e Cu ba n Gov ernm en t is blo ck ing 

anoth er re la te d pr oj ec t w hi ch th is Gov erning Co uncil has alr ea dy ap prov ed .

2. The disp la ce m en t of qu alified pe rs on ne l by the Gov er nm en t of Cu ba. Th e 

seco nd qu es tion ab out th e econ om ic val id ity of th is pro je ct co nc erns th e av ail ­

ability of qu alifi ed Cu ba n pe rs on ne l.

The fe as ib ility o f th is p ro je ct sh ou ld b e review ed , in th e li ght of re ce nt re port s 

th a t some 700 Cu ba n ag ro nom is ts ha ve be en disp lace d fr om th eir po sitio ns . Of 

th es e, som e 200 ha ve b een fo rc ed in to e x il e ; th e re st ha ve been di ve rt ed to oth er 

fu nc tions in C uba which do not utilize th eir sk ills.

Moreo ve r, th e Cu ba n G ov er nm en t has re ce nt ly mad e it c le ar th a t it is pre par ed 

to co nt in ue to d ispl ac e co m pe te nt te ch nic ia ns fo r pol itic al re as on s—w hat ev er th e 

co st to th e Cu ba n eco nomy . E rn es to “C he ” Gue va ra st ate d on April 30 ov er 

Cub an ra d io : “D es pi te th e fa c t th a t th e ty pe of te ch ni ci an we now ha ve is no t 

th e id ea l type , we hav e pre fe rr ed him to hav in g no te ch ni ci an s a t al l— an d in 

m an y ca ses, we had to be le ft w ith no ne a t all. Ma ny of them le ft an d th ey are 

leav in g ev ery da y. I t is n o se cr et fro m an yo ne t h a t ev er y da y som e m an wh o has 

be en bo ug ht or simply ca nnot w it h sta n d th e ne w cl im at e of Cu ba—I m ust sa y 

th a t in ord er no t to be u n ju st— go es in to ex ile. ”

T his a tt it u d e of th e Cub an auth ori ti es, re su ltin g as it has in th e re du ct io n of 

th e c ountr y’s te ch ni ca l an d r ese arc h c ap ac ity in pr ec isely thos e are as w ith which 

th is pro je ct is c on ce rn ed , ra is es se riou s qu es tio ns . I t do es no t see m appro pri ate 

th a t a go ve rn m en t sh ou ld ask fo r as si st ance in tr ain in g ne w pe rs on ne l which 

ha ve l it tl e o r no bac kg ro un d in a gri cult ure w hi le it i s in effect no t pro pe rly ut iliz -
UN ITED NA TIO NS SPE CIA L FUND 27

ing it s pr es en t pe rs on ne l who ha ve rece ived th is tr ain in g. Thi s si tu ati on sh ou ld 

also be in ve st ig at ed by th e st af f of th e Sp ec ial F und be fo re pr oc ee di ng w ith th e 

pr oj ec t.

3. The sl au gh te ri ng of liv es to ck and m isus e of oth er phy si ca l reso urce s.

A th ir d qu es tion ab ou t th e pr op os ed pr oj ec t is ra is ed by re ce nt ev iden ce of th e 

sl au ghte ri ng of liv estock and th e misus e of oth er avai la ble re so ur ce s. Thi s is 

p art ic u la rl y se riou s in vie w of th e st ate m ent in th e re co m m en da tion of th e m an ­

ag ing dir ec to r th a t th e p ro je ct is de sign ed to “s tr ength en th e work a t th e ce ntr al 

ex pe ri m en ta l st ati on pri nci pal ly in liv estock pro du ct io n, so il clas sifica tion an d 

co ns er va tion , an d cr op di ve rs ific at io n. The go ver nm en t is es ta blish in g a new 

catt le im pr ov em en t cente r as p a rt of th e exper im en ta l st ati on in an are a loca te d 

clo se t o th e st ati on (tinea m a rg a ri ta ). Thi s cente r w ill incl ud e a liv estock fa rm 

to te st th e p os si bi lities of a n in te gra te d pr og ra m of mix ed fa rm in g ba se d on new 

cr op s and liv es tock .”

R ec en t re port s fr om Cu ba ra is e se ri ous do ub ts about th e u ti li ty of an y ai d fo r 

th e pu rp os es ju st de sc ribe d. The y in dic at e th a t C ub a's liv es to ck prob lem toda y 

is not th e lack of avai la ble in fo rm ati on bu t ra th e r th e in dis cri m in ate sl au ght er 

of catt le —in cl ud in g pr iz e bre ed in g sto ck. The catt le po pu la tion of Cub an ha s 

dr op pe d sp ec ta cu la rl y fr om 6 mill io n he ad to 3 ^ mill io n he ad . T his mas sive 

des tr uc tion of liv es to ck has be en carr ie d out to cre ate th e illu sion of in cr ea se d 

pr od uc tio n. W e see li tt le po in t in pr ov id in g te ch ni ca l as si st ance t o aid liv estock 

pr od uc tion u n ti l th e Cub an G ov er nm en t adopts a re sp on sibl e pro gr am which 

in cr ea se s th e pr od uc tion of br ee din g stoc k and re la te s th e sl aughte r ra te to th e 

re pr od uc tion r at e.

Rec en t in fo rm at io n in dic ate s fu rth e r th a t Cub a’s des tr uct io n of it s liv estock 

is m at ch ed by th e si m il ar m isus e of oth er re so ur ce s es se nt ia l to th e succ es s of 

th is pr oj ec t. Lar ge w oo dlan d are as ha ve been de st ro ye d—os te ns ib ly to mak e 

way f or c ro ps—bu t few su ch pla nti ngs ha ve o cc ur re d. M an y ex per im en ta l p la n tings six mso red by th e N at io nal In sti tu te of A gra ri an Ref or m (I N R A ) ha ve been 

ab an do ne d. A la rg e jier ce nt ag e of th e c ountr y’s f arm m ac hi ne ry is no t fu nct io ning du e to th e lack of sp are p art s. In ge ne ra l, ine fficiency on th e fa rm s is ap ­

pa lli ng , in p a rt du e to th e pre oc cu pa tion w ith po lit ics, in p a rt du e to the 

inco mpe ten ce an d in ex pe rien ce of IN RA officials. In view of th e an no un ce d 

pu rp os e of th is pr oj ec t to fu rth e r co ns er va tion an d crop di ve rsification, th is 

su gg es ts th e ne ed fo r f u rth e r st ud y.

4. A va ilab ility of o th er as si st an ce .

Pre m ie r Fid el C as tr o an no un ce d on May 1 a hu ge pr ogra m of bil ate ra l te ch ­

ni ca l ex ch an ge which wou ld bri ng to Cu ba 300 ag ri cu lt u ra l ex per ts . Su ch a 

m as sive influx of fo re ig n te chnic ia ns unde r a b il ate ra l pro gr am re pre se nts an ­

oth er new de ve lopm en t not kn ow n to th e m an ag in g d ir ecto r an d his st af f wh en 

th is pro je ct w as su bm itte d. T he ac ti vit ie s of th es e fo re ig n te ch ni ci an s ma y 

ov erlap, or ot he rw is e be in co nsi st en t w ith , th e pro je ct her e prop os ed . As no ted 

ear lier , ur ge nc y of n ee d is on e of th e m aj or c ri te ri a fo r evalu ating Sp ec ial Fu nd 

pr oj ec ts. The ac ti vit ie s of th e fo re ig n te ch ni ci an s re ce nt ly m ad e av ai la bl e 

sh ou ld b e s tu di ed in th e light of t his c rite rion.

L et me em ph as iz e th a t th es e qu es tion s ab out th e econom ic so un dn es s of th is 

pro je ct are no t in an y re sp ec t a reflec tio n on th e ju dgm en t of th e m an ag in g dire ct or an d hi s staf f. The mos t si gn ific an t fa cts which I ha ve out line d oc cu rred 

or ca me to li ght a ft e r th e p ro je ct w as su bm itte d by th e Cub an Gov er nm en t an d 

a ft e r it w as s tu di ed by th e st aff of th e S pe cial F un d.

In o th er words , we are fa ce d w ith ne w ci rc um st an ce s w hi ch c al l fo r a review of 

th e m att er. Mo reov er, th e sit u ati o n in Cu ba is so uncert ain th a t co ns id er ab le 

tim e may be re qui re d to fo rm a soun d, re sp on sibl e ju dgm en t on th e va riou s 

qu es tion s ra is ed abo ut th e econ om ic so un dn es s of th e pr oje ct . Thi s is w hy we 

be lie ve th a t th is pro je ct sh ou ld not go fo rw ard a t th e pre se nt tim e.

Let me em ph as ize fu rth e r th a t our po sitio n is fu ll y co ns is te nt w ith th e pri nci ­

ples lai d do wn in th e t erm s of re fe re nce o f th e Sp ec ial Fu nd . As mem be rs of th e 

Gov erning Co uncil are aw ar e, th es e pr ov id e th a t “th e ass is ta nce fu rn is hed by 

th e Sp ec ial Fun d sh al l not be a m ea ns of fo re ig n econ om ic an d po litica l in te rfere nc e in th e in te rn al aff air s of th e co un try * * * co nc erne d an d sh al l not be 

ac co mpa nied by an y co nd itio ns of a po litica l n atu re .” The po litica l re la tions 

be tw ee n th e U ni ted S ta te s an d Cub a are well kn ow n. B ut th is is not th e issu e. 

The pra cti ce of U ni ted N at io ns de ve lopm en t in st it u ti o n s es ta blish ed ov er ma ny 

years mak es cle ar th a t w hi le su ch in st it uti ons m us t be no np ol itic al in chara cte r, 

th ey are obliged to ta ke ac co un t of econom ic fa cto rs which re su lt from po litica l 

ci rc um st an ce s whe n su ch fa cto rs bea r up on th e so un dn es s of a pr oj ec t under 

co ns id er at io n. Ther e is an ob viou s in te rr ela ti on be tw ee n politica l an d econom ic
28 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

conditions in any counti'y. At a certain point, the manner in which a country is 

governed has economic consequences. This applies where a government is unstable, or torn by internal violence, or where it adopts an approach which is 

hostile to cooperation with international organizations and wasterful of its 

human and material resources.

Mr. Chairman, for the reasons I have stated, this project has not received the 

approval of my government. We have great respect for the judgment of the 

staff of the Special Fund. Under normal procedures, the managing director 

would examine any questions arising before entering into a plan of operations 

for any project. We are confident, therefore, tha t the project will not proceed 

until the staff has satisfied itself about the question we have raised and is 

certain that the project can be completed successfully to the ultimate benefit of 

the Cuban people.

QUEST IO N OF O N -S IT E IN SPE C T IO N S IN CU BA

Senator Lausche. May I ask you on this pertinent thing-----

Senator Church. Senator Lausche ?

Senator Lausche. Do you know whether anywhere in the documents that were exchanged between Khrushchev and our President 

there is mention of on-site inspections? Tha t is, is there any mention 

in any of the documents under which the missiles were withdrawn 

tha t there shall be on-site inspections?

Mr. Gardner. Senator, I would have to check the documents on it. 

I am not prepared on tha t today. It is my understanding tha t the 

Soviets agreed to on-site inspections—U.N. inspections for Cuba. 

Whether that is a matter of public record, I would have to check and 

provide you with the citations.

Senator L ausche. I s there in any one of the documents exchanged 

between Khrushchev and the President a mention tha t there shall 

be on-site inspection? Will you get the answer to that question?

Mr. Gardner. I will provide tha t directly after this hearing, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

In a lette r of October 27, 1962, to President Kennedy, Premier Khrushchev 

states 1 unofficial translation) :

“I therefore make this prop osal: We agree to remove from Cuba those means 

which you regard as offensive means: we agree to carry this out and make a 

pledge to the U.N. * * *

“* * * and after that persons entrusted by the U.N. Security Council may 

check on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made.”

In his letter of October 28, 1962, to President Kennedy (official English text) 

Premier Khrushchev sta tes:

"As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reacli 

agreement to enable United Nations representatives to verify the dismantling of 

these means.”

RE AS ON S FOR U .S . OPP OSI TIO N TO CU BA N PR OJE CT

Senator Church. All righ t, now, Mr. Secretary, let us get back to 

the reasons you listed for the State Department’s opposition to this 

Cuban Special Fund project.

As I recall them, the arguments were based generally upon the fact 

that Cuban agriculture is presently in a state of chaos, that the Castro 

regime is attempting to impose unworkable Communist theories, and 

that therefore the money would be ill spent.

I take it that was the gist of the case made by our representatives 

at the U.N. against this project?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct.
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 29

Senator Churcii. Well, now, did we attempt to point out, in this 

connection, tha t the Castro government had never paid a cent into the 

Special Fund although it made a pledge of some $55,000?

Mr. Gardner. The answer is “No.” But, remember, Mr. Chairman, 

this project came up in May of 1961, and the Fund actually began operations really only in 1960, so that the Cuban record of arrearage was 

not as clear as it is now. A number of countries, I am sorry to say, are 

slow payers on their pledges. They pledge for a calendar year, and 

they do not pay sometimes until the year after.

We ourselves are slow payers because we pay on a matching basis, 

and we only pay in after we see what others have paid in, so we did 

not make an issue of the Cuban deficiency. But I assure you, sir, if 

this came up today we certainly would do so.

Senator Church. At tha t time, however, it was clearly the foreign 

policy of the United States to do everything possible to oppose the 

Castro regime in Cuba, was it not ?

Air. Gardner. Tha t is correct.

Senator Church. Why, then, didn’t we carry this matter to a vote? 

Why didn’t we force a vote? Why were we content to assume tha t 

there were not the votes and, therefore, let the matter pass without 

forcing it to a vote, or am I correct in my assumption that we did not 

force it to a vote ?

Mr. Gardner. We did not ask for a vote on this project for the 

reasons I will now give you.

I wonder if, as to this portion of my testimony, Mr. Chairman, I 

could have the privilege of editing it in light of the public record, 

because what I say now-----

Senator Church. Everything—everything you have said this morning will be submitted to you for whatever editing you think necessary.

Air. Gardner. I understand ; but I wanted to have this particularly 

noted, what I now say, because it is a sensitive matter.

Senator Church. In tha t connection, I take it, because I imagine the 

members of the press will be asking me questions following this hearing, tha t the figures you have given us with respect to Cuban contributions and assessments and so on are all matters of public record and 

can be divulged?

Air. Gardner. They are, and certainly can be.

Senator Church. All right.

Air. Gardner. Well, first of all, there has never been a separate 

vote in the Governing Council on any project. The normal practice 

is for Air. Hoffman, who is the Managing Director, an international 

civil servant not responsible to the United States, the normal practice 

is that he make recommendations to the Governing Council; the Governing Council meets twice a year, discusses the individual projects, 

and then votes on the package of projects as a whole.

When this project came up we were determined to stop it, and we 

made a major diplomatic effort. I personally was in New York at 

the time this project was before the Governing Council. We went 

to our friends and allies on the Governing Council and solicited their 

support to vote against th is project. We needed only a blocking onethird since it requires two-thirds of the 18 to approve tha t project.

So we needed, in other words, just seven votes. We could not get 

the seven votes.

[Deleted.]
30 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

Now, why was this so ? In the first place, as I pointed out earlier, 

this Fun d operates under a mandate th at political considerations shall 

not be the basis for action. The decision is to be made on a nonpolitical or economic grounds.

Now, we argued tha t our objections were eligible to be taken into 

account here because the political circumstances in Cuba affected the 

economic worth of the project. But even then we could not get enough 

countries to vote with us. There was a widespread feeling th at if this 

project were stopped the Special Fund projects in South Korea, Vietnam, and free China might be stopped because the Soviets did not 

like them either.

Moreover, I am frank to say, Mr. Chairman, tha t in May of 1961 

the attitude of the Latin American countries was still dominated by 

the atmosphere of the San Jose Conference of September 1960 at 

which Secretary of State Herter was unable to obtain an OAS resolution which would even mention Cuba by name as an object of the 

special concern of the hemisphere.

In other words, the meeting in May of 1961 was before the major 

shift of opinion in the hemisphere which was recorded, for example, 

at the Punta del Este Conference of Janu ary 1962. [Deleted.]

In those circumstances, those of us in the Department of State 

concerned with this matter had a difficult decision to make. Either 

we could force this to a vote and show th at we were isolated from 

our allies, and by this public disclosure give aid and comfort to the 

Castro regime which could claim this as a victory, or we could put our 

objections on the record as we did in Mr. K lutznick’s statement, and 

leave no doubt as to what our feelings were.

As I said earlier, we opposed the project in the Council, we have 

made our opposition known to Mr. Hoffman since, we continue to 

oppose it today.

I think tha t if a project of this kind were to come up again in the 

Governing Council in the ligh t of the very changed atmosphere in the 

inter-American system tha t has taken place in the intervening period 

and the very different attitude in NATO toward Cuba the result 

might well be different.

But at tha t time in May of 1961 we could not get the necessary 

support and it seemed to us unwise to press for a vote. [Deleted.]

PROCED URE FOR GOVERNING CO UN CIL ’S RECO NSID ERATION OF A M ATT ER

Senator Church. Let me then ask you this question: You say possibly, in view of the changed attitude toward the Cuban regime which 

has occurred since, if this matter were to come up anew there might 

be a different result, there is a procedure fo r securing reconsideration, 

is there not, in the Governing Council ?

Mr. Gardner. Tha t is correct. But the difficulty there, Mr. C hairman, is tha t it requires a two-thirds vote.

U.S . EFFORT TO ASC ERT AIN POSSIBILITY OF VOTE NECESSARY FOR 

RECONS IDERAT ION

Senator Church. I understand. Has the United States made an 

effort to ascertain whether it would be possible for us to secure the 

requisite two-thirds vote ?
UNIT ED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 31

Mr. Gardner. We have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Church. What have you found ?

Mr. Gardner. We have found we do not have the necessary twothirds vote to reconsider this project.

Senator Williams. Mr. Chairman, along the same lines-----

Senator Church. Yes, Senator ?

Senator Williams. You keep referring to May 1961, and tha t was 

before all of this recent difficulty with Mr. Castro, at which time lie was 

putting in the Russian arms, and there has been quite a change in the 

sentiment of the Latin American countries.

Have you made any effort to bring this to a vote since that time ?

Mr. Gardner. Senator, the last meeting of the Governing Council 

was in Janu ary of this year, tha t is to say, last month. We canvassed 

the opinion of U.N. members on the Special Fun d Governing Council 

at tha t time to ascertain whether in the light of Cuba’s activity last 

fall, when it received these offensive weapons, we could get a twothirds vote to deprive them of aid under this project, and we found we 

could not.

REASON FOR U .S. DECISION NOT TO REQU EST FU RT HE R VOTE

Senator Williams. That was not my question. I said have you 

asked for a vote since tha t time ?

Mr. Gardner. We have not.

Senator Williams. And you could have asked in Jan uary had you 

wished to, could you not ? You could have pushed it to a vote ?

Mr. Gardner. We could have put it to a vote and we could have 

lost.

Senator Williams. Well, do you only vote on and push to a vote 

those matters which you know you are going to win to sta rt with ?

Mr. Gardner. No. There are occasions when we force a vote even 

though we are going to lose.

Senator Williams. W hat disturbs me—excuse me, but I noticed 

in this May 1961 meeting, if tha t is the basis on which this statement 

is made, Mr. Klutznick starts out :

The Government of the United Sta tes wholehearted ly endorses the purpose 

for which the project is proposed. We have a long and affectionate friendship 

with the people of Cuba. We warmly supp ort the ir asp irations for higher living 

standa rds, social justice, and free political institution s. We believe that diversification and modernization of Cuban agriculture are essential steps toward 

these objectives—

In light of the recent developments it looks to me as if tha t is a 

very weak statement to justify this project, and I, as one member 

of this committee, believe we would have been in much better position, 

if you would have pushed it and gone down to a defeat even if you 

had to, to find out who our friends are.

Mr. Gardner. Senator, you have read just one paragraph of this 

statement.

Senator Williams. That is right. The whole statement is in the 

record.

Mr. Gardner. Mr. Klutznick also said that the U.S. Government 

cannot approve this project.

Senator Williams. But you did approve it.
32 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

Mr. Gardner. We did not approve it. We expressed our opposition 

to it, and we were recorded as opposing it.

Senator Williams. Yes. But you did not push it to a vote to find 

out just where you stood.

result or canvassing

Senator Ciiurcii. Can you tell us, Mr. Secretary, what your canvassing disclosed? You have told us that as of May 1961 you didn’t 

have the necessary votes. [Deleted.] If you want to give this off 

the record, you understand the rules by which we are operating here.

Mr. Gardner. Yes.

Senator Ciiurcii. Can you disclose to the committee what your 

canvass in Ja nua ry of this year showed you?

Mr. Gardner. Yes. I cannot, Mr. Chairman, tick off individual 

country positions to you, I simply do not have tha t in mind. I can 

give you the general conclusions which were th at we would not have 

the necessary votes.

Senator Symington. If the Chair would yield, is there any record 

of the countries you felt would be for us and the countries you felt 

would not be ?

I accept your position. You cannot prove your position.

Mr. Gardner. I cannot prove it, Senator.

Senator Ciiurcii. You must know though what countries of the 

18 countries—if you have contacted the delegation of all these countries—what countries indicated they would not support you and 

what countries indicated they would.

Mr. Gardner. And I will say that the majority of the countries 

on the governing board would not. Since we required two-thirds, it 

only required seven countries to block a reconsideration, and there were 

certainly seven votes against a reconsideration. You can see tha t 

simply looking over the list. [Deleted.]

At first blush, you might say, it is astonishing that these countries 

would not support us on such a thing, and I would like to try to place 

in the record the reasons they gave.

Senator Symington. If the Chair would yield, I would ask a 

question.

Senator Ciiurcii. Yes.

Mr. Gardner. Yes.

RECORDS KE PT OF CONVERSATION W IT H FOREIGN COU NTRIES

Senator Symington. When you have a conversation with a friendly 

country in State, don’t you make a record of th at conversation in the 

State Department? Isn’t tha t standard procedure? I am told by 

the staff it is.

Mr. Gardner. Well, there is normally a memorandum of conversation.

Senator Symington. Then if you talked to these countries on th at 

subject, haven’t you a memorandum to that effect ?

Mr. Gardner. Well, I just do not know tha t we have a complete 

record of all the conversations which took place in New York. But 

I have tried to give the committee today as full an account as I can 

of the state of the vote as of last month.
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 33

The problem here is tha t the Special Fun d operates under this 

nonpolitical mandate which I quoted earlier. I do not know that 

Senator Williams was here when I did so.

As I read earlier, the resolution authorizing the Fun d says tha t 

assistance by the Fund—

shal l not be a means o f foreign economic and poli tica l interference in the internal 

affa irs of the country concerned and sha ll not be accompanied by any conditions 

of a political n ature.

Now, when this Fund was proposed in 1957 and, as I pointed out, 

Congressman W alter Judd, who was on our delegation at the time, 

took the lead in proposing it, when it was approved after sponsorship 

by the United States, this provision was included in the mandate.

It is the same provision which appears in all U.N. economic organizations. The World Bank has the same provision, the Intern ational Development Association, the Special Fund, technical assistance, and so on, that political factors are not to be weighed.

GROUNDS FOR OB JEC TIO N

Now, tha t means the only effective thing to do, under this legislative 

history is to object on economic grounds. Of course, we objected on 

political grounds, too. It was quite clear to all the members of the 

Governing Council.

Senator Lausche. Wasn’t there a thir d ground? The delinquency 

of Cuba in fulfilling its responsibilities to the United Nations was a 

third ground.

Mr. Gardner. Tha t ground is certainly there now, Senator, but it 

was not there then.

ARREARAGES OF CUBA

Senator Lausche. It was in arrearage in May, just as it is in arrearage now.

Mr. Gardner. In May of 1961-----

Senator Lausche. It paid nothing of its Gaza assessments, nor of 

its Congo assessments. It had been delinquent to the extent of $300,000 

or more in its general assessments. It paid none of its pledges to this 

Fund. It was not performing its functions at all as it undertook them 

with the United Nations. So I concede the first two were there, but I 

say there is another argument.

Mr. Gardner. I think the Senator is certainly right that tha t is 

a major point that could be raised against the Cuban Government. 

They should not be eligible for assistance from the United Nations 

if they do not perform their obligations under the United Nations 

Charter.

But again, the problem in May of 1961 was this: The Special Fund 

had really been in operation, in existence really, only 1 year.

As I say, a number of the smaller, weaker, and less developed countries were slow payers, so their delinquency at tha t time after only a 

year and a half of Fun d operation, while serious, was not so grave 

as to be an adequate reason for convincing the countries to block 

the project.

Moreover, as to their delinquency on the Gaza strip and the Congo, 

as you are aware, Senator, a number of countries were maintaining a t 

that time that these assessments were not binding.
34 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

It was only a fter the World Court opinion, handed down in July of 

this last year, 1962, that there was an unambiguous, authoritative legal 

judgment from the World Court that these were binding assessments 

which had to be paid, and th at World Court opinion was only accepted 

by the General Assembly this last December.

So tha t in May of 1961 we did not have the kind of clear record 

which would have enabled us to argue against this project on tha t 

ground.

Senator Williams. You would have had tha t in Jan uar y of this 

year though. Did you raise that point ?

Mr. Gardner. We had it in Janu ary of this year, and we raised it 

with our country desks in the Department and discussed it among 

ourselves, but concluded it would not satisfy the necessary two-thirds 

of its members.

Senator Williams. Did you press the point in Janu ary ?

Mr. Gardner. Not with foreign governments. It would have been 

useless to do so.

official representations made to foreign governments

Senator Williams. Did you make it in an official representation to 

the United Nations, or did you make it in unofficial representations 

to the members ?

Mr. Gardner. All our representations to foreign missions to the 

U.N. are official representations. We did not make a representation 

of this kind to the United Nations.

Senator Williams. No, tha t is the poin t; you did not make it.

Senator Sparkman. You made it to the Council, which was the 

body meeting in January ?

Mr. Gardner. We made no representation to the Council on this 

point.

Senator Williams. Could you furnish us a copy of the representations you made in Jan uary which is similar to the one you made in 

1961 ?'

Mr. Gardner. Senator, we did not go on the record in January 

of this year on this subject. We did not make a statement for the 

record as we did in May 1961.

Senator Williams. That was my question.

Mr. Gardner. There may have been some private but official representations.

Senator Williams. Of which there is no record.

Mr. Gardner. That is correct.

Senator Symington. Who had them ?

Mr. Gardner. Well, the Department of State in Washington, and 

tlieU.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York.

Senator Symington. Who in the D epartment of State talked with 

these countries ?

Mr. Gardner. I cannot give you that.

Senator Symington. Could you find out?

Mr. Gardner. Senator, you are asking me for the names of individuals?

Senator Symington. Yes. 1 would like to know. I do not think 

tha t countries which consistently do not support the position of the
UNIT ED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 35

United States should be given the same consideration on foreign aid 

as countries that do consistently support our position.

Mr. Gardner. Senator, our representations in New York were made 

by those members of the U.S. Mission to the U.N. who are concerned 

with economic matters. I can make their names available to you if 

you so wish.

Senator Symington. Fine.

Air. Gardner. As to representations elsewhere, I do not know who 

they are.

REQUEST FOR NAM ES OF OFFICIALS MAKING REPRESENTATIONS

Senator Symington. Who represented the United States when this 

matter was brought up with the members of this committee of the 

United Nations?

Air. Gardner. It was, this last month, Ambassador Jonath an Bingham, who is our new representative to the Economic and Social Council, and also our representative in this governing body. He replaced 

Philip Klutznick, who represented us in Alay of 1961.

Senator Symington. Then it would not be difficult for him to come 

down here and tell the committee how each individual country wTe 

question felt about it ?

Air. Gardner. No. I think he certainly would be available.

Senator Sparkman. Will you yield to me? My experience on 

those things, though limited, has been tha t there may be half a 

dozen different officials who talked to these people.

Air. Gardner. Tha t is correct, Senator.

Senator Sparkman. Then some one particular person makes a 

report. Now, it is tha t memorandum, it seems to me, tha t would 

indicate who did it and what is-----

Senator Symington. I would revise my request to get the memorandum the Senator from Alabama has mentioned.

Senator Sparkman. It seems to me either the files here or the 

files of our U.N. delegation in New York would have memorandums.

Senator Ciiurcii. I)o you gentlemen know whether such memorandums are available?

Mr. Gardner. I do not think they are. [Deleted.]

Senator Symington. Air. Gardner, would you give the State Department’s opinion as to what countries did support it and what 

countries did not ?

Air. Gardner. Yes; I would be happ y to do that.

Senator Symington. Are there other countries you have not named ?

Air. Gardner. Yes, there are.

Senator Symington. When you come to each one would you state 

their position on it?

Air. Gardner. Do it now ?

Senator Symington. I would be happy to have you do that.

Senator Church. If we can do it now, all the better.

Air. Gardner. Let us take care of it now. [Deleted.]

Senator Church. So you are saying we would have had only a few 

votes with us, then, if we had forced the matter to a vote ?

Air. Gardner. Tha t is correct.
36 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

REL ATI ONS W IT H M R. H O FFM A N

Senator Sparkman. Following that, and during the time that Mr. 

Hoffman had this under further consideration, did we make repre ­

sentations to him th at Cuba ought not to be given this project because 

she had not contributed to the Fu nd and was delinquent ?

Mr. Gardner. We made representations to the Special Fund 

throughout the last 2 years of history on this project, saying we 

thought he should not go forward with it, and we cited a whole range 

of reasons.

Senator Sparkman. Did tha t include the time from Jan uary to 

now?

Mr. Gardner. Yes.

Senator Sparkman. After the Council met?

Mr. Gardner. Yes; tha t is correct. We made representations 

right up to the present against the going forward of this project.

Senator Church. Well now, wouldn’t i t have been desirable, given 

all the circumstances, for us to have placed on the record before the 

Governing Council, even though we may have chosen not to have 

forced the issue to a vote, a fter a careful canvass had been made as to 

the attitude of the participa ting governments, wouldn’t it have been 

desirable to have placed on the record a strong statement supplementing the statement we had made earlier to include the argument tha t 

any country tha t had failed to contribute to the Special Fun d or even 

to honor its own pledges and was generally in arrears to the United 

Nations with respect to other funds, ought not to be entitled to pa rticipate in a project of this kind ?

I should think if we had gone forward on the record and indicated 

this as the position of the United States, tha t this could have had a 

good effect, at least it would have placed our point of view clearly on 

the record for all the members of the United Nations to consider as 

they looked ahead to other projects.

Mr. Gardner. Well, Mr. Chairman, having decided not to ask for 

a vote at the session in Jan uary of the Governing Council, we felt 

there was no point in making another public statement.

Senator Church. Why not ?

Mr. Gardner. Particu larly because we were hoping, quite frankly, 

tha t the Special Fund would refrain from implementation of the 

project on the basis of the economic and technical difficulties to which 

we had called attention.

The committee is aware tha t this project was approved formally by 

the Board of Directors in May of 1961. It was only last week, a year 

and a half—more than a year and a half later, tha t Mr. Hoffman 

decided to sign the plan of operations which authorizes the project 

to proceed.

Senator Williams. Th at gets back to the point I raised before. I 

understood you to say tha t Mr. Hoffman had not approved it. He 

could have stopped it had he wished. Is that correct ?

Mr. Gardner. Under the—as a result of the—decision of the governing body we see no way tha t Mr. Hoffman could have held up the 

implementation of this project indefinitely.

Senator Williams. Why did you say you wished he hadn’t signed 

it?
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 37

Mr. Gardner. We were hoping he would examine it further because 

we continued to make representations about certain aspects of it from 

the point of view of feasibility.

Senator Church. Mr. Secretary, I cannot understand why it was 

not in our interest to do all tha t was open to us to do and place upon 

the record all of the reasons for our objection to this project as of 

last month to supplement and to strengthen the arguments we had 

made a year and a half before. Regardless of wh at you tho ught Mr. 

Hoffman would do or would not do, I should have thought it w’ould 

have been in our interest to have strengthened our case on the record.

POSS IBLE RESULTS OF A FORCED VOTE BY TH E UN ITED STATES

Mr. Gardner. Mr. Chairman, again I am being very frank with 

the committee. If we had gone in the Governing Council in Jan uary 

of this year and gone through this thing all over again, there would 

have been a tremendous outcry from other members of the Council 

which, in my judgment, would have forced Paul Hoffman to sign 

tha t project forthwith.

Now, it was our hope that we could continue to get him to examine 

it as we had for more than a year and a half.

If I may make ju st one more observation, Mr. Chairman-----

Senator Church. Yes.

Mr. Gardner (continuing). If we had forced it to a vote it would 

have been the first time in history, in the history of the Special Fund 

tha t a division was had on an individual project, and it would have 

meant tha t hereafter the Soviets would have forced a vote on all the 

projects in Taiwan, in South Korea, in Vietnam, which they do not 

like, and we would have been, if I may pu t it this way, been jeopardizing the 97 percent of the Special Fu nd projects we do like for the sake 

of 3 percent which we do not like.

CONTRIB UTION S TO TH E SPECIA L FU ND

Senator Lausciie. And the Soviets would have done that, although 

in the 5 years of operation it paid into the Fund $5 million while the 

United States paid $100 million, is that correct ?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct.

Senator Lausciie. I s th at what you call equality of treatm ent and 

justice?

Senator Williams. Moreover, the $5 million which they paid was 

in their own currency and could be used only for expenditure in their 

own country.

Senator Lausciie. You had thought then the Soviet Government 

in retaliation would have begun vetoing programs th at were contemplated for friendly nations of the West, is that right?

Mr. Gardner. I think there would have been a real danger of 

jeopardizing the Korean and Vietnam programs.

Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question here?

Senator Church. Yes.

Mr. Gardner. May I complete my answer to the question? You 

asked me whether I regarded it as just the Soviet Union paying $5 

million and we having paid $100 million. I regard it as unjust. The
38 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

Soviets have not done their share in contributing to an economic program or contributing to economic programs. These programs, although carried on in the name of universality, are programs of the 

free world. But that does not mean they do not serve our interests. 

When the United Nations serves as a channel for aid and advice the 

results are often better in countries which would rather get aid and 

advice from the U.N. than through regional or bilateral channels.

Senator Lausche. May I ask another question ? The Soviets paid 

in $5 million while the United States paid in $100,400,000. However, 

looking at the aggregate of the Communist nations, including Yugoslavia, the total paid in by all of them was $8,228,225.

AM OUN TS RECEIVED FROM THE SFE CIA L FU N D BY CUBA

Mr. Gardner. Right; and the ir take from the Special Fun d was 

$6 million.

Senator Lausche. All right.

Mr. Gardner. They put more in than they took out.

Senator Lausche. May I proceed on that? Cuba received out of 

the United Nations other assistance in addition to this $1,157,000.

Mr. Gardner. Yes, that is correct.

Senator Lausche. What is the total tha t it received—in addition 

to the $1,157,000? I am looking at the last page of this report. It 

will run to about $1 million—not more.

Mr. Gardner. Senator, as you are aware, there are other United 

Nations programs, of which Cuba is the beneficiary besides the Special 

Fund itself. Cuba, to begin with, receives assistance under the expanded program of technical assistance of the United Nations.

Senator Williams. How much ?

Mr. Gardner. In 1961-62 Cuba was programed to receive $445,883— 

tha t is for the biennium 1961-62. For the current biennium, 1963-64, 

they are to receive $405,780 in technical assistance. The total for the 

4 years is over $800,000.

I should point out tha t at the Technical Assistance Committee, 

which met in December of this last year, when this program was under consideration, the U nited States once again, as it had in the Special Fund, registered its strong opposition to the projects in Cuba.

Senator Lausche. The two which you just mentioned, is that 

correct 2

Mr. Gardner. The meeting this last December was to consider the 

$405,000 for the biennium 1963-64. Tha t came before the TAC or 

Technical Assistance Committee of the U.N. this last December.

Senator Lausche. That $405,780 covered $69,000 for a social security 

project did it not ?

Mr. Gardner. Tha t is correct.

Senator Lausche. And $160,000 for a fisheries project ?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct.

Senator Lausche. And $54,000 for a marine biological project under 

UNESCO?

Mr. Gardner. Yes.

Senator Lausche. And another UNESC O educational service of 

$13,500?

Mr. Gardner. Yes.
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 39

Senator Lausciie. A civil aviation project, $17,280 ?

Mr. Gardner. Yes.

Senator Lausche. And a W HO public health service, $152,000 ?

Mr. Gardner. Yes.

Senator Williams. In return for that, as I understand, if you will 

yield, Cuba paid $132,000 into the-----

Mr. Gardner. No, they paid $130,000 in support of the regular 

U.N. budget. They paid nothing to the Special Fund. They had 

made previous payments before the $130,000 in support of their regular 

contribution.

Senator Williams. I s there anything tha t would show-----

Mr. Gardner. Under other governments.

Senator L ausche. You are going to get the figures of those other 

payments ?

Mr. Gardner. We are to find out for you whether the Castro government has paid anything before the $130,000 in December 1962 which 

you mentioned. (See table on p. 15.)

RANSOM PAID TO CUBA

Senator Williams. I s there anything to show whether this $130,000 

which was paid in December did or did not come from the ransom 

money which it had collected from the United States, or could that 

have been paid out of some of this ransom money that they collected?

Mr. Gardner. Well, we do not have the source from which the 

Cuban Government-----

Senator Williams. It is a possibility; is it not?

Mr. Gardner. I would have to study the record, Senator, to see the 

timing of the transaction, which was not in dollars, it was in medical 

supplies. I do not see how tha t could have given them $130,000 to 

support their regular budget contribution.

Senator Williams. Can you tell us tha t none of the ransom was in 

dollars?

Mr. Gardner. I cannot.

Senator Williams. You just said it was in supplies. Now, was 

not a part of that ransom in dollars ?

Mr. Gardner. Senator, I am not familiar with tha t transaction, 

but I will supply that for the record. It is my understanding tha t 

the things given to Castro for the release of the prisoners were contributions in kind, in medicines.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

The Cuban paym ent of $130,000 on its assessment toward the reg ular U.N. 

budget was made on December 11, 1062, which was prior to the transactio n 

made later last December in connection with the relea se of Cuban prisoners.

Senator Williams. That is what we were told about a month and a 

half ago, and the gentleman at th at time was going to furnish us with 

a report, and we have not had it yet. If we have, I have not seen it. 

Has it come down ? If it has, I would like to ask the staff about it.

Mr. Holt. It has not come in writing, Senator, but we have been advised that the two individuals who are familiar with this are ready to 

appear at the committee’s convenience, and this could be arranged any 

time the committee likes.
40 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

payments to fund in currency of donor country

Senator Symington. I do not understand this note here at the bottom about currency where you say that contributions from the Communist states are made in the currency of the donor, with no provision 

of conversion except as indicated below.

Are you satisfied tha t the amount of money put out, based on exchange ratios in the international market, is such tha t you also are 

satisfied with the correctness of the figures ?

Mr. Gardner. I am not satisfied, Senator.

Senator Symington. These figures may not mean then what they 

imply. Could you give the committee further justification for the 

figures you have at the top of page 4, based on the note you have at 

the bottom, because the note, as 1 read it, casts doubt as to whether 

tha t money actually was paid in dollars into the Fund. Do you see 

what I am trying to get at ?

Mr. Gardner. Yes, I understand, Senator.

Senator Symington. And tha t would somewhat nullify your testimony very possibly.

Mr. Gardner. Well, the money is paid in, Senator. The money is 

paid in in rubles. There is a ruble account.

Now, the question is, What are the rubles worth, and are the prices 

charged by the Russians for their services and m aterials fa ir? Now, 

that is a very hard question to answer.

Senator Symington. I s there an international ruble-for-dollar 

relationship ?

Mr. Gardner. Well, there is an official ruble-dollar exchange rate. 

But as one who has visited Moscow, I am very well aware this does 

not correspond with relative costs. I would say the ruble is considerably overvalued in terms of real purchasing power. So I have no 

doubt, Senator, but tha t your point is correct, tha t this probably 

overstates what the real Soviet contribution to this program is.

Senator Symington. II ow much would you estimate, roughly ?

Mr. Gardner. I simply do not know.

Senator Symington. But then actually, say if it overstates it 50 

percent, following Senator Lausche’s questioning, the Soviets have not 

put in $5 million, they have put in $2.5 million.

Mr. Gardner. 1 would not think it overstated it anying like 50 

percent.

(The following information was subsequently furnished:)

The U.N. values the Soviet contribution to the Special Fund at the official exchange rate, which is set by the Soviet Government at 0.90 ruble per dollar. The 

value of the ruble set by the Soviet Government may or may not bear a relationship either to the comparative purchasing power or to its value in term s of 

other currencies on external fre e markets. The ruble is inconvertible, eith er 

into other currencies or into gold, strict exchange controls exist, and no inter ­

national trad e, except perh aps with in the Soviet bloc, takes place in term s of 

rubles. Since the exchange rate does not serve as a link between intern al and 

external prices, the purchasing power of a stated amount of rubles held by the 

Special Fund depends on the specific goods and services for which it is used. 

For instance, to the extent that the prices of Soviet commodities converted into 

dollars or sterling at the official exchange rate are in line with prevailing w’orld 

prices, valuation of the ruble at the official exchange rate would not be 

unrealistic.
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND 41

Senator Symington. Do we have any check on what has been done 

when they, in effect, render a bill for services ?

Mr. Gardner. Yes; because the arrangements with respect to compensation of technicians and purchase of equipment are entered into 

only after agreement with Mr. Hoffman. In other words, there is not a unilateral Soviet declaration tha t 

“Mr. X is worth 100,000 rubles.” Th is is the result of a negotiation between the Soviet Union and the 

Special Fund where a reasonable charge is made for personnel or 

services.

Senator Symington. ITow does Mr. Hoffman know they do what 

they say they are going to do, as you express it in dollars based on 

the ruble exchange, in this statement ?

Air. Gardner. Well, all the Special Fund operations, both financial 

and their physical operations in the field, are subject to very careful 

audit and review. I cannot call out the full details for you, but we 

can supply it for the record if you so desire.

Senator S ymington. We both know no audit is worth much unless 

you audit at source.

Mr. Gardner. We do not have on-site audit in the Soviet Union.

Senator S ymington. Yes.

Mr. Gardner. But we do have on-site audit in the field where the 

Soviet equipment and the technicians are made available. In effect, 

we know what the Soviets have put up.

Senator Symington. So we do audit the work that is done with 

rubles, in the third count ry ; is that correct ?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct. The Special Fun d does the audit.

Senator Symington. Would Mr. Hoffman have the records of those 

audits?

Mr. Gardner. I believe lie would.

Senator Ciiurcii. Are you through. Senator ?

Senator Symington. Than k you, Mr. Chairman.

WOR K OF PA U L H O FFM A N

Senator Church. I would like to say here at one point in your testimony you made an aside to the effect tha t Mr. Hoffman was not responsible to the United States but to the United Nations.

I think th at you should be given an opportunity to restate tha t because Mr. Hoffman has rendered very important service to the United 

Statesin past years, notably as director of the Marshall plan in Europe.

He is a most prominent and distinguished citizen of the United 

States, and I think that though he does, as an employee of the U.N., 

operate under instructions from the U.N., and pursuant to the decisions of this Governing Council, that nevertheless he has said many 

times tha t if he were ever called upon to do something which, in 

his judgment, constituted a disservice to the United States, he would 

then feel obliged to resign his position with the United Nations.

I think he has made tha t statement several times, and T would not 

want this record to be left in such shape as to suggest, that he feels 

a higher obligation to the United Nations than he does to the United 

States.
42 UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL FUND

Am I correct now in this statement that I have made?

Mr. Gardner. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, and we would want 

to associate ourselves with that statement.

Senator Church. I think, in fairness to him, we ought to make tha t 

perfectly clear for the record, because there are many who would like 

to conclude otherwise, simply because they disagree with the role Mr. 

Hoffman has played in connection with this kind of work.

Mr. Gardner. Yes. If I may be permitted to do so, I would like 

to amplify that, Mr. Chairman, by referring to the principle of the 

United Nations Charter, article 100, section 1, which reads as follows:

In the performance of their duties the Secretary General and the staff— 

and tha t would include Pau l Hoffman—

shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other 

authority external to the organization. They shall refrain from any action 

which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only 

to the organization.

We in the United States have fought very hard to maintain the 

integrity of tha t provision against, and I will be fran k to say this, 

very serious attempts to subvert it by the Communist world, and Mr. 

Hoffman, I think, has trie d to carry out his responsibilities under 

the charter.

If he felt any time that those responsibilities were inconsistent 

with the national interests of the United States, I have no doubt 

tha t he would lay down his mandate and resign.

Senator Church. Yes. I think he has made th at clear many times 

before, and for purposes of the record I think it ought to be stated 

and emphasized here.

Are there any further questions members of the committee might 

like to ask ?

Mr. Secretary, do you feel you have made a full presentation of the 

points you came here to make this morning?

Mr. Gardner. Yes, sir.

Senator Church. Then those members of the committee who desire to do so, are invited to lunch with Mr. Hoffman at 1 o’clock in 

the adjoining room and to ask him on an informal basis any questions 

they choose.

This meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)
SUMMARY INDE X

Aiken, Senator George D., exam ination of witn es s: Gardner, Page 

Richard N___________________________________________________6-10,14

Allocation of costs for Cuban project_______________________________ 15

Amounts received from the Special Fund by Cuba____________________ 38

Attitude of American people toward Cuban pro ject____________________ 17

Church, Senator Frank, examination of w itn ess: Gardner, Richard N___ 4—

11, 13-14, 18, 28-32, 35-37, 41-42

Communist coun tries:

Contributions to the Special Fun d____________________________ 7, 9, 37

Projects in______________________________________,____________ 10

Voting strength and contributions in the U.N____________________ 9

Contributions to the Special F und:

Communist countries________________________________________ 7, 9, 37

Free world__________________________________________________ 11

Inconvertible currencies_______,_______________________________ 7, 40

United Sta tes______________________________________________ 7,19, 37

Cu ba:

Amounts received from the Special Fun d________________________ 38

Delinquency on U.N. acco unts____________________________ 13,18, 20, 33

Exten t to which Cuba has paid U.N. assessments_________________ 18

Failure to pay pledged amounts to Fun d_________________________12, 18

Possible loss of U.N. vote_______________________________________ 13

Question of onsite inspectio ns__________________________________ 28

Ransom paid to______________________________________________ 39

Reduction of assessments for special U.N. operations_____________ 14

U.N. obligations a nd payments, 1960-02, tab le_____________________ 15

Cuban pro jec t:

Allocation of costs fo r_______________________________________ 15

Approval of__________________________________________________ 22

Attitude of American people tow ard _____________________________ 17

Description of________________________________________________ 22

Question of use of U.S. fun ds in_______________________________ 16

Reason for U.S. decision not to request f urther vote on_____________ 31

Research work involved in_____________________________________ 2

U.S. effort to asc ertain possibility of vote necessary for reconsideration _____________________________________________________ 31

U.S. opposition to____________________________________________ 23, 28

Description of Cuban project_____________________________________ 22

Dete rmination of prices of supplies, equipment, and personnel__________ 8

Establishme nt of special fund______________________________________ 1, 4

Free world contributions to Special Fund___________________________ 11

Gardner, Richard N., statem ent of________________________________ 1

Governing Council of the Special Fund :

Composition of_______________________________________________ 5-6

Func tions of_________________________________________________ 6

Procedures for reco nsideration of a matter_______________________ 30

Statement by Mr. Klutznick, on Cuban pro ject__________________ 25

Hoffman, Paul, work of_________________________________________ 36, 41

Klutznick, Philip M., statement by, in the Governing Council on th e Cuban

project_______________________________________________________ 25

Lausche, Senator Frank J., examination of witn es s: Gardner, Rich43
44 SUMMARY IND EX

Page

Onsite inspection in Cuba, question of---------------------------------------------- 28

Pro jects in Communist cou ntries__________________________________ 10

Purpose of Special Fun d____ - ____________________________________ 11

Ransom paid to Cuba____________________________________________ 39

Record of the Special Fund______________________________________ 24

Records kept of conversation with foreign cou ntries-------------------------- 32

Reduction of assessments for special U.N. o perations---------------------------- 14

Representations made to foreig n governments------------------------------------ 34

Resolutions rela ting to Special Fund, wording of General Assembly-------- 4

Sparkman, Senator John, exam ination of witnes s: Gardner, Richard

N_____________________________________________ 7-8,11,17,19, 21, 34-36

Symington, Senator Stuart, exam ination of witness: Gard ner, Richard

N________________________________________ 12, 15—17, 32, 34-35, 37, 40-41

Types of Special Fund projects------------------------------------------------------- 5

U.S. National interest, usefulness of the U.N. to-------------------------------- 24

U.S. opposition to Cuban pro jec t----------------------------------------------------23, 28

Voting strength of Communist coun tries in the U.N--------------------------- 9

Williams, Senator John J., examination of witnes s: Gardner, Richard N_____________________________________ 18-20, 22, 31-32, 34, 36, 38-39

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