NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

LOUIS DANIEL QUIROZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0009

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2015-002574-002

The Honorable John Christian Rea, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Matthew O. Brown, Chandler

Counsel for Appellant

Louis Daniel Quiroz, Florence

Appellant

FILED 1-18-2018
STATE v. QUIROZ

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

T H U M M A, Chief Judge:

¶1 This is an appeal under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969). Counsel for defendant Louis Daniel 

Quiroz has advised the court that, after searching the entire record, he has 

found no arguable question of law, and asks this court to conduct an Anders

review of the record. Quiroz was given the opportunity to file a 

supplemental brief pro se, and has done so. This court has reviewed the 

record and has found no reversible error. Accordingly, Quiroz’ conviction 

and resulting sentence are affirmed. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Quiroz was charged by indictment with trafficking in stolen 

property in the second degree, a Class 3 Felony. The State alleged that, in 

early April 2015, Quiroz recklessly trafficked in a stolen motorized 

shopping cart owned by Fry’s. The State filed allegations of multiple 

offenses not committed on the same occasion and prior felony convictions, 

including historical felony convictions.

¶3 The State extended at least one plea offer to Quiroz, which 

expired given the passage of time without being accepted; Quiroz also was 

given an advisement pursuant State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406 (App. 2000). In 

April 2015 and in July 2015, Quiroz participated in settlement conferences, 

but no plea agreement was reached.

¶4 Quiroz filed pro se motions to change counsel, one of which 

was granted and new counsel was appointed. Quiroz then filed a third 

motion to change counsel, asking that his new counsel be replaced with 

another attorney, which was denied. While represented by counsel, Quiroz 

 

1 This court views the facts “in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdict, and resolve[s] all reasonable inferences against the defendant.”

State v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 588-89 (1997) (citation omitted).
STATE v. QUIROZ

Decision of the Court

3

filed a pro se suppression motion, which was denied. The court appointed 

counsel for a pawn shop employee who was a trial witness and the State 

sought and obtained an order granting immunity for that witness.

¶5 A two-day jury trial was held in November 2016. Three 

witnesses testified and several exhibits were received in evidence. The first 

witness was a pawn broker, who testified that Quiroz and a woman came 

into his shop to “sell, pawn a motorized shopping cart.” Quiroz said he 

bought the cart at Costco. The pawn broker looked up the price and saw 

“they had been selling there for, I think, about $600, I think like $599.” The 

cart had no markings “[o]ther than just kind of what the manufacturer puts 

on there.” The pawn broker offered to purchase the cart for $50. The couple 

considered the offer and came back the next day and sold the cart to the 

pawn broker for $50. 

¶6 The pawn shop then waited for 20 days to see if anyone 

reported it stolen, and when no one did, the shop posted it for sale. The 

pawn broker admitted he “didn’t feel as if maybe that it was theirs [the 

couple’s] to be selling,” which factored into the purchase price. During 

direct testimony, the pawn broker admitted that, because he had a feeling 

that it could be stolen, the State provided him immunity for his testimony 

from “any kind of criminal charges.” The issue of immunity also was 

addressed during cross-examination.

¶7 After posting the cart for sale, a Fry’s grocery store 

representative came to the pawn shop and said it looked like a Fry’s cart. 

The police then became involved and Fry’s established that it was one of 

their carts. Fry’s then paid the pawn broker $50 to get the cart back.

¶8 The next witness was a Fry’s employee, who explained that a 

motorized shopping cart went missing from a nearby Fry’s store in April 

2015. She said a customer told the store that a Fry’s electric cart was in a 

pawn shop a few blocks away. She and another Fry’s employee went to the 

pawn shop and took a picture of the cart’s serial number and the “EAS tag” 

(“a small white tag” placed on items that sounds an alarm when taken out 

a door) that Fry’s puts on its carts. She verified the cart was the one stolen 

from the Fry’s store.

¶9 A Phoenix Police Department detective who interviewed 

Quiroz also testified. After identifying Quiroz in court, the detective 

testified Quiroz said he found the cart behind a Little Caesars, that it 

worked, and that they decided to take it. Quiroz told him “[t]here was no 

one around so they felt that they could” take it. During the interview, 
STATE v. QUIROZ

Decision of the Court

4

Quiroz agreed it was “an expensive item and not something that would 

typically be left behind by someone.”

¶10 After the State rested, Quiroz unsuccessfully moved for a 

judgment of acquittal. Quiroz, as was his right, elected not to testify or 

present any affirmative evidence, other than through cross-examination. 

Quiroz also elected not to pursue any lesser-included jury instructions. 

After final instructions and argument, the jury found Quiroz guilty as 

charged. The State waived the aggravation phase, and the court discharged 

the jury.

¶11 At sentencing, after receiving a presentence report and 

evidence, the court found Quiroz had at least two prior felony convictions, 

specifying those offenses. After hearing argument from counsel, and from 

Quiroz directly, the court sentenced him to 11.25 years, a presumptive term 

for a non-dangerous but repetitive Class 3 felony offense with two prior 

felony convictions. The court properly credited Quiroz with 346 days of 

pre-sentence incarceration credit. This court has jurisdiction over Quiroz’ 

timely appeal pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and 

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -

4033(A)(1) (2017).

2

DISCUSSION

¶12 Counsel for Quiroz advised this court that after a diligent 

search of the entire record, counsel found no arguable question of law. This 

court has reviewed and considered counsel’s brief and has searched the 

entire record for reversible error. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537 ¶ 30 

(App. 1999). Searching the record and brief reveals no reversible error.

¶13 The record shows Quiroz was represented by counsel at all 

stages of the proceedings and counsel was present at all critical stages. The 

record provided also shows there was substantial evidence supporting his 

conviction and resulting sentence. From the record, all proceedings were 

conducted in compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

and the sentence imposed was within the statutory limits and permissible 

range. 

 

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
STATE v. QUIROZ

Decision of the Court

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¶14 The supplemental brief filed by Quiroz personally raises 

issues regarding (1) the grant of immunity to the trial witness and (2) jury 

selection.

¶15 Quiroz questions why an attorney was appointed to represent 

the pawn broker, the experience of the prosecutor in granting immunity, 

why immunity was not granted before the day of trial, why the witness was 

granted immunity, why he did not see the written grant of immunity and 

argues that the State was “helping and protecting” the witness, and that the 

witness “should be charged.” 

¶16 The petition for immunity filed with the superior court states, 

in substance, that an individual “is to be called as a witness before this 

Court and it is stated upon information and belief that hi[s] testimony or 

other information may be necessary to the public interest” and the 

individual “has refused to testify or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 

other information on the basis of hi[s] privilege against self-incrimination.” 

As a result, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4064, the State “provide[d] immunity 

from any use against the witness, of any testimony or evidence presented 

by him before this Court.” The resulting order signed by the superior court 

required the witness to testify, adding that trial testimony “shall not be used 

against said witness” in any criminal action but that the witness “may 

nevertheless be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or forfeiture for any 

perjury, false swearing or contempt committed.” Quiroz has not shown 

how this immunity grant or resulting order fails to comply with Arizona 

law or unfairly prejudiced him at trial.

¶17 Nor has Quiroz claimed or specified how the questions he 

raises or the actions involved in the immunity grant deprived him of a fair 

trial or constitute reversible error. As noted above, the immunity grant was 

the subject of examination and cross-examination of this witness at trial. 

And Quiroz’ trial counsel pressed the immunity grant during closing 

argument. In short, Quiroz has shown no error from the grant of immunity 

or appointment of counsel for the pawn broker and has shown no resulting 

prejudice. 

¶18 Turning to jury selection, Quiroz notes several questions and 

answers by several potential jurors. Four jurors who served stated, during 

voir dire, that they or a close family member or close friend had been 

involved in law enforcement. But when the court followed up, none of these 

individuals agreed with the positions of two other individuals (who did not 

serve as jurors) that they would be inclined to believe a police witness more 

than another witness or hold police officers in “a little bit higher regards.”
STATE v. QUIROZ

Decision of the Court

6

Similarly, although several individuals who served as jurors either had 

been a crime victim, or had a relative or friend who was, none indicated 

that they would “have difficulty being fair and impartial to both sides in 

this case.” Nor has Quiroz indicated why one juror working “for Safeway 

as a systems engineer” for five years would be disqualifying.

¶19 Quiroz notes that other jurors answered affirmatively to 

various questions during voir dire, but he does not argue that they 

provided disqualifying answers to follow up questions. To the contrary, 

when identifying potential jurors to excuse for cause, none of the 

individuals mentioned by Quiroz were identified as not being able to be 

fair and impartial. Moreover, Quiroz’ counsel was given an opportunity to 

ask follow up questions of potential jurors. And after excusing individuals 

for cause, Quiroz’ counsel had no “other challenges for cause.” The jury 

was then selected from individuals where no challenges for cause had been 

made. On this record, Quiroz has shown no error in jury selection.

CONCLUSION

¶20 This court has read and considered counsel’s brief and 

Quiroz’ pro se supplemental brief, and has searched the record provided 

for reversible error and has found none. Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300; Clark, 196 

Ariz. at 537 ¶ 30. Accordingly, Quiroz’ conviction and resulting sentence 

are affirmed. 

¶21 Upon the filing of this decision, defense counsel is directed to 

inform Quiroz of the status of the appeal and of his future options. Defense 

counsel has no further obligations unless, upon review, counsel identifies 

an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by 

petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Quiroz 

shall have 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he desires, 

with a pro se motion for reconsideration or petition for review.