U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

57–574 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024

SECURING OUR NATION FROM WMDs: A REVIEW 

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 20, 2024 

Serial No. 118–56 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MARK E. GREEN, MD, Tennessee, Chairman 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi 

DAN BISHOP, North Carolina 

CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida 

AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas 

ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York 

MARJORIE TAYLOR GREENE, Georgia 

TONY GONZALES, Texas 

NICK LALOTA, New York 

MIKE EZELL, Mississippi 

ANTHONY D’ESPOSITO, New York 

LAUREL M. LEE, Florida 

MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas 

DALE W. STRONG, Alabama 

JOSH BRECHEEN, Oklahoma 

ELIJAH CRANE, Arizona 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Ranking 

Member 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana 

SHRI THANEDAR, Michigan 

SETH MAGAZINER, Rhode Island 

GLENN IVEY, Maryland 

DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, New York 

ROBERT GARCIA, California 

DELIA C. RAMIREZ, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

STEPHEN SIAO, Staff Director 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

SEAN CORCORAN, Chief Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 

ANTHONY D’ESPOSITO, New York, Chairman 

NICK LALOTA, New York 

DALE W. STRONG, Alabama 

JOSH BRECHEEN, Oklahoma 

MARK E. GREEN, MD, Tennessee (ex officio) 

TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana, Ranking Member 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

DIANA BERGWIN, Subcommittee Staff Director 

LAUREN MCCLAIN, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Anthony D’Esposito, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Troy A. Carter, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

WITNESSES

Ms. Mary Ellen Callahan, Assistant Secretary, Countering Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Mr. Herbert O. Wolfe, MHS–PA, Acting Chief Medical Officer, Acting Director, Office of Health Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16 

Ms. Tina Won Sherman, Ph.D., Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21 

(1) 

SECURING OUR NATION FROM WMDs: A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY’S COUNTERING WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION OFFICE 

Wednesday, March 20, 2024 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in room 

310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Anthony D’Esposito 

(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives D’Esposito, LaLota, Strong, Brecheen, 

and Carter. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology will come to 

order. 

The purpose of this hearing is to provide Members the opportunity to evaluate the work of DHS’s Countering Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Office and the Office of Health Security to assess their 

respective roles in preventing, mitigating, and responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Today the Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology will review the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office and the Office of Health 

Security and examine their efforts to secure this great Nation from 

weapons of mass destruction. 

I would like to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for your work 

to protect this great Nation from chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear threats. We look forward to hearing from each of you. 

The Department of Homeland Security was created following the 

terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and brought together 22 

Federal agencies to coordinate and streamline efforts to protect our 

homeland. 

Shortly after the Twin Towers collapsed, a series of letters laced 

with anthrax were sent to Congressional office buildings, news outlets, and postal facilities, killing 5 Americans and injuring 17. The 

2001 anthrax attacks highlighted the means to which bad actors 

will go to terrorize innocent people and the need for the U.S. investment in CBRN security and defense. 
2 

Twenty-three years later, the risk of biological terrorism and 

weapons of mass destruction has not gone away. Recognizing the 

need to streamline and prioritize countering CBRN threats, the 

CWMD Office was established in 2017 and authorized by Congress 

and President Trump in 2018. 

The mission of the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office is to reduce vulnerability and protect American cities from a WMD attack by supporting operational partners on the ground. For example, CWMD’s 

Securing the Cities program has equipped State and local agencies 

with nearly 48,000 items and pieces of equipment with detection 

and deterrence capabilities to protect communities across this country from radiological threats. 

In October 2023, a Houston police officer discovered dangerous 

levels of radiation in a metal scrapyard after his STC-provided personal radiation detector detected radiation during his commute to 

work. The hazardous material was identified and safely removed. 

These capabilities are critical for safeguarding this great homeland. 

Last July, I attended the Securing the Cities annual conference, 

where emergency managers from across the country gathered for 

training and coordination. I was grateful to attend and proud of 

STC’s work to fortify a network of State, local, and Federal partners that are committed to defending the United States of America 

from a potentially catastrophic nuclear or radiological attack. 

In October, CWMD held a ChemPrep program in Nassau County 

to review local chemical incident-related concerns, gaps, and 

vulnerabilities, to discuss potential opportunities to optimize local 

preparedness. I was very pleased with the local outreach and support to first responders on Long Island, the same island that Members of this committee on both sides of the aisle—myself, Congressman LaLota, Congressman Garbarino, and now Congressman 

Suozzi—represent. 

With numerous bad actors and threats confronting our Nation, 

CWMD has provided U.S. Customs and Border Protection with radiation portal monitors to scan cargo for potential threats. 

While the CWMD Office plays an essential role in equipping 

State and local partners with equipment and training to counter 

CBRN threats, there are opportunities to improve the effectiveness 

of this office. Although the office was established to streamline internal DHS operations and coordinations with States and localities, 

many reorganizations have taken place, and workplace morale has 

consistently received low rankings by CWMD Office personnel. 

When the Department of Homeland Security Act was passed in 

2002, section 872 allowed the Secretary to reorganize, establish, or 

consolidate operations within the Department. In 2022, the Secretary used this authority to reallocate some health security and 

biosecurity functions to the newly-created Office of Health Security, 

less than 5 years since the Office of Health Affairs was reorganized 

into CWMD. Such constant restructuring can be confusing and 

frustrating for employees and stakeholders. I’m looking forward to 

learning more about the Office of Health Security, the benefit of its 

move out of CWMD, and differentiating between the biodefense 

work of OHS with that of CWMD. 
3 

1https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/amerithrax-or-anthrax-investigation; https:// 

nihrecord.nih.gov/2022/05/13/2001-anthrax-attacks-revealed-need-develop-countermeasuresagainst-biological-threats#:?:text=The%20attacks-%20lasted%20a%20few,doctors%20had- 

%20experience%20treating%20anthrax. 

I am also eager to hear an update on CWMD’s BioWatch program, which is a monitoring system that collects and tests air samples for biological agents that may be used in a bioterrorism attack. 

This program has not kept pace with technological advancements 

since it was first created in response to the 2001 anthrax attacks 

and requires 12 to 36 hours before successfully verifying a biological agent and warning the public. 

In 2019, DHS began a major acquisition program, Biological Detection for the 21st Century, BD21, to move toward the next generation of national biodetection. BD21 was intended to address 

some of BioWatch’s limitations, including significantly shortening 

its time to detect. However, it seems that BD21 has been abandoned. 

The President’s fiscal year 2025 budget request refers to the program as, ‘‘obsolete,’’ and states that CWMD will transition into a 

new, ‘‘environmental biodetection capability development and maturation’’ project. I would like to understand how this new project 

will be different. Ultimately, I hope that CWMD is on a fast track 

to finally obtaining the biological technology that America needs. 

Despite the obstacles the CWMD Office has faced, I believe that 

we should work together to remedy these challenges and to help 

the office succeed in its mission of enabling operational partners 

and preventing WMDs from ever harming this great country. That 

is also why I was proud to introduce H.R. 3224, a bill to extend 

the authorization of this office, and I urge my colleagues in the 

Senate to take up this bill immediately. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the opportunities 

and challenges confronting the CWMD Office as well as the Office 

of Health Security. Thank you all for this work in this field and 

for your commitment to this country. 

[The statement of Chairman D’Esposito follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ANTHONY D’ESPOSITO

MARCH 20, 2024 

Today the Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology will review 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Office (CWMD) and the Office of Health Security and examine their efforts to secure 

our Nation from WMDs. I’d like to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for your work 

to protect our Nation from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 

threats. We look forward to hearing from each of you. 

The Department of Homeland Security was created following the terrorist attacks 

on September 11, 2001, and brought together 22 disparate Federal agencies to coordinate and streamline efforts to protect our homeland. Shortly after the Twin 

Towers collapsed, a series of letters laced with anthrax were sent to Congressional 

office buildings, news outlets, and postal facilities, killing 5 Americans and injuring 

17.1 The 2001 anthrax attacks highlighted the means to which bad actors will go 

to terrorize innocent people and the need for U.S. investment in CBRN security and 

defense. 

Twenty-three years later, the risk of biological terrorism and other weapons of 

mass destruction has not gone away. Recognizing the need to streamline and 

prioritize countering CBRN threats, the CWMD Office was established in 2017 and 

authorized by Congress and President Trump in 2018. The mission of the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office is to 
4 

2 CWMD Briefing. March 12, 2024. 

reduce vulnerability and protect American cities from a WMD attack by supporting 

operational partners on the ground. 

For example, CWMD’s Securing the Cities Program (STC) has equipped State and 

local agencies with nearly 48,000 items of equipment with detection and deterrence 

capabilities to protect communities across the country from radiological threats.2 In 

October 2023, a Houston police officer discovered ‘‘dangerous levels of radiation’’ in 

a metal scrapyard after his STC-provided personal radiation detector (RPD) detected 

radiation during his commute to work. The hazardous material was identified and 

safely removed. These capabilities are critical for safeguarding our homeland from 

WMDs. 

Last July, I attended the Securing the Cities annual conference, where emergency 

managers from across the country gathered for training and coordination. I was 

grateful to attend and proud of STC’s work to fortify a network of State, local, and 

Federal partners that are committed to defending the United States from a potentially catastrophic nuclear or radiological attack. 

In October, CWMD held a ChemPrep program in Nassau County to review local 

chemical incident-related concerns, gaps, and vulnerabilities, and to discuss potential opportunities to optimize local preparedness. I was very pleased with the local 

outreach and support to first responders on Long Island. 

With numerous bad actors and threats confronting our Nation, CWMD has provided U.S. Customs and Border Protection with Radiation Portal Monitors to scan 

cargo for potential radiological threats. 

While the CWMD Office plays an essential role in equipping State and local partners with equipment and training to counter CBRN threats, there are opportunities 

to improve the effectiveness of this office. Although the Office was established to 

streamline internal DHS operations and coordination with States and localities, 

many re-organizations have taken place, and workplace morale has consistently received low rankings by CWMD Office personnel. 

When the Department of Homeland Security Act was passed in 2002, Section 872 

allowed the Secretary to reorganize, establish, or consolidate operations within the 

Department. In 2022, the Secretary used this authority to reallocate some health 

security and biosecurity functions to the newly-created Office of Health Security 

(OHS), less than 5 years since the Office of Health Affairs was reorganized into 

CWMD. Such constant restructuring can be confusing and frustrating for employees 

and stakeholders. I’m looking forward to learning more about the Office of Health 

Security, the benefits of its move out of CWMD, and differentiating between the biodefense work of OHS with that of CWMD. 

I am also eager to hear an update on CWMD’s BioWatch program, which is a 

monitoring system that collects and tests air samples for biological agents that may 

be used in a bioterrorism attack. This program has not kept pace with technological 

advancements since it was first created in response to the 2001 anthrax attacks and 

requires 12–36 hours before successfully verifying a biological agent and warning 

the public. 

In 2019, DHS began a major acquisition program, Biological Detection for the 

Twenty-First Century (BD–21), to move toward the next generation of national biodetection. BD–21 was intended to address some of BioWatch’s limitations, including 

significantly shortening its time-to-detect. However, it seems that BD–21 has been 

abandoned. The President’s fiscal year 2025 budget request refers to the program 

as ‘‘obsolete’’ and states that CWMD will transition into a new ‘‘Environmental Biodetection (EBD) Capability Development and Maturation’’ project. I would like to 

understand how this new project will be different. Ultimately, I hope that CWMD 

is on a fast track to finally obtaining the biological detection technology that America needs. 

Despite the obstacles the CWMD Office has faced, I believe that we should work 

together to remedy these challenges and to help the Office succeed in its mission 

of enabling operational partners in preventing WMDs from ever harming our homeland. That is also why I was proud to introduce H.R. 3224, a bill to extend the authorization of this Office, and I urge my colleagues in the Senate to take up this 

bill. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the opportunities and challenges confronting the CWMD Office, as well as the Office of Health Security. 

Thank you all for your work in this field. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman and my good friend from Louisiana, Mr. Carter, for his 

opening statement. 
5 

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Good afternoon to our panel experts. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here today to discuss the 

importance of countering weapons of mass destruction and the Office of Health Security. 

CWMD and OHS plays a critical role in fortifying our Nation’s 

defense against threats that can pose considerable harm to our 

communities. CWMD improves our Nation’s capability to plan for, 

detect, and guard against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. 

OHS is the central office. It serves as the principal medical work 

force, health and safety, and public health authority for some 

260,000 Department of Homeland Security employees. 

Pursuant to CWMD Act of 2018, the office was set to sunset on 

December 21, 2023, but the sunset was subsequently extended, and 

now it’s set to expire when the continuing resolution expires, which 

is on this Friday. 

I want to thank my friend and Chairman D’Esposito for working 

in a bipartisan manner in front to reauthorize CWMD. I am proud 

to cosponsor his bill, H.R. 3224, the Countering Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Extension Act of 2023. As authorizers, we should do 

our part to make sure that all programs and offices have support 

and there is no question as to whether this office or any other office 

that protects the Nation from threats has an uncertain future. 

We should always—our No. 1 job is to make sure that we properly fund and provide the resources to keep America safe, notwithstanding whatever party or philosophical views we may have. This 

is, in fact, one of the most significant bipartisan issues that we 

have to undertake. 

CWMD operates critical programs like Securing the Cities, STC, 

which provides 14 local governments, including my home town. I 

was proud to be the lead sponsor on this bill. 

I know, Ms. Callahan, that you had the opportunity to visit New 

Orleans to do a walkthrough. So I hope you had a chance to enjoy 

the weather, the food, and, of course, the warm hearts of the people 

of New Orleans, my home town. 

With detection equipment, training exercise, support operation, 

technical subject-matter expertise, and programmatic support is so 

critically important to making sure that things like the Super Bowl 

and Mardi Gras and high-populated activities are safe, not just in 

New Orleans, but across the country, and certainly in the other 14 

cities that are part of the STC. STC is working with New Orleans 

to prepare for the Super Bowl. We continue to support important 

events like Mardi Gras, Jazz Fest, the Sugar Bowl, any other reason. 

We have millions and millions of people who visit New Orleans 

for their—the hospitality and wonderful access to transportation 

and our world-class convention center. Shameless plug there. But 

we’re also obviously very excited about having this extra barrier of 

protection because we know the threats are, in fact, real. 

I introduced H.R. 4403, the Securing the Cities Improvement 

Act, which passed the House earlier this month. My bill will help 

cities build and maintain their security capabilities against nuclear 
6 

or radiological threats. I look forward to discussing the STC’s impacts on domestic preparedness. 

While CWMD is doing great work, one concern that I have seen 

highlighted repeatedly in the Partnership for Public Service and 

the Government Accountability Office, GAO, report is internal morale issues. 

One GAO report highlighted the merger of predecessor offices 

under CWMD caused low morale and that the offices’ missions 

were unclear under the new structure. Some employees had difficulty understanding how the missions should align under the new 

structure. However, a more recent GAO report has highlighted that 

CWMD is working on its work-force morale. 

I want to thank GAO for their work on helping the committee 

understand how this new office is functioning. I look forward to 

hearing today from CWMD how you have improved your work-force 

morale. 

OHS is also an integral part of the Department and was formerly 

part of CWMD until 2022. As a separate component, OHS optimizes the health, wellness, and safety of the DHS work force and 

enhances efforts to counter health threats that pose risk to our Nation. 

In recent years, they have managed medical and public health 

initiatives to help thousands of people resettling in the United 

States through Operation Allies Welcome to—Welcome and Uniting 

for Ukraine. It is imperative to recognize and support the critical 

work carried out by both CWMD and OHS in securing our homeland. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today regarding the 

recent fiscal year 2025 budget request and any additional concerns 

and successes the office would like to discuss. We’re here to serve. 

We’re here to hear from you. We’re here to determine how we as 

a committee can do more to make sure that your jobs are easier 

to do and that you are funded to do the things that you are Constitutionally-mandated to do, and that is to make sure that we 

have a safe and wholesome community. 

So with that, I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Carter follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER TROY CARTER

MARCH 20, 2024 

CWMD and OHS play a crucial role in fortifying our Nation’s defenses against 

threats that could pose considerable harm to our communities. CWMD improves our 

Nation’s capability to plan for, detect, and guard against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. OHS is the central office that serves as the 

principal medical, workforce health and safety, and public health authority for the 

260,000 Department of Homeland Security employees. 

Pursuant to the CWMD Act of 2018 the office was set to sunset on December 21, 

2023, but the sunset was subsequently extended and is now set to expire when the 

continuing resolution expires, which is on Friday. I want to thank Chairman 

D’Esposito for working on a bipartisan front to reauthorize CWMD. I am a proud 

cosponsor of his bill, H.R. 3224, the ‘‘Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Extension Act of 2023.’’ As authorizers, we should do our part to make sure that all 

programs and offices have support and there is no question as to whether this office 

or any other office that protects the Nation from threats, has an uncertain future. 

CWMD operates critical programs, like Securing the Cities (STC), which provides 

14 local governments, including New Orleans—my home, with detection equipment, 

training, exercise support, operational and technical subject-matter expertise, and 
7 

programmatic support. STC is working with New Orleans to prepare for Super Bowl 

LIX (59) and continues to support important events such as Mardi Gras. To ensure 

such work is not hindered, I introduced H.R. 4403, the ‘‘Securing the Cities Improvement Act,’’ which passed the House earlier this month. My bill would help cities build and maintain their security capabilities against nuclear or radiological 

threats. I look forward to discussing STC’s impact on domestic preparedness. 

While CWMD is doing great work, one concern that I have seen highlighted repeatedly in the Partnership for Public Service and the Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) reports is internal morale issues. One GAO report highlighted that the 

merger of predecessor offices under CWMD caused low morale and that the Office’s 

missions were unclear under the new structure. Some employees had difficulty understanding how their missions should align under the new structure. 

However, a more recent GAO report has highlighted that CWMD is working on 

its workforce morale. I want to thank GAO for their work on helping the committee 

understand how this new office is functioning. I look forward to hearing today how 

CWMD has improved workforce morale. 

OHS is also an integral part of the Department and was formerly part of CWMD 

until 2022. As a separate component, OHS optimizes the health, wellness, and safety of the DHS workforce and enhances efforts to counter health threats that pose 

a risk to our Nation. In recent years, they have managed medical and public health 

initiatives that have helped thousands of people resettling in the United States 

through Operations Allies Welcome and Uniting for Ukraine. It is imperative to recognize and support the critical work carried out by both CWMD and OHS in securing our homeland. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today regarding the recent fiscal 

year 2025 budget request and any additional concerns or successes the offices would 

like to discuss. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Thank you, Ranking Member. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MARCH 20, 2024 

The Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Office (CWMD) and Office of Health Security (OHS) play vital roles in preparing 

the Nation against threats, whether natural or man-made. That is why I continue 

to be concerned about CWMD’s authorization, which is currently scheduled to sunset on Friday. 

This committee has worked on a bipartisan extension for CWMD, but it is not yet 

law. Congress needs to pass a long-term reauthorization for the office. I look forward to arriving at a solution so CWMD can continue to fulfill its important role 

in homeland security. 

Under past leadership, there have been questions and criticisms about CWMD’s 

technologies and workforce morale. In 2019, I worked on a bicameral, bipartisan effort with the Senate to encourage more transparency at CWMD and obtain information about the programs that were the subject of criticism. One such program was 

Biowatch, CWMD’s premier biodetection program. This program is now over 20 

years old and has not had significant updates during its life. CWMD initiated BD– 

21, an acquisition program to replace the aging BioWatch technology, but the anticipated upgrades have not come to fruition. 

Last year, the Department announced the Environmental BioDetection Capability 

Development and Maturation Project, which appears to be the next step in biodetection. I look forward to learning more about this project today. CWMD’s workforce 

morale issues have repeatedly been identified as a concern, as I mentioned. Since 

its establishment, CWMD has been either ranked the lowest or close to the lowest 

in the annual Best Places to Work in the Federal Government survey. I look forward to hearing how Assistant Secretary Callahan has been working to improve employee morale and what plans there are for the future. The morale and mental 

health of the DHS workforce has long been a priority of mine. 

This Congress, I introduced H.R. 2577, the Suicide Prevention and Resiliency for 

Law Enforcement Act, which directs DHS to address the mental health and wellness 

of its agents and officers in a comprehensive manner to improve care and reduce 

the stigma associated with seeking help. H.R. 2577 would establish the Law En-
8 

forcement Mental Health and Wellness Program to be overseen by the Department’s 

Chief Medical Officer, who we have before us today. 

Established in 2022, the Office of Health Security is tasked with ensuring DHS 

workforce resiliency and emergency response planning, policy, and oversight in collaboration with other agencies. In recent years, OHS has also overseen the medical 

and public health programs for tens of thousands of people resettling in the United 

States—these programs include Operations Allies Welcome and Uniting for Ukraine. 

I look forward to hearing today how OHS, while still very new, is pursuing its 

mission and working with other components at DHS. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of 

witnesses before us today on this very important topic critical to 

our national security. 

I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have 

answered in the affirmative. 

You may be seated. Thank you. 

I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. 

The Honorable Mary Ellen Callahan serves as the assistant secretary for the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Office. CWMD leads DHS efforts to 

safeguard the United States of America against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. Previously, Ms. Callahan 

served as the chief of staff to the deputy secretary of the Department. 

Dr. Herbert Wolfe is the acting chief medical officer and acting 

director of the Office of Health Security for DHS. He oversees the 

medical, public health, and work force health and safety activities 

across the Department. Prior to the establishment of OHS, he 

served as the deputy assistant secretary for health security within 

CWMD. 

Dr. Tina Won Sherman is the director in the Government 

Accountability’s Office Homeland Security and Justice team. She 

oversees work on the protection of the Nation’s critical infrastructure assets, the security of the United States transportation system, and additional equities within the Department of Homeland 

Security, including the CWMD office. 

I thank all the witnesses for taking the time and being here with 

us today. 

I now recognize Ms. Callahan for 5 minutes to summarize her 

opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MARY ELLEN CALLAHAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Chairman D’Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, 

distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting 

me to speak with you today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Office and our efforts to safeguard the Nation 

from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, also 

known as CBRN. 

The DHS CWMD Office has a unique value proposition in the 

CBRN space. CWMD was created by Congress 5 years ago to be a 

single point of CBRN expertise within DHS. We are the hub for the 
9 

Department’s weapons of mass destruction, or WMD/CBRN activities, providing coordination, strategy, and policy guidance, intelligence analysis, operational support, and researching technologies. 

With your support, the creation of an office solely focused on CBRN 

threats streamlined the ability of DHS to resource and execute this 

critical mission. 

My priorities for the office include focusing on the outstanding 

CWMD employees and bolstering our relationships with our important State, local, and Federal partners. I have been leading CWMD 

for 8 months. The work force at CWMD is among the most talented, mission-focused, and knowledgeable work forces I have ever 

experienced. At its founding, however, the office faced challenges, 

including frequent leadership changes, faltering morale, and staff 

turnover. 

Therefore, my first priority at CWMD is to further build a collaborative, safe, and productive work environment. The CWMD 

team deserves this. With that said, the uncertainty around 

CWMD’s future has had a devastating effect on the morale and retention of the office’s highly-skilled and in-demand work force. 

My employee morale and well-being plan has three elements. 

First, we’ve been encouraging professional development, including 

individual development plans and professional training. We’ve just 

launched a mentoring program where I am among the mentors. 

Second, we are working to better integrate the activities of each 

of the 5 directorates to make sure that the CWMD staff has complete awareness of the office missions. As a result of education and 

communication, I’ve seen better synergies and coordination between and among the directorates, which leads to a more engaged 

work force. 

Third, we are looking for ways to connect with our colleagues on 

a more personal note. We host quarterly in-person get-togethers in 

our establishing interest groups. I hold weekly office hours to engage with the work force one-on-one. 

All of these actions are playing a significant role in improving 

CWMD’s employee morale. However, without enduring reauthorization, CWMD will likely face steady attrition. 

In addition to better integrating my office, I’m committed to 

strengthening our assistance to and our relationship with our 

stakeholders, including our State, local, and Federal partners. 

CWMD has integrated the prevention and detection of all CBRN 

threats with our DHS partners through training, equipment, and 

technical assistance to CBP, HSI, TSA, Coast Guard, and Secret 

Service. We also serve as a peer organization to CISA and FEMA 

in the life cycle of CBRN incident management. We, of course, work 

seamlessly with our colleagues at the Office of Health Security on 

public health and biological threats. 

I’m working to further the operational—further integrate the 

operational support of all of these components with our planning, 

research, and support work at CWMD. 

Even with all this Federal activity, the most unique role CWMD 

plays in the CBRN ecosystem is our relationship with State and 

locals. CWMD provides radiological and nuclear detection capabilities in 14 high-risk regions in the United States through the Securing the City programs. Those regions are preparing to work 
10 

seamlessly with the FBI and the Department of Energy in the 

event of an incident. 

On Monday, I was in New Orleans, along with Representative 

Carter’s team and the FBI and DOE, in order to see a portion of 

the CBRN preparation for the 2025 Super Bowl, along with city 

and State teams. Last year, Securing the City trained over 14,000 

State and local first responders. Our BioWatch program is in over 

30 jurisdictions. We are working to update our environmental biodetection capabilities, all while providing steady-state coverage for 

these jurisdictions. 

Between Securing the City and BioWatch, CWMD provides 

steady-state detection for 40 percent of the population. For the rest 

of the country, our mobile detection deployment team was deployed 

188 times last year, providing support in 48 States, 2 territories, 

and 1 Tribal unit. All of this work with our stakeholders is intended to prepare and promote collective readiness and to safeguard the Nation from CBRN threats in the homeland. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you for this opportunity to 

speak with you today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Callahan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY ELLEN CALLAHAN

MARCH 20, 2024 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman D’Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak with you today. I appreciate the 

opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Countering 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Office’s (CWMD) efforts to safeguard the Nation from 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. 

The DHS CWMD Office has a unique role and value proposition in the CBRN 

space. Established in accordance with Public Law 115–387, the Countering Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Act of 2018, (CWMD Act of 2018) CWMD is the single point 

of CBRN expertise within the Department and the linchpin to detect CBRN threats 

in the homeland. I thank our dedicated experts in CWMD, and our Federal, State, 

and local partners for their commitment to the Nation’s security. 

CBRN threats present dynamic challenges to the Nation’s security. These threats 

may emanate from nation-states, terrorists, lone actors, violent extremists, or natural causes. The risks are constantly evolving due to the evolution of technologies— 

for example, artificial intelligence (AI)—as well as the potential of spillover of animal pathogens to human populations. 

Responding to this threat environment, CWMD is the hub for the Department’s 

WMD/CBRN activities, providing coordination, strategy and policy guidance, intelligence analysis, operations support, and developing and deploying CBRN technologies through our research, development, testing, evaluation, and acquisition initiatives. With your support, the creation of an office solely focused on WMD/CBRN 

threats has elevated and streamlined the ability of DHS to successfully resource and 

execute this critical mission, including further integrating the prevention and detection of all CBRN threats with our DHS stakeholders. 

CWMD is better able to protect the homeland through its relationships with 

State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners in order to equip them with 

CBRN training, equipment, technical assistance, and exercises. SLTT first responders are likely to be the first to identify a CBRN incident. As a Nation, we are better 

protected in light of CWMD’s expansive relationships throughout the Nation-wide 

CBRN ecosystem. This enhanced protection is a direct result of the CWMD Act of 

2018. 

I appreciate the subcommittee’s leadership and bipartisan efforts to reauthorize 

CWMD and applaud House passage of H.R. 3224, the Countering Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Extension Act of 2023. I look forward to your continued support and 

stand ready to assist in the on-going CWMD reauthorization process. An on-going 
11 

challenge is the termination of CWMD. I will reflect upon some of these challenges 

throughout this testimony. 

In August 2023, I assumed the role of assistant secretary for CWMD. My priorities for the Office are to (1) maintain a collaborative, safe, and productive work environment; (2) ensure risk-based mission capability across the broad spectrum of 

CBRN threats, including ensuring that CBRN detection acquisition programs are informed by both intelligence and stakeholder requirements; (3) further integrate 

CWMD’s support and partnerships into DHS operational components and Headquarters offices, including the Science and Technology Directorate, and the Office 

of Health Security; (4) broaden partnerships across the Federal Government; and (5) 

strengthen assistance to and the relationships with SLTT partners. 

CWMD provides extensive training, equipment, and technical assistance to U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Homeland Security Investigations, Transportation Security Administration, United States Coast Guard, and United States Secret Service. We also serve as a peer organization to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

in the life cycle of CBRN incident management. The President’s fiscal year 2025 budget requests $418 million to support 259 Federal staff and the programs critical to the CWMD mission. CWMD allocates the 

$418 million across 4 appropriations: Operations and Support; Research and Development; Procurement, Construction, & Improvements; and Federal Assistance— 

largely to SLTTs. 

The programs, activities, and funding request that I will discuss today represent 

some, but by no means all of CWMD’s work to mitigate the risks to the homeland. 

RISK-INFORMED APPROACH TO PROTECT AGAINST CBRN THREATS

CWMD conducts national and tailored threat- and location-dependent risk assessments to support decision making to protect the homeland from CBRN threats. Our 

capstone document, the CBRN Strategic Risk Assessment Summary (SRAS), provides a comprehensive, data-driven approach that integrates CBRN threat, vulnerability, and consequence information to inform DHS and SLTT stakeholder decision 

making related to risk. The outputs from the SRAS are used to analyze existing capability gaps identified within the CBRN defense architecture with the intent of reducing CBRN risk as well as assisting in resource prioritization for FSLTT partners. 

CWMD is building upon its long-standing, legislatively-mandated Global Nuclear 

Detection Architecture in developing chemical and biological defense architectures. 

These nascent architectures will allow CWMD to better understand the complex 

CBRN defense space by identifying key stakeholder capabilities needed to coordinate detection, analysis, and reporting of unauthorized uses of WMD/CBRN materials and weapons. The architectures will assist CWMD and our partners in conducting data-driven, defensible analytical activities such as capabilities-based assessments to identify and inform mitigation of capability gaps, including strategy, 

policy, operations, and resource allocation decisions. 

CBRN THREATS ENHANCED BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

CWMD is evaluating emerging technology threats in WMD/CBRN, such as from 

AI. Responsible use of AI holds great promise for advancing science, analyzing large 

complex datasets beyond human cognitive abilities, solving urgent and future challenges, and improving daily life. However, potential AI misuse poses consequential 

risk, requiring society-wide mitigation efforts. 

The variety of publicly-available AI models provides physical and life science researchers the enhanced ability to ideate novel biological and chemical agents and 

design experiments and to troubleshoot experimental procedures encountered during 

experiments. As AI technologies advance, use of these tools will likely lower the barrier for all actors across the sophistication spectrum to conceptualize and conduct 

CBRN attacks. To contain these risks, government and industry must work together 

to reinforce policies and codes of conduct based on voluntary commitments to mitigate against misuse of AI and AI-enabled tools. 

Integration of AI into CBRN prevention, detection, response, and mitigation capabilities could yield important or emergent benefits. CWMD has already started applying AI to certain fields such as cargo screening, biosurveillance, and detection 

technologies, but other areas are fertile for further research in our mission. In each 

of these areas, developing an appropriate adoption strategy for next-generation AIenabled technologies and interagency collaboration and lessons learned will be vital 

to implementation success. 

DHS, in coordination with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Department of Energy, is tasked with conducting an evaluation of the 
12 

CBRN-specific risks of AI and how AI could be applied to mitigating CBRN threats. 

CWMD’s centralized role and subject-matter expertise enable us to explore ways to 

leverage AI for our collective benefit while identifying novel CBRN risks to the 

homeland because of lower barriers to entry for malign actors. CWMD is supporting 

the Secretary’s mandate in the Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence to evaluate 

the potential for AI to be misused to enable the development or production of CBRN 

threats. 

WARNING OF BIOLOGICAL THREATS AND INCIDENTS IN TIME TO SAVE LIVES

CWMD’s flagship biodefense programs aim to provide early warning of biological 

attacks or incidents with the goal of enabling a rapid response to save lives. 

National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) 

The National Biosurveillance Integration Center integrates, analyzes, and distributes information about on-going and emerging biological incidents to help ensure 

the Nation’s responses at all levels of government are well-informed, save lives, and 

minimize economic impact. NBIC is unique in the biosurveillance community in that 

it looks across all biological threats—pandemics, accidents, and bioterrorism—and 

across multiple sectors—wildlife, human health, agriculture, and the environment. 

NBIC also provides deep analysis on the impact of these biological threats to homeland security. 

NBIC disseminates biosurveillance tools, analysis, and information to support 

common situational awareness and operational responses. NBIC is expanding its 

reach into partner biosurveillance organizations and systems to greatly enhance its 

analytic capabilities to handle the increasing complex information needs of leaders 

within the Department as well as our Federal and SLTT partners. 

BioWatch 

As the homeland’s only operational biodetection capability, CWMD’s BioWatch 

Program gives warning of an airborne bioterrorist attack in over 30 major metropolitan areas across the United States, covering over a third of the U.S. population. 

Outward signs and symptoms of a biological attack may emerge slowly. BioWatch 

can detect the presence of certain biological agents in the air after release by a terrorist or other bad actor in order to marshal an earlier response. 

Managed by CWMD, the BioWatch program is locally operated and supports coordination among scientists, laboratory technicians, emergency managers, law enforcement officers, and public health officials. Partnerships developed through participation in BioWatch have led to vast collaboration and planning efforts across all 

aspects of the CWMD mission. This includes more than 300 trainings delivered by 

BioWatch staff annually to nearly 1,700 jurisdictional stakeholders and Federal 

interagency partners covering all aspects of CWMD’s biodetection, incident characterization, and notification and response activities. CWMD’s comprehensive CBRN 

mission provides training and layered defenses for all the BioWatch jurisdictions. 

Additionally, the program facilitates over 100 exercises and drills in the jurisdictions per year. These activities not only help the jurisdictional stakeholders in their 

individual preparedness efforts, but provide countless opportunities to engage with 

other stakeholders, establish relationships and communication strategies, and improve overall situational awareness of partner activities that is vital to enable an 

effective response to an incident of any kind. 

The BioWatch technology is proven, reliable, using polymerase chain reaction 

technology (PCR). PCR technology is the national standard and results are laboratory validated. 

Environmental Biological Detection (EBD) 

CWMD has the mission to aid in the detection of biological agents that pose the 

highest risk to public health and safety. CWMD’s EBD efforts attempt to expand 

capabilities using a risk-based approach and advance developments that enable 

broader detection capabilities and decrease the time line for treatment of aerosolized 

biological attacks. 

Current EBD activities include the development of capabilities to improve warnings to public health officials, better inform SLTT response, and accelerate treatment decisions. EBD is focused on developing and deploying near-term mature technologies to meet BioWatch enhancement recommendations from our recent Integrated Project Team review, completed with input from SLTT stakeholders. EBD 

will also incorporate developing modeling capabilities, cybersecurity capabilities, and 

technology solutions. 
13 

CHEMICAL PREPAREDNESS AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE

Chemical Preparedness 

CWMD established the ChemPREP Program to partner with SLTT stakeholders 

to examine each local jurisdiction’s unique chemical risks and vulnerabilities, evaluate their ability to respond, and provide training to enhance their readiness. 

ChemPREP also seeks to connect local jurisdictions with other Federal resources to 

improve coordination and overall preparedness. 

CWMD has conducted 7 ChemPREP engagements in 5 States (NY, MA, FL, AZ, 

TX) working with front-line responders from 14 Federal organizations and 109 State 

and local organizations and partners including from Nassau and Suffolk Counties 

in New York. We are planning with New Orleans, LA to assess and optimize security in the jurisdiction in advance of next year’s Super Bowl. In an effort to accelerate and expand the chemical defense knowledge base throughout the country for 

our SLTT partners, in fiscal year 2024 CWMD is working with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers to develop standardized ChemPREP training for wider 

distribution. 

Chemical Defense 

In response to a 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit, CWMD established the DHS Chemical Coordination Group (CCG) in 2019 to meet the evolving threat from chemical attacks and incidents. This body is composed of representatives from DHS offices and agencies with significant chemical defense equities and 

serves as the primary coordination mechanism for DHS chemical defense. CWMD 

has hosted 3 DHS Chemical Defense Program Reviews, bringing DHS components 

together to do deeper-dive discussions on topical areas. 

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

The Intelligence Division of CWMD serves as the departmental lead for intelligence support related to all CBRN threats while also providing intelligence support 

to the DHS Office of Health Security and other Federal agencies on food, agriculture, veterinary, and health security threats. The Division provides strategic and 

operational threat intelligence and expertise to ensure DHS and its Federal and 

SLTT partners are equipped with timely and accurate intelligence to plan for, detect, and protect against threats. Supporting national and Departmental strategic 

objectives, the Intelligence Division produces an annual CWMD Homeland Threat 

Assessment to inform senior leaders and policy makers. 

At the operational level, we provide threat intelligence on foreign and domestic 

CBRN threats; naturally-occurring environmental threats; and food, agriculture, 

veterinary, and health security threats. The Division also creates tailored products 

and presentations to Federal and SLTT partners and stakeholders upon request. 

In fiscal year 2023, the Division published its third annual program of analysis. 

Through more effective planning, the division increased overall production to 263 

products from fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2023. The division also saw a significant increase in unique organizational customers; new customers included DHS 

operational components and headquarters offices, the Food and Drug Administration, and Department of State. 

DETECTING RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (R/N) THREATS TO PREVENT ATTACKS

An act of radiological or nuclear (R/N) terrorism could have a devastating impact 

on the United States. DHS began the Securing the Cities (STC) Program to enhance 

the Nation’s ability to detect and prevent terrorist attacks and other high-consequence events using nuclear or other radiological materials. CWMD provides detection equipment, training, exercise support, operational and technical subject-matter expertise, and programmatic support through a cooperative agreement grant 

process with eligible U.S. regions. STC is functioning in 14 high-risk areas across 

the Nation. The STC Program uses a regional approach to R/N detection that allows 

for a layered defense posture to increase the probability of detection. In addition, 

coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Energy, 

and their specialized teams ensures a timely hand-off and rapid response to possible 

terrorism. 

The program works close with STC stakeholders in these jurisdictions, including 

training and equipping first responders and law enforcement officials with specialized R/N equipment, and providing support for R/N detection exercises. Each region 

is creating its R/N training and detection protocols in consultation with CWMD. 

Several of the STC regions are sprinting toward maturation to be prepared for the 
14 

2026 World Cup. In 2023, STC facilitated approximately 330 training courses with 

over 14,000 SLTT operators trained. 

CWMD’s Mobile Detection Deployment Program (MDDP) enhances CBRN detection and R/N interdiction capabilities by deploying equipment and technical support 

for State and local surge operations and events of national significance. MDDP significantly expands our protective footprint to help support SLTT law enforcement 

in CBRN detection. In fiscal year 2023, MDDP was deployed 180 times into 42 

States, 2 territories, and 1 Tribal area. 

DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING TECHNOLOGIES TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS

CWMD works to ensure implementation of robust domestic CBRN detection architectures through deployment of technologies. CWMD’s research and development 

(R&D) program manages efforts to develop and demonstrate science and technologies that address gaps in the detection architecture, improve performance of 

CBRN detection and analysis, and reduce the operational burden of detection systems in the field. CWMD R&D’s mission is to provide novel solutions that can be 

implemented in the field, and at scale. CWMD’s Test and Evaluation Division conducts rigorous and comprehensive assessments to ensure that the technologies acquired by CWMD are both effective and suitable for the CBRN detection and prevention mission. 

CWMD’s Acquisition Division develops, acquires, and supports CBRN detection 

systems to deliver capabilities for operational partners to counter WMD threats. For 

example, CWMD’s Acquisition Division is deploying 216 new enhanced Radiation 

Portal Monitors (RPMs) at specific high-volume ports of entry, improving detection 

capability and minimizing nuisance alarms. Moreover, CWMD is collaborating with 

CBP to minimize close-proximity interference between non-intrusive inspection 

equipment and existing RPM technology. CWMD acquires small-scale portable 

CBRN detection systems that can be carried, moved, or worn by the user. Most recently, from fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2024, CWMD procured over 36,000 new 

Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs) for the DHS operational components and STC 

partners. 

THE CWMD WORKFORCE

The CWMD workforce is among the best and brightest in the Federal Government 

who work behind the scenes. The accomplishments of this team make the Nation 

safer. 

Initially, the office faced challenges, including frequent leadership changes, faltering morale, and staff turnover as discussed in the July 2022 GAO report, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: DHS Office Has Opportunities to Improve Partner Services and Employee Morale (GAO–22–106133), subsequently there were some 

promising signs in improving morale and stakeholder feedback. 

Uncertainty around CWMD’s future reversed many of those gains and had a devastating effect on the morale and retention of the office’s highly skilled and in-demand workforce. From October 2023 through February 2024, CWMD lost 24 Federal 

employees, approximately 10 percent of our Federal workforce, with 12 employees 

leaving in December 2023 alone—more than 3 times the average loss in a month. 

This represents a loss over 300 person-years of CWMD/CBRN experience. Backfilling these critical vacancies should help morale, but a long-term or permanent reauthorization is paramount to attracting and retaining high-quality candidates. 

CWMD leadership recognizes that transparency and keeping staff informed are 

critical to an engaged workforce. Since September, I conducted 17 virtual town halls 

with an average of 450 staff and contractors. The primary topics for the town halls 

last autumn were related to potential office termination; since January, we have focused the town halls on mission highlights from the staff perspective, employee resources, our mentoring program, social events, and office engagements. 

I hold open office hours to engage with the workforce collectively and one-on-one 

in order to hear directly what is most important to them. I have also sent 25 weekly 

newsletters and bulletins highlighting the key work of the agency and upcoming 

events. Additionally, CWMD hosted 6 Lunch & Learns with an average of 130 participants. 

All these actions play a significant role in improving CWMD employee morale. 

However, without long-term or permanent reauthorization, CWMD will face steady 

attrition. The administration has long sought permanent reauthorization to ensure 

CWMD has a fully-engaged workforce capable of continuing critical national security programs that support front-line operators and local communities. 
15 

CONCLUSION

CWMD remains focused on countering CBRN threats. While we are a relatively 

new office, we have matured quickly. We closely coordinate DHS efforts across the 

countering-WMD mission, provide our Federal and SLTT partners with CBRN detection equipment, and run programs to protect the Nation from CBRN security 

threats. 

CWMD’s unique role and value proposition in the CBRN space is the cornerstone 

of providing layered prevention and detection of CBRN threats. CWMD is the 

linchpin between our DHS and SLTT stakeholders and the Federal partners who 

would provide the response in the event of a CBRN incident. We are maturing detection and preparation capabilities to support stakeholders, while also better integrating our unique expertise within the Department and the overall CBRN ecosystem. I am committed to ensuring the CWMD prevention and detection mission 

is well-integrated with our DHS operational components and offices. 

On behalf of the CWMD staff who work tirelessly to keep the homeland and the 

American people safe, I look forward to our continued work with Congress to 

achieve an enduring reauthorization of our office. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Thank you, Ms. Callahan, and thank you for 

your work. 

I now recognize Dr. Wolfe for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HERBERT O. WOLFE, MHS–PA, ACTING CHIEF 

MEDICAL OFFICER, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HEALTH 

SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. WOLFE. Chairman D’Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and 

distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the great work being done by the 

dedicated personnel of the Office of Health Security, or OHS. It’s 

truly an honor to be here today to talk about the work that we are 

doing. 

I have served as the acting chief medical officer and acting director since January 2023, and prior to that, as the deputy chief medical officer and deputy director since the office creation in 2022. I 

joined the Department in 2019 after nearly 30 years of Federal 

public service. 

The challenges of the past 5 years exemplify how nearly every 

homeland security threat has a health security nexus. From acts 

of terror to a global pandemic, surges in migration, cyber attacks 

directed at critical infrastructure, including health care, natural 

disasters across the country, to international response efforts spanning nearly every continent, DHS is at the center of it all and often 

operating as the lead Federal agency. 

To answer the enduring health security challenges we face, DHS 

established OHS in July 2022 to serve as the principal medical, 

work force health and safety, and public health authority for DHS. 

The dedication of our staff and our earnest response to these challenges reflect the earnest—or enduring impact, hope, and vision of 

OHS; one that is grounded in agility, subject-matter and technical 

expertise, deep relationships with our interagency and State and 

local partners, and an unwavering commitment to the physical and 

mental health resiliency of our work force in the Nation. 

Today, OHS positions the Department to have a proactive, unified, and robust response to the ever-evolving health security landscape. Health security is, after all, a core tenet of homeland security. 
16 

The over 260,000 dedicated men, women, and working animals 

of the Department work tirelessly to secure the Nation from the 

many threats we face. The office that I am privileged to lead, which 

is comprised of exceptionally talented medical, public health, and 

work force and health safety experts, collaborates with leaders 

from across the Department, the interagency, and with our State 

and local partners to strengthen the Nation’s health security while 

providing for a safer and healthier DHS work force. 

Health, after all, is our greatest possession, and I’m proud to 

serve alongside many who are leading and championing the physical, mental, and work-life health of the DHS work force, including 

those on the front line. 

Those in the work force that we serve include 90,000 front-line 

law enforcement officers and agents, 44,000 U.S. Coast Guard uniform members, 4,000 EMTs and paramedics, 640 United States 

Public Health Service Commissioned Corps officers, 60,000 civilian 

employees who are veterans, and 4,000 four-legged employees of 

the Department. We also provide leadership and oversight of DHS, 

medical and public health policy, standards of care, and health care 

services provided to noncitizens, ensuring the delivery of high-quality care to those in our custody. 

I stand in awe and am humbled by the commitment of my OHS 

colleagues. I’ve had the privilege to lead them as we mobilized to 

stand up our domestic public health measures in response to the 

Ukraine-Russia conflict, to deploy to the Southwest Border to provide technical public health assistance and implementation of care 

improvement actions, to build on the lessons learned from Operation Allies Welcome, to work tirelessly with our partners on the 

food security is homeland security mission, to plan for and enable 

better preparedness and response to the health and medical impacts of CBRN, to ensure we optimize mental health and wellness 

resources for our work force, to leverage research and development 

and academic partners to develop approaches to known and novel 

health threats, to harness technology to provide high-quality data 

and analysis to program managers and decision makers, and last 

but not least, to assist our EMTs and paramedics on missions 

around the United States, and so much more. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the subcommittee, 

on behalf of the incredible, talented, and dedicated team at OHS 

that works at the intersection of health security and homeland security, as well as all the public health, medical, and work force 

health and safety teammates across the Department, we thank you 

for your support. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Wolfe follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HERBERT O. WOLFE

MARCH 20, 2024 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman D’Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify today on the important work 

of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS or Department) Office of Health 

Security (OHS). I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the workforce health and 

safety, medical, and public health activities of the Department. 
17 

I have served as the acting chief medical officer and acting director of OHS since 

January 2023, and prior to that, as the deputy chief medical officer and deputy director since the establishment of OHS in July 2022. I joined DHS in 2019, after 

nearly 30 years of Federal public service across multiple U.S. Government agencies 

including the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department 

of Veterans Affairs, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the intelligence community. I look forward 

to speaking about how DHS is strengthening our Nation’s health security through 

leadership and partnership, a safer and healthier DHS workforce, and optimal care 

for those entrusted to us. 

HEALTH SECURITY AT THE FOREFRONT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

The challenges of the past 5 years exemplify how nearly every homeland security 

threat has a nexus to health security. From acts of terror to a global pandemic, 

surges in migration to cyber attacks directed at critical infrastructure sectors such 

as health care, natural disasters across the country to international response efforts 

spanning nearly every continent—DHS is at the center of it all and often operating 

as the lead Federal agency. I want to start by highlighting the work we are doing 

to protect our greatest asset—the extraordinary DHS workforce. 

Each and every day, the over 260,000 dedicated personnel—in addition to nearly 

4,000 working animals—perform remarkable duties at land, air, and sea, in disaster 

zones, and at the many offices that enable our frontline workforce to deliver services 

efficiently and effectively. This mission is both dynamic and relentless and OHS 

makes it a priority to protect those who protect the Nation. 

The Department effectuates our mission through an integrated framework of policies, programs, standards, and practices—recognizing an intrinsic linkage between 

psychological, physical, and emotional health. In addition to revitalizing the DHS 

Safety and Health Leadership Council, the Department became an affiliate member 

in the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health’s Total Worker Health 

Program in 2023 and continues to make significant enhancements to our workforce 

safety, protection, and resiliency programs. 

DHS prioritizes programs focused on mental health and wellness, particularly for 

law enforcement personnel serving on the front line and the nearly 60,000 veterans 

within the DHS workforce. We appreciate Congress’ support for legislation to advance critical psychological readiness programs such as peer support, stigma reduction, lethal means safety, and our capabilities to understand and reduce suicides 

through a systematic, standardized, and data-driven approach. OHS led the revision 

and finalization of an updated DHS Workforce Health and Wellness Program that 

expands the category of health promotion activities to include mental health and 

new types of physical fitness. The inclusion of mental health into this new policy 

positions DHS as a leader across the Federal Government, offering the workforce 

dedicated time to address their mental wellness. 

We are also exploring innovative ways to expand and standardize Employee Assistance Programs, including for our international workforce, and Dependent Care 

Programs such as child care subsidy and emergency back-up care. DHS increased 

offerings of initiatives such as micro-workouts, mindful minutes, and Wellness 

Wednesdays that help employees and their family members balance work-life responsibilities and improve physical health. These programs—and many more—provide our operational components with front-line employees greater flexibility to implement workforce health and wellness programs consistent with and aligned to 

their specific mission, operational requirements, and workforce needs. Healthier and 

supported DHS employees keep the Nation and the communities in which we live 

and serve, safer. 

OHS works closely with diverse governmental and nongovernmental partners to 

promote the delivery of high-quality health care for those in our care and custody. 

This year, we look forward to operationalizing the DHS Child Well-Being Program. 

This program will deploy licensed and experienced mental health professionals 

across all U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Southwest Border Sectors to 

support the well-being of children in our care through trauma-informed, culturallysensitive support, and coordination. The Program will augment existing processes 

that impact children without increasing time in custody and enable CBP to focus 

its resources on those who pose a threat to our national security, public safety, and 

border security. 

To support medical and public health planning in the maritime mass migration 

environment, OHS collaborated with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and Homeland 

Security Task Force—Southeast (HSTF–SE) to update Operation Vigilant Sentry 

(OVS), Annex Q for Medical, Health, and Safety for the first time in a decade. Since 
18 

2022, OHS brought together over 20 organizations—including many State and local 

agencies—via 18 exercises and planning workshops, culminating in the finalization 

and issuance of a new Annex Q in May 2023. However, our work did not stop there; 

OHS and HSTF–SE partners continue to collaborate in a series of validation exercises and workshops. 

Alongside many partners, OHS had a significant role in coordinating domestic 

medical and public health activities during Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). In the 

months after, we found that many organizations shared DHS’s desire to improve operations, implement changes based on the experiences, and strengthen preparedness 

for future medical operations during global mass movement of displaced individuals. 

In October 2023, OHS hosted a multi-agency workshop in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania with 40 attendees from 18 different agencies, including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Administration for Strategic Preparedness and 

Response (ASPR), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and State and 

local partners—all collaborating on ensuring that lessons learned do not become lessons lost. Like OVS, we continue this important work and are excited to plan for 

the next in-person workshop in Philadelphia in May 2024. 

The Department also supports response efforts to mitigate the impacts of infectious diseases. OHS actively represents DHS equities in multi-lateral engagements 

related to global health security initiatives like the International Health Regulations, Pandemic Accord, and the North American Preparedness for Animal and 

Human Pandemics Initiative. In collaboration with the CDC, OHS co-leads an interagency effort to update the Federal coordination framework for mass isolation and 

quarantine in response to an infectious diseases event. 

OHS also coordinates the Department’s food, agriculture, and veterinary (FAV) 

defense activities. Over the past 6 months, OHS led the development of the first national-level risk assessment for the food and agriculture sector in support of the November 2022, National Security Memorandum (NSM) 16 on Strengthening the Security and Resilience of U.S. Food and Agriculture. This assessment was conducted 

in coordination with Sector Risk Management Agencies to identify high-consequence 

and catastrophic incidents impacting the sector’s critical infrastructure, essential 

workforce, and consequences of climate change. This first risk assessment also establishes an iterative cycle to evaluate high-level risks to the food and agriculture 

sector. In partnership with agencies such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, we 

are also advancing other deliverables in NSM–16 that DHS will lead and partner 

on. 

OHS success is achieved through partnerships. For example, some of our closest 

partners within DHS include the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, 

the Science and Technology Directorate, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, FEMA, and USCG. OHS works side-by-side with DHS components by 

providing the critical subject-matter expertise and technical assistance on public 

health and medical aspects of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, FAV, and 

global health security threats—a ‘‘One-DHS-Health’’ model of coordination. 

MATURATION OF THE OFFICE OF HEALTH SECURITY

July 2024 marks the second anniversary of OHS’s establishment. Congressional 

support has helped to create and sustain an innovative organization that recognizes 

the interconnected nature of health and unites previously fragmented lines of effort 

within DHS to enable and oversee proactive and holistic health security preparedness, response, and recovery. OHS is uniquely positioned for highly-specialized missions including mobilization of expertise to improve medical operations management 

for DHS missions and to enhance DHS’s role as a support agency for multiple Emergency Support Functions. 

OHS deeply appreciates working side-by-side with our operational partners. In 

order to meet mission requirements at the point of delivery, OHS is building its regional footprint by forward-deploying highly specialized clinicians to all 10 domestic 

geographic regions as defined by FEMA and ASPR. Currently, OHS has personnel 

rostered in regions 5, 6, and 9, with plans to further develop our regional footprint. 

Focusing on the nexus of public safety, medicine, and public health, these Federal 

personnel—with qualifications in areas such as emergency medicine, trauma and 

critical care, medical toxicology, and infectious diseases—serve as an important 

technical resource for DHS operational components and State and local, Tribal, territorial, and other stakeholders. 

OHS continues to make significant strides to unify and standardize the provision 

of health care services across the Department. For example, as part of our role in 

supporting the 4,000+ personnel of the DHS Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 

System, we reinstated the DHS EMS Training and Education Advisory Council 
19 

1Government Reorganization: Key Questions to Assess Agency Reform Efforts (GAO–18–427). 

(EMSTEAC). The EMSTEAC is the focal point for standardization of EMS-related 

protocols, procedures, austere medicine coursework and other training, and highquality working dog handler medical care programs. 

OHS is advancing programs that unify and integrate DHS medical and public 

health data systems. On-going development of the Medical Information eXchange 

(MIX), the technology backbone of a unified electronic health record program, enables proactive identification, analysis, and decision making related to emerging 

health security issues within our workforce, those in our care, and the public we 

serve. The MIX will also serve as a fusion point for the total workforce protection 

mission, integrating systems like the DHS-wide Safety Data System that is currently in development. 

OHS also serves as the Department’s Liaison to the Commissioned Corps of the 

U.S. Public Health Service. DHS counts over 640 Public Health Service Officers 

among its workforce serving across 10 different offices and components. These officers deliver or oversee critical health care, public health services, and preparedness 

and response activities during steady-state and crises—ashore and afloat. 

Our greatest asset is our workforce. In alignment with the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s recommended best practices,1 OHS continues to implement enduring employee engagement programs such as monthly pulse surveys, a Culture 

Working Group and Champions Program, and continuous quality improvement to 

ensure we recruit and retain a world-class workforce that delivers high-quality, efficient, and effective programming, policy, and operational initiatives. The 2023 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey and our internal programming indicates that OHS 

has consistently high morale and employees believe their work is impactful, meaningful, and contributes to the common good. I am proud to lead such a talented 

workforce of dedicated civilians and uniformed personnel that consistently meets the 

highest standards of public service. 

The programs and initiatives highlighted today represent only a portion of the 

work that OHS does as the principal medical, workforce health and safety, and public health authority for DHS. The President’s budget requests $57.7 million in fiscal 

year 2025 funds to support 76 Federal staff and the critical programs they 

operationalize. We look forward to working with Congress to secure the necessary 

resources that enables OHS to strengthen health security, advance our mission, and 

provide the appropriate oversight and operational expertise to ensure high-quality 

health programs for our workforce and those in our care. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman D’Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you again for holding today’s hearing and for the opportunity 

to discuss OHS. Your on-going support for the Department’s workforce resilience, 

public health, medical, and occupational safety, and health programs ensures that 

the Department is prepared and well-positioned for a proactive and agile response 

to an evolving health security landscape. Thank you for considering the legislative 

proposal to authorize OHS, which will codify and solidify those authorities, positions, and responsibilities aligned under OHS. 

I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Thank you, Dr. Wolfe. 

I now recognize Dr. Sherman for 5 minutes to summarize her 

opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF TINA WON SHERMAN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. SHERMAN. Chairman D’Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, 

Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today to 

speak on behalf of my agency, the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office. 

The intentional use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons remain real-world threats for those domestically and 

abroad. The risks posed by those weapons are significant, and each 
20 

one is unique in terms of their ability to be detected, prepared for, 

mitigated, and recovered from. 

Five years into its existence, the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office carries out 

the difficult mission of enabling operational partners at the Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial levels to promote the readiness for and prevention of the use of weapons of mass destruction 

against the United States. 

The last time GAO testified about CWMD in front of this committee in 2021, we reported that the office needed to help integrate 

and coordinate the Department’s chemical defense activities. 

CWMD has efforts under way to identify and harmonize those activities across the Department. This is even more critical given the 

stoppage in chemical security inspections resulting from the lapse 

in authorization for DHS’ Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program. 

We also told this committee that CWMD faced information-gathering and collaboration challenges as part of the National Biosurveillance Integration Center. NBIC has since enhanced its ability to collect information using open-source data, and most of the 

stakeholders we recently spoke with found value in its written 

products. However, NBIC could take additional steps to assess the 

support it provides to its FSLTT partners. 

At that time, we additionally highlighted continued problems 

with BD21, the acquisition program to replace the existing 

BioWatch early warning system, such as the technical, readiness, 

and feasibility of the technologies for the program given the inherent limitations and uncertainties for use in biodetection. With the 

BD21 acquisition now canceled, CWMD will need to forge a new 

path forward to replace the 20-year-old BioWatch system still operating in major metropolitan areas Nation-wide. 

We also at the time shared with the subcommittee that the Securing the Cities program, which provides equipment and training 

for first responders, had not clearly communicated potential program changes to or addressed risks to sustain detection capabilities 

for the program. 

In the latest report GAO is issuing today, we found that CWMD 

has improved in these areas and recommended it better communicate expectations and measures to participants for how the office 

will assess them against their new implementation plan next fiscal 

year. 

Last, we reported in 2021 that CWMD’s work force had continued to experience low morale, following the merger of its two predecessor components that held differing missions, expertise, and cultures. It has since also undergone another reorganization to establish the Office of Health Security, this all without permanent leadership. CWMD now has that leadership with Assistant Secretary 

Callahan and is continuing to take steps to strengthen employee 

engagement despite the uncertainty tied to CWMD’s reauthorization. 

We remain hopeful that CWMD will remain responsive to GAO’s 

recommendations as we continue to provide oversight support for 

the subcommittee, and clearly demonstrate its effectiveness in 
21 

meeting its mission across the range of threats it was established 

to address. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TINA WON SHERMAN

MARCH 20, 2024 

GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–24–107426, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons have the potential to kill 

thousands of people. To manage threats in these areas, Federal statute established 

CWMD in December 2018 by reorganizing functions of predecessor offices in DHS. 

This statement describes findings from GAO’s reports on CWMD’s programs from 

August 2018 through March 2024. They address challenges and opportunities for 

the effective operations and implementation of CWMD’s chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security activities. 

To conduct prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, policies, strategic plans, and 

other documents. GAO also interviewed Federal, State, industry, and other officials. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO has made 18 recommendations since 2018 to address the challenges discussed in this statement. As of March 2024, DHS has implemented 9 recommendations, partially implemented 1, and not implemented 3. GAO made 5 additional recommendations to CWMD in March 2024. GAO will monitor CWMD’s progress to implement all of the remaining recommendations. 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.—DHS HAS MADE PROGRESS IN SOME AREAS, BUT

ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED

What GAO Found 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in addressing 

challenges that GAO identified related to the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD). However, additional improvements are needed. The following 

summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in several of CWMD’s key 

areas, reported by GAO since 2018. 

Chemical defense.—GAO reported on challenges and progress in CWMD’s chemical defense efforts. In August 2018, GAO found that DHS had not fully integrated 

and coordinated its chemical defense programs and activities among its component 

agencies. By not doing so, DHS risked missing opportunities to leverage resources, 

share information, and improve its effectiveness in addressing chemical threats 

through improved integration and coordination. To address GAO’s recommendation, 

CWMD issued a Chemical Defense Strategy in December 2019 that established 

goals and objectives that included integrating and coordinating DHS’s chemical defense capabilities. DHS subsequently issued an implementation plan in September 

2021 that involved CWMD and several participating DHS component agencies. 

Biodefense.—GAO reported on challenges with two of DHS’s biosurveillance efforts 

that CWMD oversees—the Biological Detection for the 21st Century program and 

the National Biosurveillance Integration Center. In May 2021, GAO found that DHS 

did not (1) apply best practices when conducting technology readiness assessments 

for its Biological Detection for the 21st Century program; or (2) conduct these assessments before key acquisition decision points. In response, DHS revised its program guide to incorporate best practices, but as of March 2024, had not demonstrated that it is conducting such assessments before key acquisition decisions. In 

November 2023, GAO reported that the National Biosurveillance Integration Center 

documented its efforts to obtain adequate personnel and develop new technology, 

but did not clearly define performance measures and associated time frames in its 

strategic planning documents. As of March 2024, DHS reported it was developing 

a strategy and implementation plan for the center that will include milestones, actions, targets, and time frames. GAO will monitor DHS’s efforts. 

Radiological and nuclear detection.—In March 2024, GAO reported on CWMD’s 

Securing the Cities program, which is designed to enhance the nuclear detection capabilities in select cities. GAO found that CWMD took steps to strengthen program 
22 

1 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, title XIX, §§ 1900–1931, 116 Stat. 2135, 

as added by the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–387, 

§ 2(a)–(c), (e), (g) 132 Stat. 5162 (classified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 590–597, including § 591 notes). Prior 

to enactment, on October 6, 2017, DHS notified Congress of its intent to exercise its authority 

under 6 U.S.C. § 452 to consolidate some offices having chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear functions into a new office, effective December 5, 2017. According to DHS officials, the formation of CWMD consolidated the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, most of Office of Health 

Affairs, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear policy functions formerly performed 

by the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, as well as elements of the Office of Operations 

Coordination. DHS subsequently abolished Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and Office of 

Health Affairs. 2 6 U.S.C. §§ 591g, 592. The Assistant Secretary for CWMD reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See id. § 591. 

outreach among its partners, but had not clearly communicated performance expectations. GAO will monitor DHS’s efforts to address these and other challenges. 

Chairman D’Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and Members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the Department 

of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office 

(CWMD). 

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons—collectively known as 

weapons of mass destruction—have the potential to kill thousands of people in a 

single incident. A Federal statute established CWMD within DHS in December 2018 

to plan for, detect, deter, respond to, and defend against the threats of such weapons. In carrying out this mission, CWMD coordinates with partners at the Federal, 

State, and local levels and provides them with technology, training, and information. 

CWMD’s partners include DHS components, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard; other Federal agencies, such as the Department 

of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Health and 

Human Services, and the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration; and first responders and public health officials. 

Since its establishment, we have evaluated multiple aspects of CWMD. This statement describes our prior work on progress and challenges CWMD faces in managing 

key programs, including those related to chemical security, biodefense, nuclear and 

radiological security, and acquisitions. We also examine recent information regarding CWMD’s employee morale. 

This statement is based on our prior work issued from August 2018 through 

March 2024 on various CWMD efforts. It also includes updates on the status of previous recommendations we made during that time. To conduct our prior work, we 

reviewed relevant Presidential directives, laws, regulations, policies, strategic plans, 

and other documents, and interviewed Federal, State, and industry officials. More 

information on our scope and methodology can be found in each of the reports cited 

throughout this statement. The work upon which this statement is based was conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

BACKGROUND

CWMD’s Formation 

The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 established CWMD in 

statute by consolidating functions that had been previously carried out by DHS’s 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and Office of Health Affairs.1 CWMD’s primary 

statutory missions are coordinating with other Federal efforts and developing a 

strategy and policy for DHS to: (1) plan for, detect, and protect against the importation, possession, storage, transportation, development, or use of unauthorized chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials, devices, or agents in the United 

States; and (2) protect against an attack using such materials, devices, or agents 

against U.S. people, territory, or interests.2

CWMD Programs 

CWMD manages several programs specific to its mission to protect the U.S. 

against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. 

Chemical defense strategy.—Since the establishment of CWMD in 2018, the 

CWMD has undertaken actions to address chemical threats. For example, according 

to CWMD officials, it engaged with 17 U.S. cities to provide training on chemical 

threats to the mass transit sector. CWMD also led the effort to develop DHS’s 

Chemical Defense Strategy, issued in December 2019. Subsequently, in September 
23 

3 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an aerosol may be defined as 

a suspension of particles or droplets in the air and includes airborne dusts, mists, fumes, or 

smoke. 4 Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011). 5Pub. L. No. 110–53, title XI, § 1101, 121 Stat. 266, 375–79 (Classified, as amended, at 6 

U.S.C. § 195b). 

2021, DHS issued the Chemical Defense Strategy Implementation Plan, which 

CWMD also took the lead in developing, as part of a workgroup that involved 16 

DHS component agencies. 

BioWatch.—In an effort to provide early warning, detection, or recognition of a biological attack, DHS created the BioWatch program in 2003 in response to a perceived urgency to deploy useful—even if immature—technologies in the face of potentially catastrophic consequences. This perception led to the rapid deployment of 

the initial BioWatch system which modified existing air monitoring technology to 

collect biological aerosol samples for lab testing.3 Currently, the BioWatch program 

collaborates with more than 30 BioWatch jurisdictions throughout the Nation to operate approximately 600 aerosol collectors. It is a Federally-managed, locally-operated system with collectors deployed primarily in outdoor locations. 

According to a 2011 report from the National Academies, DHS’s rapid deployment 

of the system meant that BioWatch was deployed without sufficient testing, validation, and evaluation of its technical capabilities.4 In 2015, we reported on limitations to DHS’s understanding of the system’s capabilities. DHS began a new biodetection technology acquisition program in 2019 called Biological Detection for the 

21st Century (BD21) to potentially replace the BioWatch program. Figure 1 depicts 

first responders practicing a BioWatch safety drill. 

National Biosurveillance Integration Center.—The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) established the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) within DHS.5 NBIC’s objective is 

to integrate and analyze information from health surveillance systems across the 

Federal Government and support the interagency biosurveillance community. To 

achieve this objective, NBIC collaborates with Federal partners who have missions 

or resources that support NBIC’s activities. The center also develops a range of written analytical products on biodefense for distribution to a broad range of stakeholders that include Federal partners, Congressional officials, private-sector and 

international recipients, as well as State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments. 

Securing the Cities.—DHS initiated the Securing the Cities (STC) program in fiscal year 2007 as a pilot in the New York City, Jersey City, and Newark region. The 

mission of the STC program is to enhance the ability of the United States to detect 
24 

6GAO, Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: DHS Has Strengthened the Securing the Cities Program, 

but Actions are Needed to Address Key Remaining Challenges, GAO–24–106922 (Washington, 

DC: Mar. 20, 2024). 7GAO, Chemical Terrorism: A Strategy and Implementation Plan Would Help DHS Better 

Manage Fragmented Chemical Defense Programs and Activities, GAO–18–562 (Washington, DC: 

Aug. 22, 2018.) 8GAO recommended the Assistant Secretary for CWMD develop a strategy and implementation plan to help the Department of Homeland Security, among other things, guide, support, 

integrate, and coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities; leverage resources and 

capabilities; and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. GAO identified this as 

a priority recommendation and describes CWMD’s actions to implement it in GAO, Priority 

and prevent the malevolent use of nuclear and radioactive materials that pose risks 

to high-risk urban areas. As such, the STC program seeks to reduce the risk of a 

successful deployment of a nuclear or radiological weapon against cities and surrounding metropolitan areas in the United States. STC does so by providing, among 

other things, equipment and training to State and local partners to detect nuclear 

and radiological material before an incident involving these materials occurs. The 

STC program has expanded over the years and currently includes 13 participating 

regions across the United States. 

Technology acquisitions.—CWMD, like its predecessor agency—the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office—acquires technologies to support partners in DHS components such as CBP and the Coast Guard, as well as State and local partners. Detection devices provided by CWMD to these partners include personal radiation detectors (cell phone-size devices worn by first responders to alert them when radioactivity levels exceed natural levels) and radiation isotope identification devices (detectors that can identify the specific material emitting the radiation). Figure 2 shows 

examples of types of nuclear and radiological detection equipment. 

DHS HAS MADE PROGRESS ADDRESSING PAST CHALLENGES, BUT ADDITIONAL

IMPROVEMENTS ARE STILL NEEDED

Our past work, issued since CWMD’s establishment in 2018, identifies progress 

and challenges in key aspects of CWMD’s program areas, including chemical defense, biodefense, radiological and nuclear detection, acquisitions, and employee morale. Our work resulted in 13 recommendations, and, as of March 2024, 9 were implemented, 1 was partially implemented, and 3 are not yet addressed. In addition, 

we have made 5 new recommendations to CWMD in our report issued today on 

STC.6 Below are examples of issues we’ve identified across CWMD’s programmatic 

areas and the extent to which those issues have been addressed. 

Chemical Defense 

In August 2018, we found that DHS consolidated some chemical defense programs 

and activities into CWMD, but DHS had not fully integrated and coordinated its 

chemical defense programs and activities.7 Several DHS component agencies—including CBP, the Coast Guard, and Science & Technology—conduct similar activities, such as acquiring chemical detectors or assisting local jurisdictions with preparedness, separately, without DHS-wide direction and coordination. As component 

agencies carried out chemical defense activities to meet their unique mission needs, 

there was a risk that DHS may miss an opportunity to leverage resources and share 

information that could lead to greater effectiveness in addressing chemical threats. 

Therefore, we recommended that the assistant secretary for CWMD develop a strategy and implementation plan to help DHS guide, support, integrate, and coordinate 

chemical defense programs and activities.8
25 

Open Recommendations: Department of Homeland Security, GAO–22–105702 (Washington, DC: 

July 15, 2022) 9 In July 2023, the statutory authority for the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 

(CFATS) program (6 C.F.R. Part 27) expired. See Pub. L. No. 116–150, § 1(a), 134 Stat. 679 

(2020) (classified at 6 U.S.C. § 621 note). According to DHS, the Department cannot enforce compliance with the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards regulations without Congressional 

authorization, which means that DHS cannot require facilities to report potentially dangerous 

chemicals or perform inspections. 10GAO, Biodefense: DHS Exploring New Methods to Replace BioWatch and Could Benefit from 

Additional Guidance, GAO–21–292 (Washington, DC: May 20, 2021). 11GAO, Technology Readiness Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Evaluating the Readiness 

of Technology for Use in Acquisition Programs and Projects, GAO–20–48G (Washington, DC: 

Jan. 07, 2020). To develop the guide, GAO worked with practitioners and technology experts 

from across the Federal Government, commercial industry, nonprofits, and academia to ascertain the generally accepted best practices for conducting high-quality technology readiness assessments. 12GAO, Biodefense: National Biosurveillance Integration Center Has Taken Steps to Address 

Challenges, but Could Better Assess Results, GAO–24–106142 (Washington, DC: Nov. 29, 2023). 13Department of Homeland Security, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, Strategy for Integrated Biosurveillance, Fiscal Year 2018 Report to Congress, (Washington DC: July 

30, 2019); Department of Homeland Security, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, 

Continued 

CWMD addressed the recommendation by issuing the Chemical Defense Strategy 

in December 2019. The strategy includes overarching goals and a range of related 

objectives establishing a departmental approach to combating chemical threats and 

incidents. The importance of a coordinated chemical defense strategy across DHS is 

especially important given that, as of March 2024, the statutory authority for the 

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program—DHS’s primary regulatory 

program for chemical facility security—had not been reauthorized since expiring in 

2023.9

Biodefense 

CWMD manages two significant efforts to defend against biological attacks— 

BD21 and the NBIC. 

In 2021, we reported on DHS’s effort to replace BioWatch with a new system— 

BD21.10 The BD21 program faces risks, such as the possibility of increased false 

alarm rates, due to technology limitations and uncertainties with combining technologies for use in biodetection. While we found that the BD21 program was following DHS acquisition policy and guidance, we identified limitations in the program’s technology readiness assessments, which DHS uses to reduce risk within its 

technology acquisition programs. Specifically, DHS issued its technology readiness 

assessment/manufacturing readiness assessment guide in September 2020, but we 

found it did not follow some of the practices in GAO’s best practice guide for technology readiness assessments.11 Therefore, we recommended that DHS fully incorporate the best practices outlined in GAO’s guide into DHS’s guide, such as including information about how the Department will ensure objectivity and independence. DHS addressed this recommendation by May 2022. We also recommended that 

DHS ensure the BD21 program conducts high-quality technology readiness assessments of all critical technologies for BD21 before key acquisition decision points. As 

of March 2024, this recommendation has not been implemented. 

We also recommended in our 2021 report that the BD21 program address a key 

capability gap. Specifically, we found that existing BD21 program acquisition documentation lacked sufficient detail describing how a ‘‘situational awareness and common operating picture capability’’—which DHS identified as a gap—will differ from 

or leverage the NBIC. Therefore, we recommended that DHS ensure the BD21 program office clarifies—within its acquisition documentation—the ‘‘situational awareness and common operating picture capability’’ identified as a gap. This clarification 

should include the specific functionality, sources of information, and distinction from 

existing common operating picture functions at DHS, such as NBIC. DHS has not 

implemented the recommendation as of March 2024. 

In November 2023, we reported that the NBIC—within CWMD—identifies, tracks, 

and characterizes biological events using open-source, Federal, and private-sector 

data sources.12 NBIC integrates these data to develop written products and support 

its information sharing and coordination activities. Additionally, in recent years, 

NBIC began taking steps to address challenges in accessing needed data, obtaining 

adequate personnel, and developing new technologies. NBIC’s efforts were guided by 

two strategic planning documents, but these documents did not have clearly-defined 

performance measures and time frames for accomplishing milestones.13 For exam-
26 

Strategy for Integrated Biosurveillance—NBIC Implementation Plan Fiscal Year 2022–2023, 

(Washington, DC; Mar. 29, 2023). 14GAO, Combating Nuclear Terrorism: DHS Should Address Limitation to Its Program to Secure Key Cities, GAO–19–327 (Washington, DC: May 13, 2019). 15The STC program seeks to reduce the risk of a successful deployment of a nuclear or radiological weapon against select regions, consisting of cities and surrounding metropolitan areas 

in the United States. STC currently works with 13 participating regions. 16GAO, Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: DHS Has Strengthened the Securing the Cities Program, but Actions are Needed to Address Key Remaining Challenges, GAO–24–106922 (Washington, DC: Mar. 20, 2024). 17GAO, Evidenced-Based Policymaking: Practices to Help Manage and Assess the Results of 

Federal Efforts, GAO–23–105460 (Washington, DC: July 12, 2023). 

ple, one milestone is to strengthen relationships with relevant DHS components. 

However, NBIC did not include information on the specific actions for achieving the 

milestone or how it would assess progress toward achievement. 

We recommended that DHS ensure that NBIC develops future strategic planning 

documents with clearly-defined performance measures and associated time frames. 

DHS concurred with this recommendation and, in March 2024, reported that it is 

developing an NBIC strategy and implementation plan that will include performance milestones, actions, targets, and time frames. DHS expects to complete these 

actions by June 2024 and GAO will monitor its efforts to do so. 

Radiological and Nuclear Detection 

In May 2019, we identified several limitations in CWMD’s efforts to implement 

the STC program.14 We found that CWMD did not collect information needed to 

fully track the regions’ use of STC funds for approved purposes and to assess regions’ performance in the program.15 We made 4 recommendations to CWMD, including that the agency more fully assess regions’ performance by collecting data on 

achievement of key performance metrics and milestones and enforcing reporting requirements. DHS fully implemented the 4 recommendations as of October 2021. 

The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 also included a requirement for CWMD to develop an implementation plan, including the goals of the STC 

program and a strategy to achieve them. CWMD issued this plan in June 2021 and 

assessed the program’s performance based on this plan in August 2022. The act also 

required that the CWMD assess performance of the STC program based on this 

plan, which it completed in August 2022. The act included a provision for GAO to 

evaluate CWMD’s implementation plan and progress in achieving and sustaining 

STC program capabilities, which is the report we issued in March 2024.16

We found in our March 2024 report that CWMD has taken multiple steps to 

strengthen the STC program and continues working with the regions to address 

challenges and ensure continued progress toward achieving and sustaining their detection capabilities. Specifically, CWMD has incorporated lessons learned from implementing the STC program over the years. Further, it has addressed our prior recommendations to strengthen the program, including increasing outreach, developing 

planning and reporting guidance, and providing long-term Federal sustainment 

funding. Along with these improvements, CWMD is working with the STC regions 

to address challenges they continue to face implementing their programs, such as 

staff attrition, training availability and scheduling, partner engagement, and expansion of their programs. 

We also found in our March 2024 report that CWMD’s planned approach for assessing STC program performance, which includes its implementation plan with 

measurable outcomes, generally follows key practices we have identified in our prior 

work for building and using evidence to manage and evaluate results of Federal efforts.17 In June 2023, CWMD released an updated version of its STC Implementation Plan detailing its current planned approach for implementing the program and 

assessing regional performance using a set of short-, medium-, and long-term outcomes. We compared CWMD’s planned approach with 13 key practices and 29 supporting actions for using evidence to more effectively manage and assess the results 

of Federal programs. 

Our analysis identified that CWMD’s planned approach for assessing STC program performance generally follows 8 of the 13 key practices, and partially follows 

5 of the practices. Furthermore, we found that the CWMD was incorporating 24 of 

the 29 key actions that supported implementing the 13 key practices. As CWMD is 

in the process of implementing its revised assessment approach, with plans to begin 

formally assessing regional performance in 2025, opportunities exist for it take additional actions to increase accountability for results being achieved through the STC 

program. We made 5 recommendations, including that CWMD clearly communicate 

performance expectations to the STC regions and improve its tracking of their 
27 

18GAO, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: DHS Could Improve Its Acquisition of Key 

Technology and Coordination with Partners, GAO–22–104498 (Washington, DC: Apr. 19, 2022). 19The Office of Personnel Management defines employee engagement as employees’ sense of 

purpose that is evident in their display of dedication, persistence, and effort in their work or 

overall attachment to their organization and its mission. 20The Partnership for Public Service and the Boston Consulting Group calculate these 

rankings using responses to questions in the Office of Personnel Management’s Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. Results for 2022 were the most recently available as of March 2024. 21GAO, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: DHS Office Has Opportunities to Improve 

Partner Services and Employee Morale, GAO–22–106133 (Washington, DC: Jul 19, 2022). 22We have previously reported that successful agency reforms and reorganizations, including 

mergers, must involve employees and their representatives from the beginning to gain their 

ownership for the changes that are occurring in the organization. GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO–03– 

669 (Washington, DC: July 2, 2003). GAO, Government Reorganization: Key Questions to Assess 

Agency Reform Efforts, GAO–18–427 (Washington, DC: July 13, 2018). 

progress. This entails ensuring that the STC regions are reporting consistent, complete, and accurate information in their quarterly performance reports so that 

CWMD can set reliable targets and benchmarks for the performance assessments. 

DHS concurred with these 5 recommendations and we will monitor DHS’s efforts 

to implement them. 

Technology Acquisitions 

In 2022, we found that CWMD continued to carry out functions of its predecessor 

offices, including the former Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.18 For example, it 

continued to acquire nuclear and radiological detection technologies for partners in 

DHS components, particularly the Coast Guard and CBP. Officials from these DHS 

components provided examples of CWMD-provided technologies that meet their mission needs. For example, Coast Guard officials told us that CWMD provides handheld radiation detectors as well as a new technology that allows them to transmit 

information from the detectors to one of CBP’s offices for analysis. The Coast Guard 

officials told us that the new transmission system filled a gap in their capabilities 

by enabling more secure transmission of the information to CBP. CBP officials said 

that CWMD helped them obtain software developed by the Department of Energy 

that enhances their ability to analyze the data the Coast Guard provides. According 

to CBP and Coast Guard officials, without these enhanced capabilities, their ability 

to detect smuggled nuclear or radiological material would be diminished. From 2019 

through 2021, according to CWMD officials, CWMD procured over 38,000 handheld 

radiation detectors for its Federal partners. 

CWMD also continued to manage a program to acquire replacements for certain 

radiation portal monitors that CBP operates at high-volume ports. However, we 

found, at the time of our review in 2022, that these new radiation portal monitors 

were late to deploy and may not meet CBP needs. For example, CBP officials told 

us that tests of these replacement monitors resulted in higher nuisance alarm rates 

than originally anticipated. Nuisance alarms result from naturally-occurring radioactive materials in certain consumer goods, requiring CBP officers to conduct a secondary scan to determine that the source of the alarm is not a threat before a cargo 

container or vehicle can leave the port. Reducing such alarms is a key goal of the 

replacement program. Therefore, we recommended in 2022 that CWMD reassess its 

acquisition strategy for these replacement radiation portal monitors. CWMD implemented the recommendation by reassessing its acquisition strategy and ultimately 

deciding not to pursue a second phase of the radiation portal monitor acquisition 

that CWMD had been pursuing when we issued our report. 

Employee Morale 

DHS has faced challenges with low morale and low employee engagement since 

its inception in 2003.19 CWMD ranked lowest of all DHS components in employee 

engagement in 2022 and ranked 430 of all 432 Federal agency subcomponents in 

the 2022 Best Places to Work in the Federal Government® rankings.20

We reported in July 2022 on steps CWMD had taken to help address morale problems resulting from merging predecessor agencies.21 Specifically, CWMD took steps 

to identify causes of morale problems and enhance employees’ shared sense of mission. For example, CWMD used surveys and listening sessions to gather information 

on the causes of low morale. According to CWMD officials, one cause was different 

cultures within the predecessor offices that merged under CWMD.22 For example, 

CWMD officials said one of these offices coordinated with physicists and law enforcement officials and focused on detection and prevention; whereas another coordinated with public health officials and focused on preparedness and response. 
28 

23 CWMD’s first permanent Assistant Secretary assumed the role in August 2023. 

According to CWMD employees, another cause of morale issues was frequent leadership changes. As of August 2023, CWMD has had 3 acting assistant secretaries 

since its establishment in December 2018. CWMD employees said the different visions of the assistant secretaries contributed to confusion about the office’s mission.23

GAO ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you, Chairman D’Esposito, Ranking Member Carter, and Members of the 

subcommittee. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond 

to any questions you may have at this time. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Thank you, Doctor. 

Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their 5 minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning may be 

called after all Members have been recognized. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

My first set of questions is for Ms. Callahan. As I mentioned in 

my opening statement, section 872 of the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 allows the Department to reorganize, establish, or consolidate operations. This authority was used to establish the CWMD 

Office in 2017 and then used again by the Secretary to establish 

the Office of Health Security in 2022. 

In your opinion, have the CWMD and OHS office reorganizations 

been successful? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Thank you, sir. Yes, I believe both reorganizations have been successful with regard to the CWMD office in the 

first instance, then it subsequently was authorized in 2018. 

Bringing together all threats—chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear—was crucial. It’s important. It mirrors what other 

agencies are doing, and it brings together all elements to bear. It 

also helps support our operational components as well as our State 

and local stakeholders. 

With regard to the Office of Health Security, I’ll defer to Dr. 

Wolfe if he thinks it’s a success. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. That’d be great. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Could I—— 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Of course. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. But I will say—yes. I will say, I think that having the Office of Health Security outside of CWMD helped clarify 

several lanes. Obviously, they do public health, health security. We 

do biological threats. We work together seamlessly. Sometimes 

OHS takes the lead, sometimes we do. But I think getting the medical expertise outside of the office helps clarify OHS’ role within the 

Department. 

Over to you, Dr. Wolfe. 

Mr. WOLFE. Thank you, Mary Ellen. 

Yes. Chairman, related to the establishment of OHS, prior to the 

establishment, when CWMD was created, it only took approximately half of the medical and public health folks in the Department. The remaining folks that focused on the health of the work 

force went to the management directorate under the chief human 

capital officer. 

As we progressed through the second and third year and then entered the pandemic, we learned that the medical and public health 
29 

and work force health and safety expertise was very small compared to a Department that has 260,000 employees. So one of the 

great benefits of the OHS 872 was bringing together all the public 

health and medical activities of the Department under one office 

and under one leadership. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. OK. As we’ve heard, you know, sometimes the 

work force—the dedicated work force that are affected by these 

changes, the morale has been not so great. It’s been one of the 

things that we as a committee have wanted to address. 

So in addition to the morale—and, I guess, if you could just touch 

upon why you think that’s a factor. What other challenges have we 

seen in the reorganization or the consolidation when decided by 

Secretary Mayorkas? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. For Health Security? 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. It’s really the same question for both of you. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yep. The employee morale, one of—as I mentioned, I have three tenets: work on professional development, work 

on understanding the mission and how you fit into that mission 

and how you can advance, and then third, getting to know people 

on a personal level to reestablish esprit de corps. I think those are 

important elements. 

I also think transparency is crucial. That is one of my philosophies. I have fortnightly townhalls. I write a column every week in 

the bulletin. I try to be available. I have one-on-one offices to go 

and make sure they know what’s going on and that we can be 

transparent. 

I will note, my one last challenge is the threat of termination, 

what weighed heavily on us in the fall, and we can speak about 

that later. 

Herb. 

Mr. WOLFE. Yes. Chairman, one of the benefits we had at OHS 

is we got to do the 872 second after CWMD, and so one of the 

things we could do even prior to the establishment is use GAO best 

practices and learn from other Federal reorganizations. So we have 

not had the same challenge when it comes to morale. 

A few things that we’ve done. One is employee engagement. 

We’ve done a monthly survey prior to the establishment. We continue that today. The second thing we’ve done is we do a monthly 

all-hands. 

The last thing is our monthly poll survey, and the FEVS scores— 

which is the first time in 2023 that OHS was its own office—mirror 

relatively good scores. Our employee engagement and our employee 

experience index is above 75. We’ve had—greater than 90 percent 

of the surveys in FEVS had a score greater than 74 percent. 

Then last, in the FEVS score, we had several that were above 90, 

and those, I think, are attributed to medical folks have a few core 

inherent missions. First, do no harm, and second, to help those 

that are in need. So there was a real attrition in there for that. 

To your question on challenges, I think the one we continue to 

face is just the enduring mission of DHS and making sure that we 

communicate to the team that we’ve got several communities to 

serve: those in our custody, the work force, and the Nation as a 

whole. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. All right. Thank you, Doctor. 
30 

My time has expired. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I mentioned earlier, I find it concerning that the uncertainty 

surrounding the reauthorization of CWMD, along with reports of 

low morale, can be affecting staff retention and the effectiveness of 

CWMD’s mission. 

Assistant Secretary Callahan, can you speak to how the reauthorization’s uncertainty has impacted CWMD’s employees and 

what a long-term extension or sunset repeal would mean for your 

office? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Thank you, Ranking Member. The threat of termination for the office created a great deal of uncertainty. It also 

created a distraction in the office in the fall. I ended up having— 

losing 10 percent of my staff, which equaled over 380 years of 

CBRN experience, Federal experience. That is a real loss. 

We are working quickly to replace them, but it would be difficult 

to recruit the talented and in-demand work force to ask them to 

come and join when we have, again, the potential of a threat of termination in 2 years hence. 

Also, with regard to our State and local partners, they experienced and expressed to me anxiety about the threat of termination, 

and, of course, several of them are working toward the 2026 World 

Cup. When I was in Boston and in New York recently, both of them 

asked about termination and looking forward. 

It is a concern. It is weighing on us. As I said, this is an incredibly talented and mission-focused office. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CARTER. It’s unfair to ask anybody to work under these uncertain terms. We have experts that are recruited to go other 

places. The talent pool is—particularly in specified areas like this— 

very thin. So we should always endeavor to give the security of our 

agencies the privilege and the authority to know that you will be 

able to continue to be funded and operated. 

I’m happy to hear that you say that. I know my colleagues are 

listening, and we will continue to endeavor to do just that, to fully 

fund and give you the security to be able to secure us. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Thank you. 

Mr. CARTER. CWMD’s Securing the Cities, STC, program provides funds for 14 local governments to counter successful deployment of nuclear and radiological weapons in the United States, including my home town of New Orleans. However, the program is 

limited to high-risk urban areas designated by FEMA, which can 

create uncertainty for local governments participating in the program. 

As you know, I introduced H.R. 4403, the Securing the Cities Improvement Act, which would provide more stability for STC participants. I was pleased that the bill passed the House earlier this 

month. 

Assistant Secretary Callahan, could you explain why this bill is 

critical for the securing of cities and programs more importantly? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Thank you, Representative. We support decoupling the Securing the Cities high-risk urban areas from the FEMA 

designation of UASI because it’s CWMD grants. We can evaluate 
31 

the threats and the CBRN risks, as we did with New Orleans, and 

we support having that flexibility to identify potentially new highrisk areas that may be included going forward. 

Mr. CARTER. Dr. Wolfe, real quickly, are OHS and CWMD preparing for emerging biological threats? If so, how? 

Mr. WOLFE. Ranking Member, thanks for the question. Certainly, 

I believe that we are more prepared today than we were several 

years ago, but challenges remain. CWMD and OHS share a great 

relationship and a partnership. A few of the areas where I would 

say that we have done great are looking at emerging threats and 

forecasting, whether that is deliberative or whether that is unintentional. 

Secondarily, we’ve done a great job in the biological realms in the 

food, agriculture, and veterinary threat, both to food security as 

well as to the agriculture sector. 

Last, an area of concern that is shared across the Federal interagency is we’ve got a very taxed and strained public health and 

medical work force. Most of you know hospitals run at almost capacity and run day-to-day on a tight operating budget. PostCOVID, we’ve learned that the health and medical work force is resilient, but they are also vulnerable. 

So one of the areas that I share as a challenge is being sure that 

we are prepared, investing in the work force, so we’re prepared for 

the next potential public health or biological incident. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Dr. Sherman, I’ve got just a few seconds left, but I’d love you 

to—first of all, thank you all for your incredible service. What’s 

your greatest fear, and what should we know as a committee to 

help you allay those fears? 

Ms. SHERMAN. When it comes to the Countering Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Office? 

Mr. CARTER. Of course. 

Ms. SHERMAN. I think the main—I’m not sure if I’d characterize 

it as fear, but I think one area of—— 

Mr. CARTER. Concern. Concern. 

Ms. SHERMAN [continuing]. Concern, we’d like the office to continue to focus on demonstrating its effectiveness. There are a lot 

of activities and efforts under way, and the office has demonstrated—— 

Mr. CARTER. Let me real quickly. If one thing kept you awake 

at night, one thing that we as a Member of Congress can do—this 

committee more specifically—can do for you and your agency to 

make your life and our lives more safe. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield after she answers. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. All yours. 

Ms. SHERMAN. Yes. I’m not sure that I have a single fear that 

I can communicate, but I definitely feel that CWMD in particular 

has an important mission, and we definitely want to make sure to 

continue to, with the support of the subcommittee, you know, monitor its activities. 

Mr. CARTER. So you just had a blank check in front of you and 

you didn’t fill it in. 

Ms. SHERMAN. I’m happy to speak further about, you know, the 

work that we’ve done in this particular office. I think one of the 
32 

kind-of main focuses we have is, you know, these threats are real, 

as I said in my opening statement, and we are concerned about 

how the Federal Government is taking steps across—not only within the homeland security enterprise but across the Federal Government and across Nation-wide to be able to help address those 

threats. 

One of the challenges that we feel is experienced as a result is 

the fact that there needs to be, again, a coordination, a real understanding of the range of threats to make sure that there aren’t any 

specific capability gaps that exist, you know, as a result of the efforts that are under way. We—you know, we would like to continue 

to work to ensure that CWMD is helping to identify those gaps 

across the Federal Government, as well as with SLTTs, to be able 

to address those threats. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Thank you very much, Mr. Ranking Member. 

I just want to point out—really, to Ms. Callahan’s point and I 

think to concerns of all of you—the bill that—my bill that came out 

of this committee and then passed full committee in a bipartisan 

fashion. So I think that shows the commitment that this committee 

and this subcommittee has to the work that you do. 

It was actually a 7-year extension, but due to the CBO score, we 

also have to be realistic in what we could actually, as a committee 

and a subcommittee, can get onto the floor and pass. So that’s why 

we’re at the 2-year number. But this committee and my bill when 

it was originally drafted did have a 7-year extension. 

With that, I recognize my good friend and fellow New Yorker and 

Long Islander, Mr. LaLota, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LALOTA. Thank you, Chairman D’Esposito, for your leadership and to our witnesses for being with us here today. 

Like Chairman D’Esposito, I am a proud New Yorker, a proud 

Long Islander, and I’m honored to represent the eastern end of 

Long Island. My district’s about 50, 60 miles to the east of Manhattan, the heart of New York City. 

This coming September 11 marks the 23rd anniversary of the 

September 11 terrorist attacks in lower Manhattan, Shanksville, 

Pennsylvania, and here at our Nation’s Capital. After that day, we 

as a Nation collectively vowed that we would never forget and that 

we would never allow another attack of that magnitude on American soil. 

However, Mr. Chairman, I’m becoming increasingly concerned 

that we are on the cusp of another major attack, and if we do not 

properly prepare, we could fail to prevent another 9/11. 

In fact, the director of the FBI, Christopher Wray, testified in 

front of the Senate Judiciary Committee back in December and 

warned Congress of another 9/11-like failure. During that hearing, 

he said, ‘‘I see blinking lights everywhere.’’ Ask any New Yorker, 

we know what that means, and we’ll tell you plain and simple that 

we’re in trouble. 

In addition to being a proud New Yorker, I’m a Navy veteran, 

the brother of a Marine, and I served this country in uniform with 

immense pride for 11 years. I can tell you from that experience, the 

most effective way to thwart an adversary and protect an asset, especially our people, is through deterrence, the action of deterring 
33 

an action or an event by instilling doubts or fear into the consequences. 

Assistant Secretary Callahan, thanks so much for being here. As 

the assistant secretary for the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, my first question is for you. It was only 5 years 

ago that the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office within the Department of Homeland Security was established. Do you 

believe that the office has served as a deterrent for our adversaries 

in attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction on U.S. soil 

since the office was created? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Representative, I do believe it has served as a deterrent, and the way it has done so is by pushing out training, 

equipment, and exercises to the State and local first responders. 

They’re going to be the ones who are going to come across a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear threat, and getting training 

and technology in their hands is how we cannot only identify but 

prepare and respond. 

Our mission is to prevent and deter CBRN threats, and I think 

we’re doing so with regard to our relationship with State and 

locals—also in Nassau County as well as in Suffolk County, sir— 

and also with working with our operational components here in the 

Department of Homeland Security and then working in the interagency with FBI and DOE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LALOTA. Great. I know that Dr. Sherman resisted the temptation to answer the question about the blank checks, and then you 

referenced—— 

Ms. CALLAHAN. I’ll write it. 

Mr. LALOTA. You’re going to get a shot at the same question 

then. 

How can you build on that success? Your answer just now, you 

said technology was a key part of what we ought to be focused on 

moving forward. Give Congress a sense of what else you think we 

ought to be leveraging, technology and otherwise, to be able to 

build on the success of the last 5 years. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Sir, it’s technology, training, and equipment and 

exercises, getting the knowledge out for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, understanding how to respond, do the 

training and exercises that I witnessed in New Orleans just this 

week—because it’s the first responders. It’s those State and locals 

who are going to be on the ground if indeed something happens, 

and we are working to get that knowledge out as far as we can. 

With regard to the check that I will write, the enduring reauthorization of the CWMD Office is crucial to make sure that we can 

be that linchpin for the entire CWMD ecosystem. 

Mr. LALOTA. Thank you. I appreciate your feedback. 

You know, this committee, under Chairman D’Esposito’s leadership, has a strong bipartisan approach to how—— 

Ms. CALLAHAN. We are very grateful. 

Mr. LALOTA [continuing]. And we’re going to continue that. We’re 

committed to doing that. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Thank you. 

Mr. LALOTA. I’m going to maybe go to a next round in the future, 

Mr. Chairman, so I yield. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Thank you, Mr. LaLota. 
34 

I now recognize from Alabama and a first responder, Mr. Strong. 

Mr. STRONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 

Member. 

I appreciate our witnesses for being here to discuss the important work each of you are doing to secure our Nation against weapons of mass destruction. 

As you all know, BioWatch is one of the programs used to carry 

out the mission of the CWMD Office by collecting and testing air 

samples for biological agents likely to be used in an act of bioterrorism. 

As technology evolves, so do threats to our country. For example, 

increasing access and affordability of unmanned aircraft presents 

ample opportunities for bad actors to cause harm and hysteria in 

our communities. Now more than ever we depend on efficiency and 

effectiveness of BioWatch. Unfortunately, this program is not operating like it should. 

From breakdowns to accurate information sharing to bureaucratic barriers and lagging procurements of biodetection technology, 

DHS has fallen dangerously behind. For this reason, I introduced 

the DHS Biodetection Improvement Act, which would direct DHS 

to use every tool in its disposal to develop an acquisition and procurement plan to meet the biodetection needs of the 21st Century. 

The House passed this legislation earlier this month, and I urge 

my Senate colleagues to do the same. 

First, Assistant Secretary Callahan, to what extent is BioWatch 

an operational program given past findings of its inaccuracy and 

timely detection, and what plan exists for improving it? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Thank you, Representative Strong. BioWatch is 

the only biodetection capability that this Nation has. It has existed. 

It is a stable and functional process. We are working on improving 

it and looking at technology and opportunities, but it is lab-based, 

lab-proven, and we’ve worked with over 30 jurisdictions to make 

sure that we have an appropriate baseline and security. BioWatch 

is reliable, sir. 

Mr. STRONG. Thank you. How long does it take from the moment 

a sensor registers a bioagent to when the data is shared with partners for response? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes, sir. The materials for BioWatch are collected 

either on a 12- or 24-hour basis and then are analyzed in the lab. 

From the time in the lab, it takes a few hours, somewhere between 

2 and 4 hours to identify whether or not there is aerosolized biological materials in the air. 

Mr. STRONG. Twelve to 24 hours, right? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. That is for the collection time. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STRONG. Thank you. When dealing with the threats of bioterrorist attacks, every minute matters, every second matters. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. STRONG. Chairman D’Esposito highlighted it can take up to 

36 hours to get these results. 

How many times since the start of this program has there been 

a positive detection, and how many times has there been a false 

alarm? 
35 

Ms. CALLAHAN. In this room, sir, I cannot go into details, but I 

can talk about it in a different room, if that would be—happy to 

take that off-line, if that’s OK. 

Mr. STRONG. Thank you. 

Dr. Sherman, thank you for your work on reports related to 

BioWatch. I understand that GAO has made multiple recommendations about changes that need to be made to the acquisition and 

procurement process. 

Has DHS implemented any of those changes? 

Ms. SHERMAN. Yes. DHS has taken steps to better inform its acquisition process. In fact, I think as a result of BD21—the BD21 

program being canceled, it was informed in part by some of the 

questions that we had raised in prior work and recommendations 

that we had made regarding more informed decision making during 

the acquisition process and not moving forward with that process 

and spending additional funds until there’s really kind-of clear evidence and documentation of effectiveness. 

Mr. STRONG. Thank you. Other than passing the DHS Biodetection Improvement Act, what is the biggest thing DHS can do right 

now to improve BioWatch, in your judgment? What’s the biggest 

thing they can do to improve biodetection—BioWatch? 

Ms. SHERMAN. I will say—yes, I will just say that biodetection is 

an incredibly challenging task, and, you know, we’re talking about 

how long it takes to be able to capture a sample and test it and 

confirm results. 

You know, the extent to which there is a way to identify technologies that allow for increased efficiencies in those time frames, 

if those exist, then that is—you know, that would be something 

that I think would result in, you know, significant progress. 

But CWMD, given its current mission, you know, should be actively considering as it is how to continue their focus in biodefense. 

Mr. STRONG. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, you’ve touched on it just a sec. It is unique that 

you worked as a fire chief. I’ve been a fire chief, police, first responders. We know first-hand how critical that is that we get that 

information. Forty years myself and 34 years as an emergency 

medical technician. 

So it’s so critical to our first responders, and I thank each of you 

for what you do to get that information as fast as possible. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Thank you, Mr. Strong. 

I now recognize from Oklahoma, Mr. Brecheen. 

Mr. BRECHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So I want to ask Dr. Sherman representing the GAO with the 

homeland security specialty, tell me in terms of—efficiency is something that GAO is respected for, constantly analyzing. Where do 

you see resources being expended that the GAO would say may be 

inefficient and could be otherwise allocated? 

I’m really interested in the concept of the electric grid and hardening our transformers. I’d like to hear if you think that we’re 

being inefficient in some areas and if some of those resources could 

be otherwise utilized to protect what I think is a very vulnerable 

grid. 
36 

Ms. SHERMAN. Sure. So speaking to the acquisition piece, CWMD 

has gone through, not only in the biodefense space, but also in the 

radiation detection space, several acquisitions that have resulted in 

cancellation. I think I’ve mentioned it before, that’s actually not 

necessarily a bad thing, because if it comes to a decision point 

where the office or the Department decides that they don’t have 

enough information to move forward and to spend the taxpayer dollars for a particular program, then they should make a decision to 

not do that. 

So that is an area where I think the office has at least taken 

steps and demonstrated that the—you know, again, the kind-of efficiency piece is really critical and making sure that there isn’t continued efforts over time and spending to be able to identify particular threats. 

I would also say, one of the themes that we have throughout the 

CBRN space for CWMD is going back to the message about effectiveness. Really understanding whether the programs and activities are working, whether the work that—in the case of Securing 

the Cities, the partners that are being carried out in the regions, 

having an understanding of whether or not the support that 

CWMD is providing—the money, the resources—is actually working and better protecting those regions across the country. 

So I think that that is a way to really understand whether or not 

money is being well-spent as it goes toward the various programs 

within CWMD. 

Mr. BRECHEEN. Can you expound upon that? So the expenditure 

funds going to localities, high-population areas, how is GAO determining whether or not that that is a good spend for the taxpayer? 

How do you run through the—how do you analyze that accurately? 

Ms. SHERMAN. Sure. So in the case of Securing the Cities, for example, last year, CWMD put out an implementation plan for its 

program—a new version of its implementation plan, and as part of 

that plan, it was to—the office was to collect information from the 

regional partners in terms of trainings, exercises, detections, efforts 

that they have made that have been tied to the resources that 

they’ve been provided to them. 

We have found that CWMD, over time, hasn’t done as good of a 

job looking at that information, collecting that information, making 

sure that it’s accurate through quarterly reporting requirements 

and others. So in this report that we issued today, we made recommendations around making sure that it has better data, it has 

better information from those partners to be able to say, OK, you 

are successful in the efforts that you’re carrying out, being able to 

implement this program, being able to be prepared as a first responder for detection efforts, and you should be able to continue 

forward and ideally obtain sustainment funding as a result of that. 

Mr. BRECHEEN. Because I only have got 40 seconds left, Mr. 

Chairman, I wanted to ask, in regards to the expenditure—and 

next year we’ll come back and have a conversation as to whether 

or not those suggestions from GAO were implemented. 

What are your thoughts, Ms. Callahan, in regards to—is there a 

better allocation of resources that may not be high-population centers regarding our electric grid, the transformers? 
37 

My understanding, there’s some information floating around that 

says we have 20 transformers. That if they were all hit at the same 

time, whether it’s gunfire, an EMP, somebody walking up with a 

device that exploded, that we could bring down our entire electrical 

grid, shut down traffic, shut down cell phone utilization. Can you 

speak to that? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Sir, we agree with all the GAO’s recommendations with regards to Securing the Cities. With regard to the electrical grid, that would be my colleagues at the Cybersecurity and 

Infrastructure Security Agency. I know they have spent a great 

deal of time on that and are working on hardening that, but I 

would have to defer to those colleagues. 

Mr. BRECHEEN. Thank you. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Thank you, Mr. Brecheen. 

Ms. Callahan, as you mentioned in your testimony, CBRN 

threats present dynamic challenges to the Nation’s security and, 

‘‘the risks are constantly evolving due to the evolution of technologies’’. 

What steps has the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office taken to coordinate the threat with the intelligence community 

so that the agency might better understand the current threat environment? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Thank you, sir. As you may know, we have a 

dedicated intelligence shop just focused on CBRN threats. They do 

an annual report that we’re happy to brief to you and to your staff, 

the CWMD Homeland Threat Assessment. 

We work very closely with our intelligence community colleagues. 

We also are working—having a fledgling relationship with the National Guard Bureau and their intelligence shop, again, to get that 

information out to the first responders, to the folks in the field in 

the 57 different, for example, civil support teams. So trying to get 

that information out. 

We’re also working with our colleagues—Health Security among 

others—at analyzing the risks. So we’ve identified the threat, but 

we’ve also looked at the risk, which include the likelihood as well 

as the consequence and what the impact is. So we’re trying to have 

a holistic view. Yes, sir. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. OK. What’s your interaction regularly with Customs and Border Patrol to make sure that our ports, our ports of 

entry, so that they have the information necessary to make sure 

that they can protect us as best they can? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yep. Obviously, CBP is one of our biggest stakeholders. We support the radiation portal monitors, so 14—almost 

1,400 RPMs at the ports of entries. We also go and brief them on 

threats. We’ve done multiple trainings, not only at ports of entries, 

but also at the National Targeting Center for that as well. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. OK. Your testimony also speaks to chemical preparedness and chemical defense, and mentions the establishment 

of the DHS Chemical Coordination Group to, quote, meet the evolving threat for chemical attacks and incidents. 

How has the expiration of CISA’s Chemical Facility’s Anti-Terrorism Standards program affected our Nation’s chemical defense 

posture? 
38 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes. Thank you, sir. The termination of CFATS 

authorization—I know that’s the wrong phrasing—but the end of 

CFATS authorization has, in my opinion, affected our chemical 

readiness with regard to identifying threats that would be in chemical facilities. 

CFATS and CWMD are siblings, and they work together closely, 

and we are missing them in this—in this whole-of-Government 

threat. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. I know we’ve briefly touched upon this in my 

first round of questioning, but I think it’s important, because a lot 

of Federal agencies, especially when it comes to our enforcement 

agencies, Homeland Security, Customs and Border Patrol, Capitol 

Police, attrition and making sure that our work force stays, is a 

concern that we have. 

So in 2022, there was a ranking by Best Places to Work, and the 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office ranked 430 out of 

432. Four hundred thirty out of 432. CWMD has consistently—has 

had low ratings. I know that we talked about this briefly, but I 

think it’s extremely important. 

So you, I think, have—had identified in some cases why morale 

is so low. Is there anything that you weren’t able to share in the 

first round of questioning? If we can go into—because we have a 

little bit more time—what are the steps that you are taking to improve the morale to make sure that we keep our coworkers staying 

where they are? Because I think institutional knowledge is something that is so important. 

So what are we doing to make sure that they stay and are enjoying working for this great government? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yes. Thank you, sir. Retention is crucial, and it’s 

incredibly important, particularly for something as complex as 

CBRN threats, and we’re working in multiple ways. I mentioned 

my kind-of 3 tiers of my morale plan. I won’t rehash that, but I 

will say that we’re looking for opportunities to cross-train, to have 

people work within the different directorates. 

What’s interesting to me is that we’ve—because they came from 

different organizations, that in some ways they might not have 

known the other side of the CB and the RN threat, so we’re looking 

at ways to integrate that better. We’re doing presentations on what 

we’re doing. We’re looking to look for those synergies that were 

there but haven’t been focused on yet. 

So, sir, I think it’s professional development, I think it’s office development, and it’s, candidly, just getting to know us as people. We 

lost a lot of that during COVID, and we’re trying to find ways to 

connect in a hybrid environment. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. So I guess we’re both confident that the next 

time Best Places to Work does their rankings, we’ll be far better 

than 430. 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Sir, I will say the FEVS are a lagging indicator 

and that it could be possible that the FEVS scores during my time 

may come out, you know, after I leave, depending on the election. 

So I want to say, I’m not here about FEVS scores. I’m here about 

the people. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Absolutely. I’m still confident. I’m rooting for 

you. 
39 

Ms. CALLAHAN. I appreciate the vote of support, and I also share 

that vote. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. All right. My time’s expired. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I suspect that when we have the security of knowing that people 

will get a paycheck, that we’ll also have morale to go up, because 

Government should not run from continuing resolution to continuing resolution. We should have the security of people knowing 

that their Government and the full faith and credit of the Government will always be protected. So we will continue to fight to make 

sure that happens so you’re able to do your job even more. 

So Representative Strong touched on a point that I wanted to go. 

Secretary Callahan, can you tell the subcommittee where CWMD 

is advancing in its biodetection capabilities? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Thank you very much, sir. As I mentioned, 

BioWatch is a reliable program right now, but we have to improve 

on it, as Dr. Won Sherman said. We’ve got to get—make sure that 

we have a shorter time period, if possible, with the same level of 

standard of clarity and of accuracy. 

We have looked at many opportunities. I’m happy to talk about 

BD21, but I’ll put that to a side right now because it’s an acquisition program. But we’re looking at making a series of incremental 

improvements on environmental biodetection writ large, and that’s 

our focus rather than kind-of to jump to the BD21 moonshot, so to 

speak. That’s—one of the reasons BD21 couldn’t scale and couldn’t 

be operational at this moment. But instead, we’re looking at a wide 

range of technologies, opportunities, and resources to have the 

BioWatch steady state while we work on incremental improvements in terms of timeliness, response, efficiency, and so on. 

Mr. CARTER. Are we keeping up with the bad guys? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. We are working our darndest to keep up with the 

bad guys. As as Dr. Won Sherman said, biodetection at scale is 

really hard, and it’s one of the reasons why BioWatch is the only 

program that we have right now. But we’re looking at—we’re engaging our State and local stakeholders to make sure we’re meeting 

their mission and their mark as we look to make these improvements on biodetection. 

But biodetection is hard. Bioattacks are also hard, I will say, and 

stop there in this room. 

Mr. CARTER. That’s an incredible challenge. So those are not 

trick questions. They’re questions that—— 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Understood, sir. 

Mr. CARTER [continuing]. One, we understand and appreciate the 

difficult task that you have. So we’ll begin there. So the questions 

we ask, we come in peace, on how we can better serve you—— 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Understood, sir. 

Mr. CARTER [continuing]. And you can better serve us. 

So what’s your approach—you mentioned stakeholders. What’s 

your approach to collect information, data, and to learn from and, 

more importantly, teach local stakeholders, and what relationship—and how—what does that look like? 

Ms. CALLAHAN. Yep. So, first, our relationship with stakeholders 

are paramount. That’s a crucial element. We are an operational 
40 

support component supporting the 5 DHS operational supports, as 

well as all the State and locals that we’ve talked about. I have people on my team who communicate with State and locals every day 

to make sure we’re transparent, we know what’s going on, we’re 

communicating. 

With regard to the GAO recommendations on data, I was thrilled 

to see that because it’s very consistent with my philosophy, is that 

we have to have metrics. We have to have consistent metrics and 

we have to have repeatable processes. We also have the opportunity to learn from each other. 

One of the things that I witnessed when I went to the Securing 

the Cities meeting in Miami, which was the one after the Chairman came to St. Elizabeths, is that the State and locals are learning from each other. They’re sharing information. They’re supporting each other. They’re going and saying, this is my best practice, this is how I work. 

Boston came down to New Orleans to support for Mardi Gras, 

and New Orleans is going up to support for the marathon next 

month. Working together and having the information sharing is 

crucial in order to have this layered defense that we’ve established. 

Mr. CARTER. Excellent. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Sherman, what has GAO’s report found regarding CWMD 

stakeholder outreach and engagement with SLTT partners? 

Ms. SHERMAN. Yes, absolutely. So both with Securing the Cities, 

as well as actually BioWatch and also the former Chemical Defense 

Demonstration Cities Initiative, we had previously found that the 

communication and engagement with stakeholders, not only the 

Federal, but the SLTT partners, was not as robust as it could have 

been. We have seen strides, which is very positive. 

There’s been a lot of gatherings, meetings, sharing of information, and really, you know, kind-of an understanding that one participant in a program can learn from another. 

We also know in 2022 there was an SLTT engagement strategy 

that CWMD developed. We made some recommendations on how to 

improve that, but it was noticeable that they had pulled the strategy together, and so we were pleased to have seen that. 

Ranking Member, if you’ll indulge me. I don’t have an answer to 

the question regarding a blank check, but I will say, since we 

haven’t dabbled in it, you know, the—something to keep me up at 

night would be the role of AI or the potential when it comes to producing CBRN threats. That is something that, of course, is part of 

the Executive Order, you know, will be implemented. DHS is going 

to be developing an analysis to take a look at that issue. 

GAO is starting to monitor the efforts within that Executive 

Order, and so I’m a little less scared at night because I know we’re 

going to take a look at it, but that is an area, you know, of concern 

moving forward. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Dr. Sherman. My time is up. 

Mr. Chairman, if you would just indulge me one quick final question for Dr. Wolfe. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Sure. 

Mr. CARTER. Same question on engagement. As we prepare for 

the next health security risk, share with us your method or matrix 
41 

for engagement with other agencies to ensure that we have the 

best practices in place. 

Mr. WOLFE. Sure, Ranking Member. I’m from the northeast, so 

I’ll talk fast on this one. 

The first with our other Federal partners. We are the supporting 

agency to ESF 8, which is—the lead is HHS. When you’re a supporting agency, we need to do a better job. So the last few years 

with the creation of OHS, we’ve done a better job of being a solid 

partner for HHS ASPR and HHS CDC. 

We also sit on the PHEMCE, which is the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise. That is how the Federal interagency decides what medical countermeasures we should 

develop and invest in. Certainly, related to Assistant Secretary Callahan’s comment about BioWatch, right? We’re detecting to treat, 

detecting to warn. We want to make sure we’re leveraging medical 

countermeasures. Don’t want to detect something and then not 

have a treatment for someone in New Orleans or somewhere else. 

In terms of State and local, a few things we do is we convene 

monthly with the fusion centers. We make sure that health analysts are understanding what’s happening in the law enforcement 

mission. What we find a lot of times is health people tend to be 

called when the problem is known. So we’re making sure that the 

fusion centers are leveraging their health analysts prior to any 

issue that arises. 

The other thing we do is we convene communities along the 

Southwest Border and interior communities to talk about challenges they are seeing across the community, whether that is with 

migrants, whether that is just State and local issues that they’re 

devoting money from one program to another. 

The last thing we do is we’ve got the food security mission. We’ve 

done several tabletops, one in the State of Washington, one in 

Oklahoma. Both of those had good representation from the Tribes, 

which is one of our focal points for 2024, which is, as we know from 

COVID–19, for example, a lot of focus on Navajo Nation and making sure that we’re including, when we say SLTT, that we don’t forget the Tribal part of our State and locals. 

Thanks. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. Thank you all very much. 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. 

I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of the subcommittee may 

have some additional questions for the witnesses and we would ask 

that the witnesses respond to these in writing. 

Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will be 

open for 10 days. 

Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ