United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 16-2441 

LUIS ADRIÁN CORTÉS-RAMOS, 

Plaintiff, Appellant, 

v. 

SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, SONY ATV MUSIC PUBLISHING, LLC, 

SONY MUSIC HOLDINGS INC., agent of Sony Music Entertainment, 

SONY PICTURES TELEVISION, INC., SONY MUSIC BRAZIL, SONY 

ELECTRONICS, INC., 

Defendants, Appellees, 

ENRIQUE MARTIN-MORALES, a/k/a Ricky Martin, 

Defendant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpí, Jr., U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Torruella, Lipez, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges.

Juan R. Rodríguez, with whom Rodríguez Lopez Law Offices, 

P.S.C. was on brief, for appellant. 

David C. Rose, with whom Pryor Cashman LLP, Jorge I. Peirats, 

Maria D. Trelles-Hernández and Pietrantoni Méndez & Alvarez LLC, 

were on brief, for appellees. 
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May 4, 2018 

 
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BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal is from an order 

granting a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to the Copyright 

Act. We reverse. 

On July 28, 2014, the plaintiff, Luis Adrián CortésRamos, filed a complaint in the District of Puerto Rico against 

Sony Corporation of America (Sony) and other related defendants, 

in connection with a songwriting contest that Sony had cosponsored. The suit alleged various claims under Puerto Rico and 

federal law, including claims under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. 

§ 505. 

The District Court dismissed with prejudice all of the 

claims on the grounds that they were subject to mandatory 

arbitration pursuant to an agreement that Cortés-Ramos had signed 

when he entered the contest and that he had failed to allege facts 

sufficient to support his claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

We affirmed the District Court's order dismissing the claims. See 

Cortés-Ramos v. Sony Corp. of Am., 836 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2016). 

The defendants then moved for attorney's fees pursuant 

to § 505 of the Copyright Act, which provides for a "reasonable 

attorney's fee to the prevailing party." 17 U.S.C. § 505. The 

District Court granted the defendants' motion and awarded 

$47,601.78 in attorney's fees.
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Cortés-Ramos now argues that the District Court erred in 

awarding attorney's fees because the defendants do not qualify as 

prevailing parties under § 505. We agree. 

In evaluating a similarly worded attorney's fees 

provision to the one that we confront here, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 

1988(b) (providing that federal district courts may "allow the 

prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the 

costs"), the Supreme Court made clear that "[t]he touchstone of 

the prevailing party inquiry . . . [is] the material alteration of 

the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress 

sought to promote in the fee statute." Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 

74, 82 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted) 

(emphasis added). Here, there has been no such alteration. 

When these parties were last before us on appeal, we did 

affirm the District Court's order dismissing Cortés-Ramos' claims 

(including the Copyright Act claims) "with prejudice." CortésRamos, 836 F.3d at 129-30. But, we made clear that we were doing 

so solely because we were affirming the District Court's order 

compelling arbitration of these claims. Id. at 130. And, we 

expressly noted that "in light of the District Court's order 

compelling arbitration, Cortés's claims 'ha[ve] not been 

extinguished but [have been] merely left to the arbitrator.'" Id. 

at 130 (quoting Next Step Med. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Int'l, 619 

F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2010)). 
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Thus, the only material alteration in the parties' legal 

relationship concerning the Copyright Act arises from a ruling 

regarding the forum in which Cortés-Ramos' Copyright Act claims 

must be heard. But, the Copyright Act -- unlike the Federal 

Arbitration Act, see 9 U.S.C. § 2 -- reflects no congressional 

policy favoring or disfavoring arbitration of claims. There thus 

has been no "material alteration of the legal relationship of the 

parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote" when it 

enacted § 505 of the Copyright Act. Sole, 551 U.S. at 82; see 

also Heritage Capital Corp. v. Christie's, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-3404-

D, 2018 WL 398202, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2018) (holding that 

Defendant did not qualify under § 505 of the Copyright Act as a 

prevailing party because compelling arbitration was a procedural 

victory that did not materially alter the legal relationship 

between the parties). 

We therefore reverse the order of the District Court 

granting attorney's fees to the defendants.