J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TRUIST BANK, FORMERLY KNOWN 

AS BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST 

COMPANY, SUCCESSOR-BY-MERGER 

TO SUSQUEHANNA BANK

v.

PENNSYLVANIA MUSCLE BONE AND 

JOINT LLC 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 565 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered March 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Civil Division at 

No(s): J-4065-2021

TRUIST BANK, FORMERLY KNOWN 

AS BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST 

COMPANY, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER 

TO SUSQUEHANNA BANK

v.

DANIEL J. D'ARCO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 588 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered March 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Civil Division at 

No(s): J-4066-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2023

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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Daniel J. D’Arco and the Pennsylvania Muscle Bone and Joint LLC (the 

“Medical Practice”) appeal from the orders denying their petitions to strike 

and/or open confessed judgments against them. The confessed judgments 

were entered by Truist Bank, formerly known as Branch Banking and Trust 

Company, Successor by Merger to Susquehanna Bank (“Truist”). D’Arco and 

the Medical Practice argue Truist’s violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity 

Act (“ECOA”)

1 was a meritorious defense, the confession of judgment clauses

were not self-sustaining, and Truist failed to return Payment Protection 

Program (“PPP”) money. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural background as 

follows:

[D’Arco] operates, and is the sole member of, the Medical 

Practice. On January 7, 2009, the Medical Practice executed 

a Promissory Note in favor of Susquehanna Bank (the 

“Lender”) for the principal amount of $400,000.00 (the 

“Note”), along with a Commercial Security Agreement. The 

Note sets forth several provisions, including, that the loan is 

payable upon demand, and that the terms of the Note shall 

inure to the benefit of the Lender and its successors and 

assigns. Additionally, the Note contains a Confession of 

Judgment clause.1 On January 7, 2009, Dr. D'Arco executed 

a Commercial Guaranty2in favor of the Lender, which also 

included a Confession of Judgment clause.

1The Confession of Judgment clause contained in the 

Note, provides as follows.

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT. BORROWER HEREBY 

IRREVOCABLY AUTHORIZES AND EMPOWERS ANY 

ATTORNEY OR THE PROTHONOTARY OR CLERK OF 

ANY COURT IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF 

____________________________________________

1 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1691-1691f.
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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PENNSYLVANIA, OR ELSEWHERE, TO APPEAR AT ANY 

TIME FOR BORROWER AFTER A DEFAULT UNDER THIS 

NOTE AND WITH OR WITHOUT COMPLAINT FILED, 

CONFESS OR ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST 

BORROWER FOR THE ENTIRE PRINCIPAL BALANCE OF 

THIS NOTE AND ALL ACCRUED INTEREST, LATE 

CHARGES AND ANY AND ALL AMOUNTS EXPENDED 

OR ADVANCED BY LENDER RELATING TO ANY 

COLLATERAL SECURING THIS NOTE, TOGETHER 

WITH COSTS OF SUIT, AND AN ATTORNEY'S 

COMMISSION OF TEN PERCENT (10%) OF THE 

UNPAID PRINCIPAL BALANCE AND ACCRUED 

INTEREST FOR COLLECTION, BUT IN ANY EVENT NOT 

LESS THAN FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500) ON 

WHICH JUDGMENT OR JUDGMENTS ONE OR MORE 

EXECUTIONS MAY ISSUE IMMEDIATELY; AND FOR SO 

DOING, THIS NOTE OR A COPY OF THIS NOTE 

VERIFIED BY AFFIDAVIT SHALL BE SUFFICIENT 

WARRANT. THE AUTHORITY GRANTED IN THIS NOTE 

TO CONFESS JUDGMENT AGAINST BORROWER SHALL 

NOT BE EXHAUSTED BY ANY EXERCISE OF THAT 

AUTHORITY, BUT SHALL CONTINUE FROM TIME TO 

TIME AND AT ALL TIMES UNTIL PAYMENT IN FULL OF 

ALL AMOUNTS DUE UNDER THE NOTE. BORROWER 

HEREBY WAIVES ANY RIGHT BORROWER MAY HAVE 

TO NOTICE OR TO A HEARING IN CONNECTION WITH 

ANY SUCH CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT AND STATES 

THAT EITHER A REPRESENTATIVE OF LENDER 

SPECIFICALLY CALLED THIS CONFESSION OF 

JUDGMENT PROVISION TO BORROWER’S ATTENTION 

OR BORROWER HAS BEEN REPRESENTED BY 

INDEPENDENT LEGAL COUNSEL.[2]

2 The Note, Commercial Security Agreement, and 

Guaranty are hereafter referred to collectively as the 

“Loan Documents”.

By correspondence dated June 16, 2021, [Truist] informed 

[D’Arco and the Medical Practice] that it demanded the 

____________________________________________

2 The confession of judgment clause contained in the Guaranty was 

substantially similar, with minor changes, such as replacing “borrower” with 

“guarantor” and “entire principal balance of this note” with “entire principal 

balance of this guaranty.”
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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immediate payments of all amounts due and owing under 

the Loan Documents. Further, [Truist] notified [D’Arco and 

the Medical Practice] that failure to immediately pay the 

outstanding amount would result in the Bank filing for 

judgments under the Note and Guaranty, as well as, that 

[Truist] would proceed with foreclosure of the collateral 

secured by the Security Agreement. On August 18, 2021, 

[Truist] filed separate Complaints in Confession of Judgment 

against [the Medical Practice], at Docket J-4065-2021, and 

against [D’Arco], at Docket J-4066-2021. In these 

complaints, [Truist] alleges that [the Medical Practice]

defaulted on the loan when it failed to make payment upon 

demand of the Note. Additionally, [Truist] alleges that the 

default remains uncured by the [Medical Practice] or 

[D’Arco]. [Truist] demands judgment in its favor, and 

against [the Medical Practice] or [D’Arco], in the total 

amount of $345,091.83. [Truist] asserts that this total 

includes $342,090.33 of principal, fees and interest through 

July 19, 2021; $2,990.00 in attorney’s fees and costs 

through July 19, 2021; and $11.50 in filing fees. [Truist]

further requests continuing interest, including post 

judgment interest at the default rate, and continuing fees 

and costs. On August 18, 2021, the Prothonotary’s Office of 

Schuylkill County entered separate judgments against [the 

Medical Practice] and [D’Arco] in the amount of $ 

345,091.83.

Trial Court Opinion, filed Mar. 2, 2022, at 1-3 (some footnotes omitted).

The confession of judgment clause in the Note is on the same page as 

D’Arco’s signature, who signed on behalf of the Medical Practice. Complaint in 

Confession of Judgment, filed Aug. 18, 2021, at Exh. A. The Note further 

provides that it “shall be binding upon [the Medical Practice], and upon [the 

Medical Practice’s] heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns, 

and shall inure to the benefit of Lender and its successors and assigns.” Id.

Similarly, D’Arco’s signature appears on the same page of the Guaranty as the 
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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confession of judgment clause and the Guaranty defines “Lender” as 

“Susquehanna, its successors and assigns.” Id. at Exh. C.

D’Arco and the Medical Practice filed petitions on October 13, 2021, 

seeking to strike and/or open the judgments entered by confession, and 

requesting stay of execution. They argued, among other things, the court 

should strike the confessed judgment because the guaranty is not enforceable 

by a successor and the warrant is unenforceable because it was in small print 

on a pre-printed form. They contended that the court should open the 

confessed judgment because the consent necessary to permit an alleged 

successor to the Note to enforce it must be determined by a jury, Truist 

required D’Arco’s spouse to pledge marital assets and otherwise guarantee 

the loan to refinance the Note in violation of the ECOA and Regulation B, and 

Truist knowingly and improperly froze, setoff, and attached wages.

In a Declaration attached to a supplemental brief in support of the 

petitions to strike and/or open, D’Arco stated that sometime in 2021, a 

representative of Truist contacted him, stating that Truist had been assigned 

the loan. The representative allegedly informed him that the “loan did not 

meet Truist’s standard loan profile and that the Medical Practice, [D’Arco,] and 

[his] wife . . . needed to pledge marital assets and [D’Arco’s] wife would need 

to pledge her assets to guarantee the debt of the Medical Practice.” 

Declaration of Daniel J. D’Arco, M.D., filed Jan.31, 2022, at ¶ 8. D’Arco stated 

he was the sole owner of the Medical Practice, and his wife had no interest in 

it. Id. at ¶ 9. He stated Truist insisted his wife pledge her assets and guarantee 
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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the debt even though the Medical Practice was not in default on the loan. Id.

at ¶ 10. He further claimed that because he and his wife “refused to pledge 

[his] wife’s assets and she refused to guarantee the Medical Practice’s debt, 

Truist took PPP monies loaned to pay . . . employees from the Medical 

Practice’s bank account[,]” and Truist has not returned the money, “[e]ven 

though [it] agreed” to do so. Id. at ¶ 12.

The trial court issued rules to show cause why D’Arco and the Medical 

Practice were not entitled to relief. Truist filed answers to the petitions to strike 

and/or open. The court held oral argument and both parties filed supplemental 

briefs. In March 2022, the trial court denied the petitions to strike and/or open 

the confessed judgments. D’Arco and the Medical Practice filed timely notices

of appeal.3

D’Arco and the Medical Practice raise the following issues:

1. Did the trial court err in failing to hold that an Equal Credit 

Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.) claim was 

sufficiently alleged to constitute a meritorious defense to 

open the confessed judgment?

2. Did the trial court err in holding that the Note and 

Guarantee are enforceable by an alleged successor bank 

when no evidence of such assignment to a successor bank 

was introduced?

3. Did the trial court err in holding that the confession of 

judgment clause was enforceable notwithstanding its lack of 

descriptiveness, small print on a boiler plate form, failure to 

require the clause to be separately initialed, and no 

____________________________________________

3 We consolidated the cases on appeal.
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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statement of waiver of rights was included within the 

clause?

4. Did the trial court err in failing to hold that the Bank 

knowingly and improperly froze, setoff and attached wages 

and refused to release them?

Appellants’ Brs. at 2-3.

Opening and striking a judgment are different remedies subject to 

different standards. “A petition to strike a judgment is a common law 

proceeding which operates as a demurrer to the record.” Resolution Trust 

Corp. v. Copley Qu-Wayne Assoc., 683 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. 1996). “A 

petition to strike a judgment may be granted only for a fatal defect or 

irregularity appearing on the face of the record.” Id. The “record” for this 

purpose is the court record behind the confessed judgment: the complaint in 

confession of judgment and any exhibits the petitioner attached to it. Ferrick 

v. Bianchini, 69 A.3d 642, 647 (Pa.Super. 2013).

“A petition to open a confessed judgment is an appeal to the equitable 

powers of the court.” Neducsin v. Caplan, 121 A.3d 498, 504 (Pa.Super. 

2015). The court may open a confessed judgment “if the petitioner (1) acts 

promptly, (2) alleges a meritorious defense, and (3) can produce sufficient 

evidence to require submission of the case to a jury.” Id. at 506 (citation and 

emphasis omitted). “A meritorious defense is one upon which relief could be 

afforded if proven at trial.” Id. (quoting Ferrick, 69 A.3d at 647). Rule 

2959(e) provides that “[t]he court shall dispose of the rule on petition and 

answer, and on any testimony, depositions, admissions and other evidence,” 

and “[i]f evidence is produced which in a jury trial would require the issues to 
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be submitted to the jury the court shall open the judgment.” Pa.R.C.P. 

2959(e). Therefore, “a judgment of confession will be opened if ‘a petitioner 

seeking relief therefrom produces evidence which in a jury trial would require 

issues to be submitted to a jury.’” Neducsin, 121 A.3d at 507 (quoting Foerst 

v. Rotkis, 368 A.2d 805, 807–08 (Pa.Super. 1976)).

We review an order denying a petition to strike a confessed judgment 

to determine whether the record in existence at the time of the entry of the 

judgment is sufficient to sustain the judgment. First Union Nat’l Bank v. 

Portside Refrigerated Servs., Inc., 827 A.2d 1224, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

The denial of a petition to open a confessed judgment is subject to abuse of 

discretion review. Neducsin, 121 A.3d at 506. Our scope of review is “very 

narrow,” and we will overturn the trial court’s decision only if the trial court 

abused its discretion or committed manifest error. Atl. Nat. Trust, LLC v. 

Stivala Invs., Inc., 922 A.2d 919, 925 (Pa.Super. 2007).

D’Arco and the Medical Practice first claim the court erred in failing to 

hold that the ECOA claim constituted a meritorious defense. They claim the

ECOA and its implementing Regulation B prohibit creditors from discriminating 

against credit applicants based on their marital status. They assert Truist 

sought a spousal guarantee, and argue Truist treated D’Arco’s wife as a “joint 

applicant” for refinancing even though she did not agree to take on that status.

Appellants’ Brs. at 7. D’Arco and the Medical Practice point out D’Arco’s wife

did not own an interest in the Medical Practice or receive any of the loan 

proceeds. They claim that in D’Arco’s Declaration, he explained that during 
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Truist’s credit review process, Truist “included a demand for the pledge of 

marital assets and spousal guaranty without any analysis of their necessity.” 

Id. at 9. They maintain a creditor cannot recover from parties who would not 

have incurred liability for the debt without the ECOA violation and the creditor

is liable to the party whose rights were violated. They thus argue the 

confessed judgment should be opened based on the ECOA violation. 

D’Arco and the Medical Practice liken this case to Silverman v. Eastich 

Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 33 (3d Cir. 1995). They maintain

that D’Arco has been harmed because “the Bank called a longstanding loan 

that had not been in default simply out of spite because [his] wife would not 

put her assets or marital assets at risk for the Medical Practice that she owned 

no interest in.” Appellants’ Brs. at 11. They argue that courts should not limit 

the claimants who can seek relief for an ECOA violation. 

The ECOA provides that it is unlawful “for any creditor to discriminate 

against any [credit] applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit 

transaction . . . on the basis of . . . marital status.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a)(1). 

Federal regulations implementing the ECOA provide that a creditor cannot 

require the signature of an applicant’s spouse if the applicant qualifies under 

the creditor’s standards of creditworthiness:

Except as provided in this paragraph, a creditor shall not 

require the signature of an applicant’s spouse or other 

person, other than a joint applicant, on any credit 

instrument if the applicant qualifies under the creditor’s 

standards of creditworthiness for the amount and terms of 

the credit requested.
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1).

With the ECOA, “Congress chose to protect women from credit 

discrimination by requiring that creditors treat all credit applicants—male and 

female, married and unmarried—in an identical manner.” S.W. Pa. Reg’l 

Council, Inc. v. Gentile, 776 A.2d 276, 281 (Pa.Super. 2001) (quoting 

Integra Bank v. Freeman, 839 F.Supp. 326, 328 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1993)). 

However, “Congress did not enact the ECOA to permit permissibly bound 

debtors to escape contractual liability when called upon to perform.” Id. at 

282 (citation omitted). Where a spouse is required to sign as a guarantor, he 

or she “may assert an ECOA violation as a defense to a state-court confession 

of judgment.” Id. “If the defense is successful, the guarantor’s obligation is 

voided, but the underlying debt and any other guarantees are not voided.” Id.

In Silverman, which Appellants cite, the plaintiff was the wife of a 

partner in a general partnership. 51 F.3d at 29-30. The partnership had 

borrowed $10 million from a bank. The bank not only required the partners to 

guaranty the loan, but also required the plaintiff to be a guarantor. The 

partnership defaulted on the loan, and the bank confessed judgment in state 

court against the guarantors, including the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed suit in 

federal court alleging the Bank had violated her rights under the ECOA and 

sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring execution on the confessed 

judgment against her. Id. at 30. The Third Circuit concluded that although the 

statute of limitations had expired on the plaintiff’s ability to sue under the 

ECOA, nothing barred her from raising the ECOA defensively, which she had 
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in effect done by seeking relief in federal court to stop the enforcement of the 

confessed judgment. Id. at 32. The court pointed out that even if the plaintiff 

obtained the relief she sought, “this would not void the underlying debt 

obligation nor any other guaranties.” Id. at 33.

Here, unlike in Silverman, it is the credit applicant D’Arco, not his 

spouse, that attempts to raise an ECOA defense. Even if the credit applicant

may raise ECOA as a defense to a judgment of confession action, D’Arco has 

not sufficiently alleged a ECOA violation to warrant the grant of a petition to 

open. D’Arco maintains Truist required that his wife became a guarantor of 

the loan. Such a requirement violates ECOA only where the credit applicant 

“qualifies under the creditor’s standards of creditworthiness for the amount 

and terms of the credit requested.” See 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(1); Gentile, 

776 A.2d at 282 (lender does not violate ECAO where spouses are joint 

applicants or where credit applicant is not individually creditworthy without 

spouse’s signature). D’Arco makes no claim in his pleadings or his declaration

that he qualified under Truist’s standards of creditworthiness for the credit 

requested. Therefore, he failed to produce evidence which would require his 

alleged ECOA defense to be submitted to a jury and the court did not err in 

denying his petition to open.4 See Neducsin, 121 A.3d at 507.

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4 The trial court concluded D’Arco and the Medical Practice failed to allege 

and/or produce sufficient evidence of a meritorious defense based on the 

ECOA. Trial Ct. Op. at 13. It pointed out that D’Arco’s wife was not a signatory 

to any of the Loan Documents and was not an applicant or guarantor of the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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In his second claim, D’Arco and the Medical Practice argue the court 

erred in holding the confession of judgment clauses in the Note and Guaranty 

were enforceable by a successor bank. They argue rigid adherence to the 

warrant of attorney provisions and other loan documents is required to enter 

a valid confession of judgment. They point out that a confession of judgment 

clause must be self-sustaining and argue that where clear consent to the 

confession of judgment clause is absent, it is not self-sustaining. D’Arco and 

the Medical Practice argue clear consent was not provided because the Note 

did not show D’Arco authorized the Note’s enforcement by an assignee. They 

claim the Note “is devoid of any evidence that Dr. D’Arco has had the required 

clear consent to be liable to a successor or assignee of the original bank 

necessary to sustain a confession of judgment.” Appellants’ Brs. at 14. D’Arco 

and the Medical Practice therefore argue that, because the confession of 

judgment in the Note was not self-sustaining, it was invalid and 

unenforceable. Id. They contend the Note has a fatal defect on the face of the 

record and the confession of judgment should be stricken and argue the 

confession of judgment in the Guaranty is not self-sustaining because of the 

____________________________________________

loan, and therefore had no obligations under the Loan Documents. The court 

further noted that Truist had not sought judgment against D’Arco’s wife, and 

therefore she could not raise ECOA as a defense and, even if she could raise 

the defense, it would not void the underlying debt owed by D’Arco. The trial 

court noted that “in general 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a) provides for a separate 

cause of action for violations of the ECOA.” Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).

Although our reasoning differs from the trial court, we can affirm the trial court 

on any basis supported by the certified record. Commonwealth v. Williams, 

125 A.3d 425, 433 n.8 (Pa.Super. 2015).
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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defect in the Note. They further argue that, if it is not stricken due to the 

defect, the court should open the confession of judgment and hold a hearing.5

The trial court rejected this claim. It concluded the Note and Guaranty 

expressly authorize the enforcement by a successor of the Lender, pointing 

out that on page two of the Note, “in the provision entitled ‘SUCCESSOR 

INTERESTS’ it specifically states that ‘[t]he terms of this Note shall be binding 

upon Borrower, and upon Borrower’s heirs, personal representatives, 

successors and assigns, and shall inure to the benefit of Lender and its 

successors and assigns . . . .’” Trial Ct. Op. at 6 (alteration in original). The 

court further noted that on page two of the Guaranty, “in a provision entitled 

‘MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS’, it expressly states that ‘[t]he following 

miscellaneous provisions are part of this Guaranty’ . . . Successors and 

Assigns[--]The terms of this Guaranty shall be binding on Guarantor, and upon 

Guarantor’s heirs, personal representatives, successors, and assigns, and

shall be enforceable by Lender and its successors and assigns.” Id.

(alterations in original). The court also pointed out that the Guaranty defines 

the term “Lender” to include “Susquehanna Bank, its successors, and assigns.” 

Id.

____________________________________________

5

In the issue presented section in their briefs, D’Arco and the Medical Practice 

argue the Note and Guaranty were unenforceable where no evidence of 

assignment to the successor bank was introduced. However, they do not 

present this argument in the argument section of the briefs and therefore 

waived the claim. See Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 411 

(Pa.Super. 2008).
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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The record supports the trial court’s conclusion, and it did not err in 

denying the petition to strike. The Loan Documents made clear that they could 

be enforced by the successor or assignee of the Lender, such as Truist. 

The trial court also denied the petition to open based on the claim that 

there was not a clear manifestation of consent to allow a successor trustee to 

enforce the confession of judgment clauses. Id. at 10. The court found D’Arco

and the Medical Practice failed to allege or produce evidence to support a 

meritorious defense, reasoning that the Note and Guaranty expressly 

authorize the enforcement by a successor. This was not an abuse of discretion.

D’Arco and the Medical Practice next claim the confession of judgment 

clauses were unenforceable because they lacked descriptiveness, were in 

small printing on a boilerplate form, were not separately initialed, and had no 

statement of waiver of rights within the clauses. They further argue the clause

was not “properly set apart or identifiable to constitute a valid waiver of due 

process” and was “not separately and clearly signed or initialed so as to 

acknowledge the warrant of attorney by the signor, who is the party allegedly 

agreeing to allow confessing judgment.” Appellants’ Brs. at 17. Further, they 

claim that the provision was “set in small hard-to-read font.” Id. D’Arco and 

the Medical Practice argue that due to these alleged defects, they were denied 

due process rights of notice and hearing, and D’Arco did not voluntarily, 

intelligently, and knowingly waive his rights.

Courts “have noted the need for strict adherence to rules governing 

confessed judgments.” Graystone Bank v. Grove Estates, L.P., 58 A.3d 
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1277, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2012) (quoting Hazer v. Zabala, 26 A.3d 1166, 1169

(Pa.Super. 2011)). “A warrant of attorney to confess judgment must be selfsustaining and to be self-sustaining the warrant must be in writing and signed 

by the person to be bound by it. The requisite signature must bear a direct 

relation to the warrant of attorney and may not be implied.” Id. (citation 

omitted) (emphasis removed). In Graystone Bank, this Court found that a 

warrant of attorney “directly related” to the signature where it “appeared 

conspicuously in all caps on the very bottom of the penultimate page of the 

agreement and immediately preceded where the executor . . . signed at the 

top of the following, final page.” Id. at 1283 (emphasis removed). We 

concluded that “[e]vidence of this location of a conspicuous cognovit contained 

within the body of the agreement sufficed to establish that [the executor]

effectively signed his name to the warrant of attorney.” Id.

The trial court found the confession of judgment clauses were valid and 

self-sustaining because they appear in the Loan Documents in all caps, are at 

the bottom of the last page of each agreement, and immediately precede the 

Borrower’s and Guarantor’s signatures. It pointed out that in the clauses in 

both Loan Documents, D’Arco waived his rights to notice and a hearing related 

to a confessed judgment. Trial Ct. Op. at 9. The court found that he 

nonetheless had opportunities to be heard, including the filing of the petition 

to open or strike, the rule to show cause issued on Truist, and oral argument. 

The court concluded there was no fatal defect on the face of the record and 

D’Arco was not denied his due process rights. 
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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This was not error. The confession of judgment clauses were selfsustaining, as they directly related to the signatures, which were on the same 

page as, and close to, the confession of judgment clauses, which were in all 

capital letters. See Graystone Bank, 58 A.3d at 1282-83.

In their final issue, D’Arco and the Medical Practice claim the court erred 

in failing to hold the Bank knowingly and improperly froze, set off and attached 

wages and refused to release them. They assert that Truist attached $50,000 

of PPP loan proceeds intended to be paid as wages to the Medical Practice 

employees in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8127(a).6 D’Arco claims he informed 

Truist that the funds were PPP loan proceeds to be paid to employees and that

Truist agreed to restore the funds but did not. He therefore claims the 

confessed judgments should have been opened because the money should be 

released. 

The trial court concluded D’Arco and the Medical Practice failed to allege 

and/or produce evidence of a meritorious defense. It reasoned that whether 

Truist improperly froze, set off, and/or attached PPP loan proceeds and payroll 

“is a separate and distinct issue from the issue at hand, which is whether the 

confessed judgments should be opened.” Trial Ct. Op. at 15. 

____________________________________________

6

 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8127(a) provides that, with certain exceptions, “[t]he wages, 

salaries and commissions of individuals shall while in the hands of the 

employer be exempt from any attachment, execution or other process.”
J-S35010-22; J-S35016-22

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The court did not abuse its discretion. Whether certain funds should 

have been preserved does not provide a defense to Truist’s ability to confess 

judgment. 

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/24/2023