Filed 12/21/23 In re J.R. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re J.R., A Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

_____________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 

OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.R.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Juv. No. B323750

(Super. Ct. No. VJ46478)

(Los Angeles County)

J.R. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining a petition 

alleging he had violated his probation on a charge of assault with 

a deadly weapon. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 §§ 602, 777; Pen. Code, 

§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) The court ordered appellant committed to a

1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

Secure Youth Treatment Facility (SYTF) and set a maximum 

term of confinement of 5 years and 4 months and a baseline term 

of 2 years, the latter of which was reduced to 18 months in 

accordance with section 875, subdivision (b). The court also 

awarded appellant 1,054 days of precommitment custody credits, 

which were applied against his maximum term of confinement. 

Appellant contends the court erred in setting his maximum term 

of confinement and in applying his custody credits to that term 

rather than his 18-month baseline term. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In October 2018, the Los Angeles County District 

Attorney’s office filed a wardship petition alleging that appellant, 

who was then 13 years old, had possessed weapons on school 

grounds (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1)). In February 2019, 

the charge was reduced to a misdemeanor and appellant 

admitted the allegations of the petition. The court declared him a 

ward of the court and placed him home on probation for six 

months in accordance with section 725, subdivision (a). 

Appellant’s maximum term of confinement was set at 364 days 

and he was given 3 days of custody credit. 

In May 2019, another section 602 petition was filed alleging

among other things that appellant had committed a robbery (Pen. 

Code, § 211) and that a principal committed the offense while 

armed with a firearm (id., § 12022, subd. (a)(1)). After the 

petition was amended to add a charge of assault by means of 

force likely to produce great bodily injury (GBI) (id., § 245, subd. 

(a)(4)), appellant admitted that charge and was placed in a campcommunity placement for 5 months. The court set a maximum 

term of confinement of 4 years and awarded appellant 22 days of 

custody credit. 
3

In March 2020, a third section 602 petition was filed 

alleging that appellant had committed two counts of GBI assault

and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, 

§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), with additional allegations that he (1) 

committed the offenses for the benefit of his gang (id., § 186.22, 

subd. (b)(1)(A)); (2) personally inflicted GBI in committing all four 

offenses (id., § 12022.7, subd. (a)); and (3) personally used a 

deadly weapon in committing the GBI assault charged in count 1

(id., § 12022, subd. (b)(1)). After the petition was amended to add 

a charge of battery on a person causing injury (id., § 243, subd. 

(d)), appellant admitted that charge, which was declared to be a 

felony, and was placed in a camp-community placement. In 

January 2021, appellant’s camp-community placement was 

terminated and he was placed home on probation. 

In April 2021, a fourth section 602 petition was filed 

alleging that appellant had committed an attempted willful, 

deliberate, and premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. 

(a), 664). In September 2021, after the petition was amended to 

add a charge of assault with a deadly weapon, appellant admitted 

that charge and was placed in a camp-community placement for a 

period of 7 to 9 months. He was also ordered to comply with 

various terms and conditions of his probationary commitment. 

The court set his maximum term of confinement at 5 years and 4 

months and awarded him 696 days of custody credit. 

In July 2022, a section 777 petition was filed alleging that

appellant had violated various terms and conditions of his 

probation. The court subsequently found 6 of the 11 alleged 

violations true and ordered appellant committed to the SYTF. 

The court set a maximum period of confinement of 5 years and 4 

months as “previously noted by the court at disposition.” 
4

Pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) of section 875, the court set a 

baseline term of 2 years as set forth in California Code of 

Regulations, title 9, section 30810, subdivision (a)(5). The court 

then told appellant it was reducing his baseline term to 18 

months “in recognition of the treatment and the progress you 

have made. It is not nothing. You have made progress. The 

court just believes that more progress must be made in a secure 

environment, and so the baseline will be set at 18 months.” The 

court also awarded appellant 1,054 days of custody credits and 

applied those credits against his maximum confinement time 

rejecting appellant’s claim that the credits should instead be 

applied against his baseline term. 

DISCUSSION

Maximum Term Of Confinement

Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in setting 5 

years and 4 months as his maximum term of confinement. We 

disagree.

Until recently, the state Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) 

was “the state’s most restrictive placement for its most severe 

juvenile offenders.” (In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 

902.) In 2020, the Legislature amended the law to effect the 

eventual closure of the DJJ and move the jurisdiction of DJJcommitted youth to local county jurisdiction. (Stats. 2020, ch. 

337, § 1(b).) The Legislature wanted to “ensure that justiceinvolved youth are closer to their families and communities and 

receive age-appropriate treatment.” (Ibid.) The new legislation 

prohibited commitments to the DJJ in most cases as of July 1, 

2021, and the legislation stated an intent “to establish a separate 

dispositional track for higher-need youth.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 337, 

§ 30(e); former § 736.5, subds. (b), (c), (e); Miguel C., at p. 907.)
5

In 2021, the Legislature added section 875 so that counties 

could establish SYTF’s for wards who previously would have been 

committed to the DJJ. (Sen. Bill No. 92 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); 

Stats. 2021, ch. 18, § 12.) The Legislature also closed the DJJ 

effective June 30, 2023. (§ 736.5, subd. (e); Stats. 2021, ch. 18, 

§ 10.) Section 875 authorizes commitment to an SYTF only if 

certain conditions are met. (§ 875, subd. (a).) Appellant does not 

dispute that those conditions were met here.

When the juvenile court orders an SYTF commitment, it

“shall set a baseline term of confinement for the ward that is 

based on the most serious recent offense for which the ward has 

been adjudicated. The baseline term of confinement shall 

represent the time in custody necessary to meet the 

developmental and treatment needs of the ward and to prepare 

the ward for discharge to a period of probation supervision in the 

community.” (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) As relevant here, the court 

determines the baseline term “as set forth in Section 30807 to 

30813, inclusive, of Title 9 of the California Code of Regulations.” 

(Ibid.) Pending the adoption of Judicial Council guidelines, the 

court “may . . . modify the initial baseline term with a deviation 

of plus or minus six months. The baseline term shall also be 

subject to modification in progress review hearings as described 

in subdivision (e).” (Ibid.) 

In addition to setting the baseline term, the court “shall . . .

set a maximum term of confinement,” which “represent[s] the 

longest term of confinement in a facility that a ward may serve.” 

(§ 875, subd. (c)(1).) “The maximum term of confinement shall 

not exceed the middle term of imprisonment that can be imposed 

upon an adult convicted of the same offense or offenses.” (Id., 

subd. (c)(1)(B).) 
6

Section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(B) also provides that “[i]f the 

court elects to aggregate the period of physical confinement on 

multiple counts or multiple petitions, including previously 

sustained petitions adjudging the minor a ward within Section 

602, the maximum term of confinement shall be the aggregate 

term of imprisonment specified in subdivision (a) of Section 

1170.1 of the Penal Code.” Penal Code section 1170.1, 

subdivision (a) states that “when any person is convicted of two 

or more felonies, whether in the same proceeding . . . or in 

different proceedings . . . , and a consecutive term of 

imprisonment is imposed under Sections 669 and 1170, the 

aggregate term of imprisonment for all these convictions shall be 

the sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any 

additional term imposed for applicable enhancements . . . . The 

principal term shall consist of the greatest term of imprisonment 

imposed by the court for any of the crimes, including any term 

imposed for applicable specific enhancements. The subordinate 

term for each consecutive offense shall consist of one-third of the 

middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each other felony

conviction.” 

As the People note, the court set appellant’s maximum 

term of confinement by calculating: (1) a principal term of 3 

years for the assault charged in the fourth (and most recent) 

section 602 petition; (2) one year (one-third the midterm) for the

battery charged in the third petition; (3) one year (one-third the 

midterm) for the GBI assault charged in the second petition; and 

(4) four months (one-third the maximum one-year county jail 

sentence) for the Penal Code section 626.10 offense charged in 
7

the first petition, for a total of 5 years and 4 months.2 Appellant’s 

claim that the court miscalculated his maximum term of 

confinement thus fails.

Custody Credits

Appellant also contends the court erred in applying his 

precommitment custody credits against his maximum term of 

confinement, rather than his baseline term of 18 months. We 

conclude otherwise.

Appellant was committed to an SYTF pursuant to section 

875. Subdivision (c)(1)(C) of that section expressly and 

unequivocally provides that “[p]recommitment credits for time 

served must be applied against the maximum term of confinement 

as set pursuant to this subdivision.” (Italics added.) Because 

this statutory language is clear, we must follow it “‘“‘“‘unless a 

literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the 

Legislature did not intend.’”’”’” (People v. Braden (2023) 14 

Cal.5th 791, 804.)

Appellant does not demonstrate that applying his custody 

credits against his baseline term rather than his maximum term 

of confinement would be an absurd result. In re Ernesto L. (2022)

81 Cal.App.5th 31, which appellant cites in support of his claim, 

is inapposite. That case held that minors committed to the DJJ 

pursuant to section 726 were entitled to have their 

precommitment custody credits applied against their “maximum 

custodial term” under section 731 rather than the “maximum 

2 The one-third of the maximum term limitation applies to 

appellant’s misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 626.10, 

notwithstanding that Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (a) 

refers only to felonies. (See In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 

537-538.)
8

exposure term” of confinement set under section 726. (Ernesto L., 

at p. 34.) The court recognized that the reach of its holding was 

limited due to statutory amendments providing for the closure of 

the DJJ on June 30, 2023, but published the decision to express 

its disagreement with the holding to the contrary in In re A.R. 

(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1076. (Ernesto L., at p. 34, fn. 2.)

Ernesto L. has no application here because appellant was 

not committed to the DJJ pursuant to sections 726 and 731; 

rather, he was committed to an SYTF pursuant to section 875. 

Unlike section 731, the plain language of section 875 makes clear

that in committing juveniles to an SYTF the court must apply 

precommitment custody credits against their maximum term of 

confinement rather than their baseline term. As the People note, 

the baseline term set by the court under section 875—unlike the 

maximum custodial term set under section 731—may be adjusted 

downward at each six-month hearing to address the ward’s 

needs. (§ 875, subd. (e).) It is thus clear that the baseline term 

set under section 875 is not equivalent to the maximum custodial 

term set for juveniles committed to the DJJ under section 731. 

Because juveniles committed to DJJ and juveniles 

committed to an SYTF are not similarly situated in this regard, 

we also reject appellant’s claim that equal protection principles 

compel us to apply his custody credits to his baseline term rather 

than his maximum term of confinement. (See People v. Nguyen 

(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 705, 714 [recognizing that “an equal 

protection claim cannot succeed, and does not require further 

analysis, unless there is some showing that the two groups are 

sufficiently similar with respect to the purpose of the law in 

question”].) Even if they were similarly situated, there would be 

no equal protection violation because there is a rational basis for
9

treating the two groups differently for purposes of custody 

credits. (In re J.M. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 999, 1010 [Where, as 

here, a disputed statutory disparity implicates no suspect class or 

fundamental right, equal protection of the law is denied only 

where there is no rational relationship between the disparity of 

treatment and some governmental purpose].) As the People note, 

“if [an SYTF] ward’s baseline term could be consumed by 

precommitment custody credits before [they have] had a 

meaningful opportunity to engage in treatment, the stated 

purpose of setting the baseline term would rarely be achieved.” 

Appellant’s claim his custody credits must be applied against his 

baseline term thus fails.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.
Miguel Espinoza, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.