IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 19–0295 

Submitted November 18, 2020—Filed April 23, 2021 

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee, 

vs. 

TIMOTHY MICHAEL FONTENOT,

Appellant. 

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R. 

Grady, Judge. 

Defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision 

affirming his conviction for two counts of indecent contact with a child. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT

AFFIRMED.

Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which 

Waterman, Mansfield, and McDermott, JJ., joined. McDonald, J., filed a 

dissenting opinion in which Appel and Oxley, JJ., joined. 

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ashley Stewart 

(argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. 
2 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl Soich (argued), Assistant 

Attorney General, Jerry Vander Sanden, County Attorney, and Jordan N. 

Schier, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
3 

CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice. 

In this case, over the defendant’s objection, the jury was shown a 

video recording of a child’s forensic interview where the child discussed 

the defendant’s sexual abuse of her. This interview occurred at the time 

the child reported the abuse, and long before criminal charges were 

brought. The video was shown to the jury after defense counsel crossexamined the child at trial and suggested she had fabricated her criminal 

trial testimony by pointing out inconsistencies principally between her 

criminal trial testimony and her criminal case deposition. The district 

court allowed the jury to see the video only once and instructed the jury 

that the video could only be used as a tool to assess the child’s credibility. 

The district court also allowed the criminal case deposition to be read to 

the jury. The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty of two counts of 

indecent contact with a child. 

The defendant appealed, claiming it was error to let the jury see the 

interview. The court of appeals affirmed. We granted the defendant’s 

application for further review. On our review, we now conclude the video 

was admissible as a prior consistent statement under Iowa Rule of 

Evidence 5.801(d)(1)(B). We affirm the defendant’s convictions and 

sentence. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

The defendant, Timothy Fontenot, was like an uncle to H.N. His 

brother, Joe, was in a long-term relationship with H.N.’s mother. During 

the events at issue, H.N. was eleven years old and lived with her mother, 

Joe, and other siblings in Marion, Iowa. Fontenot was frequently around 

H.N. and her best friend and communicated with them on Facebook 

Messenger. In July 2016, H.N. and her friend discussed how Fontenot 
4 

would touch them inappropriately. H.N. also told her younger sister about 

the inappropriate touching. 

The younger sister was in bed with their mother at night and told 

her Fontenot had been touching H.N. When her mother spoke with H.N. 

that night, H.N. initially denied the allegation, but later in the same 

conversation, she said that Fontenot was touching her inappropriately. 

The next morning, July 14, 2016, Joe went to the Marion Police 

Department to report the allegations against his brother. H.N. was taken 

to a local hospital at the instruction of the police. On July 15, H.N. was 

taken to St. Luke’s Child Protection Center (CPC), where she discussed the 

sexual abuse with a forensic interviewer. The interview was video recorded 

and lasted approximately fifty-five minutes. 

In the video recorded CPC interview, H.N. spoke specifically about 

the most recent time Fontenot touched her. She told the interviewer they 

were in her brother’s room on a couch while her brother sat in a chair 

playing video games when Fontenot rubbed her “private spot” (vagina) 

underneath her underwear and put his finger in her private spot. She 

explained he would put his hand underneath the bottom half of her shorts 

and underwear. She noted she would have a blanket over her and he 

would go underneath the blanket. 

H.N. explained Fontenot first started touching her when she was 

seven or eight, only rubbing her pants at first before progressing to 

touching her private spot as she got older. She stated the first time he 

touched her private spot, she was ten years old and in her bedroom. H.N. 

said she was playing on her iPad while on her bed and Fontenot was on 

the floor on his knees when he touched her private spot. She noted the 

touching normally happened on her bed or her brother’s couch, and she 

discussed how Fontenot would call the inappropriate touching “tickle 
5 

time.” She added that Fontenot gave her UGG boots to get tickle time. 

H.N. also explained that her phone data and Wi-Fi were on Fontenot’s 

cellular plan instead of her parents’ plan and that he used this 

arrangement as a way to get “tickle time.” She discussed how Fontenot 

would flip her and her friend up onto his shoulders, at which time he 

would sometimes touch their private spots. 

On June 28, 2017, the State charged Fontenot with two counts of 

sexual abuse in the second degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 

709.1, 709.3(1)(b), and 903B.1 (2016), with H.N. named as the victim. 

Fontenot was also charged with two counts of indecent contact with a 

child, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code sections 

709.12(1) and 903B.2, as to H.N.’s friend. On February 14, 2018, about 

nineteen months after her videorecorded CPC interview, defense counsel 

took H.N.’s deposition with Fontenot present in the same room. H.N. had 

not reviewed her CPC interview summary or watched the recording of it. 

She told defense counsel Fontenot last touched her inappropriately in July 

of 2016. She thought that the incident occurred in her brother’s room 

while he was playing video games. She said that a blanket was tucked in 

around her and that she was wearing shorts. She told defense counsel 

she thought something happened but wasn’t sure. She thought the 

touching was just above her clothes, but she could not remember. 

During her deposition, H.N. also described a time Fontenot touched 

her in her room while she was in bed. After several more questions, 

defense counsel came back to this incident. H.N. stated she was not sure 

if Fontenot touched her under her clothes or above her clothes. She told 

defense counsel she thought Fontenot had been touching her since she 

was six or seven and would rub up her thigh. She affirmed she could not 

remember a time when Fontenot’s fingers went inside her vagina. She said 
6 

he bought her UGG boots and gave her a cell phone. H.N. affirmed the 

inappropriate touching went on for years and happened more times than 

she could count in her room, her brother’s room, and the living room. She 

noted there were times he would accidentally touch her private spot when 

flipping her up onto his shoulders but those times were not included in 

her total count of times he touched her inappropriately. 

On February 28, the State filed a notice of intent to present H.N.’s 

CPC video interview under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.807, the residual 

hearsay exception, or alternatively under Iowa Rule of Evidence 

5.801(d)(1)(B), the rule excluding prior consistent statements as hearsay, 

if the defense claimed H.N.’s statements were fabrication. On 

December 17, the State filed an unresisted motion to amend the trial 

information to reflect two additional counts of indecent contact with a 

child, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code sections 

709.12(1) and 903B.2, as to H.N. 

Fontenot’s jury trial began on December 17, 2018. H.N. took the 

stand as a witness for the State. Prior to trial, H.N. had not reviewed any 

of her statements, video recordings, or deposition. She testified Fontenot 

bought her items like a cell phone and UGG boots to get extra “tickle time,” 

his term for inappropriate touching. When asked about the first time 

Fontenot did something bad to her, she explained she was six or seven 

when he rubbed her leg while on a camping trip. She testified Fontenot 

mostly touched her inappropriately in her bedroom or her brother’s room. 

She said that at first, he would rub her legs, similar to the camping trip, 

but progressed over time to rubbing her private spot underneath her 

underwear. She noted Fontenot rubbed her private spot with his hand in 

her bedroom during the day and would not say anything to her while 

touching her. 
7 

She testified the last time Fontenot touched her, he rubbed her 

private spot with his hand. She stated he put his fingers inside her private 

spot once when she was in her brother’s room while he was playing video 

games. She also explained Fontenot would sometimes put a blanket over 

her to touch her. 

At trial, H.N. described how Fontenot would touch her and her best 

friend on the private spot by picking them up and putting them on his 

shoulders and then flipping them back down, one at a time. She testified 

Fontenot would “touch us like fast and then wait and then touch—like 

touch us back down when we were going back down.” H.N. noted there 

were times he flipped her and did not touch her private spot and it was 

possible the touching was sometimes an accident. However, she affirmed 

she never felt it was an accident when he touched her underneath her 

clothing. 

On cross-examination, defense counsel began by reminding H.N. of 

the deposition: 

Q. . . . And did you understand at that time that you 

were supposed to tell the truth? A. Yes. 

Q. Because most of what you just testified to you didn’t 

tell me on that occasion. 

Defense counsel went on to emphasize apparent inconsistencies between 

her trial testimony and what she had previously said in both her 

February 14, 2018 deposition and her July 15, 2016 CPC interview. For 

example, he addressed the incident in her brother’s room she testified to, 

but he asserted, “[Y]ou didn’t even think that you got touched on that 

occasion.” He also brought up an incident she discussed in the deposition, 

noting it “sounds a little bit like what you were talking about here today . 
8 

. . . Except the difference was that you said you weren’t sure that you were 

in your brother’s room.” 

Defense counsel selectively read back sections of the deposition 

where H.N. said she wasn’t sure on certain things. He repeatedly 

questioned whether H.N. understood she was to tell the truth. Parts of the 

questioning related specifically to her memory and how it could have 

improved at the trial in comparison to the deposition. He read the portion 

of the deposition in which she affirmed she did not remember a time 

Fontenot’s fingers went inside her vagina. He impeached her testimony 

about Fontenot first touching her on her legs when she was around seven 

on a camping trip by noting she never discussed a camping trip in her 

deposition or the CPC interview. 

Following H.N.’s testimony, the State argued to the district court 

that defense counsel’s cross-examination opened the door for admission 

of the CPC interview because defense counsel implied her testimony was 

not consistent and was recently fabricated. The State additionally argued 

the video should be admissible under the residual hearsay exception. 

Defense counsel objected to admission of the CPC video at trial. In the 

event the CPC video was admitted, Fontenot requested H.N.’s deposition 

also be admitted with a redaction. The State agreed to admission of the 

redacted deposition. 

The district court determined the video was admissible, explaining: 

Though I think it’s rather close, much closer than there are in 

other cases where the person has a much more pronounced 

inability to remember and the child is younger, I think in 

terms of the context and how the questions were asked and 

answered, I think that’s appropriate and in this case, because 

of the nature of [H.N.’s] testimony, rises to a level of necessity. 

The video was shown to the jury once and was not allowed in the jury room 

during deliberations. The redacted deposition was also read aloud to the 
9 

jury. The district court included a jury instruction that as to any 

statement not made under oath, “only use the statement as a basis for 

disregarding all or any part of the witness’s testimony.” Thus, the 

statements in the CPC video were allowed as an instrument for the jury 

only to assess H.N.’s credibility as a witness and not treated as substantive 

evidence. 

The jury found Fontenot guilty of two counts of indecent contact 

with H.N. It also found Fontenot not guilty of the two counts of indecent 

contact with H.N.’s friend. On February 15, 2019, the district court 

sentenced Fontenot to confinement for a period of 300 days, with all but 

120 days suspended, for each count, and with the sentences to run 

concurrently. The court additionally placed Fontenot on special probation 

for ten years under Iowa Code section 903A and required him to register 

as a sex offender under section 901A. On February 20, Fontenot filed a 

timely notice of appeal. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction. We 

granted further review. 

II. Standard of Review. 

We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2009). However, the standard of 

review for hearsay is for errors at law. Id. 

III. Analysis. 

The State argues the CPC video was admissible as a prior consistent 

statement under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d)(1)(B), under the residual 

exception to hearsay in rule 5.807, or under Iowa Code section 915.38. 

Fontenot contends the CPC video is hearsay evidence and was not 

admissible on any ground. Although it is unclear from the record exactly 

which rule the district court relied on in determining the video was 

admissible, this does not prevent us from upholding the district court’s 
10 

admission of the video if it was properly admissible on any ground. See, 

e.g., Giza v. BNSF Ry., 843 N.W.2d 713, 724–25 (Iowa 2014) (noting a 

district court’s evidentiary ruling may be upheld on an alternative ground); 

DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Iowa 2002) (explaining we consistently 

apply an exception for evidentiary rulings to our error preservation rule). 

Upon our review, we conclude the CPC video was admissible as a prior 

consistent statement under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d)(1)(B). 

Hearsay is a statement the declarant makes other than while 

testifying at the current trial that is offered “to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted in the statement.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c)(2). Hearsay is generally 

inadmissible unless the rules of evidence, Iowa Constitution, or an Iowa 

Supreme Court rule provide otherwise. Id. r. 5.802. Therefore, we need 

not address whether the video would have been admissible on any other 

ground. A witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible as 

nonhearsay if 

[t]he declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination 

about a prior statement, and the statement . . . [i]s consistent 

with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an 

express or implied charge that the declarant recently 

fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or 

motive in so testifying. 

Id. r. 5.801(d)(1)(B). A witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible 

under 5.801(d)(1)(B) “only if the statement was made before the alleged 

improper motive to fabricate arose.” State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160, 

164 (Iowa 1995) (adopting the bright-line federal rule for timing set out in 

Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995)). The 

requirements for rule 5.801(d)(1)(B) are as follows: 

(1) [T]he declarant must testify at trial and be subject to 

cross-examination concerning the prior statement; (2) there 

must be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or 

improper influence or motive against the declarant; (3) the 
11 

prior statement must be consistent with the declarant’s 

challenged in-court testimony; and (4) the prior consistent 

statement must be made before the alleged motive to fabricate 

or improper influence arose. 

7 Laurie Kratky Doré, Iowa Practice Series: Evidence § 5.801:7, at 903 

(2020–2021 ed. 2020) (footnotes omitted). 

Contrary to the dissent, rule 5.801(d)(1)(B) does not require that the 

proponent of the evidence and the district court must specifically identify 

the charge of recent fabrication. Because Iowa caselaw is contrary to such 

a position, the dissent understandably cites no Iowa caselaw as authority 

for its position. We may affirm admission of evidence if it was properly 

admissible on any ground, including as a prior consistent statement. See, 

e.g., State v. Reyes, 744 N.W.2d 95, 100 (Iowa 2008); Giza, 843 N.W.2d at 

724–25; DeVoss, 648 N.W.2d at 62. For example, in State v. Brotherton, 

we concluded testimony of a social worker was admissible as a prior 

consistent statement although the trial court had not admitted it as such 

and had given jury instructions that the testimony was not to be 

considered as substantive evidence. 384 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Iowa 1986) 

(en banc); see also State v. Jespersen, 360 N.W.2d 804, 806 (Iowa 1985) 

(determining hearsay statements were admissible as prior consistent 

statements although the trial court admitted them as excited utterances). 

In this case, defense counsel opened the door for admission of the 

CPC video when he repeatedly implied during his cross-examination of 

H.N. that “most of what you’ve just testified to” was fabricated, she was 

not telling the truth, and her story at trial was inconsistent with her prior 

statements. The district court then admitted the CPC video because of 

“the context and how the questions were asked and answered.” 

A. Timing Requirement. A prior consistent statement must be 

made before the alleged motive to fabricate or improper influence arose. 
12 

Johnson, 539 N.W.2d at 165. Fontenot maintains the timing requirement 

is not met because the CPC interview occurred after H.N. accused Fontenot 

of sexual abuse. Fontenot only cites State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160, 

for authority. 

In Johnson, this court determined that the district court had 

erroneously admitted video of a child’s CPC interview at trial as a prior 

consistent statement under rule 5.801(d)(1)(B). Id. at 160. The defendant 

testified his daughter made up sex abuse allegations against him after he 

told her he might schedule her for an overnight visit at a Masonic 

Children’s Home. Id. at 161. He considered scheduling this visit because 

of difficulties he and her mother were having disciplining her, concerns 

they had about her current boyfriend, and the fact that her mother and 

her “were not getting along.” Id. He further testified that he believed his 

daughter would rather live in a local foster home than be forced to end 

contact with her boyfriend, as might happen if she was placed in the 

Masonic home or continued to reside with him. Id. The child’s CPC 

interview occurred after the defendant had threatened to place her in the 

Masonic home. Id. at 161. We concluded the video was not admissible as 

a prior consistent statement because the video was recorded after the 

daughter’s alleged motive to fabricate arose. Id. at 163–65; see also United 

States v. Bercier, 506 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 2007) (determining that 

conversations victim had shortly after a sexual assault she said occurred 

in defendant’s bedroom did not qualify as prior consistent statements 

when the defendant charged that she fabricated the story immediately 

after she left his bedroom). 

On the same day we decided Johnson, we issued our decision in 

State v. Capper, 539 N.W.2d 361 (Iowa 1995), abrogated on other grounds 

by State v. Hawk, 616 N.W.2d 527 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). In Capper, two 
13 

children testified the defendant had sexually abused them. Id. at 364. At 

trial, defense counsel vigorously cross-examined the children, challenging 

their credibility. Id. at 365. To impeach their testimony, he introduced 

portions of their depositions taken prior to trial. Id. One of the children, 

N.S., denied in her deposition that defendant had at any time tried to touch 

her breast or to rub her in the vagina area. Id. at 366. However, N.S. 

testified at trial that the defendant had touched her on her stomach, 

crotch, and vagina. Id. at 365. Defense counsel implied the children 

changed their story after he had deposed them. Id. at 366. Following 

cross-examination, the district court allowed a deputy sheriff to testify as 

to statements N.S. made to him before her deposition was taken. Id. The 

deputy sheriff testified N.S. stated defendant touched her breast and 

vagina. We determined the deputy sheriff’s testimony, which preceded 

N.S.’s deposition, was properly admitted as a prior consistent statement. 

Id. 

The record in this case is distinguishable from Johnson, where the 

defendant alleged the child had fabricated the entire story, and more like 

Capper, where defense counsel implied at trial the children had changed

their stories since their depositions. Perhaps anticipating this, defense 

counsel asserted for the first time at oral arguments that Fontenot’s 

defense has been that H.N. made up the allegations because Fontenot 

threatened to take away the cell phone he paid for her to have. Our review 

of the record shows defense counsel never brought this alleged motive to 

fabricate into evidence or discussed it in its brief. The record shows the 

State offered the CPC interview as evidence after defense counsel 

suggested H.N.’s testimony at trial had changed and was inconsistent from 

her CPC interview and deposition, not to rebut a charge that H.N. made 

up the story to keep her cell phone. Thus, in this case, unlike in Johnson, 
14 

it is not an alleged motive for making up the initial allegations that is at 

issue but rather defense counsel’s cross-examination where he implied 

H.N. was changing or fabricating her story on the stand or in her 

deposition taken on February 14, 2018. See id.; United States v. Wilkinson, 

754 F.2d 1427, 1433 (2nd Cir. 1985) (allowing admission of witness’s prior 

consistent statement after defense counsel on cross-examination brought 

out inconsistencies between witness’s statements on the stand and 

statements made previously). 

Fontenot argues that because the CPC interview occurred after H.N. 

accused Fontenot of sexual abuse, the interview is not admissible as a 

prior consistent statement. As discussed above, this argument fails to 

recognize that in this case, the charge of fabrication arose at trial when 

defense counsel focused on inconsistencies between the deposition and 

the trial testimony. See United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 

2001) (allowing admission of prior consistent statements after defense 

counsel’s cross-examination implied the witness had fabricated on the 

stand by noting his testimony included observations his prior statements 

had not mentioned); Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d at 380 (determining defense 

counsel’s cross-examination made a charge of recent fabrication as 

required under rule 5.801(d)(1)(B) when questioning related to the child’s 

present memory and whether the child’s story on the stand was made up), 

modified by Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160; cf. United States v. Beaulieu, 194 

F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 1999) (determining out-of-court statements were 

not admissible at trial as prior consistent statements when defense 

counsel did not assert victim had fabricated her account of the abuse until 

closing arguments). The CPC interview occurred two days after the last 

alleged incident of abuse, the deposition occurred nineteen months later, 

and H.N.’s trial testimony occurred ten months after that. At trial, defense 
15 

counsel claimed H.N. was fabricating or changing her story and impeached 

her with portions of her deposition. If defense counsel used H.N.’s 

deposition to imply recent fabrication and impeach her on crossexamination, then the CPC video that occurred first and closest to the last 

allegation of abuse should also be admitted for the jury’s consideration. 

At earliest, Fontenot’s charge of fabrication or change in story arose at 

H.N.’s deposition on February 14, 2018. Therefore, the requirement that 

the prior consistent statement occur before the recent charge of fabrication 

arose is met in this case. 

B. Implied Charge of Recent Fabrication. A prior consistent 

statement is admissible only if it is offered to rebut an express or implied 

charge of recent fabrication. In State v. Jespersen, a testifying witness, 

Stephanie Clark, had first made a statement to a man named Ivan Snow 

that the defendant said he was going to kill the deceased. 360 N.W.2d at 

806. Clark later made a second statement to police officers that defendant 

said he was going to stab the deceased. Id. at 807. Clark made a third 

statement at trial that defendant told her he was going to kill the deceased. 

Id. On cross-examination, defense counsel pointed out the inconsistencies 

between her trial testimony and what she had previously stated to police 

officers—particularly that she had spoken of killing rather than stabbing. 

Id. We concluded that “the implication of this line of questioning was that 

Clark was lying in her trial testimony when she said defendant used the 

word ‘kill’ rather than ‘stab.’ ” Id. Thus, we determined Ivan Snow’s 

testimony as to Clark’s first statement to him that the defendant said he 

was going to kill the deceased was admissible as a prior consistent 

statement. Id. 

State v. Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375, is also instructive. There, the 

child first made statements to a social worker that the defendant had 
16 

sexually abused her. Id. at 380. The child made a second round of 

statements in a deposition. Id. At trial, the child gave a third round of 

statements that defendant had sexually abused her. Id. Defense counsel 

vigorously cross-examined the child partly on matters contained in the 

deposition. Id. Defense counsel denied he made any charge of recent 

fabrication or improper motive or influence in his cross-examination. Id. 

We disagreed because parts of the cross-examination related to matters 

such as the child’s present memory, whether the child made up the story 

testified to at trial, and the mother preparing the child for trial. Id. 

Consequently, under the rule for admission of prior consistent statements, 

the social worker was allowed to testify as to the child’s first round of 

statements that were consistent with her trial testimony. Id. at 380–81. 

The present case follows the same factual scenario. H.N. first made 

certain statements to the CPC interviewer. For example, she stated 

Fontenot put his finger inside her vagina once. She also stated the last 

time he touched her was in July 2016 in her brother’s room while her 

brother played video games. H.N. made a second round of statements in 

her deposition. She asserted she could not remember a time Fontenot’s 

fingers were inside of her. She second-guessed whether she could 

remember if Fontenot had touched her in her brother’s room while he 

played video games in July 2016. H.N. then made a third round of 

statements at trial where she testified to various details including that 

Fontenot put his finger inside her and described the last time he 

inappropriately touched her as happening in her brother’s room while he 

played video games in July 2016 and defense counsel vigorously crossexamined H.N. by focusing on apparent inconsistencies in her statements 

at the deposition and trial. See United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071, 

1080 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining if defense counsel had impeached the 
17 

child witness with an intervening inconsistent statement, then the child’s 

consistent prior statement made shortly after the last incident of alleged 

abuse would be admissible to rehabilitate the child’s credibility). 

On appeal, Fontenot does not deny defense counsel made an implied 

charge of recent fabrication during his cross-examination of H.N. Our 

review of the trial transcript shows defense counsel implied H.N.’s story at 

trial had changed from her deposition and was fabrication. Furthermore, 

the district court judge observed defense counsel’s demeanor and tone 

during cross-examination and determined the video was admissible 

because of “how the questions were asked.” This is not a situation where 

defense counsel merely pointed out H.N. had made prior inconsistent 

statements. He repeatedly implied she was fabricating and questioned her 

present memory and truthfulness. See Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d at 380 

(finding charge of recent fabrication when questioning related to child’s 

present memory); State v. Jenkins, 326 N.W.2d 67, 71 (N.D. 1982) 

(allowing witness to testify to child’s prior statements alleging abuse when 

cross-examination attempted to establish the child or her mother made up 

a story about the abuse). 

He stated no less than seven times during cross-examination of H.N. 

in various iterations that “all we wanted you to do was to tell the truth” at 

the pretrial deposition. A jury could reasonably infer H.N. had fabricated 

her testimony from this repeated line of questioning. See United States v. 

Young, 105 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming admission of a prior 

consistent statement after defense counsel inadvertently elicited witness 

testimony from which a jury could possibly infer the witness had 

fabricated his testimony); United States v. Patterson, 644 F.2d 890, 900 

(1st Cir. 1981) (determining there is a charge of recent fabrication if “[t]he 

jury could have thought it was being suggested that [a witness]’s testimony 
18 

was recently fabricated”). Defense counsel made multiple statements 

calling H.N.’s memory into question. For example, he asked “How is it that 

your memory is better today than it was back in February of this year 

when we talked?” and “Remember that? That you weren’t having a 

problem with your memory.” It is hard to imagine how these statements 

could be perceived as anything other than an implication she was 

fabricating at trial. See Dearing v. State, 691 P.2d 419, 421 (Neb. 1984) 

(per curiam) (finding charge of recent fabrication when “trial counsel crossexamined the child witness at considerable length with the apparent 

intention of implying that the child’s credibility was questionable”). On 

top of this, counsel sought to make H.N.’s testimony at trial appear 

inconsistent from her previous statements at least ten times. 

Furthermore, H.N. denied on cross-examination that she omitted 

certain portions of her trial testimony from her deposition. 

Q. . . . And did you understand at that time that you 

were supposed to tell the truth? A. Yes. 

Q. Because most of what you’ve just testified to you 

didn’t tell me on that occasion. Remember that? A. I’m pretty 

sure I told you. 

. . . . 

Q. You told me about an occasion that happened you 

said in Jacob’s room; right? A. Yeah. 

Q. When Jacob was there? A. Yeah. 

Q. And you told me that you didn’t even think that you 

got touched on that occasion. Remember that? A. No. 

“[W]hen an impeached witness denies making a prior inconsistent 

statement, it is firmly established that even the slightest suggestion of 

fabrication, improper influence or motive, triggers the rule and allows the 

admission of a witness’ prior consistent statement.” State v. Gardner, 490 
19 

N.W.2d 838, 840 (Iowa 1992), overruled on other grounds by Johnson, 539 

N.W.2d 160. 

Defense counsel additionally cross-examined H.N. as to why she 

never mentioned “to those people that wanted to help you” at CPC that 

Fontenot rubbed her legs when she was around seven years old while on 

a camping trip. He similarly questioned H.N. at length about why she 

didn’t report the abuse earlier to her mother: 

Q. And, [H.N.], how do you feel about your mother? A. 

I love her. 

Q. And your mother loves you; right? A. Yes. 

Q. And she would not hesitate to protect you, would 

she? A. Yeah. 

Q. She would? A. No, she would not. 

Q. All right. And there she is coming right into the 

room right when this is happening, and you could have said, 

Mom, Tim is doing this to me? A. Yeah. 

Q. And there would be no reason for you to not say 

that? A. Yeah. 

Q. I’m sorry? A. Yeah. 

Q. If it had actually happened. A. It did. 

Q. So why didn’t you tell your mother? 

There is a strong implication a witness has fabricated on the stand when 

cross-examination inquires at length into why the witness delayed in 

telling others details of a crime. See, e.g., Young, 105 F.3d at 9 (finding 

cross-examination implied fabrication by highlighting that the witness 

delayed in telling certain observations to others); State v. Saltz, 551 S.E.2d 

240, 246–47 (S.C. 2001) (finding a charge of recent fabrication when 

defense counsel highlighted the witness did not come forward with 

information until thirteen days before trial); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
20 

706 N.E.2d 669, 680 (Mass. 1999) (finding cross-examination “strongly 

implied” fabrication by inquiring into why the witness had not immediately 

informed police on certain details). 

The dissent claims defense counsel did not make an implied charge 

of recent fabrication. If we were to adopt the dissent’s position in this case, 

then the rule might as well be changed to requiring an express charge of 

recent fabrication because all that was left for defense counsel to do was 

outright ask, “and isn’t it true you are fabricating on the stand?” The 

dissent cites Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1, 23 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) to 

support its argument. However, a closer look at the facts of Taylor shows 

this case actually supports the majority’s finding of a charge of recent 

fabrication. 

In Taylor, a police officer testified to a statement the defendant told 

him. Id. at 22. The Florida Supreme Court found an implicit charge of 

recent fabrication had not been made on cross-examination because “the 

questioning dealt with the proper preparation of police reports and the 

observation that Noble’s written report did not contain Taylor’s statement.” 

Id. at 23. Thus, the line of questioning did not imply the officer was 

fabricating on the stand but rather implied “police attempts to identify a 

perpetrator were sloppy and incomplete.” 4 Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. 

McKenna, Jones on Evidence § 26:38 (7th ed. 2020). Thus, our finding 

that defense counsel implied recent fabrication in the present case when 

he repeatedly implied H.N. was fabricating on the stand is not at odds with 

Taylor’s holding. 

The dissent also cites Jones v. State, 439 P.3d 753 (Wyo. 2019), to 

support its position that defense counsel never implied recent fabrication. 

Jones additionally supports the majority’s position. The Wyoming 

Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s admission of children’s forensic 
21 

interviews as prior consistent statements although there were “additional 

detail[s]” and “variation” because “the gist of the prior consistent 

statements is that they address the incidents of alleged sexual abuse that 

are alleged in the six counts in this case.” Id. at 757. The court found 

defense counsel implied a charge of fabrication or improper influence 

during cross-examination of the children when “[q]uestions related to 

conversations they had with others” about the alleged sexual abuse, 

whether anyone helped them prepare to testify, and the timing of when a 

photograph was shown to one of the children in which she alleges the 

abuse was pictured occurring. Id. at 762. In the present case, defense 

counsel was arguably even more express in his charges of fabrication. For 

these reasons, we determine defense counsel implied a charge of recent 

fabrication in his cross-examination of H.N. 

C. Consistency. Although it is not clear, Fontenot possibly 

challenges the requirement that the prior statement must be consistent 

with the declarant’s challenged testimony. The vast majority of H.N.’s trial 

testimony is consistent and corroborative with her statements in the CPC 

video. For example, defense counsel went to great lengths to imply H.N. 

fabricated her testimony that Fontenot first rubbed her legs when she was 

six or seven on a camping trip. Although not described as occurring on a 

camping trip, she similarly told the CPC interviewer Fontenot first started 

touching her when she was seven by rubbing her legs before it progressed 

to rubbing on her private spot when she was ten. In addition, defense 

counsel expressly charged she fabricated the abuse she testified happened 

in her bedroom during the day. However, she discusses this specific 

incident of abuse in the CPC video. 

Fontenot asserted H.N. couldn’t remember in her deposition 

whether Fontenot had touched her on the couch while her brother was 
22 

playing video games. She speaks directly to this incident in the CPC video 

and states he touched her. He noted that in her deposition, she couldn’t 

remember whether Fontenot’s fingers ever went inside of her vagina, in 

contrast to her trial testimony. She states in the video his fingers went 

inside of her. Consistent with her trial testimony, she additionally 

discusses in the video how Fontenot bought her UGG boots and a cell 

phone plan as a way to touch her more, would flip her and E.M. and touch 

them inappropriately, would put a blanket over her body to touch her, and 

would go underneath her shorts to touch her. 

The dissent’s reliance on United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071, is 

also misplaced. We agree with the dissent’s explanation of the factual 

scenario in Kenyon. The child testified and said certain details about the 

abuse for the first time ever on the stand. Id. at 1080. The court of appeals 

held the district court erred by allowing a physician’s assistant to testify 

to the child’s prior statements about other different details. Id. This is not 

the same scenario as the present case. 

As discussed above, almost every detail of H.N.’s testimony that 

defense counsel impeached is corroborated by her statements in the CPC 

video. Furthermore, Kenyon asserts the physician’s assistant’s testimony 

would have been properly admitted as a prior consistent statement if 

defense counsel had presented evidence that the child omitted certain 

details during an “intervening” grand jury appearance that she then 

testified to at trial. Id. In that regard, Kenyon is directly on point, as 

defense counsel impeached H.N. by presenting evidence of omissions in 

an intervening deposition. 

There are details in the CPC video that were not discussed by H.N. 

at trial as well as two clearly inconsistent statements. Fontenot points 

out, for example, that at trial H.N. testified Fontenot did not touch her 
23 

breasts but in the CPC video states that he did place his hand under her 

sports bra and touched her “private spot up here.” Additionally, H.N. 

states in the CPC video Fontenot touched his penis when he touched her 

but at trial testified he used one hand when he touched her and that she 

did not know what he did with his other hand. 

These inconsistencies do not detract from the fact that the CPC video 

is, on the whole, consistent with H.N.’s trial testimony. Fontenot did not 

object to the admission of portions of the video; his objection was all or 

nothing. 

In any event, we presume the admission of hearsay that does not 

fall within an exception is prejudicial to the nonoffering party unless 

otherwise established. State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa 2003). 

Although prior consistent statements are admissible for the truth of the 

matter asserted, in this case, the district court included a jury instruction 

that informed the jury that as to statements not made under oath, “you 

may only use the statement as a basis for disregarding all or any part of 

the witness’s testimony.” We presume jurors follow instructions. State v. 

Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Iowa 2012). 

The State contends it was to Fontenot’s benefit that none of the 

statements in the CPC video came in as substantive evidence and he was 

not prejudiced by the few inconsistent statements it contained. We agree. 

Rather than bolster H.N.’s credibility to the jurors, these inconsistent 

statements more likely casted doubt on her credibility in the CPC video. 

Contrary to the CPC interview, H.N. testified at trial that Fontenot had not

touched himself in her presence or touched her breasts.1

 

1Fontenot also benefited from the district court’s decision to have the redacted 

deposition read aloud to the jury. Thus, the jury had everything before it: H.N.’s trial 

testimony, where she was vigorously cross-examined; H.N.’s original video interview; and 

H.N.’s deposition. 
24 

Furthermore, because these statements were video recorded, the 

jury was better able to assess H.N.’s credibility as to the statements. The 

CPC interviewer asked open-ended, nonleading questions the vast majority 

of the interview. However, at trial, the jury could see for themselves that 

H.N.’s answers resulting in these two particular inconsistent statements 

were in response to more leading and less open-ended questions. For 

example, the interviewer asked H.N. several times what Fontenot’s other 

hand was doing when he touched her with his one hand, and H.N. said it 

was not doing anything or she was unsure. It was only after the 

interviewer asked H.N. if Fontenot’s other hand touched any other part of 

her body that H.N. stated Fontenot would also touch her under her sports 

bra. Later in the conversation, the interviewer asked H.N. if Fontenot “ever 

touched his penis in front of you,” and H.N. responded in the negative. 

The interviewer again asked, “Did you ever accidentally see him touch his 

penis?” This time H.N. replied, “He’s tried to . . . . so when he touches me 

he touches his penis.” It seems more likely the admission of these 

statements were more injurious to the State than to Fontenot because of 

the context they arose from in the video and because H.N. testified at trial 

there was “no doubt” in her mind Fontenot never touched her breasts and 

that she did not know if he did anything with his other hand when he 

touched her. 

Admittedly, the statements in the CPC video including additional 

details not discussed in H.N.’s trial testimony have no probative value as 

prior consistent statements. For example, defense counsel made a motion 

for mistrial after the video was played because H.N. told the CPC 

interviewer in the video that Fontenot had photos of girls in small bikinis 

on his cell phone. The district court stated that in the grand scheme it 

was not prejudicial to Fontenot and noted defense counsel had months to 
25 

review the CPC video and file a motion in limine to redact certain portions. 

See Gardner, 490 N.W.2d at 842 (“Defendant did not request the court to 

preview the tape prior to admission . . . . This could have been cured by a 

request to limit play-back to the one relevant question. Defendant did not 

request the trial court to limit the presentation in this manner; 

consequently, he has not preserved a claim of error.”), overruled on other 

grounds by Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160. Defense counsel requested a 

redaction for the deposition, yet decided against requesting any redactions 

for the video.2 Furthermore, defense counsel discussed at length on crossexamination one of the few additional incidents of abuse H.N. only 

discussed in the CPC video. 

A reversal is required for improper admission of evidence if the 

admission affected a substantial right of a party. State v. Neiderbach, 837 

N.W.2d 180, 205 (Iowa 2013). As discussed above, the prejudicial effects 

of the additional details in the CPC video were not considered by the jury 

as substantive evidence of Fontenot’s guilt. Furthermore, we do not think 

the particular additional detail objected to at trial prejudiced Fontenot—

H.N. clearly stated in the video Fontenot never asked her for inappropriate 

photos nor sent her any, and she reiterated that in her testimony. We 

conclude the jury’s viewing of additional or inconsistent details in the video 

was harmless in this case. 

The dissent cites J.D.W. v. State, 176 So. 3d 863 (Ala. Crim. App. 

2014), an Alabama Court of Appeals child sexual abuse case, to argue the 

 

2Defense counsel stated to the district court after his cross-examination, 

I asked her about her CPC tape. That doesn’t make the entire thing 

admissible. If anything, I should be able to pick the parts that I want to 

play to show the inconsistencies that would be admissible under prior 

inconsistent statements, but I’m not seeking to do that because we all 

know what happens here if we let the jury have the CPC tape, that it 

enforces and bolsters her testimony and the claims that she makes. 
26 

CPC video should not have been admitted because it contains additional 

details of abuse. J.D.W. is distinguishable from this case. In J.D.W., the 

State called a forensic interviewer to testify to incidents the child “was not 

able to recall on the stand but apparently had discussed in her forensic 

interview.” Id. at 869. The child had testified to four incidents of abuse. 

Id. at 865. The forensic interviewer then testified to other incidents of 

abuse. Id. at 867. This is a completely different factual scenario than the 

present case. 

Here, the CPC video was admitted because defense counsel implied 

H.N. had fabricated her testimony and impeached her testimony with 

inconsistent statements in her deposition. The vast majority of H.N.’s trial 

statements have a companion consistent statement in the video, unlike in 

J.D.W. where the forensic interviewer testified about incidents of sexual 

abuse that were wholly absent from the victim’s testimony. Furthermore, 

Alabama’s rules lend more support to the majority’s position that the video 

should be admitted. Alabama allows introduction of evidence in sexual 

offense cases “for the purpose of corroborating the victim’s testimony on 

direct examination as to the details of the crime, as to which the victim 

has been subjected to cross-examination calculated to reflect upon her 

credibility as a witness.” Lee v. State, 565 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Ala. 1989) 

(quoting Cady v. State, 455 So. 2d 101, 105 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)) 

(allowing witnesses to testify to conversations with child after defense 

counsel’s cross-examination had the “apparent purpose of reflecting upon 

the child’s credibility as a witness”). 

Defense counsel opened the door for admission of the CPC video 

during his cross-examination of H.N. when he repeatedly implied she was 

fabricating. H.N.’s first statement in her CPC interview occurred before 

counsel took her second statement during a deposition and before trial 
27 

where defense counsel first alleged H.N. changed or fabricated her 

testimony at trial or in her deposition. Thus, the video occurred before 

defense counsel alleged H.N. was changing or fabricating her story and is 

admissible as a prior consistent statement. Therefore, we need not 

address whether the video would have been admissible on any other 

ground. 

IV. Conclusion. 

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm Fontenot’s conviction. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

Waterman, Mansfield, and McDermott, JJ., join this opinion. 

McDonald, J., files a dissenting opinion in which Appel and Oxley, JJ., 

join. 
28 

#19–0295, State v. Fontenot 

McDONALD, Justice (dissenting). 

Defense counsel impeached H.N.’s trial testimony with inconsistent 

statements from her forensic interview. H.N. testified at trial that the first 

time Fontenot did anything bad to her was on a camping trip, but defense 

counsel impeached her with her forensic interview during which H.N. did 

not discuss any camping trip. H.N. also testified at trial that Fontenot did 

not touch her breasts, but defense counsel impeached her with her 

forensic interview during which H.N. reported Fontenot touched her 

breasts. The majority concludes the forensic interview used as a prior 

inconsistent statement to impeach H.N. was actually a prior consistent 

statement admissible to rebut a charge of recent fabrication. This makes 

no sense. I dissent. 

I. 

To assess whether there was prejudicial evidentiary error, it is first 

necessary to put this case into context. This jury did not view the State’s 

case as strong. The jury found Fontenot guilty on only two of the six 

counts charged. Clearly, the jury found much of H.N.’s trial testimony not 

credible, which makes the evidentiary issue in this case of critical 

importance. 

Fontenot was charged with two counts of indecent contact with a 

child, with E.M. To prove these charges, the State was required to prove 

the defendant “with or without E.M.’s consent touched the clothing 

covering the immediate area of the inner thigh, groin, buttock, or anus of 

E.M.” and the defendant “did so with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy 

the sexual desires of the [d]efendant or E.M.” Both E.M. and H.N. testified 

at trial that the defendant touched E.M. over her clothing in her private 
29 

spot, but the jury rejected their testimony and acquitted Fontenot of the 

charges. 

Fontenot was charged with two counts of sexual abuse in the second 

degree against H.N. The jury was instructed the State was required to 

prove the defendant committed a sex act with H.N. and she was under the 

age of twelve years. “Sex act” was defined to include any sexual contact 

“[b]etween the finger or hand of one person and the genitals or anus of 

another person.” H.N. testified the defendant put his hand underneath 

her underwear and touched her private spot. She testified he digitally 

penetrated her. When the prosecutor asked H.N. how many times the 

defendant touched her in her “private area” underneath her clothing, H.N. 

testified, “More than I can count.” Despite H.N.’s explicit testimony 

regarding these charges, the jury was not convinced and deadlocked on 

the two counts of sexual abuse in the second degree. The district court 

ultimately dismissed the charges on the State’s motion. 

Fontenot was also charged with two counts of indecent contact with 

a child, H.N. To prove these charges, the State was required to prove the 

defendant “with or without H.N.’s consent touched the clothing covering 

the immediate area of the inner thigh, groin, buttock, or anus of H.N.” and 

the defendant “did so with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual 

desires of the [d]efendant or H.N.” In her forensic interview, H.N. reported 

Fontenot touched her above her clothing in her private areas. She also 

testified at trial that Fontenot touched her above her shorts or underwear 

more times than she could count. The jury found Fontenot guilty of these 

two charges. 

Was the jury’s finding of guilt based on the conduct H.N. reported 

in the forensic interview or based on H.N.’s trial testimony? That is 

unknown. But the answer to that question is not necessary to resolve this 
30 

case. When the district court erroneously admits hearsay statements into 

evidence, “[w]e presume prejudice—that is, a substantial right of the 

defendant is affected—and reverse unless the record affirmatively 

establishes otherwise.” State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 19 (Iowa 2006) 

(emphasis removed) (quoting State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 30 (Iowa 

2004)). As discussed below, the district court’s decision to admit the 

entirety of the forensic interview into evidence was erroneous, and the 

record does not affirmatively establish the error was not prejudicial. 

II. 

The general rule is that an out-of-court statement consistent with 

the declarant’s in-court testimony is not admissible as substantive 

evidence or to enhance the declarant’s credibility. This is because the 

“weak probative value of consistent statements evidence is deemed 

insufficient to overcome its prejudicial impact in terms of Rule 5.403 

considerations.” 7 Laurie Kratky Doré, Iowa Practice Series: Evidence

§ 5.801:7, at 902 (2020–2021 ed. 2020) [hereinafter Doré]. As this record 

demonstrates, “the circumstances surrounding the prior declaration may 

lead to confusion of issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time 

or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id. n.2. Further, the 

focus of a criminal jury trial should be witness testimony, delivered under 

oath, in front of the jury, in the defendant’s presence, subject to the 

defendant’s cross examination, and not litigation by “prior prepared 

statements.” Id. § 5.801:7, at 902 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)); see 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359 (2004) 

(“The common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to 

adversarial testing . . . .”). Thus, a strong preference for live testimony 

undergirds the rules of evidence, and exceptions thereto should be 

administered with great caution. 
31 

Against this traditional background, Iowa Rule of Evidence 

5.801(d)(1)(B) provides a narrow exception to the hearsay rule that permits 

admission of hearsay evidence in limited and highly focused 

circumstances.3 Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(d)(1)(B) provides that a prior 

statement is not hearsay and is admissible as substantive evidence if: 

[t]he declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination 

about a prior statement, and the statement: . . . [i]s consistent 

with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an 

express or implied charge that the declarant recently 

fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or 

motive in so testifying . . . . 

As the text of the rule suggests, the rule is not a crude weapon to 

shotgun-blast bolstering hearsay into the record when a defense lawyer 

exploits inconsistencies through effective cross-examination. Instead, it is 

a precision rifle to rebut a specific claim that the declarant recently 

fabricated specific testimony or acted from a recent improper influence or 

motive in testifying. The majority disregards the narrow nature of the 

exception and instead takes a shotgun-blast approach to the rule, holding 

that the entirety of the CPC interview was admissible as a prior consistent 

statement under rule 5.801(d)(1)(B). I disagree with this indiscriminate 

approach. 

 

3The caselaw repeatedly emphasizes the narrowness of the prior-consistentstatement exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Kitchings v. State, 291 So. 3d 181, 

196 (Fla. 2020) (“[U]se of a prior consistent statement is narrowly circumscribed . . . .”); 

People v. Wiggins, 40 N.E.3d 1197, 1204 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (recognizing “the narrow 

exception for prior statements used to rebut an inference that the witness recently 

fabricated the testimony”); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 759 N.E.2d 723, 731 (Mass. App. Ct. 

2001) (stating that “[p]rior consistent statements” are only “allowable under [a] narrow 

hearsay exception”); People v. Harris, 662 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966 (App. Div. 1997) (“There is a 

narrow exception, which permits proof of prior consistent statements to rebut a claim of 

recent fabrication.”; (citations omitted)) State v. Midgett, 680 N.W.2d 288, 293 (S.D. 2004) 

(“This hearsay exception is . . . rather narrow.”); Faison v. Hudson, 417 S.E.2d 305, 309 

(Va. 1992) (recognizing “a few narrowly circumscribed exceptions” to the general rule 

excluding prior consistent statements). 
32 

A. 

First, it is questionable whether defense counsel’s crossexamination constituted a charge of improper motive or recent fabrication. 

Defense counsel’s examination of H.N. was rigorous, and he impeached 

her credibility with numerous prior inconsistent statements. This, in and 

of itself, does not constitute a charge of motive to lie or recent fabrication. 

See Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1, 24 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that 

questioning deputy regarding omissions in report was not a charge of 

recent fabrication and stating the admission of prior statements “served to 

improperly bolster [the deputy’s] credibility regarding his trial testimony” 

and was error); People v. McWhite, 927 N.E.2d 152, 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) 

(“However, the mere introduction of contradictory evidence, without more, 

does not constitute an implied charge of fabrication or motive to lie.”); 

Commonwealth v. Bruce, 811 N.E.2d 1003, 1009 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) 

(“Contrary to the belief of the judge below, the impeachment of a witness 

by prior inconsistent statements or omissions does not, standing alone, 

entitle the adverse party to introduce other prior statements made by the 

witness that are consistent with his trial testimony.”); Jones v. State, 439 

P.3d 753, 761 (Wyo. 2019) (“A defense to crimes such as those at issue 

here will necessarily entail a defense theory that what the victim said 

happened did not happen. That alone does not open the door for 

admission of prior consistent statements.”); Doré, Iowa Practice Series: 

Evidence § 5.801:7, at 905 (“[T]he rule does not permit prior consistent 

statements merely to rebut a charge that the witness is not credible 

because the witness has made inconsistent statements.”). 

It has been repeatedly held that mere presentation at trial of 

conflicting testimony or statements made by a witness does not imply 

fabrication. See Moore v. Anchor Org. for Health Maint., 672 N.E.2d 826, 
33 

834 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“We know of no case which stands for the 

proposition that the mere introduction of contradictory evidence 

constitutes, without more, an implied charge of fabrication. In fact, the 

contrary is true.”); State v. Jones, 841 So. 2d 965, 975–76 (La. Ct. App. 

2003) (“The mere fact of a prior inconsistent statement is insufficient . . . 

there must have been an express or implied suggestion that the witness 

changed his story because of some purported motive to falsify.” 

(quoting George W. Pugh et al., Handbook on Louisiana Evidence Law 485–

86 (2000))). As noted by one appellate court, “just because evidence is 

introduced that contradicts a witness’ in-court testimony or because a 

witness [has been] impeached, it does not necessarily follow that there has 

been a charge of recent fabrication.” People v. Miller, 706 N.E.2d 947, 952 

(Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (citations omitted). Similarly, the Supreme Court of 

Virginia has declared: “[T]o allow the admission of a prior consistent 

statement after impeachment of just ‘any sort’ would create an 

unreasonably ‘loose rule.’ ” Faison, 417 S.E.2d at 310. 

B. 

Second, the State did not identify the specific questions posed by 

defense counsel that charged H.N. with improper motive or recent 

fabrication, and the district court did not make a finding of improper 

motive or recent fabrication. It was improper to allow the evidence without 

the proponent specifically identifying the charge and the district court 

making a finding regarding the same. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 

150, 166, 115 S. Ct. 696, 705 (1995) (“[T]he thing to be rebutted must be 

identified . . . .”); United States v. Lozada-Rivera, 177 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 

1999) (“[T]he proponent of evidence must point to specific questions during 

his adversary’s examination that suggest recent fabrication or bias. Merely 

appealing to credibility as a live issue will not do the trick.”); Doré, Iowa 
34 

Practice Series: Evidence § 5.801:7, at 904 (stating the district court must 

make a preliminary finding “that a charge of recent fabrication or improper 

influence or motive has been leveled against the testifying witness”). Prior 

consistent statements should not be admitted in the absence of a 

preliminary finding of improper motive or recent fabrication. 

These preliminary requirements are necessary to effectively 

administer the rule within the intended scope. The dangers of failing to 

comply with these preliminary requirements are demonstrated in the 

majority opinion. The majority is caught in a dilemma. The majority 

concludes in division III, section A that the charge of recent fabrication or 

improper motive is not that H.N. “had fabricated the entire story.” If the 

majority concluded otherwise, then the forensic interview would not have 

been made before the alleged motive to fabricate or improper influence 

arose and would be inadmissible under the rule. See State v. Johnson, 

539 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Iowa 1995) (“[A] witness’s prior consistent statement 

is admissible as nonhearsay to rebut a charge of recent improper motive 

. . . only if the statement was made before the alleged improper motive to 

fabricate arose.”); see also Tome, 513 U.S. at 158, 115 S. Ct. at 701 (“[T]he 

consistent statements must have been made before the alleged influence, 

or motive to fabricate, arose.”); Miller, 706 N.E.2d at 952 (allowing 

exception provided “that the prior consistent statement was made before 

the motive to fabricate arose”); Harris, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 966–67 (“[F]or that 

exception to apply, the prior consistent statement must have predated the 

motive to falsify.” (citations omitted)); Midgett, 680 N.W.2d at 294 

(“Because the statements were made after the alleged motive to fabricate 

arose, they were not probative to corroborate [the] trial testimony.”). The 

majority thus concludes defense counsel “implied H.N. was changing or 

fabricating her story on the stand.” But the majority never specifically 
35 

identifies how or in what respect. This is because the forensic interview 

does not actually rebut the charge of recent fabrication or improper motive 

with respect to any of the specifically challenged parts of H.N.’s testimony. 

The majority does not deny this. Instead, the majority concludes the 

evidence was admissible because the majority of H.N.’s testimony was 

consistent with her forensic interview. In the majority’s view, because the 

forensic interview contains allegations of sex abuse and H.N. testified to 

sex abuse, the charge of recent fabrication or improper motive is rebutted. 

This would only be true (if at all) if the charge of recent fabrication or 

improper motive was that H.N. had fabricated the entire story. But the 

majority rejects that as a basis for admission of the forensic interview. 

In short, to find the forensic interview occurred prior to the charge 

of recent fabrication, the majority finds defense counsel charged only that 

H.N. changed specific parts of her story, but to find the forensic interview 

was consistent, the majority looks to the interview and testimony as a 

whole because the forensic interview admittedly does not actually rebut 

the charge of recent fabrication or improper motive with respect to the 

testimony actually challenged. 

The requirements that the proponent identify the charge and that 

the court make specific findings regarding the same are meant to prohibit 

jumping between these levels of generality to game the rule. See Tome, 

513 U.S. at 157–58, 115 S. Ct. at 701 (“Prior consistent statements may 

not be admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the 

witness merely because she has been discredited. . . . The Rule speaks of 

a party rebutting an alleged motive, not bolstering the veracity of the story 

told.”). There must be a link “between the prior consistent statement,” the 

charge of improper motive or recent fabrication, and the “particular type 

of impeachment that has occurred.” United States v. Butler, ARMY 
36 

20180385, 2020 WL 2844500, at *4 (A. Ct. Crim. App. May 29, 2020) 

(quoting United States v. Finch, 79 M.J. 389, 396 (C.A.A.F. 2020)). The 

prior consistent statement to be introduced must be “an appropriate, 

narrowly tailored, and logically relevant response to a specific attack on 

the witness’s credibility.” State v. White, 977 A.2d 501, 505 (N.H. 2009) 

(quoting State v. Fischer, 725 A.2d 1, 4 (N.H. 1999)). Consistency at a high 

and superficial level of generality is insufficient to warrant admission of an 

out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted to rebut 

a specific charge of recent fabrication or improper motive. 

C. 

Third, even assuming these preconditions to admissibility had been 

met, the entirety of the CPC interview was not relevant to the grounds for 

impeachment and should not have been admitted. 

Consider, for example, H.N.’s testimony regarding the first incident 

of alleged sexual abuse. The prosecutor asked H.N. when the first time 

“something bad” happened. H.N. testified the first time was “in Minnesota 

when we were camping.” She testified “we were having like a bonfire, and 

we went into the camper, and he like pulled out the couch. And I was 

laying in the bed, and he like started rubbing my leg.” On crossexamination, defense counsel then impeached H.N. by omission. He asked 

H.N. why she had not “mention[ed] any camping trip in Minnesota” during 

her CPC interview, and she replied, “I thought I did.” Defense counsel then 

asked her why she had not mentioned the camping trip during her 

deposition, and she replied, “I thought I did.” But she did not. H.N. told 

the CPC interviewer the first time anything bad happened was in her home 

when she was sitting on her bed. H.N. never mentioned any camping trip 

in Minnesota during the CPC interview. 
37 

The fact that H.N. never mentioned the camping trip in Minnesota 

means the CPC interview was not relevant to rebut the charge of improper 

motive or recent fabrication as to this point. As one court correctly 

explained: 

On the other hand, rehabilitating the credibility of the 

declarant may require something more precisely related to 

explaining or rebutting the specific manner of the attack on 

the witness’ credibility. For example, if the declarant’s 

credibility is attacked on another ground such as 

impeachment by omission because she testified to new 

information not previously mentioned in other statements, 

admitting a prior statement that is devoid of the fact now at 

issue, is not actually consistent with the testimony attacked 

and does little to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility based 

on the specific type of attack. 

United States v. Norwood, 79 M.J. 644, 655 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2019), 

aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 79 M.J. 644 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (citations omitted). 

As another court explained, “In each instance where admission is sought, 

the trial court must begin by determining whether the prior statement is 

actually relevant ‘to rebut an express or implied charge . . . of recent 

fabrication or improper influence or motive . . . .’ ” Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 

55, 68 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (omissions in original) (quoting Alaska Rule 

of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)). The rule “seems an inappropriate basis to admit 

proof of statements that are consistent with other parts of testimony that 

have not been attacked.” 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 

Federal Evidence § 8:38, Westlaw (4th ed. May 2020 Update) [hereinafter 

Mueller & Kirkpatrick]. 

With respect to this ground for impeachment, this case is similar to 

United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2005). In that case, the 

defendant was convicted of three counts of sexual abuse against a child. 

See id. at 1074. At trial, the child testified that the last instance of abuse 
38 

occurred the week prior to the time she told a physician’s assistant about 

the abuse. See id. at 1075. The child testified the defendant had 

performed some acts of sexual abuse on her during the day and had 

attempted to force her to have oral sex. See id. at 1080. On crossexamination, defense counsel impeached the child by omission, 

questioning the child on why she had not told the physician’s assistant 

about incidents of sexual abuse occurring during the day and about 

attempted oral sex. See id. Over the defendant’s objection, the district 

court allowed the physician’s assistant to testify about her conversation 

with the child as a prior consistent statement. See id. at 1079. The court 

of appeals concluded it was error to allow the physician’s assistant to 

testify because she “did not present evidence of a prior consistent 

statement with respect to the matters on which [the child] was impeached. 

The whole point of the impeachment was that [the child] did not describe 

daytime abuse and attempted oral sex to [the physician’s assistant].” Id.

at 1080. The court vacated the convictions. See id. at 1082. The same 

result should obtain here. 

In addition, the entire CPC interview should not have been admitted 

because statements contained therein were directly contrary to H.N.’s trial 

testimony. For example, on direct examination, H.N. testified the 

defendant never touched her breasts. Defense counsel challenged this 

testimony. He impeached her with her prior inconsistent statement made 

during the CPC interview. During the CPC interview, H.N. stated the 

defendant put his hand up her shirt and under her sports bra and touched 

her breasts. A statement cannot be admitted as a prior consistent 

statement to rebut a charge of recent fabrication where it is directly 

contrary to the challenged testimony. See J.D.W. v. State, 176 So. 3d 863, 

869 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (holding testimony of forensic interviewer was 
39 

not admissible as prior consistent statement where “testimony regarding 

[the child’s] statements during the forensic interview was inconsistent—

not consistent—with [the child’s] trial testimony”); State v. Gell, 524 S.E.2d 

332, 340 (N.C. 2000) (“However, the State may not introduce as 

corroboration prior statements that actually, directly contradict trial 

testimony.”). 

Finally, the CPC interview contained statements regarding alleged 

abuse that H.N. did not testify to at trial. Those statements are not prior 

consistent statements and should not have been admitted. See United 

States v. Campbell, ARMY 20180107, 2020 WL 1150267, at *5 (A. Ct. Crim. 

App. Mar. 6, 2020) (“Only those portions of a witness’s prior statement 

that are consistent with the witness’s courtroom testimony may be deemed 

admissible at trial.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Finch, 79 M.J. at 391)). 

As one treatise explains, the rule allows admission of prior consistent 

statements to repair a specific form of attack on a testifying witness’s 

credibility; the rule was not intended to allow admission of evidence that 

expands the trial testimony: 

Yet this mechanism of repair was never intended to allow such 

statements to prove points omitted from trial testimony, and 

an important common law tradition holds that such 

statements cannot go beyond what the witness has said in her 

trial testimony . . . . This tradition is critical to proper 

application of [the federal rule], and it requires judges and 

adverse parties to keep a watchful eye on counsel offering 

such statements under the amended rule. 

4 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8:38 (emphasis omitted). 

In this respect, this case is similar to J.D.W. v. State. In that case, 

the State called a forensic interviewer to testify to prior consistent 

statements the child made during a forensic interview to rebut a charge of 

recent fabrication. See J.D.W., 176 So. 3d at 866. The court allowed the 
40 

testimony over the defendant’s objection. See id. at 867. The court of 

criminal appeals concluded this was error. See id. at 869. The court 

reasoned that the forensic interviewer’s testimony was not consistent with 

the child’s testimony because the forensic interviewer discussed other 

incidents of abuse to which the child did not testify. See id. at 869 

(“Likewise, on appeal, the State continues to argue that Wilbourn’s 

testimony regarding R.W.’s forensic interview was consistent with R.W.’s 

trial testimony; the State’s argument, however, is belied by its recognition 

that Wilbourn’s testimony included ‘other incidents of abuse’ about which 

R.W. ‘could not recall specific details.’ ”). Like the testimony in J.D.W., the 

CPC interview contains allegations of abuse outside the scope of H.N.’s 

trial testimony and should not have been admitted as a prior consistent 

statement. See 4 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8:38 (“What 

seems important is that the exception should not become the means by 

which a party can prove new points not covered in the testimony of the 

speaker.”). 

The upshot is this: for evidence to be admitted as a prior statement 

to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, the prior statement must be 

relevant with respect to the matter or matters on which the witness was 

impeached and must actually be consistent with the challenged testimony. 

If the prior statement does not satisfy these conditions, then the evidence 

is not relevant. On this basis, I conclude admission of the entire CPC 

interview was erroneous and prejudicial. 

III. 

The State contends even if the entire forensic interview was not 

admissible as a prior consistent statement, the district court properly 

admitted the evidence under the residual exception contained in Iowa Rule 
41 

of Evidence 5.807 or the child hearsay statute codified at Iowa Code 

section 915.38(3) (2018). I respectfully disagree. 

The residual hearsay exception is “used very rarely, and only in 

exceptional circumstances.” State v. Veverka, 938 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa 

2020) (quoting State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 14 (Iowa 1983) (en banc)). 

Under the rule, the proponent must establish the following: 

(1) The statement has equivalent circumstantial 

guarantees of trustworthiness; 

(2) It is offered as evidence of a material fact; 

(3) It is more probative on the point for which it is 

offered than any other evidence that the proponent can 

obtain through reasonable efforts; and 

(4) Admitting it will best serve the purposes of 

these rules and the interests of justice. 

b. Notice. The statement is admissible only if, before 

the trial or hearing, the proponent gives an adverse party 

reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement . . . . 

Iowa R. Evid. 5.807. 

In State v. Rojas, we explained the residual hearsay exception 

standard as follows: “The requirements for admissibility under the residual 

exception are five-fold: trustworthiness, materiality, necessity, service of 

the interests of justice, and notice.” 524 N.W.2d 659, 662–63 (Iowa 1994). 

In that case, the issue was whether a videotaped interview of a child’s 

allegations of sexual abuse could be admitted when the child recanted the 

statements at trial. See id. at 661. We held the video was admissible 

under rule 803(24) (now rule 5.807), the residual hearsay exception. See 

id. at 664. We held that the video was trustworthy, material, necessary, 

and served the truth-seeking function of justice because in it the child 

recounted graphic details in response to nonleading, open-ended 
42 

questions about the sexual abuse and surrounding circumstances. See 

id. at 663–64. 

In State v. Neitzel, the court of appeals admitted video evidence of a 

child’s prior statements under the residual hearsay exception. 801 N.W.2d 

612, 622–23 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). There, the one incident of abuse 

occurred three years prior to trial when the child was seven years old and 

the child no longer had memory of what occurred. See id. at 623 (“The 

admission of the evidence was necessary because T.K. was of a young age 

when the abuse occurred and unable to testify to the abuse at trial years 

later . . . .”). 

Unlike Rojas and Neitzel, there is no showing of necessity here. For 

necessity, the State must show the evidence is “more probative . . . than 

any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable 

efforts.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.807(a)(3). Here, H.N., was a teenager at the time 

of trial. Cf. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d at 623 (noting there was necessity because 

the child was young). H.N. was able to testify regarding the specific 

allegations of abuse in great detail. Cf. id. (noting the child was unable to 

testify). Unlike the child in Rojas, H.N. did not recant her allegations of 

sexual abuse. Cf. Rojas, 524 N.W.2d at 661; State v. Kone, 562 N.W.2d 

637, 638 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (finding necessity where witness “later 

recanted her statements made in the interview, [and] the admission of the 

tape was the only means by which the State could introduce the 

information it had received from” the witness). Where the witness can 

testify to the allegations of abuse there is “no basis for concluding that this 

evidence was necessary for the State’s case.” State v. Metz, 636 N.W.2d 

94, 100 (Iowa 2001). 

The State also contends the video is admissible under Iowa Code 

section 915.38(3), which allows admission of recorded statements of child 
43 

sex abuse victims into evidence if the statements “substantially comport” 

with the requirements of the residual hearsay exception. 

The court may upon motion of a party admit into evidence the 

recorded statements of a child, as defined in section 702.5, 

describing sexual contact performed with or on the child, not 

otherwise admissible in evidence by statute or court rule if the 

court determines that the recorded statements substantially 

comport with the requirements for admission under rule of 

evidence 5.803(24) or 5.804(b)(5). 

Iowa Code § 915.38(3). This court has not determined what “substantially 

comport” means. I would hold a recorded statement does not substantially 

comport with the requirements for admission under the residual exception 

where there is no showing of necessity, as is the case here. For this reason, 

I would conclude the forensic interview was not admissible under section 

915.38(3). 

IV. 

As the jury verdict reflects, this was a close case. The jury acquitted 

the defendant of two charges against E.M. to which E.M. and H.N. both 

testified. The jury could not conclude the State proved its case with 

respect to the most serious charges of sex abuse against H.N. despite her 

testimony regarding more instances of sex abuse than she could count. 

The jury did convict Fontenot of the less serious charges of indecent 

contact with a child involving H.N., but the basis for that verdict is 

unknown. “In a case of nonconstitutional error, ‘we presume prejudice—

that is, a substantial right of the defendant is affected—and reverse unless 

the record affirmatively establishes otherwise.’ ” State v. Buelow, 951 

N.W.2d 879, 890 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 30). I 

conclude there was evidentiary error here, and the record does not 

affirmatively establish the lack of prejudice. I would vacate the defendant’s 

convictions and remand this matter for new trial. 

Appel and Oxley, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.