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*********************************************** 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,

COPS LOCAL 062 v. TOWN OF

HAMDEN ET AL.

(AC 43739)

Prescott, Moll and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff union sought to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with

a disciplinary hearing against E, a police officer represented by the

plaintiff and employed by the defendant town, until the completion of

a pending criminal prosecution against E. Following a hearing, the trial

court rendered judgment granting the plaintiff’s application for a temporary injunction. The named defendant appealed to this court, claiming

that the court used an incorrect legal standard in granting the plaintiff’s

application. Held that the trial court improperly reviewed the plaintiff’s

application for a temporary injunction pursuant to the standard for

adjudicating a motion for a stay of civil proceedings; moreover, unlike

the decisions erroneously relied on by the court, Lee v. Harlow, Adams &

Friedman, P.C. (116 Conn. App. 289) and Tyler v. Shenkman-Tyler (115

Conn. App. 521), which involved motions to stay proceedings before

the court, this case involved the court attempting to enjoin a separate

proceeding conducted by another government entity, thus, the court

erred in applying a balancing of the equities test; furthermore, pursuant

to Nosik v. Singe (40 F.3d 592), the proper standard to apply in a

case involving a request to enjoin ongoing administrative disciplinary

proceedings is the standard for adjudicating a temporary injunction,

and, as the court made no findings as to whether the plaintiff would

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, the case was

remanded for the court to apply the correct standard and to make the

requisite findings.

Argued April 5—officially released December 7, 2021

Procedural History

Action, inter alia, seeking to enjoin the defendants

from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing of a police

officer, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of New Haven, where the court, Hon. Jon C.

Blue, judge trial referee, granted the plaintiff’s application for a temporary injunction, and the named defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.

Glenn A. Duhl, with whom were Adam J. Lyke, and,

on the brief, Jason R. Stanevich and Maura A. Mastrony, for the appellant (named defendant).

John M. Walsh, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The defendant town of Hamden1 appeals

from the decision of the trial court granting the application for a temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff,

United Public Service Employees Union, Cops Local

062. Specifically, the defendant was enjoined from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing concerning Devin

Eaton, a police officer in its employ, until a pending

criminal prosecution of Eaton is concluded. On appeal,

the defendant claims that the court utilized the incorrect

legal standard in determining whether to grant the plaintiff’s application for a temporary injunction.2 We agree,

and, accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial

court and remand the case for further proceedings in

accordance with this opinion.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Eaton

is a member of the plaintiff union. On April 16, 2019,

Eaton, while on duty, was involved in an incident in

which he discharged his service weapon at unarmed

civilians, injuring one civilian (April 16, 2019 incident).

Another police officer at the scene was also injured as

a result of Eaton having discharged his service weapon.

On April 26, 2019, the Hamden Police Department Ethics and Integrity Unit, directed by Acting Chief of Police

John Cappiello, initiated an internal affairs investigation

into Eaton’s conduct during the April 16, 2019 incident.

New Haven State’s Attorney Patrick J. Griffin also

authored a report concerning the April 16, 2019 incident

and Eaton’s use of deadly force. The report, dated October 17, 2019, concluded that, ‘‘[u]nder circumstances

evincing an extreme indifference to human life, [Eaton]

recklessly engaged in conduct which created a risk of

death, and thereby caused serious physical injury to [a

civilian].’’ Following Attorney Griffin’s recommendation, on October 21, 2019, Eaton was arrested and

charged with assault in the first degree in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (3) and two counts of

reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-63, all of which were related

to the April 16, 2019 incident. Eaton’s criminal case is

currently pending in the New Haven Superior Court.

On November 15, 2019, Acting Chief Cappiello

brought formal disciplinary charges against Eaton. The

matter was referred to the Hamden Board of Police

Commissioners (board) for adjudication with a recommendation for termination. On November 21, 2019, the

board notified Eaton, through his legal counsel, that a

hearing would be held on December 6, 2019, to determine what discipline, if any, would be taken against

him as a result of the April 16, 2019 incident. Notice

and an opportunity for a hearing were provided in accordance with the requirements of the collective bargaining

agreement that governs the relationship between the

plaintiff and the defendant.3
On December 2, 2019, the plaintiff filed a complaint

and an application seeking temporary injunctive relief

to prevent the board from proceeding with the disciplinary hearing for Eaton while his criminal prosecution

remains pending. See State v. Eaton, Superior Court,

judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CR-19-

0224774-T. In support of its application for a temporary

injunction, the plaintiff asserted that Eaton has a constitutional property interest in his continued employment

with the defendant. The plaintiff argued that Eaton cannot be deprived of this interest without due process of

law pursuant to the fourteenth amendment to the

United States constitution. Further, the plaintiff

asserted that Eaton also has a constitutional right

against self-incrimination pursuant to the fifth amendment to the United States constitution. The plaintiff

ultimately argued that if the defendant were allowed

to proceed with the disciplinary hearing scheduled for

December 6, 2019, while the criminal case against Eaton

was pending, Eaton would be ‘‘compelled to make a

choice between his fourteenth amendment right to due

process and his fifth amendment right against selfincrimination.’’ The plaintiff further argued that such a

choice would cause Eaton to suffer ‘‘substantial and

irreparable harm’’ because he would be deprived of

the rights guaranteed to him under the United States

constitution.

On December 13, 2019, a hearing was held on the

plaintiff’s application for a temporary injunction. During the hearing, the court specifically acknowledged

the difference between the standards for adjudicating

an application for a temporary injunction and a motion

for a stay of civil proceedings. The court explained that,

in determining whether to grant injunctive relief, the

court’s focus would be on the issue of irreparable harm.

In determining whether to grant a stay of proceedings,

however, the court’s focus would be on the competing

interests of the parties. The court asserted that the case

law relevant to the present case ‘‘does not talk about

irreparable harm . . . .’’ The court distinguished the

present case from a civil case in which one party seeks

to enjoin another party from ‘‘open[ing] [a] rendering

plant or . . . build[ing] [a] [b]all field . . . .’’ The court

further asserted that, ‘‘unlike the usual case of an order

for [a] temporary injunction,’’ because the present case

contemplates the staying of an administrative proceeding while a criminal proceeding is pending, the court’s

analysis must focus on the competing interests of the

parties.

In its oral decision, the court explained that it was

required ‘‘to balance some ponderable weights on each

side.’’ The court weighed the interests of both parties

as well as the interest of the public. The court cited

Securities & Exchange Commission v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375–76 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 993, 101 S. Ct. 529, 66 L. Ed. 2d 289

(1980), asserting that the strongest case for deferring

civil proceedings until after the completion of criminal

proceedings is when a party that has been indicted

for a criminal offense is required to defend a civil or

administrative action involving the same matter.

The court identified that the officer had two interests

in the present matter—‘‘a property interest in his continued employment . . . and . . . an interest in exercising or not exercising his fifth amendment right . . . .’’

The court also stated that the defendant and the public

had several interests in the present matter. First, the

defendant had an interest in ‘‘getting this officer off the

street,’’ which had already been accomplished at the

time of the hearing. Second, the defendant had an interest in not paying Eaton. The court acknowledged that

Eaton was on unpaid leave, and, although the defendant

continued to pay $1100 per month for Eaton’s insurance, the court asserted that this cost was ‘‘relatively

de minimis in the more global context of this action.’’

Third, both the defendant and the public had an interest

in the quick resolution of the case given the legitimate

public concern about Eaton’s conduct. The court suggested that this interest would be more significant, however, if Eaton were still working as a police officer and

ultimately determined that the public’s demands for an

immediate resolution did not outweigh Eaton’s substantial legal interests. The court also noted that the fact that

Eaton had been arrested for assault and other criminal

charges created a considerable deterrent effect for

other officers. Although the immediate firing of Eaton

‘‘would doubtless have an additional deterrent effect,’’

according to the court, ‘‘the marginal utility of that

would be relatively small . . . .’’

After setting forth the foregoing reasoning, the court

concluded that Eaton’s interests in obtaining a stay

outweighed the defendant’s interests in obtaining a

quick resolution of the case.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted

the plaintiff’s application for a temporary injunction,

announcing its decision orally.4 This appeal followed.5

Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

On appeal, the defendant raises a claim of legal error.

Specifically, it claims that the court incorrectly adjudicated the plaintiff’s application for a temporary injunction pursuant to the standard for deciding whether to

issue a stay of civil proceedings instead of the standard

for issuing a temporary injunction. We agree.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review that

governs the defendant’s claim. ‘‘When . . . the trial

court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary

and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally

and logically correct and find support in the facts that

appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Barber v. Barber, 193 Conn. App. 190, 196, 219

A.3d 378 (2019). ‘‘[O]ur analysis of whether the court

applied the correct legal standard is a question of law

subject to plenary review.’’ Wieselman v. Hoeniger, 103

Conn. App. 591, 598, 930 A.2d 768, cert. denied, 284

Conn. 930, 934 A.2d 245 (2007).

We also set forth the legal principles relevant to this

claim. ‘‘The standard for granting a temporary injunction is well settled. In general, a court may, in its discretion, exercise its equitable power to order a temporary

injunction pending final determination of the order,

upon a proper showing by the movant that if the injunction is not granted he or she will suffer irreparable harm

for which there is no adequate remedy at law. . . . A

party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that:

(1) it has no adequate remedy at law; (2) it will suffer

irreparable harm without an injunction; (3) it will likely

prevail on the merits; and (4) the balance of equities

tips in its favor. . . . The plaintiff seeking injunctive

relief bears the burden of proving facts which will establish irreparable harm as a result of that violation. . . .

Moreover, [t]he extraordinary nature of injunctive relief

requires that the harm complained of is occurring or

will occur if the injunction is not granted. Although an

absolute certainty is not required, it must appear that

there is a substantial probability that but for the issuance of the injunction, the party seeking it will suffer

irreparable harm.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Aqleh v. Cadlerock Joint Venture

II, L.P., 299 Conn. 84, 97–98, 10 A.3d 498 (2010). Further,

‘‘[a] party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of

alleging and proving irreparable harm and lack of an

adequate remedy at law. The allegations and proof are

conditions precedent to the granting of an injunction.

. . . These elements are so crucial that a party’s failure

to allege and prove them is sufficient ground for sustaining the refusal to grant an injunction, even where

a court’s conclusions on the merits are erroneous.’’

(Citations omitted.) Hartford v. American Arbitration

Assn., 174 Conn. 472, 476–77, 391 A.2d 137 (1978).

A distinct standard applies to the court’s evaluation

of a motion seeking a stay of civil proceedings. To

adjudicate a motion for a stay of civil proceedings,

courts must apply a balancing of the equities test. See

Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health

Care, 196 Conn. 451, 459–60, 493 A.2d 229 (1985). In

describing this test, our Supreme Court has stated that

‘‘[i]t is not possible to reduce all of the considerations

involved in stay orders to a rigid formula . . . .’’ Id.,

458. The court, however, did note that ‘‘[a]mong the

‘equities’ to be placed on the scales . . . are the general

equitable considerations which are involved in the issuance of a temporary injunction to preserve the status

quo pendente lite.’’ Id., 460.

This court has elaborated on the standard for evaluat-
ing a motion seeking a stay of civil proceedings. ‘‘In

determining whether to impose a stay . . . the court

must balance the interests of the litigants, nonparties,

the public and the court itself. . . . The factors a court

should consider include: [1] the interests of the plaintiff

in an expeditious resolution and the prejudice to the

plaintiff in not proceeding; [2] the interests of and burdens on the defendants; [3] the convenience to the court

in the management of its docket and in the efficient

use of judicial resources; [4] the interests of other persons not parties to the civil litigation; and [5] the interests of the public in the pending civil and criminal

actions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tyler v.

Shenkman-Tyler, 115 Conn. App. 521, 529, 973 A.2d

163, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 920, 979 A.2d 493 (2009).

‘‘In the absence of a statutory mandate, the granting of

an application or a motion for a stay of an action or

proceeding is addressed to the discretion of the trial

court . . . . [T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control

the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for

litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise

of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and

maintain an even balance.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Lee v. Harlow, Adams &

Friedman, P.C., 116 Conn. App. 289, 311–12, 975 A.2d

715 (2009).

We begin our analysis of the claim by clarifying what

standard the court applied. During the hearing, the court

stated that the temporary injunction standard applies

in situations that differ from the present matter, such

as when one party seeks to prevent another party from

‘‘open[ing] [a] rendering plant or . . . build[ing] [a]

[b]all field . . . .’’ The court further asserted that,

because the present case contemplates the staying of

an administrative proceeding while a criminal proceeding is pending, the court’s analysis must focus on the

competing interests of the parties. According to the

court, unlike the typical application for a temporary

injunction, the real question in the present case is ‘‘what

are the competing interests of the respective players in

proceeding right away as distinct from some time down

the road.’’ The court’s decision, insofar as it distinguishes the present case from cases in which the court

believed that the standard for a temporary injunction

does apply, demonstrates that the court declined to

apply the standard for a temporary injunction in the

present case.

In addition to making this distinction, the court, during the hearing and in its decision, repeatedly referred

to weighing the interests of the parties, which reflects

that it utilized the standard for adjudicating a motion

for a stay of civil proceedings, as set forth previously.

At the beginning of the hearing, the court stated that

‘‘the question before [the court], it seems pretty clear,
rest[s] on . . . a weighing of the competing interest[s]

involved . . . the interest in fact of those respective

tribunals and of course of . . . Eaton himself . . . .’’

Throughout the hearing, the court continued to make

reference to and inquire about the ‘‘competing interests’’ of the parties. Additionally, as the court

announced its decision, it stated that ‘‘this is a case

where the court has to balance some ponderable

weights on each side.’’ The court then went on to identify, in its decision, the competing interests of the parties and ultimately determined that the interests of

Eaton outweighed the interests of the defendant. This

analysis mirrors the balancing of the equities test

adopted in Griffin Hospital, which applies to the evaluation of a motion seeking a stay of civil proceedings

rather than an application for a temporary injunction.

See Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals &

Health Care, supra, 196 Conn. 459–60.

Further establishing that the court did not apply the

standard for a temporary injunction is the fact that the

court made no finding as to irreparable harm, a finding

that is integral in the adjudication of an application

for a temporary injunction. ‘‘A party seeking injunctive

relief has the burden of alleging and proving irreparable

harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law. The allegations and proof are conditions precedent to the granting

of an injunction.’’ Hartford v. American Arbitration

Assn., supra, 174 Conn. 476. Nevertheless, the court

stated that the ‘‘case law on this particular issue does

not talk about irreparable harm . . . .’’ Counsel for the

defendant specifically reminded the court that it was

required to make a finding of irreparable harm, noting

that the cases cited by the court ‘‘had to do with a stay

of proceedings and . . . the weight of the discovery.

It’s different in this case. This is an injunction case, not

a stay of civil proceedings, so I think irreparable harm

absolutely is a factor that has to be reviewed . . . .’’

Despite these contentions, the court did not make a

finding as to irreparable harm. Because the court did

not make a finding as to irreparable harm, proof of

which is a ‘‘[condition] precedent to the granting of an

injunction’’; Hartford v. American Arbitration Assn.,

supra, 476; it did not apply the standard for adjudicating

an application for a temporary injunction.

We conclude that the court undertook an incorrect

legal analysis. The standard for a motion to stay proceedings does not apply in the present case because

the court attempted to enjoin a separate proceeding

conducted by another governmental entity, rather than

staying a proceeding before it. In reaching its decision,

the court erroneously relied on Lee v. Harlow, Adams &

Friedman, P.C., supra, 116 Conn. App. 289, which is

distinguishable from the present case. The court, quoting from Lee, asserted that ‘‘[t]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court

to control the disposition of the causes on its docket
with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel,

and [for] litigants. How this can best be done calls for

the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing

interests and maintain an even balance.’’ See Lee v.

Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C., supra, 312. The stay

of proceedings at issue in Lee, however, involved the

court’s staying of proceedings in a legal malpractice

action pending on its own docket. Id., 309. In that case,

the plaintiff brought a legal malpractice action against

a law firm arising out of the firm’s representation of

the plaintiff in several foreclosure actions. Id., 290–91.

Both the foreclosure actions and the malpractice action

were pending before the court. Id., 294. In rendering

its decision, this court held that the court’s power to

stay proceedings ‘‘is incidental to the power inherent

in every court to control the disposition of the causes

on its docket . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 311.

In the present case, the court also cited Tyler v.

Shenkman-Tyler, supra, 115 Conn. App. 528–29. In

Tyler, the plaintiff and the defendant were parties to a

marital dissolution action. Id., 523. Before the dissolution trial began, there was a structural fire at a vacation

property owned by the parties, and, after an investigation, the defendant was arrested and charged with arson

related to the fire. Id. The defendant then filed a motion

to stay the marital dissolution trial that was pending

before the court until after the disposition of his criminal case. Id. The court asserted that, in order to determine whether to grant a stay, it must ‘‘balance the interests of the litigants, nonparties, the public and the court

itself.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 529. One

factor to be considered was ‘‘the convenience to the

court in the management of its docket . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Both Lee and Tyler are inapplicable to the present

case because they involve motions to stay proceedings

pending before the court. See Lee v. Harlow, Adams &

Friedman, P.C., supra, 116 Conn. App. 311–12; Tyler

v. Shenkman-Tyler, supra, 115 Conn. App. 528–29. As

we have stated, the requested ‘‘stay’’ in the present case

did not involve an action pending on the court’s docket

but a disciplinary hearing pending before the board, an

independent administrative agency. The court’s reliance on Lee and Tyler, therefore, was misplaced.

We further find instructive a decision of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which

utilized the standard for granting a temporary injunction

under an analogous set of facts.6 See Nosik v. Singe,

40 F.3d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1994). In Nosik, the plaintiff,

a school psychologist who worked for the Danbury

Board of Education, was arrested for allegedly

defrauding car insurance companies by submitting false

repair bills. Id., 594. Subsequently, the Danbury School

Administration (administration) suspected that the
plaintiff had fraudulently obtained employee health

insurance benefits for her boyfriend by claiming that

he was her husband. Id. When the plaintiff refused to

submit proof of her marriage, the administration suspended her and initiated an investigation into both of

the suspected fraudulent acts. Id. Following the investigation, the administration recommended that the board

of education terminate the plaintiff for moral misconduct. Id. The board of education commenced termination proceedings against the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff

then requested that the board of education stay the

proceedings until the criminal proceedings against her

concerning the car insurance fraud were resolved. Id.

When the board of education declined to do so, the

plaintiff brought an action in the United States District

Court for the District of Connecticut seeking the issuance of a preliminary injunction in the form of a stay of

the termination proceedings, arguing that ‘‘the hearings

would give prosecutors a preview of her criminal

defense,’’ and that ‘‘if she invoked her right against selfincrimination during the hearings, she would be fired.’’

Id. The District Court evaluated the request for a stay

of the termination proceedings under the standard

applicable to an application for temporary injunctive

relief,7 and the District Court denied the plaintiff the

relief sought. Id., 594–95. On appeal, the Second Circuit

upheld the District Court’s ruling because the plaintiff

had failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that she

was likely to prevail on the merits of her claim. Id., 595.

The plaintiff in the present case, just as in Nosik,

filed an application for a temporary injunction seeking

to enjoin the defendant from continuing with the disciplinary proceedings against Eaton until the criminal

proceedings are resolved. Both Nosik and the present

case involve requests to enjoin ongoing administrative

disciplinary proceedings—matters that were not pending on the court’s own docket—premised entirely on

the existence of parallel criminal proceedings pending

in court. According to the Second Circuit, the proper

standard to apply in such a case is the standard for

adjudicating a temporary injunction. See id.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court

improperly reviewed the plaintiff’s application for a

temporary injunction pursuant to the standard for adjudicating a motion for a stay of civil proceedings. The

court should have applied the familiar standard that

governs an application for a temporary injunction.

Application of the proper standard involves factual

determinations that must be made by the trial court,

such as whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of injunctive relief. The court made

no such finding in the present case. Thus, the proper

remedy is to reverse the judgment and remand the case

to the trial court for further proceedings in which the

court applies the correct standard and makes the requisite findings.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 We refer in this opinion to the town of Hamden as the defendant. The

Hamden Board of Police Commissioners (board) was also a defendant in

this case, but it did not appeal. ‘‘Although Connecticut recognizes the general

rule that a nonappealing party is bound by the decision of the lower court,

we also have recognized that there are times when a nonappealing party

can benefit from an appellate court’s determination even though that party

did not participate in the appeal. . . . [W]hen the rights of all the parties

are interwoven or when the erroneous legal decision of the lower court

forms the basis for all of the parties’ rights, the nonappealing party is entitled

to the benefit of the appellate court determination.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Mierzejewski v. Brownell, 152 Conn. App. 69, 83 n.5, 97 A.3d

61 (2014). This exception to the general rule is applicable in the present case.

2 The defendant also claims in this appeal that, even if the standard that

the court applied was legally proper, the court improperly found that Eaton’s

interests in his continued employment and protecting his right against selfincrimination outweighed the defendant’s interest in resolving the disciplinary proceeding. Because we conclude that the court utilized the incorrect

standard in granting the injunction, it is unnecessary for us to reach the

merits of this claim.

3 The plaintiff and the defendant are parties to a collective bargaining

agreement governing their relationship during the term of July 1, 2014

through June 30, 2022. Pursuant to article 46, § 46.1 of the agreement, ‘‘[n]o

employee shall be discharged, demoted or disciplined in any matter except

for just cause.’’ Article 46, § 46.3 (A) provides: ‘‘If any disciplinary action is

to be taken as a result of said complaint, the Police Commission shall

notify the employee allegedly involved, in writing, of the charges, and said

Commission shall schedule a hearing no later than thirty (30) calendar days

after said notification and not earlier than one (1) week after said notification

of hearing.’’

4 Subsequently, the court filed a signed transcript of its decision in accordance with Practice Book § 64-1 (a).

5 We conclude in this opinion that the court’s ruling constituted the granting of temporary injunctive relief. We briefly note that, although a temporary

injunction is not normally considered a final judgment for purposes of an

appeal; Rustici v. Malloy, 60 Conn. App. 47, 52, 758 A.2d 424, cert. denied,

254 Conn. 952, 762 A.2d 903 (2000); this appeal is jurisdictionally proper.

‘‘General Statutes § 31-118 . . . authorizes any party aggrieved by a decision

of the court on an application for a temporary injunction in a labor dispute

to appeal from the final judgment thereon. . . . [S]uch an appeal lies if,

but only if, the injunction was granted in a case involving or growing out

of a labor dispute.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id. General Statutes § 31-112 (c) defines ‘‘ ‘labor dispute’ ’’ to include ‘‘any

controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning

the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment

or concerning employment relations, or any controversy arising out of the

respective interest of employer and employee, regardless of whether or not

the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.’’

6 Although decisions of the Second Circuit are not binding on this court;

Turner v. Frowein, 253 Conn. 312, 341, 752 A.2d 955 (2000); ‘‘[f]ederal case

law, particularly decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit . . . can be persuasive in the absence of state appellate

authority . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Duart v. Dept. of Correction, 116 Conn.

App. 758, 765, 977 A.2d 670 (2009), aff’d, 303 Conn. 479, 34 A.3d 343 (2012).

7 The standard used to evaluate an application for a preliminary injunction

in federal court is similar to the standard used to evaluate an application

for a temporary injunction in our state courts. Under the federal preliminary

injunction standard, the plaintiff ‘‘bears the burden of showing that she

will suffer irreparable harm without [the injunction]. . . . She must also

demonstrate either (1) that she will likely prevail on the merits or (2) that

sufficiently serious questions go to the merits and the balance of hardships

weighs decidedly in her favor.’’ (Citation omitted.) Nosik v. Singe, supra,

40 F.3d 595.