Filed 12/16/22 Torres v. Super Center Concepts CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

OLIVIA TORRES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

SUPER CENTER CONCEPTS, 

INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B313172

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19STCV19673)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Edward B. Moreton, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Edward Shkolnikov, Edward Shkolnikov and 

Michael Sean Devereux for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Berman, Berman, Berman, Schneider & Lowary, Stephanie 

Berman Schneider and Gina M. Genatempo for Defendant and 

Respondent.

____________________
2

Plaintiff Olivia Torres claims that defendant Super Center 

Concepts, Inc., which does business as Superior Grocers

(Superior)1 negligently maintained its premises, causing her to 

slip in a puddle of water and fall. The trial court entered 

summary judgment against Torres on her claims. On appeal, 

Torres contends two triable issues of material fact should have 

precluded summary judgment. First, Torres asserts a factual 

dispute about whether Superior’s refrigerated seafood and meat 

display was the source of the water in which she slipped obviated 

any need for Torres to demonstrate that Superior knew of the 

dangerous condition created by the water puddle. Second, Torres

argues that even if there was no evidence Superior itself caused

the dangerous condition, a triable issue of fact existed as to 

whether Superior knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care 

should have known, of the dangerous condition and failed to 

remedy it within a reasonable time.

We conclude that Torres failed to present admissible 

evidence that Superior created the dangerous condition, or had 

actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition prior 

to Torres’s slip and fall. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Summary

Superior owns and operates a grocery store in Cudahy, 

California. On June 18, 2017, Torres, her husband, and her 

1 In its answer, Superior alleged its legal name is Super 

Center Concepts, Inc. doing business as Superior Grocers and 

that it was erroneously sued as Super Center Concepts, Inc. For 

ease of reference, we use the name under which Superior does 

business.
3

daughter visited the Cudahy store. Torres was wearing sandals. 

At approximately 9:47 a.m., the family made their way to the 

meat and seafood counter. At 9:55 a.m., as Torres walked in 

front of the counter to the ticket dispenser to get in the queue for 

service, she slipped on water and fell. Torres’s husband heard 

her crying out but did not see the fall. The parties do not dispute 

that “[t]here was a large pool of water and [Torres’s] clothes were 

soaked as a result of slipping in the water.”

According to Torres, while her husband helped her up or 

soon thereafter, her husband told two male employees behind the 

counter that there was water on the floor.2 It is undisputed that 

one of the employees from the meat counter thereafter cleaned up 

the water with paper towels. In their declarations, Torres and 

her husband claim this employee was named Jose and that he 

admitted to them that the water was coming from the meat and 

seafood refrigerated display. Torres did not offer a declaration or 

deposition testimony from this employee, and Superior has no 

record of an employee named Jose working at the meat counter 

on June 18, 2017. At the time she filed her opposition in 

December 2020, Torres contended, without citing any evidence, 

that whoever the employee was he “still works at the store.”

Torres acknowledged that she did not actually observe 

water coming from the display case or see “a flow of water, like 

an active leak.” Torres testified at her deposition that she did not 

know if Superior knew the water was on the floor before she fell; 

nor did she know how long the water had been on the floor before 

2 Torres claims neither employee took any action until her 

husband told them a second time about the water while she and 

her husband waited to order meat.
4

she fell. She also acknowledged that “Jose” did not say the 

refrigerated display case had leaked on any prior occasion or how 

long it had been leaking that day.

Superior asserts that Torres has no evidence the meat 

counter refrigerator was actively leaking that day. In support of 

its motion, Superior produced evidence that it has a policy and 

practice for the Cudahy store to submit work orders for 

refrigeration issues through a cloud-based system; that a leaking 

refrigerator would have been tracked through this electronic 

system; that Superior would “immediately send out a service 

provider to repair the refrigerator” upon a request for service; 

and that its records for the period June 1, 2017 through June 30, 

2017 do not reflect any leak, work order request, or work done 

relating to the Cudahy store’s meat counter refrigerator.

Superior also adduced evidence that the Cudahy store’s

policy was and is to have an employee, called a porter, inspect 

each aisle, the store perimeter, and the restrooms each hour to 

ensure the floors are clean, dry, and free of hazards. The porter 

is also to clean or otherwise remedy problems the porter may 

encounter on his or her rounds. Each porter carries a card with a 

bar code, which the porter scans when he or she begins and 

completes sweeps of different store sections. Thus, the times for 

the beginning and ending of the sweeps of each area are

electronically logged in a “Sweep Trax Activity Report” (Sweep 

Report). The Sweep Report cannot be changed once the sweeps 

are scanned and recorded. It is Superior’s policy that a scan upon 

completing a sweep cannot be made unless and until the area is 

clean and free of hazards. The store’s assistant director stated in 

his declaration that he “personally regularly walked through the 

store several times daily to ensure that the porters were 
5

complying with this sweep procedure and [he] know[s] that the 

managers of the departments were also aware of the importance 

of the hourly sweep procedures and they also watched to see that 

their departments were regularly cleaned.”

Superior had two porters on duty on June 18, 2017. It is 

undisputed the Sweep Report for that day states that a porter 

inspected the area of the store in which the meat counter is 

situated at 7:03 a.m., 8:03 a.m., 8:41 a.m., 9:33 a.m., and 10:05 

a.m. The sweep of the meat counter area preceding Torres’s fall 

began at 9:33:08 a.m. and ended at 9:34:41 a.m. As part of its 

practice, Superior took a statement from the porter that swept 

the meat counter area on the morning of June 18, 2017. The 

statement reflects that at 9:34 a.m. on June 18, 2017, the porter

“passed through the front end area and where the incident 

happened, [and] he did not see any substance or hazard on the 

floor.”

Torres baldly asserts, without any supporting detail or 

evidence, that the sweep was not properly done. Torres testified 

at her deposition that she did not know the last time the store 

inspected or cleaned the area where she fell; she did not know 

whether anyone complained to the store about a substance on the 

floor before she fell; and she did not see any footprints or cart 

tracks in the substance on the floor before she fell.

In support of her summary judgment opposition, Torres

offered a video taken by her husband after she fell. That video is

not included in the appellate record. According to Torres’s 

husband, he “took a video of the man cleaning up and of my wife’s 

knee.” Torres describes the video as showing “the water that had 

collected at the meat counter.” Superior similarly characterizes
6

the video as a short, post-incident video that depicts water on the 

floor.

In her declaration, Torres stated she took “photographs 

approximately one year [after the incident] depicting the towels 

that were packed into the meat and seafood refrigerator and the 

store floor.” Those photographs are not in the appellate record. 

Torres also asserted that as of December 30, 2020, she returned 

to the Cudahy store and observed “towels stuffed at the base of 

the meat counter.”

B. Procedural History

On June 5, 2019, Torres filed complaint against Superior 

alleging causes of action for premises liability and general 

negligence. She sought compensatory damages for hospital and 

medical expenses, “general damage,” and “incidental” damages.

On October 29, 2020, Superior filed a motion for summary 

judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. It argued 

Torres could not establish the required elements of either cause 

of action because she could not demonstrate a triable issue of 

material fact as to whether Superior created the alleged 

dangerous condition or had notice of it.3

3 In its answer to Torres’s complaint, Superior asserted 

several affirmative defenses, including that it had no actual or 

constructive knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition for a 

sufficient time prior to the alleged injury to have taken measures 

to protect against the condition. In its motion, Superior argued it 

was entitled to summary adjudication in its favor on its 

affirmative defense that it had neither actual nor constructive

notice.
7

In her opposition, filed December 31, 2020, Torres argued 

that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure4 section 437c, 

subdivision (h), she “should be allowed the opportunity to 

complete discovery.” Torres’s counsel submitted a declaration 

averring that due to the press of his criminal practice as well as 

staffing issues, he did not realize until after the Thanksgiving 

holiday that additional depositions were necessary to oppose 

Superior’s motion. Then, “with the advent of the [h]oliday season 

it was realized that there was no way timely discovery could be 

completed to oppose the [motion for summary judgment].” 

Torres’s counsel identified several persons to depose, including 

“the porter, the man seen cleaning the water, the manager, a 

[person most knowledgeable] as well as the declarant[s] in 

support of the [motion for summary judgment].” Torres 

requested a 45-day continuance of the hearing on the motion.

On January 8, 2021, Superior filed its reply brief. It 

argued, inter alia, that Torres had not met the requirements of 

section 437c, subdivision (h) because “she has not specified the 

‘essential facts’ needed to oppose the [m]otion that she thinks she 

can obtain through discovery.” Further, Torres made no effort to 

schedule the depositions she claimed were necessary between the 

date Superior filed its motion (October 29, 2020) and the date 

Torres filed her opposition (December 31, 2020).

On January 15, 2021, the trial court heard argument on the 

summary judgment motion. Superior’s counsel addressed the 

trial court’s tentative on the issue of whether the trial court could 

find, as a matter of law, that the 22 minutes between the porter 

4 Subsequent unspecified references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.
8

sweep and Torres’s fall was an insufficient amount of time for 

Superior to have discovered the dangerous condition.5 Citing 

Eidem v. Target Corp. (C.D.Cal. Aug. 24, 2011, No. EDCV 10-

01000 VAP) 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95544, Superior argued that 

although California courts do not set forth a specific time period,

cases that have found constructive notice involve time periods of 

30 minutes or longer between the inspection and the accident.

The trial court inquired about the impact of the employee’s 

statement that the refrigerator was leaking. Superior responded 

that the employee’s statement concerned what Superior knew 

after the incident and that the statement was hearsay. The trial 

court also asked whether it should consider if Torres could obtain

admissible evidence on this point by the time of trial. Superior 

responded that Torres had sufficient time to conduct discovery 

necessary to oppose the motion. Superior further argued that if 

Torres felt that she needed more time, she could make such a 

request under “the code,” and erroneously claimed “there’s an 

avenue for that that they’re not seeking.”

The trial court then asked Torres’s counsel to address 

Superior’s arguments that the employee’s statement was hearsay 

and that Torres had not demonstrated she would be able to offer 

any admissible evidence that the refrigerator was leaking. 

Torres’s counsel responded that he submitted on the tentative 

and that it was for the trier of fact to decide if there was 

sufficient notice of the dangerous condition.

The trial court again asked Superior whether it should 

disregard completely the statement from the employee 

5 The reporter’s transcript reflects that the court issued a 

tentative ruling, which is not included in the appellate record.
9

concerning the refrigerator leak. Superior’s counsel again argued 

the statement was hearsay. Torres’s counsel asked to respond. 

He argued that there was no evidence that the porter actually 

cleaned the area in front of the refrigerator unit and that Torres 

had carried her burden to show there was a dangerous condition 

in the form of water on the floor. Further, counsel argued “we 

need to do the deposition of [the person most knowledgeable] 

[inaudible] was there. Without that it would be premature to—

on defense’s part to state that the aisle was clean.” The trial 

court took the matter under submission.

On January 26, 2021, the trial court issued a minute order 

granting the motion for summary judgment without any 

explanation of its reasoning for doing so. After the trial court 

entered judgment in favor of Superior, Torres timely filed a notice 

of appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. Statutory Framework and Standard of Review

A “motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the 

papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law. . . .” (§ 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant seeking 

summary judgment has met the “burden of showing that a cause 

of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more 

elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established . . . .” 

(Id., subd. (p)(2); see also King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 

(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 432 [party moving for summary 

judgment “bears the initial burden of demonstrating that at least 

one of the elements of plaintiff’s . . . claim is without merit”].)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts 

to the plaintiff “to show that a triable issue of one or more 
10

material facts exists as to the cause of action.” (§ 437c, subd. 

(p)(2); see also Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 

Cal.App.4th 1510, 1518.) “[A]n issue of fact can only be created 

by a conflict of evidence. It is not created by speculation or 

conjecture. [Citation.]” (Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, 

Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 807.)

We review summary judgment rulings de novo. In doing 

so, we liberally construe the plaintiff’s evidentiary submission 

while strictly scrutinizing the defendant’s own showing, and 

resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in the plaintiff’s 

favor. (Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 

1078, 1083, citing Weber v. John Crane, Inc. (2006) 143 

Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438.)

B. Torres Did Not Demonstrate Any Disputed Issues of 

Material Fact

“[A]lthough a store owner is not an insurer of the safety of 

its patrons, the owner does owe them a duty to exercise 

reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.” 

(Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205 (Ortega).)

“Premises liability is a form of negligence . . . .” (Brooks v. 

Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 

1619.) “The elements of a negligence claim and a premises 

liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that 

duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. 

Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.) To establish 

causation, the plaintiff must show that the store owner either 

directly caused the dangerous condition or had actual or 

constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. (Ortega, 

supra, at pp. 1205-1206; Hatfield v. Levy Bros. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 

798, 806.)
11

1. Torres Did Not Identify Any Admissible Evidence that

Superior Created the Dangerous Condition

Torres first argues “[t]here are triable issues of fact as to 

whether [Superior] created the condition which caused [Torres] to 

fall. Because there are triable issues of fact that [Superior’s]

employee ‘created the dangerous condition’ there would be no 

need to show notice either actual or constructive.”

Torres, however, does not support this argument with any 

facts demonstrating Superior or its employees caused there to be 

water on the floor. Instead, she argues Superior “created” a 

dangerous condition when it failed to clean the water. This 

argument conflates the law governing when a premises owner 

directly causes the dangerous condition with the law governing a 

premises owner having actual or constructive knowledge of a

dangerous condition caused by others.

As our Supreme Court described in Hatfield v. Levy Bros., 

supra, 18 Cal.2d 798, “[w]here the dangerous or defective 

condition . . . has been created by reason of the negligence of the 

owner of the property or his employee acting within the scope of 

the employment, the owner of the property cannot be permitted 

to assert that he had no notice or knowledge of the defective or 

dangerous condition . . . . Under such circumstances knowledge 

thereof is imputed to him. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 806; see also

Sanders v. MacFarlane’s Candies (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 497, 501 

[“When an unsafe condition . . . has been created by the owner of 

the property himself or by an employee . . . , the invitee need not 

prove the owner’s notice or knowledge of the dangerous 

condition”].)

In contrast, “[w]here the dangerous condition is brought 

about by natural wear and tear, or third persons, or acts of 
12

God . . . , then to impose liability the owner must have either 

actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or 

have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the 

condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving 

an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises.” (Hatfield v. 

Levy Bros., supra, 18 Cal.2d at p. 806.) “[W]here the plaintiff 

relies on the failure to correct a dangerous condition [not created 

by the owner or its employee] to prove the owner’s negligence, the 

plaintiff has the burden of showing that the owner had notice of 

the defect in sufficient time to correct it.” (Ortega, supra, 26 

Cal.4th at p. 1206.)

Thus, to impose liability on Superior without showing 

actual or constructive notice, it is not sufficient to assert that 

Superior created the dangerous condition because it (or its 

employee) failed to clean up the water. Rather, Torres must 

adduce evidence that Superior or its employee was the source of 

the water and not a third party, such as another customer. 

Torres has not done so.

Torres claims the water came from the meat display 

refrigerator, but she acknowledged that neither she nor her 

husband personally observed the refrigerator leaking. The only 

evidence she offers in support of her claim the display case was 

the source of the water—the hearsay statement of the purported 

employee “Jose”—is inadmissible.6 Torres did not offer a 

6 Torres does not contend that the video taken after the 

incident depicts a leak coming from the meat display. 

Additionally, although Torres states she took photographs of 

towels in the meat display and on the store floor approximately 

one year after the incident, she presents no evidence that these 
13

declaration or any deposition testimony of the employee; nor was 

she able to accurately identify him notwithstanding the fact that, 

according to Torres, he still worked at the store at the time she 

filed her opposition.

In the trial court, Torres did not address Superior’s 

repeated hearsay objection to the purported statement by “Jose,”

even when asked by the trial court to do so. Torres’ opening 

appellate brief similarly does not address the trial court’s implied 

ruling not to accept evidence of the purported employee’s 

statement by granting summary judgment. Rather, Torres 

waited until her reply brief on appeal to argue the statement is 

admissible under the hearsay exception in Evidence Code section 

1224. Torres has thus forfeited this argument. (See Christoff v. 

Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 125 [“an 

appellant’s failure to discuss an issue in its opening brief forfeits 

the issue on appeal”]; REO Broadcasting Consultants v. Martin

(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 500 [refusing to entertain an 

argument raised for the first time in a reply brief].)

Even if the argument was not forfeited, we find it 

unpersuasive. Evidence Code section 1224 states that “[w]hen 

the liability[,] obligation, or duty of a party to a civil action is 

based in whole or in part upon the liability, obligation, or duty of 

the declarant, . . . evidence of a statement made by the declarant 

is as admissible against the party as it would be if offered against 

the declarant in an action involving that liability, obligation, 

duty, or breach of duty.” This section is inapplicable because 

Torres’s claims against Superior are not based on any liability, 

towels were placed there due to a pervasive leak from the meat 

display existing as of the date of her accident although she “still 

frequent[s] the store.”
14

obligation, or duty of “Jose,” or even any act or omission by him, 

but rather his purported admission about the source of the water.

(See Labis v. Stopper (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1005 [statement 

admissible under Evid. Code, § 1224 when it “related a specific 

and detailed act by the employee” upon which liability was 

based].) While such out of court statements by employees can be 

admissible against their employers, Torres would first need to 

show that “Jose” was authorized to speak on the subject matter of 

the statement. (See Evid. Code, § 1222, subd. (a).) She adduced 

no such evidence.

As for Torres’s statements that she observed towels at the 

meat counter on two instances—a year after the incident and two 

and a half years after the incident—these after the fact 

observations are too infrequent and remote in time to 

demonstrate a triable issue of fact as to whether the refrigerator 

unit was the source of the puddle on June 18, 2017.

Accordingly, Torres has not carried her burden to

demonstrate a triable issue as to whether Superior created the 

dangerous condition.

7

7 In the trial court, Torres suggested she could have 

obtained additional evidence relevant to opposing the motion if 

the trial court continued the matter pursuant to section 437c, 

subdivision (h). However, she does not argue on appeal that the 

trial court erred in denying this request. “Although our review of 

a summary judgment is de novo, it is limited to issues which have 

been adequately raised and supported in plaintiff[’s] brief.” 

(Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6; see Kim v. 

Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979 [“ ‘This court is 

not required to discuss or consider points which are not argued or 

which are not supported by citation to authorities or the 

record’ ”].)
15

2. Torres Did Not Demonstrate a Disputed Issue as to 

Whether Superior Had Actual or Constructive 

Knowledge of the Dangerous Condition

Torres argues there are disputed issues as to whether 

Superior had actual or constructive knowledge of the water on 

the ground before the accident. As to actual notice, she argues 

that the meat counter employee’s statement that the water came 

from the refrigerator unit establishes Superior’s actual 

knowledge of the leak. As noted above, this hearsay statement 

was inadmissible. Even if it was considered, the statement does 

not demonstrate that “Jose” knew of the leak before Torres fell. 

She acknowledged in her deposition that “Jose” did not say the 

refrigerator had leaked on any prior occasion or how long it had 

been leaking that day. She also testified she did not know if 

Superior knew the water was on the floor before she fell. Thus, 

Torres did not demonstrate a triable issue as to Superior’s actual 

knowledge of the dangerous condition prior to the accident.

Turning to constructive knowledge, it is well established 

that a “plaintiff need not show actual knowledge where evidence 

suggests that the dangerous condition was present for a sufficient 

period of time to charge the owner with constructive knowledge of 

its existence.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) “[P]laintiffs 

may demonstrate the storekeeper had constructive notice of the 

dangerous condition if they can show that the site had not been 

inspected within a reasonable period of time so that a person 

exercising due care would have discovered and corrected the 

hazard. [Citation.] In other words, if the plaintiffs can show an 

inspection was not made within a particular period of time prior 

to an accident, they may raise an inference the condition did exist 

long enough for the owner to have discovered it.” (Id. at pp. 1212-
16

1213.) Whether a store’s inspections are reasonable must be 

determined in light of the circumstances in each case, and there 

is no “exact time the condition must exist.” (Louie v. Hagstrom’s 

Food Stores, Inc. (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 601, 608.)

Although the issue of whether the dangerous condition 

existed long enough for the owner to discover it is ordinarily a 

question of fact for the jury (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1213), 

it can be decided as a matter of law when the evidence “is 

insufficient to support an inference that the defendant proprietor 

failed to exercise the care required.” (Girvetz v. Boys’ Market, Inc.

(1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 831.) For example, in Girvetz v. Boys’ 

Market, Inc., the appellate court held that one and one-half 

minutes was too short as a matter of law to provide constructive 

notice to the store owner of the dangerous condition. (Id. at 

p. 832.) At the other end of the spectrum, the appellate court in 

Zipusch v. LA Workout, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1281

concluded the plaintiff raised a triable issue of material fact as to

whether a gym negligently inspected and maintained its exercise 

equipment when no staff member inspected or cleaned the 

equipment for at least 85 minutes prior to the accident. (Id. at 

p. 1284; see also Ortega, supra, at p. 1210 [affirming the jury’s 

verdict for the plaintiff where milk might have been on the floor 

for 15 to 20 minutes or as much as two hours].)

In Louie v. Hagstrom’s Food Stores, Inc., supra, 81 

Cal.App.2d 601, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 

denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding a

jury verdict where the plaintiff slipped and fell in syrup 15 to 25 

minutes after the site had been examined. The evidence in that 

matter supported an inference that the nearby cashier would 

have heard the “appreciable noise” caused by the breaking of the 
17

glass syrup bottle, and the thickness of the syrup and size of the 

puddle on a cold day suggested the puddle took a “substantial 

period of time” to form. (Id. at p. 608.)8

Here, the evidence “is insufficient to support an inference 

that the defendant proprietor failed to exercise the care 

required.” (Girvetz v. Boys’ Market, Inc., supra, 91 Cal.App.2d at 

p. 831.) In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that 

proximate cause entails considerations of public policy and 

fairness (PPG Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1999) 20 

Cal.4th 310, 316, citing Mosley v. Arden Farms Co. (1945) 26 

8 As it did in the trial court, Superior cites to federal 

district court decisions for the proposition that in California, 

“nothing less than thirty minutes between the last inspection and 

a plaintiff’s fall has been held to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact or sufficient to uphold a plaintiff’s verdict.” (Alacan 

v. Target Corporation (C.D.Cal. June 26, 2015, No. CV 14-04564-

AB) 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178484 at p. *10 [citing Ortega, supra, 

26 Cal.4th at p. 1204 and Zipusch v. LA Workout, Inc., supra, 155 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1285]; see Eidem v. Target Corp., supra, 2011 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95544 at pp. *25-*26 [same]; see also Cardoza v. 

Target Corp. (C.D.Cal. June 22, 2018, No. CV 17-2232-MWF) 

2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117106 at p. *8 [“As a general proposition, 

California courts apply a 30-minute threshold for submitting 

questions of actual notice to a jury—i.e., if there is undisputed 

evidence that an active inspection of the relevant area occurred 

less than 30 minutes before the accident, summary judgment in 

favor of the store owner is appropriate; if not, the question should 

be resolved by a jury”].) Our review of published California 

opinions underscores that there is no specific time period cut off, 

and that the reasonableness of a store’s inspection(s) must be 

determined in light of the circumstances of each case. (See, e.g., 

Louie v. Hagstrom’s Food Stores, Inc., supra, 81 Cal.App.2d at 

pp. 608-609.)
18

Cal.2d 213, 221 (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.)) and further that a 

proprietor is not the insurer of the safety of its patrons (Ortega, 

supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1205).

Superior satisfied its initial summary judgment burden of 

presenting evidence demonstrating reasonable efforts to keep the 

store reasonably safe for its patrons. It adduced evidence of 

established procedures for refrigerated unit repair; that no 

request for repair had been made prior to the incident; that, 

consistent with inspection procedures, a porter inspected the area 

in which the meat display was located approximately 21 to 22 

minutes prior to the incident; that the inspection was recorded in 

the Sweep Report, which was electronically generated and could 

not be modified thereafter; and that the porter did not observe 

any water on the floor at that time. There also were no tracks or 

footprints visible near the puddle, indicating no one else had 

stepped in the water yet.

Torres does not offer any admissible evidence to dispute 

these facts. Although she cites the proposition that 

“[c]onstructive notice can be demonstrated by showing the site of 

the dangerous condition had not been inspected within a 

reasonable time,” Torres does not argue an inspection 21 to 22 

minutes prior to the incident was unreasonable. Instead, she 

argues “[a] jury can infer that the condition was long standing, 

pervasive and dangerous. A jury can infer that something was 

amiss with their inspection system and that the sweep that 

allegedly occurred 22 minutes before the fall never happened, 

was fudged or was done improperly.” She also asks: “Did the 

porter not actually inspect that area? Did the porter not see it?

Did the porter enter a faulty time on the sweep sheet? How could 

water of that magnitude have gathered in just 22 minutes?” 
19

Questioning the credibility of Superior’s evidence (i.e., whether

the sweep actually happened as described) is not sufficient to 

raise a triable issue of fact. (§ 437c, subd. (e) [“summary 

judgment shall not be denied on grounds of credibility or for want 

of cross-examination of witnesses furnishing affidavits or 

declarations in support of the summary judgment”]; Ayon v. 

Esquire Deposition Solutions, LLC (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 487, 

496.) Without any evidence to support these rhetorical questions, 

they are speculation that fail to create a triable factual issue. 

(See Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc., supra, 72 

Cal.App.4th at p. 807.)

Torres also does not offer any evidence that a more 

frequent inspection or additional procedures were warranted 

under the circumstances. Unlike Louie v. Hagstrom’s Food 

Stores, Inc., supra, 81 Cal.App.2d 601, where the evidence of an 

inspection 15 to 25 minutes was insufficient to support a 

judgment in the defendant’s favor, there is no evidence here that 

Superior or its employees ignored factors that would have given 

notice to them of the dangerous condition, such as an 

“appreciable noise” caused by the breaking of the syrup bottle. 

The “magnitude” of the puddle also does not give rise to an 

inference that Superior should have discovered the puddle. 

Although the evidence establishes that the puddle was “large” 

and that the water “soaked” Torres’s clothes, common experience 

tells us the viscosity of water is low and may spread easily and 

quickly. Furthermore, it can be difficult to see. Indeed, as Torres 

testified, she did not see any cart tracks or footprints in the 

water. Accordingly, Torres did not present any evidence to create 

a triable issue of material fact that Superior’s procedures for 

maintaining a reasonably safe premises were insufficient.
20

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Superior is awarded 

its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.