United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-10446

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Raymundo Frausto-Olmos, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:19-CR-346-1

Before Wiener, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Raymundo Frausto-Olmos pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after 

deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). The district court 

sentenced him to 60 months of imprisonment and imposed a three-year term 

of supervised release.

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 21, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

Frausto-Olmos argues on appeal that the district court erred in 

imposing a term of supervised release on a deportable alien without stated 

reasons to justify a term of supervised release. Because he did not raise this 

issue before the district court, review is for plain error. See United States 

v. Dominguez-Alvarado, 695 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2012).

Under U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), a “court ordinarily should not impose a 

term of supervised release in a case in which supervised release is not 

required by statute and the defendant is a deportable alien who likely will be 

deported after imprisonment.” The district court did not refer to § 5D1.1(c) 

at sentencing, but its implicit consideration of the guideline is indicated by its 

adoption of the presentence report (PSR), which advised of the hortatory 

language of § 5D1.1(c). See United States v. Cancino-Trinidad, 710 F.3d 601, 

606 (5th Cir. 2013). Moreover, it may be inferred from the sentencing 

proceedings that the district court was concerned with the sentencing factors 

of deterrence and protecting the public given its reference to paragraph 81 of 

the PSR, which summarized the factors warranting an upward departure, 

including Frausto-Olmos’s lengthy criminal history and the fact that the 

instant offense was his fourth illegal reentry prosecution. Finally, in its 

written statement of reasons, the district court explained that it “imposed a 

term of supervised release because it will provide an added measure of 

deterrence and protection.” Thus, Frausto-Olmos cannot show that the 

district court’s imposition of supervised release constituted reversible plain 

error. See Dominguez-Alvarado, 695 F.3d at 330.

Frausto-Olmos further argues that the court failed to properly 

pronounce the standard conditions of supervised release, depriving him of 

notice and an opportunity to object. As the Government notes, he does not 

claim that he was not informed of the supervision conditions prior to his 

sentencing hearing. See United States v. Garcia, 983 F.3d 820, 825 (5th Cir. 

2020).

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At sentencing, the district court ordered that if Frausto-Olmos was 

not deported or removed, he was to comply with “the standard conditions 

recommended by the . . . Sentencing Commission.” Additionally, the court 

provided Frausto-Olmos with a document titled “Order Setting Additional 

Terms of Supervised Release.” That order advised that the court intended 

to impose “the standard conditions recommended by the [United States] 

Sentencing Commission” as well as six additional conditions, which the 

court pronounced at sentencing. Frausto-Olmos signed the court’s order, 

and it was filed on the date of his sentencing hearing, but it is unclear from 

the record whether the order was executed before or after the sentencing

hearing. Although oral adoption of the order at sentencing would have 

sufficed to satisfy the oral pronouncement requirement, the district court did 

not do so. See United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 561 n.5 (5th Cir.) (en 

banc), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 825 (2020).

Under similar circumstances, however, this court has determined that 

the district court complied with Diggles and had not committed any error, let 

alone plain error, in its pronouncement of the standard conditions of 

supervised release. See United States v. Martinez, 15 F.4th 1179, 1180-81 (5th 

Cir. 2021). In Martinez, the sentencing judge failed to cite the district’s 

standing order when he orally imposed the standard conditions, but this court 

concluded that there was no pronouncement problem “[b]ecause the court 

told [the defendant] it was imposing ‘standard conditions.’” Id. at 1181. As 

such, the defendant “had notice and an opportunity to object (or, at a 

minimum, to ask for more specificity about the conditions).” Id.

Here, the district court’s shorthand reference to standard conditions 

at sentencing was sufficient to give Frausto-Olmos notice and an opportunity 

to object. See id. “As that notice and opportunity to object are the hallmarks 

of the pronouncement requirement, the district court complied with 

Diggles,” and there was no error plain or otherwise. Id.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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