SUMMARY

March 11, 2021

2021COA28

No. 17CA0720, People v. Grosko — Crimes — Pimping; Criminal 

Law — Limitation for Commencing Criminal And Juvenile 

Delinquency Proceedings — Continuing Offenses; 

Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Double Jeopardy —

Multiplicity

A division of the court of appeals decides two matters of first 

impression with respect to the pimping statute, section 18-7-206, 

C.R.S. 2020. First, the division concludes pimping is defined by the 

statute as a continuing offense. Second, the division concludes that 

the unit of prosecution for pimping is defined as per person; that is, 

an individual who is supported by funds derived from another’s 

prostitution may be prosecuted based on the number of prostitutes 

that they receive money or other things of value from. In addition, 

the division concludes that the district court did not abuse its 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
discretion in allowing expert witness testimony in this case. For 

these reasons, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA28

Court of Appeals No. 17CA0720

Jefferson County District Court No. 15CR3357

Honorable Randall C. Arp, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Robert Jay Grosko,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II

Opinion by JUDGE ROMÁN

Welling and Brown, JJ., concur

Announced March 11, 2021

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jessica A. Pitts, Deputy State 

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1

¶ 1 Defendant, Robert Jay Grosko, appeals the judgment of 

conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of pimping, 

attempted pimping, solicitation, and pandering. We affirm 

defendant’s convictions. In doing so, we address two matters of 

first impression.

¶ 2 First, we conclude that the plain language of section 18-7-206, 

C.R.S. 2020, makes pimping a continuing offense. Thus, we affirm 

defendant’s conviction for pimping for acts that occurred both 

within and outside of the statute of limitations.

¶ 3 Second, we conclude that the unit of prosecution for pimping 

is defined by section 18-7-206 as per person — that is, an 

individual who is supported by funds derived from another’s 

prostitution may be prosecuted based on the number of prostitutes 

that the pimp receives money or other things of value from. We

therefore affirm defendant’s multiple convictions for attempted 

pimping because the evidence in support of his convictions was 

based on attempts to pimp two separate individuals.

¶ 4 We also reject defendant’s evidentiary contention. 
2

I. Background

¶ 5 According to the prosecution’s evidence, defendant recruited 

E.W. to work for him as a prostitute in 2015. After E.W. “tr[ied] 

out” by having sex with him, defendant arranged for clients to meet 

with E.W. Defendant and E.W. agreed that he would receive 21% of 

the proceeds of E.W.’s work. E.W. ultimately saw four clients over 

the course of two weeks and made $550, although she never gave 

any of the money to defendant.

¶ 6 S.T., a prostitute who had previously worked for defendant in 

2013, contacted defendant to arrange a “threesome.” Unbeknownst 

to defendant, S.T. was working for the FBI as a confidential 

informant. Defendant sent E.W. to join S.T. for the “threesome,” 

which turned out to be a sting. After E.W. was arrested, she 

informed police that she was supposed to meet with defendant to 

pay him the 21% of her proceeds that she owed him.

¶ 7 At the same time as the sting, defendant went to meet A.W., 

another girl he recruited to work for him as a prostitute — also for 

21% of the proceeds. A.W., however, was a false persona created by 

law enforcement. Defendant was arrested at the same time as the 

sting set up to catch E.W.
3

¶ 8 The prosecution charged defendant with two counts of 

attempted pimping (one each for E.W. and A.W.), and one count of 

pimping (S.T.). On a motion by defense counsel, the court severed 

trial for the pimping count from the attempted pimping counts. 

After the trial on the attempted pimping charges, a jury convicted 

defendant of two counts of attempted pimping, and two counts of

the lesser nonincluded offense of solicitation. After the trial on the 

pimping charge, a jury convicted defendant of one count of pimping 

and the lesser nonincluded offense of pandering.

¶ 9 The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years in prison for 

each of the attempted pimping counts, to be served concurrently; 

ten years in prison for the pimping charge, to be served 

consecutively; and six months in jail, time served, for all of the 

lesser nonincluded offenses. 

II. Analysis

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant contends that (1) pimping is not a 

continuing offense, and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction 

as to the pimping charge and conviction because the alleged date 

range fell outside of the statute of limitations; (2) in the alternative, 

if pimping is a continuing offense, defendant’s convictions for 
4

attempted pimping were multiplicitous in violation of double 

jeopardy; and (3) the trial court erred by admitting expert 

testimony. We consider and reject each of these contentions.

A. Pimping is a Continuing Offense

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 Determining whether an offense is continuing is a matter of 

statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Allman v. People, 

2019 CO 78, ¶ 10.

¶ 12 “When the legislature creates an offense, that offense is 

deemed committed once all the substantive elements set forth by 

the legislature are satisfied.” Id. at ¶ 11. “‘However, in certain

circumstances, a crime continues beyond the first moment when all 

its substantive elements are satisfied,’ and it is deemed a 

continuing offense.” Id. (quoting People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d 

1188, 1192 (Colo. 2003)). A continuing offense “continues (and the 

statute of limitations does not begin to run) so long as the illegal 

conduct continues.” Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d at 1193; see also 

§ 16-5-401(4), C.R.S. 2020 (“When an offense . . . is based on a 

series of acts performed at different times, the period of limitation 
5

prescribed by this code . . . starts at the time when the last act in 

the series of acts is committed.”).

¶ 13 “A crime is deemed continuous when ‘the explicit language of 

the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion,’” or 

when “the nature of the crime involved is such that [the legislature]

must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing 

one.” Allman, ¶ 12 (alteration in original) (quoting Toussie v. United 

States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970)).

2. Additional Facts

¶ 14 In the initial charging documents, the prosecution charged 

defendant with one completed count of pimping regarding E.W. and 

two attempt counts — one referencing S.T. and the other 

referencing A.W. Each charge alleged that defendant’s conduct 

occurred in 2015.

¶ 15 In April 2016, the prosecution moved to amend and correct 

the information to state that (1) defendant’s conduct with respect to 

E.W. constituted attempted pimping, rather than a completed

offense; and (2) defendant had completed the crime of pimping with 

respect to S.T. between January and December 2013.
6

¶ 16 After a jury convicted defendant of pimping, he moved to 

dismiss the pimping charge as to his conduct related to S.T. 

because the April 2016 amendment fell outside the three-year 

statute of limitations by charging acts that occurred in January 

through March of 2013. The trial court found that the plain 

language of the pimping statute indicates that pimping is a 

continuing offense, and therefore, the statute of limitations did not 

run until December 2016, three years after the last act.

3. Discussion

¶ 17 The pimping statute, section 18-7-206, states: 

Any person who knowingly lives on or is 

supported or maintained in whole or in part by 

money or other thing of value earned, received, 

procured, or realized by any other person 

through prostitution commits pimping, which 

is a class 3 felony.

¶ 18 Where, as here, the statute itself does not explicitly state that 

a crime is a continuing offense, we construe the statute to give 

effect to the legislature’s intent. Allman, ¶ 12. To discern the 

legislature’s intent, we first look to the plain language of the 

statute’s text in the context of the statute as a whole. Id. at ¶ 13. 

Where the statute does not specifically define key terms, we look to 
7

the plain and ordinary meanings of the words, aided by the 

dictionary definition(s). Id. at ¶ 15; § 2-4-101, C.R.S. 2020.

¶ 19 Here, the plain language of section 18-7-206 defines a criminal 

act that takes place over time. In particular, the plain and ordinary 

meaning of the phrase “lives on or is supported or maintained” 

leads us to this conclusion. The dictionary definitions of “living,” 

“support,” and “maintain” each contemplate an ongoing period of 

time. See Black’s Law Dictionary 953 (11th ed. 2019) (defining 

“living” as “[o]ne’s source of monetary support or resources”); id. at

1481 (defining “support” as “[s]ustenance or maintenance; esp. 

articles such as food and clothing that allow one to live in the 

degree of comfort to which one is accustomed.”); id. at 973 (defining 

“maintenance” in this context as “[f]inancial support given by one 

person to another . . .”); accord Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary 1323 (2002) (defining “live” in this context as “to 

maintain oneself”); id. at 1362 (defining “maintenance” as “the act of 

providing a means of support for someone”); id. at 2297 (defining 

“support” as “to pay the costs of”).

¶ 20 Our conclusion today is the same as that of California courts 

interpreting identical statutory language. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 
8

143 Cal. Rptr. 587, 591 (Ct. App. 1978) (“Reasonable interpretation 

of the statutory definition [of pimping] leads to but one conclusion

[ — ] that the legislative intent was that living or deriving support or 

maintenance from the earnings of a prostitute . . . is an ongoing 

continuing offense that occurs over a period of time.”); see also 

People v. Culuko, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 801 (Ct. App. 2000)

(“[t]ypical continuous course of conduct crimes include . . . 

pimping”); People v. Dell, 283 Cal. Rptr. 361, 372 (Ct. App. 1991).

¶ 21 For these reasons, we conclude that pimping under section 

18-7-206 is a continuing offense and, therefore, affirm defendant’s 

conviction for pimping because his last act in the series of acts that 

constituted pimping S.T. fell within the statute of limitations. See 

§ 16-5-401(4).

B. The Attempted Pimping Convictions Were Not Multiplicitous

¶ 22 Defendant argues that if pimping is a continuing offense, then 

his convictions for attempted pimping are multiplicitous, resulting 

in a double jeopardy violation. Again, we disagree.
9

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 23 Whether convictions are multiplicitous and violate double 

jeopardy are questions of statutory interpretation that we review de 

novo. Allman, ¶ 12.

¶ 24 The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and 

Colorado Constitutions prohibit punishing an individual twice for 

the same offense. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Colo. Const. art. II, 

§ 18. “Multiplicity” prohibits “the charging of multiple counts and 

the imposition of multiple punishments for the same criminal 

conduct” and, therefore, implicates double jeopardy principles. 

Woellhaf v. People, 105 P.3d 209, 214 (Colo. 2005).

¶ 25 In these circumstances, we apply “a two-prong test for 

determining the legislatively prescribed unit of prosecution and 

then applying the legislative prescription to the facts of the case.” 

Id. at 215. First, we examine the scope of prosecution authorized 

by the statutory prescription; and second, we examine “all the 

evidence introduced at trial to determine whether the evidence on 

which the jury relied for conviction was sufficient to support 

distinct and separate offenses.” Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585, 
10

592 (Colo. 2005); see also Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 215; People v. 

Williams, 651 P.2d 899, 902 (Colo. 1982).

2. Discussion

¶ 26 Section 18-2-101(1), C.R.S. 2020, defines criminal attempt:

A person commits criminal attempt if, acting 

with the kind of culpability otherwise required 

for commission of an offense, he engages in 

conduct constituting a substantial step toward 

the commission of the offense. A substantial 

step is any conduct, whether act, omission, or 

possession, which is strongly corroborative of 

the firmness of the actor’s purpose to complete 

the commission of the offense.

¶ 27 Once again, the pimping statute states: 

Any person who knowingly lives on or is 

supported or maintained in whole or in part by 

money or other thing of value earned, received, 

procured, or realized by any other person

through prostitution commits pimping, which 

is a class 3 felony.

§ 18-7-206.

¶ 28 Thus, we must first determine what unit of prosecution the 

legislature intended to punish by proscribing a substantial step 

toward pimping. See Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 215.

¶ 29 “The unit of prosecution is the manner in which a criminal 

statute permits a defendant’s conduct to be divided into discrete 
11

acts for purposes of prosecuting multiple offenses.” Id. The 

legislature determines the allowable unit of prosecution, which, in 

turn, determines the scope of protection offered by the double 

jeopardy clause. Id. Thus, we look exclusively to the statute to 

determine the unit of prosecution that the legislature intended. Id. 

In doing so, we again look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the 

statutory language. Id.

¶ 30 Based on the plain language of the pimping statute, we

conclude that the legislature intended the unit of prosecution for 

pimping to be each person from whom a defendant knowingly 

derives support through acts of prostitution. In this context, 

“person” is a noun in its singular form, which is defined as “[a]

human being.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 137 (emphasis added); 

accord Webster’s Third New International Dictionary at 1686

(defining “person” as “an individual human being”). Thus, the 

phrase “by any other person” means that a defendant accused of 

pimping can be subject to individual charges of pimping per 

prostitute from whom he is deriving benefit as a result of their 

prostitution.
12

¶ 31 A view of the legislature’s proscription of similar criminal 

conduct — child pimping — confirms our interpretation of the 

pimping statute in this regard. People v. Jones, 2020 CO 45, ¶ 59 

(“One of the aids we may employ is to look to other statutes where 

the legislature has defined the term at issue, particularly when 

those statutes should be read in pari materia.”). The statute that 

proscribes pimping of a child, section 18-7-405, C.R.S. 2020, 

contains nearly identical language to the pimping statute, but in 

place of “money . . . realized by any other person,” the child pimping 

statute reads “money . . . realized by a child.” (Emphasis added.) A 

plain reading of this statute indicates that the unit of prosecution 

for pimping a child is per child, because “a child” is written in the 

singular. Therefore, we read “any other person” in the pimping 

statute as a signal of the legislature’s intent to designate one charge 

per person prostituted. See Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891, 898-

99 (Colo. 1986) (construing statute by reference to similar phrase in 

unrelated statute); see also Martinez v. People, 69 P.3d 1029, 1033 

(Colo. 2003) (statutes concerning the same subject matter must be 

construed in pari materia to ascertain legislative intent and to avoid 

inconsistencies).
13

¶ 32 Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature intended that the 

unit of prosecution for attempted pimping is conduct that 

constitutes a substantial step toward living on money earned by 

another individual through that individual’s prostitution.

¶ 33 Next, in light of this unit of prosecution, it is undisputed that 

the facts and the manner of the presentation of the evidence at trial

supported defendant’s separate convictions on two counts of 

attempted pimping — one for his conduct with respect to E.W. and 

the other for his conduct with respect to A.W. See Woellhaf, 105 

P.3d at 215.

¶ 34 Therefore, defendant’s two convictions for attempted pimping 

are not multiplicitous and do not violate double jeopardy.

C. The Expert’s Testimony Was Proper

¶ 35 Defendant next contends that the district court erred by 

admitting expert testimony that improperly profiled pimps. We 

disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 36 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of 

discretion. People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 122 (Colo. 2002). A trial 
14

court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, 

unreasonable, or unfair. Id.

¶ 37 Under CRE 702, a trial court may permit a qualified witness to 

give expert testimony that will help the jury understand the 

evidence or determine a fact in issue. In determining whether the 

proposed testimony would be helpful to the jury, the trial court 

must consider whether the proposed testimony is logically relevant 

and whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice under CRE 403. Salcedo v. People, 999 

P.2d 833, 838 (Colo. 2000). “In reviewing the court’s ruling 

regarding expert testimony, we afford the evidence the maximum 

probative value and minimum unfair prejudice.” People v. Conyac, 

2014 COA 8M, ¶ 23.

¶ 38 Courts have generally condemned the use of profiles as 

substantive evidence of guilt. See Salcedo, 999 P.2d at 837-38. 

“However, the ‘profile’ label is not helpful in distinguishing 

admissible from inadmissible expert testimony.” Conyac, ¶ 26. 

“Instead, courts focus on the purpose for which the evidence is 

offered: whether it is improper propensity evidence designed to 

show the defendant’s character, or whether it instead seeks to aid 
15

the jury in understanding a pattern of behavior beyond its normal 

experience.” Id. In other words, “experts may testify regarding the 

modus operandi of a certain category of criminals where those 

criminals’ behavior is not ordinarily familiar to the average 

layperson.” Id. (quoting United States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 666 

(D.C. Cir. 2003)).

2. Additional Facts

¶ 39 The prosecution tendered and, over defense counsel’s 

objection, the trial court qualified Sergeant Daniel Steele as an 

expert in the areas of commercial sex trafficking, pimping, and 

prostitution. Steele testified that he had no specific knowledge of 

the case. In his testimony, Steele discussed the prostitution trade

generally and the nature of the relationship between pimps and 

prostitutes, including

 how the various “levels of employment” in prostitution 

are separated based on the act or acts that the prostitute 

is willing to perform;

 the subtle and more overt ways pimps persuade or coerce 

prostitutes to move up a level;
16

 the items that prostitutes often keep with them for work,

such as condoms, lubricant, makeup, a change of 

clothing, and a cell phone;

 the nature of a pimp’s role, including advertising to 

clients and setting up engagements between clients and 

prostitutes;

 the details of engagements that pimps arrange with 

clients, such as location, method of payment, and 

services;

 how pimps dictate prices; and

 how other individuals, such as a recruiter and a “bottom 

bitch,” can assist pimps with recruitment of new 

prostitutes and arrange engagements.

3. Discussion

¶ 40 Relying on Salcedo, 999 P.2d 833, defendant contends that the 

trial court erred by admitting Steele’s expert testimony because it

amounted to improper profile evidence, was irrelevant, and was 

unduly prejudicial.

¶ 41 We have reviewed the record and perceive no abuse of 

discretion. Steele’s testimony was proper modus operandi 
17

testimony that was relevant, as it helped rebut defendant’s theory of

defense that he was merely pretending to be a pimp to entice 

women to sleep with him. Indeed, Steele’s testimony “alert[ed] [the 

jury] to the possibility that combinations of seemingly innocuous 

events may indicate criminal behavior.” United States v. King, 703 

F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1074 (D. Haw. 2010) (quoting United States v. 

Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, the 

testimony helped place other witnesses’ testimony — namely, S.T.’s 

and E.W.’s — “into context and provided the jury a means to assess 

their credibility.” United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186, 1195-96 

(9th Cir. 2010) (the trial court properly admitted detective’s expert 

testimony on “the business of prostitution and the relationships 

between pimps and prostitutes”); see also Conyac, ¶ 28 (“[W]here 

defendant denied that he committed any offense, the fact that his 

modus operandi was consistent with the modus operandi of sex 

offenders generally made it more likely than not that he committed 

the offenses at issue.”).

¶ 42 We reject defendant’s contention that Steele’s testimony was 

improper profile testimony that presented an “undue risk that the 

jurors would substitute Steele’s profile testimony for their own 
18

opinion.” Steele testified that he was not involved in the 

investigation of this case and did not opine as to whether defendant 

was a pimp or had the characteristics of one. See People v. 

Ramirez, 1 P.3d 223, 227 (Colo. App. 1999) (distinguishing between 

improper profile evidence and permissible modus operandi 

evidence); cf. Salcedo, 999 P.2d at 838 (a witness may not offer an 

“ill-defined compilation[]” of characteristics common to a certain 

type of offender and then opine that because the defendant has 

those characteristics, he is likely to be that type of offender).

¶ 43 Further, we are not persuaded that Steele’s testimony was 

unduly prejudicial under CRE 403. The testimony had significant 

probative value, as it bore on defendant’s theory of defense and the 

elements of the crimes charged. We discern no record support for 

defendant’s contentions that Steele’s testimony “likely inflamed the 

passions and sympathies of the jurors,” was misleading, or invited 

jurors “to substitute Steele’s . . . testimony for their own opinion of 

whether [defendant] met the legal elements of pimping.” In sum, 

affording the testimony the maximum probative value and the 

minimum unfair prejudice, as we are required to do, we cannot say 

the trial court abused its discretion by admitting it. Conyac, ¶ 23.
19

III. Conclusion

¶ 44 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE BROWN concur.