`[Senate Hearing 118-482]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






                                 


                                                        S. Hrg. 118-482
 
                       MODERNIZING U.S. ALLIANCES
                  AND PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             APRIL 17, 2024

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
       
       
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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                  
                  
                  
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             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 57-384             WASHINGTON : 2024       
                  
                  
                  
                  


                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman        
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey            JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire          MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware         MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut        PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia                    RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                   TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey             JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                   TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland             BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois              TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
                Damian Murphy, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          

                              (ii)        

  


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland.............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     2

Harris, Hon. Harry B., Jr., Former U.S. Ambassador to South 
  Korea, Former Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Colorado 
  Springs, Colorado..............................................     4
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Mead, Walter Russell, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign 
  Affairs and Humanities, Bard College, Columnist, Wall Street 
  Journal, Red Hook, New York....................................    12
    Prepared Statement...........................................    13

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Mr. Harry B. Harris, Jr., to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator James E. Risch.........................................    37

The committee received no response from Mr. Walter Russell Mead 
  to the following questions submitted by Senator James E. Risch.    38

Letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye from Douglas MacArthur II, 
  Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, 1965, 
  submitted by Senator Brian Schatz..............................    39

                                 (iii)

  


    MODERNIZING U.S. ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2024

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L. 
Cardin, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Menendez, Coons, 
Murphy, Kaine, Booker, Schatz, Risch, Romney, Ricketts, and 
Young.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    The Chairman. The hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Four years ago America's alliances were in tatters, 
especially in the Indo-Pacific. We saw a retreat from support 
for democracy and human rights, a chaotic patchwork of 
diplomatic grudges and self-defeating trade policies, and 
demands that our allies pay the cost of hosting U.S. bases.
    China was filling the vacuum left by the United States 
approach to foreign policy that some called America first but 
was in reality America alone. Only 4 years later, our alliances 
have never been stronger. The tremendous progress is thanks to 
the hard work of the Biden administration.
    The historic Camp David summit with Japan and South Korea, 
the AUKUS agreement with Australia, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom, which goes far beyond nuclear submarines, the 
increased practical cooperation with members of the Quad--
Australia, Japan and India, who share many of our strategic 
views on China.
    And just last week we witnessed the first ever trilateral 
summit here in Washington between Japan, the Philippines, and 
the United States.
    Our alliances in the region do not just reassure nations 
who live in Beijing's shadows; they also pay off for the 
American people.
    Whether it is intelligence sharing on mutual threats or 
U.S. basing and rotational agreements, we are enjoying enormous 
benefit from maintaining our Indo-Pacific alliances.
    Both Democrats and Republicans understand how important 
this region is. That is why there is bipartisan agreement 
across Congress on the need to preserve and deepen these 
alliances, and I am optimistic that the House will do the right 
thing and pass the Administration's supplemental security 
package.
    It not only includes vital funding for Ukraine but almost 
$5 billion for the Indo-Pacific. As President Kennedy once 
said, ``History has made us friends, economics has made us 
partners, and necessity has made us allies. Those who nature 
hath so joined together let no man put asunder.''
    The truth is that one of the United States' greatest 
strategic advantages are alliances. Who are China's closest 
friends? Russia, Iran, North Korea, some of the worst human 
rights abusers in the world that repress the hope and dreams of 
their citizens.
    Meanwhile, we have five mutual defense treaties with Japan, 
South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and our 
partnerships include New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, India, Mongolia, and Taiwan, and the list goes on.
    No one wants to be left off. Why? It is not just because we 
have the greatest military in the world. It is because of our 
values. It is because while others might use debt trap 
diplomacy to buy influence, the United States is working to 
bring peace and stability and prosperity.
    It is because we are working to uphold the rules based 
international order that has benefited people across the 
planet. We cannot go back to the days when America was 
agonizing and even attacking our friends.
    We cannot succeed with a foreign policy that tells 
dictators do whatever the hell they want to our allies. From 
manufacturing microchips to expanding the operational reach of 
our military across the Pacific to combating corruption, to 
standing up for human rights, the stakes in the Indo-Pacific 
are simply too high for the United States.
    We need a robust economic agenda, and we need to show up 
with concrete alternatives to what our competitors are offering 
in infrastructure and investment. America's leadership in the 
world has never been more important.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. We have two 
very, very distinguished expert witnesses with us today, and we 
should have an incredibly important discussion.
    But first let me recognize the distinguished ranking 
member, Senator Risch.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, let me say that the United States has had a 
strategic interest in Asia being open and free for over two 
centuries.
    We opened a consulate in India in 1792. In the 1850s 
various U.S. Senators made speeches about thwarting efforts by 
various colonial powers to dominate the region.
    A balance of power favorable to the United States protects 
U.S. interests and allies' sovereignty, advances economic 
prosperity, and ensures no one has to bow to a bully.
    However, this balance is being challenged. The greatest 
threat of regional domination, of course, comes from China 
supported by a growing China-Russia strategic partnership.
    It has been interesting to watch Russia become the junior 
partner in this relationship. China has improved its strategic 
posture by creating trade and economic dependencies and seizing 
territory from the South China Sea to the Indian border.
    China knows it can get what it wants if it proves U.S. 
alliances and partnerships are not up to the task when things 
get tough. Time and again we played into their hands.
    In 2012 the United States stood by as China seized the 
Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines uncontested, a failure 
we must not forget or repeat given China's growing encroachment 
on more territory like the Second Thomas Shoal.
    Weak responses spread the idea that we are unreliable. Left 
unanswered, our allies' confidence is shaken, and we should not 
be surprised if they seek to engage with China to protect their 
own national interest.
    Even in the face of a deteriorating strategic position we 
remain unserious about ensuring our alliances can address our 
shared objectives and contend with shared threats.
    U.S. allies plead for deeper economic engagement with us, 
yet the U.S. does not have a substantive economic agenda. The 
Administration's Indo-Pacific Economic Framework sounds good 
but delivers nothing.
    While there are calls for reviews of foreign investments by 
allies and the United States, we at the same time allow Chinese 
firms to benefit from U.S. tax credits and to profit off 
research at U.S. universities. This approach should be 
reversed.
    Meanwhile, the Administration's approach to allies puts 
ideology ahead of reality. The last three budgets proposed by 
the Administration prioritized gender and climate over 
countering China's advantages in transportation and digital 
infrastructure.
    The Administration instructs allies to stop buying Russian 
energy, and then at the same time bans U.S. LNG exports. This 
ham handed move has not gone unnoticed by our allies and for 
obvious reasons is roundly criticized.
    Numerous political declarations and joint statements 
obscure the lack of substance in progress with our allies. 
AUKUS is the most egregious example.
    I strongly support AUKUS, but the Administration announced 
the security alliance in 2021 but did not negotiate what it 
meant until after the press release went out.
    It is now 2024, and we still do not know when any new 
military capabilities will be produced. To make it worse, the 
Administration refuses to certify that Australia and U.K., our 
closest allies, have the laws to adequately support defense 
cooperation.
    But this did not stop the Administration from announcing 
moves to add a new AUKUS partner last week. Similarly, the 
Administration announced with great fanfare a nuclear 
consultative group with South Korea to deter North Korean 
aggression. A great idea.
    A year later, where is the progress? Further, the 
Administration fails to prioritize greater burden sharing. The 
demands of this security environment are immense. Our partners 
need to step up and buy more capability and conduct more 
presence operations.
    Finally, the Administration's Indo-Pacific alliance 
strategy does not account for the growing China-Russia 
alignment. Our Asian partners recognize that what happens in 
Ukraine will affect Asia's future.
    The Administration is politely asking China to restrain 
Russia rather than imposing effective strong economic 
punishment on China for its active role in Ukraine's suffering. 
That is the only kind of thing that China will understand or 
respond to.
    The Administration's approach to alliances is not serving 
our interests. Protectionism over economic engagement, ideology 
over pragmatism, and form over substance do not advance U.S. 
interests or give our Indo-Pacific partners strategic options.
    Initiatives must have concrete actions if they are to help 
us win this competition. The Administration's performance is 
underwhelming.
    I look forward to hearing the witnesses' thoughts on these 
matters.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    I think we all agree that the Indo-Pacific is critically 
important to U.S. national security interests. So the topic of 
modernizing U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific 
is a timely subject.
    We have two outstanding experts on the subject that have 
joined us today, and I want to thank both of you for your 
service and for your being here today.
    First, we have Admiral Harry Harris, a decorated four-star 
admiral who served our country for 3 years as the 24th 
commander of U.S. Pacific Command, INDOPACOM. Admiral Harris 
more recently led U.S. bilateral relations with our friends in 
Seoul as the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea from 2018 to 2021.
    Admiral Harris, it would be difficult to find anyone with 
more experience than you both in the military and diplomatic 
capacities in the Indo-Pacific. You are a strong advocate for 
U.S. alliances and realistic regarding the seriousness of our 
competition with the PRC.
    Our second witness is Professor Walter Russell Mead, an 
accomplished academic and historian currently serving as the 
distinguished fellow in strategies and statesmanship at the 
Hudson Institute.
    Professor Mead is also the James Clarke Chace professor of 
foreign affairs and humanities at Bard College and currently 
contributes to the Wall Street Journal and its global view 
columnist.
    So we have two very, very accomplished experts.
    Your entire statements will be made part of the record. You 
may proceed as you wish. We hoped that you could summarize in 
about 5 minutes or so, so we have time for committee 
discussion.
    With that, let me start with Admiral Harris.

STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR 
 TO SOUTH KOREA, FORMER COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND, 
                   COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO

    Mr. Harris. Thanks, Chairman Cardin and Ranking Member 
Risch and distinguished members. It is an honor for me to 
appear again before this committee. It has been almost 6 years 
since I last appeared here for my confirmation hearing to be 
the Ambassador to South Korea.
    I thought then that that would be my last testimony before 
you. I thought wrong. Today I am honored and even intimidated 
to testify alongside the esteemed, dare I say revered, 
Professor Walter Russell Mead as distinguished strategist, 
historian, teacher, and prolific writer who understands well 
the challenges and threats that confront America in the 21st 
century. So please throw the hard balls at him, and toss the 
softballs to me.
    I know I am time limited here so let me get right to it by 
first thanking this committee. That this hearing to examine the 
issue of U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific 
comes immediately after Japanese Prime Minister Kishida's and 
Philippine President Marcos's visit and 2 weeks after we 
celebrated NATO's 75th anniversary sends a powerful signal to 
the world in general and to our adversaries in particular.
    This committee's introduction last week of a bipartisan 
resolution underscoring the strength and the importance of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance serves as an authoritative reminder that 
2024 marks 64 years of our formal alliance with Japan.
    Importantly, this month also celebrates and marks the 45th 
anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. In my opinion, without 
Congress's active intervention back in 1979 when your 
predecessors in the 96th Congress crafted the act, Taiwan would 
have long succumbed to the People's Republic of China, or PRC.
    Today, 45 years later, Taiwan is democratic, an idea 
factory, and a global force for good despite the PRC's 
unrelenting quest to intimidate, isolate, and finally dominate 
this beleaguered island.
    The Cato Institute's 2023 Freedom Index ranked Taiwan as 
the freest country in Asia. As reference points, Taiwan ranked 
higher than Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and even us.
    The PRC ranked a dismal 149 out of 165 countries. Unlike 
our policy of strategic ambiguity, it appears Xi's intent is 
crystal clear. We must never allow the PRC to dictate America's 
Taiwan policy.
    As this committee knows far better than me, there are very 
few bipartisan issues in Washington these days, but our 
national concern about the PRC is one of them.
    Now, I visited Taiwan three times last year. In my opinion, 
Russia on Ukraine has galvanized them. They get it. But they 
need our tangible support, not our best wishes, and I am happy 
to discuss how this could happen in the Q&A session.
    Throughout my long military career and my short stint in 
diplomacy I emphasized my belief that America's single greatest 
asymmetric strength is our network of alliances and 
partnerships.
    Today we face a security environment more complex and 
volatile than any I have experienced--ever. Today more than 
ever alliances are critical to our national security. Alliances 
and allies matter.
    Ambassador Emanuel, our envoy to Japan, put it just this 
way last Sunday--we are betting on our allies, and they are 
betting on us.
    President Reagan once said that we cannot play innocents 
abroad in a world that is not innocent.
    This statement is as true today as it was on December 7, 
throughout the cold war, on 9/11, on 2/24 when Russia invaded 
Ukraine, and on the 7th of October when Hamas terrorists 
invaded Israel.
    Over a thousand Israelis including women, children, and the 
elderly, were subjected to unspeakable cruelty, murder, and 
rape, and hundreds were taken hostage. This is pure evil, and 
it baffles and angers me that there are those who seek to 
justify Hamas's actions.
    Indeed, the world remains a dangerous place. The unipolar 
moment following the cold war is long over. So, today more than 
ever I believe that America's security and prosperity in the 
Indo-Pacific are inextricably linked to this network of 
alliances and partnerships as we face a challenging and 
precarious crossroad where tangible opportunity meets 
significant challenge.
    We find ourselves again in peer competition. Not ``near 
peer''--but peer competition--with adversaries who are 
developing and deploying cutting edge weaponry and information 
disorder to undermine democracy and defeat us.
    An aggressive North Korea is building and testing nuclear 
weapons. A revisionist PRC seeks regional then global 
domination, and a revanchist Russia is on the move in Europe.
    I agree with Professor Mead's piece in the Wall Street 
Journal where he opined that we get it wrong when we believe 
that giving in to leaders like Putin will satisfy them.
    In my opinion, the same can be said of Kim Jong-Un and 
autocrats the world over. Equally concerning to me is the 
dangerous and growing alignment between the PRC, Russia, and 
North Korea, and all three with Iran.
    Maya Angelou once said that when someone shows you who they 
are, believe them the first time. These autocrats have shown us 
who they are time and time again and what they intend to do, 
and shame on us if we ignore them.
    Professor Mead asserted over a decade ago that America's 
cold war alliances were insufficient then to meet the needs of 
the 21st century. I agree.
    So today, in addition to the U.S.-Japan-South Korea 
trilateral, we have the Quad, we have AUKUS, and the new 
trilateral relationship involving the Philippines.
    In my written statement I talk about specific alliances and 
multilateral relationships, so I will not go into them here 
other than to observe that, one, AUKUS is not an alliance to 
counter an alien invasion, and two, those relationships reflect 
a fundamental change to America's approach.
    Moving away from the old hub and spoke model of my day, so 
20th century, INDOPACOM is now pursuing lattice like security 
arrangements with multiple connections between members.
    Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks with this 
observation. The U.S. made two flawed geopolitical assumptions 
last century.
    One, we assumed that the PRC would morph into something 
resembling a global force for good, and two, that Russia would 
no longer threaten its neighbors or the West.
    Today, the Russian bear is afoot, and we find ourselves 
shooting well behind the Peking duck. We must step up our game, 
or we will find ourselves outgunned, literally and 
figuratively.
    While challenges to our interests in the Indo-Pacific are 
real and daunting, I believe our resolve is powerful and 
durable. We are bolstered--and we are sustained and 
strengthened--by our allies and partners.
    Again, to quote Professor Mead, a distracted America still 
leads the world. I thank this committee and the Congress for 
your enduring support of our diplomatic corps and our armed 
forces, and I look forward to your questions.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Mr. Harry B. Harris, Jr.

    Thank you, Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished 
members. It's an honor for me to appear again before this committee. 
It's been almost 6 years since I last appeared here for my confirmation 
hearing to be the Ambassador to South Korea. I thought then that that 
would be my last testimony before you. I thought wrong. Today, I'm 
honored and even intimidated to testify alongside the esteemed-dare-I-
say-venerated Professor Walter Russell Mead . . . a distinguished 
strategist, historian, teacher, and prolific writer who understands 
well the challenges and threats that confront America in the 21st 
Century, as well as the importance of alliances to our Nation's 
security.
    Let me begin by thanking this committee. That this timely hearing 
to examine the state of U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-
Pacific comes immediately after Japanese PM Kishida's and Philippine 
President Marcos' visit and 2 weeks after we celebrated NATO's 75th 
anniversary sends a powerful signal to the world in general and to our 
adversaries in particular. This Committee's introduction last week of a 
bipartisan resolution underscoring the strength and importance of the 
United States-Japan alliance serves as an authoritative reminder that 
2024 marks 64 years of our formal alliance with Tokyo.
    More broadly, I'm grateful for Congress' bipartisan passing of the 
fiscal year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed 
by the President last December. This NDA (1) included strong support 
for Taiwan including increased military aid and security cooperation to 
that embattled island; (2) authorized the sale and transfer of defense 
articles and services relating to the implementation of the AUKUS 
partnership; (3) increased funding for the Pacific Deterrence 
Initiative (PDI); and (4) reinforced alliances and partnerships.
    Importantly, this month marks the 45th anniversary of the signing 
into law of the Taiwan Relations Act. In my opinion, without Congress' 
active intervention back in 1979 when your predecessors of the 96th 
Congress crafted the Act, Taiwan would have long succumbed to the 
People's Republic of China, or PRC. Today, 45 years later, Taiwan is 
democratic, an idea factory, and a global force for good, despite the 
PRC's unrelenting quest to intimidate, isolate, and finally dominate 
this beleaguered island. The CATO Institute's 2023 Freedom Index ranked 
Taiwan as the freest country in Asia. A reference points, Taiwan ranked 
higher than Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and the United 
States. The PRC ranked a dismal 149 out of 165 countries. I've called 
for ending the almost 44-year U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity in 
favor of strategic clarity. I also believe we should ink a bilateral 
Free Trade Agreement with Taiwan as soon as possible. The 
Administration's Indo-Pacific strategy specifically supports an 
environment in which Taiwan's future is determined peacefully by its 
people. My successor at Indo-Pacific Command testified before Congress 
in 2021 that the PRC could invade Taiwan in 6 years. That's 2027 . . . 
3 years from now. We ignore Admiral Davidson's warning at our peril. 
Unlike our policy of strategic ambiguity, the PRC's intent is crystal 
clear and oft-stated. We must never allow the PRC to dictate America's 
Taiwan policy.
    I was in Taiwan a year ago for the Council of Foreign Relations . . 
. again last May on INDOPACOM business where I met with President Tsai 
. . . and again just last December where I delivered remarks to their 
National Defense University. In my opinion, Russia-on-Ukraine has 
galvanized them. They get it. But they need our tangible support . . . 
not our best wishes.
    The Congress' continued bipartisan actions to strengthen the 
technological backbone of the United States against the relentless 
challenge posed by the PRC through passage of the CHIPs and Science Act 
in 2022 and your ongoing close examination of Tik-Tok are significant. 
I'll take this opportunity to express my hope for speedy passage of 
NDAA 2025.
    Throughout my long military career and my short stint in the 
diplomatic world, I underscored the fact that the United States' single 
greatest asymmetric strength is our worldwide network of alliances and 
partnerships. Today, we face a global security environment more complex 
and volatile than any I have experienced. Today, more than ever, 
alliances are critical to our national security. Alliances and allies 
matter.
    President Reagan once said, `We cannot play innocents abroad in a 
world that's not innocent.' This statement is as true today as it was 
in on December 7th . . . through the cold war . . . on 9-11 . . . on 2-
24 when Russia invaded Ukraine, and the 7th of October when Hamas 
terrorists invaded Israel. Over a thousand Israelis--including women, 
children, and the elderly--were subjected to unspeakable cruelty, 
murder, and rape . . . and hundreds were taken hostage. This is pure 
evil, and it baffles me that there are those who seek to justify Hamas' 
actions.
    Indeed, the world remains a dangerous place or, as Professor Mead 
calls it, a ``terrifying'' place. The unipolar moment following the 
cold war is long over.
    Today, more than ever, I believe America's security and economic 
prosperity are inextricably linked to this network of alliances and 
partnerships. We face challenging and precarious global crossroads 
where tangible opportunity meets significant challenge. Nowhere is this 
truer than in the Indo-Pacific. We find ourselves, again, in peer--not 
``near-peer'' but ``peer''--competition with adversaries who are 
developing and deploying cutting-edge weaponry and information disorder 
to undermine democracy with a goal and intent to defeat us. An 
aggressive North Korea is building and testing nuclear weapons; a 
revisionist PRC seeks regional, even global, dominion; and a revanchist 
Russia is not only on the move in Europe but increasingly conducts 
operations and engagements throughout the Indo-Pacific and, 
importantly, the High North. I agree with Professor Mead's piece in the 
Wall Street Journal where he opined that we get it wrong when we 
believe that giving in to leaders like Putin will satisfy them. The 
same can be said of Kim Jong Un and autocrats the world over.
    Last year, I testified before the House Armed Services Committee on 
the threat from the PRC. My testimony occurred in the midst of the spy 
balloon fiasco, which is so illustrative of the PRC's bad behavior and 
disregard for international norms. That Beijing would claim this 
incursion over sovereign American airspace was innocuous and unintended 
beggars the imagination.
    In 2022, the current Administration released its National Security 
Strategy. Though I would use the term ``adversary'' rather than 
``competitor'', this strategy recognizes that the PRC is the only 
competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to 
reshape the international order. As this committee knows far better 
than me, there are very few bipartisan issues in Washington these days, 
but our national concern about the PRC is one of them. As Michele 
Flournoy has said, ``There is a strong bipartisan consensus in seeing 
China as the pacing threat, economically, technologically, 
diplomatically and militarily.''
    The PRC's aggression in the South China Sea continues unabated--in 
fact, it has increased--despite the 2016 Permanent Court of 
Arbitration's tribunal ruling that invalidated China's ridiculous 9-
dash line claim and unprecedented land reclamations. The PRC's actions 
are coordinated, methodical, and strategic, using its military, ``grey 
zone'', and economic power to erode the free and open international 
seas.
    China's considerable military buildup could soon challenge the U.S. 
across almost every domain. While some might say the PRC is already 
there, I am not one of them. However, the PRC is making significant 
advancements in hypersonic weapons, 5th generation fighters, a blue-
water navy with aircraft carriers, an incredible build up of its 
nuclear arsenal, and in the next wave of military technologies 
including artificial intelligence and advanced space and cyber 
capabilities. Geo-politically, the PRC seeks to supplant the United 
States as the security partner of choice for countries not only in the 
Indo-Pacific, but globally. As I testified before the Congress when I 
was in uniform, and again last year, I believe Beijing seeks hegemony 
not only in East Asia, but greater Asia and beyond. The PRC wants to 
set the rules for the region, indeed the world.
    The United States has made it clear that we reject foreign policy 
based on leverage and dominance. The United States won't weaponize 
debt. We encourage every country to work in its own interest to protect 
its own sovereignty. And we must work in our own enlightened self-
interest to develop our own reliable sources of critical materials, 
including rare earths, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals essential for 
weaponeering, independent of the PRC. Former Deputy National Security 
Advisor for Strategy Nadia Schadlow wrote in 2022 that the PRC is ``the 
sole source or a primary supplier for a number of critical energetics 
materials.'' By ``energetics,'' I'm referring to those materials that 
are used for explosives and propellants--from bullets, to artillery, to 
missiles. I was stunned to learn about our reliance on the PRC for this 
critical capability.
    We find ourselves sailing into rocks and shoals, to use a nautical 
analogy, and we must invest and innovate to right the errant course 
we're on. If the United States does not keep pace, the Joint Force will 
struggle to compete with the People's Liberation Army on future 
battlefields.
    Now, I note that the current Administration's fundamental 
understanding of the PRC is consistent with its predecessor. Consider 
that the Secretary of State testified that the previous 
Administration's tougher approach is right; that what's happening in 
Xinjiang is genocide; and that democracy is being trampled in Hong 
Kong. The Secretary of Defense testified that he's focused on the 
threat posed by the PRC and he promised strong support for Taiwan.
    I'm worried about the trajectory of the PRC's body politic. As 
former Australian Prime Minister and now Ambassador to the United 
States Kevin Rudd wrote, the 2022 party Congress is likely to be ``an 
era-defining event . . . cementing Xi Jinping as China's paramount 
leader . . . solidifying the country's turn to the state and away from 
the market . . . and officially underscoring the primacy of Marxism-
Leninism.'' In other words, Deng Xiaoping is dead in more ways than 
one. If the first era of modern Chinese politics was Mao Zedong's, and 
the second Deng Xiaoping's, the third is unquestionable Xi Jinping's.
    Equally concerning to me is the dangerous and growing alignment 
between the PRC, Russia, and North Korea, and now, Iran. Clearly, we 
are in what I call the decisive decade. In 2018, I talked about the 
challenges facing the United States, including the perception--which, 
by the way, I completely disagree with--that the United States is a 
declining power facing unrelenting challenges posed by North Korea, the 
PRC, and Russia. Of course, today, I would add Iran to that list. Over 
the past 6 years, the situation has worsened in almost every geo-
strategic measure. Consider that Taiwan is under siege, Israel finds 
itself fighting once again for its very existence, Ukraine is ablaze, 
eastern and northern Europe is under threat, and our Navy is involved 
in countering Houthi rebels who have effectively shut down commercial 
shipping in the Red Sea.
    Regarding alliances in general, I was recently asked during a Q&A 
session following a speech I gave in Florida about the U.S. acting as a 
global policeman, an idea which has gained some traction in some 
quarters. The question was posed along the lines of ``why are we the 
world's policeman?'' I reject this notion. We are not the world's 
policeman. Police and law enforcement officers do their difficult jobs 
out a sense of true noblesse oblige . . . of altruism of a high order. 
They risk their lives to protect their communities, often with little 
pay, no reward, and scant appreciation from those they protect. Their 
actions define ``selfless service.'' But, as a Nation, when we act on 
the global stage--whether because of alliance obligations or some other 
cause or need--we act out of enlightened self-interest. What we provide 
to our allies is matched by what we selfishly gain from our allies--
whether that is access, basing, trade, or even broad international 
military support like we saw after 9-11. We are not in this alone. 
Ambassador Emanuel, our envoy to Japan, put it this way just this past 
Sunday: ``We're betting on our allies and they're betting on us.''
    Let me now discuss five examples of how the United States benefits 
from alliances--one global case and 4 Indo-Pacific cases.
    I'll begin with the global case. 75 years ago this month, the 
United States and 11 other countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty 
to counter the threat from the Soviet Union. Professor Mead wrote back 
in 2001, just a few years after NATO's 50th, that the United States``. 
. . built the NATO alliance, the largest and longest-lasting intimate 
security partnership among sovereign states in modern history.'' Many 
call this the most successful alliance in history and I tend to agree. 
Today's NATO--with 32 member countries--is not only the largest NATO 
has ever been, but I would submit, it's the strongest that NATO has 
ever been. I need not remind this committee that in NATO's 75-year 
history, Article 5--the collective defense piece--has only been called 
into action once: following 9-11 when we were attacked. In other words, 
on that darkest of dark days, NATO came to our assistance, not vice 
versa.
    Now, Japan. I've already mentioned last week's state visit by Prime 
Minister Kishida. There was also a trilateral summit with Prime 
Minister Kishida, President Marcos of the Philippines, and President 
Biden. America's alliance with Japan stands as the cornerstone of 
prosperity, security, and stability throughout the Indo-Pacific region. 
Since the end of World War II, the network of U.S. alliances has been 
at the core of a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific . . . benefiting us 
as much as any of our alliance partners. Now, no country can shape in a 
positive way the future of the region in isolation, and no vision for 
the region is complete without a robust network of sovereign countries 
cooperating to secure their collective interests.
    This is why trilateral cooperation between the U.S., South Korea, 
and Japan is so important. It's crucial for our three nations to work 
together to enhance our security cooperation and preserve the 
international rules-based order. The reality is that no important 
security or economic issue in the region can be addressed without both 
South Korea's and Japan's active involvement.
    This is also why bilateral cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul is 
critical. I'm heartened by Prime Minister Kishida's and President 
Yoon's outreaches to each other. Frankly, the stakes are too high to 
embark on any other course. Last year, President Yoon travelled to 
Japan for bilateral meetings with Prime Minister Kishida--the first 
such meeting by a sitting President of South Korea in 12 years. This is 
statesmanship in action. The recent trilateral decision to implement 
the North Korean missile warning data sharing mechanism has reached 
full operational capability . . . this benefits us all. As does the 
multi-year trilateral exercise plan established by Washington, Tokyo, 
and Seoul which begins this year.
    Japan's remarkable commitment to dramatically increase its defense 
spending to historic levels is both welcome and critical to our 
Alliance and stability in the region. Tokyo's decision to move surface-
to-ship missiles to Okinawa is part and parcel of this buildup and is 
both an example and clear recognition of the twin threats from China 
and North Korea.
    I agree with Professor Mead's assertion which he made over a decade 
ago that America's cold war alliances were insufficient to meet the 
needs of the 21st Century. To this end, we worked hard on expanding our 
international structures when I commanded USPACOM, and my successors 
have moved the ball in ways I couldn't even imagine. So today, in 
addition to the United States, Japan, South Korea trilateral I already 
mentioned, we have the Quad, AUKUS, and a new relationship involving 
the Philippines. Let me briefly touch on these.
    I'm a big fan and booster of the Quad. That's the informal grouping 
of like-minded democracies: the United States, Australia, Japan, and 
India. I called for its resurgence when I spoke at the inaugural 
Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi in 2016. Jake Sullivan calls it the 
``foundation upon which to build a substantial U.S. policy in the 
region.'' I've called for the establishment of a Quad Secretariat, 
headquartered somewhere in the region, to coordinate what issues to 
take on . . . and, perhaps, to also get at the question of how new 
members can join. You know, in college football, the Big 10 used to 
have 14 teams and the Big 12 had 10 teams. So, there's nothing that 
says the Quad has to have only 4 teams. But let me be clear. The Quad 
is not NATO nor will it ever be NATO. It's a grouping of like-minded 
democracies who share an outlook on the region's opportunities, 
challenges, and dangers. It is not a defense pact.
    Now, the new Australia, United Kingdom, and U.S., or ``AUKUS'' 
arrangement is a defense pact . . . and I, for one, am all for AUKUS 
and am excited by it. AUKUS is a game changer. I cannot wait to see a 
nuclear submarine under Australian colors underway in the Indo-Pacific. 
I don't believe this will take decades as some have said. After all, we 
put a man on the moon in 8 years and developed a Covid vaccine in less 
than 1 year. Last year, President Biden and Prime Ministers Sunak and 
Albanese announced a plan . . . an imminently do-able plan in my 
opinion . . . to do just this. We are already training Australian 
submariners and technicians in nuclear reactor management. I'm 
optimistic. One of the outcomes of last week's visit by PM Kishida was 
bringing Japan into AUKUS Pillar Two. To be clear, this will not make 
Japan an AUKUS Pillar One partner. Nevertheless, this is a significant 
development which underscores both Japan's technological prowess and 
the importance of AUKUS to the region writ large.
    Also encouraging and, frankly, exciting, is the new, formal 
trilateral partnership between the United States, Japan, and the 
Philippines. This trilateral will change the power dynamic in the South 
Chins Sea. It is long overdue in my opinion.
    All of these relationships reflect a fundamental change to 
America's approach to alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. 
In my day, we worked on improving bilateral relationships using the 
hub-and-spoke model. That is so 20th Century! Today, our approach is 
analogous to a lattice structure with multiple connections between 
members and across structural boundaries.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, since I was the Ambassador to the Republic 
of Korea, I would be remiss if I didn't spend a few paragraphs on our 
alliance with South Korea. In my opinion, the textbook case for the 
power of alliances is the U.S.-South Korea Alliance--which will be 71 
years strong this year. Forged during a devastating conflict, it has 
stood the test of time. It's mind-boggling to consider how much has 
changed in the world in general, Northeast Asia in particular, and the 
Korean Peninsula especially, since 1953.
    Some changes have been for the better, such as South Korea's 
miraculous growth into an economic and cultural powerhouse, a vibrant 
democracy, and a high-tech ``innovation nation.'' Other changes have 
been for the worse. Why is North Korea, far away in Northeast Asia, a 
challenge for the entire world? The answer is simple: Kim Jong-Un's 
missiles point in every direction. Today, North Korea stands out as the 
only nation this century to test nuclear weapons. North Korea is ruled 
with an iron fist, by a brutal dictator, who values power over the 
prosperity and welfare of his own people. The North's unrelenting 
pursuit of nuclear weapons, the means to deliver them, and its 
unmitigated aggression toward South Korea and America should concern us 
all.
    I believe KJU wants 4 things: sanctions relief, keep his nukes, 
split our Alliance, and dominate the peninsula. Last September, KJU 
stated unequivocally that he'd never give up his nukes and that North 
Korea's status as a nuclear weapons state is irreversible. This past 
January, by declaring that the North would no longer seek peaceful 
reunification with the South, and depicting the Republic as the North's 
``primary foe and invariable principal enemy'', he abandoned a 
foundational doctrine of the Communist regime. As the Wall Street 
Journal stated, ``Kim Jong Un has a new Enemy No. 1--and it isn't the 
U.S.''
    This doesn't sound to me like he's going to get rid of his nuclear 
ambitions anytime soon. In fact, he's telling us precisely the 
opposite. The North continues to test missiles of ever-increasing 
complexity. A year ago, we saw multiple drone incursions across the 
DMZ. And now, KJU is trading low-cost weapons for Russian technology--
why am I not surprised?
    Clearly, this is no path toward peace. While we hope for diplomacy 
with North Korea to be successful, we must recognize that hope alone is 
not a course of action. The quest for dialogue with the North must 
never be made at the expense of the ability to respond to threats from 
the North. Dialogue and military readiness must go hand-in-hand. 
Idealism must be rooted in realism.
    By his declarations and actions, KJU has eliminated any remaining 
fantasy about potential peaceful reunification with South Korea. Let's 
not sugar-coat his words; let's take them at face value. Maya Angelou 
once said, ``When someone shows you who they are, believe them the 
first time.'' Time and time again KJU has shown us who he is, and shame 
on us if we fail to believe him. Therefore, I believe our heretofore 
U.S. policy goal of negotiating away North Korea's nuclear program has 
reached its useful end. We must up our combined game. Deterrence by 
appeasement is not deterrence at all.
    This is why I'm encouraged by South Korean President Yoon's vision 
to make the U.S.-South Korea Alliance the centerpiece of his foreign 
policy. I'm pleased that he places a primacy on defending South Korea 
against the threat from the North, which means a return to joint 
military exercises and an emphasis on combined readiness. And I'm 
heartened by his outreach to Japan which I've already discussed.
    President Yoon's State Visit with President Biden last year 
underscored the vitality and, frankly, the global necessity of our 
Alliance. The outcomes of this visit are significant, including the 
Washington Declaration on extended nuclear deterrence.al force for good 
and, two, that Russia would no longer threaten its neighbors or the 
West. Today, the Russian
    Mr. Chairman, I'll conclude my written testimony with this 
observation. The United States made 2 flawed geopolitical assumptions 
last century: one, we assumed that the PRC would morph into something 
like a globbear is afoot and we find ourselves shooting well behind the 
Peking duck. We must step up our game or we'll find ourselves 
outgunned, literally and figuratively. While American interests in the 
Indo-Pacific are real and enduring, and challenges to our interests are 
equally real and daunting, I believe our resolve is powerful and 
durable. And we are bolstered, sustained, and strengthened by our 
allies and partners. Again, to quote Professor Mead, ``a distracted 
America still leads the world.'' As he wrote in 2012, ``the American 
world vision isn't powerful because it is American; it is powerful 
because it is, for all its limits and faults, the best way forward.'' I 
thank this committee and the Congress for your enduring support to our 
diplomatic corps and armed forces. I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Admiral Harris, first of all, I very much 
appreciate your testimony. It is very informative, very 
helpful, and very different than when you testified before us 
on your nomination.
    So we can see the difference between those types of 
appearances. But again, thank you for your service.
    Professor Mead.

STATEMENT OF WALTER RUSSELL MEAD, JAMES CLARKE CHACE PROFESSOR 
  OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HUMANITIES, BARD COLLEGE, COLUMNIST, 
            WALL STREET JOURNAL, RED HOOK, NEW YORK

    Mr. Mead. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members 
of this committee, it is a great honor to be asked to speak 
before you and especially to testify with either Admiral or 
Ambassador Harris in both capacities. He is one of America's 
great public servants.
    I will just make five points this morning, and I hope they 
will contribute to our discussion.
    First, America's interests are global, but our goal is not 
global conquest. History teaches that if any country dominates 
either Europe or Asia, our security and our prosperity here 
will come under attack.
    Maintaining this balance of power and ensuring the freedom 
of the world's sea lanes and communications networks is now and 
has been for many generations the foundation of American 
foreign policy.
    These limited goals make American power a force for the 
freedom of other countries and provide the basis for strong and 
enduring partnerships. Our goal should be to safeguard these 
vital long term national interests at the lowest possible risk 
and cost.
    Second, allies are a vital asset. We do not want to fight 
either Russia or China, or for that matter Iran, on our own. 
Fortunately, when great powers try to dominate their 
neighborhoods the smaller powers come looking for allies.
    Today, countries like India, Japan, and, thanks in part to 
Ambassador Harris's service, South Korea have awakened to the 
danger. Sweden and Finland have joined NATO to help check 
Russia's bid for power, and we all saw literally a miracle last 
week as Arab air forces joined with the U.K., the U.S., and 
Israel to block Iran's missile and drone attacks.
    Third, after the cold war Americans fell asleep at the 
wheel. We took our military and economic superiority for 
granted and thought that the era of great power competition was 
over.
    We ignored the danger signs from Russia and Iran. We fail 
to foresee the consequences of China's abuse of the world 
trading system or to match its military build up in its 
neighborhood.
    Today, we and our allies are overstretched and under 
attack. Wars are erupting all over the world. We must get back 
to the basics. Military power is not the only dimension of 
American power, but without a solid, hard power foundation we 
will not be able to make progress on issues like human rights 
or climate change.
    Fourth, we now face an axis of revisionist powers including 
China, Russia, Iran, and smaller hostile countries around the 
world.
    These countries do not love or trust each other, but their 
fear and hatred of American power and their hope that we can 
now at long last be defeated is once again haunting the 
civilized world and driving them to act in concert.
    The danger of a downward spiral into a new era of chaos and 
war is real. We can look at Gaza and Sudan to see what an era 
like that will mean for the peoples of the world.
    Fifth and finally, we still have time to turn things 
around. We are not yet in the position of Winston Churchill, 
who could promise his fellow citizens nothing but blood, toil, 
tears, and sweat in the darkest days of World War II. We can 
still deter war while working for peace.
    China can be deterred from attacking its neighbors while 
those neighbors catch up with its economic growth and military 
might. Russia, Iran, and the fanatical terrorists seeking to 
revive the ideology of jihadism can be taught that their 
fantasies of empire cannot be fulfilled.
    While he was still in college the young John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy wrote his senior thesis about Britain's failure to 
foresee and forestall the terrible tragedy of World War II.
    Soon after he published his thesis as the book ``Why 
England Slept.'' After that, he went to war.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, honorable members, I 
pray to God that no young Americans today will have to write a 
book about why America slept or to fight in the war that will 
come if we fail.
    This distinguished committee does not need for me to tell 
it that the world's situation is dark today and getting darker.
    But with focus, determination, and the help of our allies 
we can still turn this around and this famous committee, scene 
of so many of the great debates that shaped American and world 
history in past generations, can and I very much hope will play 
a leading role in helping to put the world back on the path to 
peace.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Mr. Walter Russell Mead

    Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, and members of 
the committee:
    It is an honor to be invited to testify before this committee and 
its distinguished members. It is a great privilege to join you today to 
discuss the system of alliances the United States has built and 
maintained over the past several decades, and the future of that system 
in Asia. International politics are changing rapidly, and not for the 
better, and it is altogether appropriate to assess how well the current 
configuration of American alliances addresses the needs of the American 
people and their friends around the world.
    The first step in any strategic assessment is to identify 
priorities: only by understanding what is vital, what is important, and 
what is desirable can we determine what the United States needs to 
accomplish abroad. But it is only the first step. After establishing 
priorities, an assessment must also evaluate how to achieve these 
objectives. In the next few minutes, I would like to describe the core 
goals of American foreign policy and how our different kinds of 
alliances help accomplish these goals.
                      i. america's grand strategy
    Although much of the world has changed significantly over the past 
century, American objectives have remained remarkably consistent. 
Before World War I, Great Britain was the most powerful of the European 
states, and it maintained both a global balance of power and an 
international economic order that allowed nearly a century of general 
peace and prosperity from the end of the Napoleonic Wars until 1914. 
There were still many savage conflicts, and some of the national wars 
in Europe took on a genocidal character, so the world was far from 
tranquil. But it was spared the horrors of a prolonged conflagration 
between great powers.
    As Americans determined that Britain was no longer capable of 
shouldering this burden, and as they saw that this failure cost 
hundreds of thousands of American lives in two world wars, they moved 
in fits and starts toward creating a new international order that was 
based on American rather than British power. To do this, they 
endeavored to make their hemisphere peaceful and secure, maintain a 
favorable balance of power on both ends of the Eurasian landmass, and 
to create a reasonably well-integrated global economy in which 
Americans, their friends, and neutral countries alike could access 
economically important goods, such as oil and other forms of energy, 
and communicate freely across the global commons. The challenge of 
Soviet Communism underscored the importance of this national strategy, 
as that strategy provided the tools to contain the USSR and to ensure 
that the postcolonial nations emerging from the collapsing European 
empires aligned with the Free World rather than the Communist bloc. 
Those efforts led the United States to incorporate, with mixed success, 
goals like economic development into its national strategy.
    America's alliance network, the largest and most effective system 
of alliances among free nations in the history of the world, is both 
the product of this strategy and a means by which we have achieved our 
goals at less risk and cost than we would have faced acting alone.
    Before I describe each of these goals and how our alliances factor 
into them, I would like to make a further observation about American 
foreign policy that informs much of this testimony. In some countries, 
foreign policy is largely restricted to the actions of the state. This 
has never been true in American history, and I see no reason for this 
to change in the years to come. Ever since the United States gained its 
independence, American traders, missionaries, military experts and 
development workers have affected how other countries view the United 
States and have in turn shaped American foreign policy. In many cases, 
the actions of American citizens acting on their own initiative have 
done more to change the world than the official representatives of our 
government. While I will restrict my remarks today to government 
actions, none of us should forget that the American people will 
continue to change the world through their religious and civic 
activism, their universities, and their business activities.
    The first pillar of American security is the maintenance of a 
favorable balance of power on both ends of the Eurasian supercontinent. 
Americans have believed that any nation that dominated the immense 
resources of East Asia or Europe would have the ability to threaten 
American security and to cripple our trade.
    During his tenure in the White House, Teddy Roosevelt used the 
power that the United States developed during the Industrial Revolution 
to restrain revisionist states in Europe and Asia. His diplomacy to end 
the war between Russia and Japan won him a Nobel Peace Prize, but his 
main goal was to prevent any one country from dominating East Asia. 
Similarly, he warned Germany against attempting to overturn the 
British-led order in Europe. George Kennan, the most eloquent 
articulator of the containment strategy that won the cold war, argued 
for a ``strongpoint defense'' against Communism that focused on the 
same regions. As he saw it, control over the industrial heartlands of 
Europe and Japan would decide the contest between communism and 
democracy. To that end, he recommended that the United States do 
everything in its power to reconstruct Europe's and Japan's economies 
and to develop strong alliances in both places. A bipartisan consensus 
formed around that strategy, which served the country well throughout 
the cold war.
    Maintaining the balance of power has benefited the United States 
and its allies. Keeping the Red Army at bay was an expensive 
proposition, and at times a fraught one, but it cost much less in lives 
and treasure than a third major conflict in Europe and East Asia would 
have. The current confrontation with China is similarly tragic, but it 
is far better than ceding some of the most economically and 
strategically important parts of the world to a rival.
    Allies have always been important in these efforts. In recent 
years, our allies have stepped up in meaningful ways to preserve and 
maintain this system. Japan has long been an important economic and 
diplomatic counterbalance to China, and as Prime Minister Kishida's 
visit last week demonstrated, his country is increasingly important in 
the security realm as well. It is even contributing to the defense of 
Ukraine. South Korea is assisting Europe's security through arms sales 
and transfers, along with its work to defend its own country, which has 
become an important part of the global economy. The Philippines is 
contesting Chinese claims in the South China Sea, one of the most 
important arteries of the global economy. And Australia, which has 
fought alongside the United States in every major conflict for more 
than a century, is playing a major role through the Quad, AUKUS, and 
other critical initiatives.
    From the American Revolution, fought as we can read in the 
Declaration of Independence in part to free the American economy from 
unfair British trade restrictions, to the present day advancing 
Americans' economic interests by preserving our rights to trade (and 
protecting American producers from predatory practices by overseas, 
state-aided rivals) has been the second pillar of our national 
strategy. After World War II Americans organized the global economy 
around a dollar-based system of international finance and trade that 
helped propel both this country and our allies to unprecedented levels 
of prosperity. Today, thanks to the abuse of the system by China, 
changes in patterns of investment and trade and to errors in the post-
cold war construction of the World Trade Organization, the old system 
is badly in need of reform. Nevertheless, building and upholding a 
trade system that favors the interests of Americans and binds our 
allies into a common system remains a key task for American 
policymakers.
    America's economic and security needs are often connected. Economic 
activity requires energy, and securing plentiful and stable sources of 
energy is important for the global economy to function. The free flow 
of information and goods between countries is similarly important. The 
interstitial spaces through which that information and those goods 
move, such as international waters and outer space, must be kept secure 
for American prosperity to continue.
    Stability in global energy markets is even more important for many 
of our Asian allies than it is for the United States. The International 
Energy Agency estimates that net imports account for 90 percent of 
Japan's total energy supply and 85 percent of South Korea's. India is 
not an ally, but one-third of its total energy supply comes from 
abroad. The United States is a net exporter of energy, by comparison, 
and we nevertheless feel keenly the effects of high oil prices. This 
hearing is not about the Middle East, but I would be remiss if I did 
not note that the security and stability of the oil-exporting regions 
of the world is a matter of economic survival for our key allies and 
partners in Asia, and that they pay careful attention to our Middle 
East policy.
    Preventing any single country from dominating the Middle East or 
acquiring the ability to block the flow of Middle East energy to world 
markets remains an essential component of American global strategy. The 
interests of the state of Israel and the United States are not 
identical, but the aspirations of Iran today, and perhaps of other 
countries in the future, to dominate the Middle East threaten Israel's 
survival and vital American interests. For this reason, Israel (and 
Gulf Arab states with similar concerns) are important strategic 
partners for the United States. Building a solid framework of regional 
security in which local actors like Israel and its Arab neighbors take 
the lead, with American support in reserve, is the best way to protect 
basic American interests at the lowest risk and cost.
    Keeping the interstitial spaces free and clear is also important 
for the American and the global economy. In recent years, we have seen 
resurgences of piracy in various parts of the world, including off the 
coast of Somalia, and Iran's Houthi proxies are significantly 
disrupting global trade by attacking international shipping near the 
Red Sea. There are two other potential flashpoints that I would like to 
discuss today.
    The first is in the South China Sea. In 2016, the United Nations 
found that over one-fifth of global trade passed through this disputed 
waterway. China has built and militarized a set of islands in the South 
China Sea as part of its campaign to claim the waterway as part of 
China's territory. An arbitration court at The Hague has found these 
Chinese claims to be meritless, but China has ignored the ruling. 
Recently, it has escalated its harassment of Philippine ships as our 
treaty ally maintains its own territorial claims there. Among others, 
ships from our Australian and Japanese allies have joined our efforts 
to defend Philippine sovereignty. There are many possible causes of a 
broader conflict there, and the consequences for the global economy 
would be dramatic.
    The other is around Taiwan. My recent travels in Northeast Asia 
have reinforced how devastating a war around Taiwan will be for the 
global economy. High-tech industries around the world will grind to a 
halt if Taiwan's semiconductor industry can no longer export. Fighting 
in the waters around Taiwan will immediately restrict Japan's and South 
Korea's abilities to import food and fuel for their populations, to say 
nothing of the other inputs their economies need to function and trade 
with other countries. Bloomberg estimates that a conflict started by a 
Chinese invasion of Taiwan would slash global GDP 10 percent in the 
first year of fighting. Japan and the Philippines are each taking 
measures to deter such a conflict, and the Biden administration has 
reached many agreements that should make Beijing hesitate about using 
force in the Taiwan Strait.
    The core objectives of American grand strategy are remarkably 
constant, but as circumstances change, our enduring interests require 
changes in policy. We should understand that the nature of American 
leadership is to promote and accelerate technological, economic and 
social change as our dynamic capitalist economy innovates and expands. 
The Information Revolution today is introducing changes as profound, 
and sometimes as destabilizing, as the Industrial Revolution did in its 
day. A changing America must manage its affairs in a changing world. 
From the development of nuclear weapons to the impact of information 
technology and artificial intelligence, scientific developments are 
continually changing and, usually, making more complex the tasks of our 
diplomats and military leaders. This is a feature not a bug of 
America's activity in the world, and we must continually update both 
our tactics and our strategies as the situation at home and abroad 
rapidly evolves in an era of accelerating and often disruptive 
technological progress.
    Europe was once the center of American foreign policy concerns. 
Today the center of gravity in world politics has shifted decisively 
away from the European Union and its neighbors. And while Russia's 
revisionist foreign policy goals and deep hatred (under its current 
leadership) of the United States and our values make it a rival, 
Vladimir Putin's Russia poses a less immediate threat to the European 
balance of power than did the Soviet Union under Stalin and his 
successors. As the United States seeks to prevent Russia from becoming 
a more formidable enemy, we seek to cooperate with NATO allies and 
others to limit Russian power. America's goal for NATO should be to 
promote the ability and the will of our European allies to stand up for 
their own security even as our priorities move elsewhere.
    China today, both as a powerful actor in the Indo-Pacific and as a 
source of strength and support to other American rivals like Russia and 
Iran, is the chief threat to both the geopolitical and economic 
interests of the United States. China is a more formidable rival than 
the Soviet Union was. The possibility of a never-ending struggle 
against such an adversary is a grim one, and although our geopolitical 
track record has been a good one, it is not clear who would prevail in 
such a contest. But there is another way to achieve our objectives in 
the region and ensure another century of American peace and prosperity.
             ii. the problem of uneven economic development
    When we look at the history of Asia and of American engagement in 
the Indo-Pacific, the geopolitical consequences of uneven economic 
development have led to the most serious challenges to the balance of 
power that America seeks. In the late 18th and throughout the 19th 
century the British and the Europeans established colonial empires 
because they were able to achieve a level of modernization and 
industrial development much faster than Japan, China, and India. 
Japan's early industrial success made it the greatest power in Asia by 
the early 1900s, and aspirations for regional supremacy went to the 
heads of Japan's rulers, driving them on a destructive and ultimately 
ruinous quest for hegemony.
    Today, China's success has made it the greatest regional power and 
tempted many in Beijing to follow the path of Imperial Japan. Take its 
outsized share of the region's GDP: in 1980 mainland China accounted 
for approximately 11 percent of the combined GDP of East Asia and the 
Pacific. In 2022, it accounted for nearly 57 percent of the region's 
total GDP. To specifically see the kind of power inequities this causes 
it is helpful to examine the evolution of the Indian and Chinese 
economies since 1980.
    According to World Bank figures in chained dollars, in 1980 India's 
GDP was 64 percent of China's. By 2001 when China joined the World 
Trade Organization, India's economy was only 28 percent as large as 
China's. And, despite several years of rapid growth in the 21st 
century, by 2021 India's economy had fallen even further behind and 
equaled only 17 percent of the Chinese economy. Even as India has 
caught up with China in population and built a world-class technology 
sector, it has not emerged as the kind of manufacturing powerhouse that 
could rival China's economic weight in Asia and beyond.
    If India's economy had kept pace with China over the past 40 years, 
India would currently have a GDP of $10 trillion instead of $2.73 
trillion. Between the military spending an economy of that size can 
support and the economic and political clout it would give Indian 
businessmen and diplomats, there would be no ``China threat'' in the 
Indo-Pacific. When and if the gap between India and China begins to 
close, the balance of power in Asia will also start to shift, and China 
will need to rethink its approach to regional and world politics begins 
to close, the balance of power in Asia will also start to shift, and 
China will need to rethink its approach to regional and world politics.
    China today, like Japan in the 1930s, is a country whose rapid 
development seems to put Asian supremacy within reach, but Beijing has 
lucked into a fortuitous moment in history, not an era. As India, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Burma 
all continue to modernize and reach their potential, a rising Asia will 
become too big for any country to dominate. In this sense, the 
objective of American strategy toward the region should not necessarily 
be either to crush China or to change its form of government but to 
promote development and modernization across the rest of the region. 
Our goal should not be a defeated, embittered, impoverished or divided 
China. It should be an Indo-Pacific so big, so rich, and so powerful 
that no single country now or in the future can successfully pursue a 
hegemonic strategy. As the rest of Asia rises, Beijing's chance at 
supremacy begins to shrink--and our allies in the Indo-Pacific will be 
able to bear more of the costs that keeping the peace requires.
              iii. the missing piece: economic development
    In order to help push the region toward a more natural balance of 
power, it is helpful to take a step back and look at American strategy 
in the decades following the end of World War II. The progress toward 
free trade and the development of an international legal and political 
system that supported successive waves of expansion and integration 
across the entire world economy was one of the great triumphs in 
American foreign policy, even as an Iron Curtain had descended on much 
of Europe. American leaders realized that unless important countries 
could recover from the calamitous destruction of World War II and 
regain their prosperity, the United States would have no foreign 
customers for its products, no strong military allies in the struggle 
with the Soviet Union, and the poverty and misery felt by many would 
enhance the appeal of communism around the globe. To avoid this 
outcome, the United States opened its markets to foreign goods from 
Europe and Japan--often on a non-reciprocal basis--while also promoting 
American aid and investment abroad, maintaining a stable system of 
exchange rates, and bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of 
the common defense. The role of the dollar as a global reserve 
currency, along with the expansionary bias of American fiscal and 
monetary authorities, facilitated America's assumption of the role that 
became known as ``the locomotive of the global economy'' and ``the 
consumer of last resort.'' American trade deficits stimulated 
production and consumption in the rest of the world, significantly 
increasing both the prosperity of other countries and their willingness 
to participate in the American system.
    While the decision to grant foreigners access to our domestic 
markets was one of the most debated aspects of American foreign policy, 
it was imperative that countries from France and Germany to Japan and 
South Korea recognized that the advantages of partnering with the 
United States were greater than those of aligning with the Soviet 
Union. This policy helped consolidate support around the world for the 
American system and was very much a critical element of our strategy to 
contain and ultimately roll back the Soviet empire.
    Unfortunately, today, it is not clear that many in the region are 
convinced that the benefits of working with the Americans outweighs the 
benefits of working more closely with our communist adversaries in 
Beijing. A recent annual survey of business, political and civil-
society actors by the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute found 
for the first time this year that a slim majority of Southeast Asian 
leaders would, if forced to choose, opt for China over the U.S. as 
their ``preferred alignment choice in the region.'' Thailand, Indonesia 
and Malaysia were among the countries where majorities would choose 
China. What I have heard from senior officials and business leaders 
across the region is that vague--even if well intentioned--initiatives 
like IPEF do not provide many nations with what they really want, which 
is access to American markets. For many of these countries, trade and 
investment with the United States is seen as an engine for development 
and a pathway toward the kind of wealth and prosperity that we have 
enjoyed in the West for generations.
    Many things have changed since the 1940s and the United States 
cannot return to the non-reciprocal trade relationships of the past. 
But the development of a truly integrated, efficient and dynamic 
economic system that attracts partners around the world remains 
necessary to America's security and economic interests.
                    iv. the eroding military balance
    It is important to note that the Biden administration has had 
several notable accomplishments that have strengthened our hand in the 
Indo-Pacific over the last few years. Last summer, the US and India 
signed several important agreements that deepened cooperation between 
the world's two largest democracies. Many countries, alarmed by Chinese 
saber-rattling and heavy-handed diplomacy, have looked toward the 
United States in order to strengthen security ties, leading to 
significant initiatives such as the launch of AUKUS. The 
administration's diplomatic efforts have helped facilitate a temporary 
easing of the often-strained relationship between Japan and South 
Korea. Additionally, strategically located Pacific Island nations such 
as Papua New Guinea have granted the United States permission to 
station U.S. troops and supplies on the island nation which is close in 
proximity to vital shipping lanes. The American-led campaign to limit 
Chinese access to sensitive computer technology has chalked up 
important wins. Passage of the flawed but consequential Inflation 
Reduction Act, and Chips Act demonstrated America's economic resilience 
and refuted claims that Washington is hopelessly gridlocked. However, 
the alliances and partnerships that give the U.S. the strength to 
manage its relationship with Beijing ultimately depend on military 
power and our will, and perceived will to use it when necessary. The 
erosion of American deterrence is the biggest single problem facing 
American foreign policy, and our inability to get this issue right has 
led to catastrophe in both Ukraine and the Middle East and could 
potentially lead to war in Asia.
    Over the last 20 years, China has launched one of the greatest 
military buildups in the history of the world and America's failure to 
match this epochal military buildup--not a lack of diplomatic 
activism--is the root cause of the region's geopolitical insecurity. 
China recently announced a 7.2 percent increase in defense spending. In 
contrast, when adjusted for inflation, the President's $850 billion 
request for the defense budget in 2025 is actually a reduction. China 
possesses the world's largest navy, and recent estimates suggest that 
their shipbuilding capacity is over 230 times greater than that of our 
own. TheCenter for Strategic and International Studies has noted that 
as we have allowed our defense industrial base to shrivel up, Beijing 
has invested in and is in the process of acquiring high-end weapons 
systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States. 
As many war games have shown, it is not even clear if we have enough 
long range precision guided munitions to last a week if all-out war 
breaks out over Taiwan or in the South China Sea. Earlier this month, 
the Navy released a fact sheet showing that several of its key 
shipbuilding programs are facing years of delays. These are just a few 
examples that I know you are all aware of, but it is becoming 
increasingly clear that the military balance in the Far East has 
shifted from a clear American advantage into a gray zone and Beijing is 
now closer than ever to having the capability to forcibly unify with 
Taiwan. Better security cooperation with our allies, like we have seen 
with Japan and the Philippines last week, can help at the margins, but 
a serious policy for the Indo-Pacific requires larger investments from 
the United States than both parties seem currently unready to provide. 
This reality is well understood in capitals across Asia and many 
nations are beginning to take steps to hedge their position.
                v. moralism, morality, and global issues
    This discussion has focused primarily on American interests, and a 
listener could object that American values have made some fleeting 
appearances, but I have not placed much emphasis on them. Dean Acheson, 
one of the architects of the American-led post-World War II order, once 
made an insightful comment about the difference between morality and 
moralism in American foreign policy. Years after he served as Harry 
Truman's Secretary of State, he argued that ``the righteous who seek to 
deduce foreign policy from ethical or moral principles are as 
misleading and misled as the modern Machiavellis who would conduct our 
foreign relations without regard to them.'' As he saw it, moral 
progress could only come through the responsible exercise of power, and 
throughout his life he sought to make sure that the United States did 
that.
    America's cold war policy aimed at stopping the spread of Soviet 
tyranny was, Acheson rightly believed, deeply moral. Today, the Chinese 
Communist Party has become an expansionist, tyrannical power whose 
inordinate ambition endangers freedom worldwide. America's interests 
and values both lead us to oppose that ambition, even as we seek to 
avoid the catastrophe of another great-power war.
    Moral foreign policy often requires pragmatism. Defeating Nazi 
Germany required an alliance with the equally evil Soviet Union. And 
President Nixon's rapprochement with Mao's China, then at the 
horrifying acme of the Cultural Revolution, similarly was driven by the 
need to counter the greater threat posed at that time by the Soviet 
Union. Today, America and its democratic allies, even at their best, 
are not strong and united enough to handle the world's geopolitical 
challenges without enlisting the help of nondemocratic and even 
antidemocratic partners. In pursuit of objectives that are 
fundamentally moral and legitimate, the United States will need to draw 
on our pragmatic tradition of foreign policy that recognizes realities 
while aiming at the promotion of human freedom and flourishing.
    Since the end of the cold war, many American analysts and 
policymakers assumed that geopolitical competition was largely 
irrelevant, and that the United States needed to redefine its interests 
around a set of what some would call ``posthistorical goals'' and 
global issues. Eliminating global poverty, addressing social injustices 
ranging from the marginalization of women and sexual minorities to 
economic inequality within and between countries, fighting climate 
change, strengthening the role of law and of rule-driven institutions 
in international life, and promoting human rights replaced the more 
limited goals of traditional statecraft.
    It is not wrong to care about such things and many of these goals 
reflect objectives that the American people intend to pursue either 
through government policies or through the activities of NGOs and 
religious organizations. But for American strategists at a time of 
limited resources and mounting international challenges it will be 
necessary to distinguish between the achievable and the aspirational, 
and the ``must haves'' and the ``nice to haves'' among these goals. 
Furthermore, we must rigorously reject the seductive illusion that soft 
power and the power of example can be the principal tools of American 
foreign policy in times like these. The failure of America and our 
allies to maintain our military margin of superiority in the South 
China Sea and the Taiwan Strait has done more to endanger peace than 
anything we have done or could have done in the realm of soft power to 
preserve it.
    In the absence of a military coalition that has the will and the 
means to uphold the peace, none of the global goals dear to the hearts 
of many Americans can be achieved. Building that coalition and doing 
America's share to provide the resources and power such a coalition 
requires, must in today's world hold the central place in American 
statecraft. A network of strong alliance partners in the key theaters 
of world politics backed by American economic, technological and 
military power remains the best and the cheapest way to secure our 
essential interests and to provide a foundation for the pursuit of 
higher and more complex goals.

    The Chairman. Well, thank you for your insight. I think we 
all need to take your advice and be prepared to act on it.
    I was interested in both of your comments about our 
alliances, which is the subject here for the Indo-Pacific.
    I would agree with you, Professor Mead, that our 
adversaries do not trust each other but they have an alliance.
    Their alliance is not a transparent alliance that we do 
when we deal with the Quad, or we deal with the AUKUS 
agreements, but there is a clear alliance between China, 
between Russia, between Iran, between North Korea.
    They are covering for each other and supporting each other. 
They may not trust each other, and they are forming a very 
strong block against the national security interests of the 
United States that promote a value based rule based global 
systems with democratic institutions.
    So I guess my first question is, we have a lot of 
alliances. America is known in the Indo-Pacific for being 
military forward, but are we doing enough in trade and 
investment in diplomacy, which is really where I think the 
battleground needs to be.
    Our military is there--absolutely important--but we need to 
avoid, as you said, sending our men and women over in harm's 
way.
    So is there a better way to coordinate our alliances in 
order to meet the challenges that we have today? Let me start, 
if I might, first with Professor Mead and then we will go to 
Admiral--Ambassador Harris.
    Mr. Mead. Well, absolutely, Senator. In 1980 India's GDP 
was 65 percent of China's. Today it is about 17 percent of 
China's, and that gap that opened up is in some ways the heart 
of our problem in the Far East.
    That is to say that China, which at one point was one of a 
number of powers in Asia, has, thanks to its vast economic 
growth and its military build up, become a threat to the 
system.
    The best way to assure the long term stability of the Indo-
Pacific--of a free and open Indo-Pacific without Americans 
going to war--is to encourage and support the economic growth 
of countries like India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines in the hope that at some point as these countries 
are more dynamic, powerful, and wealthy, even in Beijing they 
will understand that their dream of dominating the Indo-Pacific 
is simply not realistic.
    It is too big for any one country, even China, to control, 
and so this must always be a core element of our strategy in 
the region.
    The Chairman. Admiral Harris, you were our military leader 
in the Indo-Pacific, and then you became our Ambassador to one 
of the most important countries in the region.
    So are we putting too much attention into the military and 
not into diplomacy and economics and trade?
    Mr. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I do not think so. I think that 
we are putting adequate emphasis on diplomacy, the military 
component, and the economic component.
    However, I am not convinced that we are advocating all the 
time for the right things in those three buckets. Let me get at 
this just a little bit.
    I will add to what Professor Mead said by highlighting that 
in 1970 the GDP of South Korea was actually less than that of 
North Korea, and by some measure South Korea is the ninth 
largest economy in the world today.
    And that is not because of the great communist system that 
North Korea has. It is because the United States provided South 
Korea an umbrella under which it could develop economically.
    So I think that is an important point.
    The Chairman. Let me fine tune this a little bit.
    We withdrew from TPP. This framework that is being 
discussed is important, but it is not trade agreements. It does 
not have remedies.
    We are not a member of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. Are we missing opportunities because we are not 
as aggressive as we need to be on those fronts?
    Mr. Harris. Clearly, in my opinion we are missing huge 
opportunities. So I advocated in uniform for the United States 
to become a signatory to TPP, which is kind of an unusual 
position for a military officer to take.
    But I did it because of the security relationships between 
the TPP countries that I felt would have been strengthened had 
we become a signatory to it. We lost that opportunity, and now 
there is this thing called CPTPP which is being driven by 
Japan. And we are not a signatory to that, either.
    It would be super ironic if China becomes a signatory--a 
member of CPTPP, which is a free trade agreement.
    I agree with the ranking member that IPEF lacks the teeth 
that a free trade agreement or free trade relationship has.
    So I am an advocate for free trade agreements. I believe we 
need to have a free trade agreement with Taiwan. I hope that we 
become a signatory to CPTPP--not for the benefit of the other 
11 countries that are in CPTPP, but because of the benefit to 
us. For our own enlightened self-interest we should become a 
signatory to these things.
    And the same with UNCLOS. That is the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. We have long been a holdout 
in signing on to UNCLOS even though it was President Reagan and 
his team who put together the final package for UNCLOS.
    He had a lot of disagreements with the UNCLOS as it was 
initially crafted and for all the right reasons. So, he and his 
team crafted a version of UNCLOS that would have benefited the 
United States economically.
    But here we are today as one of the few countries in the 
world that are not signatories to UNCLOS, and in fact if you 
look at the map of nations that are not signatories to UNCLOS 
it starts to resemble an axis of stupidity. Because we are not 
a signatory to this convention that China, Russia, and others 
are signatories to, and they are taking economic advantage of 
all the things that UNCLOS provides. We are not.
    So that is, in my opinion, shooting ourselves in the foot.
    The Chairman. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am tempted to take up there, but I got a couple of things 
I want to talk about first.
    We are almost a fourth of the way through the 21st century 
already and as we have watched this first quarter of a century 
unfold it has become apparent, I think, that more and more we 
have seen two poles develop and that one pole is the 
association of the autocracies in the world, and the other is 
the democracies of the world, and as every year goes by it 
seems it gets more and more so, and our affiliation for the 
people on our side is our values, our freedoms, the things that 
we value.
    On the other side I think that they are pulled together, as 
you guys have pointed out, a hatred for America amongst other 
things, but also their values of how they think a government 
should treat their people.
    I think the challenge for the rest of the 21st century is 
how the two poles keep from killing each other and exist on the 
same planet, because they are not going to change. The 
autocracies are not going to change.
    I mean, there is hope, I think, for Iran because of the 
demographics in the country. But China is not going to change. 
Russia is not going to change. North Korea is not going to 
change.
    So we have got to figure out how we do that. Your thoughts 
on how we coexist with these countries? We are, certainly, not 
changing. They are not, certainly, changing.
    Mr. Mead, why do we not start with you?
    Mr. Mead. Well, I think here we come back, to some degree, 
to the thought of George Kennan and thinking about how are we 
going to deal with the Soviet Union after World War II, a 
hostile power with expansionist ambitions, morbid suspicion of 
the United States, a nontransparent political system, and yet, 
in a world of nuclear weapons the idea of a U.S.-Soviet war was 
unthinkable.
    And his analysis, I think, remains useful today that you 
can reach agreements--pragmatic agreements--with powers like 
this under some circumstances but you first have to establish a 
firm line of deterrence.
    They have to realize that sort of pushing and poking with a 
bayonet will not get them any benefits, that your power and 
your resolve and your alliance network are resilient and strong 
enough so that there is--they cannot succeed in this other way, 
and then you can start to talk about areas where you do have 
real interests.
    We got through 40 years of the cold war in this way, not 
always elegantly, but I think we are going to find that, yes, 
learning to live with countries with whom we have fundamental 
differences is going to be at least in the kind of year to year 
process necessary to our policy.
    We can hope for better things. We can--as you mentioned 
with Iran. My own experiences of traveling in China before Xi 
Jinping took things in a different direction. There are many, 
many people in China who see the world much more the way we do 
than the way the current leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party does.
    I am not given to despair. But I think pragmatically we 
cannot assume that our enemies will suddenly convert to the 
cause of democracy and human rights, and all of our problems 
will melt away. We need another more substantive strategy for 
dealing with it.
    Senator Risch. Ambassador.
    Mr. Harris. So, thanks for the question, Senator.
    I think we have an exemplar to look at, and that is the 
United States' long cold war against the Soviet Union, both 
hugely capable nuclear states that managed to work through our 
daily differences without treading on the foundational 
differences between our countries until the Soviet Union 
collapsed of its own weight.
    I think it is important that we understand that the United 
States is at fundamentally, ideologically polar opposite 
positions than that taken today by modern China, Russia, North 
Korea, and even Iran. We ought not to begin discussions with 
these countries, in my opinion, by trying to negotiate away 
those foundational beliefs that they hold--just as they should 
not try to negotiate away our foundational beliefs.
    An example of that is the Taiwan issue. China is not going 
to change their mind that Taiwan is a renegade province of 
China, and we should not try to change that view of theirs 
because it is a waste of breath, energy, and resources.
    And they should not try to change our idea that we think 
that the Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully by the 
Taiwanese.
    Now, if we yield to that point in any way, then the PRC is 
winning, and we are losing. I think that we ought to keep this 
in mind as we make policies at the political level and laws at 
the congressional level when we deal with these countries, and 
a good example of this is the Science and CHIPS Act.
    Another example is the Congress's--the Senate's--ongoing 
examination of TikTok, and these sorts of things. This falls 
into the realm of policy and laws.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. My time is up. I wish we had more 
time. Your comments have been fascinating and certainly open a 
lot more areas of discussion. But it is what it is.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
    Thank you to our two distinguished witnesses. I am grateful 
that you are offering us your insight and your advice in this 
important time.
    In your opening testimony, Mr. Mead, you sounded a dark but 
important, and I think, timely note by referencing back to John 
F. Kennedy's book, ``Why America Slept'' and then the 
consequences that he himself was in combat in the South Pacific 
a few short years later.
    Given what both of you have seen, studied, spoken about, I 
do think it is long past time for us to be more engaged, 
effective, and purposeful in meeting this moment. And this is 
timely because right now, today, on the other side of the 
Congress the Speaker is making a decision--his caucus is making 
a decision--about whether we will move ahead with robust 
funding for security in the Indo-Pacific, for the defense of 
Israel, for the defense of Ukraine, for humanitarian aid, that 
in combination will reassure a divided and worried world that 
the United States intends to still be the indispensable global 
partner with this network of alliances, this lattice of 
security arrangements we have.
    I thought it was a striking development in the last year 
that both Germany and Japan decided to double their defense 
spending. In both cases it has a double edged sword.
    It is partly because they lack confidence that we will be 
the trusted and reliable security partner they have counted on 
us to be for decades. It is also because, as Prime Minister 
Kishida said to us in an address to a joint session of 
Congress, that they recognize that Americans have wearied of 
bearing so much of the burden of being that guarantor of the 
free and open global system.
    We have critical work to do, and I think in the last 3 
years there has been real progress. AUKUS was a striking 
innovation in terms of security and deterrence. The Quad has 
been elevated from a talk shop to a real movement forward, and 
as you both said in your testimony our alliances are absolutely 
a key strategic benefit.
    Tragically, our past president, unmoored from a sense of 
history, did not appreciate or invest in those alliances.
    Many have invested and worked hard, both of you, and you in 
particular as Ambassador helped bring together Japan and Korea 
in a way that critically contributes to the regional security 
architecture.
    You have referenced some critical failings--the failure to 
ratify the Convention of the Law of the Sea, which those of us 
who serve on this committee, we were here for those debates--I 
only wish we could go back and rerun them and ratify them 
again--the failure to join CPTPP and to have a real and robust 
trade and economic agenda.
    What are the key actions now, looking forward, that each of 
you would urge us to take both to strengthen our security 
architecture in the region to deter the dark possibilities, Mr. 
Mead, that you laid out, and to better balance what I think is 
our real strength, which is our economy?
    We are the world's most innovative country. We have the 
strongest economic underpinnings of any advanced society right 
now. Our biggest weakness is our political division, is our 
inability to show that confidence, that bipartisan strength, 
that this committee was long known for.
    What are the key actions you think we must take in this 
moment to secure our future?
    Mr. Mead, and then, if I might, Admiral.
    Mr. Mead. Thank you, Senator Coons. Those are very useful 
questions. I hope my answers will be as useful as the question.
    To give you just two quick things, I would say that we do 
need to increase our defense spending in ways that are not 
simply spreading pork around the American economy but actually 
focused on the capabilities that we need and that our allies 
are looking for.
    If Germany and Japan can do a better job, so can we. 
Domestically, though--and I think this is important--I agree 
with you. With all we have been hearing this morning about the 
need for U.S. receptivity to more trade, fair and free trade 
agreements with key partners, to do that we need to be 
reassuring the American people that our economy is moving 
forward in a way that benefits them.
    I am actually publishing today or tomorrow, depending on--
an essay in Tablet magazine that looks at how we can use some 
technological innovations to help Gen Z, the Zoomers, enjoy the 
same kind of access to single family housing and get on the 
property ladder in the way that past generations have done.
    I think when the American people see that the door is open 
to more prosperity for them, we as a country will be able to 
approach some of these international issues in a more open 
minded, and I think, ultimately helpful way.
    Senator Coons. Mr. Chairman, if we might, could we hear 
from the Ambassador?
    Mr. Harris. Thanks, Senator.
    I think there are half a dozen ways I can respond to your 
question. I will start by saying that we should be very 
aggressive, in my opinion, on laws that affect our relationship 
with China, aggressive in terms of holding China accountable, 
and aggressive in protecting our country.
    Again, I go back to the CHIPS and Science Act. I look at 
what could come down the pike with TikTok and the like. I think 
that we should sign on to CPTPP before China does. We will be 
at a significant economic disadvantage if China gets in the 
CPTPP, and we do not.
    We should sign UNCLOS for all the reasons that I talked 
about. I think we should reimagine foreign military sales--
FMS--and an example here: We should get the munitions to Taiwan 
that Taiwan has already paid for and that Congress has already 
authorized, but the United States still has not gotten those 
munitions--those weapon systems--to Taiwan.
    It has taken us 8 years to get Harpoon to Taiwan, even 
though Taiwan already has Harpoon, and that sale has already 
been approved. So, it should not take 8 years. It should not 
take a decade to do that.
    I think we should increase our defense spending. If you 
look at it in terms of inflation, our defense spending has 
actually gone down at a time when we need it more than ever.
    I think we should look for ways to use foreign weapons 
manufacturers--shipbuilding, for example--as a bridge to 
overcome our own industrial deficiencies in this regard in the 
2020 to 2030 timeframe, not as a permanent solution but as a 
bridge solution.
    Those are just some ideas. I will stop here.
    Senator Coons. Thank you both.
    Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more with the testimony 
that the hour is late, the need is urgent, and we need to act 
in a way that shows the bipartisan determination to address 
things like defense modernization using trade and engaging more 
closely with our allies.
    Thank you for this hearing.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coons.
    Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    China apparently believes that America is in decline, that 
our social networks are frayed, that our industrial base is not 
as strong as it once was, that actually there are attitudes of 
isolationism in the U.S., an unwillingness to work with allies 
and to support allies.
    Given the fact that Xi is reported to be a pretty smart 
guy, would he not be wise to say if that is the case why do we 
not just wait out Taiwan, wait out America's weakness, and no 
reason to invade?
    I know there are many who feel like an invasion could be 
imminent. But if you really believe that America was in 
decline, a position I disagree with, but if you were to believe 
that and also recognize that an invasion of Taiwan would have 
an enormous economic impact on China given their reliance on 
Taiwanese semiconductors, is it your view that invasion is a 
real and imminent threat, or is it that no, actually, Xi 
Jinping is going to wait it out and see how things develop?
    Each of you get a chance to speak. Could you begin, and 
then I will turn to the admiral?
    Mr. Mead. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the question.
    Well, I am not good at reading anyone's mind, and Xi 
Jinping is not transparent to me. But I do think that what we 
need to do--the best way to restore predictability and 
stability, and in fact, to get the topic of a Chinese invasion 
of Taiwan off the sort of international conversation agenda is 
for there to be a margin of military superiority sufficient so 
that it is evident to people in Beijing as well as elsewhere 
that it is simply not possible for China to successfully 
attack.
    And those are not preparations for invasion of the mainland 
by us. These are defensive preparations. And in that case China 
itself will stop talking about Taiwan, stop harassing Taiwan as 
much because why do you open a conversation the result of which 
will simply advertise your weakness?
    So this would be the way I think we should proceed.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Admiral.
    Mr. Harris. Senator, I think on the one hand, if you are 
looking at it demographically the PRC is upside down in terms 
of youth and age and the like. So that could argue that sooner 
rather than later regarding an invasion.
    But on the other hand, I think that Xi Jinping is no fool. 
He seeks stability in the international order so that he has 
time to shape that international order even more to his favor.
    So that would argue against the likelihood of an immediate 
attack on Taiwan. I am reminded of the Davidson window.
    Phil Davidson was the four-star that relieved me at 
INDOPACOM when I retired, and he famously said, or the 
``Davidson window'' famously ascribes to him, that 2027 is the 
timeframe by which China could and will invade Taiwan.
    I have never put a time certain on that. General Minihan, 
who is the Air Force four-star in command of the Air Mobility 
Command, he said 2025. Well, that is next year, and the 
Davidson window is in 3 years.
    I always said that the 2030s was the decade of danger. So I 
think we are moving in that direction, and we could move to the 
point that Xi Jinping will balance all the pluses and minuses, 
and could decide because of the reasons you articulated and 
because of the demographic upside down status of his people 
that that might be the time to attack Taiwan.
    But we have time, I believe, Senator, to right that issue 
by supporting Taiwan and doing the other things I talked about 
in response to Senator Coons' questions.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Let me ask, should or are Japan and South Korea thinking 
about becoming nuclear nations?
    Mr. Harris. There are----
    Senator Romney. They are next door to people--North Korea 
and China--that have nuclear weapons. They look at us as being 
their source of nuclear protection. But are they thinking about 
becoming nuclear, or should they be?
    Mr. Mead and Admiral.
    Mr. Harris. So, I will start with that, Senator.
    There are, clearly, elements inside South Korea and Japan 
that are advocating for their own independent nuclear 
deterrent. Those voices so far have not been the predominant 
voices in either country, which is a good thing.
    There are some in Korea that are advocating for the return 
of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, which we removed in the 
1990s.
    I believe that both are bad ideas, that we must convince 
them that our extended nuclear deterrence is actually reliable. 
I think South Korea's President Yoon's visit to the U.S. last 
year, the outcome of which was the Washington Declaration on 
extended nuclear deterrence, has gone a long way to quieting 
those voices that would have South Korea nuclearized, if you 
will.
    Senator Romney. Mr. Mead, do you have comments on that?
    May I continue? Thank you.
    Mr. Mead. I believe that--I would hope that we will not see 
that day because that day would be an indication that both of 
those countries no longer trusted the United States' ability to 
take the lead there.
    But I think also we would then see this as the beginning of 
a further proliferation cascade. What begins in East Asia would 
not stop in East Asia, and personally I believe the world has 
too many nuclear weapons already.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Schatz.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, 
and thank you to our two distinguished testifiers.
    Admiral Harris, it is very good to see you again. It has 
been too long.
    It is well known that Hawaii is not covered by Article Six 
of the NATO Treaty.
    In fact, I have--and with the permission of the Chairman I 
would like to submit for the record a letter from Senator 
Inouye to Assistant Secretary MacArthur in 1965 on this very 
topic.
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be 
found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' 
section at the end of this document.]
    Senator Schatz. Admiral Harris, do you think there is 
deterrent value in making it explicit that Hawaii is covered?
    Mr. Harris. Senator, good to see you again, and for sure. 
So the issue for those who might not be aware of it is Article 
Six defines the geographic area of NATO. Hawaii is not in the 
geographic area as defined by Article Six.
    As Article Six was amended to include Alaska, Alaska is. 
And also Hawaii became a State after the Atlantic Charter was 
signed.
    [Editor's note.--We endeavor to publish accurately the 
spoken and written words of Senators and witnesses in each 
hearing published. The paragraph above reflects what Mr. Harris 
said. Mr. Harris corrected this statement to ``As Article Six 
was clarified in 1965 to include Alaska, Alaska is now covered 
in the geographic area of NATO. Also, Hawaii became a State 
after the NATO Treaty was signed.'']
    Mr. Harris. I believe that Hawaii in 2024 is far different 
than Hawaii in 1965, and Hawaii is on the front line of any 
attack if we were to suffer an attack from China or North 
Korea. It is on the front line. It will be attacked again, and 
I do not want to be a part of another December 7 if we can 
prevent it.
    Hawaii covered by NATO, in my opinion, will go a long way 
to preventing that. It would, in fact, be a deterrent. Now, 
Hawaii is--in 2024--is a State of the United States. Hawaii is 
far different than other countries who have territories 
globally, those territories of which may not be covered by 
NATO.
    Again, Hawaii is a State. Its congressional leaders vote on 
things like the United Nations, on things like Ukraine, on 
issues like impeachment and all that, unlike, perhaps, some 
other territories of the United States.
    So I think that Hawaii's status is different than that of 
simply territories, and therefore, I believe that Hawaii should 
be covered by NATO.
    Now, the argument against it is, well, all of these other 
countries have territories, too. Again, Hawaii is not like----
    Senator Schatz. Territory.
    Mr. Harris [continuing]. These other territories.
    Senator Schatz. Well, we are not a territory and thank you, 
Admiral Harris, for that.
    And the other argument that I have heard is that we would 
be covered by Article Four, but Article Four just provides for 
consultation, and so the argument from NATO and for those that 
do not want to go through the difficulty of amending this 
agreement or even establishing a sidecar explicit multilateral 
agreement is that, well, if Hawaii were attacked--and I think 
this is true, by the way--that certainly we would convene NATO, 
and then we would under Article Four consult.
    That is cold comfort, is it not? And I think that for our 
national security, and also as a matter of principle to treat 
every one of our 50 States equally, that we have to remedy 
this.
    And the argument is also made that various NATO countries 
have territories all across the globe--territories, not States. 
That is a different question, and I think it is one that we 
have to address.
    My final question for you, Admiral Harris, is just over the 
last several years my own judgment is that we have done--we, 
the United States--have done through the State Department and 
the Department of Defense a much better job of engaging with 
our Asia Pacific allies in terms of island nations, that when 
we think about the Indo-Pacific we usually skip all the way 
over the Pacific part, and then just go to South Asia or East 
Asia and the sort of trouble areas.
    And one of the things that I think Secretary Blinken and 
President Biden and Senators Cardin and Risch through ratifying 
COFA, through spending time with Pacific Island leaders, have 
done is to show the respect to other sovereigns.
    They may be a sovereign with 65,000 residents. They may be 
a sovereign with 2 million people. But they are still a 
sovereign country and deserve to be interacted with as if they 
are not just a place to park our military equipment and to, 
perhaps, have a trade agreement.
    I am wondering if you can speak to the evolution of that, 
those relationships, and how that impacts our security.
    Mr. Harris. Yes. We did ignore these countries in the South 
Pacific and the Central Pacific, and it is shameful that we 
did.
    China, on the other hand, has not ignored them, and they 
work hard at filling the diplomatic and economic void left by 
the United States.
    An example is we have an ambassador in Fiji who is the 
ambassador to five different countries. He is spread thin 
throughout that region, and we are starting to correct it 
thanks to this committee and the leadership here by putting in 
a standalone and separate embassy in many of these countries.
    We pulled out our embassy in the Solomons in the 1990s, and 
now we are going to reestablish a new mission in the Solomons.
    Meanwhile, China successfully filled that void from their 
perspective. So, I agree with you, and I am glad to see that we 
are starting to fix the situation now.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Senator Ricketts.
    Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Harris, in October at AEI you assessed that the 
U.S. is ill prepared to face off against the PRC in a Taiwan 
Strait conflict in this decade.
    You said that our lack of resourcing for the Indo-Pacific, 
the PRC's upside down demographics, their own economic 
challenges, are all factors that could lead the PRC to move 
sooner rather than later with regard to Taiwan.
    This makes our alliances and partnerships in the region 
even more important as they represent a clear and asymmetric 
advantage that we have over the PRC. The good news is that many 
of these alliances from Japan to Australia have been upgraded 
in recent years.
    However, it is still unclear what the role of these allies 
and partners would play in a Taiwan contingency. For example, 
Japan is widely seen as--by analysts as our most likely U.S. 
ally to contribute troops to defend Taiwan. But of course, that 
is no sure thing.
    Admiral Harris, if this is indeed the case where, in fact, 
the next decade there is a danger for a Taiwan contingency what 
are your expectations in terms of response we could expect from 
our allies and partners in the region if there were a 
contingency like this?
    Mr. Harris. Very important question, Senator.
    I believe that our allies, as we will in other scenarios, 
will make those decisions that best meet their enlightened 
self-interest.
    I do believe that Japan understands the full danger 
presented to them geopolitically by the People's Republic of 
China, and I think they will be with us in Taiwan.
    I think Australia will. Peter Dutton, the former minister 
of defense in Australia, he famously said several years ago 
that of course Australia would be with the United States if the 
U.S. defended Taiwan.
    But our own policy on Taiwan is not clear. We have this 
policy of strategic ambiguity so we cannot even tell the 
Taiwanese or the Chinese what we would do if China invaded 
Taiwan.
    Meanwhile, China has spent the last century--well, for all 
of its existence really but heavily this century--by telling us 
clearly what they intend to do with regard to Taiwan if Taiwan 
does not yield to them and return to the fold, if you will.
    Senator Ricketts. So actually it is an interesting point 
you bring up there, Admiral, because I think that is part of 
our strategy is this strategic ambiguity, to not really say for 
sure what would happen so that that would give the PRC more 
difficulty in planning against what we might do.
    It sounds like from your remarks you almost disagree with 
that strategic ambiguity. Are you suggesting that we be more 
clear about certain things? Help me with----
    Mr. Harris. So I have advocated that we should end our 
policy of strategic ambiguity in favor of strategic clarity. 
Now, look, in my opinion we owe clarity to three constituents 
on the issue of what we will do if China attacks Taiwan.
    We owe it to the Taiwanese so they can make those decisions 
as a country to either arm up or capitulate. We owe it to the 
Chinese because they are going to lose a lot of troops in any 
battle with the United States, a lot of them, so they ought to 
know what they are getting into. We were very clear with the 
Soviet Union, and that was an important thing.
    But the most important constituent in my opinion, Senator, 
is the American people. They need to know what their sons and 
daughters are signing up for when they sign on to the U.S. 
military with regard to the question of Taiwan and whether we 
are going to fight the Chinese over that.
    And the American people, parents primarily--but those who 
signed up as well--were very clear in our understanding during 
the cold war of what could possibly happen if the Soviets moved 
on the plains in Western Europe and across the Fulda Gap and 
down the Greenland, Iceland, and U.K. gap.
    They signed on to that. They knew that. But today, they are 
not clear about China, and we owe it to our own people, I 
believe, to be clear in that regard.
    Senator Ricketts. Very good.
    Just getting back to our allies, do you think that their 
response would be different for--depending on what the 
contingency was, for example, if this was a blockade versus an 
outright military invasion? Do you think our allies would 
behave differently with regard to their level of support for 
what we were trying to do?
    Mr. Harris. Potentially, but again, our allies are 
wondering what we would do--in any of those scenarios, whether 
it was an outright invasion or a blockade. We got to see a 
precursor of how a blockade might look after former Speaker 
Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, which was very helpful to us to 
understand how China might conduct a blockade.
    Senator Ricketts. And so I am guessing you are saying we 
should come up with our own direction for those different 
contingencies, whether it is blockade or outright invasion, and 
this strategic ambiguity and just say, hey, this is what we are 
going to do?
    Mr. Harris. Well, I will modify that slightly. I mean, I 
know that INDOPACOM has those contingencies in planning, but I 
do not think we should necessarily share what those 
contingencies are.
    Senator Ricketts. OK. But just the general direction of 
what our level of support is going to be for Taiwan should the 
PRC do something like that.
    Mr. Harris. I think we should defend Taiwan.
    Senator Ricketts. OK. Very good.
    Mr. Harris. I think we should follow the law which is the 
Taiwan Relations Act, which does not oblige us to defend 
Taiwan, but it does oblige us to provide for Taiwan's defense, 
which they pay for, and that we advocate for a peaceful 
resolution of the issue, not a martial resolution of the issue.
    Senator Ricketts. OK. Thank you, Admiral.
    The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
    Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The PRC's expansion of its military capabilities outside 
its borders often relies on its foreign aid loans through their 
Belt and Road Initiative, preying on developing nations that 
are strategically located in the region.
    This results in the construction of many dual use 
facilities that provide China's air force and navy with 
potential outstations for future operations while these 
recipients are left in the infamous PRC debt trap.
    Admiral Harris, from your perspective how impactful are 
economic conditions and relations to the Administration's 
partnership and alliance goals, particularly with regard to 
nations in the region that may not be as resilient to economic 
and military influence from China?
    Mr. Harris. Senator, I believe that our policies are 
positive in that regard, but there is a lot more that we could 
do, and some of the examples I already provided in response to 
Senator Coons's questioning.
    I think economically we could do a lot more in terms of 
free trade frameworks and free trade bilateral and multilateral 
free trade agreements, and China for sure is moving to fill all 
the opportunity voids that are left by us.
    Senator Menendez. Well, in the Senate Finance Committee, 
which I served as--the chairman serves, we have Ambassador Tai 
before us today, and I want to get to my question.
    This one of the things I am going to ask. We do not have 
any free trade agreements being promoted in the region. We have 
a behemoth of an economic challenge with China in this region.
    You mentioned earlier in your testimony that people will 
react to their own self-interest--countries will react into 
their own self-interest. That is not a novel idea, but it is a 
very clarion idea.
    So, therefore, would it not behoove us, beyond an economic 
question, as a security concern to be engaged in free trade 
agreements in this region--to strengthen the economic 
opportunity to loosen the noose that China has with these 
countries?
    Mr. Harris. For sure, Senator. That is why I advocated for 
TPP when I was the PACOM commander because of those security 
connections represented by the countries that signed on to TPP.
    Senator Menendez. Yes. It was a lost opportunity.
    Mr. Mead, do you believe a free and open Indo-Pacific is 
available with--achievable, I should say, with a foreign policy 
approach that is based on uncertainty?
    Mr. Mead. I am sorry, based in----
    Senator Menendez. Uncertainty.
    Mr. Mead. Well, uncertainty is irreducible in life. But I 
would say that the United States needs to be absolutely clear 
about our commitment to the region on a multi-dimensional 
basis--military, economic, cultural--in every possible way 
deepening our links.
    Every time I have gone to the region since the 1980s I have 
heard people ask me, is America here to stay? Are you really 
committed to this region?
    My answer is the first American permanent force in that 
area was in 1819 when we had sent the U.S. Navy to protect 
American whalers. I think we are here to stay, but we need to 
keep getting that message out. So we need to restore a sense of 
confidence.
    Senator Menendez. And in that respect the United States is 
the best deterrent our partners have in the region when it 
comes to Chinese aggression and expansion. Do you believe that 
if a future Administration threatened to retreat from alliances 
like the trilateral alliance that we have with Japan and South 
Korea or AUKUS, China would continue to be deterred from 
applying economic and military pressures against allies in the 
region?
    Mr. Mead. I would hope that any president of the United 
States of any party would understand the value of these 
alliances and relationships, Senator.
    Senator Menendez. I agree with you, and this is why I get 
concerned when I see what former President Trump said while he 
was in office, raising questions about our security alliance 
with Japan, refusing to say what he would do with Taiwan even 
though we have a law that pretty much I think outlines what we 
should do with Taiwan.
    And so while I believe the Biden administration has room to 
improve, it is undeniable that it has reestablished the United 
States' position as a reliable global partner, particularly in 
the region that we are discussing today, and if we have 
uncertainty, uncertainty invites a response, and that response 
is not going to be the one that we want.
    So I hope we make it very clear and indisputable what our 
positions are, what our presence will be, and what our actions 
will be in the future.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the 
witnesses.
    Ambassador Harris, good to see you again. I so enjoyed the 
opportunity to visit with you when you were in Korea with a 
CODEL in 2019, and I am very happy that you are here today.
    On the alliances question, I think sometimes those of us on 
this side of the dais understand some realities, but we do not 
explain them that well, and I would like to get into the 
rapprochement that the U.S. has been able to help forge between 
the political leadership in South Korea and Japan.
    When President Biden had the summit at Camp David, the 
headline here at home was President Biden has these leaders at 
Camp David, and it was kind of a ho-hum moment at home because 
we view Japan and South Korea as allies.
    So it was not that surprising. But I think it was a much 
bigger deal in Japan and South Korea. Talk a little bit about 
what this closer political relationship between Japan and Korea 
mean to stability in the region.
    Mr. Harris. It means, in my opinion, Senator--and good to 
see you again--it means everything in the region, especially 
Northeast Asia. There is no economic or security issue that can 
be resolved in Northeast Asia without the active participation 
and cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo. Otherwise, without 
that cooperation there will be no positive movement on security 
in the region, and China will move to fill that void.
    I believe that President Yoon of South Korea and Prime 
Minister Kishida of Japan's outreach to each other--despite 
considerable domestic opposition--by doing the right thing 
demonstrates statesmanship in action. The significantly 
improved bilateral and trilateral relationships that are 
playing out now are the benefit of that outreach. The big 
beneficiary is stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia.
    Senator Kaine. Let me ask you a question about how to 
calibrate the work we are doing in the region to be a deterrent 
to Chinese aggression without it being a provocation to China.
    You talked about the Davidson window, and I would sort of 
like to hear each of you respond to this. I think the Davidson 
window concept is a concept about when China could invade, not 
necessarily when they will invade.
    So it is when they believe they have the capacity to 
undertake military action, and I think the U.S. strategy has 
been to just push that back a day at a time, a year at a time, 
and we do that by providing defense support to Taiwan. We do it 
by creating this latticework of alliances to promote stability 
in the region, whether it is AUKUS or the Quad, or we are 
working with Korea and Japan.
    At some point one of Xi Jinping's calculations could be, I 
am not yet ready, but if I see too many pieces being put on the 
chessboard around me that might block my ultimate ambitions, I 
may act before I am ready. And this has to be probably one of 
the most careful analyses done every day in the Pentagon and 
elsewhere in our security establishment to try to decide what 
is a deterrent, and then what goes beyond deterrent to 
provocation.
    Could you share a little--each of your share your own 
thought on how we try to get that calibration--how we should 
contemplate calibrating this correctly?
    Mr. Mead. It is a very good set of questions, Senator. I 
would argue that part of what we need to do is to make the 
picture bigger that the consequences of a Chinese attack on 
Taiwan or a full blown blockade of Taiwan would not just take 
place in the South China Sea. I think it would be very hard to 
get commercial shipping in and out of Chinese ports should 
there be an event of that kind.
    I do not know that it would be easy for South Korea to 
trade with the rest of the world if there was a military 
confrontation in the South China Sea, Japan, Taiwan, and so on.
    We could be doing a good deal to deter China by showing 
that we and other countries around the world are prepared to 
impose a global blockade on China that would exert severe 
costs.
    But we should also--I see that Bloomberg's, I believe, 
organization has estimated that a war in the South China Sea or 
over Taiwan could take 10 percent off global GDP in a first 
year. A blockade could be almost as eventful.
    When we think about deterring and staving off and otherwise 
responding to this kind of threat, we really do need to put 
together a multi-dimensional approach.
    I think as China saw that this was a more serious element 
of our planning, the temptation to move in a Davidson window or 
in the scenario you describe might be less.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you.
    Mr. Chair, could I have Admiral Harris respond as well?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Mr. Harris. Thanks, Senator.
    I will simply say that from a military perspective 
calibration is easy because the military has to be ready all 
the time. So they must assume that China is going to attack 
today. And so they must have plans and procedures in place to 
deal with that.
    But from a diplomatic or policy level issue it is far more 
difficult, and that is the heart of the question because, like 
you say, you want to be supportive of our friends, allies, and 
partners and us, and not be provocative at the same time.
    But this said, I think we should be less concerned about 
provoking China. I mean, look what China has done to provoke 
us. The balloon thing last year is a case in point. If you 
believe China, it was innocuous and unintended. This beggars 
the imagination when you think about it.
    So we should be less concerned about provoking China than 
we should be concerned about bolstering our friends, allies, 
and partners in the region.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thanks to the witnesses.
    The Chairman. Senator Coons asked about the importance of 
the support we have for the Indo-Pacific that is in the 
supplemental appropriation bill that is, hopefully, going to be 
considered in the House by the end of this week.
    Part of that, of course--the main part of that supplemental 
is the support for Ukraine, and it was, I think, informative 
that Japanese Prime Minister Kishida in his speech before us 
said Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.
    So I guess my question to you is how important is the 
outcome of Ukraine in regards to the calculations being made in 
security in the Indo-Pacific as it relates to either Taiwan, 
the China Seas, or other security interests? Are our allies 
looking at what is happening, or are our enemies looking at 
what is happening in Ukraine affecting the calculations in the 
Indo-Pacific?
    I will go with my military person first.
    Mr. Harris. A great question, Senator, and I believe that 
we must support Ukraine, and to quote Admiral Stavridis 
recently, it would be strategic and moral malpractice not to do 
so.
    Where Ukraine goes Poland follows, Moldova follows, the 
Baltics follow. So, it is important to the stability of 
Ukraine, and more important to the stability of Europe and our 
NATO allies, that we support Ukraine.
    In fact, if you look at the cost to Russia today, they have 
borne enormous costs in terms of materiel, resources, and 
people, and we have not lost a single U.S. soldier in the 
fight. So this is Ukraine's fight, but they cannot fight it 
without our support and the EU support and NATO support, the 
individual countries' support.
    So that is why I believe the supplemental is so important. 
Xi Jinping, as I said before, is no fool. He is watching 
Ukraine closely, and he is learning that control of the 
internet is vital.
    He has got to be wondering if his army, which is trained in 
the Soviet model, is as bad as Russia's army appears to be; if 
the PLA navy--the People's Liberation Army navy--is as bad as 
the Black Sea fleet appears to be. He is learning about all of 
these things.
    But to the question of how other countries in the Indo-
Pacific view that they are watching Ukraine and our actions 
very closely, and they will take their cues on what we do with 
regard to Ukraine.
    If we walk away from Ukraine, I think they will start to 
consider those things that we talked about earlier in the 
hearing, because their faith and confidence in the United 
States to come to their aid could be questioned.
    Even though we are not an ally of Ukraine, we are allies of 
many countries in the Indo-Pacific, and they will be wondering.
    The Chairman. I think we all agree with your response on 
that. But we are also frustrated that it is difficult for us to 
connect the importance of our support for Ukraine through the 
support of the American people for our engagement in Ukraine.
    So let me ask both of you a final question. Alliances, you 
have all pointed out, are extremely important for us to have in 
the Indo-Pacific. How do we explain that to Americans so that 
we have more support for these types of alliances among the 
American political system?
    If you could give us a simple answer to that we would 
appreciate it because we find that we usually lose our 
constituents after one sentence. So can you give us an answer 
in one sentence?
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Mead. Senator, I think--Mr. Chairman, I think experts 
and people who are deeply engaged in foreign policy often think 
in terms of hope and the beautiful things that we can build.
    It was Dean Acheson who said the average American has less 
than 10 minutes a week to devote to the study of foreign 
affairs.
    At a similar moment at the start of the cold war, President 
Truman realized that the way to get the attention of the 
American people was to tell them the truth in a way that I 
think frightened--let us say, frightened the pants off them. 
That is not quite what he said but close enough.
    And we need--the world situation is grave; things could go 
disastrously wrong in a relatively short period of time. We 
need to get that message out. It needs to be done by leaders in 
both parties.
    This committee played a large role in doing that in the 
1940s. We need to level with the American people about just how 
much trouble we are in, and I think at that point we will begin 
to see a much more positive and engaged response.
    The Chairman. Admiral.
    Mr. Harris. We join alliances for us as much as for them. 
One sentence.
    Senator Risch. That was good. I like it.
    The Chairman. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, both, for spending--we sit here a 
lot, spend a lot of time here. A lot of times we get a lot of 
talk and not much substance, and I think today all of us feel 
we got our money's worth today. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Absolutely.
    Senator Kaine.
    I have been told the Senator Van Hollen is on his way. I do 
not know if that is accurate or not. I do not want to hold my 
colleagues up. He is my colleague in Maryland so we will give 
him a moment or two and see if he----
    I just really want to agree with Senator Risch. We were 
talking a little bit. The two of you are extraordinary in your 
wisdom, and we thank you for that. We recognize the seriousness 
of the situation.
    It is frustrating to us that we have not been able to be 
more effective in communicating to our constituents the urgency 
of these issues, and I think the point that you raised about 
the PRC looking at the Ukraine campaign and looking at the need 
to deal with the internet is a good point.
    We are looking at having a hearing of this committee 
dealing with how social media is affecting America's foreign 
policy and national security interests because it is clear that 
our adversaries are using social media, our open system, 
against us, and it is affecting the type of policies that we 
need to deal with the urgency of the situation.
    I hope we are able to get the supplemental done this week, 
but it is already months later than it should have been, and 
Ukraine has paid a heavy price for our inability to act in a 
more timely way.
    So the circumstances are pretty dire, and I really do not 
think the majority of Americans recognize the urgency of the 
situation. So any advice you have on dealing with the social 
media I will take your advice on that as well.
    Mr. Harris. I am not on social media.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Harris. So I was on Twitter for a little while, but 
when I left Korea I got off of that, and I just do not do 
social media.
    Mr. Mead. I think you are right. Not that long ago 
Americans were bragging that our open system was going to 
destabilize these autocracies, and today we are concerned that 
these autocracies will actually use our open system or will 
weaponize our open system against us.
    That is, I think, a sign of how far the world that we are 
in is different from the world that we thought we were going to 
be in 5, 10, 15 years ago.
    And I look at things like the lack of education in world 
history in our high schools and colleges. I look at in general 
a sort of lack of understanding of the history, how we got to 
where we are, so that young people looking at social media have 
no context within which to see this.
    We really do need to think about how do we prepare our 
society so that rather than being overwhelmed and divided by 
these new technologies and new forms of communication we are 
actually--they actually make us stronger.
    The Chairman. Agreed.
    I have gotten information from my colleague that will allow 
us to close. I do not need his permission, but he would allow 
us to close the hearing.
    The record will stay open until the end of business 
tomorrow. If members have questions we would ask that you would 
answer them for the record.
    And again, with our sincere thanks to both of you for your 
help in this important subject, the committee will be 
adjourned. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


          Responses of Mr. Harry B. Harris, Jr. to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Given China's support for Russia in Ukraine, do you think 
Russia would support China in a Taiwan conflict? What would this look 
like, and how should we prepare for this?

    Answer. Yes, I do. A lot depends on the timing of a China v. Taiwan 
conflict and the outcome of Russia's illegal and immoral invasion of 
sovereign, independent Ukraine. I've seen reporting that Russia has 
suffered as many as 350,000 casualties (killed and wounded) so far and 
significant loss of key military hardware. Russia will continue to lose 
irreplaceable personnel and replaceable hardware as its conflict with 
Ukraine lurches on, which will affect its ability to support China with 
personnel and materiel in the near term. As long as we (and NATO, plus 
partners like Japan and South Korea) continue to support Ukraine, 
Russia's ability to ultimately help China is less than it could be 
otherwise. Our best preparation is four-fold:

    1. Continue to resource our Joint Force at a rate higher than 
inflation so that we have the best equipment for our forces and for 
Taiwan.

    2. Continue to support Ukraine which depletes Russia's personnel 
and equipment without us firing a shot, which ultimately will weaken 
Russia's ability to support China.

    3. Diplomacy and diplomats matter. In this instance, we should 
relentlessly ensure that our allies and partners are with us if we 
choose to defend Taiwan. Additionally, we must get Ambassadors to posts 
quickly. This requires quick nominations of qualified people to be 
Ambassadors and fast action by the Senate to confirm them.

    4. As I testified, I believe we should end our American policy of 
strategic ambiguity in favor of strategic clarity when it comes to the 
question of whether we will defend Taiwan if China invades. The 
President has said on at least 4 public occasions that yes, we would. 
This is helpful. However, his declarations have been ``walked back'' by 
government officials who have not been elected or confirmed by the 
Senate, or both. This is not helpful and makes us appear feckless.

    Question. How concerned are you that China will take action at 
Second Thomas Shoal to test the U.S.-Philippine alliance and U.S. 
resolve? What should the United States be doing now to prepare for that 
scenario?

    Answer. Yes, I am concerned. Unlike our policy of strategic 
ambiguity regarding Taiwan, we have been clear that, while we don't 
take sides in territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS), our 
treaty obligations to the Philippines extend to Philippine troops 
wherever they are, including aboard the beached and rusting Sierra 
Madre hulk on Second Thomas Shoal. I believe this has prevented the PRC 
from being even more aggressive than they currently are (limited, so 
far, to water cannons and bumping). The U.S. has finally taken a clear 
position supporting the 2016 International Tribunal on the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) ruling which invalidated China's 9-dash line claim and 
validated the Philippine position. The Philippines, with our urging, 
took this case to the Tribunal. We lost an opportunity when the 
Tribunal ruling was announced in 2016 because we did not immediately 
and publicly support it or the Philippine position. However, then-
Philippine Duterte didn't support the ruling at all (the case was 
initiated by his predecessor's administration).
    What we should be doing now is:

    1. Ensure the Philippines are ready to fight but are not 
instigating a fight which could cause the treaty to be invoked 
prematurely. This means equipment, training, and rapid buildup of the 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites.

    2. Diplomats and diplomacy matter. We should be clear with the PRC 
that we will fully meet our obligations to the Philippines under our 
treaty. In this instance, we should relentlessly ensure that our allies 
and partners are with us if we choose to defend the Philippines. 
Additionally, we must get Ambassadors to posts quickly. This requires 
quick nominations of qualified people to be Ambassadors and fast action 
by the Senate to confirm them. Finally, continue to expand INDOPACOM's 
emphasis on ``lattice-like'' security structures to replace the old 
``hub-and-spoke'' model of my day. The new U.S.-Philippines-Japan 
trilateral is a case in point.

    3. Ensure our own forces are ready. Continue to resource our Joint 
Force at a rate higher than inflation so that we have the best 
equipment for our forces and for the Philippines.

    4. Creating dilemmas for China. I began advocating for the U.S. to 
pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2017. 
As a refresher, the INF Treaty was a bilateral treaty with the Soviet 
Union (and its successor states, primarily Russia, after the USSR fell 
in 1991) which, per Wikipedia,``. . . banned all of the two nations' 
nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic missiles, cruise 
missiles, and missile launchers with ranges of 500-1,000 kilometers 
(310-620 mi) (short medium-range) and 1,000-5,500 km (620-3,420 mi) 
(intermediate-range)''. China was never a signatory to INF nor would it 
have been for good reason: the overwhelming majority of China's 
ballistic missile inventory would have been excluded by INF had it been 
a signatory. Russia routinely violated INF. Therefore, INF was 
unilaterally self-limiting for the U.S., which is why I was for 
scrapping it or significantly renegotiating it. The U.S. did withdraw 
from the Treaty in 2019 despite, laughably, China's opposition to our 
withdrawal. However, though we've tested land-based Tomahawk (precluded 
by the Treaty when it was in force) since then, to my knowledge we've 
not yet developed a new intermediate range mobile land-based missile. 
We should do so without delay, including hypersonic missiles, and 
deploy them immediately somewhere in the Philippines archipelago 
(perhaps at an EDCA site) and elsewhere to create dilemmas for China.

    Question. Last week, President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida 
announced an effort to modernize U.S.-Japan military command and 
control. What concrete steps are needed to actually make this a 
reality? Do you think we are providing adequate resources to make this 
happen?

    Answer. Once the leaders ``buy off'' on this, which they did, DoD 
and INDOPACOM are cleared to work with the Japanese Ministry of 
National Defense (MND) and the Japan Joint Staff (JJS) to develop 
courses of action (COAs) on ways to implement a better command and 
control arrangement. This part should take no more that 6 months in my 
opinion. Once DoD and MND agree on the best COA, they can proceed to 
execution unless, for the U.S. side, if the selected COA involves 
significant additional resources/manpower or moving an existing 
headquarters somewhere else. These should be executed only after 
consultation with the Congress and, depending on their scopes, might 
actually require congressional authorization. The Japanese side might 
face similar issues. Regarding the second part of this question, I 
cannot answer that until I know what COA is ultimately developed and 
selected. Right now, it is only a think-piece.

    Question. How can we make sure our new access agreements in the 
Philippines and Papua New Guinea advance our strategic interests, 
support our partners, and are politically sustainable?

    Answer. I believe these agreements advance our strategic interests 
already, or we would not have pursued them in the first place. We 
support our partners (and, in the case of the Philippines, our treaty 
ally) by actually following through and committing resources--
authorizing and appropriating--to those access sites to get them built/
built up quickly. To ensure they are politically sustainable:

    1. We must demonstrate to the American people, through Congress, 
that these sites remain strategically important and worth the 
investment. China's bad behavior is helping make our own case for us.

    2. Increase the defense budget ahead of inflation.

                                 ______
                                 

    The Committee Received No Response From Mr. Walter Russell Mead 
     to the Following Questions Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Given China's support for Russia in Ukraine, do you think 
Russia would support China in a Taiwan conflict? What would this look 
like and how should we prepare for this?

    [No response received.]

    Question. How concerned are you that China will take action at 
Second Thomas Shoal to test the U.S.-Philippine alliance and U.S. 
resolve? What should the United States be doing now to prepare for that 
scenario?

    [No response received.]

    Question. We have to work with the Indo-Pacific partners we have to 
advance U.S. interests, even if they are not on the same page about 
democracy and human rights.
    In practical terms, what should our approach be to partners that 
share our strategic interests, but not our values? What helps, and what 
hurts?

    [No response received.]
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