### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 285 -CV

Wil lia m Cr aig Ri le y , A ppe lla nt

v. Gar y J. Cohen , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-07- 0041 54 , HO NORAB LE DARLENE BY RNE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Wil liam Craig Riley

appea ls a district cour

t j u d g me nt a

w a r ding G ary

J . Cohen $8,600 in atto rn e y ’s fe e s and e xpe ns e s tha t Cohe n inc ur re d in def e nd ing a laws uit Rile y ha d f ile d a g a ins t him. The judg ment rec ites that it is based upon a mot ion for sanctions Cohen filed “under Rule 13 of the Te x as Rules of Civil P roce dure a nd C h ap t er 9 o f t he Te x as Civil P rac tice and Re medies Code.” The judgme nt als o incorporates the finding “that Plaintiff’s cla ims ag ainst Gary J . Cohen

wer e g roundless and br oug ht for purpose s of har assment,” but does not other wise ela borate on the ba sis fo r t he sanc tio ns . In a sin g le iss ue , Rile y argue s that the dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in failing to state in its judgment “the pa rticulars” of t h e “good cause” it found for sanc tions, as

re qu ir e d b y

ru le 13 of the ru le s of ci vil pr oc e dure . Te x. R. Civ. P. 1 3 ( “ No sanc tio n und e r t his ru le may be imposed ex ce pt for g ood cause , the par ticulars of w hich must be stated in the sanc tionSee, e.g. , Ru dis e ll v . P aq ue tte , 89 S.W .3d 233, 237 (Tex. App.—Corpu s Christi 2002, 1 no pet.) (c itin g T

h omas v. Thomas , 917 S.W .2d 425, 432 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ); F r i ed ma n & Assocs., P.C. v. Be ltline Rd., Lt d. , 861 S.W .2d 1, 2-3 (Te x . App.—Dallas 1993, wr it d ism ’d

by a g r. ); GTE

Com mc ’n s S

y s. Cor p. v . Cu rry , 819 S

. W

. 2 d 6 5 2 , 654 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 19 91 ) ( or ig . p ro c .) ); Murphy v . Friendswood Dev. Co. , 965 S.W .2d 708, 70 9- 10 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 98 , n o p e t.) ; see also Schexnider v . Scott & W hite Mem ’l Hosp. , 953 S.W .2d 439, 441 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1997, no writ) (obser ving that rule 13 sanc tions or de r s ta tin g on ly

that of fe nd ingpa

rt y ’s ple a din g s w ere “g ro un dle ss a nd br ou g ht .

. . in b a d f

a ith and broug ht for the pur

pose of ha

rassment” was “ err oneous on its fac e,” a nd t h at s u ch error pr e c lud e d “ me anin g fu l a

pp e llate re vie w” be c a

us e “ ‘t he sanc tio ne d p art

y [is] un a ble to o ve rc ome the pre sumption t hat the trial c ourt found nec essar y fac ts in s u p p o rt o f its judgment’ ” (quoting GTE Commc’ns Sy

s. Corp. , 819 S.W .2d at 654), but holding that comp l ai n t was not pre serve d). Her e, Riley

prese rved his complaint in a post-tri al m o t i o n to modify the judg ment. Cf. id. (citing Land v. AT & S Transp., Inc. , 947 S.W .2d 665, 666-67 (Te x . App.—Austin 1997, no writ)). We a lso ob se rv e that, a s Co hen emp has iz es, c ha pte r 9 do e s n ot c on ta in a pa rt ic ula ri ty 2 require ment like rule 13. Although Riley , who is incarc erated, has proc eede d pr o s e a t a ll s ta g e s o f t his c a se , h e is 3 bound by the same pr ocedur al standar ds as par ties repr esente d by

attorney s. Se e Ma ns

fie ld S tate Bank v . Cohn , 5 73 S.W. 2d 18 1, 18 4- 85 (T e x. 19 78 ) (“ Th e re c ann ot b e tw o s e ts o f p ro c e dura l r ule s, one for liti gan t s wi t h counsel a

nd the other f

or litiga nts repre senting themselves. L itigants who repr esent themselve s must comply with the applicable procedura l rules, or else they would be g iven an unfa ir adva

ntag e over

litigants re prese nted by

counsel.” ). 2 order .”). Riley

invokes the line of case s holding that rule 13’s par ticularity require ment is mandatory and that noncomplianc e constitutes har m and re versible e rror . 1 Howeve r, the judg ment, on its face , also purports to be b as ed o n chapte r 9 of the civil prac tice and r emedies c ode. Riley does not c halleng e this a lternative g round that could support the jud g me nt. Be cause Riley has wa i v ed an y co m p laint with this g round for the judg ment, we 2

a ff ir m. See, e.g ., Te

x as De p’ t of Hu ma n R es. v . O rr , 7 30 S.W. 2d 43 5, 43 6 ( Te x. Ap p.—Aus tin 3 1987, no writ) (“ Should a judgment r est upon more than one g round, the p ar t y aggr i eved by the judgme nt must assign er ror a s to eac h such g round or r isk having the ju d g ment aff irmed on the g ro un d to whic h n o e rr or wa s a ssi g ne d. ” ); see also In ReHansen , No. 05-06-00585- CV, 20073

Tex. App. L EXI S 2115, at *1-3 (Te x . App.—Dallas Ma r. 20, 2007, no pet.) ( mem. op.) (whe re sanctions orde red unde r ru l e 13 and cha pter 10, a nd appellant only

complained of

order under rule 13, a ny err o r wa s h armless because “the unc halleng ed indepe ndent g round fully supports the complained- of ruling ”).

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 19, 2009