SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience 

of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interest of 

brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).

State of New Jersey v. Demetrius C. Cope (A-13-14) (074206)

Argued November 9, 2015 – April 25, 2016

ALBIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers: (1) the circumstances under which contraband, discovered by police in the 

context of a protective sweep conducted incident to arrest, is subject to suppression; and (2) when a trial court may 

preclude the introduction of third-party-guilt testimony.

In October 2006, defendant was charged with second-degree possession of a weapon by a person previously 

convicted of a crime. Defendant moved to suppress the rifle, claiming that its seizure violated his right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. In April 2011, the trial court conducted a suppression hearing at which the State 

called the only witness, Sergeant David Brintzinghoffer. He testified that on July 5, 2006, at approximately 6:20 p.m.,

he and five other police officers went to defendant’s apartment to execute a warrant for his arrest. Sergeant 

Brintzinghoffer knew that defendant had a number of prior convictions and had information that he might be armed. 

Defendant resided in a second-floor apartment with a back porch adjacent to its living room. Three officers 

positioned themselves behind the building, while Sergeant Brintzinghoffer and two other officers knocked on the front 

door. After knocking, the sergeant heard a commotion inside the apartment. He announced that he had a warrant, and 

seconds later, an officer guarding the rear called out that defendant had run into the apartment from the back porch. The 

sergeant banged on the front door, after which a female voice responded, “Hold on.” The sergeant stated that he had an 

arrest warrant and that he would kick in the door unless defendant answered. 

April Grant, defendant’s adult daughter, opened the door. Sergeant Brintzinghoffer and another officer 

climbed the stairs, walked into the living room, and arrested defendant. Sergeant Brintzinghoffer conducted a protective 

sweep of the bedroom, bathroom, and back porch to ensure that no one could launch a surprise attack. When he stepped 

onto the porch, he saw a bag on the floor next to a storage bin in which he feared someone might be hiding. He picked 

up the bag and knew by its weight and feel that a rifle was inside. He opened the bag and found an assault-type rifle, a 

banana clip, and numerous rounds of ammunition. The bag and its contents were seized as evidence. The trial court 

found the sergeant credible and denied defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that he conducted a permissive 

protective sweep, during which he discovered the rifle. 

At trial, the State called several police officers, including Sergeant Brintzinghoffer, as witnesses. Officer 

Christopher Ent, a member of the team guarding the rear of the apartment, recalled seeing the porch’s sliding glass door 

open, its screen door come crashing down, and defendant step onto the porch. In his defense, defendant claimed that 

someone else placed the rifle on his porch without his knowledge. Defendant’s daughter testified that the balcony was 

cluttered and that defendant used it to store his tools there. Defendant testified that he owned a home-improvement 

business that employed ex-felons. He explained that he wanted to give others with a criminal record an opportunity for 

gainful employment. He said his employees had access to his apartment, stored work gear and tools there, and recalled 

workers loading tools from his balcony on July 5, 2006, the day of his arrest. Defendant intended to call Dante 

Santiago, his former employee, to testify that he owned the rifle and placed it on the porch. According to a notarized 

statement by Santiago, he stashed the rifle on the porch and planned to sell it. When Santiago returned to retrieve the 

rifle, police were at the property and, as a result, he considered the rifle a loss. 

After jury selection, the court conducted a Rule 104 hearing to determine whether Santiago would invoke his 

Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, given the self-incriminating nature of his expected testimony. Under oath, 

Santiago stated that he did not need a lawyer and that he would not invoke his right to remain silent. The court 

conducted a second Rule 104 hearing at the conclusion of the State’s case to determine the admissibility of Santiago’s 

notarized statement and his expected testimony. The court reviewed Santiago’s judgment of conviction and jail records,

showing that he was incarcerated in a county jail from June 22, 2006 until August 30, 2006. The court also reviewed 

his prior statements, including one given to detectives on May 3, 2011, the day before defendant’s trial began. That 

day, detectives questioned Santiago about his earlier notarized statement. They showed him a document indicating that 

he was incarcerated from May 16, 2006 through November 16, 2006. They asked, “if you dropped the gun off, it had to 

be before May, right?” Santiago responded that he was not “sure of the date exactly,” reminding the detectives that the 

events occurred five years earlier. Santiago pointed out that he must have left the rifle in defendant’s apartment before 

his incarceration, stating, “I had to have left it there before that, right” and “It’s impossible for me to be in two places at 

one time right?” Ultimately, the court barred the admission of Santiago’s notarized statement, and his expected 

testimony, on the basis the account was factually impossible. The jury convicted defendant of possession of a weapon 

by a person previously convicted of a crime. The court sentenced defendant to twelve years’ imprisonment, subject to
2

six years of parole ineligibility, and imposed the applicable fines and penalties. 

Defendant appealed. In an unpublished decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court erred when it 

denied the motion to suppress the rifle and the contents of the rifle bag and when it barred defendant from presenting 

evidence of third-party guilt. The panel reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. The Court 

granted the State’s petition for certification. 220 N.J. 40 (2014). 

HELD: 1) After arresting defendant in his living room, the police conducted a protective sweep of an adjoining porch to 

ensure no individuals posing a safety risk were on the premises. The sweep did not violate constitutional standards and the 

trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the rifle. 2) The trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant 

the right to present a full third-party-guilt defense. A witness whose testimony is central to a defense of third-party guilt 

cannot be kept off the stand unless the expected version of events is so patently false that the events could not have 

occurred. 

1. A protective sweep is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of 

police officers or others. The permissible scope of a protective sweep incident to a home arrest depends on the radius of 

danger facing the officers. They may look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which 

an attack could be immediately launched without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The sweep must be narrowly 

confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding. The sweep should last no longer 

than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger or to complete the arrest and depart the premises. (pp. 16-20)

2. Here, police executed the arrest warrant for defendant while he was in his apartment. No one responded immediately 

to the officers’ knocks. The sergeant heard a commotion, which made him believe that multiple people were inside. 

Once inside, the sergeant conducted a protective sweep. When the sergeant stepped onto the porch, he instantly 

observed the rifle bag and, given defendant’s prior convictions, knew that defendant was barred from possessing a 

firearm. The porch was in such close proximity to the place of arrest that a protective sweep of that area was 

permissible, even without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The sweep was limited to a brief visual inspection of 

an area from which a person might have emerged to surprise and threaten the officers. The sweep was swift and did not 

exceed the time necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger. The seizure of the rifle bag and its contents met 

the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court’s finding that the protective sweep was reasonable 

is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. (pp. 20-24) 

3. The Compulsory Process Clause in the federal and state constitutions gives the accused in a criminal prosecution the 

right to call witnesses in his favor. A defendant does not bear the burden of proving his innocence, but has the right to 

introduce evidence that someone else committed the crime for the purpose of raising reasonable doubt. Third-party guilt 

evidence need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt to warrant its admissibility. A court 

cannot bar the admissibility of third-party-guilt evidence that has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with 

respect to an essential feature of the State’s case. (pp. 24-26)

4. Here, Santiago provided a notarized statement that he brought a gun into defendant’s apartment, without defendant’s 

knowledge, on his third day working for defendant. He planned to retrieve the gun and sell it, but was thwarted when he 

approached the apartment and observed police “running down on the place.” The trial court apparently determined that the 

third day of Santiago’s work corresponded with the day of defendant’s arrest because of Santiago’s observation of “police 

running down on the place” -- presumably referring to the apartment. On July 5, 2006, the day of defendant’s arrest, 

Santiago was incarcerated. Having assumed that Santiago was actually in jail on the day of defendant’s arrest, the court 

concluded that Santiago could not have placed the rifle on the balcony as he claimed. The error in the court’s reasoning is 

the assumption that the only day the police may have been in the area of defendant’s apartment was July 5, 2006. The 

record does not contain irrefutable evidence to support that assumption. However implausible Santiago’s account may 

have seemed, the credibility of Santiago’s notarized statement and expected testimony was for the jury to resolve. While 

the trial court retains broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, that discretion is abused when relevant 

evidence offered by the defense and necessary for a fair trial is kept from the jury. A person who confesses to the crime of 

which the defendant is accused should not be barred from testifying unless the claim is so patently false that it was 

impossible for him to have committed the crime. (pp. 26-31)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART. The matter is 

REMANDED to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. On retrial, the version of N.J.R.E. 609 

now in effect governs the admissibility of defendant’s prior convictions.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, and SOLOMON; and JUDGE 

CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE ALBIN’S opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did not 

participate. 
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-13 September Term 2014

074206

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEMETRIUS C. COPE (a/k/a 

RAASHID HABSHIN, RASHEED 

COPE, DEMETRIUS M. COPE, and 

DEMETRIAS COPE),

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued November 9, 2015 – Decided April 25, 2016

On certification to the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division.

Jane C. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General, 

argued the cause for appellant (John J. 

Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of New 

Jersey, attorney).

Theresa Yvette Kyles, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, argued the cause for 

respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Ms. Kyles and John V. 

Saykanic, Designated Counsel, on the 

briefs).

JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Defendant Demetrius C. Cope was convicted by a jury of 

second-degree possession of a weapon by a person previously 

convicted of a crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). 
2

In this appeal, we must determine whether the trial court 

properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress a rifle 

discovered during a protective sweep of his apartment 

immediately following his arrest in his living room. The court 

rejected defendant’s claim that the limited search exceeded 

constitutional limits. We must also determine whether the trial 

court denied defendant his right to present a defense of thirdparty guilt by barring the testimony of a witness who took

responsibility for placing the rifle in defendant’s apartment. 

The court precluded the third-party-guilt testimony because it 

believed that the witness’s account was factually impossible. 

The Appellate Division reversed defendant’s conviction. 

The appellate panel concluded that the rifle should have been 

suppressed because the police did not have a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion of danger that justified the protective 

sweep. The panel also found that the trial court improperly 

denied defendant the right to advance a third-party-guilt 

defense.

We agree with the Appellate Division that defendant’s 

conviction must be reversed because defendant was denied the 

right to present a full third-party-guilt defense. The 

witness’s account of having placed the rifle in defendant’s 

apartment was not factually impossible, however implausible it 

may have seemed to the trial court. The final arbiter of the 
3

witness’s credibility should have been the jury, not the court. 

A witness whose testimony is central to a defense of third-party 

guilt cannot be kept off the stand unless the expected version 

of events is so patently false that the events could not 

possibly have occurred. That exceedingly high standard was not 

met here, and therefore it was for the jury to determine the 

ultimate reliability of the witness’s testimony.

We disagree, however, with the Appellate Division’s

conclusion that the trial court erred in not suppressing the 

rifle. After arresting defendant in his living room, the police

conducted a protective sweep of an adjoining porch to ensure 

that no individuals posing a safety risk were on the premises. 

The protective sweep did not violate constitutional standards.

We remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

I.

A.

In October 2006, defendant was indicted on the charge of 

second-degree possession of a weapon by a person previously 

convicted of a crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).1 The charge arose 

 

1 In the same indictment, defendant was charged with third-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f); fourthdegree prohibited weapons and devices, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j); and

third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a). 

These charges were not submitted to the jury and, apparently, 

were dismissed before trial.
4

from the discovery of an assault-type rifle in defendant’s

apartment when police took defendant into custody on an 

unrelated arrest warrant.

Defendant moved to suppress the rifle, claiming that the 

seizure of the rifle by the police violated his federal and 

state constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable 

searches and seizures. In April 2011, the trial court conducted 

a suppression hearing. The State called the only witness to 

testify at the hearing, Burlington Township Police Sergeant 

David Brintzinghoffer. The factual record of the suppression 

hearing is based primarily on the officer’s testimony. 

B.

On July 5, 2006, at approximately 6:20 p.m., Sergeant 

Brintzinghoffer, along with five other police officers, went to

defendant’s unit at the Chateau Apartment complex in Burlington 

Township to execute a warrant for his arrest. Sergeant 

Brintzinghoffer knew that defendant had a number of prior 

criminal convictions and had information that he “[m]ight be 

armed” with a weapon.2

 

2 Defendant’s convictions included two for third-degree 

possession of controlled dangerous substances with the intent to 

distribute within 1000 feet of school property, one for thirddegree eluding, one for possession of a weapon for an unlawful 

purpose, and one for fourth-degree resisting arrest. The 

information concerning defendant possibly being armed came from 

a law enforcement officer.
5

Defendant resided in a second-floor apartment that has a 

back porch adjacent to the unit’s living room. The apartment is

accessed by a door on the first floor. Three officers 

positioned themselves behind the building, allowing them to

observe defendant’s back porch, while Sergeant Brintzinghoffer 

and two other officers knocked on the front door. After 

knocking, Sergeant Brintzinghoffer heard what sounded like a 

“commotion” -- the movement of something and “multiple people 

inside the apartment.” The sergeant announced that he had a 

warrant, and seconds later an officer guarding the rear called 

out that defendant had run into the apartment from the back 

porch. Sergeant Brintzinghoffer then banged on the door. A 

female voice responded, “[H]old on.” The sergeant stated that

he had an arrest warrant for defendant and that the door would 

be kicked in unless defendant answered. 

April Grant, defendant’s adult daughter, opened the door,

and Sergeant Brintzinghoffer and one other officer climbed the 

stairs, which opened into the apartment’s living room. There, 

the officers found defendant lying on a couch. Defendant was

handcuffed and placed under arrest. 

 Sergeant Brintzinghoffer then conducted a protective sweep 

of the bedroom, bathroom, and back porch to ensure that no one

could launch a surprise attack against the officers. A sliding 

glass door separating the living room from the porch was open. 
6

When Sergeant Brintzinghoffer stepped onto the porch, he 

observed a camouflage rifle bag on the floor next to a storage 

bin in which he feared someone might be hiding. He picked up 

the bag and knew by its weight and feel that a rifle was inside. 

He opened the bag and found an assault-type rifle, a “banana 

clip,” and “numerous rounds of ammunition, other magazines, 

[and] speed loaders.” The rifle and contents of the bag were 

seized as evidence. 

The trial court determined that Sergeant Brintzinghoffer 

was a credible witness and denied defendant’s motion to suppress 

on the basis that the sergeant conducted a permissible 

protective sweep during which he discovered, in plain view, the 

rifle and its accoutrements.

C.

During a four-day jury trial in May 2011, the State called

several police officers as witnesses, including Sergeant 

Brintzinghoffer, whose testimony tracked the account he gave at 

the suppression hearing. Burlington Township Police Officer 

Christopher Ent, who was part of the perimeter team guarding the 

rear of defendant’s apartment during the execution of the arrest 

warrant, recalled seeing the back porch’s sliding glass door

open, its screen door come crashing down, and defendant step

onto the porch. 
7

Burlington Township Sergeant (then-officer) Richard 

Sullivan, who also was on the perimeter team, remembered the 

screen door falling and defendant coming onto the balcony.3 

After he and defendant made eye contact, Sullivan trained his 

rifle on defendant and ordered him back into the apartment. 

Defendant put his hands up and complied.

The State offered expert testimony that the assault-type

rifle seized from defendant’s apartment was operable and that no 

identifiable fingerprints were lifted from the weapon. 

Defendant and the State stipulated that “defendant has been 

convicted of a predicate prior offense.”

Defendant asserted as his defense that, without his 

knowledge, someone put the rifle on his porch. In support of 

that defense, defendant called as a witness his adult daughter, 

April, then a college student, who was visiting her father when 

the police arrived. April testified that she did not see 

defendant go onto the balcony that day. She stated that the 

screen to the porch’s sliding glass door fell when she opened 

it. She described the balcony as a cluttered area where 

defendant stored his tools and where junk had accumulated. She 

remembered that, on other occasions, her father’s constructionbusiness employees were present in the apartment. She also 

 

3 Balcony and porch were used interchangeably during the trial.
8

averred that she had never seen or heard her father talk about a

rifle. 

Testifying in his own defense, defendant stated that he 

owned a home-improvement construction company that employed exfelons. He explained that, given his own past, he wanted to 

give others with a prior criminal record an opportunity for 

gainful employment. Defendant also stated that his employees 

had access to his apartment and stored work gear and tools 

inside. He recalled workers loading tools from his balcony on 

July 5, 2006, the day of his arrest. 

Defendant maintained that in 2006 he was living in two 

separate residences, the unit at the Chateau Apartment complex 

and at the home of his then fiancée and now wife (April’s 

mother). According to defendant, when the police arrived at his 

door, the television was playing, and he was leaning over the

porch screen onto his balcony when the screen fell off its 

hinges. He became scared when he saw a “shotgun” pointing at 

him. Defendant denied ever owning or seeing the rifle or 

ammunition found on his balcony.

D.

Defendant intended to call as a witness Dante Santiago, a 

former employee of defendant’s construction business, who 

claimed that he owned the rifle and placed it on the porch 
9

unbeknownst to defendant. In a notarized statement dated April 

22, 2011, Santiago wrote:

On my third day at work I not only brought an 

“SK” with me (gun), but without permission I 

also decided to stash it on the boss man’s 

balcony until work was finished because I was 

going to sell it to an associate of mine that 

resides in North Camden. Well what was 

suppose[d] to take place obviously didn’t, 

because after work this day me and [my friend] 

headed back to boss man Cope’s apartment so 

that we could receive payment for the day’s 

work and so that I could also pick up my shit, 

but as we approached the apartment there was 

police running down on the place. Why? Beats 

the hell out of me, but what I did know was 

that I was going to have to chalk my “SK” (gun) 

up as a loss.

Santiago concluded his notarized statement by saying: “I cannot 

allow for an innocent man to go to prison because of something 

that didn’t even belong to him. I . . . am taking full 

responsibility of my gun that was found at Mr. Cope’s address.” 

After jury selection, at the prosecutor’s request, the 

court conducted a Rule 104 hearing to determine whether Santiago 

would invoke the Fifth Amendment in the presence of the jury, 

given the self-incriminating nature of his expected testimony.4 

Under oath, Santiago stated that he “[did] not need a lawyer” 

and would not invoke his constitutional right to remain silent. 

 

4 N.J.R.E. 104(a) provides that “[w]hen the qualification of a 

person to be a witness, or the admissibility of evidence . . . 

is subject to a condition . . . that issue is to be determined 

by the judge.”
10

He also averred that he would “tell . . . the truth” and “answer 

each and every question,” including those concerning criminal 

charges pending against him. Based on those responses, the 

court concluded that Santiago would be permitted to testify.

At the prosecutor’s urging, a second Rule 104 hearing was 

held at the close of the State’s case, this time to determine 

the admissibility of Santiago’s notarized statement and his 

expected testimony. The court reviewed Santiago’s judgment of 

conviction and jail records showing that he was incarcerated in 

a county jail from June 22, 2006 until August 30, 2006. The 

court also reviewed his prior statements, including one given to 

detectives on May 3, 2011, the day before defendant’s trial 

began. 

On that day, detectives in the Burlington County 

Prosecutor’s Office questioned Santiago about his earlier 

notarized statement. During the recorded questioning, the 

detectives showed Santiago a document indicating that he was 

incarcerated in the Camden County Jail from May 16, 2006 until 

November 16, 2006. The primary interrogator asked, “[I]f you 

dropped the gun off it had to be before May, right?” Santiago 

responded that he was not “sure of the date exactly,” reminding 

the detective that the events occurred five years earlier. 

Santiago pointed out to the detective that he must have left the 

rifle in defendant’s apartment before his incarceration, 
11

stating, “I had to have left it there before that, right” and 

“It’s impossible for me to be in two places at one time right?”

The prosecutor acknowledged to the court that Santiago was 

claiming that he dropped off the rifle before his incarceration. 

The court also took testimony from Santiago that did not shed 

much light on the precise day he claimed to have dropped off the 

rifle. Given the passage of time, Santiago testified that he 

did not remember the dates of his incarceration and admission 

into the Sheriff’s Labor Assistance Program in 2006. He stated,

“I don’t want to state a date and it not be true and me be lying 

when I just raised my right hand.”

At the end of the Rule 104 hearing, the court barred the 

admission of Santiago’s notarized statement, offered as a 

declaration against interest, and his expected testimony on the 

basis that his account was factually impossible. The court 

determined that Santiago’s prior statements indicated that he 

placed the rifle in defendant’s apartment on July 5, 2006, the 

same day defendant was arrested -- a day when Santiago was 

incarcerated. In reaching that conclusion, the court stated, 

“There is no way that [Santiago] could have done what he said 

and been in jail at the same time and that’s just an 

impossibility.” 

Accordingly, the court withheld from the jury Santiago’s 

notarized statement and his testimony.
12

E.

The jury found defendant guilty of possession of a weapon 

by a person previously convicted of a crime. The trial court 

sentenced defendant to twelve years’ imprisonment, with a sixyear period of parole ineligibility, and imposed the applicable 

fines and penalties. 

Defendant appealed.

II.

In an unpublished decision, the Appellate Division held 

that the trial court erred in not granting the motion to 

suppress the rifle and the contents of the rifle bag and in 

barring defendant from presenting evidence of third-party guilt 

through the testimony of Dante Santiago. Accordingly, the panel

reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.

On the suppression issue, the panel determined that 

Sergeant Brintzinghoffer did not have a legitimate basis, under 

either the Federal or State Constitution, to conduct a 

protective sweep of the back porch of defendant’s apartment. 

The panel relied on State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 102 (2010), 

for the proposition that a protective sweep is permissible if 

the police were lawfully on the premises and had “a reasonable

articulable suspicion that the area to be swept harbors an 

individual posing a danger.” It found that “[t]he police were 

lawfully within defendant’s home pursuant to the arrest 
13

warrant,” but that the protective sweep “was not supported by 

any ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’” that a “dangerous 

individual” was lurking on the back porch. The panel reached

that finding because, based on the police surveillance, no one 

other than defendant appeared on the porch from the time the 

police arrived until defendant’s arrest. The panel also noted 

that Sergeant Brintzinghoffer “did not see or hear anything that 

led him to believe a person was hiding on the back porch 

balcony.” According to the panel, in the absence of an 

articulable suspicion to conduct a protective sweep of the 

balcony, Sergeant Brintzinghoffer’s “only lawful choice was to 

secure the premises and apply for a search warrant or simply 

leave,” citing State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 555-56 (2008).

The Appellate Division also concluded that the trial court 

violated defendant’s right to present witnesses, which is 

derived from the due-process and compulsory-process guarantees

of the Federal and State Constitutions. The panel submitted

that a defendant is entitled to offer evidence of third-party 

guilt as a defense. It reasoned that Santiago’s account that he 

placed the rifle in defendant’s apartment, “if believed by the 

jury, could have exonerated defendant.” Questions concerning

Santiago’s whereabouts during the relevant time period, 

according to the panel, went to the witness’s credibility and 

not to the admissibility of his testimony.
14

Last, in light of the need for a new trial, the panel did 

not address the trial court’s ruling on the evidential use of 

defendant’s prior convictions given that the admissibility of 

prior convictions would be governed by the amended version of 

Rule 609 at the retrial.

We granted the State’s petition for certification. State 

v. Cope, 220 N.J. 40 (2014).

III.

A.

The State argues that, under Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S.

325, 334, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 286 (1990),

the police had the right to conduct a warrantless protective 

sweep of defendant’s back porch to safeguard against someone 

launching a surprise attack. The State submits that Sergeant

Brintzinghoffer properly seized the rifle bag, which he observed

in plain view while he was lawfully on the porch, because he

knew that defendant could not legally possess a gun.

The State contends that Santiago’s proposed testimony that 

he placed the rifle in defendant’s apartment was “‘impossible,’ 

and not simply improbable” based on documentary evidence that he 

was incarcerated during the relevant time period. The State 

thus argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

barring the testimony of a “defense witness who planned to lie”

and by precluding “the admission of Santiago’s affidavit which 
15

contained the same demonstrably false claims.” The State 

submits that the trial court properly exercised its gatekeeping 

role by ensuring that the jury was not exposed to Santiago’s 

perjured testimony and false claims. 

Last, the State maintains that the court properly admitted 

defendant’s prior convictions based on the evidence rule and 

case law then in effect.

B.

Defendant urges that we affirm the Appellate Division. He 

insists that, under Buie, the protective sweep of his back porch 

was not justified as a search incident to an arrest or as a 

search supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion. 

According to defendant, the police had no reason to believe that 

individuals were hiding on the back porch based on the testimony

of the officers on the perimeter detail and given Sergeant

Brintzinghoffer’s view of the porch from the living room. 

Defendant also argues that the trial court violated his 

federal and state constitutional rights to present a defense of 

third-party guilt by barring Santiago from testifying that he 

placed the rifle in defendant’s apartment. Defendant insists 

that Santiago consistently denied knowing the date on which he 

left the rifle at defendant’s apartment and therefore his claim 

was not impossible -- that is, Santiago may have acted before 

his incarceration. Defendant maintains that the court should 
16

not have precluded Santiago’s testimony, but rather should have 

allowed his credibility to be tested by vigorous crossexamination.

Finally, defendant agrees with the Appellate Division that, 

on retrial, the trial court must apply the amended version of 

Rule 609.

IV.

We first address whether the protective sweep of 

defendant’s apartment following his arrest in the living room

conformed to the dictates of the Fourth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey 

Constitution.

A.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect 

against “unreasonable searches and seizures” by government 

officials.5 “Our constitutional jurisprudence expresses a 

 

5 The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 use virtually 

identical language. The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 

be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 

affirmation, and particularly describing the 

place to be searched, and the persons or 

things to be seized.
17

decided preference that government officials first secure a 

warrant before conducting a search of a home or a person.” 

State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 513 (2015) (citing State v. 

Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 129 (2012)). The police may conduct a 

warrantless search only if it falls within “one of the . . . 

well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” 

Edmonds, supra, 211 N.J. at 130 (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 

N.J. 586, 598, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 876, 125 S. Ct. 108, 160 

L. Ed. 2d 128 (2004)). “The State bears the burden of proving 

by a preponderance of the evidence the validity of a warrantless 

search.” Id. at 128 (citing State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 12-13 

(2003)). 

To justify the warrantless home search in this case, the 

State relies on the protective-sweep doctrine. A protective 

sweep of a home incident to a lawful arrest is a reasonable 

search under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 

7 of our State Constitution. Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at 327-28, 

110 S. Ct. at 1094-95, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 281-82; Davila, supra, 

203 N.J. at 113. “A ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited 

search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to 

protect the safety of police officers or others. It is narrowly 

confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which 

 

[U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also N.J. Const.

art. I, ¶ 7.]
18

a person might be hiding.” Davila, supra, 203 N.J. at 113 

(quoting Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at 327, 110 S. Ct. at 1094, 108 

L. Ed. 2d at 281).

The rationale for the protective sweep is officer safety. 

See id. at 103. It is recognized that police officers who make 

an arrest in a home face a great “risk of danger” because they 

are “at the disadvantage of being on [their] adversary’s 

‘turf.’” Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at 333, 110 S. Ct. at 1097-98, 

108 L. Ed. 2d at 285. Officers making an in-home arrest have an 

interest in ensuring that the suspect “is not harboring other 

persons who are dangerous and who could unexpectedly launch an 

attack.” Ibid. Additionally, an arrest in a home may trigger a 

potentially chaotic, volatile, and dangerous scene involving the 

suspect’s immediate relatives or friends. See Greiner v. City 

of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding 

qualified immunity for protective sweep incident to in-home 

arrest because situation was chaotic and occupants were

aggressive towards officers). Officers have a right to take 

commonsense safety precautions that will lessen the potential 

dangers to which they are exposed while executing an arrest in a 

home. See Davila, supra, 203 N.J. at 115-16.

The permissible scope of a protective sweep incident to a 

home arrest depends on the radius of danger facing the officers. 

The officers may “look in closets and other spaces immediately 
19

adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be 

immediately launched” without probable cause or reasonable 

suspicion. Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S. Ct. at 1098, 

108 L. Ed. 2d at 286. Any wider search, however, must be based 

on “articulable facts” and “rational inferences” drawn from 

those facts that “would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in 

believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing 

a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Ibid. 

In Davila, supra, we approved of protective sweeps in cases 

involving in-home arrests as set forth in Buie and, more 

broadly, in non-arrest cases in which police officers are 

legitimately in a home and have a reasonable and articulable 

suspicion to believe that their safety is in danger. 203 N.J.

at 116. Davila addressed the scenario in which the police 

secured admittance to a home on a potentially pretextual basis 

for the purpose of conducting a sweep of the premises. Id. at 

101-03. That concern is not present in this case.

In summary, a protective sweep incident to an in-home 

arrest is permissible under the following circumstances. First,

the police may sweep the “spaces immediately adjoining the place 

of arrest from which an attack” might be launched even in the 

absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Buie, supra, 

494 U.S. at 334, 110 S. Ct. at 1098, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 286. Any

wider sweep must be justified by “specific facts that would 
20

cause a reasonable officer to believe there is an individual 

within the premises who poses a danger” to the arresting 

officers. Davila, supra, 203 N.J. at 115. Second, the sweep 

must be “narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of 

those places in which a person might be hiding.” Buie, supra,

494 U.S. at 327, 110 S. Ct. at 1094, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 281. 

Although the sweep “is not a search for weapons or contraband,”

such items may be seized if observed “in plain view” during the 

sweep. Davila, supra, 203 N.J. at 115. Last, the sweep should 

last “no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable 

suspicion of danger” or “to complete the arrest and depart the 

premises.” Ibid. (quoting Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at 335-36, 110 

S. Ct. at 1099, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 287).

We apply those principles to the facts of this case.

B.

The police executed the arrest warrant for defendant while 

he was present in his apartment. No one in the apartment 

responded immediately to the officers’ door knocks, and Sergeant 

Brintzinghoffer heard a “commotion” and the movement of 

something. Based on the noise coming from the apartment, 

Sergeant Brintzinghoffer believed “multiple people [were] inside 

the apartment.” The door to the apartment was opened by 

defendant’s daughter only after Sergeant Brintzinghoffer 

announced that he had a warrant and threatened to kick in the 
21

door. The officers arrested defendant in his living room. 

Sergeant Brintzinghoffer conducted a protective sweep of the 

bedroom, bathroom, and back porch to prevent a surprise attack. 

An open sliding glass door separated the living room from the 

adjoining porch, where defendant was sighted by officers on the 

perimeter detail immediately before his arrest. When Sergeant 

Brintzinghoffer stepped onto the porch, he instantly observed 

the rifle bag. He knew that defendant, based on his prior 

convictions, was barred from possessing a firearm. Upon picking 

up the bag, by its weight and feel, he realized that a rifle was 

inside. 

Initially, we conclude that the porch was in such close 

proximity to the place of arrest -- indeed, immediately 

adjoining it -- that a protective sweep of that area was 

permissible even without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 

See, e.g., Kerr v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 250, 267-68 (Ky. 

2013) (stating that for protective-sweep purposes, bedroom was 

“immediately adjoining” place of arrest, which occurred several 

feet down hallway in another room); State v. Murdock, 455 N.W.2d 

618, 620 (Wis. 1990) (stating that for protective-sweep 

purposes, room where defendant was arrested was “immediately 

adjoining” pantry connected to that room). Even so, given all 

of the information available to Sergeant Brintzinghoffer, he 

would have been justified entering the porch based on the 
22

reasonable-and-articulable-suspicion standard. See United 

States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 510, 514 (6th Cir.) (noting that 

officers’ protective sweep was justified because before

arresting defendant in his apartment, they heard shuffling 

sounds indicating presence of second person), cert. denied, 534 

U.S. 981, 122 S. Ct. 414, 151 L. Ed. 2d 315 (2001). Under the 

circumstances, Sergeant Brintzinghoffer did not have to wager 

his safety and the lives of his fellow officers by erring on the 

side of excessive caution.

Second, the sweep was limited to a brief visual inspection 

of an area from which a person might have emerged to surprise 

and threaten the officers. See Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at 327, 

110 S. Ct. at 1094, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 281. The officers on the 

perimeter detail did not have a complete view of the porch or 

the storage bin. The search was in direct proportion to the 

risk.

Third, the sweep was swiftly conducted and did not exceed 

the time “necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of 

danger.” See Davila, supra, 203 N.J. at 115 (quoting Buie, 

supra, 494 U.S. at 335-36, 110 S. Ct. at 1099, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 

287).

Last, the seizure of the rifle bag and its contents met the 

plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. 

Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 236 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 
23

104 S. Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1984). Sergeant 

Brintzinghoffer was lawfully on the porch when he first saw the 

rifle bag; his discovery of the bag was inadvertent, that is, he 

did not know in advance that a rifle would be located on the 

porch; and it was immediately apparent to him that the bag and 

its contents were evidence of a crime. See ibid. (citing 

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-70, 91 S. Ct. 2022,

237-40, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 582-85 (1971));6 see also Texas v. 

Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 734, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1539, 75 L. Ed. 2d 

502, 508 (1983) (holding that criminal nature of container is 

immediately apparent where officer “[b]ecause of his previous 

experience in arrests for drug offenses, . . . was aware that 

narcotics frequently were packaged in [similar] balloons”); 

State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 219 (2002) (holding that 

criminal nature of container is immediately apparent where 

“outward appearance of the clear plastic bag gave the officer a 

degree of certainty that was functionally equivalent to the 

plain view of crack-cocaine itself”).

The trial court’s finding that the protective sweep was

reasonable is “supported by sufficient credible evidence in the 

 

6 The United States Supreme Court has since removed the 

inadvertence prong of this test. See Horton v. California, 496 

U.S. 128, 141-42, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2310-11, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112, 

125-26 (1990). But see State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 478-79 

(2015) (applying inadvertence prong to plain-view exception

(citing Bruzzese, supra, 94 N.J. at 236)).
24

record.” State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (quoting 

State v. Elders, 386 N.J. Super. 208, 228 (App. Div. 2006)). 

That finding was therefore entitled to deference. The Appellate 

Division was mistaken that a protective sweep incident to an inhome arrest requires reasonable suspicion even when the sweep is 

of “spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest.” Davila,

supra, 203 N.J. at 114 (quoting Buie, supra, 494 U.S. at 333-34, 

110 S. Ct. at 1097-98, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 285-86). Accordingly, 

we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division granting the 

suppression motion.

V.

Next, defendant claims that he was denied the 

constitutional right to present a third-party guilt defense. We 

must determine whether the trial court erred in suppressing the

exculpatory statement and prospective testimony of a witness who 

claimed to have placed the rifle in defendant’s apartment

unbeknownst to defendant. 

A.

The Compulsory Process Clause in the United States and New 

Jersey Constitutions gives the accused in a criminal prosecution 

the right to call “witnesses in his favor.” U.S. Const. amend. 

VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10. The right “to call witnesses in 

one’s own behalf” is essential to a “fair opportunity to defend 

against the State’s accusations,” and therefore is indispensable 
25

to due process and a fair trial. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 

U.S. 284, 294, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 

(1973); State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129, 147 (quoting State v. 

Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 169 (2003)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160, 

124 S. Ct. 1169, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (2004). Thus, the 

Compulsory Process Clause and due process “guarantee criminal 

defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 

defense.’” Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 168 (2003) (quoting Crane 

v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L. Ed.

2d 636, 645 (1986)). “[A] complete defense includes a criminal 

defendant’s right to introduce evidence of third-party guilt . . 

. .” State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 332 (2005).

Although defendant does not bear the burden of “prov[ing] 

his innocence through the introduction of evidence of thirdparty guilt,” State v. Fortin, (Fortin II), 178 N.J. 540, 591 

(2004), he has the right to introduce evidence that someone else 

committed the crime for the purpose of raising reasonable doubt 

about his own guilt, State v. Koedatich, (Koedatich II), 112 

N.J. 225, 297, 299 (1988) (citing 1A Wigmore on Evidence §§ 139-

41 (1983)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S. Ct. 813, 102 L. 

Ed. 2d 803 (1989). Thus, “[t]hird-party guilt evidence ‘need 

only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s 

guilt’ to warrant its admissibility.” Fortin II, supra, 178 

N.J. at 591 (quoting Koedatich II, supra, 112 N.J. at 299). A 
26

court cannot bar the admissibility of third-party guilt evidence 

that “has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt 

with respect to an essential feature of the State’s case.” 

Fortin II, supra, 178 N.J. at 591 (quoting State v. Sturdivant, 

31 N.J. 165, 179 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 956, 80 S. Ct.

873, 4 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1960)); see also Cotto, supra, 182 N.J. at 

333 (noting that third-party-guilt evidence is admissible so 

long as it “creates the possibility of reasonable doubt”)

(citing Fortin II, supra, 178 N.J. at 591; State v. Fulston, 325 

N.J. Super. 184, 191 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J.

397 (2000)).

We now apply those principles to the facts before us.

B.

Before trial, Santiago provided a notarized statement that 

he brought a gun into defendant’s apartment and “stash[ed]” it 

on the balcony on his “third day at work” for defendant. He 

indicated that he intended to retrieve the gun and sell it to an 

associate, but was thwarted when he “approached the apartment 

[and] there was police running down on the place.” Santiago 

took “full responsibility [for the] gun that was found at Mr. 

Cope’s address” and emphasized that he could not “allow for an 

innocent man to go to prison because of something that didn’t 

even belong to him.” 
27

The trial court, apparently, determined that the third day 

of Santiago’s work corresponded with the day of defendant’s 

arrest because of Santiago’s observation of “police running down 

on the place” -- presumably referring to defendant’s apartment. 

On July 5, 2006, the day of defendant’s arrest, Santiago was 

incarcerated in the county jail, according to documents that are 

not in dispute. Having assumed that Santiago was in jail on the 

day of defendant’s arrest, the court reached the ineluctable 

conclusion that Santiago could not possibly have placed the 

rifle on the balcony as he claimed.

The error in the court’s reasoning is the assumption that 

the only day the police may have been in the area of defendant’s 

apartment was July 5, 2006. The record does not contain 

irrefutable evidence to support that assumption. Indeed, one 

day before defendant’s trial in May 2011, in response to police 

questioning, Santiago indicated that he could not recall the 

exact date on which he dropped the rifle off five years earlier 

and that the drop-off date had to be before his incarceration. 

In court, Santiago testified that he did not “want to state a 

date and it not be true and me be lying when I just raised my 

right hand.” Importantly, the prosecutor affirmed that Santiago

was claiming -- based on his response to police questioning --

that he put the rifle on the balcony before his incarceration.
28

In any event, Santiago’s claims concerning when he placed 

the rifle in defendant’s apartment were subject to dispute. 

However implausible Santiago’s account may have seemed to the 

trial court, the credibility of Santiago’s notarized statement 

and expected testimony ultimately was for the jury to resolve.

Santiago’s prior statement constituted a statement against 

interest -- an exception to the hearsay rule -- and was 

therefore admissible in evidence.7 See N.J.R.E. 803(c)(25) 

(defining statement against interest as “[a] statement which was 

at the time of its making . . . so far tended to subject 

declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable 

person in declarant’s position would not have made the statement 

unless the person believed it to be true”); see also State v. 

White, 158 N.J. 230, 238 (1999) (“The law of evidence recognizes 

that a statement in which a party confesses to having committed 

a crime subjects the declarant to criminal liability, and 

therefore constitutes a statement that is against interest.”).

“A confession by another is of such probative importance in a 

criminal trial that its exclusion . . . has been held a denial 

of the defendant’s due-process right to a fair trial.” State v. 

Jamison, 64 N.J. 363, 378 (1974) (citing Chambers, supra, 410 

 

7 Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the 

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” N.J.R.E.

801(c).
29

U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297). In Jamison, we 

held that the court could not bar or dissuade a witness from 

testifying that he, not the defendant, committed the crime. Id.

at 377-78. 

The trial court’s erroneous evidential ruling kept from the 

jury not only Santiago’s statement accepting criminal 

responsibility, but also Santiago’s testimony. Santiago twice 

appeared before the court, stating that he was prepared to 

testify and that he would not invoke his privilege against selfincrimination. The issue is not whether the court believed

Santiago’s testimony exculpated defendant, but whether his

prospective testimony before the jury would have presented “a 

rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to 

an essential feature of the State’s case.” Fortin II, supra, 

178 N.J. at 591 (quoting Sturdivant, supra, 31 N.J. at 179).

Although a trial court retains broad discretion in 

determining the admissibility of evidence, that discretion is 

abused when relevant evidence offered by the defense and 

necessary for a fair trial is kept from the jury. See Chambers, 

supra, 410 U.S. at 294-95, 93 S. Ct. at 1045, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 

308. A person who confesses to the crime of which the defendant 

is accused should not be barred from the witness stand. The 

only exception to this rule is when the confessor’s claim is so 

patently false because it was impossible for him to have 
30

committed the crime. See Koedatich II, supra, 112 N.J. at 300 

(noting that evidence of third-party guilt may not be excluded 

if “some link [is] demonstrated between the third party and the 

. . . crime”). Thus, for example, if documents of unquestioned 

authenticity established that the confessor was jailed in a

maximum security facility when he claimed to have committed the 

crime, then the court would have authority to act. In the 

absence of such strong evidence, which will rarely be present,

the witness is subject to the rigors of cross-examination, which 

in our system of justice is the “greatest legal engine ever 

invented for the discovery of truth.” California v. Green, 399 

U.S. 149, 158, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1935, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 497 

(1970) (quoting 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1367 (1940)); see also

Chambers, supra, 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S. Ct. at 1046, 35 L. Ed.

2d at 309 (stating that cross-examination “helps assure the

‘accuracy of the truth-determining process’” (quoting Dutton v. 

Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89, 91 S. Ct. 210, 220, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213, 

227 (1970))). A jury is not likely to be deceived about thirdparty guilt if the State can show that the third party was in 

jail at the time the crime was committed. It is also unlikely 

that the defense would put such an unavailing witness on the 

stand. Ultimately, the jury, not the judge, is the arbiter of 

the truth in reaching its verdict. We conclude that the 

exclusion of Santiago’s prior statement and prospective 
31

testimony was an abuse of discretion. See Cotto, supra, 182

N.J. at 333.

VI.

We agree with the Appellate Division that, on retrial, the 

version of N.J.R.E. 609 now in effect governs the admissibility 

of defendant’s prior convictions. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 

U.S. 513, 543, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 1638, 146 L. Ed. 2d 577, 601

(2000) (holding that changes to state’s rules of evidence “which 

do not increase the punishment, nor change the ingredients of 

the offence or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt” 

may be applied retroactively without violating ex post facto 

clause (quoting Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590, 4 

S. Ct. 202, 210, 28 L. Ed. 262, 269 (1884))); see also N.J.R.E.

609(b).

VII.

For the reasons expressed, we reverse the judgment of the 

Appellate Division, which overturned the trial court’s denial of 

defendant’s motion to suppress. The evidence discovered during 

the protective sweep of defendant’s apartment is admissible at 

trial. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division

reversing defendant’s conviction based on the trial court’s 

erroneous exclusion of evidence of third-party guilt. We remand 

to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
32

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, and 

SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE 

ALBIN’S opinion. JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA did not participate. 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

NO. A-13 SEPTEMBER TERM 2014

ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEMETRIUS C. COPE (a/k/a 

RAASHID HABSHIN, RASHEED

COPE, DEMETRIUS M. COPE, and

DEMETRIAS COPE),

Defendant-Respondent.

DECIDED April 25, 2016

Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING

OPINION BY Justice Albin

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY

DISSENTING OPINION BY 

CHECKLIST

AFFIRMED/

REVERSED/

REMANDED

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X

JUSTICE ALBIN X

JUSTICE PATTERSON X

JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA ----------------

JUSTICE SOLOMON X

JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X

TOTALS 6