Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Swift, 2016 IL App (3d) 140604

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

LOREN SWIFT, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District 

Docket No. 3-14-0604

Filed

Rehearing denied

October 19, 2016

November 28, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle County, No. 12-CF-608; the 

Hon. Cynthia M. Raccuglia, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier and Ann Fick, of State Appellate Defender’s 

Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Brian Towne, State’s Attorney, of Ottawa (Jasmine Morton, of State’s 

Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Holdridge and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Loren Swift, appeals from his conviction for aggravated driving under the 

influence (DUI). He argues first that the trial court should have dismissed the case where the 

indictment was deficient. Further, defendant contends that the State failed to prove the element 

of proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm. 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 On January 2, 2013, the State charged defendant with two counts of aggravated DUI (625 

ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6), (d)(1)(C) (West 2012)). The State would later drop one of those charges. 

The indictment on the remaining count read as follows: 

“On or about, August 17, 2012, in LaSalle County, Illinois, *** defendant[ ] 

committed the offense of: aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (Class 4 

felony) 

 In that the said defendant drove a Chevy Trailblazer north on County Highway 15 

at a time when there was any amount of drug, substance or compound in the 

defendant’s blood, breath, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of 

cannabis, and in committing the violation the defendant was involved in a motor 

vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm to Robert Miller.”

¶ 4 The trial court arraigned defendant on February 1, 2013. On that date, the State tendered 

the then two-count indictment to the defense. Defense counsel stated: “We’ll acknowledge 

receipt of the two count indictment, waive reading of that and recitation of penalties and enter 

a plea of not guilty and demand trial by jury, please.”

¶ 5 Over the ensuing months, defendant filed a number of pretrial motions. In one of those 

motions, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him on the grounds that the statute 

under which he was charged had been amended to carve out an exception for the lawful 

medical use of cannabis. Defendant argued that his equal protection and due process rights 

would be violated if the new standard did not apply to him. At a hearing on the matter, defense 

counsel declared that he had “read the whole act five times.” The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 6 Defendant’s jury trial commenced on March 10, 2014. The State’s first witness was Dr. 

Richard Anderson, a trauma surgeon at St. Francis Hospital in Peoria. Anderson testified that 

defendant was brought to the hospital on August 17, 2012, and a urinalysis was conducted as a 

standard part of trauma procedures. He testified that the urinalysis toxicology showed the 

presence of cannabinoids in defendant’s system. He explained that cannabinoids are 

derivatives of marijuana and that their presence in a urine sample is indicative of prior 

marijuana use. 

¶ 7 After Anderson was dismissed, defense counsel moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing 

that it was defective on its face. Counsel argued that while the statute referenced a statutory 

subsection that required proximate cause, the actual indictment did not contain that element. 

Counsel characterized that as a fatal flaw, arguing that the case should be dismissed. The State 

argued that the phrase “resulted in great bodily harm,” as used in the indictment, had the same 

meaning as proximate cause. The State also referenced a discussion the parties had held 

regarding jury instructions that took place the previous day in the court’s chambers. Citing that 

discussion, the State suggested defense counsel’s argument was not made in good faith.
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¶ 8 The trial court denied defendant’s motion and directed the State to amend the indictment. 

The court commented: “[I]t’s just a matter of words because resulted in does, indeed, mean the 

cause.” Accordingly, the court found that amending the indictment to include the proximate 

cause element was technical rather than substantive and thus did not require the State to go 

back to the grand jury. The court also found that amending the indictment to include the 

proximate cause element would cause no surprise to defendant. 

¶ 9 The State’s next witness was Miller, the victim in the case. Miller testified that on the date 

in question he was driving his pickup truck with a trailer attached. After loading farm 

equipment onto his trailer, Miller proceeded north on County Highway 15 toward the town of 

Kernan. Miller described that stretch of Highway 15 as “gently rolling, [with a] roller 

coaster-type effect.” Miller testified that Highway 15 is a two-lane road with a three-foot 

shoulder. 

¶ 10 As Miller turned onto Highway 15, he noticed in his mirror that a piece of the equipment on 

his trailer had come loose. Concerned that the equipment might fall off the trailer when the 

truck crossed railroad tracks, Miller decided to pull over. Citing his experience as a truck 

driver, Miller testified that he knew the best place to pull over would be the top of a hill. He 

explained that the top of a hill is ideal both to increase the visibility of his truck and to “get a 

truck moving again” upon restarting. Miller testified that he found an appropriate spot “on top 

of a little rise,” and that he “pulled off the road as far as I safely could.” Miller explained that to 

the right of the three-foot shoulder was a ditch with a steep drop-off. He testified that the 

wheels on his truck and trailer were as close to that drop-off as possible and were then “about 

halfway off the pavement.”

¶ 11 Upon stopping, Miller checked his driver’s side mirror and saw the running lights of a 

vehicle cresting a hill behind him. He activated his emergency flashers and checked his mirror 

once again. This time, Miller saw nothing behind him. He alighted from his truck and walked 

back to the trailer. He grabbed the loose piece of iron, then noticed that another piece of iron 

had come loose as well. Miller took the first piece of iron to the bed of his truck and turned 

back toward the trailer to retrieve the second loose piece. As he returned to the trailer, he 

noticed a vehicle traveling toward him. Miller testified: “I noticed a vehicle coming from the 

south at a rate of speed that I thought was faster than should have been traveling knowing that 

*** I was there. Knowing that I was *** partially obstructing the road.” Miller testified that the 

vehicle he saw was a TrailBlazer. 

¶ 12 Miller saw the TrailBlazer hit his trailer. He testified that he did not hear the squealing of 

tires indicative of braking before the impact. Miller recalled spinning, as well as seeing a 

vehicle in the air. His next recollection was of lying in the middle of the road. His shoulder was 

on the center line with his head facing south. Miller testified that he was just under the 

TrailBlazer’s driver’s door. Miller spoke to the driver of the TrailBlazer as they waited for help 

to arrive. Miller identified defendant as the driver. 

¶ 13 Miller was taken by ambulance to a hospital in Streator, then later via helicopter to St. 

Francis Hospital in Peoria. Miller testified that he sustained a number of injuries, including a 

broken femur, a broken disc in his lumbar spine, and three breaks in his pelvis. His injuries 

required eight or nine surgeries, including, in Miller’s words, “five serious surgeries.”

¶ 14 On cross-examination, Miller testified that he was aware of a large parking lot off Highway 

15, approximately 25 to 50 yards north of where the accident took place. That parking lot was 

adjacent to Harv’s Auto Body Repair. He explained that he chose not to pull in there because 
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backing out onto Highway 15 with his trailer would have been difficult and unsafe. It was for 

this same reason that Miller chose not to pull off onto a smaller street. 

¶ 15 Lawrence Majerus of the La Salle County sheriff’s office testified that he responded to the 

scene of the accident. Majerus briefly spoke to defendant on the scene and again later at the 

hospital. Defendant told Majerus that he had been glancing at a cornfield, and when he brought 

his eyes back to the road he saw the truck and trailer, and was unable to stop or swerve. 

Majerus described the relevant stretch of Highway 15 as follows: “There are dips in the road 

but they’re not to the point where you come up over a rise and you’re on top of somebody.” 

Majerus confirmed that the accident occurred at the top of one of those rises. Majerus agreed 

that there were multiple places further down the road that Miller could have pulled into, 

including the parking lot by Harv’s Auto Body Repair.

¶ 16 David Guinnee, also of the La Salle County sheriff’s office, testified that he spoke to 

defendant on October 19, 2012, approximately two months after the accident. Defendant told 

Guinnee that on the morning of the accident he had purchased two sandwiches and placed them 

on the front passenger’s seat of his vehicle. Defendant told Guinnee that at one point the 

sandwiches fell off the seat onto the floorboard. Defendant bent down to retrieve the 

sandwiches, at which point the accident occurred. Defendant also told Guinnee that he had 

smoked marijuana approximately one month prior to the accident. 

¶ 17 The defense’s first witness was Paul Surrock, who lived in Kernan and had come upon the 

accident after it occurred. He testified that a vehicle could safely pull off Highway 15 at Harv’s 

Auto Body Repair, which was 200 to 300 yards from where the accident occurred. Further, 

Surrock testified that approximately 50 yards beyond Harv’s, traveling north, was a large 

gravel parking lot big enough that one could “turn a train around” in it. Surrock described the 

shoulder at the scene of the accident as being 16 inches of gravel, 4 inches of grass, and then a 

significant drop-off. Surrock testified that he noticed marks indicating that the trailer’s tires 

had been “right at the edge of the grass,” just before the immediate drop-off. Surrock testified 

that he observed scratch marks in the roadway indicating that “part of the trailer hit was right 

almost in the center of the road. Like one foot off the center of the road of the yellow lines.”

¶ 18 Defendant testified on his own behalf. He testified that as he drove up a rise on Highway 15 

on the day of the accident, he could not see Miller’s vehicle. At one point, defendant reached 

down to pick up sandwiches that had fallen off of the passenger’s seat. Defendant described 

what happened next: “Bam. I did not—I didn’t even have time to put my brakes on. I didn’t 

have time to step on my brakes.” Defendant admitted that he had smoked marijuana a month 

prior to the accident and had taken a marijuana capsule for pain relief two weeks prior to the 

accident. 

¶ 19 On cross-examination, defendant testified that he had been driving within the speed limit 

and had not slowed down as he approached the crest of the rise. He admitted that he “glanced” 

over a cornfield at some point to observe a parked train. He agreed that he had not mentioned 

the sandwiches until speaking to Guinnee over two months after the accident. 

¶ 20 Following closing arguments, the trial court delivered instructions to the jury. In doing so, 

the court listed five propositions that the State was obligated to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt to sustain a conviction for aggravated DUI. The court read the fifth proposition as 

follows: “That the defendant’s act of driving a vehicle while there was any amount of a drug, 

substance or compound in his blood or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of 

cannabis was the proximate cause of the great bodily harm.” The court continued:
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“The term ‘proximate cause’ means any cause which in the natural or probable 

sequence produced the great bodily harm. It need not be the only cause nor the last or 

nearest cause. It is sufficient if it occurs with some other cause, which in combination 

with it causes the great bodily harm.”

¶ 21 The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated DUI. Following a sentencing hearing held 

on June 13, 2014, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of two years’ imprisonment.

¶ 22 ANALYSIS 

¶ 23 On appeal, defendant argues first that his conviction should be reversed because the State’s 

indictment was deficient. Alternatively, defendant argues that the State failed to prove him 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

¶ 24 I. Indictment 

¶ 25 Defendant argues that the indictment failed to strictly comply with the charging 

requirements set forth in section 111-3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code). 

See 725 ILCS 5/111-3 (West 2012). Specifically, defendant points out that the indictment 

failed to allege that his conduct was the proximate cause of Miller’s injuries and that proximate 

cause is a necessary element of the offense. Because the State’s omission was substantive 

rather than formal, defendant maintains that the proper remedy is reversal of his conviction and 

dismissal of the charges. 

¶ 26 Section 111-3(a) of the Code provides a list of five items that the State must include in any 

criminal charging instrument. 725 ILCS 5/111-3(a) (West 2012). This includes the 

requirement that the instrument “[set] forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.” 

725 ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 2012). Section 111-5 of the Code, however, provides that the 

charging instrument should not be dismissed based on formal defects—that is, minor, technical 

defects, as opposed to substantive defects. See 725 ILCS 5/111-5(a-f) (West 2012). That 

section further sets out a list of formal defects which will not form the basis of a dismissal: 

“(a) Any miswriting, misspelling or grammatical error;

 (b) Any misjoinder of the parties defendant; 

 (c) Any misjoinder of the offense charged; 

 (d) The presence of any unnecessary allegation; 

 (e) The failure to negative any exception, any excuse or proviso contained in the 

statute defining the offense; or 

 (f) The use of alternative or disjunctive allegations as to the acts, means, intents or 

results charged.” Id.

Section 111-5 provides that a charging instrument that contains such a defect should be 

remedied via amendment, on motion of the State or defendant. Id.

¶ 27 Defendant argues that the State’s failure to include the element of proximate cause in the 

indictment constitutes a substantive defect. Defendant also maintains that absent strict 

compliance with section 111-3(a), an indictment must be dismissed. Our analysis requires 

three distinct inquiries: (1) was the indictment in the present case defective; (2) was any defect 

formal or substantive in nature; and (3) is defendant required to show prejudice flowing from 

the deficiency, and if so, has he shown such prejudice. 
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¶ 28 A. Defect 

¶ 29 Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code is entitled “Driving while under the influence 

of alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating compound or compounds or any combination 

thereof.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2012) (DUI statute). Subsection (a) of the DUI statute sets 

forth the scenarios in which misdemeanor DUI may be committed. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) 

(West 2012). In turn, subsection (d)(1) provides a list of circumstances in which misdemeanor 

DUI may be elevated to felony aggravated DUI. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1) (West 2012). 

Subsection (d)(1)(C), the subsection under which defendant was charged, provides that a 

person commits aggravated DUI where “the person in committing a violation of subsection (a) 

was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm or permanent 

disability or disfigurement to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the 

injuries.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2012). 

¶ 30 Proximate cause is plainly an element of aggravated DUI as charged under subsection 

(d)(1)(C). Here, the court’s instruction to the jury stated that proximate cause was one of the 

propositions the State was obligated to prove in order to sustain a conviction. The State was 

required to include that element in the charging instrument. 725 ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 

2012). Since proximate cause was not explicitly stated in the indictment, the indictment was 

defective in that it failed to strictly comply with the Code. 

¶ 31 B. Formal or Substantive Defect 

¶ 32 A defect in a charging instrument is formal in nature where that defect “is not material or 

does not alter the nature and elements of the offense charged.” People v. Flores, 250 Ill. App. 

3d 399, 401 (1993). A defect is considered substantive where it materially alters the charge in 

such a way that it cannot be determined whether the grand jury intended such an alteration. 

People v. Milton, 309 Ill. App. 3d 863, 866 (1999). In other words, “once an indictment has 

been returned by the grand jury, it may not be broadened through amendment except by the 

grand jury itself.” People v. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245, 254 (1996). 

¶ 33 The State’s failure to include proximate cause in the indictment in the present case does not 

fall under any of the formal defects contemplated by section 111-5 of the Code. See supra ¶ 26. 

The failure to include an essential element of the charge would seem to be a clear substantive 

defect, which requires a broadening of the indictment to include that element. However, the 

trial court reasoned that the phrase “resulted in great bodily harm” meant the same thing as 

proximate cause. Under the trial court’s analysis, the defect in the indictment was merely 

formal, because although the indictment did not contain the precise phrase “proximate cause,” 

it nevertheless sufficiently described proximate cause. See People v. Viar, 131 Ill. App. 2d 

983, 985 (1971) (“It is one thing to hold that there is a total omission of a necessary allegation 

and quite another to hold that a necessary allegation is imprecisely stated.”).

¶ 34 The trial court erred in finding that “resulted in” holds the same functional meaning as 

“proximate cause.” “Cause” and “result” are separate concepts. As written, the State’s 

indictment only required that the end result of the motor vehicle accident was bodily harm to 

Miller. The DUI statute, however, requires that defendant’s driving a motor vehicle caused that 

bodily harm. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2012). Proximate cause, as defined in the 

jury’s instructions, means “any cause which in the natural or probable sequence produced the 

great bodily harm.” Supra ¶ 20; see also infra ¶¶ 51-52. Indeed, Miller could have been injured 

in an accident with defendant, where defendant did not proximately cause those injuries. Thus, 
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it is not apparent from the face of the indictment whether the grand jury considered whether 

defendant’s driving was the proximate cause of Miller’s injuries. The amendment to include 

proximate cause in the indictment, then, was necessarily a broadening of that charging 

instrument. Accordingly, the defect in the indictment was substantive in nature. 

¶ 35 C. Prejudice 

¶ 36 Whether a defendant must show that he was prejudiced by a substantively defective 

charging instrument turns on the timing of his challenge to that instrument. It is well-settled 

that where a charging instrument is challenged in a pretrial motion, the charging instrument 

will be dismissed if it does not strictly comply with the requirements of section 111-3 of the 

Code. E.g., People v. Rowell, 229 Ill. 2d 82, 93 (2008). It is equally well-settled that where an 

indictment is challenged for the first time on appeal, a defendant must show prejudice in the 

preparation of his defense. People v. Davis, 217 Ill. 2d 472, 479 (2005). In that context, an 

indictment will be deemed “sufficient if it apprised the accused of the precise offense charged 

with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a 

bar to future prosecution arising out of the same conduct.” People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29 

(1976). 

¶ 37 Where a defendant challenged the State’s indictment during his trial is less well-settled. 

However, our supreme court has addressed such a situation on two occasions. In Benitez, 169 

Ill. 2d at 246-47, the grand jury returned an indictment that named only one codefendant, and 

did not contain Gavino Benitez’s name. The State nevertheless informed Benitez that he had 

been indicted. Id. at 247. At Benitez’s arraignment, the State filed a new indictment, which 

named Benitez. Id. The State had not reconvened the grand jury, nor had it filed any motion to 

amend the original indictment. Id. Thirteen months later, on the second day of trial, defense 

counsel alerted the court that “it ha[d] just come to [his] attention that the indictment in this 

case *** does not contain the name of Gavino Benitez.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

at 247-48. The trial court found the second indictment sufficient, and Benitez was found guilty. 

¶ 38 The supreme court reversed, relying heavily on the fact that the State had failed to utilize 

either prescribed method for altering an indictment, i.e., returning to the grand jury or filing a 

motion for amendment. Id. at 255. The court explained: 

“[T]he State arrogated for itself the power to amend the indictment as it saw fit. 

Secretaries in the State’s Attorney’s office prepared the second indictment to replace 

the first indictment. The second indictment added two new defendants and changed the 

name of a victim. We cannot sanction such a practice. Assistant State’s Attorneys and 

their staff do not have the authority to amend grand jury indictments at will. 

Accordingly, we find that the second indictment was not valid as to the present 

defendant. Because the initial indictment failed to name defendant and the second 

indictment was not valid, defendant was never properly charged with any offense.” Id.

¶ 39 Further, the court rejected the State’s argument that the conviction should nevertheless 

stand because Benitez could not show that he suffered any prejudice as a result of being 

arraigned under the second indictment. Id. at 257. The court stated: “We hold that, under the 

unique circumstances of this case, defendant is not required to show that he sustained prejudice 

to warrant reversal of his convictions.” Id. at 259. 

¶ 40 Our supreme court considered a challenge to a charging instrument nine years later in 

People v. Cuadrado, 214 Ill. 2d 79 (2005). In Cuadrado, the court held that its prior decision in 
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Benitez had been based primarily on the prosecution’s malfeasance in substituting one 

indictment for another. Id. at 87. Thus, the court held that, as a general rule, a defendant 

challenging a charging instrument during trial must show prejudice and that the misconduct in 

Benitez represented an exception to that rule. Id.

“Our holding in Benitez clearly relied in large part upon the prosecution’s misconduct. 

Due to that misconduct, the defendant was denied an opportunity to object to the 

deficiencies in the indictment before trial because he was only apprised of the State’s 

improprieties after the trial had begun. 

 In marked contrast, defendant in this case had ample opportunity before trial to 

object to the indictment. The indictment properly cited the charged offense [citation]. 

Its only deficiency was the substitution of the word “solicited” for the word “procured” 

used in the statutory section defining solicitation of murder for hire [citation]. We 

disagree with the State that the substitution is irrelevant and that the two terms are 

interchangeable. We do agree with the State, however, that defendant was not 

prejudiced by the substitution. Prior to filing her motion to dismiss the indictment, 

defendant filed and argued a motion for a directed finding, alleging the State’s case in 

chief failed to prove that she “procured” Jimenez to murder her husband. This motion 

establishes that defendant was aware of the State’s need to prove procurement. We 

cannot say the error in the indictment inhibited defendant in the preparation of her 

defense. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that defendant suffered any prejudice.” Id.

at 87-88.

¶ 41 We recognize that defendant here challenged the indictment after only one witness 

testified, whereas the defendant in Cuadrado did so after the State had completed its 

case-in-chief and after making a motion for directed finding. However, given the “general 

requirement of prejudice when an indictment is challenged after the commencement of trial” 

(id. at 87), we find this to be a distinction without a difference. Indeed, the State only amended 

the indictment after the trial court ordered it to do so. The defendant is obligated to show that 

he was prejudiced by the defective indictment in order to obtain relief in the form of dismissal. 

¶ 42 Defendant, however, has put the full force of his argument on appeal behind the legal 

theory that he is not obligated to show prejudice in the preparation of his defense. He makes no 

alternative argument that he actually did suffer prejudice. In any event, the record would 

contradict any such argument. 

¶ 43 The record shows that defendant was aware of the proximate cause element, despite the 

State’s failure to include it in the charging instrument and suffered no prejudice in the 

preparation of his defense. The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the 

indictment. 

¶ 44 II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

¶ 45 Defendant next contends that the State failed to introduce evidence sufficient to prove him 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In this context, defendant once again takes issue with the 

proximate cause requirement. Specifically, defendant maintains that the State failed to prove 

that his conduct was the proximate cause of Miller’s injuries where evidence showed that 

Miller’s own actions were an intervening cause of those injuries.
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¶ 46 When a challenge is made to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, we review to determine 

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 31; People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 

237, 261 (1985). In making this determination, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 31. All reasonable inferences 

from the record in favor of the prosecution will be allowed. People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 327 

(2005). 

¶ 47 It is not the purpose of a reviewing court to retry a defendant. People v. Milka, 211 Ill. 2d 

150, 178 (2004). Great deference is given to the trier of fact. See, e.g., People v. Saxon, 374 Ill. 

App. 3d 409, 416-17 (2007). “The weight to be given to witnesses’ testimony, the witnesses’ 

credibility, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, are all the 

responsibility of the fact finder.” Milka, 211 Ill. 2d at 178. The trier of fact is not required to 

accept or otherwise seek out any explanations of the evidence that are consistent with a 

defendant’s innocence; nor is the trier of fact required to disregard any inferences that do flow 

from the evidence. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 380 (1992). 

¶ 48 “[A]ggravated DUI is simply misdemeanor DUI with an aggravating factor, which turns 

the offense into a felony.” People v. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 24. In order to prove the 

underlying misdemeanor DUI in the present case, the State needed only to show that defendant 

was in actual physical control of a vehicle while “there [was] any amount of a drug, substance, 

or compound in [defendant’s] breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or 

consumption of cannabis” or other controlled substances. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) 

(West 2012).1 Defendant concedes that the State proved that he committed this misdemeanor. 

¶ 49 To prove that defendant committed aggravated DUI, the State had the burden of proving 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, “in committing a violation of subsection (a)[,] was 

involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm or permanent disability 

or disfigurement to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries.” 625 

ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2012). Our supreme court has clarified that the proximate cause 

element refers not to the presence of drugs referenced in subsection (a)(6), but only to a 

defendant’s driving. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 26. In other words, the State must prove only a 

causal link between defendant’s driving and a person’s injuries. Id.

¶ 50 The concept of proximate cause encompasses two separate requirements, cause in fact and 

legal cause. People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392, 401 (2006). “Cause in fact exists where there is 

 

1Though subsection (a)(6) appears in the statute entitled “Driving while under the influence ***,”

no actual “influence” or impairment is necessary to sustain a conviction under that subsection. It has 

thus been characterized as a strict liability violation. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2012). E.g., 

People v. Merrick, 2012 IL App (3d) 100551, ¶ 27. Perhaps reflective of changing public perceptions, 

our legislature has begun to phase out that strict liability for drivers found with cannabis or its 

derivatives in their systems. Effective in 2014, the statute now contains an exception for those lawfully 

consuming cannabis pursuant to Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act (410 

ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 2014)). 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2014). Effective July 29, 2016, 

cannabis has been removed from subsection (a)(6) altogether. Pub. Act 99-697 (eff. July 29, 2016) 

(amending 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2014)). Now, the presence of cannabis in a driver’s system may 

only serve as the basis for a DUI conviction when it reaches a certain level in the body, similar to a DUI 

conviction based on alcohol. Pub. Act 99-697 (eff. July 29, 2016) (amending 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2 

(West 2014)). 
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a reasonable certainty that a defendant’s acts caused the injury or damage.” First Springfield 

Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 258 (1999). 

“Legal cause ‘is essentially a question of foreseeability’; the relevant inquiry is 

‘whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of 

his or her conduct.’ [Citation.] Foreseeability is added to the cause-in-fact requirement 

because ‘even when cause in fact is established, it must be determined that any 

variation between the result intended *** and the result actually achieved is not so 

extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible for the actual 

result.’ ” Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d at 401 (quoting Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258, and 1 Wayne 

R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4, at 464 (2d ed. 2003)). 

¶ 51 A defendant may escape liability by showing that an intervening event was the actual 

proximate cause of an accident. See Mack v. Ford Motor Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 52, 57 (1996) 

(citing Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 64 Ill. 2d 380, 395 (1976)). An intervening event does not 

break the chain of legal causation, however, where that intervening event is foreseeable. Id.

(citing Felty v. New Berlin Transit, Inc., 71 Ill. 2d 126, 131 (1978)). In fact, there may be more 

than one proximate cause to an injury. E.g., Seef v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 311 Ill. App. 3d 

7, 20 (1999). “Furthermore, the precise nature of the intervening cause need not be foreseen 

[citation], and where varying inferences are possible, foreseeability is a question for the jury 

[citation].” Mack, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 57.

¶ 52 A rational juror could reasonably have found that defendant’s driving proximately caused 

Miller’s injuries. Such a juror could surely conclude that it is foreseeable that a vehicle may be 

pulled over onto the shoulder of a road. Moreover, a rational juror could certainly find it 

foreseeable that when the shoulder of a road is narrow, such a stopped vehicle may partially 

obstruct the roadway. Finally, a rational juror could also conclude that when a driver takes his 

eyes off the road, whether to stare into a cornfield, or to pick up sandwiches, it is foreseeable 

that a traffic accident might occur. 

¶ 53 Defendant maintains that Miller’s conduct was an unforeseeable intervening cause of 

Miller’s injuries, defeating the conclusion that defendant’s own driving was the proximate 

cause of those injuries. He asserts that he “could not have foreseen that a trailer would be 

obstructing the only northbound lane of a road with rolling hills which already made it difficult 

to anticipate conditions ahead.”

¶ 54 However, as discussed above, a rational jury could find that a motorist pulled over onto the 

narrow shoulder should have been foreseeable to defendant. While the defense did present 

evidence probative of the unreasonableness of Miller’s actions, the jury was under no 

obligation to accept its evidence. When looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the State, we find that a rational juror could have found defendant’s conduct to be the 

proximate cause of Miller’s injuries beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 55 CONCLUSION 

¶ 56 The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed. 

¶ 57 Affirmed.