In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-12-00547-CR 

________________________

RYAN LANE MESTAS, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

 

On Appeal from the 100th District Court 

Hall County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 3598; Honorable Stuart M. Messer, Presiding 

 

August 5, 2014 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. 

Appellant, Ryan Lane Mestas, was convicted by a jury of ten counts of 

possession of child pornography.1 By a separate judgment as to each count, he was 

assessed a sentence of ten years confinement and a fine of $5,000. The trial court 

ordered that the judgments pertaining to counts two through ten be served concurrent to 

 

1

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26(a) (West Supp. 2014). An offense under this section is a 

third degree felony. Id. at § 43.26(d). 
2

one another and consecutive to the judgment pertaining to count one. Appellant 

contends the trial court abused its discretion by (1) denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress evidence; (2) permitting the State to introduce evidence that Appellant’s 

semen was found on two articles of children’s clothing; and (3) the evidence is legally 

and (4) factually insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In July 2012, an amended indictment charged Appellant with committing four 

counts of possession of child pornography on or about March 10, 2011, and six counts 

on or about July 14, 2011. Each count alleged the possession of a specific

pornographic image, identified as a JPEG image, contained on a flash drive.

2

 More 

specifically, the indictment alleged Appellant possessed ten images of children 

engaging in sexual intercourse, lewd exhibition of genitals, deviate sexual intercourse or 

sexual contact. 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Appellant’s wife, Angela Mestas, originally discovered what she believed was 

child pornography on a black Motorola cellphone belonging to the couple. She then 

searched their community residence where she located additional items she suspected 

contained similar images. On August 18, 2011, Angela delivered those devices to Hall 

County Sheriff, Timothy Wiginton, who then transferred them to Texas Ranger, John 

Foster. On August 19th, Foster obtained Angela’s voluntary consent to forensically 

 

2

In the world of digital photography, JPEG is a standard method of storing photographic images 

where the individual files are customarily identified by the .jpg suffix. At trial the flash drive was also 

described as a “USB thumb drive.”
3

search the devices for suspected child pornography. During this period of time, Angela 

also happened to be a Justice of the Peace for Hall County. 

During its investigation, the State discovered that pornographic images were 

stored as electronic/digital data on eight different electronic devices: an Apevia 

computer, a Mac laptop, a white iPod, four USB thumb drives and the black Motorola 

cellphone. In June 2012, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the 

State alleging that “[t]he actions of the Justice of the Peace Angela Mestas violated the 

constitutional and statutory rights of [Appellant] under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9 of the 

Texas Constitution, and under Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.” 

At the conclusion of a hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress, the trial court denied 

the motion, finding Angela resided at the residence where the devices were found, had 

access to each device, had an ownership interest in the devices under community 

property principles, and consented to the forensic search of the devices by law 

enforcement officials.

THE TRIAL

In November 2012, the trial court held a two-day jury trial. At the trial’s 

conclusion, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all ten counts of the amended 

indictment and sentenced Appellant to ten years confinement and a $5,000 fine for each 

count. The trial court ordered that the judgments pertaining to counts two through ten 

be served concurrent to one another and consecutive to the judgment pertaining to 

count one. This appeal followed.
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DISCUSSION

POINT OF ERROR ONE—MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Appellant asserts the trial court erred by not suppressing certain electronic/digital 

evidence seized because his wife, acting as an agent for the State, conducted an illegal 

warrantless search of his computer files. In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion 

to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 

323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We defer to the trial court’s determination of 

historical facts that depend on credibility, while we review de novo the trial court’s 

application of the law to those facts. Id. See St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (finding the trial judge to be the “sole trier of fact and judge of 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony”). An appellate 

court should sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and 

correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 

857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2002)). 

Except to assert Angela searched the contents of Appellant’s computer files 

while acting as an agent of the State through her capacity as Justice of the Peace, 

Appellant produced no evidence to show she was, in fact, acting in any capacity other 

than his wife. The State’s evidence, on the other hand, showed the couple had been 

married for nine years, the electronic/digital devices were purchased or acquired during 

marriage, they were located in the community residence, Angela had used some or all 

of the devices in their home, the cellphone was on Angela’s account, Angela had 
5

access to and drove the vehicle where one of the devices was found, at the time the 

devices were seized there was a restraining order in effect granting Angela possession 

of the devices until their divorce was final, and Angela signed a consent-to-search form 

for all the devices. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, at the 

time of the search and seizure, Angela was Appellant’s wife with unlimited access to the 

devices located at the couple’s residence. As such, Appellant assumed the risk that his 

wife might consent to a search that would lead to discovery of the contents of those

devices. See Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 560-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A third 

party may consent to a search to the detriment of another’s privacy interest if the third 

party has actual authority over the place or thing to be searched, or if the third party 

shares common authority over the premises or property with the non-consenting 

person’s interest. Id. at 560. See Kohler v. State, No. 01-05-00625-CR, 2012 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 3888, at *2-6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 17, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication). 

Furthermore, the trial court could reasonably have found Angela was not acting 

as an agent of the State under the facts of this case. A person who is not an officer or

agent of an officer does not violate the exclusionary rule by taking property that is 

evidence of a crime, without the effective consent of the owner and with the intent to 

turn the property over to an agent for the State. See Jenschke v. State, 147 S.W.3d 

398, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in 

denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant’s first point of error is overruled.
6

POINT OF ERROR TWO—RULE 403 OF THE TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE

Appellant next asserts the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence 

that his DNA matched semen on two articles of children’s clothing. He contends the 

probative value of that evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 

We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A trial court 

abuses its discretion only if its decision is “so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone 

within which reasonable people might disagree.” Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A trial court’s decision not to exclude evidence, i.e., finding the 

probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, is 

entitled to deference. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, 

misleading the jury, considerations of undue delay, or the needless presentation of 

cumulative evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 403. “Unfair prejudice” refers to more than the fact 

that the evidence has an adverse or detrimental effect on the defendant’s case. Casey 

v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Virtually all evidence that a 

party offers will be prejudicial to the opponent’s case, or the party would not offer it.” Id. 

Instead, “unfair prejudice” refers to “an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an 

improper basis, commonly an emotional one.” Id. (emphasis added). 

At trial, Appellant asserted in his opening statement and through crossexamination of witnesses that Angela downloaded the child pornography onto the 
7

devices for either personal or nefarious purposes. Specifically, Appellant contended the 

charges in the indictment were trumped up by Angela in order to obtain an advantage in 

their divorce proceedings. Thus, there is at least a reasonable argument that the 

objected to evidence was admissible for the purpose of rebutting Appellant’s defensive 

theory. See Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 

Furthermore, much of Appellant’s argument regarding unfair prejudice simply 

asserts the evidence was inherently prejudicial. Failing to establish that the probative 

value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the 

evidence, Appellant failed to establish the evidence was subject to exclusion under Rule 

403. See Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 87-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). See also 

Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“[a]ny evidence presented by 

the State is generally prejudicial to the defendant”). The trial court, therefore, did not 

abuse its discretion by deciding the evidence in question was admissible. See Bass, 

270 S.W.3d at 563-64. Appellant’s second point of error is overruled.

POINTS OF ERROR THREE AND FOUR—SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Appellant finally asserts the State’s evidence was both legally and factually 

insufficient to establish he intentionally or knowingly possessed child pornography. In 

evaluating the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, the only standard a 

reviewing court should apply is the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 33 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In making that assessment, this Court considers all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determines whether, based on 
8

that evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, a rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). When the record supports 

conflicting inferences, a reviewing court must “presume that the factfinder resolved the 

conflicts in favor of the prosecution” and defer to that determination. Id. 

The sufficiency standard of review is the same for both direct and circumstantial 

evidence. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). For the evidence 

to be sufficient, the State need not disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses that 

are inconsistent with the defendant’s guilt. Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903 (citing Geesa v. 

State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). Rather, a court considers only 

whether the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon the 

cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the 

verdict. Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903 (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13).

A person commits possession of child pornography if he “knowingly or 

intentionally possesses . . . visual material that visually depicts a child younger than 18 

years of age at the time the image of the child was made who is engaging in sexual 

conduct” and he “knows that the material depicts the child” in this manner. TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. § 43.26(a) (West Supp. 2014). Visual material includes any physical 

medium that allows an image to be displayed on a computer and any image transmitted 

to a computer by telephone line, cable, satellite transmission, or other method. Id. at § 

43.26(b)(3). “Sexual conduct” includes sexual contact, actual or simulated sexual 

intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, and lewd exhibition of the genitals, the anus, or 
9

any portion of the female breast below the top of the areola. Id. at § 43.25(a)(2) (West 

2011). 

A person possesses a thing when he exercises actual care, custody, control or 

management over the thing. Id. at § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp. 2014). A person acts 

intentionally when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in conduct or to 

cause the result. Id. at § 6.03(a) (West 2011). A person acts knowingly when he is 

aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist or when he is aware 

that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. at 6.03(b). Proof of a 

culpable mental state almost invariably depends on circumstantial evidence, see 

Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), and a trier of fact can 

infer knowledge from all the circumstances, including the acts, conduct, and remarks of 

the accused. See Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). 

Here, Appellant does not assert that he did not have care, custody, control or 

management of the devices found to contain pornographic images, or even whether the 

images stored thereon were child pornography. Instead, he contends the State failed to 

prove he knowingly or intentionally possessed child pornography because his wife’s 

testimony that she was unaware of the child pornography on the devices was not to be 

believed, i.e., she had a vested interest in his incarceration due to the pending divorce

proceedings. He further contends there is insufficient evidence to establish that he

possessed the pornography because Foster agreed on cross-examination that, 

hypothetically, if Appellant had delivered the devices to him and claimed they belonged 

to Angela, Foster could have arrested his wife. Appellant’s first contention goes to the 

weight and credibility of Angela’s testimony which, judging from the verdict, the jury 
10

found to be credible. Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903 (“The factfinder exclusively determines 

the weight and credibility of evidence.”). Regarding Appellant’s second assertion, the 

State need not disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses that are inconsistent with 

the defendant’s guilt for its evidence to be sufficient. Id. 

The State’s evidence established the circumstances under which Angela 

discovered the devices found to contain child pornography, where she found the items 

and when she found them. Evidence established the Mac laptop was discovered 

between the mattresses under Appellant’s side of the bed and a USB thumb drive 

containing pictures of underage girls in sexual situations was found in a Saturn vehicle

(hidden in a compartment where the sunroof motor had been removed) belonging to the 

couple. Angela testified Appellant usually kept the Saturn locked and hid the keys in his 

pickup. Also, Sheriff Wiginton testified that he observed Appellant searching the Saturn 

in the area where the USB thumb drive had been discovered and that he became angry 

when he discovered the USB thumb drive was no longer there. Testimony further 

established the Motorola cellphone which contained a pornographic image was found in 

the pickup Appellant usually drove. 

Furthermore, Angela testified she did not search for or download any 

pornographic images, nor did she create or use the screen name “BillyBob,” which she 

found on the Apevia computer. She testified that Appellant admitted to her that 

“BillyBob” was a temporary email address he had used. Angela also testified that while 

Appellant was proficient at using computers, she was unfamiliar with programs loaded 

on the Mac laptop which Lannie Hilboldt, a forensic computer expert for the Attorney 

General’s office, testified were commonly used by persons involved in child 
11

pornography. In his testimony, Hilboldt identified child pornography images on two of 

the USB thumb drives, one of which had been hidden in the Saturn. He found 

pornographic images that had been on the Mac laptop were transferred to the thumb 

drive. He also opined that forensic evidence from the laptop indicated that the person 

downloading the child pornography would have been aware of what he was 

downloading and that the “BillyBob” user account found on the Apevia computer utilized 

search terms designed to locate child pornography on the Web. Electronic images of 

Appellant’s penis were also recovered and articles of children’s clothing were found with 

Appellant’s semen on them. Hilboldt further opined that men, not women, typically 

collect child pornography.

Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the jury 

could have reasonably rejected Appellant’s claim that the images were downloaded by

his former wife and could have instead determined that Appellant possessed the 

pornographic images of children found on the devices. That child pornography images 

were deleted and/or moved from the laptop to the USB thumb drives and vice versa is 

further evidence tending to show Appellant possessed or controlled the child 

pornography. See Assousa v. State, No. 05-08-00007-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 

3500, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 21, 2009, pet ref’d) (mem. op., not designated

for publication). See also Krause v. State, 243 S.W.3d 95, 111-12 (Tex. App.—Houston 

2007, pet. ref’d); Savage v. State, No. 05-06-00175-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1990, at 

*16-17 (Tex.App.—Dallas Mar. 19, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication); Fridell v. State, No. 09-04-201-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 11501, at *7-8 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 
12

Based on this record, we find a rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s third and fourth points of 

error are overruled. 

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Patrick A. Pirtle

 Justice

Do not publish.