FILED 


JANUARY 5, 2016 


In the Office of the Clerk of Court 


W A State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 32809-I-III 

) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION 

) 

lC.,t ) 

) 

Appellant. ) 

LAWRENCE-BERREY, 1. This case requires this court to interpret and apply 

RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v), which concerns sealing juvenile records. That subsection 

prohibits sealing when a person's juvenile court record contains an adjudication for 

indecent liberties that was "actually committed" with forcible compulsion. 

As a juvenile, lC. pleaded guilty to an amended charge ofindecent liberties by 

forcible compulsion. As an adult, he unsuccessfully moved to seal his juvenile conviction 

file. He contends the trial court erred because the evidence shows that he did not 

"actually" use forcible compulsion in committing indecent liberties. 

t For purposes ofthis opinion, the minor's initials are used in place ofhis name. 
No. 32809-1-III 

State v. J.C 

We resolve two questions: (1) whether RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) required the trial 

court to determine whether lC. actually used forcible compulsion, and (2) whether it is 

appropriate for this court to render an ultimate decision at this juncture. We answer the 

first question yes, and the second question no. We, therefore, reverse the trial court's 

order, and remand for the trial court to conduct a hearing and enter findings of fact and 

conclusions oflaw. 

FACTS! 

When J.C. was 13 years old he volunteered at a "Mothers ofPreschool Children" 

(MOPS) program. While the mothers met in a separate part of the building, J.e. sat at a 

classroom table with M.B.C., a five-year-old girl, and W.A.B., a five-year-old boy, and 

exposed himself to both ofthem. He asked M.B.C. and W.A.B. to do the same. M.B.C. 

'" told him no because Mom said not to, '" but J.C. said, '" show me anyway.'" Clerk's 

Papers at 1. Both M.B.C. and W.A.B. then exposed themselves to J.C. He then asked 

W.A.B. to touch his penis, and W.A.B. complied. J.C. told M.B.C. and W.A.B. not to tell 

anyone what they had done. When later questioned by Detective Kevin Bechtold, J.e. 

I These facts come from the police reports that supported the initial probable cause 

determination. In the statement ofplea of guilty form, lC. admitted to the facts in these 

reports. 

2 

No. 32809-I-II1 

State v. 1. C. 

admitted he had exposed himselfto W.A.B. on two prior occasions, and had asked 

W.A.B. to expose his penis once prior. 

The State charged lC. with child molestation in the first degree and indecent 

exposure. A negotiated settlement resulted in the State amending the charge to indecent 

liberties by forcible compulsion, and lC. pleading guilty to the amended charge.2 The 

trial court ordered J.C. into the special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA) 

program. J.C. completed the SSODA program and all other court-imposed requirements. 

The Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration released J.C. from supervision, and in 2012, 

he no longer was required to register as a sex offender. 

In August 2014, J.C. moved to seal his juvenile record under RCW 13.50.260(3). 

Due to the legislature's reworking of chapter 13.50 RCW in 2011, juvenile records 

containing sex offenses-including class A felony sex offenses-are required to be 

sealed ifsix conditions are met.3 The State agreed that J.C. met all conditions, except the 

2 In what is commonly referred to as a Barr plea, a person pleads guilty to a 

substituted charge and a trial court can accept the plea even though there is no factual 

basis for it, provided there is a factual basis for the original charge. In re Pers. Restraint 

a/Barr, 102 Wn.2d 265,684 P.2d 712 (1984). 

3 The full statute provides: 

(4)(a) The court shall grant any motion to seal records for class A 

offenses made pursuant to subsection (3) ofthis section if: 

(i) Since the last date ofrelease from confinement, including fulltime residential treatment, if any, or entry ofdisposition, the person has 

3 

No. 32809-1-111 

State v. J. C. 

fifth: that he had "not been convicted of ... indecent liberties that was actually committed 

with forcible compulsion." RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v). The trial court agreed with the 

State and denied lC.'s motion to seal. This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS 

J.C. argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to seal. He argues that 

the statutory provision in question required the trial court to determine whether he 

actually used forcible compulsion, and because he did not use forcible compulsion, his 

motion to seal should have been granted. 

spent five consecutive years in the community without committing any 

offense or crime that subsequently results in an adjudication or conviction; 

Oi) No proceeding is pending against the moving party seeking the 

conviction of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense; 

(iii) No proceeding is pending seeking the formation of a diversion 

agreement with that person; 

(iv) The person is no longer required to regist.er as a sex offender 

under RCW 9A.44.l30 or has been relieved ofthe duty to register under 

RCW 9A.44.143 ifthe person was convicted of a sex offense; 

(v) The person has not been convicted ofrape in the first degree, 

rape in the second degree, or indecent liberties that was actually committed 

withforcible compulsion; and 

(vi) The person has paid the full amount ofrestitution owing to the 

individual victim named in the restitution order, excluding restitution owed 

to any insurance provider authorized under Title 48 RCW. 

RCW 13.50.260 (emphasis added). 

4 

No. 32809-1-III 

State v. J. C. 

A. 	 Whether RCW J3.50.260(4)(a)(v) requires the trial court to determine 

whether J. C. actually used forcible compulsion 

1. 	 Standard ofreview 

The legal standard for sealing or unsealing records is a question of law 

reviewed de novo. Rufer v. Abbott Labs., 154 Wn.2d 530,540, 114 P.3d 1182 (2005). 

RCW 13.50.260(3) permits a person who is the subject of a filed juvenile offender 

complaint and has not had his or her juvenile court record sealed to move the court to 

vacate its order and findings and seal the official juvenile court record, except 

as to certain persons and for certain purposes as set forth in RCW 13.50.050. In 

RCW 13.50.260(4)(a), the legislature removed trial court discretion and directed that trial 

courts "shall grant any motion to seal records for class A offenses made pursuant to 

subsection (3)" if six conditions are met. Because the legislature removed trial court 

discretion, the general abuse of discretion standard otherwise applicable to a trial court's 

granting or denying a motion to seal is not appropriate here. 

2. Statutory background 

RCW 13.50.260 governs sealing juvenile criminal records.4 Washington has 

4 RCW 13.50.050 governed juvenile record sealing until June 2014. In June 2014, 

the sections ofRCW 13.50.050 addressing sealing hearings and sealing juvenile offender 

records were recodified in a new section, RCW 13.50.260. See LAWS OF 2014, ch. 175, 

§§ 3-4. 

5 

No. 32809-1-111 

State v. J. C. 

historically provided a mechanism for juveniles convicted ofsex offenses to have their 

records sealed. See State v. Webster, 69 Wn. App. 376, 378, 848 P.2d 1300 (1993) 

(holding trial court was obligated to seal juvenile's records once statutory requirements 

were met, even ifjuvenile was convicted ofa sex offense). However, in July 1997, the 

legislature amended former RCW 13.50.050 and prohibited sealing juvenile records 

containing sex offenses. See LAWS OF 1997, ch. 338, § 40( 11) ("The court shall grant the 

motion to seal records ... ifit finds that ... (d) The person has not been convicted of a 

class A or sex offense."). 

In 2011, the Washington State Senate introduced S.B. 5204, which proposed 

reinstating the right for ex-juvenile offenders to have certain juvenile sex offense records 

sealed. See S.B. 5204, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011) (deleting the condition, "[t]he 

person has not been convicted of a sex offense" and replacing it with, "[t]he person is no 

longer required to register as a sex offender"). S.B. 5204, as it was originally introduced, 

included a list of five conditions for an ex-juvenile offender to meet before that person's 

juvenile record containing a sex offense could be sealed: (1) five consecutive years in the 

community without acquiring a new adjudication or conviction, (2) no pending juvenile 

or criminal offenses, (3) no pending diversionary agreements, (4) the person is no longer 

required to register as a sex offender, and (5) full restitution has been paid. Id. 

6 

No. 32809-I-III 

State v. Je. 

After the original bill had been introduced, the Washington Association of 

Prosecuting Attorneys (WAP A) lobbied the sponsors of the bill to categorically prohibit 

sealing juvenile records containing adjudications for three crimes: first degree rape, 

second degree rape, and forcible indecent liberties.5 In response, the legislature drafted 

RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v), inserted the new provision into the Substitute Senate Bill, and 

included the provision in the enacted law.6 See SUBSTITUTE S.B. 5204, at 14, 62d Leg., 

5 WAPA's Tom McBride testified to the Senate Committee on Human Services 

and Corrections: 

Here to request an amendment on this bill ... the second thing we did in the 

sealing statute is we gave the court a specific list of factual findings and 

then you should seal the records. Well the problem is, Senator Hargrove, as 

you said, there's "sex offenders" and there's sex offenders, and there's three 

crimes that we don't think this is a sufficient amount of time to keep track 

of, and there's a public safety issue. And those are the crimes ofrape in the 

first degree, rape in the second degree, and forcible indecent liberties. And 

the reason why, is these are as much crimes of violence as they are sex, and 

it's that intersection of violence and sex. These are crimes that we think are 

pretty serious, they need to be kept track of. Thankfully there's not very 

many ofthem. Most of the sex offenses in the juvenile system are going to 

be rape of a child or child molestation-they're not going to be these 

violent sexual crimes. So we'd ask you to exempt those three specific 

crimes, because we do think that there's a benefit to tracking those crimes. 

Hr'g on S.B. 5204 Before the S. Comm. on Human Servo & Corr., 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. 

(Jan. 25, 2011), 1 :30 p.m. (Wash. 2011), available at 

http://www.tvw.orgiindex.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2011011176 (statement 

ofTom McBride, Member, WAPA). 

6 Unfortunately, the body oflegislative history for S.B. 5204 is devoid of any 

indication why the legislature included the word, "actually." This is available at the 

Washington State Legislature's Internet site for "bill information." See Bill Information, 

7 

No. 32809-1-III 

State v. J. C. 

Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011); LAWS OF 2011, ch. 338, § 4(12)(a)(v). 

3. Legislative intent behind RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) 

The fundamental goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and implement the 

legislature's intent. State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444,450,69 P.3d 318 (2003). When 

interpreting a statute, courts look first to the statute's plain meaning. State v. Armendariz, 

160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). "Plain meaning is discerned from the 

ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context ofthe statute in which that 

provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." Christensen 

v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). "If the statutory language is 

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, then a court may resort to statutory 

construction, legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in discerning 

legislative intent." Id. 

Washington courts have established principles of statutory construction. '" [E]ach 

word of a statute is to be accorded meaning.'" State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 

624, 106 P.3d 196 (2005) (quoting State ex reI. Schillberg v. Barnett, 79 Wn.2d 578,584, 

488 P.2d 255 (1971)). '" [T]he drafters oflegislation ... are presumed to have used no 

superfluous words,'" and courts must ascribe meaning to every word in a statute. Id. at 

S.B. 5204-2011-12, http://apps.leg.wa.govlbillinfo/summary.aspx?bil1=5204&year=2011 

8 
No. 32809-1-III 

State v. Jc. 

624-25 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Recall of 

Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wn.2d 756, 767, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000» ("Isolating 'reckless' from 

the phrase 'in a reckless manner,' as petitioners advocate, would render the word 

'manner' meaningless and superfluous."). Courts "may not delete language from an 

unambiguous statute: [s]tatutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language 

used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous." JP., 149 

Wn.2d at 450 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Davis v. 

Dep 't ofLicensing, 137 Wn.2d 957, 963, 977P.2d 554 (1999». Finally, and importantly, 

"the legislature is deemed to intend a different meaning when it uses different terms." 

Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d at 625. 

First, RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v)'s plain meaning is evidenced by the ordinary 

meaning of the language at issue: the word "actually." "Actually" is synonymous with 

"de facto, genuinely, really, truly, veritably." WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE THESAURUS 12 

(1988). Thus, by using the word "actually" in RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v), the legislature 

signaled its intent for the trial court to consider what "genuinely, really, truly" happened 

in fact when determining whether the underlying crime was committed with forcible 

compulsion. 

(last visited September 18, 2015). 

9 
No. 32809-1-III 

State v. J. C. 

In addition to the ordinary meaning of the word "actually," the context of the 

statute, its related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole all support 

interpreting RCW 13.S0.260(4)(a)(v) in a way that requires trial courts to look past the 

pleadings and consider the specific facts of the person's prior adjudication. In addition to 

RCW 13.S0.260(4)(a)(v) and the indecent liberties provision itself (RCW 9A.44.100), the 

crime of "indecent liberties by forcible compulsion" appears II times in the Revised 

Code ofWashington.7 Every other statutory reference to this crime uses one of three 

7 See RCW 9A.28.020(3)(a) (grading an attempt to commit "indecent liberties by 

forcible compulsion" as a class A felony); RCW 9.41.0 I 0(3)(a) (defining "crime of 

violence" under the firearms and dangerous weapons statute, which includes "indecent 

liberties if committed by forcible compulsion"); former RCW 9.94A.030(37)(b)(i) (2012) 

(defining the criteria for "persistent offender" under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 

(SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, which can include a conviction for, among other offenses, 

"indecent liberties by forcible compulsion"); former RCW 9.94A.030(S4)(a)(v) (2012) 

(defining "violent offense" under the SRA, which includes "[i]ndecent liberties if 

committed by forcible compulsion"); RCW 9.94A.S07(1)(a)(i) (providing a special 

sentencing scheme for persons convicted of a number of sex offenses, including "indecent 

liberties by forcible compulsion"); RCW 9.94A.S1S (assigning "Indecent Liberties (with 

forcible compulsion)" a seriousness level X, and "Indecent Liberties (without forcible 

compulsion)" seriousness level VII); RCW 9.94A.737(S) (requiring that offenders who 

violate a condition of community custody by committing a new crime "shall be held in 

total confinement pending a sanction hearing" if the underlying offense is enumerated in 

the provision, which includes "[i]ndecent liberties with forcible compulsion, as defined in 

RCW 9A.44.100(l)(a)"); RCW "9.94A.837(1) (authorizing the prosecutor to file a special 

aIiegation "[i]n a prosecution for ... indecent liberties by forcible compulsion" when the 

victim of the offense was under IS years of age); RCW 9.94A.838(l) (authorizing the 

prosecutor to file a special allegation "[i]n a prosecution for ... indecent liberties with 

forcible compulsion" when the victim had diminished capacity); RCW 13.40.21O(3)(a) 

10 

No. 32809-1-III 

State v. 1.C. 

syntactic permutations: "indecent liberties by forcible compulsion," "indecent liberties 

with forcible compulsion," or "indecent liberties if committed by forcible compulsion." 

These other statutes all have straightforward applications. The fact that a person was 

convicted of forcible indecent liberties operates to categorically qualify or disqualify that 

person in the pertinent statutory scheme, full stop-no individualized factual inquiry into 

the underlying conviction is needed. See, e.g., State v. Morin, 100 Wn. App. 25, 30, 995 

P.2d 113 (2000) (conviction for indecent liberties by forcible compulsion was defendant's 

"second strike" and automatically qualified defendant as a "persistent offender." 

Ifthe legislature intended RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) to work the same way as the 11 

other "forcible indecent liberties" provisions in the Revised Code of Washington, it 

would have drafted RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) with the same language: "[t]he person has 

not been convicted of rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, or indecent 

liberties by forcible compUlsion." However, because the legislature chose to add the 

word "actually," "we must recognize that a different meaning was intended." 

Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d at 626. To hold otherwise would render the word "actually" 

meaningless and superfluous, in contradiction to well-established principles of statutory 

(increasing the length ofparole to 24 months for juveniles "sentenced for ... indecent 

liberties with forcible compulsion"); RCW 71.09 .020(17) (defining "sexually violent 

offense" under the sexually violent predators statute, which includes "indecent liberties 

11 
No. 32809-1-III 

State v. J. C. 

construction. 

Finally, the legislature's stated intent behind its 2014 chapter 13.50 RCW 

amendments supports interpreting RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) in a way that resolves 

ambiguities in favor of the person seeking to have his or her juvenile record sealed: 

[I]t is the policy ofthe state of Washington that the interest in juvenile 

rehabilitation and reintegration constitutes compelling circumstances that 

outweigh the public interest in continued availability ofjuvenile court 

records. 

LAWS OF 2014, ch. 175, § 1(2). The legislature designed the mechanism for sealing 

juvenile records specifically so juveniles can overcome prejudice and reintegrate into 

society. ld. at § 1(1). Because Washington's goal for its juvenile justice system is 

rehabilitation and reintegration rather than punishment, "[t]he legislature has always 

treated juvenile court records as distinctive and as deserving of more confidentiality than 

other types ofrecords[,] and [Washington] court[s] halve] always given effect to the 

legislature's judgment in the unique setting ofjuvenile court records." State v. s.J.c., 183 

Wn.2d 408, 417,352 P.3d 749 (2015). 

These goals, in tandem with the ordinary meaning ofthe word "actually," the 

context ofthe statute and its related provisions, the statutory scheme as a whole, and the 

legislature's stated intent behind the 2014 amendments to chapter 13.50 RCW, support 

by forcible compulsion"). 

12 
No. 32809-I-III 

State v. Jc. 

interpreting RCW 13.50.260(4)(a)(v) as requiring trial courts to inquire whether actual 

force was used in the commission of indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. Except in 

the instance of a Barr plea, the inquiry will be conclusively answered by the findings of 

fact if the case was tried or in the plea statement if disposition was by a plea. 

B. 	 Whether it is appropriate for this court to render an ultimate decision at 

this juncture or whether remand is appropriate 

lC. requests that this court direct the trial court to enter an order sealing his 

juvenile conviction file. An appellate court does not make initial findings of fact and, 

where the trial court failed to enter sufficient findings, remand is the proper remedy. 

State v. Barber, 118 Wn.2d 335,342, 823 P.2d 1068 (1992). 

Because this court has clarified the meaning ofRCW l3.50.260(4)(a)(v), we 

remand the case to the trial court to determine whether lC. actually used forcible 

compUlsion in light of this court's ruling. The parties may stipulate to the police reports 

being the facts for the trial court to apply to our ruling. Ifthe parties do not so stipulate, 

the trial court should conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve J.C.'s motion to seal. An 

evidentiary hearing is appropriate when there are questions of fact. See Franks v. 

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56,98 S. Ct. 2674,57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978); State v. 

Crockett, 118 Wn. App. 853, 857-58, 78 P.3d 658 (2003) (quoting former RCW 

13 

No. 32809-1-111 

State v. Jc. 

9.94A.530(2) (2002)); State v. Zatkovich, 113 Wn. App. 70, 75-76, 52 P.3d 36 (2002); 

State v. Card, 48 Wn. App. 781, 786, 741 P.2d 65 (1987). 

Reversed and remanded. 

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

1 CONCUR: 


Fearing, J. 

14 

32809-I-II1 

KORSMO, J. (concurring) - I agree that this matter should be remanded for a new 

hearing on the petition to seal the record of the juvenile adjudication. However, I 

disagree with the majority's construction of the statute and suggest a different basis for 

reaching the same result. The legislature has categorically excluded indecent liberties by 

forcible compulsion from the juvenile sealing statute. 

My disagreement starts with the word "actually." While clarity of intent would 

have been better served by using a different word, there is no significant issue presented 

in this circumstance by the novel word choice. As the majority notes, the legislature has 

varyingly described the crime of indecent liberties "by/with/if com~itted by" forcible 

compulsion. For some reason, the majority has no difficulty determining that all three of 

those iterations mean the same thing, but finds that the language used in the sealing 

statute ("actually committed with forcible compulsion") must mean something different. 

I disagree. If the use of different language means a different legislative intent, then all of 

those first three iterations must likewise mean something different. However, the 

majority correctly discerns that they mean the same thing. That should likewise be the 

case for indecent liberties "actually committed by" forcible compulsion. It is just another 

description for the one offense defined by the legislature. 

Indecent liberties can be committed in six different manners, five of which are 

class B felonies. RCW 9A.44.100(l), (2)(a). Those five offenses all involve victim 
No. 32809-1-III 

State v. Jc. 

vulnerability or a specified offender-victim relationship. RCW 9AA4.1 00(1 )(b)-(f). The 

legislature has declared the crime of indecent liberties "by forcible compulsion" to be a 

class A felony. RCW 9A.44.l00(1)(a); (2)(b). This is the one version of indecent 

liberties focused solely on the offender's conduct. The majority duly notes that the 

legislature has defined "forcible compulsion" in terms of "physical force" or threatened 

use of force. RCW 9A.44.010(6). As the majority's excellent exposition ofthe 

legislative history reveals, the legislature intended to exempt from the sealing statute the 

three necessarily violent sex offenses-first and second degree rape, and indecent 

liberties involving forcible compulsion. It did not intend for trial courts (or appellate 

courts) to attempt to reconstruct the factual basis for an old indecent liberties 

adjudication. The words "actually committed by" simply specified which of the six 

versions ofindecent liberties the legislature intended not be subject to a sealing order. 

The phrase is not any different than the "if committed by" language used in the 

definitional statutes cited by the majority. RCW 9.41.010(3)(a) (defining "crime of 

violence"); RCW 9.94A.030(54)(a)(v) (defining "violent offense" for the Sentencing 

Refonn Act of 1981). It simply described which alternative method of committing the 

crime was exempted from the sealing statute. 

Accordingly, J.C.'s argument fails on the language of the sealing statute. It also 

fails under the definition ofthe crime of indent liberties "by" forcible compulsion. RCW 

9A.44.l 00(1 )(a). By definition, it simply is not legally or logically possible to commit 

2 

No. 32809-1-II1 

State v. J. C. 

indent liberties by forcible compulsion without using forcible compulsion. Id.; RCW 

9A.44.010(6). Thus, indecent liberties "actually committed by forcible compulsion" will 

always exist whenever a youth has been adjudicated to have committed indecent liberties 

by forcible compulsion. With the rare exception exemplified by this case, the majority 

approach dooms trial judges to a pointless review of a record to confirm exactly what the 

original trial court had to consider in the first instance-whether there was a factual basis 

to find that the offender committed indecent liberties. It is essentially an untimely 

collateral attack on the evidence supporting the original adjudication, even when, as here, 

the offender eschews such a challenge. There is absolutely nothing in the history to 

suggest that the legislature intended trial judges engage in this wild goose chase. I 

Accordingly, I disagree with the majority's construction of the sealing statute. It is a 

strained reading of otherwise clear language. 

Nonetheless, I agree that, on these unusual facts, the matter should be remanded 

for another hearing. I would get there by focusing on the nature of the guilty plea itself. 

I agree with the majority that this case was treated as a Barr plea. In re Pers. Restraint of 

Barr, 102 Wn.2d 265, 684 P.2d 712 (1984). There was a factual basis for the charged 

greater offense of first degree child molestation, thus providing a fictional basis for 

I This approach also effectively reverses the burden of proof in this motion. As a 

proponent of sealing, J.e. is required to establish that he acted without physical force, so 

he has no interest in setting forth any evidence contradicting that burden. The State 

would need to show use of physical force to defeat the motion. 

3 
No. 32809-1-111 

State v. 1. C. 

accepting the plea to the somewhat2 lesser offense of indecent liberties by forcible 

compulsion. 

The legislature intended that the sealing statute would apply to juveniles who 

committed first degree child molestation. J.C. having committed this greater offense, 

rather than the fictional one to which he entered a guilty plea, 1would allow the trial 

court to enter a sealing order because it was the legislature's intent that this fact pattern 

be subject to sealing. Thus, 1would permit Barr pleas to be subject to sealing when the 

charged greater offense was subject to sealing. 3 

Since 1believe a new hearing is appropriate, 1concur in the majority's disposition 

of the case despite my disagreement with the majority's construction ofthe statute. 

I Kor lifo 0, J.

2 First degree child molestation is classified as an A- felony under the Juvenile 

Justice Act of 1977, while indecent liberties by forcible compulsion is classified as a B+ 

felony. For someone with no previous adjudications, as in lC.'s case, the difference had 

no sentencing consequences, although there would have been a difference in outcome if 

there had been prior offenses. See RCW 13.40.0357. 

3 1 would permit this approach only when the Barr plea fiction was followed and 

would not allow sealing just because the record would have permitted the filing of a 

different charge subject to sealing. For example, an offender adjudicated to have 

committed first or second degree rape of a youthful victim would not be allowed to argue 

for sealing on the basis that the prosecutor could have instead charged first or second 

degree child rape, offenses for which sealing is possible. 

4