UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ IRASEMA SALCIDO-RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States Attorney General, Respondent. No. 19-9602 (Petition for Review)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, BRISCOE and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Irasema Salcido-Rodriguez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order by the Board of Immi gration Appeals (the Board) denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings and c onsider an application for cancellation of removal. We grant the petition for revi ew and remand for further proceedings. The immigration judge determined that Ms. Salcido-Rodriguez was not eligible for cancellation of removal because she had not been present in the United

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 23, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 States for a “continuous period” of at leas t ten years before sh e was served with a notice to appear. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1 )(A). Ms. Salcido-Rodriguez’s former counsel filed a notice of app eal, but did not file a brie f, and the Board summarily dismissed the appeal. Ms. Salcido-Rodriguez then m oved to reopen in light of Pereira v. Sessions , 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018), and her counsel’s ineffe ctive assistance. She argued that the notice of appeal serv ed upon her was deficient under Pereira and did not trigger the stop-time rule, so that she had accrued the requi red ten years of presence. She further argued that her counsel was inef fective for failing to file a motion to remand under Pereira . The Board recognized that under Pereira , the notice to appear “would not stop [her] accrual of phys ical presence because it did not include the time and place of her hearing.” R. at 2. But the Board reasoned that the stop-time rule nevertheless a pplied because a subsequent notice of the time and place of the hearing cured any defect in the no tice to appear. It also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim, in part reasoning that b ecause of the stop-time rule, Ms. Salcido-Rodriguez had not suffered prejudice from her former counsel’s failure to move to remand. After the Board’s decision, this court held that “the stop-time rule is triggered by one complete notice to appear rather than a co mbination of documents.” Banuelos-Galviz v. Barr , 953 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. denied , 2021 WL 1725170 (U.S. May 3, 2021) (No. 20-356). At the go vernment’s request, we then abated this matter when the Supreme Court agr eed to consider the same3 stop-time issue in another ca se. The Supreme Court now has decided that case. Consistent with Banuelos-Galviz , it held that the stop-time rule does not apply unless the noncitizen is served with on e complete noti ce to appear. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland , 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1485, 1486 (2021). Accordingly, the Board’s decision is no longer good law. We lift the abatement, grant Ms. Salcido-Rodriguez’ s petition for review , and remand for the Board to consider the motion to reopen in light of Niz-Chavez and Banuelos-Galviz

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Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich Chief Judge