IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 58098-5-II

Respondent, 

v.

JASON LOUIE FULLER, PUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

CRUSER, C.J. – Jason Fuller appeals his bench trial conviction for failure to register as a 

sex offender (second violation). He argues that the trial court erred when it rejected a negotiated 

settlement between him and the State that included an agreed-to motion to amend the information 

from failure to register as a sex offender to attempted failure to register as a sex offender and his 

entry of a guilty plea to the amended information because the motion was made after the “pretrial 

period” in violation of a local court rule.

We hold that the trial court erred when it denied the motion to amend the information and 

Fuller’s request to plead guilty to the amended charge because the local court rule and related 

policy that the court applied are inconsistent with CrR 2.1(d). Accordingly, we reverse the 

conviction and sentence and remand for the State to reinstate its plea offer and refile the motion to 

amend the charge.1

 

1

In light of this holding, we do not reach the other issues Fuller raises.

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

April 30, 2024
No. 58098-5-II

2

FACTS

On March 11, 2021, Fuller failed to comply with his sex offender registration requirements. 

Several months later, on September 29, the State charged Fuller with failure to register as a sex 

offender under former RCW 9A.44.132(1)(a) (2019). Fuller was arrested in February 2022. He 

was arraigned and pleaded not guilty on March 7. 

At the May 31, 2022 pretrial conference, the parties confirmed that they were prepared to 

proceed to trial on June 14. 

On June 9, Fuller and the State reached a plea agreement. Fuller agreed to plead guilty to 

an amended information charging him with attempted failure to register as a sex offender, a 

misdemeanor offense. The State agreed to recommend a 364-day sentence. 

On June 10, four days before the trial was set to begin, the parties set a hearing to address 

a waiver of jury trial. But on the day of the hearing, the State provided the trial court with a written 

motion to amend the charging information. 

In its motion, the State explained that the reduced charge was consistent with “the State’s 

goal of prosecuting criminal wrongdoing while being mindful of contextually appropriate 

outcomes.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 40. The State came to this conclusion because Fuller did not 

pose a high risk of reoffense and he would have been eligible for relief from his 30-year-old 

registration requirement as a matter of law but for his “non-violent/non-sexual convictions.” Id.

When the hearing began, the trial court acknowledged that the parties were now seeking 

to amend the information. But the trial court stated that the motion was being made “past the 
No. 58098-5-II

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time for an amendment,” and asked the parties to discuss the timing of the motion.2 Verbatim 

Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (June 10, 2022) at 17.

The following discussion ensued:

[THE STATE]: The parties have reached a resolution on this matter.

THE COURT: Well, but your resolution proposes an amendment, and you 

are past pretrial. So the time for amending the information has passed. So what 

basis is there to deviate from the rule in this case?

[THE STATE]: Well, first and foremost, the offer that was extended was 

different than what was previously handled by a different prosecutor, so that is 

number one.

Two, given the time in which I received that case, I have worked with 

extraordinary expediency in order to try to reach a just resolution, and also save a 

great -- some type of judicial efficiency, given the resources.

THE COURT: I think the thing the parties need to understand is that it’s 

not efficient. We have already called a jury. So it has saved almost nothing by doing 

this late, which is why the rule is in place that these sorts of amendments are not 

allowed post pretrial. [Defense counsel]?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, this is a situation where the 

negotiations weren’t progressing until [this deputy prosecutor] got into the case, 

and we reached a reasonable resolution. I recognize it’s late. But it’s fair to all 

parties, and it does save going through a trial at this point.

Id. at 17-18.

The trial court then questioned the State about why the State’s position regarding the charge 

and plea offer had changed so late into the proceedings. The State responded that there had been a 

substitution of deputy prosecutors and that it was a matter of prosecutorial discretion. The State 

stated that after reviewing “numerous cases and prosecutorial charging standards,” the current 

deputy prosecutor had determined that this plea would be appropriate. Id. at 19.

 

2

In referring to the motion being brought “past time for an amendment,” the trial court was 

apparently referring to Grays Harbor County Local Court Rule (LCrR) 4.2 and Grays Harbor 

County Felony Case Management Policy. VRP (June 10, 2022) at 17. But neither the trial court 

nor the parties ever specifically mentioned this rule or policy during this hearing. 
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The trial court commented that the fact there were inconsistencies between deputy 

prosecutors working in the same office made “no sense.” Id. at 20. The State responded, “I don’t 

disagree with you, Your Honor, but I don’t think that should preclude the defendant from being 

able to enter a plea of guilty.” Id. The trial court replied that because the amendment had been 

proposed “past the pretrial,” the motion to amend the information was denied. Id. Although the 

State’s motion discussed its reasoning for seeking the amendment and negotiating the plea 

agreement with Fuller, the trial court never discussed the State’s position regarding the 

appropriateness of the amendment or the plea agreement. 

The court then asked if Fuller preferred a jury or a bench trial. Fuller agreed to a bench 

trial. The trial court accepted Fuller’s jury trial waiver and struck the jury. 

After striking the jury, the trial court stated,

If you bring the elected prosecutor in and she wants to make a pitch for this deal 

that this is within her office’s policy, the Court would listen, but this is -- it’s outside 

the scope of the time. And so while you may have not officially had the case, your 

office has been in it for nine months. And it just -- because it was filed in September 

of 2021, I understand Mr. Fuller didn’t appear, but this is not like a case that has 

just come up.

Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 

The State asked to make a record, but the trial court stated, “Not today.” Id. The State then 

noted its objection for the record. 

Fuller then commented, “I would just like to add, I have been difficult with my attorney 

and the prosecutor through this process.” Id. at 23. The court responded, “Well, you may reap the 

punishment for that, because pretrial is the time for amendments” and reiterated that it had made 

its ruling. Id. The original charge on which Fuller was forced to proceed to trial carried a standard 

range of 43 to 57 months in prison. 
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Following the presentation of evidence at the bench trial, the trial court found Fuller guilty 

of failure to register as a sex offender. 

At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that Fuller be sentenced to 43 months, 

which was the bottom of the standard range. Fuller requested an exceptional sentence downward. 

The trial court imposed the State’s recommended sentence, which was three and a half 

times longer than the sentence Fuller would have received under the plea agreement. Neither the 

trial court or any party mentioned the rejected plea agreement at sentencing.

Fuller appeals his conviction. 

ANALYSIS

Fuller contends that under CrR 2.1(d), when the State moves to amend the information 

prior to resting its case the trial court has no authority to deny such a motion when substantial 

rights of the defendant will not be prejudiced. Because the amendment in this case would not 

prejudice the defendant, Fuller argues that the trial court therefore erred as a matter of law in 

denying the motion to amend. 

The State agrees that CrR 2.1(d) permits amendment any time before the State rests its 

case. But the State argues that CrR 2.1(d) is a discretionary rule and that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to amend the information because the motion was 

untimely and did not comply with LCrR 4.2 and the related Grays Harbor County’s Felony Case 

Management Policies. 

Although the State is correct that CrR 2.1(d) affords the trial court discretion in granting 

amendments, LCrR 4.2 and the related policy conflict with CrR 2.1(d) insofar as they purport to 

disallow any and all amendments to the information occurring after pretrial unless the parties can 
No. 58098-5-II

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establish extenuating circumstances. As such, LCrR 4.2 and the related policy are unenforceable 

insofar as they conflict with CrR 2.1(d) and the trial court erred when it denied the joint motion to 

amend the information and rejected Fuller’s guilty plea.

I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

CrR 2.1(d) provides, “The court may permit any information or bill of particulars to be 

amended at any time before the verdict or finding if substantial rights of the defendant are not 

prejudiced.” (Emphasis added.) We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to amend an 

information for abuse of discretion. State v. Brooks, 195 Wn.2d 91, 96, 455 P.3d 1151 (2020). “A 

trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable 

grounds or reasons.” Id. at 97. And “[a] court’s decision is based on untenable reasons if it is based 

on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct standard.” Id.

Trial court’s also have discretion to accept or reject plea agreements. State v. Westwood, 

10 Wn. App. 2d 543, 550, 448 P.3d 771 (2019). The trial court’s authority to approve or deny a 

plea bargain includes the right to permit or refuse the amendment of the charges. State v. Haner, 

95 Wn.2d 858, 863-64, 631 P.2d 381 (1981).

If the trial court’s rejection of a plea agreement is “based on a court’s valid exercise of 

discretion,” we defer to the trial court’s decision. Westwood, 10 Wn. App. 2d at 550. But we review 

a trial court’s decision to reject a plea agreement based on a legal determination de novo. Id.

II. ENFORCEABILITY OF LOCAL RULE AND RELATED POLICY

In his opening brief, apparently unaware of LCrR 4.2 and the related policy, Fuller 

contends that the trial court “invented a deadline where there was none,” and contends that the 

court had no authority to deny the motion to amend based on this “invented” deadline in violation 
No. 58098-5-II

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of CrR 2.1(d). Br. of Appellant at 16. But the State asserts that the trial court’s ruling was based 

on LCrR 4.2 and the related policy, not CrR 2.1(d). In his reply, Fuller responds that LCrR 4.2 and 

the related policy are “void” because they are inconsistent with CrR 2.1(d). Reply Br. at 7 

(capitalization omitted). We agree the local rule and policy cannot be enforced insofar as they are 

inconsistent with CrR 2.1(d).

Although the trial court never mentioned the local rule or related policy, it is apparent from 

the trial court’s ruling that it rejected the motion to amend the information and the subsequent plea 

agreement based on LCrR 4.2 and the related policy. 

LCrR 4.2 provides:

When a case is set for trial, the Court shall assign a date for a pretrial 

conference which shall be at least two weeks prior to the trial date. Pleas of guilty 

should be entered by the pretrial conference. The Court may refuse to grant a 

discretionary reduction or dismissal of charges or counts if a plea is entered after 

the time for the pretrial conference.

(Emphasis added.)

The related policy states:

If a case is to be resolved by change of plea pursuant to the terms of a plea 

agreement, such change of plea must be completed at the PTC [(pretrial 

conference)], or earlier. If the accused chooses to plead after the PTC, she or he 

must plead to the original charge(s) unless extenuating circumstances are found by 

the Court such that a denial of the plea would be inconsistent with the fair 

administration of justice.

Felony Case Management Policy (Grays Harbor County Super. Ct., Wash. 2022) 

[https://perma.cc/UP7Z-722A] (emphasis added).
No. 58098-5-II

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LCrR 4.2 and the related policy lend support to the trial court’s decision. But a local rule 

cannot be inconsistent with the court rules announced in CrR 2.1(d). GR 7(c);3 CR 83;4State v. 

Chavez, 111 Wn.2d 548, 555, 761 P.2d 607 (1988) (“ ‘Inconsistent’ when involving court rules 

means ‘court rules so antithetical that it is impossible as a matter of law that they can both be 

effective.’ ” (quoting Heaney v. Seattle Mun. Ct., 35 Wn. App. 150, 155, 665 P.2d 918 (1983))). 

Local rules that restrict the exercise of a right created by a state-wide rule by imposing a different 

time requirement are inconsistent with the state-wide rule. See Harbor Enters. Inc. v. Gudjonsson, 

116 Wn.2d 283, 293, 803 P.2d 798 (1991) (holding that a local rule that restricted a litigant’s right 

based on a time requirement different from that of a statute was invalid).

Here, CrR 2.1(d) gives the trial court broad discretion to permit amendment of the charges 

at any point before the verdict or finding of guilt. LCrR 4.2 and the related policy are inconsistent 

with this rule because they place additional restrictions on the trial court’s discretion prior to the 

verdict or finding of guilt. Because LCrR 4.2 and the related policy restrict the court’s discretion 

prior to the time designated in CrR 2.1(d), the local rule and related policy are inconsistent with 

CrR 2.1(d) and are unenforceable insofar as they purport to restrict the trial court’s exercise of 

discretion and disallow any amendment of the information after the pretrial hearing. Accordingly, 

 

3 GR 7(c) provides in part: “All local rules shall be consistent with rules adopted by the Supreme 

Court.”

4 CR 83(a) provides in part: “Each court by action of a majority of the judges may from time to 

time make and amend local rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules.”
No. 58098-5-II

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the trial court erred as a matter of law when it relied on the local rule and policy to deny the motion 

to amend the charge.5

Furthermore, although CrR 2.1(d) is permissive and a trial court can deny a motion to 

amend an information even if it does not prejudice the defendant, the trial court’s reasoning here 

does not withstand scrutiny and could not justify denying the motion to amend under CrR 2.1(d). 

State v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 131, 285 P.3d 27 (2012). The trial court stated that it was denying 

the motion because the motion was made after a jury had already been called. 

But the court’s reasoning ignores the fact that at that point Fuller had not yet declared 

whether he wanted a jury trial or a bench trial. The fact Fuller still had the option of waiving his 

right to a jury trial belied the court’s justification for rejecting the motion to amend because 

although a jury had been called the jury trial had not yet been confirmed. Furthermore, the fact 

that the State brought the motion to amend and seemed taken aback at the court’s response to the 

proposed resolution of the case suggests that LCrR 4.2 is not consistently applied, undercutting 

the suggestion by the trial court that the rule is non-discretionary. Finally, the prejudice to Fuller 

can hardly be overstated. Under his plea agreement with the State Fuller faced a maximum 

sentence of 364 days in jail. By proceeding to trial on the original information, Fuller faced a 

standard range sentence of 43 to 57 months in prison. His ultimate sentence of 43 months was 

three and a half times longer than the maximum sentence he could have received under the plea.

 

5 Although Fuller did not object to the trial court’s ruling on the ground that the court rule or policy 

conflicted with CrR 2.1(d), we exercise our discretion to address this issue under RAP 2.5(a)

because the trial court did not identify the rule or policy as the basis of its ruling and Fuller objected 

to the denial of the motion to amend the charges.
No. 58098-5-II

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The trial court erred in denying the motion to amend the information and rejecting the plea 

agreement of the parties. We reverse Fuller’s conviction.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the conviction and sentence and remand for the State to reinstate its plea offer 

and refile the motion to amend the charge.6See Westwood 10 Wn. App. 2d at 556.

CRUSER, C.J.

I concur:

MAXA, J.

 

6 Because we reverse on this basis, we do not address Fuller’s other arguments.
No. 58098-5-II

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PRICE, J. (concurring) – I concur with the majority that LCrR 4.2 and its related policy are 

inconsistent with CrR 2.1(d) and are unenforceable insofar as they purport to disallow any 

amendment of the information after the pretrial hearing. The conflict between the local rule and 

the state criminal rules is an appropriately narrow basis to resolve this case. I write separately, 

however, to express my concern with the local rule’s infringement of the fundamental principle of 

separation of powers.

I empathize with the challenges faced by superior courts as they seek to improve the 

efficiency of criminal case management. The superior courts have an impossible job; they are 

tasked with balancing many different, often contradictory, interests. Caseloads are overwhelming 

resources, yet the courts must still accommodate victims, witnesses, jurors, and court staff, all 

while protecting the rights of criminal defendants. To that end, LCrR 4.2 may be a wellintentioned product of an attempt to provide more efficient case management.

But the principle of separation of powers limits each branch of government to their 

respective roles. The prosecutor’s office’s role is to bring criminal charges. See State v. Rice, 174 

Wn.2d 884, 901, 279 P.3d 849 (2012) (discussing the importance of separation of powers, the 

court notes “A prosecuting attorney's most fundamental role as both a local elected official and an 

executive officer is to decide whether to file criminal charges against an individual and, if so, 

which available charges to file.”). To be sure, the rules provide the courts a limited role in curbing 

prosecutorial abuses, but broadly speaking, it is the prosecutor, not the courts, who decides whether 

and when to bring (or settle) charges. Judicial officers might bristle when they view these 

decisions as being incorrect or they believe the timing is inefficient. So be it—separation of 

powers requires that courts stay in their lane. 
No. 58098-5-II

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The majority correctly held that LCrR 4.2 conflicts with CrR 2.1(d). But something more 

fundamental is also wrong with LCrR 4.2. See id. (“[t]he division of governmental authority into 

separate branches is especially important within the criminal justice system, . . .”). The quest for 

more efficient criminal case management can never be an excuse for judicial overreach. 

PRICE, J.