```

[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       AN ASSESSMENT OF THE BIDEN
                      ADMINISTRATION'S WITHDRAWAL
                 FROM AFGHANISTAN BY AMERICA'S GENERALS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 19, 2024

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-89

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FOORMAT]        

       Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
                            docs.house.gov, 
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov
                       
                              __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
55-810PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                          

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman
                   
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	     BRAD SHERMAN, California	
DARRELL ISSA, California	     GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri		     WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida		     AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado		     JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee		     DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee	     TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky		     SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas		     DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California		     COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida	     ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan		     SARA JACOBS, California
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, 	     KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
    American Samoa		     SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas		          Florida	
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio		     GREG STANTON, Arizona
JIM BAIRD, Indiana		     MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida	             JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey         JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York	     SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
CORY MILLS, Florida		     JIM COSTA, California
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia              JASON CROW, Colorado
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas		     GABE AMO, rhode Island
JOHN JAMES, Michigan		     BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas			
                                

                    Brendan Shields, Majority Staff Director
                    Sophia Lafargue, Minority Staff Director

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Milley, General Mark A., (Retired), Fmr. Chairman of the Joint 
  Chiefs of Staff at the U.S. Department of Defense..............     8
Mckenzie, General Kenneth F., Jr., (Retired), Fmr. Commander of 
  United States Central Command at the U.S. Department of Defense    15

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    86
Hearing Minutes..................................................    87
Hearing Attendance...............................................    88

                   STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..    89

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    91

 
                       AN ASSESSMENT OF THE BIDEN
   ADMINISTRATION'S WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN BY AMERICA'S GENERALS

                        Tuesday, March 19, 2024

                          House of Representatives,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                     ashington, DC.

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m., in 
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael McCaul 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
    Chairman McCaul. Committee on Foreign Affairs will come to 
order. Chair would like to remind our guests today that 
demonstrations from the audience, including the use of signs 
and placards as well as verbal outbursts, are a violation of 
the rules of the House. And you will be escorted.
    Purpose of this hearing is to discuss the Biden 
Administration's deadly withdrawal of Afghanistan and to hear 
from the generals who advised President Biden against his 
disastrous foreign policy decision. I now recognize myself for 
an opening statement.
    On April 14th, 2021, President Biden announced the United 
States would unilaterally withdraw its military forces from 
Afghanistan. For months before that announcement, the 
intelligence community and his senior military advisors, 
including both gentlemen testifying here today, issued dire 
warnings about the withdrawal's consequences. After the 
announcement, I along with other Republican and Democrat 
Members of Congress urged the President to prepare for the 
withdrawal and its inevitable fallout.
    Unfortunately, those warnings were ignored. As a withdrawal 
dated neared, the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated as the 
Taliban gained significant ground across the country. Yet the 
Biden Administration's failure to plan for their withdrawal 
threatened the safety and security of U.S. personnel in 
country.
    As a result in July 2021, 23 State Department employees in 
Kabul sent a cable channel to Secretary Blinken warning of 
their grave concerns for Afghanistan stability and for their 
own safety, yet nothing was done. Instead, our investigation 
uncovered the White House refused to listen to warnings about 
the situation on the ground. Disturbingly, we have uncovered 
that State Department leadership prohibited its employees from 
even uttering the word NEO, shorthand for emergency evacuation, 
until as late as August 2021. Too little, too late.
    Additionally, this committee learned that the State 
Department did not even request an emergency evacuation until 
after Kabul was surrounded by the Taliban. As a result, the 
airport was not secured until August 17th, 2 days after Kabul 
fell. As the saying goes, if you fail to plan, you plan to 
fail. And fail they did.
    The next 2 weeks created international outrage and 
humiliation for the United States. People all over the world 
watched as babies were flung over a barbed wire fence by 
mothers without hope. Desperate Afghans fell to their deaths 
from airplanes.
    And hoards of people surrounded the airport as they tried 
to flee for their lives. The damage to our reputation and our 
credibility, the United States credibility, around the world, 
that damage will last for generations. Our servicemembers were 
forced to watch as American citizens and Afghan allies were 
beaten and murdered outside the gates of the airport.
    These brave Americans were told to stand by as terrorists 
brutalized innocent civilians. And then on the morning of 
August 26, we watched in horror as reports of a terrorist 
attack at Abbey Gate flooded the news. Thirteen U.S. 
servicemembers were murdered with dozens more injured. A 
hundred and seventy Afghans were killed with countless injured 
as well.
    Some of the Abbey Gate Gold Star families members are here 
today, and we honor you. We honor your sacrifice here today. To 
the families here today and to the American people, I say I 
will not rest until I get to the bottom of this tragedy.
    You deserve answers. The American people deserve answers, 
and I intend to deliver. With the last U.S. military plane 
left, on August 30th, 2021, more than 1,000 American citizens 
remained trapped in Afghanistan as were tens of thousands of 
Afghan allies who risked their lives serving beside our troops 
and diplomats. Many if not most of those allies are still 
trapped, constantly in fear for their lives.
    I want to thank both of our witnesses for being here today. 
Despite current DOD officials actively trying to limit your 
testimony, you have agreed to appear here voluntarily. And I am 
grateful to you, both of you, sirs, for your service to our 
country and your service to this investigation.
    I also want to thank the Abbey Gate Gold Star families for 
joining us here today. And while the President has never 
publicly stated the names of your children, I will here today. 
Their names are Darin Hoover, Johanny Rosario, Nicole Gee, 
Hunter Lopez, Daegan Page, Humberto Sanchez, David Espinoza, 
Jared Schmitz, Rylee McCollum, Dylan Merola, Kareem Nikoui, 
Maxton Soviak, and Ryan Knass.
    Those are the names of the fallen. May God bless them. They 
will not be forgotten. And with that, the chair now recognizes 
the ranking member.
    Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me start by 
thanking former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff General Mark A. 
Milley and former Commander of the United States Central 
Command General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. for testifying before 
this committee today and sharing, as you did before the House 
Armed Services Committee in 2021, key military and policy 
insights of the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan. I 
also want to thank you both for the years of sacrifice and 
service to our great country and recognize the hundreds of 
thousands of American servicemembers, diplomats, and 
development professionals that work to support the United 
States efforts in Afghanistan over the course of our presence 
in the country.
    I want to also recognize the 2,461 American military 
personnel who gave their life in Afghanistan for our country. 
And of course, that includes who my heart bleeds for, the 13 
brave Americans who were killed in an ISIS terrorist attack 
while facilitating the evacuation of 124,000 people over the 
course of 17 days in August 2021. And as I've previously said, 
President Biden's efforts to end the 20-year war in Afghanistan 
and bring our troops home was the right one.
    And while that decision was in our country's best interest, 
a number of contributing factors complicated the withdrawal, 
namely President Ghani fleeing Afghanistan on August 15th, 2021 
and the resulting collapse of the Aghan government. As we heard 
in our hearing just last month from former Special 
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, 
former President Donald Trump's Doha deal empowered the Taliban 
at the expense of the Afghan government. The Trump 
Administration's commitment to facilitate the release of 
Taliban prisoners in Afghan and the Afghan government that they 
were in their custody and initiated significant unilateral U.S. 
troop drawdowns placed the Taliban in the strongest position 
since the United States first arrived in Afghanistan 20 years 
earlier.
    Continued troop drawdowns, despite the Taliban not fully 
complying with terms of the Doha agreement undercut the United 
States leverage with the Taliban. During the transition between 
the Trump and Biden Administrations, it also became clear that 
the Trump Administration lacked a comprehensive plan for 
withdrawing from Afghanistan despite the May 1st deadline fast 
approaching. Upon taking office, President Biden conducted a 
thorough interagency review and determined he had two options.
    The President could either continue the withdrawal started 
by his predecessor or break the agreement and return us to an 
active war with the Taliban, a decision that would necessitate 
a significant surge of troops for an undefined time. The 
Taliban made clear that backing out of the Doha agreement would 
result in the resumption of hostilities which would place our 
servicemembers once more in the crosshairs.
    Let me be clear. This is not my opinion on the timeline and 
facts. This is the picture painted by the Afghanistan after 
review--after action report conducted by the State Department 
which DOD has corroborated throughout its own internal reviews 
of the withdrawal.
    These are the facts outlined by this committee's own 
investigation which has been comprised over 100 hours of 
transcribed testimony, multiple public hearings, and 11,000 
pages of documents produced by the State Department. And I also 
again like to reinforcement the importance of broadening the 
scope of Afghanistan. Proper oversight of Afghanistan requires 
an honest look back not just at a few months but at the entire 
20 years of war over four Administration.
    Generals Milley and McKenzie, I look forward to your 
continued commitment to truth and transparency today, helping 
us gain a better understanding so we may learn from our 
successes and mistakes. And I want to commend the efforts of 
all who contributed to the successful evacuation and airlift of 
124,000 people from Afghanistan. We understand over the course 
of our interviews and investigations that this was an all hands 
on deck undertaking.
    And while I'm thankful such an airlift was successful given 
the dynamic and chaotic situation of the ground, you must also 
scrutinize the lessons learned, including from a tragic bombing 
at Abbey Gate. So I look forward to hearing how the Defense 
Department similar to the State Afghanistan's AAR has taken 
ethics to assess and learn from our withdrawal so that we do 
not repeat those mistakes in the future. Let me close just by 
saying I would like also to make special mention of our 
previously bipartisan commitment to ensuring Special Immigrant 
Visas for the Afghan allies who work with U.S. servicemembers 
and diplomats throughout our mission in Afghanistan.
    Thus far, the Republican leadership in the House is 
refusing to increase the SIVs to the Administration's requested 
amount. So I know Chairman McCaul and the majority of members 
on this committee agree that Congress must act on fulfilling 
our promises to them. And I hope to have your support in 
working with Democrats on getting that done. And with that, I 
yield.
    Chairman McCaul. Ranking member yields. Let me add to that 
comment. We are working in a very bipartisan manner to increase 
the number of SIVs. I think it's vitally important when we talk 
about Afghan partners left behind to provide the visas 
necessary for them to get out of there.
    And I'm pleased to announce but I do not want to announce 
the number yet because it's being negotiated that we will have 
an agreement. So with that, I'm pleased to have with us here 
today the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
Mark Milley and former Commander of U.S. Central Command 
General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. Both generals played a pivotal 
role throughout the Afghanistan withdrawal but also a pivotal 
role throughout our Nation's history in many conflicts. And I 
commend you for your service to our Nation.
    Your full statements will be made a part of the record. And 
I'll ask each of you keep your remarks to 5 minutes. And 
finally as a reminder, today's hearing is subject to the 
veracity protections of Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United 
States Code which makes it a crime to knowingly make any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements to the committee in the 
context of this investigation. With that, I now recognize 
General Mark Milley for his opening statement.

STATEMENT OF MARK MILLEY (RETIRED), FMR. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT 
       CHIEFS OF STAFF AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    GENERAL MILLEY. Thank you, Chairman McCaul and Ranking 
Member Meeks and members of the committee. And thank you for 
your efforts in what you're doing. I'm grateful for the 
opportunity to be here with General McKenzie.
    And my purpose here today is to help you form a holistic 
assessment of our efforts in Afghanistan. But most importantly, 
I am personally here today voluntarily to help the families of 
the fallen, the 13 fallen at Abbey Gate, and the thousands of 
fallen and tens of thousands of wounded and countless other 
members who suffer the invisible wounds of war, to help them 
get answers. I'm humbled to be here today with three Gold Star 
families from Abbey Gate, and I know the other families could 
not make it.
    But I intend to contact them in the coming weeks. They know 
my feelings for them. They know that there are no words by me 
or any general or any politician or anyone that can ever bring 
back their fallen.
    But all of us can and all of us must honor their sacrifice 
to protect our country and to be forever grateful that they 
answered the call to the colors. Each of them paid the ultimate 
sacrifice for freedom like so many before them in order to keep 
our Nation safe. And we owe them answers.
    And I am committed to assist in the effort to get them 
answers. But we should also not be under any illusion. We're 
not going to get all the answers here today. It's a process 
that's going to take a considerable length of time.
    And we must also recognize that much of the record, in 
fact, is classified and beyond the scope of this open hearing. 
So over two decades between 2001 and 2021, about 800,000 of us 
in uniform in the United States military served in Afghanistan 
and thousands of others from my agencies in our government. Of 
those, 2,471 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines gave their 
lives.
    Almost 30,000 more were wounded in action and countless 
others suffer those invisible wounds. And that includes the 13 
from Abbey Gate. We must always honor all of their sacrifice, 
each of them, over two decades of fighting the Taliban, 
bringing Osama bin Laden to justice, and ultimately protecting 
the American homeland.
    We lost over 200 U.S. international troops and many more 
wounded in action in units that were under my direct command in 
several tours and multiple years of combat in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. And every commander who's ever served in combat 
knows that we personally issue the orders that gave the task, 
the purpose, the place, and the time of that soldier's death or 
wounds. And we also know it was the enemy that killed or 
wounded them.
    Combat is an unforgiving environment. And those of us who 
have served in the brutality of ground combat live with that 
dark reality every day and every night. And we'll live with 
that for the rest of the days of our lives.
    There's no military leader who's lost troops in combat who 
does not know that feeling. So this is personal to me. And I 
will do everything in my power to ensure that these families 
and all of our veterans and families know the truth and have 
the answers.
    At the peak of our military commitment in 2011, the United 
States had just under 100,000 troops and about 20,000 DOD 
contractors. That same year, the United States began to 
steadily drawdown troops, close bases, and retrograde 
equipment. Nothing we're going to discuss today happened 
overnight.
    It was a process of withdrawal that spanned a decade. The 
outcome in Afghanistan was the cumulative effect of many 
decisions over many years of war. And like any complex 
phenomena, there's no single causal factor that determined the 
outcome but multiple factors in combination.
    In the fall of 2020, as I previously testified publicly, my 
analysis, my personal analysis was that an accelerated 
withdrawal would likely lead to the general collapse of the 
Afghan Security Forces and the Afghan government resulting in a 
large scale civil war reminiscent of the 1990's with a complete 
Taliban takeover. In November 2020, DOD received orders from 
the White House to reduce troop levels, to 2,500 by January 15, 
1921. When the current Administration took office in January 
1921, there were, roughly speaking, 2,500 U.S. troops on the 
ground with about 22,000 NATO troops and contractors.
    Beginning in February 1921, the National Security Council 
conducted a 10-week interagency review of the Doha agreement 
and various options were presented and debated. In previous 
public testimony, I noted that at that time, my analysis based 
on my assessment and the recommendations of the commanders to 
include General McKenzie and the consensus of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff was that we needed to maintain a minimum force of 
2,500 troops on the ground, mostly Special Forces with allied 
troops and contractors, in order sustain the Afghan national 
security forces and its government until the diplomatic 
conditions of the Doha agreement were met. Without this 
support, it was my view at the time that it was only a matter 
of when, not if the Afghan government would collapse and the 
Taliban would take control.
    Again, I previously publicly testified and I consistently 
supported a negotiated end of the war but only if there was a 
reduction in violence leading to a permanent cease-fire and 
there were Afghan to Afghan negotiations leading to a power 
sharing agreement between the Afghan government and the 
Taliban. And it was my view that absent those conditions, I was 
not in favor of a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces because 
of my assessment of the associated costs and risks. The 
fundamental tension facing the President, in fact, two 
Presidents, was that no one could satisfactorily explain when 
or even if those conditions would ever be met.
    And if we stayed indefinitely, an open war would likely 
begin with the Taliban again with increased risk of additional 
casualties. On 14 April 1921, President Biden made the formal 
announcement of his decision to honor the Doha agreement with a 
miliary withdrawal while maintaining a continued diplomatic 
presence. The Department of Defense understood that our mission 
was to conduct a retrograde of the remaining U.S. military 
forces and equipment while leaving a contingent to defend the 
American Embassy while diplomatic outcomes were negotiated.
    On 14 August, the noncombatant evacuation operation 
decision was made by the Department of State. And the U.S. 
military alerted, martial mobilized, and rapidly deployed 
faster than any military in the world could ever do. It is my 
assessment that decision came too late.
    The deploying forces quickly took operational control of 
the airport with significant elements and the 82d Airborne 
Division, Marines, National Guard, and Special Forces along 
with our CIA partners and selected NATO forces. Additionally, 
we set up multiple bases to process evacuees in other countries 
throughout the Middle East, Europe, and CONUS. In short, the 
United States military performed one of the most incredible 
evacuations under pressure in recorded history and in an 
extremely difficult dynamic and dangerous environment.
    That performance is due to the individual bravery, 
competence, and compassion of every private to general who had 
any role in this NEO. At the end of 20 years, we, the military, 
helped build an Army, a State. But we could not forge a nation.
    The enemy occupied Kabul and overthrew the government and 
the military we supported for two decades faded away. That is a 
strategic failure. But the U.S. military also provided hope for 
20 years to the Afghan people. We provided unprecedented 
opportunity to millions.
    In the final days, we gave 130,000 people their lives and 
freedom at very high cost. And most importantly, we protected 
the United States from terrorist attack from Afghanistan which 
was our original mission. And that mission continues today. 
There are many lessons to be learned from 20 years of war and 
the 10-year drawdown of forces and the final evacuation. And 
Mr. Chairman, I have a lengthier paper for written testimony 
that I would like to submit for the record with your 
permission.
    Chairman McCaul. Without objection. so ordered.
    General Milley. To the American people, the most important 
lesson I think to learn is that your troops, the United States 
military, from private to general did all that bravery and duty 
could ever do. Your military defended you successfully for 20 
years and continues to do that. And for that, every American 
should be eternally grateful.
    So to all the veterans of Afghanistan, hold your heads 
high. And I know there are several in the room today. Know that 
you did your duty.
    Each of you did what your country asked of you under 
extreme circumstances. Many of you like Congressman Mast lost 
limbs and were grievously wounded. And you did it selflessly 
with professionalism, courage, compassion, and with great 
sacrifice.
    And finally to the Gold Star families that are here with us 
today and those that could not make it, there's nothing that I 
can say or do that's going to fill that gaping hole in your 
heart. But as I've told you before, I'm committed and I will 
honor that commitment to get you the answers, to get you to the 
truth. And I will personally, and I know everyone else will as 
well, honor your sacrifice and the sacrifice of your loved one. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Milley follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, General Milley. I now recognize 
General McKenzie for his opening statement.
    General McKenzie. I'd like to ask for this opening to be 
submitted for the record.
    Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH MCKENZIE JR. (RETIRED), FMR. COMMANDER OF 
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    General McKenzie. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Meeks, 
distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
I'm here to voluntarily testify today about the military 
component of our withdrawal from Afghanistan. Before I begin, 
I'd like to recognize the Gold Star families that are here 
today. I hope that we discuss today will reduce their pain.
    Like General Milley, I am humbled to be in their presence 
here today. As you are aware in September 2021, I provided over 
10 hours of open and closed testimony in this subject to the 
two congressional committees charged with oversight and 
military operations, the House Armed Services Committee and the 
Senate Armed Services Committee. Much of my testimony will be 
of necessity mirror that earlier transcribed testimony.
    As a theater commander, I will confine my opening remarks 
to those matters that were under my direct operational control. 
Specifically, the withdrawal of U.S. military forces and the 
subsequent Noncombatant Evacuation Operation or NEO. These were 
two distinct and separate operations. We had detailed and 
constantly updated plans for each of them.
    We executed both of those plans, although separated in 
time. Thanks to the valor and dedication of thousands of men 
and women in harm's way, we completed both missions, but not 
without loss of life. We honor the 13 brave Americans who dies 
at Abbey Gate, joining the over 2,400 other servicemembers who 
lost their lives in this 20-year campaign.
    Their sacrifice stands with those of our coalition partners 
and of course the Afghans who fought beside us for so many 
years. I briefed President Trump on a plan to completely depart 
Afghanistan on 3 June 2020. This plan envisioned the complete 
withdrawal of all our forces and our diplomats and citizens. It 
also contemplated the possible withdrawal of Afghans who served 
with us.
    The plan has a number of options, but it was the framework 
for everything that followed. Ultimately, President Trump 
selected a branch of the plan that maintained 2,500 U.S. 
military personnel in Afghanistan by inauguration day in 
January 2021. We had branches to that plan to complete a 
withdrawal by May 2021 had we been so ordered.
    On 11 April 2021, I received orders from President Biden 
through the Secretary of Defense to execute a full military 
withdrawal by 11 September 2021, a date which was subsequently 
modified to the end of August. This decision did not include 
the withdrawal of our embassy, our citizens, and at-risk 
Afghans. It's important to understand that we had a complete 
plan to execute that task as well but were not ordered to do 
so.
    The President's decision was to maintain an embassy to not 
require our citizens to leave and of course to not expedite the 
extraction of at-risk Afghans. This was not a military 
decision. We substantially accomplished the military withdrawal 
by 12 July 2021 when I relieved General Scott Miller as the 
commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
    My orders then were to retain a military platform of 650 
personnel solely designed to provide security for the U.S. 
embassy in Karzai International Airport. During this period and 
with minimal to no support from us, the Afghan Security Forces 
and more importantly the government of Afghanistan, crumbled in 
the face of Taliban pressure. The order to execute the 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operation, bringing out our embassy, 
our citizens, and at-risk Afghans was received on 14 August.
    These dates are important because I believe that the events 
of mid and late August 2021 were the direct result of delaying 
the initiation of a NEO for several months, in fact, until we 
were in extremis and the Taliban had overrun the country. As 
you are ware, the decision to begin a NEO rests with the 
Department of State, not the Department of Defense. Despite 
this, we had begun positioning forces in the region as early as 
9 July.
    But we could do nothing to commence the operation, the 
evacuation until a NEO was declared. Our operations at Karzai 
International from 14 August through our ultimate departure on 
early 31 August were both heroic and tragic. This was a combat 
operation of the most difficult sort, carried out in contact 
with the enemy.
    We eventually put 5,784 U.S. troops, almost 2,000 more 
coalition and other forces, eight U.S. maneuver battalions on 
the ground at Karzai International. I'd like to talk a little 
bit now about Abbey Gate. It was a tragic event, one of many 
that have occurred over our 20-year engagement in Afghanistan.
    It remains my opinion that if there's culpability in this 
attack, it lies in policy decisions that created the 
environment of August 2021 in Kabul. Culpability and 
responsibility do not lie with the troops on the ground who 
performed magnificently. It does not lie with platoon, company, 
or battalion commanders or the flag officers who oversaw 
operations on the ground in Kabul.
    The simple fact is this: On the battlefield, even with good 
planning, tremendous execution by brave people on the ground, 
the enemy sometimes has success. To ignore this fact is to 
ignore the fundamental reality of the battlefield. If there's 
fault, it lies in a policy decision that placed the joint force 
in this situation and exposed the force over time to the 
possibility of these kinds of attacks.
    We did not rely on the Taliban for our security. We used 
them as one tool among many to beef up our defensive posture. 
We avoid a number of potential Abbey Gate attacks, and I'm 
proud of the commanders and troops who prevented them.
    This is a small comfort to those who lost loved ones, and I 
realize this. Nonetheless, what's remarkable about Kabul is not 
that the tragedy of Abbey Gate happened but that many other 
attacks did not happen. I'll lend my statement with this 
observation.
    I was the overall commander. And I and I alone bear full 
military responsibility for what happened at Abbey Gate. Thank 
you, Chairman. I'm ready for questions.
    [The prepared statement of General McKenzie follows:]

    ***STATEMENT WAS NOT AVAILABLE AT PRESS RELEASE***

    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, General McKenzie. I now 
recognize myself for questions. We have a Sergeant Tyler 
Vargas-Andrews here today.
    I want to thank you, sir, for your service and your courage 
for testifying before this committee almost a year ago to the 
day. He was a sniper at Abbey Gate and testified to us that he 
had the suicide bomber in his sights that was identified to be 
on the lookout. He sent the sniper photos and other related 
documents to his commanding officer for permission to engage 
the suicide bomber.
    Yet that warning was ignored. He never heard back. I and 
the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee after that 
testimony sent a letter to the Department of Defense requesting 
that these documents and sniper photos be delivered to the 
Congress, produced to the Congress by this document, this 
letter request.
    To date, that has been ignored. The Department of Defense 
has refused. We've also requested the testimoneys of General 
Chris Donahue and Admiral Peter Vasely who were the commanding 
officers on the ground during the Abbey Gate disaster.
    To both of you, to General Milley, do you think that these 
documents should be turned over to the United States Congress? 
And do you think that both General Donahue and Admiral Vasely 
should testify before Congress?
    General Milley. Sure, absolutely. I believe in 
transparency. You're the board of directors for this 
corporation called the American government. And I believe that 
you're entitled to those within the bounds of classification, 
absolutely.
    So whatever documents are out there should be turned over 
to the appropriate committees, jurisdiction, and oversight. And 
whatever witnesses are needed to establish truth and 
transparency within the bounds of classification, absolutely, 
absolutely. That's why I'm here.
    Chairman McCaul. Thank you. Chairman McKenzie?
    General McKenzie. I agree with General Milley, and I 
associate myself with his remarks.
    Chairman McCaul. So also on accountability, I've asked the 
State Department officials who was responsible for the 
catastrophic emergency evacuation? Not surprisingly, they point 
their fingers at the Department of Defense. But I want to set 
the record straight. While the DOD helps conduct the emergency 
evacuation, it's the State Department that is responsible under 
law for developing the plan and leading the evacuation. Is that 
your understanding?
    General Milley. Yes, the State Department is the lead 
Federal agency for planning and execution, oversight of the 
execution of the noncombatant operation. And the Department of 
Defense is in support of and other departments are in support 
of the State Department. The State Department is the lead 
Federal agency for NEOs. That's correct.
    Chairman McCaul. General McKenzie?
    General McKenzie. I agree with that.
    Chairman McCaul. It's the State Department responsible 
under law again for requesting the emergency evacuation. Is 
that correct?
    General Milley. That is correct. And I think actually the--
I think that's done at the Ambassadorial level to tell you the 
truth. I'd have to check the law. But I think the Ambassador 
can make the decision to execute a NEO. But typically, it'll be 
either him or the Secretary of State.
    Chairman McCaul. And did the State Department, specifically 
Embassy Kabul, have an evacuation plan for Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. So Chairman, every embassy has an 
evacuation plan for Afghanistan. And Embassy Kabul had a plan--
had what we would call an F-77 list which is the list of U.S. 
citizens and their families that are in the country. And we 
struggled to gain access to that plan and work with them over 
much of July until we finally got a decision to execute the NEO 
which as I've already mentioned occurred on the 14th of August. 
Now we worked with the embassy before then, but we did not have 
authority to move out and do the things that you have to do to 
make a NEO happen until the 14th of July--correction, the 14th 
of August. And as I noted, we were in extremis at that point.
    Chairman McCaul. And August 14th, just days before the fall 
of Kabul and the evacuation of the embassy. August 14th is when 
they finally put forward this plan?
    General McKenzie. Now that's when we got authority to 
execute the plan.
    Chairman McCaul. That's when you got authority. And you 
urged the White House and State Department to put pen to paper 
to develop a plan to get Americans and our Afghan allies out of 
Afghanistan, correct?
    General McKenzie. Yes, I did. In fact, I was concerned by 
the middle of July. I was concerned about the different pace of 
Department of Defense planning as compared to Department of 
State planning. And I took an opportunity then to make 
representations to the Secretary about my concern over that, 
the fact that we were moving pretty fast on this. They were not 
moving fast, and I was concerned that we were going to arrive 
at different locations just based on it.
    And I went to the Secretary. We spent some time talking 
about that and actually followed up with a written idea on some 
things that we could do. Sent a letter with ten recommendations 
to the Secretary of Defense on that.
    Chairman McCaul. And is that your recollection, General 
Milley?
    General Milley. Absolutely. Without breaching things like 
executive privilege, et cetera, my assessments at the time--and 
Frank McKenzie submitted assessments. Scott Miller submitted 
assessments. The general consensus of the military up through 
and including the Secretary of Defense was that the embassy 
should be coming out, roughly speaking, the same time we should 
be coming out. And then after the decisions were made to keep a 
diplomatic presence there, as the situation deteriorated 
through the summer and the fall of the breach of capitals, et 
cetera, we were clearly pressing for early calls to execute a 
NEO.
    Chairman McCaul. And they did eventually develop a plan?
    General Milley. Well, they--go ahead on the plan.
    General McKenzie. So they had a plan. Like I said, it's a 
requirement to have the plan. But it's one thing to have the 
plan. It's a second thing to do the actual coordination of the 
plan, to talk about the specifics of execution.
    Having a plan is one thing. Preparing the plan, vetting the 
plan, coordinating the plan with the people that are going to 
actually carry you out, the Department of Defense, that's 
another set of tasks completely.
    Chairman McCaul. And that was too little, too late?
    General McKenzie. It was my judgment that it was far too 
little, far too late.
    Chairman McCaul. Was that your assessment, General Milley.
    General Milley. It was. And I would broaden it a little bit 
by saying it was a pretty consistent assessment by me and other 
members of the uniform military up through and including the 
Secretary that the withdrawal of the military forces and the 
contractors and the NATO forces that went with it would 
ultimately, as I said in my opening statement, to a general 
collapse of the ANSF and the government. And as I mentioned, 
the tension was when would those conditions be made. It was 
also our assessment at the time that keeping an embassy open in 
a war zone which Afghanistan was and, to do that without the 
presence of the U.S. military and the contractors and NATO, et 
cetera, that that embassy would be untenable.
    Chairman McCaul. And that was your advice to the State 
Department and the White House?
    General Milley. Well, as you know because of the 
requirements of executive privilege, et cetera, I can tell you 
what my assessments were at the time. And those were my 
thoughts at the time.
    Chairman McCaul. Do you believe that the failure to plan 
timely created the chaos at HKIA airport?
    General Milley. I think the call to execute the NEO came 
too late. And as General McKenzie mentioned, it was logged in 
on the 14th. At that point in time, the Afghan government 
senior leadership was preparing to depart, and they departed 
the next day on the 15th.
    The thousands of Afghan civilians were gathering at the 
airport. The Afghan Security Forces were collapsing on the 
various provincial capitals and although there were some still 
around Kabul. So the general situation at that point with 750 
U.S. soldiers in and around the embassy, the Turkish troops 
were required along with some ANSF to protect HKIA.
    They melted away. So you had a situation with the U.S. 
embassy and 750 troops when that NEO was called. And that's--
now we leaned forward.
    So I think it's the 9th, 10th, or 11th timeframe. We had 
already put forces on alert, et cetera. But in essence, we 
alerted marshalled, deployed the 82d Airborne Division, the 
Division Ready Brigade, and the MEU out of Saudi that was 
underneath General McKenzie's control.
    They rapidly deployed along with Special Forces to take 
control of that airport. It took them two to 3 days. That's 
where those videos come from. But they eventually wrestled 
control of that airport.
    Chairman McCaul. And General McKenzie, do you agree with 
that assessment?
    General McKenzie. I do. That was the opinion I had at the 
time and the opinion I have now.
    Chairman McCaul. I believe that accountability ensures 
mistakes in the past are not repeated. But from where I sit, 
the President and this Administration refuse to acknowledge 
their failures. There's an inscription at the National Archives 
down the streets that reads what is past is prologue. I 
launched this investigation to make sure that the mistakes made 
in Afghanistan never ever happen again. With that, I recognize 
the ranking member.
    Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by saying 
thank you. You are here voluntarily. Is that correct?
    General Milley. Correct.
    General McKenzie. That is correct, sir.
    Mr. Meeks. Although you did receive the threat of a 
subpoena at one point. Is that also correct?
    General Milley. Received?
    Mr. Meeks. A threat of being subpoenaed to come today?
    General Milley. Chair McCaul mentioned that he wanted us to 
appear and that there are compulsory measures which I took to 
mean subpoena, sure. But that wasn't necessary from the 
beginning.
    Mr. Meeks. I know you can voluntarily. But I just want to 
get the point out that there was something in regards to a 
subpoena to come, correct?
    General Milley. I was not subpoenaed.
    Mr. Meeks. I said the threat of a subpoena to come or 
something compulsory?
    General Milley. I'll answer it like this. Before I retired, 
I testified several times as well as General McKenzie in open 
and classified hearings on Afghanistan. Prior to retirement, 
Chair McCaul asked me, would you be willing to discuss with the 
committee? I said, absolutely, yes.
    No threat of subpoena, no compulsory, nothing. I said yes. 
I saw Chair McCaul again after retirement and he reminded me of 
that conversation. I said, sure, absolutely. So in January and 
February of this year, we worked out some of the details. I 
said I wanted to go back and review records, et cetera.
    And then it was originally supposed to be closed, 
classified hearing, and I still think we're going to do one of 
those after this. And I thought that was important to be a 
classified hearing because a lot of information is still 
classified. And then there was a discussion of a public 
hearing.
    Mr. Meeks. So just speaking of that, when you--you've 
testified before. You testified before the Armed Services 
Committee. Is that correct?
    General Milley. Testified before the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees in both classified and open hearings. And 
then I've testified about Afghanistan and several other 
testimoneys that we're----
    Mr. Meeks. Same with you, General McKenzie.
    General McKenzie. That's correct, sir.
    Mr. Meeks. And is your testimony--has anything changed from 
when you were in uniform and testifying to which you've 
testified today? Is there anything that you did not testify to 
before that you're testifying to now? Is there any change of 
thought of what took place today from what you testified to 
previously?
    General Milley. In general for me, everything that I 
testified before is still true and accurate today. And in open 
testimony, that would be correct. I have learned more about 
Abbey Gate because of the investigations that wasn't available 
during previous testimony. For me, it wasn't. But I have since 
read those investigations and briefed on them. But they weren't 
available the first time.
    Mr. Meeks. So your testimony to date is still basically 
consistent and transparent testimony?
    General Milley. It's totally consistent.
    Mr. Meeks. General McKenzie?
    General McKenzie. That's the same for me.
    Mr. Meeks. Right. So there's not really anything new that 
learned today because you've testified to it before, right?
    General Milley. I'll leave that to you all to determine if 
there's anything new.
    Mr. Meeks. I'm just asking you, from your testimony, from 
what has been made public and what has been public----
    General Milley. Sure.
    Mr. Meeks [continuing]. Is basically this is not something 
new.
    General McKenzie. Ranking Member, as I mentioned in my 
opening statement, much of what I say today is going to mirror 
the 10-hours of----
    Mr. Meeks. That's my point.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. Testimony I gave earlier.
    Mr. Meeks. This is not anything groundbreaking or anything 
that is being discovered newly. This is something that has been 
out in the public from the time that you testified back in 
2022, right? Nothing groundbreaking here.
    Fact of the matter is let me ask this question. I think 
maybe it was you, General Milley, said that the framework for 
what took place during the 20 years because I think that we 
should be looking at--if we really want to figure out what went 
wrong, what we need to fix, we need to look at the entire 20 
years of being in Afghanistan, not just the last few months. 
Would you say that's correct?
    General Milley. Yes, and I said that before as well in 
previous testimony. Now in the written remarks submitted for 
the record, I've elaborated on what I think are, say, top ten 
lessons learned. But there's many more.
    You're not going to learn all the lessons of a 20-year war 
in short sessions. But I think there's a huge amount of lessons 
to be learned over the course of 20 years. Should we have gone 
after bin Laden in 2001 in that winter when we had him more or 
less from an intel standpoint?
    We thought we had him located. Should we--could we have? 
Yes. Should we have? I think yes. In hindsight, that would've 
changed the trajectory of the whole war. And there's a whole 
series of lessons along the way.
    Specific to this hearing and to help these families, I 
think the focus is more recent relative to the withdrawal 
itself and the Abbey Gate and NEO. But you're correct. A 
holistic view, absolutely, I think. But that's going to take a 
considerable amount of time.
    Mr. Meeks. Would you say that the Doha agreement that was 
done under the Trump Administration had some connection to the 
conditions on the ground when Joe Biden became President----
    General Milley. Of course.
    Mr. Meeks [continuing]. And leading on up to what took 
place at Abbey Gate? There was a nexus there. Is that not 
correct?
    General Milley. Yes, I think the end game, if you will, the 
final months, I think the framework of that is set by the Doha 
agreement, absolutely.
    Mr. Meeks. So if we're going to study to find out the 
findings of what we should do, we should be talking about what 
happened during the Trump Administration as well as what took 
place during the Biden Administration because they are 
connected. They're not separate. And so if we're serious about 
trying to figure out what took place and why it took place, we 
should be looking at both, what took place under the Bush 
administration, the Obama administration, the Trump 
Administration, and--is that not correct?
    General Milley. Sure. As you point out, four presidents. I 
think there's half a dozen Secretaries of Defense, half a dozen 
Secretaries of State. There's half a dozen Chairmen of Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. There's another four commanders in 
Afghanistan.
    So yes, there's absolutely lessons to be learned through 
all of this. And the end game using the Doha agreement if you 
wanted to say that was the start point, sure. There's a lot to 
be said about that as well, and there is a continuum. As I 
mentioned in my opening statement, there's no phenomena at the 
end of the war----
    Mr. Meeks. My point is this. If we're taking a serious look 
at this----
    General Milley. Sure.
    Mr. Meeks [continuing]. You cannot just take a peek at one 
little segment of it and say this is the reason everything 
happened without looking at what preceded it because you'd have 
to look at it in its entirety. Isn't that correct, if you're 
serious about trying to figure out how we're going to make sure 
the mistakes that may have made and the things we did right? 
You can only do that in a serious investigation if you take all 
of it and look at all of it and you examine all of it, not just 
piecemealing that. Would you agree with that?
    General Milley. Of course. I mean, I said that in my 
opening statement I said in previous testimony that a holistic 
look at the whole war in order to really determine outcomes, et 
cetera. In anything as complex as a war is not the result of a 
single causal factor.
    There's multiple factors and multiple decisions. So yes, in 
general, I agree. But I'm here for these families to try to get 
them answers and to try to get answers on the immediate issues 
that are at hand.
    Mr. Meeks. So I know the chairman went--so I just want to 
do the same amount of time that he had. I do not want to get 
cutoff there. So let me ask this. With the conclusion of the 
Doha deal, the Taliban stopped attacking U.S. forces inside of 
Afghanistan. Is that correct?
    General Milley. They--well, yes, lethal attacks. They 
committed to not doing it. There were some attacks. But they 
committed to not conducting lethal attacks. And by my memory, I 
do not think there was a lethal attack on U.S. forces----
    Mr. Meeks. So let me ask this. I'm running out of time. I 
saw the chairman finished about with 5 minutes there. So when 
the United States committed to the Doha deal, that was to 
withdraw--and I quote, ``withdraw from Afghanistan all military 
forces of the United States, its allies, coalition partners, 
including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private 
security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting 
service personnel.'' Is that correct? That was a Doha deal done 
under the Trump Administration. Is that correct?
    General Milley. As I recall, I think there were seven 
conditions that the United States signed up to and eight 
conditions that the Taliban signed up to. And I think you 
rattled off most of the key ones. It was a very explicit thing. 
It said you have to go from--there were 13,000, more or less--
13,000 U.S. troops when Doha was signed. And then you had to go 
to 8,600 in 135 days.
    Mr. Meeks. Let me just do this. I want to make sure. And so 
therefore, the withdrawal was well underway in January 2021 
after President Trump withdrew U.S. forces, notwithstanding 
concerns about the Taliban's behavior. Is that correct?
    General Milley. The withdrawal was absolutely underway. The 
drawdown of forces was underway. That's correct.
    Mr. Meeks. So I do not have time, but I would like--because 
I would like to do a complete investigation. That is what I 
think that our committee has the responsibility so that we can 
really be transparent with the American people on everything 
that took place in the 20 years in Afghanistan. Not just one 
piece but everything if we are serious and not playing politics 
with this issue. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time is expired. I will 
say the Afghanistan Commission has been commissioned to look at 
the last 20 years. The purpose of this investigation is to 
examine the evacuation.
    I will hold the members accountable 5 minutes under the 
rules of discipline so that we can get to every member on this 
committee who deserves to be heard. And we thank you for 
showing up. With that, I recognize Mr. Smith.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling 
this important hearing. Thank you to the two generals, for your 
distinguished service to our country. Thank you so very much 
for that.
    General Milley, you mentioned how you had suggested a 
minimum of 2,500 troops to remain. Who rejected your advice? 
Was it the President? Did you ever get a written or oral 
feedback as to why they rejected that advice?
    General Milley. Well, again, I cannot say President said 
this, President said that. That's beyond the scope of the law 
or actually with executive privilege. But it's obvious that the 
President made the decision and the President made an 
announcement on the 14th.
    And our recommendation was as I mentioned. Or our thoughts 
at the time was as I mentioned. And every President has a right 
to make those decisions. He's looking at things from a much 
wider angle than a military angle.
    Our military assessment was keep 2,500. And with them, it's 
not just 2,500. It's 2,500 plus the NATO plus the contractors. 
And the contractors are key here. And then that we thought--our 
assessment was that would keep the Afghan government and the 
military stable until such time as a diplomatic outcome could 
occur in accordance with the conditions set in the Doha 
agreement.
    Mr. Smith. In retrospect, would that have made the 
difference?
    General Milley. We will never know, I guess, because it did 
not happen. So I do think, though that--I believe that the 
Afghan government and the Afghan Security Forces would not have 
collapsed in August 21 had we maintained that posture. 
Those are high end special forces capable of defending 
themselves and conducting operations as they had been for a 
while.
    And I think my assessment probably moderate to significant 
risk on U.S. forces. But is that worth that risk? Again, the 
Doha agreement had conditions.
    But where was the problem for two Presidents. Nobody that I 
recall, nobody, zero, could coherently argue how it would end 
or how those conditions--the diplomatic conditions were going 
to be obtained. It's not a military problem, but how were those 
diplomatic conditions going to be obtained?
    Mr. Smith. Let me just ask you. I asked Secretary of State 
Blinken on September 2021 about the infamous phone call with 
Ghani. And Reuters did get a copy of that phone call, the 
transcript and apparently an actual verbatim. They listened to 
it.
    And in it, he said that there's a need whether it's true or 
not--this is our President of the United States saying this--
whether it's true or not, there's a need to project a different 
picture about the Taliban's capabilities. General McKenzie, you 
talked about how there was no plan to get U.S. citizens out. 
Then there seemed to be a bewilderment on the part of the 
Administration why Americans weren't flocking to leave.
    They did not have many ways of doing it anyway. And I'm 
just wondering what you thought of that phone call. I mean, I 
asked Blinken. He said, I do not talk about something that's 
been leaked.
    Well, is it true? Did he say that? Lying like that to me 
when you give the false impression to a whole group of 
Americans who never then got out, that's very, very serious.
    Second, just let me ask because I will run out of time, how 
many Americans were left behind? And again, I thank you that 
you did everything you could make this policy work. But you 
were given a policy that was egregiously flawed.
    But how many Americans were left behind? How many of our 
allies? And what has happened to them? Have them been beaten, 
killed, tortured?
    And second about all the weapons that were left behind, 
there are reports that some of it has found its way to Hamas. I 
do not know if that's true. I know you did everything you could 
on the way out to destroy them. But many were intact and left 
in the hands of the Taliban.
    General Milley. I cannot speak to the phone call. I do not 
have any personal knowledge of that. A number of Americans, 
this was always an issue. The number of Americans as General 
McKenzie, the F-77 report is supposed--every Ambassador in 
every country of the world keeps an F-77 report. And it's 
supposed to track the Americans, where they're at, the phone 
numbers, address, et cetera, in the country.
    That was always a difficult number for us and the 
Department of Defense to get a hold of. And I think it's true 
at the tactical level and operation level as well. And I'll be 
candid.
    I do not know the exact number of Americans that were left 
behind because the starting number was never clear. Same is 
true of at-risk Afghans, SIVs, the commandos, other Afghans 
that served with us. Those numbers varied so widely that they 
were quite inaccurate is best I could tell at the time. So I 
would just say I'm not sure even today about the accuracy of 
all those numbers.
    Mr. Smith. Are they in jail, dead some of them?
    General Milley. I think some were killed, Afghans. I do not 
know about the Americans. I do not think the Americans were. 
But I think some of the Afghans were tracked down that worked 
with us, and I think some of them were killed. And I'm pretty 
certain some of them in pretty brutal ways. Some managed to 
escape through various means. Others just laid low and keeping 
their heads down.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time is expired. Chair 
recognizes Mr. Sherman.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I wish we were having 
a hearing with these excellent witnesses on what's on people's 
mind which is what's going on in Gaza where we could discuss 
the incredible difficulties of urban warfare an how the top 
expert on urban warfare at West Point has said that Israel has 
done at least as good a job as any other military in minimizing 
civilian casualties given the incredible difficulties of urban 
warfare. Instead we have what appears a highly politicized 
hearing trying to blame Biden.
    And this hearing began with the title Biden's strategic 
failure. It's my understanding that our witnesses refused to 
testify with that title. In any case, they should have.
    We now re-titled it the hearing, but we haven't re-purposed 
it. It continues to be politicized. But a highly partisan 
hearing shouldn't be held if you're in the party that made most 
of the mistakes.
    Let's put this in context. We had a real dispute as to 
whether we should leave 2,500 or so American servicemen there 
for perhaps this decade and the following decade. The dissent 
cable argued for that.
    A lot of the foreign policy establishment argued for that. 
But Trump promised the American people every single American 
soldier would be out. And from that point, we had no bargaining 
position.
    That's why the chief negotiator said that it was well known 
by 2018--by the end of 2018 that we are hellbent to get every 
person out. And so what kind of agreement did we enter into in 
Doha? Supposedly by the best negotiator in the world, then 
President Trump.
    It is an agreement that says it's OK for the Taliban to 
treat 12-year-old girls like sex slaves. No provision prohibits 
that. Nothing prohibits the Taliban from killing people because 
they're part of the LGBT community.
    Nothing prohibits them from killing someone because they 
convert from Islam to Christianity. All they're required to do 
is talk to the Afghan government. They talked perhaps and then 
they assumed total power.
    And we could do nothing about it because we had promised 
the American people that absolutely every soldier would be out. 
And of course, right before the election, Trump promised to 
have them all back by Christmas of 2020. The Trump 
Administration lost 59 of servicemen, 152 of contractors, 
accomplishing absolutely nothing.
    We surrendered in 2020. We could've surrendered in 2017. 
But perhaps the most extreme partisanship has arised when so 
many members of this committee have attacked President Biden 
supposedly for not bringing back the, quote, ``85 billion''--I 
think it's closer to 8 billion dollars--of equipment that we 
left behind.
    Now this equipment was in the hands of Afghans who had 
plenty of use for it. They could keep it for their own defense. 
They could sell it to the Taliban. They did not choose to bring 
it back to us and return it.
    So I'll ask General Milley, had we--was there a way for us 
to go all around Afghanistan and demand the return of our 
equipment? This is assuming--I realize that at the time we 
hoped the Afghan armed forces would use that to resist the 
Taliban. But if we had realized that they were going to cave 
immediately, could we have taken that equipment away from all 
these Afghans with no casualties?
    General Milley. No, of course not.
    Mr. Sherman. So we would've incurred very substantial 
casualties if we had done what so many on the other side on the 
aisle have suggestion and that somehow get back our equipment. 
Now how does our withdrawal from Afghanistan compare to our 
withdrawal from--well, actually have another question. Biden 
came in on January 2021. Was there a comprehensive plan at that 
time to both withdraw absolutely every one of our servicemen 
because that was the promise had made to the American people 
while withdrawing in an organized way with no American 
casualties? Was there a complete plan ready to go at that time?
    General Milley. So two points, I'll go back to the 
equipment just very quickly. As I recall and I think it's laid 
out in the SIGAR's report, the Special IG for Afghanistan. It's 
80-some-odd billion dollars' worth of military aid total.
    That's everything from food and building barracks and 
uniforms and boots to include equipment over 20 years. And then 
he cites I think it's 7.2 billion of military equipment, U.S. 
manufactured military equipment that is with the Afghan 
Security Forces. That's Afghan owned equipment, not American 
equipment.
    Every piece of American equipment that the American 
military owned came out with us with Scott Miller or he 
destroyed onsite. And that's a fact. So the idea that the 
American----
    Mr. Sherman. So this attack on Biden----
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time expired.
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. For not taking the equipment is 
total bunk?
    Chairman McCaul. Chair recognizes Mr. Wilson, South 
Carolina.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I ask for 
unanimous consent to submit two reports from the George W. Bush 
Institute of February 2024, the captured State on human costs 
on corruption.
    Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And indeed, Generals, 
we appreciate your service. But we just have to learn from 
what's occurred, the appeasement in Afghanistan.
    The Biden decision to peace is the worst foreign policy 
national security decision I believe in the history of the 
United States. It led directly to the encouragement of 
dictators who are ruling by gun to invade the democracies rule 
of law. We saw that on February 22, 2022 when war criminal 
Putin invaded Ukraine.
    We saw that on October 7, 2023 when the regime in Tehran 
through their puppets of Hamas invaded Israel. We see it today 
as the world's largest military buildup is being conducted by 
the Chinese Communist Party to threaten Taiwan. The global war 
on terrorism continues and indeed with open borders. And the 
American families have never been at greater risk of attack.
    And I especially appreciate the military families who are 
here today. As a 31-year veteran of the 218th Infantry Brigade, 
I visited four times with our personnel with the Adjutant 
General Bob Livingston and our troops serving in Afghanistan. 
And I saw them serve with their Afghan brothers just as you 
did.
    And due to encouragement by my wife, I'm particularly 
grateful of my oldest son, Alan, who received a CAB in Iraq, my 
second son, a doctor at Baghdad International Airport. My third 
served at the southern border and also served in Egypt. And my 
youngest son served under your command a year in Afghanistan.
    And to me, the Biden decision that led to the 13 deaths of 
the persons at Abbey Gate, the service members, it's just 
inexcusable. And I actually felt assured, Generals, knowing 
that your competence and capability, particularly a Citadel 
graduate. But I am very concerned that you were blamed on 
August the 26th, 2021 by Mr. Biden.
    He specifically said that the 13 murdered, the withdrawal 
of forces was a decision as determined by the military. And he 
said he had letters that indicated that you had said there 
should be an immediate appeasement. I sent a letter that day to 
the President asking for copies of the letters.
    And every couple of months, I will send another request. It 
has not been provided. And so there are no letters. And it's 
the responsibility of the President of United States, his 
decision that resulted in what occurred putting American 
families at risk.
    With that, indeed the Doha agreement, each of you, was 
there a violation? It was conditions based. And were there 
violations by the Taliban of the agreement?
    General Milley. I'll let General McKenzie give you the 
specifics. But yes, the Taliban violated every condition of the 
agreement except lethal attacks on U.S. forces from the time 
they signed the agreement all the way to the end. So yes, they 
were in violation.
    They did not renounce Al Qaeda. They did not do Afghan to 
Afghan negotiations. They did not--there's a whole series of 
conditions in the Doha agreement that they did not do.
    General McKenzie. That's correct. Every condition except 
the narrow conditions about attacks on U.S. and coalition 
forces. And in particular, actually, they stepped up 
intentional attacks on Afghan forces during this period because 
we had agreed to withdraw substantive air combat support from 
the Afghan military during this period of time. And they took 
advantage of that opportunity.
    Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate that President Donald Trump 
has indicated it was conditions based. The conditions were 
violated. And that would've led to his view of maintaining the 
Bagram base. What is your position?
    General McKenzie. So my position on Bagram was linked to my 
recommendation, my position then and now, that we should've 
held at 2,500. At 2,500 U.S. forces if you also assume that 
will allow the Afghans to stay in the fight, you can maintain a 
viable base at Bagram.
    Mr. Wilson. And indeed Bagram would be----
    General McKenzie. And I consider Bagram critical.
    Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Protecting American families. And 
hey, as we conclude, we still have a President making bad 
decisions and that is that we had 7 weeks ago three young 
Americans killed, Army Reservist from Georgia. And this was the 
decision of the President, Mr. Biden, who did not follow 
through on trying to stop these attacks on our troops by the 
puppets of Iran. And we lost three servicemembers, over 40 
injured. And the President needs to take this seriously. We're 
in a conflict existential of our country. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. Chair recognizes Mr. 
Crow.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Chairman Milley 
and General McKenzie, for your service then and for coming 
voluntarily to testify and provide really important information 
to the committee and to the Gold Star families. And I join you 
in extending my condolences to the Gold Star families for 
making the ultimate sacrifice that certainly we can never 
repay.
    But we are trying the best to get answers for you. And I 
also want to extend my condolences to the over 2,400 other Gold 
Star families who weren't able to join us here today whose 
families also made the ultimately sacrifice over the 20 years 
of this war. My criticisms of the withdrawal, and the missteps 
and the problems are well documented.
    There were certainly issues that have to be addressed, and 
I've been very clear about that. And I've endeavored to get 
answers with my colleagues. But I also want to provide some 
really important context and that is ending wars is never easy 
and ending wars is never clean.
    And in fact, as you all know better than me, retrograde 
operations, withdrawal operations are some of the hardest and 
most dangerous things that we ask our military to do. So I want 
to provide some of that context. Chairman Milley, you said in 
your opening that the Doha agreement that President Trump and 
his Administration entered into with the Taliban required the 
complete withdrawal of U.S. forces and diplomatic.
    That was the agreement that the Trump Administration 
entered into. You said that had we not complied with that 
agreement that there would be, quote, ``open war with the 
Taliban,'' right? That they had kept their agreement not to 
attack U.S. forces which allowed us to withdraw and reduce our 
footprint. So here today had we not withdrawn and not ended the 
war would we be at open war with the Taliban?
    General Milley. I think the probability is greater than not 
that the Taliban would've reinitiated combat operations on 1 
May or 2 May. The Doha agreement says all force out by 1 May. 
The current Administration that the State Department negotiated 
with the Taliban to get that extended, Zal Khalilzad to get 
that extended until September, I guess it was, to buy some 
additional time. But there's little question in my mind that 
had the United States--that either Presidents' agreement to 
withdraw, if we did not withdraw 100 percent, then we would've 
been back at war with the Taliban. That's right.
    Mr. Crow. General McKenzie?
    General McKenzie. I generally agree with what General 
Milley said. But we always thought about staying--keeping 2,500 
needed to be coupled with an aggressive negotiation program 
with the Taliban, one that perhaps had a few more sticks and 
not all carrots.
    I think you needed to change your approach to negotiation 
if you decided to stay. We'll never know. You'll never know. I 
think, it's very possible that we could've been fighting the 
Taliban. But that's just a counterfactual that we will not know 
the answer to.
    Mr. Crow. . Thank you. On the issue of a NEO, I actually 
was one of those voices that joined you and called for an 
earlier NEO. And it was something that I thought would've been 
better and could've led to a smoother evacuation but not a 
perfectly clean one because NEOs are hard.
    And one thing I want to talk about is this issue of who we 
evacuate, right? You talked about getting accounts on U.S. 
citizens. But the simple fact of the matter is the United 
States nowhere ever requires its citizens to register at the 
State Department. So in no instance do we ever fully know what 
Americans are on the ground in any situation. Is that correct?
    General Milley. I think that's 100 percent correct. And 
you'll see it playing out today in Haiti. You saw it in the 
Sudan. You saw it in Ukraine. You saw it many other places.
    Very, very difficult. It's a voluntary thing. People are 
encouraged to register with the embassy. But I do not know of 
any compulsory requirement to do that.
    Mr. Crow. And also when we evacuate American citizens in 
Afghanistan, many of those were, in fact, dual citizens. Is 
that accurate, General McKenzie?
    General McKenzie. That's correct, yes.
    Mr. Crow. And many of those folks actually had non-American 
citizen family members. Is that right?
    General McKenzie. That is correct.
    Mr. Crow. So many of them not until the last moment wanted 
to evacuate until they knew that there was a crisis because 
they did not leave their family. Is that accurate?
    General McKenzie. I think you're absolutely correct.
    Mr. Crow. So even if we had started a NEO earlier, that 
does not mean at the end of the day there would not have been a 
rush and a crisis as the Afghan government and security forces 
collapsed because people finally realize they needed to get 
out. That probably would not have changed even if we had 
started the NEO earlier?
    General McKenzie. Hard to know. But that's certainly a 
possibility.
    Mr. Crow. Last piece is the part of the story that is not 
yet written and that is our partners, our friends, our Afghan 
allies who are still there, we have an obligation to get them 
out. There's a bill called the Afghan Allies Protection Act, a 
bipartisan bill. I want to thank Mr. Baird over here who's a 
co-sponsor of that. And I would encourage all my colleagues who 
are here who are not yet co-sponsors of that bill to sign on 
because we can still do right and save lives by passing this 
bill and providing a pathway for our friends to get out. With 
that, I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. Chair recognizes Mr. 
Perry from Pennsylvania.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, I thank you 
for your service and we honor the Gold Star families and the 
servicemembers here today. General Milley, General McKenzie, 
were the rules of engagement at the time of the Abbey Gate 
incident sufficient for servicemembers like Tyler Vargas to 
protect themselves?
    General McKenzie. So it's my judgment they were. And we 
went in with what we call the standard Chairman Joint Chiefs of 
Staff ROE with supplements for Afghanistan. There's three main 
components to it.
    First of all, the inherent right of self-defense. A U.S. 
servicemember anywhere in the world at any time has the right 
to defend him or herself against a threat. It does not have to 
be an action that you're defending against. It can be intent 
interpreted.
    So we're under that--we're operating under that threat, 
under that ROE at the same time. We had extended what we call 
collective self-defense to our friends, partners, and allies 
that are there. So you could take actions to defend the Brits. 
You could take actions to defend our Afghan partners.
    The third component of that was we used what we call direct 
action authorities which allowed you to strike people that were 
not in direct contact with you, particularly in relationship to 
Kabul if they posed a self-defense threat. So the last point I 
would say is we exercise self-defense with lethal effect three 
times during the defense of Kabul on 16 and I believe 22 and 26 
August.
    Mr. Perry. OK. So sticking with the Abbey Gate incident, 
General McKenzie, you said there was no specific attacker 
intelligence or no specific intelligence existed and that there 
was nobody on the BOLO that fit that description. Does that 
remain true today?
    General McKenzie. It does.
    Mr. Perry. So were you aware--after the Abbey Gate attack, 
were you aware that service members at the gate had requested 
the ability to service the target, so to speak? Were you aware 
of that?
    General McKenzie. No, I would not be aware of that.
    Mr. Perry. And it's understandable that a combatant 
commander might not be aware of what servicemembers right on 
the line are aware of? But post-that circumstance, were you 
concerned about the intelligence you were getting regarding the 
action you were about to take on the would be attackers and 
that network?
    General McKenzie. Sure. On or about the 26th, we were 
tracking four broad, very active, very concerning threat 
streams. We were looking at the threat of a vehicle borne IED, 
a person borne IED which actually was the modality of the 
abdicated attack.
    Mr. Perry. Right.
    General McKenzie. We were looking at indirect fire rocket 
attacks----
    Mr. Perry. Right.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. Orders. And we were looking 
at an insider attack. Somebody gets in and blows themselves up 
in the turmoil.
    Mr. Perry. Right.
    General McKenzie. So we had dozens of----
    Mr. Perry. But you had nothing fitting the description of 
what your servicemembers on the gate, on the line had----
    General McKenzie. We have a lot of descriptions of men 
and----
    Mr. Perry. So when the servicemember on the line is looking 
at the attacker based on the description and he's got the rules 
of engagement. But the rules of engagement at that point 
require him to check with his commander, go up the line and he 
does not get approval, that's exceptionally concerning. I 
understand the fog of war. I get the circumstance you're in.
    But there's a man sitting here that's been blown up because 
he could not get the answer that needed. So on Thursday, August 
26th, the Abbey Gate attack happens. Three days later of August 
29th, the drone strike occurs. Now you said that we had up to 
six Reapers following this car around for 8 hours. And I think 
up to 60 pieces of intelligence that proved that these were the 
people that had just attacked the Abbey Gate.
    General McKenzie. No, sir. That's not correct.
    Mr. Perry. Well, that's what I got here for open source 
reporting. OK. Maybe some of that is not correct. But 
regardless of the fact on the 29th, the drone strike occurs, 
kills ten, seven of them children. Five days later, the 
Pentagon admits there was a mistake, 5 days later. General 
Milley, when did you know that the drone strike was a failure?
    General Milley. When did I know that the drone----
    Mr. Perry. Drone strike on----
    General Milley [continuing]. Was a mistake?
    Mr. Perry [continuing]. The civilian taking water to his 
family was a failure.
    General Milley. Yes, no, I remember. When did I know? I 
probably----
    Mr. Perry. It was 5 days before the Pentagon said it was a 
mistake. When did you know?
    General Milley. Probably Day 4, Day 5, in that range. I did 
not know right away if that's what your question is.
    Mr. Perry. And who did you tell when you knew?
    General Milley. Well, I think it came up through me to the 
Secretary of Defense. I do not remember the exact----
    Mr. Perry. And it went from you to the SECDEF.
    General Milley. Well, it would've come from--General 
McKenzie would've called me. I do not remember the specifics, 
but General McKenzie would've called me and said we have an 
incident----
    Mr. Perry. Does anybody else in the Biden Administration 
know at that point that it's a failure?
    General Milley. I honestly do not know.
    Mr. Perry. Because the whole time they're telling us 
secondary explosions. We go the target and lying to the 
American people not having a clue. Why did you tell?
    General Milley. I told the Secretary of Defense. And of 
course, if we're having a principle's meeting, we go through 
the details of the strike. But I guess I'm trying to--if you're 
saying did I tell the President of the United States or 
whomever other than the Secretary of the Defense that there was 
a mistake, I think--and I'm doing this from memory.
    I think Frank McKenzie--General McKenzie would've called 
me. And I would've informed the Secretary of Defense. Or he 
would've called the Secretary of Defense which is his chain of 
command, and I might've been in there at the time.
    I do not recall the actual day time nor the individual that 
I mentioned to you. But for several days, it was my impression 
that the procedures were executed correctly and that we struck 
a target that we thought was an enemy. There was a mistake 
made. It's a tragic mistake----
    Mr. Perry. It's huge.
    General Milley [continuing]. Of war.
    Mr. Perry. And you lied to the American people for 5 days 
and all these families----
    General Milley. We weren't lying, though, Congressman. 
Lying implies we were intentionally trying to deceive. That is 
not what--I know that's not what I was doing.
    Mr. Perry. It's a pretty big mistake, sir. I yield the 
balance.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. I ask unanimous 
consent to allow Representative Miller-Meeks of Iowa to sit on 
the dais and participate in today's hearing without objection. 
So the chair now recognizes Mr. Schneider.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General Milley, 
General McKenzie. Like my colleagues here, I want to thank you 
for your distinguished service to our Nation. We're very 
grateful.
    I personally share your compassion and gratitude and extend 
my condolences to the Gold Star families here and all those who 
lost loved ones, the more than 2,400 who made the ultimate 
sacrifice over nearly 20 years of action in Afghanistan, as 
well as the thousands wounded, both with injuries that are 
visible and those that are not.
    I'm paraphrasing some of the things that I've heard today. 
No single factor determined the outcomes, I think is something 
you said. Twenty years of decisions, actions, successes, and 
failures all contributed to what ultimately happened in 
Afghanistan. You said there was a whole series of lessons along 
the way. And if I come to something, General Milley, I think--
if I got it right when you were talking with my colleague, 
Ranking Member Meeks, that the start of the end was the Doha 
agreement in 2020. Is that fair?
    General Milley. I think that's a way that a historian could 
look at it. You could also start it in 2011 when the decision 
to begin the drawdown. It's a 10-year process of drawdown. The 
end game itself, I probably peg it at Doha because it's a 
continuum of unbroken cause and effects from that moment to 
toward the end.
    Mr. Schneider. I think that's fair. It's hard to put one 
point. But what were your thoughts at the time of the signing 
of the Doha agreement in 2020?
    General Milley. Well, the military was not consulted on the 
Doha agreement, nor would I necessarily expect to be. But that 
was a State Department operation that was done under Secretary 
of State Pompeo with Zal Khalilzad as the Ambassador during 
negotiations. I was not consulted.
    It was an 18-month process. So it actually begins before I 
became a chairman. It begins under General Dunford. So that 
process goes on.
    I do not know what General Dunford knew, but I do not think 
he knew much about it. We knew there was a negotiation going 
on, the specifics of which we did not know the terms of the 
negotiation. I found out about that from Secretary Esper after 
the fact.
    And then it was then. And then a week or two later, we 
found the--we were given the classified annex to the Doha 
agreement. But no, we did not participate in the development of 
the terms nor the negotiations.
    Mr. Schneider. And when the decision was made to drawdown 
to 2,500 troops by I think you said inauguration day, did you 
see that as something that was sustainable, get to the ultimate 
goal? Or did that put U.S. forces at undo risk?
    General Milley. My assessment at the time was that 2,500 
U.S. troops--and again, these are high end Special Forces 
troops--2,500 U.S. troops with the contractors with NATO was 
the min force necessary in order to buy the time to ensure the 
conditions were going to get met and result in a satisfactory 
negotiated settlement with the government of Afghanistan and 
the Taliban. Obviously, that did not happen.
    Mr. Schneider. At any time between the Doha agreement and 
January 21 when 2,500 or even April and ongoing was the 
government involved in the negotiations, was there evidence of 
progress being made in negotiations between the Taliban and the 
government that would give confidence that we could achieve the 
conditions that were laid out in the Doha agreement?
    General Milley. I do not actually know that. I think that's 
probably a question for the State Department because they 
probably have better visibility. I do not think--I'm almost 
positive that there were no substantive negotiations between 
the government of Afghanistan, the government of President 
Ghani and the Taliban.
    Now there may have been some back channel stuff. There 
might've been some stuff that I'm not aware of. But I am not 
aware of substantive negotiation between the government of 
Afghanistan. And, in fact, the Doha agreement, that's one of 
the requirements.
    One of the conditions is a reduction in violence for a 
specified period of time. I think it was 90 days if I remember. 
And then that was supposed to lead to a permanent countrywide 
cease-fire.
    And then that would lead to a negotiated settlement between 
the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban. Obviously, the 
Taliban did not adhere to those conditions. They blew through 
those.
    But that was part of the Doha agreement. And that I think--
and I know you had Dr. Khalilzad here before. I think that's 
kind of what he was trying to make happen, but it never 
happened.
    Mr. Schneider. I understand. I'm almost out of time. But 
the goal was to have that negotiated agreement. The Taliban 
quickly, I think, recognized that they did not need to 
negotiate with the government. The government was weak and they 
could achieve their goals by other means. At what point, if 
any, and this is to both of you, would you mark the tipping 
point where the outcome was all but certain? It was probably 
long before August 2021, I imagine.
    General Milley. I would say two points. One is the Doha 
Agreement, because it was negotiated by the government of 
United States and a State Department-designated terrorist 
organization, the Taliban. There was a bilateral agreement. 
That kind of pulled the rug out morale-wise from both the 
Afghan Security Forces and the government itself.
    Because, at that point, they knew with certainty that there 
was a date-certain now, right? So I think that probably had a 
significant effect. Historians are going to have to figure out 
exactly what that effect is. The actual observable tipping 
point of the collapse of the Afghan military, et cetera, that 
clearly is in July.
    As you start looking at when provincial capitals start 
falling. The first provincial capital falls, I think it's 6 
August. And then in the next 10 days, the rest of them start 
falling all the way to the capture of Kabul. But it's at the 
end of July sort of right at the beginning of August, it 
becomes evident that the Afghan Security Forces are crumbling. 
And that's where the whole NEO thing comes up.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
    General Milley. But that's about the timing.
    Mr. Schneider. All right. Chairman, I apologize for the 
extra time. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired. Chair 
recognizes Mrs. Wagner.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank our 
witnesses for their time and their service to our country, 
recognizing certainly our Gold Star families that have joined 
us and those that have not today. One of the 13 lost at Abbey 
Gate was from my community in Missouri, Lance Corporal Jared 
Schmitz.
    I also want to remind our viewers and our colleagues here 
today that the title of this hearing, of this particular 
hearing is an Assessment of the Biden Administration's 
withdrawal from Afghanistan by America's Generals. Even today, 
two and a half years after the Biden Administration's botched 
withdrawal after countless hearings, roundtables, and 
briefings, the incompetence that led to the abandonment of 
Afghanistan absolutely astounds me. The Administration ignored 
the advice of allies, experts, and military leaders, blowing 
past warning sign after warning sign as it allowed Afghanistan 
to collapse.
    The total betrayal of our U.S. military servicemen and 
women, of our allies, of Afghanistan, and the subsequent 
chaotic, shameful withdrawal has seriously damaged our 
credibility as an ally and a leader. And because of the Biden 
Administration's actions, American communities are less safe. 
And the world is much more dangerous and unstable.
    We are paying the price now with conflicts roiling every 
corner of the globe. And yes, General Milley, those responsible 
must provide answers as you've said over and over. But also, 
they must be held to account. General Milley, General McKenzie, 
I ask the following questions not just as a Member of Congress 
but also as a mother of an Army Ranger who served under command 
in combat, in Afghanistan. So let me ask both of you, General 
Milley, General McKenzie, did you engage with our NATO allies 
and other allied nations about the withdrawal plan before 
President Biden announced his decision to go to zero in April 
2021?
    General Milley. Absolutely, sure. That was fundamental. And 
the NATO slogan at the time was in together, out together. So 
we coordinated multiple times with our NATO allies.
    Mrs. Wagner. Did our allies with troops in Afghanistan, 
recommend not going to zero prior to or after President Biden's 
April 2021 withdrawal announcement? General McKenzie?
    General McKenzie. Yes, they did. And it was my actual 
belief that had we stayed at 2,500, we would've had probably 
5,000----
    Mrs. Wagner. Yours and everyone else's.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. And maybe more than that.
    Mrs. Wagner. Clearly the Trump Administration. Did our 
allies with troops in Afghanistan inform you that they would 
withdraw if the U.S. went to zero? General Milley?
    General Milley. Yes, they said we'll be aligned with you. 
In together, out together, we'll be aligned with you and that 
they would follow our lead.
    Mrs. Wagner. General McKenzie?
    General McKenzie. Yes, because the unique capabilities that 
the United States brings, they could not have stayed without 
our presence.
    Mrs. Wagner. General Milley and General McKenzie, the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan was nearly complete 
by mid-July, more than a month ahead of the August deadline. 
Why was the drawdown executed so quickly? And did you at any 
point believe the process was moving too fast?
    General McKenzie. I'll take that. It was by design. From 
the very beginning, we wanted to get out as quickly as we could 
because we believed speed brought safety. And it would also 
give us a cushion in case unanticipated problems arose.
    Mrs. Wagner. What objectives, threat assessments, or orders 
were driving the speed?
    General McKenzie. Concerns about the Taliban attacking us. 
Concerns about ISIS being able to carry out attacks. But also a 
desire to have room at the back end, in case we had trouble. We 
had weather problems. We had aircraft problems that slowed us 
down. And in case that did not happen----
    Mrs. Wagner. It's not clear, sir, that the Afghan military 
and some of allies for that matter were not ready for how 
quickly the U.S. withdrawal occurred. Did you ever consider or 
advise that the pace of the drawdown slowed to ensure the 
Afghan military was able to successfully transition? So why was 
such action not taken?
    General McKenzie. The Afghan military was read in from the 
beginning about the pace of the withdrawal. And frankly, ma'am, 
I do not believe that waiting another 30 days would've had any 
material impact at all----
    Mrs. Wagner. One quick other question, and I thank you so 
much. General Milley, General McKenzie, has the Taliban been 
carrying out a campaign of retribution, reprisals, and revenge 
killing against the Afghan allies that we left behind?
    General Milley. I believe yes.
    General McKenzie. Absolutely, systematically.
    Mrs. Wagner. Systematically. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields. The chair 
recognizes Mr. Phillips.
    Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Milley, 
General McKenzie, thank you for your sacrifices. To my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle who have served in 
uniform, thank you for yours. To all of you in this room who 
might've served, I am grateful.
    And particularly to the Gold Star families in the room, if 
you might just raise your hands, those of you here are 
representing loved ones. I'm one of you, and thank you for 
holding that up. I'm one of you, and I know how you feel.
    I've been looking for answers my whole life after having 
lost my father in Vietnam. You can imagine the questions I have 
to this very day. With the help of Chairman Milley's office and 
the chairman himself, I was able to go back to Vietnam for the 
first time in my life in March of last year.
    I went to the very dirt where my father took his last 
breath. And I can tell you from that experience it is where I 
took my first. And when I came home, I recognized two things.
    First of all, one of the answers is this little piece of 
plastic, the voting card that we use in the House chamber in 
the Capitol. It's where we make decisions that can make life 
and also take life. It's true in the White House. It's true 
with our generals. It's true with our armed services.
    And the weight of that is something that changed me 
forever. But what I also recognized is how remarkable the 
hospitality of the Vietnamese were when I was there. The 
People's Army, our own people in Vietnam, how gracious, how 
hospitable, how kind, how caring, and how meaningful they saw 
my return.
    And my question to you, both generals, is this. What do we 
need to start doing today in Afghanistan to ensure that 
families here and families of the 2,400 others that lost their 
lives can 1 day return to Afghanistan and have that same 
blessing that I had to visit the dirt where my father was 
killed?
    General Milley. I'll be candid, Congressman. I do not think 
there's anything immediate. It will take years upon years upon 
years. In my view, this is my personal view, I believe the 
Taliban is still a terrorist organization.
    I still believe that they conduct incredible, horrific 
retribution inside their own country. And I would not recommend 
to any family member at this time to return. There is probably 
some diplomatic initiatives that could be done in the years 
ahead. But the Taliban----
    Mr. Phillips. And that's my question, sir, is my return was 
54 years later. What do we need to do now----
    General Milley. It's going to be many years.
    Mr. Phillips. --10, 20, 30 years to plant the seed so that 
people can return?
    General Milley. I've served several tours in Afghanistan. 
Lost a lot of people to include these 13. And I have a problem 
reconciling with the Taliban. My father had a problem 
reconciling with the Japanese.
    Wars are horrible, terrible things. And I'm carrying that 
with me, and I'll probably go to the grave with it. So I do not 
know how many years it's going to take. But it's going to take 
a long time.
    Mr. Phillips. I appreciate it. General McKenzie, any 
thoughts on what we need to do, this institution, Members of 
Congress, the White House? What do we need to do now----
    General McKenzie. Well, I think----
    Mr. Phillips [continuing]. Where 50 years from now others 
can go back?
    General McKenzie. Frankly, our principle concern with 
Afghanistan right now should be the fact that Al Qaeda and ISIS 
have the opportunity to gather strength in ungoverned spaces 
with clear desire to attack our homeland. So I think we should 
begin with concern about that. And I----
    Mr. Phillips. Let's talk about that. On that account, it's 
more difficult now than it was before obviously. What should we 
be doing now?
    General McKenzie. So I think we need to continue to 
resource U.S. Central Command so they have the opportunity to 
do surveillance into Afghanistan. I'm out of that picture now. 
I do not know what they do. But I think we need to keep an eye 
on it. I think that's very important.
    In the long term, I believe it is decades away before 
there's going to be any rapprochement with Afghanistan, 
particularly given their unusually and specifically horrific 
treatment of women, children, human rights issues. And they 
seem to embrace that. I agree with the chairman that the 
Taliban is a terrorist organization.
    They themselves do not have a desire to attack us in our 
homeland. But they do harbor entities and organizations that do 
have a desire to do that. And I think right now it's hard for 
me to get beyond that relentless focus.
    Mr. Phillips. I understand. But I have about 50 seconds 
left. The U.S. has a history of making war, sometimes 
successfully, sometimes not. We also have a tradition of making 
peace, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. But looking to 
success and prospectively, we made a lot of our former enemies 
our dear friends and allies. Are there things that we should be 
thinking about right now as it relates to making former enemies 
our friends?
    General McKenzie. In the case of Afghanistan, it's hard to 
find common ground with them right now.
    Mr. Phillips. Understood. That seems to be the theme, and I 
respect that.
    General McKenzie. It's difficult for me to--I'm probably 
not the right person to ask. You might ask someone from the 
Department of State----
    Mr. Phillips. I understand.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. To come in and talk to you 
more about that or USAID because there are some opportunities 
there. But from my perspective, I tend to focus on the security 
issues. And frankly, sir, the security issues are profound.
    Mr. Phillips. I get it. Gentlemen, thank you. And to the 
Gold Star families, rest assured my mission now is to ensure 
some day you can go back because there's nothing more 
meaningful and powerful. God bless you all. Thank you. I yield 
back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. Chair now recognizes 
a veteran of Afghanistan who made dear sacrifices to his nation 
and to Afghanistan as well, Mr. Mast.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Generals, for 
your attendance and for your answers today and for putting on a 
uniform in defense of this country. I think any of us that put 
on a uniform want the next generation to wake up every day and 
be able to say this country is still worth it. America is worth 
the fight.
    And it's one of the most important reasons that we have 
these hearings and that we do these oversights so that 
everybody can wake up and say yes, this is a place that's worth 
it. I want to ask some questions about targeting. I've watched 
your all's interviews from in uniform to leaving uniform. As 
you can imagine, it's of great personal interest to me and of 
course to the Gold Star families as well throughout the war.
    We left on August 30th, 2021. We lost 13 servicemembers on 
the 26th of 2021. And moving behind those dates, can you recall 
when the last time it was that America targeted somebody 
specifically for the purpose of termination on the 25th, on the 
24th, on the 23d, wherever, whether it be ISIS-K, whether it be 
Taliban, whether it be Al Qaeda?
    General McKenzie. Sure. On the night of 27-28 August, we 
targeted an ISIS-K bomb maker in Nangarhar Province.
    Mr. Mast. Prior to the 26th, General.
    General McKenzie. Prior to the 26th----
    Mr. Mast. I know that we made a mistake in target.
    General McKenzie. That was the 29th. That was 2 days later.
    Mr. Mast. Prior to the 26th, prior to the Abbey Gate?
    General McKenzie. It had been quite a while before we had 
actually struck any deep targets. It'd been a lengthy period of 
time. I could not give the exact date, but it was probably a 
matter of many weeks since we had struck a target that you 
would develop and strike as a personality target or a deep 
strike target.
    Our strikes were during the period particularly after the 
Doha agreement. We were more in direct self-defense of Afghan 
forces. And that became increasingly difficult to deliver as 
our aircraft were repositioned out of Afghanistan as we drew 
down.
    So our strikes became increasingly limited. Now the Afghans 
struck, and they struck not only close-to-fence targets but 
deep targets. But we had very limited visibility on those 
targets. And I do not believe they were necessarily effective 
in those strikes.
    Mr. Mast. And I want to get to that a little bit, General 
McKenzie. In one of your interviews was with Fox. And you said 
this specifically. There were a wide variety of targets the 
U.S. military told the Taliban to look at.
    And it's not that I really want to get specifically to. 
When did that envelope change for America? And what did it look 
like? Which targets were we choosing to give to the Taliban to 
target and which targets were we keeping for ourselves? What 
met that threshold of saying, the U.S. is going to hit this, 
but we're going to give this off to the Talibs?
    General McKenzie. Sure. I prefer to talk a little bit more 
about this in the closed session. But we passed the Taliban 
information on targets that were in close proximity to KIA, 
places where we thought ISIS-K was gathering, ISIS-K might be 
preparing to strike. And there were about 18 of those targets 
that we passed.
    And they took action on some of them. I cannot tell you if 
they took action on all of them because we did not have 
visibility on them. Now when I say they actioned them, they did 
not strike them with a drone obviously.
    They drove out and looked at the location. May or may not 
have taken action. But I can tell you that we did that, I 
believe, 18 times during this period of time. And by that, I 
mean after 15 August until we left the country.
    Mr. Mast. After 15 August? You said it was several weeks 
before we had--since we had targeted somebody prior to the 
Abbey Gate.
    General McKenzie. Correct. And we were not targeting before 
15 August at any number in Afghanistan. But specifically, I was 
answering your question about the Taliban because the 
relationship with the Taliban was a direct, highly 
transactional relationship based on our withdrawal between 15 
August and 30 August.
    Mr. Mast. And here's the reason that that timeline, that 
looking at that is important to me. As I've said, I've looked 
at your all's comments, your interviews, things that you've 
said. And speaking on a different subject, you were speaking 
about Iran, the failure of the Biden Administration in talking 
Iran off the target list, not that we should drop ordinance on 
them tomorrow, but that they should be on the list just so that 
there is deterrence, just so that they know they cannot act and 
not have a response by the United States of America and that is 
a failure.
    And you use specifically the terminology that to take Iran 
off the target list was to give Iran aid and comfort were the 
exact words. And it is my opinion that if we are ceasing to 
target Al Qaeda, ISIS-K, or the Taliban in those days leading 
up to August 26th, then just as you looked at a lack of 
targeting Iran as giving the enemy aid and comfort, I would 
look at giving that enemy, I would look at those lack of 
actions as giving that enemy aid and comfort. And in that, 
General, my time has expired.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. Chair recognizes Mr. 
Connolly.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to both 
of our witnesses. General Milley, just as an American, I want 
to thank you for your service and for how you've conducted 
yourself in that service. America owes you a debt.
    You come from my hometown of Boston, just outside Boston if 
I understand it correctly. Your father fought in World War II 
in the 4th Marine Division in the Pacific. Is that correct? And 
your mother was a nurse who served in the U.S. Naval Reserve 
during that same war. Is that correct?
    General Milley. She worked at a hospital out in Seattle, 
took care of the wounded. That's correct.
    Mr. Connolly. And yet an uncle who served in the Korean 
War?
    General Milley. I had two uncles that were also in World 
War II, one in the Philippines and one was landing at Normandy 
while my dad was at Saipan and another uncle that was in the 
Korean War.
    Mr. Connolly. So it'd be fair to say your family really 
answered a call to serve its country including bearing arms to 
protect this country and to deter its adversaries and enemies. 
Is that correct?
    General Milley. That's correct, and two uncles in World War 
I and cousins in Vietnam.
    Mr. Connolly. Oh, even going further. And then you, 
yourself, deployed in Somalia, Panama, Haiti, and multiple 
times as brigade commander to Iraq and Afghanistan. Is that 
correct?
    General Milley. Correct.
    Mr. Connolly. You proud of that service?
    General Milley. Forty-four years, proud.
    Mr. Connolly. Are you proud of that service?
    General Milley. Absolutely, 100 percent.
    Mr. Connolly. And then a retired colonel Ross Davison who 
served under you in Baghdad recounted one incident where you 
ran across a booby-trapped bridge at night in order to prevent 
a pair of U.S. tanks from blowing up and thus save lives. Is 
that incident accurate?
    General Milley. It's correct.
    Mr. Connolly. General Milley, on a Truth Social post on 
September 22d of last year, Donald J. Trump said talking about 
you, quote, ``This guys turned out to be a woke train wreck who 
if the fake news reporting is correct was actually dealing with 
China to give them a head's up on the thinking of the President 
of the United States. This is an act so egregious that, in 
times gone by, the punishment would've been death,'' unquote. 
And a member of the other side of the aisle on this very 
committee called you a traitor and said, I quote, ``In a better 
society, quislings,`` referring to the leader of Norway during 
World War II who collaborated with the Nazis, ``like the 
strange,`` I will not use the words used by our colleague, 
``General Milley would be hung,'' unquote.
    General Milley, what's your reaction to those statements 
about you, especially given you and your family's long service, 
distinguished service to the United States of America as we're 
discussing patriotism and protecting troops? I wonder how you 
respond to the kind of slander I've just read attributed to two 
prominent political figures?
    General Milley. Well, let me just say----
    Mr. Connolly. And if you could move the mic closer so we 
can hear you.
    General Milley. So obviously, I do not agree with the 
comments. But it's a free country and people can say what they 
want. But with all due respect, Congressman, I'm here for the 
families of Abbey Gate and I'm here for the families of those 
that served in Afghanistan.
    And I'll leave those comments. As much as I do not care for 
those comments, I do not agree with them, they have a right to 
say them. But I'd like to stay focused on these families with 
respect.
    Mr. Connolly. I think that's very much in keeping with the 
honorable tradition you've set in your own career and your own 
good name. But as a member of this body, I want to let you know 
I find those comments inconsistent with the honor we're trying 
to bestow on those who lost loved ones, who have served and 
served nobly their country. You deserve that honor and respect 
too.
    And those kinds of comments are dangerous and unbefitting 
anybody from my point of view who serves or seeks to serve 
public office. And as a member of this committee, I want you to 
know I renounce them and I have a very different view of your 
service. Thank you for serving the American people. I yield 
back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. Chair recognizes Mr. 
Barr.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Milley, General 
McKenzie, thank you all for your service. On July 2d, 2021, the 
United States left Bagram Air Base in the dead of night without 
notifying the base's new Afghan commander who discovered the 
U.S. departure more than 2 hours after the military had left. 
General Milley, was your assessment at the time that Bagram Air 
Base was the most strategically important base in Afghanistan 
and across the region?
    General Milley. I think it was a strategically important 
air base. However, at that point, the troops had been drawn 
down to a degree that it was not defendable by U.S. forces. So 
there was no question of closing it.
    As far as the specific information of the Afghan command, I 
read that in the media. I do not know. I'd ask Frank to comment 
on whether he knew or did not know.
    Mr. Barr. Sir, was Bagram a key component of U.S. air 
capabilities to strike ISIS-K and Al Qaeda and to stop Taliban 
advances?
    General Milley. Sure, and had been for 20 years.
    Mr. Barr. And is Bagram Air Base or was Bagram Air Base the 
only U.S. air base in a country with a physical border with 
China?
    General Milley. Well, we had several previously. But at 
that point in time, that was the only one remaining.
    Mr. Barr. Who, General Milley, made the--gave the order to 
abandon Bagram?
    General Milley. Well, the President makes a decision, 
announces it on the 14th of April. And the decision very simply 
was withdraw U.S. forces and keep a diplomatic presence. The 
embassy is going to remain in Kabul. And if you're ever going 
to have to do a NEO, they're going to have to use the Kabul 
International Airport as the evacuation air field.
    Mr. Barr. Would a NEO--could a NEO----
    General Milley. When you drawdown----
    Mr. Barr. Could a NEO have taken place in a more orderly 
fashion had it been conducted out of Bagram versus HKIA?
    General Milley. Sure. But you do not have the forces to 
defend. It's a question that--it's a non-question in the sense 
that you do not have the forces to defend Bagram. Bagram 
would've required--roughly speaking, if U.S. forces are 
defending it, Bagram would've required about 5,000. If the 
Afghans are there with you, then you probably could've defended 
it with 1,800, maybe 2,000, something like that. So. once you 
make the decision, Congressman, to go to--to remove U.S. 
forces, you do not have the option of keeping Bagram.
    Mr. Barr. Right. So----
    General Milley. It's no longer there.
    Mr. Barr. Who did give the order? Who specifically gave the 
order to abandon Bagram? And I assume the order was delivered 
to General Miller.
    General Milley. Well, it was General Miller's 
recommendation that if he's going withdraw U.S. forces, I 
cannot keep Bagram and HKIA and defend. It's was 750 guys. It's 
not even feasible.
    Mr. Barr. So----
    General Milley. That's his recommendation. The plan is 
brought up through the chain of command.
    Mr. Barr. Was there----
    General Milley. And the plan is approved.
    Mr. Barr [continuing]. Dissent within the military? Was the 
order given against military advice?
    General Milley. To close Bagram?
    Mr. Barr. Yes.
    General Milley. No, and that's because the previous 
decision is a strategic decision----
    Mr. Barr. Right.
    General Milley [continuing]. To withdraw U.S. forces.
    Mr. Barr. Well, General McKenzie, if I could ask. You 
stated that DOD and State were operating at different speeds. 
Do you believe that if State and DOD were on the same page that 
Bagram could have remained a viable option for the NEO?
    General McKenzie. The key point the Chairman made is this, 
sir. It's once you go below 2.5k for U.S. forces, you cannot 
hold Bagram. At 2.5k, I was enthusiastic about holding Bagram. 
Scott Miller was enthusiastic about holding Bagram.
    Mr. Barr. Understand. But neither one of you recommended to 
go below----
    General McKenzie. My position then and now was to stay at 
2.5k.
    General Milley. And that's right, once the decision is 
made.
    Mr. Barr. Understand, understand.
    General Milley. Presidents make decisions. And once that 
decision is made, we execute.
    Mr. Barr. But the point here that I'm trying to make is 
that the refusal to abide by the recommendations that both of 
you made would have preserved the option to maintain Bagram and 
execute the NEO from Bagram. My question is would Bagram have 
been a preferable strategic exit versus HKIA?
    General McKenzie. So there are problems with Bagram. It's 
30 miles away from Kabul. All things being equal, you prefer to 
have Bagram at 2.5k.
    There's a lot of reasons why you'd want that second air 
base. And yes, it would've helped the NEO had you been doing it 
at the force level that would allow you to man it.
    Mr. Barr. Yes. So it was really the fact that the resources 
weren't there. The troop levels were not there to actually 
carry out a successful NEO. General McKenzie, did you ever make 
a request to re-seize Bagram either before or after August 
15th?
    General McKenzie. We had plans. And I prefer to talk about 
them in a closed session. But we had plans to do a variety of 
things.
    Mr. Barr. My time has expired. I think your advice to the 
political leadership was the correct advice primarily because 
we lost a key strategic asset in the counter terrorism fight. 
And now in retrospect looking at the fact that we have 
competition with China and we do not have an air base there, a 
huge, huge strategic blunder in my judgment. With that, I 
yield.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. Chair recognizes Mr. 
Dean--Ms. Dean. That's the second time I've done that.
    Ms. Dean. Thank you, Chairwoman.
    [Laughter.]
    Chairman McCaul. Touche.
    Ms. Dean. We need a laugh here today.
    Thank you, Chairman McCaul; thank you, Ranking Member 
Meeks, for holding this hearing.
    Thank you, General Milley; thank you, General McKenzie, for 
your extraordinary careers of service to this country and the 
sacrifice that both you and your families have made for the 
service of our country.
    I also recognize the very faithful service members of all 
of our military, some of whom are here today, but over the 20 
years of the conflict in Afghanistan, the more than 2400 who 
gave their lives for this country, for this democracy, for the 
rights that we prize here.
    I also recognize the Gold Star Families who are in the 
room. You know I care desperately that you get the answers that 
you need.
    And I appreciate that both of our testifiers here today 
have talked about that it is a comprehensive look that you 
deserve. It is not about a single day or a single month. You 
deserve the answers to what went right with this war and what 
went wrong.
    To the Abbey Gate veterans and families--and I see Veteran 
Sergeant Vargas-Andrews and your family. Thank you for being 
here yet again.
    I wanted to start quickly with the testimony before the 
House Armed Services Committee in September 2021, where 
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said of the timing of the 
evacuations, ``As for when we started evacuations, we offered 
input to the State Department decision, mindful of their 
concerns that moving too soon might actually cause the very 
collapse of the Afghan government that we all wanted to 
avoid.''
    I wanted to ask both of you, what role did the sudden, just 
almost instantaneous collapse of the Afghan government play in 
the events following the continuing evacuation and withdrawal? 
Can you speak to the utter collapse that seems to have 
surprised most people?
    General McKenzie. Operationally, the collapse meant that at 
HKIA we depended upon Afghan support to hold the perimeter. 
They melted away. And that was probably the most significant 
immediate operational effect of the collapse of the Afghan 
government and the attendant collapse of the Afghan military.
    Now, we had a plan for that, we saw it as a possibility. 
But that's why we had to put in 6,000, almost 6,000 U.S. 
forces, to replace those Afghans that had melted away. We would 
have been able to hold HKIA with a far smaller number of U.S. 
forces, had the Afghans remained. But when the government 
collapsed, they went away. So, that had a profound and 
immediate effect on everything else that followed.
    Ms. Dean. General Milley?
    General Milley. Yes, I think, with respect to what General 
Austin was saying, that was a concern of the State Department, 
but there was a general consensus that complete withdrawal of 
U.S. military force was going to lead to collapse of the 
government in the end. And so, the issue is timing, when that 
would happen. Most of the assessments indicated, the 
intelligence community assessments, were a 12-to-24-month sort 
of thing.
    The military actually had a tighter assessment, and we 
estimated that the earliest time of complete collapse could be 
in the fall, maybe around Thanksgiving, something like that. 
Nothing indicated August per se.
    Having said that, though, I think that we certainly were 
advocating for the parallel withdrawal of the embassy personnel 
and the American citizens with the military prior to the events 
of August.
    Ms. Dean. And what role did President Ghani's leaving 
town----
    General Milley. I think that was the straw that broke the 
camel's back. I think it was collapsing anyway, but at that 
point in time--you know, I do not want to make comparisons, I 
suppose, but, you know, you have Ghani and Zelensky, right? 
Zelensky stays and his military stays in Kyiv, and they are a 
nation at war and they're fighting tooth and nail.
    And then, in this particular case, President Ghani and his 
entire cabinet less one--one went up into the Panjshir Valley; 
the rest of them got on airplanes and took off out of the 
country. As soon as the ANSF saw that, they literally took 
their uniforms off, put their weapons down, and it collapsed. 
It was very, very quick, once that event happened.
    Ms. Dean. As to the drawdown, if I could ask you both--and 
maybe it's more appropriate to General Milley, but I might be 
wrong--under the Doha Agreement, the drawdown to 8600 troops by 
June 202 was required. But my understanding is, subsequent 
withdrawals were at President Trump's discretion--4500 by 
November 2020; 2500 by January 2021, as a new Administration is 
about to take place.
    It did not seem ideal by defense officials. On what basis 
did President Trump order the troop withdrawal to 2500 in 
January 2021?
    General Milley. Well, to back up, the requirement to go to 
8600 was 135 days after the signing of the Doha Agreement. And 
that was executed. Secretary Esper was the Secretary of 
Defense.
    Then, Secretary Esper submitted a recommendation, and I 
concurred with it, to withdraw to 4500 and hold at 4500 until 
all the conditions were being met. Secretary Esper was removed 
from office on the 9th of November.
    On the 11th or 12th of November, I was handed a piece of 
paper with the President's signature on it, which had two 
sentences. One was withdrawal of our forces from Somalia by the 
15th of December, and then, withdrawal of our forces out of 
Afghanistan by the 15th of January.
    We went, the Acting Secretary of Defense Miller and I, and 
others, went over to the White House to confirm that order, 
because we had not been consulted on that. So, we did, and that 
order was, then, subsequently rescinded. And on the 17th of 
December, or November, another order was received signed by 
Robert O'Brien, the National Security Advisor to the President, 
which directed at that point to come down to 2500. Twenty-five 
hundred was always given as the min force required by the 
military as a recommendation to two consecutive Presidents.
    Ms. Dean. And yet, momentarily, the President, the former 
President, placed an order to withdraw everybody.
    General Milley. Well, it was a drawdown to zero, and then, 
you may recall--I think somebody had mentioned it--that there 
was kind of a--there was some discussion of everybody's home by 
Christmas, that kind of thing.
    But the actual formal orders is what I just discussed.
    Ms. Dean. Again, I thank you for your service, and I thank 
all the military families.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    The chair now recognizes Mrs. Young Kim.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman McCaul and 
Ranking Member Meeks, for holding today's hearing.
    I want to thank General Milley and General McKenzie for 
coming before our committee with your testimoneys.
    And I do, also, want to welcome the Gold Star Families and 
veterans. Thank you for your service.
    Following the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
President Biden stated that he owes no apologies for how the 
withdrawal was conducted. I disagree. To this date, we're still 
unclear on how many Americans were left behind in Afghanistan 
and remain there, not to mention Afghan allies that helped our 
service members with translation services and intelligence 
gathering. That could have been prevented if the withdrawal was 
not carried out in a way that was dismissive of advice coming 
from the DOD's top leadership.
    President Biden also promised in an ABC News interview just 
a few days after the Taliban takeover of Kabul that, if there 
are American citizens left, we're going to stay until we get 
them all out. Well, that's not happened.
    So, General Milley and General McKenzie, did you consider 
this promise an order from the President?
    General Milley. No. The ABC interview, I would not consider 
that an order. We receive orders from the White House in formal 
ways. It has been like this for decades. Typically, they are 
signed by, typically, the National Security Advisor to the 
President, and then, that's transmitted to the Secretary of 
Defense chain of command. And then, the Joint Staff and the 
Chairman will take those orders, turn them into military orders 
to transmit to the combatant commanders.
    So, I would not consider an ABC interview or any other 
means of a media communication as, quote-unquote, ``an order.''
    Mrs. Kim of California. General McKenzie?
    General McKenzie. I think General Milley described it 
exactly correct.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Was there any contingency planning 
with the State Department to ensure that no citizens would be 
left behind?
    General McKenzie. After we departed at the end of August--
--
    Mrs. Kim of California. I'm asking prior to the withdrawal, 
was there contingency planning with the State Department?
    General McKenzie. We always plan for capacities. For 
example, from the very beginning, CENTCOM worked with a number 
of about 150,000. That's how many people we thought--that goes 
back to June 2020--that was the number that we thought would 
have to come out.
    The Department of Defense's responsibility there is to make 
sure you've got the airplanes to move them; you can process 
them. But it's up to the Department of State to say who's 
coming out; how you're going to categorize those people; how 
you're going to sort them, and how you're going to get them 
there.
    And that's when I would talk about the velocities, the 
different velocities of the two departments. You know, we are 
pretty straightforward with our ability to do that, but we're 
dependent on the Department of State actually to make those 
decisions that turn our ability into actual movement of human 
beings.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Sure.
    So, we talked about how the President promised that during 
that ABC News interview, but when did you realize that 
President Biden's promise would be broken?
    General McKenzie. I'm sorry, just help me with that.
    Mrs. Kim of California. When did you realize that the 
President's promise of getting every one of the American 
citizens left in the Taliban will be left--I mean, will be, 
we'll get them out? When did you----
    General McKenzie. I would say by mid-July 2021 I was 
concerned, given events in Afghanistan, about the State of the 
Department of State's planning and their ability to execute on 
the--now, I never thought we'd get everybody out. I always 
thought there would be some--you've never going to obtain 
perfection there, but you would want to get that number as 
small as possible. So, I was--I knew there would be people left 
behind. We weren't going to get everybody out, but you want to 
get as close to zero as you can.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Were you told by that same 
Administration just days later to leave Americans behind if it 
meant getting out by August 31st?
    General McKenzie. No, I was never told that. But I would 
share with you my advice in late August was we needed to get 
out by the 31st. If we did not leave by the 31st, it was clear 
to me, from our intelligence reporting and a number of other 
sources, we would have been fighting the Taliban. So, I thought 
you want to get out by the 31st, and then, resort to diplomatic 
means to bring our citizens that do not get out by the 31st 
out. Otherwise, you're going to have to pour thousands more 
forces into Afghanistan just to stay there, and permanently 
impair your opportunity to get citizens out, not to mention the 
tens of thousands of at-risk Afghans that you would like to get 
out, that are actually, of course, at much higher risk.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Let me ask General Milley my last 
question. You previously testified that, during the NEO, you 
and General McKenzie both recommended against keeping U.S. 
forces in Afghanistan past August 31st. So, why would you 
recommend this, even with hundreds of Americans and tens of 
thousands of Afghan allies left behind?
    General Milley. Well, for the very same reasons that 
General McKenzie just outlined. I think to keep them past the 
31st--you're already at a very small number--you would have had 
to increase that number by tens of thousands in order to have 
stayed there and continued fighting now what would be the 
Taliban.
    As far as the American citizens, it wasn't clear then, and 
it's still not clear to me, what those numbers are, and that 
was never clarified by anyone in the State Department, exactly 
how many were there; who they are. Are they out in Herat? Are 
they down in Kandahar?
    We cannot, unless you put tens of thousands of troops in 
there, we cannot be bouncing around a country that's at war and 
trying to look for this person and that person. It's just not 
realistic. It's not a feasible course of action. And by the end 
of August, especially after the 26th Abbey Gate, absolutely not 
feasible.
    So, at that point in time, your choices are extend well 
into September, October. You could look forever, because you do 
not even know what number you're looking for. And you do not 
even know where they're at.
    So, those weren't feasible or acceptable courses of action 
at the time, although I do understand the human desire, but did 
not know numbers, did not know necessarily where they were, and 
so on and so forth. So, not a realistic option.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Got it.
    Well, thank you very much. My time is up.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time is expired.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Moskowitz.
    Mr. Moskowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Generals, for your service to the country.
    And echoing comments of my colleagues, I want to, 
obviously, extend my condolences to the Gold Star Families 
here, and that were here earlier, and paying the ultimate 
sacrifice for our country.
    I also want to recognize the sacrifice of our colleague 
Brian Mast for his service in Afghanistan.
    A lot of people on this committee do a lot of great things 
in service to the country. I want to thank our colleague Cory 
Mills, who just over the weekend was helping getting people out 
of Haiti. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, we can soon get a 
classified briefing on the situation going on there.
    This, obviously, is a very important topic today on what 
happened with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, why it did not 
go according to what the experts in the Pentagon and in our 
intel community believed.
    I think we need to know what gaps existed. I think we need 
to know how that happened. We need to know the lessons that 
were learned, and most importantly, how we prevent something 
like this from happening in the future.
    You know, we had soldiers die over the 20 years of war and 
we had soldiers die on the withdrawal. And I think multiple 
things can be true. A lot of times in this town, it's an ``and/
or'' kind of deal, right? It's either Trump was responsible or 
Biden was responsible, right? I actually think in Afghanistan 
it's an ``and/and,'' quite frankly.
    I think there were mistakes made in the withdrawal. I think 
the American people think there were mistakes made in the 
withdrawal. And I think it's OK to admit that. I mean, what's 
the opposite of that? That the withdrawal was perfect; 
everything went according to plan?
    General Milley, do you think mistakes were made in either 
the planning phases, things that we thought were going to 
happen that did not happen, or things on the ground that 
unfolded that we did not prepare for? Do you think mistakes 
were made in all of that thought process?
    General Milley. There's zero doubt in my mind there were 
mistakes made, and that's the point of the after-action 
reviews: identify those mistakes and develop solutions to 
implement them in the future.
    And I think the fundamental mistake, the fundamental flaw, 
was the timing of the State Department call of the NEO. I think 
that was too slow and too late. And that, then, caused a series 
of events that resulted in the very last couple of days.
    There was a lot of other mistakes that are made along the 
way. I tried to cover them in the written statement to submit 
to you guys. But I think that was, you know, germane to this 
particular hearing, I think that was key. I think that was 
fundamental.
    Mr. Moskowitz. Yes, and reading the dissent cable, which I 
will not discuss here, but, I mean, do you think some of the 
intelligence that you all used, our military leaders used----
    General Milley. Sure. I think, for the intel, for the 
intelligence, we pulled off in the summer of 2020--so, when we 
went to 8600, in accordance with the Doha Agreement, and then, 
you drop from 86 to 45, you're pulling advisors off the so-
called kandaks, the battalions, the Afghan battalions.
    What that, then, means is we do not have a fingertip touch 
for what's going on in the Afghan Security Forces. We could not 
see. We blinded ourselves when you pull those advisors off.
    So, we relied on electronic means or technological means in 
order to be able to see what's happening with the Afghan 
Security Forces. But technology cannot read a person's heart. 
They cannot see the negotiation that's going on locally between 
the Taliban and the local Afghan.
    So, we lost our ability to really sense that environment 
with a degree of granularity that could make better predictions 
than what was turned out. And I think that's true of the 
intelligence community and the military writ large, et cetera.
    So, I think that was a major gap, was our ability to see 
into what was happening on the ground, because we pulled our 
advisors out. And that's going to happen when you pull advisors 
out.
    Mr. Moskowitz. And there's no doubt that mistakes were made 
by multiple Administrations over 20 years that I'm sure we can 
point to when the full after-action review is completed.
    Do you think it was a mistake by the previous President to 
invite the Taliban, what you call a terrorist organization, to 
Camp David?
    General Milley. I will not comment on that. That's a 
political act and I'll stay out of that.
    But on mistakes, I think one of the key ones, to be very 
candid with you, is the development of the ANSF writ large, 
which begins, of course, in the early 2000's. And I was part of 
that. Frank was part of that. Many of us were part of that.
    The number of security forces were too small. We had 
estimated, we, the military, estimated that we needed 6 to 7 
hundred thousand. Decisions were made by the Bonn Agreement to 
field them at 350,000. Half of those were police and they were 
completely not designed well for a counter-insurgence. So, 
you're looking at about 175,000 army, and the Taliban fielded 
about 100,000 Taliban. So, your force ratio is your correlation 
of forces between the insurgent and the regime forces. It was 
always balanced more in favor of the Taliban. And then, they 
had a sanctuary over in Pakistan.
    These were decisions from 1904, 1905, and 1903, that kind 
of thing. But they have second-and third-and fourth-order 
consequences to the outcome of this war. So, by the end of the 
day, the Taliban, or the ANSF, there was mirror-imaging going 
on. We tried to build a conventional army. We did not build the 
commandos and special forces until late. There's a whole series 
of these that go way back in time that, ultimately, end up in a 
collapse of the Afghan Security Forces under intense pressure 
by the Taliban in the summer of 1921.
    Mr. Moskowitz. Thank you, General. My time has expired.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Huizenga.
    Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Generals.
    I'm going to share a couple of quick stories. And one of 
those was related to those Gold Star Families that are here.
    I had a constituent who did not lose his life, but was 
severely, severely injured in the blast. I do not use his real 
name. I call him Jose. He was a marine. He was a 240-pound 
machine gunner that, when I first met him, was about 175 pounds 
after his recovery from his injuries.
    This young man, though, is so dedicated to his country, he 
re-opted. Unfortunately for the Marines, they did not take him 
back, but he's now a Navy Corpsman and has still continued to 
try to serve his country.
    What I'm frustrated about is what seems like the 
subservient behavior of the State Department and DOD, frankly. 
To a lot of us, it seems that some individuals within the 
departments chose to save face for the Administration, rather 
than acting and possibly bringing home an already--I'm sorry, 
rather than bringing some shame to a foreign policy that was a 
disaster. And this could have saved both American and Afghan 
lives.
    General Milley, you talked about the number of citizens, 
how it was impossible to know who was there.
    I found myself screaming at the television when I was 
watching a DOD brief--I'm sorry--Secretary Blinken and others 
within the State Department briefing, saying that their 
estimate was about 200 U.S. citizens, most of whom chose to 
stay in Afghanistan. That was total BS, and I would like to say 
the actual words, but I'm trying to not; I'm restraining 
myself.
    My office alone had nearly 200 open cases--200 cases--not 
200 people; 200 cases in my congressional District alone. And 
as I talk to my constituents--or I'm sorry--my colleagues, they 
were having similar numbers. So, this fantasy that we did not 
know that there was U.S. citizens over there, or where they 
were or what they were doing, is a complete fallacy. The State 
Department should have been talking to us, and they were not.
    The other story I have on that is about one of those 
citizens. He was an interpreter with the Army. He was able to 
escape Afghanistan. He's a U.S. citizen now. He is here in the 
states. His wife was not as fortunate. Her first two attempts 
at entering HKIA, she was beaten almost to death by the 
Taliban.
    Now, there was a little problem. The U.S. Embassy had her 
passport and had all of her information. Guess what they did? 
They destroyed it all. They destroyed it all on the retrograde.
    So, they printed off--she had to print off a letter that 
she could then show. Guess what that letter proved to the 
Taliban? Where she was going.
    And so, after the second beating, she left. We were 
getting, literally, phone calls into the office. Beatrice in my 
office was, literally, talking to her in the middle of the 
night.
    The third time she went was when the explosion at Abbey 
Gate happened. Fortunately for her, she was not one of those 
170 Afghans that were killed. And fortunately for my 
constituent Jose, he wasn't one of the 13 Americans who was 
killed.
    We welcomed her home to the United States this past 
weekend--finally. If that is not an indication of a broken, 
broken policy and broken system, I do not know what it is. I 
know she's dealing with literal physical and psychological 
scars that this government has put on her.
    Very quickly, General McKenzie, what information about 
American citizens did the United States pass to the Taliban?
    General McKenzie. Very limited information, and you would 
really need to talk to State because they were the agency that 
did it. But it was designed to get them through, typically, in 
convoys into the compound. But you would need to go to the 
Department of State to get a good understanding----
    Mr. Huizenga. Are you aware of those claims, even by some 
State Department employees, that the Taliban was beating up 
American citizens and others like my constituent and his wife 
who were green card holders?
    General McKenzie. I'm aware of those claims.
    Mr. Huizenga. Are you aware of the claims that the Taliban 
beat up or even killed Afghan allies outside the gates of HKIA?
    General McKenzie. Yes. I am.
    Mr. Huizenga. Mr. Chairman, we had the sniper who had the 
bomber in his sights here in front of our committee before, and 
that was run up the chain of command. And he was denied the 
ability to take that sniper out. That's a breakdown. And I 
believe that the security control of Kabul contributed to this 
violence.
    I know my time is up, and I've got a few other questions 
that I'm going to put in writing through the chairman.
    Mr. Huizenga. But, at the end of the day, this is a 
shameful situation all the way around.
    I appreciate your willingness to work with these families 
and meet and talk with them now, but we must have 
accountability. We must.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Keating.
    Mr. Keating. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And Gold Star Families here, as a Gold Star Family--my 
uncle being killed in action--thank you for being here. 
Condolences on your loss and gratitude, eternal gratitude, for 
the great sacrifice and courage of those we loved.
    When I was first elected, I visited our troops right away 
in Iraq, then, in Iraq. And I came upon a marine and I asked 
him, you know, in conversation, what his opinion was of the war 
at that stage. And he looked at me and told me one of the most 
important lessons I learned. He said, ``Well, sir, I'm here to 
serve. Those kind of decisions and those questions you're 
asking, well, those are yours. Those are political decisions.''
    And I think what we have this morning, in effect, is a 
little bit of the replay of that conversation. We're asking two 
generals, that I deeply respect and thank for their service, to 
comment on political decisions thrust on them. And much of what 
we have should be turned around. We should be out there and 
maybe they should be up here asking the questions. But, 
nevertheless, it's where we are.
    I just want to comment on one title of this hearing. And 
that's the fact that the last section of that is the Taliban 
takeover. This is like a sequence that's there that I just want 
to correct.
    Not one decision led to the Taliban takeover. And many of 
the decisions we had here, clearly, would not have resulted in 
the Taliban not taking over. Is that correct, General Milley?
    General Milley. I think, as I mentioned several times 
already, there's a series of strategic decisions that set the 
conditions, and those decisions are made over the course, 
frankly, of 20 years. And then, of course, those series of 
decisions at the end that impacted this very specific 
withdrawal and NEO, yes, it's the cumulative effect of multiple 
decisions.
    Mr. Keating. I could not agree more and that's the way we 
should view this, although I think there was a linchpin to 
today's testimony that helped underscore something, too, as 
we're looking at things. And that's when General McKenzie was 
talking about the fact that keeping 2500 more troops at Bagram 
Air Force Base could have been helpful, assuming--assuming--the 
Afghans stay in the fight.
    And one of those key decisions, frankly, that got us to 
where we were at the end of this was the decisions that 
surrounded the Doha Agreement in that sense.
    Now, General Milley, I mean, I think one of the critical 
things was excluding the Afghans from those discussions. Could 
you comment on that?
    General Milley. Well, I mean, it's a historical fact that 
the Doha Agreement was made between the United States and the 
Taliban. It was a bilateral agreement. The intent was--and you 
would get a better answer out of Ambassador Khalilzad or 
Secretary of State Pompeo--but I think the intent there was for 
that to occur, the U.S.-Taliban negotiation, in order to set 
the framework for an Afghan-to-Afghan negotiation. And the 
Afghan-to-Afghan negotiation never happened. And there was 
supposed to be a reduction in violence, and then, a cease-fire, 
and then, an Afghan-to-Afghan negotiations.
    Mr. Keating. And former Ambassador John Bass said our main 
policy efforts did not reinforce each other. They were 
contradictory. There were contradictory signals amplified by 
President Trump's periodic statements supporting rapid force 
reductions. And taken all together, they undermined the 
Afghans' confidence in the U.S. security. I mean, that was a 
critical point as well.
    But we could point to so many critical points in this whole 
process. This is 20-year lookback, which we should. We're 
looking back to learn lessons. This is a 20-year lookback, you 
know, four different Administrations, two Republican, two 
Democrat, two decades.
    These are decisions that culminated in the final 
occurrences that occurred, and that's the way they should be 
viewed. We can dissect them. We can go back in classified after 
this and learn more in detail. But we're going to learn this: 
that we're working for the one thing I think any family member 
would want, so that no other American family has to go through 
what they went through. It's important to look back at the 
past, but it's important to look for the present.
    Here's my final point: I cannot sit here on March 19th 
knowing what's going on in Ukraine now, knowing that we have an 
Article 5 responsibility, and that Putin has put in his sights 
NATO countries as the next target after he gets through with 
Afghanistan--with Ukraine, rather.
    So, I just ask everyone here on this side, the political 
side, when we have the supplemental ready to give support to 
the Ukraine government, we must act on it now because failure 
to do that will jeopardize in the future the lives of other 
brave American men and women who are there under a treaty of 
Article 5 to defend our word in this world and defend democracy 
in Europe, the same democracy that my uncle died for.
    So, I hope and just implore everyone here, put the bill on 
the floor for a vote. The present is important; the future is 
important, and saving the lives of courageous young American 
men and women is important.
    I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. I agree with that assessment.
    The chair recognizes Mrs. Radewagen.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Milley and/or General McKenzie, in April 2021, 
President Biden announced his decision to draw troops down to 
zero. What was your assessment of the threat environment in 
Afghanistan at that time?
    General McKenzie. My opinion then, and my opinion now, was 
that, if we go down to zero, you're going to see a rapid 
collapse of the Afghan government and the Afghan military. It 
would be difficult for them to sustain themselves because they 
were not prepared to stand alone.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Did you advise against any part of the 
withdrawal as announced? And if so, what concerns did you have 
and to whom did you raise them?
    General McKenzie. Ultimately, I participated in meetings at 
the very highest level where I expressed the opinion I've just 
stated to you and it was heard. So, I do not want to go into 
specific discussions with the President, but I had the 
opportunity to express my opinion at length, and I did so.
    Mrs. Radewagen. In September 2021, you testified before the 
House Armed Services Committee that going below 2500 was the 
other sort of ``nail in the coffin.'' Did you hold this belief 
in April 2021 and did you provide this assessment to the 
President or anyone else in the Administration?
    General McKenzie. So, my assessments are, typically, 
provided to the Secretary of Defense, and he forwards them on 
as he wishes. And I've had the opportunity to be in higher-
level meetings and I've expressed my opinions in those 
meetings. But, generally speaking, my assessments go up through 
the Secretary, and he's the agent that carries them over to the 
interagency process.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Did your military leaders on the ground in 
Afghanistan raise any concerns to you about the withdrawal? If 
so, what were their concerns?
    General McKenzie. Well, sure. General Miller, a four-star 
commander in Afghanistan, his position on this issue mirrored 
mine, and the concerns that I've just articulated to you were 
those that were completely shared by Scott Miller. And, in 
fact, many of my positions were developed from his initial 
analysis because he was the commander on the ground.
    Mrs. Radewagen. What was your assessment of the strength 
and movements of the Taliban at the time?
    General McKenzie. So, I think the Taliban, after Doha, the 
Taliban benefited from the fact that we were striking them much 
less frequency and with much less force, particularly after we 
began some of the programmed drawdowns that were part of the 
Doha Agreement. So, they began to become larger, bolder, and 
more aggressive.
    Now, a key point is they also drew back considerabbly, like 
100 percent or 99 percent of their attacks against us. And most 
of their attacks against us were probably low-level Taliban 
commanders who did not get the word.
    On the other hand, their attacks against Afghan forces 
increased in ferocity and did not come down at all, and they 
began to hit them very hard during this period of time. So, it 
is my judgment that the Taliban grew better and bolder during 
this period of time.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Do you believe the State Department was on 
the same page as the U.S. military in April 2021?
    General McKenzie. I'm just trying to--let me think about 
that for a minute.
    And I would say, I think that the intent of the Department 
of State was to maintain a diplomatic platform in Afghanistan, 
even after we withdrew our military forces. I did not believe 
that was a feasible action, in that I did not think that the 
government of Afghanistan would be around to be the partner for 
our diplomats, once we removed our military capability. It was 
a divergence of opinion, and that divergence of opinion lasted 
until August, when we actually began to withdraw our embassy.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Well, what was your assessment of the State 
Department's planning during the retrograde and in the lead-up 
to the noncombatant evacuation operation?
    General McKenzie. So, I felt they were moving at a slower 
pace compared to us. We felt the immediacy of the problem. I 
felt that State was, just for a variety of reasons, not moving 
quickly. And I felt strongly enough, so that mid-July I took my 
concerns formally to the Secretary of Defense and outlined 
them.
    And I felt it ranged everything from the number of 
potential consular officers that we could use to process visas 
to what we might or might not do for ``lily pads'' across the 
region, if we had to pull people out, to detailed plans from 
the embassy itself--a variety of things that concerned me, and 
also, particularly, the requirement for closer collaboration 
with the embassy and our State Department partners, as the 
situation on the ground began to get worse and began, in fact, 
to accelerate.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields--or the gentlelady 
yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Davidson.
    Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman.
    I thank you, Generals, for your presence here today. 
Hopefully, it provides us guidance in how to take as many 
lessons learned as we can from this horrible and largely 
preventable disaster in Afghanistan.
    So far, this Administration, the Biden Administration, has 
presided over the evacuation of an 11 embassies. I think that 
is a record.
    General McKenzie, you highlighted that the State Department 
makes the decision on when we need a noncombatant evacuation 
operation. So, there is a civil-military interaction there. The 
State Department makes the call; it's their decision, but where 
does the responsibility for execution become the military's?
    General McKenzie. Well, ultimately, in a NEO, the 
Ambassador in country is the ultimate representative of the 
Government of the United States for the execution of the NEO. 
That's policy. That's actually what we follow.
    Now, we support them. It's our responsibility to get the 
aircraft together, get the security together, do all the things 
that have to happen. But the ultimate decisionmaking authority 
on when we come out and who comes out, and how we come out, 
even to some degree, is a Department of State responsibility.
    Mr. Davidson. Yes. So, a long time ago when I served in the 
Ranger Regiment, we trained noncombatant evacuation and never 
had the experience of executing one of those. And it seemed 
inconceivable to me that the State Department would ever make 
the decision that let's get the military out, and then, count 
on some path afterwards for some of the civilians to get out. 
How did that decision evolve, that we were going to get the 
military out, knowing that there were still American citizens 
behind?
    General McKenzie. So, it was my opinion then, and my 
opinion now, that that particular decision was the fatal flaw 
that created what happened in August. The alternative was, of 
course, as we began to draw down in mid-April, to begin to 
bring our embassy, our citizens out----
    Mr. Davidson. Even in August, when the decision was 
unwinding and Joe Biden had foolishly picked a date-certain, 
instead of a condition certain on the ground, no matter what, 
hell or high water, we're getting out on August 31st, you knew 
that you were going to leave American citizens behind. But, as 
that date approached, was it really still the State Department 
that said, ``No, we're going to stay here. We're going to get 
the civilians out some other way, but the military has got to 
go.''?
    General McKenzie. Absolutely.
    Mr. Davidson. So, that's the State Department's decision. 
So, that's a Foreign Affairs decision here in Congress. So, we 
need to provide some accountability for them. And that's part 
of the goal of this hearing.
    One of the other problems that the State Department had for 
the whole execution on this war on terror has been rules of 
engagement. So, could you explain the role of the State 
Department in working with the Department of Defense on rules 
of engagement?
    General McKenzie. Sure. At my level, the combatant 
commander level, I had no input from the Department of State on 
my rules of engagement. My rules of engagement came from the 
Chairman, the standard CJCS ROE, and existed solely within the 
Department of Defense. So, there was never a crimp or a 
pressure on the rules of engagement that we gave the force in 
Afghanistan or Iraq, or anywhere else in the Central Command 
theater, as a result of the Department of State.
    Mr. Davidson. So, that wasn't the State Department then?
    General McKenzie. It was not.
    Mr. Davidson. So, how did it break down----
    General McKenzie. It was----
    Mr. Davidson. How did it break down? So, between the time 
the rules of engagement that, apparently, you all felt no need 
to change, must be working well, how did it break down that 
Sergeant Tyler Vargas-Andrews could not get a commander to make 
a decision? I mean, frankly, it seems like the sniper should 
have been trusted with the decision, maybe a call to a two-
leader company commander. But even up at the battalion 
commander, he could not get somebody to make a decision. What 
was broken?
    General McKenzie. That's a tactical question at a very low 
level. I do not know the exact details of that, but I can tell 
you this: the first principle of any rules of engagement is, if 
you see or if you feel a threat, if it's intent or in action, 
you always have the right to defend yourself.
    Mr. Davidson. Over the years, the big problem was that you 
held the junior enlisted guys accountable for a lot, and the 
officers and civilians accountable for almost nothing. Now, I 
admit, every now and then, a general got fired and they put a 
different one in, but they did not go to jail. They did not 
lose everything. They just left Afghanistan. That's not how the 
junior enlisted guys were treated. So, do you really think that 
they felt empowered to make those decisions?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I can only say that, in the defense 
of HKIA, we employed these rules of engagement three times with 
lethal effect under conditions exactly as we're discussing. So, 
yes, I----
    Mr. Davidson. A lot of that sounds like you're blaming the 
guys on the ground for not making a decision. I really do not 
think that's what happened. Personally, now I wasn't there, but 
I do think that crosses over into HASC, and we've got our 
divisions here in Congress on that.
    But when I look at the civilian side, when I look at the 
Foreign Affairs, the public policy side, the side that, 
frankly, a lot of people here in this body are supposed to 
make, Congress is supposed to declare our wars under our 
Constitution. They do not, generally, get around to doing that.
    But they also set a mission. They work with the National 
Command Authority to set missions. And for a long time in 
Afghanistan, we had something along the lines of as much as it 
takes, as long as it takes.
    We had a previous witness that came in and he had written 
op-eds going all the way back to 2004, overseeing operations in 
Afghanistan.
    General Milley, is that an acceptable mission statement for 
anyone wearing a uniform?
    General Milley. No, of course no. There should be a defined 
end State and you should have the ways and means to achieve 
that end State. And you should understand the purpose of what 
you're doing; the constraints and restraints, and should 
understand that end State.
    And the end State in Afghanistan, starting in about 2011-
ish, 2012, became a negotiated settlement between the Afghan 
government and the Taliban in a power-sharing agreement. That's 
how they--that's how the policy was.
    Mr. Davidson. And at the time, the question there, my 
application of that is to say that, when we decide that, I 
think we should expect a better mission statement. And we could 
serve everyone from----
    General Milley. Well, I can say----
    Mr. Davidson [continuing]. The combatant commanders all the 
way down to Sergeant Vargas-Andrews on the ground----
    General Milley. Yes.
    Mr. Davidson [continuing]. By providing clearly defined 
success. And that applies across the board, whether you are 
talking Afghanistan or Ukraine, or anywhere else.
    I wish I had longer to talk with you all, and I look 
forward to reading your additional submissions and would be 
happy to collaborate in any way.
    General Milley. If I could, Chairman, our mission is--and 
you know this well from being a Ranger, and I know many others 
in the room as well--our mission, the U.S. military mission 
statement was to prevent an attack on the United States of 
America from the territory of Afghanistan. That mission was 
accomplished for 20 consecutive years.
    You accomplished your mission. Every soldier, sailor, 
airman, and marine accomplished their mission. This country was 
defended for two decades.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes our Vietnam veteran, Mr. Baird.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you 
holding this session.
    And, you know, I want to add my condolences to the Gold 
Star Families. As the chairman mentioned, I did my time in 
Vietnam, and I can appreciate the sacrifice that those families 
and those soldiers made during that war.
    And I also appreciate the Generals, General Milley and 
General McKenzie, for both of you being here and willing to 
talk to us and see if we can find some answers to help these 
Gold Star Families. And so, I really do appreciate that.
    And, you know, I guess I want to go to the point of also 
mentioning that one of the 13 service members that were killed 
during that evacuation came from my district. And that was 
Corporal Sanchez. And so, I express my condolences to that 
family as well. In fact, I attended the funeral, and it's 
always unfortunate when we lose service members.
    But I guess, more in that same vein, I want to change my 
focus a little bit to the fact that we left about $7 billion 
worth of military equipment and weapons that was intended for 
the Afghan military. However, it was abundantly clear that, 
prior to the shutting down of Bagram Air Base, that the 
Administration knew that the Afghan army was destabilized and 
demoralized, and it was just a matter of time until Afghans 
would fall, leaving these weapons in the hands of the Taliban.
    So, last year, these weapons started to pop up in other 
conflicts, including the Kashmir region. And this was left, a 
war chest of weapons in the hands of a Pakistani-based military 
group that are designated by the United States as FTOs, Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations.
    So, General Milley, did the Biden Administration have any 
advanced knowledge that the U.S. weapons and equipment left 
behind would not be used by the Afghan military and would be 
seized by the Taliban? And so, when was this decision made to 
notify the Afghan military about these new possessions of these 
weapons?
    General Milley. Those weapons that you mentioned were part 
of the foreign military sales or assistance over 20 years. So, 
that $7 billion is over 20 years.
    How much of that, those weapons, were throughout the whole 
country, I mean they were spread out all over the place. So, 
there was no specific indicator that I can recall that said 
this group of weapons is going to go over to the Taliban or 
anything.
    We knew that the Afghan military had those weapons. Those 
were out there. These are weapons. These are night vision 
devices. These are wheeled vehicles, et cetera.
    But there was nothing that was specific to say this unit or 
that unit is going to hand off their weapons to the Taliban, or 
any of that kind of stuff. But I think an important point here 
is the United States military did not leave that equipment. 
That equipment was given to the Afghan Security Forces.
    So, when we gave in Vietnam, the war you fought in, when we 
gave equipment to the South Vietnamese Army, the ARVN, and the 
North Vietnamese overran South Vietnam, the Americans did not 
give that equipment to the North Vietnamese Army. That's the 
ARVN; that's the South Vietnamese Army doing that.
    So, the same thing is true, say, in Korea or anywhere else. 
So, I want to make sure that, you know, it is not a U.S. 
decision on that equipment because that is Afghan-owned 
equipment at that point in time.
    And it's completely impractical--frankly, it would have 
been quite dangerous--for us to try to go out and try to police 
up that equipment in the summer of 2021. It wasn't feasible. We 
had 2500 Special Forces guys, and that kind of wasn't their 
tasking purpose.
    The Afghan government collapsed. The Afghan military 
collapsed. And the IG, the Special Investigating IG estimates 
$7.2 billion worth of U.S.-manufactured equipment, not U.S.-
owned equipment, ended up in Taliban hands.
    And I do believe I think there's probably some reporting 
out there that indicates some of that equipment has been sold 
on black markets, et cetera. And I have zero doubt that some of 
that is in the hands of people who have nefarious objectives 
toward the United States.
    Mr. Baird. I thank you, and my time is expired. So, I yield 
back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thank you for the witnesses for coming in.
    I've got to tell you, Mr. Chairman, the more I listen to 
this hearing, the more infuriated I get. And I know the Gold 
Star Families sitting here have to feel the same way. I know 
every veteran watching today has to feel the same way--because 
it's not about us; it's about them.
    And I think what upsets them most, General Milley and 
General McKenzie, are some of the statements from the President 
during this evacuation, including an interview that the 
President gave on national television during the withdrawal on 
August 18th saying, ``The generals never advised me to leave 
2500'' and the only air base, Bagram Air Base, in the world 
sandwiched between China, Russia, Iran, and a platform to stay 
after counterterrorism.
    General Milley, is that an accurate statement, that the 
generals never advised him to leave a stay-behind force to keep 
a lid on half the world's terrorist organizations?
    General Milley. I will tell you what my thoughts were at 
the time, my assessment at the time----
    Mr. Waltz. Well, let me just--you testified today, you both 
testified repeatedly----
    General Milley. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. That you advised the National 
Command Authority we should leave----
    General Milley. Twenty-five hundred.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. A stay-behind force, including the 
base.
    General Milley. Twenty-five hundred, plus NATO, plus 
Bagram----
    Mr. Waltz. That's right.
    General Milley [continuing]. That's correct.
    Mr. Waltz. Did President Trump leave that stay-behind 
force, despite his stated desire to get everybody out, because 
the Taliban did not meet the conditions?
    General Milley. When the Administrations changed hands, 
there were 2500 soldiers and that was----
    Mr. Waltz. Did you, then--and you've stated today you did 
not advise Biden to pull everybody out. You advised him to 
stay.
    General Milley. That's correct.
    Mr. Waltz. So, that's an inaccurate statement.
    But let's go down the list here. Let's go back to July 
2021. President Biden, there's a likelihood--``the likelihood 
there's going to be the Taliban overrunning everything and 
owning the whole country is highly unlikely.''
    Does that comport with your knowledge at the time? In fact, 
you, just a few weeks later, said Kabul would be surrounded in 
30 to 60 days.
    General Milley. That's right. My assessment at the time 
was, if we went to zero in U.S. military forces, then there was 
a high likelihood of a collapse of the government of 
Afghanistan and the ANSF, with the Taliban taking over. And----
    Mr. Waltz. Would collapse?
    General Milley. But I thought it was going to be--I, 
personally, thought it was going to be in the fall, somewhere 
around Thanksgiving. The assessments vary widely.
    Mr. Waltz. We're talking within months?
    General Milley. Within months of our withdrawal----
    Mr. Waltz. Right.
    General Milley [continuing]. That's correct.
    Mr. Waltz. That's the one: ``There's going to be no 
circumstance where you see people being lifted off the roof of 
an embassy,'' an embassy ``of the United States from 
Afghanistan. It is not at all comparable'' with Saigon.
    I think this picture proves that not to be the case; fair 
enough.
    Joe Biden, July 8th, 2021.
    The next one: ``Americans should understand we're going to 
try to get it done before August 31st.'' And if you're an 
American, ``If there's American citizens left, we're going to 
stay until we get them all out.''
    Was that your understanding of the operational planning at 
the time, to stay beyond August 31st? Or were you planning to 
get out by August 31st?
    General Milley. We planned to get out by August 31st.
    Mr. Waltz. Last, but perhaps the most egregious, ``we 
believe about 100 to 200 Americans remain in Afghanistan with 
some intention to leave.''
    You both testified today, you just testified, General 
Milley, that it was impossible to know the number. In fact, is 
that accurate? It was very difficult to know the number?
    General Milley. Very difficult, and I do not think the 
numbers were accurate.
    Mr. Waltz. Yet, the State Department has revised that 
number since to nearly a thousand Americans left behind.
    Look, in July 2021, Bagram is closing; we're withdrawing 
our four-star commander, General Milley; Ghani is visiting 
President Biden, practically begging us to at least leave our 
contractors and some little bit of air support.
    General McKenzie, you've testified that you were so 
concerned in July 2021 that you put up recommendations, 
including lily pads to get our allies out; putting pieces in 
place to process our SIVs faster; putting measures in place to 
get our American citizens out, to get our allies out, and to 
take care of what American military should do, which is 
protecting all Americans. You were so concerned in July 2021, 
you put those recommendations forward? That's what you've 
testified today.
    General McKenzie. That's correct.
    Mr. Waltz. And, in fact, also, the diplomats on the ground, 
Mr. Chairman, sent a dissent cable--23 diplomats saying, ``If 
you continue down this road, disaster will ensue.'' Was that 
dissent cable shared with either of you? This is a formal 
channel going to the Secretary of State himself. Was that 
shared with you, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? Was that 
shared with you, as the commander?
    General McKenzie. I've never seen it.
    General Milley. I did not see it at the time and I haven't 
seen it since. And I would like to see that dissent----
    Mr. Waltz. I think the American people would like to see 
that, gentlemen.
    But here's my question for you: do you know where the 
Secretary of State was on August 13th----
    General McKenzie. I----
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. The day before Kabul fell? Do you 
know where the Secretary of State was, despite all of your 
concerns that the State Department wasn't planning fast enough; 
we weren't getting our people out? According to The Washington 
Post, he was in the Hamptons. He was in the Hamptons on 
vacation, Secretary of State Blinken. I do not know, I cannot 
even imagine how that makes our Gold Star Families feel.
    Here's the bottom line, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
your indulgence. I'll close with this.
    The State Department, to use a military term, ``had its 
head up its rear.'' It wasn't planning. It, in fact, thought we 
could just have an embassy and the good Taliban terrorists will 
take care of the bad Taliban terrorists. I mean, that's, 
essentially, what happened.
    And because of that, we did not get our people out; we did 
not get our citizens out. We did not have the force posture. We 
did not have the basing. We failed, and their loved ones are 
dead because of it.
    I apologize to you, to my Gold Star Families. Your 
government failed you.
    There is a difference, gentlemen--and I know you both know 
this--in taking responsibility and accountability. A lot of 
people have taken responsibility; no one has been held 
accountable. And they deserve better.
    Your government failed you.
    And I will give you an opportunity in my time remaining, 
Mr. Chairman, if there's anything you all would like to say 
publicly on the record.
    Chairman McCaul. I will give the witnesses time to respond. 
But your time has expired.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlemen, they have a right to 
respond.
    General Milley. Well, I'd like to take you up on that 
offer. I've talked to these families.
    Mr. Waltz. And I thank you for that.
    General Milley. I've met the other families. And I have 
committed to them--and I will do so again publicly to all of 
you--that I will work with them to get you the answers, to make 
sure that accountability and transparency is established. And 
I'm going to do that until the day I go in the grave. That's 
what a soldier does. And I'm not going to turn my back on these 
families or any other Gold Star Families.
    There are other Gold Star Families in this room right now. 
Jane Horton is in this room. I've been working with her for 
years. There's many others, and they know who I am, and I will 
work with them forever.
    Mr. Waltz. They deserve accountability, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, General Milley.
    Chairman McCaul. I agree 100 percent.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Kean.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to thank our witnesses for their service to our 
country and recognize the Gold Star Families who are joining us 
today.
    General Milley and General McKenzie, you have mentioned 
today with some frequency about the impact and lack of 
coordination regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops and its 
impact on U.S. contractors, advisors, and logistics. What 
impact did that have on the Afghan military?
    General McKenzie. The pulling out of contractors and 
advisors had a profound effect on the Afghan military's ability 
to operate. General Milley has already talked about, when we 
came off the kandaks, to use a term of art, when we lost our 
ability to see down the combat formations back in the summer of 
2020, that was a major blow.
    But, then, when we made the decision to go from 2500 to 
zero, you're bringing out all your people that actually make 
sure the Afghan logistics systems work. Let me give you an 
example very briefly.
    So, before we went below 2500, if a box of mortar rounds 
went into Afghanistan--you're dropping them around at HKIA or 
maybe Bagram--there would be a contractor there. You would tag 
it. You would have visibility on it as it went down through the 
Afghan system to get to the kandak it was going to.
    Once you pull out that capability, you drop the mortar 
rounds off on the ramp and you have no idea where those things 
go--no idea at all. They could be going directly to the bazaar. 
They could be going to the Taliban. You just do not see it. So, 
that capability is gone.
    But more perniciously perhaps is what it meant to Afghan 
aviation, the one sort of asymmetric advantage that they had. 
So, we wanted to keep our contractors in there as long as we 
could, but they had to come out. We tried desperately to come 
up with schemes to help them. We looked at long-distance tele-
video maintenance, which has been tried by airlines in the 
United States--with indifferent success in a technically 
literate population. So, we knew we were swimming upstream with 
this.
    It's difficult for me to overestimate the negative, 
synergistic, pernicious effect drawing down these capabilities 
had on the Afghan military.
    Mr. Kean. Yes, that was obvious for people to estimate in 
advance, and it was, obviously, what happened on the ground.
    General McKenzie. And this was foreseeable. This was not a 
surprise.
    Mr. Kean. Yes. And so, did the United States ever come up 
with a plan to properly make up for the loss of these key 
capabilities?
    General McKenzie. We tried what I call heroic measures. We 
had a forward, over-the-horizon, you know, security cooperation 
office in one of the Gulf countries. But it just does not work. 
You cannot--you have to be there. You've got to be with your 
partners. And the degree to which you're not with your 
partners, it does not mean you're fighting for them; you're not 
doing that. What you're helping them do is manage complex 
logistics systems and ensuring that graft and corruption isn't 
overwhelming.
    Once you pull that all off and you lose that visibility, 
you lose the ability to help them as well. And so, that was--a 
significant factor in the collapse of the Afghan military in 
2021.
    Mr. Kean. And was there any long-term planning for how the 
United States would be able to continue its work as long-time 
allies of the Afghan military at all?
    General McKenzie. We did, but, again, you know, so you work 
under the conditions that you're given to operate----
    Mr. Kean. Yes.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. Which is there's not going 
to be anybody on the ground. Ideally, in a perfect world, there 
would be 650 U.S. forces guarding the embassy and a handful of 
people in the embassy that might be able to do some limited, 
limited form of security cooperation, but nothing at the 
ministerial level even, and certainly nothing at the core or 
the formation levels that's there. So, it's really very hard to 
see a way forward.
    Mr. Kean. Was President Biden ever informed that the U.S. 
military hadn't yet figured out how to provide logistics and 
maintenance support for the Afghan military?
    General McKenzie. That's a question I cannot answer. I just 
do not know the answer to that.
    Mr. Kean. General?
    General Milley. Yes, I think there were plans presented. 
They certainly weren't optimal, as Frank just pointed out, but 
he was witting of the contractors coming down and the potential 
impacts, and the mitigations, the over-the-horizon mitigations 
and remote maintenance, et cetera. But I think everybody 
recognizes the general consensus that nothing is going to 
replace the contractors on the ground.
    You're looking at about, if my numbers are correct from my 
head, I want to say about 20,000 or so over the summer of 2020. 
That comes down to about 10 maybe into 2021, and then, you 
start glide-pathing into maybe eight or nine. But there's still 
a significant contractor capability there until we come out in 
July, in the first or second weeks of July. And that's when it, 
basically, goes to zero.
    And the contractors aren't going to stay unless there's 
American military forces to protect them. And these were DOD 
contractors, U.S. persons, right, and then, there's contractors 
from Europe, and then, there's contractors that are local. So, 
the number, the contracting piece is a really significant 
factor to the collapse of the ANSF, in my view.
    Mr. Kean. Given the amount of time that has passed since 
the American withdrawal, in retrospect, are there any actions 
that you wish that you would have taken that may have prevented 
this catastrophe?
    General Milley. I think, for me, the biggest thing is to 
synchronize the withdrawal of the U.S. military with the State 
Department. And I'm an advisor, not a commander sort of thing, 
and it's to--I mean, we said it over and over and over again. 
There's probably other things, I guess, that could have been 
done. That's my biggest regret, as I go back through all these 
meetings, et cetera, on that whole issue of the State 
Department coming out with the military in July really. That's 
what we were looking at.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes the gentleman----
    Mr. Kean. Thank you. I yield back my time.
    Chairman McCaul [continuing]. From Texas, Mr. Self.
    I apologize. Mr. McCormick from Georgia.
    Mr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Congratulations to both generals for your retirement. 
Hopefully, you're enjoying that somewhat.
    And congratulations to Sergeant Tyler Vargas-Andrews for 
his retirement. Hopefully, you're enjoying it as well. Thank 
you for being here today.
    Listening very intently to your testimoneys today, 
gentlemen, when you and I were together last time at the HASC 
brief, we went back and we talked about some of the things that 
happened to create the collapse and kind of the predictability 
about it.
    I thought it was interesting that General McKenzie talked 
about knowing that this was going to be a total collapse of the 
government pretty early on, when you could see how this, the 
withdrawal was working rapidly against us.
    The interesting thing you talked about, we sustained the 
mission. You very clearly stated just a second ago it was to 
make sure that forces were not being trained and deployed from 
Afghanistan to harm Americans, and it was successful for 20 
years.
    I would agree. When I was there in 2016, there were very 
few American casualties. It was a relatively peaceful place. I 
mean, the Afghanis were still paying the price. There as a lot 
of violence. But they weren't training bad guys.
    But after spending $2 trillion, 20 years, 2,462 lives, 
20,700-plus casualties, plus the years away we all spent away 
from our families, we, then, lost it during the withdrawal. And 
now, how many billions of dollars were left behind for them 
during that withdrawal? How many billions, gentlemen? $7.2 
billion left behind for the enemies to use.
    And how many training bases are over there now training 
enemy combatants against the United States? How many bases, 
approximately?
    General Milley. That I do not know. It would be an 
intelligence question for the intelligence community.
    Mr. McCormick. So, the unclassified brief is 27. So, $7.2 
billion worth of military gear, some of it brand-new, and 27 
bases to train enemy combatants now. So, I'd say we failed our 
mission.
    And we had already paid the price. That's what irks me, is 
my friends that are no longer able to come home; my friends who 
have lost lives and limbs and time away from their family; the 
money that we spent; the time we invested--just to give it back 
to an enemy that now we're not fulfilling the mission we set 
out to do.
    And we did fail--miserably, in my opinion, especially on 
that 1 day, the withdrawal. To hammer that home, the example 
that we had, which Sergeant Vargas-Andrews so succinctly said 
during his testimony, is that he testified before about the 
Kabul airport bombing. And in his testimony, he informed the 
committee that his team was tracking a suspected terrorist who 
aligned exactly with descriptions given by intel, who is 
believed to be the Abbey Gate bomber.
    He further testified that, after being denied initial 
permission to engage the suspect, he elevated the issue to his 
battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brad Whited. According 
to Vargas-Andrews, when asked if they had permission to kill 
the suspect, the Lieutenant Colonel said, ``I do not know.'' 
He's now a colonel.
    I do not understand where we have gone wrong, that we do 
not have a mission statement that allows a lieutenant colonel 
in charge of very capable people to make decisions that would 
have saved lives and limbs, and then, they get promoted for it.
    I do not understand where accountability went, not only in 
our mission, but our withdrawal, and even a mission statement 
for that very day. Can we speak to that, please? Because if we 
do not have accountability, then why are we here? Because if we 
did not learn our lessons from what we did wrong, why are we 
here? And if we're not answering to the people who lost lives 
and limbs, why are we here?
    General Milley. I can speak to the rules of engagement 
piece. General McKenzie has already spoke to the standard rules 
of engagement that you're familiar with, and that Cory Mills is 
familiar with and former Colonel Self, and everyone, Colonel 
Waltz, et cetera.
    It's positive ID, hostile act, hostile intent. You pull the 
trigger. You do not have to ask permission of anyone. Every 
single soldier, sailor, airman, marine, ship's captain, or 
fighter pilot has the right to self-defense.
    And if you perceive, if it's your understanding in that 
moment in time--whether it's Afghanistan or anywhere else, by 
the way, except the continental United States--if you perceive 
those conditions to exist, then you are fully empowered by law 
to use lethal force, if necessary.
    Now, having said that, I cannot speak--and I do not 
actually know the specifics----
    Mr. McCormick. Well, so you do not know, but here is a 
funny thing, sir, is that neither did the lieutenant colonel, 
``I do not know.'' And I will say that, if I was on--and I'll 
finish my piece, sir.
    General Milley. Congressman, I know the rules of 
engagement.
    Mr. McCormick. So do I. I just----
    General Milley. I do not know the specific incident that--
--
    Mr. McCormick. Well, let me tell you. I'm telling you what 
the testimony was.
    General Milley. Yes.
    Mr. McCormick. And here's what the problem is: in our 
litigious society, where I've seen soldiers and sailors and 
marines get in trouble for making the wrong decision.
    General Milley. That's right.
    Mr. McCormick. When they ask their commander officer, they 
expect a clear answer, not ``I do not know,'' that cost people 
lives and limbs.
    And I'll yield with that. Thank you.
    General Milley. But my guess is that Congressman Waltz, 
when he was there, my guess is that perhaps then-Sergeant Mills 
or others that are on this committee engaged the enemy with 
lethal force and were not asking permission.
    I do not know the specifics of that particular case, but I 
know the rules of engagement are clear, and they're trained. 
And I would have to personally interact with Sergeant Vargas, 
which I have not done yet, and I want to, or Colonel Whited, I 
think his name is, or the company commanders, et cetera, to 
find out what did break down. Obviously, something broke down.
    If Sergeant Vargas had a positive ID on a known enemy 
target, and that enemy target was hostile act or hostile 
intent, the rules of engagement allowed it.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Self is recognized.
    Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you for being here and your testimony.
    General McKenzie, before I go there, I was going to ask the 
question on the ROE. Because we've had several conversations, 
and I will still unsure as to who had the ultimate authority. 
Thank you for that answer.
    One has to wonder, though, if he had taken the shot--in 
ROE, in my experience, my 25 years, deployments on four 
continents, it is absolutely crucial. If he had taken the shot 
in today's military, one has to wonder what would have happened 
to our young sergeant.
    But, General McKenzie, my question to you: on August the 
26th, you had a press briefing, and I'm trying to sort through 
the dates here, exactly what your intent was. You said that you 
had a common purpose with the Taliban in the evacuation. That 
was on the 26th.
    Now, you've testified here today that you were also telling 
people that we had to get out by the 31st, or we were going to 
be fighting the Taliban. Can you just walk me through? That was 
5 days later, you thought we would be fighting the Taliban. 
From a ``common purpose'' on the 26th to full-scale combat on 
the 31st, I'm trying to--what was your intent----
    General McKenzie. Sure.
    Mr. Self [continuing]. Between those 5 days?
    General McKenzie. Certainly. Let me just briefly talk to 
the ROE question for a moment. So, between 16 and 26 August, 
three teams did take lethal shots through this ROE. And nothing 
happened to the individuals that took the shots. So, let's be 
very clear when we talk about this.
    Mr. Self. Thank you.
    General McKenzie. Three people applied the ROE with success 
and with lethal effect.
    We had an agreement with the Taliban we were going to be 
gone by the 31st of August.
    Mr. Self. Mm-hmm.
    General McKenzie. That was we negotiated that at a very 
high level. That was not a military decision, but it was, 
rather, a policy decision by the President we were going to be 
out of Afghanistan.
    And it was clear, based on voluminous intelligence reports, 
that if we remained beyond the 31st, not only would we be 
fighting ISIS-K, but we would be fighting the Taliban as well. 
That was very clear in the intelligence reporting that we were 
seeing.
    When I talked to the Taliban in Doha and in the days 
afterwards, it was clear they wanted us to leave. We wanted to 
leave. Those were the orders we had, to get out. So, we did 
have a common purpose and that common purpose was leaving 
Afghanistan. The noncombatant evacuation operation, by 
definition, is an operation where you're leaving.
    Yes, we shared a common purpose. But I do not trust the 
Taliban. I do not like the Taliban. It's a highly transactional 
agreement, but it was designed to let us get out.
    And I will tell you that we certainly did not outsource our 
security to the Taliban, but I am confident that we would have 
had more Abbey Gate attacks, had we not negotiated these 
limited agreements with the Taliban for some of the external 
that they provided.
    Mr. Self. Yes, I was going to ask the two of you your 
assessment of the Taliban. Because most people just refer to it 
as ``Doha,'' but I always want to bring to people's attention 
the formal name of what we refer to as ``Doha'': the Agreement 
for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan, which is not recognized by the United States as 
a State and is known as the Taliban, and the United States. 
That's the formal name of this agreement. I have a copy here 
and I have been following your testimony closely, as you have 
done it.
    I used the term ``naive'' with the Ambassador Khalilzad, 
when he testified before this committee just several weeks ago. 
I think the entire agreement was naive. I think it was poorly 
negotiated, and I think the two of you, along with General 
Miller and others, were put in a horrible position by that 
agreement.
    I have heard the words here from the other side of the 
aisle ``highly partisan hearing.'' I will tell you I agree with 
several of my colleagues here that have said we are still 
paying the price for that go-to-zero decision. We are still 
paying the price around the world.
    Putin started moving troops within 2 months. We now see the 
Red Sea in its current condition; Gaza, Hezbollah standing 
ready.
    I will tell you what I think, and I'm going to--I think 
what we engaged in, General Milley, was not so much defending 
our Nation--because I believe the mission of the United States 
military is to go and break things when our national interest 
requires it.
    Twenty years there, we should have said, ``We're leaving. 
If you do it again, we'll come whomp you again. We'll break 
things in the interest of the United States again.''
    And my last point is I'm glad that one of you mentioned the 
sanctuary, because that was our fatal mistake in Vietnam, the 
sanctuary across the border in Laos and Cambodia. And it proved 
a fatal error in Afghanistan and Iraq as well. There was a 
sanctuary, an across-the-border sanctuary.
    Last question, real quickly, Qatar is now playing a part 
both in Afghanistan, getting our folks out of Afghanistan, and 
in Gaza. Was Qatar a part of any of your discussions before 
this? Did it play a part?
    General McKenzie. It was principally where we went to 
negotiate with the Taliban. It's where they hosted them. They 
did not have a significant effect beyond that.
    I will say, as we left, they began to flow--they flew 
people back into Afghanistan. Qatar does a number of things 
across the region, as you are aware.
    Mr. Self. Right.
    General McKenzie. They walk a--they walk a very tight, 
thinly defined line between a number of competing interests. 
And they were certainly active in that at the very end of the 
Afghan engagement.
    Mr. Self. I do not think the line is as fine as you make 
it.
    I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time is expired.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Hill.
    Mr. Hill. Gentlemen, thank you for voluntarily coming 
before the committee, and we are grateful for your 86 years of 
combined service in uniform to this country, the country that 
you love.
    And to our Gold Star Families, we are here for you. We are 
here to conduct oversight in your name to get to the bottom of 
this disastrous outcome, after two decades in Afghanistan.
    And for me, it is a source of great disappointment because 
I do think our Nation is less safe the way we exited, because 
of the precedent that set and the signal it sends to our 
adversaries around the world. And I think it was a mistake by 
the President to exit in his method, also, as it relates to our 
ability to support our allies in that region.
    General McKenzie, I was really struck with your opening 
comments. And this follows the lines of Congressman Sherman's 
questioning about playing a little bit of the game between the 
Trump Administration and the Biden Administration. But you made 
a very good point in your opening comments.
    You said that you briefed President Trump in June 2020 and 
that there had been a--I took it to be a DOD and State 
comprehensive exit. So, military exit, State Department exit, 
our strategic Afghan partners' exit, and then, obviously, 
American citizens' exit. Is that true that that took place in 
June 2020?
    General McKenzie. The plan I briefed on 3 June 2020 to 
President Trump accommodated the number of people that were at 
the embassy. It accommodated the number of citizens that we 
knew were in Afghanistan and projected number of Afghan at-risk 
people. It was not a plan that was coordinated with the 
Department of State.
    Mr. Hill. Right.
    General McKenzie. But it did reflect the capacity to bring 
those elements out.
    Mr. Hill. So, that got me considering the numbers from 
DOD's perspective, what it would take to accomplish those four 
goals.
    General McKenzie. Right.
    Mr. Hill. Good. So, then, subsequent to that, between June 
2020 and the inauguration of President Biden, did State and DOD 
work to finetune a joint approach to accomplishing the goals of 
the June 2020 brief?
    General McKenzie. No. Nothing substantive was done. They 
maintained a NEO plan that we've talked about before. We 
continued to refine our plan going forward to account for the 
reduced numbers.
    Mr. Hill. Right. And, of course, General Milley just 
testified to that a few minutes ago, about his conversations 
with Secretary Esper----
    General McKenzie. Right.
    Mr. Hill [continuing]. And coming down to----
    General McKenzie. That's correct.
    Mr. Hill [continuing]. The Christmas, and then, January 
number on the military side.
    So, that implies that, upon being sworn into office, that 
President Biden and his advisors took the decision to get out 
completely. When was the first time, General Milley, that you 
were told that the President had taken the decision that we are 
going to exit completely--from a planning point of view, not 
the date you agreed to, but just from a planning point of view?
    General Milley. Yes, that was--well, the announcement was 
on the 14th. If my memory serves me right, I think I was 
informed on maybe the 11th----
    Mr. Hill. Right.
    General Milley [continuing]. Something like that. But it's 
just prior.
    Mr. Hill. So, upon that announcement, would you say that 
the Department of Defense and State began a coordinated effort 
to accomplish the goal, the goals of the June brief to 
President Trump? Or was there no effort to get, as you both 
talked about today numerous times, both departments--State 
having the preeminent role on exiting the Nation and DOD a 
supportive role?
    General Milley. It was--it was a coordinated effort, 
coordinated interagency effort, led by the National Security 
Council. And we did what's called a TTX or a ROC drill, a 
rehearsal of concept drill on 8 May. And there were several of 
these type things. There was tons of coordination being done.
    But the fundamental flaw, the fundamental principle was 
to--well, the decision was to leave a diplomatic presence, 
leave the embassy there. And that is leaving an embassy in a 
war zone, while simultaneously withdrawing your military 
forces. We strongly thought at the time that the embassy should 
come out and that it was not tenable to keep an embassy in a 
war zone. And so, we thought they should be coming out.
    Mr. Hill. Yes. Thank you for that.
    Let me switch subjects to the subject of equipment, 
equipment owned by the Afghan National Forces. At any time 
during that planning from the early Trump planning in June 2020 
until spring of 2021, was there a contingency plan to, as you 
saw the situation could deteriorate, to also disable the fixed 
wing, rotary wing, or larger artillery pieces that belonged to 
the Afghan government?
    General Milley. I'll let General McKenzie speak to the 
specifics. But, yes, we disabled as much equipment that we 
could prior to departing.
    Mr. Hill. But U.S. equipment. I'm talking about the 
equipment belonging--you testified a few minutes ago the 
distinction between them.
    General Milley. Oh, there was similar----
    Mr. Hill. Also, the Afghan government?
    General Milley. Oh, some of it, yes. I'll let Frank talk to 
the details of it.
    General McKenzie. The Afghans were using that equipment. In 
order to allow them to use it, we did not disable it.
    I would tell you, at places like HKIA, the airfield, where 
there was Afghan equipment there, after we established a 
perimeter, we did, in fact, destroy all that equipment. It will 
never be useful to anybody.
    Mr. Hill. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    I just want to announce the White House and congressional 
leaders have agreed to grant 12,000 Special Immigrant Visas for 
Afghan nationals who assisted the United States. It will be the 
State Department foreign operations funding bill. I think those 
were certainly supported by me and the ranking member as well.
    Mr. Meeks. I just want to say thank you because it is 
something that we both support and we are working on that, what 
I was talking about.
    Chairman McCaul. We cannot say, hey, we left them behind; 
we're not going to give them a visa to get out of there, right?
    The chair recognizes Mr. Mills.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. And thank you for your service getting 
Haitian Americans out of Haiti.
    Mr. Mills. Well, it is an honor to be able to do this, to 
be able to help Americans out of Haiti, as we did with the 255 
that we got out of Israel, and as we did with the Americans out 
of Afghanistan. So, there is a pattern of abandonment that has 
existed throughout this Administration that I'm going to call 
attention to immediately.
    I want to thank the Gold Star Families, who I consider to 
be friends at this point, and who we have had many longstanding 
conversations with.
    And I can tell you, Steve, that many of us will be looking 
to get all charges dropped, which never should have been levied 
against you to begin with, for a grieving father who lost both 
of his sons, who, understandably, would be upset when there 
still has been no accountability.
    Responsibility, people are seeing a lot of responsibility. 
``Oh, it's my fault.'' ``It's my fault.'' ``It's my fault.'' 
These same individuals are continuing to get promoted. These 
same individuals are continuing to serve. These are people who 
are allowed to serve after making critical errors that cost 
lives, but people who refused because of religious and medical 
exemptions are being purged out of our military, who are 
willing to serve. Think of the irony of this.
    Now, I do want to thank both of you for your service.
    I'm going to ask a series of rhetorical questions, but they 
are needed in an effort to try and base a context of my further 
questions.
    Mr. Milley, can you tell me exactly kind of what your 
description of your job was, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff?
    General Milley. I mean, it's codified in law the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a senior military advisor. He's 
not in the chain of command. Military advisor to the President, 
Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council, and by 
extension, to Congress. And it is his job or her job, and it's 
to be the senior military advisor of a group of people called 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are all the chiefs of the 
individual services.
    You represent the Joint Chiefs and you represent their 
advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. And if 
there's any dissenting advice, you give that as well.
    Mr. Mills. But, traditionally, you're----
    General Milley. An advisor.
    Mr. Mills. Your role is advisory?
    General Milley. It's an advisor. It's an advisor to----
    Mr. Mills. And, General McKenzie, your role, as Commander 
of CENTCOM, is actual ground force operation command, is that 
correct?
    General McKenzie. Joint force operational command.
    Mr. Mills. Joint force operation command.
    General McKenzie. I'm in the chain of command. I'm 
responsible for everything that goes----
    Mr. Mills. Which means, at the end of the day, whatever 
happens on the ground, the buck stops with you, correct?
    General McKenzie. That's correct.
    Mr. Mills. So, I would like to ask a question because I 
understand the advisory role, and I think that General Milley 
has made it very clear, the direction in which he had advised, 
and it was very different than what this Administration has 
done. And I think that you have testified to the same.
    But I do have some issue with some of the things that were 
said. I think that when you look at the Secretary of Defense, 
he has made comments before this committee to say there was no 
actionable or credible intelligence that was provided that 
could have led to the understanding of when the suicide bomber 
was going to do this.
    However, I think you have all read the day-to-day 
intelligence reports, as I have, in a classified setting, that 
would speak very much to the difference of that, even to the 
extent and the clarity of saying, moving into this location or 
this city, planning has commenced; planning is finished; 
execution is imminent. And these are the day-to-day day logs 
that we all saw, which will prove that there was credible 
intelligence that could have been rendered on that.
    Not to mention the fact that there was in the State 
Department--who I put a tremendous amount of responsibility on, 
and have requested multiple times for Antony Blinken to go 
ahead and step down--the 23 dissent cables which warned early 
on what would occur in this.
    Now, my only real severe issue that I have had as of late, 
General McKenzie, is that you have made multiple comments in 
the media and otherwise to the extent that a brave hero, in my 
opinion, who has sacrificed his limbs for this country, 
Sergeant Tyler Vargas-Andrews, that his recollection of the 
events that took place on August 26th, to quote you, sir, 
``that he was not recalling this correctly.'' And second, you 
said that you claimed there was no BOLO that would even meet 
the description.
    Now this is the rhetorical part of this. Where were you on 
August 26th, sir?
    General McKenzie. Tampa, Florida.
    Mr. Mills. Well, I can tell you where Sergeant Vargas-
Andrews was, and he was sitting at the gate. And I would trust 
on-the-ground information far more than someone who is sitting 
9, 10, 11 thousand miles away, who is potentially watching from 
ISR and potentially being briefed by the commanders on the 
ground. But his testimony, which has been corroborated, by the 
way, by multiple marines who have testified before this 
committee about the events that he has actually made comment 
and made clear actually did take place.
    And we're fortunate enough, General McKenzie, that the 
gentleman who actually endured the most from this, who was on 
the ground--and ground truth matters, as we all know--is 
sitting right there. So, would you like the opportunity to tell 
Sergeant Vargas right there that he is not recalling the 
incidents that occurred on August 26th correctly; that he and 
his fellow marines are not actually the ones who said there was 
a BOLO of this description; that he is incorrect in his 
assessment, which is putting into question his integrity? Do 
you want to face him and tell him that before him now?
    General McKenzie. I do not want to face him and tell him 
that. I want to say that the battlefield is a very complex 
place. There were a lot of threats that were flowing around out 
there that day. I honor his service. I regret he was injured.
    Mr. Mills. Have you spoke to him since then?
    General McKenzie. I have not spoken to him since then.
    Mr. Mills. So, you, obviously, haven't honored him, nor has 
anyone else come to even question him about what took place, 
even after our committee a year ago. So, a lot of what----
    General McKenzie. I have a lot of----
    Mr. Mills. Sir, I'm still talking.
    General McKenzie. If he has some questions----
    Mr. Mills. Sir, General? The bottom line is that he 
deserved that respect, like these Gold Star Families deserve 
that respect. And to question his integrity, to question what 
took place on August 26th that he observed from his own eyes 
and sacrificed his limbs for; that you're unwilling to actually 
face him and actually tell him the same thing that you were 
willing to say to MSNBC and all the rest, which is that his 
recollection is incorrect, and that there was no such thing--
it's shameful.
    With that, I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    My understanding is the two generals have met with the 
families; that they are willing to meet with Sergeant Tyler 
Vargas-Andrews.
    And you deserve that, sir.
    With that, the chair recognizes Mr. Lawler.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Just to followup on my colleague's question here, General 
McKenzie, when did you retire?
    General McKenzie. 1 April 2022.
    Mr. Lawler. OK. And, General Milley, when did you retire?
    General Milley. I came out of my duty position on the night 
of the 30th of September, and I officially retired 1 November.
    Mr. Lawler. OK. And so, at any point between the disastrous 
withdrawal in Afghanistan and to today, have either of you 
spoken with Sergeant Vargas-Andrews?
    General Milley. I have not personally spoken to Vargas. I 
want to----
    General McKenzie. No, I have not.
    General Milley. I want to speak to him----
    General McKenzie. I have not.
    General Milley [continuing]. But I have not, that's 
correct.
    Mr. Lawler. OK. He testified before this committee a year 
ago. Are you both aware of that?
    General Milley. I am.
    General McKenzie. I am.
    Mr. Lawler. Did you watch his testimony?
    General Milley. I did.
    General McKenzie. I did not.
    Mr. Lawler. Did you get a report on his testimony?
    General McKenzie. Yes, I did.
    Mr. Lawler. And at no point did you feel the need to reach 
out to him or ask for a meeting, based on his testimony?
    General Milley. For me, personally, that would be 
inappropriate, because while I was in uniform as the Chairman, 
there was an active investigation that was going on. Sergeant 
Vargas was part of that. And it would be very inappropriate for 
me to meet with any of the potential witnesses during an active 
investigation.
    Mr. Lawler. And from your standpoint?
    General McKenzie. And the CENTCOM investigation has 
actually been reopened. So, that's still an active 
investigation. So, no, it would not--I would not have sought 
to----
    Mr. Lawler. OK. So, based on an active investigation, how 
are you going to meet with him today, if that's the standard?
    General Milley. We're not on active duty anymore. So----
    General McKenzie. That kind of investigation has been 
closed.
    Mr. Lawler. Right.
    General McKenzie. It has not yet been briefed to the 
families, but that investigation is no longer active.
    Mr. Lawler. OK.
    General Milley. So, we're----
    Mr. Lawler. So, as of today, you're both going to seek to 
meet with him?
    General Milley. Yes. But, also, we're in different statuses 
now. So, we're no longer on active duty. He was the commander; 
I was the Chairman. And you do not want unlawful command 
influence on an active investigation. So, that's while in 
uniform. Now we're not in uniform and I want to meet with 
Sergeant Vargas.
    Mr. Lawler. OK. With respect to the decision by President 
Biden to announce September 11th as the deadline for full U.S. 
military withdrawal, was there any tactical or military reason 
for that date?
    General McKenzie. Not that I'm aware of.
    General Milley. Not that I know of.
    Mr. Lawler. OK. So, was it purely political and from the 
standpoint of a symbolic date, from your understanding?
    General Milley. I'll be candid. I do not even know where or 
who made the decision of the 11th September thing. I, frankly, 
thought it was actually inappropriate at the moment in time, 
but it was very rapidly changed to the end of August.
    Mr. Lawler. And you were never involved in the decision to 
do that?
    General McKenzie. No.
    General Milley. Not to pick the date, no.
    Mr. Lawler. OK. General McKenzie, you said in your opening 
statement that you, and you alone, are responsible for the 
military operations that occurred during the withdrawal. Again, 
I ask, did you set the date for the withdrawal?
    General McKenzie. No, I did not.
    Mr. Lawler. Did you make the decision to bring our troop 
level to zero?
    General McKenzie. I did not.
    Mr. Lawler. President Biden is the Commander-in-Chief. Did 
he make those decisions?
    General McKenzie. Yes, he did.
    Mr. Lawler. So, is it your position that he bears no 
responsibility for the aftermath; that you are the only one 
that bears the responsibility for the military operations?
    General McKenzie. So, I was responsible for military 
operations. The Commander-in-Chief is responsible for those and 
all the other operations, to include those of the Department of 
State, all the other appropriate Cabinet agencies. But I----
    Mr. Lawler. But you report to the Commander-in-Chief?
    General McKenzie. I do.
    Mr. Lawler. OK. So, at the end of the day, is he 
responsible for the decision to set the date and to set the 
troop level to zero?
    General McKenzie. Yes.
    Mr. Lawler. So, he bears responsibility, not just you?
    General McKenzie. That's correct.
    Mr. Lawler. OK. General Milley, you told the Senate and 
House Armed Services Committees, in September 2021, that one 
provision of the Doha Agreement the Taliban adhered to was the 
most important one, which was: do not attack us or the 
coalition forces. You said that the Taliban did not attack U.S. 
and coalition forces. Didn't the Taliban carry out at least 
some attacks against U.S. and coalition bases in 2021, 
including indirect fire attacks?
    General Milley. There were, but the Taliban themselves, the 
senior leaders who were part of this negotiation, they would 
deny that. They would--the Taliban is a very amorphous 
organization. You know, you never can be certain if they have 
total control over their individual units with indirect fire. 
There were some attacks. The issue was a lethal attack. Really, 
that's the fundamental piece.
    And there was also some specifics about no VBIEDs in the 
cities----
    Mr. Lawler. So, in other words, it depends on the 
definition of ``it''?
    General Milley. No, no, not at all.
    Mr. Lawler. I mean, what do you mean?
    General Milley. So, it says no attacks on the--and I think 
Congressman Self has the agreement. I do not have it in front 
of me. But I think it says no attacks on U.S. or coalition 
forces.
    I can tell you, in conversation with Zal Khalilzad, what 
you're talking about here is lethal attacks really. But, also, 
there's some specifics I believe--and I'm doing it from memory 
without a document in front of me--about no VBIEDs in the 
cities; no mass casualty attacks, those sorts of things.
    Now, the problem is they had figured to adhere to most of 
that. There were some attacks. They weren't lethal. But they 
did pick up the pace on attacks on Afghan Security Forces, and 
that's really significant. By my memory, I think we're looking 
at somewhere between 30 and 40 thousand attacks. It was like 
the peaking, the peak of attacks on Afghan Security Forces that 
had occurred in 2020 and 2021. It's a very significant amount 
of attacks on the Afghan Security Forces, leading, obviously, 
to the summer of 2021.
    But the idea of not attacking coalition or U.S. forces, I 
would say, largely, that was adhered to by the Taliban.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Moran.
    Mr. Moran. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Both gentlemen, thank you so much. Both of you gentlemen 
have made statements calling for transparency and understanding 
regarding the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and I agree with 
those statements.
    I want to pause, also, at the beginning and recognize and 
thank the Gold Star Families that are here today in this room 
and convey my condolences for their loss, their deep loss of 
their loved ones.
    I also want to recognize Sergeant Tyler Vargas-Andrews, who 
is here, and thank him for his dedicated service to this 
country as well, and for his testimony last year. It was very 
insightful.
    But I want to come back to you guys. Thank you both for 
being here today and undertaking this pursuit of truth. That's 
what we are here to do. I know you have had a long day. We are 
just about done. Just a couple more of us left.
    But the American people certainly deserve the truth, and 
the families who lost loved ones most certainly deserve it as 
well.
    So, I want to ask both you guys a question I do not think 
anybody has asked today. And that is, generally, if you have 
advice for this committee, as we look forward into the future, 
as to how should we look toward additional transparency and 
accountability in this regard? What further witnesses should we 
interview, as a committee, to better understand what happened 
wrong with the Afghan engagement and withdrawal, and how can we 
do better next time? So, that is my first question to you, is: 
what additional witnesses does this committee need to engage 
with?
    General Milley. Well, I mean, I'm not, obviously, in 
Congress for that. This role is in Congress and it is for you 
to get an accurate tactical picture of what occurs at HKIA at 
the time of the NEO, et cetera. It seems to me you would have 
to ask the tactical commanders. You would have to get them. You 
know, this is General Donahue. This is Admiral Vasely. This is 
General Sullivan.
    But you're not the committee of oversight and jurisdiction 
on the military. That's the House Armed Services Committee. So, 
I do not know how you do that.
    But if you're going to get an accurate picture, you're 
going to have to--obviously, you've interviewed with Sergeant 
Vargas and others. There's lots of people along the line that 
will need to be discussed.
    The second thing is documents. And Chairman McCaul I think 
mentioned it upfront. There is a lot of documents. The vast 
majority of them are classified and many very highly 
classified.
    And how that would work between, say, the Department of 
Defense, the Department of State, CIA, et cetera, and the 
various committees--but to get a full, comprehensive, holistic 
picture, you're going to have to get documents and all that. 
That's going to take a long time, and there's rules that govern 
all that. And I think you guys know those rules.
    So, the documents and the witnesses. But the specific 
military witnesses, I think that would have to go--I do not 
know the rules 100 percent here, but I think that has to go 
over to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees----
    Mr. Moran. OK. Thank you.
    General Milley [continuing]. Not this committee.
    Mr. Moran. General McKenzie, let me just ask you about 
after-action reviews. As you guys went through after-action 
reviews after the evacuation, who was involved? When did those 
first ones take place? When is the last one that you 
participated in that took place?
    And excluding any kind of executive privilege discussions, 
would you talk about what were the top frustrations that were 
communicated during those after-action reviews, and maybe top 
two of the consensus positions--what we could have done better 
or what we should do differently next time?
    General McKenzie. Sure. The after-action reviews begin 
pretty quickly after an operation is over, because you want to 
capture people's remembrances while they're still very strong 
and before they go on to do other things.
    So, we had a series of those at every level. Every unit 
does it. Some of them come at CENTCOM's level. Some do not come 
to CENTCOM's level.
    But if I were going to pick a couple of things that I think 
I would hit on, that would be, first of all, the requirement to 
absolutely be better integrated with the Department of State. 
And I think it has been a common theme today. We're only 
partially responsible for that, but I think that is a very key 
thing.
    The second thing would be--and it's not a bad news story, 
but it's just a story that you need to continue to work on--is 
you need to understand your strategic lift requirements; what's 
going to be required to get out of some place; how you want to 
scope and scale that.
    I think those are a couple of things that are absolutely 
very important as you take a look at it. If I were just going 
to pick two of those, those are probably the two I would look 
at first.
    Mr. Moran. And then, the last topic--yes, sir, General?
    General Milley. OK. I would just offer one more thought 
there. One thing that you may take a look at is the law on lead 
Federal agencies with respect to noncombatant evacuation 
operations. Who has decision authority? An Ambassador or a 
combatant commander? The Department of State, Secretary of 
State, or the Secretary of Defense?
    Right now, the law is Ambassador and Secretary of State, 
but that's something that might be taken a look at. Because 
command and control, and the decision authority, and who is in 
charge matters. And when you make these calls matters.
    So, I think that's something--I believe it's codified in 
law, actually, about the departments. I'm not positive about 
that, but I think it is.
    Mr. Moran. Quick question about chain of command. When the 
team on the ground was seeking authority to take out the 
prospective bomber and they saw somebody that matched the 
description, they were told, quote, ``Leadership does not have 
engagement authority for us. Do not engage.''
    Did we ever figure out what happened in the chain of 
command there, so that the folks on the ground did not ever 
give the authority to engage with who might have been the 
bomber that day?
    General Milley. I do not have personal knowledge of that. 
That's one of the reasons I want to talk personally to Sergeant 
Vargas.
    Mr. Moran. Yes.
    General Milley. I do not have personal knowledge of that 
set of asks or denials. I know the rules of engagement and what 
it authorizes, but I do not have personal knowledge of those 
conversations back and forth.
    Mr. Moran. OK.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Let me clarify to the gentleman from Texas, we are working 
with the committee of jurisdiction over DOD--that is Armed 
Services--to get a document production, including the sniper 
photos that Tyler testified to that he handed over to the 
commanding officer and the command center. In my opening 
statement--that has yet to be produced. We expect that to be 
produced.
    In addition, these two gentleman are at a very high level. 
The COs on the ground are Admiral Vasely and General Donahue, 
and we have requested through HASC as well that they testify 
before the Congress. We will vigorously pursue this, and if we 
have to do it with a joint hearing, which has been done before, 
of Armed Services and Foreign Affairs, that is our plan. And we 
are not going to give up on this until we get the answers.
    Mr. Moran. Thanks.
    Chairman McCaul. And we do have a classified briefing, I 
want to say, after this. So, I want to get through this.
    We have Mr. Burchett.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Like you, my father was a World War II veteran. Dad was a 
marine, and he told me the only thing generals ever gave him 
was a hard time. So, I fully expect to get that from you all.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Burchett. You do not need to write that down, but 
that's just--that's just me personally. This is for either one 
of you.
    General Milley. My father was a Marine in World War II, and 
he said the same thing.
    Mr. Burchett. Do what?
    General Milley. That my father was a Marine in World War II 
with the 4th Marine Division and he said the same thing.
    Mr. Burchett. Mine was in the 1st Marine Division. His 
colonel was Chesty Puller. So, thank you.
    This is for either one of you all. The Taliban was in 
violation of the Doha Agreement. Why did we remove our troops?
    General Milley. I think that's a question for policymakers, 
not for either of us.
    Mr. Burchett. So, you all, I guess what I want to get at is 
you all weren't involved in the consultation of that?
    General Milley. We absolutely were involved in the 
consultation and we pointed out repeatedly that the conditions 
were not being met.
    Mr. Burchett. That is what I wanted to know.
    Can you explain why the arbitrary deadline of August 31st 
was chosen as the date of removal from Afghanistan? And was the 
State Department or Department of Defense the ones that chose 
this date?
    General Milley. Didn't choose the date, but I can tell you 
some of the logic and thinking that was going behind that.
    So, the date of May 1st is the Doha Agreement.
    Mr. Burchett. Right.
    General Milley. This current Administration, the Biden 
Administration, comes into office on the 20th of January. And 
then, the first week in February--actually, I think the first 
meeting is either the 3d, 4th, or 5th, or something like that--
but the first week in February is the beginning of a 10-week 
deliberation that was quite rigorous, actually--lots of 
meetings; lots of readouts, et cetera--by the National Security 
Council, to include the current President.
    And then, the decision--well, the guidance to the State 
Department was to get additional time; work with the Taliban; 
postpone the 1 May. And I think the most that the State 
Department would get was, I think, whatever that is, 6 months I 
think it is.
    So, that, then, bounds your problem. From time of decision, 
14 April, we're not going to go with 1 May, and it takes you 
out X amount of days. I think it was--whatever that is--to the 
end of August, September. But that was--that was the backstop 
and that was because of negotiations between Zal Khalilzad and 
the Taliban as to how much he could push it to the right.
    Mr. Burchett. Thirteen Americans, including my constituent, 
Staff Sergeant Ryan Knauss, and 170 Afghanis were killed at 
Abbey Gate. Do you all consider this withdrawal a success?
    General Milley. Well, as I said in my opening statement, 
and I've previous said in several previous testimoneys, I think 
the whole thing is a strategic failure. I've said that openly 
several different times.
    But at the same time, I want it really clear that the 
United States military did its job, and the United States 
military did what was asked of it; and that anyone who served 
in Afghanistan, or any family of the fallen, or any of the 
wounded--every single one of them did their job, did what 
bravery and courage could ask of. They did it with 
professionalism. They did it with dignity. They did it with 
courage and they did it with compassion. So, I believe the 
United States military executed its mission, and I think that 
they did so with great professionalism.
    Mr. Burchett. And my dad had another saying; I'm sure he 
stole it from somebody. But old men make decisions and young 
men die. And that is apparent that is what happened here, and 
those old men being at the State Department.
    Would it have been better to choose a measure of 
operational success other than a date, when deciding your all's 
date of withdrawal?
    General Milley. I think one of the lessons, if you want to 
call it a lesson, I suppose, is do not put date-certains on 
things like this. Don't announce them and do not put date-
certains. That's, basically, you lose whatever leverage you 
might have, if you were involved in some sort of negotiation.
    Mr. Burchett. It seems to me that we have never learned 
that lesson. We always announce these dates, and then, whether 
it be Vietnam or some other debacle, it just seems to always 
end the same way.
    General McKenzie, you are not getting enough air time. So, 
I want to ask you a question, if that's all right, brother.
    What was CENTCOM's official assessment of the ties between 
the Taliban and other terrorist organizations? And do you agree 
in hindsight with those assessments?
    General McKenzie. I think we had a pretty consistent 
assessment that the Taliban was opposed to ISIS. They had 
theological disputes, and the Taliban, given an opportunity, 
would push ISIS out of Afghanistan. And they tried to do that 
on a couple of occasions, but had limited success.
    On the other hand, their ties with Al Qaeda were deep and 
profound, and there was no way, in my judgment, that they were 
ever going to separate from Al Qaeda. And so, those are the two 
major organizations that you see operating in the region.
    ISIS, yes, given a choice, they would just as soon be rid 
of them. Al Qaeda, they are not going to take that action. Now 
today, ISIS-K probably is the more potent of the two threats, 
but it is difficult to project into the future.
    Mr. Burchett. All right. I have run out of time, but I 
would just like to say to the families I hope you all find some 
peace in your life and hope the Lord blesses you all. And thank 
you for the sacrifice.
    Momma lost her brother in the Second World War, and to the 
day she died, when they played that National Anthem, she teared 
up.
    And I hope you have some real peace in your lives. So, 
thank you all.
    Mr. Chairman, I apologize for going over.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognize Mr. Issa.
    Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Milley, good to see you again, and General 
McKenzie.
    I was looking over your long and distinguished careers. And 
what I noticed was you were both on active duty just before I 
left active duty. General Milley, you were promoted to first 
lieutenant in 18 months. I did not get that lucky and I wasn't 
that good.
    You said something, General Milley, that I think was 
profound. In fairness to the United States military, there were 
no military mistakes while under military command in this case. 
And that brings a couple of questions.
    First of all, both of you during the day have said we 
should see more; we should hear more, and so on. If I could 
point out something to see if you have seen it--they have 
distributed it to you. The question is, here is a public log 
that shows a vast amount of a video that I haven't seen; I have 
not been made aware of it. Some of it is redacted, but most of 
it, you can read what it says. And the timelines are pretty 
pronounced.
    Do you believe that--I mean, obviously, that exists; this 
was a FOIA. Have you, either one of you, seen any of these 
videos and do you think we should see them on the committee as 
a whole?
    General McKenzie?
    General McKenzie. I've probably seen most of these videos 
at one time or another. I should certainly see no reason why 
you shouldn't see them.
    Mr. Issa. OK. It will not surprise you we haven't. So, when 
this became aware--we became aware of it and I wanted to ask.
    I want to point out 211 and 214, 217 and 223. General 
McKenzie, do you recognize those and are they of particular 
significance? Also, 212 and 213.
    General McKenzie. I read the titles. I understand what they 
say. I just cannot associate them with a video.
    Mr. Issa. OK. Well, hopefully, we will see them.
    General Milley, during your career rising through the 
ranks, I had four careers. One of them was here in Congress. 
So, I do want to correct one thing you said, which is very 
unusual for a nobody private or a captain to do, but we do have 
the jurisdiction. And you said it very well in your own 
statement, and I would like to point it out for the Gold Star 
Families that are here.
    This committee could, all or in part, change the question 
of who is in charge, Title X, or not, in the case of an armed 
withdrawal. We could decide whether the chief of mission 
continues to be accountable to somebody back in Foggy Bottom, 
or whether you would have been in the direct chain going back 
to the Pentagon.
    We could put primary responsibility on the amount of forces 
necessary in each and every--and, General McKenzie, you know 
your marines and what they do. You know how many more we have 
after Benghazi. You know what happened because of Benghazi, 
what General Amos did.
    So, for the Gold Star Families, this committee does have at 
least most of the jurisdiction to decide whether or not a State 
Department that in our own investigation clearly made decisions 
that were counter to the safety of Americans there, counter to 
the safety of our allies, but not necessarily counter to their 
own safety, although, in fairness, the decision not to move the 
embassy, either out of the country or to the military base 
instead, certainly contributed.
    So, General, both of you, Generals--and, look, I have 
nothing but respect for your service and for the tough 
situation you both found yourself in in this withdrawal. But 
I'm going to ask you to, basically, answer as much of a yes or 
no as you can.
    If you had had the authority to determine the continued 
presence, would it have been dramatically different from a 
standpoint of safety of American personnel?
    General Milley. Go ahead.
    General McKenzie. I want to make sure I understand the 
question. You're talking----
    Mr. Issa. If you had been told that we were withdrawing----
    General McKenzie. Right.
    Mr. Issa [continuing]. Would you have done it differently, 
as a military man, rather than the way it was done?
    General McKenzie. I would have begun sooner.
    Mr. Issa. Would have begun sooner?
    General McKenzie. Yes. That's probably the principal thing 
I would have done. I would have begun much sooner than when we 
actually did.
    General Milley. And I would have the same. I would have 
brought the embassy and the State Department out with the 
military by the middle of July. That is what, if there was one 
thing I would do over--you do not get do-overs in this stuff, 
but if there was a do-over, that would be it. And that point 
was debated and discussed, and so on and so forth. But that is 
a yes, to answer that, that particular question.
    Mr. Issa. The last question, Mr. Chairman, if I may?
    If you had been given the opportunity to determine that you 
wanted Afghanistan to stay free and independent of the Taliban, 
would that have been possible during your chairmanship?
    General Milley. Well, I think that if you kept 2500 as your 
min force--and it wasn't just any 2500; this is a group of 2500 
that were very, very highly talented, the Special Forces--I 
think that group of 2500, plus the NATO forces, plus the 
contractors, I believe to this day that the Afghan Security 
Forces and the Afghan government would not have collapsed.
    But I also know, believe, and I believe it would have 
happened, is that the war with the Taliban would have reopened. 
And that could have possibly meant another increase in forces.
    So, if your purpose, the political, strategic purpose made 
by policymakers is to withdraw, then the idea of keeping 2500--
with the possibility of even increasing--it is, obviously, at 
cross-purposes.
    Mr. Issa. So, if I could surmise, or, you know, summarize 
what you said, if we had had the same attitude in Afghanistan 
that we have until today in South Korea, that, in fact, if 
there is an adverse combatant force that is unrelenting, you 
keep sufficient forces in order to prevent them from 
prevailing, even if it's more than half a century?
    General Milley. Well, I think that, if your intent, your 
strategic intent, is to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a 
platform for terrorism to strike the United States, and to do 
that, you've got a means--the government of Afghanistan and the 
Afghan Security Forces--and if you withdraw, they're going to 
collapse, then I think you either accept the risks of that 
collapse, and if you're going to do that and withdraw 
completely, then I agree 100 percent with what General McKenzie 
said earlier--you're going to have to withdraw quickly, fast. 
That includes your State Department folks. Or make a decision 
to stay. It's a binary choice there. There's not a lot of gray 
in between.
    And I think that if you decide to stay, there's risks 
associated with that, and the likelihood that war again would 
start with the Taliban.
    Mr. Issa. And the marines, sir, would the marines confer 
with the Army in this case----
    Mr. Issa. The gentleman's time has expired.
    And Mrs. Miller-Meeks is recognized.
    Mr. Issa. Oh, I did not realize. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. And we kept you in the 5-minute----
    Mr. Issa. I thought it was done. I thought it was----
    Chairman McCaul. OK.
    Mr. Issa. I thought it was the closing act, Chairman.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. I would like to thank Chairman McCaul 
for the opportunity to wave on this hearing today, and to our 
witnesses for testifying before the committee, and for the Gold 
Star Families that are here.
    The reason I wanted to be here at this hearing is that I am 
a 24-year military veteran, Vietnam era veteran. My brother 
served in Vietnam. My husband is a 30-year Vietnam era veteran 
as well. My father was career Air Force. Six of his eight 
children served in our military.
    The botched withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 was 
the single worst foreign policy disaster of the United States 
that has not been witnessed since the fall of Saigon. And I 
mentioned this at a Homeland Security hearing in June of that 
year.
    This completely preventable catastrophe resulted in the 
deaths of 13 U.S. service members, one of which including 
Corporal Daegan Page grew up in Red Oak, Iowa, and 170 Afghans.
    When President Biden took control of the White House, the 
world was at peace and our enemies on guard. Since the 
disastrous withdrawal of Afghanistan showed our weaknesses on 
the world stage, Russia has invaded Ukraine; China has 
dramatically increased its aggression in the South China Sea 
against Taiwan, and even in the Philippines; Hamas has launched 
a horrific attack against Israel, and the Houthis are launching 
attacks in the Red Sea, openly attacking U.S. and allied 
service members in the Middle East.
    You both previously testified that you recommended 
maintaining a small force in Afghanistan, instead of a full 
withdrawal. General Milley, you have also previously stated 
that the withdrawal was a strategic failure.
    Was it less problematic to defend Bagram Air Base than 
HKIA? And why was the decision made to give up Bagram Air Base, 
for which we could do counterterrorism and better to protect 
than in the middle of an urban area?
    General Milley. I'll let General McKenzie talk the 
specifics of Bagram. But Bagram was not a feasible course of 
action to keep open, once a decision was made to withdraw U.S. 
forces below 2500.
    And Frank can talk to the numbers, but to maintain security 
and to maintain Bagram as an open air base would have required 
a brigade combat team. You're looking at 5,000-plus, plus a 
battalion to patrol the 30-mile road between Kabul and Bagram. 
So now, you're looking at 6,000, and then, you're still going 
to have to take care of HKIA, which in the end ended up being 
6,000 Americans, 2,000 internationals, and others. So, about 
8,000 with HKIA. So, you're looking at 15-20 thousand people.
    If your strategic purpose is to withdraw from 2500 to zero, 
it does not make--it does not pass the common-sense test to, 
then, increase to 15,000.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Now, I'm going to reclaim my time.
    General Milley. That's the fundamental issue.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Can either of you provide U.S. 
intelligence--it was woefully inaccurate in predicting how 
quickly Afghanistan would fall to Taliban control. Was this 
willful neglect of the Biden Administration, of the State 
Department, if you advised them that the potential for a fall 
would be rapid?
    General Milley. We, the United States military, 
consistently indicated that there would be a likely collapse of 
the government and the ANSF upon a full withdrawal of the 
United States military, and we estimated that that would be 
months, not in August--months. We thought, at least I thought 
it would be sometime in the late fall, Thanksgiving/Christmas. 
I extended that out to maybe spring. It could get past 
Christmas and into spring. The intelligence community estimated 
anywhere between 12 and 24 months after the full withdrawal of 
the U.S. military.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. And was there a recommendation to the 
Biden Administration and the State Department that there would 
be a strategic intent and benefit of keeping Bagram Air Base 
and troops within Afghanistan?
    General Milley. I'm not sure I understand the question.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Was there a value to maintaining a 
presence in Afghanistan and Bagram Air Base?
    General Milley. Well, I thought that keeping--you would 
have to have at least 2500, if you're going to keep Bagram. So, 
I thought, personally, I thought at the time, my assessment at 
the time--and I've said this publicly before--that keeping 
2500, the value was to buy time to achieve the conditions of 
Doha and a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government 
and GIRoA.
    Presidents are in positions to make very difficult 
decisions, and I'm looking at this from a military standpoint. 
Two Presidents in a row, a much wider angle of view, taking in 
much more factors than I do as a general, they both decided the 
same thing, just with different timing.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. But, General Milley, with all due 
respect----
    General Milley. Yes.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks [continuing]. Even as a nurse in the 
Army, I had to push back against majors and lieutenant 
colonels----
    General Milley. Correct.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks [continuing]. And colonels and generals 
who were recommending things that were in our patients----
    General Milley. Yes.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks [continuing]. Not in their best interests 
and would have cost them their lives.
    General Milley. Right.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. We expect to have pushback from the 
military when a State Department or a Commander-in-Chief is 
doing things that are not in the best interest of this country 
and in the best interest of our service men and women.
    General Milley. There were many heated, lengthy sessions 
and debates----
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Let me just end here with recruitment 
down----
    General Milley [continuing]. Lots of pushback.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks [continuing]. Will we have to wait until 
November or January 2025 to finally get accountability for the 
disastrous, incompetent call----
    Chairman McCaul. We have to go to a classified briefing. 
Please make this short. It has been a long day. Wrap up your 
question.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. I'm sorry, I just did, Chairman. I just 
said, will we have to wait until November or January 2025 to 
finally get accountability for the disastrous withdrawal from 
Afghanistan?
    With that, I yield back. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. I thank the gentlelady.
    I would like to recognize the ranking member for a closing 
statement.
    Mr. Meeks. Again, I want to thank the former Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, and former 
Commander of the United States Central Command, General Kenneth 
McKenzie, Jr., for testifying before Congress again, and 
providing vital insight, as this committee continues to use its 
oversight authority on Afghanistan, including its withdrawal, 
but including our oversight.
    Your testimony I think reinforces the need to have 
bipartisan, good-faith oversight for our 20 years in 
Afghanistan. I believe that the American public and our service 
members, and those Gold Star Families, the 13 at Abbey Gate, 
but also there's over 2,461 that lost their lives at our 20 
years, going on 20 years in Afghanistan. The American people 
deserve nothing less.
    And I would hope and I will join, and I will say to those 
Gold Star Families here whose hearts I really feel, that I will 
on stand to make sure that we do the 20-year investigation, so 
that they can get and find out what we did right; what we did 
wrong, for the benefit of everybody in our military.
    And I think, in order to do that, we need to do it not in a 
political way, but in a bipartisan way. And clearly, from the 
testimony of the generals here, it is investigating what took 
place during the Bush administration, the Obama administration, 
the Trump Administration, and the Biden Administration. And 
then, and only then, will we be able to make that account to 
the American people in a thorough and nonpolitical and 
bipartisan way.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman McCaul. I thank the ranking member.
    We did establish the Afghanistan War Commission on the 
National Defense Authorization, and it is a board of highly 
esteemed people, just like Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who knows 
these issues probably better than anybody. This is not a 
partisan group. I look forward to their recommendations.
    With respect to this investigation, we are focused on the 
evacuation. And so, I do look forward to working with my friend 
on lessons learned and legislative recommendations to move 
forward to ensure that this never happens again.
    And I think, as we have heard today, it was the lack of a 
plan by the State Department and the failure to timely execute 
the plan that led to the chaos at HKIA and led to the suicide 
bomber, the Abbey Gate terror attack.
    That truth will come out. We will get the commanding 
officers before this committee and we get the production of the 
sniper photos that Tyler took, and we will get it soon.
    And so, with that, we are going to stand in recess, as we 
move to the classified space to have the classified portion of 
the briefing.
    I apologize if I was a little impatient. It has been a long 
day. I appreciate your patience.
    But we really need to get into the classified space before 
the votes.
    Thank you so much. We will see you soon.
    [Recess.]
    Chairman McCaul. And without objection, the committee 
stands in recess.
    [Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX
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         STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY
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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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