U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

57–384 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024

S. HRG. 118–482 

MODERNIZING U.S. ALLIANCES 

AND PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 17, 2024 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via http://www.govinfo.gov 
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

MITT ROMNEY, Utah 

PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

DAMIAN MURPHY, Staff Director

CHRISTOPHER M. SOCHA, Republican Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................... 1 

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho .................................................. 2 

Harris, Hon. Harry B., Jr., Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, Former 

Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado .......... 4 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 7 

Mead, Walter Russell, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and 

Humanities, Bard College, Columnist, Wall Street Journal, Red Hook, New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 13 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses of Mr. Harry B. Harris, Jr., to Questions Submitted by Senator 

James E. Risch ..................................................................................................... 37 

The committee received no response from Mr. Walter Russell Mead to the 

following questions submitted by Senator James E. Risch .............................. 38 

Letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye from Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant 

Secretary for Congressional Relations, 1965, submitted by Senator Brian 

Schatz .................................................................................................................... 39 

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(1) 

MODERNIZING U.S. ALLIANCES AND 

PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2024 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, 

chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Menendez, Coons, Murphy, 

Kaine, Booker, Schatz, Risch, Romney, Ricketts, and Young. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee will come to order. 

Four years ago America’s alliances were in tatters, especially in 

the Indo-Pacific. We saw a retreat from support for democracy and 

human rights, a chaotic patchwork of diplomatic grudges and selfdefeating trade policies, and demands that our allies pay the cost 

of hosting U.S. bases. 

China was filling the vacuum left by the United States approach 

to foreign policy that some called America first but was in reality 

America alone. Only 4 years later, our alliances have never been 

stronger. The tremendous progress is thanks to the hard work of 

the Biden administration. 

The historic Camp David summit with Japan and South Korea, 

the AUKUS agreement with Australia, the United States, and the 

United Kingdom, which goes far beyond nuclear submarines, the 

increased practical cooperation with members of the Quad—Australia, Japan and India, who share many of our strategic views on 

China. 

And just last week we witnessed the first ever trilateral summit 

here in Washington between Japan, the Philippines, and the 

United States. 

Our alliances in the region do not just reassure nations who live 

in Beijing’s shadows; they also pay off for the American people. 

Whether it is intelligence sharing on mutual threats or U.S. basing and rotational agreements, we are enjoying enormous benefit 

from maintaining our Indo-Pacific alliances. 

Both Democrats and Republicans understand how important this 

region is. That is why there is bipartisan agreement across Congress on the need to preserve and deepen these alliances, and I am 
2 

optimistic that the House will do the right thing and pass the Administration’s supplemental security package. It not only includes vital funding for Ukraine but almost $5 billion for the Indo-Pacific. As President Kennedy once said, ‘‘History 

has made us friends, economics has made us partners, and necessity has made us allies. Those who nature hath so joined together 

let no man put asunder.’’ 

The truth is that one of the United States’ greatest strategic advantages are alliances. Who are China’s closest friends? Russia, 

Iran, North Korea, some of the worst human rights abusers in the 

world that repress the hope and dreams of their citizens. 

Meanwhile, we have five mutual defense treaties with Japan, 

South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and our 

partnerships include New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, 

India, Mongolia, and Taiwan, and the list goes on. 

No one wants to be left off. Why? It is not just because we have 

the greatest military in the world. It is because of our values. It 

is because while others might use debt trap diplomacy to buy influence, the United States is working to bring peace and stability and 

prosperity. 

It is because we are working to uphold the rules based international order that has benefited people across the planet. We cannot go back to the days when America was agonizing and even attacking our friends. 

We cannot succeed with a foreign policy that tells dictators do 

whatever the hell they want to our allies. From manufacturing 

microchips to expanding the operational reach of our military 

across the Pacific to combating corruption, to standing up for 

human rights, the stakes in the Indo-Pacific are simply too high for 

the United States. 

We need a robust economic agenda, and we need to show up with 

concrete alternatives to what our competitors are offering in infrastructure and investment. America’s leadership in the world has 

never been more important. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. We have two very, 

very distinguished expert witnesses with us today, and we should 

have an incredibly important discussion. 

But first let me recognize the distinguished ranking member, 

Senator Risch. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO 

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, let me say that the United States has had a strategic 

interest in Asia being open and free for over two centuries. 

We opened a consulate in India in 1792. In the 1850s various 

U.S. Senators made speeches about thwarting efforts by various colonial powers to dominate the region. 

A balance of power favorable to the United States protects U.S. 

interests and allies’ sovereignty, advances economic prosperity, and 

ensures no one has to bow to a bully. 

However, this balance is being challenged. The greatest threat of 

regional domination, of course, comes from China supported by a 

growing China-Russia strategic partnership. 
3 

It has been interesting to watch Russia become the junior partner in this relationship. China has improved its strategic posture 

by creating trade and economic dependencies and seizing territory 

from the South China Sea to the Indian border. 

China knows it can get what it wants if it proves U.S. alliances 

and partnerships are not up to the task when things get tough. 

Time and again we played into their hands. 

In 2012 the United States stood by as China seized the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines uncontested, a failure we must 

not forget or repeat given China’s growing encroachment on more 

territory like the Second Thomas Shoal. 

Weak responses spread the idea that we are unreliable. Left unanswered, our allies’ confidence is shaken, and we should not be 

surprised if they seek to engage with China to protect their own 

national interest. 

Even in the face of a deteriorating strategic position we remain 

unserious about ensuring our alliances can address our shared objectives and contend with shared threats. 

U.S. allies plead for deeper economic engagement with us, yet 

the U.S. does not have a substantive economic agenda. The Administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework sounds good but delivers nothing. 

While there are calls for reviews of foreign investments by allies 

and the United States, we at the same time allow Chinese firms 

to benefit from U.S. tax credits and to profit off research at U.S. 

universities. This approach should be reversed. 

Meanwhile, the Administration’s approach to allies puts ideology 

ahead of reality. The last three budgets proposed by the Administration prioritized gender and climate over countering China’s advantages in transportation and digital infrastructure. 

The Administration instructs allies to stop buying Russian energy, and then at the same time bans U.S. LNG exports. This ham 

handed move has not gone unnoticed by our allies and for obvious 

reasons is roundly criticized. 

Numerous political declarations and joint statements obscure the 

lack of substance in progress with our allies. AUKUS is the most 

egregious example. 

I strongly support AUKUS, but the Administration announced 

the security alliance in 2021 but did not negotiate what it meant 

until after the press release went out. 

It is now 2024, and we still do not know when any new military 

capabilities will be produced. To make it worse, the Administration 

refuses to certify that Australia and U.K., our closest allies, have 

the laws to adequately support defense cooperation. 

But this did not stop the Administration from announcing moves 

to add a new AUKUS partner last week. Similarly, the Administration announced with great fanfare a nuclear consultative group 

with South Korea to deter North Korean aggression. A great idea. 

A year later, where is the progress? Further, the Administration 

fails to prioritize greater burden sharing. The demands of this security environment are immense. Our partners need to step up and 

buy more capability and conduct more presence operations. 

Finally, the Administration’s Indo-Pacific alliance strategy does 

not account for the growing China-Russia alignment. Our Asian 
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partners recognize that what happens in Ukraine will affect Asia’s 

future. 

The Administration is politely asking China to restrain Russia 

rather than imposing effective strong economic punishment on 

China for its active role in Ukraine’s suffering. That is the only 

kind of thing that China will understand or respond to. 

The Administration’s approach to alliances is not serving our interests. Protectionism over economic engagement, ideology over 

pragmatism, and form over substance do not advance U.S. interests 

or give our Indo-Pacific partners strategic options. 

Initiatives must have concrete actions if they are to help us win 

this competition. The Administration’s performance is 

underwhelming. 

I look forward to hearing the witnesses’ thoughts on these matters. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

I think we all agree that the Indo-Pacific is critically important 

to U.S. national security interests. So the topic of modernizing U.S. 

alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific is a timely subject. 

We have two outstanding experts on the subject that have joined 

us today, and I want to thank both of you for your service and for 

your being here today. 

First, we have Admiral Harry Harris, a decorated four-star admiral who served our country for 3 years as the 24th commander of 

U.S. Pacific Command, INDOPACOM. Admiral Harris more recently led U.S. bilateral relations with our friends in Seoul as the 

U.S. Ambassador to South Korea from 2018 to 2021. 

Admiral Harris, it would be difficult to find anyone with more experience than you both in the military and diplomatic capacities in 

the Indo-Pacific. You are a strong advocate for U.S. alliances and 

realistic regarding the seriousness of our competition with the 

PRC. 

Our second witness is Professor Walter Russell Mead, an accomplished academic and historian currently serving as the distinguished fellow in strategies and statesmanship at the Hudson Institute. 

Professor Mead is also the James Clarke Chace professor of foreign affairs and humanities at Bard College and currently contributes to the Wall Street Journal and its global view columnist. 

So we have two very, very accomplished experts. 

Your entire statements will be made part of the record. You may 

proceed as you wish. We hoped that you could summarize in about 

5 minutes or so, so we have time for committee discussion. 

With that, let me start with Admiral Harris. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH KOREA, FORMER COMMANDER, U.S. 

INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND, COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO 

Mr. HARRIS. Thanks, Chairman Cardin and Ranking Member 

Risch and distinguished members. It is an honor for me to appear 

again before this committee. It has been almost 6 years since I last 

appeared here for my confirmation hearing to be the Ambassador 

to South Korea. 
5 

I thought then that that would be my last testimony before you. 

I thought wrong. Today I am honored and even intimidated to testify alongside the esteemed, dare I say revered, Professor Walter 

Russell Mead as distinguished strategist, historian, teacher, and 

prolific writer who understands well the challenges and threats 

that confront America in the 21st century. So please throw the 

hard balls at him, and toss the softballs to me. 

I know I am time limited here so let me get right to it by first 

thanking this committee. That this hearing to examine the issue of 

U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific comes immediately after Japanese Prime Minister Kishida’s and Philippine 

President Marcos’s visit and 2 weeks after we celebrated NATO’s 

75th anniversary sends a powerful signal to the world in general 

and to our adversaries in particular. 

This committee’s introduction last week of a bipartisan resolution 

underscoring the strength and the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance serves as an authoritative reminder that 2024 marks 64 

years of our formal alliance with Japan. 

Importantly, this month also celebrates and marks the 45th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. In my opinion, without 

Congress’s active intervention back in 1979 when your predecessors 

in the 96th Congress crafted the act, Taiwan would have long succumbed to the People’s Republic of China, or PRC. 

Today, 45 years later, Taiwan is democratic, an idea factory, and 

a global force for good despite the PRC’s unrelenting quest to intimidate, isolate, and finally dominate this beleaguered island. 

The Cato Institute’s 2023 Freedom Index ranked Taiwan as the 

freest country in Asia. As reference points, Taiwan ranked higher 

than Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and even us. 

The PRC ranked a dismal 149 out of 165 countries. Unlike our 

policy of strategic ambiguity, it appears Xi’s intent is crystal clear. 

We must never allow the PRC to dictate America’s Taiwan policy. 

As this committee knows far better than me, there are very few 

bipartisan issues in Washington these days, but our national concern about the PRC is one of them. 

Now, I visited Taiwan three times last year. In my opinion, Russia on Ukraine has galvanized them. They get it. But they need our 

tangible support, not our best wishes, and I am happy to discuss 

how this could happen in the Q&A session. 

Throughout my long military career and my short stint in diplomacy I emphasized my belief that America’s single greatest asymmetric strength is our network of alliances and partnerships. 

Today we face a security environment more complex and volatile 

than any I have experienced—ever. Today more than ever alliances 

are critical to our national security. Alliances and allies matter. 

Ambassador Emanuel, our envoy to Japan, put it just this way 

last Sunday—we are betting on our allies, and they are betting on 

us. 

President Reagan once said that we cannot play innocents 

abroad in a world that is not innocent. 

This statement is as true today as it was on December 7, 

throughout the cold war, on 9/11, on 2/24 when Russia invaded 

Ukraine, and on the 7th of October when Hamas terrorists invaded 

Israel. 
6 

Over a thousand Israelis including women, children, and the elderly, were subjected to unspeakable cruelty, murder, and rape, 

and hundreds were taken hostage. This is pure evil, and it baffles 

and angers me that there are those who seek to justify Hamas’s actions. 

Indeed, the world remains a dangerous place. The unipolar moment following the cold war is long over. So, today more than ever 

I believe that America’s security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific 

are inextricably linked to this network of alliances and partnerships as we face a challenging and precarious crossroad where tangible opportunity meets significant challenge. 

We find ourselves again in peer competition. Not ‘‘near peer’’— 

but peer competition—with adversaries who are developing and deploying cutting edge weaponry and information disorder to undermine democracy and defeat us. 

An aggressive North Korea is building and testing nuclear weapons. A revisionist PRC seeks regional then global domination, and 

a revanchist Russia is on the move in Europe. 

I agree with Professor Mead’s piece in the Wall Street Journal 

where he opined that we get it wrong when we believe that giving 

in to leaders like Putin will satisfy them. 

In my opinion, the same can be said of Kim Jong-Un and autocrats the world over. Equally concerning to me is the dangerous 

and growing alignment between the PRC, Russia, and North 

Korea, and all three with Iran. 

Maya Angelou once said that when someone shows you who they 

are, believe them the first time. These autocrats have shown us 

who they are time and time again and what they intend to do, and 

shame on us if we ignore them. 

Professor Mead asserted over a decade ago that America’s cold 

war alliances were insufficient then to meet the needs of the 21st 

century. I agree. 

So today, in addition to the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral, 

we have the Quad, we have AUKUS, and the new trilateral relationship involving the Philippines. 

In my written statement I talk about specific alliances and multilateral relationships, so I will not go into them here other than to 

observe that, one, AUKUS is not an alliance to counter an alien invasion, and two, those relationships reflect a fundamental change 

to America’s approach. 

Moving away from the old hub and spoke model of my day, so 

20th century, INDOPACOM is now pursuing lattice like security 

arrangements with multiple connections between members. 

Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks with this observation. 

The U.S. made two flawed geopolitical assumptions last century. 

One, we assumed that the PRC would morph into something resembling a global force for good, and two, that Russia would no 

longer threaten its neighbors or the West. 

Today, the Russian bear is afoot, and we find ourselves shooting 

well behind the Peking duck. We must step up our game, or we will 

find ourselves outgunned, literally and figuratively. 

While challenges to our interests in the Indo-Pacific are real and 

daunting, I believe our resolve is powerful and durable. We are bol-
7 

stered—and we are sustained and strengthened—by our allies and 

partners. 

Again, to quote Professor Mead, a distracted America still leads 

the world. I thank this committee and the Congress for your enduring support of our diplomatic corps and our armed forces, and I 

look forward to your questions. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Mr. Harry B. Harris, Jr. 

Thank you, Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members. It’s an honor for me to appear again before this committee. It’s been almost 

6 years since I last appeared here for my confirmation hearing to be the Ambassador to South Korea. I thought then that that would be my last testimony before 

you. I thought wrong. Today, I’m honored and even intimidated to testify alongside 

the esteemed-dare-I-say-venerated Professor Walter Russell Mead . . . a distinguished strategist, historian, teacher, and prolific writer who understands well the 

challenges and threats that confront America in the 21st Century, as well as the 

importance of alliances to our Nation’s security. 

Let me begin by thanking this committee. That this timely hearing to examine 

the state of U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific comes immediately 

after Japanese PM Kishida’s and Philippine President Marcos’ visit and 2 weeks 

after we celebrated NATO’s 75th anniversary sends a powerful signal to the world 

in general and to our adversaries in particular. This Committee’s introduction last 

week of a bipartisan resolution underscoring the strength and importance of the 

United States-Japan alliance serves as an authoritative reminder that 2024 marks 

64 years of our formal alliance with Tokyo. 

More broadly, I’m grateful for Congress’ bipartisan passing of the fiscal year 2024 

National Defense Authorization Act, which was signed by the President last December. This NDA (1) included strong support for Taiwan including increased military 

aid and security cooperation to that embattled island; (2) authorized the sale and 

transfer of defense articles and services relating to the implementation of the 

AUKUS partnership; (3) increased funding for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative 

(PDI); and (4) reinforced alliances and partnerships. 

Importantly, this month marks the 45th anniversary of the signing into law of the 

Taiwan Relations Act. In my opinion, without Congress’ active intervention back in 

1979 when your predecessors of the 96th Congress crafted the Act, Taiwan would 

have long succumbed to the People’s Republic of China, or PRC. Today, 45 years 

later, Taiwan is democratic, an idea factory, and a global force for good, despite the 

PRC’s unrelenting quest to intimidate, isolate, and finally dominate this beleaguered island. The CATO Institute’s 2023 Freedom Index ranked Taiwan as the 

freest country in Asia. A reference points, Taiwan ranked higher than Japan, South 

Korea, Australia, Canada, and the United States. The PRC ranked a dismal 149 out 

of 165 countries. I’ve called for ending the almost 44-year U.S. policy of strategic 

ambiguity in favor of strategic clarity. I also believe we should ink a bilateral Free 

Trade Agreement with Taiwan as soon as possible. The Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy specifically supports an environment in which Taiwan’s future is determined peacefully by its people. My successor at Indo-Pacific Command testified before Congress in 2021 that the PRC could invade Taiwan in 6 years. That’s 2027 

. . . 3 years from now. We ignore Admiral Davidson’s warning at our peril. Unlike 

our policy of strategic ambiguity, the PRC’s intent is crystal clear and oft-stated. We 

must never allow the PRC to dictate America’s Taiwan policy. 

I was in Taiwan a year ago for the Council of Foreign Relations . . . again last 

May on INDOPACOM business where I met with President Tsai . . . and again just 

last December where I delivered remarks to their National Defense University. In 

my opinion, Russia-on-Ukraine has galvanized them. They get it. But they need our 

tangible support . . . not our best wishes. 

The Congress’ continued bipartisan actions to strengthen the technological backbone of the United States against the relentless challenge posed by the PRC through 

passage of the CHIPs and Science Act in 2022 and your ongoing close examination 

of Tik-Tok are significant. I’ll take this opportunity to express my hope for speedy 

passage of NDAA 2025. 

Throughout my long military career and my short stint in the diplomatic world, 

I underscored the fact that the United States’ single greatest asymmetric strength 

is our worldwide network of alliances and partnerships. Today, we face a global se-
8 

curity environment more complex and volatile than any I have experienced. Today, 

more than ever, alliances are critical to our national security. Alliances and allies 

matter. 

President Reagan once said, ‘We cannot play innocents abroad in a world that’s 

not innocent.’ This statement is as true today as it was in on December 7th . . . 

through the cold war . . . on 9–11 . . . on 2–24 when Russia invaded Ukraine, and 

the 7th of October when Hamas terrorists invaded Israel. Over a thousand 

Israelis—including women, children, and the elderly—were subjected to unspeakable cruelty, murder, and rape . . . and hundreds were taken hostage. This is pure 

evil, and it baffles me that there are those who seek to justify Hamas’ actions. 

Indeed, the world remains a dangerous place or, as Professor Mead calls it, a ‘‘terrifying’’ place. The unipolar moment following the cold war is long over. 

Today, more than ever, I believe America’s security and economic prosperity are 

inextricably linked to this network of alliances and partnerships. We face challenging and precarious global crossroads where tangible opportunity meets significant challenge. Nowhere is this truer than in the Indo-Pacific. We find ourselves, 

again, in peer—not ‘‘near-peer’’ but ‘‘peer’’—competition with adversaries who are 

developing and deploying cutting-edge weaponry and information disorder to undermine democracy with a goal and intent to defeat us. An aggressive North Korea is 

building and testing nuclear weapons; a revisionist PRC seeks regional, even global, 

dominion; and a revanchist Russia is not only on the move in Europe but increasingly conducts operations and engagements throughout the Indo-Pacific and, importantly, the High North. I agree with Professor Mead’s piece in the Wall Street Journal where he opined that we get it wrong when we believe that giving in to leaders 

like Putin will satisfy them. The same can be said of Kim Jong Un and autocrats 

the world over. 

Last year, I testified before the House Armed Services Committee on the threat 

from the PRC. My testimony occurred in the midst of the spy balloon fiasco, which 

is so illustrative of the PRC’s bad behavior and disregard for international norms. 

That Beijing would claim this incursion over sovereign American airspace was innocuous and unintended beggars the imagination. 

In 2022, the current Administration released its National Security Strategy. 

Though I would use the term ‘‘adversary’’ rather than ‘‘competitor’’, this strategy 

recognizes that the PRC is the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order. As this committee knows far 

better than me, there are very few bipartisan issues in Washington these days, but 

our national concern about the PRC is one of them. As Michele Flournoy has said, 

‘‘There is a strong bipartisan consensus in seeing China as the pacing threat, economically, technologically, diplomatically and militarily.’’ 

The PRC’s aggression in the South China Sea continues unabated—in fact, it has 

increased—despite the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s tribunal ruling that 

invalidated China’s ridiculous 9-dash line claim and unprecedented land reclamations. The PRC’s actions are coordinated, methodical, and strategic, using its military, ‘‘grey zone’’, and economic power to erode the free and open international seas. 

China’s considerable military buildup could soon challenge the U.S. across almost 

every domain. While some might say the PRC is already there, I am not one of 

them. However, the PRC is making significant advancements in hypersonic weapons, 5th generation fighters, a blue-water navy with aircraft carriers, an incredible 

build up of its nuclear arsenal, and in the next wave of military technologies including artificial intelligence and advanced space and cyber capabilities. Geo-politically, 

the PRC seeks to supplant the United States as the security partner of choice for 

countries not only in the Indo-Pacific, but globally. As I testified before the Congress 

when I was in uniform, and again last year, I believe Beijing seeks hegemony not 

only in East Asia, but greater Asia and beyond. The PRC wants to set the rules 

for the region, indeed the world. 

The United States has made it clear that we reject foreign policy based on leverage and dominance. The United States won’t weaponize debt. We encourage every 

country to work in its own interest to protect its own sovereignty. And we must 

work in our own enlightened self-interest to develop our own reliable sources of critical materials, including rare earths, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals essential for 

weaponeering, independent of the PRC. Former Deputy National Security Advisor 

for Strategy Nadia Schadlow wrote in 2022 that the PRC is ‘‘the sole source or a 

primary supplier for a number of critical energetics materials.’’ By ‘‘energetics,’’ I’m 

referring to those materials that are used for explosives and propellants—from bullets, to artillery, to missiles. I was stunned to learn about our reliance on the PRC 

for this critical capability. 

We find ourselves sailing into rocks and shoals, to use a nautical analogy, and 

we must invest and innovate to right the errant course we’re on. If the United 
9 

States does not keep pace, the Joint Force will struggle to compete with the People’s 

Liberation Army on future battlefields. 

Now, I note that the current Administration’s fundamental understanding of the 

PRC is consistent with its predecessor. Consider that the Secretary of State testified 

that the previous Administration’s tougher approach is right; that what’s happening 

in Xinjiang is genocide; and that democracy is being trampled in Hong Kong. The 

Secretary of Defense testified that he’s focused on the threat posed by the PRC and 

he promised strong support for Taiwan. 

I’m worried about the trajectory of the PRC’s body politic. As former Australian 

Prime Minister and now Ambassador to the United States Kevin Rudd wrote, the 

2022 party Congress is likely to be ‘‘an era-defining event . . . cementing Xi Jinping 

as China’s paramount leader . . . solidifying the country’s turn to the state and 

away from the market . . . and officially underscoring the primacy of Marxism-Leninism.’’ In other words, Deng Xiaoping is dead in more ways than one. If the first 

era of modern Chinese politics was Mao Zedong’s, and the second Deng Xiaoping’s, 

the third is unquestionable Xi Jinping’s. 

Equally concerning to me is the dangerous and growing alignment between the 

PRC, Russia, and North Korea, and now, Iran. Clearly, we are in what I call the 

decisive decade. In 2018, I talked about the challenges facing the United States, including the perception—which, by the way, I completely disagree with—that the 

United States is a declining power facing unrelenting challenges posed by North 

Korea, the PRC, and Russia. Of course, today, I would add Iran to that list. Over 

the past 6 years, the situation has worsened in almost every geo-strategic measure. 

Consider that Taiwan is under siege, Israel finds itself fighting once again for its 

very existence, Ukraine is ablaze, eastern and northern Europe is under threat, and 

our Navy is involved in countering Houthi rebels who have effectively shut down 

commercial shipping in the Red Sea. 

Regarding alliances in general, I was recently asked during a Q&A session following a speech I gave in Florida about the U.S. acting as a global policeman, an 

idea which has gained some traction in some quarters. The question was posed 

along the lines of ‘‘why are we the world’s policeman?’’ I reject this notion. We are 

not the world’s policeman. Police and law enforcement officers do their difficult jobs 

out a sense of true noblesse oblige . . . of altruism of a high order. They risk their 

lives to protect their communities, often with little pay, no reward, and scant appreciation from those they protect. Their actions define ‘‘selfless service.’’ But, as a Nation, when we act on the global stage—whether because of alliance obligations or 

some other cause or need—we act out of enlightened self-interest. What we provide 

to our allies is matched by what we selfishly gain from our allies—whether that is 

access, basing, trade, or even broad international military support like we saw after 

9–11. We are not in this alone. Ambassador Emanuel, our envoy to Japan, put it 

this way just this past Sunday: ‘‘We’re betting on our allies and they’re betting on 

us.’’ 

Let me now discuss five examples of how the United States benefits from alliances—one global case and 4 Indo-Pacific cases. 

I’ll begin with the global case. 75 years ago this month, the United States and 

11 other countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty to counter the threat from the 

Soviet Union. Professor Mead wrote back in 2001, just a few years after NATO’s 

50th, that the United States‘‘. . . built the NATO alliance, the largest and longestlasting intimate security partnership among sovereign states in modern history.’’ 

Many call this the most successful alliance in history and I tend to agree. Today’s 

NATO—with 32 member countries—is not only the largest NATO has ever been, but 

I would submit, it’s the strongest that NATO has ever been. I need not remind this 

committee that in NATO’s 75-year history, Article 5—the collective defense piece— 

has only been called into action once: following 9–11 when we were attacked. In 

other words, on that darkest of dark days, NATO came to our assistance, not vice 

versa. 

Now, Japan. I’ve already mentioned last week’s state visit by Prime Minister 

Kishida. There was also a trilateral summit with Prime Minister Kishida, President 

Marcos of the Philippines, and President Biden. America’s alliance with Japan 

stands as the cornerstone of prosperity, security, and stability throughout the IndoPacific region. Since the end of World War II, the network of U.S. alliances has been 

at the core of a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific . . . benefiting us as much as 

any of our alliance partners. Now, no country can shape in a positive way the future 

of the region in isolation, and no vision for the region is complete without a robust 

network of sovereign countries cooperating to secure their collective interests. 

This is why trilateral cooperation between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan is 

so important. It’s crucial for our three nations to work together to enhance our security cooperation and preserve the international rules-based order. The reality is that 
10 

no important security or economic issue in the region can be addressed without both 

South Korea’s and Japan’s active involvement. 

This is also why bilateral cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul is critical. I’m 

heartened by Prime Minister Kishida’s and President Yoon’s outreaches to each 

other. Frankly, the stakes are too high to embark on any other course. Last year, 

President Yoon travelled to Japan for bilateral meetings with Prime Minister 

Kishida—the first such meeting by a sitting President of South Korea in 12 years. 

This is statesmanship in action. The recent trilateral decision to implement the 

North Korean missile warning data sharing mechanism has reached full operational 

capability . . . this benefits us all. As does the multi-year trilateral exercise plan 

established by Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul which begins this year. 

Japan’s remarkable commitment to dramatically increase its defense spending to 

historic levels is both welcome and critical to our Alliance and stability in the region. Tokyo’s decision to move surface-to-ship missiles to Okinawa is part and parcel 

of this buildup and is both an example and clear recognition of the twin threats 

from China and North Korea. 

I agree with Professor Mead’s assertion which he made over a decade ago that 

America’s cold war alliances were insufficient to meet the needs of the 21st Century. 

To this end, we worked hard on expanding our international structures when I commanded USPACOM, and my successors have moved the ball in ways I couldn’t even 

imagine. So today, in addition to the United States, Japan, South Korea trilateral 

I already mentioned, we have the Quad, AUKUS, and a new relationship involving 

the Philippines. Let me briefly touch on these. 

I’m a big fan and booster of the Quad. That’s the informal grouping of like-minded 

democracies: the United States, Australia, Japan, and India. I called for its resurgence when I spoke at the inaugural Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi in 2016. Jake 

Sullivan calls it the ‘‘foundation upon which to build a substantial U.S. policy in the 

region.’’ I’ve called for the establishment of a Quad Secretariat, headquartered 

somewhere in the region, to coordinate what issues to take on . . . and, perhaps, 

to also get at the question of how new members can join. You know, in college football, the Big 10 used to have 14 teams and the Big 12 had 10 teams. So, there’s 

nothing that says the Quad has to have only 4 teams. But let me be clear. The Quad 

is not NATO nor will it ever be NATO. It’s a grouping of like-minded democracies 

who share an outlook on the region’s opportunities, challenges, and dangers. It is 

not a defense pact. 

Now, the new Australia, United Kingdom, and U.S., or ‘‘AUKUS’’ arrangement is 

a defense pact . . . and I, for one, am all for AUKUS and am excited by it. AUKUS 

is a game changer. I cannot wait to see a nuclear submarine under Australian colors 

underway in the Indo-Pacific. I don’t believe this will take decades as some have 

said. After all, we put a man on the moon in 8 years and developed a Covid vaccine 

in less than 1 year. Last year, President Biden and Prime Ministers Sunak and 

Albanese announced a plan . . . an imminently do-able plan in my opinion . . . to 

do just this. We are already training Australian submariners and technicians in nuclear reactor management. I’m optimistic. One of the outcomes of last week’s visit 

by PM Kishida was bringing Japan into AUKUS Pillar Two. To be clear, this will 

not make Japan an AUKUS Pillar One partner. Nevertheless, this is a significant 

development which underscores both Japan’s technological prowess and the importance of AUKUS to the region writ large. 

Also encouraging and, frankly, exciting, is the new, formal trilateral partnership 

between the United States, Japan, and the Philippines. This trilateral will change 

the power dynamic in the South Chins Sea. It is long overdue in my opinion. 

All of these relationships reflect a fundamental change to America’s approach to 

alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. In my day, we worked on improving 

bilateral relationships using the hub-and-spoke model. That is so 20th Century! 

Today, our approach is analogous to a lattice structure with multiple connections 

between members and across structural boundaries. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, since I was the Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, I 

would be remiss if I didn’t spend a few paragraphs on our alliance with South 

Korea. In my opinion, the textbook case for the power of alliances is the U.S.-South 

Korea Alliance—which will be 71 years strong this year. Forged during a devastating conflict, it has stood the test of time. It’s mind-boggling to consider how 

much has changed in the world in general, Northeast Asia in particular, and the 

Korean Peninsula especially, since 1953. 

Some changes have been for the better, such as South Korea’s miraculous growth 

into an economic and cultural powerhouse, a vibrant democracy, and a high-tech 

‘‘innovation nation.’’ Other changes have been for the worse. Why is North Korea, 

far away in Northeast Asia, a challenge for the entire world? The answer is simple: 

Kim Jong-Un’s missiles point in every direction. Today, North Korea stands out as 
11 

the only nation this century to test nuclear weapons. North Korea is ruled with an 

iron fist, by a brutal dictator, who values power over the prosperity and welfare of 

his own people. The North’s unrelenting pursuit of nuclear weapons, the means to 

deliver them, and its unmitigated aggression toward South Korea and America 

should concern us all. 

I believe KJU wants 4 things: sanctions relief, keep his nukes, split our Alliance, 

and dominate the peninsula. Last September, KJU stated unequivocally that he’d 

never give up his nukes and that North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons state 

is irreversible. This past January, by declaring that the North would no longer seek 

peaceful reunification with the South, and depicting the Republic as the North’s 

‘‘primary foe and invariable principal enemy’’, he abandoned a foundational doctrine 

of the Communist regime. As the Wall Street Journal stated, ‘‘Kim Jong Un has a 

new Enemy No. 1—and it isn’t the U.S.’’ 

This doesn’t sound to me like he’s going to get rid of his nuclear ambitions anytime soon. In fact, he’s telling us precisely the opposite. The North continues to test 

missiles of ever-increasing complexity. A year ago, we saw multiple drone incursions 

across the DMZ. And now, KJU is trading low-cost weapons for Russian technology—why am I not surprised? 

Clearly, this is no path toward peace. While we hope for diplomacy with North 

Korea to be successful, we must recognize that hope alone is not a course of action. 

The quest for dialogue with the North must never be made at the expense of the 

ability to respond to threats from the North. Dialogue and military readiness must 

go hand-in-hand. Idealism must be rooted in realism. 

By his declarations and actions, KJU has eliminated any remaining fantasy about 

potential peaceful reunification with South Korea. Let’s not sugar-coat his words; 

let’s take them at face value. Maya Angelou once said, ‘‘When someone shows you 

who they are, believe them the first time.’’ Time and time again KJU has shown 

us who he is, and shame on us if we fail to believe him. Therefore, I believe our 

heretofore U.S. policy goal of negotiating away North Korea’s nuclear program has 

reached its useful end. We must up our combined game. Deterrence by appeasement 

is not deterrence at all. 

This is why I’m encouraged by South Korean President Yoon’s vision to make the 

U.S.-South Korea Alliance the centerpiece of his foreign policy. I’m pleased that he 

places a primacy on defending South Korea against the threat from the North, 

which means a return to joint military exercises and an emphasis on combined readiness. And I’m heartened by his outreach to Japan which I’ve already discussed. 

President Yoon’s State Visit with President Biden last year underscored the vitality and, frankly, the global necessity of our Alliance. The outcomes of this visit are 

significant, including the Washington Declaration on extended nuclear deterrence.al 

force for good and, two, that Russia would no longer threaten its neighbors or the 

West. Today, the Russian 

Mr. Chairman, I’ll conclude my written testimony with this observation. The 

United States made 2 flawed geopolitical assumptions last century: one, we assumed 

that the PRC would morph into something like a globbear is afoot and we find ourselves shooting well behind the Peking duck. We must step up our game or we’ll 

find ourselves outgunned, literally and figuratively. While American interests in the 

Indo-Pacific are real and enduring, and challenges to our interests are equally real 

and daunting, I believe our resolve is powerful and durable. And we are bolstered, 

sustained, and strengthened by our allies and partners. Again, to quote Professor 

Mead, ‘‘a distracted America still leads the world.’’ As he wrote in 2012, ‘‘the American world vision isn’t powerful because it is American; it is powerful because it is, 

for all its limits and faults, the best way forward.’’ I thank this committee and the 

Congress for your enduring support to our diplomatic corps and armed forces. I look 

forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Harris, first of all, I very much appreciate your testimony. It is very informative, very helpful, and very 

different than when you testified before us on your nomination. 

So we can see the difference between those types of appearances. 

But again, thank you for your service. 

Professor Mead. 
12 

STATEMENT OF WALTER RUSSELL MEAD, JAMES CLARKE 

CHACE PROFESSOR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HUMANITIES, BARD COLLEGE, COLUMNIST, WALL STREET JOURNAL, RED HOOK, NEW YORK 

Mr. MEAD. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members 

of this committee, it is a great honor to be asked to speak before 

you and especially to testify with either Admiral or Ambassador 

Harris in both capacities. He is one of America’s great public servants. 

I will just make five points this morning, and I hope they will 

contribute to our discussion. 

First, America’s interests are global, but our goal is not global 

conquest. History teaches that if any country dominates either Europe or Asia, our security and our prosperity here will come under 

attack. 

Maintaining this balance of power and ensuring the freedom of 

the world’s sea lanes and communications networks is now and has 

been for many generations the foundation of American foreign policy. 

These limited goals make American power a force for the freedom of other countries and provide the basis for strong and enduring partnerships. Our goal should be to safeguard these vital long 

term national interests at the lowest possible risk and cost. 

Second, allies are a vital asset. We do not want to fight either 

Russia or China, or for that matter Iran, on our own. Fortunately, 

when great powers try to dominate their neighborhoods the smaller 

powers come looking for allies. 

Today, countries like India, Japan, and, thanks in part to Ambassador Harris’s service, South Korea have awakened to the danger. Sweden and Finland have joined NATO to help check Russia’s 

bid for power, and we all saw literally a miracle last week as Arab 

air forces joined with the U.K., the U.S., and Israel to block Iran’s 

missile and drone attacks. 

Third, after the cold war Americans fell asleep at the wheel. We 

took our military and economic superiority for granted and thought 

that the era of great power competition was over. 

We ignored the danger signs from Russia and Iran. We fail to 

foresee the consequences of China’s abuse of the world trading system or to match its military build up in its neighborhood. 

Today, we and our allies are overstretched and under attack. 

Wars are erupting all over the world. We must get back to the basics. Military power is not the only dimension of American power, 

but without a solid, hard power foundation we will not be able to 

make progress on issues like human rights or climate change. 

Fourth, we now face an axis of revisionist powers including 

China, Russia, Iran, and smaller hostile countries around the 

world. 

These countries do not love or trust each other, but their fear 

and hatred of American power and their hope that we can now at 

long last be defeated is once again haunting the civilized world and 

driving them to act in concert. 
13 

The danger of a downward spiral into a new era of chaos and 

war is real. We can look at Gaza and Sudan to see what an era 

like that will mean for the peoples of the world. 

Fifth and finally, we still have time to turn things around. We 

are not yet in the position of Winston Churchill, who could promise 

his fellow citizens nothing but blood, toil, tears, and sweat in the 

darkest days of World War II. We can still deter war while working 

for peace. 

China can be deterred from attacking its neighbors while those 

neighbors catch up with its economic growth and military might. 

Russia, Iran, and the fanatical terrorists seeking to revive the ideology of jihadism can be taught that their fantasies of empire cannot be fulfilled. 

While he was still in college the young John Fitzgerald Kennedy 

wrote his senior thesis about Britain’s failure to foresee and forestall the terrible tragedy of World War II. 

Soon after he published his thesis as the book ‘‘Why England 

Slept.’’ After that, he went to war. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, honorable members, I 

pray to God that no young Americans today will have to write a 

book about why America slept or to fight in the war that will come 

if we fail. 

This distinguished committee does not need for me to tell it that 

the world’s situation is dark today and getting darker. 

But with focus, determination, and the help of our allies we can 

still turn this around and this famous committee, scene of so many 

of the great debates that shaped American and world history in 

past generations, can and I very much hope will play a leading role 

in helping to put the world back on the path to peace. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Mr. Walter Russell Mead 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the committee: 

It is an honor to be invited to testify before this committee and its distinguished 

members. It is a great privilege to join you today to discuss the system of alliances 

the United States has built and maintained over the past several decades, and the 

future of that system in Asia. International politics are changing rapidly, and not 

for the better, and it is altogether appropriate to assess how well the current configuration of American alliances addresses the needs of the American people and 

their friends around the world. 

The first step in any strategic assessment is to identify priorities: only by understanding what is vital, what is important, and what is desirable can we determine 

what the United States needs to accomplish abroad. But it is only the first step. 

After establishing priorities, an assessment must also evaluate how to achieve these 

objectives. In the next few minutes, I would like to describe the core goals of American foreign policy and how our different kinds of alliances help accomplish these 

goals. 

I. AMERICA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Although much of the world has changed significantly over the past century, 

American objectives have remained remarkably consistent. Before World War I, 

Great Britain was the most powerful of the European states, and it maintained both 

a global balance of power and an international economic order that allowed nearly 

a century of general peace and prosperity from the end of the Napoleonic Wars until 

1914. There were still many savage conflicts, and some of the national wars in Europe took on a genocidal character, so the world was far from tranquil. But it was 

spared the horrors of a prolonged conflagration between great powers. 
14 

As Americans determined that Britain was no longer capable of shouldering this 

burden, and as they saw that this failure cost hundreds of thousands of American 

lives in two world wars, they moved in fits and starts toward creating a new international order that was based on American rather than British power. To do this, 

they endeavored to make their hemisphere peaceful and secure, maintain a favorable balance of power on both ends of the Eurasian landmass, and to create a reasonably well-integrated global economy in which Americans, their friends, and neutral countries alike could access economically important goods, such as oil and other 

forms of energy, and communicate freely across the global commons. The challenge 

of Soviet Communism underscored the importance of this national strategy, as that 

strategy provided the tools to contain the USSR and to ensure that the postcolonial 

nations emerging from the collapsing European empires aligned with the Free 

World rather than the Communist bloc. Those efforts led the United States to incorporate, with mixed success, goals like economic development into its national strategy. 

America’s alliance network, the largest and most effective system of alliances 

among free nations in the history of the world, is both the product of this strategy 

and a means by which we have achieved our goals at less risk and cost than we 

would have faced acting alone. 

Before I describe each of these goals and how our alliances factor into them, I 

would like to make a further observation about American foreign policy that informs 

much of this testimony. In some countries, foreign policy is largely restricted to the 

actions of the state. This has never been true in American history, and I see no reason for this to change in the years to come. Ever since the United States gained 

its independence, American traders, missionaries, military experts and development 

workers have affected how other countries view the United States and have in turn 

shaped American foreign policy. In many cases, the actions of American citizens acting on their own initiative have done more to change the world than the official representatives of our government. While I will restrict my remarks today to government actions, none of us should forget that the American people will continue to 

change the world through their religious and civic activism, their universities, and 

their business activities. 

The first pillar of American security is the maintenance of a favorable balance of 

power on both ends of the Eurasian supercontinent. Americans have believed that 

any nation that dominated the immense resources of East Asia or Europe would 

have the ability to threaten American security and to cripple our trade. 

During his tenure in the White House, Teddy Roosevelt used the power that the 

United States developed during the Industrial Revolution to restrain revisionist 

states in Europe and Asia. His diplomacy to end the war between Russia and Japan 

won him a Nobel Peace Prize, but his main goal was to prevent any one country 

from dominating East Asia. Similarly, he warned Germany against attempting to 

overturn the British-led order in Europe. George Kennan, the most eloquent articulator of the containment strategy that won the cold war, argued for a ‘‘strongpoint 

defense’’ against Communism that focused on the same regions. As he saw it, control over the industrial heartlands of Europe and Japan would decide the contest 

between communism and democracy. To that end, he recommended that the United 

States do everything in its power to reconstruct Europe’s and Japan’s economies and 

to develop strong alliances in both places. A bipartisan consensus formed around 

that strategy, which served the country well throughout the cold war. 

Maintaining the balance of power has benefited the United States and its allies. 

Keeping the Red Army at bay was an expensive proposition, and at times a fraught 

one, but it cost much less in lives and treasure than a third major conflict in Europe 

and East Asia would have. The current confrontation with China is similarly tragic, 

but it is far better than ceding some of the most economically and strategically important parts of the world to a rival. 

Allies have always been important in these efforts. In recent years, our allies have 

stepped up in meaningful ways to preserve and maintain this system. Japan has 

long been an important economic and diplomatic counterbalance to China, and as 

Prime Minister Kishida’s visit last week demonstrated, his country is increasingly 

important in the security realm as well. It is even contributing to the defense of 

Ukraine. South Korea is assisting Europe’s security through arms sales and transfers, along with its work to defend its own country, which has become an important 

part of the global economy. The Philippines is contesting Chinese claims in the 

South China Sea, one of the most important arteries of the global economy. And 

Australia, which has fought alongside the United States in every major conflict for 

more than a century, is playing a major role through the Quad, AUKUS, and other 

critical initiatives. 
15 

From the American Revolution, fought as we can read in the Declaration of Independence in part to free the American economy from unfair British trade restrictions, to the present day advancing Americans’ economic interests by preserving our 

rights to trade (and protecting American producers from predatory practices by 

overseas, state-aided rivals) has been the second pillar of our national strategy. 

After World War II Americans organized the global economy around a dollar-based 

system of international finance and trade that helped propel both this country and 

our allies to unprecedented levels of prosperity. Today, thanks to the abuse of the 

system by China, changes in patterns of investment and trade and to errors in the 

post-cold war construction of the World Trade Organization, the old system is badly 

in need of reform. Nevertheless, building and upholding a trade system that favors 

the interests of Americans and binds our allies into a common system remains a 

key task for American policymakers. 

America’s economic and security needs are often connected. Economic activity requires energy, and securing plentiful and stable sources of energy is important for 

the global economy to function. The free flow of information and goods between 

countries is similarly important. The interstitial spaces through which that information and those goods move, such as international waters and outer space, must be 

kept secure for American prosperity to continue. 

Stability in global energy markets is even more important for many of our Asian 

allies than it is for the United States. The International Energy Agency estimates 

that net imports account for 90 percent of Japan’s total energy supply and 85 percent of South Korea’s. India is not an ally, but one-third of its total energy supply 

comes from abroad. The United States is a net exporter of energy, by comparison, 

and we nevertheless feel keenly the effects of high oil prices. This hearing is not 

about the Middle East, but I would be remiss if I did not note that the security and 

stability of the oil-exporting regions of the world is a matter of economic survival 

for our key allies and partners in Asia, and that they pay careful attention to our 

Middle East policy. 

Preventing any single country from dominating the Middle East or acquiring the 

ability to block the flow of Middle East energy to world markets remains an essential component of American global strategy. The interests of the state of Israel and 

the United States are not identical, but the aspirations of Iran today, and perhaps 

of other countries in the future, to dominate the Middle East threaten Israel’s survival and vital American interests. For this reason, Israel (and Gulf Arab states 

with similar concerns) are important strategic partners for the United States. Building a solid framework of regional security in which local actors like Israel and its 

Arab neighbors take the lead, with American support in reserve, is the best way 

to protect basic American interests at the lowest risk and cost. 

Keeping the interstitial spaces free and clear is also important for the American 

and the global economy. In recent years, we have seen resurgences of piracy in various parts of the world, including off the coast of Somalia, and Iran’s Houthi proxies 

are significantly disrupting global trade by attacking international shipping near 

the Red Sea. There are two other potential flashpoints that I would like to discuss 

today. 

The first is in the South China Sea. In 2016, the United Nations found that over 

one-fifth of global trade passed through this disputed waterway. China has built and 

militarized a set of islands in the South China Sea as part of its campaign to claim 

the waterway as part of China’s territory. An arbitration court at The Hague has 

found these Chinese claims to be meritless, but China has ignored the ruling. Recently, it has escalated its harassment of Philippine ships as our treaty ally maintains its own territorial claims there. Among others, ships from our Australian and 

Japanese allies have joined our efforts to defend Philippine sovereignty. There are 

many possible causes of a broader conflict there, and the consequences for the global 

economy would be dramatic. 

The other is around Taiwan. My recent travels in Northeast Asia have reinforced 

how devastating a war around Taiwan will be for the global economy. High-tech industries around the world will grind to a halt if Taiwan’s semiconductor industry 

can no longer export. Fighting in the waters around Taiwan will immediately restrict Japan’s and South Korea’s abilities to import food and fuel for their populations, to say nothing of the other inputs their economies need to function and 

trade with other countries. Bloomberg estimates that a conflict started by a Chinese 

invasion of Taiwan would slash global GDP 10 percent in the first year of fighting. 

Japan and the Philippines are each taking measures to deter such a conflict, and 

the Biden administration has reached many agreements that should make Beijing 

hesitate about using force in the Taiwan Strait. 

The core objectives of American grand strategy are remarkably constant, but as 

circumstances change, our enduring interests require changes in policy. We should 
16 

understand that the nature of American leadership is to promote and accelerate 

technological, economic and social change as our dynamic capitalist economy innovates and expands. The Information Revolution today is introducing changes as profound, and sometimes as destabilizing, as the Industrial Revolution did in its day. 

A changing America must manage its affairs in a changing world. From the development of nuclear weapons to the impact of information technology and artificial intelligence, scientific developments are continually changing and, usually, making more 

complex the tasks of our diplomats and military leaders. This is a feature not a bug 

of America’s activity in the world, and we must continually update both our tactics 

and our strategies as the situation at home and abroad rapidly evolves in an era 

of accelerating and often disruptive technological progress. 

Europe was once the center of American foreign policy concerns. Today the center 

of gravity in world politics has shifted decisively away from the European Union 

and its neighbors. And while Russia’s revisionist foreign policy goals and deep hatred (under its current leadership) of the United States and our values make it a 

rival, Vladimir Putin’s Russia poses a less immediate threat to the European balance of power than did the Soviet Union under Stalin and his successors. As the 

United States seeks to prevent Russia from becoming a more formidable enemy, we 

seek to cooperate with NATO allies and others to limit Russian power. America’s 

goal for NATO should be to promote the ability and the will of our European allies 

to stand up for their own security even as our priorities move elsewhere. 

China today, both as a powerful actor in the Indo-Pacific and as a source of 

strength and support to other American rivals like Russia and Iran, is the chief 

threat to both the geopolitical and economic interests of the United States. China 

is a more formidable rival than the Soviet Union was. The possibility of a neverending struggle against such an adversary is a grim one, and although our geopolitical track record has been a good one, it is not clear who would prevail in such 

a contest. But there is another way to achieve our objectives in the region and ensure another century of American peace and prosperity. 

II. THE PROBLEM OF UNEVEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

When we look at the history of Asia and of American engagement in the IndoPacific, the geopolitical consequences of uneven economic development have led to 

the most serious challenges to the balance of power that America seeks. In the late 

18th and throughout the 19th century the British and the Europeans established 

colonial empires because they were able to achieve a level of modernization and industrial development much faster than Japan, China, and India. Japan’s early industrial success made it the greatest power in Asia by the early 1900s, and aspirations for regional supremacy went to the heads of Japan’s rulers, driving them on 

a destructive and ultimately ruinous quest for hegemony. 

Today, China’s success has made it the greatest regional power and tempted 

many in Beijing to follow the path of Imperial Japan. Take its outsized share of the 

region’s GDP: in 1980 mainland China accounted for approximately 11 percent of 

the combined GDP of East Asia and the Pacific. In 2022, it accounted for nearly 57 

percent of the region’s total GDP. To specifically see the kind of power inequities 

this causes it is helpful to examine the evolution of the Indian and Chinese economies since 1980. 

According to World Bank figures in chained dollars, in 1980 India’s GDP was 64 

percent of China’s. By 2001 when China joined the World Trade Organization, India’s economy was only 28 percent as large as China’s. And, despite several years 

of rapid growth in the 21st century, by 2021 India’s economy had fallen even further 

behind and equaled only 17 percent of the Chinese economy. Even as India has 

caught up with China in population and built a world-class technology sector, it has 

not emerged as the kind of manufacturing powerhouse that could rival China’s economic weight in Asia and beyond. 

If India’s economy had kept pace with China over the past 40 years, India would 

currently have a GDP of $10 trillion instead of $2.73 trillion. Between the military 

spending an economy of that size can support and the economic and political clout 

it would give Indian businessmen and diplomats, there would be no ‘‘China threat’’ 

in the Indo-Pacific. When and if the gap between India and China begins to close, 

the balance of power in Asia will also start to shift, and China will need to rethink 

its approach to regional and world politics begins to close, the balance of power in 

Asia will also start to shift, and China will need to rethink its approach to regional 

and world politics. 

China today, like Japan in the 1930s, is a country whose rapid development 

seems to put Asian supremacy within reach, but Beijing has lucked into a fortuitous 

moment in history, not an era. As India, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thai-
17 

land, Bangladesh, and Burma all continue to modernize and reach their potential, 

a rising Asia will become too big for any country to dominate. In this sense, the objective of American strategy toward the region should not necessarily be either to 

crush China or to change its form of government but to promote development and 

modernization across the rest of the region. Our goal should not be a defeated, embittered, impoverished or divided China. It should be an Indo-Pacific so big, so rich, 

and so powerful that no single country now or in the future can successfully pursue 

a hegemonic strategy. As the rest of Asia rises, Beijing’s chance at supremacy begins 

to shrink—and our allies in the Indo-Pacific will be able to bear more of the costs 

that keeping the peace requires. 

III. THE MISSING PIECE: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In order to help push the region toward a more natural balance of power, it is 

helpful to take a step back and look at American strategy in the decades following 

the end of World War II. The progress toward free trade and the development of 

an international legal and political system that supported successive waves of expansion and integration across the entire world economy was one of the great triumphs in American foreign policy, even as an Iron Curtain had descended on much 

of Europe. American leaders realized that unless important countries could recover 

from the calamitous destruction of World War II and regain their prosperity, the 

United States would have no foreign customers for its products, no strong military 

allies in the struggle with the Soviet Union, and the poverty and misery felt by 

many would enhance the appeal of communism around the globe. To avoid this outcome, the United States opened its markets to foreign goods from Europe and 

Japan—often on a non-reciprocal basis—while also promoting American aid and investment abroad, maintaining a stable system of exchange rates, and bearing a disproportionate share of the burden of the common defense. The role of the dollar as 

a global reserve currency, along with the expansionary bias of American fiscal and 

monetary authorities, facilitated America’s assumption of the role that became 

known as ‘‘the locomotive of the global economy’’ and ‘‘the consumer of last resort.’’ 

American trade deficits stimulated production and consumption in the rest of the 

world, significantly increasing both the prosperity of other countries and their willingness to participate in the American system. 

While the decision to grant foreigners access to our domestic markets was one of 

the most debated aspects of American foreign policy, it was imperative that countries from France and Germany to Japan and South Korea recognized that the advantages of partnering with the United States were greater than those of aligning 

with the Soviet Union. This policy helped consolidate support around the world for 

the American system and was very much a critical element of our strategy to contain and ultimately roll back the Soviet empire. 

Unfortunately, today, it is not clear that many in the region are convinced that 

the benefits of working with the Americans outweighs the benefits of working more 

closely with our communist adversaries in Beijing. A recent annual survey of business, political and civil-society actors by the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute found for the first time this year that a slim majority of Southeast Asian 

leaders would, if forced to choose, opt for China over the U.S. as their ‘‘preferred 

alignment choice in the region.’’ Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia were among the 

countries where majorities would choose China. What I have heard from senior officials and business leaders across the region is that vague—even if well intentioned—initiatives like IPEF do not provide many nations with what they really 

want, which is access to American markets. For many of these countries, trade and 

investment with the United States is seen as an engine for development and a pathway toward the kind of wealth and prosperity that we have enjoyed in the West 

for generations. 

Many things have changed since the 1940s and the United States cannot return 

to the non-reciprocal trade relationships of the past. But the development of a truly 

integrated, efficient and dynamic economic system that attracts partners around the 

world remains necessary to America’s security and economic interests. 

IV. THE ERODING MILITARY BALANCE

It is important to note that the Biden administration has had several notable accomplishments that have strengthened our hand in the Indo-Pacific over the last 

few years. Last summer, the US and India signed several important agreements 

that deepened cooperation between the world’s two largest democracies. Many countries, alarmed by Chinese saber-rattling and heavy-handed diplomacy, have looked 

toward the United States in order to strengthen security ties, leading to significant 

initiatives such as the launch of AUKUS. The administration’s diplomatic efforts 
18 

have helped facilitate a temporary easing of the often-strained relationship between 

Japan and South Korea. Additionally, strategically located Pacific Island nations 

such as Papua New Guinea have granted the United States permission to station 

U.S. troops and supplies on the island nation which is close in proximity to vital 

shipping lanes. The American-led campaign to limit Chinese access to sensitive computer technology has chalked up important wins. Passage of the flawed but consequential Inflation Reduction Act, and Chips Act demonstrated America’s economic 

resilience and refuted claims that Washington is hopelessly gridlocked. However, 

the alliances and partnerships that give the U.S. the strength to manage its relationship with Beijing ultimately depend on military power and our will, and perceived will to use it when necessary. The erosion of American deterrence is the biggest single problem facing American foreign policy, and our inability to get this 

issue right has led to catastrophe in both Ukraine and the Middle East and could 

potentially lead to war in Asia. 

Over the last 20 years, China has launched one of the greatest military buildups 

in the history of the world and America’s failure to match this epochal military 

buildup—not a lack of diplomatic activism—is the root cause of the region’s geopolitical insecurity. China recently announced a 7.2 percent increase in defense 

spending. In contrast, when adjusted for inflation, the President’s $850 billion request for the defense budget in 2025 is actually a reduction. China possesses the 

world’s largest navy, and recent estimates suggest that their shipbuilding capacity 

is over 230 times greater than that of our own. TheCenter for Strategic and International Studies has noted that as we have allowed our defense industrial base to 

shrivel up, Beijing has invested in and is in the process of acquiring high-end weapons systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States. As many 

war games have shown, it is not even clear if we have enough long range precision 

guided munitions to last a week if all-out war breaks out over Taiwan or in the 

South China Sea. Earlier this month, the Navy released a fact sheet showing that 

several of its key shipbuilding programs are facing years of delays. These are just 

a few examples that I know you are all aware of, but it is becoming increasingly 

clear that the military balance in the Far East has shifted from a clear American 

advantage into a gray zone and Beijing is now closer than ever to having the capability to forcibly unify with Taiwan. Better security cooperation with our allies, like 

we have seen with Japan and the Philippines last week, can help at the margins, 

but a serious policy for the Indo-Pacific requires larger investments from the United 

States than both parties seem currently unready to provide. This reality is well understood in capitals across Asia and many nations are beginning to take steps to 

hedge their position. 

V. MORALISM, MORALITY, AND GLOBAL ISSUES

This discussion has focused primarily on American interests, and a listener could 

object that American values have made some fleeting appearances, but I have not 

placed much emphasis on them. Dean Acheson, one of the architects of the American-led post-World War II order, once made an insightful comment about the difference between morality and moralism in American foreign policy. Years after he 

served as Harry Truman’s Secretary of State, he argued that ‘‘the righteous who 

seek to deduce foreign policy from ethical or moral principles are as misleading and 

misled as the modern Machiavellis who would conduct our foreign relations without 

regard to them.’’ As he saw it, moral progress could only come through the responsible exercise of power, and throughout his life he sought to make sure that the 

United States did that. 

America’s cold war policy aimed at stopping the spread of Soviet tyranny was, 

Acheson rightly believed, deeply moral. Today, the Chinese Communist Party has 

become an expansionist, tyrannical power whose inordinate ambition endangers 

freedom worldwide. America’s interests and values both lead us to oppose that ambition, even as we seek to avoid the catastrophe of another great-power war. 

Moral foreign policy often requires pragmatism. Defeating Nazi Germany required 

an alliance with the equally evil Soviet Union. And President Nixon’s rapprochement with Mao’s China, then at the horrifying acme of the Cultural Revolution, 

similarly was driven by the need to counter the greater threat posed at that time 

by the Soviet Union. Today, America and its democratic allies, even at their best, 

are not strong and united enough to handle the world’s geopolitical challenges without enlisting the help of nondemocratic and even antidemocratic partners. In pursuit of objectives that are fundamentally moral and legitimate, the United States 

will need to draw on our pragmatic tradition of foreign policy that recognizes realities while aiming at the promotion of human freedom and flourishing. 
19 

Since the end of the cold war, many American analysts and policymakers assumed that geopolitical competition was largely irrelevant, and that the United 

States needed to redefine its interests around a set of what some would call 

‘‘posthistorical goals’’ and global issues. Eliminating global poverty, addressing social injustices ranging from the marginalization of women and sexual minorities to 

economic inequality within and between countries, fighting climate change, 

strengthening the role of law and of rule-driven institutions in international life, 

and promoting human rights replaced the more limited goals of traditional 

statecraft. 

It is not wrong to care about such things and many of these goals reflect objectives that the American people intend to pursue either through government policies 

or through the activities of NGOs and religious organizations. But for American 

strategists at a time of limited resources and mounting international challenges it 

will be necessary to distinguish between the achievable and the aspirational, and 

the ‘‘must haves’’ and the ‘‘nice to haves’’ among these goals. Furthermore, we must 

rigorously reject the seductive illusion that soft power and the power of example can 

be the principal tools of American foreign policy in times like these. The failure of 

America and our allies to maintain our military margin of superiority in the South 

China Sea and the Taiwan Strait has done more to endanger peace than anything 

we have done or could have done in the realm of soft power to preserve it. 

In the absence of a military coalition that has the will and the means to uphold 

the peace, none of the global goals dear to the hearts of many Americans can be 

achieved. Building that coalition and doing America’s share to provide the resources 

and power such a coalition requires, must in today’s world hold the central place 

in American statecraft. A network of strong alliance partners in the key theaters 

of world politics backed by American economic, technological and military power remains the best and the cheapest way to secure our essential interests and to provide 

a foundation for the pursuit of higher and more complex goals. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you for your insight. I think we all 

need to take your advice and be prepared to act on it. 

I was interested in both of your comments about our alliances, 

which is the subject here for the Indo-Pacific. 

I would agree with you, Professor Mead, that our adversaries do 

not trust each other but they have an alliance. 

Their alliance is not a transparent alliance that we do when we 

deal with the Quad, or we deal with the AUKUS agreements, but 

there is a clear alliance between China, between Russia, between 

Iran, between North Korea. 

They are covering for each other and supporting each other. They 

may not trust each other, and they are forming a very strong block 

against the national security interests of the United States that 

promote a value based rule based global systems with democratic 

institutions. 

So I guess my first question is, we have a lot of alliances. America is known in the Indo-Pacific for being military forward, but are 

we doing enough in trade and investment in diplomacy, which is 

really where I think the battleground needs to be. 

Our military is there—absolutely important—but we need to 

avoid, as you said, sending our men and women over in harm’s 

way. 

So is there a better way to coordinate our alliances in order to 

meet the challenges that we have today? Let me start, if I might, 

first with Professor Mead and then we will go to Admiral—Ambassador Harris. 

Mr. MEAD. Well, absolutely, Senator. In 1980 India’s GDP was 

65 percent of China’s. Today it is about 17 percent of China’s, and 

that gap that opened up is in some ways the heart of our problem 

in the Far East. 
20 

That is to say that China, which at one point was one of a number of powers in Asia, has, thanks to its vast economic growth and 

its military build up, become a threat to the system. 

The best way to assure the long term stability of the Indo-Pacific—of a free and open Indo-Pacific without Americans going to 

war—is to encourage and support the economic growth of countries 

like India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the hope 

that at some point as these countries are more dynamic, powerful, 

and wealthy, even in Beijing they will understand that their dream 

of dominating the Indo-Pacific is simply not realistic. 

It is too big for any one country, even China, to control, and so 

this must always be a core element of our strategy in the region. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Harris, you were our military leader in 

the Indo-Pacific, and then you became our Ambassador to one of 

the most important countries in the region. 

So are we putting too much attention into the military and not 

into diplomacy and economics and trade? 

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I do not think so. I think that we 

are putting adequate emphasis on diplomacy, the military component, and the economic component. 

However, I am not convinced that we are advocating all the time 

for the right things in those three buckets. Let me get at this just 

a little bit. 

I will add to what Professor Mead said by highlighting that in 

1970 the GDP of South Korea was actually less than that of North 

Korea, and by some measure South Korea is the ninth largest economy in the world today. 

And that is not because of the great communist system that 

North Korea has. It is because the United States provided South 

Korea an umbrella under which it could develop economically. 

So I think that is an important point. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me fine tune this a little bit. 

We withdrew from TPP. This framework that is being discussed 

is important, but it is not trade agreements. It does not have remedies. 

We are not a member of the United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea. Are we missing opportunities because we are not 

as aggressive as we need to be on those fronts? 

Mr. HARRIS. Clearly, in my opinion we are missing huge opportunities. So I advocated in uniform for the United States to become 

a signatory to TPP, which is kind of an unusual position for a military officer to take. 

But I did it because of the security relationships between the 

TPP countries that I felt would have been strengthened had we become a signatory to it. We lost that opportunity, and now there is 

this thing called CPTPP which is being driven by Japan. And we 

are not a signatory to that, either. 

It would be super ironic if China becomes a signatory—a member 

of CPTPP, which is a free trade agreement. 

I agree with the ranking member that IPEF lacks the teeth that 

a free trade agreement or free trade relationship has. 

So I am an advocate for free trade agreements. I believe we need 

to have a free trade agreement with Taiwan. I hope that we become a signatory to CPTPP—not for the benefit of the other 11 
21 

countries that are in CPTPP, but because of the benefit to us. For 

our own enlightened self-interest we should become a signatory to 

these things. 

And the same with UNCLOS. That is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. We have long been a holdout in 

signing on to UNCLOS even though it was President Reagan and 

his team who put together the final package for UNCLOS. 

He had a lot of disagreements with the UNCLOS as it was initially crafted and for all the right reasons. So, he and his team 

crafted a version of UNCLOS that would have benefited the United 

States economically. 

But here we are today as one of the few countries in the world 

that are not signatories to UNCLOS, and in fact if you look at the 

map of nations that are not signatories to UNCLOS it starts to resemble an axis of stupidity. Because we are not a signatory to this 

convention that China, Russia, and others are signatories to, and 

they are taking economic advantage of all the things that UNCLOS 

provides. We are not. 

So that is, in my opinion, shooting ourselves in the foot. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am tempted to take up there, but I got a couple of things I 

want to talk about first. 

We are almost a fourth of the way through the 21st century already and as we have watched this first quarter of a century unfold 

it has become apparent, I think, that more and more we have seen 

two poles develop and that one pole is the association of the autocracies in the world, and the other is the democracies of the world, 

and as every year goes by it seems it gets more and more so, and 

our affiliation for the people on our side is our values, our freedoms, the things that we value. 

On the other side I think that they are pulled together, as you 

guys have pointed out, a hatred for America amongst other things, 

but also their values of how they think a government should treat 

their people. 

I think the challenge for the rest of the 21st century is how the 

two poles keep from killing each other and exist on the same planet, because they are not going to change. The autocracies are not 

going to change. 

I mean, there is hope, I think, for Iran because of the demographics in the country. But China is not going to change. Russia 

is not going to change. North Korea is not going to change. 

So we have got to figure out how we do that. Your thoughts on 

how we coexist with these countries? We are, certainly, not changing. They are not, certainly, changing. 

Mr. Mead, why do we not start with you? 

Mr. MEAD. Well, I think here we come back, to some degree, to 

the thought of George Kennan and thinking about how are we 

going to deal with the Soviet Union after World War II, a hostile 

power with expansionist ambitions, morbid suspicion of the United 

States, a nontransparent political system, and yet, in a world of 

nuclear weapons the idea of a U.S.-Soviet war was unthinkable. 

And his analysis, I think, remains useful today that you can 

reach agreements—pragmatic agreements—with powers like this 
22 

under some circumstances but you first have to establish a firm 

line of deterrence. 

They have to realize that sort of pushing and poking with a bayonet will not get them any benefits, that your power and your resolve and your alliance network are resilient and strong enough so 

that there is—they cannot succeed in this other way, and then you 

can start to talk about areas where you do have real interests. 

We got through 40 years of the cold war in this way, not always 

elegantly, but I think we are going to find that, yes, learning to live 

with countries with whom we have fundamental differences is 

going to be at least in the kind of year to year process necessary 

to our policy. 

We can hope for better things. We can—as you mentioned with 

Iran. My own experiences of traveling in China before Xi Jinping 

took things in a different direction. There are many, many people 

in China who see the world much more the way we do than the 

way the current leadership of the Chinese Communist Party does. 

I am not given to despair. But I think pragmatically we cannot 

assume that our enemies will suddenly convert to the cause of democracy and human rights, and all of our problems will melt away. 

We need another more substantive strategy for dealing with it. 

Senator RISCH. Ambassador. 

Mr. HARRIS. So, thanks for the question, Senator. 

I think we have an exemplar to look at, and that is the United 

States’ long cold war against the Soviet Union, both hugely capable 

nuclear states that managed to work through our daily differences 

without treading on the foundational differences between our countries until the Soviet Union collapsed of its own weight. 

I think it is important that we understand that the United 

States is at fundamentally, ideologically polar opposite positions 

than that taken today by modern China, Russia, North Korea, and 

even Iran. We ought not to begin discussions with these countries, 

in my opinion, by trying to negotiate away those foundational beliefs that they hold—just as they should not try to negotiate away 

our foundational beliefs. 

An example of that is the Taiwan issue. China is not going to 

change their mind that Taiwan is a renegade province of China, 

and we should not try to change that view of theirs because it is 

a waste of breath, energy, and resources. 

And they should not try to change our idea that we think that 

the Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully by the Taiwanese. 

Now, if we yield to that point in any way, then the PRC is winning, and we are losing. I think that we ought to keep this in mind 

as we make policies at the political level and laws at the congressional level when we deal with these countries, and a good example 

of this is the Science and CHIPS Act. 

Another example is the Congress’s—the Senate’s—ongoing examination of TikTok, and these sorts of things. This falls into the 

realm of policy and laws. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. My time is up. I wish we had more 

time. Your comments have been fascinating and certainly open a 

lot more areas of discussion. But it is what it is. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons. 
23 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. 

Thank you to our two distinguished witnesses. I am grateful that 

you are offering us your insight and your advice in this important 

time. 

In your opening testimony, Mr. Mead, you sounded a dark but 

important, and I think, timely note by referencing back to John F. 

Kennedy’s book, ‘‘Why America Slept’’ and then the consequences 

that he himself was in combat in the South Pacific a few short 

years later. 

Given what both of you have seen, studied, spoken about, I do 

think it is long past time for us to be more engaged, effective, and 

purposeful in meeting this moment. And this is timely because 

right now, today, on the other side of the Congress the Speaker is 

making a decision—his caucus is making a decision—about whether we will move ahead with robust funding for security in the IndoPacific, for the defense of Israel, for the defense of Ukraine, for humanitarian aid, that in combination will reassure a divided and 

worried world that the United States intends to still be the indispensable global partner with this network of alliances, this lattice 

of security arrangements we have. 

I thought it was a striking development in the last year that 

both Germany and Japan decided to double their defense spending. 

In both cases it has a double edged sword. 

It is partly because they lack confidence that we will be the 

trusted and reliable security partner they have counted on us to be 

for decades. It is also because, as Prime Minister Kishida said to 

us in an address to a joint session of Congress, that they recognize 

that Americans have wearied of bearing so much of the burden of 

being that guarantor of the free and open global system. 

We have critical work to do, and I think in the last 3 years there 

has been real progress. AUKUS was a striking innovation in terms 

of security and deterrence. The Quad has been elevated from a talk 

shop to a real movement forward, and as you both said in your testimony our alliances are absolutely a key strategic benefit. 

Tragically, our past president, unmoored from a sense of history, 

did not appreciate or invest in those alliances. 

Many have invested and worked hard, both of you, and you in 

particular as Ambassador helped bring together Japan and Korea 

in a way that critically contributes to the regional security architecture. 

You have referenced some critical failings—the failure to ratify 

the Convention of the Law of the Sea, which those of us who serve 

on this committee, we were here for those debates—I only wish we 

could go back and rerun them and ratify them again—the failure 

to join CPTPP and to have a real and robust trade and economic 

agenda. 

What are the key actions now, looking forward, that each of you 

would urge us to take both to strengthen our security architecture 

in the region to deter the dark possibilities, Mr. Mead, that you 

laid out, and to better balance what I think is our real strength, 

which is our economy? 

We are the world’s most innovative country. We have the strongest economic underpinnings of any advanced society right now. Our 

biggest weakness is our political division, is our inability to show 
24 

that confidence, that bipartisan strength, that this committee was 

long known for. 

What are the key actions you think we must take in this moment 

to secure our future? 

Mr. Mead, and then, if I might, Admiral. 

Mr. MEAD. Thank you, Senator Coons. Those are very useful 

questions. I hope my answers will be as useful as the question. 

To give you just two quick things, I would say that we do need 

to increase our defense spending in ways that are not simply 

spreading pork around the American economy but actually focused 

on the capabilities that we need and that our allies are looking for. 

If Germany and Japan can do a better job, so can we. Domestically, though—and I think this is important—I agree with you. 

With all we have been hearing this morning about the need for 

U.S. receptivity to more trade, fair and free trade agreements with 

key partners, to do that we need to be reassuring the American 

people that our economy is moving forward in a way that benefits 

them. 

I am actually publishing today or tomorrow, depending on—an 

essay in Tablet magazine that looks at how we can use some technological innovations to help Gen Z, the Zoomers, enjoy the same 

kind of access to single family housing and get on the property ladder in the way that past generations have done. 

I think when the American people see that the door is open to 

more prosperity for them, we as a country will be able to approach 

some of these international issues in a more open minded, and I 

think, ultimately helpful way. 

Senator COONS. Mr. Chairman, if we might, could we hear from 

the Ambassador? 

Mr. HARRIS. Thanks, Senator. 

I think there are half a dozen ways I can respond to your question. I will start by saying that we should be very aggressive, in 

my opinion, on laws that affect our relationship with China, aggressive in terms of holding China accountable, and aggressive in 

protecting our country. 

Again, I go back to the CHIPS and Science Act. I look at what 

could come down the pike with TikTok and the like. I think that 

we should sign on to CPTPP before China does. We will be at a 

significant economic disadvantage if China gets in the CPTPP, and 

we do not. 

We should sign UNCLOS for all the reasons that I talked about. 

I think we should reimagine foreign military sales—FMS—and an 

example here: We should get the munitions to Taiwan that Taiwan 

has already paid for and that Congress has already authorized, but 

the United States still has not gotten those munitions—those 

weapon systems—to Taiwan. 

It has taken us 8 years to get Harpoon to Taiwan, even though 

Taiwan already has Harpoon, and that sale has already been approved. So, it should not take 8 years. It should not take a decade 

to do that. 

I think we should increase our defense spending. If you look at 

it in terms of inflation, our defense spending has actually gone 

down at a time when we need it more than ever. 
25 

I think we should look for ways to use foreign weapons manufacturers—shipbuilding, for example—as a bridge to overcome our 

own industrial deficiencies in this regard in the 2020 to 2030 timeframe, not as a permanent solution but as a bridge solution. 

Those are just some ideas. I will stop here. 

Senator COONS. Thank you both. 

Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more with the testimony that 

the hour is late, the need is urgent, and we need to act in a way 

that shows the bipartisan determination to address things like defense modernization using trade and engaging more closely with 

our allies. 

Thank you for this hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Coons. 

Senator Romney. 

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

China apparently believes that America is in decline, that our social networks are frayed, that our industrial base is not as strong 

as it once was, that actually there are attitudes of isolationism in 

the U.S., an unwillingness to work with allies and to support allies. 

Given the fact that Xi is reported to be a pretty smart guy, would 

he not be wise to say if that is the case why do we not just wait 

out Taiwan, wait out America’s weakness, and no reason to invade? 

I know there are many who feel like an invasion could be imminent. But if you really believe that America was in decline, a position I disagree with, but if you were to believe that and also recognize that an invasion of Taiwan would have an enormous economic 

impact on China given their reliance on Taiwanese semiconductors, 

is it your view that invasion is a real and imminent threat, or is 

it that no, actually, Xi Jinping is going to wait it out and see how 

things develop? 

Each of you get a chance to speak. Could you begin, and then I 

will turn to the admiral? 

Mr. MEAD. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the question. 

Well, I am not good at reading anyone’s mind, and Xi Jinping is 

not transparent to me. But I do think that what we need to do— 

the best way to restore predictability and stability, and in fact, to 

get the topic of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan off the sort of international conversation agenda is for there to be a margin of military 

superiority sufficient so that it is evident to people in Beijing as 

well as elsewhere that it is simply not possible for China to successfully attack. 

And those are not preparations for invasion of the mainland by 

us. These are defensive preparations. And in that case China itself 

will stop talking about Taiwan, stop harassing Taiwan as much because why do you open a conversation the result of which will simply advertise your weakness? 

So this would be the way I think we should proceed. 

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

Mr. HARRIS. Senator, I think on the one hand, if you are looking 

at it demographically the PRC is upside down in terms of youth 

and age and the like. So that could argue that sooner rather than 

later regarding an invasion. 
26 

But on the other hand, I think that Xi Jinping is no fool. He 

seeks stability in the international order so that he has time to 

shape that international order even more to his favor. 

So that would argue against the likelihood of an immediate attack on Taiwan. I am reminded of the Davidson window. 

Phil Davidson was the four-star that relieved me at 

INDOPACOM when I retired, and he famously said, or the ‘‘Davidson window’’ famously ascribes to him, that 2027 is the timeframe 

by which China could and will invade Taiwan. 

I have never put a time certain on that. General Minihan, who 

is the Air Force four-star in command of the Air Mobility Command, he said 2025. Well, that is next year, and the Davidson window is in 3 years. 

I always said that the 2030s was the decade of danger. So I think 

we are moving in that direction, and we could move to the point 

that Xi Jinping will balance all the pluses and minuses, and could 

decide because of the reasons you articulated and because of the 

demographic upside down status of his people that that might be 

the time to attack Taiwan. 

But we have time, I believe, Senator, to right that issue by supporting Taiwan and doing the other things I talked about in response to Senator Coons’ questions. 

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you. 

Let me ask, should or are Japan and South Korea thinking about 

becoming nuclear nations? 

Mr. HARRIS. There are—— 

Senator ROMNEY. They are next door to people—North Korea and 

China—that have nuclear weapons. They look at us as being their 

source of nuclear protection. But are they thinking about becoming 

nuclear, or should they be? 

Mr. Mead and Admiral. 

Mr. HARRIS. So, I will start with that, Senator. 

There are, clearly, elements inside South Korea and Japan that 

are advocating for their own independent nuclear deterrent. Those 

voices so far have not been the predominant voices in either country, which is a good thing. 

There are some in Korea that are advocating for the return of 

U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, which we removed in the 1990s. 

I believe that both are bad ideas, that we must convince them 

that our extended nuclear deterrence is actually reliable. I think 

South Korea’s President Yoon’s visit to the U.S. last year, the outcome of which was the Washington Declaration on extended nuclear deterrence, has gone a long way to quieting those voices that 

would have South Korea nuclearized, if you will. 

Senator ROMNEY. Mr. Mead, do you have comments on that? 

May I continue? Thank you. 

Mr. MEAD. I believe that—I would hope that we will not see that 

day because that day would be an indication that both of those 

countries no longer trusted the United States’ ability to take the 

lead there. 

But I think also we would then see this as the beginning of a 

further proliferation cascade. What begins in East Asia would not 

stop in East Asia, and personally I believe the world has too many 

nuclear weapons already. 
27 

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Schatz. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, 

and thank you to our two distinguished testifiers. 

Admiral Harris, it is very good to see you again. It has been too 

long. 

It is well known that Hawaii is not covered by Article Six of the 

NATO Treaty. 

In fact, I have—and with the permission of the Chairman I 

would like to submit for the record a letter from Senator Inouye to 

Assistant Secretary MacArthur in 1965 on this very topic. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The information referred to above can be found 

in the ‘‘Additional Material Submitted for the Record’’ section at 

the end of this document.] 

Senator SCHATZ. Admiral Harris, do you think there is deterrent 

value in making it explicit that Hawaii is covered? 

Mr. HARRIS. Senator, good to see you again, and for sure. So the 

issue for those who might not be aware of it is Article Six defines 

the geographic area of NATO. Hawaii is not in the geographic area 

as defined by Article Six. 

As Article Six was amended to include Alaska, Alaska is. And 

also Hawaii became a State after the Atlantic Charter was signed. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—We endeavor to publish accurately the spoken 

and written words of Senators and witnesses in each hearing published. The paragraph above reflects what Mr. Harris said. Mr. 

Harris corrected this statement to ‘‘As Article Six was clarified in 

1965 to include Alaska, Alaska is now covered in the geographic 

area of NATO. Also, Hawaii became a State after the NATO Treaty 

was signed.’’] 

Mr. HARRIS. I believe that Hawaii in 2024 is far different than 

Hawaii in 1965, and Hawaii is on the front line of any attack if 

we were to suffer an attack from China or North Korea. It is on 

the front line. It will be attacked again, and I do not want to be 

a part of another December 7 if we can prevent it. 

Hawaii covered by NATO, in my opinion, will go a long way to 

preventing that. It would, in fact, be a deterrent. Now, Hawaii is— 

in 2024—is a State of the United States. Hawaii is far different 

than other countries who have territories globally, those territories 

of which may not be covered by NATO. 

Again, Hawaii is a State. Its congressional leaders vote on things 

like the United Nations, on things like Ukraine, on issues like impeachment and all that, unlike, perhaps, some other territories of 

the United States. 

So I think that Hawaii’s status is different than that of simply 

territories, and therefore, I believe that Hawaii should be covered 

by NATO. 

Now, the argument against it is, well, all of these other countries 

have territories, too. Again, Hawaii is not like—— 

Senator SCHATZ. Territory. 

Mr. HARRIS [continuing]. These other territories. 

Senator SCHATZ. Well, we are not a territory and thank you, Admiral Harris, for that. 
28 

And the other argument that I have heard is that we would be 

covered by Article Four, but Article Four just provides for consultation, and so the argument from NATO and for those that do not 

want to go through the difficulty of amending this agreement or 

even establishing a sidecar explicit multilateral agreement is that, 

well, if Hawaii were attacked—and I think this is true, by the 

way—that certainly we would convene NATO, and then we would 

under Article Four consult. 

That is cold comfort, is it not? And I think that for our national 

security, and also as a matter of principle to treat every one of our 

50 States equally, that we have to remedy this. 

And the argument is also made that various NATO countries 

have territories all across the globe—territories, not States. That is 

a different question, and I think it is one that we have to address. 

My final question for you, Admiral Harris, is just over the last 

several years my own judgment is that we have done—we, the 

United States—have done through the State Department and the 

Department of Defense a much better job of engaging with our Asia 

Pacific allies in terms of island nations, that when we think about 

the Indo-Pacific we usually skip all the way over the Pacific part, 

and then just go to South Asia or East Asia and the sort of trouble 

areas. 

And one of the things that I think Secretary Blinken and President Biden and Senators Cardin and Risch through ratifying 

COFA, through spending time with Pacific Island leaders, have 

done is to show the respect to other sovereigns. 

They may be a sovereign with 65,000 residents. They may be a 

sovereign with 2 million people. But they are still a sovereign country and deserve to be interacted with as if they are not just a place 

to park our military equipment and to, perhaps, have a trade 

agreement. 

I am wondering if you can speak to the evolution of that, those 

relationships, and how that impacts our security. 

Mr. HARRIS. Yes. We did ignore these countries in the South Pacific and the Central Pacific, and it is shameful that we did. 

China, on the other hand, has not ignored them, and they work 

hard at filling the diplomatic and economic void left by the United 

States. 

An example is we have an ambassador in Fiji who is the ambassador to five different countries. He is spread thin throughout that 

region, and we are starting to correct it thanks to this committee 

and the leadership here by putting in a standalone and separate 

embassy in many of these countries. 

We pulled out our embassy in the Solomons in the 1990s, and 

now we are going to reestablish a new mission in the Solomons. 

Meanwhile, China successfully filled that void from their perspective. So, I agree with you, and I am glad to see that we are 

starting to fix the situation now. 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ricketts. 

Senator RICKETTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Harris, in October at AEI you assessed that the U.S. is 

ill prepared to face off against the PRC in a Taiwan Strait conflict 

in this decade. 
29 

You said that our lack of resourcing for the Indo-Pacific, the 

PRC’s upside down demographics, their own economic challenges, 

are all factors that could lead the PRC to move sooner rather than 

later with regard to Taiwan. 

This makes our alliances and partnerships in the region even 

more important as they represent a clear and asymmetric advantage that we have over the PRC. The good news is that many of 

these alliances from Japan to Australia have been upgraded in recent years. 

However, it is still unclear what the role of these allies and partners would play in a Taiwan contingency. For example, Japan is 

widely seen as—by analysts as our most likely U.S. ally to contribute troops to defend Taiwan. But of course, that is no sure 

thing. 

Admiral Harris, if this is indeed the case where, in fact, the next 

decade there is a danger for a Taiwan contingency what are your 

expectations in terms of response we could expect from our allies 

and partners in the region if there were a contingency like this? 

Mr. HARRIS. Very important question, Senator. 

I believe that our allies, as we will in other scenarios, will make 

those decisions that best meet their enlightened self-interest. 

I do believe that Japan understands the full danger presented to 

them geopolitically by the People’s Republic of China, and I think 

they will be with us in Taiwan. 

I think Australia will. Peter Dutton, the former minister of defense in Australia, he famously said several years ago that of 

course Australia would be with the United States if the U.S. defended Taiwan. 

But our own policy on Taiwan is not clear. We have this policy 

of strategic ambiguity so we cannot even tell the Taiwanese or the 

Chinese what we would do if China invaded Taiwan. 

Meanwhile, China has spent the last century—well, for all of its 

existence really but heavily this century—by telling us clearly what 

they intend to do with regard to Taiwan if Taiwan does not yield 

to them and return to the fold, if you will. 

Senator RICKETTS. So actually it is an interesting point you bring 

up there, Admiral, because I think that is part of our strategy is 

this strategic ambiguity, to not really say for sure what would happen so that that would give the PRC more difficulty in planning 

against what we might do. 

It sounds like from your remarks you almost disagree with that 

strategic ambiguity. Are you suggesting that we be more clear 

about certain things? Help me with—— 

Mr. HARRIS. So I have advocated that we should end our policy 

of strategic ambiguity in favor of strategic clarity. Now, look, in my 

opinion we owe clarity to three constituents on the issue of what 

we will do if China attacks Taiwan. 

We owe it to the Taiwanese so they can make those decisions as 

a country to either arm up or capitulate. We owe it to the Chinese 

because they are going to lose a lot of troops in any battle with the 

United States, a lot of them, so they ought to know what they are 

getting into. We were very clear with the Soviet Union, and that 

was an important thing. 
30 

But the most important constituent in my opinion, Senator, is 

the American people. They need to know what their sons and 

daughters are signing up for when they sign on to the U.S. military 

with regard to the question of Taiwan and whether we are going 

to fight the Chinese over that. 

And the American people, parents primarily—but those who 

signed up as well—were very clear in our understanding during the 

cold war of what could possibly happen if the Soviets moved on the 

plains in Western Europe and across the Fulda Gap and down the 

Greenland, Iceland, and U.K. gap. 

They signed on to that. They knew that. But today, they are not 

clear about China, and we owe it to our own people, I believe, to 

be clear in that regard. 

Senator RICKETTS. Very good. 

Just getting back to our allies, do you think that their response 

would be different for—depending on what the contingency was, for 

example, if this was a blockade versus an outright military invasion? Do you think our allies would behave differently with regard 

to their level of support for what we were trying to do? 

Mr. HARRIS. Potentially, but again, our allies are wondering 

what we would do—in any of those scenarios, whether it was an 

outright invasion or a blockade. We got to see a precursor of how 

a blockade might look after former Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, 

which was very helpful to us to understand how China might conduct a blockade. 

Senator RICKETTS. And so I am guessing you are saying we 

should come up with our own direction for those different contingencies, whether it is blockade or outright invasion, and this strategic ambiguity and just say, hey, this is what we are going to do? 

Mr. HARRIS. Well, I will modify that slightly. I mean, I know that 

INDOPACOM has those contingencies in planning, but I do not 

think we should necessarily share what those contingencies are. 

Senator RICKETTS. OK. But just the general direction of what our 

level of support is going to be for Taiwan should the PRC do something like that. 

Mr. HARRIS. I think we should defend Taiwan. 

Senator RICKETTS. OK. Very good. 

Mr. HARRIS. I think we should follow the law which is the Taiwan Relations Act, which does not oblige us to defend Taiwan, but 

it does oblige us to provide for Taiwan’s defense, which they pay 

for, and that we advocate for a peaceful resolution of the issue, not 

a martial resolution of the issue. 

Senator RICKETTS. OK. Thank you, Admiral. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The PRC’s expansion of its military capabilities outside its borders often relies on its foreign aid loans through their Belt and 

Road Initiative, preying on developing nations that are strategically located in the region. 

This results in the construction of many dual use facilities that 

provide China’s air force and navy with potential outstations for future operations while these recipients are left in the infamous PRC 

debt trap. 
31 

Admiral Harris, from your perspective how impactful are economic conditions and relations to the Administration’s partnership 

and alliance goals, particularly with regard to nations in the region 

that may not be as resilient to economic and military influence 

from China? 

Mr. HARRIS. Senator, I believe that our policies are positive in 

that regard, but there is a lot more that we could do, and some of 

the examples I already provided in response to Senator Coons’s 

questioning. 

I think economically we could do a lot more in terms of free trade 

frameworks and free trade bilateral and multilateral free trade 

agreements, and China for sure is moving to fill all the opportunity 

voids that are left by us. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, in the Senate Finance Committee, 

which I served as—the chairman serves, we have Ambassador Tai 

before us today, and I want to get to my question. 

This one of the things I am going to ask. We do not have any 

free trade agreements being promoted in the region. We have a behemoth of an economic challenge with China in this region. 

You mentioned earlier in your testimony that people will react to 

their own self-interest—countries will react into their own self-interest. That is not a novel idea, but it is a very clarion idea. 

So, therefore, would it not behoove us, beyond an economic question, as a security concern to be engaged in free trade agreements 

in this region—to strengthen the economic opportunity to loosen 

the noose that China has with these countries? 

Mr. HARRIS. For sure, Senator. That is why I advocated for TPP 

when I was the PACOM commander because of those security connections represented by the countries that signed on to TPP. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Yes. It was a lost opportunity. 

Mr. Mead, do you believe a free and open Indo-Pacific is available with—achievable, I should say, with a foreign policy approach 

that is based on uncertainty? 

Mr. MEAD. I am sorry, based in—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Uncertainty. 

Mr. MEAD. Well, uncertainty is irreducible in life. But I would 

say that the United States needs to be absolutely clear about our 

commitment to the region on a multi-dimensional basis—military, 

economic, cultural—in every possible way deepening our links. 

Every time I have gone to the region since the 1980s I have 

heard people ask me, is America here to stay? Are you really committed to this region? 

My answer is the first American permanent force in that area 

was in 1819 when we had sent the U.S. Navy to protect American 

whalers. I think we are here to stay, but we need to keep getting 

that message out. So we need to restore a sense of confidence. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And in that respect the United States is the 

best deterrent our partners have in the region when it comes to 

Chinese aggression and expansion. Do you believe that if a future 

Administration threatened to retreat from alliances like the trilateral alliance that we have with Japan and South Korea or 

AUKUS, China would continue to be deterred from applying economic and military pressures against allies in the region? 
32 

Mr. MEAD. I would hope that any president of the United States 

of any party would understand the value of these alliances and relationships, Senator. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I agree with you, and this is why I get concerned when I see what former President Trump said while he was 

in office, raising questions about our security alliance with Japan, 

refusing to say what he would do with Taiwan even though we 

have a law that pretty much I think outlines what we should do 

with Taiwan. 

And so while I believe the Biden administration has room to improve, it is undeniable that it has reestablished the United States’ 

position as a reliable global partner, particularly in the region that 

we are discussing today, and if we have uncertainty, uncertainty 

invites a response, and that response is not going to be the one 

that we want. 

So I hope we make it very clear and indisputable what our positions are, what our presence will be, and what our actions will be 

in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the witnesses. 

Ambassador Harris, good to see you again. I so enjoyed the opportunity to visit with you when you were in Korea with a CODEL 

in 2019, and I am very happy that you are here today. 

On the alliances question, I think sometimes those of us on this 

side of the dais understand some realities, but we do not explain 

them that well, and I would like to get into the rapprochement that 

the U.S. has been able to help forge between the political leadership in South Korea and Japan. 

When President Biden had the summit at Camp David, the headline here at home was President Biden has these leaders at Camp 

David, and it was kind of a ho-hum moment at home because we 

view Japan and South Korea as allies. 

So it was not that surprising. But I think it was a much bigger 

deal in Japan and South Korea. Talk a little bit about what this 

closer political relationship between Japan and Korea mean to stability in the region. 

Mr. HARRIS. It means, in my opinion, Senator—and good to see 

you again—it means everything in the region, especially Northeast 

Asia. There is no economic or security issue that can be resolved 

in Northeast Asia without the active participation and cooperation 

between Seoul and Tokyo. Otherwise, without that cooperation 

there will be no positive movement on security in the region, and 

China will move to fill that void. 

I believe that President Yoon of South Korea and Prime Minister 

Kishida of Japan’s outreach to each other—despite considerable domestic opposition—by doing the right thing demonstrates statesmanship in action. The significantly improved bilateral and trilateral relationships that are playing out now are the benefit of 

that outreach. The big beneficiary is stability and prosperity in 

Northeast Asia. 
33 

Senator KAINE. Let me ask you a question about how to calibrate 

the work we are doing in the region to be a deterrent to Chinese 

aggression without it being a provocation to China. 

You talked about the Davidson window, and I would sort of like 

to hear each of you respond to this. I think the Davidson window 

concept is a concept about when China could invade, not necessarily when they will invade. 

So it is when they believe they have the capacity to undertake 

military action, and I think the U.S. strategy has been to just push 

that back a day at a time, a year at a time, and we do that by providing defense support to Taiwan. We do it by creating this 

latticework of alliances to promote stability in the region, whether 

it is AUKUS or the Quad, or we are working with Korea and 

Japan. 

At some point one of Xi Jinping’s calculations could be, I am not 

yet ready, but if I see too many pieces being put on the chessboard 

around me that might block my ultimate ambitions, I may act before I am ready. And this has to be probably one of the most careful analyses done every day in the Pentagon and elsewhere in our 

security establishment to try to decide what is a deterrent, and 

then what goes beyond deterrent to provocation. 

Could you share a little—each of your share your own thought 

on how we try to get that calibration—how we should contemplate 

calibrating this correctly? 

Mr. MEAD. It is a very good set of questions, Senator. I would 

argue that part of what we need to do is to make the picture bigger 

that the consequences of a Chinese attack on Taiwan or a full 

blown blockade of Taiwan would not just take place in the South 

China Sea. I think it would be very hard to get commercial shipping in and out of Chinese ports should there be an event of that 

kind. 

I do not know that it would be easy for South Korea to trade 

with the rest of the world if there was a military confrontation in 

the South China Sea, Japan, Taiwan, and so on. 

We could be doing a good deal to deter China by showing that 

we and other countries around the world are prepared to impose 

a global blockade on China that would exert severe costs. 

But we should also—I see that Bloomberg’s, I believe, organization has estimated that a war in the South China Sea or over Taiwan could take 10 percent off global GDP in a first year. A blockade could be almost as eventful. 

When we think about deterring and staving off and otherwise responding to this kind of threat, we really do need to put together 

a multi-dimensional approach. 

I think as China saw that this was a more serious element of our 

planning, the temptation to move in a Davidson window or in the 

scenario you describe might be less. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Mr. Chair, could I have Admiral Harris respond as well? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. HARRIS. Thanks, Senator. 

I will simply say that from a military perspective calibration is 

easy because the military has to be ready all the time. So they 
34 

must assume that China is going to attack today. And so they must 

have plans and procedures in place to deal with that. 

But from a diplomatic or policy level issue it is far more difficult, 

and that is the heart of the question because, like you say, you 

want to be supportive of our friends, allies, and partners and us, 

and not be provocative at the same time. 

But this said, I think we should be less concerned about provoking China. I mean, look what China has done to provoke us. 

The balloon thing last year is a case in point. If you believe China, 

it was innocuous and unintended. This beggars the imagination 

when you think about it. 

So we should be less concerned about provoking China than we 

should be concerned about bolstering our friends, allies, and partners in the region. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thanks to the witnesses. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons asked about the importance of the 

support we have for the Indo-Pacific that is in the supplemental 

appropriation bill that is, hopefully, going to be considered in the 

House by the end of this week. 

Part of that, of course—the main part of that supplemental is the 

support for Ukraine, and it was, I think, informative that Japanese 

Prime Minister Kishida in his speech before us said Ukraine today 

may be East Asia tomorrow. 

So I guess my question to you is how important is the outcome 

of Ukraine in regards to the calculations being made in security in 

the Indo-Pacific as it relates to either Taiwan, the China Seas, or 

other security interests? Are our allies looking at what is happening, or are our enemies looking at what is happening in 

Ukraine affecting the calculations in the Indo-Pacific? 

I will go with my military person first. 

Mr. HARRIS. A great question, Senator, and I believe that we 

must support Ukraine, and to quote Admiral Stavridis recently, it 

would be strategic and moral malpractice not to do so. 

Where Ukraine goes Poland follows, Moldova follows, the Baltics 

follow. So, it is important to the stability of Ukraine, and more important to the stability of Europe and our NATO allies, that we 

support Ukraine. 

In fact, if you look at the cost to Russia today, they have borne 

enormous costs in terms of materiel, resources, and people, and we 

have not lost a single U.S. soldier in the fight. So this is Ukraine’s 

fight, but they cannot fight it without our support and the EU support and NATO support, the individual countries’ support. 

So that is why I believe the supplemental is so important. Xi 

Jinping, as I said before, is no fool. He is watching Ukraine closely, 

and he is learning that control of the internet is vital. 

He has got to be wondering if his army, which is trained in the 

Soviet model, is as bad as Russia’s army appears to be; if the PLA 

navy—the People’s Liberation Army navy—is as bad as the Black 

Sea fleet appears to be. He is learning about all of these things. 

But to the question of how other countries in the Indo-Pacific 

view that they are watching Ukraine and our actions very closely, 

and they will take their cues on what we do with regard to 

Ukraine. 
35 

If we walk away from Ukraine, I think they will start to consider 

those things that we talked about earlier in the hearing, because 

their faith and confidence in the United States to come to their aid 

could be questioned. 

Even though we are not an ally of Ukraine, we are allies of many 

countries in the Indo-Pacific, and they will be wondering. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think we all agree with your response on that. 

But we are also frustrated that it is difficult for us to connect the 

importance of our support for Ukraine through the support of the 

American people for our engagement in Ukraine. 

So let me ask both of you a final question. Alliances, you have 

all pointed out, are extremely important for us to have in the IndoPacific. How do we explain that to Americans so that we have more 

support for these types of alliances among the American political 

system? 

If you could give us a simple answer to that we would appreciate 

it because we find that we usually lose our constituents after one 

sentence. So can you give us an answer in one sentence? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MEAD. Senator, I think—Mr. Chairman, I think experts and 

people who are deeply engaged in foreign policy often think in 

terms of hope and the beautiful things that we can build. 

It was Dean Acheson who said the average American has less 

than 10 minutes a week to devote to the study of foreign affairs. 

At a similar moment at the start of the cold war, President Truman realized that the way to get the attention of the American 

people was to tell them the truth in a way that I think frightened—let us say, frightened the pants off them. That is not quite 

what he said but close enough. 

And we need—the world situation is grave; things could go disastrously wrong in a relatively short period of time. We need to get 

that message out. It needs to be done by leaders in both parties. 

This committee played a large role in doing that in the 1940s. 

We need to level with the American people about just how much 

trouble we are in, and I think at that point we will begin to see 

a much more positive and engaged response. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral. 

Mr. HARRIS. We join alliances for us as much as for them. One 

sentence. 

Senator RISCH. That was good. I like it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, both, for spending—we sit here a lot, 

spend a lot of time here. A lot of times we get a lot of talk and 

not much substance, and I think today all of us feel we got our 

money’s worth today. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. 

Senator Kaine. 

I have been told the Senator Van Hollen is on his way. I do not 

know if that is accurate or not. I do not want to hold my colleagues 

up. He is my colleague in Maryland so we will give him a moment 

or two and see if he—— 

I just really want to agree with Senator Risch. We were talking 

a little bit. The two of you are extraordinary in your wisdom, and 
36 

we thank you for that. We recognize the seriousness of the situation. 

It is frustrating to us that we have not been able to be more effective in communicating to our constituents the urgency of these 

issues, and I think the point that you raised about the PRC looking 

at the Ukraine campaign and looking at the need to deal with the 

internet is a good point. 

We are looking at having a hearing of this committee dealing 

with how social media is affecting America’s foreign policy and national security interests because it is clear that our adversaries are 

using social media, our open system, against us, and it is affecting 

the type of policies that we need to deal with the urgency of the 

situation. 

I hope we are able to get the supplemental done this week, but 

it is already months later than it should have been, and Ukraine 

has paid a heavy price for our inability to act in a more timely way. 

So the circumstances are pretty dire, and I really do not think 

the majority of Americans recognize the urgency of the situation. 

So any advice you have on dealing with the social media I will take 

your advice on that as well. 

Mr. HARRIS. I am not on social media. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HARRIS. So I was on Twitter for a little while, but when I 

left Korea I got off of that, and I just do not do social media. 

Mr. MEAD. I think you are right. Not that long ago Americans 

were bragging that our open system was going to destabilize these 

autocracies, and today we are concerned that these autocracies will 

actually use our open system or will weaponize our open system 

against us. 

That is, I think, a sign of how far the world that we are in is 

different from the world that we thought we were going to be in 

5, 10, 15 years ago. 

And I look at things like the lack of education in world history 

in our high schools and colleges. I look at in general a sort of lack 

of understanding of the history, how we got to where we are, so 

that young people looking at social media have no context within 

which to see this. 

We really do need to think about how do we prepare our society 

so that rather than being overwhelmed and divided by these new 

technologies and new forms of communication we are actually— 

they actually make us stronger. 

The CHAIRMAN. Agreed. 

I have gotten information from my colleague that will allow us 

to close. I do not need his permission, but he would allow us to 

close the hearing. 

The record will stay open until the end of business tomorrow. If 

members have questions we would ask that you would answer 

them for the record. 

And again, with our sincere thanks to both of you for your help 

in this important subject, the committee will be adjourned. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 
37 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF MR. HARRY B. HARRIS, JR. TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. Given China’s support for Russia in Ukraine, do you think Russia would 

support China in a Taiwan conflict? What would this look like, and how should we 

prepare for this? 

Answer. Yes, I do. A lot depends on the timing of a China v. Taiwan conflict and 

the outcome of Russia’s illegal and immoral invasion of sovereign, independent 

Ukraine. I’ve seen reporting that Russia has suffered as many as 350,000 casualties 

(killed and wounded) so far and significant loss of key military hardware. Russia 

will continue to lose irreplaceable personnel and replaceable hardware as its conflict 

with Ukraine lurches on, which will affect its ability to support China with personnel and materiel in the near term. As long as we (and NATO, plus partners like 

Japan and South Korea) continue to support Ukraine, Russia’s ability to ultimately 

help China is less than it could be otherwise. Our best preparation is four-fold: 

1. Continue to resource our Joint Force at a rate higher than inflation so that we 

have the best equipment for our forces and for Taiwan. 

2. Continue to support Ukraine which depletes Russia’s personnel and equipment 

without us firing a shot, which ultimately will weaken Russia’s ability to support 

China. 

3. Diplomacy and diplomats matter. In this instance, we should relentlessly ensure that our allies and partners are with us if we choose to defend Taiwan. Additionally, we must get Ambassadors to posts quickly. This requires quick nominations of qualified people to be Ambassadors and fast action by the Senate to confirm 

them. 

4. As I testified, I believe we should end our American policy of strategic ambiguity in favor of strategic clarity when it comes to the question of whether we will 

defend Taiwan if China invades. The President has said on at least 4 public occasions that yes, we would. This is helpful. However, his declarations have been 

‘‘walked back’’ by government officials who have not been elected or confirmed by 

the Senate, or both. This is not helpful and makes us appear feckless. 

Question. How concerned are you that China will take action at Second Thomas 

Shoal to test the U.S.-Philippine alliance and U.S. resolve? What should the United 

States be doing now to prepare for that scenario? 

Answer. Yes, I am concerned. Unlike our policy of strategic ambiguity regarding 

Taiwan, we have been clear that, while we don’t take sides in territorial disputes 

in the South China Sea (SCS), our treaty obligations to the Philippines extend to 

Philippine troops wherever they are, including aboard the beached and rusting Sierra Madre hulk on Second Thomas Shoal. I believe this has prevented the PRC 

from being even more aggressive than they currently are (limited, so far, to water 

cannons and bumping). The U.S. has finally taken a clear position supporting the 

2016 International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) ruling which invalidated 

China’s 9-dash line claim and validated the Philippine position. The Philippines, 

with our urging, took this case to the Tribunal. We lost an opportunity when the 

Tribunal ruling was announced in 2016 because we did not immediately and publicly support it or the Philippine position. However, then-Philippine Duterte didn’t 

support the ruling at all (the case was initiated by his predecessor’s administration). 

What we should be doing now is: 

1. Ensure the Philippines are ready to fight but are not instigating a fight which 

could cause the treaty to be invoked prematurely. This means equipment, training, 

and rapid buildup of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites. 

2. Diplomats and diplomacy matter. We should be clear with the PRC that we will 

fully meet our obligations to the Philippines under our treaty. In this instance, we 

should relentlessly ensure that our allies and partners are with us if we choose to 

defend the Philippines. Additionally, we must get Ambassadors to posts quickly. 

This requires quick nominations of qualified people to be Ambassadors and fast action by the Senate to confirm them. Finally, continue to expand INDOPACOM’s emphasis on ‘‘lattice-like’’ security structures to replace the old ‘‘hub-and-spoke’’ model 

of my day. The new U.S.-Philippines-Japan trilateral is a case in point. 

3. Ensure our own forces are ready. Continue to resource our Joint Force at a rate 

higher than inflation so that we have the best equipment for our forces and for the 

Philippines. 
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4. Creating dilemmas for China. I began advocating for the U.S. to pull out of the 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2017. As a refresher, the INF 

Treaty was a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union (and its successor states, primarily Russia, after the USSR fell in 1991) which, per Wikipedia,‘‘. . . banned all 

of the two nations’ nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic missiles, 

cruise missiles, and missile launchers with ranges of 500–1,000 kilometers (310–620 

mi) (short medium-range) and 1,000–5,500 km (620–3,420 mi) (intermediate-range)’’. 

China was never a signatory to INF nor would it have been for good reason: the 

overwhelming majority of China’s ballistic missile inventory would have been excluded by INF had it been a signatory. Russia routinely violated INF. Therefore, 

INF was unilaterally self-limiting for the U.S., which is why I was for scrapping it 

or significantly renegotiating it. The U.S. did withdraw from the Treaty in 2019 despite, laughably, China’s opposition to our withdrawal. However, though we’ve tested land-based Tomahawk (precluded by the Treaty when it was in force) since then, 

to my knowledge we’ve not yet developed a new intermediate range mobile landbased missile. We should do so without delay, including hypersonic missiles, and deploy them immediately somewhere in the Philippines archipelago (perhaps at an 

EDCA site) and elsewhere to create dilemmas for China. 

Question. Last week, President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida announced an 

effort to modernize U.S.-Japan military command and control. What concrete steps 

are needed to actually make this a reality? Do you think we are providing adequate 

resources to make this happen? 

Answer. Once the leaders ‘‘buy off’’ on this, which they did, DoD and 

INDOPACOM are cleared to work with the Japanese Ministry of National Defense 

(MND) and the Japan Joint Staff (JJS) to develop courses of action (COAs) on ways 

to implement a better command and control arrangement. This part should take no 

more that 6 months in my opinion. Once DoD and MND agree on the best COA, 

they can proceed to execution unless, for the U.S. side, if the selected COA involves 

significant additional resources/manpower or moving an existing headquarters 

somewhere else. These should be executed only after consultation with the Congress 

and, depending on their scopes, might actually require congressional authorization. 

The Japanese side might face similar issues. Regarding the second part of this question, I cannot answer that until I know what COA is ultimately developed and selected. Right now, it is only a think-piece. 

Question. How can we make sure our new access agreements in the Philippines 

and Papua New Guinea advance our strategic interests, support our partners, and 

are politically sustainable? 

Answer. I believe these agreements advance our strategic interests already, or we 

would not have pursued them in the first place. We support our partners (and, in 

the case of the Philippines, our treaty ally) by actually following through and committing resources—authorizing and appropriating—to those access sites to get them 

built/built up quickly. To ensure they are politically sustainable: 

1. We must demonstrate to the American people, through Congress, that these 

sites remain strategically important and worth the investment. China’s bad behavior is helping make our own case for us. 

2. Increase the defense budget ahead of inflation. 

THE COMMITTEE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM MR. WALTER RUSSELL MEAD

TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. Given China’s support for Russia in Ukraine, do you think Russia would 

support China in a Taiwan conflict? What would this look like and how should we 

prepare for this? 

[No response received.] 

Question. How concerned are you that China will take action at Second Thomas 

Shoal to test the U.S.-Philippine alliance and U.S. resolve? What should the United 

States be doing now to prepare for that scenario? 

[No response received.] 

Question. We have to work with the Indo-Pacific partners we have to advance U.S. 

interests, even if they are not on the same page about democracy and human rights. 

In practical terms, what should our approach be to partners that share our strategic interests, but not our values? What helps, and what hurts? 

[No response received.] 
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