* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

JAN 30 1997

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re: S. DWAYNE CHASTEEN,

Debtor,

_____________________________

FAHEEMAH MUHAMMAD, also

known as Fehema Muhammed, also

known as Minnie Debrow,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

S. DWAYNE CHASTEEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-3389

(D.C. No. 95-1152-PFK)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before TACHA, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
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After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

Dwayne Chasteen, the debtor in this bankruptcy action, appeals the district

court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s order holding that the debt owed by

Chasteen to Faheemah Muhammad is nondischargeable. The bankruptcy court

relied on the decision of a California bankruptcy court in an earlier proceeding

holding that the debt was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Because

a debt found nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) is not one of those listed in

§ 523(b) that can be discharged in a subsequent bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court

here determined that principles of res judicata prevented it from revisiting the

issue of dischargeability in this, Chasteen’s second, bankruptcy.

In reviewing the decision of a bankruptcy court, both we and the district

court apply the same standards of review that govern appellate review in other

cases. Therefore, we review the bankruptcy court’s legal determinations de novo

and its factual findings for clear error. See Sender v. Buchanan (In re

Hedged-Investments Assocs.), 84 F.3d 1286, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996).

On appeal, Chasteen does not challenge the merits of the bankruptcy

court’s application of res judicata to the issue of dischargeability. Rather, he
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raises the following three challenges: (1) the bankruptcy court lost jurisdiction

over Muhammad’s claim when the judgment on the claim expired in July 1994; 

(2) the district court deprived Chasteen of due process by not addressing the

foregoing challenge to the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction; and (3)

the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were inadequate under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

In July 1984, Muhammad obtained a California judgment against Chasteen,

her former attorney, for legal malpractice. In 1985, Chasteen filed bankruptcy in

California and attempted to discharge the debt owed Muhammad. The bankruptcy

court determined that Chasteen’s acts were “willful and malicious” within the

meaning of § 523(a)(6) and, therefore, that the debt represented by Muhammad’s

California judgment was nondischargeable. See Supp. R. Vol. I, Doc. 2,

Complaint to Determine Debt to be Non-Dischargeable, Ex. A at 7; id., Ex. B at

2. Chasteen subsequently moved to Kansas, where he filed the present

bankruptcy proceeding in 1993 and again attempted to discharge the debt owed

Muhammad. She objected to the discharge and filed an adversary proceeding in

October 1993 to have the debt declared nondischargeable on res judicata grounds.

When Muhammad filed her adversary proceeding here, her claim against

Chasteen was enforceable under California law. Her money judgment was due to

expire in July 1994, however, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 683.020, unless she
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either filed an application to renew the judgment before its expiration date, see id.

§ 683.120, or she filed an action on the judgment in California state court within

the ten-year limitations period set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure

section 337.5, see id. § 683.050. Filing a renewal application gives the creditor

another ten years to attempt to collect on the original judgment, whereas filing an

action on the judgment gives the creditor a new judgment on which she then has

ten years to collect.

To ensure that she would be able to institute collection proceedings on her

California judgment in Kansas, where Chasteen now resides, Muhammad chose

the latter course to renew her claim against Chasteen. See, e.g. Worthington v.

Miller, 727 P.2d 928, 930-31 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986) (holding enforcement of

Colorado judgment timely under Kansas law where revival of judgment in

Colorado court created new judgment and creditor brought Kansas enforcement

action within five years of date new judgment entered). Muhammad obtained

relief from the automatic stay and, in April 1994, brought an action in California

on her original judgment, thereby preserving her right to payment. See 

United States Capital Corp. v. Nickelberry, 174 Cal. Rptr. 814, 815 (Cal. Ct. App.

1981) (“Once an action is begun within the statutory period, the creditor’s right to

recover remains alive, even though the ten-year period may subsequently

expire.”). Chasteen objected to the action on the ground that the California court
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could not assert personal jurisdiction over him, but the court overruled his

objection and entered judgment against him in December 1994.

Two months later, the bankruptcy court entered its decision in

Muhammad’s adversary proceeding. The court noted that whether a valid debt is

owed and, if so, whether that debt is dischargeable, are two separate inquiries. 

The court then determined that, under the Bankruptcy Code and res judicata

principles, it could not revisit the issue of the dischargeability of the debt

previously held nondischargeable by the California bankruptcy court. The court

then specifically declined to consider whether the debt remained valid and

enforceable, reasoning that it would be “a waste of judicial resources for this

Court to determine the enforceability of the California judgment while the issue is

currently before the California courts.” Supp. R. Vol. I, Doc. 2, Memorandum

Opinion & Order at 6. The court noted that Chasteen’s defenses to the California

judgment were better raised in the California courts before Muhammad’s

December 1994 judgment became final and nonappealable, id., and further

reasoned that “[a]ny state in which plaintiff attempts to enforce [her] judgment

will be in a better position to decide issues relating to that state’s enforcement

laws,” id. at 9.

We turn now to Chasteen’s specific arguments on appeal, beginning with

his contention that the bankruptcy court lost jurisdiction to adjudicate the
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dischargeability of Muhammad’s claim when the 1984 California judgment

expired in July 1994. As the bankruptcy court correctly noted, a proceeding to

determine the dischargeability of a debt involves two separate inquiries: whether

a debt is owed and whether that debt is dischargeable. See, e.g., Resolution Trust

Corp. v. McKendry (In re McKendry), 40 F.3d 331, 336-37 (10th Cir. 1994). A

proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt is a core proceeding under

28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). See, e.g., First Bank of Colo. Springs v. Mullett (In re

Mullett), 817 F.2d 677, 678-79 (10th Cir. 1987). Therefore, the bankruptcy court

has subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether a valid claim exists, and this

jurisdiction cannot be lost by the occurrence of an event, such as the expiration of

a judgment, that may affect the validity of a claim. We, therefore, reject

Chasteen’s contention that the bankruptcy court lost jurisdiction over the subject

matter of this adversary proceeding when Muhammad’s original judgment expired

in July 1994.

We likewise reject Chasteen’s contention that the district court’s failure to

address Chasteen’s challenge to the bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction

in its opinion on appeal deprived Chasteen of due process. Chasteen had the

opportunity to present the argument to the district court and that court’s failure to

discuss this nonmeritorious argument did not result in any prejudice to Chasteen.
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Finally, we reject Chasteen’s argument that the district court failed to make

adequate findings of fact pursuant to Rule 52(a). By its terms, Rule 52(a) applies

only to “actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury” and

to the grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction. Here, the district court was

not sitting as a trial court, but as an appellate court. As an appellate court, the

district court’s duty was not to make its own findings, but to review the findings

of the bankruptcy court for clear error. See, e.g., In re Hedged-Investments

Assocs., 84 F.3d at 1288.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas

is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

David M. Ebel

Circuit Judge