NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

2020 IL App (5th) 190117WC-U 

FILED: February 20, 2020 

NO. 5-19-0117WC 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION DIVISION

CRAIG KAMP, 

 Appellant, 

 v. 

THE ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 

COMMISSION et al. (Gateway Packaging Co., 

Appellee).

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from 

Circuit Court of 

Madison County 

No. 18MR160 

Honorable 

David W. Dugan, 

Judge Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

 JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. 

Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hoffman, Hudson, and Barberis concurred

in the judgment. 

 

ORDER

 

¶ 1 Held: The Commission’s finding that claimant failed to prove that his injury arose out of 

his employment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and it

 committed no error in denying claimant compensation under the Act. 

¶ 2 On September 2, 2016, claimant, Craig Kamp, filed an application for adjustment 

of claim pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 to 30 (West 2014)), 

seeking benefits from appellee, his employer, Gateway Packaging Co. (Gateway). Claimant 

alleged he sustained a work-related injury to his back on June 26, 2016, when he was carrying a 
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100-pound sleeve from a printing press up a set of stairs. He felt pain in his back, but he believed 

he had just “tweaked” a muscle. He continued his shift. He was not scheduled to work for the next 

two days so, during that time off, he hoped his back pain would relieve itself with limited activity 

at home. On the second day, he prepared to shower when he felt back pain again as he bent over 

to remove his shorts. He continued into the shower but was unable to get out due to severe pain.

He required assistance to walk. Claimant told his supervisor and his initial treatment providers 

only about the shower incident, not the work-related incident. 

¶ 3 Following a hearing, the arbitrator found claimant had failed to prove he sustained 

an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment and denied him all benefits under 

the Act. The arbitrator awarded the employer a credit in the amount of $7997 for non-occupational 

indemnity disability benefits. On review, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission 

(Commission) adopted the arbitrator’s decision in full. On judicial review, the circuit court of 

Madison County confirmed the Commission. We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On March 29, 2017, and May 8, 2017, the arbitrator heard evidence on claimant’s 

petition. Claimant testified he had been employed at Gateway for nine years. On Sunday, June 26, 

2016, claimant was working in the flexograph printing department as the “first pressman,” where 

he had been assigned for the past year and a half. His job was to “get the press up and running as 

quickly and efficient[ly] as [he could] and keep it running and have fast changeovers and make 

readies with the least amount of waste.” He routinely had to lift objects. On this particular day, 

toward the end of his shift, he was changing the press from an eight- or nine-color job to a twocolor job. He was carrying “a sleeve,” weighing close to 100 pounds, up to the top deck by going 

up a flight of stairs. He held the sleeve over his shoulder and held on to the handrail with the 
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opposite hand. He said as he “was climbing up the steps[,] he felt something in [his] back and [he] 

just thought [he] tweaked a muscle or something.” He said he was not “too concerned about it.” 

He described the sleeve as 5 feet long and 35 inches around. When he got to the top of the stairs, 

he “slung if off” his shoulder into his arms. He reached forward to “slide it on the mandrel [ ] when 

[he] felt the pain.” He continued to work the remainder of his shift. On the way home, he told Lisa, 

his then girlfriend who also worked there, about his pain. (Lisa was not called as a witness.)

Claimant said he was scheduled off the next two days. On Monday, the day after the accident, he 

felt “a little pain in [his] back but [he] just thought it was a tweaked muscle.”

¶ 6 Claimant said on Tuesday, two days after the incident at work, he, Lisa, and her 

daughters “went for a little car ride.” On the way home, they got a flat tire and started to walk 

home when a friend saw them. Claimant said his friend “changed [his] tire with [him].” That 

evening, when claimant was preparing to take a shower, he bent over to remove his shorts and “felt 

something in [his] back again.” Despite some pain, he continued with his shower. When he 

finished, he felt severe pain and was unable to step out of the shower. He said he could not walk 

or dress himself. Lisa helped him to a bed. 

¶ 7 Claimant said he called his supervisor, Ray Byrd, on Wednesday morning and 

advised his “back was really sore.” Byrd agreed to give claimant a paid vacation day. According 

to an exhibit entered into evidence, in a July 8, 2016, e-mail, Byrd documented his recollection of 

his conversation with claimant. Byrd noted that claimant texted him at 5:30 a.m. on Wednesday, 

asking Byrd to call him. When Byrd called him, claimant told Byrd that when he got out of the 

shower, he bent over to get dressed and a pain shot through his back down through his leg. Byrd 

said claimant told him the pain was so bad it knocked him to the floor and Lisa had to help him 

up. Claimant told Byrd he would let him know how he was on Thursday. Byrd also noted he spoke 
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with claimant on July 8, 2016. In the conversation, claimant asked Byrd to “fill out a[n] accident 

report for him hurting his back lifting bridges, plate sleeves and aniloxes.” 

¶ 8 Claimant said he was aware of the company’s policy about filing an accident report,

but he did not do so because he “just thought [he] tweaked a muscle or something and it would be 

fine the next day.” He said he spoke with Barb Henry (in the human resources department) and 

asked her to send an accident report home with Lisa but she did not do so. Claimant said he also 

completed short-term disability and “FMLA” paperwork as well. He did not inquire about 

workers’ compensation benefits. 

¶ 9 Claimant first sought treatment on July 1, 2016, with his primary care physician

Dr. David Peter. Dr. Peter wrote in his notes that claimant’s “pain first began when he was leaning 

forward to get into the shower” and he “denies any recent trauma or other difficulty.” Claimant 

explained Dr. Peter’s note as follows: 

“Because for me trauma means I didn’t, you know, have an accident and 

that—where—it was—I mean, I don’t know what I’m trying to say. I didn’t realize 

I had anything going on, you know. I know that Friday when I went to the hospital, 

before that I went and seen my primary doctor. It was the first time I could get into 

see him and he just gave me pain medicine and sent me on my way, and I’ll never 

go back to him again, but that evening it got so bad I started losing feeling in my 

legs. I remember it like it was yesterday. I thought I was paralyzed.” 

Being dissatisfied with his visit with Dr. Peter, claimant went to the emergency room at BarnesJewish St. Peters Hospital on July 1, 2016, because he wanted “to know what is wrong.” 

¶ 10 Dr. Peter referred claimant to Dr. Piper, an orthopedist, who, in turn, recommended

physical therapy. Dr. Piper ordered two injections which, according to claimant, somewhat 
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alleviated the pain. Claimant said he was currently being treated by Dr. Matthew Gornet, a referral 

by Dr. Piper, after Dr. Piper discovered this was a workers’ compensation case. Claimant said he 

had received “some money through short-term disability.”

¶ 11 On cross-examination, claimant testified he laid in bed and rode in the car during 

the two days following the incident at work. He said he felt his condition got worse when he 

showered on Tuesday. When he saw Dr. Gornet, he explained he had an accident on June 26, 2016,

but his back went completely out on June 28, 2016. He explained he had treated with Dr. Piper 

from July 5, 2016, through September 13, 2016. Dr. Piper refused further treatment after 

September 13, 2016, when he was advised this was a workers’ compensation case. 

¶ 12 The employer’s counsel questioned claimant about his answers on the medical 

providers’ questionnaires. For example, on July 19, 2016, claimant completed a questionnaire for 

Dr. Piper’s office and indicated the injury was not work related. The physical therapist, Charles 

McDonald, noted claimant denied any prior history of back injuries and noted only that claimant 

reported the onset of low back pain when he removed his shorts. 

¶ 13 On redirect, claimant said he had never had a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 

scan or a computerized tomography (CT) scan on his back, never been prescribed pain medication 

for back pain, and had never been involved in a significant automobile accident prior to the work 

incident. Claimant rested.

¶ 14 The employer called Barbara Henry, the human resource director at Gateway since 

May 2016. On July 5, 2016, claimant met with Henry and retrieved “paperwork” for short-term 

disability and medical leave. He did not request any workers’ compensation paperwork or mention 

any work-related injury. Claimant told Henry the “accident” occurred when he was preparing to 

take a shower. Henry said she learned the accident was allegedly work related based on a July 8, 
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2016, email from supervisor Ray Byrd. Henry said she gave Lisa the workers’ compensation 

paperwork and told her to have claimant call Henry before he completed the documents so she 

could go through it with him. Henry said she did not hear from claimant nor did she receive the 

paperwork. 

¶ 15 On cross-examination, Henry acknowledged that on July 28, 2016, she had sent an 

email to “a bunch of people” explaining that she had gotten disability paperwork from claimant in 

which he had indicated he had injured himself at work on June 26, 2016. 

¶ 16 The employer then called Bob Tiepelman, the production manager, as a witness. 

Tiepelman said he first learned of claimant’s injury when Byrd called him. Tiepelman pulled two 

videos of claimant walking to the parking lot after his alleged injury on June 26, 2016. Tiepelman 

testified that, in his opinion, the video did not provide any evidence of an apparent injury. He said 

claimant did not follow the proper procedures regarding immediately reporting any work accident.

¶ 17 At the close of the employer’s case, claimant introduced his medical records, which 

are not in dispute. The records reveal claimant first sought treatment with Dr. Peter on July 1, 

2016, and denied any trauma. He was diagnosed with low back pain and was prescribed 

medication. Later that day, claimant went to the Barnes-Jewish St. Peters Hospital emergency 

room complaining of lower back pain which radiated down his legs. The record from the 

emergency room stated claimant presented “with a complaint of low back pain with radiation to 

his left lower extremity. The pain has been present for the past four to five days and worsening 

over the past day.” According to the hospital notes, claimant stated the “pain first began when he 

was leaning forward to getting to the shower. He denies any recent trauma or other difficulty.” A 

CT scan of the lumbar spine revealed a broad-based disc bulge at L4-L5 and mild multilevel 

degenerative disc disease. Claimant was diagnosed with a herniated disc. He was given a 
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prescription, was discharged, and instructed to follow up with Dr. Piper. 

¶ 18 Dr. Piper’s notes, which were also introduced, revealed that claimant reported that 

his back pain began when he was “[g]etting in the shower.” An MRI scan confirmed the results of 

the CT scan, which demonstrated the bulging disc at L4-L5. Claimant was referred to physical 

therapy. 

¶ 19 Claimant participated in physical therapy at Excel Sports and Physical Therapy. 

His intake paperwork revealed that he denied the injury was work related and reported that he “was 

simply removing a pair of shorts when the onset of lower back pain occurred.” 

¶ 20 In October 2016, claimant sought treatment from Dr. Gornet. Claimant reported to 

Dr. Gornet that “his problem began on [June 26, 2016]” when he was carrying the sleeve at work 

and felt pain in his back. Although he said “this [pain] was different,” he often experienced pains 

in his arms and back. He also reported the onset of “sudden severe pain” two days later when he 

bent over to remove his shorts before showering. 

¶ 21 In January 2017, the employer arranged an independent medical examination

(IME) with Dr. Daniel Kitchens. Claimant reported to Dr. Kitchens the pain he experienced at 

work on June 26, 2016, and the subsequent shower incident on June 28, 2016. After Dr. Kitchens’ 

review of the pertinent medical records and physical examination of claimant, he concurred that 

claimant suffered a herniated disc at L4-L5. He found claimant’s medical history “inconsistent,” 

noting claimant first mentioned a work-related accident to Dr. Gornet. Dr. Kitchens said he was 

“unable to give an opinion as to the timing of the disc herniation as it relate[d] to his work activity.” 

Because claimant’s report of a work-related injury to Dr. Gornet contradicted claimant’s other 

medical records, Dr. Kitchens found “no medical record evidence that would support that 

[claimant’s] lumbar disc herniation occurred at work on June 26, 2016.” In Dr. Kitchens’s opinion, 
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within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, claimant’s 

“disc herniated spontaneously without any traumatic event. Bending over and 

removing shorts is not a supraphysiologic force and is a common maneuver that 

people do on a routine basis and is not, in itself, enough force to cause a disc to 

herniate[ ]. Symptomatically, however, that is when the disc herniat[ed]. It is [his] 

opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the factors 

responsible for the herniation are of a degenerative nature and are affected by 

[claimant’s] chronic tobacco abuse.”

¶ 22 After his IME, claimant returned to Dr. Gornet in February 2017. Dr. Gornet 

reported that he agreed with Dr. Kitchens that the “event of getting out of the shower was not a 

traumatic event.” However, according to Dr. Gornet, “[t]he plausible explanation is that the

significant lifting activity that he performed at work caused a disc injury that progressed over the 

next several days.” 

¶ 23 After considering the evidence presented, the arbitrator determined that claimant

had failed to prove he sustained an accidental injury on June 26, 2016, that arose out of and in the 

course of his employment. She found claimant’s testimony that he injured his back at work was 

“undermined by the medical records in this matter and that the contemporaneous histories in the 

medical records, where available, contradict [claimant]’s testimony.” The arbitrator denied 

claimant’s claim.

¶ 24 On June 8, 2018, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision in 

full. On March 11, 2019, the circuit court of Madison County confirmed the Commission. 

¶ 25 This appeal followed. 
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¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 27 On appeal, claimant argues that the Commission’s finding that claimant failed to 

sufficiently prove he suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 28 We note as a preliminary matter that the employer argues that claimant’s statement 

of facts includes argument and comment in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) 

(eff. May 25, 2018). While we may strike a statement of facts or dismiss an appeal based upon 

such violations, we decline to do so here, as the violations do not hinder our review. See O’Gorman 

v. F.H. Paschen, S.N. Nielsen, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 133472, ¶ 80. However, we should disregard 

the noncompliant portions of claimant’s statement of facts. See id. 

¶ 29 An employee’s injury is compensable under the Act only if it “aris[es] out of” and 

“in the course of” his employment. 820 ILCS 305/2 (West 2014). Both elements must be present 

for the claimant’s injuries to be compensable. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 

131 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (1989). “In the course of” refers to the time, place, and circumstances under 

which the accident occurred. Mlynarczyk v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2013 IL 

App (3d) 120411WC, ¶ 13. 

¶ 30 That is, to obtain compensation under the Act, a claimant must prove that some act 

or phase of his employment was a causative factor in his ensuing injuries. Land & Lakes Co. v. 

Industrial Comm’n, 359 Ill. App. 3d 582, 592 (2005). An accidental injury need not be the sole or 

principal causative factor, as long as it was a causative factor in the resulting condition of ill-being. 

Sisbro, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 207 Ill. 2d 193, 205 (2003). In resolving disputed issues of fact, 

including issues related to causation, it is the Commission’s province to assess the credibility of 

witnesses, draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, determine what weight to give 
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testimony, and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Hosteny v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation 

Comm’n, 397 Ill. App. 3d 665, 674 (2009); Fickas v. Industrial Comm’n, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 

1041 (1999). We will overturn the Commission’s causation finding only when it is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. A factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence 

if the opposite conclusion is “clearly apparent.” Swartz v. Industrial Comm’n, 359 Ill. App. 3d 

1083, 1086 (2005). The test is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Commission’s 

finding, not whether this court or any other tribunal might reach an opposite conclusion. Pietrzak 

v. Industrial Comm’n, 329 Ill. App. 3d 828, 833 (2002). 

¶ 31 Although an employee’s testimony about an alleged accident might be sufficient, 

standing alone, to justify an award of benefits under the Act, it is not enough where consideration 

of all facts and circumstances demonstrates that the manifest weight of the evidence is against it. 

Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 83 Ill. 2d 213, 218 (1980). As we observe below, 

portions of claimant’s testimony were contradicted by the record. 

¶ 32 The parties do not dispute that claimant suffers from a herniated disc. The only 

disputed issue is what caused the herniation. Claimant asserts that he injured his back on June 26, 

2016, while carrying a printing sleeve up a set of stairs during the course of his employment. He 

felt pain in his back as he slung the sleeve off his shoulder. Although he felt the pain, he believed 

he had only “tweaked” a muscle. Two days later, this injury, he claims, manifested itself in the 

form of severe debilitating pain while he was getting into or out of the shower at home. 

¶ 33 Within days after the shower incident, claimant reported his injury to his employer, 

his primary physician (Dr. Peter), emergency room personnel, an orthopedic surgeon (Dr. Piper), 

and a physical therapist. Each time, claimant denied trauma and/or denied experiencing an accident 

or injury at work. His first report of a work-related injury to a medical provider was in October 
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2016 to Dr. Gornet. 

¶ 34 Claimant argues that this case involves only two possibilities. Either claimant 

injured himself at work while carrying the heavy sleeve or he injured himself at home when he 

bent over to remove his shorts in preparation for a shower. Drs. Gornet and Kitchens agreed that

claimant’s herniated disc was not caused by bending over to remove clothing. Therefore, claimant 

argues, there remained only one other possibility. As Dr. Gornet found, “[t]he plausible 

explanation is that the significant lifting activity that [claimant] performed at work caused a disc 

injury that progressed over the next several days.” 

¶ 35 However, because claimant failed to conclusively prove that he suffered an injury 

at work, it is just as likely that there exists a third possibility—that he suffered an injury sometime 

between leaving work on June 26, 2016, and taking a shower on June 28, 2016. The manifest 

weight of the evidence, i.e., claimant’s actions and his medical records, does not support his claim

of a work-related injury. 

¶ 36 As we stated previously, in resolving questions of fact, it is within the province of 

the Commission to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in the evidence, assign 

weight to be accorded the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Hosteny, 

397 Ill. App. 3d at 678-79. Applying the appropriate standard, we find the Commission’s 

conclusion that claimant’s current condition is not causally connected to a work-related accident 

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment, confirming the 

Commission’s decision. 

¶ 39 Affirmed.