Filed 7/2/13 Kiet v. Litton Loan Servicing CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

TANG KIET, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
LITTON LOAN SERVIC ING, LP, et al., Defendants and Respondents. G047505 (Super. Ct . No. 30-2010-00432088)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Karen J. Bravata, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Ca l. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. Law Office of Quyen Kiet and Quye n Kiet for Plaintiff and Appellant. Houser & Allison, Eric D. Hous er and M. Benjamin Susman for Defendants and Respondents.2 The first deed of trust on residential real property was foreclosed upon and bought by the lender at the nonjudicial fore closure sale for a full credit bid, leaving appellant Tang Kiet as a sold-out junior lien holder. Kiet did not appear at or bid at the trustee’s sale, nor did he otherwise attempt to cure the default on the senior lien. Instead, he filed the instant action against the le nders, Bank of America (as successor to Countrywide Home Loan s, Inc. (Countrywide)) and the Ba nk of New York as Trustee for the Certificate Holders CWL, Inc. Asset-Ba cked Certificates, Series 2002-03 (BNY), the loan servicer, Litton Loan Se rvicing, LP (Litton), and Mort gage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) (hereafter collectiv ely referred to as the Defendants unless the context indicates otherwise), seeking to recover from them the amount of his extinguished junior lien. Kiet appeals from the judgment in favor of the Defendants that followed their successful summary judgm ent motion. He primarily contends the lender’s full
credit bid included amounts the lender was not entitled to add to the secured debt (specifically property taxes and hazard insurance premiums paid by the lender), and included inflated amounts of principal and in terest. Kiet urges the amounts improperly
included in the lender’s full cr edit bid constitute surplus sale s proceeds that should have been made available to satisfy his junior lien. We reject Kiet’s contentions and affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE The Complaint In April 2002, Countrywide made an ad justable rate real estate loan of $437,750 to Lan Anh Truong (B orrower), evidenced by a promi ssory note (the Note) and secured by a recorded firs t deed of trust on residential property located in Fountain Valley. By the time of the for eclosure, BNY was the lender’s assignee via3 MERS, 1 and Litton was the loan se rvicer. In December 2003, Kiet, who is an attorney, was named beneficiary of a second deed of tr ust on the property securing a $75,000 note. Kiet alleged that when he learned of Borrower’s March 2006 default on the payments on the loan secured by the first deed of trust, he contacted Litton in August
2006 to advise it of his secure d interest in the property. The trustee’s sale was set for December 19, 2008, and the noti ce of the trustee’s sale set the minimum bid at $559,806, which Kiet alleged was enough to cover bo th liens. The property was purchased by
lender BNY at the trustee’s sale for a full credit bid of $622,136. Kiet’s post-sale requests that his junior lien be satisfied went unanswered by L itton. Kiet alleged
Defendants “inflated” the amount of the bid on the property by including amounts to which they were not entitled. He allege d the difference between the amounts Borrower really owed on the Note and BNY’s bid wa s at least $75,182—an amount that should have been available to pay off the second deed of trust. Based on the foregoing allegations, Kiet’s complaint contained cause s of action against all the Defendants for equitable estoppel, negligent mi srepresentation, enforcement of lien, breach of implied in fact contract, common counts, and unjust enrichment. Summary Judgment Motion The Defendants moved for summary judgment. Before setting forth the facts contained in the separate statements, we describe the trust deeds in more detail.

1 “MERS is a private corporation that administers a national registry of real estate debt interest transactions. Member s of the MERS System assign limited interests in the real property to MERS, which is listed as a grantee in the official records of local governments, but the members retain the promi ssory notes and mortgage servicing rights. The notes may thereafter be transferred amon g members without requi ring recordation in the public records. [Citation.] [¶] Ordinar ily, the owner of a promissory note secured by a deed of trust is designated as the beneficiary of the deed of trust. [Citation.] Under the MERS System, however, MERS is designated as the beneficiary in deeds of trust, acting as ‘nominee’ for the lender, and granted the authority to exercise legal rights of the lender.” ( Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 267 ( Fontenot ).)4 The First Deed of Trust and the Note The April 2002 loan to Borrower was an adjustable rate loan based on the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) plus si x percent. The Note specifically referred to and was incorporated in to the first deed of trust. As rele vant to the issues raised in this appeal, the first deed of trust defined the secu red loan as including “the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest, any prepayment char ges and late charges due under the Note, and all sums due under this [first deed of trust] plus interest.” The first deed of trust provided Borrower “shall pay all taxes, assessments, char ges, fines, and impositions attributable to the [secured property] which can attain priority over this [first deed of trust.]” If Borrower failed to pay property taxes, the lender could do so in order to protect its security interest in the pr operty, and any amounts so e xpended would beco me additional debt secured by the first deed of trust bearin g interest at the same rate as the Note from
the date of disbursement. The first deed of trust further provided Borrower must
maintain hazard insurance on the property and if Borrower failed to do so, the lender could obtain the insurance and any amount s expended by the lender in maintaining hazard insurance coverage “shall become add itional debt of Borrower secured by this [first deed of trust]” bearing interest at the rate provided fo r in the Note. The Second Deed of Trust On December 8, 2003, without obtaining the re quired approval from the lender, Borrower executed a gran t deed transferring title of th e property to St. Thomas Corp., and a few days later Phan Anh Do as president of St. Thomas Corp. executed a promissory note for $75,000 payable to Kiet secured by a second deed of trust recorded against the property with Kiet as beneficiar y. The reasons for this transaction are not entirely clear. At his deposition, Kiet testifie d he was the attorney for St. Thomas and the $75,000 note was for attorney fees related to a bankruptcy proceedi ng, but he could not explain why the property had been transf erred to St. Thomas or what Borrower’s relationship was with St. Thomas.5 Defendants’ Separate Statement Borrower stopped paying on the loan se cured by the first deed of trust in
March 2006 and a notice of default was reco rded on March 31, 2008. On October 28, 2008, the foreclosure trustee executed a no tice of trustee’s sale to take place on November 26, 2008, which set a minimum bid of $559,806. The notice of the trustee’s
sale was recorded on November 7, 2008. On December 19, 2008, the property was sold at public auction for a full credit bid by BNY. The full credit bid amount of $622,136, included, among other amounts, unpaid principa l and interest of $560,910, property taxes of $42,002, hazard insurance premiums of $13,8 12, attorney fees of $1,770, and statutory disbursements of $1,983. Defendants put forth the following as un disputed facts: The first deed of
trust was senior to the second deed of trust. It was foreclosed by a trustee’s sale on December 19, 2008, for a full credit bid repres enting the amount of un paid debt and costs owed by Borrower. Kiet did not attend the fore closure sale, cure the default on the first deed of trust prior to foreclosure, or redeem the property at the foreclosure sale. Kiet did not communicate with MERS, Bank of America, or BNY. Litton did not promise Kiet it would pay him surplus funds from the foreclosure sale. Kiet was aware of the
foreclosure on the first deed of trust since 2006, and he testified at his deposition that
when he contacted Litton he was told Litton c ould not discuss the first deed of trust with
him because he was not the borrower. Kiet di d not record a request for special notice of
the trustee’s sale until December 16, 2008. Kiet testified he made no attempts to collect on the promissory note from St. Thomas. Kiet’s Opposition Kiet’s opposition included his declara tion in which he attempted to dispute many of Defendants’ undisputed facts. Kiet’s declaration attached as exhibits many of
the same documents included in Defendants’ m oving papers. Kiet declared he contacted
Litton after the trustee’s sale to ask for payment of hi s second deed of trust, was told they6 were reviewing the matter, and “promised that I would be paid if there was a surplus of funds.” In his declaration, Kiet stated he was “led by Litton[]” to believe the sales price
obtained was sufficient to cover the first deed of trust and the second de ed of trust. Kiet attached as exhibit M what appears to be an Internet printout from Zillow, dated December 26, 2008 (i.e., after the trustee’s sale) listing the two liens on the property (the $437,750 first deed of trust and the $75,000 second deed of trust), which showed the minimum foreclosure bid price of $559,806. He attached as exhibit H, a letter dated January 2, 2009 (i.e., after the trustee’s sale), he sent to Litton asking for payment of the debt secured by the second deed of trust. Kiet also included a declaration from Borrower
in which she stated she had never “acknowl edged” the amounts expended to pay property taxes or hazard insurance premiums, to be part of the amount she owed under the Note. Kiet also included with his oppositi on a document designated exhibit F, of which he asked the court to take judicial noti ce. Exhibit F was a printout of what Kiet
described as “a true and corr ect copy of table of histori cal 6-month LIBOR rates” from January 2002 to July 2012, pub lished “on-line” at a website found at the Internet address “www.moneycafe.com.” He also included exhi bit G, which was “a true and correct copy of Lender’s Officer’s Certificate produced by [d]efendant L[itton] in discovery.” The
document has Borrower’s name and address at the top, and three columns comprised of a list of dates followed by the amount of prin cipal and interest due on each date, beginning March 2006 and ending May 2009 . Defendants objected to both exhibits as inadmissible hearsay and lacking relevance. Ruling The trial court granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion. As
relevant to the issues Kiet ra ises in his appeal, the court fo und he could not prevail on his
cause of action for enforcement of lien beca use his junior lien was extinguished by the foreclosure of the senior lien by the lender’s full credit bid at the trustee sale, which left no surplus as a matter of law. The court rej ected Kiet’s argument in clusion of property7 taxes and insurance advances in the fu ll credit bid was improper—it was undisputed Borrower did not make all of her property ta x and insurance payments and the first deed of trust specifically provided property taxe s and insurance advanced by the lender became part of the total debt owed under the fi rst deed of trust. Additionally, Kiet had no standing to enforce the terms of the Note or the first deed of trust as he was not a party to, or third party beneficiary of, either. The cour t found there were no triable issues of fact
as to Kiet’s common counts an d unjust enrichment causes of action. The court sustained Defendants’ objections to exhibits F and G, and declined to take judicial notice of either
document.
DISCUSSION A. Summary Judgment Standard of Review “Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving pa rty is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. [Citation.] . . . A defendant moving for summa ry judgment . . . must show that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of acti on cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. [Citation.] The de fendant can satisfy its burden by presenting evidence that negates an elemen t of the cause of action or evidence that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably expect to obtain evidence need ed to support an element of the cause of action. [Citation.] If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to set forth ‘specific f acts’ showing that a tria ble issue of material fact exists. [Citation.] [¶] We review the trial court’s ruling de novo, liberally construe the evidence in favor of the pa rty opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of the o pposing party. [Citation.] We will affirm an order granting summary judgment . . . if it is correct on any ground that the parties had an adequate opportunity to address in the trial court, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons. [Citations.]” ( Securitas Security Services US A, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 115, 119-120.)8 “‘A different analysis is required for our review of the trial court’s . . . rulings on evidentiary objections. Although it is often said that an appellate court reviews a summary judgment motion ‘de novo,’ the weight of authority holds that an appellate court reviews a court’s final ruli ngs on evidentiary objec tions by applying an
abuse of discretion standard. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( Miranda v. Bomel Construction Co., Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1335.) B. Evidentiary Rulings
Kiet contends the trial court e rred by not admitting into evidence his exhibit F, a printout of LIBOR rates from Janu ary 2002 to Ju ly 2012, he found “on-line,” and exhibit G, a docum ent titled “Lender’s Officer’s Certificate,” which he states was produced by Litton in discovery . The trial court sustained Defendants’ relevance and hearsay objections to both documents. “‘On appeals challenging discreti onary trial court rulings, it is appellant’s
burden to establish an abuse of discre tion. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.Ap p.4th 615, 624 ( Ramos ).) Kiet has
failed to establish an abus e of discretion here.
The trial court did not e rr by declining to take judicial notice of exhibit F, the printout of the website found at the Internet address “www.moneycare.com” listing
historical LIBOR rates. Judicial notice is a court’s recognition of the existence of a
matter of law or fact relevant to an issue as a substitute for formal proof of that matter. ( Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 264; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4t h 1106, 1117.) “‘Taking judicial notice of a
document is not the same as acce pting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.’ [Citation.] Wh ile courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the tr uth of matters stated therein . [Citation.] ‘When judicial notice is taken of a document, . . . th e truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.’ [Citation.]” ( Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.9 (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 13 75, italics added; see also In re Christian P. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1275, fn. 4 [judicial “ notice [of court record ] is limited to the
existence of the documents and is not the same as taking notice of the truth of any matters or facts stated therein”].) A lthough the printout might be an accurate representation of the website Kiet found at “www.moneycare.co m,” that does not allow the trial court to take judicial notice of the facts that were asserted on that we bpage. Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled the document inadmissible.
Nor has Kiet demonstrated the trial c ourt abused its discretion by excluding
his exhibit G. Kiet contends the one -page document, titled “Lender’s Officer’s Certificate” was admissible because it was pr oduced by Litton in di scovery, and relevant
because it has Borrower’s name and loan number on it. Ki et offers no reasoned legal analysis of the issues to which the documen t pertains or how its exclusion prejudiced him. The document is a list of payment dates beginning in Marc h 2006 and ending May 2009, followed by amounts of principal and in terest due on each date. In his opposition to the summary judgment motion, Kiet assert ed it showed the “lender” charged interest after the foreclosure. But there is nothing explaining who created the document, when it was prepared, what it was for, or how it rela tes to the amounts calculated for BNY’s full
credit bid. Kiet has failed to demonstrat e the document’s relevance and has failed to meet his appellate burden. ( Ramos, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 624.) C. Enforcement of Li en Cause of Action As to the enforcement of lien cause of action, Kiet claimed there were “surplus funds” from the trustee’s sale that should have been made available to pay his junior lien on the property in accordance w ith the priorities set forth in Civil Code section 2924k, subdivision (a). Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds lender BNY’s full credit bid extinguished the junior lien, which left no surplus sale proceeds as a matter of law, and Kiet took no steps to protect his junior lien prior to its extinguishment. Defendants are correct.10 Civil Code section 2924k, subdivisi on (a), requires the foreclosure trustee to distribute the proceeds of the trustee’s sale in the following order of priority: (1) the allowable costs and expenses associated with exercising the power of sale; (2) payment of the obligations secured by the deed of trust being forecl osed upon (e.g., the senior lien); (3) satisfying junior liens and encumb rances; and then (4) to the trustor.
The holder of a subordinat e deed of trust will recover all or a portion of the debt secured by the subordinate deed of trus t only if the successful trustee’s sale bidder pays enough to pay off all of senior and a ll or a portion of the junior indebtedness. ( South Bay Building Enterprises, Inc. v. Riviera Lend-Lease , Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1120-1121; FPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E & G Investments, Ltd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1023 ( FPCI RE-HAB 01 ); Civ. Code, § 2924k, subd. (a).) If the successful bidder purchases at a price insufficient to pay o ff any of the junior indebtedness after the proceeds of the sale are applie d to the senior indebtedness (and other statutory costs and expenses attributable to the sale see Civil Co de, § 2924k, subd. (a)), then the holder of the junior deed of trust is out of luck. Kiet is out of luck. In this case, the lender BNY was the on ly bidder at the trustee’s sale, and it
made a full credit bid. A “full credit bid” is described as follows: “At a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, if the lender chooses to bid, it does so in the capacity of a purchaser. [Citation.] The only distincti on between the lender and any ot her bidder is that the lender is not required to pay cash, but is entitled to make a credit bid up to the amount of the outstanding indebtedness. [Cita tions.] The purpose of this entitlement is to avoid the inefficiency of requiring the lender to tender cash which woul d only be immediately returned to it. [Citation.] A ‘full credit bid’ is a bid ‘in an amount equal to the unpaid principal and interest of the mortgage debt, together with the costs, fees and other expenses of the foreclosure.’ [Citation.] If th e full credit bid is successful, i.e., results in the acquisition of the property, the lender pa ys the full outstanding balance of the debt
and costs of foreclosure to itself and takes title to the security pr operty, releasing the11 borrower from further obligations under the defaulted note. [Citation.]” ( Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1238.) In other words, when the foreclosi ng lender makes a full credit bid on the property, by its very nature, no money chan ges hands. The full credit bid conclusively
establishes the value of the property. ( Bank of America v. Quackenbush (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1171). There is no “surpl us” to distribute. The lender’s debt is extinguished, and it gets title to the property. “If a junior lie nor does not cure the default in the senior obligation or redeem at the seni or foreclosure, its lien will be extinguished at the foreclosure sale . . . .” ( FPCI RE-HAB 01, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1023.) We reject Kiet’s argument the lende r’s full credit bid improperly included amounts not included in the debt secured by the first deed of trust, somehow requiring the lender (or one of the other de fendants) to now pay those overbid amounts to Kiet—the sold-out junior. Kiet primarily argues th e lender’s payment of $42,002 in delinquent property taxes and $13,812 in hazard in surance premiums was voluntary and those amounts cannot be considered part of the debt secured by the first deed of trust.
Nonsense. The first deed of trust specifically requires Borrower to pay property taxes and maintain insurance, and pr ovides if Borrower defaults in those obligations, the lender may advance those costs and add them to the debt secured by the first deed of trust. Kiet provides no authority supporting his contention the absence of provisions concerning the lender’s payment of taxes and insurance in the Note controls; it is well established that a promissory note and deed of trust are part of a single transaction and are read together. (See Huckell v. Matranga (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 471, 481.) Moreover, numerous statutes and ca ses specifically validate the lender’s rights in this regard so as to protect its secu rity interest in the pr operty. For example, by statute liens for real property taxes have priority over all private liens, regardless of the time of their creation. (See Rev. & Tax. Co de, §§ 2192.1, 3712; Gov. Code, § 53935.)12 And when the trustor on a deed of trust fails to pay property taxes when due, the lender/beneficiary may make the payments , add the amount paid to the principal indebtedness and foreclose the security if those amounts are not reimbursed. ( Security-First Nat. Bank v. Lamb (1931) 212 Cal. 64, 68- 69.) Indeed Civil Code section 2876 specifically provides that when a lien holder “is compelled to satisfy a prior lien for his own protection, he may enforce pa yment of the amount so paid by him, as a part of the claim for whic h his own lien exists.” Similarly, case law has acknowledge d that both the borrower/trustor and the lender/beneficiary have separate in surable interests in the property ( Mosee v. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark (1927) 87 Cal.App. 473, 475; Loring v. Dutchess Ins. Co. (1905) 1 Cal.App. 186, 188), and if the borrower/trustor de faults on the obligations set
forth in the deed of tr ust to keep the property adequately insured fo r the benefit of both, the lender beneficiary is entitled to insure or pay the premium and add that amount to the secured debt. (See Campbell v. Realty Title Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 1 95; 27 Cal.Jur. 3d (2013) Deed of Trust, § 99; Bernhardt, Cal. Mortgages, Deeds of Trust, and Foreclosure Litigation (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2012) Trustor’s Failure to Insu re, § 8.58, p. 683; see also Fin. Code, §§ 1487 & 7461 [a llow enforcement of provisions in mortgages and deed of trusts accelerating the debt and foreclosi ng for nonpayment of taxes and insurance whether or not lender’s security interest in the property has been impaired].) We are similarly unimpressed by Kiet ’s argument the lender’s full credit
bid was based on incorrect ca lculations of the principal remaining due and inflated interest charges, and therefore either the le nder (or one of the othe r defendants) must pay
those amounts to Kiet. Even if the amounts of principal and accrued interest owed by Borrower on the Note were miscalculated, Ki et suggests no basis on which he can assert Borrower’s rights. It is undisputed Kiet made no attempt to cure Borrower’s default on the first deed of trust so as to protect his junior lien, did not bi d on the property at the foreclosure sale, or redeem the property. And there is no evidence of any irregularities in13 the trustee’s sale that precluded Kiet from curi ng the default on the first deed of trust or prevented a bid by a higher bidder. 2 Furthermore, “In order to prove [he] was damaged by [any] irregularities in the fo reclosure sale which dissuaded or prevented a higher bid, the junior lienor would have to produce a ready, willing a nd able buyer who would have paid the higher price but for the wrongful co nduct. Otherwise, da mages alleged would be speculative.” ( FPCI RE-HAB 01 , supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 1023; see also Park v. First American Title Co. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1418 , 1424.) Kiet presented no evidence he or anyone else was ready, willing, and able to bid on the property at the trustee’s sale. In short, there was no material issue of fact as to whether there was any “surplus” of funds from the trustee’s sale, a nd the trial court correctly granted summary judgment. D. Common Counts and Unjust Enrichment Causes of Action
Kiet contends the trial court erre d by granting summary judgment on his common counts and unjust enrichment causes of action. He engages in absolutely no reasoned legal analysis of either cause of acti on. He provides no c itation to authority, or any discussion of the requisites for those claims. While we pe rform a de novo review of summary adjudications, it is always the appella nt’s burden on appeal to demonstrate the trial court erred. ( Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp . (2006) 137 Cal.Ap p.4th 645, 649-650,

2 Kiet makes a passing reference to the trustee’s sale date being “changed without giving notice to Borrower and other interested parties,” but he offers no facts indicating an irregularity in the trustee’s sale . The record shows the trustee’s sale was properly noticed to take place on November 26, 2008. The truste e’s sale actually occurred on December 19, 2008. Civil Code section 29 24g requires only that a postponement of the trustee’s sale (for less th an 365 days) be orally announced, i.e., “by public declaration by the trustee at the time and place last appointed for sale. . . . No other notice of postponement need be given. ” (Civ. Code, § 2924g, subds. (a) & (d).) The trustee’s deed states a ll legal notice requirements we re complied with creating a presumption the sale was conducted regular ly and properly. (Civ. Code, § 2924, subd. (c); Residential Capital v. Cal- Western Reconveyance Corp. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 807, 823, fn . 4.) Kiet presented no evidence rebutting the presumption notice of any postponement was properly given.14 [“party asserting trial court error may not . . . rest on the bare assertion of error but must present argument and legal authority on each poi nt raised”].) Accordingly, we deem the contentions waived. ( Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [when appellant raises issue “ but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived”]; see also Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979.)
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Responde nts are awarded their costs on appeal.

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, J.

IKOLA, J.