T he H o no rable D avi d M

. Law son, U ni t ed Stat es D i st ri ct Jud ge f o r t he E ast ern D i st ri ct of M i chi gan, s i t t i ng * b y de si gnat i o n. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0009n.06 Case Nos. 07- 6057 and 07-6155 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee/Cr oss-Appellan t,

v. JER OM E SA WY ER S, Defendan t-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT CO UR T F OR

THE M ID DL E DI STRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEFORE: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge, COLE , Circuit Judge; and Law son , D is t r ict Judge. * ALICE M. B ATCHELDER, Chi ef Jud ge. This is the appea l of defe ndant’s re sentenc ing for possessingan unre g is t er ed firea rm in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871 (2006) , and being a felon in posse ssion of a firea rm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 9 2 2 (g) (1 ) a n d 9 24(a) (2). Def endant- Appellant/Cross-Appe llee Jerome Sawy ers ( “Sawy ers” ) ra ises sever al claims reg arding the ca lculation of hi s base offense level, the standard of proof for t he enha nceme nts he was g iven, the conse cutive runningof his sentenc es, and the application to his case of United States v. Book er , 54 3 U .S. 22 0 ( 20 05 ). Th e g ov e rnme nt c ounter s th a t th e se nte nc e me te d o ut w a s p ro c e dura lly

unrea sonable be cause it failed to consider the cross ref ere nce provision of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c ), and failed to apply a two-level incre ase for obst ruction of just ice. B eca use it is not clear f

rom the re cord2

the basis upon which the district c ourt calc ulated Sawy ers’ base of fense level, and be cause the cour t declined to a

pply § 2k2.1(c) ’s cr oss refe ren ce p ro vision to conduct for whic h Sawy ers wa s not convicted and required too stringe nt a st andar d of proof for fact finding at se ntencing , we VA CATE t h e s en t en ce an d

R E M AN D f

o r r es en t en ci n g. I. Sawy ers wa s char g ed in a n October 24, 2001, superse ding indictment w ith va rious wea pon and drug violations. Following a trial, on April 19, 2002, a jury found Sawy ers guilty

of Count 2 of the ind ic tme nt, po sse ssi on of a n unr e g ist e re d fir e arm , a

nd Count 3 , f

e lon in p os se ssi on

of a fi re arm . The c ourt sentenc ed S awy ers on April 25, 2003, to twenty y ear s in prison. Following Sawy ers’ pro

s e ap p ea l o f hi s co n v i ct i o n an d s en t en ce , we af fi rm ed t h e co n v i ct i o n , b u tre m an d edfo r r es en t en ci n g. Un ite d S tates v . S awy e rs , 127 F. App’ x 174, 186 (6th Cir. 2005). A re sentenc ing he aringwas he ld on Aug ust 13 and 14, 2007, befor e a district judg e diffe rent from the one who had pr esided at Sawy ers’ t ri al an d o ri g inal sentenc ing. T he district cour t on

rese ntencingimposed imprisonment of 115 months for Count 2 and 35 months for Count 3. S awy ers and the United States both a ppeale d. II. We reviewa judg ment of sentence fo r reasonable ness under an abuse- of-discr etion standard. T o obtain relief , an appellant must show that the sentenc e is either p ro cedurally or substantively

unrea sonable. A se ntence may be held proc edura lly

unrea sonable if it is ma

rked by signific ant proc edura l error , such as fa iling to c alculate (or imprope rly calc ulating) the Guidelines ra ng e, tre ating the Gu i d el i n es as m an d at o ry , fa i l i n g t o c o n s i d e r t h e § 3 5 5 3 (a ) f ac t o rs , s el ec t i n g a sentenc e base d on clea

rly err oneous fa cts, or failing to a dequate ly explain the chosen sentenc e-inc luding a

n explanation for any

deviation from the Guidelines rang e. United States v. Houston , 529 F.3d 743, 753 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “[A] s entenc e may3

be substantively

unrea sonable whe re the district court select[s] the s entenc e arbitrarily , bas[es] t he sentenc e on impermissible fac tors, fail[s] to consider pe rtinent § 3553(a) fa ct ors, or g iv[ es] an

unrea sonable amount of weig ht to any per t i n en t fac tor.” United States v. Tab , 259 F. App’ x 684, 69 7 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) (c itatio ns omi tte d) . We have sa id t hat “ the bo rd e r b e tw e e n f a c tor s p ro pe rl y considere d ‘substantive’ a nd those proper ly

considere d ‘proc edura l’ is blurry if not porous,” United States v. Liou , 491 F.3d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 2007), but the distinction is not particula rly meaning ful in terms of the sort of pr ocess a nd rea soning in whi ch t h e d i s t ri ct cour t is permitted — or not permitted — to eng ag e. Sawy ers’ initial claim is t hat the base offe nse leve l on which his sentence was c alculate d was inc or re c t bec a us e it pr e sume d two pr ior qu a lif ying a du lt fe lony c on vic tio ns , an d Saw y e rs ha s o nly one such c onviction. The application notes to the sentencingg uid el i n e at issue, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manua l (U.S.S.G.) § 2K2.1, ar e clea r that a “fe lony conviction” is a c rime punishable by more than one y ear ’s imprisonment “r ega rdless of the a ctual sente nce imposed.” We ag ree that Sawy ers has only one prior felony conviction as an adult (pe r Tenne ssee law , Sawy ers’ misdemeanor

c on vic tio n w a s pun ish a

ble by le ss tha

n a y e ar, Te nn . Co de . A nn § 4 0- 35 -1 11 (e )( 1) -( 2) (2 00 8) ). Hi s offe nse leve l, theref

ore should be c alculate d based on only one prior f

elony conviction unless the

c ourt pr ov ide s a

re a so ne d b a sis fo r d oin g oth e rw ise . ( We n ote that th e re m igh t be su c h a ba sis in thi s c ase, given Sawy e rs ’ l on g juv e nil e c ri min a l hi sto ry , b ut t he c ourt wo uld ne e d to art ic ulate its

rea son for c onsidering that history .) Sawy ers c laims that the district court’s ex planation of his offe nse l evel wa s, at least, uncle ar, and, at most, err oneous. B eca use af ter Bo ok e r was de cided on January 12, 2005, a sentenc e base d

on an im pr op e rl y c a lc ulate d guid e lin e s r ang e is c on sid e re d to be pr oc e dura lly unre a so na

ble , w e mus t4

rema nd for r esente ncing or cla

rification. U.S. v. Catalan , 499 F .3 d 604 , 606 (6 th Cir . 2 00 7) (“ Pos tBook er, we co ns ide r s e nte nc e s p re dic a te d o n a g uid e lin e mis c a lc ulatio n to be ‘p ro c e dura lly

unrea sonable.’” ) (c itations omi tted). Sawye rs ne xt cl a ims tha

t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d wh e n it e nh anc e d h is s e nte nc e on the ba sis of acquitted conduct. But we have held that a “district court doe s not abridg e the de fenda nt’s rig ht to a jur y tr ia l by loo kin g to oth e r fa c ts, inc lud ing a c qu itt e d c on du c t, whe n s e le c tin g a se nte nc e wi thi n the statutory

rang e.” Un ite d S

tates v . W hite , 5 51 F .3 d 3 81 , 38 5 (6 th Cir . 2 00 8) . E a c h o f S awye rs ’ convictions was subjec t to a statutory maxi mum ter

m of 120 months’ imprisonment. His sentence for Count 2 (possessing an unre g istered f irea rm) was 115 months and his sentenc e for Count 3 (felon in p os se ssi on of a

fi re arm ) w a s 3 5 mo nth s, bo th w e ll w ith in t he statut or

y ra ng e . T hu s, the se c la ims have no me ri t. Sawy ers a lso contests the fac t that his sentences w ere made to run consecutively , rathe r than

c o n c u r r e n t l y , an d

c l a i m s t h a tt h e d i s t r i c tj u d g e d i d n o tp r o v i d e a

r a t i o n a l e f

o r t h i s d e t e r

m i n a t i o n . In United States v. Owens , we he ld that the cou rt m u s t “m ake[ ] gene rally clea r the rationale under which it h a s im p o s e d th e c o n s e c u ti v e s e n te n c e an d s e e k s to e n s u r e ana

p p r o p r iate in c r e me n ta l pe na lty fo r t he ins tant o ff

e ns e . . . .” 15 9 F .3 d 2 21 , 2 30 (6 th C ir . 1 99 8) . T he c ourt he re , in

se nte nc ingSawye rs , s a id t hat it wa s con sid e ri ng“ his pe rs on a l hi sto ry , h is p os t- inc arc e ratio n e ff or ts at re habilitation, his personal circ umstance s t h at wer e outlined by counsel a

nd set out in the pr e se nt e n c e r e p o rt , [a

n d ] c o n s i d e r [i n g ] a l l o f t h e f a c t o r s u n d e r § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) , ” an d m e n t i o n e d its p arti c u la r c o n c e r nr e g ar d in g Sa

w y e r s ’ lo n g h is to r

y o f v io le n c e an d w e a

p o n s - r e late d c o n d

u c t. We

c o n c lu d e th a t t

h is d is c u s s io nla c k s th e s p e c if ic it y n e c e s s ar y to f u lf il l t he Owens re quirement. On

rema n d, the cour

t should ex plain more c lear ly the rationale for its conse cutive-se ntence5

deter mination. See18 U.S.C. § 3584(b) (“The court, in dete rmining whether the terms imposed ar e to be order ed to r

un concur rently or conse cutively , shall consider, a s to eac h offe nse for which a te rm of imprisonment is being imposed, the fac tors set forth in sec tion 3553(a).” ). Sawye rs ’ f

in al con te nti on

is that United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), wa s incorre ctly

applied to his case beca

use it post-dated his offe nses. Appar ently , Sawy ers be lieves that his sentence would have be en more palatable under the rubrics of Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 5 30 U. S. 466 (2000) a

nd Blakely

v. W ashington , 5 42 U. S. 29 6 (2 00 4)

. B ut a s Sawye rs c or re c tly no te s in

his brief, Booke r

applies to “a ll cases on dire ct re view” at the time it was decide d. See B ooker , 5 43 U. S. at 267. Booke r was decide d on J anuar y 12, 2005, and Sawy ers’ direc t appea l was dec ided on Marc h 22, 2005. Sawy ers’ s dir ec t appea l was pendingat the time of the Booke r de c isi on . T his c la im i s

me ri tle ss. III . Th e g ov e rnme nt’ s c ro ss a

pp e a l c la i m s t

h a t S a wye r s ’ s e nt e n c e wa s p ro c e dura lly unre a so na

ble beca use the district cour

t failed to consider the cross-r efe renc e provision of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c ), and failed to e nhance the offe nse for obstructi o n o f j u stice. “[T]he adjustments of sentence s by enhanc ements or r eductions ar e mix ed questions of lawand fa ct and ar e re viewed de novo by app e ll a te c o u rts
. . . . I f th e s e n te n c e is p r o c e d u r a ll y s o u n d , w e th e n r e v ie w th e s e n te n ce f or substanti v e r e asonable ness under an abuse of discre tion standard.” United States v. Groe nendal , 557 F.3d 419, 423 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). We review a district cour

t’s interpre tations of the Guidelines de novo, and its fa ctual finding s at sentenc ing for c lear err or. United St ates v. Kana , N os . 07-2556, 07-2557, 08- 1513, 2009 WL 1421102 at *1 (6th Cir. May 20, 2009) (c itations omi tted). Whil e the dis tr ic t c ourt

did c on sid e r § 2K 2. 1( c )’ s c ro ss- re fe re nc e pr ov isi on , the c ourt sa id6

that it could not apply

that provision beca

use there was no underlying conviction for the offense the g overnme nt asked it to cross-r efe renc e. B ut we have said repe atedly with refe renc e to § 2K2.1(c ) and cross-re fer encing that the cour t may consider a cquitted conduc t. E.g., United States v. Cowon , 19 6 F .3 d 6 46 , 6 49 (6 th C ir 19 99 ) ( “ the se ntenc in g g uid e lin e s d o n ot r e str ic t § 2 K2 .1 (c ), the c ro ss ref ere nce pr ovision, to offenses that we re c harg ed in the indictment or that res u l t ed in a

c on vic tio n. ” ). Thus , th e di str ic t ju dg e ’s fa ilure to c on sid e r t he c ro ss r e fe re nc e pr ov isi on a s to acquitted c onduct was pr ocedur ally unrea sonable. The g overnme nt’s second c laim of err or is that the district court er red when it require d that the enha nceme nt for obstruction of justice be based only on fac ts admitted by Sawy ers or found by the j ury beyond a reasonable doubt. The gove rnment i s corr ect. “ Booke r did not eliminate judicial fac t-finding .” United States v, Stone , 432 F.3d 651, 654 ( 6th Cir. 2005), cert. de nied , 127 S. Ct . 129 (2006). The heig htened standa rd of pr oof ar

ticulated and a

pplied by t h e dis trict judg e wa s proce durally

unrea sonable. See United States v. Gray , 521 F.3d 514, 542 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) (“ A sentenc ing c ourt ac ts unreasona bly if it commits leg al error in the process of takingthe Guidelines or ot her factor s into acc ount, or i f i t fails t o consider them at all.”). The district cour t’s err or her e was not har

mless since it aff

ecte d the sentenc e that wa s imposed, United States v. Haze lwood , 398 F.3d 792, 801 ( 6th Cir. 2005) , and thus it merits a re mand for r esente ncing , United States v. Vicol , 514 F.3d 559, 561- 62 (6th Cir. 2008). IV. For the fore g oing rea sons, we VA CA TE Sawy ers’ s sentence and REMAND this matter for

rese ntencingconsistent with this opi nion.