[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallo, 131 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-758.] 

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. GALLO. 

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallo, 131 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-758.] 

Attorney misconduct, including recklessly making false statements concerning the 

integrity of a judicial officer—Public reprimand. 

(No. 2011-0756—Submitted September 21, 2011—Decided February 29, 2012.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-087. 

__________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Respondent, Nicholas Matthew Gallo of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0083226, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2008. 

On December 7, 2009, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Gallo with 

professional misconduct based on allegations he had made against a judge in an 

affidavit and in a motion to strike the judge’s motion to intervene in a domesticrelations case. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline found 

that Gallo had recklessly made false statements impugning the integrity of a judge 

and recommends that we publicly reprimand him for this misconduct. 

{¶ 2} Gallo objects to the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of 

law, arguing that due to his inexperience, he made an innocent mistake in 

identifying a man standing outside the judge’s judicial suite as the judge himself 

and that he had had a good-faith basis for the allegations he made against the 

judge. Therefore, he urges the court to reject the board’s findings and dismiss the 

complaint against him. 

{¶ 3} The record clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Gallo failed 

to take reasonable steps to verify that the person who he thought was staring at his 
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client was in fact the judge he accused. Therefore, we adopt the board’s findings 

of fact and conclusions of law and publicly reprimand Gallo for his misconduct. 

Misconduct

{¶ 4} In January 2009, Gallo was hired as an associate attorney at 

Stafford & Stafford Co., L.P.A., a small firm in Cleveland that handles mainly 

domestic-relations cases. On June 3, 2009, he stepped in to handle a pretrial 

conference representing Jeffery Rymers, whom the firm represented in a divorce 

proceeding pending in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas. At that time, 

Gallo had been practicing for only about six months, although he had been 

admitted to the bar for just over one year. He had never met Mr. Rymers, Mrs. 

Rymers, or Mrs. Rymers’s attorney, and he had never been to the Lake County 

Courthouse. He was, however, aware that Mrs. Rymers was in a relationship with 

Lake County Common Pleas Court Judge Eugene Lucci. 

{¶ 5} While Gallo waited in the hall outside the domestic-relations 

courtroom, which is just across the hall from Judge Lucci’s judicial suite, he saw 

a man repeatedly exit Judge Lucci’s judicial suite, look around the hall, and then 

re-enter the judicial suite. When Mr. Rymers appeared, Gallo met him and 

walked down the hall with him to discuss the case. As they were talking, Mrs. 

Rymers’s counsel approached them and handed Gallo a copy of Judge Lucci’s 

motion to intervene in the Rymerses’ divorce proceeding. Gallo quickly read 

through the document and phoned his boss, Joseph Stafford, to determine how he 

should proceed. During that conversation, Gallo described the man he had seen in 

the hallway and Stafford told him that the description “sound[ed] like Judge 

Lucci.” After ending the phone call, Gallo resumed talking to Mr. Rymers. 

Gallo’s back was to Judge Lucci’s judicial suite, and Mr. Rymer was facing him. 

At one point, Mr. Rymers told him that Judge Lucci was standing outside the 

judicial suite looking in their direction. Gallo turned around and saw that the 

same man he had seen earlier was staring in their direction. 
January Term, 2012 

3 

{¶ 6} When Gallo returned to his office after the pretrial conference, he 

prepared a memorandum for his supervisors summarizing the events that occurred 

at the courthouse. Two weeks later, Gallo filed a response to Lucci’s motion to 

intervene and argued that intervention was prohibited by Civ.R. 75(B). He also 

argued that Lucci had violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 by “improperly using his position 

as presiding Judge to advance his own personal interests, by attempting to insert 

himself into an action in which he has no legitimate interest.” He further asserted 

that Lucci had violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.3 by (1) failing to cite in his motion to 

intervene controlling law (Civ.R. 75(B)) that Lucci knew was directly adverse to 

his intervening in the divorce proceeding and (2) “engag[ing] in a pattern of 

harassing and threatening conduct toward the Defendant, Jeffery G. Rymers, and 

Joseph G. Stafford; and hav[ing] intimated on numerous occasions these threats, 

based upon [Lucci’s] position as a presiding Judge in the Lake County Court of 

Common Pleas.” 

{¶ 7} Gallo supported these allegations with affidavits from himself and 

Mr. Rymers attesting that on the day of the pretrial hearing, they had seen Judge 

Lucci standing in the hallway outside his judicial suite, staring at Mr. Rymers. 

Mr. Rymers further attested that he had felt intimidated and threatened by this 

conduct. Gallo also submitted an affidavit from Stafford addressing Judge 

Lucci’s allegation that Stafford’s representing Mr. Rymers was a conflict of 

interest because Lucci had consulted Stafford regarding his divorce. Gallo signed 

and filed the opposition brief on June 17, 2009. He resigned his position at 

Stafford’s firm approximately one week later for reasons unrelated to the Rymers 

case. 

{¶ 8} Judge Lucci filed a grievance with relator, stating that he had been 

falsely accused of abusing his office and that he had not been in the hallway while 

Gallo and Mr. Rymers were at the courthouse. He alleged that he had “witnesses 

and irrefutable, conclusive evidentiary proof” that the allegations in Gallo’s and 
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Mr. Rymers’s affidavits were not true. Gallo stood by his allegations until relator 

filed a formal complaint and assistant disciplinary counsel advised him that she 

had obtained video recordings of the activity in the Lake County Courthouse from 

June 3, 2009. After reviewing the video recordings, Gallo moved to withdraw his 

affidavit, stating that the video revealed that the person he had believed to be 

Judge Lucci was not, in fact, the judge, but rather the judge’s bailiff. 

{¶ 9} At the disciplinary hearing, the panel heard testimony from Mr. 

and Mrs. Rymers, Judge Lucci and his bailiff, Stafford, Gallo, and others. The 

panel also viewed portions of the video recordings from all four cameras that 

record activity in the pertinent hallway of the Lake County Courthouse. The 

evidence revealed that Judge Lucci had not been in the hallway during the time in 

question and that the man whom Gallo and Rymers had seen in the hallway was 

the judge’s bailiff. 

{¶ 10} Gallo testified that while he was standing approximately 70 feet 

away from the door to Judge Lucci’s judicial suite talking to Mr. Rymers, he saw 

the man whom he then believed to be Lucci standing outside the judicial suite 

staring at him and Mr. Rymers. He stated that Rymers appeared very 

uncomfortable—his face turned bright red and he started shuffling his feet. Gallo 

admitted that he had never asked Mr. Rymers whether he had met Judge Lucci 

and that other than the information he had obtained from Rymers and Stafford, the 

only effort he had made to determine the identity of the man he had observed in 

the hall was to view Judge Lucci’s picture on the Internet. He stated that he 

believed the picture to be consistent with the man he had observed in the 

courthouse that morning. 

{¶ 11} The board found that Gallo had not knowingly made false 

statements and that he had been under considerable pressure from his employer 

when he filed the documents containing the accusations. However, it concluded 

that his conduct was not blameless. Rather, the board found that Gallo had acted 
January Term, 2012 

5 

recklessly by failing to independently verify the identity of the man he had 

observed in the hallway before raising such serious allegations against Judge 

Lucci. Based upon these findings, the board concluded that Gallo had violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly or recklessly making 

false statements concerning the integrity of a judicial officer) and 8.4(d) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice). Citing insufficient evidence, the board recommends 

that we dismiss alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer 

from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation) and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that 

adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). 

Recommended Sanction 

{¶ 12} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 

sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 

St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final 

determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 

listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 

St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 

{¶ 13} The parties did not stipulate to any aggravating or mitigating 

factors in this case, and the board found that no aggravating factors are present. 

Mitigating factors found by the board include the absence of a prior disciplinary 

record, the absence of a selfish or dishonest motive, Gallo’s timely withdrawal of 

his affidavit after viewing the videotapes and discovering his mistake, and his 

cooperative attitude throughout the disciplinary proceeding. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10 

(B)(2)(a), (b), (c), and (d). While Gallo did not submit any evidence of his 

character or reputation, the board observed that Stafford and another associate 
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from his firm spoke positively of Gallo throughout the hearing. See BCGD 

Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e). 

{¶ 14} The board also considered the fact that Gallo had voluntarily 

stopped practicing law as a mitigating factor, even though his departure from the 

practice was largely due to his inability to find work in the legal field. See 

BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(f). Moreover, the board concluded that Gallo’s 

inexperience—he had been a member of the bar for only a brief period prior to his 

misconduct—was also a mitigating factor. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). See also

Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-4541, 894 

N.E.2d 1210, ¶ 40-42 (considering an attorney’s recent admission to the practice 

of law to be a mitigating factor when a more experienced attorney at his firm had 

established the practices that contributed to his misconduct). 

{¶ 15} At the hearing, Gallo urged the panel to either dismiss the 

complaint against him or recommend a public reprimand for his conduct. Citing 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 

N.E.2d 425, relator sought a six-month suspension from the practice of law. 

{¶ 16} The board observed that in Gardner, we imposed a six-month 

suspension from the practice of law on an attorney who, in a motion for 

reconsideration, had waged a vitriolic attack against the appellate court that had 

affirmed his client’s criminal conviction, making unfounded accusations that the 

court was biased and corrupt. Id. at ¶ 2-9, 33-34. But the board found that 

Gallo’s conduct was less egregious than Gardner’s because Gallo did not impugn 

the integrity of the judicial process or attack the impartiality of a judge presiding 

over a case in which he served as counsel. Finding no evidence that Gallo is 

either unfit to practice law or that he is unworthy of the trust and confidence 

essential to an attorney-client relationship, and finding that he has accepted full 

responsibility for his conduct, the board concluded that he should not be 
January Term, 2012 

7 

suspended from the practice of law, but should be publicly reprimanded for his 

misconduct. 

Gallo’s Objections

{¶ 17} Gallo objects to the board’s findings of misconduct, arguing that 

neither his mistaken identification of the bailiff as Judge Lucci nor his allegation 

that Judge Lucci had engaged in a pattern of harassing and threatening conduct 

was reckless. With regard to his mistaken identification, he asserts that he had no 

reason to believe that Mr. Rymers had not previously met Judge Lucci or to 

question Stafford’s statement over the phone that the man Gallo described in the 

hallway at the courthouse was Judge Lucci. 

{¶ 18} Gallo had not been involved in the Rymerses’ divorce prior to his 

attendance at the June 3, 2009 pretrial hearing, and he met Mr. Rymers for the 

first time that morning. And yet he accepted Mr. Rymers’s identification of the 

man in the hallway without any further inquiry. He relied upon Mr. Rymers’s 

identification, Stafford’s telephonic identification, and his own determination that 

the man he had seen in the courthouse matched an online photograph of Lucci as 

conclusive proof that the man in the hallway was Lucci. 

{¶ 19} In Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, 

¶ 26, we adopted an objective standard to determine whether an attorney has made 

a statement about a judicial officer with knowledge or reckless disregard of its 

falsity. Under that standard, we consider the nature of the statements and the 

context in which they were made and determine whether the attorney had a 

reasonable factual basis for making them. Id. 

{¶ 20} Gallo made no effort to confirm the man’s identity with anyone 

working at the courthouse. Nor did he ask Mr. Rymers, whom he had just met, 

about his familiarity with Judge Lucci. Instead, he relied upon the identification 

by a client he barely knew, a telephonic identification by his employer, and his 

own determination that the man he had seen in the courthouse matched an online 
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photograph of Lucci to levy serious charges of professional misconduct against a 

sitting judge. Furthermore, he made those allegations in a public filing in a 

domestic-relations court instead of in a confidential grievance submitted to 

disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee in accordance with 

Gov.Bar R. IV(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a respectful attitude toward the 

courts and to submit any serious complaints against judicial officers to the proper 

authorities) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(b) (requiring a lawyer who possesses 

unprivileged knowledge that a judge has violated the rules of professional or 

judicial conduct to inform the appropriate authority). Given the evidence that 

Gallo relied on and the minimal effort that he undertook to confirm the identity of 

the man in the hallway before making serious allegations against Judge Lucci, we 

do not find that he had a reasonable factual basis for his statements. We therefore 

find by clear and convincing evidence that Gallo engaged in conduct that is 

prejudicial to the administration of justice by recklessly making false statements 

impugning the integrity of Judge Lucci in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a) and 

8.4(d). 

{¶ 21} Accordingly, we overrule Gallo’s objections, adopt the board’s 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in their entirety, and hereby dismiss the 

alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and 8.4(h) as being unsupported by the 

evidence. For the reasons set forth in the board’s report, we agree that the proper 

sanction for Gallo’s misconduct is a public reprimand. 

{¶ 22} Accordingly, Nicholas Matthew Gallo is hereby publicly 

reprimanded. Costs are taxed to Gallo. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, 

JJ., concur. 

LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 

__________________ 
January Term, 2012 

9 

LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.

{¶ 23} The majority concludes that Gallo failed to take reasonable steps to 

verify that the person who he thought was staring at his client was in fact the 

judge he accused. I disagree. For the reasons that follow, I dissent from the 

majority’s decision to publicly reprimand Gallo for his conduct. 

{¶ 24} Gallo had been practicing law for less than a year before he was 

called in to handle the pretrial conference representing Jeffery Rymers. Gallo had 

never seen or talked to Judge Lucci or his bailiff, had never been in Judge Lucci’s 

courtroom or chambers, and had never even met the Stafford firm’s own client, 

Mr. Rymers, until the day in question. 

{¶ 25} The man who was mistaken for Judge Lucci had gone into and out 

of Judge Lucci’s chambers multiple times that morning and had been seen staring 

in the direction of Gallo and his client, and Mr. Rymers mistakenly confirmed that 

the man was Judge Lucci. Gallo was aware that Judge Lucci was involved in a 

relationship with Mr. Rymers’s wife and that she and the Rymerses’ children 

were living in the judge’s home. It was reasonable for Gallo to believe that his 

client would recognize Judge Lucci. 

{¶ 26} But Gallo did not rely solely on the identification by his client 

when he prepared his affidavit accusing the judge. He also relied on the 

identification made by one of the partners in the Stafford firm, who confirmed 

that the man described by Gallo was Judge Lucci. In addition, Gallo compared 

the judge’s official photograph on the Lake County Common Pleas Court website 

to his memory of the man he had seen in the hallway. In my view, Gallo took 

reasonable steps to verify the identity of the person in question. 

{¶ 27} Further, I would argue that the circumstances in this case are 

unusual. The more typical situation in these types of cases is that an attorney 

attacks the integrity of a judge presiding over a case in which the attorney is 

involved. In this case, this judge was personally involved in the divorce case that 
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Gallo was handling, even to the point of filing a motion to intervene in the 

proceeding. Thus, it was reasonable for Gallo to make the assumption that his 

client could identify the man in the hallway. And because the case does involve 

such unusual facts, it is not a situation that is likely to occur again in the future. 

{¶ 28} In my view, Gallo made a simple, good-faith mistake—a mistake 

that was reasonable, not reckless. Moreover, Gallo immediately moved to 

withdraw his affidavit when he discovered his mistake, and he left his position 

with the firm shortly thereafter. I dissent from the majority’s decision to publicly 

reprimand him. I would dismiss. 

O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 

__________________ 

Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, Lori J. Brown, Chief 

Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, for relator. 

Law Offices of Brent L. English and Brent L. English, for respondent. 

______________________