IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

October 10, 2023 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DANTIS LAKKA-LAKO

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2019-A-739 Jennifer L. Smith, Judge

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No. M2023-00080-CCA-R3-CD

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A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Dantis Lakka-Lako, of one count of 

especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially 

aggravated burglary, and two counts of theft of property. The trial court sentenced the 

Defendant to an effective sentence of fifty years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant 

asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his confession. He 

additionally contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for 

especially aggravated robbery and aggravated rape, and that the trial court erred when it 

sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.

CAMPBELL, SR., and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Manuel B. Russ (on appeal) and Brent Horst (at trial), Nashville, Tennessee, for the 

appellant, Dantis Lakka-Lako.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andreé Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor 

General; Philip Hammersley, Assistant Solicitor General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney 

General; and Doug Thurman and Kristen E. Stonehill, Assistant District Attorneys General, 

for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

This case arises from the Defendant’s assault and rape of the victim inside her 

Nashville apartment. The victim, who was pregnant at the time, jumped out of her thirdfloor apartment window to escape the Defendant. The Defendant then stole the victim’s 

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husband’s vehicle and the victim’s credit cards, which he later used to make purchases. 

For these offenses, a Davidson County grand jury indicted the Defendant for one count of 

especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially 

aggravated burglary, and two counts of theft of property. 

A. Motion to Suppress

Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement to the police on 

the grounds that it was involuntary as a result of coercion and misleading tactics by law 

enforcement, including statements made by one detective minimizing the impact the 

Defendant’s statements would have on his future. 

The trial court held a hearing, at which the following evidence was presented: 

Detective Kimberlin Rothwell testified that she worked for Metro Nashville Police 

Department (“MNPD”) in the sex crimes unit. On September 5, 2018, Detective Rothwell 

was called to Vanderbilt University Medical Center about a female who was the victim of 

a home invasion. The victim, who had been injured, reported being sexually assaulted 

inside her apartment. The victim said that she escaped her attacker by using a knife to slash 

open a window screen and jumping out of her third-story apartment unit. The victim was 

pregnant and suffered multiple injuries, including a fractured pelvis. 

Detective Rothwell received information from the victim’s husband that her credit 

card had been used at Mapco. Mapco provided their surveillance recording, which showed 

the Defendant using the victim’s credit card. The Defendant’s fingerprints were also 

identified on the victim’s husband’s vehicle, which was stolen after the assault. Based on 

this, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for the Defendant’s residence that he 

shared with his mother and siblings. Law enforcement executed the warrant on September 

18, 2018, which was the Defendant’s sixteenth birthday. On that same day, law 

enforcement asked to speak with the Defendant, and the Defendant willingly spoke to the 

detective in the detective’s vehicle in the parking lot of the Defendant’s residence’s 

complex. The Defendant was not handcuffed. Detective Rothwell was dressed in plain 

clothes and driving an unmarked vehicle. Detective Rob Carrigan also attended the 

interview. Detective Rothwell sat in the driver’s seat, the Defendant in the front passenger 

seat, and Detective Carrigan in the backseat. Detective Rothwell asked the Defendant if 

he wished to waive his Miranda rights, and the Defendant indicated that he did. The 

Defendant also signed a written waiver confirming this. The Defendant indicated that he 

had completed the eighth grade and was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

The interview was audio-recorded, and the trial court admitted a transcript of the 

interview as an exhibit to the hearing. The Defendant did not ask to speak to a lawyer or 
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with his family, who remained inside their apartment. The Defendant indicated that he had 

retained a lawyer in the past for other criminal matters. 

During the interview, which Detective Rothwell stated lasted one hour and twenty 

minutes, the Defendant did not ask for a break, and the detectives did not threaten him. At 

some point during the interview, the Defendant asked to speak to Detective Rothwell alone, 

and Detective Carrigan exited the police vehicle. The Defendant initially admitted to using 

the victim’s stolen credit card but said he was not involved with the robbery or rape. He

blamed the robbery and rape on someone named “Joe Joe.” By the end of the interview, 

the Defendant admitted to being inside the victim’s apartment, then to taking a knife from 

the apartment, and then to attempting to rape the victim. The Defendant was arrested and 

charged in juvenile court before the case was transferred to general sessions court. 

Detective Rothwell said that she would have brought the Defendant’s mother to the vehicle 

if the Defendant had so requested.

On cross-examination, Detective Rothwell stated that Detective Carrigan got out of 

the police vehicle halfway through the interview, and Detective Rothwell finished it alone. 

Detective Rothwell then got out of the car, and Sergeant Sean Rohweder got in and spoke 

to the Defendant. Sergeant Rohweder’s portion of the interview lasted twenty to thirty 

minutes. Detective Rothwell agreed that the Defendant was not told he was free to leave 

the interview but never indicated he wanted a break or asked to leave. The Defendant was 

respectful and compliant. 

Sergeant Rohweder testified that he joined the other officers at the Defendant’s 

apartment complex. Thereafter, he became involved in the Defendant’s interview being 

conducted inside the police vehicle. He recalled that Detective Carrigan stepped out of the 

vehicle and told Sergeant Rohweder that the Defendant appeared to want to be cooperative 

with the investigation but was somewhat apprehensive. After Detective Rothwell finished 

speaking with the Defendant, Sergeant Rohweder got into the police vehicle and spoke 

with him. At that point, Sergeant Rohweder was under the impression that the Defendant 

had admitted to being present in the victim’s apartment but had not “fully confessed” to 

sexually assaulting the victim. The Defendant did not “fully confess to raping her” during 

Sergeant Rohweder’s portion of the interview.

The transcript of the interview indicates that Detective Rothwell told the Defendant 

explicitly that he was not in custody. She explained his Miranda rights to him which she 

explained meant he “[didn’t] have to talk” to law enforcement. The Defendant indicated 

in the affirmative that he understood his rights and wished to be interviewed. Detective 

Carrigan encouraged the Defendant to be honest and not dig himself into a hole. The 

Defendant admitted to seeing the victim and asking for her phone. He admitted to going 

inside her apartment and taking a knife from the victim’s kitchen. Detective Rothwell 
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exited the vehicle and, when she returned, asked if the Defendant needed to take “a minute” 

and the Defendant said he was fine. The Defendant admitted to going into the victim’s 

bedroom to look for items to steal but denied attempting to rape her.

Detective Rothwell exited the vehicle again and Sergeant Rohweder replaced her. 

Sergeant Rohweder told the Defendant, in essence, that he supported the Defendant as if 

he was his own son. The Defendant replied that he had made “too big of a mistake.” 

Sergeant Rohweder replied that it did not have to amount to a “forever mistake.” Sergeant 

Rohweder encouraged him to clear his conscience and tell the truth. The Defendant said 

he saw his crime as an “opportunity” to steal from the victim and make money to live. He 

took the victim’s purse and a locked safe. The Defendant said he told the victim to “get on 

her knees” but she was “fighting” back. The Defendant attempted to take his pants off but 

was unable to. He denied raping the victim.

Defense counsel argued that, based on the evidence presented, a reasonable sixteenyear-old would not have felt free to leave and was therefore in custody.

The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress, stating the following in 

an order:

The Defendant now challenges the admissibility of the statements 

made to the third officer, Sergeant Rohweder, on grounds that his statement 

was a product of coercion and illusory promises. At the suppression hearing, 

defense counsel conceded that the statements made to Detectives Rothwell 

and Carrigan in the first hour and twenty minutes of the interview were 

voluntary and thus admissible.

. . . .

The Court finds from the totality of the circumstances that the 

Defendant’s statement was voluntarily given. Detective Rothwell and 

Sergeant Rohweder testified at the hearing on [the] Defendant’s motion, 

giving this Court the opportunity to see, hear, and assess their credibility. 

The Court also reviewed a recording and transcript of Detective Rothwell, 

Detective Carrigan, and Sergeant Rohweder’s September 11, 2018, 

encounter with the Defendant.

Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the encounter between 

the detectives and the Defendant took place on the morning of September 11, 

2018, and lasted approximately one hour and fifty minutes. Detective 

Rothwell and her partner initiated the encounter with the Defendant validly 
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by executing a search warrant at the Defendant’s residence and asking if they 

could speak with him outside in their unmarked car. The Defendant 

accompanied the detectives voluntarily. He was not restrained by handcuffs. 

Detective Rothwell informed the Defendant that he was not in custody, and 

there is nothing [in] the record to suggest that he did not understand that 

information. 

For the duration of the interview, the Defendant sat in the passenger 

seat of the unmarked police car. He spoke with three different officers. 

Detective Rothwell and her partner Detective Carrigan were present in the 

beginning of the interview. They were stern but polite throughout the 

process. In the middle of the interview, the Defendant asked to speak with 

only Detective Rothwell, at which time Detective Carrigan obliged and 

stepped out of the vehicle. Sergeant Rohweder joined Detective Rothwell 

for the last thirty minutes of the interview and was calm and polite when 

addressing the Defendant.

Detective Rothwell informed the Defendant that they had surveillance 

video of the Defendant coming out of the victim’s apartment; they found the 

Defendant’s fingerprints inside the victim’s stolen vehicle, which was found 

at the Defendant’s apartment complex; they had video of the Defendant at 

multiple businesses using the victim’s stolen credit cards; and they had DNA

from the victim’s assailant. None of the detectives threatened or abused the 

Defendant in any way but explained that they were giving him the 

opportunity to explain his motivations and take responsibility for his actions. 

The Defendant was cooperative, though not initially forthcoming. The 

Defendant admitted to the robbery allegations after learning that the 

Detectives had video footage of the apartment complex and saw the 

Defendant entering and exiting the victim’s apartment alone. Although the 

Defendant did not initially admit to the sexual assault, he ultimately told 

Sergeant Rohweder that he directed the victim to get on her knees but 

claimed he was unsuccessful and his pants never came off.

There is nothing about the personal characteristics of the Defendant, 

aside from his age, that would make him particularly susceptible to coercion. 

The Defendant had just turned sixteen at the time of the interview. He was 

a freshman in high school and was able to read and write English. The Court 

credits the testimony of Detective Rothwell that the Defendant gave no 

indication that he did not understand what was going on. The Defendant 

denied being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. [The] Defendant also 
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gave no indication that he was sleep deprived or in need of food or medical 

attention.

The Defendant was read his Miranda warnings and indicated that he 

understood those rights and still wanted to talk. The Defendant signed a 

waiver of rights, which was admitted at the suppression hearing as Exhibit 1. 

He had previous experience with law enforcement and admitted he had 

previously been advised of his rights during an earlier encounter with police 

and had experience with an attorney in the past. Although the Defendant’s

mother was in close proximity inside the apartment during the interview, the 

Defendant never asked that she or any other adult be present during 

questioning. The Court credits the testimony of Detective Rothwell that the

Defendant’s mother never tried to join the Defendant during the interview.

The Defendant conceded at the suppression hearing that his 

statements to Detectives Rothwell and Carrigan were voluntary. 

Nevertheless, the Court finds nothing in Detective Carrigan’s statements to 

the Defendant that would render his statement involuntary. In Callahan, the 

Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a juvenile’s statements 

made after Miranda, explaining that “neither the Tennessee Constitution nor 

the United States Constitution requires police officers to inform the 

defendant that he may be prosecuted as an adult.” 979 S.W.2d at 578. 

Detective Carrigan’s interactions with the Defendant fall well within legal 

bounds and did nothing to overbear the Defendant’s will.

The Court also finds no fault with Sergeant Rohweder’s statements to 

the Defendant that he would give his son the same advice and, “This isn’t a 

permanent thing. It’s not a forever thing. It’s not a ‘I’m going to spend the 

rest of my life in jail thing.’” The Court is guided by the decision of the Sixth 

Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Charlton, 737 Fed. Appx. 257, 

261 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 390 (2018), in which the court 

ruled that officers’ offer to help the defendant and to protect his family if 

they could were not a promise of leniency and were not objectively coercive.

Similarly, Sergeant Rohweder’s statements were not objectively 

coercive. Nor did he make any improper promise of leniency. Persuasion is 

not the same as coercion. See id. The Defendant’s decision to talk with 

detectives appears to this Court to have been motivated by his realization of 

the strong evidence against him rather than by any alleged misconduct of 

Sergeant Rohweder. Moreover, the Defendant had already admitted to other 
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officers that he was present in the victim’s apartment before Sergeant 

Rohweder joined the conversation.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that 

the Defendant’s statements to detectives were voluntary and not 

contaminated by duress or coercion.

B. Trial

At the Defendant’s trial, the parties presented the following evidence: The victim, 

who testified through an interpreter, stated that she was from Thailand and that English 

was her second language. In 2018, she was living in a Nashville apartment with her 

husband and was five months pregnant. The day of the incident, she took her mother in 

her husband’s car to a doctor’s appointment and then went to the grocery and the post 

office. The victim’s husband had gone to work in her car. After her errands, the victim 

returned to her apartment complex around 3 p.m. and observed a teenage boy sitting on the 

stairs of her apartment building. The victim took two trips to get her groceries from her 

car to her apartment. On the second trip, the boy asked her for her phone. She took her 

groceries inside her apartment and locked her door. The victim later identified the boy at 

her apartment building as the Defendant sitting in the courtroom.

The victim laid down on her bed and soon after the Defendant entered her bedroom. 

He was wearing gloves and holding a knife from the victim’s kitchen. The Defendant told 

her not to scream or make noise and held her at knifepoint to keep her from leaving the 

room. The Defendant took the cash that was in her purse, about $600. Then he grabbed 

her wrist and twisted it behind her back. The Defendant told her to perform oral sex on 

him and took off his pants. He made the victim get on her knees and tried to force her 

mouth onto his penis. The victim squeezed his testicles while refusing and struggling to 

get away from him. The Defendant then put his mouth on her vagina and put his tongue 

inside. He then penetrated her vagina with his penis several times. The victim continued 

to struggle, so the Defendant was not able to ejaculate. 

The victim tried to push the Defendant away and ended up smashing a bottle on his 

head causing his head to bleed. He left the bedroom but left the knife behind, which the 

victim grabbed. The victim thought the Defendant would kill her, and she looked for ways 

to escape. She eventually cut a hole in the window screen and jumped out of her apartment 

window, which was on the third level. She ran to the parking lot and banged on a car to 

set off the car alarm. The victim then ran to a bystander who called the police. The victim 

watched the Defendant drive away in her husband’s car. The keys had been hanging on 

the wall inside her apartment. The police responded, and the victim went to the hospital. 
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The victim was shown a photographic lineup at the hospital, but she could not identify her 

attacker.

Regarding her injuries, the victim stated that she suffered a pelvic crack on her 

posterior. She needed surgery, but did not have it because of her pregnancy. She suffered 

severe pain, which remained three years later at the time of trial. As a result of her injury, 

she was not able to give birth vaginally, but instead needed to have a cesarean section. The 

victim sustained an injury to her arm that healed on its own, but resulted in lingering pain. 

The victim was hospitalized for two to three months and struggled to walk well, so she 

required a wheelchair at times. The victim described the incident as “terrifying” and said 

she has since been “afraid of everything.” She stated that she lost her trust in people and 

no longer had loving feelings towards kids. The victim stated that the Defendant punched 

her twice in the face with a closed fist.

The victim’s husband testified that he was born in Burma and that English was his 

second language. The victim and her husband moved into their apartment and the crime 

occurred the next day. The victim’s husband received a phone call at work and was told 

to go to the hospital to meet his wife. She appeared badly injured and could not move 

easily. The victim was in the hospital for an extended period and then went to live at her 

parents. She suffered continual pain and limited movement. 

While the victim was in the hospital, her husband returned to their apartment to 

retrieve some items and found it in disarray. He observed the broken window and many 

items out of place. The victim’s husband noticed transactions on the victim’s credit card 

at Mapco, Walmart, and McDonald’s. The victim was still in the hospital at that time. 

Police eventually recovered the stolen car with trash and nicotine products inside, none of 

which belonged to the victim or her husband. The victim’s husband testified that a jewelry 

safe was stolen from their apartment.

Heather Kennedy testified that she was an emergency room nurse at Vanderbilt 

University Medical Center and examined the victim there. Ms. Kennedy confirmed that 

the victim was five months pregnant. The victim stated that the sexual assault occurred in 

her bedroom and that the Defendant did not ejaculate inside her. The victim indicated that 

the Defendant had licked her vagina. Ms. Kennedy took DNA samples from inside the 

victim’s mouth, under her fingernails, and her genital area.

Officer Richard Olive with the MNPD testified that he responded to the victim’s 

apartment and observed her substantial injuries. She appeared “traumatized, bleeding, 

multiple parts of her body having difficulty moving.” 
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Investigator Lynnette Mace testified that she worked as a crime scene investigator 

for MNPD and responded to the victim’s apartment. Inside the bedroom she found a 

broken beer bottle and the window screen cut open, consistent with the victim’s testimony. 

Investigator Mace found a kitchen knife on the ground outside the victim’s window. 

Officer Gerald Gomes with the MNPD testified that he received a tip about the 

location of the victim’s stolen vehicle, which was at another apartment complex. Officer 

Gomes ran the tag number on the vehicle, and it was registered to the victim’s husband. 

The vehicle was towed from the scene and processed for evidence. Lorita March with the 

MNPD Crime Lab received fingerprints that were lifted from inside the stolen vehicle 

registered to the victim’s husband. Found inside the vehicle was a bottle of lotion that the 

victim’s husband indicated did not belong to him. Ms. Marsh testified that the Defendant’s 

fingerprints were found on the bottle. 

Julie Ellis, with the MNPD forensic biology unit, testified that she analyzed DNA 

samples taken from the victim, her husband, and the Defendant. She also analyzed samples 

taken from the stolen vehicle, the kitchen knife, and items found inside the victim’s 

apartment. Testing indicated the presence of the Defendant’s DNA under the victim’s 

fingernails. DNA consistent with the Defendant was also found on a paper towel found 

inside the victim’s apartment and on the steering wheel and gear shifter of the stolen 

vehicle.

Upon hearing this evidence, the jury convicted the Defendant of one count of 

especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially 

aggravated burglary, and two counts of theft of property.

C. Sentencing

The trial court held a sentencing hearing at which the presentence report was 

admitted into the record. The presentence report indicated that the Defendant had been 

adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court for six offenses, offenses that would have been 

felonies had they been committed by an adult. The following evidence was presented: The 

Defendant’s sister testified that the Defendant was one of six children. She characterized 

the Defendant as loving and caring, a “helper” who had never been violent towards anyone. 

She apologized on behalf of the Defendant. Other family members testified favorably in 

support of the Defendant. The State did not present any additional evidence. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made the following statement:

In determining the appropriate sentence in this case, the Court has 

considered the evidence presented at the trial, and I have made a point to go 
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back and very carefully review my notes from the trial and the evidence 

presented in this sentencing hearing. 

The Court also received a presentence report which was admitted into 

evidence as Exhibit 1.

The Court has considered the statutory sentencing principles that are 

embodied in Tennessee Code Annotated 40-35-103. The Court has 

considered the nature and characteristics of the conduct involved in this case 

and the evidence and information offered by the parties with respect to 

enhancing and mitigating factors.

The Court has also considered any evidence before it today that would 

have any bearing one way or another on the [D]efendant’s potential for 

rehabilitation and treatment.

The [D]efendant is a Range [I] standard offender, but he stands 

convicted today of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, which 

carries a range of punishment for a standard offender of 15 to 25 years in 

prison.

He has been convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated rape, also 

a Class A felony, which carries a range of punishment of 15 to 25 years in 

prison.

He stands convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, that 

would carry a range of 3 to 6 years in prison.

And he stands convicted of two counts of theft, one count at a value 

over $2500, which is a Class D felony, which carries a 2 to 4-year prison 

range and one count of misdemeanor theft which carries jail time up to 11 

months and 29 days.

In determining where to place the sentence within those applicable 

ranges, the statute and the law requires that the Court consider certain 

statutory enhancement factors and mitigating factors. And the State has 

offered a number of factors that it believes to be applicable in this case in 

terms of enhancement.

. . . .
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The State offers enhancement factor number 6, that the personal 

injuries inflicted upon or the amount of damage to property sustained by or 

taken from the victim was particularly great. And the Court does find that 

that enhancement factors applies and the Court finds that enhancement factor 

carries great weight.

[H.H.] testified that she was no longer able to give birth naturally after 

this incident, in which she was forced to literally leap from a three-story 

window to save her own life. At the time of the trial she was still in physical 

pain and described her psychological suffering. She was also in the hospital 

for a month after this incident happened which indicates, again, the severity 

of her injuries. And so[,] for all of these reasons, that factor applies and is

very weighty. 

. . . .

Factor number 9, the [D]efendant possessed or employed a firearm or 

explosive device or other deadly weapon during the commission of the 

offense was clearly established in proof at the trial, and the Court does apply 

that factor with respect to counts 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Factor number 10, the [D]efendant had no hesitation about 

committing a crime when the risk to human life was high. And the Court 

does apply that and specifically with respect to [the victim’s] unborn child. 

The victim was obviously pregnant at the time of this incident. The 

[D]efendant would have known she was pregnant. And so for that reason, 

that factor does apply.

Factor 13, at the time of the felony in these -- the felonies in these 

cases, the [D]efendant was released on probation. Again, that factor was 

established in the proof at the trial today and is set out in Exhibit Number 2.

And finally, the [D]efendant was adjudicated to have committed a 

delinquent act or acts as a juvenile that would constitute a felony if 

committed by an adult was also established clearly by the collective Exhibit 

Number 2, which indicates that the [D]efendant had been previously 

adjudicated delinquent for six acts that would constitute felonies if they had 

been committed by an adult. And that is that’s an extensive, extensive 

juvenile record that proceeded this incident.
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So[,] with respect to enhancement factors, the Court does find five 

factors that are clearly established by the proof and in this Court’s view quite 

weighty considering the totality of the circumstances.

In mitigation, the defense presented several character witnesses who 

came here to testify on the [D]efendant’s behalf, family members, close 

friends, a supervisor from a juvenile facility. And I appreciate all of you 

coming here to testify.

. . . .

What I did not hear today, however, and what I had hoped to hear 

today, was any expression from this [D]efendant, the [D]efendant who stands 

convicted of a number of very violent and serious offenses. I heard no 

remorse. I heard no explanation, no reason why a pregnant woman who was 

minding her own business, taking in groceries to a new apartment would be 

viciously attacked, raped in her own home, forced to fling herself out a thirdstory window, shattering her pelvis, and endangering the unborn child that 

she carried in her body. 

I had hoped to hear that because this -- these types of acts are always 

inexplicable and sometimes an explanation provides a little bit more weight 

to the testimony about the defendant being a good person. Because it is 

impossible for this Court to reconcile the testimony of the family members 

that the [D]efendant is a good person, a polite person, a mannerly person with 

the testimony that this Court heard, that the [D]efendant raped a pregnant 

woman and forced her to fling herself out a third-story window. It is 

irreconcilable because a good person would not do that, okay, without some 

reason. And the reason is not known to me. The reason is not known to the 

Court. And so[,] without a reason, then I am forced to look at nothing but 

this event. 

So[,] taking all of that into consideration, you know, we have got 

multiple applicable enhancement factors and very little mitigation and no 

explanation. 

Before going to the length of sentence, I am going to move directly 

into the consecutive sentencing, because the State has asked that these are 

multiple offenses and this Court has the discretion if certain statutory 

considerations are met to run any or all of these sentences consecutively. 
13

And the Court does find that at least three statutory bases for consecutive 

sentencing are established here.

The [D]defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is 

extensive. Not only do we have multiple convictions in the incident case, 

but his juvenile record is extensive, as I have previously stated.

The [D]efendant is sentenced for an offense committed while on 

probation. And he had just been placed on probation and yet still committed 

the crimes here.

And finally, the Court does agree with the State that the [D]efendant 

is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for 

human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to 

human life is high.

In applying this factor, the Court does find that the circumstances 

surrounding the offense were aggravated for all of the reasons as previously 

stated. The victim was a small woman, pregnant, alone, had a language 

barrier, ended up leaping multiple stories, sustaining serious injuries. An 

extended sentence is necessary to protect the publi[c].

The Court also finds that the aggregate length of the sentences 

reasonably relates to the [offenses] for which the [D]efendant is convicted.

So[,] with all of those findings, the Court sentences the [D]efendant 

as follows:

As to Count 1 on the offense of especially aggravated robbery, the 

Court sentences the [D]efendant to the maximum term of 25 years.

On Count 2, the offense of aggravated rape, the Court sentences the 

[D]efendant to the maximum term of 25 years.

As to Count 3, on the conviction for aggravated rape, the Court 

sentences the [D]efendant to the term of 25 years.

For his conviction of aggravated burglary, the Court sentences the 

[D]efendant to 6 years.
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For his conviction for theft over $2500, the Court sentences the 

[D]efendant to 4 years.

For his sentence for theft at a value under $1,000, the Court sentences 

the [D]efendant to 11 months and 29 days.

The sentences in counts 1 and 2, especially aggravated robbery and 

aggravated rape, will be run consecutively.

The sentences in counts 3, 4, 5, and 6 will run concurrently with the 

sentence in Count 1.

The Defendant received a total effective sentence of fifty years of incarceration. It 

is from these judgments that the Defendant appeals. 

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion 

to suppress his statement to “members of MPD.” He also asserts that the evidence is 

insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape and especially aggravated 

robbery. Finally, he contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him.

A. Suppression

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to 

suppress his statement to members of the MNPD. He contends that his statement was not 

knowing and voluntary because, based on his juvenile status, his waiver of his rights was 

not valid. The State responds that the Defendant did not challenge the validity of his waiver 

at trial, and thus, his argument on appeal amounts to a new theory and is subject to plain 

error review. The State contends that the Defendant cannot establish plain error because 

1) no Miranda violation occurred because the Defendant was not in custody when he made 

the statement; 2) if the Defendant was in custody, he validly waived his Miranda rights; 

and 3) any Miranda violation that did occur did not affect the Defendant’s substantial rights 

or create a substantial injustice. 

1. Level of Review

The State contends that the Defendant’s argument on appeal was not properly 

presented at trial, and thus that his argument on appeal pursuant to a new theory is entitled 

only to plain error review. The Defendant does not appear to address this issue in his brief.
15

The Defendant motioned to suppress his statements made in the police vehicle. He 

eventually conceded that his statements to Detectives Rothwell and Carrington were 

voluntary but challenged the admissibility of his statement to Sergeant Rohweder. At the 

suppression hearing, he argued that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave 

and therefore he was in custody. 

The stated objections did not include the issue of the validity of his Miranda waiver 

based upon his status as a juvenile. “Appellate review generally is limited to issues that a 

party properly preserves for review by raising the issues in the trial court and on appeal.” 

State v. Minor, 546 S.W.3d 59, 65 (Tenn. 2018) (citing Tenn. R. Crim. P. 51; Tenn. R. 

Evid. 103(a)-(b); Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e), 13(b), 27(a)(4), 36(a)); State v. Bledsoe, 226 

S.W.3d 349, 353-54 (Tenn. 2007). In keeping with these principles, a party is bound by 

the ground asserted when making an objection to the admission of evidence and cannot 

assert a new or different theory to support the objection in the motion for new trial. State 

v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 634-35 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). As the Defendant’s 

objection to the statement was only made on the grounds of it being custodial, in keeping 

with the foregoing, we are constrained to review this issue pursuant to the plain error 

doctrine.

The doctrine of plain error applies when all five of the following factors have been 

established:

(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court;

(b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached;

(c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected;

(d) the accused must not have waived the issue for tactical reasons; and

(e) consideration of the error must be “necessary to do substantial justice.”

State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting State v. Terry, 118 S.W.3d 

355, 360 (Tenn. 2003)) (internal brackets omitted). “An error would have to [be] especially 

egregious in nature, striking at the very heart of the fairness of the judicial proceeding, to 

rise to the level of plain error.” Id. at 231.

2. Statement to Law Enforcement

We review for plain error the Defendant’s argument that his waiver of his rights was 

unknowing and involuntary, based on the totality of the circumstances including his age, 

the location and his lack of true understanding of his rights. 

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article 

I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution protect an accused’s privilege against self-
16

incrimination. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against compelled self-incrimination requires police 

officers, before initiating custodial interrogation, to advise the accused of his right to 

remain silent and his right to counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-479 (1966). 

Assuming the use of these procedural safeguards by police interrogators and provided that 

the accused is acting voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, an accused may waive his 

Miranda rights. State v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 529 (Tenn. 1997).

The Defendant lists the factors contained in our supreme court’s opinion in State v. 

Callahan as the framework for our consideration of the voluntariness of a juvenile’s waiver 

of his right against self-incrimination. 979 S.W.2d 577 (Tenn. 1998). The defendant in 

Callahan was fifteen years old at time he waived his rights and gave a statement confessing 

to killing his mother and sister. In analyzing the validity of his waiver, our supreme court 

concluded that juvenile waivers would be analyzed under a totality-of-the-circumstances 

test requiring consideration of the following factors:

(1) consideration of all circumstances surrounding the interrogation 

including the juvenile’s age, experience, education, and intelligence;

(2) the juvenile’s capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and the 

consequences of the waiver;

(3) the juvenile’s familiarity with Miranda warnings or the ability to read and 

write in the language used to give the warnings;

(4) any intoxication;

(5) any mental disease, disorder, or retardation; and

(6) the presence of a parent, guardian, or interested adult.

Callahan, 979 S.W.2d at 583. In holding that the defendant’s waiver of his rights was 

voluntary, the Callahan court considered that the defendant was:

reread his rights and verbally acknowledged that he understood his rights. 

He signed the Miranda forms. Both the atmosphere of the interrogation and 

the defendant’s demeanor were calm. The defendant was permitted to take 

a break and was provided a snack and a soft drink. He possessed aboveaverage intelligence and was able to read and write in the language used to 

convey his Miranda rights. The defendant was not under the influence of any 

intoxicants at the time of the waiver and did not appear to be suffering from 

any mental disorders. His demeanor during his statement was calm, polite, 

and cooperative.

Id. 
17

In considering the totality of the circumstances in the present case, we look at the 

following factors: The Defendant voluntarily accompanied law enforcement to the police 

vehicle where he gave his statement. The interview was relatively short, lasting less than 

two hours in total. The Defendant was seated in the front of the police vehicle, 

unrestrained, and was told he was not in custody. The Defendant indicated that he 

understood his rights and had prior dealings with law enforcement, and he never asked for 

his mother, who was nearby, to be present. The Defendant requested to speak with one of 

the interviewers alone, and the second interviewer exited the vehicle as a result. The 

Defendant indicated he was not impaired and appeared sober. The Defendant exhibited an 

understanding of what was being asked and did not exhibit any signs of being confused. 

The Defendant signed a waiver of rights. He remained cooperative throughout while 

gradually revealing what happened inside the victim’s apartment. 

Based on our consideration of the foregoing circumstances, we agree with the State 

that the Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief because he has not carried his burden 

of showing that there was a clear and unequivocal breach of a rule of law. All the factors 

for consideration listed in Callahan, save one, indicate that the Defendant voluntarily 

waived his Miranda rights. We acknowledge the fact that the Defendant’s mother was 

present inside their apartment but not on the scene when the Defendant gave his statement. 

His mother had the right as his parent to be present for the interview or to insist that he not 

give one. No such request was made. Because the factors weigh in favor of the 

Defendant’s confession being voluntary, we conclude that he is not entitled to plain error 

relief on this issue. 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. 

He contends that the State did not present sufficient proof that the Defendant was the 

proximate cause of the victim’s serious injuries necessary to sustain his convictions for 

especially aggravated robbery and aggravated rape. The State responds that the evidence 

is sufficient from which the jury could conclude that the Defendant caused the victim’s 

injuries and therefore that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions. We agree 

with the State.

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this court’s standard 

of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 

“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); 

see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004) (citing 

State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 276 (Tenn. 2002)). This rule applies to findings of guilt 

based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and 
18

circumstantial evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1999) (citing State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)). In the 

absence of direct evidence, a criminal offense may be established exclusively by 

circumstantial evidence. Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tenn. 1973). “The jury 

decides the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and ‘[t]he inferences to be drawn 

from such evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and 

inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury.’” State v. Rice, 184 

S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tenn. 

1958)). “The standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence] ‘is the same whether the 

conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 

2009)). 

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this court should not re-weigh or 

reevaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). 

Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from the 

evidence. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Liakas v. State, 286 

S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956)). “Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the 

weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the 

evidence are resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 

1997). “‘A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony 

of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.’” 

State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978) (quoting State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 

474, 476 (Tenn. 1973)). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and 

the jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their 

demeanor on the stand. Thus[,] the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given 

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523, 

527 (Tenn. 1963)). This court must afford the State the “‘strongest legitimate view of the 

evidence’” contained in the record, as well as “‘all reasonable and legitimate inferences’” 

that may be drawn from the evidence. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d at 775 (quoting State v. Smith, 

24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Because a verdict of guilt against a defendant removes 

the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal 

defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain 

a guilty verdict. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000).
19

As relevant here, aggravated rape is the “unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by 

the defendant or the defendant by a victim accompanied by any of the following 

circumstances: (1) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the act and the defendant is 

armed with a weapon; (2) The defendant causes bodily injury to the victim. T.C.A. § 39-

13-502(a)(1), (2) (2018). Especially aggravated robbery is a robbery accomplished with a 

deadly weapon and where the victim suffers serious bodily injury. T.C.A. § 39-13-403(a). 

Our supreme court has held that “causation in criminal cases generally is a question 

of fact for a properly instructed jury,” and “a jury’s determination of the causation issue 

will be reviewed under the familiar sufficiency of the evidence standard and will not be 

disturbed by an appellate court so long as the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s 

determination.” State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 203-04 (Tenn. 2001). The State points 

us to our decision in State v. Locke as determinative of this issue. 771 S.W.2d 132 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1988). The victim in Locke, after being raped by the defendant, jumped from 

her second-story apartment unit’s window and suffered serious injury from her fall. Id. at 

134. The trial court in Locke determined that the victim’s injuries “sustained by her efforts 

to escape the wrath of the defendant by jumping from the second floor” were caused by the 

defendant. Id. at 136. 

The Defendant contends that there was insufficient proof that he was the proximate 

cause of the victim’s injuries because she chose to jump out the window, notwithstanding 

his criminal behavior at the time she made the decision. He contends that the State did not 

demonstrate a “causal relationship” between his conduct and her injuries, and that her 

decision to jump was not a “natural and probable consequence of his assaultive behavior.” 

We disagree. While the victim’s injuries were a direct result of her choosing to jump out 

the window, it is indisputable that her decision to do so was a natural and probable result 

of the Defendant’s conduct. The victim stated that she thought the Defendant would kill 

her, so she chose the lesser consequence of suffering any injuries that she might sustain 

from jumping from her apartment. The Defendant may not have been the sole cause of the 

victim’s injuries, but he was certainly the sole cause of the victim’s act of flight, which 

caused her to sustain those injuries. For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence was 

sufficient from which a rational jury could have concluded that the Defendant caused 

bodily injury, sufficient to prove aggravated rape, and serious bodily injury, sufficient to 

prove especially aggravated robbery. The Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

C. Sentencing

Lastly, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. He 

contends that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences to the maximum allowable 

sentence within the applicable range. He also contends that the trial court erred when it 
20

imposed consecutive sentences. The State responds that the trial court properly imposed a 

within-range sentence. The State points out that the trial court considered the factors 

presented and declined to apply several enhancement factors while properly applying 

others to justify a sentence greater than the minimum. As to the imposition of partially 

consecutive sentences, the State contends that the trial court properly considered the 

applicable factors, namely the aggravated circumstances of the crime which occurred while 

the Defendant was on probation, as well as his extensive criminal history, and reasonably 

determined that consecutive sentences were justified. We agree with the State.

1. Enhancement of the Sentences

“Sentences imposed by the trial court within the appropriate statutory range are to 

be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of reasonableness.’” 

State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012). A finding of abuse of discretion “‘reflects that 

the trial court’s logic and reasoning was improper when viewed in light of the factual 

circumstances and relevant legal principles involved in a particular case.’” State v. Shaffer, 

45 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting State v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Tenn. 

1999)). To find an abuse of discretion, the record must be void of any substantial evidence 

that would support the trial court’s decision. Id. at 554-55; State v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 

285, 286 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Delp, 614 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). The 

reviewing court should uphold the sentence “so long as it is within the appropriate range 

and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in compliance with the purposes 

and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-10. So long as the trial court 

sentences within the appropriate range and properly applies the purposes and principles of 

the Sentencing Act, its decision will be granted a presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 

707.

The misapplication of an enhancement or mitigating factor does not remove the 

presumption of reasonableness from a trial court’s sentencing decision. Id. A reviewing 

court should not invalidate a sentence on this basis unless the trial court wholly departed 

from the principles of the Sentencing Act. Id. So long as there are other reasons consistent 

with the purpose and principles of sentencing, a sentence within the appropriate range 

should be upheld. Id.

In determining the proper sentence, the trial court must consider: (1) the evidence, 

if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the 

principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and 

characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by 

the parties on the mitigating and enhancement factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated 

sections 40-35-113 and -114; (6) any statistical information provided by the administrative 

office of the courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; (7) any 
21

statement the defendant made in the defendant’s own behalf about sentencing; and (8) the 

result of the validated risk and needs assessment conducted by the depart and contained in 

the presentence report. See T.C.A. § 40-35-210 (2019); State v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400, 

411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The trial court must also consider the potential or lack of 

potential for rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant in determining the sentence 

alternative or length of a term to be imposed. T.C.A. § 40-35-103 (2019).

We conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. The trial court 

carefully considered the relevant principles and sentenced the Defendant to a within range 

sentences for each of his crimes. The trial court applied enhancement factor (6), that the 

victim suffered injuries that were particularly great, based on the severe injuries sustained 

by the victim, her lengthy hospital stay, trouble with physical mobility, and complicated 

childbirths. T.C.A. § 40-35-114(6) (2019). The trial court applied enhancement factor (9), 

that the Defendant brandished a knife while committing the crime, and enhancement factor 

(13), that the Defendant was on probation when he committed the offense. T.C.A. § 40-

35-114(9), (13). All of these factors were supported by the evidence presented at trial and 

contained in the presentence report. As such, the appropriate application of enhancement 

factors supports the trial court’s sentencing decision. The Defendant is not entitled to relief 

on this issue.

2. Consecutive Sentencing

Where a defendant is convicted of one or more offenses, the trial court has discretion 

in determining whether the sentences shall be served concurrently or consecutively. T.C.A. 

§ 40-35-115(a). “[T]he abuse of discretion standard, accompanied by a presumption of 

reasonableness, applies to consecutive sentencing determinations.” State v. Pollard, 432 

S.W.3d 851, 860 (Tenn. 2013). A trial court may order multiple offenses to be served 

consecutively if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant fits into at 

least one of the seven categories in Code section 40-35-115(b). This court must give 

“deference to the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to impose consecutive 

sentences if it has provided reasons on the record establishing at least one of the seven 

grounds listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)[.]” Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 

at 861. When imposing consecutive sentences, the court must still consider the general 

sentencing principles that each sentence imposed shall be “justly deserved in relation to the 

seriousness of the offense,” “no greater than that deserved for the offense committed,” and 

“the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is 

imposed.” T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102(1), -103(2), -103(4); State v. Imfield, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708 

(Tenn. 2002). “So long as a trial court properly articulates reasons for ordering consecutive 

sentences, thereby providing a basis for meaningful appellate review, the sentences will be 

presumed reasonable and, absent an abuse of discretion, upheld on appeal.” Pollard, 432 

S.W.3d at 862 (citing Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1); Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705).
22

Here, the trial court found that consecutive sentencing was proper, pursuant to 

section 40-35-115(b)(2), because the Defendant had a record of extensive criminal activity, 

including six offenses which would be considered felonies. The trial court also determined 

that consecutive sentencing was proper based on the Defendant’s excessively violent 

actions towards the victim which warranted the application of the dangerous offender 

factor. Id. § 40-35-115(b)(3). We agree. The Defendant is not entitled to relief as to this 

issue.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the aforementioned reasoning and authorities, we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court.

________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE