_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 23A763 

RAUL LABRADOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO 

v. PAM POE, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NEXT 

FRIENDS, PENNY AND PETER POE, ET AL. 

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY 

[April 15, 2024] 

The application for stay presented to JUSTICE KAGAN and 

by her referred to the Court is granted. The December 26, 

2023 order of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, case No. 1:23-cv-269, is stayed, except as to 

the provision to the plaintiffs of the treatments they sought 

below, pending the disposition of the appeal in the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is

timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall

terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted, 

the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

 JUSTICE KAGAN would deny the application for stay. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and 

JUSTICE ALITO join, concurring in the grant of stay.

Early in the litigation below, the district court issued a 

preliminary injunction. Ordinarily, injunctions like these 

may go no further than necessary to provide interim relief 

to the parties. In this case, however, the district court went 

much further, prohibiting a State from enforcing any aspect 

of its duly enacted law against anyone. Today, the Court 

stays the district court’s injunction to the extent it applies

to nonparties, which is to say to the extent it provides “universal” relief. That is a welcome development. 
 

 

 

2 LABRADOR v. POE 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

I 

To appreciate the significance of the Court’s ruling, some 

background helps. In 2023, Idaho adopted the Vulnerable 

Child Protection Act. The law sought to regulate a number

of “‘practices upon a child for the purpose of attempting to

alter the . . . child’s sex.’” ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___ (Idaho

2023), App. A to Application for Stay 5. Those practices

range from “surgeries that sterilize or mutilate” a child’s 

genitals to the supply of “[p]uberty-blocking medication.” 

Ibid. Idaho claimed that its law aimed to protect children 

from treatments that can cause “lasting harm and irreversible damage.” Id., at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The law’s provisions were scheduled to take effect January 

1, 2024. 

Before that could happen, two children and their parents

sued Idaho’s attorney general and a local prosecutor in federal district court. The children and their parents alleged

that, without access to puberty blockers and estrogen, the

two minor plaintiffs would likely suffer serious mental 

health problems. Decl. of P. Poe in No. 1:23–cv–269 (D

Idaho), ECF Doc. 32–2, ¶¶14, 19, 22; Decl. of J. Doe, ECF 

Doc. 32–4, ¶¶14, 16, 23–24. Shortly after filing suit, the 

plaintiffs asked the district court to issue a preliminary injunction.

The district court agreed to do so. But instead of enjoining state officials from enforcing the law with respect to the

plaintiffs and the drug treatments they sought, the district

court entered a universal injunction. App. A to Application 

for Stay 52–54. That is, the court prohibited the defendants 

from enforcing “any provision” of the law under any circumstances during the life of the parties’ litigation. Id., at 54. 

Among other things, this meant Idaho could not enforce its

prohibition against surgeries to remove or alter children’s

genitals, even though no party before the court had sought 

access to those surgeries or demonstrated that Idaho’s prohibition of them offended federal law. The court’s order 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

promised to suspend Idaho’s law indefinitely, too, as this

litigation (like many today) may take years to reach final 

judgment.

Idaho responded by appealing the district court’s preliminary injunction decision to the Ninth Circuit. The State 

also asked the Ninth Circuit to stay the preliminary injunction during the pendency of the appeal. At the least, the 

State argued, the court of appeals should stay the universal

aspect of the district court’s injunction so that at least some

portions of its duly enacted law might finally take effect. 

After the Ninth Circuit denied Idaho’s stay request in a 

brief unreasoned order, the State proceeded here. Before 

us, the State does not challenge the preliminary injunction 

to the extent it ensures the two minor plaintiffs in this case

continued access to their drug treatments. That aspect of

the district court’s order will remain in place pending appeal. The State asks us to stay the preliminary injunction

only to the extent it bars Idaho from enforcing any aspect

of its law against any person anywhere in the State. 

II 

Stay motions and other requests for interlocutory relief

are nothing new or particularly remarkable. In truth, they 

are perhaps “as old as the judicial system of the [N]ation.” 

Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 17 (1942). 

Every federal court in this country has within its “traditional” toolkit the power to pause temporarily its own order 

or one of a lower court or issue other forms of interim relief. 

Id., at 9; see 28 U. S. C. §1651(a); this Court’s Rule 23.1; 

Fed. Rule App. Proc. 8(a). Often, judges at all levels of the 

federal judiciary resolve motions for interlocutory relief in

brief orders like the one the Court issues today and the

Ninth Circuit did below. Judges have proceeded this way 

throughout the Nation’s history. Indeed, many courts could

not efficiently manage their dockets otherwise. Cf. Wilson 
 

 

 

 

 

4 LABRADOR v. POE 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

v. Sellers, 584 U. S. 122, 139 (2018) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (“[A] busy appellate court may sometimes not see the 

profit in devoting its limited resources to explaining the error [or] alternative basis for affirming . . . so it issues a summary affirmance instead”).

Just as familiar are the rules that govern stay applications. This Court, like every other federal court, is “guided” 

by the same “sound . . . principles.” Nken v. Holder, 556 

U. S. 418, 434 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); 

see Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 582 

U. S. 571, 580 (2017) (per curiam); id., at 584 (THOMAS, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). We ask (1)

whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that 

it is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) whether it will suffer

irreparable injury without a stay, (3) whether the stay will

substantially injure other parties interested in the proceedings, and (4) where the public interest lies. Nken, 556 U. S., 

at 434. A court’s “‘“discretion”’” to enter a stay is thus not 

left up to its mere “‘“inclination, but to its judgment”’” regarding each of these time-tested considerations. Ibid. 

(quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U. S. 132, 

139 (2005), in turn quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 

30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, C. J.)). 

Applying that traditional stay test here yields a ready answer. Start with the first question: whether Idaho has

shown it is likely to succeed on the merits. This Court has 

long held that a federal court’s authority to fashion equitable relief is ordinarily constrained by the rules of equity

known “‘at the time of the separation of ’” this country from 

Great Britain. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308, 318 (1999); see Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U. S. 99, 105 (1945); Boyle 

v. Zacharie & Turner, 6 Pet. 648, 658 (1832). Under those 

rules, this Court has said, a federal court may not issue an 

equitable remedy “more burdensome to the defendant than 

necessary to [redress]” the plaintiff ’s injuries. Califano v. 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682, 702 (1979); see Gill v. Whitford, 

585 U. S. 48, 68 (2018) (“[A] ‘remedy must . . . be limited to 

the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the 

plaintiff has established’”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 

12 Pet. 657, 718 (1838); Department of Homeland Security 

v. New York, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (DHS) (GORSUCH, J., 

concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 3); United States v. 

Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 693 (2023) (GORSUCH, J., concurring 

in judgment); S. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the 

National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 425–428 (2017).

The district court’s universal injunction defied these

foundational principles. It did not just vindicate the plaintiffs’ access to the drug treatments they sought. It purported to bar the enforcement of “any provision” of the law 

against anyone. App. A to Application for Stay 54. The district court issued this sweeping relief even though, by its

own admission, the plaintiffs had failed to “engage” with

other provisions of Idaho’s law that don’t presently affect

them—including the law’s provisions prohibiting the surgical removal of children’s genitals. Id., at 52. In choosing

such an extraordinary remedy, the district court clearly

strayed from equity’s traditional bounds.

The remaining stay factors—the relative harms to the

parties and the public interest—point to the same conclusion. Members of this Court have long held that, “‘[a]ny

time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a 

form of irreparable injury.’” Maryland v. King, 567 U. S. 

1301, 1303 (2012) (ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers) (quoting 

New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U. S. 

1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). Likewise, 

this Court has held that “[t]here is always a public interest

in prompt execution” of the law, absent a showing of its unconstitutionality. Nken, 556 U. S., at 436. 

Both considerations favor Idaho. The district court purported to bar the State from bringing into effect portions of 
 

6 LABRADOR v. POE 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

a statute that no party has shown, and no court has held,

likely offensive to federal law. The district court’s order 

promised to run for the life of this lawsuit, thus preventing 

Idaho from executing any aspect of its law for years. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs face no harm from the partial stay the 

State requests. Even with it, the district court’s preliminary injunction will operate to prevent state authorities

from taking any action to interfere with their ability to access the particular drug treatments they seek. 

III 

The dissent disputes none of this. It does not question

that Idaho is entitled to relief under this Court’s traditional 

stay test. Instead, it laments the number of requests for 

interim relief this Court has recently faced in “high-profile” 

cases. Post, at 1 (JACKSON, J., dissenting from the grant of 

stay). To deter future applications of that sort, the dissent

proposes adding to our traditional stay test new factors alien to our precedents and historic equitable practice. Respectfully, however, the dissent’s proposals miss the mark. 

First, the dissent suggests that we should refuse to intervene when both a district court and a court of appeals have 

refused a party’s request for interim relief. Post, at 2. But 

the dissent does not explain how this system of upside-down 

precedent works, where the Supreme Court is somehow 

bound to follow lower court decisions. Of course, no one 

questions that the Court should (as it does) afford due respect to the work of our lower court colleagues. See, e.g., 

Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (ROBERTS, 

C. J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 5). But the 

dissent does not explain why due respect should be replaced 

with abject deference, or how the rule it proposes would allow us to discharge faithfully our own obligation to assess

fairly and independently the cases that come to us. Nor, for 

that matter, does the dissent attempt to reconcile its proposed new rule with the fact that, over the last 12 months, 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

this Court has (repeatedly) granted interim relief to the federal government in the face of contrary lower court rulings.1 

Perhaps sensing these problems and convinced of the correctness of this Court’s recent interventions, the dissent ultimately fashions itself an escape hatch. Tucked away in a

footnote, the dissent adds that it does not mean to suggest 

that the “burden” of overcoming adverse lower court decisions “can never be carried.” Post, at 3, n. 1. But if that’s 

true, when does the dissent believe we should intervene, 

and when not? And why was it appropriate for this Court

to override lower court decisions in so many other recent 

cases but it is inappropriate to do the same here? The dissent never says. So much for the added clarity and “restraint” it hopes to bring to our law. Post, at 7. 

Second, the dissent suggests that, before granting relief, 

we should ask whether a case is “certworthy.” Post, at 4. 

But it isn’t clear how that would help matters either. In the 

past, various individual Justices faced with requests for interlocutory relief in chambers, sometimes while the Court

stood in recess, considered whether four Justices would 

likely agree to take up the dispute. That practice may be

understandable. But when hearing many stay requests,

this one included, we sit as a full Court. And here, a majority has decided that this case is worthy of the Court’s attention. 

It has done so, too, for good reason. This case poses a 

question about the propriety of universal injunctive relief—

a question of great significance that has been in need of the 

—————— 1See, e.g., Murthy v. Missouri, 601 U. S. ___ (2023) (overriding a lower 

court order prohibiting the government from coercing or encouraging social media companies to censor private speech); Garland v. Blackhawk 

Mfg. Group, Inc., 601 U. S. ___ (2023) (setting aside a lower court order

prohibiting the government from enforcing its regulation restricting the 

sale of ghost guns); FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 598 U. S. 

___ (2023) (countermanding a lower court order staying the Food and

Drug Administration’s approval of mifepristone, an abortion drug). 
 

 

 

 

8 LABRADOR v. POE 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

Court’s attention for some time. DHS, 589 U. S., at ___ 

(opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 3); Griffin v. HM Florida-ORL, LLC, 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (statement of 

KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 3). This case also implicates an

apparent circuit split, as courts of appeals have disagreed 

about whether district courts may issue the sort of sweeping relief the district court issued here when faced with 

laws very much like Idaho’s. See, e.g., Brandt v. Rutledge, 

47 F. 4th 661, 672 (CA8 2022); L. W. v. Skrmetti, 83 F. 4th 

460, 489–490 (CA6 2023). Even applying the dissent’s proposed standard for relief, then, this case would seem to satisfy it.2 

Third, the dissent suggests that the Court should exercise more “caution” and “restraint” in cases like this one, 

where a party does not challenge the entry of a preliminary 

injunction but asks us to address only the scope of the remedy it provides. Post, at 2, 4–5. But if “caution” and “restraint” are our watchwords, why would a party’s request 

—————— 2The dissent seeks to downplay the “certworthiness” of this case by 

recasting the universal aspect of the district court’s order as an “incidenta[l]” feature designed to protect the plaintiffs’ anonymity. See post, 

at 3, n. 2, 4, and n. 3. But labeling universal relief incidental does not 

make it so. The district court faced two plaintiffs seeking access to certain specific treatments, yet it issued an order applicable to all potential

nonparties and all regulated treatments. There was nothing incidental 

about it. Tellingly, too, the district court nowhere paused to address the 

adequacy of less intrusive (and truly incidental) measures to protect the 

plaintiffs’ anonymity—for example, a sealed order, shared with pertinent

state authorities and the plaintiffs’ physicians, guaranteeing them access to the particular treatments they seek. Today, the Court supplies a 

much-needed reminder that courts cannot so easily sidestep the traditional equitable rule that the relief a federal court may issue “must . . . 

be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the

plaintiff has established.” Gill v. Whitford, 585 U. S. 48, 68 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, the Court does not, as the 

dissent suggests, “ignor[e]” the district court’s reason for granting universal relief. Post, at 4, n. 3. Rather, the Court recognizes that “aspect 

of the District Court’s decision” for what it is—an unpersuasive departure from our precedents. Ibid. 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 9 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

for narrower rather than broader relief “counsel against our 

intervention”? Post, at 2. Do we really want to incentivize 

parties to seek more sweeping relief in order to enhance 

their chances of success in this Court? And how does it 

serve “caution” and “restraint” for this Court to allow lower 

courts to transgress foundational remedial principles more 

readily than foundational liability principles? Especially

when pursuing that course would mean (as it does here) 

that a single federal judge may erroneously suspend the operation of a law adopted by the people’s elected representatives for years on end? Once more, the dissent offers no answers. 

Fourth, the dissent contends that we should exercise special “caution” when considering whether to intervene in 

“high-profile cases.” Post, at 1. But by any measure, a great 

deal of caution is already baked into the Nken analysis. To 

warrant this Court’s intervention, an applicant seeking a

stay must make a “‘strong showing’” on the merits, demonstrate an “‘irreparable’” harm, and persuade the Court that 

the public interest warrants intervention. Nken, 556 U. S., 

at 434. The dissent does not explain why these traditional 

cautionary notes are insufficient. 

Nor does it explain why we should reserve an added new 

measure of caution for “high profile” matters alone. I would 

have thought that, as judges, we should neither deliberately seek out nor evade “high-profile” disputes, but afford

all litigants who come before us their lawful due. Even taking the dissent’s test on its own terms, too, my colleagues 

fail to explain why this case qualifies for special caution as

“high profile” but so many others in the last 12 months did 

not. Does anyone really think that this Court’s recent interventions—in cases involving ghost guns, allegations of 

government censorship, and abortion access—were war-
 

 

 

10 LABRADOR v. POE 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

ranted because the laws at issue there were less “high-profile” than Idaho’s? See n. 1, supra.3 

IV 

None of this is to suggest the dissent is without a point.

Perhaps the Court has seen a rise in the number of applications for interim relief. But if so, it seems to me that this 

trend is not the result of (nor does it justify tinkering with)

this Court’s precedents and traditional equitable standards. Instead, at least part of the problem may be attributable to a departure from those precedents and standards in 

the lower courts. In recent years, certain district courts 

across the country have not contented themselves with issuing equitable orders that redress the injuries of the plaintiffs before them, but have sought instead to govern an entire State or even the whole Nation from their courtrooms. 

Today, Idaho is on the receiving end of one of these universal injunctions, but lately it has often been the federal government.4 

—————— 3The dissent chides me for neglecting to mention that the State 

stamped the word “EMERGENCY” on the front cover of its stay application. Post, at 5. But it is not obvious what point the dissent is trying to 

make. Post, at 6, n. 4. In its recent stay applications, the federal government hasn’t always affixed a similar stamp on its papers. See, e.g., 

Application in No. 23A302, Garland v. Blackhawk Mfg. Group, Inc. (Oct.

5, 2023); Application in No. 23A243, Murthy v. Missouri (Sept. 14, 2023); 

Application in No. 22A902, FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine 

(Apr. 14, 2023). Should we have denied those applications on that basis?

In truth, every applicant for interim relief believes its case qualifies as 

an “emergency.” Our traditional stay test helps us evaluate those assertions by focusing our attention on factors such as irreparable harm, the 

balance of equities, and the public interest. The dissent does not explain 

what additional value an “emergency” test would provide or what neutral 

principle would guide our analysis. Nor, for that matter, does the dissent 

square its proposed new “emergency” test with its other proposals. Take 

the dissent’s preference for avoiding high-profile cases. See post, at 1, 5. 

Does the dissent mean to suggest that we should grant relief only in

“emergencies,” but only so long as they also keep a low profile? 4Many of this Court’s recent orders granting interim relief were the 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 11 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

As best I can tell, universal injunctions are a relatively

new phenomenon. By some accounts, universal injunctions 

against the federal government during President Franklin 

D. Roosevelt’s tenure—those 12 eventful years covering the

Great Depression, the New Deal, and most of World War 

II—were virtually unknown. See Bray, 131 Harv. L. Rev., 

at 434–435. Others have pointed to a single example of a 

“nation-wide” decree during that period, but there the 

Court reversed the lower court’s “sweeping” ruling for lack 

of standing. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 117, 

120–121 (1940). Even as late as President Barack Obama’s 

administration, some estimate that lower courts issued 

only about 19 universal injunctions against the federal government over the course of eight years. See Dept. of Justice,

J. Rosen, Opening Remarks at Forum on Nationwide Injunctions and Federal Regulatory Programs (Feb. 12, 2020). 

Since then, however, universal injunctions have proliferated. By one count, lower courts issued 55 universal injunctions during the first three years of President Donald

Trump’s administration. Ibid. And if the last 12 months 

are any indication, it seems that trend has continued apace 

during the administration of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

See, e.g., n. 1, supra (citing examples).

A rising number of universal injunctions virtually guarantees that a rising number of “high-profile” cases will find

their way to this Court. Just consider this case. Idaho does 

not challenge the district court’s injunction to the extent it

addresses the plaintiffs’ asserted injuries. The State seeks 

relief here only because and to the extent the district court 

prevented it from enforcing any aspect of its duly enacted 

—————— 

product of a different and unrelated problem: the profound “intrusions

on civil liberties” governments attempted in response to COVID–19. Arizona v. Mayorkas, 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (statement of GORSUCH, J.) 

(slip op., at 4). And, “[n]ot surprisingly,” the number of requests for interim relief in this Court “has shrunk in the years since COVID–19.” 

Post, at 11, n. 5 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in the grant of stay). 
 

 

 

12 LABRADOR v. POE 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

law against anyone—all without any showing that other 

provisions in the statute violate federal law or the rights of 

any current party. As in so many other recent cases, the 

district court’s universal injunction effectively transformed 

a limited dispute between a small number of parties focused 

on one feature of a law into a far more consequential referendum on the law’s every provision as applied to anyone. 

What’s worse, universal injunction practice is almost by

design a fast and furious business. Normally, parties spend 

“their time methodically developing arguments and evidence” before proceeding to a trial and final judgment limited to the persons and claims at hand. DHS, 589 U. S., at 

___ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 3). If they seek

relief for a larger group of persons, they must join those individuals to the suit or win class certification. In universalinjunction practice, none of that is necessary. Just do a little forum shopping for a willing judge and, at the outset of 

the case, you can win a decree barring the enforcement of a

duly enacted law against anyone. Once that happens, the 

affected government (state or federal) will often understandably feel bound to seek immediate relief from one 

court and then the next, with the finish line in this Court. 

After all, if the government does not act promptly, it can

expect a law that the people’s elected representatives have 

adopted as necessary and appropriate to their present circumstances will remain ineffectual for years on end. In all 

these ways, universal injunctions circumvent normal judicial processes and “tend to force judges into making rushed,

high-stakes, low-information decisions” at all levels. Id., at 

___ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 4).

Today, the Court takes a significant step toward addressing the problem. It does so not by reworking our precedents 

and traditional equitable practices, but by enforcing them.

It focuses directly on a root cause of the recent proliferation 

of interlocutory litigation in “high profile” matters, sets 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 13 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

aside a district court’s universal injunction, and in the process reminds lower courts of the foundational rule that any 

equitable remedy they issue must not be “more burdensome 

to the defendant than necessary to [redress]” the plaintiff ’s

injuries. Califano, 442 U. S., at 702. 

Lower courts would be wise to take heed. Retiring the

universal injunction may not be the answer to everything 

that ails us. But it will lead federal courts to become a little 

truer to the historic limits of their office; promote more

carefully reasoned judicial decisions attuned to the facts,

parties, and claims at hand; allow for the gradual accretion 

of thoughtful precedent at the circuit level; and reduce the 

pressure on governments to seek interlocutory relief in this

Court. A return to a more piecemeal and deliberative judicial process may strike some as inefficient. It may promise 

less power for the judge and less drama and excitement for 

the parties and public. But if any of that makes today’s decision wrong, it makes it wrong in the best possible ways, 

for “good judicial decisions are usually tempered by older 

virtues.” DHS, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4). 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 23A763 

RAUL LABRADOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO 

v. PAM POE, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NEXT 

FRIENDS, PENNY AND PETER POE, ET AL. 

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY 

[April 15, 2024] 

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE BARRETT 

joins, concurring in the grant of stay. 

A Federal District Court in Idaho preliminarily enjoined 

Idaho from enforcing its new Vulnerable Child Protection

Act. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 

declined to stay the injunction. Idaho then filed an 

emergency application in this Court for a partial stay of the 

injunction. The Court today grants Idaho’s emergency 

application. I agree with the Court’s decision.

I add this concurring opinion to explain how this Court 

typically resolves emergency applications in cases like 

this—namely, in cases where a party has sought to enjoin

enforcement of a new state or federal law in the often yearslong period until a final decision on the merits. 

Traditionally, one important factor when this Court

decides an emergency application involving a new law is 

likelihood of success on the merits. The likelihood of 

success on the merits factor can pose difficulty, however,

because it can require the Court to assess the merits of 

important cases earlier and more quickly than is ordinarily 

preferable, and to do so without the benefit of full merits 

briefing and oral argument. But when resolving emergency 

applications involving significant new laws, this Court

often cannot avoid that difficulty. It is not ideal, but it is 

reality. Given that reality, the Court must then determine 
 

2 LABRADOR v. POE 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

the best processes for analyzing likelihood of success on the 

merits in emergency cases. 

I 

Here is how the issue typically arises. After a new federal 

statute, federal regulation, or state law has been enacted,

an adversely affected party who contends that the new law 

violates the Constitution or federal law may seek a preenforcement preliminary injunction in federal district 

court. A preliminary injunction prevents the government

from enforcing its new law pending the eventual decision

on the merits. If the district court grants a preliminary

injunction, the government may promptly seek a stay in the

court of appeals. Or if the district court denies a 

preliminary injunction, the plaintiff may promptly seek an 

injunction in the court of appeals. 

The party that loses in the court of appeals may then seek 

emergency relief in this Court. The losing party may argue, 

for example, that a consequential new law has been

mistakenly enjoined or mistakenly green-lighted by the 

lower courts, and ask this Court to grant relief.

When an emergency application comes to this Court, we

must decide it—grant or deny. The Court has no authority 

to reject or turn away emergency filings without deciding 

them. 

It is critical to appreciate the significance of the decision

that this Court is being asked to make in emergency cases 

involving new laws. Keep in mind how much time it takes 

for the litigation process to run its course and reach a final

merits ruling in the district court, court of appeals, and

potentially this Court—often one to three years or even

longer. The final merits decision, when it occurs, will of 

course be important. But the interim status of the law— 

that is, whether the law is enforceable during the several 

years while the parties wait for a final merits ruling—itself 

raises a separate question of extraordinary significance to 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

the parties and the American people. And that is the 

question this Court often must address when deciding 

emergency applications involving new laws.1 

Consider a few examples. Suppose that a State enacts a 

new online defamation law. Do communications and media 

companies have to alter their editorial policies and posting 

practices to comply with that new speech law during the

several years while its constitutionality under the First

Amendment is being litigated on the merits? Or suppose

that EPA issues major new environmental regulations. Do 

businesses have to restructure their operations or build 

new facilities to comply with the new regulations during the 

multiyear period while the legality of the regulations is 

being challenged in court? Cf. West Virginia v. EPA, 577 

U. S. 1126 (2016) (enjoining Clean Power Plan pending 

review by the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court). 

In those emergency cases, the plaintiffs—including

individuals and businesses—often will suffer irreparable 

harm if the relevant government officials are not enjoined

from enforcing the law during that multiyear period. But 

on the flip side, other parties—including the Federal 

Government, the States, or other individuals and 

businesses—often will suffer irreparable harm if the

relevant government officials are enjoined from enforcing

the law during that multiyear period. 

If the moving party has not demonstrated irreparable

harm, then this Court can avoid delving into the merits.

But not infrequently—especially with important new 

laws—the harms and equities are very weighty on both 

sides. In those cases, this Court has little choice but to 

—————— 1The Court also receives emergency applications in other contexts, 

such as capital cases, election-law cases, and a smorgasbord of other 

matters. But a distinct difficulty arises when we consider emergency

applications involving the enforcement of new federal or state laws. This 

opinion uses “laws” as shorthand to include regulations and executive 

policies as well. 
 

4 LABRADOR v. POE 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

decide the emergency application by assessing likelihood of 

success on the merits. Courts historically have relied on

likelihood of success as a factor because, if the harms and 

equities are sufficiently weighty on both sides, the best and

fairest way to decide whether to temporarily enjoin a law 

pending the final decision is to evaluate which party is most 

likely to prevail in the end.2 

The merits issues raised in emergency applications 

involving new laws can be consequential and difficult. And 

those applications can require this Court to assess the

merits on a tight timeline—without the benefit of many

reasoned lower-court opinions, full merits briefing, and oral 

argument. It is worth noting that this difficulty is not 

unique to this Court—lower courts must also deal with 

applications for interim relief that can require them to 

assess the merits on a tight timeline. 

That scenario is not always optimal for orderly judicial

decisionmaking. So various suggestions have been made to 

eliminate or reduce the need for this Court to address 

likelihood of success on the merits when resolving 

emergency applications involving new laws. Some 

suggestions have force; others are questionable. As I see it, 

none completely eliminates the need for this Court to make 

those calls. 

First, some suggest that this Court, when receiving an

emergency application involving a new law, should adopt a 

default posture of deference to the court of appeals’ ruling 

on a stay or injunction, especially when the court of appeals 

—————— 2This Court has used different formulations of the factors for granting

emergency relief. All formulations basically encompass (1) likelihood of 

success on the merits (or a fair prospect of success); (2) certworthiness;

(3) the harms to the parties; and (4) the equities and public interest. See, 

e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam). For 

present purposes, I will treat likelihood of success as equivalent to a fair 

prospect of success. If there is any meaningful difference among the 

common formulations of the emergency-relief factors (which I tend to 

doubt), those distinctions can be explored if necessary in a future case. 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

has not disturbed the district court’s ruling on whether to

grant or deny an injunction. See, e.g., post, p. 1 (JACKSON, 

J., dissenting from grant of stay). Under that view, this 

Court should deny most emergency applications in cases

involving new laws, regardless of whether an injunction 

against enforcement of the law was ultimately upheld or

denied by the court of appeals.

I respectfully disagree with that suggestion. Again,

whether a new federal or state law can be enforced during 

the several years before a final ruling on the merits can 

itself be an important national question. And this Court 

has a responsibility to resolve major questions of national 

importance. So a default policy of off-loading to lower 

courts the final word on whether to green-light or block 

major new laws for the several years until a final ruling on

the merits would amount to an abdication of this Court’s 

proper role. Moreover, given the possibility that different 

courts of appeals might reach different conclusions on

whether to enjoin the enforcement of a new law for the

several years pending final review, a deferential approach 

could lead to substantial uncertainty and disuniformity 

that become untenable in cases involving nationwide

government programs or national businesses.

I would therefore not adopt a default position where the

Court always (or almost always) denies emergency

applications involving new laws. Rather, the Court needs 

some way to evaluate when to grant relief. And one of the 

traditional, tried-and-true factors has been likelihood of 

success on the merits. 

Second, one might reasonably think that this Court, 

when dealing with an emergency application, should simply 

try to “preserve the status quo.” Sounds attractive in 

theory. But in practice, difficulties emerge when trying to 

define the status quo. Is the status quo the situation on the 

ground before enactment of the new law? Or is the status 

quo the situation after enactment of the new law, but before 
 

 

6 LABRADOR v. POE 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

any judicial injunction? Or is the status quo the situation

after any district court ruling on a preliminary injunction?

Or is the status quo the situation after a court of appeals

ruling on a stay or injunction?

There is no good blanket answer to the question of what 

the status quo is. Each conception of the status quo is

defensible, but there is no sound or principled reason to pick 

one over another as a rule to apply in all cases involving 

new laws. 

And even if we could settle on one definition of the status 

quo, applying that one definition consistently across the 

range of emergency applications would lead to very

troubling results. Suppose, for example, that the status quo 

is defined to mean the status before enactment of the new 

law. If courts applied that rule across the board, some 

plainly constitutional and democratically enacted laws 

would effectively be blocked for several years pending the

final decision on the merits. Or suppose instead that the 

status quo is defined as the status after the new law is in 

place. In that case, some plainly unconstitutional or

otherwise illegal laws would nonetheless remain in effect 

and be enforced against individuals and businesses for 

several years pending the final decision on the merits. 

I doubt that anyone would tolerate such an inequitable 

and scattershot approach. So even if we could define the 

status quo in theory in a principled way across all cases, a

blanket rule of “preserving the status quo” in application

would not be suitable for this Court’s emergency docket. 

That is yet another reason why the Court throughout its 

history has relied on likelihood of success on the merits as

an essential factor in determining when to grant emergency 

relief in individual cases. 

Third, JUSTICE BARRETT has emphasized that the Court

can and should take care to focus on certworthiness when 

considering emergency applications. Does 1–3 v. Mills, 595 

U. S. ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J., concurring in denial of 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

application for injunctive relief ). If the underlying merits

issue would not warrant this Court’s review when the case 

returned to the Court on the merits docket, then we should 

deny the application and leave the question of interim relief

to the court of appeals. I fully agree with JUSTICE 

BARRETT’s important insight. Emphasizing certworthiness

as a threshold consideration helps to prevent parties from

using “the emergency docket to force the Court to give a

merits preview in cases that it would be unlikely to take.” 

Id., at ___ (slip op., at 1). 

Of course, the certworthiness factor is, by definition, only

a partial cure for the issue here: Although emphasizing

that factor reduces the number of emergency applications 

involving new laws where we have to assess the merits, 

some of the most significant and difficult emergency 

applications will readily clear the certworthiness bar. And 

in those cases, we may still have to assess likelihood of 

success on the merits. 

Fourth, some suggest that the Court should prohibit socalled nationwide and statewide injunctions—injunctions

that prevent enforcement of a law against persons other 

than the plaintiffs. The theory is that eliminating

nationwide and statewide injunctions by district courts will

in turn reduce the number of emergency applications

involving new laws that make it to this Court, or at least 

reduce the number of applications where this Court needs 

to assess the merits. 

As I see it, prohibiting nationwide or statewide 

injunctions may turn out to be the right rule as a matter of 

law regardless of its impact on this Court’s emergency

docket. See ante, at 4–5, 13 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in 

grant of stay). More to the point for present purposes, I

agree that such a rule could somewhat reduce the number 

of emergency applications that make it to this Court and 

require the Court to assess the merits.

To begin with, the government party might not seek 
 

8 LABRADOR v. POE 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

immediate appellate (or Supreme Court) review of a 

preliminary injunction that is confined to one or a few

individual parties. And an emergency application to this 

Court where the issue concerns only a few individual

parties may not clear the certworthiness bar.3 

That said, a rule prohibiting nationwide or statewide

injunctions would not eliminate the need for this Court to

assess the merits of some emergency applications involving 

new laws. For one, there is ongoing debate about whether 

any such rule would apply to Administrative Procedure Act

cases involving new federal regulations, given the text of 

the APA. See Griffin v. HM Florida-ORL, LLC, 601 U. S. 

___, ___, n. 1 (2023) (statement of KAVANAUGH, J., 

respecting denial of application for stay) (slip op., at 3, n. 1); 

5 U. S. C. §706(2). But put that caveat aside for now. 

Even if a district court enjoins a new federal statute or

state law only as to the particular plaintiffs, that injunction 

could still have widespread effect. For example, the

plaintiff might be a State, or the plaintiff might be an 

association that has many members, or the plaintiffs might 

file a class action for classwide injunctive relief under Rule 

23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. So even if 

district court injunctions are confined to the plaintiffs,

there still will be emergency applications with nationally

important effects that come to this Court and clear the 

certworthiness bar, thereby still requiring this Court to

assess the merits. 

Moreover, the effects of a rule prohibiting nationwide or

statewide injunctions on this Court’s emergency docket can 

be diminished by vertical stare decisis. The general

discussion of the scope of district court injunctions often 

overlooks the important role of the court of appeals. Even 

—————— 3The scope of the injunction may affect evaluation not only of

certworthiness but also of the harms to the government defendant and 

other affected parties. 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 9 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

when district court injunctions are limited to the plaintiffs, 

the losing party in the district court’s preliminary 

injunction proceeding may promptly seek an injunction or

stay in the court of appeals. And any ensuing decision by

the court of appeals to grant or deny injunctive relief could

then have precedential effect—formally, when there is a

precedential opinion, or perhaps informally, when there is

not—on other district courts in that circuit when other 

parties seek similar injunctive relief. After all, with any 

consequential new law, many different parties may seek 

preliminary injunctions in separate proceedings in the

district courts within a circuit. 

As a result, the ruling by the court of appeals on an 

emergency application for a stay or injunction in a discrete

case (or cases) can often determine whether the new law 

continues to be enforced across the entire circuit. And in 

those circumstances, the losing party in the court of appeals 

may seek relief in this Court and point out that the court of 

appeals decision may have broader circuitwide impact—

and is therefore different from just a single district court 

ruling involving a few plaintiffs. Put simply, when a court 

of appeals ruling on an emergency stay or injunction could 

affect enforcement of a significant new law throughout the 

circuit, that broader impact may sometimes make the case

significant enough to clear the certworthiness bar in this 

Court. 

With any consequential new federal law, moreover, it is

likely that different parties will seek preliminary

injunctions in multiple circuits. And what happens if 

different courts of appeals reach different results? For 

example, what if a major new federal law regulating social

media companies, or immigration, or energy producers, or 

healthcare, or securities markets is enforceable in one 

circuit but not in another for the several years pending final 

review on the merits? That disuniformity could often be 

highly problematic. Again, an emergency application to 
 

10 LABRADOR v. POE 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

this Court in those circumstances could clear the 

certworthiness bar, meaning that we may still have to 

consider likelihood of success when deciding it. 

In short, a rule limiting the scope of district court

injunctions may be correct as a matter of law, even apart

from its effects on this Court’s emergency docket. And the 

result of a rule against nationwide or statewide injunctions 

may be to somewhat reduce the number of emergency 

applications involving new laws where this Court must 

assess likelihood of success on the merits. But that rule 

would not eliminate the need for this Court to sometimes 

decide important emergency applications involving new 

laws by assessing likelihood of success on the merits.4 

II 

As the discussion so far has sought to illustrate, this

Court cannot avoid evaluation of the merits in at least some 

emergency applications involving consequential new laws. 

If I am correct about that basic reality, another important 

question concerns this Court’s processes. What process 

should this Court employ for assessing likelihood of success

on the merits with respect to an emergency application,

particularly in cases involving important new federal or 

state laws? Given the extraordinary significance of the

question whether a consequential new law can be enforced 

during the several years while merits litigation is ongoing, 

the Court should use as many tools as feasible and 

appropriate to make the most informed and best decision. 

Sometimes that might mean taking more time (if available), 

ordering supplemental briefing, or inviting amicus briefs. 

In certain circumstances, moreover, the Court might 

benefit from oral argument or may even grant certiorari

before judgment. 

—————— 4Here, the State’s application seeks a stay primarily because of the 

scope of the injunction. That issue is itself certworthy, and I believe that

the State has a likelihood of success on that issue. 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 11 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

Especially in recent years, the Court has employed many

of those tools to help the Court better decide important

emergency applications. See, e.g., Biden v. Nebraska, 600 

U. S. 477 (2023) (Court granted certiorari before judgment 

and expedited oral argument after receiving emergency

application involving federal student loan forgiveness

program); National Federation of Independent Business v. 

OSHA, 595 U. S. 109 (2022) (per curiam) (Court granted 

expedited oral argument after receiving emergency 

application involving OSHA vaccine mandate); Biden v. 

Missouri, 595 U. S. 87 (2022) (per curiam) (same, for 

emergency application involving CMS vaccine mandate). 

And I believe that the Court should continue to be flexible 

in employing appropriate procedures so as to best decide

important emergency applications. 

A related question is whether the Court should issue 

opinions—that is, opinions for the Court as distinct from

separate concurring or dissenting opinions—to publicly

explain our grounds for granting or denying an emergency 

application involving an important new law. Opinions for

the Court can sometimes be appropriate in order to explain 

our reasoning, as in the vaccine mandate cases, for

example. See ibid.

5 That said, an opinion for the Court 

addressing likelihood of success on the merits for an 

emergency application can sometimes come at a cost. A 

written opinion by this Court assessing likelihood of success 

on the merits at a preliminary stage can create a lock-in 

effect because of the opinion’s potential vertical 

—————— 5During the COVID–19 pandemic, the Court sometimes found it 

important to issue opinions on COVID–19-related legal questions, in part

because of the widespread assumption that the pandemic would largely 

be over before any final ruling on the merits in the court system. 

Therefore, the emergency docket during the COVID–19 pandemic in 

essence was the merits docket as to certain COVID–19-related issues. 

Not surprisingly, this Court’s emergency docket, while still robust, has 

shrunk in the years since COVID–19. 
 

12 LABRADOR v. POE 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

precedential effect (de jure or de facto), which can thereby

predetermine the case’s outcome in the proceedings in the 

lower courts and hamper percolation across other lower

courts on the underlying merits question. (Of course, that

can happen to a lesser degree even when the Court simply 

issues a bare-bones order granting or denying relief.) So in 

my view, issuing opinions for the Court with respect to

emergency applications may sometimes be appropriate, but 

we should exercise appropriate caution before doing so. 

* * * 

Although the volume of cases challenging new laws and 

coming to this Court on the emergency docket is a relatively

recent development, this Court’s emergency docket—and

the difficulties associated with it—are not new. The 

emergency docket has always existed, and both the Court

and even individual Justices acting in chambers have made 

a plethora of important decisions for the Nation in an 

emergency posture. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 577 

U. S. 1126 (2016) (temporarily enjoining Clean Power 

Plan); Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam)

(vacating injunction pending appeal regarding state voter 

ID law); Rubin v. United States, 524 U. S. 1301 (1998)

(Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers) (denying stay pending

certiorari of order enforcing subpoenas to Secret Service 

agents regarding observations of the President); 

Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U. S. 1321 (1973) (Marshall,

J., in chambers) (staying District Court’s injunction that

ordered a halt to bombing in Cambodia); Youngstown Sheet 

& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 584, 589 (1952) (after 

expedited oral argument, affirming District Court’s 

preliminary injunction that proscribed seizure of steel mills 

by government); cf. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U. S. 

273, 283–285 (1953) (vacating stay of execution of the

Rosenbergs).

In my view, the Court can potentially reduce the number 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 13 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

of emergency applications involving new laws where the

Court has to assess likelihood of success on the merits. But 

this Court is responsible for resolving questions of national 

importance, even when they arise on the emergency docket. 

Fulfilling that responsibility will sometimes require us to

assess likelihood of success on the merits in emergency 

cases involving new laws, as the Court has in the past. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 23A763 

RAUL LABRADOR, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO 

v. PAM POE, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NEXT 

FRIENDS, PENNY AND PETER POE, ET AL. 

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY 

[April 15, 2024] 

JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins,

dissenting from grant of stay. 

When a party asks this Court to “sideste[p] the ordinary

judicial process” and intervene at an atypical juncture, our 

default should be “restraint.” Barr v. East Bay Sanctuary 

Covenant, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting from grant of stay) (slip op., at 5). We do not have 

to address every high-profile case percolating in lower

courts, and there are usually many good reasons not to do 

so. Few applicants can meet our threshold requirement of

“an exceptional need for immediate relief,” by showing that

they will suffer not just substantial harm but an “irreversible injury . . . occurring during the appeals process that cannot be later redressed.” Louisiana v. American Rivers, 596 

U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2). 

Even when an applicant establishes that highly unusual

line-jumping justification, we still must weigh the serious 

dangers of making consequential decisions “on a short fuse

without benefit of full briefing and oral argument.” Does 1– 

3 v. Mills, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J., concurring 

in denial of application for injunctive relief ) (slip op., at 1).

Without adequate caution, our decisions risk being not only 

“unreasoned,” but unreasonable. Whole Woman’s Health v. 

Jackson, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (KAGAN, J., dissenting 

from denial of application for injunctive relief ) (slip op., at 
 

 

2 LABRADOR v. POE 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

1–2).

This case presents numerous reasons for exercising restraint. As explained in Part I below, the State of Idaho’s 

emergency application asks us to override the decisions of 

two lower courts based on an issue not clearly implicated

and under circumstances where the State does not contest 

that its law should remain enjoined as likely unconstitutional, at least as applied to the plaintiffs. As described in 

Part II, even if today’s application actually involved a “universal injunction,” the emergency docket would not be the 

place to address the open and challenging questions that 

that issue raises. I respectfully dissent. 

I 

Three interdependent reasons counsel against our intervention. First of all, the applicant seeks displacement of

the decisions of both “the District Court and . . . a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals.” Beame v. Friends of 

the Earth, 434 U. S. 1310, 1312 (1977) (Marshall, J., in 

chambers). A Federal District Court determined that a 

never-before-in-effect Idaho law is likely unconstitutional, 

and that court issued a preliminary injunction that temporarily blocks the law’s enforcement while it considers the 

merits of the challengers’ legal claims. Wishing to enforce

the challenged law during the course of the litigation, the 

State asked for a stay pending appeal. But both the District 

Court and the Ninth Circuit denied that request. Our respect for lower court judges—no less committed to fulfilling 

their constitutional duties than we are and much more familiar with the particulars of the case—normally requires 

an applicant seeking an emergency stay from this Court after two prior denials to carry “an especially heavy burden.”

See Edwards v. Hope Medical Group for Women, 512 U. S. 
 

 

 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

1301, 1302 (1994) (Scalia, J., in chambers) (internal quotation marks omitted).1 

Second, the State has not come close to carrying its heavy

burden in this case. No party disputes that, assuming all 

of the other stay factors were met, Idaho needs to show “a 

reasonable probability that this Court will grant certiorari” 

in order to obtain an emergency stay. Maryland v. King, 

567 U. S. 1301, 1302 (2012) (ROBERTS, C. J., in chambers) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Emergency Application for Stay 29–32; Response in Opposition 19–24; Reply Brief 14–15.2 Idaho maintains that this case is certworthy because it raises the question of whether a district court

can issue an injunction that grants relief directed to all potentially impacted nonparties—a so-called “universal injunction.” The only problem: That’s not what the District

Court did here. Far from attempting to grant relief to parties not before it, the District Court expressly stated that, 

—————— 1The concurrence seems perplexed by the idea that lower court decisions about interim relief deserve our respect. See ante, at 6–7 (opinion 

of GORSUCH, J.) (hereinafter concurrence). In its telling, that “upsidedown” suggestion leaves this Court either powerless to correct mistakes 

or hopelessly inconsistent when we do. Ante, at 6. But to say that a party

bears an especially heavy burden is not to say that burden can never be 

carried. See Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (ROBERTS, 

C. J., joined by, inter alios, GORSUCH, J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip 

op., at 5) (“No one has overlooked that the State bears an ‘especially

heavy burden’ in justifying a stay pending its appeal to the Ninth Circuit[,] . . . [b]ut in my view that burden has been met”). Even when two 

lower courts deny relief, an applicant can still prevail in this Court under

our traditional emergency stay factors. The heavier burden, though, has

long served as a sobering reminder that, after two prior levels of review, 

interim relief has consistently been deemed unwarranted. 2While the concurrence appears to attribute the certworthiness consideration to this dissent, see ante, at 7–8, it is standard practice for this 

Court to assess certworthiness when evaluating an emergency application. See, e.g., Does 1–3 v. Mills, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J., 

concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief ) (slip op., at 1); 

Little, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 

183, 190 (2010) (per curiam). 
 

 

4 LABRADOR v. POE 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

“[i]n the absence of class certification, injunctive relief generally should be limited to the named plaintiffs.” ___ 

F. Supp. 3d ___, ___ (Idaho 2023), App. A to Application for 

Stay 52. Then, ultimately, the District Court settled on issuing a statewide preliminary injunction for a party-centered, fact-specific reason: because it found that doing so

was necessary to protect the particular plaintiffs before the 

court, including two minors proceeding under pseudonyms, 

against action by the State it deemed likely unconstitutional. Id., at 53. Any error by the District Court as to the 

necessity of the preliminary relief it has chosen raises, at

best, a factbound question, not a certworthy issue.3 

Third, and finally, Idaho seeks emergency relief without 

contesting that its law should be preliminarily enjoined as

likely unconstitutional, at least as applied to the plaintiffs

before the District Court. See ante, at 2–3 (opinion of 

GORSUCH, J.). The State takes this litigating position while 

defending a statute that regulates access to gender-affirming medical care for transgender children. That is a serious 

and consequential matter, which, indeed, raises the profile 

of this case and the stakes of our intervention, for the law 

at issue here will have a significant practical impact on everyone it affects. The constitutional questions around this 

law are significant as well because statutes like this one 

raise new and complex issues. Unlike in myriad other

emergency cases, however, the State is not seeking interim 

—————— 3The concurrence all but ignores this key aspect of the District Court’s 

decision. See ante, at 1–3. But even the most ardent critics of “universal 

injunctions” acknowledge that, in providing relief to the parties before a 

court, an injunction may incidentally benefit nonparties. See, e.g., 

United States v. Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 693 (2023) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment); Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 667, 717 (2018) (THOMAS, 

J., concurring). We might ultimately disagree in this case about whether

the District Court’s determination about the necessary scope of relief to

protect the plaintiffs qualifies as an abuse of discretion. See ante, at 8, 

n. 2. But any such debate would not transform the State’s case-specific,

fact-intensive request for error correction into a certworthy issue. 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

relief based on any errors by the lower courts with respect

to consequential merits questions. Contra, ante, at 8–9. 

Instead, in a troubling bid for this Court’s early intervention, the State asks us to wade into the middle of ongoing 

lower court proceedings to weigh in on a single query concerning only one aspect of a preliminary determination by 

the District Court: whether the temporary relief that the

District Court has afforded pending its review of the merits

sweeps too broadly. In my view, we should resist being conscripted into service when our involvement amounts to micromanaging the lower courts’ exercise of their discretionary authority in the midst of active litigation. This Court is 

not compelled to rise and respond every time an applicant 

rushes to us with an alleged emergency, and it is especially 

important for us to refrain from doing so in novel, highly 

charged, and unsettled circumstances. Here, where the 

State does not even seek relief from the District Court’s determination that the law is likely unconstitutional as to at 

least some of the individuals it will impact, caution is especially warranted. 

II

 JUSTICE GORSUCH’s concurrence demonstrates the perils

of treating this application any other way. Conspicuously

minimized in that opinion is the word that appears, bolded 

and capitalized, on the cover of the State’s application:

“EMERGENCY.” The concurrence proceeds, instead, to

treat the State’s application as a run-of-the-mill motion for 

interim relief, just as any court might dispose of such a motion on its regular docket. See ante, at 3. From the standpoint of an interest in taming our emergency docket, that is

folly.4 

—————— 4This is not to say that the traditional stay factors do not matter, or 

that this Court can only entertain an application that is labeled as an 

“emergency.” See ante, at 9–10, n. 3. Rather, my point is that not every 
 

6 LABRADOR v. POE 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

What is more, in resolving this particular application, the 

concurrence reaches out to address an unsettled remedial 

issue that, by the concurrence’s own assessment, is of profound significance for the functioning of our government. 

See ante, at 11. It appears, then, that if the concurrence is

right that “universal injunctions . . . ‘tend to force judges 

into making rushed, high-stakes, low-information decisions,’” the majority has taken the bait. Ante, at 12. 

To be clear, though, the Court has not decided the propriety of “universal injunctions.” Whether federal courts have 

the power to issue “universal injunctions” is “an important 

question that could warrant our review in the future,” not 

a foregone conclusion dictated by our precedent. Griffin v. 

HM Florida-ORL, LLC, 601 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) 

(KAVANAUGH, J., statement respecting denial of application 

for stay) (slip op., at 3); see also, e.g., Department of Homeland Security v. New York, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) 

(GORSUCH, J., concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 5)

(framing “underlying equitable and constitutional questions raised by . . . nationwide injunctions” as ones “we 

might at an appropriate juncture take up”). After today, 

that question remains.

Nor does history offer an easily discernible answer. As 

one leading scholar candidly admits, “traditional equity

lacked the sharply defined rule” that the concurrence would

claim the Court adopted today. S. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev.

417, 421 (2017). And other leading scholars are actively debating what lessons can be gleaned from the historical record. See A. Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 

N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1065, 1080–1090 (2018) (offering an account of “universal injunctions” consistent with Article III 

—————— 

alleged error made by a lower court judge warrants this Court’s immediate intervention and correction in real time, while the lower court’s proceedings are pending. 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

and American courts’ traditional equitable powers); see also

M. Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 

133 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 1008 (2020) (expressing concern 

that, in debate over the limits of federal courts’ equitable 

powers, “we risk allowing selectively crafted conceptions of

historical tradition to run away with us”). 

Simply put, the questions raised by “universal injunctions” are contested and difficult. I would not attempt to

take them on in this emergency posture, even in a case that

actually raised the issue. We do not have full adversarial 

briefing, the benefits of oral argument, or even a final opinion from the Court of Appeals. To the extent we can draw 

any lesson from the lower courts at this point, it is that, 

“when faced with laws very much like Idaho’s,” determining

the appropriate bounds of equitable relief and the propriety

of “universal injunctions” is not straightforward. Ante, at 7 

(citing Brandt v. Rutledge, 47 F. 4th 661, 672 (CA8 2022); 

L. W. v. Skrmetti, 83 F. 4th 460, 489–490 (CA6 2023)). 

* * * 

All that said, I see some common ground. I agree that our

emergency docket seems to have become increasingly unworkable. See ante, at 10. I share the concern that courts 

heed the limits of their power. See ante, at 12. And surely 

all could benefit from “more carefully reasoned judicial decisions attuned to the facts, parties, and claims at hand,” 

not to mention “a more . . . deliberative judicial process.” 

Ante, at 12–13. With respect, though, I worry that we may 

be too eager to find fault in everyone but ourselves. 

This Court will almost certainly have a chance to consider 

the entirety of this case soon, whoever prevails below. In 

the meantime, it is far better for all concerned to let the 

lower courts proceed unfettered by our intervention. We 

can, and usually should, wait to provide our assessment in

the ordinary course—when it is our turn to do so. Put differently, whenever this Court must determine whether to 
 

8 LABRADOR v. POE 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

exercise its discretionary power to intervene in pending

cases on an emergency basis, I firmly believe we must proceed with both reason and restraint. Because the majority

demonstrates neither today, I respectfully dissent.