Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 19‒8010 

IN RE HAROLD HALEY BURBANK, II, 

Respondent. 

ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY RECIPROCAL 

DISCIPLINE SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED 

Before 

Thompson, Boudin, and Kayatta, 

Circuit Judges. 

Harold Haley Burbank, II pro se. 

October 28, 2019 

 
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Per Curiam. On January 24, 2018, the Supreme Judicial 

Court of Maine ("SJC") imposed upon Harold Haley Burbank, II 

("Burbank") a twelve-month suspension from the practice of law, 

which in turn prompted this court to issue an order to show cause 

why it should not impose reciprocal discipline. Having carefully 

considered the arguments Burbank advanced in his brief and during 

his hearing before our disciplinary panel, we now order that 

Burbank be suspended from practice before this court for a period 

of twelve months nunc pro tunc to run concurrently with his Maine 

suspension, and he may seek reinstatement in this court when and 

if he is reinstated in Maine. 

We lay out some basic facts to provide context and round 

out the foundation of the disciplinary proceedings. This 

proceeding stems from a property dispute between Burbank's 

neighbors and eighteen members of Burbank's family, including 

Burbank.1 The neighbors filed suit, seeking grant of a 

prescriptive easement, conversion, and punitive damages regarding 

a small piece of property co-owned by Burbank and his family 

members. Burbank represented himself and three co-owners (his 

 1 The neighbors had been using for decades, without issue or 

objection, beach-access stairs adjacent to Burbank's Northport, 

Maine property to descend an embankment -- they would then cross 

a small portion of Burbank's property in order to get to the beach. 

Burbank took it upon himself to report the stairs as a zoning 

violation and, ultimately, he removed the stairs (contrary to an 

advisement from the town and against the wishes of his fellow coowners), giving rise to this lawsuit. 
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father, sister, and brother); the remaining family members, 

separately represented, filed a cross-claim for partition by sale 

of property. 

In finding in favor of the neighbors across the board 

(and also granting the petition for partition), the Maine Superior 

Court concluded Burbank's actions demonstrated "malice." The 

court levied a $20,000 judgment ($15,000 of that was punitive 

damages) in light of "all the aggravating and mitigating factors 

indicated by the evidence, the reprehensibility of [Burbank's] 

conduct toward the [neighbors], and the harm caused to the 

[neighbors]." Lincoln v. Burbank II, 2015 WL 10134783 at *18 (Me. 

Super. Aug. 11, 2015). Burbank appealed.2

The SJC, sitting as the Law Court, affirmed, adding 

$10,000 in sanctions for Burbank's "repeated misconduct" in 

prosecuting the appeal: he "state[d] facts not in the trial court 

record"; raised issues but provided "no further argument"; and 

argued issues that were "meritless," "frivolous," and "devoid of 

legal authority." Lincoln v. Burbank, 147 A.3d 1165, 1172-79 (Me. 

2016). The Law Court explained that "Burbank [] consistently 

disregarded standards of law and practice that govern appellate 

review," and his "efforts ha[d] been disrespectful to the proper 

role of the trial court, unfair to and expensive for the other 

 2 Burbank initially was represented by counsel -- when she 

withdrew, Burbank proceeded pro se. 
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parties, and contrary to Maine appellate law." Id. at 1179. The 

Law Court also concluded that "Burbank's frivolous and baseless 

actions [were] egregious conduct that [] confused the issues on 

appeal, delayed final resolution of th[e] matter, and 

significantly [drove] up the costs to other parties." Id. 

The Board of Overseers commenced an investigation and 

then disciplinary proceedings. The matter was then referred to 

the SJC, where Burbank's actions continued to be "problematic." 

Based on the SJC's findings and conclusions in the underlying case, 

taken together with the evidence the SJC heard at the disciplinary 

hearing, the SJC ordered the suspension of Burbank based on his 

violations of the Maine Rules of Professional Misconduct.3 Bd. of 

Overseers of the Bar v. Burbank, No. BAR-17-12, 5-8 (Me. Jan. 24, 

2018). 

As for the penalty to be imposed, the SJC observed there 

were "many aggravating factors" and "some mitigating factors." 

Id. at 7. As for the aggravating factors, the SJC considered the 

seriousness of the misconduct and the fact that he "caused 

substantial injury to the parties" and wasted judicial resources. 

Id. But the SJC also noted that Burbank had no prior disciplinary 

 3 Rules violated included Rule 1.1 (requiring competence), 

Rule 1.3 (requiring diligence), Rule 3.1 (barring frivolous and 

bad faith arguments), Rule 3.4 (barring attorneys from "knowingly 

disobey[ing] an obligation under the rules of a tribunal"), and 

Rule 8.4 (barring violations of these Rules and "engag[ing] in 

conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice"). 
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record in Maine alongside the stress he was under due to his 

father's poor health and Burbank suffering a stroke himself. Id. 

Additionally, the SJC recognized that Burbank had provided 

competent legal representation in Maine in the past, and while not 

all of Burbank's misconduct was deliberate, as a practicing 

attorney he "should have known that his conduct was far afield 

from the standards expected of a reasonably competent attorney, 

and that his actions constituted misconduct." Id. at 7-8. 

On balance, those factors added up to the imposition of 

a twelve-month suspension with the requirement that Burbank 

petition for reinstatement.4 Back in Connecticut, Burbank's 

primary residence and practice jurisdiction, the Superior Court, 

Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Burbank, No. DN HHDCV 

186088744-S, ¶ 3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 4, 2018), and then the 

United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, In 

re Burbank, No. 3:18-gp-00006 (MPS), 1 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 2018), 

imposed reciprocal suspensions. 

Upon receiving the SJC's order, this court initiated its 

own disciplinary proceedings through an order to show cause why 

substantially the same discipline should not be imposed. Indeed, 

our inquiry is limited to the appropriateness of imposing 

 4 The Maine suspension was entered on January 24, 2018, so 

Burbank is now eligible for reinstatement, however he has not 

petitioned for reinstatement; the $10,000 and $20,000 in sanctions 

and damages remain unpaid. 
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reciprocal discipline in this court, and our standards for doing 

so "are clear and are set forth in In re Williams, 398 F.3d 116 

(1st Cir. 2005) (per curiam)." In re Oliveras López De Victoria, 

561 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2009). We impose substantially similar 

discipline to that imposed in the state court unless the respondent 

persuades us 

1. that the procedure used by the other court was so 

lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to 

constitute a deprivation of due process; or 

2. that there was such an infirmity of proof establishing 

the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction 

that this Court could not, consistent with its duty, 

accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or 

3. that the imposition of substantially similar 

discipline by this Court would result in grave 

injustice; or 

4. that the misconduct established is deemed by the Court 

to warrant different discipline. 

In re Williams, 398 F.3d at 119 (quoting 1st Cir. R. Att'y Discip. 

Enf. (Discip. R.) II.C)); see also Fed. R. App. P. 46(b)(1)(A). 

The respondent bears the burden to demonstrate "by clear and 

convincing evidence . . . that the imposition of substantially 

similar discipline is unwarranted." In re Barach, 540 F.3d 82, 85 

(1st Cir. 2008). "Given the limited nature of our inquiry, the 

norm will be for this court to impose discipline which is 

substantially similar to that imposed by the state court." In re 

Williams, 398 F.3d at 119 (citing In re Hoare, 155 F.3d 937, 940 

(8th Cir. 1998)); see also In re Kersey, 402 F.3d 217, 218 (1st 
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Cir. 2005). 

In his lengthy response to the show cause order, Burbank 

appears to argue that: he was deprived of due process in this 

court by virtue of improper service of the order to show cause; 

the SJC didn't consider his health issues when imposing its 

discipline; the SJC violated his rights under a United Nations 

treaty; and the Maine courts and this court committed a variety of 

violations of his constitutional rights.5

As we review these arguments, we will "treat the state 

court's factual findings with a high degree of respect," In re 

Barach, 540 F.3d at 84 (citing In re Williams, 398 F.3d at 118), 

even as we "fully consider the state record" in determining whether 

reciprocal discipline is warranted, id. (citing Selling v. 

Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917)). 

Overall, we are not persuaded by Burbank's conclusory 

and haphazard arguments, most of which seek to relitigate the SJC's 

disciplinary proceedings or request dismissal of the "federal 

complaint" against him. First, we reject Burbank's service- and 

notice-related contention that the case (our disciplinary inquiry, 

 5 To the extent Burbank's attacks on the SJC's disciplinary 

proceedings and fact-finding are a plea for us to do something 

about the discipline the SJC imposed, we note only that this court 

"lack[s] jurisdiction in a federal disciplinary proceeding to 

vacate or modify the state court's imposed discipline." In re 

Barach, 540 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing In re Williams, 

398 F.3d at 118). 
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we assume) must be dismissed because he says the SJC's disciplinary 

decision was not attached to our show-cause order. Even if this 

argument would fit the bill for one of the four enumerated grounds 

for not imposing substantially similar discipline, and further 

assuming the SJC's decision was not attached, as he says, Burbank 

has suffered no prejudice since he already had a copy of the SJC's 

decision -- he conceded as much to this panel at oral argument. 

Next: Burbank's claim that he's "clearly exempt[ ] from 

ethics rules due to diagnosed medical incapacity," and his 

assertion that his health was not adequately considered by the 

SJC. But we're not aware of -- and Burbank does not direct us to 

-- any authority supporting his take on the rules of professional 

conduct. And the second piece is easily disposed of since the SJC 

explicitly listed Burbank's health among the mitigating factors it 

carefully weighed.6 

We collapse Burbank's remaining big-ticket arguments 

into one: constitutional and treaty-based violations, all of which 

we reject as nonstarters, and most of which do not relate to any 

of the four enumerated grounds that must be shown to persuade us 

not to impose substantially similar discipline. For example, 

Burbank says Maine's discipline, along with our own reciprocal 

 6 Burbank also advances an Eighth Amendment argument that the 

SJC disregarding his health is cruel and unusual punishment, but 

again, the SJC did consider his health. For this reason (and 

others we need not get into), this is another baseless assertion. 
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discipline inquiry, are in contravention of his rights under a 

United Nations treaty, which he says allows him to protect his 

family and therefore renders his "frivolous" arguments not so 

frivolous since they were made for that purpose.7 But even taking 

that novel and devoid-of-legal-authority argument as true, Burbank 

does not tell us -- and we do not see -- how it advances any of 

the grounds for us not imposing substantially similar discipline 

in his case. And, along those same lines, he says his arguments 

were protected political speech, but that flies in the face of our 

precedent. See, e.g., In re Zeno, 504 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2007) 

(explaining that an attorney's "free speech" during litigation is 

"extremely circumscribed," and an attorney cannot rely on the First 

Amendment to bring any legal theory he wishes without risk of 

sanction or discipline) (quoting Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 

501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991)). 

Burbank also points to the Fourteenth Amendment in 

support of his position that the Maine proceedings and this 

"federal complaint" were deficient and constitute a due process 

violation because he was never informed of the specific claims 

against him. This lacks merit. To the extent Burbank is attacking 

the proceedings before the Law Court, that court's procedure is 

 7 Burbank mostly just copied and pasted from the treaty with 

little effort at developed argumentation, but the familyprotection angle is something he somewhat attempts to develop. 

That's the only part of his treaty-based argument we spill ink on. 
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not our focus8 -- we instead look to the proceedings before the 

SJC, which bear no indicia of any due process shortcomings. 

Indeed, the SJC provided sufficient notice to Burbank of the 

allegations against him, time to respond, and, ultimately, a 

testimonial hearing before imposing a suspension from practice. 

For our part, this court notified Burbank of the claims against 

him in the show-cause order. We see no defect at all, let alone 

one so severe as to constitute a deprivation of due process in the 

notice and opportunity to be heard. See In re Williams, 398 F.3d 

at 119-20; Discip. R. II.C(1). 

And we reject out of hand Burbank's conclusory position 

that he has demonstrated that the imposition of reciprocal 

discipline would occasion grave injustice. See In re Williams, 

398 F.3d at 119; Discip. R. II.C(3). This was not adequately 

developed by Burbank and, in any event, lacks merit. 

We therefore impose upon Burbank a twelve-month 

suspension from the bar of this court nunc pro tunc to run 

concurrently with his Maine suspension. If and when Maine 

 8 But we do note that the Law Court's decision itself put 

Burbank on notice of the misconduct allegations that would follow, 

spending a great many pages describing in detail Burbank's 

misconduct before concluding it warranted sanctions, Lincoln, 147 

A.3d at 1172-79, even going as far as to write that "Burbank has 

had both notice of the potential for sanctions on this appeal (and 

similar notice at the trial court level), and an opportunity to be 

heard on the motion for sanctions, which he treated with the same 

disregard for deadlines as he has treated other court rules," id. 

at 1176. 
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reinstates Burbank to the practice of law, Burbank may seek 

reinstatement in this court. 

So ordered.