[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 14

- 11688 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 2:11

- cr - 00001

- JES

- CM

- 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus LOUIS MICHAEL PASQUAZZI, Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ No. 14

- 11822 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 2:13

- cr - 00138

- JES

- DNF

- 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee, Case: 14-11688 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 1 of 82 versus LOUIS MICHAEL PASQUAZZI, Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

________________________ ( April 9, 2015 ) Before HULL , ROSENBAUM, and JULIE CARNES , Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: In these consolidated appeal s , Defendant Louis Pasquazzi appeals both his
71

- month sentence , imposed after pleading guilty to passing or uttering a counterfeit $100 bill in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 472 and 2 , and his consecutive
24

- month sentence , imposed following the revocation of his supervised release. Defendant argues that it was substantively unreasonable for the district court to sentence him to the high

- end of the applicable guideline ranges for both his supervised release violation and criminal conviction and to run those sentences consecutively . After review, we affirm

. I. Background In 2011, Defendant pled guilty to seven counts of uttering counterfeit $50 and $100 bills , in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 472 and 2. As part of his 2011 offense

Case: 14-11688 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 2 of 83 conduct, Defendant manufactured and passed ( and had unindicted co

- conspirators also pass) counterfeit $20, $50, and $100 bills. After serving a 33

- month sentence, Defendant was released from prison in June 2013 and began his three

- year term of supervised release.
S hortly after his release from prison, Defendant began manufacturi ng $100 bills. From August 1 to August 27, 2013, Defendant , along with a half

- dozen other individual s , passed the counterfeit bills. Defendant and his cohorts used the counterfeit $100 bills to make small purchase s for which they then receive d genuine currency as change . Defendant’s fellow participants then g ave their change to Defendant

. In August 2013, Defendant’s probation officer filed a petition for revocation of supervised release. The petition alleged that Defendant had violated the conditions of his supervised release by : (1) having two positive drug tests for cocaine and amphetamines o n July 8 and 22, 2013 and (2) fai ling to submit to two periodic drug tests o n July 29 and August 6, 2013. In September 2013, Defendant was indicted for one count of passing or uttering a counterfeit $100 bill, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 472 and 2. The probation officer filed a superseding revocation petition, in which he added the allegation that Defendant had violated a condition of supervised re lease by engaging in new criminal conduct.

Case: 14-11688 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 3 of 84 After Defendant pled guilty to passing or uttering a counterfeit $100 bill, the district court held a joint revocation and sentencing hearing. Defendant admitted the violations of his conditions of supervised release, and the district court revoked Defendant’s supervised release. Defendant requested that a 24

- month total
sentence , with significant mental health treatment , be imposed for both his supervised release violations and criminal conviction

. 1 He argued that such a downward variance was warranted based on his mental health issues. He further claimed that he had used cocaine to self

- medicate his untreated Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and bipolar disease and that he had engaged in c riminal activity in order to get cocaine. Defendant contended that he would no longer use cocaine , and thus not engage in future criminal conduct , if he received psychological and medical treatment

. The district court de clined Defendant’s request for a d ownward variance and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating the conditions of his supervised release and to 71 months’ imprisonment for his conviction for uttering a counterfeit $100 bill , to be served consecutively , for a 95

- month total se ntence

.

1 Defendant’s guideline range for his supervised release violations was 21 to 24 months’ imprisonment. His guideline range for his uttering a counterfeit $100 bill conviction was 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment.

Case: 14-11688 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 4 of 85 I I. Discussion On appeal, Defendant argues that both the l ength of his sentences and the ir consecutive nature are substantively unreasonable because the district court did not adequately account for his expressed desire to receive effective mental health
treatment

. We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion using a two

- step process. United States v. Pugh , 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). We look first to whether the district court committed any significant procedural error and then t o whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 2 Id

. Likewise, we review sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised release for

reason ableness. United States v. Sweeting , 437 F.3d 1105, 1106

- 07 (11th Cir. 2006). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable. Pugh , 515 F.3d at 1189. We will reverse only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of

2 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for th e offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Case: 14-11688 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 5 of 86 judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the fa cts of the case.” Id. at 1191 (quotation marks omitted). Whether a te rm of imprisonment imposed for supervised release violation s is to be served concurrently or consecutively to another sentence is a question
entrust ed to the district court’s discret ion. United States v. Quinones , 136 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998). I n determining whether sentences should run consecutively or concurrently, the district court must consider the § 3553 (a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). Here, Defendant has not sho wn that the length of his sentences or the imposition of consecutive sentences is substantively unreasonable. Defendant’s
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- month sentence for his conviction for passing c ounterfeit currency is within the advisory guideline range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment , and well below the
20

- year statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 472

. See United States v. Hunt , 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, while we do not apply a presumption, we ordinar y expect a sentence inside the advisory guidelines range to be reasonable); United States v. Gonzalez , 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing the fact that the sentence imposed was well below the statutory maximum

as a n indication of reasonableness). Likewise, Defendant’s 24

- month revocation sentence is within the advisory guideline range of 21 to 24 months ’ imprisonment

Case: 14-11688 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 6 of 87 and d oes not exceed the 24

- month statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). At the sentencing hearing, Defendant presented evidence, including a report and testimonial evidence from a doctor who had evaluated him, in an effort to show that h is previously untreated mental health issues had led to his cocaine use and past criminal activity . Defendant argued that medi cal treatme nt would break this cycle of drug addiction and criminal activity. In imposing sentence, the district court specifically acknowledged that it had heard and considered Defendant’s arguments and evidence , including the doctor’s report and testimony , and tha t it had considered all of the § 3553(a) factors

. Responding to Defendant’s argument about his need for mental health treatment , the court recommended that Defendant serve his sentence in a facility that had the ability to address those medical needs. A s to the appropriate sentence, however, the district court noted that Defendant’s v iolent and lengthy criminal history suggested that it was unlikely Defendant’s behavior would change, even with medical treatment

. We c onclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion i n making this determination

. See United States v. Clay , 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that “ [ t ] he weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court .” (quotation marks omitted)). Defendant’s criminal history span s 25 years and include s numerous

Case: 14-11688 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 7 of 88 violent offenses, such as battery, assault, aggravated battery with a firearm, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon

. Defendant also ha s a prior federa l conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon , as well as a federal conviction for possession of cocaine

. Moreover, Defendant admitted that he violat ed the terms of his supervised release less than three months after he was released from p rison. Indeed, Defendant committed the very same offense for which he was on supervised release. We also conclude that it was well within the distric t court’s discretion to impose consecutive sentence s after considering Defendant’s criminal history

. See Quinones , 136 F.3d at 1295. We note that the Sentencing Guidelines provide, in a policy statement, that a sentence resulting from a supervised release violation “shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defe ndant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation of probation or supervised release.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). On these facts, the district court did not abuse its discre tion by complying with this policy statement. For all of these reasons, Defendant has not carried his burden to show that his two sentence s are substantively unreasonable. AFFIRMED. Case: 14-11688 Date Filed: 04/09/2015 Page: 8 of 8