Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

L STREET INVESTMENTS, 

Appellant, 

v. 

MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAG

and ANCHORAGE DOWNTOWN 

PARTNERSHIP, Ltd., 

Appellees. 

) 

) Supreme Court No. S-14466 

Superior Court No. 3AN-10-12355 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 6816 – August 23, 2013 

) 

) 

) 

) 

E, ) 

) 

) 

)
 

)
 

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Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 

Judicial District, Anchorage, John Suddock, Judge. 

Appearances: Christopher J. Slottee, Atkinson, Conway & 

Gagnon, Inc., Anchorage, for Appellant. Sean Halloran, 

Littler Mendelson, P.C., Anchorage, for Appellee Anchorage 

Downtown Partnership, Ltd. Deitra Ennis, Assistant 

Municipal Attorney, and Dennis Wheeler, Municipal 

Attorney, Anchorage, for Appellee Municipality of 

Anchorage. 

Before: Carpeneti, Chief Justice, Fabe, Winfree, and 

Stowers, Justices. 

STOWERS, Justice. 
 

 

 

 

I. INTRODUCTION
 

The former Anchorage Municipal Code provided for the creation of special 

assessment districts for public capital improvements. On June 11, 1996, the Anchorage 

Municipal Assembly (Assembly) enacted Anchorage Ordinance 96-77(S-I) to broaden 

“special assessment districts” to include the provision of services and to authorize 

business improvement districts. In 1997 the Assembly passed Anchorage Ordinance 

97-51, which created the Downtown Improvement District (District) for a period of three 

years. When passing this ordinance, the Assembly amended the boundaries of the 

proposed District to exclude some properties on K and L Streets. The building at 420 

L Street, the property owned by appellant L Street Investments, was in the original 

proposal but subsequently carved out by the Assembly. In 2000 the Assembly extended 

the life of the District for ten years. Beginning in 2009, the Anchorage Downtown 

Partnership canvassed businesses hoping to extend the life of the District again and 

expand the District to include businesses between I and L Street. After the majority of 

business owners in the proposed District approved the extension and expansion, the 

Assembly extended the life of the District and expanded it to include businesses between 

I and L Streets, including the building at 420 L Street. 

L Street Investments filed a complaint arguing: (1) Section 9.02(a) of the 

Municipality of Anchorage’s Charter does not authorize the Municipality to finance 

services within the District by an assessment — rather, the Municipality can finance 

services only by a tax levy; and (2) the District is a “service area,” and AS 29.35.450(c) 

prohibits the expansion of a service area unless a majority of voters in the area to be 

added vote in favor of expanding the service area. The Anchorage Downtown 

Partnership intervened, and all parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The 

superior court granted summary judgment to the Municipality and the Anchorage 

Downtown Partnership. We affirm. 

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II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 


In late 1994 and early 1995, a group of Anchorage business and civic 

leaders formed the Downtown Action Committee to develop a vision to revitalize 

downtown Anchorage. In April 1995 the Committee decided to develop a “business 

improvement district” to provide services that enhanced the beauty, safety, convenience, 

and vibrancy of downtown Anchorage. In January 1996 the Committee incorporated 

under the name Anchorage Downtown Partnership, Ltd. (Partnership). 

At the time, Title 19 of the Anchorage Municipal Code provided for the 

creation of special assessment districts for capital improvements; it did not provide for 

the creation of districts for public services such as a business improvement district. On 

June 11, 1996, at the urging of the Partnership, the Assembly enacted Anchorage 

Ordinance 96-77(S-I) to broaden “special assessment districts” to include the provision 

of public services, thereby authorizing business improvement districts.1 The Anchorage 

Municipal Code now states: 

A special assessment district, including a business 

improvement district, may be initiated for public capital 

improvements or for public services as specifically defined 

by the ordinance creating the assessment district, as provided 

[ ] in this section. 2

1	 Anchorage Code Ordinance (ACO) 96-77(S-I) (1996). 

2 Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 19.10.020(A) (1996). Subsection 

(A)(2) provides: 

Assessment districts for public services may be initiated only 

for public services specified in this subsection . . . . 

a.	 Maintenance, repair and upkeep of any public capital 

improvement created by an assessment district; 

(continued...) 

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A special assessment district can enhance but not replace city services already provided: 

Assessment districts for services shall provide an enhanced 

or supplemental public service or new public service not 

provided by the municipality generally. The establishment of 

an assessment district for services shall not operate 

unilaterally or by implication as a substitute for or to reduce 

2

(...continued) 

b. Maintenance, including snow removal/disposal and 

dust suppression, cleaning and beautification and 

decoration of public places, areas, facilities and 

rights-of-way such as: 

(1) Streets, roads, alleys, parkways, street 

lighting, curbs and gutters, driveways, 

curb cuts and parking areas and 

facilities; 

(2) Sidewalks, trails and other pedestrian 

ways and facilities; 

(3) Parks and recreational areas and 

facilities; 

c. Visitor and tourism public services; 

d. Security services not including law enforcement 

services; 

e. Promotion of public events within the assessment 

district and promotion of the assessment district itself 

as an area of enhanced public services. 

f. Other public services closely similar to those listed in 

subsections A.2.a. through A.2.e. of this subsection 

designed to promote the vitality, stability and 

improvement of the assessment district as a whole. 

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or eliminate the nature or extent of services provided by other 

[ ] 3 means. 

A special assessment district can be initiated either by a petition of property owners in 

that district or by the Assembly, but it “may be created or extended only with the 

approval of the property owners who would bear more than 50 percent of the estimated 

cost of the improvement or service.”4 The Assembly then holds a public hearing “upon 

the necessity for the proposed improvement or service.”5

 After the public hearing, the 

Assembly decides whether to proceed with the proposal: 

[T]he assembly shall adopt an ordinance determining either 

to proceed or not to proceed with the proposed improvement 

or service. The ordinance to proceed shall find that the 

improvement or service is necessary, of benefit to the 

properties to be assessed, and that the petition for the 

improvement or service has been approved by sufficient and 

proper petitioners. The findings of the assembly are 

[ ] conclusive. 6

In 1997 the Assembly passed Anchorage Ordinance 97-51, which created 

Assessment District 1SD97 for a period of three years.7 When passing AO 97-51, the 

Assembly amended the boundaries of the proposed Assessment District to exclude some 

properties on K and L Streets. The building at 420 L Street, the property owned by 

L Street Investments (L Street), was included in the original proposal but subsequently 

carved out by the Assembly. 

3 AMC 19.10.020(B). 

4 AMC 19.20.010(B). 

5 AMC 19.20.040. 

6 AMC 19.20.050. 

7 ACO 97-51 (1997). 

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The boundaries of the District were Gambell Street to the east, Ninth 

Avenue to the south, and First Avenue to the north; the western boundary ran from Ninth 

Avenue to Sixth Avenue on K Street and from Sixth Avenue to Second Avenue on 

I Street. The enumerated powers of the District were: 

A.	 Maintenance, repair and upkeep of public capital 

improvements located in the area of the assessment 

district; 

B.	 Maintenance, snow removal, dust suppression, 

cleaning, beautification, and decoration of public 

parks, places and pedestrian rights-of-way; 

C.	 Visitor and tourism services; 

D.	 Security services, but not including law enforcement 

services; 

E.	 Promotion of the assessment district and the 

promotion of public events within the assessment 

district; and 

F.	 Other closely similar public services promoting the 

vitality, stability and improvement of the assessment 

[ ] district. 8

The District collected assessments for its services based on the value of 

each property within its boundaries: 

Each assessable parcel within . . . Assessment District 1SD97 

shall be assessed at a mill rate not to exceed 1.5 mills of 

assessed value ($1.50 per $1,000 of assessed value) up to and 

ACO 97-51 § 4 (1997); see also ACO 2010-58(S) § 5 (2010) (extending 

the life of the District for an additional ten years); ACO 2000-98 § 4 (2000) (extending 

the life of the District for ten years). 

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8 
 

 

 

 

 

 

including $10,000,000 plus $100 per $1,000,000 of assessed 

[ ] value in excess of $10,000,000. 9

Government-owned properties, churches, and non-profit religious, charitable, or 

educational organizations were exempt from the assessments.10 Further, qualified owners 

of single-family, owner-occupied residences who timely applied for an exemption were 

also exempt from assessment.11 

In 2000 the Assembly extended the life of the District for ten years.12 

Starting in 2009, the Partnership canvassed property owners about extending the life of 

the District again, as well as expanding the District to include businesses between I and 

L Streets. The Partnership circulated petitions to property owners within the original 

District for the owners to indicate whether they were in favor of continuing the District 

and expanding it or whether they wished to terminate the District. The Partnership also 

circulated petitions to property owners in the proposed expansion area for those owners 

to indicate whether they were in favor of or opposed to extending the District. 

Responses showed that owners of 316 properties — representing 62% of the total 

assessment value of the District including the proposed expansion area — supported 

reenactment and expansion. Owners representing 12% of the total annual assessment 

stated they opposed the continuation of the district. The remaining property owners, 

representing approximately 26% of the total annual assessment, did not return the 

petitions. Out of the 63 properties in the proposed expansion area that returned petitions, 

33 opposed being added to the District; those in opposition comprised a total annual 

9 ACO 97-51 § 5; see also ACO 2010-58(S) § 6; ACO 2000-98 § 5. 

10 ACO 97-51 § 7; see also ACO 2010-58(S) § 8; ACO 2000-98 § 6. 

11 ACO 97-51 § 7; see also ACO 2010-58(S) § 8; ACO 2000-98 § 6. 

12 ACO 2000-98. 

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assessment of $67,615, or 43.2%. 13 Thirty properties in the expansion area with a total 

annual assessment of $89,057, or 56.8%, were in favor of the expansion. 

On September 28, 2010, the Assembly passed AO No. 2010-58(S) 

(Ordinance), which extended the life of the District and expanded it to include I Street 

and L Street north of Ninth Avenue.14 This included L Street Investment’s building, 

420 L Street, which had an estimated assessment of $10,962 annually. 

L Street filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the superior court 

against the Municipality on November 24, 2010. L Street argued: (1) Section 9.02(a) 

of the Municipality of Anchorage’s Charter does not authorize the Municipality to 

finance services within the District by an assessment — rather, it can finance services 

only by a tax levy; and (2) the District is a “service area,” and AS 29.35.450 prohibits 

the expansion of a service area unless a majority of voters in the area to be added vote 

in favor of expanding the service area. The Partnership intervened. All parties filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment, and oral argument was held before Superior Court 

Judge John Suddock on January 18, 2011. The superior court granted summary 

judgment to the Municipality and the Partnership and denied L Street’s motion. The 

court concluded that AS 29.35.450, which governs service areas such as parks and 

recreation service areas, does not govern the District because the District “has a different 

scope and administrative structure.” The court also concluded “that [S]ection 9.02 of the 

13 It is not clear from the record if some of the property owners in the 

expansion area did not return their petitions. Further, the calculation of 43.2% was 

determined by summing the assessment value of those owners opposed ($67,615) and 

dividing by the total assessment value of the expansion area ($156,672). This total 

assessment value and the petition totals are different from the figures the appellant 

provided in its brief because the appellant overlooked two petitions opposed to 

expansion from Platinum Jaxx and an office building on Sixth Avenue. 

14 ACO 2010-58(S). 

-8- 6816
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Charter does not prohibit assessments for services within the District.” The court entered 

final judgment in favor of the Municipality and the Partnership. 

L Street appeals. 

III.	 DISCUSSION 

A.	 Standard Of Review 

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, “drawing all 

permissible factual inferences in favor of, and viewing the facts in the light most 

favorable to, the non-prevailing party.”15 “We affirm grants of summary judgment if 

there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.”16 We apply our independent judgment when interpreting 

statutes, municipal charters, and municipal codes.17 

B.	 The Municipality of Anchorage Has The Authority To Fund Special 

Services By Assessment. 

The Municipality is a unified home rule municipality. 18 Under article X, 

section 11 of the Alaska Constitution, “A home rule borough or city may exercise all 

15 Bradshaw v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 224 P.3d 118, 

121-22 (Alaska 2010). 

16	 Id. at 122. 

17	 Municipality of Anchorage v. Repasky, 34 P.3d 302, 305 (Alaska 2001). 

18 AS 29.06.190(a) (“A borough and all cities in the borough may unite to 

form a single unit of home rule government . . . .”); AS 29.06.410 (“A municipality 

unified under AS 29.06.190-29.06.410 has all powers (1) not prohibited by law or 

charter; and (2) granted to a home rule borough.”); AS 29.71.800(24) (defining “unified 

municipality” as “a municipality unified in accordance with AS 29.06.190-29.06.410”); 

Anchorage Municipal Charter §§ 1.01, 1.02 (naming municipality and defining its 

boundaries); Anchorage Municipal Charter § 3.01 (“The municipality may exercise all 

legislative powers not prohibited by law or by this Charter.”). 

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legislative powers not prohibited by law or charter.”19 Section 3.01 of the Municipality’s 

Charter similarly states, “The municipality may exercise all legislative powers not 

prohibited by law or by this Charter.” The Commentary to this section reads: 

By virtue of this section the new government will be a home 

rule municipality. This section brings all allowable 

legislative power from the state level to the local level. 

However, Sections 9.01 and 9.02, and other provisions of the 

Charter calling for voter approval of government action, 

reserve to the people the basic power to determine if and 

[ ] when the municipal power will be exercised. 20

Although the legislative powers of the Municipality may be limited by state law or the 

Municipal Charter, the legislative powers are not dependent on “specific grants of power 

from a state legislature.”21 Instead, the Municipality derives its legislative power from 

article X, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution. Thus, based on the plain language of the 

Alaska Constitution and the Anchorage Municipal Charter, the District has the authority 

19 Alaska Const. art. X, § 11. 

20 Commission Commentary on Anchorage Municipal Charter: An aid to 

legislative history, to assist in the interpretation of the Charter document, § 3.01 (Aug. 

20, 1975). 

21 Jefferson v. State, 527 P.2d 37, 42 (Alaska 1974); see also Liberati v. 

Bristol Bay Borough, 584 P.2d 1115, 1120 n.19 (Alaska 1978) (“Dillon’s rule . . . states: 

[a] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and not 

others. First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily implied or 

necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely essential to 

the declared objects and purposes of the corporation not simply convenient, but 

indispensable. The minutes of the constitutional convention reveal that the liberal 

construction clause of Article X, Section 1 was intended to assure that general law 

municipalities, as well as those having home rule powers, would not be governed by 

[Dillon’s] rule, but would have their powers liberally interpreted.”). 

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to impose an assessment on property owners within the District so long this action is not 

limited by state law or the Charter. 

L Street argues that because the Ordinance imposes an assessment for 

services, the Ordinance is invalid because it finances those services in a manner contrary 

to Section 9.02(a) of the Municipality’s Charter. Section 9.02(a) of the Charter states: 

The Assembly by ordinance may establish assessment 

districts to provide and finance capital improvements by 

means of an assessment, or services by means of a tax levy. 

The assessment or levy shall be proportionate to the benefit 

received from and the burden imposed upon the improvement 

or service. The Assembly by ordinance shall prescribe 

uniform criteria for allocating the cost of the improvement or 

service within an assessment district. 

L Street argues that the Charter does not allow the Municipality to impose an assessment 

to finance services in the District. Instead, L Street contends the Charter specifically 

provides that the Municipality can only use an assessment to finance capital 

improvements and can only use a tax levy to finance services. Thus, L Street considers 

Charter Section 9.02 to be a limit on the Municipality’s home rule power. We disagree. 

We conclude that Section 9.02(a) does not preclude the Municipality from 

levying an assessment for services because the language in Section 9.02(a) is permissive 

rather than mandatory, and does not expressly prohibit the Municipality from using an 

assessment to finance services. The Municipality, as a unified home rule municipality, 

enjoys broad authority to exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law or 

Charter.22 The use of assessments to finance services is not prohibited by law or Charter 

and is therefore a valid exercise of the Municipality’s authority. 

Alaska Const. art. X, § 11. 

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22 
 

 

 

 

1.	 The plain language of the Anchorage Municipal Charter does 

not forbid the funding of special services by assessment. 

In interpreting municipal charters, “we are guided by the rules of statutory 

construction.” 23 L Street argues, “The Charter must, if possible, be construed to give 

effect to every word and phrase, and a construction that renders any portion of the 

Charter superfluous should be rejected.”24 However, the Commentary to the Charter 

specifically states, “As used in this Charter, ‘may’ is permissive, ‘shall’ is mandatory, 

and ‘may not’ or ‘shall not’ are prohibitive.”25 The first sentence of Section 9.02(a) 

states, “The assembly by ordinance may establish districts to provide and finance capital 

improvements by means of an assessment, or services by means of a tax levy.” 

(Emphasis added.) L Street interprets Section 9.02(a) as providing the Municipality with 

the discretion to create and finance districts. Should the Municipality choose to create 

a district, L Street interprets Section 9.02(a) as mandating the manner in which the 

district is financed — an assessment for capital improvements or a tax levy for services. 

The Partnership and the Municipality, in contrast, argue that “[n]othing in 

this provision precludes the Municipality from creating a special assessment district to 

furnish services.” They note that the last sentence of Section 9.02 provides for the 

creation of assessment districts for services by stating, “The [A]ssembly by ordinance 

shall prescribe uniform criteria for allocating the cost of the improvement or service 

23	 City & Borough of Sitka v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 1547, 

653 P.2d 332, 335-36 (Alaska 1982) (internal citation omitted). 

24 See Mech. Contractors of Alaska, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 

91 P.3d 240, 248 (Alaska 2004). 

25 Commission Commentary on Anchorage Municipal Charter: An aid to 

legislative history, to assist in the interpretation of the Charter document, § 17.11 

(Aug. 20, 1975). 

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within an assessment district.” (Emphasis added.) Further, they argue that “the 

permissive ‘may’ cannot lawfully be construed as a prohibition on any other manner of 

funding services” because “[w]here no Charter provision and no statute provides that the 

Municipality ‘may not’ or ‘shall not’ fund services with an assessment, there is no 

prohibition on doing so.” 

This argument is compelling. Under both article X, section 11 of the 

Alaska Constitution and Section 3.01 of the Municipality’s Charter, the Municipality 

“may exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law or charter.” Section 9.02 of 

the Charter contains no prohibitory language, and the Commentary to the Charter 

provides instruction on how to interpret the Charter, undermining L Street’s 

interpretation. L Street’s interpretation of the permissive “may” would create a 

prohibition where none exists. 

L Street also contends that the basic principles of statutory construction, 

particularly the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 

26 “requires the Municipality 

to finance services in the District by use of a tax levy, instead of an assessment,” and that 

the Municipality’s interpretation “renders § 9.02(a) a nullity.” L Street argues that the 

specification in Section 9.02 of a tax levy to finance services “supports the conclusion 

that all other means of financing, including by assessment, are not allowed.” 

The superior court concluded that applying the maxim expressio unius est 

exclusio alterius was “inappropriate” because “there is no categorical listing of items 

26 This maxim is a canon of statutory construction meaning “where certain 

things are designated in a statute, ‘all omissions should be understood as exclusions.’ ” 

Puller v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Alaska 1978) (quoting 2A 

C.SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 123 (4th 

ed. 1973)). 

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attended by a telling omission” in Section 9.02(a). We agree. The United States 

Supreme Court has stated: 

As we have held repeatedly, the canon expressio unius est 

exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or 

grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are 

members of an “associated group or series,” justifying the 

inference that items not mentioned were excluded by 

[ ] deliberate choice, not inadvertence. 27

In a different case the Supreme Court explained, “The canon depends on identifying a 

series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand, 

which is abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left out 

must have been meant to be excluded.”28 

Here, as the superior court concluded, financing capital improvements by 

means of an assessment and financing services by means of a tax levy are not “members 

of an associated group or series” that “justify[] the inference that items not mentioned 

were excluded by deliberate choice.”29 This is particularly apparent when considering 

that the Commentary to the Charter instructs that the word “may,” which is used in 

Section 9.02 to describe how the Municipality can finance capital improvements and 

services, is “permissive.”30 Applying expressio unius est exclusio alterius is 

inappropriate because the use of the word “may” in Section 9.02 undermines the 

27 Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (quoting United 

States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)). 

28 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002). 

29 Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

30 See Commission Commentary on Anchorage Municipal Charter: An aid to 

legislative history, to assist in the interpretation of the Charter document, § 17.11 

(Aug 20, 1975). 

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“sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded.”31 This 

canon of statutory construction does not support L Street’s argument that Section 9.02(a) 

of the Charter forbids the funding of special services by assessment.32 

31 Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 536 U.S. at 81. 

32 We address one final argument related to the plain language of the 

Anchorage Municipal Charter and the ordinances at issue here. During oral argument, 

a discussion arose regarding the significance of the preambles to the ordinances. 

Anchorage Ordinance 96-77(S-1) states in its preamble that the Assembly was 

“authorized in Charter Section 9.02” to amend Title 19 of the Municipal Code to provide 

for assessment districts for services. In subsequent ordinances creating and extending 

the life of the Downtown Improvement District, the preambles contain the statement: 

“WHEREAS, in accordance with Anchorage Municipal Charter Section 9.02, the 

Anchorage Assembly provided for the creation of assessment districts for public 

services . . . .” See ACO 97-51 (1997); ACO 2000-98 (1998); ACO 2010-58(s) (2010). 

To the extent one can argue that the Assembly’s references to Section 9.02 in the 

preambles somehow indicate that the Municipality is no longer operating under its home 

rule power but instead cabining its power to be within the confines of Section 9.02, 

which L Street argues is a narrower power which would not allow creating assessment 

districts for public services, we provide two responses. 

First, these preamble statements do not preclude the Assembly from 

creating assessment districts for services because “[t]he preamble of a legislative act is 

not part of the law, and it cannot be used to discern the legislature’s intent if no doubt 

exists as to a statute’s meaning.” 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 

SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20:3, 123-25 (7th ed. 2011); see also 

Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Apokedak, 680 P.2d 486, 488 n.3 (Alaska 1984) 

(stating that a preamble “can neither restrain nor extend the meaning of an unambiguous 

statute; nor can it be used to create doubt or uncertainty which does not otherwise exist” 

(quoting 2A C. SANDS & SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 

§ 47.04 (4th ed. 1973))). The ordinances are abundantly clear that they create 

assessment districts for services and there is no need to examine the preamble to 

determine the Assembly’s intent. 

Second, even if we were to afford the preambles legal weight, the language 

in Section 9.02(a) does not narrow the power of the Municipality to disallow it from 

(continued...) 

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2.	 The legislative history of the Municipal Charter does not forbid 

the funding of special services by assessment. 

“Although the starting point in construing a statute is the language of the 

statute itself, reference to legislative history may provide insight that is helpful in 

determining the statute’s meaning.”33 L Street argues that the Anchorage Area Charter 

Commission changed Section 3.01 to add the phrase “or by this Charter” in order “to 

specifically reject the claims that the Municipality ‘would have no limitation upon its 

powers except those imposed by State law.’ ”34 L Street contends that this legislative 

history is “dispositive” and establishes that Section 3.01 “mandates that [Section] 9.02(a) 

be given legal effect and meaning, and not written out of the Charter.” 

This argument is unpersuasive. In June 1975, after reviewing the first draft 

of the Charter, the Charter Production Committee recommended that the Anchorage Area 

Charter Commission add the phrase “or by this charter” to Section 3.01, “Powers of the 

Municipality.”35 The Charter Production Committee recognized that adding this phrase 

32(...continued) 

creating assessment districts for public services. As discussed in Part III.B.1 of this 

opinion, the use of the word “may” in Section 9.02, when interpreted under the 

guidelines of the Commentary to the Charter, is permissive and cannot prohibit the 

Municipality from creating assessment districts for public services. See Commission 

Commentary on Anchorage Municipal Charter: An aid to legislative history, to assist in 

the interpretation of the Charter document, § 17.11 (Aug. 20, 1975). 

33 City & Borough of Sitka v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 1547, 

653 P.2d 332, 336 (Alaska 1982) (citing N. Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 

585 P.2d 534, 540 (Alaska 1978)). 

34 Charter Prod. Comm., Committee Report #3 to the Anchorage Area Charter 

Commission (June 25, 1975). 

35 Id. In the report, the section number was “2.01,” but the substance of the 

section is identical to what eventually became Section 3.01 of the Charter. See 

(continued...) 

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was “simply redundant” because the Charter defined the word “law” as including the 

Charter,36 but the Committee made this recommendation to assuage voters who had 

feared “an omnipotent municipal government.”37 The Charter Commission followed the 

recommendation of the Committee and added this phrase to the Section even though 

there would be no additional legal effect. Contrary to L Street’s assertions, the phrase 

“or by this Charter” does not provide additional limitations on the powers of the 

Municipality such that Section 9.02 must be interpreted to require the Municipality to 

finance the District by tax levy only. As we have explained, the Municipality has the 

broad authority to exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter.38 

The legislative history of Section 3.01 does not indicate that the use of assessments to 

finance services was intended to be prohibited by law or by the Anchorage Municipal 

Charter. 

35(...continued) 

Anchorage Municipal Charter art. III, § 3.01. 

36 Section 17.3(f) of the Anchorage Municipal Charter provides: 

“Law” means this Charter, the ordinances and resolutions 

preserved by this Charter, or enacted pursuant to it, and those 

portions of the statutes of the State of Alaska and the 

Constitutions of the State of Alaska and of the United States 

which are valid limitations on the exercise of legislative 

power by home rule governments. 

37 Charter Prod. Comm., Committee Report #3 to the Anchorage Area Charter 

Commission (June 25, 1975). 

38 Alaska Const. art. X, § 11. 

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C.	 State Law Does Not Govern The Expansion Of The Downtown 

Improvement District. 

L Street argues that the District is a “service area” under state law; 

therefore, before the Assembly could expand the District, AS 29.35.450 required that a 

dual majority of the voters residing in the area to be annexed and voters residing in the 

existing District vote in favor of the expansion.39 But AS 29.35.450 applies to “service 

area[s] that provide[] road, fire protection, or parks and recreation services.”40 The 

Municipality and the Partnership assert that the District is “purely a creature of 

Anchorage Municipal law” governed by Chapter 19.20 of the Municipal Code.41 We 

agree with the Municipality and the Partnership. 

1.	 The Downtown Improvement District is purely a creature of 

municipal law. 

Anchorage Municipal Code 19.10.020 states that a special assessment 

district “is and shall remain a municipal mechanism for delivering special municipal 

39 AS 29.35.450(c) provides: “A service area that provides road, fire 

protection, or parks and recreation services in which voters reside may not be altered . . . 

unless that proposal is approved, separately, by a majority of the voters who vote on the 

question and who reside in each of the service areas or in the area outside of service areas 

that is affected by the proposal.” 

40	 Id. 

41 In its order, the superior court determined that the District was “impliedly 

authorized” by AS 29.46.010(a). This statute states, “A municipality may assess against 

the property of a state or federal governmental unit and private real property to be 

benefited by an improvement all or a portion of the cost of acquiring, installing, or 

constructing capital improvements.” We disagree with the superior court’s reasoning. 

Alaska Statute 29.46.010(a) does not apply because the District is purely a creature of 

Anchorage municipal law. We affirm the superior court’s decision based on this 

conclusion. See Snyder v. Am. Legion Spenard Post No. 28, 119 P.3d 996, 1001 (Alaska 

2005) (“We may affirm a judgment on any grounds that the record supports, even if not 

relied on by the superior court.”). 

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government services.”42 The Downtown Improvement District is a special assessment 

district governed by the Anchorage Municipal Code, not AS 29.35.450. 

As we previously explained, the authority to create the District arose from 

Anchorage Ordinance 96-77(S-I), which the Assembly enacted to broaden “special 

assessment districts” under Title 19 of the Municipal Code to include the provision of 

services.43 The Assembly subsequently passed Anchorage Ordinance 97-51 which 

created Assessment District 1SD97, the Downtown Improvement District, for a period 

44	 45 of three years. In 2000 the Assembly extended the life of the District for ten years. 

Then on September 28, 2010, the Assembly passed AO No. 2010-58(S) to extend the life 

of the District again and expand its boundaries.46 This expansion, based solely on 

ordinances the Assembly passed, is what is at issue now. As a unified home rule 

municipality, the Municipality has the authority to exercise all legislative powers not 

prohibited by law or charter,47 including expanding the boundaries of a special 

assessment district. 

2.	 AS 29.35.450 is inapplicable. 

a.	 AS 29.35.450 does not indicate that the District is within 

the statute’s scope. 

Alaska Statute 29.35.450(c) states in part: 

42 AMC 19.10.020(C) (emphasis added). 

43 ACO 96-77(S-I) (1996). 

44 ACO 97-51 (1997). 

45 ACO 2000-98 (2000). 

46 ACO 2010-58(S) (2010). 

47 Alaska Const. art. X, § 11. 

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A service area that provides road, fire protection, or parks 

and recreation services in which voters reside may not be 

altered or combined with another service area unless that 

proposal is approved, separately, by a majority of the voters 

who vote on the question and who reside in each of the 

service areas or in the area outside of service areas that is 

affected by the proposal. 

The District does not provide road or fire protection services, though 

L Street contends that the District does provide “parks and recreation services” because 

it has the authority to beautify and decorate the public parks, places, and pedestrian 

rights-of-way. 48 L Street also argues that because the Anchorage Parks and Recreation 

Service Area is “responsible for beautifying, operating and maintaining Park and 

Recreation assets”49 and the District has a similar responsibility, the District is providing 

“parks and recreation services” under the statute. 

Under the plain language of AS 29.35.450, the statute applies to “service 

areas” that provide “road, fire protection, or parks and recreation services.” While the 

statute clearly applies to a service area such as the Anchorage Parks and Recreation 

Service Area, which has the sole purpose of providing parks and recreation services, it 

does not expressly apply to all service areas that provide any parks and recreation 

services, however minimal. The statute also does not apply to a business improvement 

district that provides a wide variety of services, only one category of which happens to 

include “[m]aintenance, snow removal, dust suppression, cleaning, beautification, and 

decoration of public parks, places and pedestrian rights-of-way.” And the legislative 

48 ACO 2010-58(S) § 5 (2010). 

49 See AMC 27.30.080 (1996) (establishing the Anchorage Parks and 

Recreation Service Area). 

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history of AS 29.35.450 clarifies that the legislature intended to address only certain 

types of service areas. 

b.	 The legislative history of AS 29.35.450 does not suggest 

that the District is included in the statute’s scope. 

L Street argues that the legislative history “establishes that the primary 

purpose of AS 29.35.450(c) was to take the power to expand service areas from local 

governments such as the Municipality, and vest final authority over such expansion in 

the voters to be added to the service area.” The Partnership and the Municipality respond 

that the “legislative history is clear in showing that the legislation was meant to address 

only certain types of service areas and nothing more.” The superior court agreed, 

concluding: 

The court finds nothing in the legislative history of 

[AS 29.35.450(c)] to suggest anything beyond the obvious: 

that the legislature wished to preclude the expansion of three 

well-defined types of traditional service areas over voter 

objection. Nothing suggests such fervency about dualmajority elections that the legislature wished to impose them 

in instances where a non-road, non-fire-protection, non-park 

service area or special assessment district might provide de 

minimis road, fire, or beautification functions. 

We agree with the superior court. 

In Area G Home & Landowners Organization, Inc. (HALO) v. Anchorage, 

we addressed the Anchorage Assembly’s expansion of the Anchorage Police Service 

Area to include the growing Hillside neighborhood without a separate vote by the 

annexed Hillside residents.50 The appellants in that case argued, similar to L Street here, 

50 927 P.2d 728, 730-31 (Alaska 1996). 

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that the term “area affected” in Section 9.01 of the Anchorage Municipal Charter51 meant 

the geographical area to be added to or removed from a service area.52 We affirmed the 

authority of the Anchorage Assembly to expand the service area to include the Hillside 

without a separate vote by Hillside residents.53 

Following this decision, in 2001 Hillside’s state representative Con Bunde 

sponsored a bill to amend AS 29.35.450 to provide “for voter approval of the formation, 

alteration, or abolishment of certain service areas.”54 Throughout the committee hearings 

on this bill, Representative Bunde made it clear that this bill would mainly address road 

services areas and one fire service area.55 Representative Bunde stated, “This legislation 

does not address police service. The police service issue was settled by the Alaska 

Supreme Court.”56 Much of the discussion and concern in the committees was over the 

51 Anchorage Municipal Charter § 9.01(a) provides: 

A service area may be created, altered, or abolished only with 

the approval of a majority of those voting on the question 

within the area affected, or, if no qualified voter resides 

within the area, with the written consent of the owners of all 

real property within the area affected. However, the 

Assembly, by ordinance may consolidate service areas in 

which services are provided by the municipality at the same 

level in each of the areas to be consolidated. 

52 HALO, 927 P.2d at 734. 

53 Id. at 739. 

54 Rep. Con Bunde, Sponsor Statement for SCSCSSSHB 13, 22nd Leg., 1st 

Sess. 

55 Minutes, H. Community & Reg’l Affairs Comm. Hearing on SSHB. 13, 

22nd Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 25, 2001) (comments of Representative Bunde). 

56 Id.; see also Minutes, H. Judiciary Comm. Hearing on SSHB 13, 22nd Leg., 

(continued...) 

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constitutionality of the bill. In all five of the committee meetings in the House and 

Senate, Representative Bunde tailored his comments to focus on “road service areas,” 

and the discussions stemmed from that understanding.57 Ultimately the legislature listed 

“road, fire protection, or parks and recreation services” in AS 29.35.450(c), although 

earlier versions of the bill only listed “road or fire protection services.”58 

As the superior court stated, the legislative history of AS 29.35.450 shows 

that the legislature was focused on specific types of service areas. It does not suggest 

that the legislature either contemplated or intended to impose the voting requirements of 

AS 29.35.450(c) on a business improvement district that does not primarily provide road, 

fire, or park and recreation services, but may provide some services in those areas. 

Neither the plain language nor the legislative history of AS 29.35.450 indicates that the 

56(...continued) 

1st Sess. (Feb. 5, 2001) (comments of Representative Bunde). 

57 Minutes, H. Community & Reg’l Affairs Comm. Hearing on SSHB 13, 

22nd Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 25, 2001) (comments of Representative Bunde); Minutes, H. 

Community & Reg’l Affairs Comm. Hearing on H.B. 13, 22nd Leg., 1st Sess. 

(Jan. 30, 2001) (comments of Representative Bunde); Minutes, H. Judiciary Comm. 

Hearing on SSHB 13, 22nd Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 5, 2001) (comments of Representative 

Bunde); Minutes, H. Judiciary Standing Comm. Hearing on H.B. 13, 22nd Leg., 1st 

Sess. (Feb. 14, 2001) (comments of Representative Bunde); Minutes, Senate Judiciary 

Comm. Hearing on H.B. 13, 22nd Leg., 1st Sess. (Apr. 2, 2001) (comments of 

Representative Bunde). 

58 See H.B. 13, 22nd Leg., 1st Sess. (2001). 

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District is a service area subject to its terms. 59 Accordingly, we hold that the District is 

not a service area subject to the voting requirements of AS 29.35.450. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the superior court’s grant of summary judgment. 

59 L Street also raises a due process argument. Under AMC 19.20.010(B) 

(1996), the District may be “extended only with the approval of the property owners who 

would bear more than 50 percent of the estimated cost of the improvement or service.” 

L Street argues that “[s]o long as a sufficient number of property owners already in the 

District vote to expand the District, the District can be expanded regardless and in spite 

of the wishes of those in the area to be annexed.” We do not reach this constitutional 

argument because it is inapplicable here. While the Assembly appears to have only 

examined the total number of petitions in favor of expanding and continuing the District 

rather than also looking at the subset of petitions from only those property owners within 

the proposed expansion, thirty properties in the expansion area with a total annual 

assessment of $89,057, or 56.8%, were in favor of the expansion. Thus, a majority of 

business owners in the area affected by the proposed expansion voted in favor of 

expanding the District to include their properties. L Street’s argument is inapposite. 

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