alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### COASTAL TOWERS CONDOMINIUM APARTMENTS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Vera F. TRAINOR and Vera F. Trainor, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gordon P. Trainor, Appellee/Cross Appellant. Vera F. TRAINOR, etc., et al., Appellants, v. COASTAL TOWERS CONDOMINIUM APARTMENTS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.

Nos. 85-2513, 85-2778.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 3, 1987.

Rehearing Denied July 29, 1987.

Lawrence J. Marraffino, Boca Raton, and Donna E. Albert and Frank R. Gramling of Fertig and Gramling, Fort Lauderdale, for Coastal Towers.

Montgomery, Searcy & Denney, P.A., and Barbara J. Compiani of Edna L. Caruso, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Vera F. Trainor.

PER CURIAM.

We reverse and remand for a new trial solely on the issue of liability. We agree with appellant that the trial court erred in its instructions and comments to the jury concerning the issue of comparative negligence.

In particular we believe the trial court erred in telling the jury that the plaintiff-appellee, Vera F. Trainor, had no legal duty to report the unsafe condition of an elevator within which she subsequently fell, and in subsequently reading to the jury definitions of “moral obligation” and “legal cause” from a legal dictionary. The combined effect of the trial court’s actions was to remove from the jury’s consideration any evidence of the plaintiff’s failure to protect herself by reporting the condition which she concededly was aware of well in advance of her fall. We do not mean to imply that the trial court should have instructed the jury that plaintiff had a legal duty to report the unsafe condition. However, we believe the jury had a right to *352consider evidence of her failure to do so in determining the comparative negligence issue.

We disagree with appellant’s contention that the plaintiff had a special legal duty, as a result of her membership in the condominium association or her ownership of a part of the common areas, to report the unsafe condition to the association. In our view the plaintiff had the same duty as anyone else using the elevator, namely to look out for herself in a reasonable manner. *See Hemispheres Condominium Association, Inc. v. Corbin,*357 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), and *Manassa v. New Hampshire Insurance Company,*332 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The standard instructions on comparative negligence were sufficient to cover this issue. The error of the trial court here was in suggesting to the jury that while the plaintiff may have had a moral duty to report* the unsafe condition, she had no legal duty to do so.

We also reverse on the cross appeal and hold that there is sufficient evidence on the loss of consortium claim to support the jury’s award. The trial court erred in striking that award after trial. That damage award will, of course, be contingent upon the outcome of the retrial on liability.

ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., and FEDER, RICHARD YALE, Associate Judge, concur.
From: "Matz, Tim" <tmatz@htcnam.com>

To: Keith Barnett/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA

Cc: Steve Fruh/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Peter Tsirigotis/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Curtis

Lesslie < curtis.lesslie@ashgrove.com >, Fran Streitman |

< fran.streitman@ashgrove.com >

Date: 11/23/2009 03:31 PM

Subject: Portland Cement MACT Rule

Dear Keith,

I am writing to you today to express Lehigh Cement Company's concurrence with Ash

Grove Cement Company's proposed Beyond the Floor standards and work practices

regarding mercury reductions for the Tehachapi and Durkee cement plant

operations. Lehigh has a shared interest with Ash Grove in promoting a

subcategory for the outlier sources with high mercury limestone. Lehigh is in

agreement with Ash Grove on EPA setting a beyond the floor standard with work

practices for such outliers. Lehigh specifically agrees with the following

proposal for EPA to set a subcategory:

1. Limestone mercury content >225 ppb

2. Establish a floor based on the average uncontrolled emissions of the two

sources in the subcategory category

3. Impose a minimum technology based limit of 75% control through addition of

activated carbon injection

4. Require development of a Mercury Minimization Plan

‐ Prohibit the use of fly ash as an ingredient in the kiln raw feed

‐ Source must limit the acceptance of off

‐ site raw materials that

contain mercury

‐ Source must minimize mercury emissions to the maximum extent possible

‐ Source must shuttle main baghouse dust to the finish mill to the

extent allowed by product standards

‐ These work practices should be imposed without a specified emission

control since they are site specific Lehigh requests that you and

EPA strongly consider this proposal to set a beyond the floor cement

NESHAPs standard with work practices for these high mercury

limestone sources.

Thank you,

Timothy L. Matz

Corporate Director of Environmental Affairs

Lehigh Hanson

300 East John Carpenter Freeway

Irving, Texas 75062

phone: (972) 653

‐ 3787

cell: (469) 834

‐ 7349

fax: (972) 653

‐ 5693

tmatz@htcnam.com
#### Michael SAMPSON v. Odelia L. SAMPSON.

No. 87-CD-0243.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 2, 1987.

In re Sampson, Michael; applying for stay order, and supervisory writs; Twelfth Judicial District Court, Parish of Avoyelles, No. 86-8659.

*220Denied. Relator must first seek relief in the Court of Appeal.
#### In the Interest of M.J.

No. 87-3386.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 7, 1989.

*1324Alberta S. Widman of Alberta S. Wid-man, P.A., Fort Pierce, for appellant, Ana Marie Baustista-Pinales.

K. Stuart Goldberg of K. Stuart Goldberg, P.A., Royal Palm Beach, for ap-pellee, Dept, of Health and Rehabilitative Services.

STONE, Judge.

This is an appeal by a natural mother from an order adjudicating her ten-year-old child dependent and placing her under the protection of the court.

When the child was five years old the natural mother, who lived in the Dominican Republic, consented to her being privately adopted by a single male, who was a United States citizen. The adoptive father returned to this country with the child and was subsequently arrested and convicted for sexually abusing her. The child was initially adjudicated dependent when the charges were filed against the adoptive father. Following his conviction, the Dominican Republic invalidated the adoption. The natural mother then demanded that the child be returned to her in the Dominican Republic, and as a result the state filed this second petition for dependency.

The trial court considered a number of factors in finding that it was in the best interest of the child to be adjudicated dependent and to continue to reside with her foster family.

The trial court found that the mother had abandoned the child, as evidenced by the circumstances under which she surrendered her child, without investigation, and by her subsequent lack of meaningful effort to assume parental responsibilities. Although there was some minimal effort by the appellant to communicate with the child, the court considered this effort to be marginal and not having evinced a settled purpose to assume parental duties. The court also found that the child had become assimilated to the United States, and was bonded to her foster parents. The child did not want to return to the Dominican Republic, and had no feelings for her biological mother.

The trial court did not err by recognizing that the revocation of the adoption, although valid, did not alone require the immediate return of a child to her biological parent. The trial court may weigh the totality of the evidence in determining the best interest of the child. *See In the Interest of J.L.P.,*416 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). *See also In re Camm,*294 So.2d 318 (Fla.), *cert. denied,*419 U.S. 866, 95 S.Ct. 121, 42 L.Ed.2d 103 (1974). A court of this state has an obligation to protect children within its jurisdiction. The revocation of adoption did not affect the duty of the court to consider the totality of the evidence in determining the need for continued HRS care.

We also find no error in conducting the dependency proceedings in the absence of the natural mother, who was represented by court appointed counsel.

Therefore the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

HERSEY, C.J., and WARNER, J., concur.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-10660

Summary Calendar

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KENNETH RAY WRIGHT,

 Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

- - - - - - - - - -

June 5, 1996

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Kenneth Ray Wright appeals his conviction for bank robbery and

using and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence.

He contends, for the first time on appeal, that the district court

erred by intervening in the trial proceedings to such an extent

that it assumed the role of the prosecution; and by refusing to

allow him to present surrebuttal evidence to refute testimony

regarding his reputation for untruthfulness presented by government

rebuttal witnesses. Finally, Wright contends that the imposition

of mandatory drug testing as a condition of his supervised release

violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and was an abuse of

the district court's discretion.
A thorough review of the entire trial transcript reveals that

questioning by the district court, although considerably more

extensive than normal, did not constitute plain error. See United

States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc),

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1266 (1995). 

It is not clear that Wright was denied surrebuttal. Nor did

the district court abuse its discretion if it did deny Wright

surrebuttal because Wright "failed to proffer to the district court

the substance of his surrebuttal testimony." United States v.

Alford, 999 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1993). 

The requirement of drug testing imposed during Wright's period

of supervised release is not plain error. See Calverley, 37 F.3d

at 162-64. The district court only imposed the condition mandated

by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). That condition serves the legitimate

purpose of enforcing the general condition requiring supervisees to

refrain from unlawful use of controlled substances. Persons on

supervision do not enjoy absolute liberty but only conditional

liberty dependent upon observance of special conditions. Griffin

v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987). There is no Fourth

Amendment violation.

AFFIRMED.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

SHERROD RICE,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 361 EAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 13th day of December, 2016

, the Petition for Allowance of

Appeal is DENIED

.

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
III 

107TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. CON. RES. 301

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2002

Received and referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of Congress regarding American Gold 

Star Mothers, Incorporated, Blue Star Mothers of America, Incorporated, the service flag, and the service lapel 

button.

Whereas section 901 of title 36, United States Code, authorizes members of the immediate family of individuals serving in the Armed Forces to display a service flag approved by the Secretary of Defense in a window of their 

place of residence during any period of war or hostilities 

in which the Armed Forces are engaged;
2

HCON 301 RFS 

Whereas such section also authorizes members of the immediate family of individuals serving in the Armed Forces 

to wear a service lapel button approved by the Secretary 

of Defense during any period of war or hostilities in 

which the Armed Forces are engaged;

Whereas the traditions of displaying the service flag and 

wearing the service lapel button have not been widely 

practiced since the end of World War II; and 

Whereas reinvigorating the traditions of displaying the service flag and wearing the service lapel button would foster 

patriotism and express support for the members of the 

Armed Forces during the war on terrorism: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 

2 concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that—

3 (1) the members of American Gold Star Moth4 ers, Incorporated, and Blue Star Mothers of Amer5 ica, Incorporated, should be recognized for their sac6 rifices and for their dedicated and patriotic support 

7 of the United States; 

8 (2) during the period in which the Armed 

9 Forces are engaged in the war on terrorism, mem10 bers of the immediate family of individuals serving 

11 in the Armed Forces should be encouraged to dis12 play a service flag approved by the Secretary of De13 fense under section 901 of title 36, United States 

14 Code, in the window of their place of residence and 
3

HCON 301 RFS 

1 wear a service lapel button approved under such sec2 tion; and 

3 (3) the President should issue a proclamation 

4 calling on members of the immediate family of indi5 viduals serving in the Armed Forces to display a 

6 service flag approved by the Secretary of Defense 

7 under section 901 of title 36, United States Code, 

8 in the window of their place of residence and wear 

9 a service lapel button approved under such section 

10 during the period in which the Armed Forces are en11 gaged in the war on terrorism. 

12 SEC. 2. The Clerk of the House of Representatives 

13 shall transmit a copy of this resolution to the American 

14 Gold Star Mothers, Incorporated, and the Blue Star Moth15 ers of America, Incorporated.

Passed the House of Representatives September 24, 

2002. 

Attest: JEFF TRANDAHL, 

Clerk.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 1**  **1 -**  **1307**

GIL W. JONES , P laintiff

- Appell ant ,

v.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES , Defendant

– Appell ee .
Appeal from the United States District C ourt for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. Richard D. Bennett , District Judge. ( 1 : 1 0

- c v - 0 3 4 29

- R D B )

Submitted : Jul y 2 8 , 2011 Decided: August 1, 2011

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirm ed by unpublished per curiam opinion

.

Gil W. Jones , Appellant Pro Se
.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Gil W. Jones appeals the district court ’ s order dismissing his civil complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (2006) for failure to s tate a claim. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.
Jones v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs

. , No. 1:10

- cv - 03429

- RDB (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2011) . We dispense with ora l argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     I,  Shefali  Vibhakar,  certify,  pursuant  to  18  U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted  pursuant  to  Section  906  of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the
Quarterly  Report  of  Telesis  Technology  Corporation on Form 10-QSB/A for the
quarterly  period  ended September 30, 2005 fully complies with the requirements
of  Section  13(a)  or  15(d)  of  the  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that
information  contained  in  such  Form  10-QSB/A fairly presents in all material
respects the financial condition and results of operations of Telesis Technology
Corporation.

                                                  Telesis Technology Corporation
                                                  ------------------------------
DATED: April 28,2006                          By: /s/ Shefali Vibhakar
                                                  -------------------
                                                  Shefali Vibhakar
                                                  Chief Financial Officer

<PAGE>
III

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. RES. 387

Relative to the death of Representative Julian C. Dixon, of California.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 11 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 22), 2000

Mr. HUTCHINSON (for Mr. LOTT and Mr. DASCHLE) submitted the following

resolution; which was considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Relative to the death of Representative Julian C. Dixon,

of California.

1 Resolved, That the Senate has heard with profound

2 sorrow and deep regret the announcement of the death

3 of the Honorable Julian C. Dixon, late a Representative

4 from the State of California.

5 Resolved, That the Secretary communicate these reso6 lutions to the House of Representatives and transmit an

7 enrolled copy thereof to the family of the deceased.

8 Resolved, That when the Senate adjourns or recesses

9 today, it stand adjourned or recessed as a further mark

10 of respect to the memory of the deceased Representative.

Æ
#### Lorretta Johnson, Plaintiff, Lillian Freeman, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Queens County,

April 2, 1959.

*754
      *Harold Gordon*for plaintiff.

*Thomas F. Keane*for defendant.

Henry J. Latham, J.

Motion by the plaintiff in a negligence action for summary judgment in accordance with new rule 113 of the Buies of Civil Practice, effective March 1,1959.

The plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile operated by one Lenwood Johnson as it was proceeding north on Beach 9th Street at its intersection with Caffrey Avenue, Par Bockaway, Queens County, New York. Plaintiff and said Lenwood Johnson claim in their supporting affidavits that the automobile operated by the defendant in an easterly direction on Caffrey Avenue was proceeding “ at an excessive rate of speed ” when it struck the left side of their vehicle at a point “ approximately in the center of the roadway.”

The sole opposing affidavit was submitted by an attorney associated with the attorney of record for the defendant. It is not based upon personal knowledge of the facts nor, indeed, does it contain any facts of probative value. It merely presents the point of view on behalf of the defendant to the. effect that she is entitled to have the issue of negligence and contributory negligence determined by a jury and not upon affidavits alone.

While this opposing affidavit is insufficient under the provisions of subdivision 2 of the new rule which states that “ The affidavit must be by a person having knowledge of the facts; it must recite all the material facts; and it must show ** * **that the action or claim has no merit * * * ”, the plaintiff’s motion must nevertheless be denied. It is provided in the said subdivision 2 that The motion shall be granted if, upon all the papers and proof submitted, the action or claim * * * shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment * * in favor of any party.”

The court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has not established her action or claim sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment ’ ’ in her favor on the issue of negligence. Even though the facts contained in the moving affidavits have not been disputed by an affiant having knowledge, it is still for the jury to determine in a case such as this whether these facts spell out a ease of negligent operation of the defendant’s vehicle. The fact that plaintiff was a passenger in one of the automobiles involved in the collision and the accident occurred at an intersection are factors to be considered with all others by the trier of the facts and are not conclusive upon a motion such as this.

Submit order.
## TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT:

ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM

FOR CONSUMER PRODUCTS AND

COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT:

RESIDENTIAL COOKING PRODUCT S: MICROWAVE OVEN STANDBY

POWER

October 2011

U.S. Department of Energy

Assistant Secretary

Office of Energy Efficien cy and Renewable Energy

Building Technologies Program

Appliances and Commercia l Equipment Standards

Washington, DC 20585This Document was prepared for the Department of Energy

and by staff members of

Navigant Consulting, Inc.

and

Ernest Orlando Lawrence Be rkeley National Laboratory
```

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 106 (Wednesday, June 3, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Page 31634]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-13470]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 9161]

Fine Arts Committee Notice of Meeting

    The Fine Arts Committee of the Department of State will meet on 
June 2, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. in the Henry Clay Room of the Harry S. Truman 
Building, 2201 C Street NW., Washington, DC. The meeting will last 
until approximately 3:00 p.m. and is open to the public.
    The agenda for the committee meeting will include a summary of the 
work of the Fine Arts Office since its last meeting on November 14, 
2014 and the announcement of gifts and loans of furnishings as well as 
financial contributions from January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014.
    Public access to the Department of State is strictly controlled and 
space is limited. Members of the public wishing to take part in the 
meeting should telephone the Fine Arts Office at (202) 647-1990 or send 
an email to WallaceJA@State.gov by May 26th to make arrangements to 
enter the building. The public may take part in the discussion as long 
as time permits and at the discretion of the chairman.

     Dated: May 11, 2015.
Marcee Craighill,
Director & Curator, Fine Arts Committee, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2015-13470 Filed 6-2-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
```