COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JOSEPH VINCENT,

Appellant,

V.

JUST RIGHT PROPERTY 

SOLUTIONS, LLC,

Appellee.

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No. 08-16-00012-CV

Appeal from the

County Court at Law No. 4

of Williamson County, Texas

(TC# 15-1477-CC4)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Just Right Property Solutions, LLC, Appellee, has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as 

moot because Appellant, Joseph Vincent, failed to make the payment required to supersede the 

judgment and the trial court issued a writ of possession. We have reviewed Vincent’s response 

to the motion as well as the briefs submitted by the parties on the merits of the appeal. We grant 

the motion and dismiss the appeal as moot.

JRPS purchased the subject property previously owned by Vincent at a foreclosure 

auction on August 4, 2015. The foreclosure sale was conducted pursuant to the power of sale 

provision set forth in paragraph 22 of the Deed of Trust. Paragraph 22 provides, in relevant part, 

that:

If the Property is sold pursuant to this Section 22, Borrower or any person holding 

possession of the Property through Borrower shall immediately surrender 

possession of the Property to the purchaser at that sale. If possession is not 
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surrendered, Borrower or such person shall be a tenant at sufferance and may be 

removed by writ of possession or other court proceeding.

On August 8, 2015, JRPS hand-delivered and mailed a notice to vacate the property. Vincent 

refused to vacate and JRPS filed a forcible detainer suit in the Williamson County Justice of the 

Peace Count (Precinct 4). The JP Court entered an agreed judgment that Vincent would vacate 

the premises, and Vincent appealed to the County Court at Law No. 4 of Williamson County. 

The trial court entered a final judgment granting JRPS immediate possession of the property. 

The judgment provided that Appellant could supersede the judgment pending appeal by 

depositing $3,100 into the court’s registry and by depositing $1,550 no later than the first day of 

each month beginning on December 1, 2015. Appellant timely made the first deposit of $3,100 

but he failed to pay $1,550 by December 1, 2015.1 The trial court entered a writ of possession on 

December 4, 2015, and it was executed on December 14, 2015. Appellant filed his notice of 

appeal on December 14, 2015. It is well settled that issues of title are not adjudicated in a 

forcible-detainer suit and the only issue to be decided is the right to immediate possession of the 

property. Marshall v. Housing Authority of the City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 

2006); Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2001, no pet.). While failure to 

supersede a forcible-detainer judgment does not divest an appellant of the right to appeal, an 

appeal from a forcible-detainer action becomes moot if the appellant is no longer in possession 

of the property, unless the appellant holds and asserts a potentially meritorious claim of right to 

current, actual possession of the property. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 786-87; see Wilhelm v. 

Federal National Mortgage Association, 349 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 

2011, no pet.).

 

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 Vincent asserts in his response to the motion to dismiss that he attempted to make the $1,550 deposit on 

December 8, 2015, but the County Clerk refused to accept it.
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It is undisputed that Vincent is no longer in possession of the property and there is no 

evidence of a lease between the parties. Vincent does not argue in his response to the motion to 

dismiss or his briefs on the merits that he has a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, 

actual possession of the property. He instead maintains that JRPS was not “a person entitled to 

possession of the property” when it gave him notice to vacate on August 8, 2015 because the 

Substitute Trustee’s Deed was not actually executed until August 10, 2015. 

Section 24.002 provides:

(a) A person who refuses to surrender possession of real property on demand 

commits a forcible detainer if the person:

(1) is a tenant or a subtenant wilfully and without force holding over after the 

termination of the tenant’s right of possession;

(2) is a tenant at will or by sufferance, including an occupant at the time of 

foreclosure of a lien superior to the tenant’s lease; or

(3) is a tenant of a person who acquired possession by forcible entry.

(b) The demand for possession must be made in writing by a person entitled to 

possession of the property and must comply with the requirements for notice 

to vacate under Section 24.005.

Tex.Prop.Code Ann. § 24.002 (West 2014).

The argument made by Vincent addresses whether JRPS was “a person entitled to 

possession of the property” at the time it served the demand for possession. The critical question 

for us to decide is not whether JRPS had a right to possession when it served the demand for 

possession under Section 24.002, but whether Vincent has asserted a potentially meritorious

claim of right to current, actual possession of the property. Under paragraph 22 of the Deed of 

Trust, Vincent was required to immediately surrender possession of the property to JRPS at the 

foreclosure sale, and upon his refusal to do so, he became a tenant at sufferance. A tenant at 

sufferance is one who wrongfully continues in possession of property after his right to possession 
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has ceased and does not assert a claim to superior title. ICM Mortgage Corporation v. Jacob, 

902 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1994, writ denied); see Coinmach Corporation v. 

Aspenwood Apartment Corporation, 417 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. 2013). Because Vincent has not 

asserted a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property, we 

conclude that his appeal is moot because he is no longer in possession of the property. We grant 

JRPS’s motion and dismiss the appeal as moot.

August 3, 2016

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.