U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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BEHIND THE SCENES: HOW THE 

BIDEN ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO 

ENFORCE THE DOHA AGREEMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

February 15, 2024 

Serial No. 118–86 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

RONNY JACKSON, Texas 

YOUNG KIM, California 

MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, 

American Samoa 

FRENCH HILL, Arkansas 

WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio 

JIM BAIRD, Indiana 

MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida 

THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey 

MICHAEL LAWLER, New York 

CORY MILLS, Florida 

RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia 

NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas 

JOHN JAMES, Michigan 

KEITH SELF, Texas 

GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking 

Member 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY KIM, New Jersey 

SARA JACOBS, California 

KATHY MANNING, North Carolina 

SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK, Florida 

GREG STANTON, Arizona 

MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania 

JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida 

JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois 

SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California 

JIM COSTA, California 

JASON CROW, Colorado 

BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

GABE AMO, RHODE ISLAND 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Majority Staff Director 

SOPHIA LAFARGUE, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Information submitted for the record from Ambassador Smith .......................... 4 

WITNESSES 

Khalilzad, Zalmay, Former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, U.S. Department of State ................................................................ 11 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Information submitted for the record from Representative Davidson ................ 35 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 60 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 61 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 62 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE 

CONNOLLY 

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly .................... 63 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Responses to questions submitted for the record .................................................. 65 

(1) 

BEHIND THE SCENES: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO ENFORCE THE 

DOHA AGREEMENT 

Thursday, February 15, 2024 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael McCaul (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come 

to order. The purpose of this hearing is to discuss how the Biden 

Administration unconditionally handed over Afghanistan to the 

Taliban terrorist organization with its refusal to enforce the DOHA 

agreement. 

Today’s hearing comes at a crucial moment in this committee’s 

investigation into the Biden Administration’s catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan. 

For months after President Biden announced the withdrawal, his 

senior military advisors and his own intelligence community repeatedly issued dire warnings about the damage this would create. 

At the same time, I, along with other Republican and Democrat 

Members of Congress, urged President Biden to uphold the conditions of the DOHA agreement, and most importantly, we urged him 

to prepare for the eventual fallout of our withdrawal. 

He ignored us and all, including his own State Department personnel, who issued a dissent cable in July warning of the dire situation on the ground. Instead, as the Taliban takeover became imminent, the White House and State Department leadership stuck 

their heads in the sand. 

It was so bad the State Department waited until the day after 

the Taliban captured Kabul to actually request an emergency evacuation, also known as a NEO. As a result of the Biden Administration’s failure to plan, the U.S. military was forced to conduct this 

emergency evacuation surrounded by tens of thousands of Taliban 

terrorists. Put simply, President Biden and Secretary Blinken put 

thousands of American lives at risk through their incompetence 

and willful blindness. 

And then, the worst possible outcome: a terrorist attack at Abbey 

Gate on August the 26th, 2021, that killed 13 U.S. service members, wounded 45 more, and killed more than 170 Afghan civilians. 

It was the deadliest day for the United States in Afghanistan in 

over a decade. 

And today, we have some of the family members of the service 

members killed at Abbey Gate in the audience. They are here be-
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cause they want accountability for their children’s deaths. I’m 

going to get them answers—the answers they deserve. 

I anticipate my colleagues on the other side of the aisle will attempt to spin this disaster as all being President Trump’s fault. 

They will claim the DOHA agreement forced President Biden to 

withdraw and that he had no choice, but this is false. 

To that end, I want to remind everyone of two critical facts. 

First, the DOHA agreement was conditions-based—conditions 

our witness here today negotiated. And as he can tell you, those 

conditions were not being met by the Taliban, and they are still not 

being met today. 

The Taliban is allowing terrorists like Al Qaeda to flourish in Afghanistan. And the truth is that President Biden wanted to withdraw from the DOHA agreement, and if he wanted to, he could 

have. He did just that with many of President Trump’s other agreements, like Remain in Mexico. 

Second, President Biden himself said that, even if the DOHA 

agreement had never been signed, he would still have withdrawn 

all U.S. troops from Afghanistan exactly the way that he did. 

When asked by George Stephanopoulos, quote, he said, ‘‘Would 

you have withdrawn troops like this, even if President Trump had 

not made that deal with the Taliban?’’ President Biden replied, 

quote, ‘‘I would have tried to figure out how to withdraw those 

troops, yes.’’ 

Our witness today, Ambassador Khalilzad, someone I have 

known for quite many years, served as the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation under President Trump, where 

he negotiated the DOHA agreement and was asked to remain on 

by President Biden. 

In November 2023, Ambassador Khalilzad appeared before the 

committee for a nearly 12-hour, closed-door, transcribed interview—and voluntarily, I might add, and we thank you for that. 

And in that interview, one thing was made clear: the core problem was not the DOHA agreement. It was a President who refused 

to enforce it. 

I want to thank our witness for being here today. Ambassador 

Khalilzad, I believe you have valuable information to share with 

this committee. And I know you have chosen to do so voluntarily, 

and I hope you do so with the same candor you showed in November. 

And I really admire you, sir. You are not forced to appear here. 

We could have done that. You are doing this as a patriot and an 

American, and someone who was in the middle of all this from the 

very beginning with so many facts to share with this committee. 

We thank you, sir, for being here today. 

With that, I recognize the ranking member, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me begin by also thanking you for hearing my call for 

transparency at our November 23rd—November 2023 Afghanistan 

hearing. Yesterday, your staff sent us written notice of your personal commitment to publicly release all transcripts from interviews held during this Congress and in the committee’s investigation into the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan after they 

are finalized on February 29th. 
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This, indeed, is the right thing to do. The American people have 

funded our bipartisan oversight work and we owe them full transparency, not just misleading, cherry-picked snippets. Such transparency is critical for any investigation. 

So, I strongly hope that your commitment to make transcripts 

public will extend to the other oversight investigations you have 

initiated in this Congress in which witnesses have been questioned 

behind closed doors. We must not let this committee’s activities become another typical move in a partisan game. 

And with that, let me thank Ambassador Khalilzad for appearing 

before our committee. Ambassador, you served under three different Presidents in a variety of capacities during America’s 20 

years of war effort in Afghanistan. And your insights on the August 

2021 withdrawal, and the many decision points that led to the 

events of August 2021, are important to this committee’s understanding. A 20-year war deserved comprehensive and bipartisan 

oversight. 

But the title of this hearing, ‘‘How the Biden Administration 

failed to enforce the DOHA agreement,’’ is telling. It is not titled, 

‘‘The Biden Administration’s failed DOHA agreement with the 

Taliban.’’ That is because it was not Joe Biden who crafted the 

February 2020 deal. It was, in fact, his Republican predecessor that 

made the agreement with the Taliban that committed the United 

States to withdraw all of our troops from Afghanistan. 

Nor is the hearing titled, ‘‘How the Trump Administration failed 

to press the Taliban to live up to its commitments in the DOHA 

agreement, but withdrew troops anyway.’’ That would require scrutiny of the DOHA deal since its inception under the Trump Administration. 

I must say this because, for some of my Republican colleagues, 

the challenges of Afghanistan began the day of Joe Biden’s inauguration. That is not to say that the Biden Administration is beyond congressional review or that there is nothing to learn from 

those 8 months, but that is an 8-month snapshot out of 20 years. 

At best, this fixation is oversight malpractice. At worst, it is historical revisionism, politically motivated to place a withdrawal which 

President Biden inherited solely at his feet. 

Let’s be clear. Both President Biden and President Trump sought 

to end our forever war in Afghanistan, and President Biden, ultimately, achieved that goal. Our presence in Afghanistan has 

changed, but our core interests have not. And the United States 

continues to pursue those interests, as it has demonstrated with 

the killing of the Emir of Al Qaeda and a key 9/11 mastermind, 

Ayman al-Zawahiri, in 2022 in Kabul. 

This is not about pointing blame. This is about grappling with 

reality, with the facts we like, as well as the ones we do not. And 

with the sacred responsibility, we have to oversee the State Department and the U.S. foreign policy. 

To that end, I want to acknowledge Ambassador Dan Smith’s 

statement which is submitted for today’s record. 

[The information referred to:] 
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Mr. MEEKS. Ambassador Smith served for almost four decades at 

the State Department and returned at Secretary Blinken’s request 

to lead its after-action review, an independent review of the Department’s actions over the course of January 2020 to August 2021 

related to the United States withdrawal. 

The result of his review, drawn from more than 150 interviews, 

are not just invaluable, but actionable and provide a roadmap we 

all should consult regularly to support the Department’s crises 

management capacity and its single greatest assets—its people. 

Now, Ambassador Khalilzad, I know you have previously sat for 

a transcript interview on today’s subject that lasted over 10 hours, 

and we thank you for that. That’s a testimony to both your vast 

knowledge to share and your deep commitment to America and to 

our national security. 

So, I look forward to your testimony and I hope that the American people can hear today what we have already heard behind 

closed doors. 

With that, I yield. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

Chairman MCCAUL. We are pleased to have here today Hon. 

Zalmay Khalilzad before us today. He served as a Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation at the State Department 

from September 2018 to October 2021. 

Your full statement will be made part of the record. 

And I now recognize Ambassador Khalilzad for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD, FORMER U.S. SPECIAL 

REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONCILIATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the committee, I welcome the 

opportunity to talk with you today about America’s strategy in Afghanistan during my service as the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation between 2018 and 2021. 

In September 2018, the Trump Administration asked me to help 

negotiate a framework agreement for the safe withdrawal of U.S. 

forces, obtain commitments from both the Taliban and the Afghan 

government on U.S. counterterrorism concerns, and set the stage 

for Afghans to start negotiating an end to the war in their country. 

By the end of 2018, the President’s decision was to bring the 

American forces home. Several factors that contributed to this decision: 

The conclusion that this war had gone on for too long with no 

end in sight. 

The opportunity cost was too high. The United States needed to 

focus on great power competition—that is, China, Russia, and the 

threat from Iran. 

Afghanistan no longer was central to the war on terror. 

The goal of transforming Afghanistan into a modern and democratic State had been unrealistic. Despite best efforts, the country 

had huge governance problems and rampant levels of corruption. 
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That decision recognized the potential risks involved in this policy. The greatest risk was the potential threat to U.S. forces during 

withdrawal. The British withdrawal in 1842 and the Soviet withdrawal in 1988 and 1989 had been very bloody. 

A second risk was Afghanistan once again becoming the big platform for a terrorist threat against the United States homeland, 

U.S. interests, and our allies. 

A third risk was the loss of gains made by the Afghan people. 

There was opposition to this policy, both inside the government 

and outside, but the President determined that the withdrawal was 

in the U.S. national interest. 

After more than a year of negotiations, on February 29, 2020, we 

reached two agreements—one with the Taliban and the other with 

the Afghan government. These provided a framework for U.S. withdrawal, dealing with terrorism, intra-Afghan negotiations within 

the Taliban and the Afghan Republic, a permanent cease-fire, and 

future relations between the United States and Afghanistan. 

Key features of the agreement were: 

Phased withdrawal of U.S. forces over a 14-month period. 

Afghanistan was not to be used by any group or individual to 

threaten the security of the United States and its allies. 

Intra-Afghan negotiations. 

Importantly, the Taliban committed not to attack U.S. forces 

once the agreement was signed. This was critical, and the Taliban 

adhered to it, killing no coalition fighter or U.S. soldier during the 

entire withdrawal period. 

The first phase of withdrawal lasted 135 days, in which the U.S. 

forces were reduced to 8600. By the time President Trump left office, U.S. forces in Afghanistan had been reduced to 2,500. 

The United States retained the right to come to the defense of 

the Afghan forces if the Taliban attacked them. We exercised this 

right as needed. 

During the negotiations between the Afghanistan Republic and 

the Taliban, which started on September 12, 2020, they did not 

make any significant progress. 

After the November 2020 elections, President-Elect Biden’s team 

asked me to stay on. 

The Administration had three options: 

One, withdraw from the DOHA agreement. 

Two, implement the agreement, but with changes, such as the 

extension of the agreed timeline—linking the withdrawal of remaining forces to the conclusion of a political agreement between 

the Taliban and the Afghan government, or insisting on leaving behind in Afghanistan a counterterror force, or withdraw the remaining forces without such linkages. 

The President announced in April 2021 that we would add 4 

months to the timetable for withdrawal, for a total of 18 months. 

The withdrawal was not conditioned on a political agreement between the two Afghan sides because it was believed that such conditionality would risk a return to war without end and entrap the 

United States into reversing course and sending more forces again. 

It was also decided that our over-the-horizon capabilities would 

allow us to monitor and respond to terror threats to the United 

States from Afghan territory. 
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On protecting social and political gains, the approach was to advocate for key values in the course of intra-Afghan negotiations by 

pressing the Taliban on respecting women’s rights and human 

rights. 

The withdrawal proceeded based on the new extended timeline. 

The assessment was that the Afghan government would remain in 

power and its forces would defend it and fight the Taliban during 

the withdrawal and for some time afterwards. This assumption informed our plans. 

Although reasonable, the assumption turned out to be wrong. 

The situation on the ground began to shift significantly and rapidly 

in favor of the Taliban. They took over one province after another, 

and by mid-August 2021, were at the gates of Kabul. 

We had the last-minute success in persuading the Taliban to refrain from entering Kabul and, instead, to hold talks with government to reach a political deal for a shared government, a step to 

which both sides agreed. 

But this fell apart when President Ghani surprisingly fled the 

country, which caused the now leaderless Afghan military and police to instantly disintegrate. 

These developments led to the Taliban entry into Kabul, and this 

abrupt series of events obliged the United States to react, adapt, 

and improvise, as none of this had been foreseen in our plans to 

withdraw by the end of August. 

As we all remember, the final 2 weeks of chaos at the airport and 

the tragic loss of 13 brave Americans in an ISIS-K terrorist attack 

were difficult, and ‘‘what-ifs’’ remain hotly debated. 

The events of those final days should not diminish the achievements made. We must all remember that, after 9/11, we sent our 

forces to Afghanistan to decimate Al Qaeda there. This was accomplished and represents a major win for the security of the United 

States. We all are grateful to those whose sacrifice made this possible and to their families. 

The struggle for Afghanistan is not over and Afghanistan’s final 

chapter is certainly not written. The seed of the values we planted 

may well bear fruit over time. It would be a mistake to turn our 

back on the country. 

The American approach going forward must take current realities in Afghanistan, the region, and the world into account while 

remaining guided, as elsewhere, by our interests and enduring values. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Khalilzad follows:] 
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Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Ambassador. 

And I want to echo your comments to our veterans that their 

service was not in vain. They protected this Nation for 20 years 

from a major terrorist attack like 9/11, and we thank them for that. 

We also want to thank the parents of Marine Corps Corporal 

Hunter Lopez and Marine Corps Sergeant Nicole Gee, who are here 

today, and to the Lopez family, Ms. Shamblin, and the rest of the 

Gold Star families. We honor your sacrifice and your children. 

In November, you testified before this committee in a transcribed 

interview and you just restated that you presented to the Biden 

Administration and to the President, basically, three options on the 

DOHA agreement. 

One, to, basically, ignore it and unconditionally withdraw. 

Two, to tear it up. 

And three, to enforce it, its conditions against the Taliban. 

You also testified that you and Secretary Blinken both recommended to President Biden that he enforce DOHA’s conditions. 

But, instead, the President ignored your advice or disagreed and 

chose to ignore the DOHA conditions and unconditionally withdraw. Is that correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I think there was the opportunity for me to brief 

the President, as you said, correct, and the options that he had. 

And it was clear that it would be desirable that the final withdrawal happens after there is an agreement between the government and the Taliban. 

And that was broadly supported, that idea, but upon discussion 

and deliberation, and consultations with allies and others—and the 

allies, too, favored withdrawal after there was an agreement between the government and the Taliban—but there was a judgment 

that, if we did that, since that was not part of the DOHA agreement, that it could result in a protracted delay in the withdrawal 

of forces, as we couldn’t be certain when and if the Afghans would 

reach an agreement. And if there was a risk of going back to war, 

and perhaps sending more troops, the decision was not to pursue 

that, and there was broad support for that decision. 

Chairman MCCAUL. But your recommendation to the President 

was to enforce DOHA’s conditions, correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. That was part of the agreement, yes, and we restated that, that this was a condition-based agreement. It was a 

package deal and there were linkages. What we did depended on 

the Taliban delivering on their commitments. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Right. And the President disagreed with you 

and chose not to enforce the conditions? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, I described the discussion that occurred 

and the judgment that was made. 

Chairman MCCAUL. And the conditions were not enforced, and as 

a result, the Taliban is in control of Afghanistan today, correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, I would say it’s clear that the Taliban are 

in control, but I would put the responsibility for what happened 

largely on the shoulders of the Afghan government leadership for 

not standing for their government, for their system, and for the 

values that they said they believed in. 
16 

Chairman MCCAUL. Yes, and I agree. I think President Ghani’s 

actions were cowardice in fleeing his country as a coward—not a 

good example. 

Let me turn to the meeting you had in DOHA between yourself, 

General McKenzie, and the Taliban leader Mullah Baradar. You 

said that the Taliban offered to give the United States control of 

Kabul for the purposes of evacuation, but that offer was turned 

down. When asked by my committee at your interview whether the 

Taliban viewed that as a, quote, ‘‘green light’’ to take over Kabul, 

you said, quote, ‘‘I think that’s clear.’’ Do you agree with that statement? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I agree that we had made an agreement for the 

Taliban not to enter Kabul and for a delegation to come from 

Kabul—and President Ghani had agreed to it as well—to negotiate 

the power-sharing government to take over on September 1 in a 

meeting of 200 Afghan notables present. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Right, but McKenzie says, ‘‘That’s not my 

mission’’ because his orders are not to secure Kabul—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, indeed. 

Chairman MCCAUL [continuing]. For evacuation. His orders are 

to evacuate—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Indeed. Indeed. 

Chairman MCCAUL [continuing]. By July 4th, and he did not 

have the troops—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Chairman MCCAUL [continuing]. Allocated for that. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Now, he could have raised that to the President. Was this meeting, to your knowledge, ever reported to the 

White House? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. It was reported clearly to the entire government, 

but it was reported after General McKenzie said on the spot there 

that that wasn’t, as you said, Chairman, his mission to secure 

Kabul. And the initial goal was for the Taliban not to be in Kabul. 

In fact, it presented them with a map of some 20 to 25 miles away 

from the center, within that area, that there should be no Talibs 

present. 

But the departure of President Ghani and increased widespread 

concern by Afghans in Kabul about law and order with the disintegration of the Security Forces, the options were either that the 

Talibs offer that we take responsibility, and General McKenzie, as 

you said correctly, Chairman—I was present in the meeting—that 

that was not part of his mission, and then, the discussion shifted 

to where the Talibs could go for—— 

Chairman MCCAUL. Because of his understanding, McKenzie’s 

understanding, that the President wouldn’t authorize more troops 

to take over Kabul for purposes of the evacuation? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, I cannot comment on that because—— 

Chairman MCCAUL. Yes. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. I wasn’t presented in any discussion 

he may have had—— 

Chairman MCCAUL. Now, if that had happened, imagine, 

wouldn’t that have been a little different, right? We take over 

Kabul for purposes of the evacuation. The Taliban agrees to stay 
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out of this 20-mile radius and they do not take over HKIA. They 

are not part of this chaos at the very end, and the suicide bomber 

coming from this prison out of Bagram—you know, I’m not asking 

you to speculate, but it is very foreseeable that may never have 

happened. And this report does go to the White House, and yet, 

nothing is done to change the course of events. Correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, your account is correct, but we do not 

know what else could have happened if that decision was made. So, 

we are entering speculation now. 

Chairman MCCAUL. No, the bottom line is you really cannot 

trust the Taliban. 

And I see my time is expired, and I now recognize the ranking 

member, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

I’m not going to speculate because I do not think we should be 

speculating or just giving our own opinions, or paraphrasing of 

what you are saying. I want to take it for what you are saying and 

not going to guess on what my thoughts are, because we want to 

do an investigation to determine what we should learn from it. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Correct. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me join the chairman, though, in, first, saying 

to our Gold Star families how much we appreciate you and the heroes that lost their lives. And I know that there is nothing that we 

can do to bring them back, but they are, indeed, heroes for our 

country. And I thank you for your sacrifices. And I will tell you 

that, no matter whether it is a Democrat or a Republican, I truly 

believe that we will always hold them dear and acknowledge the 

heroes that they are. Thank you for being here. 

Ambassador, you have worked tirelessly over the years to negotiate and implement the DOHA deal, as did many others in our 

government. And I have some questions I want to ask based upon 

your experience. They are mostly yes or no. So, we do not have to 

get into speculation and any things of that nature. 

Now, Secretary Pompeo himself—I think I have a picture here— 

had gone to DOHA to sign the agreement in a photo op with the 

Taliban leader, Mullah Baradar, after nearly two decades of being 

at war with them. And despite any criticisms of it, it is fair to say 

that concluding the DOHA deal was a big deal; it was a significant 

event, is that correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, signing it was a significant event. 

Mr. MEEKS. And with the conclusion of the DOHA deal, the 

Taliban, then, stopped attacking U.S. forces inside Afghanistan, 

fulfilling the top condition placed on it in the deal. Is that also correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Correct. 

Mr. MEEKS. And the United States committed in the DOHA deal 

to, quote, ‘‘withdraw from Afghanistan all military forces of the 

United States, its allies, and coalition partners, including all nondiplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, 

advisors, and supporting services personnel.’’ Is that not correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Correct. 

Mr. MEEKS. And arguably, that withdrawal was well underway 

in January 2021 after President Trump, according to Ambassador 

Smith’s statement for the record, quote, ‘‘steadily withdrew U.S. 
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forces, notwithstanding concerns about the Taliban’s behavior.’’ Is 

that correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Correct. We were down to 2500, as I said, yes. 

Mr. MEEKS. Right. And so, in your expert opinion, what did you 

think the Taliban would have done if President Biden, just a few 

months before the original May deadline that his predecessor had 

set for a full withdrawal, had just walked away entirely from the 

DOHA agreement, in your expert opinion? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. If we had walked away from the DOHA agreement, we would have been back, in my opinion—now I am offering 

an opinion—— 

Mr. MEEKS. Yes, your expert opinion. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. We would have been back and fighting the Taliban. So, we would have been back to where we were 

before the agreement. That is my opinion. 

Mr. MEEKS. Right. So, you spoke in your opening statement of 

the belief that imposing further conditions on the Taliban at that 

time, as you just stated, would risk a return to war. And you hold 

to that belief today, is that correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I do. 

Mr. MEEKS. And had President Biden sought to revise the deal 

to maintain a small number of troops in Afghanistan indefinitely, 

did the risk remain that the Taliban would resume attacks against 

them? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Very likely. 

Mr. MEEKS. So, I’m sure, Mr. Ambassador, you agree that the 

highest priority of the United States President should be to protect 

American lives, correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Correct. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

And even over other development or national security objectives, 

or even the welfare of our allies and partners? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Of course, this gets into a complicated discussion. We do put lives at risk in defense of our interests and our values, as we did in Afghanistan for many years. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me ask my last question—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. MEEKS [continuing]. Because I see I’m out of time. 

So, Mr. Ambassador, in your own belief, do you believe that 

President Biden’s completion of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 was necessary to protect American lives? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Certainly American lives in Afghanistan in 

terms of American military forces, yes. 

Mr. MEEKS. I thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Mr. MEEKS. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Ambassador, thank you for your service, and it is just so 

inspiring to be with you. So, we are grateful for what you have 

done for our country. 

And it is particularly a time for us to appreciate the success of 

the American military. 
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Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. WILSON. For 20 years, they stopped terrorist attacks in our 

country. And so, as people look back, we should appreciate the success of the American military. 

It is very personal to me. My former National Guard unit, the 

218th Mechanized Infantry of the South Carolina National Guard, 

led by General Bob Livingston, served for a year across Afghanistan, and they developed a great affection for their Afghan brothers. I was there four times seeing firsthand the success of what 

they were doing. 

And then, I am grateful my youngest son, First Lieutenant Hunter Wilson, was an engineer serving with the Army Guard for a 

year in Afghanistan. 

So, it is very personal to me, the absolute disgust I have with 

President Joe Biden. His shameful appeasement, surrender, and 

abandonment of the people of Afghanistan has led immediately to 

the death of 13 young Americans at Kabul airport, even though the 

sniper had the mass-murdering individual bomber in his sights, 

which could have saved the 13 lives and could have saved, indeed, 

hundreds of poor Afghan citizens who were murdered. But yet, the 

Biden rules of engagement came into play and 13 young Americans 

died. 

And with that, too, it has also given encouragement to what we 

are into now which we did not choose. And that is a war, dictators 

with rule of gun invading democracies with rule of law. We saw 

that on February 24th, 2022, when War Criminal Putin invaded 

Ukraine. We saw it October 7th, when Hamas, the puppets of Iran, 

invaded Israel. We see it today with the threats being made 

against the 24 million people of Taiwan by the Chinese Communist 

Party. 

All of this to me goes back to the shameless, shameful decision 

which I think is the most catastrophic in the history of the United 

States in terms of national defense, security, and foreign police, 

and there is no excuse, however they rewrite history, God bless 

their hearts. 

But, then, additionally, we should always remember that America was in Afghanistan and liberated Afghanistan from Taliban terrorists because of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Again, history 

should not be rewritten. What happened is Osama bin Laden was 

operating out of a cave in Afghanistan. 

And so, for 20 years, indeed, our military was successful to protect, but, sadly, we now, by abandoning Afghanistan, the global 

war on terrorism is not over. It is coming to America. The FBI has 

identified that we are great risk of attack imminently today in 

America that could occur. And so, it is just shameful what occurred. 

Additionally, a question I have is that, on August 26th, 2021, 

when President Biden excused his appeasement, and right in the 

middle of his speech, he was explaining his advisors had said to 

just abandon; leave now, and then, he threw in—it was not on the 

teleprompter—‘‘I have letters.’’ 

OK. I sent him, and asked that night, I asked for copies of the 

letters of the advice that he received to abandon the people of Afghanistan. And it should not surprise you, about every 2 months, 
20 

I send a letter to the White House asking for the letters. There are 

no letters; they have not been revealed. But what advice was given 

by his advisors on leaving the people of Afghanistan to fall off jets 

as the abandonment took place? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, I believe that our military, under the leadership of the President and the chain of command, did an admirable job in a very difficult set of circumstances to get as many people out, as some 125,000 people were brought out. 

So, I associate myself with your praise of our military. I had the 

honor of serving with them in Afghanistan and in Iraq. And they 

have done an outstanding job for the people of the United States 

and our security. 

With regard to what you mentioned, sir, about the letters and 

advice, I do not have a direct knowledge of what it is that was involved there. But the advice was to bring out as many people as 

possible, to reach out to as many Americans and those who had 

worked for us or for organizations that worked for us, to bring 

them out. And a huge number was brought out. 

Mr. WILSON. Again, thank you for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Throughout the relevant period, we had two 

choices: keep a force there, particularly with air power, and be prepared to incur modest casualties, or pull out. The foreign policy establishment wanted to stay. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The dissent cables said, ‘‘Stay.’’ The politicians 

promised the American people we would pull out—not because our 

casualties were particularly large, but because they were on top of 

20 years of war. 

We were defeated militarily in achieving our full goals in Afghanistan not by the Taliban, but by the phrase ‘‘Forever War.’’ Once 

that phrase was coined, the American people demanded we withdraw. 

Now, I know there is pressure on the chairman to politicize this 

committee and achieve the political objectives of his party, but this 

hearing is going to give politicization a bad name because it is the 

worst issue for the Republicans to bring up. 

Because, Ambassador, this agreement, this DOHA agreement, is 

the worst agreement I could imagine. I do not blame you. Because 

President Trump—well, you had testified in your testimony, by the 

end of 2018, it was well known that President Trump’s decision 

was to bring all American forces home from Afghanistan. In 2019, 

on the anniversary of 9/11, he invited them to Camp David, and 

just before the November 2020 election, President Trump stated, 

‘‘We will have the small remaining number of our brave men and 

women serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas.’’ 

So, the only leverage you had over the Taliban is maybe we will 

take that foreign policy approach and keep our Air Force capacity 

there. And you have got the President saying, President Trump 

saying, they’re all home by Christmas, every single one of them. 
21 

So, this is the worst agreement I could imagine. Ambassador, is 

there anything in the agreement where the Taliban commit themselves to allowing 13-year-old girls to go to school? I did not find 

anything like that. Is there in there? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. The Taliban—there is nothing in the agreement. 

The issues dealing with the future of Afghanistan was to be negotiated—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. But the agreement itself—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. Among the Afghans, between the 

two sides. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The purpose of this hearing is to say, why did not 

we enforce the agreement? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But when the Taliban treats 12-year-old girls like 

sex slaves, when they kill members of the LGBT community, when 

they kill anyone who converts from Islam to Christianity, they are 

not in violation of this agreement that we are having a hearing to 

say, why aren’t we enforcing? They are not in violation. You cannot 

enforce it. We entered into an agreement in which they agreed to 

do nothing more than talk to the Afghan government. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. SHERMAN. They talked. They decided they wanted to kill the 

LGBTQ community; they wanted to kill what they call apostates. 

They wanted to, basically, enslave half the human race, the female 

half. 

So, this agreement was so bad that the chairman attacks President Biden for not withdrawing from it. This is an agreement entered into by the man who claims he is the best negotiator in the 

world, President Trump. 

I will say that we did achieve one objective, and that is Afghanistan is not uniquely situated to serve as a base for terrorism 

against America, and, in fact, there has been more terrorism coming out of Afghanistan killing Iranians in Iran than killing Americans. 

There is no such thing as an easy withdrawal. As the Ambassador pointed out, Russia and Britain had very messy withdrawals 

from Afghanistan, and our withdrawal from Vietnam was messy as 

well. 

That was particularly true when every English-speaking Afghan 

I had any acquaintance with was trying to leave, the idea that the 

average grunt in Afghanistan would stay in fight is absurd. 

But I do have one more question. And that is, the Republicans 

have said that somehow we should have gone over Afghanistan and 

collected our $85 billion worth of weapons, presumably from people 

who knew that they could keep them for their own self-defense or 

sell them to the Taliban. Could we have, by force, taken back our 

weapons everywhere in Afghanistan on our way out without casualties? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you, sir. 

As you know, the weapons that were left behind were weapons 

that we thought was safe to leave behind for the government of Afghanistan since—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Even if we had realized the government was useless, could we have seized them without casualties? 
22 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Now we are speculating. Because the government, we assumed, would not fall apart before our withdrawal. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador, it was more of a rhetorical question. 

If people have weapons they want to hold onto, you cannot take 

them away if you are not willing to incur some casualties. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, I’m over here. 

In September 2020, you appeared before the House Oversight 

Committee and testified that the U.S. troop withdrawal would be 

determined based—and I’m going to quote you—‘‘based on conditions on the ground and delivery by the Taliban on their commitment.’’ 

Did you or Secretary Blinken advocate for an extension on the 

withdrawal date, considering the poor planning behind the final 

evacuation as it occurred? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. As I said, sir, 4 months were added to the timetable, moving from 14 to 18. But, as I said again, the decision was 

made to withdraw at the end of August and not to link it to any 

conditions that you might have in mind. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, that was your quote, ‘‘conditions.’’ So, I think 

Americans have in mind that it would be a condition-based withdrawal, which makes sense. You provide some kind of—when I say, 

‘‘you,’’ our adversary, so to speak—you provide some level of compliance with the agreement that we can see, and then, we will give 

you a little. But that is not what occurred. 

I’m just wondering if you can name a single concession made by 

the Taliban during the time period between the April 14th announcement by the President, by President Biden, of total withdrawal and the fall of Afghanistan. What concessions? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, one concession was that they acquiesce to 

the addition of 4 months that we demanded. 

Mr. PERRY. Of foreign what? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Four months—— 

Mr. PERRY. Four months. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. Was demanded of additional time. 

They could have rejected it and gone back to fighting. They did not; 

they acquiesced. 

Too, they agreed not to enter Kabul, when we asked. They 

agreed to sit and agreed to a government that would include members of the republican side, the government side. 

Mr. PERRY. But those agreements, as you know, were hallow because they took more and more and more of the government under 

their control, which was not in the DOHA agreement, which was 

not what was considered, which was not what was agreed to. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, they—— 

Mr. PERRY. And they did invade Kabul. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, they did because—they agreed not to, and 

then, there was to be negotiations—— 

Mr. PERRY. And so, they lied to us. So, it wasn’t based, the withdrawal was not based on conditions on the ground. And I’m wondering, did you convey these concerns to President Biden during 
23 

the continuing negotiations about the blatant violations—blatant. 

They were blatant. The whole world saw them as they were occurring. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Certainly, I’m not here to defend the behavior of 

the Talibs or the Taliban. 

Mr. PERRY. None of us are; I get that. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. But I believe that—— 

Mr. PERRY. I’m trying to—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. Insisting on additional conditions—— 

Mr. PERRY. We are not asking for additional conditions, just the 

conditions that they agreed to. And I’m trying to determine, knowing that—you knew that. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Sure. 

Mr. PERRY. The world saw that. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. PERRY. The President saw that. I’m assuming—maybe I 

shouldn’t be—but I’m assuming you advised him of that. The Secretary advised him of that. But he proceeded anyway. That’s—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. He proceeded to withdraw forces because he believed, if he persisted, we would be back to a fight, and he did not 

want to do that. 

Mr. PERRY. So, just out of curiosity, in the remaining time, who 

chose the 20th anniversary of 9/11 as the final evacuation day? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I actually do not know that. 

Mr. PERRY. Did you ever question that? I mean, maybe it is not 

as important, impactful to you as it is for the rest of Americans, 

but that’s pretty significant. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I agree with that, but I think, therefore, an adjustment was made to the end of August as the final date of withdrawal. 

Mr. PERRY. But it was September 11th. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. The initial announcement was, you know as well 

as I do, but I think—— 

Mr. PERRY. You do not know who made the decision? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I do not—well, the President, obviously, made 

the decision, but I do not know who advised him on choosing that 

date. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, the President is the Commander-in-Chief, regardless—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. Of who advised him. 

Now, it was said that the President wanted to withdraw, and you 

even kind of just reminded us, because it was to protect American 

lives and to lessen the loss of American lives. But you would also 

concede that the time coming into that during the previous Administration there had been no loss of American lives. And once the decision was made and the plan executed, there was a horrific loss 

of American lives. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, the loss of life that did not occur under 

President Trump’s Administration—— 

Mr. PERRY. We will never know what did not occur, sir. What we 

know did occur, and that the previous Administration’s plan com-
24 

ing into it during that period of time, a long period of time, there 

was no loss of American service members’ lives. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Because of the agreement. 

Mr. PERRY. No, no, it wasn’t because of the agreement. The 

Taliban wasn’t following the agreement or abiding by the agreement. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well—— 

Mr. PERRY. It was because the President let the Taliban know 

that, if they killed any American lives, it was going to be over for 

them. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. You know, I—— 

Mr. PERRY. I yield the balance. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First off, as a Gold Star family myself—my uncle was killed in 

action—I just want to recognize and thank the families that are 

here. I want to be sure we thank, first and foremost, and give our 

eternal gratitude to their service and their sacrifice. 

The purpose of undertaking the overall investigation of Afghanistan was to look to 20-plus years and to try to find out lessons 

learned, things that we could do differently. And the goal is—and 

I think I share it, and I’m sure the families here share it—to prevent future lives from being lost. Can we learn something over this 

period of time that will save other families and save other brave 

Americans from that sacrifice? So, that is my goal, over 20 years, 

looking at this. 

And I cannot really sit here at this moment in time talking about 

saving future American lives without just indicating something else 

that is happening right here in this House right now, and that is 

not acting on aid to Ukraine. 

Why is that relevant to this? Because when we can fund Ukrainians defending themselves against an illegal war from Russia that 

is a direct and present danger to the United States and our allies, 

and we can confront this threat with funding Ukraine, and by 

doing that, confront Russia, deter other threats—threats that could 

be in China and Taiwan—in the process, and keep young American 

men and women from being deployed under Article 5. If Ukraine 

falls, Putin has made it clear he is going into the Baltic states, 

which are NATO states. 

So, in the theme of trying to save future American lives, I hope 

that the Speaker has the courage to even allow democracy that so 

many people fought for a chance to have a vote on this. 

Now, when it comes to Ukraine, Mr. Ambassador, you know, I 

did not get to choose who is here. I did not get to choose the title 

that says ‘‘the Biden Administration failed.’’ Again, I prefer to look 

at this over 20-plus years. 

But I would quote, given the comments of some of my colleague, 

a quote from former U.S. Ambassador John Bass, who said our 

main policy efforts—and he was the Ambassador, as you are 

aware—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. He was. 

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. Under President Trump—our main 

policy efforts not only did not reinforce each other; they contra-
25 

dicted each other. These contrary signals were amplified by President Trump’s periodic statements supporting rapid force reductions. Taken together, they undermined Afghan’s confidence in a 

U.S. security commitment and in their own armed service and government—something that you alluded to, Mr. Ambassador, the lack 

of confidence that spelled itself out with the Afghan government 

and their military. 

I guess I would just leave with this, and hope that we can undertake, as a committee, really our emphasis on what went wrong; 

what we can learn; learn from our military; learn from our diplomats. There was plenty that went wrong and it had dire consequences in many instances. 

But, in terms of limiting this hearing to how the Biden Administration failed, I will just end with one quote, and that quote occurred on June 26th, 2021. It was at a political campaign rally 

afterwards by the former President. And quote, ‘‘I started this process. All the troops are coming home. They couldn’t stop this process.’’ Unquote. 

So, let’s not have this hearing center on who is the last person 

holding the ball when the music ended, but, rather, sincerely looking at what we can do to prevent other tragedies; what we can 

learn from this, and how we can save young American men and 

women from being in harm’s way when they do not have to be. 

They have the courage to be there when they have to be. The decisions that are made are not there. 

I will never forget, when I first became a Congressman, I went 

to one of our members serving in a war zone and I asked him what 

he thought about the war. And he said, ‘‘Well, sir, my job is to 

serve.’’ 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. KEATING. ‘‘That question is yours to answer, respectfully.’’ 

That is why we are here. That is why we are trying to learn. That 

is why we are trying to save more American lives in the future. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. 

The chair recognizes Mrs. Wagner. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank the chairman. 

And I thank the Ambassador for being here and for his service. 

Today, more than 2 years after the Biden Administration’s 

shameful, tragic, and utterly misguided flight from Afghanistan, it 

has become clear that the President was determined to abandon 

the country at any cost and with no conditions. The cost in lost 

military assets and our credibility as a friend and ally, and global 

leader, and most of all, in precious American lives, was incalculable. 

Again and again, the Administration proved that it was willing 

to simply cede Afghanistan to the Taliban, irrespective of the 

Taliban’s clear intent to ignore all commitments and agreements. 

The responsibility, the absolute debacle in Afghanistan, rests on 

this Administration’s shoulders, period. 

And there must be accountability. There has been no accountability for the Administration’s total failure to protect U.S. troops 

and citizens. 
26 

Ambassador Khalilzad, did countries in NATO argue against a 

full U.S. troop withdrawal? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. They did—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. They did. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. As subject to a political agreement 

that I mentioned to the chairman. 

Mrs. WAGNER. How did Russia and China respond to the Taliban 

takeover? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I do not know for sure, but it seems to me that 

they would have preferred a political settlement. They stated at 

least that they would have a preferred a political settlement. I was 

always suspicious of their motivations. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Sometimes they would want a political settlement, but they knew that there is no easy path to a political settlement. They also would have liked to have kept us in Afghanistan 

in a difficult situation, doing what they wanted us to do, in part, 

which is to get the terrorists that were focused on them eliminated 

by us, and paying a price without winning. 

So, we had to be careful in terms of the Russian and Talib activities, yes. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Ambassador, I know that this was touched on before, but Afghanistan—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I could talk some more, if we were in a different 

setting, about their policies, but this is what I can say in this setting. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

And it is more concerning to me that NATO was against—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mrs. WAGNER [continuing]. A full troop withdrawal. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Afghanistan—and this was touched on—is now 

ranked worst of 177 countries in terms of the status of women, according to the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. Did you believe the 

Taliban would respect women’s rights and allow girls to go to 

school? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I did not trust them. They did make statements 

on the record, video statements, that they would allow girls to go 

to school, all the way through not only college, but to a PhD. This 

is on the record that they have made, but—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. But they did not do it. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. They have not lived up to it. 

Mrs. WAGNER. They did not do it. They did not do it—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. They did not do it. 

Mrs. WAGNER [continuing]. And you did not trust them? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Why did not U.S. negotiators press the Taliban to 

extend the withdrawal date beyond August 31 to facilitate the 

evacuation? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. That was according to the President’s decision 

not to. He had asked for 4 months, as I mentioned before, but that 

was his decision not to ask for an additional extension. 

Mrs. WAGNER. President Biden’s? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. President Biden, yes. 
27 

Mrs. WAGNER. The Taliban issued threats to attack U.S. troops 

if they stayed longer than the August 31 deadline. Ambassador, did 

you consider this to be the actions of a responsible partner of 

peace? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, that consideration, that if an additional extension was asked for, it wasn’t asked. But if an additional extension was asked for, perhaps it could lead to this restart of the fight, 

and that is why perhaps the decision was made not to ask for more 

time. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Well, they threatened our U.S. troops—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mrs. WAGNER [continuing]. If they stayed on day longer—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mrs. WAGNER [continuing]. Than August 31. 

What was your assessment throughout 2021 of whether the 

Taliban was meeting the conditions of the DOHA agreement? And 

how about in April 2021? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, it always was my personal judgment that, 

to get the Taliban to do what they have agreed to do, we have to 

respond with our commitment in a way that incentivizes them to 

do what they have committed to do—meaning that we wouldn’t do 

what we have committed to unless they do what they have committed to doing. That was my point of view and that was my advice. 

Mrs. WAGNER. My time has ended here, and I yield back. Thank 

you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentlelady yields. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Castro. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Thank you, Ambassador, for your testimony today. 

In your prepared testimony, you said, quote, ‘‘By the end of 2018, 

as is well known, the President’s decision was to bring home American forces from Afghanistan.’’ We have also heard testimony in 

multiple closed-door transcribed interviews with senior State Department officials to this effect. 

In other words, that the withdrawal of all U.S. troops—the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Afghanistan began in February 2020, 

as part of the agreement you negotiated between the United States 

and the Taliban. Can you provide examples of how President 

Trump’s decision to withdraw all U.S. troops was apparent and, 

quote, ‘‘well known’’ beginning in 2018? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, and the President tweeted to that effect 

multiple times. I would give a reference to Secretary Pompeo’s book 

in which he documents the President’s determination. And, of 

course, when I had my meetings with the President, he always 

made that clear, that that was the objective. 

Mr. CASTRO. So, let me ask you: so, it is fair to say the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan began as a result of the February 2020 

DOHA agreement under President Trump? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Indeed. 

Mr. CASTRO. And do you believe that sentiment to withdraw all 

troops was known or suspected by the Taliban when you were negotiating with them? And what informs this belief? 
28 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, the public statements. Sometimes the 

Taliban would say that I was not following in my negotiations the 

letter or the spirit of what was being said publicly by saying we 

would only withdraw if certain conditions are met, while sometimes 

statements would be made that provided, that created the impression as if we would withdraw regardless. And so—— 

Mr. CASTRO. So, you feel like that was undermining at the time 

of your negotiating? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, but that is for others to judge, but the 

challenge is as I described. The challenge was as I described. 

Mr. CASTRO. And so, how did that fact, how did that situation— 

the conflicting statements, and so forth; the fact that the Taliban 

had a sense at least or suspected that there would be a total withdrawal—how did that affect your ability to negotiate the DOHA 

deal with them? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, it was not helpful, but, also, however, I 

tried to educate them not to take public statements made for a variety of reasons as the definitive final word, because circumstances 

could change; that we needed a good agreement, as good as possible, given the statements that were being made. Because without 

having such an agreement, they might hear a statement very different than the statement that I heard. 

Mr. CASTRO. From the President or the Secretary of State, or 

some high-ranking U.S. official? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Indeed. 

Mr. CASTRO. Yes. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. CASTRO. And you negotiated this deal. Was there ever any 

doubt that it what it committed the United States to do was to 

draw down its military fully from the country? Basically, to go to 

zero? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, that was, clearly, in the agreement, but the 

idea of perhaps leaving some forces behind was there, not in the 

agreement. We had raised it with the Talibs. It became an understanding—I have to be careful how I articulate this—that if there 

is an agreement between the government of Afghanistan and the 

Taliban, and there is a new unity government, the issue of a residual U.S. presence would be decided by that government. But, as 

well, they could never agree to—— 

Mr. CASTRO. Sure. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. Themselves—— 

Mr. CASTRO. Well, let me ask you, in light of these facts to which 

you have testified, would it be reasonable to say that the withdrawal began in 2020? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. CASTRO. And that it wasn’t—that it wasn’t the sole decision 

of one U.S. President in 2021? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Agreed. 

Mr. CASTRO. The Trump Administration initiated the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan by negotiating and, ultimately, concluding the DOHA deal in February 2020 with an explicit aim to 

withdraw all American troops in the country in 14 months. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 
29 

Mr. CASTRO. The Trump Administration’s implementation of this 

deal set in motion the formal U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Agree. I would advise that, if we could think 

about withdrawal, and then, the way the final phase withdrawal 

happened, that is, I think, a distinction that we should keep in 

mind. 

Mr. CASTRO. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Mast. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Chairman. 

I would start by touching on the last statement that you just 

said. There is the withdrawal, and then, there is, essentially, the 

way that it is conducted. You could say that about any sporting 

event, any athletic event, anything that you are planning on doing 

in the future. You know, you might plan to have a Super Bowl, but 

there is the way that the game is played. And that is what ultimately counts, is what do you do when you get onto the ground, 

as they say, where the metal meets the meat. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. MAST. So, I want to ask a few questions about that, and I 

want to ask a few questions about the conditions for the Biden Administration. 

Did the Biden Administration execute or operate on a plan that 

there are no conditions; there is no line, no threshold, no red line, 

anything that was going to prevent them from being out of Afghanistan on the day they wanted? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Let me understand what you are asking. Certainly, the desire to complete the withdrawal by the end of August 

was that any stay beyond that risks the restart of the war, which 

was a driving factor, as I understood it. 

Mr. MAST. So, to say it again—I’m not going to try to put words 

in your mouth—was there anything that was going to stop them 

from leaving on the day that they wanted to leave? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. That would be speculating, of course, but I 

would reState that avoiding the restart of the war was the most 

important factor shaping decisions. 

Mr. MAST. I wonder if, in fact, it would be speculating or not be 

speculating. Because, as you have spoken about, as you have been 

questioned about, and as you offered up in interviews previously, 

you made your recommendations to the Administration. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. MAST. And you said, you know, listen, there is continuation 

of expecting full adherence with the provisions, the conditions, of 

the DOHA agreement. That is a recommendation, and I believe 

that was your recommendation: make the Taliban uphold to those 

provisions. 

There is scrap the DOHA agreement as though it never existed 

and create your own conditions, President Biden, and tell the 

Taliban this is what you want. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. MAST. Or there is forget about the conditions of the DOHA 

agreement and, one way or another, you are leaving when you 

want to leave. 
30 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. MAST. He chose, my understanding is, forget the conditions 

of the agreement; we are leaving when we want to leave. We are 

leaving on the date that we demand to leave. We are not leaving 

on any other date, is that correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, the additional 4 months was the only factor 

that changed from the timetable. Otherwise, you are right. 

Mr. MAST. And we know he chose September 11 to begin with. 

I’m just going to ask one more question. Do you know who pays 

the price ultimately for bad foreign policy? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. All of us. 

Mr. MAST. Who—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Especially the Armed Forces, of course. 

Mr. MAST. That is exactly right. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. And I want to associate myself with—— 

Mr. MAST. How many people—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. All the comments—— 

Mr. MAST. How many people paid the price for his bad foreign 

policy? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, of course, ISIS attacked. We knew that 

they were out to attack and we demanded steps by the Taliban to 

preclude or prevent the attack. And General McKenzie on the 

record has said that, despite the fact that he is very hostile toward 

the Taliban, that they did everything we asked for. So, it was an 

ISIS attack that killed 13 brave Americans. And the Taliban-U.S. 

cooperation to prevent that did not succeed. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you for the time today. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. 

The chair recognizes Ms. Titus. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, on June 26th, 2021, a person at a rally said 

this. Tell me who said this: ‘‘I started the process. All the troops 

are coming back home. They couldn’t stop the process. Twenty-one 

years is enough, do not you think? Twenty-one years, they couldn’t 

stop the process.’’ 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I suspect that is President Trump. 

Ms. TITUS. That is correct. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Ms. TITUS. So, does not that suggest that he was acknowledging 

that the process he started could not be stopped without some consequences? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I cannot speculate, but it was about whether 

others could stop it, although it is my judgment that President 

Biden, if he wanted to, he could have. That is my personal—— 

Ms. TITUS. Well, let me ask you this: you just said a few minutes 

ago to Mrs. Wagner, when she was asking you about the Taliban’s 

commitment to education of women—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Mm-hmm. 

Ms. TITUS [continuing]. Virtually, that we have to live up to our 

obligation in order to make them live up to theirs. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. You are right. 

Ms. TITUS. Now, what if we had not withdrawn those troops? 

What if we had not lived up to our obligation? Wouldn’t that have 
31 

had consequences that were not what were desirable? Hadn’t they 

already stopped attacking U.S. troops before this, and if we had left 

troops there, we had not met our obligation, who knows what they 

would have done? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. You are absolutely right. 

Ms. TITUS. OK. So, we can speculate that whatever they would 

have done probably wouldn’t have been good, because the chairman 

said, ‘‘I cannot trust the Taliban’’—or ‘‘We cannot trust the 

Taliban.’’ And you said, ‘‘I do not trust the Taliban.’’ 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Ms. TITUS. So, why did we enter into an agreement with the 

Taliban with no accountability measures, no way to hold them to 

their commitments, if we cannot trust them? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, we enter agreements—we are talking 

about international politics with people that we do not trust. We 

did it during arms control with the Soviets. Remember President 

Reagan said, ‘‘Trust, but verify.’’ 

Ms. TITUS. Right. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. And the way to incentivize the other side when 

you have an agreement to adhere is that you won’t do what they 

want from you unless they do what they have agreed to doing. So, 

that is the way it works. And then, you have your information system to monitor are they living up to the agreement or not. And 

then, you bring that information into the negotiation and the implementation of the agreement. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, did you have any way to monitor what they 

were doing? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Absolutely, we had a way, maybe not perfectly. 

We did have, we did have information. We, in fact, did reports, my 

office did with the Department of Defense together on, for example, 

what were they doing in terms of terrorism; what they had agreed 

with us to do or not to do, and then, what they were doing. And 

we were sending those reports out—— 

Ms. TITUS. Let me ask you about that, since you mentioned terrorism. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Ms. TITUS. We made the deal that they were no longer going to 

be a base or a support for terrorism. And yet, did not we find that 

Al Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri there—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Sure. 

Ms. TITUS [continuing]. And take him out with a drone? So, obviously, they weren’t living up to that obligation. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. But that was a—violations happen in 

agreements. That was a flagrant violation. 

Ms. TITUS. Yes, it was. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. And then, we took action and that we did. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, how did you miss that, if you were monitoring, 

and then, we wouldn’t—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, we, obviously—this happened after the 

withdrawal had been completed. So, the monitoring system worked. 

We found him, and then, we took action that the Taliban said we 

shouldn’t have. But we had made it clear that we would do what 

is necessary to protect the American people, and we took the action 

that the President did, and I applauded that action. 
32 

Ms. TITUS. Well, what else have they done that we caught 

through any kind of monitoring that was perhaps was not desirable? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, we are watching their counterterrorism 

commitments, the implementation of it. And I’m not in the government now, and you can, I’m sure, see reports that they do. From 

what I see on the outside now—and this is my opinion—it appears 

that we believe they are largely adhering to those, to those commitments. 

Ms. TITUS. But not to the education of women, apparently? 

If we had left some troops there, like some people have suggested 

we should have done, do you not think that would have had consequences for what they would have done, aside from the DOHA 

agreement? If we had violated our half, our part, and left some 

troops there, do you think they would have just said, ‘‘Oh, well, 

OK.’’? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. The judgment was—and you, obviously, rely on 

a lot of people, intelligence, on coming to a judgment—was that we 

would be back to fighting if we did that. If we unilaterally said, 

‘‘We are not withdrawing all our forces,’’ although we agreed that 

we would, and that we may be back and fighting. And as I said, 

President Biden decided to withdraw all the forces. 

Ms. TITUS. But did you, do you agree with that? Or you thought 

we should leave them there and risk fighting? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, I supported the idea, that not going back 

to war and—but one would have reopened some negotiations. That 

is something different on the—— 

Ms. TITUS. I think the American people did not want us to go 

back to war. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The chair now recognizes Mr. Davidson. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I appreciate you 

being here today. Thank you for your service to our country, and 

I appreciate your testimony today. 

Hopefully, it helps us learn what we can from Afghanistan and 

apply it, not just to provide accountability and truth for the record, 

but for action in the future. 

I spent my life from 18 to 30 in the Army. I was fortunate to get 

to serve in the 75th Ranger Regiment. And one of the core missions 

that we trained on was non-combatant evacuation operations. In 

none of those training scenarios—and I never did it live; we trained 

for it—but in Afghanistan that was the mission. It was a non-combatant evacuation operation. In no training scenario that I’m aware 

of did we have a plan to ever take the military out first, and then, 

hope that somehow the civilians would get out. Have you ever 

heard of such a doctrine anywhere? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, of course, I applaud you for your service. 

I have had the great honor of serving with our brave men and 

women in Iraq and Afghanistan and they have inspired me, and I 

very much associate myself with what you said. 

I think the problem was, in my judgment—and I said it before— 

is that we planned for a single scenario, and that scenario was that 
33 

the government and its troops would survive our withdrawal and 

for some time thereafter. And that is what informed, I think, the 

sequencing, it is my judgment, the sequencing—— 

Mr. DAVIDSON. So, you believe that the State Department actually believed that they would trust the lives of American citizens 

to the Taliban? Because they weren’t there themselves, frankly. 

They were ready to get out of town. And they thought that we 

could get ourselves out; we can get the military out, and we’ll just 

trust the Taliban to finish the job. That was the plan? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, it was to work with the government of Afghanistan, with the troops of the Afghan government that we had 

trained and equipped to deal with the withdrawal period, and then, 

for a period after the withdrawal. The plan was to maintain some 

forces after the withdrawal was completed at Kabul airport and to 

protect the embassy. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Yes. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. And I believe that assumption—and I keep repeating that because several of your colleagues are mentioning lessons learned—is that we do not plan, as one lesson that I have 

learned from the outside, for a single scenario. We have to plan for 

alternative scenarios and how we would digress from one to the 

other. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Well, regardless of how many alternatives we 

had, that seemed like a particularly bad plan. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. And now, with the benefit of hindsight, I think 

everyone can agree that it was, in fact, a bad plan. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. In this respect, it does, it is—it was problematic, 

but I explained to you what the assumption was. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. I understand. I understand. But, in 2004, you 

wrote an op-ed in The Washington Post titled, quote, ‘‘Afghanistan’s Milestone,’’ which I would like to submit for the record, Mr. 

Chairman. This op-ed covered the country’s approval of a new constitution. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. However, I want to read aloud some sentences 

that you wrote. 

Quote: ‘‘Afghanistan has sent a compelling message to the rest 

of the world that, by investing in that country’s development, the 

United States is investing in success. Americans can take pride in 

the role that we played in leading the multilateral effort to support 

Afghan democratization. President Bush’s decision to increase aid 

to Afghanistan, which will likely total more than $2 billion in fiscal 

2004, will accelerate reconstruction of the country’s national army, 

police force, economic infrastructures, schools, and medical system.’’ 

You finished this op-ed by writing, quote, ‘‘Our work in Afghanistan is not yet done. It will take several years and sustained commitment of significant resources by the United States and the 

international community before the country can stand on its own 

feet. Given the stakes involved, we must remain committed for as 

long as it takes’’—I have heard that phrase before—‘‘to succeed.’’ 

Do you think we were successful—— 

Chairman MCCAUL. And without objection, it is entered into the 

record. 
34 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you, Chairman. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
35 
36 

Mr. DAVIDSON. What can we learn about nation-building? It 

seems pretty foolish to me. I will admit it seemed foolish at the 

time. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, yes, I supported President Bush’s vision for 

transforming not only Afghanistan, but the broader Middle East. 

His vision was that problems of that region was—— 

Mr. DAVIDSON. The goals are always nice. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. And if we judge things by what people say they 

aspire to, it always sounds so good. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. It was aspirational. That was aspirational. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. But the execution is problematic. And I will say 

that, frankly, that same phrase, ‘‘as long as it takes,’’ ‘‘as much as 

it takes’’—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. DAVIDSON [continuing]. Is the only public plan the Biden Administration has laid out for Ukraine. And other than that—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. DAVIDSON [continuing]. I do not see any tie to Ukraine here. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I associate—— 

Mr. DAVIDSON. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields back. 

Ms. Wild is recognized. 

Ms. WILD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Ambassador, thank you so much for your testimony—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Ms. WILD [continuing]. Here today. 

Before I begin my question, I just want us all to take a moment 

to remember the 13 U.S. service members who lost their lives on 

August 26th of 2021 while conducting the evacuation. I know that 

every member of this committee joins me in paying tribute to their 

families, as well as to the families of all service members who put 

their lives on the line over the course of our country’s longest war. 

We will continue to honor them and we will never forget their sacrifices 

On August 26th of 2021, I spent much of the day on the phone 

with a constituent, a mother whose son had very abruptly been 

sent to Afghanistan to assist in the evacuation. He was stationed 

at the airport, and she did not hear from him the entire day. And 

you can imagine the stress and anxiety that she had as we got the 

news that service members had been lost. So, I will never forget 

that. 

And, you know, it is our obligation, when we send men and 

women in uniform into harm’s way, that we continually ensure 

that they have the support that they need and that the mission 

they are being asked to conduct is in our national interest and is 

achievable; and that their partners on the ground are willing to 

make the same kind of sacrifices that our troops are making every 

day. 

So, my question I think is simple, but it is probably a complicated answer. It deals with the fundamental underlying reality 

here. Why over the course of 20 years in Afghanistan did Administrations of both parties fail to correctly assess the level of dedication and cohesion of the Afghan forces and its political leadership? 
37 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, that’s, obviously, an excellent question, 

and there are lessons to be learned—that we have to focus sharply 

on that. We spent a lot of resources, a lot of effort. The forces were 

of varying qualities. They sacrificed a lot. Some 70,000 perhaps, 

60,000 to 70,000 Afghan soldiers and policemen died during the period—— 

Ms. WILD. No question. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. We were there. But what happened 

to them, our assessment was that they would do a lot better after 

our withdrawal. 

Ms. WILD. Understood, but my real question is, how did we fail 

so badly at that—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, that—— 

Ms. WILD [continuing]. Over the 20 years? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. We did. 

Ms. WILD. I mean, we know that there was a division in the intelligence community—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Ms. WILD [continuing]. With the CIA on one side—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Ms. WILD [continuing]. And the Pentagon on the other side—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Ms. WILD [continuing]. On the effectiveness of training the Afghan forces. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Ms. WILD. And I’m not asking you to go into classified information in a public setting. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Ms. WILD. But can you speak broadly to these—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Ms. WILD [continuing]. Divergent perspectives and what interests they may have been driven by? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. One is perhaps the way we build the armed 

forces needs to be a question. Many people would argue that the 

Afghans, teaching them how to fight shouldn’t have been a difficult 

task. The way we organized them perhaps to fight, their recruitment, sustainment, organization maybe were not appropriate for 

the circumstances. Perhaps that would be one. 

And second would be to what extent politics and the divisions in 

the country affected the force. I was very concerned. I spent a lot 

of time in 2020 because two candidates announced themselves as 

presidents, two presidents. And here was a possible scenario in 

which some forces were going to go with one candidate, the forces 

we invested so much in, and some would have gone with the other. 

And you would have had—already you are at war with the Talibs, 

and then, you will have another war inside the republic side. 

So, there are lessons to be learned and—— 

Ms. WILD. Well, I’m just going to stop you there because I only 

have another 30 seconds. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Sure. 

Ms. WILD. But I have a very deep concern that from Vietnam to 

Afghanistan to Iraq—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 
38 

Ms. WILD [continuing]. And who knows in the current situation 

in the world?—we keep seeing politicization of intelligence—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Ms. WILD [continuing]. To sort of fit a pre-designed agenda and 

what seems to be a cherry-picking of intelligence and data that Administrations may use to tell the story that they want to tell, not 

necessarily the reality. And that is what I want to see us get away 

from. 

With that, I thank you very much. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Sure. 

Ms. WILD. I’m sorry we do not have more time, and I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentlelady yields. 

The chair recognizes Mrs. Kim. 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Chairman, for holding today’s hearing. 

And I want to thank you, Ambassador, for making yourself available—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA [continuing]. And coming before our 

committee today. 

Since the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, under the 

Biden Administration, all hard-fought progress and basic freedoms 

and rights for Afghan women have vanished. Women made incredible gains in the classroom; played an active role in the Afghan 

government and free press, and participated in the workforce side 

by side with their male coworkers. 

When the Taliban seized power, one of their first actions was to 

ban girls from attending secondary school. They eliminated the Afghan Commission to Eliminate Violence Against Women; banned 

women from working at NGO’s, and started restricting women’s access to public areas. Decades of work on women and girls went 

down the drain in a matter of weeks. As a woman, this is deeply 

personal to me. 

It has been raised several times today that you presented the Administration with several power-sharing proposals that we give the 

Taliban partial or majority control of the Afghan government. So, 

what did these peace plans say about women’s rights and participation in the Afghan government? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. We did give one plan to accelerate the negotiations. Since we wanted to see the optimal outcome, the better options would have been an agreement before withdrawal was completed. And in those draft proposals, Afghanistan’s adherence to 

international standards on human rights, respect for the rights of 

all Afghan citizens—men, women, minorities, children—were all 

specified in the draft that we shared with them to assist with accelerating the negotiations, yes. 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Ambassador, did you think that the 

Taliban would be willing to share power of the Afghan government 

with women? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, we had them say to us—and they say it 

publicly and on videos—that women could be ministers; women 

could be active in all parts of life. What has happened since has 

been a violation of those statements that are on the record, not to 

me alone, but—— 
39 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Say what they—yes, they actually did 

not follow them. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. To the whole world they said that. 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Yes. Their words and actions did not 

match. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. You know, the Taliban was often cited 

as stating to the United States, ‘‘You might have the watches, but 

we have the time.’’ 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Was the Taliban waiting the U.S. Government out, so it could overthrow the Afghan government after 

our departure? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, I would be speculating, but, certainly, they 

waited us out in the sense that, based on what happened, based 

on changes in the world, based on successes that we had on 

counterterrorism, as I have described, we decided that it is time to 

come home. 

And there are things we could have done differently in retrospect. Those studies will be done that would have perhaps had a 

different outcome in terms of the Taliban. One issue as Ambassador—— 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Ambassador, did you—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes? 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Ambassador, did you consider that as 

a possibility, if a power-sharing agreement was implemented? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I did, certainly, consider it as a possibility because both sides were saying they want that. And the question was 

the terms. The President of Afghanistan, President Ghani, did not 

want to leave office. He wanted the Talibs to join them. They said, 

no, they wouldn’t join; there has to be a new government that 

would be formed with a head that is acceptable to both sides. 

So, the negotiations were difficult. We knew it was going to take 

time, you know. The war had been going on there for 40 years. 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Do you think that President Biden’s 

unconditional withdrawal legitimized the Taliban’s plan of action? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Now, our withdrawal, of course, changed the balance in favor of the Taliban. But I believe that the bigger mistake 

or the bigger factor that shaped the outcome was the poor performance of the government, of the Afghan government. Running away 

while saying that they will never do that; the disintegration of the 

armed forces, those were the bigger factors, in my judgment, in 

terms of what ultimately happened. 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Well, there was no doubt we saw—— 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentlelady yields. 

The chair recognizes Ms. Manning. 

Mrs. KIM OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much. Thank you. 

Ms. MANNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to our witness for being here with us today. 

Mr. Ambassador, I have to be honest with you. Like many Americans, I was shocked when I read the February 2020 Trump DOHA 

agreement by how few conditions there were for the Taliban to 

meet. There were no protections for women and girls in Afghani-
40 

stan or for the Afghan people who had helped us and worked side 

by side with our forces. 

Basically, the former President agreed to a precipitous withdrawal of all troops, all coalition partners, and all civilian personnel by May 1st; to release 5,000 prisoners; to work with the 

U.N. to lift sanctions against the Taliban; to seek economic cooperation for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and to refrain from 

the threat or use of force against Afghanistan or intervene in its 

domestic affairs. 

In exchange, the Taliban agreed to release up to a thousand prisoners. For our 5,000, they agreed to release a thousand. They 

vaguely committed to enter intra-Afghan negotiations and agreed 

not to allow its members to attack our personnel on the way out. 

I did not see any agreement to stop attacks against Afghans. I 

did not see any agreement to prevent them from taking Afghan territory, and I certainly did not see any protection of Afghan women 

and girls. I did not see any guarantees that Afghanistan would 

prosecute anyone who commits atrocities against women or girls. I 

did not see any requirement that the Taliban take steps to keep 

women and girls in schools. I did not see any requirement that the 

Taliban take steps to uphold any rights of the Afghan people. Apparently, the protection of women and girls was not important to 

President Trump. 

Given the terrible reality that we see today in Afghanistan, including for Afghan women and girls, in retrospect, what should 

have been done differently to secure protections for vulnerable minority populations and, in particular, women and girls in Afghanistan? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, the key issue for you and for our other 

leaders is whether achieving the goals that you outlined on women 

should have been a pre-condition for withdrawal, which means that 

the U.S. forces would have been given the responsibility to achieve 

those rights; that we should have stayed in Afghanistan until the 

Taliban agreed to those—— 

Ms. MANNING. To protect women and girls. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Ms. MANNING. And was that—were you ever instructed on behalf 

of President Trump to secure those agreements? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. And the judgment was that to pursue those objectives with other means other than the use of armed forces. Because there’s lots of violations of human rights around the world, 

and it is not the responsibility of the U.S. forces to go to war—— 

Ms. MANNING. Of human rights. We are talking about—we are 

talking about half the population of the country. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Ms. MANNING. Was it ever articulated that one of the goals of 

withdrawal was to make sure that Afghan women and girls were 

going—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Ms. MANNING [continuing]. To be protected? Was that ever articulated as a goal of the Trump Administration? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. Yes, it was articulated that that would be 

pursued in the intra-Afghan negotiations, during which—and we 

have a written agreement in which it states that we would work 
41 

with the government which supported the human rights, the legitimate government of Afghanistan, to pursue those objectives in the 

intra-Afghan negotiations using diplomacy, using the future relations—— 

Ms. MANNING. So, you weren’t going to negotiate that with the 

Taliban? You were going to help behind the scenes the Afghan government—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. The Afghan government—— 

Ms. MANNING [continuing]. That collapsed? You were going to encourage them to work to support women and girls? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. OK. The assumption was—it turns out to be 

wrong, ma’am—that the government would not collapse; that it had 

big, more forces in numbers, more weapons, more international 

standing, more money. So that it would—— 

Ms. MANNING. Did you ever—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes? 

Ms. MANNING. Did you ever believe that the Taliban was truly 

interested in negotiating with the Afghan government? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I saw them negotiate with the Afghan government because the negotiations started in September up to the—— 

Ms. MANNING. But was that before you gave up all the leverage 

by signing the agreement, and frankly, by Donald Trump tweeting 

in advance what he was going to do in withdrawing our troops? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. As I said before, I mean, and there was this 

agreement, obviously, inside the Administration and outside where 

the way the President decided to go was the right way. But the decision was made. In our system, as you know, the President makes 

the decisions. Others will express their opinions, the advisors. The 

decision was made not to link withdrawal on these other matters—— 

Ms. MANNING. On the protection of Afghan people and Afghan 

women and girls. 

My time has expired. I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentlelady yields. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Baird. 

Mr. BAIRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here today. I appreciate all the work that you have done. 

You know, the question I have deals with the many reports of 

sidebar agreements between the United States and the Taliban 

during the DOHA. For instance, after signing the deal, Secretary 

of State Mike Pompeo claimed that the Taliban would destroy Al 

Qaeda. Other reports indicated that the Taliban would enter negotiations with the Afghan government. 

So, neither of these things really happened. So, did you believe 

the Taliban would destroy the Al Qaeda? Or what is your position—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, the agreement says, specifically—and you 

talked about the side agreements. They are classified. There are 

two, and one deals with terrorism. I cannot go into that in this setting. Hopefully, you have read it. 

It was not to allow Al Qaeda, specifically, but terrorists, any terrorists that would threaten the security of the United States and 

our allies. That was the agreement. 
42 

Now, the al-Zawahiri case was a grave violation of that agreement. But, as I said before, I am not in government. You should 

ask the intelligence community what our judgment is on their adherence to that. I believe, based on what I read, that we believe 

that they are largely in compliance on the counterterrorism. 

With regard to government negotiations, negotiations did stop. 

The agreement necessitated the start of intra-Afghan negotiations. 

We assume it will take time. We desired if it could be concluded 

before we left, but we did not want to make it conditional on the 

withdrawal on an agreement, because one side or the other in the 

negotiations would have not wanted to conclude something and 

keep us there. 

The government, for example, could have been interested in 

keeping us there because the government did not want us to withdraw, the Afghan government. They liked the situation with a big 

American presence and support. 

So, as to the assessment of who was more serious about negotiations, I could speculate or I could give you my opinion, but the key 

point is that we did not want the withdrawal of forces—a decision 

was made to leave, conditioned on a decision by Afghans toward 

each other, because we did not know quite what their calculations 

would be, and whether those calculations would assist with the 

timetable or withdrawal that the President had in mind. 

Mr. BAIRD. Thank you. 

One more question, since you were involved in this so deeply. 

Was the Biden Administration made aware of these side agreements with the Taliban? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Mr. BAIRD. Absolutely? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Absolutely. 

Mr. BAIRD. So, my last question deals with giving you the opportunity to refresh us about your involvement in communications, 

and so on, in those final days before the fall of Kabul. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. I was very much at the center of the storm, 

if you like. I was in DOHA, basically, during the final days. I would 

participate, obviously, with the President and others in meetings. 

I was, essentially, the channel to get the Taliban to do what we 

wanted during those 2 weeks. 

We wanted a road closed because we thought ISIS-K was going 

to use that road, or from that hill nearby, they might shoot a rocket at the airport. At this mosque, there might be a terrorist. To direct them to block the road; go up the hill; go to the mosque. 

And then, I would deal with people’s movement. I would get 

calls. One thing I learned, sir, is how our society had gotten 

intermixed with the Afghan society. I would get calls from all over 

the United States saying, ‘‘This X person used to drive my car and 

he wants to get to the airport. He is stuck in this place in Kabul. 

Please arrange for him to get to the airport.’’ 

And then, I would be in almost multiple contacts daily with our 

military at the airport. I had put my deputy at the airport also 

with our military. And then, the military would call me. ‘‘We want 

to see X Talib. They are not reacting, responding to our messages. 

Can you talk to the big Talib leader, to Mullah Baradar, to allow 

this to happen.’’ 
43 

So, it was a lot going on, and then, not to mention Members of 

Congress calling, asking for movement of people. 

Mr. BAIRD. I thank you. I have run out of time. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. So, I gave you too much information, I think. 

Mr. BAIRD. I appreciate it. 

And, Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me for just a second 

or so? 

Chairman MCCAUL. Sure. 

Mr. BAIRD. I cannot help but share my experience about soldiers, 

men and women who put the uniform on. And we had one of those 

young 13 right from my district. And so, I cannot help but recognize the contribution that our people in uniform make around this 

world. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Absolutely. 

Mr. BAIRD. And so, thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, sir. We appreciate your contribution as well in Vietnam. 

So, the chair now recognizes Mr. Stanton. 

Mr. STANTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Congressman Baird, for those good comments about 

our women and men serving our country. 

Thank you, Ranking Member Meeks, for holding this hearing 

today. 

I would like to focus on our allies, those who risked everything, 

their safety, their families’ safety, to support the United States 

mission in Afghanistan. For two and a half years, our Afghan allies 

have been trapped in a frightening legal limbo—trapped because 

Congress has, again and again, failed to pass the Afghan Adjustment Act and make good on our promises. We even had an opportunity to pass parts of it in the Senate border deal just last week, 

a deal that extreme Republicans killed. 

Now, I have been fortunate to get to members of an especially 

vulnerable group, the Female Tactical Platoon, part of the Afghan 

National Army Special Operations Command. These brave women 

went through rigorous screening and training by the United States 

military. They have participated in hundreds of direct-action combat missions against the Taliban, alongside U.S. Special Forces, including Green Berets, Navy SEALs, and Army Rangers. 

Forty-two FTPs, many of whom are part of the persecuted 

Hazara ethnic minority, were evacuated after Kabul fell. But the 

Taliban knows who they are. They know who the families are that 

they were forced to leave behind. 

And a constituent of mine, an Army captain who served in Afghanistan from 2016 to 2020, spent part of her deployment serving 

alongside the FTPs. She told me that, quote, ‘‘Threatening letters 

from the Taliban were sent to these women warning that they will 

be dealt with, so that they will serve as an example.’’ Unquote. She 

also said, quote, ‘‘There is no doubt that these women would have 

been raped and tortured before death if they hadn’t been evacuated 

by U.S. counterparts.’’ Unquote. 

Another active duty service member wrote to me, quote, ‘‘The Female Tactical Platoon holds some of the bravest women I have ever 

met. I am an American soldier and these women fought by my side 

for nearly 10 years, targeting the enemies of the United States in 
44 

Afghanistan. I trusted them with my life daily and they entrusted 

me with theirs. 

When Afghanistan fell in August •21, they did not want to lay 

down their arms and flee. They were forced to. As the Taliban encircled Kabul, they began to target the members of the Female Tactical Platoon and their families. Their loved ones remained in danger. Their mothers, fathers, sisters, and brothers were forced to 

stay behind since they are not considered’’—quote—‘‘ ‘immediate 

family.’ To this day, I receive messages from family members desperately seeking help. Many have been beaten, tortured, and killed. 

They need our help.’’ Unquote. That is from that active duty service 

member. 

In the words of an FTP herself residing in my home State of Arizona, who was kind enough to share her story with my office, 

quote, ‘‘I cannot give you my name for fear of reprisals against my 

family in Afghanistan. I served in the Afghan National Army Special Forces Female Tactical Platoon for 5 years. I speak five languages, spent a year and a half training with U.S. and British 

forces before being assigned to the platoon. I would love to serve 

in the U.S. Army. I left behind my father, mother, three sisters, 

three brothers. They are now subject of harassment, intimidation, 

and kidnapping at the hands of the Taliban because of my service 

with U.S. forces.’’ Unquote. 

‘‘My sisters are hiding for fear the Taliban will’’—quote—‘‘ ‘disappear’ them, as has happened to other FTP family members. Even 

though they are only my sisters, the Taliban will exact revenge on 

anyone they can find who is related to me by blood. I fear for my 

family’s lives every day.’’ Unquote. 

I share their words today to underscore the deadly consequences 

if this Congress continues to stall on the Afghan Adjustment Act. 

Every day that this Congress fails to act is a betrayal of our allies 

and of our American values. 

Ambassador, your thoughts on the Afghan Adjustment Act? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I appreciate what you said, Congressman. I am 

not familiar with this Act. So, therefore, I am not in a position to 

offer an opinion on it. 

Mr. STANTON. I appreciate your diplomatic answer to that. For 

your information, yes, as you would expect, this would allow the 

Female Tactical Platoon and others that served alongside the U.S. 

military who temporarily have immigration status in the United 

States to be given permanent status here in the United States. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I know that many Afghans served with distinction alongside our forces. They sacrificed a great deal. But with regard to the specifics, I haven’t looked at the legislation. 

Mr. STANTON. Ambassador, you are an outstanding diplomat. 

Thank you. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. You are kind. 

Mr. STANTON. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Self. 

Mr. SELF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is one of the more concerning hearings I have ever been in. 

A little bit of background. I do not have your experience in the 

region, but over a 20-year period I had five assignments when I 
45 

dealt directly with the region, starting in 1984 dealing with Iran— 

most of my assignments as a military planner. I was in Bagram 

early in 2002, stationed in the headquarters in Bagram. I was in 

Al Udeid later for the Iraqi Freedom Operation. 

With that background, our enduring values are not shared in 

this region. I have heard nothing and I have read nothing in the 

preparation for this hearing that—it is filled with naivete. 

Now, you are given the position of having done much of this 

under both President Trump and President Biden. I am not questioning your motive, sir, but we have to focus on the fact that the 

withdrawal from Afghanistan was a strategic blunder of monumental proportions—monumental proportions. 

Putin started moving troops within 2 months after that strategic 

blunder. And as for the 20-year forever wars, our Nation, our military, this Nation’s military is not meant for nation-building. It is 

meant to go and break things and impose our national will, our national interests on our adversaries. That is the use of the United 

States military. 

So, I want to focus on that one strategic blunder, but I also want 

to read for people—we talked about the DOHA agreement. The actual title of the DOHA agreement I think is instructive. ‘‘The 

Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic 

Emirate of Afghanistan’’—which is not recognized by the United 

States as a State and is known as the Taliban—‘‘and the United 

States of America.’’ That is the formal title of what we call the 

DOHA agreement. 

The Taliban, it is naive to think the Taliban was ever going to 

live up to anything. My 20 years, over a span of 20 years dealing 

with the region, this entire process that we have heard today is extremely naive. And, sir, I find you at the middle of it. 

I will tell you, I firmly disagree with your statement that the restart of the war being the most important factor in the withdrawal. 

I absolutely disagree with your characterization of that. 

But my question to you, sir, is you said earlier the Taliban was 

largely in compliance with their counterterrorism agreement. Can 

you justify that statement for us? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. First, on the last statement, I said I’m not 

in the government. I do not read the intelligence now. But, based 

on what I read of what the intelligence community puts out in unclassified product, it appears to me that they are largely in compliance, based on what I read of their report. 

But you shouldn’t take my word for it. You should call experts 

who are monitoring the situation very closely in our government. 

We have a significant body of expertise that monitors this, and I 

relied on them when I was in government. 

Mr. SELF. Yes, but let me just help you there. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. SELF. The U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Team released a report 

last month—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. SELF [continuing]. In January—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. SELF [continuing]. That says about it, ‘‘The relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda remains close.’’ 
46 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. SELF. ‘‘And the latter maintains a holding pattern in Afghan 

under Taliban patronage.’’ 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. SELF. We need to understand that the Taliban—and let me 

ask you a yes-or-no question. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Let me, let me—— 

Mr. SELF. What is the status of the Taliban? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. But may I comment on—— 

Mr. SELF. No, sir. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well—— 

Mr. SELF. What is the status of the Taliban today? We do not 

recognize them as a government. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. SELF. We understand that they are in physical control of Afghanistan. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. SELF. What is the official U.S. position on the Taliban today? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Again, you should ask the U.S. Government officials, but my understanding is that we transact with them. We 

meet with them when we have concerns we raise with them on particular issues. We interact with them. We do not have a presence, 

as you know, in Afghanistan. We do not recognize the Taliban government. We haven’t implemented parts of the DOHA agreement 

because of our unhappiness with what they are doing and not 

doing. 

But those are questions and issues for the current officials. The 

nuances of what they are doing or are not—I am telling you what 

I read. 

Mr. SELF. Yes. If I may, if I may quickly, Chairman—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. SELF [continuing]. Germany just became the third largest 

economy in the world. If we are talking Ukraine funding, the EU 

needs to step forward. Our GDP is $27 trillion; EU together is $20 

trillion. Russia’s is $2.5 trillion. We need to push Europe as a 

whole to be funding the Ukraine war. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Mr. SELF. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. 

The chair recognizes Ms. Dean. 

Ms. DEAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking 

Member Meeks. 

Thank you, Ambassador, for being here, for your years of service 

and expertise. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. Thank you. 

Ms. DEAN. It is very valuable to us on this committee and to 

American citizens. 

I do want to recognize the families in the room, some of whom 

I have had the opportunity to meet, Gold Star families. 

I want to recognize the service of our military members over the 

course of 20 years, the sacrifice and service, and the brave gains 

that were made, and the horrific losses that were suffered. And so, 
47 

with heartbreak, I recognize you, and with humility, I recognize 

you and your service and your loved ones. 

I also, of course, remember the 13 service members killed at 

Abbey Gate, that tragic, tragic set of events and the scores of others who were injured that day. 

I wanted to try to examine three areas as quickly as I can. 

The impact of President Ghani’s actions. When you were asked 

earlier, you said that you put the responsibility of what happened 

in the Afghan withdrawal on the Afghan government. And I would 

like you to tell us more about that. 

For example, going back to the final days of the withdrawal, you 

said in your testimony that the agreement you negotiated between 

the Taliban and the Afghan government, quote, ‘‘fell apart when 

President Ghani surprisingly fled the country, which caused the 

now leaderless Afghan military and police to instantly disintegrate.’’ 

What did the impact of that disintegration have on the situation 

outside the gates at Kabul airport and on the non-combatant evacuation? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, thank you for what you said. 

The impact was instantaneous. The rush to the airport, the airport crisis, if you like, was created because of what happened. The 

security leaders, rather than standing in place carrying out their 

duties, defending their city, defending the government, they rushed 

to the airport to be evacuated. And then, there was, obviously, 

challenges created about securing the perimeters of the airport. 

Ms. DEAN. And it was surprising, apparently, across the board, 

whether to you, to the Administrations, both Administrations. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. To our various communities that watch these 

things. And if he was afraid, the president, for his life, although 

there was an agreement and a lot of his immediate subordinates 

said, with the announcement that Talibs will not come into Kabul, 

there was a sense of calm in the palace; that he did not reach out 

to us to say, ‘‘Look, can you do one, two, three to secure the palace?’’ if he was afraid of that. I do not know what we would have 

done. We had no indication from him that he was going to leave 

the field and go to the UAE. 

Ms. DEAN. A stunning abandonment. 

A second area, the troop drawdown. We saw that the Trump Administration first drew down to 8600 in the first 135 days, then 

down to 4500 by September 2020. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Ms. DEAN. Can you explain to me what happened that created 

the final drawdown in the last minutes, the last days, of the Trump 

Administration down to 2500? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Ms. DEAN. What were your thoughts there? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. There was a discussion and the President had 

said that the troops will be home by Christmas. And so, so there 

was—whether total withdrawal would happen—— 

Ms. DEAN. What did you think of President Trump in his final 

days in office setting it up with the new Administration, having 

2500 members on the ground? 
48 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, ultimately, the back-and-forth that took 

place resulted in a decision not to completely withdraw by Christmas, but to leave that final decision to the new Administration. 

Ms. DEAN. I want to end on something you ended on in your testimony—that you saw perhaps the seeds and values being planted. 

Can you give us some possibility of all of the work of so many folks 

on the ground, Afghanistan, as well as our military? What are 

some of those seeds that you think could possibly spring a better 

future for Afghanistan? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, most young Afghans in their 20’s, 30’s, experienced the America, the encounter we had with Afghanistan— 

the schools, universities with—— 

Ms. DEAN. Women being educated. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. Women being educated, with cell 

phones, with the internet. And I think they are struggling for their 

rights in their own ways. Now some have left the field, but others 

are standing for their values. 

The future remains uncertain. The struggle goes on. The values, 

the objectives that President Bush and others had for a democratic, 

modern Afghanistan, I think those objectives remain valid, but it 

is going to come not with American bayonets, if you like, but with 

American engagement and interaction, perhaps in their own way 

and over a longer, much longer period of time. 

Ms. DEAN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing that answer. 

And thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Kean. 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to our witness—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Mr. KEAN [continuing]. Being here today. 

Ambassador Khalilzad, you have a very long and very distinguished career in the U.S. Government and have often appeared 

before this committee. And I want to thank you for your extraordinary service to the people of this country and people around the 

world. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. KEAN. Unfortunately, the Taliban is, once again, the ruling 

power in Afghanistan. From President Biden’s go-to-zero order in 

April 2021 that was meant to coincide with the 20th anniversary 

of September 11th, 2021, despite leaders in the U.S. military previously urging the retention of some troops to support Afghans, 

what conversations did the Administration have on retention of 

U.S. contractors in Afghanistan? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, if I understood the question, what impact 

did it have on the contractors, right? Did I understand? 

Mr. KEAN. Mm-hmm. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, they became uncertain, and then, ultimately, mostly decided to leave because they were concerned about 

the security environment, insurance-related issues. And although 

the plan based on the assumption that the government would survive, the systems that they had, the military system would continue to be serviced, but when the contractor departures—we had 
49 

to rush around, try to find outside the country potential places 

where those systems could be serviced. 

Mr. KEAN. Well, clearly—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. KEAN [continuing]. Much of the Afghan Security Forces relied on U.S. contractors to maintain equipment, vehicles, and aircraft. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Absolutely. 

Mr. KEAN. And it must have been pointed out that, without this 

support, the Afghan Security Forces wouldn’t be able to successfully combat the Taliban. 

Ambassador, can you also speak the Peace Government Plan that 

was advanced by the Biden State Department in early 2021? 

Whose idea was the plan? Can you talk us through the formation—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, there was a discussion when the new Administration came to accelerate negotiations. Because, as I said, 

even in the previous Administration, the desire was to get a political agreement as soon as possible, although, realistically, it was 

assumed that it would be complicated; it will take time. 

And the two features of the proposals by the Biden team was, 

one, to internationalize the effort, to get the U.N. to appoint someone to help with the negotiations. 

And second was to advance a power-sharing plan for Afghanistan—not that that be the one, but to get a discussion going. And 

the government of Afghanistan dismissed it, more or less. 

I would say there were many ideas and plans, but, yes, there was 

a—there was a proposal put forward and given to the Taliban and 

to the Afghan government. 

Mr. KEAN. How did the Russian government respond to the 

Taliban takeover, Ambassador? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, the Russians, clearly, had a two-track policy. One was they wanted us to leave, and they said that they 

wanted us to leave. On the other hand, they wanted us to, also, 

stay and to do the dirty work, if you like, of dealing—going after 

groups that they would target them, and to see us stuck there, pay 

a price without succeeding. 

But their public statements, at least as I recall now—it was a 

long time ago—the immediate aftermath was they would have preferred an agreement first, a political agreement first. But I’m sure 

they were happy to see us leave, no doubt, to depart. 

Mr. KEAN. And can you explain your assessment in deeper regard, please? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, for the longer term, they did not want U.S. 

forces on the border of the former Soviet territory, and that they 

thought our presence with regards to Central Asia offered those opportunities and advantages. But, on the other hand, like Iran, they 

wanted to make it as difficult for us, to tie us down, to have leverage, if you like, over us by remaining vulnerable and stuck there— 

not to win, but not to kind of leave. So, I said before, wanting us 

to, ultimately, not have permanent bases there; to, also, while we 

were there, to make us suffer. 

Mr. KEAN. Thank you. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 
50 

Mr. KEAN. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Waltz. 

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Good to see you, Ambassador. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Great to see you. 

Mr. WALTZ. Many years of this painful episode in our history, but 

I would say to our Gold Star families that are here, and every veteran who sacrificed, we kept America safe for over two decades, 

and we cannot lose—we cannot lose sight of that. We did not have 

another 9/11. We did not have additional attacks on our homeland, 

despite many issues in this war that we absolutely should learn 

from. 

So, we have heard continuously, both in the media, from colleagues on the other side of the aisle, and from the President, from 

President Biden, that he was stuck with the DOHA agreement; 

that this was his hands were tied; the Trump Administration tied 

his hands. He had no choice. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. No. 

Mr. WALTZ. And I just want to put out, Mr. Chairman, one thing 

for the record here. This is a short list of the policies that the 

Biden Administration walked away from on day one—everything 

from the construction of the border wall; our membership in the 

World Health Organization. The Biden Administration completely 

walked away from Trump’s maximum pressure campaign; tried to 

get us back into the disastrous Iran nuclear deal; rejoin the Paris 

Climate Accord; ended Remain in Mexico; canceled the Keystone 

Pipeline, $16 billion in investment. And I could go on. All of these 

things were reversed in the first month. But yet, we are supposed 

to believe that somehow he was handcuffed to this deal. 

Mr. Ambassador, let’s go back to January 2021. President Trump 

is still in office. His advisors go in, tell him, ‘‘Mr. President, the 

Taliban haven’t lived up to the half dozen conditions that were in 

the deal minus one—partially not attacking troops—but in terms 

of entering negotiations with the Afghan government and other 

conditions, the Taliban did not live up to the deal.’’ What did President Trump do, Mr. Ambassador, as a result of that advice? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well—— 

Mr. WALTZ. He had a stated goal of getting all U.S. troops out. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. WALTZ. Right? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. WALTZ. But now, he is told they did not live up to the deal. 

What did President Trump do? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, it would be speculation, of course—— 

Mr. WALTZ. But it is not speculation that, by January 19th, 

2021—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. We still had Bagram Air Base. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. We did. 

Mr. WALTZ. Did we? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, we did. 

Mr. WALTZ. Is that the only air base in the world that is sandwiched between China, Russia, Iran—— 
51 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. And is a key platform for counterterrorism? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. WALTZ. Did we still have Bagram Air Base? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. We did. 

Mr. WALTZ. Did we still have 2500 U.S. special operators and intelligence professionals? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. We did. 

Mr. WALTZ. Did we still have five to seven thousand NATO 

troops? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. We did. 

Mr. WALTZ. Did we still have over 10,000 contractors that were 

keeping the Afghan air force flying? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. We did. 

Mr. WALTZ. And all of our intelligence assets, and plus, the most 

important thing, the message to the Afghan people and government 

that we stand with you, right? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. WALTZ. So, let’s fast forward. Just a few months later—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. Did President Biden reject your advice 

for conditionality moving forward on the DOHA agreement? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. He decided not to make a withdrawal of the final 

2,500 conditional on a political agreement or leaving a force, a 

counterterrorism force behind. 

Mr. WALTZ. He, essentially, said—well, he did not essentially— 

he said to the world, ‘‘We’re pulling out.’’ He was asked, ‘‘Are there 

conditions?’’ He said, unconditionally, we’re out, regardless of the 

consequences. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. WALTZ. Correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Because I am going to have to say that he 

thought, if he stayed, he might have to go back to war, likely to 

go back to war with the Taliban. 

Mr. WALTZ. But this is the misnomer. This is the false choice. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. WALTZ. We could take an approach like we did in, say, Colombia for 40 years, where we had trainers; we had assets; we had 

support, but we did not put American troops in harm’s way. There 

was a lot of middle ground—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Ranges of choices. 

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. Between unconditional full withdrawal 

and going back to any type of surge or war? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. True. 

Mr. WALTZ. Correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. True. Correct. 

Mr. WALTZ. But those options weren’t considered. And I will just 

ask you this: we have had the senior leader of Al Qaeda, Zawahiri, 

as a guest of the Taliban. We now have reports of eight Al Qaeda 

training camps in Afghanistan. We have reports from the U.N. of 

tens of thousands of fighters, foreign fighters, flowing into Afghanistan; plus, the ongoing threat of ISIS. 

Is the American homeland today safer than it was 3 years ago? 
52 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, I would, respectfully, ask you to ask the 

intelligence community, ours, to look at the data that the U.N. reports. I wouldn’t rely, in other words, on the U.N. report. 

Mr. WALTZ. OK. Let me ask you—Chairman, if I could indulge 

you—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Please, please. 

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. I think we are at the end here. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Please. 

Mr. WALTZ. Does Al Qaeda and ISIS still have the intent to attack the United States and the West, if given the opportunity to 

do so? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, no doubt, but I also want to point that—— 

Mr. WALTZ. So, that is a yes? I mean, just for the record, that 

is a, yes, they fully intend to—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, but they—but they have the intent. But I 

also want to say, Congressman, that our intelligence community, 

from what I read in the unclassified versions, as we cannot discuss 

classified material here, believe that in the next year or two Al 

Qaeda does not have the ability to attack the United States—I’m 

paraphrasing—from Afghanistan. The likelihood would be—— 

Mr. WALTZ. The Commander of Central Command a year ago testified that ISIS will have reconstituted their capability to attack 

the West within 6 months—and that was a year ago—from Afghanistan—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. He did say, but I noticed, again, the intelligence 

community since then, in the last few months, has highlighted successes by the Taliban against Daesh, against ISIS-K. 

I would, respectfully, suggest that, for coming to a judgment on 

those, that you, and maybe you are—— 

Mr. WALTZ. I would. I would. I’m on the Intelligence Committee 

and I will just State for the record—Mr. Chairman, thank you for 

your indulgence—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. Relying on terrorists like the Taliban 

and Al Qaeda to take out terrorists—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well—— 

Mr. WALTZ [continuing]. Is a fool’s errand and danger, and very 

dangerous for the—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. We shouldn’t rely—— 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The chair recognizes Mr. Barr. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Khalilzad, thank you for coming back before our 

committee. 

And in 2021, the last time you were before this committee—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. BARR [continuing]. Before the withdrawal, I asked you if 

President Ghani and Chairman Abdullah had any predictions 

about the outcome of a planned U.S. withdrawal in Afghanistan, 

having met both gentlemen when I visited Afghanistan in 2015. 

And your response was, quote, ‘‘They have no choice but to prepare 
53 

to defend themselves, and we have made a commitment to help 

them defend themselves if the Talibs go the route of a military solution.’’ 

Ambassador Khalilzad, did the United States stick to our commitment to help the Afghan government when the Taliban took a 

military solution in Afghanistan? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, we did, I believe in the following way, if 

I understand you, sir, which is that we continued to provide them 

with military support, including attacks against the Talibs when 

the Talibs attacked them. But once the government had disintegrated with the departure of President Ghani, then, of course, we 

could not help them. I think the—— 

Mr. BARR. Well, just reclaiming my time—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. BARR [continuing]. As I think Mr. Waltz demonstrated so 

ably, we did not stick to our commitments and there was not a fulfillment of the DOHA conditions-based withdrawal. It was an unconditional withdrawal. And so, from that standpoint, I do not 

think that the United States stuck to our commitment to help the 

Afghan government when the Taliban was clearly making progress 

throughout the country. 

Do I interpret your testimony in response to Mr. Waltz correctly 

that public defender did not adhere to a conditions-based withdrawal, as contemplated by the DOHA agreement? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, I—no. The DOHA agreement, the conditions were: one, that there will be no attacks on the U.S. withdrawing forces; that we could come to the assistance of the Afghan 

government; that there would be intra-Afghan negotiations, and 

that there would be no allowing of terrorists. 

But whether to make withdrawal conditional on a cease-fire, that 

the two Afghan sides do not fight each other, and, too, that there 

be a political agreement, those were not explicit conditions. 

Mr. BARR. Yes. Well, this was, clearly, an abandonment of the 

conditions-based approach of DOHA. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, but the agreement was condition-based, but 

which conditions, that’s what I mean. 

Mr. BARR. I hear you. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. BARR. It was an unconditional retreat, the way I see it. 

In 2021, also, before the withdrawal, I asked you whether it 

would be a strategic mistake to abandon Bagram. And I’m paraphrasing you, but you, basically, referred me to the Defense Department—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. BARR [continuing]. On that, on that question. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Sure. 

Mr. BARR. Ambassador, the withdrawal from Afghanistan gave 

up U.S. control of the only U.S. Air Base in the country that shares 

a land border with China. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. BARR. Can you give us a readout on what the status is of 

Bagram? Who is in control of it now, and have you seen any Chinese interest in that base? 
54 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, now, of course, you are right that we gave 

up, obviously, Bagram, and that was as part of the agreement to 

withdraw our forces. But, as far as what is happening there now, 

I’m not in a good position. You should ask the intel community to 

brief you. But I wouldn’t be surprised if the Chinese were interested in it, but I have no—I have no data or a fact to give you on 

that. 

Mr. BARR. Have you seen any increase in Chinese investment in 

Afghanistan since the United States left? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. There are indications, clearly, from what I read 

in the media of Chinese interest in Afghanistan and activities, yes. 

Mr. BARR. In my remaining time, Ambassador, it is often portrayed that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was a security decision for the long-term safety of American soldiers. While I do not 

believe the United States should have had a forever presence in Afghanistan, save for maybe Bagram, the way in which we withdrew 

was an unmitigated disaster. Do you believe the United States is 

more or less safe with the Taliban in charge? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I believe that the withdrawal was because of the 

costs and a perception that we weren’t succeeding; that it was costing too much; the world had changed, and we needed to adjust. 

But, certainly, in terms of terrorism, it was that being there gave 

us certain advantages, being in Afghanistan, rather than not being 

in Afghanistan, but—— 

Mr. BARR. My time has expired. But with ISIS-K fighters, Al 

Qaeda allowed to thrive in Afghanistan, the Taliban in charge, 

clearly, the United States is not in a safer posture. 

With that, my time has expired. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the 

hearing. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Amo. 

Mr. AMO. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Ambassador, a pleasure to see you. 

I wanted to understand a portion of your opening testimony. You 

said that, quote, ‘‘The first phase of the withdrawal lasted 135 

days, in which U.S. forces were reduced to 8600.’’ 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. AMO. ‘‘By the time President Trump left office, U.S. forces 

in Afghanistan had been reduced to 2500.’’ 

So, let’s fill in the gaps a little bit on what happened between 

the levels of 8600 to 2500. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. AMO. So, that reduction to 8600 which you said occurred initially that was ordered by President Trump—is that the case? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. That is the case. 

Mr. AMO. And it was an explicit condition of the DOHA deal that 

the United States was on the hook to do that level of withdrawal 

after the signing of the agreement in 2020? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. The only one that was specified in terms of a 

phase was phase one—— 

Mr. AMO. OK. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. To come to 8600. It did not get into 

subsequent phases, except that the final withdrawal of the remaining forces would be by May 1st or so—in 14 months, in other 
55 

words. But there was no other phases, like to go to 4500, to 2500; 

that was not specified in the agreement. 

Mr. AMO. OK. And it had occurred per the terms of the deal 

within 135 days—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Phase one. 

Mr. AMO. Phase one? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. AMO. OK. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. And we had felt the military advice was—I actually asked them—that we could do the mission with 8600, so the 

risk was not going to be higher in any significant degree in terms 

of our ability to carry out the mission still at the 8600. 

Mr. AMO. Got it. Understood. 

So, you said that was in phase one. So, there were no stipulations of further troop—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Subsequent phases, yes. 

Mr. AMO. None of them? OK. And do you recall any troop reduction directed by President Trump in September to 4500? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. There was a phase of coming, I believe—I will 

need to check—but my recollection is it went to another phase of 

4500, and then, to 2500. 

Mr. AMO. And was that at the discretion of President Trump? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. The military offering options and the President 

deciding. 

Mr. AMO. OK. And did you understand that the drawdown in 

2020, was that to be tied to any Taliban progress on meeting its 

own commitments in the DOHA deal? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. Well, in that regard, yes, I would say. And 

that was their commitments, especially on the counterterrorism 

part. The tie, the relationship between the counterterrorism commitment and withdrawal was very tight. 

Mr. AMO. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. The commitment on the Afghan reconciliation 

was not as tight. It was linked, but not as tight. It definitely was 

tight on the start of intra-Afghan negotiations, but not on success 

and agreement being in place before departure, complete departure. 

Mr. AMO. OK. And do you recall a tweet by President Trump in 

October 2020 pledging to have the small remaining number of our 

brave men and women serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas? 

Do you remember that tweet? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, that, yes, there was the idea that was 

floated. I do not remember the specific tweet—— 

Mr. AMO. OK. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. To get everybody home by Christmas. Yes, I remember speeches and statements—— 

Mr. AMO. But if you saw that, that would be something that 

would—it surprised you? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. That would not surprise me, no. 

Mr. AMO. OK. OK. And according to the terms of the DOHA 

agreement, the United States would not fully withdraw all troops 

until May 2021. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 
56 

Mr. AMO. So, did that seem realistic, given the actions of the 

Taliban? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, I mean, that was not called for in the 

agreement, and the agreement had until May, and then, it had, 

also, conditionality, which is that our commitments, delivering on 

them, dependent on them delivering on their commitments. 

Mr. AMO. Would removing all those troops have impacted your 

leverage to secure Afghan peace talks? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, yes, removing troops was the biggest leverage. So, therefore, if we did not have the troops and the leverage 

during that period, during which we would have had troops, it 

would not have been there. 

Mr. AMO. Mm-hmm. And then, do you recall another discretionary troop reduction by President Trump down to 2500 in January 2021, just before the Administration took office? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I am not aware of that, that there was any other 

decision in January to, to get the 2500 troops out. Before the 

change in Administration? I am not aware of that. 

Mr. AMO. OK. Well, I see my time has expired. So, I yield. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Issa. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, getting the troops home for Christmas makes this 

particularly appropriate. In the back there, there’s two Gold Star 

families—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. ISSA [continuing]. Christie Shamblin and Alicia and Herman 

Lopez. Their loved ones did not get home for Christmas. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. ISSA. They did not get home for Christmas because of a hasty 

withdrawal, because of a decision to withdraw from the military 

base and keep, as it turned out, a completely non-defendable, or at 

least not defended, embassy. 

So, I want to go through a little bit of a timeline, because you 

have two Administrations and to a great extent you were there for 

all of them. 

When Mike Pompeo left office, one of the agreements was a 50/ 

50 sharing coming out of that negotiation between the Taliban and 

the lawfully elected government, isn’t that true? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. The percentages were not mentioned, but it was 

to be negotiations for a new government between the Taliban—— 

Mr. ISSA. With shared authority? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Shared government, yes. 

Mr. ISSA. OK. So, the shared authority, it is fair to say, started 

off, at least tangentially, as 50/50, and then, as the Taliban continued to aggressively take bigger parts of the country—because we 

had withdrawn and, to be honest, the Afghan government was not 

able to hold them back in that summer offensive—as I understand 

it, it went to 60/40 in favor of the Taliban; 70/30, and then, ultimately, 100/0, as they headed toward Kabul. Is that correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I do not know about the percentages. There was 

nothing formally—— 
57 

Mr. ISSA. Well, was the Taliban demanding more authority as 

they took more land? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Oh, no doubt that, as the balance shifted and the 

requirement—what one heard is the increase. But I have to say 

again that, on the 15th of August, they made a proposal for a 

shared government. 

Mr. ISSA. OK. But, I mean, you previously testified to the 50/50, 

60/40, and 70/30, and these are your own prior statements. So, I 

just want to—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. I, I—— 

Mr. ISSA. We will give it to you from the transcribed interview. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, please. I know that they have actually 

changed their position, but I do not recall a specific number. 

Mr. ISSA. OK. Well, let’s just try to be—let’s try to be fair with 

the facts as they occurred. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Sure. Absolutely. 

Mr. ISSA. There was a negotiation for an end to hostilities and 

a shared government power, in many ways similar to other ends 

of that. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right, yes. 

Mr. ISSA. We agreed to leave because they agreed not to fight. 

During perhaps the Trump Administration, but certainly during 

the Biden Administration, the Taliban was aggressively fighting. 

They were, in fact, taking territory. They were violating the spirit 

of the cease-fire, the spirit of the agreement. And yet, we continued 

our withdrawal as though they were not, in fact, taking by force 

control of the country. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. The agreement was, Congressman, for them to 

attack withdrawing forces. The agreement was for us, if they attacked the Afghans, to come to the defense of the Afghan forces, 

and we did that. 

Mr. ISSA. But we did not come to—no, but let’s be clear. What 

you are saying is we agreed that we wouldn’t get killed as we withdraw, withdrew—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. ISSA [continuing]. But we left the caveat that we would not 

allow the Taliban to defeat the Afghan military, and we had the 

right to come to their defense. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right, and we did. 

Mr. ISSA. But we did not do it sufficient to stop them, did we? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, at the end, you are right, but what surprised us was the poor performance of the Afghans, particularly 

post-President Biden’s announcement and in the summer—— 

Mr. ISSA. OK. 

Mr. KHALILZAD [continuing]. The April announcement and in the 

summer that the balance began to shift significantly. 

Mr. ISSA. So, I just want to ask a simple question. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ISSA. And it is a final question, I believe. When conditions 

changed and our ability to stop the Taliban by taking the country 

by force and putting children, particularly girls, back into, essentially, slavery, when that began to change, President Biden did not 

react by sending troops back in—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Correct. 
58 

Mr. ISSA [continuing]. Or anything else. And it is your testimony 

he did so because sending troops back in—in other words, enforcing 

their keeping their agreement—would have potentially cost American lives, and he wasn’t willing to do so. 

So, 13 Americans died and countless Americans and people who 

helped Americans became trapped in Afghanistan because he 

wouldn’t send troops back in, when, in fact, the Taliban was violating, not just the spirit, but the facts of what they had agreed to, 

which was not taking the country by force. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, the government disintegrated. The president ran away. 

Mr. ISSA. But wait a minute. Wait a second. Wait a second. 

The government disintegrated when all they had left was an encircled Kabul. The president flew out at a time—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. If you go further in time—— 

Mr. ISSA. Well, I would like to go back to around January 20th 

of 2021. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. ISSA. On January 20, 2020—or January 20th, 2021—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes. 

Mr. ISSA [continuing]. Was, in fact, the government already disintegrated or did, over the next 8 months, as they were finding 

themselves unable to hold the territories and negotiate, they began 

to disintegrate—disintegrating finally when they were entrapped 

and all that was left was an airport to leave by? 

Mr. KHALILZAD. You are absolutely right that during the 8 

months the disintegration increased and, finally, in Kabul, what 

happened happened. But I think that the balance shifted, surprisingly—our assessment was different than what happened. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, you know, I appreciate the surprise, but, Mr. 

Chairman, I think the testimony speaks for itself. It was during 

the 8 months—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. ISSA [continuing]. In which the Taliban aggressively took 

land that they began to deteriorate a government because we did 

not re-engage with troops sufficient, and maybe that was a good decision. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Right. 

Mr. ISSA. But I do not think it was. I think it was the decision 

that made inevitable the people of Afghanistan living in slavery 

and 13 Americans losing their lives. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The gentleman yields. 

We are still waiting for Mr. Mills, is that correct? 

STAFF. He’s not coming. 

Chairman MCCAUL. OK. Well, let me just say I want to thank 

you, sir, for being here today, again, voluntarily. I appreciate your 

honestly, transparency. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. You were in a very difficult assignment, as 

I always told you—— 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL [continuing]. Even back in the day. And it is 

very helpful to this committee to get all the facts before us. 
59 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. And I want to thank you for your service to 

the Nation as well. 

There may be additional questions that we would ask you to submit in writing. 

Mr. KHALILZAD. Sure. 

Chairman MCCAUL. And pursuant to committee rules, all members have 5 days to submit questions and extraneous materials for 

the record. 

And without objection, this committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
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APPENDIX 
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63 

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE 

CONNOLLY 
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65 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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