IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-629

No. COA21-749

Filed 20 September 2022

New Hanover County, Nos. 18 CRS 058548, 058553

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

ERIC JAMES FAUCETTE, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 19 February 2021 by Judge

Richard Kent Harrell in the New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the 

Court of Appeals on 25 May 2022.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Asher P. 

Spiller, for the State.

William D. Spence for defendant-appellant.

MURPHY, Judge.

¶ 1 Defendant Eric James Faucette appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion 

to dismiss a charge of identity theft based on the sufficiency of the evidence. 

Defendant has several theories as to why there was insufficient evidence presented 

at trial to support his conviction under N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20, but we need not reach 

the merits of those arguments as the State concedes that “there was insufficient 

evidence presented at trial showing that Defendant knowingly used identifying 

information of another person living or dead within the meaning of the identity theft 
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Opinion of the Court

statute.” As we agree with both parties that there was insufficient evidence showing 

that Defendant intended to fraudulently represent that he was any actual person 

living or dead, the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. We 

therefore vacate Defendant’s conviction.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On 7 November 2018, Curtis Frashure received a phone call regarding a 

disturbance at a trailer he owned. Frashure was told that Defendant, a former tenant 

of Frashure, was destroying the trailer, tearing holes in the wall, and tearing doors 

down. Frashure had previously told Defendant that he was no longer permitted to 

live in the trailer. Upon receiving the phone call, Frashure contacted his friend James 

Hinson, who lived across the street, and asked Hinson to find out what was going on 

at his trailer. Frashure then called 911 to report the disturbance.

¶ 3 After speaking with Frashure, Hinson and Mary Baisden, Hinson’s fiancé,

walked over to Frashure’s home, where they observed Defendant picking through a 

trashcan. Hinson told Defendant that he was not supposed to be there, that Frashure 

had told Defendant to leave, and that Defendant would need to go. Without giving 

any verbal response, Defendant stepped away from the trashcan and struck Hinson 

in the head with a machete. Hinson then sought to disarm Defendant by punching 

him but was not successful.
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¶ 4 During their encounter, Hinson was hit with the machete multiple times. 

Baisden eventually led Hinson back to their trailer, where they called 911. Hinson 

was then taken to New Hanover Regional Medical Center where he received stitches 

and staples on the lacerations on his head. In addition to scarring, the assault left

Hinson with recurring headaches, which still recurred at the time of trial.

¶ 5 After the assault, Defendant fled and eventually checked himself into New 

Hanover Regional Medical Center. Defendant told hospital personnel that his name 

was David Bostic and that his date of birth was 24 September 1972. Defendant 

eventually left the hospital, apparently without receiving medical services or 

treatment, wearing a bracelet identifying his name as David Bostic and his date of 

birth as 24 September 1972.

¶ 6 Later that evening, Defendant was arrested by Sergeant Joshua Bryant. At 

trial, Sgt. Bryant testified that he stopped Defendant after observing him riding a 

bicycle without the required safety equipment. Sgt. Bryant observed what appeared 

to be blood on Defendant’s clothes. He also recognized Defendant from a picture that 

had been texted to him by another officer. Defendant began talking about the incident 

and, while speaking to Sgt. Bryant, stated that he “went into the hospital under 

another person’s name.”

¶ 7 On 18 February 2019, Defendant was indicted on charges of assault with a 

deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and identity theft. At trial, with respect to the 
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identity theft charge, the State argued that Defendant gave the hospital false 

information because he had an outstanding charge for failing to appear in court. The 

State introduced and published a video recording of an interview of Defendant 

conducted by John Carpenter, a former detective of the New Hanover County Sherriff’s 

Office. During Defendant’s interview, Defendant stated that he gave the false name 

to the hospital because he had a failure to appear. He further stated, in reference to 

giving the false information to the hospital, “[t]his is just me protecting myself from 

not [sic] having to go to jail.” Defendant further indicated that the information he 

provided to the hospital did not belong to a real person. Defendant stated that he 

thought he could just be “John Doe” at the hospital, and “that’s all it was.” He also 

stated, in reference to the false name and birthdate, “that person doesn’t even exist.”

¶ 8 At trial, the wristband that Defendant obtained upon being admitted at the 

hospital was also introduced into evidence. The name on the wristband was “David 

Bostic,” and the birthdate on the wristband was 24 September 1972. Carpenter 

testified that he contacted a man named David Bostic who verified that he did not visit 

the hospital on 7 November 2018. The State then called David Bostic himself, who

testified he lived in Pender County,1 did not visit New Hanover Regional Medical 

 

1 We take judicial notice that Pender and New Hanover are adjoining counties. See 

Lineberger v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 189 N.C. App. 1, 6, 657 S.E.2d 673, 677 (quoting West v. 

G.D. Reddick, Inc., 302 N.C. 201, 203, 274 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1981)) (“Appellate courts may 
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Opinion of the Court

Center on 7 November 2018, did not know Defendant, and had never given Defendant 

permission to use his identity. He also testified that his date of birth was 28 May 1975.

¶ 9 At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant made a motion to dismiss the 

charge of identity theft based on the sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant’s motion 

was denied. Subsequently, Defendant renewed his motion to dismiss at the close of all 

evidence, which was again denied. Defendant timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss 

the charge of identity theft at the close of all evidence on the ground that the evidence 

was insufficient to establish every element of the crime pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A1227. See generally N.C.G.S. § 15A-1227 (2021). Defendant argues that the evidence 

presented was not sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact to find each element 

of this charge beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, the trial court should not 

have allowed this charge to go to the jury. The State concedes that this argument is 

correct, and we agree.

 

take judicial notice ex mero motu on ‘any occasion where the existence of a particular fact is 

important . . . .’ [Facts subject to judicial notice are those] which are either so notoriously 

true as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute or ‘capable of demonstration by readily 

accessible sources of indisputable accuracy’ . . . .”), aff’d per curiam in part, disc. rev. 

improvidently allowed in part, 362 N.C. 675, 669 S.E. 2d 320 (2008).
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Opinion of the Court

¶ 11 “We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.” State v. 

Sanders, 208 N.C. App. 142, 144, 701 S.E.2d 380, 382 (2010). “This Court, under a 

de novo standard of review, considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own 

judgment for that of the trial court.” Id. (citing State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-

33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008)).

A defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied if there 

is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the 

offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and 

(2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial 

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the State, making all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence in favor of the State. The trial court in 

considering such motions is concerned only with the 

sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury and 

not with its weight. Contradictions and discrepancies are 

for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal. 

Id. at 144-45, 701 S.E.2d at 382-83 (marks and citations omitted).

¶ 12 N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20 provides, in pertinent part, that identity theft exists 

when “[a] person . . . knowingly obtains, possesses, or uses identifying information of 

another person, living or dead, with the intent to fraudulently represent that the 

person is the other person . . . for the purpose of avoiding legal consequences[.]” 

N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(a) (2021) (emphasis added). N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(b) further 

provides a non-exclusive list of information that constitutes “identifying information”
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Opinion of the Court

within the meaning of the statute. See N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(b) (2021); State v. Miles, 

267 N.C. App. 78, 89, 833 S.E.2d 27, 34 (2019), disc. rev. denied, 373 N.C. 588, 837 

S.E.2d 891 (2020).

¶ 13 This Court has determined that another person’s actual name, date of birth, 

and address may constitute forms of identifying information under N.C.G.S. § 14-

113.20(b). See Miles, 267 N.C. App. at 89, 833 S.E.2d at 34. In State v. Miles, the 

defendant went to Duke Regional Hospital to receive treatment for gunshot wounds 

after fleeing from an assault with a deadly weapon. Id. at 80-81, 833 S.E.2d at 29-

30. Upon arrival, the defendant gave the hospital the actual name, date of birth, and 

address of another person, Jerel Thompson. Id. On these facts, we found that a 

name, date of birth, and address of another person are “possible forms of identifying 

information where a defendant, like [the] defendant in the instant case, uses the 

information for the purposes of escaping arrest or other legal consequences and 

possibly to receive hospital services for his injuries.” Id. at 89, 833 S.E.2d at 34. 

¶ 14 Here, however, there was no evidence presented that an actual person matched

the identifying information on Defendant’s hospital wristband: David Bostic, born on 

24 September 1972. And Defendant did not give the hospital an address. While the 

State’s evidence, taken in the light most favorable to it, indicated that Defendant 

gave the false name of David Bostic and a false birthdate to hospital personnel and

further showed that he did so for the purpose of avoiding arrest for a failure to appear, 
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Opinion of the Court

there was no evidence presented at trial to connect Defendant’s use of this 

information with an actual person, living or dead. The individual named David Bostic 

who testified at trial did not have the same birthdate the State’s evidence suggested

Defendant provided the hospital, and the remaining evidence presented at trial does 

not indicate that anyone could have used the information given by Defendant to 

identify any real person.

¶ 15 Therefore, under the facts of this case and a plain reading of the statute, there 

was insufficient evidence at trial to show that Defendant “knowingly . . . use[d] 

identifying information of another person, living or dead, with the intent to 

fraudulently represent that [Defendant was] the other person” within the meaning of 

N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(a). N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(a) (2021).

CONCLUSION

¶ 16 There was insufficient evidence at trial to show that Defendant intended to 

fraudulently represent he was the David Bostic who testified at trial or that

Defendant used the identifying information of any other actual person, living or dead. 

Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and his 

conviction for identity theft under N.C.G.S. § 14-113.20(a) is vacated.

2

 

2 We note that, because Defendant’s sentence for the identify theft conviction was to 

be served concurrently with an equivalent term of imprisonment for the assault conviction,

which Defendant did not challenge on appeal, vacatur of the identify theft conviction does 

not necessitate a new sentencing hearing.
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Opinion of the Court

VACATED.

Judges ARROWOOD and CARPENTER concur.