J-A28009-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SANTOS B. RAMOS-RODRIGUEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1484 MDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 29, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-67-CR-0000140-2006

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

JUDGMENT ORDER BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 21, 2021

Santos B. Ramos-Rodriguez appeals from the order, entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of York County, denying his petition filed pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, 

we affirm.

On December 14, 2005, a jury convicted Ramos-Rodriguez of various 

drug, firearm, and related offenses. On August 21, 2006, the trial court 

sentenced Ramos-Rodriguez to 30 to 60 years’ incarceration, which included 

the imposition of a two-year school-zone mandatory minimum sentence and 

a five-year gun mandatory minimum sentence. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317; 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1. On August 28, 2006, Ramos-Rodriguez filed a postsentence motion, which the trial court denied on September 25, 2006. This 

Court affirmed Ramos-Rodriguez’s judgment of sentence on June 21, 2007. 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Commonwealth v. Ramos-Rodriguez 931 A.2d 51 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(unpublished memorandum). Ramos-Rodriguez did not file a petition for 

allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

Thereafter, Ramos-Rodriguez filed five unsuccessful PCRA petitions. He 

filed the instant petition, his sixth, on November 2, 2018. In the instant

petition, Ramos-Rodriguez argues his sentence is illegal because section 6317

(drug-free school zone mandatory minimum statute) was declared

unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015). 

Ramos-Rodriguez alleges that the PCRA court erred by: (1) failing to treat 

the PCRA petition as a writ of habeas corpus because the constitutional relief 

he seeks from section 6317 falls outside the enumerated remedies of the 

PCRA; and (2) concluding that his PCRA petition was time-barred where he 

pled and proved a retroactively-applied constitutional right. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9745(b)(i)(iii). 

Despite his first claim, Ramos-Rodriguez admits he styled his filing as a 

PCRA petition, and, in fact, his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal refers to the appeal as a “PCRA” appeal. See 

generally Defendant’s Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief, 11/2/18. 

Further, in Ramos-Rodriguez’s petition, he neither sought habeas corpus nor 

constitutional relief from section 6317, nor did he seek such habeas corpus or 

constitutional relief in his “Objections to the 907(1) Notice” or his Rule 1925(b)

statement. See Defendant’s Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief, 

11/2/18, at 8; Objections to 907(1) Notice, 9/16/19. Thus, Ramos-Rodriguez 
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waived the issue of whether his claim should be treated as a habeas corpus

petition. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 

A.2d 717, 725-26 (Pa. 2000) (“Under the PCRA, waiver occurs if the petitioner 

could have raised the issue but failed to do so before trial, at trial, on appeal, 

or in a prior state post-conviction proceeding.”).

Even if the issue had not been waived, Ramos-Rodriguez cannot escape 

the PCRA time-bar by now labeling his petition as a writ of habeas corpus.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“Unless the 

PCRA could not provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes 

the writ of habeas corpus. Issues that are cognizable under the PCRA must 

be raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas corpus

petition.”) (citations omitted). Moreover, Ramos-Rodriguez’s filing challenges 

the constitutionality of one of the mandatory minimum statutes that applied 

to his sentence. Under such circumstances, he is effectively challenging the 

legality of his sentence—a claim that must be brought under the PCRA. See 

Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990, 991 (Pa. 2021) (challenge to 

constitutionality of sentencing statute properly treated as PCRA petition).

Regarding Ramos-Rodriguez’s second issue, we acknowledge that, while 

challenges to a sentence’s legality cannot be waived, the PCRA court still must

have jurisdiction to review the merits of such a claim. See Commonwealth 

v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. 2013) (PCRA’s “time requirement is 

mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in 

order to reach the merits of the petition”). Instantly, Ramos-Rodriguez’s 
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judgment of sentence became final, for purposes of the PCRA, on December 

21, 2007, when the time expired for him to file a petition for allowance of 

appeal with our Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 

1113. Thus, Ramos-Rodriguez had until December 21, 2008, to file a timely 

petition. Ramos-Rodriguez’s petition, however, was filed almost ten years 

later; therefore, it is patently untimely. Since Ramos-Rodriguez failed to plead 

and prove an exception to the PCRA time-bar, the PCRA court had no 

jurisdiction to consider the merits of his petition. Hernandez, supra.

Although Ramos-Rodriguez attempts in his appellate brief to plead and 

prove the exception for a retroactively-applied constitutional right under 

section 9545(b)(1)(iii), we find that he has waived this argument where he 

never raised this exception in his petition, his “Objections to the 907(1) 

Notice,” or in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Defendant’s Motion for PostConviction Collateral Relief, 11/2/18; Objections to 907(1) Notice, 9/16/19; 

see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (issues not raised in Rule 1925(b) 

statement waived); Taylor, supra at 468; Commonwealth v. Wharton, 

886 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Pa. 2005) (“Exceptions [to the PCRA jurisdictional timebar] cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[.]”). Because RamosRodriguez fails to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA court’s time-bar,
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the court properly denied his petition.

1

 Hernandez, supra; Commonwealth 

v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 97-98 (Pa. 2001).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/21/2021

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1 Even if we did not find waived Ramos-Rodriguez’s argument that Hopkins, 

supra, “established a substantive[,] [c]onstitutional rule that should be 

applied retroactively to cases on collateral review[,]” Ramos-Rodriguez failed 

to prove the exception, as our Supreme Court has held that Hopkins does 

not apply retroactively. Appellant’s Reply Brief, at 2 (citing Montgomery v. 

Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016); Commonwealth v. Whitehawk, 146 

A.3d 266, 271 (Pa. 2016)). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) (right asserted 

is constitutional right recognized by Supreme Court of United States or 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after time period provided in this section and 

has been held by Court to apply retroactively).