_____________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

 

 

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

 

 

2017 IL App (3d) 150055 

Opinion filed April 3, 2017 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

THIRD DISTRICT 

2017 

DAVID D. WALKER,	 ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Will County, Illinois. 

) 

) 

v. ) Appeal No. 3-15-0055 

) Circuit No. 13-MR-519 

ADAM P. MONREAL, Chairman of the ) 

Illinois Prisoner Review Board, ) Honorable 

) Roger Rickmon, 

Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices McDade and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Plaintiff, David Walker, an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), 

filed a complaint for mandamus relief against Adam Monreal, Chairman of the Prisoner Review 

Board. In his complaint, Walker requested that the trial court compel Monreal to conduct a new 

revocation hearing regarding the revocation of his mandatory supervised release (MSR). The 

trial court granted Monreal’s motion to dismiss the mandamus complaint with prejudice. Walker 

appealed. We affirm. 

¶ 2	 FACTS 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

¶ 3 According to Walker’s filings in this case, he was released from prison to serve a threeyear MSR term on March 29, 2000, related to case number 90-CF-1815. On October 3, 2000, 

Walker was arrested for violating various terms of his MSR. On October 25, 2000, he was also 

charged with the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. On June 6, 2001, he was charged, by way 

of indictment, with first degree murder and attempted armed robbery for an incident that had 

occurred on October 1, 2000. On October 11, 2002, after a jury trial, Walker was found guilty of 

first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to 50 years of imprisonment. 

¶ 4 On November 5, 2003, Walker appeared before the Illinois Prisoner Review Board for a 

revocation hearing regarding the MSR term he was serving in case number 90-CF-1815 at the 

time he committed the murder offense. At the revocation hearing, Walker requested a 

continuance to obtain evidence to prove that the warrant issued for his arrest for alleged MSR 

violations was issued without verified facts to establish probable cause. The hearing officer 

denied the request for a continuance, reasoning that Walker’s argument of lack of probable cause 

to support the warrant that had been issued on October 3, 2000, was moot in light of Walker 

being convicted of a murder that he committed during the MSR term, on October 1, 2000. The 

hearing officer indicated that the revocation of the MSR term should proceed based on Walker 

having violated the conditions of the MSR as evidence by his murder conviction. 

¶ 5 On February 26, 2013, nearly 10 years later, Walker filed a complaint for mandamus 

relief, requesting that the trial court compel Monreal, the Chairman of the Prisoner Review 

Board, to conduct a second revocation hearing. In the complaint, Walker argued that he was 

denied due process at the original revocation hearing. 

2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

¶ 6 On August 12, 2013, Walker filed a motion for default because Monreal had been served 

with the complaint but failed to file an answer. On August 22, 2013, the trial court entered an 

order giving Monreal one month to answer or otherwise plead to Walker’s default motion. 

¶ 7 On September 26, 2013, an assistant attorney general entered his appearance to represent 

Monreal and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure 

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)), arguing that Walker’s mandamus complaint failed to 

state a claim. Also on September 26, 2013, Walker filed a second motion for default. The same 

day, the trial court denied Walker’s default motions and granted Monreal leave to file the motion 

to dismiss. On February 27, 2014, the trial court denied Monreal’s section 2-615 motion to 

dismiss and gave him until March 25, 2014, to answer or otherwise plead. 

¶ 8 On March 26, 2014, Monreal filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the 

Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2014)), arguing that Walker’s mandamus complaint was barred 

under the common law doctrine of laches. Monreal contended that a mandamus action must be 

brought within six months unless there was a reasonable explanation for the delay and 

defendant’s mandamus complaint was not filed until 10 years after the revocation hearing of 

which he complained. Monreal also argued Walker’s claim was moot because Walker was 

convicted of first degree murder, which provided an alternative basis for revoking Walker’s 

MSR. 

¶ 9 On December 17, 2014, the trial court granted Monreal’s motion and dismissed Walker’s 

mandamus complaint with prejudice. In addition, the trial court found that Monreal’s section 2­

615 motion to dismiss should have also been granted. 

3 
 

 

 

 

 

¶ 10 On January 14, 2015, Walker filed a notice of appeal that was file-stamped as received by 

the circuit clerk on January 20, 2015. The envelope for the notice of appeal indicated, “This 

correspondence is from an inmate of the IDOC” and was postmarked January 16, 2015. 

¶ 11 Along with the notice of appeal, defendant enclosed a “Proof/Certificate of Service,” 

dated January 14, 2015, which was also file-stamped as being received by the circuit clerk on 

January 20, 2015. The certificate of service was signed by Walker and listed his address as the 

Stateville Correctional Center, P.O. Box 112, Joliet, Illinois. The certificate of service indicated 

that the documents were to be delivered to the circuit court clerk at 14 West Jefferson Street, 

Joliet, Illinois, 60432, and stated: 

“PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on Jan. 14, 2015, I placed the attached or 

enclosed documents in the institutional mail at Stateville Correctional Center, 

properly addressed to the parties listed above for mailing through the United 

States Postal Service.” 

¶ 12 ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 On appeal, Walker argues the trial court erred by (1) denying his motions for default, (2) 

granting Monreal’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss, and (3) finding Monreal’s section 2-615 

motion to dismiss should have been granted. Monreal filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction, arguing Walker’s notice of appeal was untimely and “leaves this Court 

without jurisdiction to consider the appeal.” Monreal also argues on appeal that this court should 

affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the mandamus complaint and that the trial court did not err in 

denying Walker’s motions for default. 

4 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

¶ 14	 I. Jurisdiction 

¶ 15 We first address Monreal’s motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A 

reviewing court has a duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction prior to addressing any issue 

on appeal. Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009). 

A timely notice of appeal is mandatory for jurisdiction to be conveyed upon the appellate court. 

Id. Without a properly filed notice of appeal, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over the matter 

and must dismiss the appeal. Huber v. American Accounting Ass’n, 2014 IL 117293, ¶ 8. 

¶ 16 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015) requires an appealing party to 

file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final 

judgment being appealed (or within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of a timely 

posttrial motion directed against the judgment). The time of filing of the notice of appeal will be 

the date on which the filings are actually received by the clerk of the reviewing court. Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 373 (eff. Sept. 19, 2014).1 However, if the clerk receives the notice of appeal after the due 

date, the time of mailing shall be deemed the time of filing. Id. 

¶ 17	 Subsection (b)(4) of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12 specifically addresses service by 

mail by a pro se petitioner from a correctional facility, which provides that proof of service is 

accomplished by “certification as provided in section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure 

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2012)) of the person who deposited the document in the 

institutional mail, stating the time and place of deposit and the complete address to which the 

document was to be delivered.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(4) (eff. Sept. 19, 2014).2 Section 1-109 of the 

5 

1

Subsequent to the relevant time pertaining to the facts of this case, Rule 373 was amended on 

October 6, 2016, with an effective date of November 1, 2016. Ill. S. Ct. R. 373 (eff. Nov. 1, 2016). 

2

Subsequent to the relevant time pertaining to the facts of this case, Rule 12 was amended twice, 

with effective dates of January 2, 2016 and November 1, 2016. Ill. S. Ct. R. 12 (eff. Nov. 1, 2016). 
 

 

 

Code indicates that the person having knowledge of the matters stated in the document that was 

certified shall subscribe to a certification in substantially the following form: 

“Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of 

Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this 

instrument are true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on 

information and belief and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as 

aforesaid that he verily believes the same to be true.” 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 

2014). 

Section 1-109 also provides, “Any person who makes a false statement, material to the issue or 

point in question, which he does not believe to be true, in any pleading, affidavit or other 

document certified by such person in accordance with this Section shall be guilty of a Class 3 

felony.” 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2014). 

¶ 18 In this case, Walker’s notice of appeal was due for filing in the circuit clerk’s office by 

January 16, 2015. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). However, the circuit clerk did not 

receive the notice of appeal until January 20, 2015. Since defendant’s notice of appeal was 

received by the circuit clerk more than 30 days after the trial court dismissed his mandamus 

complaint, the time of mailing may be used to establish the filing date. Walker’s proof of mailing 

indicated the date and place of deposit and the complete address of where the document was to 

be delivered but failed to include certifying language in substantial compliance with the 

requirements of section 1-109 of the Code. 

¶ 19 Specifically, Walker was required to certify the following statement: “on Jan[uary] 14, 

2015, I placed the attached or enclosed documents in the institutional mail at [the] Stateville 

Correctional Center, properly addressed to the parties listed above for mailing through the United 

6 
 

 

 

 

States Postal Service.” See 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2014). Walker failed to indicate anywhere 

in the “certification” that he was certifying that he had placed the documents in the mail system 

on January 14, 2015, in accordance with section 1-109 of the Code. See 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 

2014). Thus, Walker’s certificate of mailing was insufficient to prove the date of mailing and 

failed to establish that the notice of appeal was timely filed. 

¶ 20 Nonetheless, the envelope in which the notice of appeal was mailed was clearly 

postmarked January 16, 2015. Many districts have held that a postmark cannot be relied upon to 

provide sufficient proof of service where there is no certificate of service as required by Rule 

12(b). See People v. Blalock, 2012 IL App (4th) 110041, ¶ 11 (postjudgment motion deemed 

filed on date received by clerk and not date of postmark); People v. Smith, 2011 IL App (4th) 

100430 (adhering to the strict requirement of filing an affidavit or certificate of service in 

compliance with Rule 12(b)); People v. Tlatenchi, 391 Ill. App. 3d 705, 713 (2009) (the First 

District Appellate Court adhered to the strict requirements of Rule 12(b) for proof of mailing); 

People v. Lugo, 391 Ill. App. 3d. 995, 1002 (2009) (Second District Appellate Court held that a 

postmark is not sufficient proof of mailing under Rule 12(b)). However, in contrast, a panel of 

the Second District Appellate Court has held that a legible postmark is sufficient to establish the 

date of mailing. People v. Hansen, 2011 IL App (2d) 081226, ¶ 14 (a clearly legible postmark is 

sufficient proof of mailing even where there is no certificate of service as required by Rule 

12(b)). 

¶ 21 Here, the envelope was clearly postmarked January 16, 2015, and was made part of the 

record in this case. The envelope indicates that Walker mailed the notice of appeal on or before 

January 16, 2015. We agree with the Hansen court that requiring a court to ignore a clearly 

legible postmark is requiring the court to disregard “the best, most competent evidence” of the 

7 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

date of mailing. Id. Relying upon the clearly legible postmark in this case, we conclude that 

Walker’s notice of appeal was timely filed. Consequently, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 

¶ 22 II. Dismissal of the Mandamus Complaint 

¶ 23 On appeal, Walker argues the trial court erred by (1) denying his motions for default and 

(2) granting Monreal’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss and indicating Monreal’s section 2-615 

motion to dismiss should have been granted. In response, Monreal argues that this appeal should 

be dismissed as moot because Walker is seeking a new MSR revocation hearing but the sentence 

that included the applicable MSR term has been discharged. Monreal also argues that the trial 

court properly dismissed the mandamus complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code because 

the claim was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. He further argues that the dismissal of 

the mandamus complaint is appropriate pursuant to section 2-615 because the allegations of the 

complaint failed to state a cause of action. Finally, Monreal argues that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Walker’s motions for default judgment where there has been no 

showing of the denial of substantial justice. 

¶ 24 We review de novo the trial court’s dismissal of Walker’s mandamus complaint pursuant 

to section 2-619 of the Code, and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Ashley v. 

Pierson, 339 Ill. App. 3d 733, 737 (2003). In the mandamus complaint, Walker requested a new 

revocation hearing so that he could offer proof at the new hearing that the warrant for his arrest 

for violating the MSR term was issued without probable cause. 

¶ 25 Walker’s claim is barred by the doctrine of laches. Laches is applied when a party’s 

failure to timely assert a right has caused prejudice to an adverse party. Id. The doctrine of laches 

applies to mandamus petitions. Id. at 739. Generally, the party asserting a laches defense must 

prove (1) a lack of due diligence by the party asserting a claim and (2) prejudice to the party 

8 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

asserting laches. Id. The plaintiff’s lack of diligence is established by showing that more than six 

months has elapsed between the accrual of the cause of action and filing of the petition, unless 

there is a reasonable excuse for the delay. Id.; Caruth v. Quinley, 333 Ill. App. 3d 94, 99 (2002). 

In proving prejudice by the other party’s delay, prejudice is deemed inherent “where a detriment 

or inconvenience to the public will result.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ashley, 339 Ill. 

App. 3d at 739 (quoting City of Chicago v. Condell, 224 Ill. 595, 598-99 (1906)). Such detriment 

and inconvenience exists in cases where inmates file mandamus petitions more than six months 

after the completion of the original IDOC disciplinary proceedings and no reasonable excuse 

exists for the delay. Ashley, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 739; Alicea v. Snyder, 321 Ill. App. 3d 248, 254 

(2001) (IDOC conducts large number of disciplinary proceedings every year and the expense and 

burden of conducting reviews long after the original proceedings are completed would result in 

extensive public detriment and inconvenience). 

¶ 26 In this case, Walker filed his mandamus complaint more than 10 years after the denial of 

his request for a continuance at the revocation hearing on November 5, 2003. Walker provides 

no reasonable excuse for the prolonged delay. Prejudice by the delayed filing of the mandamus 

complaint is inherent in this case, where more than six months has elapsed since the complained 

of proceeding was conducted by the Illinois Prisoner Review Board and the sentence for which 

the relevant MSR term was revoked has long since been discharged. See Ashley, 339 Ill. App. 3d 

at 737. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Walker’s mandamus complaint 

pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code. 

¶ 27 III. Denial of Walker’s Motions for Default 

¶ 28 Walker also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions for default. Entry of a 

default is a drastic remedy that should be used only as a last resort because the law prefers that 

9 
 

 

 

 

 

controversies be determined according to the substantive rights of the parties. In re Haley D., 

2011 IL 110886, ¶ 69. Decisions whether to grant or deny a motion for default judgment are 

within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of 

discretion or the denial of substantial justice. Dupree v. Hardy, 2011 IL App (4th) 100351, ¶ 51. 

Where a defendant files a motion to vacate a default order, the provisions of the Code of Civil 

Procedure governing relief from a default are to be liberally construed, with the overriding 

consideration being whether substantial justice is being done between the litigants and whether it 

is reasonable, under the circumstances, to compel the parties to go to trial on the merits. Haley 

D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 69. In making this assessment, a court should consider all events leading 

up to the judgment, with the determination of what is just and proper determined by the facts of 

each case. Id. 

¶ 29 Given the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Walker’s requests for default where substantial justice would not have been accomplished had 

the default motions been granted. Section 2-615 of the Code governs motions to dismiss 

complaints that are substantially insufficient in law. See 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)). Under 

section 2-615 of the Code, we accept as true all well-pleaded facts contained within the 

complaint, along with the reasonable inferences, and view those facts in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff. Dupree, 2011 IL App (4th) 100351, ¶ 19. Here, Walker alleged that he was 

arrested for violating various terms of his MSR and the arrest warrant lacked probable cause. He 

claimed that he requested several continuances of the MSR revocation hearing to obtain 

information to challenge the warrant, but the hearing officer denied those requests, finding the 

issue of whether there was sufficient probable cause to issue the arrest warrant to be “moot” 

where Walker had been convicted of a murder that took place during the MSR term that was the 

10 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

subject of the revocation hearing. Accepting the facts that Walker pled as true, Walker had been 

convicted of a murder that took place during his MSR term, and the revocation hearing officer 

specifically indicated that the revocation proceedings were to be based on that murder offense. 

The mandamus complaint failed to state a claim. See McFatridge v. Madigan, 2013 IL 113676, 

¶ 17 (mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to compel public officers to perform 

nondiscretionary official duties, wherein a plaintiff must establish a clear right to the relief 

sought, a clear duty of the public officer to act, and clear authority of the public officer to comply 

with the order); Hadley v. Ryan, 345 Ill. App. 3d 297, 301 (2003) (mandamus may not be used to 

direct the official to reach a particular decision or exercise his discretion in a particular manner). 

Substantial justice would not have been accomplished by the trial court granting Walker’s 

default motions where the complaint failed to state a claim. 

¶ 30 Furthermore, even if a default order against Monreal had been entered, upon Monreal’s 

request for vacatur, substantial justice would require the trial court to set aside the default where 

the mandamus complaint both failed to state a claim and was barred by the doctrine of laches. 

See Haley D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 69. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Walker’s motions for default. 

¶ 31 CONCLUSION 

¶ 32 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. 

¶ 33 Affirmed. 

11