United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 14, 2018*

Decided June 14, 2018

Before

      DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

      JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

      DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 17‐3594

HAROLD McKAY,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

SHALIZA ODOM, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:15‐cv‐01337 SMY‐RJD   

Staci M. Yandle,

Judge.

O R D E R

Harold McKay, a former Illinois prisoner, sued the prison’s dental hygienist and

her employer for violating the Eighth Amendment after a prison dentist did not

promptly implant dentures to replace some extracted teeth. The district court granted

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal McKay has abandoned any

argument about the hygienist and has presented no evidence that her employer,

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 17‐3594    Page 2

Wexford Health Sources, condoned an unconstitutional dental policy. So we affirm the

district court’s judgment.   

McKay first sought dental care from Dr. Elizabeth Brack, the prison’s dentist,

while he was imprisoned in Illinois in May 2014. Dr. Brack examined McKay, found

that he had severe gum disease, and recommended extracting 11 teeth. She recalls

telling him that he needed extensive restorative treatment before he could receive

partial dentures and that she could not predict how long that treatment would take.

McKay, in contrast, said that Dr. Brack assured him that he would receive partial

dentures before his release date. For purposes of our summary‐judgment review, we

accept McKay’s version. See Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017).

After Dr. Brack extracted McKay’s teeth, he received several follow‐up cleanings

with Shaliza Odom serving as the dental hygienist. McKay repeatedly asked when he

could get his dentures, and she reminded him that he needed to complete his

restorative treatment first. Dr. Brack then found that McKay had some cavities that

needed to be filled before implanting dentures, and she placed him on the waiting list

for non‐emergency fillings. At a later appointment, McKay pointed out that his release

date was approaching, and he expressed his concern that he had not yet received his

dentures. Dr. Brack replied that his health would not be in danger if he were released

without dentures, but that he would need to find an outside dentist to complete his

treatment. McKay filed two grievances about his treatment status, but they were

dismissed. McKay was released in October 2015 without receiving dentures.   

McKay sued Odom and Wexford (but not Dr. Brack) under 42 U.S.C § 1983. He

alleged that they violated the Eighth Amendment by making him wait 16 months for

partial dentures, during which time he could chew only on the right side of his mouth.

In later moving for summary judgment, Odom argued that she had no control over the

treatment plan put in place by Dr. Brack. Wexford argued that McKay failed to assert

that any of its policies violated the Constitution. Agreeing with these arguments, the

district judge entered summary judgment for Odom and Wexford. The judge added

that even if Dr. Brack had been named as a defendant, she was not deliberately

indifferent because McKay never reported pain or problems eating.

We review the grant of summary judgement de novo. See Estate of Simpson,

863 F.3d at 745. McKay does not question the district judge’s analysis or cite any

applicable legal authority. We could dismiss the appeal on this ground alone. See FED.

R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); Yasinskyy v. Holder, 724 F.3d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 2013). But we have
No. 17‐3594    Page 3

reviewed the record de novo to assure ourselves that the district court’s decision is

sound. See Estate of Simpson, 863 F.3d at 745. And as we now explain, it is.   

McKay’s only argument is about Wexford. Section 1983 does not support a

theory of respondeat‐superior liability against an employer like Wexford. See Shields v.

Illinois Depʹt of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 796 (7th Cir. 2014). McKay can proceed to trial

against Wexford only if he supplied evidence that “his injury was caused by a Wexford

policy, custom, or practice of deliberate indifference to medical needs, or a series of bad

acts that together raise the inference of such a policy.” Id. He has not supplied evidence

that would support a finding that Wexford is liable. In response to the defendants’

motion for summary judgment, McKay asserted in an affidavit only that he was not

provided medical treatment for his gum disease at any of his nine appointments after

his teeth were extracted. He does not mention any Wexford policy that motivated the

conduct of Dr. Brack or any other Wexford employee.   

Moreover, even though we have assumed that Dr. Brack told McKay that he

would receive partial dentures before his release, that statement does not provide a

basis for finding that Wexford is liable for a constitutional violation. Dr. Brack’s

prediction that she would implant dentures before McKay’s release was, as later events

(such as McKay’s unexpected cavities) revealed, incorrect. But an incorrect prediction

may at most suggest negligence, and negligence does not violate the Eighth

Amendment. See Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679–80 (7th Cir. 2008). Furthermore

even if Dr. Brack’s incorrect prediction could make her liable, her single misstatement

would not make Wexford culpable because “isolated acts of misconduct will not

suffice” to establish an unconstitutional policy. Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 596

(7th Cir. 2003).

AFFIRMED