alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 22-2296

___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v. Alfonso R. Mosley lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Western

____________ Submitted: October 3, 2022 Filed: October 6, 2022 [Unpublished]

____________ Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. Alfonso R. Mosley appeals after the district court 1 revoked his supervised release for the second time and sentenced him to 7 months in prison, with no

1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.additional supervised release to follow. His counsel has moved to withdraw and has

filed a brief challenging the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. After reviewing the record under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, we conclude the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review). The sentence is below the statutory limits, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), and is presumptively reasonable because it falls within the applicable policy statement range in the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a); United States v. Petreikis, 551 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2009). The district court sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors and did not overlook a relevant factor, give significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or commit a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Miller, 557 F.3d at 917; see also United States v. Clayton, 828 F.3d 654, 658 (8th Cir. 2016) . Accordingly, we affirm the judgment, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________

-2-
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Jonas HANEY.

No. 87-KK-1819.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 4, 1987.

In re State of Louisiana; applying for supervisory writ; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. KW87 0891; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “B”, Nos. 7-80-117, 10-80-694 and 6-80-483.

Stay order recalled. Writ denied.
#### Theodore M. HATHEWAY v. Helen Waldorf, Wife of Dr. Edward A. JOHN and Dr. Edward A. John.

No. 88-C-0122.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 26, 1988.

In re Stamps, Ronella Dejan — Other; De-jan, Ronella — Other; Stamps, Barry — Oth*426er; Butler, Jerry — Other; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. CA-7289; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “C”, No. 82-19155.

Prior report: La.App., 517 So.2d 1218.

Denied.

DIXON, C.J., and CALOGERO and LEMMON, JJ., would grant the writ.
<PAGE>


                                                                      EXHIBIT 21
                                                                      ----------


                SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY AT DECEMBER 31, 2001
                ------------------------------------------------

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                         Jurisdiction of
Entity                                                                   Incorporation
------                                                                   -------------
<S>                                                                     <C>
Atwood Publishing, LLC                                                   Delaware
EXPO Magazine, LLC                                                       Delaware
GEM Communications, LLC                                                  Delaware
InterGame, Limited                                                       United Kingdom
Afro Games (Proprietary) Limited                                         South Africa
ExpoExchange, LLC                                                        Delaware
I.T.S. Information Services, Inc.                                        Delaware
Total Information Services, Inc.                                         Oklahoma
Record Search, Inc.                                                      Delaware
The Official Provider Source, Inc. (Formerly Crimesearch, Inc.)          Oklahoma
STA United, Inc.                                                         Delaware
United States Mutual Association, Inc                                    Delaware
TOIC Holdings, LLC                                                       Delaware
</TABLE>
#### The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Albert MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 81SA386.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

April 4, 1983.

Rehearing Denied April 18, 1983.

J.D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., John Daniel Dailey, J. Stephen Phillips, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, Colorado State Public Defender, Jody Sorenson Theis, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.

HODGES, Chief Justice.

Defendant Martinez appeals the denial of his Crim.P. 35(c) motion to either vacate his guilty plea on a charge of first-degree assault1 or to resentence him. We affirm.

The defendant pled guilty to shooting his victim at point-blank range, causing partial paralysis, in an incident which occurred in 1973. Pursuant to a plea bargain, three other counts, including two habitual criminal counts, were dismissed. The defendant was sentenced to a term of 15 to 25 years in the penitentiary in accordance with his plea bargain.

At the providency hearing the defendant told the trial judge that although he wished to accept the plea bargain, he acted in self-defense. The record established that the defendant, after being fully advised of his rights, waived them and knowingly and consciously chose to plead guilty. He was represented by counsel during all the proceedings. On this basis, his plea of guilty must stand. *McMann v. Richardson,*397 U.S. 759, 774, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1450, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 775 (1970); *North Carolina v. Alford,*400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).

The defendant bases his claim for resentencing and reducing his sentence on our decision in *People v. Bramlett,*194 Colo. 205, 573 P.2d 94 (1977). This reliance is misplaced because *Bramlett*has no application to the facts here. We held in *Bramlett*
      *1293that if a defendant charged with first-degree assault raised the affirmative defense of self-defense at trial and “if the jury-determines that the defendant acted with the good faith, but unreasonable belief, that his actions were justified, the sentence imposed can be no greater than that which could be imposed upon a defendant under the criminally negligent homicide statute.” *See People v. Estrada,*198 Colo. 188, 601 P.2d 619 (1979). The defendant’s conviction pursuant to a plea agreement forecloses any assertion of the affirmative defense and sentencing considerations recognized in *Bramlett.*

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

. Section 40-3-202(l)(a), C.R.S.1963, now section 18-3-202(l)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8).
#### Coyle *v.*Pittsburgh Railways Company, etc., Appellant.

Argued May 1, 1942.

Before Keller, P. J., Cunningham, Baldrige, Rhodes, Hirt and Kenworthey, JJ.

*James R. Orr,*with him *J. R. McNary,*for appellant.

*Saul Chersky,*with him *Mayer Sniderman,*for ap-pellee.

July 23, 1942:

Opinion by

Kenworthey, J.,

On February 14, 1941, about 5:30 p.m., plaintiff boarded one of defendant’s street cars in the City of Pittsburgh. He was his only witness. His testimony *282is summarized in his History of the Case as f ollows: “In anticipation of the starting of the car, the plaintiff, who was standing, the car being crowded, took a firm grip with his left hand on the handle built into a cross seat, but the violent start caused his grip to be torn loose from the handle and he was thrown backward...... and his left arm injured.” He also said “other passengers lurched/’ although he “was the only one that was thrown so violently.”1

The judgment for plaintiff must be reversed.

It has been the rule of this Commonwealth for at least twenty-five years2 that such evidence is not sufficient to prove the negligence of the carrier. It has been applied in a line of cases unbroken save as in such cases as *Sanson v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,*239 Pa. 505, 86 A. 1069, arid *Jenkins et ux. v. Beyer,*118 Pa. Superior Ct. 527, 180 A. 135, where the start or stop was so violent as to throw the passenger out through a door onto the street, or as in *Tilton v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,*231 Pa. 63, 79 A. 877, where plaintiff was thrown off the seat.

To the casual observer, the rule may appear harsh; the operator of a public conveyance may, in a particular case, be careless, yet it be impossible for the passenger to prove it. Perhaps, even, this is such a case. But to him who would explore the underlying purpose of the rule, it will become apparent that the rule is one of necessity. A street car company is a public servant. Its duty is to furnish the most rapid transportation possible commensurate with safety. Reduction of time consumed in the enormous number of starts and stops *283required by a street car in a large city is a vital factor in the performance of the service. Its proper performance is bound to involve some risk which, of course, must not be unreasonable. Every rider knows that to' keep one’s feet, in a moving street car, whether it be stopping, starting, going around a curve or traversing a not quite straight portion of track, requires alertness and a certain regard for balance. And if every person thrown and injured in a street car could recover damages on proof merely that he was “violently” thrown, the resulting burden on the carrier would be unbearable. See *Smith v. Pittsburgh Railways Co.,*314 Pa. 541, 171 A. 879.

The judgment is reversed and entered for defendant.

1

 He had previously stated that others “were thrown violently,” but there was -no evidence any of them were thrown to the floor or were injured.

2

*Uffelman v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,*253 Pa. 394, 98 A. 574. Compare *White v. Columbia and Montour Electric Ry. Co.,*215 Pa. 462, 64 A. 676.
Exhibit 21.1

New Hampshire Thrift Bancshares, Inc.

Subsidiaries of the Registrant



|                       |  |                        |   |  |                                                 
|---------------------- |  | ---------------------- | - |  | ------------------------------------------------
|Subsidiary             |  | Percentage ofOwnership |   |  | State of Incorporation                          
|Lake Sunapee Bank, fsb |  | 100                    | % |  | Incorporated under the laws of the United States
|                       |  |                       
|NHTB Capital Trust I   |  | 100                    | % |  | Delaware                                        
|                       |  |                       
|NHTB Capital Trust II  |  | 100                    | % |  | Connecticut                                     
|                       |  |                       
|NHTB Capital Trust III |  | 100                    | % |  | Connecticut                                     

Subsidiaries of Lake Sunapee Bank, fsb



|                                      |  |                        |   |  |                      
|------------------------------------- |  | ---------------------- | - |  | ---------------------
|Subsidiary                            |  | Percentage ofOwnership |   |  | State ofIncorporation
|Lake Sunapee Group, Inc.              |  | 100                    | % |  | New Hampshire        
|                                      |  |                       
|Lake Sunapee Financial Services Corp. |  | 100                    | % |  | New Hampshire
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 ACCERIS COMMUNICATIONS INC.OFFICERS CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(18 U.S.C. 1350) April 12, 2004 The undersigned Gary M. Clifford, duly appointed and incumbent officer of
Acceris Communications Inc., a Florida corporation (the Corporation), in
connection with the Corporations Annual Report on Form 10-K for the annual
period ended December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), does hereby represent, warrant
and certify pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as
amended, that, to the best of his knowledge:  1.
    
    The Report is in full compliance with reporting requirements of
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operation
of the Corporation. /s/ Gary M. CliffordGary M. CliffordChief Financial Officer and Vice President of
Finance
```

[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 223 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 223

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That the Rotunda of the Capitol is authorized to be used at any time on 
September 12, 2001, for a prayer vigil in memory of those who lost 
their lives in the events of September 11, 2001. Physical preparations 
for the vigil shall be carried out in accordance with such conditions 
as the Architect of the Capitol may prescribe.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 12 
      (legislative day, September 11), 2001.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
107th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                            H. CON. RES. 223

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Permitting the use of the Rotunda of the Capitol for a prayer vigil in 
  memory of those who lost their lives in the events of September 11, 
                                 2001.
```
**Exhibit** **32.2**

 

**Certification of Chief Financial Officer**

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of HyperSpace Communications, Inc. (the “*Company*”) hereby certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that:

 

(i) the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2006 (the “*Report*”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

|            | /s/ Mark A. Pougnet     |
|-----------------|-------------------------|
| August 14, 2006 | Mark A. Pougnet         |
|            | Chief Financial Officer |
**EXHIBIT 31.1****Certification of the Chief Executive Officer pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.**I, Richard J. Naughton, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Xenonics Holdings, Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, theperiods presented in this report;  4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in ExchangeAct Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the small business issuer, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small businessissuer’s most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer’s fourth fiscalquarter in case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and 5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the smallbusiness issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of small business issuer’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the small business issuer’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the small business issuer’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.        Date:  February 14, 2007 /s/   Richard J. Naughton   Name:  Richard J. Naughton   Title:  Chief Executive Officer
[No. 17207.

Department One.

September 5, 1922.]

#### M. Cummins, *Respondent,*v. S. E. Allen *et al., Appellants.*
      *1*

Municipal Corporations (379, 389)—Use of Streets—Collision at Crossing—Negligence—Evidence—Sufficiency. The evidence sufficiently shows defendant’s negligence in a collision of automobiles at a street intersection, notwithstanding the driver of his car testified that he reached the intersection first and was half way across before plaintiff entered it, where it appears by all the evidence that the cars collided before defendant’s car reached the center and that, by greater speed, the driver attempted to run around in front of plaintiff’s car without taking any precautions.

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for Pierce county, Clifford, J., entered September 2, 1921, upon findings in favor of the plaintiff, in an action for damages to property sustained in an automobile collision, tried to the court.

Affirmed.

*199
      *Burkey, O’Brien & Burkey,*for appellants.

*H. P. Jones,*for respondent.

Reported in 208 Pac. 1118.

Mitchell, J.

This action arises out of the collision of two automobiles at the intersection of Oakes street and North Twenty-first street, in the city of Tacoma. Plaintiff’s car, driven north, entered the intersection from Oakes street, the other car, driven east, entered the intersection from North Twenty-first street. Upon the trial of the case without a jury, the plaintiff prevailed. The defendants have appealed.

It is assigned that the court erred in finding for the respondent and not dismissing the complaint, and also erred in the assessment of damages.

On the question as to whose fault caused the accident, there is a conflict in the evidence. A consideration of all the evidence, as shown in the statement of facts, convinces us that the trial court reached the correct conclusion. Generally speaking, the proof on the part of the respondent was consistent and convincing, while that on behalf of the appellants was not so in important particulars. The driver of appellants’ car testified that he entered the intersection first, again he testified that he was well into it before the respondent was, and, at still another time, he said that he was half way across the intersection before respondent’s car reached it, and yet, by all the evidence, the cars collided at a point on respondent’s proper course north of the center of the intersection. We are satisfied, from a consideration of all the evidence, that respondent entered the intersection first, and that the driver of appellants’ car, with a greater rate of speed, attempted to run around in front of her, and without taking any precautions, immediate or otherwise, caused the collision as respondent was engaged in trying to check her car npon seeing there was danger of a collision.

*200As to the amount of the recovery, there was no error in the manner of proof, while the amount awarded was well within the evidence.

Affirmed.

Parker, C. J., Tolman, Fullerton, and Bridges, JJ., concur.
[No. 17975-0-II.

Division Two.

June 7, 1996.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. William Tann, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 93-1-02281-8, Bruce Cohoe, J., entered January 24, 1994. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Bridge-water, J., concurred in by Seinfeld, C.J., and Morgan, J.
IRIS+ 22.8 18 0 DJI DJI 19.0 17 216 Hubsan 1.0 1 20

TOTALS: 

### 42.8 36

6/11/2013 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 6/13/2013 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 7/3/2013 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 7/4/2013 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 8/15/2013 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 8/17/2013 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 8/29/2013 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 9/15/2013 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 9/28/2013 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 9/29/2013 DJI Self Cemetary Local Flight 11/16/2013DJI Self Cemetary Local Flight 11/17/2013DJI Self AMA Field Local Flight 11/30/2013DJI Self Field Local Flight 12/14/2013DJI Self Field Local Flight 12/15/2013DJI Self Field Local Flight 12/28/2013DJI Self Cemetary Local Flight 12/29/2013DJI Self Cemetary Local Flight 1/11/2014 DJI Self Park Local Flight 19-Jan-14 DJI Self Park Local Flight Hunsan AIRCRAFT TYPES TOTAL HOURS No. OF FLIGHTSDAYS SINCE LAST FLIGHT

DATE TYPE 

### RC OPERATOR LOG BOOK FORDOUGLAS DORRER

3D Robotics

REG. PILOT IN COMMANDCO-PILOT or STUDENT ROUTE DETAILS AIRCRAFT FLIGHT CREW30-Jan-14 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 8-Feb-14 DJI Self Baseball fieldLocal Flight 9-Feb-14 DJI Self park Local Flight 28-Feb-14 DJI Self park Local Flight 15-Mar-14 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 16-Mar-14 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 23-Mar-14 DJI Self park Local Flight 30-Mar-14 DJI Self field Local Flight 19-Apr-14 DJI Self field Local Flight 20-Apr-14 DJI Self field Local Flight 7-Jun-14 DJI Self Baseball fieldLocal Flight 8-Jun-14 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 14-Jun-14 DJI Self AMA Field Local Flight 15-Jun-14 DJI Self AMA Field Local Flight 21-Jun-14 DJI Self AMA Field Local Flight 22-Jun-14 DJI Self Parking Lot Local Flight 1-Dec-14 IRIS+ Self Cemetary Local flight 3-Dec-14 IRIS+ Self AMA AirfieldLocal flight 4-Dec-14 IRIS+ Self Open Field Local flight 7-Dec-14 IRIS+ Self Open Field Local flight 13-Dec-14IRIS+ Self Park Local flight 14-Dec-14IRIS+ Self Cemetary Local flight 16-Dec-14IRIS+ Self Cemetary Local flight 20-Dec-14IRIS+ Self Park Local flight 21-Dec-14IRIS+ Self Park Local flight 27-Dec-14IRIS+ Self Cemetary Local flight 28-Dec-14IRIS+ Self Cemetary Local flight

1-Jan-15 IRIS+ Self AMA AirfieldLocal flight 3-Jan-15 IRIS+ Self Cemetary Local flight 4-Jan-15Hubsan Self Indoors Local flight 10-Jan-15IRIS+ Self Park Local flight 11-Jan-15IRIS+ Self AMA AirfieldLocal flight 17-Jan-15IRIS+ Self Field Local flight 18-Jan-15IRIS+ Self Field Local flight 24-Jan-15IRIS+ Self FIELD Local Flight