### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-60650 Summary Calendar

E. STEPHEN DEAN, Plaintiff - Appellant
v. PIETER TEEUWISSEN, in His Official Capacity, as Chairman of the Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions, Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:06-CV-68

Before KING, JOLLY, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * For the third time, w e address the merits of this appeal. Earl Stephen Dean appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims against the Mississippi B o a r d o f Bar Admissions. The district court held that Dean is not entitle d t o relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because his claims are barred by the doctrines of

res judicata and collateral estoppel. Because the district court commi tted no U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D June 27 , 20 12 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Pursua nt to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm inedt hat this op inion s houldnot * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-60650 Document: 00511901595 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/27/2012No. 11-60650

reversible error, we AFFIRM the ju d gment of the district court, based on its well-reasoned opinion. I. Because we have already recounted the facts and much of the procedural history of this case in detail, see Dean v. Miss. Bd. of Bar Admissions (Dean I ), 326 F. App’x 760, 762-63 (5th Cir. 200 9), we do not repeat them in full here. In summa ry of the pertinent facts, in 2002, Dean’s application for admission to the Mississippi Bar was denied by the Missis s i p p i B o a rd of Bar Admissions (the Board) because h e de m o n s tr at e d “an inclination to be dishonest,

an inclination to take unfair advantage of others, an inclination to fail to exercise self-control, and an inclination to be mentally or emotionally unstable to the extent th a t h e w a s not suited to the practice of law.” Over the course of several years, Dean – to no avail – exhausted all of his appeals before the Board. Thus, in October 2005, Dean appealed the Board’s decision to th e H i nds County Chancery Court, urging the court to reverse the Board’ s d e c ision and allow him to sit for the Mississippi Bar exam. Dean argued that the Board had violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech as well as his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. In its affirm a n c e of the Board’s decision, the chancery court considered Dean’s constitutional arguments and held that the Board had committed no constitutional violations. In September 2006, Dean appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, raising the same constitutional arguments. The Supreme Court rejected Dean’s appeal, holding that the Board had not violated Dean’s constitutional rights. At the same time h e w a s a p p ealing the Board’s refusal to let him sit for the bar exam in Mississippi state courts, D e a n f iled two lawsuits in federal district courts against the chairperson of the Board. The first federal lawsuit, 1

The origi nal chair per s o n of the Board nam ed as a def enda nt in this law sui t wa s 1 Jam es R. Mo zingo. Mo zingo has sin ce been rep lace d – both as a def enda nt and as chair per so n 2 Case: 11-60650 Document: 00511901595 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/27/2012No. 11-60650

filed on February 8, 2006, claimed damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The second lawsuit, the subject of the instant appeal, was filed on May 17, 2006, and sought prospective and injunctive relief against the Board on the grounds t h a t D e a n should be protected from future First Amendment violations by the Board. This suit was also brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed both of Dean’s lawsuits on t he grounds of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In a consolidated 2 appeal in Dean I

, this court reversed and remanded both ca s e s t o t h e United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, holding that the district court did not properly apply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine no r di d the court properly consider th e d o c t rines of collateral estoppel or res judicata

. See Dean I , 326 F. App’x at 762-63. First, the district court reheard Dean’s case asserting his ADA and his § 1983 claims for damages and dismissed his complaint on grounds of res judicata

. Thereafter, in Dean II

, we affirmed. Dean v. Miss. Bd. of Bar Admissions (Dean II ), 394 F. App’x 172 (5th Cir. 2010). After our affirmance of the dismissal of Dean’s ADA and § 1983 damages claims on the grounds of res judicata , the district court turned to t h e c ase sub judice , addressing Dean’s § 1983 claims for prospective, injunctive relief. The district court, relying heavily upon our opinion in Dean II , held that, in the light of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in In re Dean , 972 So. 2d 590 (Miss. 2008), Dean’s current federal lawsu i t w as barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata

. Thus, the district court dismissed Dean’s complaint

of the Board– by Pie terTee uw iss en. The Rooke r- Fel dma n doc tri ne es tabl ish es t h a t f e der al cour ts have subject mat ter 2 juris dic tio n to revie w genera l chall enges to the cons tit utio nalit y of st ate bar adm iss ions rule s but lack juris dic tio n to reviewa state court’s fina l judgm ent in a bar admis sio n mat ter

. D. C. Ct. of Ap pe als v. Fe ldm an , 460 U. S. 462 , 482- 86 ( 1983)

. 3 Case: 11-60650 Document: 00511901595 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/27/2012No. 11-60650

u n d e r F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. Once again, Dean appeals, arguing that the district court erred by holding that his claims were precluded by t h e doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata

. II. Dean’s primary argum e nt on appeal – which is the same argument he raised in Dean II – is that the district court erred by applying the res judicata doctrine to foreclose this lawsuit. For ess e nti ally th e s a m e reasons we decided Dean’s lawsuit was precluded in Dean II

, we find that Dean’s present appeal has no merit. After reviewing the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion in In re Dean , we hold t h a t a l l of the elements of res judicata have been met here. See Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson Ins., Inc. , 891 So. 2d 224, 232 (M i s s . 2005). Moreover, we hold that both the chancery court and the Mississippi Supreme Court con s i d ered de novo Dean’s arguments that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated, the same arguments which give rise to his pres e n t f ederal suit for injunctive relief. See Dean II

, 394 F. App’x at 176 (citing In re Dean , 972 So.2d at 597-98). Because Dean is precluded from bringing the present action, the di strict court did not err by dismissing his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). 3 III. We h old that the district court did not err by dismissing this suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Essentially for the reasons given by the district court in its well-considered opinion, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Becaus e res judi ca ta pr eclu des De an fr om bringin g this law sui t, ther e is no reas on for 3
us to add res s wh ethe r coll ater al es top pelal sop rec lude s this s uit. 4 Case: 11-60650 Document: 00511901595 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/27/2012