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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re Z B-L PALAN-LILLAND, Minor. February 2, 2016 

No. 328819 

Kalamazoo Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 2015-000131-NA 

 

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and GLEICHER and M. J. KELLY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her 

minor son under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).1 

Petitioners are the child’s maternal grandparents and have guardianship over him under the 

Estates and Protected Individual Code. See MCL 700.1101 et seq. Because the trial court did 

not clearly err when it found that petitioners presented clear and convincing evidence to establish 

at least one ground for termination and did not clearly err when it found that termination was in 

the child’s best interests, we affirm. 

 In February 2013, petitioners picked up their grandson and his sister in Iowa and brought 

them to live in Michigan. According to respondent’s father, they had planned to have their 

daughter also move in and “get re-established.” He stated that, in April 2013, respondent 

traveled from Iowa to Michigan to also live with them, but she changed her mind a few days 

after her arrival and left. She then called and told petitioners that she was coming back to collect 

her things and that “her things included her kids.” When she returned, her minor son indicated 

that he did not want to go with her. Respondent took her daughter and moved back to Iowa, 

leaving her minor son with petitioners. 

 In the trial court, the parties presented conflicting evidence as to whether respondent 

made an effort to communicate with her son or provide him with any support. Respondent 

generally testified that she tried to communicate with her son and support him, but petitioners 

prevented her from doing so. Petitioners, in contrast, presented evidence that their daughter 

made no effort to communicate with her son or support him even indirectly. 

 

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 The child’s father is deceased. 
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 The trial court found petitioners’ version of events to be more credible. Indeed, it found 

that respondent had abandoned her son for the last two years: 

 Something happened the day she [respondent] picked up her children and 

she decided that the son was not going to be a part of her life. Maybe it was a—at 

the time, I think he was about twelve saying I don’t want to be with you. A lot of 

people get hurt by that and she walked away, and she did not make any attempts 

for two years, as far as this court is concerned, to try to get back into that child’s 

life. 

 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that petitioners had established 

grounds for terminating respondent’s parental rights. 

 On appeal, respondent argues that the court clearly erred when it found that petitioners 

established a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. This Court reviews for 

clear error a trial court’s factual findings following a termination hearing. MCR 3.977(K). A 

finding is clearly erroneous if “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 

NW2d 216 (2003). 

 Petitioners had the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence at least one 

ground for terminating respondent’s parental rights to the minor child. See In re 

Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 431; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). In rendering its decision, 

the trial court in relevant part found that petitioners had established by clear and convincing 

evidence that respondent had “deserted the child for 91 or more days and has not sought custody 

of the child during that period.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii). 

 Petitioners presented evidence that respondent had not had any contact with her son since 

“about the first week, maybe second week, of April 2013,” after she left him with them and went 

back to Iowa. Although respondent testified that she tried to contact her son and indirectly 

support him in various ways, she did not produce any proof to substantiate her testimony, which 

the court found incredible. The evidence further showed that respondent did not contact the 

authorities to complain that her parents were withholding the child from her and did not file any 

complaints or motions in the guardianship case. Because the evidence on this ground was 

largely a matter of the weight and credibility to be afforded the witnesses, this Court must defer 

to the trial court’s superior opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. See In re Miller, 

433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). And the trial court found petitioners’ version of 

events to be more credible than respondents’ version. 

 Although the trial court cited MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) as the relevant statutory ground, 

we believe that the ground stated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) more aptly applies under the facts 

of this case. In their petition and complaint, petitioners alleged that their daughter had the ability 

to support and contact the minor child and failed to do either without good cause for two or more 

years. They asserted similar allegations in their petition for authority to consent to adoption. 

Although petitioners asserted these allegations in support of their contention that the court could 

take jurisdiction over the child under MCL 712A.2(b)(6), the provisions of that statute are 

substantially similar to the grounds for terminating parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f). 
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Taking the allegations as a whole, it is evident that petitioners asserted that the trial court could 

not only take jurisdiction over the minor child on the basis of their daughter’s failure to support 

and contact the minor child for two or more years, but also that the court could terminate her 

parental rights on that same ground. Respondent was plainly on notice that it was petitioners’ 

position that she abandoned her child for two or more years while under a guardianship, which 

would satisfy the ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f); accordingly, she had 

adequate notice of the proofs she would have to present to overcome termination under that 

statute. See In re Perry, 193 Mich App 648, 651; 484 NW2d 768 (1992). 

 Moreover, the trial court specifically found that petitioners established that respondent 

had the ability to provide regular and substantial support and failed to do so without good cause 

for two or more years, and that she similarly failed to regularly and substantially visit, contact, or 

communicate with her child without good cause for two or more years. Although the trial court 

made these findings in the context of taking jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(6), it emphasized 

that it found that petitioners established those failures by clear and convincing evidence, which is 

the higher burden applicable to establishing grounds for termination. See In re Riffe, 147 Mich 

App 658, 670; 382 NW2d 842 (1985). Accordingly, we are convinced that the trial court 

actually found that petitioners established this ground for termination by clear and convincing 

evidence, and that its failure to cite that ground was merely inadvertent. Finally, we are not left 

with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court clearly erred when it found that 

petitioners had established by clear and convincing evidence grounds for terminating 

respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f). 

 Although respondent has not challenged the trial court’s finding on the child’s best 

interests, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court did not clearly when it found that 

termination was in the child’s best interests. See MCL 712A.19b(5). Finally, because 

petitioners only had to establish one statutory ground for termination, we decline to address the 

other grounds in support of termination. See In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 431. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly