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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re Z B-L PALAN-LILLAND, Minor. February 2, 2016

No. 328819 Kalamazoo Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 2015-000131-NA

Before: B ECKERING , P.J., and G LEICHER and M. J. K ELLY , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminatin g her parental rights to her minor son under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). 1 Petitioners are the child’s mater nal grandparents and have guar dianship over him under the Estates and Protected Indi vidual Code. See MCL 700.1101 et seq. Because the trial court did not clearly err when it found that petitioners presented clear and convincing evidence to establish at least one ground for terminati on and did not clearly err whe n it found that termination was in the child’s best interests, we affirm.

In February 2013, petitioners picked up their grandson and his sister in Iowa and brought them to live in Michigan. Accord ing to respondent’s father, th ey had planned to have their daughter also move in and “get re- established.” He stated that , in April 2013, respondent traveled from Iowa to Michigan to also live with them, but she changed her mind a few days after her arrival and left. She then called and told petitione rs that she was coming back to collect her things and that “her things included her kids.” When she r eturned, her minor son indicated that he did not want to go with her. Respondent took her daugh ter and moved back to Iowa, leaving her minor s on with petitioners.

In the trial court, the parties presented conflicting evidence as to whether respondent made an effort to communicate with her son or provide him with any support. Respondent generally testified that she tried to communicate with her son and support him, but petitioners prevented her from doing so. Petitioners, in contrast, present ed evidence that their daughter made no effort to communicate w ith her son or support him even indirectly.

1 The child’s father is deceased.-2- The trial court found petitioners’ version of events to be mor e credible. Indeed, it found that respondent had abandoned her son for the last two years:

Something happened the day she [respondent] picked up her chil dren and she decided that the son was not going to b e a part of her life . Maybe it was a—at the time, I think he was about twelve saying I don’t want to be with you. A lot of people get hurt by that and she walked away, and she did not ma ke any attempts for two years, as far as this court is concerned, to try to get back into that child’s life.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that p etitioners had established grounds for terminating res pondent’s parent al rights.

On appeal, respondent argues that the court clearly erred when it found that petitioners established a ground for termina tion by clear and convincing ev idence. This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s factual findings following a termin ation hearing. MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly erroneous if “the reviewing court on the ent ire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re JK , 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).

Petitioners had the burden to establish by clear and convincin g evidence at least one ground for terminating respondent’s parental rights to the mino r child. See In re Gonzales/Martinez , 310 Mich App 426, 431; 871 NW2d 868 (2015). In rendering its decision, the trial court in relevant part found that petitioners had est ablished by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had “deserted the child for 91 or more days and has not sought custody of the child during that period.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ).

Petitioners presented evidence that respondent had not had any contact with her son since “about the first week, maybe second week, of April 2013,” after she left him with them and went back to Iowa. Although respondent testified that she tried to contact her son and indirectly support him in various ways, she did not produce any proof to s ubstantiate her testimony, which the court found incredible. The evidence further showed that r espondent did not contact the authorities to complain that he r parents were withholding the c hild from her and did not file any complaints or motions in the guard ianship case. Because the ev idence on this ground was largely a matter of the weight and credibility to be afforded t he witnesses, this Court must defer to the trial court’s superior opportunity to judge the credibil ity of the witnesses. See In re Miller

, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). And the trial court fo und petitioners ’ version of events to be more credible than respondents’ version.

Although the trial court cited MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)( ii ) as the relevant statutory ground, we believe that the ground stated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f) more aptly applies under the facts of this case. In their petition and complaint, petitioners all eged that their daught er had the ability to support and contact the minor child and failed to do either without good cause for two or more years. They asserted similar al legations in their petition for authority to consent to adoption. Although petitioners asserted th ese allegations in support of t heir contention that the court could take jurisdiction over the child under MCL 712A.2(b)(6), the pr ovisions of that statute are substantially similar to the grounds for terminating parental r ights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f).-3- Taking the allegations as a whol e, it is evident that petitione rs asserted that the trial court could not only take jurisdiction over the minor child on the basis of their daughter’s failure to support and contact the minor child for two or more years, but also tha t the court could terminate her parental rights on that same ground. Respondent was plainly on notice that it was petitioners’ position that she abandoned her child for two or more years whi le under a guardianship, which would satisfy the ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)( f); accordingly, she had adequate notice of the proofs she would have to present to over come termination under that statute. See In re Perry , 193 Mich App 648, 651; 484 NW2d 768 (1992).

Moreover, the trial court speci fically found that petitioners established that respondent had the ability to provide re gular and substantial support and failed to do so without good cause for two or more years, and that she similarly failed to regular ly and substantially visit, contact, or communicate with her child without good cause for two or more y ears. Although the trial court made these findings in the cont ext of taking jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(6), it emphasized that it found that petitioners est ablished those failures by cl ear and convincing ev idence, which is the higher burden applicable to establishing grounds for termin ation. See In re Riffe , 147 Mich App 658, 670; 382 NW2d 842 (1985). Accordingly, we are convinc ed that the trial court actually found that petitioners e stablished this ground for ter mination by clear and convincing evidence, and that its failure to cite that ground was merely i nadvertent. Finally, we are not left with the definite and firm convict ion that the trial court clea rly erred when it found that petitioners had established by clear and convincing evidence gr ounds for terminating respondent’s parental right s under MCL 712A.19b(3)(f).

Although respondent has not challenged the trial court’s findi ng on the child’s best interests, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court did no t clearly when it found that termination was in the child’s best interests. See MCL 712A.19 b(5). Finally, because petitioners only had to establi sh one statutory ground for term ination, we decline to address the other grounds in support of termination. See In re Gonzales/Martinez , 310 Mich App at 431.

Affirmed.

/s/ Jane M. Beckering /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher /s/ Michael J. Kelly