SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0126- 23 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. KATHERINE L. BELL, Defendant-Respondent.

__________________________

Argued January 10, 2024

– Decided April 29, 2024Before Judges Vernoia, Gummer and WalcottHenderson. On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superi or Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment Nos. 22- 06 -0469, 22- 06 -0470 , and 22- 06

- 0471. Milton Samuel Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argu ed the cause for appellant (William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton Samuel Leibowit z , of counsel and on the brief). Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora,

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 0126

- 23 Public Defender, attorney; Stefan Van Jura, of coun sel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM By leave granted, the State appeals from an order entered on August 15,
2023 , denying its motion to admit evidence and granting defendant's m otion to
suppress a handgun, bullets, and a key fob found in a purse re covered from a vehicle that had been reported stolen and in which defendant Katherine Bell was

a passenger. The State argues that because it presen ted sufficient unrebutted facts establishing defendant knew the vehicle was stole n, she had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or purse, and the search of the purse that resulted in the seizure of the evidence was lawful. W e agree and reverse.
I. We glean the following relevant facts from the moti on record, including the parties' brie fs and police reports provided by defendant , submitted to the trial court pursuant to Rule 3:5

- 7. 1 Officers from the Elizabeth Police Department reported to a shopping mall on a complaint of a carjacking involving two victims, Brandon Ortiz and Kimberly Lopez. Ortiz and Lopez had driven to the mall in Lopez's white Honda Civic. They reported to the po lice that after they

1 As we explain, Rule 3:5 -7 provides the procedure for the court's considera tion of motions to suppress physical evidence seized dur ing a warrantless search.3 A- 0126

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had parked the vehicle, two women, who m they later identified as defendant and Ciara Turner, pulled into the parking spot next to them in a blue Honda Accord. According to Lopez, defendant and Turner exited the ir vehicle and accused Lopez of striking the Honda Accord. Ortiz later to ld police that defendant then pulled a black handgun from a "small yellow purse" and struck him in the face

. Lopez told police Turner had confronted her and dem anded her car keys and phon e, and she dropped her keys, phone, and purse

— a small brown Michael Kors crossbody , "backed away from [Turner]," and r an towards the mall after Turner "threatened to shoot [her]." Both vehicles were later seen on security video leaving the mall by different exits. Lopez and Ortiz called 9-1-1 and reported they had been carjack ed . They gave a description of the perpetrators, including t hat one "suspect had a tattoo on her face and that [Lopez] would be able to ident ify [the person later identified as defendant] if she saw [her] again." The police report notes that Lopez had descri be d the person later identified as defendant as "a Black F emale[,] wearing an orange puffer jacket, a durag, [with] a tattoo o n her upper cheek bone, also armed with a black handgun." Lopez described the p erson later identified as Turner as "a Black Female [] wearing a blue face mask and a black Hoody, also armed with a black handgun."4 A- 0126

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Later that same afternoon, the cars were caught on traffic cameras passing through an intersection in Newark together. Approx imately two hours later, after being alert ed about the carjacking by dispatch , Newark police officers observed a white Honda Civic matching the descripti on of Lopez's vehicle and followed it into a nearby parking lot. An officer removed the driver , Turner, from the vehicle while another officer approached d efendant who was seated in the front passenger seat. Th e officer asked defendant to step out of the vehicle, but she initially refused, asking, "what for?" Defenda nt eventually exited the vehicle and was placed in handcuffs and into a poli ce vehicle. The next morning, an officer processed the impound ed Civic recovered from defendant and Turner and identified, marked, a nd inventoried several items found in side the vehicle , including: a beige Guess purse with faux fur that was found on the rear passenger-side seat and contained a key fob and a handgun loaded with seven rounds, including a hollow-point bullet; and another beige purse containing a Families First card belonging to Turner. Neither purse found in the vehicle matched the description Lopez had pr ovided of the small, brown, Michael Kors crossbody that had been stolen from he r . However, the police reports defendant submitted pu rsuant to Rule 3:5

- 7 in support of her motion to suppress the handgun, b ullets, and key fob found in5 A- 0126

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the Guess purse recovered from the Civic revealed t hat police had evidence prior to the search that the purse matched the descriptio n Ortiz had provided of the yellow purse from which one of the carjackers had p ulled a gun during the carjacking. Two days after the post -impound search of the vehicle and the discovery of the Guess purse with the handgun, bullets, and k ey fob , Ortiz and Lopez identified defendant and Turner as the carjackers from po lice photo arrays. The key fob found in the beige Guess purse recovered fr om Lopez's Civic belonged to the Accord the carjackers had driven to the crim e scene and in which one of the carjackers had fled the crime scene. A Union County Grand Jury returned an indictment ch arging defenda nt with first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2); fi rst-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); second-degree unlawful poss ession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); fourth-degree possess ion of prohibited weapons and devices-defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d); f ourth-degree possession of prohibited weapons and devices

– hollow-p oint bullet, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)(1); third-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapo n, N.J.S.A 2C:12-1(b)(2);6 A- 0126

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and fourth-degree aggravated assault

– p ointing a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C: 39

- 7(b)(1). The State later moved to "admit any and all of the evidence seized from the blue Accord and the white Civic, including but not limited to" the contents of the beige Guess purse with faux fur

— the handgun, the bullets, and the Honda key fob for the blue Accord. Defendant moved to sup press this same evidence. 2 On February 17, 2023, the State presented a letter brief in accordance with Rule 3:5 -7 in support of its claim the evidence seized from the Civic, including the Guess purse and its contents, was the product of a lawful warrantless search.
In t he brief the State summarized the facts surrounding t he carjacking and defendant's arrest after she was found in the carja cked vehicle. The State also asserted in part defendant knew the car was stolen and, therefore, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen car or its contents based on our holding in State v. Lugo that "a defendant operating an automo bile known by him to have been stolen has no reasonable expectati on of privacy respecting

2 "Rule [3:5-7(c)] provides that the filing of a moti on by a defendant . . . triggers a requirement that 'the State submit a brief contai ning a statement of facts and the defendant file a brief and counterstatement of facts. '" State v. Green, 346 N.J. Super. 87, 90 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting State v. Hewins, 166 N.J. Super. 210, 213

– 15 (Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 178 N.J. Super. 360 (App . Div. 1981))

.7 A- 0126

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contraband he had hidden in it

— no matter how the contraband is packaged." 249 N.J. Super. 565, 568 (App. Div. 1991). The State also argued there was no need for an evid entiary hearing on the legality of the search of the Civic and Guess purse , asserting the undisputed facts establish the legality of the search. The State ex plained:

The State submits, therefore, that there is no doub t that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing i f a dispute as to a material fact as to a Fourth Amendm ent issue has been presented to the court, but only if such has been presented. Should no such question exist, a defendant cannot demand testimony from the State's witnesses and must limit his argument to the application of Fourth Amendment law to the facts already submitted to the court. Thus far, the Stat e is unaware of any dispute as to a material fact as to a Fourth Amendment issue. Although [defendant] has yet to file a brief and has thus not had the opport unity to attempt to identify a dispute, the State submits that defense will be unable to identify a material dispu te. In response, defendant in her letter brief reiterat ed the facts set forth in the State's brief and acknowledged the Civic had be en stolen, but she did not address or dispute the State's contention that she knew the vehicle was stolen when the police found her and Turner in it. Defend ant did not concede ownership of the Guess purse

— where the gun , bullets, and key fob were found. Instead, she asserted a privacy interest only in the contents of the vehicle, includ ing the Guess purse. Further, she argued Lopez was no t a ble to consent8 A- 0126

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to the search "of the opaque Guess purse that was n ot [Lopez's] and did not belong to [Lopez]." 3 The court heard oral argument on defendant's suppr ession motion and the State's motion to admit evidence of the contents of the two vehicles including, the gun , bullets, and key fob seized from the Guess purse. The court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing and did not make fin dings as to whether an evidentiary hearing was required based on its review of the p arties' submissions under Rule 3:5 -7. Instead, the court relied on the State's claim a hearing was unnecessary, finding:

[t]he State has urged this court on multiple occasi ons not to have any testimony concerning this search. Well, the [S]tate got what it wants. There's no testimony. . . . So without testimony and without the automobile exception, the [motion to suppress] has merit and the State has failed to establish that th is warrantless search, which is presumptively invalid [] should be allowed.

3 Defendant also argued that an evidentiary hearing w as required to determine the admissibility of statements made to the arresti ng officers, asserting a "hearing is necessary to establish the scope and co ntent of the statements that the State intends to elicit in its case [in] chief as the State has made no clear proffer of what those statements are and the defend ant is entitled to know what they intend to elicit in order to challenge their a dmissibility." We do not address the argument because the admissibility of any purpo rted statements is not an issue presented for our consideration.9 A- 0126

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The court rejected the State's arguments in support of the admission of the contents of the Guess purse

— without explicitly address ing , or making findings as to, the State's argument that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Guess purse under Lugo, 249 N.J. Super. at 568, because she
kn ew the car had been stolen. Rather, the court focu sed on whether the warrantless search of the Guess purse was valid bec ause it had been abandoned or based on Lopez's consent to search her vehicle. The court stated:

there was no testimony . . . [t]he body worn camera s of the officers were not submitted . . . the court has no information regarding the ability of the defendant to abandon the purse in the car or if she was instruct ed to leave the purse in the car,

. . . . by the time the police searched the Civic, they had already interviewed Ms. Lopez and Mr. Ortiz. Ms. Lopez explained that her purse was a small, brown, Michael Kors crossbody. At the time of the search, the police were aware that the [Guess purse] did not be long to the victims. It was objectively unreasonable of them to believe that Ms. Lopez had the authority to cons ent to a search for [a] purse that did not belong to he r. The court concluded that Lopez's consent to search the vehicle did not constitute permission to search the Guess purse bec ause, based on Lopez's description of the purse stolen from her, the polic e knew the Guess purse was not hers. The court also rejected the State's clai m defendant had abandoned the10 A- 0126

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purse in the vehicle. The court further stated, "t here is no question that the stop of the Civic and the arrest of the defendant were v alid and supported by ample probable cause[,]" but "the search of the vehicle, and the search of the purse, did not take place in the field at the time of arrest." The court entered an order granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence se ized from the Guess purse. The reafter, the State sought, and the court granted, a st ay pending appeal

. W e then granted leave to appeal

. The State presents a single argument on appeal: The trial court erroneously suppressed the evidence found in the stolen Honda Civic by incorrectly find ing the State failed to meet its burden to establish de fendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle that she stole and, thus, the interest of j ustice demands the State's motion for leave to appeal be granted. The State does not challenge the court's determinat ion that the search of the purse was im proper because it was not supported by either Lopez 's consent to search her vehicle or defendant's alleged abando nment of the purse in the vehicle. Instead, the State argues the search of t he purse was proper because the State's Rule 3:5 -7 proffer provided facts establishing that the pur se was found with defendant in a vehicle

— the carjacked Honda Civic

— she knew was stolen11 A- 0126

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and, therefore, she had no reasonable expectation o f privacy in the purse supporting suppression of its contents.
II. The scope of review of a decision on a motion to su ppress is limited. State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021); State v. Nelson , 237 N.J. 540, 551 (2019); State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425 (2017); State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). "Generally, on appellate review, a trial c ourt's factual findings in support of granting or denying a motion to suppress must be upheld when 'those findings are supported by sufficient credible evide nce in the record.'" State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 395 (2019) (quoting State v. S. S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017)). Appellate courts must consider the suppression moti on solely on the evidence presented at the hearing below. See State v. Gibso n, 318 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1999). "The New Jersey Constitution provides greater prote ctions from warrantless searches and seizures than the Fourth A mendment of the Constitution of the United States." State v. Shaw, 237 N.J. 588, 616 (2019) (citing State v. Alston , 88 N.J. 211, 226 (1981)). Under our Constitution , we recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy standa rd that cuts broader than the Federal counterpart. Alston , 88 N.J. at 228.12 A- 0126

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"[U]nder Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey C onstitution, 'a criminal defendant is entitled to bring a motion to suppress evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure if he has a proprietary , possessory or participatory interest in either the place searched or the proper ty seized.'" State v. Randolph , 228 N.J. 566, 581 (2017) (quoting Alston, 88 N.J. a t 228). This standard's broader protections advance three important State i nterests, State v. Johnson , 193 N.J. 528, 543 (2008), which our Court has summa rized as follows :

The first is the State's interest in protecting def endants from having to admit possession to vindicate their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The second is to prevent the State from arguing a defendant should be subject to criminal liability for possessing contraband, while assertin g the same defendant had no privacy interest in the area from which police obtained the contraband without a warrant. Our third aim is to increase privacy protections for our citizens and to promote respect for our Constitution by discouraging law enforcement fr om carrying out warrantless searches and seizures wher e unnecessary. [Shaw, 237 N.J. at 616 (citations omitted) .] Both the federal and state constitutions afford pro tection against unreasonable searches that occur in areas where peo ple have a legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize. State v. Hinton , 216 N.J. 211, 229 (2013). To establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in a13 A- 0126

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place or object that is searched under the Fourth A mendment, a defendant must demonstrate (1) '"an actual (subjective) expectatio n of privacy'" in the object of the challenged search, and (2) that his or her subj ective privacy expectation is

"' one that society is prepared to recognize as reason able. '" State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 369 (2003) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 34 7, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). "Unlike the federal test, the New Jersey constituti onal standard does not require the defendant to prove a subjective expecta tion of privacy. . . . Instead, Article I, Paragraph 7 . . . 'requires only that an expectation of privacy be reasonable. '" Hinton, 216 N.J. at 236 (quoting State v. Hempel e, 120 N.J. 182, 200 (1990)). "'Expectations of privacy are established by genera l social norms,' and must align with the 'aims of a free and open so ciety.'" State v. Taylor, 440 N.J. Super. 515, 523 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Hemp ele, 120 N.J. at 200

- 01 ). "On a defendant's motion to suppress evidence seize d in a warrantless search, the State must set forth its factual allega tions in its brief." State v. Carrillo, 469 N.J. Super. 318, 332 (App. Div. 2021) (citing R. 3:5 -7(b)). In response, a defendant is required to file "a brief and [counterstatement] of facts. . . ." R. 3:5 -7(b); see also State v. Torres, 154 N.J. Super. 169, 173 (App. Div. 1977) (explaining Rule 3:5 -7(b)'s "clear and unambiguous" language does14 A- 0126

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not require a defendant to file an affidavit suppor ting his counterstatement of facts on a motion to suppress evidence seized durin g a warrantless search). Rule 3:5 -7(c) requires a testimonial hearing on a motion to suppress evidence seized without a warrant "[i]f material fa cts are disputed[.]" To establish a dispute as to material facts, "a defend ant must do more than allege baldly that the search warrant was unlawful." Carr illo, 469 N.J. Super. at 332. "[F]actual allegations which are general and conclu sory or based on suspicion and conjecture [do] not suffice" to establish a dis pute of material facts warranting a testimonial hearing. State v. Hewins, 166 N.J. Super. 210, 215 (Law Div. 1979) (quoting Cohen v. United States, 37 8 F.2d 751, 760 (9th Cir. 1967)), aff'd, 178 N.J. Super. 360 (App. Div. 1981)

. In its consideration of a motion made under the Rule, a court must review the proffers of the parties to determine if there are fact issues material to the determination of the validity of the search. Carrillo, 469 N.J. Super. at 333. We do not accord deference to a court's determinatio n there is no need for an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress base d on a determination, made after a review of the parties' briefs, that there are no "ma terial facts" in dispute. 4

4 A determination whether a factual dispute exists su ch that an evidentiary hearing is required under Rule 3:5

- 7 is an issue to be decided by the trial court15 A- 0126

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"Determining . . . if facts are in dispute is a mat ter of law" that may be made by "examin[ing] side- by -side the parties' allegations. " Ibid. The determination of whether facts are material also presents an issue o f law we review de novo. Ibid.
I II

. The State argues the court erred by granting defen dant's suppression motion by failing to properly consider and address its claim defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the pur se because it was found with her in a vehicle she knew had been stolen. The Sta te's argument requires that we consider our decisions in Lugo , and Taylor.
In Lugo , we addressed the defendant's privacy interest in a brown paper bag discovered in an alleged stolen vehicle during an im pound search. 249 N.J. Super. at 568. We held: "[a] defendant operating an automobile known by him to have been stolen has no reasonable expectation o f privacy respecting contraband he had hidden in it . . . . " Ibid. (emphasis added). Since Lugo , however, we have "decline[d] the State's invitation to formulate a bright-line rule, as a matter of law, that an individual operat ing or occupying a stolen motor

based on its review of the parties' submissions. I t is not a determination made by either the State or the defendant.16 A- 0126

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vehicle, regardless of their knowledge of its statu s , does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy," Taylor, 440 N.J. Super. at 523. In Taylor, another case involving warrantless searc hes

— the first conducted on the roadway and the second, post -impound

— of a stolen motor vehicle in which the defendant had been a passenger , the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found from the two searches: guns and a magazine. Id. at 519-20. In Taylor, New Jersey State troopers initiated a st op of a motor vehicle they had observed weaving in and out of traffic on the Turnpike. Id. at 518. Taylor was one of three individuals in the vehicle

— a backseat passenger

— and while the driver produced a valid license, she also advised troopers that the vehicle did not belong to her. Id. at 519-20. Tro opers ran a check of the vehicle's identification number and confirmed that the vehicle had been reported stolen several months earlier. Id. at 519. All three occupants of the vehicle were subsequentl y arrested, and troopers conducted an initial search at the side of the roadway, which revealed the presence of two handguns, one located under the driver's seat and the other in the trunk. Ibid. Days later, after the vehicle had been impounded in a private yard, an attendant searching for keys to the vehicl e discovered a handgun17 A- 0126

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magazine and reported it to police. Id. at 520. D efendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the initial automobi le search revealing two handguns and the post-impound discovery of the hand gun magazine. 5 Ibid. The motion court, relying on Lugo and without an evidentiary hearing, concluded that it was unreasonable for there to exi st an expectation of privacy in a stolen vehicle as a matter of law. Ibid. We determined that a critical fact considered by the court in Lugo was that defendant was operating an automobile known to him to have been stolen. Id. at 523. And , we rejected the State's repeated "strict liability" arguments that knowledg e of the vehicle's status

— whether stolen or not

— is irrelevant to a determination of a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. Ibid. As we expressly noted, "the question of whether defendant had a reasonable expectation o f privacy in the motor vehicle cannot be solely determined as a matter of law, but requires a factsensitive inquiry." Ibid. Consistent with Taylor and Lugo , and as argued by the State to the motion court, a critical issue here is whether defendant knew the vehicle was sto len. If defendant knew the car had been stolen, she had no reasonable expectation of

5 We recognize that in Taylor, the court made no dist inction between the initial search on the roadway which yielded the recovery oftwo guns, or the postimpound inadvertent discovery of the handgun magazi ne. Id. at 5 19

- 20.18 A- 0126

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privacy in the Guess purse in the vehicle in which the gun, bullets, and key fob were found and defendant's motion to suppress shoul d have been denied. See Lugo , 249 N.J. Super. at 568 ("a defendant operating an automobile known by him to have been stolen has no reasonable expectati on of privacy respecting contraband he had hidden in it- no matter how the contraband is packaged.") ; accord Taylor , 440 N.J. Super. at 525. Rule 3: 5- 7 provides the procedures for a motion to suppress ev idence seized without a warrant and, as enunciated in Carr illo, in its consideration of a motion made under the Rule, the court must review the pro ffers of the parties to determine if there are fact issues material to the determination of the validity of the search. 469 N.J. Super. at 333. Here, to addre ss the State's argument the search of the Guess purse was supported under Lugo , the court was required to determine if the parties' submissions established a fact issue as to whether defendant knew Lopez 's Civic had been stolen. Ibid. On February 17, 2023, the State presented its lette r br ie f pursuant to Rule 3:5 -7, in which it asserted defendant knew the Civic i n which she was found had been stolen and that if that fact was uncontested:

a defendant cannot demand testimony from the State' s witnesses and must limit [her] argument to the application of Fourth Amendment law to the facts already submitted to the court. Thus far, the Stat e is19 A- 0126

- 23 unaware of any dispute as to a material fact as to a Fourth Amendment issue. Specifically, as to defendant's knowledge the car h ad been stolen, the State argued: The defendant does not have a legitimate reasonable

expectation of privacy inside the White Honda Civic because she knew it was stolen. Defendant knew the vehicle was stolen because she assisted in stealing it. . .

. [T]he victims described defendant as having been the driver of the Blue Hon da Accord and as having been the first suspect to draw a firearm, which she had in her small purse. A purse was found in the backseat of the White Honda Civic with a firearm and with the vehicle key for the same Blue Honda Accord. The victim's phone, which she had removed from the vehicle and was then taken from her, was found in the White Honda Civic in the center console. Although the State submits the above is sufficient, even were more factual support to be required, there are other factors that also show defendant knew the White Honda Civic was stolen. T he vehicle was found within hours of when it was stole n. No one provided any documentation for the vehicle no r any explanation for why they were in the vehicle or when/how they entered the vehicle. [6]

6 We do not consider the State's argument that defend ant's silence when questioned by the arresting officer suggested perso nal knowledge about the vehicle being stolen. Defendant had the right to r emain silent, and her failure to refute an officer's statement, at least in this context, cannot be properly relied upon to suggest knowledge of anything. See State v . Kucinski, 227 N.J. 603, 617 (2017) ("[o]ur state-law privilege against self -incrimination offers broader20 A- 0126

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In response, defendant acknowledged the vehicle was stolen and did not address or dispute any of the facts the State had c ited in support of its claim she knew the car had been stolen. In fact, her proffer actually included additional information supporting a conclusion the car had bee n stolen

— the police report defendant submitted in opposition to the State's submissi on stated that the purse which was found on the seat behind defendant in the car fit the description of the purse from which one of the carjackers had pull ed the gun. Having reviewed the record de novo, Carrillo, 469 N .J. Super. at 333, we conclude the State 's unchallenged statement of facts are sufficient to establish defendant knew the vehicle in which she was found had been st olen. Nonetheless, based solely on our consideration of t he undisputed facts presented in the parties' Rule 3:5 -7 submissions, we are convinced the State establis hed defendant knew the Civic had been stolen when she a nd Turner were stopped and arrested. Thus, defendant had no expectation o f privacy in the contents of the vehicle, including the contents of the Guess pu rse found therein. See Taylor , 440 N.J. Super. at 523.

protection than its federal counterpart under the F ifth Amendment.") (quoting State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 568 (2005)).21 A- 0126

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More particularly, our side

- by -side review of the parties' proffered statements reveals that defendant did not contest t he State's assertion she knew the car was stolen. Additionally, police initiated the stop of Lopez's vehicle in Newark a mere few hours after the carjacking and it contained two individuals, defendant and Turner , who fit the descriptions of the perpetrators provid ed by the victims in the first police report. Defendant was the passenger discovered in Lopez's vehicle

. And, a purse fitting the description of the one fro m which the gun was pulled during the carjacking was found on the rear seat of the vehicle, directly behind where defendant sat in the stolen vehicle. Collectively, these facts give rise to an inference, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant was one of the carjackers and, thus, knew the vehicle in which she was found was had been stolen. We note the motion court did not perform the requir ed side- by -side comparison of the parties' Rule 3:5 -7 submissions and, further, did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of law addressing t he State's argument that the search of the purse was proper under Lugo and Taylor because it was seized from a vehicle in which defendant was found and the undisputed facts permitted a reasonable inference she knew was stolen. Howeve r, because the determination of the undisputed facts based on the parties' subm issions under22 A- 0126

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the Rule, and the application of such undisputed fa cts to the applicable law governing the propriety of the search constitute le gal issues we review de novo, for the reasons we have stated we conclude the sear ch was valid because defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the purse in which the gun, bullets, and key fob were found. See Car rillo, 469 N.J. Super. at 333; Lugo , 249 N.J. Super. at 568; Taylor, 440 N.J. Super. a t 525.
We therefore reverse the court's order suppressing th e contents of the Guess purse. We remand for further proceedings con sistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdicti on.