```

[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       BEHIND THE SCENES: HOW THE
                      BIDEN ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO 
                        ENFORCE THE DOHA AGREEMENT

=======================================================================

                                 HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           February 15, 2024

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-86

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]        

       Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
                            docs.house.gov, 
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov
                       
                               __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
55-924PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                         

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

                    COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS #4

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	     BRAD SHERMAN, California	
DARRELL ISSA, California	     GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri		     WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida		     AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado		     JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee		     DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee	     TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky		     SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas		     DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California		     COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida	     ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan		     SARA JACOBS, California
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, 	     KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
    American Samoa		     SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas		          Florida	
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio		     GREG STANTON, Arizona
JIM BAIRD, Indiana		     MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida	             JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey         JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York	     SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
CORY MILLS, Florida		     JIM COSTA, California
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia              JASON CROW, Colorado
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas		     BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
JOHN JAMES, Michigan		     GABE AMO, Rhode Island
KEITH SELF, Texas			

                Brendan Shields, Majority Staff Director
                Sophia Lafargue, Minority Staff Director

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                  INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Information submitted for the record from Ambassador Smith.......     4

                               WITNESSES

Khalilzad, Zalmay, Former U.S. Special Representative for 
  Afghanistan Reconciliation, U.S. Department of State...........    11

            ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Information submitted for the record from Representative Davidson    35

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    60
Hearing Minutes..................................................    61
Hearing Attendance...............................................    62

    STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..    63

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    65

 
 BEHIND THE SCENES: HOW THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO ENFORCE THE 
                             DOHA AGREEMENT

                      Thursday, February 15, 2024

                          House of Representatives,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                     Washington, DC

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m., in 
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael McCaul 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
    Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come 
to order. The purpose of this hearing is to discuss how the 
Biden Administration unconditionally handed over Afghanistan to 
the Taliban terrorist organization with its refusal to enforce 
the DOHA agreement.
    Today's hearing comes at a crucial moment in this 
committee's investigation into the Biden Administration's 
catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan.
    For months after President Biden announced the withdrawal, 
his senior military advisors and his own intelligence community 
repeatedly issued dire warnings about the damage this would 
create. At the same time, I, along with other Republican and 
Democrat Members of Congress, urged President Biden to uphold 
the conditions of the DOHA agreement, and most importantly, we 
urged him to prepare for the eventual fallout of our 
withdrawal.
    He ignored us and all, including his own State Department 
personnel, who issued a dissent cable in July warning of the 
dire situation on the ground. Instead, as the Taliban takeover 
became imminent, the White House and State Department 
leadership stuck their heads in the sand.
    It was so bad the State Department waited until the day 
after the Taliban captured Kabul to actually request an 
emergency evacuation, also known as a NEO. As a result of the 
Biden Administration's failure to plan, the U.S. military was 
forced to conduct this emergency evacuation surrounded by tens 
of thousands of Taliban terrorists. Put simply, President Biden 
and Secretary Blinken put thousands of American lives at risk 
through their incompetence and willful blindness.
    And then, the worst possible outcome: a terrorist attack at 
Abbey Gate on August the 26th, 2021, that killed 13 U.S. 
service members, wounded 45 more, and killed more than 170 
Afghan civilians. It was the deadliest day for the United 
States in Afghanistan in over a decade.
    And today, we have some of the family members of the 
service members killed at Abbey Gate in the audience. They are 
here because they want accountability for their children's 
deaths. I'm going to get them answers--the answers they 
deserve.
    I anticipate my colleagues on the other side of the aisle 
will attempt to spin this disaster as all being President 
Trump's fault. They will claim the DOHA agreement forced 
President Biden to withdraw and that he had no choice, but this 
is false.
    To that end, I want to remind everyone of two critical 
facts.
    First, the DOHA agreement was conditions-based--conditions 
our witness here today negotiated. And as he can tell you, 
those conditions were not being met by the Taliban, and they 
are still not being met today.
    The Taliban is allowing terrorists like Al Qaeda to 
flourish in Afghanistan. And the truth is that President Biden 
wanted to withdraw from the DOHA agreement, and if he wanted 
to, he could have. He did just that with many of President 
Trump's other agreements, like Remain in Mexico.
    Second, President Biden himself said that, even if the DOHA 
agreement had never been signed, he would still have withdrawn 
all U.S. troops from Afghanistan exactly the way that he did.
    When asked by George Stephanopoulos, quote, he said, 
``Would you have withdrawn troops like this, even if President 
Trump had not made that deal with the Taliban?'' President 
Biden replied, quote, ``I would have tried to figure out how to 
withdraw those troops, yes.''
    Our witness today, Ambassador Khalilzad, someone I have 
known for quite many years, served as the U.S. Special 
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation under President 
Trump, where he negotiated the DOHA agreement and was asked to 
remain on by President Biden.
    In November 2023, Ambassador Khalilzad appeared before the 
committee for a nearly 12-hour, closed-door, transcribed 
interview--and voluntarily, I might add, and we thank you for 
that.
    And in that interview, one thing was made clear: the core 
problem was not the DOHA agreement. It was a President who 
refused to enforce it.
    I want to thank our witness for being here today. 
Ambassador Khalilzad, I believe you have valuable information 
to share with this committee. And I know you have chosen to do 
so voluntarily, and I hope you do so with the same candor you 
showed in November.
    And I really admire you, sir. You are not forced to appear 
here. We could have done that. You are doing this as a patriot 
and an American, and someone who was in the middle of all this 
from the very beginning with so many facts to share with this 
committee. We thank you, sir, for being here today.
    With that, I recognize the ranking member, Mr. Meeks.
    Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And let me begin by also thanking you for hearing my call 
for transparency at our November 23rd--November 2023 
Afghanistan hearing. Yesterday, your staff sent us written 
notice of your personal commitment to publicly release all 
transcripts from interviews held during this Congress and in 
the committee's investigation into the United States withdrawal 
from Afghanistan after they are finalized on February 29th.
    This, indeed, is the right thing to do. The American people 
have funded our bipartisan oversight work and we owe them full 
transparency, not just misleading, cherry-picked snippets. Such 
transparency is critical for any investigation.
    So, I strongly hope that your commitment to make 
transcripts public will extend to the other oversight 
investigations you have initiated in this Congress in which 
witnesses have been questioned behind closed doors. We must not 
let this committee's activities become another typical move in 
a partisan game.
    And with that, let me thank Ambassador Khalilzad for 
appearing before our committee. Ambassador, you served under 
three different Presidents in a variety of capacities during 
America's 20 years of war effort in Afghanistan. And your 
insights on the August 2021 withdrawal, and the many decision 
points that led to the events of August 2021, are important to 
this committee's understanding. A 20-year war deserved 
comprehensive and bipartisan oversight.
    But the title of this hearing, ``How the Biden 
Administration failed to enforce the DOHA agreement,'' is 
telling. It is not titled, ``The Biden Administration's failed 
DOHA agreement with the Taliban.'' That is because it was not 
Joe Biden who crafted the February 2020 deal. It was, in fact, 
his Republican predecessor that made the agreement with the 
Taliban that committed the United States to withdraw all of our 
troops from Afghanistan.
    Nor is the hearing titled, ``How the Trump Administration 
failed to press the Taliban to live up to its commitments in 
the DOHA agreement, but withdrew troops anyway.'' That would 
require scrutiny of the DOHA deal since its inception under the 
Trump Administration.
    I must say this because, for some of my Republican 
colleagues, the challenges of Afghanistan began the day of Joe 
Biden's inauguration. That is not to say that the Biden 
Administration is beyond congressional review or that there is 
nothing to learn from those 8 months, but that is an 8-month 
snapshot out of 20 years. At best, this fixation is oversight 
malpractice. At worst, it is historical revisionism, 
politically motivated to place a withdrawal which President 
Biden inherited solely at his feet.
    Let's be clear. Both President Biden and President Trump 
sought to end our forever war in Afghanistan, and President 
Biden, ultimately, achieved that goal. Our presence in 
Afghanistan has changed, but our core interests have not. And 
the United States continues to pursue those interests, as it 
has demonstrated with the killing of the Emir of Al Qaeda and a 
key 9/11 mastermind, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in 2022 in Kabul.
    This is not about pointing blame. This is about grappling 
with reality, with the facts we like, as well as the ones we do 
not. And with the sacred responsibility, we have to oversee the 
State Department and the U.S. foreign policy.
    To that end, I want to acknowledge Ambassador Dan Smith's 
statement which is submitted for today's record.
    [The information referred to:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Meeks. Ambassador Smith served for almost four decades 
at the State Department and returned at Secretary Blinken's 
request to lead its after-action review, an independent review 
of the Department's actions over the course of January 2020 to 
August 2021 related to the United States withdrawal.
    The result of his review, drawn from more than 150 
interviews, are not just invaluable, but actionable and provide 
a roadmap we all should consult regularly to support the 
Department's crises management capacity and its single greatest 
assets--its people.
    Now, Ambassador Khalilzad, I know you have previously sat 
for a transcript interview on today's subject that lasted over 
10 hours, and we thank you for that. That's a testimony to both 
your vast knowledge to share and your deep commitment to 
America and to our national security.
    So, I look forward to your testimony and I hope that the 
American people can hear today what we have already heard 
behind closed doors.
    With that, I yield.
    Chairman McCaul. Other members of the committee are 
reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the 
record.
    Chairman McCaul. We are pleased to have here today Hon. 
Zalmay Khalilzad before us today. He served as a Special 
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation at the State 
Department from September 2018 to October 2021.
    Your full statement will be made part of the record.
    And I now recognize Ambassador Khalilzad for his opening 
statement.

      STATEMENT OF ZALMAY KHALILZAD, FORMER U.S. SPECIAL 
REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONCILIATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
                            OF STATE

    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 
Member, and distinguished members of the committee, I welcome 
the opportunity to talk with you today about America's strategy 
in Afghanistan during my service as the Special Representative 
for Afghanistan Reconciliation between 2018 and 2021.
    In September 2018, the Trump Administration asked me to 
help negotiate a framework agreement for the safe withdrawal of 
U.S. forces, obtain commitments from both the Taliban and the 
Afghan government on U.S. counterterrorism concerns, and set 
the stage for Afghans to start negotiating an end to the war in 
their country.
    By the end of 2018, the President's decision was to bring 
the American forces home. Several factors that contributed to 
this decision:
    The conclusion that this war had gone on for too long with 
no end in sight.
    The opportunity cost was too high. The United States needed 
to focus on great power competition--that is, China, Russia, 
and the threat from Iran.
    Afghanistan no longer was central to the war on terror.
    The goal of transforming Afghanistan into a modern and 
democratic State had been unrealistic. Despite best efforts, 
the country had huge governance problems and rampant levels of 
corruption.
    That decision recognized the potential risks involved in 
this policy. The greatest risk was the potential threat to U.S. 
forces during withdrawal. The British withdrawal in 1842 and 
the Soviet withdrawal in 1988 and 1989 had been very bloody.
    A second risk was Afghanistan once again becoming the big 
platform for a terrorist threat against the United States 
homeland, U.S. interests, and our allies.
    A third risk was the loss of gains made by the Afghan 
people.
    There was opposition to this policy, both inside the 
government and outside, but the President determined that the 
withdrawal was in the U.S. national interest.
    After more than a year of negotiations, on February 29, 
2020, we reached two agreements--one with the Taliban and the 
other with the Afghan government. These provided a framework 
for U.S. withdrawal, dealing with terrorism, intra-Afghan 
negotiations within the Taliban and the Afghan Republic, a 
permanent cease-fire, and future relations between the United 
States and Afghanistan.
    Key features of the agreement were:
    Phased withdrawal of U.S. forces over a 14-month period.
    Afghanistan was not to be used by any group or individual 
to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.
    Intra-Afghan negotiations.
    Importantly, the Taliban committed not to attack U.S. 
forces once the agreement was signed. This was critical, and 
the Taliban adhered to it, killing no coalition fighter or U.S. 
soldier during the entire withdrawal period.
    The first phase of withdrawal lasted 135 days, in which the 
U.S. forces were reduced to 8600. By the time President Trump 
left office, U.S. forces in Afghanistan had been reduced to 
2,500.
    The United States retained the right to come to the defense 
of the Afghan forces if the Taliban attacked them. We exercised 
this right as needed.
    During the negotiations between the Afghanistan Republic 
and the Taliban, which started on September 12, 2020, they did 
not make any significant progress.
    After the November 2020 elections, President-Elect Biden's 
team asked me to stay on.
    The Administration had three options:
    One, withdraw from the DOHA agreement.
    Two, implement the agreement, but with changes, such as the 
extension of the agreed timeline--linking the withdrawal of 
remaining forces to the conclusion of a political agreement 
between the Taliban and the Afghan government, or insisting on 
leaving behind in Afghanistan a counterterror force, or 
withdraw the remaining forces without such linkages.
    The President announced in April 2021 that we would add 4 
months to the timetable for withdrawal, for a total of 18 
months.
    The withdrawal was not conditioned on a political agreement 
between the two Afghan sides because it was believed that such 
conditionality would risk a return to war without end and 
entrap the United States into reversing course and sending more 
forces again.
    It was also decided that our over-the-horizon capabilities 
would allow us to monitor and respond to terror threats to the 
United States from Afghan territory.
    On protecting social and political gains, the approach was 
to advocate for key values in the course of intra-Afghan 
negotiations by pressing the Taliban on respecting women's 
rights and human rights.
    The withdrawal proceeded based on the new extended 
timeline. The assessment was that the Afghan government would 
remain in power and its forces would defend it and fight the 
Taliban during the withdrawal and for some time afterwards. 
This assumption informed our plans.
    Although reasonable, the assumption turned out to be wrong. 
The situation on the ground began to shift significantly and 
rapidly in favor of the Taliban. They took over one province 
after another, and by mid-August 2021, were at the gates of 
Kabul.
    We had the last-minute success in persuading the Taliban to 
refrain from entering Kabul and, instead, to hold talks with 
government to reach a political deal for a shared government, a 
step to which both sides agreed.
    But this fell apart when President Ghani surprisingly fled 
the country, which caused the now leaderless Afghan military 
and police to instantly disintegrate.
    These developments led to the Taliban entry into Kabul, and 
this abrupt series of events obliged the United States to 
react, adapt, and improvise, as none of this had been foreseen 
in our plans to withdraw by the end of August.
    As we all remember, the final 2 weeks of chaos at the 
airport and the tragic loss of 13 brave Americans in an ISIS-K 
terrorist attack were difficult, and ``what-ifs'' remain hotly 
debated.
    The events of those final days should not diminish the 
achievements made. We must all remember that, after 9/11, we 
sent our forces to Afghanistan to decimate Al Qaeda there. This 
was accomplished and represents a major win for the security of 
the United States. We all are grateful to those whose sacrifice 
made this possible and to their families.
    The struggle for Afghanistan is not over and Afghanistan's 
final chapter is certainly not written. The seed of the values 
we planted may well bear fruit over time. It would be a mistake 
to turn our back on the country.
    The American approach going forward must take current 
realities in Afghanistan, the region, and the world into 
account while remaining guided, as elsewhere, by our interests 
and enduring values.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Khalilzad follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Ambassador.
    And I want to echo your comments to our veterans that their 
service was not in vain. They protected this Nation for 20 
years from a major terrorist attack like 9/11, and we thank 
them for that.
    We also want to thank the parents of Marine Corps Corporal 
Hunter Lopez and Marine Corps Sergeant Nicole Gee, who are here 
today, and to the Lopez family, Ms. Shamblin, and the rest of 
the Gold Star families. We honor your sacrifice and your 
children.
    In November, you testified before this committee in a 
transcribed interview and you just restated that you presented 
to the Biden Administration and to the President, basically, 
three options on the DOHA agreement.
    One, to, basically, ignore it and unconditionally withdraw.
    Two, to tear it up.
    And three, to enforce it, its conditions against the 
Taliban.
    You also testified that you and Secretary Blinken both 
recommended to President Biden that he enforce DOHA's 
conditions. But, instead, the President ignored your advice or 
disagreed and chose to ignore the DOHA conditions and 
unconditionally withdraw. Is that correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I think there was the opportunity for me to 
brief the President, as you said, correct, and the options that 
he had. And it was clear that it would be desirable that the 
final withdrawal happens after there is an agreement between 
the government and the Taliban.
    And that was broadly supported, that idea, but upon 
discussion and deliberation, and consultations with allies and 
others--and the allies, too, favored withdrawal after there was 
an agreement between the government and the Taliban--but there 
was a judgment that, if we did that, since that was not part of 
the DOHA agreement, that it could result in a protracted delay 
in the withdrawal of forces, as we couldn't be certain when and 
if the Afghans would reach an agreement. And if there was a 
risk of going back to war, and perhaps sending more troops, the 
decision was not to pursue that, and there was broad support 
for that decision.
    Chairman McCaul. But your recommendation to the President 
was to enforce DOHA's conditions, correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. That was part of the agreement, yes, and we 
restated that, that this was a condition-based agreement. It 
was a package deal and there were linkages. What we did 
depended on the Taliban delivering on their commitments.
    Chairman McCaul. Right. And the President disagreed with 
you and chose not to enforce the conditions?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I described the discussion that 
occurred and the judgment that was made.
    Chairman McCaul. And the conditions were not enforced, and 
as a result, the Taliban is in control of Afghanistan today, 
correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I would say it's clear that the 
Taliban are in control, but I would put the responsibility for 
what happened largely on the shoulders of the Afghan government 
leadership for not standing for their government, for their 
system, and for the values that they said they believed in.
    Chairman McCaul. Yes, and I agree. I think President 
Ghani's actions were cowardice in fleeing his country as a 
coward--not a good example.
    Let me turn to the meeting you had in DOHA between 
yourself, General McKenzie, and the Taliban leader Mullah 
Baradar. You said that the Taliban offered to give the United 
States control of Kabul for the purposes of evacuation, but 
that offer was turned down. When asked by my committee at your 
interview whether the Taliban viewed that as a, quote, ``green 
light'' to take over Kabul, you said, quote, ``I think that's 
clear.'' Do you agree with that statement?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I agree that we had made an agreement for 
the Taliban not to enter Kabul and for a delegation to come 
from Kabul--and President Ghani had agreed to it as well--to 
negotiate the power-sharing government to take over on 
September 1 in a meeting of 200 Afghan notables present.
    Chairman McCaul. Right, but McKenzie says, ``That's not my 
mission'' because his orders are not to secure Kabul----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, indeed.
    Chairman McCaul [continuing]. For evacuation. His orders 
are to evacuate----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Indeed. Indeed.
    Chairman McCaul [continuing]. By July 4th, and he did not 
have the troops----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Chairman McCaul [continuing]. Allocated for that.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Chairman McCaul. Now, he could have raised that to the 
President. Was this meeting, to your knowledge, ever reported 
to the White House?
    Mr. Khalilzad. It was reported clearly to the entire 
government, but it was reported after General McKenzie said on 
the spot there that that wasn't, as you said, Chairman, his 
mission to secure Kabul. And the initial goal was for the 
Taliban not to be in Kabul. In fact, it presented them with a 
map of some 20 to 25 miles away from the center, within that 
area, that there should be no Talibs present.
    But the departure of President Ghani and increased 
widespread concern by Afghans in Kabul about law and order with 
the disintegration of the Security Forces, the options were 
either that the Talibs offer that we take responsibility, and 
General McKenzie, as you said correctly, Chairman--I was 
present in the meeting--that that was not part of his mission, 
and then, the discussion shifted to where the Talibs could go 
for----
    Chairman McCaul. Because of his understanding, McKenzie's 
understanding, that the President wouldn't authorize more 
troops to take over Kabul for purposes of the evacuation?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I cannot comment on that because----
    Chairman McCaul. Yes.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. I wasn't presented in any 
discussion he may have had----
    Chairman McCaul. Now, if that had happened, imagine, 
wouldn't that have been a little different, right? We take over 
Kabul for purposes of the evacuation. The Taliban agrees to 
stay out of this 20-mile radius and they do not take over HKIA. 
They are not part of this chaos at the very end, and the 
suicide bomber coming from this prison out of Bagram--you know, 
I'm not asking you to speculate, but it is very foreseeable 
that may never have happened. And this report does go to the 
White House, and yet, nothing is done to change the course of 
events. Correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, your account is correct, but we do not 
know what else could have happened if that decision was made. 
So, we are entering speculation now.
    Chairman McCaul. No, the bottom line is you really cannot 
trust the Taliban.
    And I see my time is expired, and I now recognize the 
ranking member, Mr. Meeks.
    Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
    I'm not going to speculate because I do not think we should 
be speculating or just giving our own opinions, or paraphrasing 
of what you are saying. I want to take it for what you are 
saying and not going to guess on what my thoughts are, because 
we want to do an investigation to determine what we should 
learn from it.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Correct.
    Mr. Meeks. Let me join the chairman, though, in, first, 
saying to our Gold Star families how much we appreciate you and 
the heroes that lost their lives. And I know that there is 
nothing that we can do to bring them back, but they are, 
indeed, heroes for our country. And I thank you for your 
sacrifices. And I will tell you that, no matter whether it is a 
Democrat or a Republican, I truly believe that we will always 
hold them dear and acknowledge the heroes that they are. Thank 
you for being here.
    Ambassador, you have worked tirelessly over the years to 
negotiate and implement the DOHA deal, as did many others in 
our government. And I have some questions I want to ask based 
upon your experience. They are mostly yes or no. So, we do not 
have to get into speculation and any things of that nature.
    Now, Secretary Pompeo himself--I think I have a picture 
here--had gone to DOHA to sign the agreement in a photo op with 
the Taliban leader, Mullah Baradar, after nearly two decades of 
being at war with them. And despite any criticisms of it, it is 
fair to say that concluding the DOHA deal was a big deal; it 
was a significant event, is that correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, signing it was a significant event.
    Mr. Meeks. And with the conclusion of the DOHA deal, the 
Taliban, then, stopped attacking U.S. forces inside 
Afghanistan, fulfilling the top condition placed on it in the 
deal. Is that also correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Correct.
    Mr. Meeks. And the United States committed in the DOHA deal 
to, quote, ``withdraw from Afghanistan all military forces of 
the United States, its allies, and coalition partners, 
including all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private 
security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting 
services personnel.'' Is that not correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Correct.
    Mr. Meeks. And arguably, that withdrawal was well underway 
in January 2021 after President Trump, according to Ambassador 
Smith's statement for the record, quote, ``steadily withdrew 
U.S. forces, notwithstanding concerns about the Taliban's 
behavior.'' Is that correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Correct. We were down to 2500, as I said, 
yes.
    Mr. Meeks. Right. And so, in your expert opinion, what did 
you think the Taliban would have done if President Biden, just 
a few months before the original May deadline that his 
predecessor had set for a full withdrawal, had just walked away 
entirely from the DOHA agreement, in your expert opinion?
    Mr. Khalilzad. If we had walked away from the DOHA 
agreement, we would have been back, in my opinion--now I am 
offering an opinion----
    Mr. Meeks. Yes, your expert opinion.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. We would have been back and 
fighting the Taliban. So, we would have been back to where we 
were before the agreement. That is my opinion.
    Mr. Meeks. Right. So, you spoke in your opening statement 
of the belief that imposing further conditions on the Taliban 
at that time, as you just stated, would risk a return to war. 
And you hold to that belief today, is that correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I do.
    Mr. Meeks. And had President Biden sought to revise the 
deal to maintain a small number of troops in Afghanistan 
indefinitely, did the risk remain that the Taliban would resume 
attacks against them?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Very likely.
    Mr. Meeks. So, I'm sure, Mr. Ambassador, you agree that the 
highest priority of the United States President should be to 
protect American lives, correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Correct.
    Mr. Meeks. Thank you.
    And even over other development or national security 
objectives, or even the welfare of our allies and partners?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Of course, this gets into a complicated 
discussion. We do put lives at risk in defense of our interests 
and our values, as we did in Afghanistan for many years.
    Mr. Meeks. Let me ask my last question----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Meeks [continuing]. Because I see I'm out of time.
    So, Mr. Ambassador, in your own belief, do you believe that 
President Biden's completion of the U.S. withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in 2021 was necessary to protect American lives?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Certainly American lives in Afghanistan in 
terms of American military forces, yes.
    Mr. Meeks. I thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Mr. Meeks. I yield back the balance of my time.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair now recognizes Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Ambassador, thank you for your service, and it is just 
so inspiring to be with you. So, we are grateful for what you 
have done for our country.
    And it is particularly a time for us to appreciate the 
success of the American military.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Wilson. For 20 years, they stopped terrorist attacks in 
our country. And so, as people look back, we should appreciate 
the success of the American military.
    It is very personal to me. My former National Guard unit, 
the 218th Mechanized Infantry of the South Carolina National 
Guard, led by General Bob Livingston, served for a year across 
Afghanistan, and they developed a great affection for their 
Afghan brothers. I was there four times seeing firsthand the 
success of what they were doing.
    And then, I am grateful my youngest son, First Lieutenant 
Hunter Wilson, was an engineer serving with the Army Guard for 
a year in Afghanistan.
    So, it is very personal to me, the absolute disgust I have 
with President Joe Biden. His shameful appeasement, surrender, 
and abandonment of the people of Afghanistan has led 
immediately to the death of 13 young Americans at Kabul 
airport, even though the sniper had the mass-murdering 
individual bomber in his sights, which could have saved the 13 
lives and could have saved, indeed, hundreds of poor Afghan 
citizens who were murdered. But yet, the Biden rules of 
engagement came into play and 13 young Americans died.
    And with that, too, it has also given encouragement to what 
we are into now which we did not choose. And that is a war, 
dictators with rule of gun invading democracies with rule of 
law. We saw that on February 24th, 2022, when War Criminal 
Putin invaded Ukraine. We saw it October 7th, when Hamas, the 
puppets of Iran, invaded Israel. We see it today with the 
threats being made against the 24 million people of Taiwan by 
the Chinese Communist Party.
    All of this to me goes back to the shameless, shameful 
decision which I think is the most catastrophic in the history 
of the United States in terms of national defense, security, 
and foreign police, and there is no excuse, however they 
rewrite history, God bless their hearts.
    But, then, additionally, we should always remember that 
America was in Afghanistan and liberated Afghanistan from 
Taliban terrorists because of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
Again, history should not be rewritten. What happened is Osama 
bin Laden was operating out of a cave in Afghanistan.
    And so, for 20 years, indeed, our military was successful 
to protect, but, sadly, we now, by abandoning Afghanistan, the 
global war on terrorism is not over. It is coming to America. 
The FBI has identified that we are great risk of attack 
imminently today in America that could occur. And so, it is 
just shameful what occurred.
    Additionally, a question I have is that, on August 26th, 
2021, when President Biden excused his appeasement, and right 
in the middle of his speech, he was explaining his advisors had 
said to just abandon; leave now, and then, he threw in--it was 
not on the teleprompter--``I have letters.''
    OK. I sent him, and asked that night, I asked for copies of 
the letters of the advice that he received to abandon the 
people of Afghanistan. And it should not surprise you, about 
every 2 months, I send a letter to the White House asking for 
the letters. There are no letters; they have not been revealed. 
But what advice was given by his advisors on leaving the people 
of Afghanistan to fall off jets as the abandonment took place?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I believe that our military, under the 
leadership of the President and the chain of command, did an 
admirable job in a very difficult set of circumstances to get 
as many people out, as some 125,000 people were brought out.
    So, I associate myself with your praise of our military. I 
had the honor of serving with them in Afghanistan and in Iraq. 
And they have done an outstanding job for the people of the 
United States and our security.
    With regard to what you mentioned, sir, about the letters 
and advice, I do not have a direct knowledge of what it is that 
was involved there. But the advice was to bring out as many 
people as possible, to reach out to as many Americans and those 
who had worked for us or for organizations that worked for us, 
to bring them out. And a huge number was brought out.
    Mr. Wilson. Again, thank you for your service.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Sherman.
    Mr. Sherman. Throughout the relevant period, we had two 
choices: keep a force there, particularly with air power, and 
be prepared to incur modest casualties, or pull out. The 
foreign policy establishment wanted to stay.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Sherman. The dissent cables said, ``Stay.'' The 
politicians promised the American people we would pull out--not 
because our casualties were particularly large, but because 
they were on top of 20 years of war.
    We were defeated militarily in achieving our full goals in 
Afghanistan not by the Taliban, but by the phrase ``Forever 
War.'' Once that phrase was coined, the American people 
demanded we withdraw.
    Now, I know there is pressure on the chairman to politicize 
this committee and achieve the political objectives of his 
party, but this hearing is going to give politicization a bad 
name because it is the worst issue for the Republicans to bring 
up.
    Because, Ambassador, this agreement, this DOHA agreement, 
is the worst agreement I could imagine. I do not blame you. 
Because President Trump--well, you had testified in your 
testimony, by the end of 2018, it was well known that President 
Trump's decision was to bring all American forces home from 
Afghanistan. In 2019, on the anniversary of 9/11, he invited 
them to Camp David, and just before the November 2020 election, 
President Trump stated, ``We will have the small remaining 
number of our brave men and women serving in Afghanistan home 
by Christmas.''
    So, the only leverage you had over the Taliban is maybe we 
will take that foreign policy approach and keep our Air Force 
capacity there. And you have got the President saying, 
President Trump saying, they're all home by Christmas, every 
single one of them.
    So, this is the worst agreement I could imagine. 
Ambassador, is there anything in the agreement where the 
Taliban commit themselves to allowing 13-year-old girls to go 
to school? I did not find anything like that. Is there in 
there?
    Mr. Khalilzad. The Taliban--there is nothing in the 
agreement. The issues dealing with the future of Afghanistan 
was to be negotiated----
    Mr. Sherman. But the agreement itself----
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. Among the Afghans, between the 
two sides.
    Mr. Sherman. The purpose of this hearing is to say, why did 
not we enforce the agreement?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Sherman. But when the Taliban treats 12-year-old girls 
like sex slaves, when they kill members of the LGBT community, 
when they kill anyone who converts from Islam to Christianity, 
they are not in violation of this agreement that we are having 
a hearing to say, why aren't we enforcing? They are not in 
violation. You cannot enforce it. We entered into an agreement 
in which they agreed to do nothing more than talk to the Afghan 
government.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Sherman. They talked. They decided they wanted to kill 
the LGBTQ community; they wanted to kill what they call 
apostates. They wanted to, basically, enslave half the human 
race, the female half.
    So, this agreement was so bad that the chairman attacks 
President Biden for not withdrawing from it. This is an 
agreement entered into by the man who claims he is the best 
negotiator in the world, President Trump.
    I will say that we did achieve one objective, and that is 
Afghanistan is not uniquely situated to serve as a base for 
terrorism against America, and, in fact, there has been more 
terrorism coming out of Afghanistan killing Iranians in Iran 
than killing Americans.
    There is no such thing as an easy withdrawal. As the 
Ambassador pointed out, Russia and Britain had very messy 
withdrawals from Afghanistan, and our withdrawal from Vietnam 
was messy as well.
    That was particularly true when every English-speaking 
Afghan I had any acquaintance with was trying to leave, the 
idea that the average grunt in Afghanistan would stay in fight 
is absurd.
    But I do have one more question. And that is, the 
Republicans have said that somehow we should have gone over 
Afghanistan and collected our $85 billion worth of weapons, 
presumably from people who knew that they could keep them for 
their own self-defense or sell them to the Taliban. Could we 
have, by force, taken back our weapons everywhere in 
Afghanistan on our way out without casualties?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you, sir.
    As you know, the weapons that were left behind were weapons 
that we thought was safe to leave behind for the government of 
Afghanistan since----
    Mr. Sherman. Even if we had realized the government was 
useless, could we have seized them without casualties?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Now we are speculating. Because the 
government, we assumed, would not fall apart before our 
withdrawal.
    Mr. Sherman. Ambassador, it was more of a rhetorical 
question. If people have weapons they want to hold onto, you 
cannot take them away if you are not willing to incur some 
casualties.
    I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Perry.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Ambassador, I'm over here.
    In September 2020, you appeared before the House Oversight 
Committee and testified that the U.S. troop withdrawal would be 
determined based--and I'm going to quote you--``based on 
conditions on the ground and delivery by the Taliban on their 
commitment.''
    Did you or Secretary Blinken advocate for an extension on 
the withdrawal date, considering the poor planning behind the 
final evacuation as it occurred?
    Mr. Khalilzad. As I said, sir, 4 months were added to the 
timetable, moving from 14 to 18. But, as I said again, the 
decision was made to withdraw at the end of August and not to 
link it to any conditions that you might have in mind.
    Mr. Perry. Well, that was your quote, ``conditions.'' So, I 
think Americans have in mind that it would be a condition-based 
withdrawal, which makes sense. You provide some kind of--when I 
say, ``you,'' our adversary, so to speak--you provide some 
level of compliance with the agreement that we can see, and 
then, we will give you a little. But that is not what occurred.
    I'm just wondering if you can name a single concession made 
by the Taliban during the time period between the April 14th 
announcement by the President, by President Biden, of total 
withdrawal and the fall of Afghanistan. What concessions?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, one concession was that they acquiesce 
to the addition of 4 months that we demanded.
    Mr. Perry. Of foreign what?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Four months----
    Mr. Perry. Four months.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. Was demanded of additional 
time. They could have rejected it and gone back to fighting. 
They did not; they acquiesced.
    Too, they agreed not to enter Kabul, when we asked. They 
agreed to sit and agreed to a government that would include 
members of the republican side, the government side.
    Mr. Perry. But those agreements, as you know, were hallow 
because they took more and more and more of the government 
under their control, which was not in the DOHA agreement, which 
was not what was considered, which was not what was agreed to.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, they----
    Mr. Perry. And they did invade Kabul.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, they did because--they agreed not to, 
and then, there was to be negotiations----
    Mr. Perry. And so, they lied to us. So, it wasn't based, 
the withdrawal was not based on conditions on the ground. And 
I'm wondering, did you convey these concerns to President Biden 
during the continuing negotiations about the blatant 
violations--blatant. They were blatant. The whole world saw 
them as they were occurring.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Certainly, I'm not here to defend the 
behavior of the Talibs or the Taliban.
    Mr. Perry. None of us are; I get that.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. But I believe that----
    Mr. Perry. I'm trying to----
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. Insisting on additional 
conditions----
    Mr. Perry. We are not asking for additional conditions, 
just the conditions that they agreed to. And I'm trying to 
determine, knowing that--you knew that.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
    Mr. Perry. The world saw that.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Perry. The President saw that. I'm assuming--maybe I 
shouldn't be--but I'm assuming you advised him of that. The 
Secretary advised him of that. But he proceeded anyway. 
That's----
    Mr. Khalilzad. He proceeded to withdraw forces because he 
believed, if he persisted, we would be back to a fight, and he 
did not want to do that.
    Mr. Perry. So, just out of curiosity, in the remaining 
time, who chose the 20th anniversary of 9/11 as the final 
evacuation day?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I actually do not know that.
    Mr. Perry. Did you ever question that? I mean, maybe it is 
not as important, impactful to you as it is for the rest of 
Americans, but that's pretty significant.
    Mr. Khalilzad. I agree with that, but I think, therefore, 
an adjustment was made to the end of August as the final date 
of withdrawal.
    Mr. Perry. But it was September 11th.
    Mr. Khalilzad. The initial announcement was, you know as 
well as I do, but I think----
    Mr. Perry. You do not know who made the decision?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I do not--well, the President, obviously, 
made the decision, but I do not know who advised him on 
choosing that date.
    Mr. Perry. Well, the President is the Commander-in-Chief, 
regardless----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Perry [continuing]. Of who advised him.
    Now, it was said that the President wanted to withdraw, and 
you even kind of just reminded us, because it was to protect 
American lives and to lessen the loss of American lives. But 
you would also concede that the time coming into that during 
the previous Administration there had been no loss of American 
lives. And once the decision was made and the plan executed, 
there was a horrific loss of American lives.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the loss of life that did not occur 
under President Trump's Administration----
    Mr. Perry. We will never know what did not occur, sir. What 
we know did occur, and that the previous Administration's plan 
coming into it during that period of time, a long period of 
time, there was no loss of American service members' lives.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Because of the agreement.
    Mr. Perry. No, no, it wasn't because of the agreement. The 
Taliban wasn't following the agreement or abiding by the 
agreement.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well----
    Mr. Perry. It was because the President let the Taliban 
know that, if they killed any American lives, it was going to 
be over for them.
    Mr. Khalilzad. You know, I----
    Mr. Perry. I yield the balance.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Keating.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First off, as a Gold Star family myself--my uncle was 
killed in action--I just want to recognize and thank the 
families that are here. I want to be sure we thank, first and 
foremost, and give our eternal gratitude to their service and 
their sacrifice.
    The purpose of undertaking the overall investigation of 
Afghanistan was to look to 20-plus years and to try to find out 
lessons learned, things that we could do differently. And the 
goal is--and I think I share it, and I'm sure the families here 
share it--to prevent future lives from being lost. Can we learn 
something over this period of time that will save other 
families and save other brave Americans from that sacrifice? 
So, that is my goal, over 20 years, looking at this.
    And I cannot really sit here at this moment in time talking 
about saving future American lives without just indicating 
something else that is happening right here in this House right 
now, and that is not acting on aid to Ukraine.
    Why is that relevant to this? Because when we can fund 
Ukrainians defending themselves against an illegal war from 
Russia that is a direct and present danger to the United States 
and our allies, and we can confront this threat with funding 
Ukraine, and by doing that, confront Russia, deter other 
threats--threats that could be in China and Taiwan--in the 
process, and keep young American men and women from being 
deployed under Article 5. If Ukraine falls, Putin has made it 
clear he is going into the Baltic states, which are NATO 
states.
    So, in the theme of trying to save future American lives, I 
hope that the Speaker has the courage to even allow democracy 
that so many people fought for a chance to have a vote on this.
    Now, when it comes to Ukraine, Mr. Ambassador, you know, I 
did not get to choose who is here. I did not get to choose the 
title that says ``the Biden Administration failed.'' Again, I 
prefer to look at this over 20-plus years.
    But I would quote, given the comments of some of my 
colleague, a quote from former U.S. Ambassador John Bass, who 
said our main policy efforts--and he was the Ambassador, as you 
are aware----
    Mr. Khalilzad. He was.
    Mr. Keating [continuing]. Under President Trump--our main 
policy efforts not only did not reinforce each other; they 
contradicted each other. These contrary signals were amplified 
by President Trump's periodic statements supporting rapid force 
reductions. Taken together, they undermined Afghan's confidence 
in a U.S. security commitment and in their own armed service 
and government--something that you alluded to, Mr. Ambassador, 
the lack of confidence that spelled itself out with the Afghan 
government and their military.
    I guess I would just leave with this, and hope that we can 
undertake, as a committee, really our emphasis on what went 
wrong; what we can learn; learn from our military; learn from 
our diplomats. There was plenty that went wrong and it had dire 
consequences in many instances.
    But, in terms of limiting this hearing to how the Biden 
Administration failed, I will just end with one quote, and that 
quote occurred on June 26th, 2021. It was at a political 
campaign rally afterwards by the former President. And quote, 
``I started this process. All the troops are coming home. They 
couldn't stop this process.'' Unquote.
    So, let's not have this hearing center on who is the last 
person holding the ball when the music ended, but, rather, 
sincerely looking at what we can do to prevent other tragedies; 
what we can learn from this, and how we can save young American 
men and women from being in harm's way when they do not have to 
be. They have the courage to be there when they have to be. The 
decisions that are made are not there.
    I will never forget, when I first became a Congressman, I 
went to one of our members serving in a war zone and I asked 
him what he thought about the war. And he said, ``Well, sir, my 
job is to serve.''
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Keating. ``That question is yours to answer, 
respectfully.'' That is why we are here. That is why we are 
trying to learn. That is why we are trying to save more 
American lives in the future.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mrs. Wagner.
    Mrs. Wagner. I thank the chairman.
    And I thank the Ambassador for being here and for his 
service.
    Today, more than 2 years after the Biden Administration's 
shameful, tragic, and utterly misguided flight from 
Afghanistan, it has become clear that the President was 
determined to abandon the country at any cost and with no 
conditions. The cost in lost military assets and our 
credibility as a friend and ally, and global leader, and most 
of all, in precious American lives, was incalculable.
    Again and again, the Administration proved that it was 
willing to simply cede Afghanistan to the Taliban, irrespective 
of the Taliban's clear intent to ignore all commitments and 
agreements. The responsibility, the absolute debacle in 
Afghanistan, rests on this Administration's shoulders, period.
    And there must be accountability. There has been no 
accountability for the Administration's total failure to 
protect U.S. troops and citizens.
    Ambassador Khalilzad, did countries in NATO argue against a 
full U.S. troop withdrawal?
    Mr. Khalilzad. They did----
    Mrs. Wagner. They did.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. As subject to a political 
agreement that I mentioned to the chairman.
    Mrs. Wagner. How did Russia and China respond to the 
Taliban takeover?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I do not know for sure, but it seems to me 
that they would have preferred a political settlement. They 
stated at least that they would have a preferred a political 
settlement. I was always suspicious of their motivations.
    Mrs. Wagner. Mm-hmm.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Sometimes they would want a political 
settlement, but they knew that there is no easy path to a 
political settlement. They also would have liked to have kept 
us in Afghanistan in a difficult situation, doing what they 
wanted us to do, in part, which is to get the terrorists that 
were focused on them eliminated by us, and paying a price 
without winning.
    So, we had to be careful in terms of the Russian and Talib 
activities, yes.
    Mrs. Wagner. Ambassador, I know that this was touched on 
before, but Afghanistan----
    Mr. Khalilzad. I could talk some more, if we were in a 
different setting, about their policies, but this is what I can 
say in this setting.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    And it is more concerning to me that NATO was against----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. A full troop withdrawal.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mrs. Wagner. Afghanistan--and this was touched on--is now 
ranked worst of 177 countries in terms of the status of women, 
according to the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. Did you 
believe the Taliban would respect women's rights and allow 
girls to go to school?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I did not trust them. They did make 
statements on the record, video statements, that they would 
allow girls to go to school, all the way through not only 
college, but to a PhD. This is on the record that they have 
made, but----
    Mrs. Wagner. But they did not do it.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. They have not lived up to it.
    Mrs. Wagner. They did not do it. They did not do it----
    Mr. Khalilzad. They did not do it.
    Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. And you did not trust them?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mrs. Wagner. Why did not U.S. negotiators press the Taliban 
to extend the withdrawal date beyond August 31 to facilitate 
the evacuation?
    Mr. Khalilzad. That was according to the President's 
decision not to. He had asked for 4 months, as I mentioned 
before, but that was his decision not to ask for an additional 
extension.
    Mrs. Wagner. President Biden's?
    Mr. Khalilzad. President Biden, yes.
    Mrs. Wagner. The Taliban issued threats to attack U.S. 
troops if they stayed longer than the August 31 deadline. 
Ambassador, did you consider this to be the actions of a 
responsible partner of peace?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, that consideration, that if an 
additional extension was asked for, it wasn't asked. But if an 
additional extension was asked for, perhaps it could lead to 
this restart of the fight, and that is why perhaps the decision 
was made not to ask for more time.
    Mrs. Wagner. Well, they threatened our U.S. troops----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. If they stayed on day longer----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mrs. Wagner [continuing]. Than August 31.
    What was your assessment throughout 2021 of whether the 
Taliban was meeting the conditions of the DOHA agreement? And 
how about in April 2021?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, it always was my personal judgment 
that, to get the Taliban to do what they have agreed to do, we 
have to respond with our commitment in a way that incentivizes 
them to do what they have committed to do--meaning that we 
wouldn't do what we have committed to unless they do what they 
have committed to doing. That was my point of view and that was 
my advice.
    Mrs. Wagner. My time has ended here, and I yield back. 
Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Castro.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
    Thank you, Ambassador, for your testimony today.
    In your prepared testimony, you said, quote, ``By the end 
of 2018, as is well known, the President's decision was to 
bring home American forces from Afghanistan.'' We have also 
heard testimony in multiple closed-door transcribed interviews 
with senior State Department officials to this effect.
    In other words, that the withdrawal of all U.S. troops--the 
withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Afghanistan began in 
February 2020, as part of the agreement you negotiated between 
the United States and the Taliban. Can you provide examples of 
how President Trump's decision to withdraw all U.S. troops was 
apparent and, quote, ``well known'' beginning in 2018?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, and the President tweeted to that 
effect multiple times. I would give a reference to Secretary 
Pompeo's book in which he documents the President's 
determination. And, of course, when I had my meetings with the 
President, he always made that clear, that that was the 
objective.
    Mr. Castro. So, let me ask you: so, it is fair to say the 
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan began as a result of the 
February 2020 DOHA agreement under President Trump?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Indeed.
    Mr. Castro. And do you believe that sentiment to withdraw 
all troops was known or suspected by the Taliban when you were 
negotiating with them? And what informs this belief?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the public statements. Sometimes the 
Taliban would say that I was not following in my negotiations 
the letter or the spirit of what was being said publicly by 
saying we would only withdraw if certain conditions are met, 
while sometimes statements would be made that provided, that 
created the impression as if we would withdraw regardless. And 
so----
    Mr. Castro. So, you feel like that was undermining at the 
time of your negotiating?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, but that is for others to judge, but 
the challenge is as I described. The challenge was as I 
described.
    Mr. Castro. And so, how did that fact, how did that 
situation--the conflicting statements, and so forth; the fact 
that the Taliban had a sense at least or suspected that there 
would be a total withdrawal--how did that affect your ability 
to negotiate the DOHA deal with them?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, it was not helpful, but, also, 
however, I tried to educate them not to take public statements 
made for a variety of reasons as the definitive final word, 
because circumstances could change; that we needed a good 
agreement, as good as possible, given the statements that were 
being made. Because without having such an agreement, they 
might hear a statement very different than the statement that I 
heard.
    Mr. Castro. From the President or the Secretary of State, 
or some high-ranking U.S. official?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Indeed.
    Mr. Castro. Yes.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Castro. And you negotiated this deal. Was there ever 
any doubt that it what it committed the United States to do was 
to draw down its military fully from the country? Basically, to 
go to zero?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, that was, clearly, in the agreement, 
but the idea of perhaps leaving some forces behind was there, 
not in the agreement. We had raised it with the Talibs. It 
became an understanding--I have to be careful how I articulate 
this--that if there is an agreement between the government of 
Afghanistan and the Taliban, and there is a new unity 
government, the issue of a residual U.S. presence would be 
decided by that government. But, as well, they could never 
agree to----
    Mr. Castro. Sure.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. Themselves----
    Mr. Castro. Well, let me ask you, in light of these facts 
to which you have testified, would it be reasonable to say that 
the withdrawal began in 2020?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Castro. And that it wasn't--that it wasn't the sole 
decision of one U.S. President in 2021?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Agreed.
    Mr. Castro. The Trump Administration initiated the U.S. 
withdrawal from Afghanistan by negotiating and, ultimately, 
concluding the DOHA deal in February 2020 with an explicit aim 
to withdraw all American troops in the country in 14 months.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Castro. The Trump Administration's implementation of 
this deal set in motion the formal U.S. withdrawal from 
Afghanistan?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Agree. I would advise that, if we could 
think about withdrawal, and then, the way the final phase 
withdrawal happened, that is, I think, a distinction that we 
should keep in mind.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Mast.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
    I would start by touching on the last statement that you 
just said. There is the withdrawal, and then, there is, 
essentially, the way that it is conducted. You could say that 
about any sporting event, any athletic event, anything that you 
are planning on doing in the future. You know, you might plan 
to have a Super Bowl, but there is the way that the game is 
played. And that is what ultimately counts, is what do you do 
when you get onto the ground, as they say, where the metal 
meets the meat.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Mast. So, I want to ask a few questions about that, and 
I want to ask a few questions about the conditions for the 
Biden Administration.
    Did the Biden Administration execute or operate on a plan 
that there are no conditions; there is no line, no threshold, 
no red line, anything that was going to prevent them from being 
out of Afghanistan on the day they wanted?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Let me understand what you are asking. 
Certainly, the desire to complete the withdrawal by the end of 
August was that any stay beyond that risks the restart of the 
war, which was a driving factor, as I understood it.
    Mr. Mast. So, to say it again--I'm not going to try to put 
words in your mouth--was there anything that was going to stop 
them from leaving on the day that they wanted to leave?
    Mr. Khalilzad. That would be speculating, of course, but I 
would reState that avoiding the restart of the war was the most 
important factor shaping decisions.
    Mr. Mast. I wonder if, in fact, it would be speculating or 
not be speculating. Because, as you have spoken about, as you 
have been questioned about, and as you offered up in interviews 
previously, you made your recommendations to the 
Administration.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Mast. And you said, you know, listen, there is 
continuation of expecting full adherence with the provisions, 
the conditions, of the DOHA agreement. That is a 
recommendation, and I believe that was your recommendation: 
make the Taliban uphold to those provisions.
    There is scrap the DOHA agreement as though it never 
existed and create your own conditions, President Biden, and 
tell the Taliban this is what you want.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Mast. Or there is forget about the conditions of the 
DOHA agreement and, one way or another, you are leaving when 
you want to leave.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Mast. He chose, my understanding is, forget the 
conditions of the agreement; we are leaving when we want to 
leave. We are leaving on the date that we demand to leave. We 
are not leaving on any other date, is that correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, the additional 4 months was the only 
factor that changed from the timetable. Otherwise, you are 
right.
    Mr. Mast. And we know he chose September 11 to begin with.
    I'm just going to ask one more question. Do you know who 
pays the price ultimately for bad foreign policy?
    Mr. Khalilzad. All of us.
    Mr. Mast. Who----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Especially the Armed Forces, of course.
    Mr. Mast. That is exactly right.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. And I want to associate myself with----
    Mr. Mast. How many people----
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. All the comments----
    Mr. Mast. How many people paid the price for his bad 
foreign policy?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, of course, ISIS attacked. We knew that 
they were out to attack and we demanded steps by the Taliban to 
preclude or prevent the attack. And General McKenzie on the 
record has said that, despite the fact that he is very hostile 
toward the Taliban, that they did everything we asked for. So, 
it was an ISIS attack that killed 13 brave Americans. And the 
Taliban-U.S. cooperation to prevent that did not succeed.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you for the time today.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Ms. Titus.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Ambassador, on June 26th, 2021, a person at a rally 
said this. Tell me who said this: ``I started the process. All 
the troops are coming back home. They couldn't stop the 
process. Twenty-one years is enough, do not you think? Twenty-
one years, they couldn't stop the process.''
    Mr. Khalilzad. I suspect that is President Trump.
    Ms. Titus. That is correct.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Ms. Titus. So, does not that suggest that he was 
acknowledging that the process he started could not be stopped 
without some consequences?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I cannot speculate, but it was about whether 
others could stop it, although it is my judgment that President 
Biden, if he wanted to, he could have. That is my personal----
    Ms. Titus. Well, let me ask you this: you just said a few 
minutes ago to Mrs. Wagner, when she was asking you about the 
Taliban's commitment to education of women----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Mm-hmm.
    Ms. Titus [continuing]. Virtually, that we have to live up 
to our obligation in order to make them live up to theirs.
    Mr. Khalilzad. You are right.
    Ms. Titus. Now, what if we had not withdrawn those troops? 
What if we had not lived up to our obligation? Wouldn't that 
have had consequences that were not what were desirable? Hadn't 
they already stopped attacking U.S. troops before this, and if 
we had left troops there, we had not met our obligation, who 
knows what they would have done?
    Mr. Khalilzad. You are absolutely right.
    Ms. Titus. OK. So, we can speculate that whatever they 
would have done probably wouldn't have been good, because the 
chairman said, ``I cannot trust the Taliban''--or ``We cannot 
trust the Taliban.'' And you said, ``I do not trust the 
Taliban.''
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Titus. So, why did we enter into an agreement with the 
Taliban with no accountability measures, no way to hold them to 
their commitments, if we cannot trust them?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we enter agreements--we are talking 
about international politics with people that we do not trust. 
We did it during arms control with the Soviets. Remember 
President Reagan said, ``Trust, but verify.''
    Ms. Titus. Right.
    Mr. Khalilzad. And the way to incentivize the other side 
when you have an agreement to adhere is that you won't do what 
they want from you unless they do what they have agreed to 
doing. So, that is the way it works. And then, you have your 
information system to monitor are they living up to the 
agreement or not. And then, you bring that information into the 
negotiation and the implementation of the agreement.
    Ms. Titus. Well, did you have any way to monitor what they 
were doing?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Absolutely, we had a way, maybe not 
perfectly. We did have, we did have information. We, in fact, 
did reports, my office did with the Department of Defense 
together on, for example, what were they doing in terms of 
terrorism; what they had agreed with us to do or not to do, and 
then, what they were doing. And we were sending those reports 
out----
    Ms. Titus. Let me ask you about that, since you mentioned 
terrorism.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Ms. Titus. We made the deal that they were no longer going 
to be a base or a support for terrorism. And yet, did not we 
find that Al Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri there----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
    Ms. Titus [continuing]. And take him out with a drone? So, 
obviously, they weren't living up to that obligation.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right. But that was a--violations happen in 
agreements. That was a flagrant violation.
    Ms. Titus. Yes, it was.
    Mr. Khalilzad. And then, we took action and that we did.
    Ms. Titus. Well, how did you miss that, if you were 
monitoring, and then, we wouldn't----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we, obviously--this happened after the 
withdrawal had been completed. So, the monitoring system 
worked. We found him, and then, we took action that the Taliban 
said we shouldn't have. But we had made it clear that we would 
do what is necessary to protect the American people, and we 
took the action that the President did, and I applauded that 
action.
    Ms. Titus. Well, what else have they done that we caught 
through any kind of monitoring that was perhaps was not 
desirable?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we are watching their counterterrorism 
commitments, the implementation of it. And I'm not in the 
government now, and you can, I'm sure, see reports that they 
do. From what I see on the outside now--and this is my 
opinion--it appears that we believe they are largely adhering 
to those, to those commitments.
    Ms. Titus. But not to the education of women, apparently?
    If we had left some troops there, like some people have 
suggested we should have done, do you not think that would have 
had consequences for what they would have done, aside from the 
DOHA agreement? If we had violated our half, our part, and left 
some troops there, do you think they would have just said, 
``Oh, well, OK.''?
    Mr. Khalilzad. The judgment was--and you, obviously, rely 
on a lot of people, intelligence, on coming to a judgment--was 
that we would be back to fighting if we did that. If we 
unilaterally said, ``We are not withdrawing all our forces,'' 
although we agreed that we would, and that we may be back and 
fighting. And as I said, President Biden decided to withdraw 
all the forces.
    Ms. Titus. But did you, do you agree with that? Or you 
thought we should leave them there and risk fighting?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I supported the idea, that not going 
back to war and--but one would have reopened some negotiations. 
That is something different on the----
    Ms. Titus. I think the American people did not want us to 
go back to war.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Chairman McCaul. The chair now recognizes Mr. Davidson.
    Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I appreciate you 
being here today. Thank you for your service to our country, 
and I appreciate your testimony today.
    Hopefully, it helps us learn what we can from Afghanistan 
and apply it, not just to provide accountability and truth for 
the record, but for action in the future.
    I spent my life from 18 to 30 in the Army. I was fortunate 
to get to serve in the 75th Ranger Regiment. And one of the 
core missions that we trained on was non-combatant evacuation 
operations. In none of those training scenarios--and I never 
did it live; we trained for it--but in Afghanistan that was the 
mission. It was a non-combatant evacuation operation. In no 
training scenario that I'm aware of did we have a plan to ever 
take the military out first, and then, hope that somehow the 
civilians would get out. Have you ever heard of such a doctrine 
anywhere?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, of course, I applaud you for your 
service. I have had the great honor of serving with our brave 
men and women in Iraq and Afghanistan and they have inspired 
me, and I very much associate myself with what you said.
    I think the problem was, in my judgment--and I said it 
before--is that we planned for a single scenario, and that 
scenario was that the government and its troops would survive 
our withdrawal and for some time thereafter. And that is what 
informed, I think, the sequencing, it is my judgment, the 
sequencing----
    Mr. Davidson. So, you believe that the State Department 
actually believed that they would trust the lives of American 
citizens to the Taliban? Because they weren't there themselves, 
frankly. They were ready to get out of town. And they thought 
that we could get ourselves out; we can get the military out, 
and we'll just trust the Taliban to finish the job. That was 
the plan?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, it was to work with the government of 
Afghanistan, with the troops of the Afghan government that we 
had trained and equipped to deal with the withdrawal period, 
and then, for a period after the withdrawal. The plan was to 
maintain some forces after the withdrawal was completed at 
Kabul airport and to protect the embassy.
    Mr. Davidson. Yes.
    Mr. Khalilzad. And I believe that assumption--and I keep 
repeating that because several of your colleagues are 
mentioning lessons learned--is that we do not plan, as one 
lesson that I have learned from the outside, for a single 
scenario. We have to plan for alternative scenarios and how we 
would digress from one to the other.
    Mr. Davidson. Well, regardless of how many alternatives we 
had, that seemed like a particularly bad plan.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Davidson. And now, with the benefit of hindsight, I 
think everyone can agree that it was, in fact, a bad plan.
    Mr. Khalilzad. In this respect, it does, it is--it was 
problematic, but I explained to you what the assumption was.
    Mr. Davidson. I understand. I understand. But, in 2004, you 
wrote an op-ed in The Washington Post titled, quote, 
``Afghanistan's Milestone,'' which I would like to submit for 
the record, Mr. Chairman. This op-ed covered the country's 
approval of a new constitution.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Davidson. However, I want to read aloud some sentences 
that you wrote.
    Quote: ``Afghanistan has sent a compelling message to the 
rest of the world that, by investing in that country's 
development, the United States is investing in success. 
Americans can take pride in the role that we played in leading 
the multilateral effort to support Afghan democratization. 
President Bush's decision to increase aid to Afghanistan, which 
will likely total more than $2 billion in fiscal 2004, will 
accelerate reconstruction of the country's national army, 
police force, economic infrastructures, schools, and medical 
system.''
    You finished this op-ed by writing, quote, ``Our work in 
Afghanistan is not yet done. It will take several years and 
sustained commitment of significant resources by the United 
States and the international community before the country can 
stand on its own feet. Given the stakes involved, we must 
remain committed for as long as it takes''--I have heard that 
phrase before--``to succeed.''
    Do you think we were successful----
    Chairman McCaul. And without objection, it is entered into 
the record.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Davidson. What can we learn about nation-building? It 
seems pretty foolish to me. I will admit it seemed foolish at 
the time.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, yes, I supported President Bush's 
vision for transforming not only Afghanistan, but the broader 
Middle East. His vision was that problems of that region was--
--
    Mr. Davidson. The goals are always nice.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Davidson. And if we judge things by what people say 
they aspire to, it always sounds so good.
    Mr. Khalilzad. It was aspirational. That was aspirational.
    Mr. Davidson. But the execution is problematic. And I will 
say that, frankly, that same phrase, ``as long as it takes,'' 
``as much as it takes''----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Davidson [continuing]. Is the only public plan the 
Biden Administration has laid out for Ukraine. And other than 
that----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Davidson [continuing]. I do not see any tie to Ukraine 
here.
    Mr. Khalilzad. I associate----
    Mr. Davidson. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
    Ms. Wild is recognized.
    Ms. Wild. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Ambassador, thank you so much for your testimony----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Ms. Wild [continuing]. Here today.
    Before I begin my question, I just want us all to take a 
moment to remember the 13 U.S. service members who lost their 
lives on August 26th of 2021 while conducting the evacuation. I 
know that every member of this committee joins me in paying 
tribute to their families, as well as to the families of all 
service members who put their lives on the line over the course 
of our country's longest war. We will continue to honor them 
and we will never forget their sacrifices
    On August 26th of 2021, I spent much of the day on the 
phone with a constituent, a mother whose son had very abruptly 
been sent to Afghanistan to assist in the evacuation. He was 
stationed at the airport, and she did not hear from him the 
entire day. And you can imagine the stress and anxiety that she 
had as we got the news that service members had been lost. So, 
I will never forget that.
    And, you know, it is our obligation, when we send men and 
women in uniform into harm's way, that we continually ensure 
that they have the support that they need and that the mission 
they are being asked to conduct is in our national interest and 
is achievable; and that their partners on the ground are 
willing to make the same kind of sacrifices that our troops are 
making every day.
    So, my question I think is simple, but it is probably a 
complicated answer. It deals with the fundamental underlying 
reality here. Why over the course of 20 years in Afghanistan 
did Administrations of both parties fail to correctly assess 
the level of dedication and cohesion of the Afghan forces and 
its political leadership?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, that's, obviously, an excellent 
question, and there are lessons to be learned--that we have to 
focus sharply on that. We spent a lot of resources, a lot of 
effort. The forces were of varying qualities. They sacrificed a 
lot. Some 70,000 perhaps, 60,000 to 70,000 Afghan soldiers and 
policemen died during the period----
    Ms. Wild. No question.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. We were there. But what 
happened to them, our assessment was that they would do a lot 
better after our withdrawal.
    Ms. Wild. Understood, but my real question is, how did we 
fail so badly at that----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, that----
    Ms. Wild [continuing]. Over the 20 years?
    Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
    Ms. Wild. I mean, we know that there was a division in the 
intelligence community----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Wild [continuing]. With the CIA on one side----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Wild [continuing]. And the Pentagon on the other side--
--
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Wild [continuing]. On the effectiveness of training the 
Afghan forces.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Wild. And I'm not asking you to go into classified 
information in a public setting.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Wild. But can you speak broadly to these----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Ms. Wild [continuing]. Divergent perspectives and what 
interests they may have been driven by?
    Mr. Khalilzad. One is perhaps the way we build the armed 
forces needs to be a question. Many people would argue that the 
Afghans, teaching them how to fight shouldn't have been a 
difficult task. The way we organized them perhaps to fight, 
their recruitment, sustainment, organization maybe were not 
appropriate for the circumstances. Perhaps that would be one.
    And second would be to what extent politics and the 
divisions in the country affected the force. I was very 
concerned. I spent a lot of time in 2020 because two candidates 
announced themselves as presidents, two presidents. And here 
was a possible scenario in which some forces were going to go 
with one candidate, the forces we invested so much in, and some 
would have gone with the other. And you would have had--already 
you are at war with the Talibs, and then, you will have another 
war inside the republic side.
    So, there are lessons to be learned and----
    Ms. Wild. Well, I'm just going to stop you there because I 
only have another 30 seconds.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
    Ms. Wild. But I have a very deep concern that from Vietnam 
to Afghanistan to Iraq----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Wild [continuing]. And who knows in the current 
situation in the world?--we keep seeing politicization of 
intelligence----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Wild [continuing]. To sort of fit a pre-designed agenda 
and what seems to be a cherry-picking of intelligence and data 
that Administrations may use to tell the story that they want 
to tell, not necessarily the reality. And that is what I want 
to see us get away from.
    With that, I thank you very much.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
    Ms. Wild. I'm sorry we do not have more time, and I yield 
back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
    The chair recognizes Mrs. Kim.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman, for holding 
today's hearing.
    And I want to thank you, Ambassador, for making yourself 
available----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kim of California [continuing]. And coming before our 
committee today.
    Since the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, under the 
Biden Administration, all hard-fought progress and basic 
freedoms and rights for Afghan women have vanished. Women made 
incredible gains in the classroom; played an active role in the 
Afghan government and free press, and participated in the 
workforce side by side with their male coworkers.
    When the Taliban seized power, one of their first actions 
was to ban girls from attending secondary school. They 
eliminated the Afghan Commission to Eliminate Violence Against 
Women; banned women from working at NGO's, and started 
restricting women's access to public areas. Decades of work on 
women and girls went down the drain in a matter of weeks. As a 
woman, this is deeply personal to me.
    It has been raised several times today that you presented 
the Administration with several power-sharing proposals that we 
give the Taliban partial or majority control of the Afghan 
government. So, what did these peace plans say about women's 
rights and participation in the Afghan government?
    Mr. Khalilzad. We did give one plan to accelerate the 
negotiations. Since we wanted to see the optimal outcome, the 
better options would have been an agreement before withdrawal 
was completed. And in those draft proposals, Afghanistan's 
adherence to international standards on human rights, respect 
for the rights of all Afghan citizens--men, women, minorities, 
children--were all specified in the draft that we shared with 
them to assist with accelerating the negotiations, yes.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Ambassador, did you think that the 
Taliban would be willing to share power of the Afghan 
government with women?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we had them say to us--and they say it 
publicly and on videos--that women could be ministers; women 
could be active in all parts of life. What has happened since 
has been a violation of those statements that are on the 
record, not to me alone, but----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Say what they--yes, they actually 
did not follow them.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. To the whole world they said 
that.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Yes. Their words and actions did 
not match.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mrs. Kim of California. You know, the Taliban was often 
cited as stating to the United States, ``You might have the 
watches, but we have the time.''
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Was the Taliban waiting the U.S. 
Government out, so it could overthrow the Afghan government 
after our departure?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I would be speculating, but, 
certainly, they waited us out in the sense that, based on what 
happened, based on changes in the world, based on successes 
that we had on counterterrorism, as I have described, we 
decided that it is time to come home.
    And there are things we could have done differently in 
retrospect. Those studies will be done that would have perhaps 
had a different outcome in terms of the Taliban. One issue as 
Ambassador----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Ambassador, did you----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes?
    Mrs. Kim of California. Ambassador, did you consider that 
as a possibility, if a power-sharing agreement was implemented?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I did, certainly, consider it as a 
possibility because both sides were saying they want that. And 
the question was the terms. The President of Afghanistan, 
President Ghani, did not want to leave office. He wanted the 
Talibs to join them. They said, no, they wouldn't join; there 
has to be a new government that would be formed with a head 
that is acceptable to both sides.
    So, the negotiations were difficult. We knew it was going 
to take time, you know. The war had been going on there for 40 
years.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Do you think that President Biden's 
unconditional withdrawal legitimized the Taliban's plan of 
action?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Now, our withdrawal, of course, changed the 
balance in favor of the Taliban. But I believe that the bigger 
mistake or the bigger factor that shaped the outcome was the 
poor performance of the government, of the Afghan government. 
Running away while saying that they will never do that; the 
disintegration of the armed forces, those were the bigger 
factors, in my judgment, in terms of what ultimately happened.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Well, there was no doubt we saw----
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
    The chair recognizes Ms. Manning.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you very much. Thank you.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to our witness for being here with us today.
    Mr. Ambassador, I have to be honest with you. Like many 
Americans, I was shocked when I read the February 2020 Trump 
DOHA agreement by how few conditions there were for the Taliban 
to meet. There were no protections for women and girls in 
Afghanistan or for the Afghan people who had helped us and 
worked side by side with our forces.
    Basically, the former President agreed to a precipitous 
withdrawal of all troops, all coalition partners, and all 
civilian personnel by May 1st; to release 5,000 prisoners; to 
work with the U.N. to lift sanctions against the Taliban; to 
seek economic cooperation for the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, and to refrain from the threat or use of force 
against Afghanistan or intervene in its domestic affairs.
    In exchange, the Taliban agreed to release up to a thousand 
prisoners. For our 5,000, they agreed to release a thousand. 
They vaguely committed to enter intra-Afghan negotiations and 
agreed not to allow its members to attack our personnel on the 
way out.
    I did not see any agreement to stop attacks against 
Afghans. I did not see any agreement to prevent them from 
taking Afghan territory, and I certainly did not see any 
protection of Afghan women and girls. I did not see any 
guarantees that Afghanistan would prosecute anyone who commits 
atrocities against women or girls. I did not see any 
requirement that the Taliban take steps to keep women and girls 
in schools. I did not see any requirement that the Taliban take 
steps to uphold any rights of the Afghan people. Apparently, 
the protection of women and girls was not important to 
President Trump.
    Given the terrible reality that we see today in 
Afghanistan, including for Afghan women and girls, in 
retrospect, what should have been done differently to secure 
protections for vulnerable minority populations and, in 
particular, women and girls in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the key issue for you and for our 
other leaders is whether achieving the goals that you outlined 
on women should have been a pre-condition for withdrawal, which 
means that the U.S. forces would have been given the 
responsibility to achieve those rights; that we should have 
stayed in Afghanistan until the Taliban agreed to those----
    Ms. Manning. To protect women and girls.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Manning. And was that--were you ever instructed on 
behalf of President Trump to secure those agreements?
    Mr. Khalilzad. And the judgment was that to pursue those 
objectives with other means other than the use of armed forces. 
Because there's lots of violations of human rights around the 
world, and it is not the responsibility of the U.S. forces to 
go to war----
    Ms. Manning. Of human rights. We are talking about--we are 
talking about half the population of the country.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Manning. Was it ever articulated that one of the goals 
of withdrawal was to make sure that Afghan women and girls were 
going----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Manning [continuing]. To be protected? Was that ever 
articulated as a goal of the Trump Administration?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. Yes, it was articulated that that would 
be pursued in the intra-Afghan negotiations, during which--and 
we have a written agreement in which it states that we would 
work with the government which supported the human rights, the 
legitimate government of Afghanistan, to pursue those 
objectives in the intra-Afghan negotiations using diplomacy, 
using the future relations----
    Ms. Manning. So, you weren't going to negotiate that with 
the Taliban? You were going to help behind the scenes the 
Afghan government----
    Mr. Khalilzad. The Afghan government----
    Ms. Manning [continuing]. That collapsed? You were going to 
encourage them to work to support women and girls?
    Mr. Khalilzad. OK. The assumption was--it turns out to be 
wrong, ma'am--that the government would not collapse; that it 
had big, more forces in numbers, more weapons, more 
international standing, more money. So that it would----
    Ms. Manning. Did you ever----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes?
    Ms. Manning. Did you ever believe that the Taliban was 
truly interested in negotiating with the Afghan government?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I saw them negotiate with the Afghan 
government because the negotiations started in September up to 
the----
    Ms. Manning. But was that before you gave up all the 
leverage by signing the agreement, and frankly, by Donald Trump 
tweeting in advance what he was going to do in withdrawing our 
troops?
    Mr. Khalilzad. As I said before, I mean, and there was this 
agreement, obviously, inside the Administration and outside 
where the way the President decided to go was the right way. 
But the decision was made. In our system, as you know, the 
President makes the decisions. Others will express their 
opinions, the advisors. The decision was made not to link 
withdrawal on these other matters----
    Ms. Manning. On the protection of Afghan people and Afghan 
women and girls.
    My time has expired. I yield back. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Baird.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here today. I 
appreciate all the work that you have done.
    You know, the question I have deals with the many reports 
of sidebar agreements between the United States and the Taliban 
during the DOHA. For instance, after signing the deal, 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed that the Taliban would 
destroy Al Qaeda. Other reports indicated that the Taliban 
would enter negotiations with the Afghan government.
    So, neither of these things really happened. So, did you 
believe the Taliban would destroy the Al Qaeda? Or what is your 
position----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the agreement says, specifically--and 
you talked about the side agreements. They are classified. 
There are two, and one deals with terrorism. I cannot go into 
that in this setting. Hopefully, you have read it.
    It was not to allow Al Qaeda, specifically, but terrorists, 
any terrorists that would threaten the security of the United 
States and our allies. That was the agreement.
    Now, the al-Zawahiri case was a grave violation of that 
agreement. But, as I said before, I am not in government. You 
should ask the intelligence community what our judgment is on 
their adherence to that. I believe, based on what I read, that 
we believe that they are largely in compliance on the 
counterterrorism.
    With regard to government negotiations, negotiations did 
stop. The agreement necessitated the start of intra-Afghan 
negotiations. We assume it will take time. We desired if it 
could be concluded before we left, but we did not want to make 
it conditional on the withdrawal on an agreement, because one 
side or the other in the negotiations would have not wanted to 
conclude something and keep us there.
    The government, for example, could have been interested in 
keeping us there because the government did not want us to 
withdraw, the Afghan government. They liked the situation with 
a big American presence and support.
    So, as to the assessment of who was more serious about 
negotiations, I could speculate or I could give you my opinion, 
but the key point is that we did not want the withdrawal of 
forces--a decision was made to leave, conditioned on a decision 
by Afghans toward each other, because we did not know quite 
what their calculations would be, and whether those 
calculations would assist with the timetable or withdrawal that 
the President had in mind.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you.
    One more question, since you were involved in this so 
deeply. Was the Biden Administration made aware of these side 
agreements with the Taliban?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Absolutely. Absolutely.
    Mr. Baird. Absolutely?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Absolutely.
    Mr. Baird. So, my last question deals with giving you the 
opportunity to refresh us about your involvement in 
communications, and so on, in those final days before the fall 
of Kabul.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. I was very much at the center of the 
storm, if you like. I was in DOHA, basically, during the final 
days. I would participate, obviously, with the President and 
others in meetings. I was, essentially, the channel to get the 
Taliban to do what we wanted during those 2 weeks.
    We wanted a road closed because we thought ISIS-K was going 
to use that road, or from that hill nearby, they might shoot a 
rocket at the airport. At this mosque, there might be a 
terrorist. To direct them to block the road; go up the hill; go 
to the mosque.
    And then, I would deal with people's movement. I would get 
calls. One thing I learned, sir, is how our society had gotten 
intermixed with the Afghan society. I would get calls from all 
over the United States saying, ``This X person used to drive my 
car and he wants to get to the airport. He is stuck in this 
place in Kabul. Please arrange for him to get to the airport.''
    And then, I would be in almost multiple contacts daily with 
our military at the airport. I had put my deputy at the airport 
also with our military. And then, the military would call me. 
``We want to see X Talib. They are not reacting, responding to 
our messages. Can you talk to the big Talib leader, to Mullah 
Baradar, to allow this to happen.''
    So, it was a lot going on, and then, not to mention Members 
of Congress calling, asking for movement of people.
    Mr. Baird. I thank you. I have run out of time.
    Mr. Khalilzad. So, I gave you too much information, I 
think.
    Mr. Baird. I appreciate it.
    And, Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me for just a 
second or so?
    Chairman McCaul. Sure.
    Mr. Baird. I cannot help but share my experience about 
soldiers, men and women who put the uniform on. And we had one 
of those young 13 right from my district. And so, I cannot help 
but recognize the contribution that our people in uniform make 
around this world.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Absolutely.
    Mr. Baird. And so, thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, sir. We appreciate your 
contribution as well in Vietnam.
    So, the chair now recognizes Mr. Stanton.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Congressman Baird, for those good comments about 
our women and men serving our country.
    Thank you, Ranking Member Meeks, for holding this hearing 
today.
    I would like to focus on our allies, those who risked 
everything, their safety, their families' safety, to support 
the United States mission in Afghanistan. For two and a half 
years, our Afghan allies have been trapped in a frightening 
legal limbo--trapped because Congress has, again and again, 
failed to pass the Afghan Adjustment Act and make good on our 
promises. We even had an opportunity to pass parts of it in the 
Senate border deal just last week, a deal that extreme 
Republicans killed.
    Now, I have been fortunate to get to members of an 
especially vulnerable group, the Female Tactical Platoon, part 
of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command. These 
brave women went through rigorous screening and training by the 
United States military. They have participated in hundreds of 
direct-action combat missions against the Taliban, alongside 
U.S. Special Forces, including Green Berets, Navy SEALs, and 
Army Rangers.
    Forty-two FTPs, many of whom are part of the persecuted 
Hazara ethnic minority, were evacuated after Kabul fell. But 
the Taliban knows who they are. They know who the families are 
that they were forced to leave behind.
    And a constituent of mine, an Army captain who served in 
Afghanistan from 2016 to 2020, spent part of her deployment 
serving alongside the FTPs. She told me that, quote, 
``Threatening letters from the Taliban were sent to these women 
warning that they will be dealt with, so that they will serve 
as an example.'' Unquote. She also said, quote, ``There is no 
doubt that these women would have been raped and tortured 
before death if they hadn't been evacuated by U.S. 
counterparts.'' Unquote.
    Another active duty service member wrote to me, quote, 
``The Female Tactical Platoon holds some of the bravest women I 
have ever met. I am an American soldier and these women fought 
by my side for nearly 10 years, targeting the enemies of the 
United States in Afghanistan. I trusted them with my life daily 
and they entrusted me with theirs.
    When Afghanistan fell in August 21, they did not 
want to lay down their arms and flee. They were forced to. As 
the Taliban encircled Kabul, they began to target the members 
of the Female Tactical Platoon and their families. Their loved 
ones remained in danger. Their mothers, fathers, sisters, and 
brothers were forced to stay behind since they are not 
considered''--quote--`` `immediate family.' To this day, I 
receive messages from family members desperately seeking help. 
Many have been beaten, tortured, and killed. They need our 
help.'' Unquote. That is from that active duty service member.
    In the words of an FTP herself residing in my home State of 
Arizona, who was kind enough to share her story with my office, 
quote, ``I cannot give you my name for fear of reprisals 
against my family in Afghanistan. I served in the Afghan 
National Army Special Forces Female Tactical Platoon for 5 
years. I speak five languages, spent a year and a half training 
with U.S. and British forces before being assigned to the 
platoon. I would love to serve in the U.S. Army. I left behind 
my father, mother, three sisters, three brothers. They are now 
subject of harassment, intimidation, and kidnapping at the 
hands of the Taliban because of my service with U.S. forces.'' 
Unquote.
    ``My sisters are hiding for fear the Taliban will''--
quote--`` `disappear' them, as has happened to other FTP family 
members. Even though they are only my sisters, the Taliban will 
exact revenge on anyone they can find who is related to me by 
blood. I fear for my family's lives every day.'' Unquote.
    I share their words today to underscore the deadly 
consequences if this Congress continues to stall on the Afghan 
Adjustment Act. Every day that this Congress fails to act is a 
betrayal of our allies and of our American values.
    Ambassador, your thoughts on the Afghan Adjustment Act?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I appreciate what you said, Congressman. I 
am not familiar with this Act. So, therefore, I am not in a 
position to offer an opinion on it.
    Mr. Stanton. I appreciate your diplomatic answer to that. 
For your information, yes, as you would expect, this would 
allow the Female Tactical Platoon and others that served 
alongside the U.S. military who temporarily have immigration 
status in the United States to be given permanent status here 
in the United States.
    Mr. Khalilzad. I know that many Afghans served with 
distinction alongside our forces. They sacrificed a great deal. 
But with regard to the specifics, I haven't looked at the 
legislation.
    Mr. Stanton. Ambassador, you are an outstanding diplomat. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Khalilzad. You are kind.
    Mr. Stanton. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Self.
    Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This is one of the more concerning hearings I have ever 
been in.
    A little bit of background. I do not have your experience 
in the region, but over a 20-year period I had five assignments 
when I dealt directly with the region, starting in 1984 dealing 
with Iran--most of my assignments as a military planner. I was 
in Bagram early in 2002, stationed in the headquarters in 
Bagram. I was in Al Udeid later for the Iraqi Freedom 
Operation.
    With that background, our enduring values are not shared in 
this region. I have heard nothing and I have read nothing in 
the preparation for this hearing that--it is filled with 
naivete.
    Now, you are given the position of having done much of this 
under both President Trump and President Biden. I am not 
questioning your motive, sir, but we have to focus on the fact 
that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was a strategic blunder of 
monumental proportions--monumental proportions.
    Putin started moving troops within 2 months after that 
strategic blunder. And as for the 20-year forever wars, our 
Nation, our military, this Nation's military is not meant for 
nation-building. It is meant to go and break things and impose 
our national will, our national interests on our adversaries. 
That is the use of the United States military.
    So, I want to focus on that one strategic blunder, but I 
also want to read for people--we talked about the DOHA 
agreement. The actual title of the DOHA agreement I think is 
instructive. ``The Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan 
between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan''--which is not 
recognized by the United States as a State and is known as the 
Taliban--``and the United States of America.'' That is the 
formal title of what we call the DOHA agreement.
    The Taliban, it is naive to think the Taliban was ever 
going to live up to anything. My 20 years, over a span of 20 
years dealing with the region, this entire process that we have 
heard today is extremely naive. And, sir, I find you at the 
middle of it.
    I will tell you, I firmly disagree with your statement that 
the restart of the war being the most important factor in the 
withdrawal. I absolutely disagree with your characterization of 
that.
    But my question to you, sir, is you said earlier the 
Taliban was largely in compliance with their counterterrorism 
agreement. Can you justify that statement for us?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. First, on the last statement, I said 
I'm not in the government. I do not read the intelligence now. 
But, based on what I read of what the intelligence community 
puts out in unclassified product, it appears to me that they 
are largely in compliance, based on what I read of their 
report.
    But you shouldn't take my word for it. You should call 
experts who are monitoring the situation very closely in our 
government. We have a significant body of expertise that 
monitors this, and I relied on them when I was in government.
    Mr. Self. Yes, but let me just help you there.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Self. The U.N. Sanctions Monitoring Team released a 
report last month----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Self [continuing]. In January----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Self [continuing]. That says about it, ``The 
relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda remains close.''
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Self. ``And the latter maintains a holding pattern in 
Afghan under Taliban patronage.''
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Self. We need to understand that the Taliban--and let 
me ask you a yes-or-no question.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Let me, let me----
    Mr. Self. What is the status of the Taliban?
    Mr. Khalilzad. But may I comment on----
    Mr. Self. No, sir.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well----
    Mr. Self. What is the status of the Taliban today? We do 
not recognize them as a government.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Self. We understand that they are in physical control 
of Afghanistan.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Self. What is the official U.S. position on the Taliban 
today?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Again, you should ask the U.S. Government 
officials, but my understanding is that we transact with them. 
We meet with them when we have concerns we raise with them on 
particular issues. We interact with them. We do not have a 
presence, as you know, in Afghanistan. We do not recognize the 
Taliban government. We haven't implemented parts of the DOHA 
agreement because of our unhappiness with what they are doing 
and not doing.
    But those are questions and issues for the current 
officials. The nuances of what they are doing or are not--I am 
telling you what I read.
    Mr. Self. Yes. If I may, if I may quickly, Chairman----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Self [continuing]. Germany just became the third 
largest economy in the world. If we are talking Ukraine 
funding, the EU needs to step forward. Our GDP is $27 trillion; 
EU together is $20 trillion. Russia's is $2.5 trillion. We need 
to push Europe as a whole to be funding the Ukraine war.
    Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Mr. Self. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Ms. Dean.
    Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking 
Member Meeks.
    Thank you, Ambassador, for being here, for your years of 
service and expertise.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. Thank you.
    Ms. Dean. It is very valuable to us on this committee and 
to American citizens.
    I do want to recognize the families in the room, some of 
whom I have had the opportunity to meet, Gold Star families.
    I want to recognize the service of our military members 
over the course of 20 years, the sacrifice and service, and the 
brave gains that were made, and the horrific losses that were 
suffered. And so, with heartbreak, I recognize you, and with 
humility, I recognize you and your service and your loved ones.
    I also, of course, remember the 13 service members killed 
at Abbey Gate, that tragic, tragic set of events and the scores 
of others who were injured that day.
    I wanted to try to examine three areas as quickly as I can.
    The impact of President Ghani's actions. When you were 
asked earlier, you said that you put the responsibility of what 
happened in the Afghan withdrawal on the Afghan government. And 
I would like you to tell us more about that.
    For example, going back to the final days of the 
withdrawal, you said in your testimony that the agreement you 
negotiated between the Taliban and the Afghan government, 
quote, ``fell apart when President Ghani surprisingly fled the 
country, which caused the now leaderless Afghan military and 
police to instantly disintegrate.''
    What did the impact of that disintegration have on the 
situation outside the gates at Kabul airport and on the non-
combatant evacuation?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, thank you for what you said.
    The impact was instantaneous. The rush to the airport, the 
airport crisis, if you like, was created because of what 
happened. The security leaders, rather than standing in place 
carrying out their duties, defending their city, defending the 
government, they rushed to the airport to be evacuated. And 
then, there was, obviously, challenges created about securing 
the perimeters of the airport.
    Ms. Dean. And it was surprising, apparently, across the 
board, whether to you, to the Administrations, both 
Administrations.
    Mr. Khalilzad. To our various communities that watch these 
things. And if he was afraid, the president, for his life, 
although there was an agreement and a lot of his immediate 
subordinates said, with the announcement that Talibs will not 
come into Kabul, there was a sense of calm in the palace; that 
he did not reach out to us to say, ``Look, can you do one, two, 
three to secure the palace?'' if he was afraid of that. I do 
not know what we would have done. We had no indication from him 
that he was going to leave the field and go to the UAE.
    Ms. Dean. A stunning abandonment.
    A second area, the troop drawdown. We saw that the Trump 
Administration first drew down to 8600 in the first 135 days, 
then down to 4500 by September 2020.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Ms. Dean. Can you explain to me what happened that created 
the final drawdown in the last minutes, the last days, of the 
Trump Administration down to 2500?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Ms. Dean. What were your thoughts there?
    Mr. Khalilzad. There was a discussion and the President had 
said that the troops will be home by Christmas. And so, so 
there was--whether total withdrawal would happen----
    Ms. Dean. What did you think of President Trump in his 
final days in office setting it up with the new Administration, 
having 2500 members on the ground?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, ultimately, the back-and-forth that 
took place resulted in a decision not to completely withdraw by 
Christmas, but to leave that final decision to the new 
Administration.
    Ms. Dean. I want to end on something you ended on in your 
testimony--that you saw perhaps the seeds and values being 
planted. Can you give us some possibility of all of the work of 
so many folks on the ground, Afghanistan, as well as our 
military? What are some of those seeds that you think could 
possibly spring a better future for Afghanistan?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, most young Afghans in their 20's, 
30's, experienced the America, the encounter we had with 
Afghanistan--the schools, universities with----
    Ms. Dean. Women being educated.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. Women being educated, with cell 
phones, with the internet. And I think they are struggling for 
their rights in their own ways. Now some have left the field, 
but others are standing for their values.
    The future remains uncertain. The struggle goes on. The 
values, the objectives that President Bush and others had for a 
democratic, modern Afghanistan, I think those objectives remain 
valid, but it is going to come not with American bayonets, if 
you like, but with American engagement and interaction, perhaps 
in their own way and over a longer, much longer period of time.
    Ms. Dean. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing that 
answer.
    And thank you, Ambassador.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Kean.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to our witness----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Mr. Kean [continuing]. Being here today.
    Ambassador Khalilzad, you have a very long and very 
distinguished career in the U.S. Government and have often 
appeared before this committee. And I want to thank you for 
your extraordinary service to the people of this country and 
people around the world.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Kean. Unfortunately, the Taliban is, once again, the 
ruling power in Afghanistan. From President Biden's go-to-zero 
order in April 2021 that was meant to coincide with the 20th 
anniversary of September 11th, 2021, despite leaders in the 
U.S. military previously urging the retention of some troops to 
support Afghans, what conversations did the Administration have 
on retention of U.S. contractors in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, if I understood the question, what 
impact did it have on the contractors, right? Did I understand?
    Mr. Kean. Mm-hmm.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, they became uncertain, and then, 
ultimately, mostly decided to leave because they were concerned 
about the security environment, insurance-related issues. And 
although the plan based on the assumption that the government 
would survive, the systems that they had, the military system 
would continue to be serviced, but when the contractor 
departures--we had to rush around, try to find outside the 
country potential places where those systems could be serviced.
    Mr. Kean. Well, clearly----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Kean [continuing]. Much of the Afghan Security Forces 
relied on U.S. contractors to maintain equipment, vehicles, and 
aircraft.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Absolutely.
    Mr. Kean. And it must have been pointed out that, without 
this support, the Afghan Security Forces wouldn't be able to 
successfully combat the Taliban.
    Ambassador, can you also speak the Peace Government Plan 
that was advanced by the Biden State Department in early 2021? 
Whose idea was the plan? Can you talk us through the 
formation----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, there was a discussion when the new 
Administration came to accelerate negotiations. Because, as I 
said, even in the previous Administration, the desire was to 
get a political agreement as soon as possible, although, 
realistically, it was assumed that it would be complicated; it 
will take time.
    And the two features of the proposals by the Biden team 
was, one, to internationalize the effort, to get the U.N. to 
appoint someone to help with the negotiations.
    And second was to advance a power-sharing plan for 
Afghanistan--not that that be the one, but to get a discussion 
going. And the government of Afghanistan dismissed it, more or 
less.
    I would say there were many ideas and plans, but, yes, 
there was a--there was a proposal put forward and given to the 
Taliban and to the Afghan government.
    Mr. Kean. How did the Russian government respond to the 
Taliban takeover, Ambassador?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the Russians, clearly, had a two-track 
policy. One was they wanted us to leave, and they said that 
they wanted us to leave. On the other hand, they wanted us to, 
also, stay and to do the dirty work, if you like, of dealing--
going after groups that they would target them, and to see us 
stuck there, pay a price without succeeding.
    But their public statements, at least as I recall now--it 
was a long time ago--the immediate aftermath was they would 
have preferred an agreement first, a political agreement first. 
But I'm sure they were happy to see us leave, no doubt, to 
depart.
    Mr. Kean. And can you explain your assessment in deeper 
regard, please?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, for the longer term, they did not want 
U.S. forces on the border of the former Soviet territory, and 
that they thought our presence with regards to Central Asia 
offered those opportunities and advantages. But, on the other 
hand, like Iran, they wanted to make it as difficult for us, to 
tie us down, to have leverage, if you like, over us by 
remaining vulnerable and stuck there--not to win, but not to 
kind of leave. So, I said before, wanting us to, ultimately, 
not have permanent bases there; to, also, while we were there, 
to make us suffer.
    Mr. Kean. Thank you.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Mr. Kean. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Good to see you, Ambassador.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Great to see you.
    Mr. Waltz. Many years of this painful episode in our 
history, but I would say to our Gold Star families that are 
here, and every veteran who sacrificed, we kept America safe 
for over two decades, and we cannot lose--we cannot lose sight 
of that. We did not have another 9/11. We did not have 
additional attacks on our homeland, despite many issues in this 
war that we absolutely should learn from.
    So, we have heard continuously, both in the media, from 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, and from the 
President, from President Biden, that he was stuck with the 
DOHA agreement; that this was his hands were tied; the Trump 
Administration tied his hands. He had no choice.
    Mr. Khalilzad. No.
    Mr. Waltz. And I just want to put out, Mr. Chairman, one 
thing for the record here. This is a short list of the policies 
that the Biden Administration walked away from on day one--
everything from the construction of the border wall; our 
membership in the World Health Organization. The Biden 
Administration completely walked away from Trump's maximum 
pressure campaign; tried to get us back into the disastrous 
Iran nuclear deal; rejoin the Paris Climate Accord; ended 
Remain in Mexico; canceled the Keystone Pipeline, $16 billion 
in investment. And I could go on. All of these things were 
reversed in the first month. But yet, we are supposed to 
believe that somehow he was handcuffed to this deal.
    Mr. Ambassador, let's go back to January 2021. President 
Trump is still in office. His advisors go in, tell him, ``Mr. 
President, the Taliban haven't lived up to the half dozen 
conditions that were in the deal minus one--partially not 
attacking troops--but in terms of entering negotiations with 
the Afghan government and other conditions, the Taliban did not 
live up to the deal.'' What did President Trump do, Mr. 
Ambassador, as a result of that advice?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well----
    Mr. Waltz. He had a stated goal of getting all U.S. troops 
out.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz. Right?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz. But now, he is told they did not live up to the 
deal. What did President Trump do?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, it would be speculation, of course----
    Mr. Waltz. But it is not speculation that, by January 19th, 
2021----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. We still had Bagram Air Base.
    Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
    Mr. Waltz. Did we?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, we did.
    Mr. Waltz. Is that the only air base in the world that is 
sandwiched between China, Russia, Iran----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. And is a key platform for 
counterterrorism?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Waltz. Did we still have Bagram Air Base?
    Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
    Mr. Waltz. Did we still have 2500 U.S. special operators 
and intelligence professionals?
    Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
    Mr. Waltz. Did we still have five to seven thousand NATO 
troops?
    Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
    Mr. Waltz. Did we still have over 10,000 contractors that 
were keeping the Afghan air force flying?
    Mr. Khalilzad. We did.
    Mr. Waltz. And all of our intelligence assets, and plus, 
the most important thing, the message to the Afghan people and 
government that we stand with you, right?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Waltz. So, let's fast forward. Just a few months 
later----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Did President Biden reject your 
advice for conditionality moving forward on the DOHA agreement?
    Mr. Khalilzad. He decided not to make a withdrawal of the 
final 2,500 conditional on a political agreement or leaving a 
force, a counterterrorism force behind.
    Mr. Waltz. He, essentially, said--well, he did not 
essentially--he said to the world, ``We're pulling out.'' He 
was asked, ``Are there conditions?'' He said, unconditionally, 
we're out, regardless of the consequences.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Waltz. Correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Because I am going to have to say that he 
thought, if he stayed, he might have to go back to war, likely 
to go back to war with the Taliban.
    Mr. Waltz. But this is the misnomer. This is the false 
choice.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz. We could take an approach like we did in, say, 
Colombia for 40 years, where we had trainers; we had assets; we 
had support, but we did not put American troops in harm's way. 
There was a lot of middle ground----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Ranges of choices.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Between unconditional full 
withdrawal and going back to any type of surge or war?
    Mr. Khalilzad. True.
    Mr. Waltz. Correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. True. Correct.
    Mr. Waltz. But those options weren't considered. And I will 
just ask you this: we have had the senior leader of Al Qaeda, 
Zawahiri, as a guest of the Taliban. We now have reports of 
eight Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. We have reports 
from the U.N. of tens of thousands of fighters, foreign 
fighters, flowing into Afghanistan; plus, the ongoing threat of 
ISIS.
    Is the American homeland today safer than it was 3 years 
ago?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I would, respectfully, ask you to ask 
the intelligence community, ours, to look at the data that the 
U.N. reports. I wouldn't rely, in other words, on the U.N. 
report.
    Mr. Waltz. OK. Let me ask you--Chairman, if I could indulge 
you----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Please, please.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. I think we are at the end here.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Please.
    Mr. Waltz. Does Al Qaeda and ISIS still have the intent to 
attack the United States and the West, if given the opportunity 
to do so?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, no doubt, but I also want to point 
that----
    Mr. Waltz. So, that is a yes? I mean, just for the record, 
that is a, yes, they fully intend to----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, but they--but they have the intent. But 
I also want to say, Congressman, that our intelligence 
community, from what I read in the unclassified versions, as we 
cannot discuss classified material here, believe that in the 
next year or two Al Qaeda does not have the ability to attack 
the United States--I'm paraphrasing--from Afghanistan. The 
likelihood would be----
    Mr. Waltz. The Commander of Central Command a year ago 
testified that ISIS will have reconstituted their capability to 
attack the West within 6 months--and that was a year ago--from 
Afghanistan----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Mr. Ambassador.
    Mr. Khalilzad. He did say, but I noticed, again, the 
intelligence community since then, in the last few months, has 
highlighted successes by the Taliban against Daesh, against 
ISIS-K.
    I would, respectfully, suggest that, for coming to a 
judgment on those, that you, and maybe you are----
    Mr. Waltz. I would. I would. I'm on the Intelligence 
Committee and I will just State for the record--Mr. Chairman, 
thank you for your indulgence----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Relying on terrorists like the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda to take out terrorists----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well----
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Is a fool's errand and danger, and 
very dangerous for the----
    Mr. Khalilzad. We shouldn't rely----
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman McCaul. The chair recognizes Mr. Barr.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador Khalilzad, thank you for coming back before our 
committee.
    And in 2021, the last time you were before this committee--
--
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Barr [continuing]. Before the withdrawal, I asked you 
if President Ghani and Chairman Abdullah had any predictions 
about the outcome of a planned U.S. withdrawal in Afghanistan, 
having met both gentlemen when I visited Afghanistan in 2015. 
And your response was, quote, ``They have no choice but to 
prepare to defend themselves, and we have made a commitment to 
help them defend themselves if the Talibs go the route of a 
military solution.''
    Ambassador Khalilzad, did the United States stick to our 
commitment to help the Afghan government when the Taliban took 
a military solution in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, we did, I believe in the following 
way, if I understand you, sir, which is that we continued to 
provide them with military support, including attacks against 
the Talibs when the Talibs attacked them. But once the 
government had disintegrated with the departure of President 
Ghani, then, of course, we could not help them. I think the----
    Mr. Barr. Well, just reclaiming my time----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Barr [continuing]. As I think Mr. Waltz demonstrated so 
ably, we did not stick to our commitments and there was not a 
fulfillment of the DOHA conditions-based withdrawal. It was an 
unconditional withdrawal. And so, from that standpoint, I do 
not think that the United States stuck to our commitment to 
help the Afghan government when the Taliban was clearly making 
progress throughout the country.
    Do I interpret your testimony in response to Mr. Waltz 
correctly that public defender did not adhere to a conditions-
based withdrawal, as contemplated by the DOHA agreement?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I--no. The DOHA agreement, the 
conditions were: one, that there will be no attacks on the U.S. 
withdrawing forces; that we could come to the assistance of the 
Afghan government; that there would be intra-Afghan 
negotiations, and that there would be no allowing of 
terrorists.
    But whether to make withdrawal conditional on a cease-fire, 
that the two Afghan sides do not fight each other, and, too, 
that there be a political agreement, those were not explicit 
conditions.
    Mr. Barr. Yes. Well, this was, clearly, an abandonment of 
the conditions-based approach of DOHA.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, but the agreement was condition-based, 
but which conditions, that's what I mean.
    Mr. Barr. I hear you.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Barr. It was an unconditional retreat, the way I see 
it.
    In 2021, also, before the withdrawal, I asked you whether 
it would be a strategic mistake to abandon Bagram. And I'm 
paraphrasing you, but you, basically, referred me to the 
Defense Department----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Barr [continuing]. On that, on that question.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
    Mr. Barr. Ambassador, the withdrawal from Afghanistan gave 
up U.S. control of the only U.S. Air Base in the country that 
shares a land border with China.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Barr. Can you give us a readout on what the status is 
of Bagram? Who is in control of it now, and have you seen any 
Chinese interest in that base?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, now, of course, you are right that we 
gave up, obviously, Bagram, and that was as part of the 
agreement to withdraw our forces. But, as far as what is 
happening there now, I'm not in a good position. You should ask 
the intel community to brief you. But I wouldn't be surprised 
if the Chinese were interested in it, but I have no--I have no 
data or a fact to give you on that.
    Mr. Barr. Have you seen any increase in Chinese investment 
in Afghanistan since the United States left?
    Mr. Khalilzad. There are indications, clearly, from what I 
read in the media of Chinese interest in Afghanistan and 
activities, yes.
    Mr. Barr. In my remaining time, Ambassador, it is often 
portrayed that the withdrawal from Afghanistan was a security 
decision for the long-term safety of American soldiers. While I 
do not believe the United States should have had a forever 
presence in Afghanistan, save for maybe Bagram, the way in 
which we withdrew was an unmitigated disaster. Do you believe 
the United States is more or less safe with the Taliban in 
charge?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I believe that the withdrawal was because of 
the costs and a perception that we weren't succeeding; that it 
was costing too much; the world had changed, and we needed to 
adjust.
    But, certainly, in terms of terrorism, it was that being 
there gave us certain advantages, being in Afghanistan, rather 
than not being in Afghanistan, but----
    Mr. Barr. My time has expired. But with ISIS-K fighters, Al 
Qaeda allowed to thrive in Afghanistan, the Taliban in charge, 
clearly, the United States is not in a safer posture.
    With that, my time has expired. Mr. Chairman, thanks for 
the hearing. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Amo.
    Mr. Amo. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Ambassador, a pleasure to see you.
    I wanted to understand a portion of your opening testimony. 
You said that, quote, ``The first phase of the withdrawal 
lasted 135 days, in which U.S. forces were reduced to 8600.''
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Amo. ``By the time President Trump left office, U.S. 
forces in Afghanistan had been reduced to 2500.''
    So, let's fill in the gaps a little bit on what happened 
between the levels of 8600 to 2500.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Amo. So, that reduction to 8600 which you said occurred 
initially that was ordered by President Trump--is that the 
case?
    Mr. Khalilzad. That is the case.
    Mr. Amo. And it was an explicit condition of the DOHA deal 
that the United States was on the hook to do that level of 
withdrawal after the signing of the agreement in 2020?
    Mr. Khalilzad. The only one that was specified in terms of 
a phase was phase one----
    Mr. Amo. OK.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. To come to 8600. It did not get 
into subsequent phases, except that the final withdrawal of the 
remaining forces would be by May 1st or so--in 14 months, in 
other words. But there was no other phases, like to go to 4500, 
to 2500; that was not specified in the agreement.
    Mr. Amo. OK. And it had occurred per the terms of the deal 
within 135 days----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Phase one.
    Mr. Amo. Phase one?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Amo. OK.
    Mr. Khalilzad. And we had felt the military advice was--I 
actually asked them--that we could do the mission with 8600, so 
the risk was not going to be higher in any significant degree 
in terms of our ability to carry out the mission still at the 
8600.
    Mr. Amo. Got it. Understood.
    So, you said that was in phase one. So, there were no 
stipulations of further troop----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Subsequent phases, yes.
    Mr. Amo. None of them? OK. And do you recall any troop 
reduction directed by President Trump in September to 4500?
    Mr. Khalilzad. There was a phase of coming, I believe--I 
will need to check--but my recollection is it went to another 
phase of 4500, and then, to 2500.
    Mr. Amo. And was that at the discretion of President Trump?
    Mr. Khalilzad. The military offering options and the 
President deciding.
    Mr. Amo. OK. And did you understand that the drawdown in 
2020, was that to be tied to any Taliban progress on meeting 
its own commitments in the DOHA deal?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes. Well, in that regard, yes, I would say. 
And that was their commitments, especially on the 
counterterrorism part. The tie, the relationship between the 
counterterrorism commitment and withdrawal was very tight.
    Mr. Amo. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.
    Mr. Khalilzad. The commitment on the Afghan reconciliation 
was not as tight. It was linked, but not as tight. It 
definitely was tight on the start of intra-Afghan negotiations, 
but not on success and agreement being in place before 
departure, complete departure.
    Mr. Amo. OK. And do you recall a tweet by President Trump 
in October 2020 pledging to have the small remaining number of 
our brave men and women serving in Afghanistan home by 
Christmas? Do you remember that tweet?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, that, yes, there was the idea that was 
floated. I do not remember the specific tweet----
    Mr. Amo. OK.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. To get everybody home by 
Christmas. Yes, I remember speeches and statements----
    Mr. Amo. But if you saw that, that would be something that 
would--it surprised you?
    Mr. Khalilzad. That would not surprise me, no.
    Mr. Amo. OK. OK. And according to the terms of the DOHA 
agreement, the United States would not fully withdraw all 
troops until May 2021.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Amo. So, did that seem realistic, given the actions of 
the Taliban?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, I mean, that was not called for in the 
agreement, and the agreement had until May, and then, it had, 
also, conditionality, which is that our commitments, delivering 
on them, dependent on them delivering on their commitments.
    Mr. Amo. Would removing all those troops have impacted your 
leverage to secure Afghan peace talks?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, yes, removing troops was the biggest 
leverage. So, therefore, if we did not have the troops and the 
leverage during that period, during which we would have had 
troops, it would not have been there.
    Mr. Amo. Mm-hmm. And then, do you recall another 
discretionary troop reduction by President Trump down to 2500 
in January 2021, just before the Administration took office?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I am not aware of that, that there was any 
other decision in January to, to get the 2500 troops out. 
Before the change in Administration? I am not aware of that.
    Mr. Amo. OK. Well, I see my time has expired. So, I yield.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Issa.
    Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    You know, getting the troops home for Christmas makes this 
particularly appropriate. In the back there, there's two Gold 
Star families----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Issa [continuing]. Christie Shamblin and Alicia and 
Herman Lopez. Their loved ones did not get home for Christmas.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Issa. They did not get home for Christmas because of a 
hasty withdrawal, because of a decision to withdraw from the 
military base and keep, as it turned out, a completely non-
defendable, or at least not defended, embassy.
    So, I want to go through a little bit of a timeline, 
because you have two Administrations and to a great extent you 
were there for all of them.
    When Mike Pompeo left office, one of the agreements was a 
50/50 sharing coming out of that negotiation between the 
Taliban and the lawfully elected government, isn't that true?
    Mr. Khalilzad. The percentages were not mentioned, but it 
was to be negotiations for a new government between the 
Taliban----
    Mr. Issa. With shared authority?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Shared government, yes.
    Mr. Issa. OK. So, the shared authority, it is fair to say, 
started off, at least tangentially, as 50/50, and then, as the 
Taliban continued to aggressively take bigger parts of the 
country--because we had withdrawn and, to be honest, the Afghan 
government was not able to hold them back in that summer 
offensive--as I understand it, it went to 60/40 in favor of the 
Taliban; 70/30, and then, ultimately, 100/0, as they headed 
toward Kabul. Is that correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. I do not know about the percentages. There 
was nothing formally----
    Mr. Issa. Well, was the Taliban demanding more authority as 
they took more land?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Oh, no doubt that, as the balance shifted 
and the requirement--what one heard is the increase. But I have 
to say again that, on the 15th of August, they made a proposal 
for a shared government.
    Mr. Issa. OK. But, I mean, you previously testified to the 
50/50, 60/40, and 70/30, and these are your own prior 
statements. So, I just want to----
    Mr. Khalilzad. I, I----
    Mr. Issa. We will give it to you from the transcribed 
interview.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, please. I know that they have actually 
changed their position, but I do not recall a specific number.
    Mr. Issa. OK. Well, let's just try to be--let's try to be 
fair with the facts as they occurred.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Sure. Absolutely.
    Mr. Issa. There was a negotiation for an end to hostilities 
and a shared government power, in many ways similar to other 
ends of that.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right, yes.
    Mr. Issa. We agreed to leave because they agreed not to 
fight. During perhaps the Trump Administration, but certainly 
during the Biden Administration, the Taliban was aggressively 
fighting. They were, in fact, taking territory. They were 
violating the spirit of the cease-fire, the spirit of the 
agreement. And yet, we continued our withdrawal as though they 
were not, in fact, taking by force control of the country. 
Isn't that correct?
    Mr. Khalilzad. The agreement was, Congressman, for them to 
attack withdrawing forces. The agreement was for us, if they 
attacked the Afghans, to come to the defense of the Afghan 
forces, and we did that.
    Mr. Issa. But we did not come to--no, but let's be clear. 
What you are saying is we agreed that we wouldn't get killed as 
we withdraw, withdrew----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Issa [continuing]. But we left the caveat that we would 
not allow the Taliban to defeat the Afghan military, and we had 
the right to come to their defense.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right, and we did.
    Mr. Issa. But we did not do it sufficient to stop them, did 
we?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, at the end, you are right, but what 
surprised us was the poor performance of the Afghans, 
particularly post-President Biden's announcement and in the 
summer----
    Mr. Issa. OK.
    Mr. Khalilzad [continuing]. The April announcement and in 
the summer that the balance began to shift significantly.
    Mr. Issa. So, I just want to ask a simple question.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Issa. And it is a final question, I believe. When 
conditions changed and our ability to stop the Taliban by 
taking the country by force and putting children, particularly 
girls, back into, essentially, slavery, when that began to 
change, President Biden did not react by sending troops back 
in----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Correct.
    Mr. Issa [continuing]. Or anything else. And it is your 
testimony he did so because sending troops back in--in other 
words, enforcing their keeping their agreement--would have 
potentially cost American lives, and he wasn't willing to do 
so.
    So, 13 Americans died and countless Americans and people 
who helped Americans became trapped in Afghanistan because he 
wouldn't send troops back in, when, in fact, the Taliban was 
violating, not just the spirit, but the facts of what they had 
agreed to, which was not taking the country by force. Isn't 
that true?
    Mr. Khalilzad. Well, the government disintegrated. The 
president ran away.
    Mr. Issa. But wait a minute. Wait a second. Wait a second.
    The government disintegrated when all they had left was an 
encircled Kabul. The president flew out at a time----
    Mr. Khalilzad. If you go further in time----
    Mr. Issa. Well, I would like to go back to around January 
20th of 2021.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Issa. On January 20, 2020--or January 20th, 2021----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Yes.
    Mr. Issa [continuing]. Was, in fact, the government already 
disintegrated or did, over the next 8 months, as they were 
finding themselves unable to hold the territories and 
negotiate, they began to disintegrate--disintegrating finally 
when they were entrapped and all that was left was an airport 
to leave by?
    Mr. Khalilzad. You are absolutely right that during the 8 
months the disintegration increased and, finally, in Kabul, 
what happened happened. But I think that the balance shifted, 
surprisingly--our assessment was different than what happened.
    Mr. Issa. Well, you know, I appreciate the surprise, but, 
Mr. Chairman, I think the testimony speaks for itself. It was 
during the 8 months----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Issa [continuing]. In which the Taliban aggressively 
took land that they began to deteriorate a government because 
we did not re-engage with troops sufficient, and maybe that was 
a good decision.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Right.
    Mr. Issa. But I do not think it was. I think it was the 
decision that made inevitable the people of Afghanistan living 
in slavery and 13 Americans losing their lives.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    We are still waiting for Mr. Mills, is that correct?
    Staff. He's not coming.
    Chairman McCaul. OK. Well, let me just say I want to thank 
you, sir, for being here today, again, voluntarily. I 
appreciate your honestly, transparency.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. You were in a very difficult assignment, 
as I always told you----
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul [continuing]. Even back in the day. And it 
is very helpful to this committee to get all the facts before 
us.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. And I want to thank you for your service 
to the Nation as well.
    There may be additional questions that we would ask you to 
submit in writing.
    Mr. Khalilzad. Sure.
    Chairman McCaul. And pursuant to committee rules, all 
members have 5 days to submit questions and extraneous 
materials for the record.
    And without objection, this committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX
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         STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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