SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2836-15T4

JAMCO HEATING & AIR

CONDITIONING, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MASSIMO PROCACCINI, d/b/a

MASSIMO PROCACCINI –

RENOVATOR AND CUSTOM

BUILDER,1

Defendant-Respondent.

______________________________

Argued March 23, 2017 – Decided May 15, 2017

Before Judges O'Connor and Whipple.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. DC7500-15.

Jo-Leo W. Carney-Waterton argued the cause for 

appellant.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

 

1 Defendant is improperly pled. Defendant is properly known as

Massimo Procaccini General Contractor, L.L.C.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
2 A-2836-15T4

Plaintiff JAMCO Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. appeals from 

a February 19, 2016 Law Division order denying its motion to vacate 

the court's previous order that dismissed the complaint with 

prejudice. We affirm.

We discern the following facts from the record on appeal. On 

June 8, 2015, plaintiff, a heating, ventilation, air conditioning 

and refrigeration (HVACR) contractor filed a complaint for breach 

of contract against defendant Massimo Procaccini General 

Contractor, L.L.C. According to the allegations in the complaint,

plaintiff entered into an agreement with defendant to perform 

HVACR work. Under the contract, plaintiff was to receive three 

payments over the course of the project, totaling $17,575.

On April 11, 2014, defendant paid plaintiff $8878 for 

completion of the first phase. After completion of the second 

phase, defendant paid plaintiff $5273. On August 12, 2014,

plaintiff billed defendant for the final payment of $3514; however,

defendant only remitted a partial payment of $2000, leaving a 

balance of $1514.

Plaintiff filed suit seeking the amount owed plus an

additional late payment as set forth in the contract of 1.5% per 

each month the bill was unpaid, for a total demand of $1718.39.

Following the October 26, 2015 bench trial, the court entered 
3 A-2836-15T4

judgment in defendant's favor and dismissed plaintiff's complaint 

with prejudice. 

On January 11, 2016, plaintiff moved to vacate the entry of 

judgment under Rule 4:50-1, presenting the court with a letter 

from a Deputy Attorney General, serving as counsel to the New 

Jersey State Board of Examiners of Heating, Ventilating, Air 

Conditioning and Refrigeration Contractors (the Board), that 

explained the licensing requirements for HVACR contractors. The 

trial judge denied the motion, stating the following:

A bench trial was heard by this court on 

October 16, 2015, and the Court dismissed 

plaintiff's claim with prejudice. Plaintiff 

files present motion to vacate the final order 

of judgement by the court after the October 

16, 2015 trial.

The plaintiff contends that the contract 

between it and the defendant was legally 

binding at the time of its signing. The issue 

is whether an HVACR repairman held a valid 

license to conduct business after March 1, 

2014, if that repairman had not received a 

license pursuant to N.J.S.A. 45:16A-1.

Plaintiff further stated that the court 

affirmed defendant's interpretation of the 

statute, and, in effect, has endorsed the 

purported legislative intent to deprive 

thousands of men and women of their livelihood 

for the sake of bureaucratic compliance.

Plaintiff further asserts that the HVACR 

Board of Examiners has determined that HVACR 

repairmen that possessed a home improvement 

contractor's license, were eligible for waiver 

from the education and examination 

requirements of the statute and submitted an 
4 A-2836-15T4

application during the six-month grandfather 

period were legally permitted to work as an 

HVACR repairman until such time as they 

received their license from the Board.

Plaintiff's representative, Mike Green,

Sr., possessed one of these licenses and was 

eligible for waiver of the new license, 

because he had served as a contractor for at 

least two years prior to March 1, 2014. Thus, 

he was legally permitted according to the 

plaintiff to ply his trade on behalf of the 

plaintiff, to the benefit of the defendant, 

until he received his new licensing from the 

Board.

Now I think we've cleared it up that this 

case is brought -- or this motion is brought 

pursuant to Rule 4:50-1. Pursuant to that 

rule, on motion, with briefs and upon such 

terms as are just, the [c]ourt may relieve a 

party or the party's legal representative from 

a final judgment or order for the following 

reasons: mistake, inadvertent surprise; or 

excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence, 

which would probably alter the judgment or 

order and which, by due diligence could not 

have been discovered in time for a new trial 

under Rule 4:49; fraud; misrepresentation or 

other misconduct; the judgment or order is 

void; the judgment or order has been 

satisfied; or any other reason justifying 

relief from the operation of the judgment or 

order.

The court finds there is no newly 

discovered evidence in this case that would 

not have been discovered in time for a new 

trial, which may have provided relief pursuant 

to Rule 4:50-1. Plaintiff simply argues that 

the true legislative intent was not followed 

by the court and provides as evidence the

opinion of a Deputy Attorney General. While 

the Court appreciates the opinion of the DAG, 

it merely states the opinion of a lawyer and 
5 A-2836-15T4

is, in no way, indisputable evidence of 

legislative intent. 

The Court, therefore, will deny the 

motion and hold that Rule 4:50-1(f) does not 

justify relief from the operation or order of 

judgment.

. . . .

This is simply a dispute over the 

interpretation of a statute, not an injustice, 

so if you think I've gotten it wrong, you 

should have taken it up much earlier than you 

did.

On appeal, plaintiff argues the evidence presented in support 

of the motion to vacate was not an opinion letter but represents 

an articulation of the Board's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 45:16A1 to -28, and deserves deference. Plaintiff contends the court's 

interpretation of the applicable statutes denies his client due 

process. We disagree.

The trial judge decided this motion on the basis of Rule

4:50-1(b) and (f). Plaintiff argues the trial judge's legal 

conclusions dismissing the complaint were flawed, and the judge 

erred denying his motion to vacate the judgment and to present new 

evidence. We note at the outset, plaintiff has not provided the 

record of the trial proceedings; therefore, we do not know the

legal basis for the trial court's determination beyond what we 

discern from the judge's ruling on the motion. Moreover, we have 
6 A-2836-15T4

been provided with an incomplete record of plaintiff's motion to 

vacate the judgment. See Rule 2:5-4(a). 

A party seeking to vacate a final judgment must meet the 

standards of Rule 4:50-1. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 

N.J. 449, 467 (2012). Rule 4:50-1 provides six grounds for relief: 

(a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 

excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered 

evidence which would probably alter the 

judgment or order and which by due diligence 

could not have been discovered in time to move 

for a new trial under R. 4:49; (c) fraud 

(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 

misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the 

judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment 

or order has been satisfied, released or 

discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon 

which it is based has been reversed or 

otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 

equitable that the judgment or order should 

have prospective application; or (f) any other 

reason justifying relief from the operation 

of the judgment or order. 

"The rule is 'designed to reconcile the strong interests in 

finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable 

notion that courts should have authority to avoid an unjust result 

in any given case.'" Guillaume, supra, 209 N.J. at 467 (quoting

Mancini v. EDS, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993)).

We afford "substantial deference" to a judge's determination 

to grant relief under Rule 4:50-1 and reverse only if the court's 

determination amounts to a clear abuse of discretion. Ibid.
7 A-2836-15T4

(citing DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 261 (2009); 

Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994)). 

An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is "made without a 

rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established 

policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Id. at 467-68 

(quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 

(2007)).

Here, plaintiff does not explicitly identify what subsection 

of Rule 4:50-1 it relied on, but the trial court discussed

subsections (b) and (f). To prevail under Rule 4:50-1(b), 

plaintiff must demonstrate "that the evidence would probably have 

changed the result, that it was unobtainable by the exercise of 

due diligence for use at the trial, and that the evidence was not 

merely cumulative." DEG, LLC, supra, 198 N.J. at 264 (quoting 

Quick Chek Food Stores v. Twp. of Springfield, 83 N.J. 438, 445 

(1980)). Further, "[a]ll three [of these] requirements must be 

met"; it is insufficient to prove only one or two prongs of the 

test. Ibid. Finally, "'newly discovered evidence' does not 

include an attempt to remedy a belated realization of the 

inaccuracy of an adversary's proofs." Ibid. (quoting Posta v. 

Chung-Loy, 306 N.J. Super. 182, 206 (App. Div. 1997)). "The motion 

shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (a), (b) 
8 A-2836-15T4

and (c) of R. 4:50-1 not more than one year after the judgment, 

order or proceeding was entered or taken." R. 4:50-2.

Rule 4:50-1(f) permits relief for "any other reason 

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order" and 

"is available only when 'truly exceptional circumstances are 

present.'" Guillaume, supra, 209 N.J. at 484 (quoting Hous. Auth. 

of Morristown, supra, 135 N.J. at 286). We are not persuaded

plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to relief under either 

standard based upon the record presented, nor do we discern an 

abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Plaintiff's additional 

arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.