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. e du/thir dc ir c uit_2012/13461 PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 11

- 2497

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

WILLIAM MOYER,

Appellant

(M.D. Pa. N o. 3

- 09

- cr

- 00397

- 003)

_____________

No. 11

- 2559

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MATTHEW NESTOR,

Appellant

(M.D. Pa. No. 3

- 09

- cr

- 00397

- 001)2 __________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania District Judge: Hon. A. Richard Caputo

__________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 23, 2012

Before: FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges

.

(Filed : February 29, 2012 )

Enid W. Harris, Esq. 400 Third Avenue, Suite 111 Kingston, PA 18704 Counsel for Appellant William Moyer

James J. West, Esq.
James J. West LLC 105 North Front Street, Suite 205 Harrisburg, PA 17101 Counsel for Appellant Matthew Nestor

Thomas E. Perez

Jes sica Dunsay Silver Angela M. Miller United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section
Ben Franklin Station

P.O. Box 144033 Washington, D.C. 20044

__________ Counsel for Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge

.

Appellants Matthew Nestor and William Moyer appeal from final judgments entered by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania after a jury found Nestor guilty on Count Two of the indictment and Moyer guilty on Count Fi ve. Count Two of the indictment charged Nestor with knowingly falsifying police reports with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation into a matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), in violation o f 18 U.S.C. § 1519. Count Five charged Moyer with knowingly making a false material statement in a matter within the FBI’s jurisdiction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

Nestor now challenges both the indictment and his conviction. First, he contends th at the District Court: (1) exceeded its discretion by denying, in relevant part, his motion for a bill of particulars; (2) erred by refusing to dismiss Count Two because it was duplicitous; and (3) exceeded its discretion by refusing to enforce the bill of particulars it did order. Nestor also contends (4) that the government presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (5) that 18 U.S.C. § 1519 is unconstitutionally vague. Moyer argues that the evidence was4 insufficient to support his con viction under § 1001. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I.
A. In the late evening of July 12, 2008, in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, teenagers Brandon Piekarsky, Derrick Donchak, Brian Scully, Colin Walsh, Ben Lawson, and Josh
Redmond encountered Luis Ramirez, a Hispanic man, in a local park. After s ome o f the teenagers shouted racially derogatory comments at Ramirez and told him to “go back to Mexico,” a violent fight ensued. App. 00765. Walsh knocked
Ramirez down and Piekarsky kicked their victim in the head while he was on the ground. The fight ended with Ramirez lying unconscious in the street

.

Arielle Garcia witnessed part of the incident. She recognized the teenagers as students from Shenandoah High
School an d heard Scully shout ing “racial ” things to Ramirez
ab out his ancestry . App. 00767. She saw Scully and Ramirez “interlock” and later saw “some[one]” kick Ramirez in the head “really hard” after he fell. App. 00675. After the teenagers fled the sc ene toward the park, Garcia phon ed 911.

A t the same time, Francis Ney saw approximately four “younger individuals” run in front of his moving car. App.
00977. He heard a female shouting and saw Ramirez lying in the street. Ney called 911 and reported seeing the teenagers in the park. Ney tried to revive Ramirez but eventually ran to the park with a man referred to as “Mexican Jesse,” who confronted Piekarsky, Scully, Donchak, Walsh, Lawson and
Redmond . A ccording to some , “Mexican Jesse” brandished a5 gun. 1 Officer Robert Senape of the West Mahanoy P olice Department arrived at the scene and requested an ambulance. Lieutenant William Moyer and Officer Jason Hayes of the
She nandoah Police Department

— both defendants below

— arrived shortly thereafter. In the meantime, the police dispatch system reported a man chasing people in the park, so Lieutenant Moyer and Officer Hayes left to respond.

Moments later , Ney again called 911 to report that the teenagers who had beaten Ramirez were near the baseball field and urged the dispatcher to send police to the ar ea. Ney was speaking with the dispatcher when Lieutenant Moyer and Officer Hayes arrived. While still on the phone with the 911 dispatcher, Ney told the officers that approximately five teenagers were running through the field on the back side of
the schoo l. When one of the officers asked who the teenagers were, Ney responded that they were a bunch of 16

- t o 17

- year

- old kids. Ney told the officers that he saw the
teenagers who were beating Ramirez and that they fled when he stopped them to ask what they wer e doing. Ney told the police that Donchak remained in the p ark while the others ran away. Throughout this conversation

— which was recorded on
the 911 call

— the dispatcher repeatedly asked if Ney was speaking with the police. After the dispatcher’s third inqu iry,

1 One of the teenagers testified that he never saw a weapon. Ney acknowledged at trial that Jesse could have had a weapon, but explained tha t he did not remember Jesse having a gun. The recordings of Ney’s 911 calls

, played to the jury
and admitted into evidence

, do not reference a gun. Ney, however, included in his police statement that Jesse had a gun and testified before the grand jury that Jesse had a gun that evening.6 Ney responded in the affirmative and the dispatcher
terminated the call.

Ney and Donc hak were placed in the police cruiser

, and Lieutenant Moyer drove to Donchak’s home

, where the teenagers had g athered. After speaking with them , the officers
looked “shocked” and “confused,” and releas ed the pair from
the police car . App. 00989. But moments later, when
Lieutenant Moyer and Officer Hayes saw Ney on their way
back to the scene , they arrested him based on Piekarsky’s assertion that Ney had a gun. Office r Charles Kovalewski of the Mahanoy City Police Department arrived while
Lieutenant Moyer was handcuffing Ney, who kept saying “it wasn’t him.” App. 00957. Lieutenant Moyer told Ney to “shut up” and placed him in the rear seat of the police car. App. 00958 . Officer Kovalewski also got into the car. At no point did Kovalewski hear Ney say anything about a man with a gun. The officers then drove back to the scene of the
assault . Once there, Officer Hayes

— who was romantically involved with Piekarsky’s mother, Tammy

— took Piekarsky toward the park and spoke with him privately

.

Lieutenant Moyer telephon ed Matthew Nestor, the Chief of Police, who was off

- duty at a bar, and briefed him on
the incident. Chief Nestor then called Piekarsky’s mother. 2

2 Meanwhile, at Donchak’s home, the teenagers spoke with Piekarsky on the phone and were told that Piekarsky had Other officers remained at the park and eventually found a BB gun. At the police station, Garcia and Ney pro vided statements, during which Garcia never identified who kicked Ramirez in the head. Officer Hayes interviewed Ney about the gun but did not ask what Ney knew ab out the assault.7 The next day, July 13, 2008, detectives from the District Attorney’s office arrived at the station. They, along
with Lieutenant Moyer, interviewed Scully, who relayed “the cover story [the teenagers] made up” the night before. App.

00774 . Later that day, District Attorney (“D.A.”) James Goodman was briefed about the assault, and he instructed his detectives to continue to assist the police with their investigation.

Ramirez died on July 14. The cause of death was ruled
a homicide. Phone records indicate that on the afternoon of July 15

— immediately after learning the cause of death

— Chief Nestor placed six telephone calls to Tammy Piekarsky.

By July 21, D.A. Goodman decided to take over the investigation because (1) the romantic relations hip between Tammy Piekarsky and Officer Hayes created a conflict of interest, and (2) some of the suspects were “trying t o protect the kicker.” App. 013 6 5 . On July 23, D.A. Goodman

given a statement to the police and the other teenagers needed to match their stories to Piekarsky’s. Piekarsky and his mother came to Donchak’s home later that evening. Based on
the information Tammy Piekarsky received from Chief Nestor, which she relayed to the teenagers, everyone knew the situation was serious and that they would get in trouble if they did not “ g et it together and leave things out” of their story. App. 00773. The teenagers decided to base their stories on Piekarsky’s statement to the police: the fight was “one on
one” and did not involve “ drinking, ” “ kicking, ” or “ ra cial language.” App. 00560

.8 contacted the Pennsylvania State Police and the State Attorney General’s Of fice about a possible cover

- up involving the Shenandoah Police Department. 3 Two days later, on July 25, the D.A.’s office filed criminal complaints against the teenagers.

On July 28, the D.A.’s office contacted Chief Nestor because D.A. Goodman had not y et received any investigative reports from Officer Hayes. In fact, the only reports D.A. Goodman received fr om the police department were (1) a July 20 report from Chief Nestor regarding his investigative steps in the Ramirez assault, and (2) a one

- page

re port from Lieutenant Moyer about “an individual who brought a BB gun to the scene after the assault” on Ramirez, but nothing regarding the assault itself. App. 01367. Chief Nestor’s July 20 report did not: (1) identify the teenaged suspects; (2) include an y of his contacts with Ms. Piekarsky; or (3) include his conversation with Borough Manager Palubinsky about the conflict of interest.

On August 1, D.A. Goodman sent a formal memorandum to Chief Nestor, Lieutenant Moyer and Officer Hayes, requesting addit ional information from Nestor and reports from Moyer and Hayes on their involveme nt in the investigation. They complied with this request

. Lieutenant Moyer’s report indicated that eyewitness Garcia told him at

3 T hat night, Lieutenant Moyer came to the Scully home. He parked down the street and told Scully’s stepfather that he could not risk being seen. He then said numerous witnesses claimed Scully kicked Ramirez and urged them to “[d]o the right thing” and get Sc ully “to confess.” App. 01296.9 the scene that Scully had kicked Ramirez in th e head. Officer Hayes’s report

— which Chief Nestor reviewed and incorporated into his August 1 report

— also indicated that Garcia identified Scully as the kicker. This was the first time
the D.A.’s office heard from the Shenandoah Police Department that some one had identified Scully as the kicker, even though Lieutenant Moyer briefed the D.A.’s office about the incident on the morning of July 13. In his August 1 report

, Nestor stated that he was the one who : (1) contact ed the
D.A.’s office about a possible co nflict of interest, and (2)
request ed that the D.A.’s office take over the case. 4

The FBI became involved by the end of July 2008

, after media reports revealed that the assault may have been racially motivated. As part of the investigation, FBI Special Ag ent Adam Aichele interviewed Lieutenant Moyer on June 2, 2009. At that time, Lieutenant Moyer stated that when he initially encountered Ney in the park on the night of the
assault , Ney said someone had a gun

, and

, upon hearing this information, Moyer instr ucted Ney to get into the police car.
Lieutenant Moyer also stated that Ney never identified
Ramirez’s assailants. When Special Agent Aichele
interviewed Lieutenant Moyer again on June 11, 2009, Moyer reiterated the same sequence of events

. Special Agent A ichele questioned Moyer’s account and played the 911 recording for

Mo yer, in which Ney does not mention a man with a gun but

4 At trial, D.A. Goodman testified that Chief Nestor never suggested that the D.A.’s office take over and that it was
Goodman who contacted Chief Nestor to inform him that the D.A.’s office would be “taking over” the case be cause of the conflicts of interest and the D.A.’s suspicion that the police department was involved in a cover

- up. App. 01365.10 does identify Ramirez’s assailants. After hearing the recording, Lieutenant Moyer said, “That’s not what he told me.” App. 01674. S pecial Agent Aichele played the recording several more times for Moyer, who denied that Ney was speaking to him when Ney stated in the 911 call, “There they go,” claiming that Ney must have been speaking to the dispatcher. Lieutenant Moyer then changed his st ory , stating that Ney must have told him about the gun after he put Ney in the police cruiser.

B. On December 10, 2009, a federal grand jury returned a
five

- count indictment against Chief Nestor, Lieutenant Moyer and Officer Hayes, charging each with conspiring to falsify documents with the intent to obstruct an investigation of a matter within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One), and with the substantive offense of falsifying documents in vio lation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Count Two). The indictment additionally charged Lieutenant Moyer with two counts of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (Counts Three and Four) and one count of making false statements in violation
of 18 U.S. C. § 1001 (Count Five).

Chief Nestor moved to dismiss Counts One and Two
of the indictment and also moved for a bill of particulars seeking (1) the agency and matter within the federal government’s jurisdiction and (2) the reports and/or statements allege d to be false in Count Two. The District
Court denied the motion to dismiss and granted Chief Nestor’s motion for a bill of particulars with respect to the “federal investigation or matter under the jurisdiction of a United States agency [Nestor] is allege d to have contemplated11 at the time of the alleged obstructive acts.” App. 00287. In response, the government informed Chief Nestor that the matter within the FBI’s jurisdiction wa s the racially motivated killing of Ramirez. The Court denied Chief

Nestor’s motion with respect to reports and/or statements pertaining to Count Two, concluding that the indictment specifically identified the reports at issue, the investigation to which they pertained, their subject matter, authors, and
relevant dates.

Defendant s pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. At the close of the government’s case

- in

- chief, defendants moved for judgments of acquittal on sufficiency grounds. The
Court denied the motions. O n January 27, 2011, after a

two

- week trial, the jury convicted M oyer of making false statements (Count Five) and Nestor of falsifying documents (Count Two). Defendants were acquitted on all other counts. After the verdict, the Court denied defendants’ motions for judgments of acquittal and new trials. Lieutenant Moyer was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment on Count Five, followed by one year of supervised release; Chief Nestor was sentenced to thirteen months’ imprisonment on Count Two,
fol lowed by two years of supervised release. Defendants timely appealed. 5

II

. We first consider Nestor’s substantive challenges to
Count Two of the indictment. He contends that the District

Court (1) exceeded its discretion by denying the requested bill

5 The District Court had jurisdict ion under 18 U.S.C. § 3231

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.12 of particulars relating to the alleged false statements ; (2) erred by refusing to dismiss Count Two because it was duplicitous ; and (3) exceeded its discretion by failing to enforce the bill of particulars it did order . We address ea ch of these contentions
in turn.

A

. First, Nestor contends that the District Court exceeded
its discr etion by denying the requested bill of particulars relating to the alleged false statements. The sufficiency of an indictment is a question of law over w hich we exercise plenary review. S ee United States v. Hodge , 211 F.3d 74, 76 (3d Cir. 2000) . A district court’s denial of a motion for a bill of particulars is revi ewed for an abuse of discretion. S ee United States v. Urban , 404 F.3d 754, 771 (3d Cir. 2005).

For an indictment to be sufficient, it must contain all
the elements of a crime and adequately appr ise the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet. See Russell v. United

States , 369 U.S. 749, 763

- 766 (1962) . “[W]hen the indictment itself is too vague and indefinite for such purposes,” a bill of particulars is warranted. United States v. Addonizio

, 451 F.2d 49, 64 ( 3d Cir. 1971) (intern al quotation marks and citation omitted). “The purpose of the bill of particulars is to inform the defendant of the nature of the charges brought against him to adequately prepare his defense, to avoid surprise during the trial and to protect him against a second prosecution for an inadequately described offense.” Id. at 63

- 64 (quoting United
States v. Tucker , 262 F. Supp. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). The decision to grant a motion for a bill of particulars is a
“discret ionary matter with the trial court,” and a denial of
such a motion “does not amount to an abuse of discretion
unless the deprivation of the information sought leads to the13 defendant’s inability to adequately prepare his case, to avoid surprise at trial, or to avoid the later risk of double jeopardy.”
Id. at 64.

Nestor contends that Count Two of the indictment was insufficient because it failed to identify the false statements underlying his conviction. See Virgin Islands v. Pemberton

, 813 F.2d 626, 632 (3d Cir. 1987)

. Nestor asserts he was prejudiced by this because, without knowing which statements were allegedly false, he was unable to properly prepare for trial. Therefore, Nestor contends, the District Court exceeded its discretion by denying his motion for a bill of particulars.

We conclude that the indictment here was sufficiently detailed such that a bill of particulars was not necessary. When an indictment merely quotes the language of a statute and that statute contains generalities, the indictment must factually define those generalities , descending into particulars. See Russell , 369 U.S. at 765. Tracking the language of § 1519 , Count Two charged Nestor with aiding and abetting others in falsifying documents while acting in
relation to and in conte mplation of a matter within federal jurisdiction, and doing so with the intent to impede, obstruct,
and influence an investigation into that matter. The indictment, however, did more than just set forth the offense
in the words of the statute. Count Two ex plained that the falsified documents were “official police reports” created between July 12, 2008, and March 30, 2009. App. 00053. Because Count Two incorporated Count One (charging conspiracy to violate § 1519 ), Nestor also knew which specific police repo rts were being investigated and which14 federal matter was at issue : the racially motivated assault of
Ramirez.

Although the government did not identify every
omission or inclusion that rendered false the documents identified in the indictment, and thus “d id not, at the pre

- trial stage, weave the information at its command into the warp of a fully integrated trial theory for the benefit of the defendant[ ]

, ” the government was not “ required to do so. ”
Addonizio , 451 F.2d at 64 (citation omitted). Rule 7(c) o f the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires an indictment to be “concise” and contain “essential facts,” but does not require the indictment to include every fact to be alleged by the government. Moreover, we agree with the District Court’s

assessme nt that the specificity with which the government identified the reports at issue made it “highly unlikely that [Nestor would] be unfairly surprised with an unfamiliar police report at trial.” App. 00288. Because the indictment here was sufficiently detail ed, we conclude that the District Court did not exceed its discretion by declining Nestor’s request for a bill of particulars.

B

. Nestor asserts that Count Two of the indictment should
be dismissed altogether because it alleged multiple false

statements in multiple police reports in a single count and

was , therefore

, duplicitous. “Duplicity is the joining of two or more distinct offenses in a single count, so that a general verdict does not reveal exactly which crimes the jury found
the defendant had comm itted.” United States v. Gomberg

, 715 F.2d 843, 845 (3d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Garrett v. United States , 471 U.S. 773 (1985) . Whether an indictment is duplicitous is a question of15 law subject to de novo review. See Uni ted States v. Haddy

, 134 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 1998).

Our analysis begins by ascertaining “the allowable unit of prosecution to decide whether the indictment properly charges a violation of the pertinent statute.” United States v.

Root , 585 F.3d 145, 15 0 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). To do so, we discern “[c] ongressional intent by examining the language of the statute.” Id.

Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. (citation omitted). The statute

states:

18 U.S.C. § 1519. The statute is silent as to whether each
falsified document

— or even each falsifi ed statement

— is required to be charged separately or whether multiple

statements or documents may be combined in on e count.

The question of whether each falsified entry in a single
document must be charged separately was recently considered
in United Sta tes v. Schmeltz

, --- F.3d

---- , 2011 WL 6351623 (6th Cir. 2011), in which the government charged a defendant with one count of obstruction for multiple falsified entries in a single document. The court held that “[t]he ‘falsifies’ clause16 of § 1519 was . . . intended to punish the falsification of a document, rather than specific statements or omissions within a document. Accordingly, [the defendant] could violate § 1519 once

— and no more than once

— by falsifying [a single]

. . . report with his omissions.” Id

. at *4. We agree
with the rationale of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit and conclude that the statute does not require the government to charge separate counts for each false entry in a
document.

Section 1519 does not explain in ipsis verbis wh ether
each falsified document must be charged separately. The

statute criminalizes the falsifying of “any record.” The word “any” is defined as “[a]n indeterminate derivative of one . . . in which the idea of unity

. . . is subordinated to that of
indiffer ence as to the particular one or ones that may be selected.” Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2009) (online version Dec. 2011)

. Courts have consistently rejected duplicity arguments when the statute employs “any” as a signifier regarding the “allowable un it of prosecution.” See

e.g. , Root , 585 F.3d at 150

- 151 (explaining that multiple years of tax evasion may be combined in one count for
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 , which criminalizes any willful “attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title . . . .” (emphases added)); United States v. Brimberry , 744 F.2d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1984) (“We find that these separate actions of the defendant were in furtherance of the sole object of destroying all Stix records in Miller’s possession, an d . . . these actions constituted a continuing course of conduct.”); United States v. Berardi , 675 F.2d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1982) ( concluding that an indictment may combine three separate attempts to influence a witness’s testimony into one count of obstruc ting justice by “threats or17 force, or by any threatening letter” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503).

Interpretation of the word “record” permits this reading as well. “R ecord” is defined as “anything preserving information and constituting a piece of evid ence about past

events.” Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2009) (online version Dec. 2011) . Thus, the “ record ” concerning the investigation into the Ramirez assault could fairly be interpreted as the collection of official police reports. Because

Count Tw o alleges a continuing course

, between July 12, 2008, and March 30, 2009, of falsifying the “record” to obstruct a single federal investigation

— and identifies multiple reports that were created to that singular end

— the indictment is not duplicitous. See Be rardi , 744 F.2d at 898 (holding that an indictment is not duplicitous when it is “fairly interpreted” to set forth a “continuing course of conduct, during a discrete period of time” to obstruct justice with facts that support such a theory); see also Rule 7(c)(1) (allowing a single count to allege “that the defendant committed [the offense] by one or more specified means”).

But our inquiry is not yet finished. Because the government has discretion to draw “[t]he line between multiple offenses and multiple means to the commission of a single continuing offense,” Berardi , 675 F.2d at 898, we must
also “examine the concerns traditio nally associated with charging in one count what could be sev eral independent charges. ” Root , 585 F.3d at 154 ( internal quotation marks and
citation omitted ). These concerns include: (1) avoiding doubt
that a general verdict may mask a finding of guilt as to one crime but not another; (2) avoiding risk that the jury was not unanimous as to any one of the crimes charged; (3) providing18 the defendant adequate notice; (4) supplying an adequate basis for sentencing; and (5) protecting against double jeopardy. See id. (citation omitted)

.

Nestor argues that Count Two’s duplicity prejudiced him because the jurors may have relied on different acts in concluding that he was guilty of obstructing justice. We disagree. Nestor was convicted of knowingly falsifying the
record with the intent to obstruct a matter with in the jurisdiction of the FBI. The jury instructions were crystal
clear that if th e jury found Nestor “guilty of an offense [,] every [juror] must agree that the government has overcome the presumption of innocence with evidence that proves each element of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” App. 02626. At trial, following the readi ng of the verdict, the jury was polled and the verdict was affirmed individually by each juror. Thus, every juror agreed that between July 12, 2008, and March 30, 2009, Nestor engaged in a continuing course of conduct of using the official police reports t o knowingly falsify the record of the Ramirez investigation, with the intent
to obstruct a matter with in the jurisdiction of the FBI. Given this, we conclude that Count Two of the indictment “may fairly be read to charge but a single scheme and is therefor e not duplicitous.” Root , 585 F.3d at 150 (quoting United States

v. Shorter , 809 F.2d 54, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1987) )

.

C

. Nestor contends also that the District Court exceeded its discretion in refusing to enforce the bill of particular s that
it did order. 6

6 The District Court ’s order stated: “ T he government is directed to disclose what matter within the jurisdiction of an In r esponse to the Court’s order, the government19 informed Nestor that “the matter within the jurisdiction of the [FBI was] the racially motivated killing of” Ramirez. App. 00302. Nestor asserts that this response was inadequate and required further enforcement . We disagree.

First, the FBI clearly has jurisdiction to investigate racially motivated killings under several statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 241, § 245, and 42 U.S.C. § 3631. Second, that the government did not identify a specific criminal statute ove r which it had jurisdiction is of no consequence. The plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 criminalizes a defendant’s efforts to obstruct “the investigation or proper administration of any matter” within the jurisdiction of the FBI, “or in
relation to or con templation of any such matter.” Indeed, § 1519 covers efforts to obstruct investigations that do not
result in the filing of charges

. See, e.g.

, United States v. Gray

, 642 F.3d 371, 379 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[Section] 1519 does not require the existence or like lihood of a federal investigation.”). Thus, if the statute does not require the existence of a federal investigation before criminal liability may attach, it certainly does not require the government to identify a specific federal statute that is the focus of the investigation. Therefore, because the FBI unquestionably has jurisdiction to investigate racially motivated killings, and because Nestor was informed that the racially motivated killing of Ramirez was the federal matter at issue in Count Two, the D istrict Court did not exceed its discretion by denying a request for additional information. We therefore reject Nestor’s three challenges to the indictment.

agency of the United States Defendant is alleged to have contemplated.” App. 00290.20 III

. Nestor raises several challenges to the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction on Count Two for obstructing justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 . For the reasons that follow, we conclude that these contentions do not carry the day.

Count Two of the indictment charged Nestor with knowingly falsifying police reports with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation into the racially
motivated assault of Ramirez

. Nestor contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt on Count Two. Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law, subject to plenary rev iew. See United States v. Silveus

, 542 F.3d 993, 1002 (3d Cir. 200 8). W e review “the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,” afford “defere nce to a jury’s findings,” and draw “ all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict.” United States v. Riley , 621 F.3d 312, 329 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We will overturn the verdict “only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a rea sonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Nestor asserts that the evidence was insufficient to convict him because the government failed to prove: (1) that he knowingly falsified documents; (2) that he knew the
“matter” at issu e was within the FBI’s jurisdiction; (3) that he intended to obstruct an FBI investigation; and (4) that he acted in “contemplation of ” such a matter. To resolve these challenges, we must first consider what proof is require d to establish a violation of § 1519.21 A

. The parties agree that the government must prove that Nestor knowingly falsified a record or document. The government presented evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude not only that Nestor had a motive to falsify police reports, 7

7 Evidence presented to support Nestor’s motive includes testimony that: (1) he was briefed after the assault that the
suspects wer e local teenagers, including Pie karksy; (2) his subordinate, Officer Hayes, was dating Piekarsky’s mother; (3) he was friends with, and had vacationed with, Officer Hayes and Ms. Piekarksy; (4) he s poke with Ms. Piekarsky on the night of the assault, after which she instructed the teenagers to get their stories straight before talking with the police (a story which omitted the final kick to Ramirez and the use of racial slurs); and (5) he called Ms. Piekarsky immediately after learning that Ramirez’s death was ruled a
homicide. bu t that he did, in fact, knowingly falsify reports and aided and abetted others in doing so as well. The jury learned that on August 1, 2008, as part of the D.A.’s investigation into a possible police cover

- up of the Ramirez assault, the D.A. formally direc ted Nestor, Moyer and Hayes to prepare reports of their investigative efforts. The jury lea rned that Hayes’s report

— which Nestor reviewed
and in corporated into his own report

— falsely indicated that eyewitness Garcia identified Scully as the one who kicked the
victim in the head . The jury also heard evidence from which it could reasonably infer that Nestor

— who was present at Garcia ’s interview

— knew the information in the report about Garcia identifying the kicker was false. App. 01997. Moreover, n one of the police reports included any mention of22 racial motivation for the assault. Nestor’s own July 20 report did not: (1) identify the teenaged suspects then known to him; (2) include any of his contacts with Ms. Piekarsky; or (3)
include his conversation with Pa lubinsky about the conflict of interest. Nestor’s August 1 report, moreover, falsely stated
that he was the person who (1) contact ed the D.A.’s office about a possible conflict of interest; and (2) request ed that the

D .A.’s o ffice take over the case. In th e s e respect s , the reverse

was true.

Nestor contends that , like other obstruction of justice statutes, § 1519 does not criminalize the omissions in his report because there is no proof that he had a contemporaneous duty to disclose the specific information alleged to have been omitted. See United States v. Curran , 20 F.3d 560, 566 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]o convict under a section 1001 concealment charge, the government must show that a defendant had a legal duty to disclose the facts at the time he was alleged to have concealed them.”). Furthermore, Nestor contends, none of the omissions or false representations may be considered material.

These arguments fail. It borders on the ridiculous to

assert that a Chief of Police would not have a duty to disclose
the identity of suspects in his official police reports or , conversely, that withhold ing the names of suspects

— known
to him

— in those official police reports would be deemed acceptable. Furthermore, although one court has concluded
that material omissions may s upport a conviction under § 1519, see United States v. Lanham , 617 F.3d 873, 887 (6th Cir. 2010), we refuse to require such a conclusion , because materiality is not an express element of § 1519, as it is in 1823 U.S.C. § 1001 . Nestor’s reliance on Curran , th erefore, is misplaced, because that case involved § 1001. 8

From all of this evidence, we conclude that a reasonable juror could find that Nestor knowingly falsified documents. There was sufficient evidence to prove that he knowingly (1) endorsed false in formation contained in his subordinate’s report, (2) omitted information from his own report, and (3) produced false information in his report, all with the intent to impede the investigation into the racially
motivated assault

.

8 Regardless, Nes tor’s omissions were material. H is report omitted the names of the suspects involved in the assault, and
this information would certainly “be of a type capab le of influencing” the investigation. United States v. McBane

, 433 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2005)

. He also omitted his communications with a suspect’s mother and his personal relationship with her , which suggest s an effort to conceal his preferential treatme nt of that suspect. See United States v.
Lanham , 617 F.3d 873, 887 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
“reasonable fact

- finder could conclude that [a defendant] falsified his report” in violation of § 1519 when he omitted information “as an attempt to ‘cover u p’” information). Nestor’s affirmative misrepresentations regarding his conversations with the D.A. were also material, because if he had truthfully reported that it was the D.A. who insisted on taking over the investigation, this information would given

w eight to the conflicts of interest and raised questions about the police department’s actions during the investigation.24 B

. Nestor maintains that t he knowledge requirement of § 1519 necessitates that the government prove Nestor knew the “matter” at issue was within the jurisdiction of the FBI. We decline to read such a requirement into the statute. See
Bates v. United States , 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) ( “[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.”).

The most natural reading of § 1519 , which we accept, is to interpret “knowingly” as modifying its surrounding verbs only: “alters, destroys, mutilates, con ceals

, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry.” 18 U.S.C. § 1519 ; see also
United States v. Yielding , 657 F.3d 688, 714 (8th Cir. 2011)

. Although the Supreme Court has occasionally interpreted “knowingly” more broadly when scienter is not otherwise

e xpressed in the criminal statute, see, e.g. , United States v.

X

- Citement Video, Inc. , 5 13 U.S. 64, 69

- 70 (1994), that

“ concern [] [ is ] not present here,” because § 1519 expressly “requires proof that an accused knowingly falsified a document, with intent to impede, obstruct, or interfere with the investigation or proper administration of a matter,” Yielding , 657 F.3d at 714. “By the plain terms of § 1519, knowledge of a pending federal investigation or proceeding is
not an element of the obstruction crime.” Gray , 642 F.3d at

378.

Indeed, “[i]t i s well settled that mens rea requirements typically do not extend to the jurisdictional elements of a
crime

— that ‘the existence of the fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal

statute.’” United States v. Cooper , 482 F.3d 658, 664 (4th Cir.25 2007) (quoting United States v. Feola , 420 U.S. 671, 677 n. 9 (1975)). The government therefore need not prove that Nestor actually knew that the “matter” at issue was within the jurisdiction of the federal governm ent when he falsified
documents. 9 I t need only prove that he knowingly falsified
them. To that end, we conclude that there was sufficient
evidence for a reasonable juror to find that he did so.

C

. Nestor contends also that the government did not prove a sufficient “nexus” between his conduct and the federal investigation, as required by United States v. Aguilar

, 515 U.S. 593 (1995)

, and Arthur Andersen LLP v. United

States

, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). We conclude that proof of such a nexus is not required. The text of § 1519 requires only proof that Nestor knowingly falsified documents and did so with the intent to “impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper adminis tration of any mat ter” that happens to be
within federal jurisdiction.

9 Although it was not required to do so , the government did present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that
Nestor knew the matter at issue was within the FBI’s jurisdiction. Witnesses testified that it was widely reported by
the local media outlets that the FBI became involved in the investigation by the end of July

— before Nestor wrote both police reports. App. 0118

- 01120 . In addition, the government presented evidence that every certified police officer in Pennsylvania is taught that the FBI has jurisdiction over civil rights violations, such as ethnic intimidation and bias crimes, and that hate crimes are covered by a va riety of federal statutes. App. 01572

- 01574, 01577

- 01580, 01607

- 01610.26 In reliance upon Aguilar and Arthur Andersen , Nestor

argue s that the government must prove that he intended to impede a specific federal investigation. In Aguilar , the Court
held that the defendant’s act of lying to investigators was not sufficiently connected to a grand jury proceeding to uphold his conviction under the general obstruction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503. See 515 U.S. at 600

- 601. Extendin g the reasoning of Aguilar to § 1512 (b)(2), the Court in Arthur Andersen held that the government was required to prove a “nexus” between the defendant’s attempts to persuade another to destroy documents and a pending or foreseeable official proceeding. 544 U.S. at 708 (reasoning that a know ingly corrupt persuader “ cannot be someone who persuades others to shred documents under a document retention policy when he does

not have in contemplation any pa rticular official proceeding
in which those documents might be material ” ).

We decline to exte nd the reasoning of §§ 1503 and 1512(b)(2) , because “the language of § 1519 is materially different from [those] statutes.” Yielding , 65 7 F.3d at 712;
see also United States v. Kernell

, --- F.3d

---- , 2012 WL
255765

, at * 6

- *7 (6th Cir. 2012). Section 1503 forbids “corruptly endeavor[i ng]” to obstruct justice, and § 1512(b)(2) prohibits the “knowingly corrupt[t] persua[sion]” to obstruct justice. Thus, in both Aguilar and
Arthur Andersen , the Court was “required to discern the substance of an intent requirem ent from statutory terms that appeared to imply one, but did not speak directly to its

content.” Yielding , 65 7 F.3d at 713. By contrast, the statute at issue here speaks “more directly to the requisite intent and describe[s] its scope more precisely.” Id. “That the accused’s intent must be wrongful is evident from the nature of the acts prohibited, such as knowing falsification of documents, and27 the requisite intent to influence, obstruct, or impede an investigation.” Id. (citation omitted). Nestor’s argume nt, therefore, conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute. “The words of the statute are unambiguous, and thus, ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” Gray , 642 F.3d at 377 (quoting Conn.
Nat’l Bank v. Germain , 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)). Therefore, “[i]t is sufficient that the ‘matter’ [under investigation] is within the jurisdiction of a federal agency as a factual

matter.” Yielding , 65 7 F.3d at 714 (citation omitted). We accept the analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in this respect.

T he legislative history further confirms this interpretation. The Senate considered the intent requirement to be independent of the jurisdiction requiremen t, explaining that § 1519 “is meant to apply broadly to any acts to destroy or fabricate physical evid ence so long as they are done with
the intent to obstruct, impede or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter, and such matter is within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States .” S. Rep.
No. 107

- 146, at 14 (2002) (empha ses added). The Senate Report goes on to clarify: “[t]his statute is specifically meant not to include any technical requirement, which some courts have read into other obstruction of justice statutes, to tie the obstructive conduct to a pending or imminen t proceeding or

matter.” Id. at 14

- 15 ; see also 148 Cong. Rec. S7419 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“The fact that a matter is within the jurisdiction of a federal agency is intended to be a jurisdictional matter, and not in a ny way linked to the intent of the defendant.”).

Thus, we conclude that the government was required only to prove that (1) Nestor intended to impede an28 investigation into “any matter” and (2) the matter at issue was ultimately proven to be within the fede ral government’s jurisdiction . I t was not required to prove that Nestor intended to obstruct or impede a specific federal investigation.

D

. Nestor contends also that no reasonable juror could have found that he acted in “contemplation of” a specific
feder al investigation at the time he prepared his reports in July and August of 2008. Again, Nestor’s argument is based upon a misguided reading of § 1519.

The statute expressly criminalizes the knowing falsification of any record “with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of” the federal government. 18 U.S.C. § 1519. To ensure that the

statute is applied “broadly,” criminal liability “also extends to
acts done in contempl ation of such federal matters, so that the timing of the act in relation to the beginning of the matter or investigation is also not a bar to prosecution.” S. Rep. No.

107

- 146, at 13 (2002) (emphasis added); see also Gray , 642
F.3d at 379 (“[Section] 1519 does not require the existence or likelihood of a federal investigation.”). In analyzing the intent requirement of § 1519, we examined the statute’s use of “any
matter” and concluded that a defendant need not intend to obstruct or impede a specific federal investigation; the government must prove only that (1) a defendant intended to impede the investigation of “any matter” and (2) the matter at
issue was ultimately proven to be within the federal government’s jurisdiction

. See supra Part III.C . The in

“con te mplation of” clause of § 1519 refers to the same “matter.” Thus, the same analysis is required.29 Looking to the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that a reasonable juror could have fou nd that Nestor acted in “contemplation of” an investigation in to the racially motivated assault on Ramirez, which was within the jurisdiction of the FBI. The government presented evidence that D.A. Goodman took over the investigation because he determined that the “coverup was more than just the [teenaged] boys.” App . 01455. As part of the D.A.’s investigation, Goodman directed Nestor to prepare the police reports at issue. Moreover, there was evidence that, by the end of July 2008, it was well

- reported by local news outlets that the FBI was investigating the Ramirez assault. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to prove Nestor knowingly falsified documents in “contemplation of” an investigation of a “matter,” which was proven to be within the jurisdiction of the federal government.

IV

. Finally, Nestor challe nges the constitutionality of § 1519

, arguing it is too vague. We apply de novo review to this challenge

. See United States v. Weatherly , 525 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2008). “It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve F irst Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the
case at hand.” United States v. Mazurie , 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) (citation omitted).

A

. A statute is unconstitutionally vague only if it “fails to provide people of ordinary intell igence a reasonable opportunity to under stand what conduct it prohibits ” or
“authorizes

. . . arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”30 United States v. Amirnazmi , 645 F.3d 564, 588 (3d Cir. 2011) ( internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In crimin al cases, because “vagueness attacks are based on lack of notice, they may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons would know their conduct puts [them] at risk of punishment under the statute.” San Filippo v. Bongiovanni

, 961 F.2d 1125, 1 136 (3d Cir. 1992) (alteration in original) ( internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Criminal

statu tes, therefore, need only give “‘ fair warning ’ that certain conduct is prohibited” to withstand a constitutional challenge.
Id. ( quoting Colten v. Ke ntucky , 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) ).

The focus of our inquiry is the meaning of the statute in light of common understanding and practice. See Robinson v. Napolitano , 554 F.3d 358, 365 (3d Cir. 2009). In looking at the language of the statute, § 1519 “rathe r plainly criminalizes the conduct of an individual who (1) knowingly (2) makes a false entry in a record or document (3) with the intent to impede or influence a federal investigation.” United

States v. Hunt , 526 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2008)

. As a law

e nforcement officer, Nestor cannot credibly argue that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Any person of ordinary intelligence

— let alone a chief of police

— would comprehend that this statute prohibits a police officer from knowingly w riting a false report with the intent to impede an ongoing, or future, investigation. See id. (“ A person of ordinary intelligence would understand a police report to be a ‘record’ or ‘document,’ and would also read the language ‘any matter within the juris diction of [a] department

. . . of the United States’ to include an FBI investigation.”). Nestor’s conduct, therefore, falls plainly within the proh ibitions of the statute, and as such, the statute’s “plain31 text” put Nestor “on notice [ that ] his conduct wa s unlawful.”
Id

.

Section 1519’s scienter requirement, moreover, eliminates any concerns regarding statutory vagueness. Scienter requirements in criminal statutes “alleviate vagueness concerns” because a mens rea element makes it less likely that a defenda nt will be convicted for an action committed by mistake. Gonzales v. Carhart , 550 U.S. 124, 149 (2007) (citation omitted) . Because a defendant will be convicted for violating § 1519 “only for an act knowingly
done with the purpose of doing that which the s tatute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a
violation of law.” Screws v. United States , 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945). Here, by the express language of the statute, no liability will be imposed for knowingly falsifying documents
without an “intent to impede, obstruct, or influence a matter.” 18 U.S.C. § 1519; see also Kernell

, 2012 WL 255765

, at *5 (“[T]he construction creates the needed specific intent and avoids [defendant’s] concern t hat ‘the statute would forbid
innocent cond uct. ’” (quoting Yielding , 567 F.3d at 711)).

B

. Nestor contends also that applying § 1519 to his actions would require a Procrustean stretching of that statute’s language

, because his actions were not done in

“c ontemplation of” an FBI investigation

. Specifically, Nestor
asserts that the “contemplation of” clause is too vague because it does not specify what a defendant must know to trigger criminal liability.32 We have already concluded that it was enough that th e government prove that Nestor acted in “contemplation of” an investigation into the racially motivated assault on Ramirez, which was within the jurisdiction of the FBI. Although this interpretation makes criminal liabi lity very broad under § 1519, this “i s consistent with the legislative history and other cases to consider the question.” Kernell

, 2012 WL
255765 , at * 8 ; see also Gray , 642 F.3d at 379 (“[Section] 1519 does not require the existence or likelihood of a federal investigation.”); S. Rep. No. 107

- 146, at 14 (2002) (explaining that § 1519 “is meant to apply broadly to any acts to destroy or fabricate physical evidence ” (emphasis added)).

“Moreover, even if this element is potentially vague as it relates to hypothetical defendants,” it is clearly not vague as it relates to Nestor. Kernell

, 2012 WL 255765 , at *8 . As previously discussed, the government presented sufficient evidence to prove that when Nestor falsified the police reports, he contemplated an investigation into a matter within the juris diction of the FBI , intending to impede that investigation

. See supra , Part III. D . Thus, we conclude that the statute is not vague “in the light of the facts of the case at
hand.” Mazurie , 419 U.S. at 550 (citation omitted). 10

10 Nestor also maintains that § 1519 is void for vagueness as applied to his case because the nexus required between his conduct and the investigation is too attenuated. This argument
is foreclosed by our conclusion that the government is not required to prove a nexus between Nestor’s conduct and the investigation. See supra Part III.C

.33 Because § 1519 clearly expres ses the elements that the government must prove to secure a conviction under the statute, we reject Nestor’s challenges to its constitutionality.

V.

We now turn to review Moyer’s conviction on Count Five, for knowingly making a false material statement in a matter within the FBI’s jurisdiction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 11 Specifically, the indictment alleged that, in conversations with the FBI on June 2 and 11, 2009, Moyer falsely stated that (1) an eyewitness warned that there was a man with a gun i n the park and (2) the same eyewitness never identified anyone involved in the assault on Ramirez.

To establish a violation of § 1001, the government was required to prove each of the following five elements: (1) that Moyer made a statement or representat ion; (2) that the statement or representation was false; (3) that the false statement was made knowingly and willfully; (4 ) that the statement or representation was material; and (5) that the statement or representation was made in a matter within the

11 Again, sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law, subject to plenary review. See Silveus , 542 F.3d at 1002 . W e review “the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,” afford “defere nce to a jury’s findings,” and
draw “ all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict.” Riley , 621 F.3d at 329 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We will overturn the verdict “only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).34 juri sdiction of the federal government. 12 See United States v.

Barr

, 963 F.2d 641, 645 (3d Cir. 1992 ). Moyer contends that the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove three of the required five elements: (1) that the statements were false; (2) that they were made knowingly and willfully; and (3) that they were material. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Moyer’s
conviction.

A. First, we agree with the government that there was
sufficient evidence that Mo yer made false statements. Based on the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable juror could find that Moyer falsely stated that the eyewitness, Francis

12 18 U.S.C. § 1001 states : (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully

— (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers u p by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation;

or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or
fr audulent statement or entry;

s hall be fined under this title, i mprisoned not more than 5 years . . . .35 Ney, did not identify Ramirez’s assailants. Indeed, the 911
call recorded this identification. The rec ording indicates that

, after being asked who the teenagers were, Ney told the
officers that a bunch of 16

- to 17

- year

- old kids, who had beaten up Ramirez, began running when Ney asked what they were doing. This evidence is more than sufficient to support

t he jury’s finding that Moyer falsely stated to the FBI that Ney did not identify the suspects

. See United States v. McKanry , 628 F.3d 1010, 1018 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding
defendant’s false statement conviction where defendant’s statement was “directly con tradicted by [trial] evidence”).

The jury’s finding that Moyer falsely stated that Ney reported seeing a man with a gun is equally well supported. There is no mention of a man with a gun whatsoever in the 911 recording. Moreover, Officer Hayes’s written report makes no mention of Ney informing the officers about such a

man . Ney even testified that immediately after the 911 call ended, he got into the police cruiser and did “not remember” having a conversation with anyone while in the cruiser. App.

01027. Furthermore, Moyer confirmed that there were no conversations while Ney was in it . Ney also testified that it was only after one of the teenagers told police that Ney had a

gun

— and immediately befor e the police arrested him

— that he realized the police were even concerned about a man with a gun. Thus, the jury could reasonably conclude that Ney never actually informed the police

— either during the recorded 911 call or immediately after

— that there was a man with a gun. Although Moyer testified that Ney did, in fact,
mention a man with a gun, it was the jury’s duty

— and not

ours

— to “weigh evidence [and] determine the credibility of
witnesses

. . . . ” United States v. Beckett , 208 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Casper , 956 F.2d 416,36 421 (3d Cir. 1992))

. Based on the 911 recording, Hayes’s written report, and Ney’s testimony, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Moyer’s statements to the
FBI were false. See McKanry , 628 F.3d at 1018 (holding that the “evidence adequately suppo rts the jury’s verdict” when defendant’s “denial was directly contradicted by evidence, including [defendant’s] recorded admission ”).

B. We also agree that there was sufficient evidence that Moyer acted “deliberately and with knowledge” that his
represent ations were false and that he was aware “at least in a general sense, that his conduct was unlawful.” United States

v. Starnes

, 583 F.3d 196, 212 (3d Cir. 2009). When questioned on June 2 and June 11, 2009, Moyer told the FBI
that

, immediately upon his arr ival at the scene, Ney warned of someone in the park with a gun. The jury also heard testimony that, when confronted with the 911 recording in which Ney did not mention a gun and did identify the participants, Moyer changed his original statement so it

wou ld no longer conflict with the recording. Moyer’s efforts to conform his statement to the recording are sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Moyer deliberately changed his
statement and knew that both his original and changed
statements were false

. See id. at 212

- 213. Th e government

, moreover, presented evidence that no gunman was ever mentioned, as Ney testified at trial that he had no recollection of ever mentioning that anyone had a gun in the park that night. Furthermore, the jury also heard su fficient evidence to conclude that Moyer knew his actions were unlawful; as a certified law enforcement officer, Moyer receive d training that made him aware that, “at least in a general sense,” obstructing a criminal investigation by lying to a federal law37 enforcement officer is unlawful. Id. at 212. All of this evidence was sufficient to prove that Moyer’s actions were knowing and willful.

C. Finally, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of materiality. Courts have recogniz ed that “a frequent aim of false statements made to federal investigators is to cast suspicion away from the declarant.” United States v. Lutpon , 620 F.3d 790, 806 (7th Cir. 2010). “When statements are aimed at misdirecting agents and their investigation, even if they miss spectacularly or stand absolutely no chance of succeeding, they satisfy the materiality requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.” Id. at 806

- 807.

Although the government was not required to show actual reliance on Moyer’s statements, it was req uired to prove that Moyer’s statements had a “natural tendency to influence” or were “capable of influencing” the FBI. United
States v. Gaudin , 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also McBane , 433
F.3d at 352 (expl aining that false statements that could cause
the FBI “to re

- direct their investigation . . . question their informant differently or more fully, or perhaps close their investigation altogether” were material). Count Five focused on Moyer’s efforts to obst ruct the investigation, and specifically, his actions to focus attention away from Piekarsky. His statements to the FBI that Ney mentioned a man with a gun but did not identify Ramirez’s assailants, if taken as true, could have explained Moyer’s actions on the night of the assault with respect to his protection of the teenaged suspects. If believed and acted upon, Moyer’s false statements could have refocused the FBI’s investigation. For38 this reason, Moyer’s statements were material, because they
were “of a type capable of influencing a reasonable
decisionmaker.” McBane , 433 F.3d at 351.

Thus, we conclude that Moyer’s conviction was sufficiently supported by evidence that he knowingly and willfully made materially false statements to the FBI and we will th erefore affirm his conviction.

V I

. For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the judgments of the District Court

.