Filed 2/2/22 In re L.K. CA2/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re L.K., Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B310763

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.K.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

20LJJP00718

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.

Emery El Habibiy, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Navid Nakhjavani, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

The juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over L.K., the child 

of L.M. (mother)1 and M.K. (father), under Welfare and 

Institutions Code2 section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). It found

L.K. was at risk of harm due to father’s physical abuse of L.K.,

violent conduct toward mother, and alcohol abuse, as well as 

mother’s failure to protect L.K. from father’s conduct. 

Subsequently, the court removed L.K. from father under section 

361, subdivision (c)(1) and placed her with mother under the 

supervision of the Department of Children and Family Services 

(the Department). It ordered father to participate in 

enhancement services and granted him monitored visits in a 

therapeutic setting. 

On appeal, father contends: (1) the jurisdictional findings 

regarding his physical abuse of L.K., his infliction of domestic 

violence on mother, and his alcohol abuse are unsupported by 

substantial evidence; (2) removal was unwarranted because 

reasonable alternatives to removal were available to protect L.K. 

if she were returned to father; (3) the juvenile court abused its 

discretion by including certain services in his court-ordered case 

plan; and (4) the court improperly delegated its authority to 

determine the frequency of his visits with L.K. to her therapist. 

As discussed below, we conclude father’s first three 

arguments are without merit. We further conclude father 

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal. 

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code. 
3

forfeited his challenge to the portion of the dispositional order 

concerning his visits with L.K. Accordingly, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Mother and father are the parents of L.K., who was born in 

November 2004. Per a family law court order filed in 2010, they

share joint legal custody of L.K., but father has sole physical 

custody. Until August 2020, L.K. lived with both parents at 

father’s home in Bakersfield. At that point, mother left the home 

and moved into the home of L.K.’s maternal grandmother in

Palmdale. 

On November 6, 2020, L.K. ran away from father’s home 

and had a friend drive her to mother’s residence. The next day,

father informed Deputy Gardner of the Palmdale Sheriff station 

that he had filed a missing person report for L.K. and “asked

[him] to see if [L.K.] was at mother’s home.” He provided Gardner 

with a copy of the 2010 court order regarding the parents’ custody 

of L.K. 

Upon conducting a welfare check at mother’s home, 

Gardner observed L.K. inside. Although father originally told

Gardner that he would allow L.K. to stay at mother’s home, he 

later informed Gardner that he had changed his mind and did not 

want L.K. to remain with mother. Consequently, Gardner 

brought L.K. to the station. Father agreed to pick up L.K., but 

noted it would take him several hours to get there. Subsequently,

however, he told Gardner he was unable to retrieve L.K., and 

that she should be placed in the Department’s custody. The 

events on November 7, 2020 prompted a referral to the 

Department. 

On the same evening, a Department social worker spoke

with L.K. at the Sherriff’s station. L.K. told the social worker 
4

“she left home because there is a lot of fighting at home [and

there was] yelling[ ] [and] screaming happening every day.” 

Among other things, she also related father has been physically 

violent with her, that she has seen father hit mother, that father 

has called her and mother “bad names[,]” and that father “is a 

‘high functioning’ drunk” who regularly drinks significant 

amounts of alcohol in the home. 

Following its investigation, on November 10, 2020, the 

Department filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (a) 

and (b) on L.K.’s behalf. The petition alleged L.K. was at 

substantial risk of serious physical harm due to father’s physical 

abuse, his infliction of domestic violence on mother, his alcohol

abuse, and mother’s failure to protect her from father. 

At the jurisdictional hearing held in December 2020, the 

juvenile court sustained the petition as pled and declared L.K. a 

dependent of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). 

Subsequently, at the dispositional hearing held in February 2021, 

the juvenile court removed L.K. from father and placed her with 

mother under Department supervision, on the condition that 

mother comply with her court-ordered case plan. The court 

granted father enhancement services. His court-ordered case plan 

required him to participate in a full drug and alcohol treatment 

program with aftercare, random or on-demand weekly drug and 

alcohol testing, a 12-step program, a domestic violence program, 

and individual counseling. The juvenile court also ordered father 

to have monitored visitation in a therapeutic setting, and 

specified that “visits will be a minimum of one hour.” 

Father timely appealed. 
5

DISCUSSION

I. Father’s Challenges to the Jurisdictional Findings 

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review 

Under section 300, subdivision (a), the juvenile court may 

exercise jurisdiction over a child if it finds “[t]he child has 

suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, 

serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by 

the child’s parent or guardian.” Pursuant to section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction 

over a child if it finds “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a 

substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm 

or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child’s

parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child[.]”

We review a juvenile court’s jurisdictional orders for 

substantial evidence. (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 

992.) Under this standard, “we view the record in the light most 

favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations, drawing all 

reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the juvenile 

court’s findings and orders.” (Ibid.) “We do not reweigh the 

evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve 

evidentiary conflicts.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 

212, 228.) 

“Substantial evidence must be of ponderable legal 

significance. It is not synonymous with ‘any’ evidence. [Citation.] 

The evidence must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid 

value.” (In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.) “The 

appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a 

sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order.” 

(Ibid.) “‘“The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier 
6

of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole 

record.”’” (In re Yolanda L., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 992.)

B. Father’s Physical Abuse of L.K. 

Father contends the jurisdictional findings pertaining to 

his physical abuse of L.K. are unsupported by substantial 

evidence. Although he acknowledges L.K. reported “several 

instances of physical abuse over the past four years,” he argues 

those incidents “were remote in time and [are] unlikely to recur.” 

Accordingly, he contends “there was a lack of a current risk of 

harm to [L.K.] at the time of the jurisdiction hearing,” and 

therefore “the juvenile court improperly sustained the 

[allegations] for physical abuse.” 

We disagree with father’s argument. As discussed below, 

the evidence demonstrates father was frequently violent with 

L.K. in numerous ways over the last four years. Further, the 

record reflects that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, L.K. 

remained at risk of harm due to his physical abuse, as he has 

refused to accept responsibility for or otherwise acknowledge his 

actions. He is therefore unlikely to change his behavior in the 

future. Consequently, the juvenile court did not err by sustaining 

the allegations pertaining to his physical abuse of L.K.

During separate interviews with the Department, mother 

and L.K. each reported father began physically abusing L.K. 

when she was 12 years old. According to mother, father’s physical 

abuse of L.K. “happened so often over the years that it [was] 

impossible [for her] to pinpoint every time [ ]” it occurred. Mother 

stated father has grabbed L.K. by the hair, placed her in a “choke 

hold”, pushed her to the ground, and kicked her on the head 

while she was on the ground.
7

L.K.’s reports of abuse were consistent with mother’s. L.K. 

stated father has choked her, and “would often push her, pull her 

hair[,] and spit on her.” In recounting specific incidents of 

physical abuse, L.K. reported that during an argument in 2018, 

“father came from behind her and put his arm around her neck so 

the crease of his elbow was against her neck and held her tight.” 

She also stated that in the summer of 2019, father pushed her to 

the ground and kicked her several times on the back of her head, 

leaving welts. L.K. related the most recent incident occurred in

mid-October 2020, just a few weeks before this case was initiated. 

L.K. stated that, for no apparent reason, father took her cell 

phone away, causing her to “panic[ ]” because she felt “her cell 

phone is the only way she can call for help if . . . father gets too 

intoxicated.” When she tried to get her phone back, father pushed 

her, pulled her hair, and spat on her. 

L.K.’s maternal adult half-sister, J.R., reported that 

although “she never witnessed [father] hitting [L.K.], . . . [L.K.] 

ha[s] told her about numerous incidents of him dragging her 

([L.K.]) by the hair, holding/pinning her down on the bed, and 

spitting on her.” J.R. reported father was similarly abusive with 

her when she visited mother and father during her childhood, 

and when she resided with them for a short period of time as a 

teenager. In addition, L.K.’s adult maternal half-brother, A.L., 

stated L.K. “has . . . reported to him that [father] has been very 

aggressive towards her.” 

Despite this, father has denied physically abusing L.K. He 

told the Department that J.R. was “‘coaching’” L.K. and telling 

her to make false reports of abuse. 

In sum, substantial evidence demonstrates father has 

engaged in a repeated pattern of violent behavior toward L.K. 
8

since she was 12 years old. Moreover, substantial evidence 

demonstrates he has refused to acknowledge or otherwise accept 

responsibility for his abusive behavior. Under these 

circumstances, the juvenile court could reasonably infer father’s 

violent conduct is likely to reoccur, and properly find that at the 

time of the jurisdictional hearing, L.K. was at substantial risk of

serious physical harm due to father’s physical abuse. 

C. Father’s Violent Conduct Toward Mother 

Father contends the jurisdictional findings pertaining to 

his infliction of domestic violence on mother are unsupported by 

substantial evidence because “the incidents of domestic violence 

were remote in time and [are] unlikely to recur, as . . . mother 

had moved out of the family home in August 2020 and had no 

plans to return.” He therefore contends that at the time of the 

jurisdictional hearing in December 2020, L.K. was not at risk of 

harm due to ongoing domestic violence between her parents. We 

disagree with his argument. 

Mother reported that she was in a relationship with father 

for 17 years before leaving his home and moving in with maternal 

grandmother in August 2020. She related that for “almost their 

entire relationship[,] [father] has been emotionally and physically 

abusive towards her.” Among other incidents, mother reported 

that when L.K. was a teenager, father sprayed mother with a 

pressure washer during an argument, using sufficient pressure to 

“rip[ ] her shirt off and t[ear] up her skin.” Shortly thereafter, 

L.K. saw mother’s injuries and went to a friend’s house because 

she was afraid. Mother also related that in 2016, father pushed

her to the ground and kicked her in the face while wearing steeltoed boots, causing “her eye . . . to sink in and swell up to the 
9

point that she could not see.” Similarly, L.K. reported father has 

been violent with mother often throughout her childhood for as 

long as she could remember. L.K. stated she has seen father kick 

mother in the face, shove her head under the water in a pool, hit 

her with his hand, drag her around the house by her hair, and try

to suffocate her by shoving her head into the couch. 

Father correctly observes mother moved out of his home in 

August 2020 and has not returned or spoken to him since then. 

As the Department points out, however, mother’s departure from 

the home was fairly recent, having occurred only four months 

before the jurisdictional hearing. More important, the record 

reflects this is not the first time she has left father. Specifically, 

mother reported “she had left father’s home before due to 

intimate partner violence,” which resulted in the family law 

custody order entered in 2010. She later reconciled with father 

and resumed her relationship with him. In addition, mother 

related her decision to leave father in August 2020 was largely 

related to her relatively recent sobriety from longstanding alcohol 

abuse. While the evidence is mixed regarding how long she has 

been sober, it establishes that, as of the jurisdictional hearing, 

mother had only been sober for eight to nine months at the most, 

and four to five months at the least. Moreover, while Department 

noted the evidence did not indicate L.K. was at risk of harm due 

to mother’s alcohol abuse, it still expressed concern for mother’s

ongoing sobriety given her extensive history of abuse, and 

recommended services to ensure she remained sober in the 

future. 

Viewing the evidence, as we must, “in the light most 

favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations [ ]” (In re Yolanda 

L., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 992), we conclude the juvenile court 
10

could appropriately infer that although mother recently moved 

out of father’s home, there is a reasonable possibility that they 

could reconcile and resume their relationship in the future. 

Consequently, the juvenile court could reasonably find that at the 

time of the jurisdictional hearing, L.K. was at substantial risk of 

serious physical harm due to domestic violence between her 

parents. The jurisdictional findings pertaining to domestic 

violence are therefore supported by substantial evidence. 

D. Father’s Alcohol Abuse 

Father argues that the jurisdictional findings relating to 

his alcohol abuse should be reversed because: (1) the evidence 

does not demonstrate he “was an alcohol abuser [ ]”; and (2) 

“[e]ven if [father] did abuse alcohol, no nexus existed between his 

alcohol use and his ability to properly care for [L.K.]” We address 

each contention in turn below. 

First, although not entirely clear, father appears to contend

the record does not reflect he abused alcohol because the evidence 

does not meet the criteria for a finding of “substance abuse” set 

forth in In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 766. In 

support of his contention, father emphasizes that he denied 

drinking alcohol daily, and that L.K. “acknowledged he was able 

to stop drinking when [her] paternal grandparents came to the 

home.” For the reasons discussed below, we disagree with his 

argument. 

We acknowledge that in In re Drake M., supra, 211 

Cal.App.4th at p. 766, the appellate court held that “a finding of 

substance abuse for purposes of section 300, subdivision (b)[ ] 

must be based on evidence sufficient to (1) show that the parent 

or guardian at issue ha[s] been diagnosed as having a current 
11

substance abuse problem by a medical professional or 

(2) establish that the parent or guardian at issue has a current 

substance abuse problem as defined in the DSM-IV-TR.”3 Several 

other courts, however, have disagreed with this holding, and 

rejected the notion that a medical professional’s diagnosis or 

satisfaction of the criteria set forth in DSM-IV-TR is required to 

support a finding that a parent has a substance abuse problem

warranting jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). (See, 

e.g., In re Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720, 726; In re 

Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1218.) 

In any event, we conclude the record contains sufficient 

evidence to support a finding that father suffers from a substance 

abuse problem based on the criteria set forth in In re Drake M. 

3 “The full definition of ‘substance abuse’ found in the DSMIV-TR describes the condition as ‘[a] maladaptive pattern of 

substance use leading to clinically significant impairment or 

distress, as manifested by one (or more) of the following, 

occurring within a 12-month period: [¶] (1) recurrent substance 

use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, 

school, or home (e.g., repeated absences or poor work performance 

related to substance abuse; substance-related absences, 

suspensions, or expulsions from school; neglect of children or

household)[; ¶] (2) recurrent substance use in situations in which 

it is physically hazardous (e.g., driving an automobile or 

operating a machine when impaired by substance use)[;¶] 

(3) recurrent substance-related legal problems (e.g., arrests for 

substance-related disorderly conduct)[; and ¶] (4) continued 

substance use despite having persistent or recurrent social or 

interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of 

the substance (e.g., arguments with spouse about consequences of 

intoxication, physical fights).” (In re Drake M., supra, 211 

Cal.App.4th at p. 766.) 
12

Mother, L.K., and J.R. each reported father drinks large 

quantities of beer daily, and that he will drink constantly from 

when he wakes in the morning to when he goes to sleep or passes 

out in the evening. L.K. and J.R. reported they have seen father 

drink a 30-pack of beer in one day. Mother stated father “‘has 

always pretty much been an alcoholic[,]’” and that he has been 

drinking in this manner since 2004. Before then, he was arrested 

for driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs in 1999, 2000, 

and 2001. 

The evidence shows father became verbally aggressive and 

physically violent toward L.K. and mother when drunk. Mother 

reported that by 4:00 p.m. each day, father was intoxicated; at 

that point, she “‘knew to stay away from him[ ]’” because “‘[h]e 

would become combative, regularly[ ]’” , and would regularly 

“yell[ ] and scream[ ]” at her or “becom[e] physical with her.” She

also stated that when father was drunk, “he would always do

things to be mean [to her and L.K.,] like lock them out of the 

house or put [hair removal product] in her hair while [she] was 

sleeping to make her hair fall out.” 

Similarly, L.K. reported father “got angry very easily when 

intoxicated[,]” and that “it was normal for . . . father to drink beer 

throughout the day and be drunk in the evening[,]” at which 

point “[i]t usually took very little to anger him.” L.K. stated “she 

is very afraid of . . . father when he is drinking.” Indeed, as noted 

above, in October 2020, she “panicked” when father took her cell 

phone away because she felt “her cell phone is the only way she 

can call for help if . . . father gets too intoxicated.” Further, in

recalling occasions where father was violent, mother and L.K. 

observed father was drunk at the time of those incidents. In 
13

addition, J.R. stated she “is scared that [f]ather w[ill] kill [L.K.] 

when he gets drunk one night.” 

The evidence thus adequately supports a finding that 

father’s alcohol use satisfied several of the DSM-IV-TR categories 

referenced in In re Drake M., namely: (1) “‘recurrent substance 

use in situations in which it is physically hazardous’”; 

(2) “‘recurrent substance-related legal problems’”; and 

(3) “‘continued substance use despite having persistent or 

recurrent social or interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated 

by the effects of the substance[.]’” (In re Drake M., supra, 211 

Cal.App.4th at p. 766.) Accordingly, substantial evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s finding that father suffers from a 

substance abuse problem to justify jurisdiction under section 300, 

subdivision (b). 

Next, father contends the juvenile court erred by sustaining 

the alcohol abuse allegations because “no nexus existed between 

his alcohol use and his ability to properly care for [L.K.]” or “the 

physical abuse alleged by [L.K.]” In support of his contention, he 

attempts to analogize the facts of this case to those in In re Drake 

M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 754 and In re David M. (2005) 134

Cal.App.4th 822. Again, we do not agree with his argument. 

In In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 754, the 

appellate court reversed the jurisdictional finding based on the 

father’s marijuana use because the child’s physical needs were 

being met,“[t]here was no evidence or even allegations of abuse in 

the home[,]” the father “had been employed for many years[,]” 

and “[t]here was no evidence showing that [the child] was 

exposed to marijuana, drug paraphernalia[,] or even secondhand 

marijuana smoke.” (Id. at pp. 768-769.) On those facts, the court 

held the Department “failed to show that there was any link 
14

between [the] father’s usage of medical marijuana and any risk of 

serious physical harm or illness to [the child.]” (Id. at p. 769.) 

Similarly, in In re David M., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 

the appellate court reversed the jurisdictional finding concerning

the mother’s marijuana use because “the evidence of [the] 

mother’s . . . substance abuse problems . . . was never tied to any 

actual harm to [her children] or to a substantial risk of serious

harm.” (Id. at p. 829.) The appellate court noted that although 

mother used marijuana on at least one occasion while pregnant 

with her younger child, the evidence did not indicate the child 

consequently suffered any harm. (Ibid.) The appellate court also 

emphasized “[t]he evidence was uncontradicted that [the older 

child] was healthy, well cared for, loved, and that [his parents] 

were raising him in a clean, tidy home.” (Id. at p. 830.) 

Both of these cases are distinguishable from the present 

case. Here, as discussed above, the evidence is sufficient to 

support a finding that father’s alcohol abuse caused him to

frequently become violent with L.K., thereby causing her physical 

harm and compromising her safety. The evidence also 

demonstrates father’s alcohol abuse facilitated his frequent 

infliction of domestic violence on mother in L.K.’s presence, which 

further exposed L.K. to risk of harm and jeopardized her safety.

Therefore, in contrast with the evidence in In re Drake M. and In 

re David M., the record in this case shows that due to his alcohol 

abuse, father did not “adequately supervise or protect [L.K.]”

while she was in his care (§ 300, subd. (b)) and placed her at 

substantial risk of serious physical harm.

In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude the 

juvenile court did not err by sustaining the jurisdictional findings 

pertaining to father’s alcohol abuse. 
15

II. Father’s Challenges to the Dispositional Order 

A. Removal 

1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

Pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1), the juvenile 

court may remove a child from the custody of a parent if it finds, 

by clear and convincing evidence, “[t]here is or would be a 

substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or 

physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were 

returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the 

minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the 

minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” “A juvenile 

court’s removal order at a disposition hearing will be affirmed on 

appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence.” (In re V.L.

(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.) 

Our Supreme Court recently clarified the nature of 

substantial evidence review applicable to a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding made under the 

clear and convincing evidence standard. It held: “[A]n appellate 

court must account for the clear and convincing standard of proof 

when addressing a claim that the evidence does not support a 

finding made under this standard. When reviewing a finding that 

a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the 

question before the appellate court is whether the record as a 

whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact

finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. 

In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give 
16

appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated 

the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and 

drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”

(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012 (O.B.).) 

2. Analysis 

As an initial matter, we note that in challenging the 

removal order, father does not dispute the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that the first 

prong of the two-prong test set forth above has been satisfied. In 

any event, we note that based on the evidence discussed in 

section I, ante, “the record . . . contains substantial evidence from 

which [the juvenile court] could have found it highly probable” 

(O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011) that “[t]here is or would be a 

substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or 

physical or emotional well-being of [L.K.] if [she] were returned” 

to father. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) 

Instead, father solely contends the removal order is 

unsupported by substantial evidence because “[r]easonable 

alternatives to removal existed, such as unannounced home visits 

by the [D]epartment, conjoint therapy, preservation services, and 

wraparound services for the family.” For the reasons discussed 

below, we are not convinced by his argument. 

First, father does not explain how his suggested 

alternatives to removal would have been sufficient to protect 

L.K.’s physical safety if she were returned to him. We 

acknowledge that, in making his argument, father points out he 

was granted sole physical custody of L.K. in 2010, that he has 

“held a job” and “provided for [L.K.,]” and that mother left the 

home in August 2020. However, he does not spell out—and we 
17

cannot discern—how these facts demonstrate his proposed 

alternatives to removal would adequately protect L.K. from harm 

if she were to remain in his custody. The conclusory nature of his 

argument alone is sufficient to warrant its rejection. 

In any event, we conclude substantial evidence supports

the juvenile court’s finding that the second prong of the test set 

forth in section 361, subdivision (c)(1) has been satisfied. In 

addition to denying that he physically abused L.K., father also 

“denied ongoing physical or verbal violence” with mother. He also 

“denie[d] having an alcohol problem[,]” “denie[d] the 

allegations . . . by [mother] that he drinks alcohol all day every 

day[,] and “denie[d] that he drinks to intoxication.” Moreover, 

when asked to identify services that may be beneficial to the 

family in addressing the issues bringing it to the Department’s 

attention, father “did not offer any suggestions on services that 

might benefit him.” 

In sum, as discussed in section I, ante, the record reflects 

father has exhibited a pattern of violent behavior toward L.K. 

and mother, which is related to his alcohol abuse. Nevertheless, 

the evidence discussed above demonstrates father has yet to 

accept responsibility for his actions, recognize the impropriety of 

his conduct, or appreciate the extent to which his behavior has 

and will continue to negatively affect L.K.’s safety. Under these 

circumstances, the juvenile court “could have found it highly 

probable” (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011) that “there are no 

reasonable means by which [L.K.’s] physical health can be 

protected without removing [her] from [her father’s] physical 

custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); see also In re Cole C. (2009) 174 

Cal.App.4th 900, 918 [affirming finding that no reasonable means 

short of removal were available to protect the child where the 
18

father failed to acknowledge the inappropriate nature of his 

abusive parenting techniques and disciplinary methods].)

B. Father’s Participation in Services 

1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

When a child is declared a dependent of the court under 

section 300, the juvenile court “may make any and all reasonable 

orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, 

and support of the child[.]” (§ 362, subd. (a).) Moreover, “[t]he 

juvenile court may direct any reasonable orders to the 

parents . . . of the child . . . as the court deems necessary and 

proper . . . . That order may include a direction to participate in a 

counseling or education program, including, but not limited to, a 

parent education and parenting program . . . . The program in 

which a parent . . . is required to participate shall be designed to 

eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding that the 

child is a person described by [s]ection 300.” (§ 362, subd. (d).)

“‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what 

would best serve and protect the child’s interests and to fashion a 

dispositional order accordingly. On appeal, this determination 

cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.’” (In re 

Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311.) 

2. Analysis

Father contends “[t]he juvenile court’s dispositional orders 

requiring [him] to participate in a six-month drug program, 52-

week domestic violence class, and individual counseling should be 

reversed as an abuse of discretion.” In support of his contention, 

he largely reiterates the same arguments raised in support of his 
19

challenge to the jurisdictional findings. We addressed these 

arguments in section I, ante, and based on the evidence discussed 

therein conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by 

ordering father to participate in the challenged services. 

C. Visitation 

Lastly, father contends the visitation order must be 

reversed. He notes that while the juvenile court granted him onehour monitored visits in a therapeutic setting, it “failed to specify 

the frequency of visits” and instead “order[ed] visits were ‘going 

to be dictated by the availability of the therapist.’” He argues 

that, in so doing, “[t]he court violated the separation of powers 

doctrine” by improperly “delegat[ing] to the therapist the 

authority to determine when visits would begin and thereafter 

take place.” In response, the Department contends father 

forfeited his challenge to the visitation order “because he not only 

failed to object to it [in the juvenile court,] but . . . in 

fact . . . acquiesced to the order[.]” We agree with the 

Department. 

“‘“An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural 

defects or erroneous rulings in connection with relief sought or 

defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was 

not, presented to the lower court by some appropriate method.”

[Citations.]’ This is the general rule, because any other rule 

would allow a party to deliberately stand by in silence and permit 

the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could 

acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable.” (In re G.C. (2013) 

216 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1398.) Where a parent fails to assert in the 

juvenile court that a visitation order improperly delegates the 

court’s authority to determine whether visitation will occur to a 
20

third-party, he or she forfeits the right to raise the issue on 

appeal. (See Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 

676, 685-686.) 

At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court granted 

father monitored visits in a therapeutic setting, with a minimum 

duration of one hour per visit. Subsequently, father’s counsel 

“lodge[d] an objection to the [juvenile] court setting monitored 

visits in a therapeutic setting for one hour.” Immediately 

thereafter, father’s counsel asked the court to clarify its order by 

inquiring whether “there [was] a minimum for how often 

[father’s] visits are to occur[.]” The juvenile court replied that it 

“did not indicate the frequency because . . . [the visits] have to be 

in a therapeutic setting[,]” and therefore the court “assum[ed]” 

that component of visitation would be “dictated by the 

availability of the therapist.” In response, father’s counsel stated: 

“Understood.” 

The record therefore reflects that, upon the juvenile court’s 

pronouncement of the visitation order, father’s counsel raised a 

general objection to the order without specifying the grounds 

upon which it was based. It is well-settled, however, that 

“[g]eneral objections are insufficient to preserve issues for review. 

[Citation.]” (In re E.A. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 787, 790.)

Moments later, in response to father’s counsel’s request for 

clarification, the juvenile court expressly stated it was not going 

to specify the minimum frequency of father’s visits, and stated 

the occurrence of visits would instead be contingent on the

therapist’s availability. At that point, however, father’s counsel 

did not raise any additional objections or otherwise argue that 

the order resulted in an improper delegation of the juvenile 

court’s visitation authority, despite having ample opportunity to 
21

do so. Indeed, as the Department points out, father’s counsel 

apparently acquiesced to the visitation order. 

On this record, we conclude father forfeited his challenge to 

the juvenile court’s visitation order. Accordingly, we decline to

consider his arguments regarding this issue on the merits. 

DISPOSITION

The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, J. 

We concur: 

WILLHITE, Acting P.J. 

COLLINS, J.