### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 22, 200 9 S es sio n

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . MICHAE L EUGE NE CHI TTUM

Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Trousdale County No. 07-69-D -298 John D. Wootten, Jr., Judge

No. M2008- 02106-CCA -R9-C O - F iled May 27, 2009

The De fenda

nt, Michael Eug ene Chit t u m , wa s char g ed with one c ount of rec kless vehicular homicide, a Class C felony

. His application for pretria l diversion was denied by the district attorney g ener al and that de nial was uphe ld by the Criminal Court of Trousdale County . I n this appeal, the Def endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in upholding his de nial of pre trial diversion bec ause the district attorney

g ener al consider ed an ir

rele vant fa ctor in his de nial memorandum. On appe al, the State concedes that the district attorney g ener al impermissibly

considere d an irre levant fa ctor a nd

a sk s u s to re mand

thi s c a se to t

he dis tr ic t a tto rn e y

g e ne ra l f or re c on sid e ra

tio n. Th e Defen da

nt, in response , asks us to reve rse the decision of the trial cour t and re mand to the trial cour t for entr y of an orde r g ranting him pretria l diversion. Afte r our r eview, w e re verse , rema nd, and dire ct the entr

y of an or der g ranting the Def endant pr etrial diver sion.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 9 Int e r loc ut or y A ppe al; Judg m e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t R e ve r se d; Rem anded

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich J ER R Y L. S MI TH and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Vi nc e nt P . Wy a tt, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, Mic ha e l E ug e ne Chi ttum.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po r t e r; Me lis sa

Rob e rg e , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Tom P. Thompson, Dist rict Attorney Gene ra l ; and Jason L awson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound As ou tli ne d b y th e di st ric t a tto rn e y g e ne ra l in

his de nia l of

pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion , th e fa c ts

un de rl y ingthi s c a se are a s f oll ow s:-2- On the e ve nin g of

Ea ste r Sun da

y , Ap ri l 8th , 2 00 7, the De fe nd ant .

. . ha d ju st finished visiting a f

riend in Trousda le County and wa s travelingdown Hig hway 231 towards L ebanon on his wa y to his home i n Her

mitage

. He a

pproac hed the f

our-wa y stop at the intersec tion of

Hig hway 25 and Hig hway

231, and wa ited while a tra ctortr a ile r t ru c k, wh o h a d a

rr ive d at th e sto p s ig n f

ir st, tur ne d le ft fr om H ig hw ay

25 on to Hig hway 231, trave ling in the same direc tion a s the Def endant. The De fenda

nt then proce eded stra ight through the intersec tion and bega n following the t ruck. The truck
was tra veling at about 40 to 50 miles per hour . Acc o rding to the Def endant, he wanted to pa ss the truck. He could not pass the truc k at t h e fi rs t passing zone beca u se of onc oming ve hicles. At the sec ond [] passing zone, another onc oming vehicle obs t ru ct ed his path. Then, ac cording to another motorist following the Def endant, just as the se cond [] passing zone had conc luded, the De fenda nt attempted to over

take the se mi-truck in the no p as s i n g zone. Accor ding to the motorist, the Defe ndant beg an his pass in the no passing zone as he wa s approa ching a small hi l l

. At the rise of the hill, the Defe ndant say s that he wa s only halfwa y throug h the pass of the semi-truck w hen anothe r v eh i cl e t o pped the hill and the Def endant’ s vehicle struc k the ot her vehicle head on. The other vehicle w as driven by the vic tim
, Ge ra ld Mil le r. Mr

. Mil le r wa s kil le d a s a re su lt of the c ra sh . A lso in Mr . M iller ’s ve hic le wa s h is w if e and the ir sma ll g ra

nd da ug hte r. B oth

of the se passeng ers r ecei v ed m i nor injuries. Mr. Miller a nd his wife had spe nt the day cele brating the Easter holiday with f amily and [were] returninghome at the time of the cr ash. Acc ording to the Crash Re-Constructionalist with the Tenne ssee Hig hway Patrol, the Def

endant tra veled in the no pa ssing zone for a distance of seve n hundred

and tw e nty -s e ve n f

e e t to the po int

of imp a c t, a

dis tanc e of

ov e r a te nth of a mil e (0.135 miles).

Th e De fe nd ant w a s n ot u nd e r t he inf lue nc e of a lc oh ol or dr

ug s at th e tim e of

the a c c ide nt. He g a ve the fo llo wi ngre c itatio n o f t he fa c ts:

Iwa s tr a ve lin g so uth

bo un d o n U S Hi g hw ay

23 1 in the e ve nin g ho ur s o f A

pr il 8, 2007. Iwas following a trac tor trailer for a couple of miles at f orty miles a

n hour until I attempted to pa ss the trac tor trailer in the opposite lane inside a passing zone. Itrave led alongthe trac tor trailer until I rea liz ed Iwas in a no pa ssing zone as I saw the l ights of another vehicle cre sting the hill in the l ane of traff ic I was traveling . The vehicle a ppear ed to be too close t o al l ow me to fa ll back into the lane be hind the truck, so I

pulled the whee l t o t he lef t toward the nor

th bound ditch. The driver of the vehicle swerve d for the ditch as we l l an d we c ollided. Iam ver y sad about the

a c c ide nt t hat I kn ow I cause d. Ire g re t e ve ry da y the de c isi on

that I ma de to t

ry to pa ss t he tr uc k. Iwi shthat I

c ou ld t a ke ba c k tha t dec isi on ba c k [si c ] as Ife e l te rr ibl e about the loss of life that my actions ca

used.

The De fenda

nt was cha

rg ed with one c ount of non-intox icated r eckle ss vehicular homicide under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-213( a)( 1), a Class C felony

. On April 10, 2008, he-3-

submitt ed an a

pplication for pr etrial diver sion to the district attorney g ener al. The a pplication was d en i edo nM ay

8
, 2 0 0 8
, ci t i n g

three compelling rea sons for deny ing dive rsion. (1) The Def endant’ s conduct not only endang ere d human life, but actua lly cause d the death of an innocent person and endang ere d t wo others (2) Ba sed on the De fenda nt’s lack of

corr ection fr om previous incidents, he is likely to re-of fend ( 3) The le g islature has e x presse d a cle ar intent with the pa ssag e of a new law that persons c harg ed with Vehic ular Homicide by Recklessne ss should not receive diversion.

I n opining that the D efe ndant was likely to re-of fend, the district attorney g ener al noted one previous ac cident on the De fenda nt’s thirty -seve n y ear

driving rec ord. T h at accident occ urre d on May 18, 2005. The district attorne y g ener al also noted two citations for speeding and one citation fo r r un nin g a re d li g ht.

As to the Def

endant’ s criminal and soc ial history , the district attorney g ener al not ed that the Def endant ha d one convic tion for shoplifting in 1973. The district attorney g ener al otherw ise noted the Def endant’ s positive social history and the positive letters of ref ere nce he compiled in support of his pretria l diversion application. The Def endant has a college deg ree and a ma ster’s de g ree and has re mained consistently employ ed. He h as no hi story of mental or phy sical problems a nd no

re c or d o f p ro ble ms r e la te d to dr ug s o r a lc oh ol.

Ex plaining the perc eived signific ance of the leg islature’s de cision, made a fter A pril 8, 2007,
to remove r eckle ss vehicular homicide from pr etrial diver s ion eligibility , the district attorney g ener al explained that the

[pretrial diversion] statute expressly prohibits diver sion f or the crime of

Ve h icular Homicide. While this provisi on was not i n ef fe ct at the time of the cra sh, the leg islature has subse quently amende d the statute to pr ohibit the g rant of dive rsion for vehicular homicides. As pre- trial diversion was a dis position cre ated by the will and
act a nd intent of t he legislature
, courts shoul d pay particula r attention t o subsequent mod if ic a tio ns and

re vis ion s to the statut e . E ve n if , a s th e De fe nd ant c la ims , E x Post Fa cto protec tions a

pply to a llow the court to rea ch the c onclusion that the Def endant

was s tatuto r il y e li g ib le a t th e ti me o f th e o f f e n s e , th e c u r

r e n t s tatu s o f the law indicate s that a District Attorne y does not abuse his discr etion in denying suc h diversion. Fur

ther, it is important to note that a person char g ed with a class A or B felo n y h as n ever

been e ntitled to diversion. Theref ore, a vehicular

homicide by intox ication has ne ver be en entitled t o diversion under any Tenne ssee diver sion statute. This illust rate s that wh en the leg islature ame nded the pr e-tria l diversion statute to specific ally

exclude vehi cular homicide, the only true e ffe ct of the amendment wa s to no long er make vehic ular homicide by rec klessness elig ible. That was the spe cific le g islative intent o f t h e amendment, as the other wa s alrea dy excluded by

the B felony

rule.-4-

On J uly 1, 2008, the Defenda

nt filed a petition for writ of certiorar i seeking reve rsal of the dis tr ic t a tto rn e y

g e ne ra l’ s d e nia l of

pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion. The Cr imi na l Co ur t of Tr ou sd a le County declined to r ever se the de nial. The De fenda nt now appea ls that decision.

Ana lys is The pre trial diversion statute allows a district attorney g ener al t o suspend t he prosecution of an elig ible defe ndant for a period not to exceed two y ear s. See Tenn. Code Ann. §40-15- 105(a) (1)( A). In order

to qualify for pretria l dive rsion, the defe ndant must not have previously been g rante d diversion; must not have a prior misdemeanor c onviction for which a sentenc e of confine ment was ser

ved or a prior felony conviction within a five-y ear period afte r completing the

se nte nc e or pr ob a tio na

ry pr og ra m for the pr ior c on vic tio n; an d must no t be c ha rg e d w itha

Cla ss A felony , a Class B f

elony , cer tain class C felonies, certa in sexual offe nses, drivi ng under the influence
, or vehic ular a ssault. See id. § 40-15-105( a)( 1)(B )(i)( a)- (c)

. As mentioned above, the s tatute now makes a ny vehicular

homicide inelig ible for pr etrial diver sion, see Te n n es s ee Code Annotated section 40-15- 105(a) (1)( B) (iii)(k), a lthough r eckle ss vehicular homicide was elig ible at t he time the Def endant c ommitt ed his offe nse. S ee 2007 T enn. Pub. Acts ch. 471, §1 ( adding vehicular homicide as one of the Class C felonies inelig ible for pr etrial diver sion).

There is no presumption that a per son elig ible for pr etrial diver sion is entitl ed to diversion. See State v. Curry , 988 S.W .2d 153, 157 (Tenn. 1999) . The “ defe nd an t bear s the burden of establishing that pretrial diver sion is appropriate a nd in the interest of justice;” t h erefore , it is t he responsibility

of the de fenda

nt to provide “substantial favorable evidence fo r t h e district attorney g ener al’s conside ration.” State v. B ell, 69 S.W .3d 171, 179 (Tenn. 2002)

.

The de cision to gr ant or deny an application for pretrial diversion rests within the discretion of the district attorne y

g ener al. S ee Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40-15-105( b)(3)

. “When deciding whe ther
to en te r int o a mem or and

um of un de rs tand ing un de r the pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion statut e a pr os e c uto r s ho uld focus on the de fenda n t ’s amena bility to corre ction. Any

fac tors which tend to ac curately ref lect whether a par ticular de fenda

nt will or wi l l n ot become a repe at offe nder should be c onsidered.” State v. Hammer sley , 650 S.W .2d 352, 355 (Tenn. 1983)

.

Amo n g the fa ctors to be c onsidered in a ddition to t he cir cumstance s of the off ense a re the defe ndant’s criminal rec ord, social history
, the phy sical and me ntal condition of a de fenda nt where

a pp ro pr ia te , a

nd the lik e lih oo d th a t pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion wi ll s e rv e the e nd s o f j us tic e and the be st interest of both the public a nd the defe ndant. I d. I f pretria l dive rsion is de nied, the denia l must be written, must list the evidence considered, discuss which factors were considere d, and discuss the

we ig ht ac c or de d to ea c h fa c tor

. Se e State v. Pin kh a m, 9 55 S.W. 2d 95 6, 96 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . “ Th is require ment entails more than a n abstrac t statement in the reco rd t h at t he district attorne y g ener al has consider ed these fac tors.” Curry , 988 S.W .2d at 157 (c itations omi tted).

I f the a pplication for pretrial diversion is denied, the defe ndant m ay appea l to the t rial cour t fo r a w r i t o f c e rt i o r ar i

. S e e T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 1 5

- 1 0 5 ( b ) ( 3 )

. O n r e v i e w , t h e t r ia l c ou rtis

c on str a ine d to c on sid e r o nly the e vid e nc e c on side red by the dis tr ic t a tto rn e y

g e ne ra l and

mus t-5-

d e te r mi n e w h e th e r

th e d is tr ic t a

tt o r n e y g e n e r a l h a s a

b u s e d h is o r h e r d is c r e ti o n

. Se e B e ll
, 6 9 S. W. 3d at 177. An abuse of discre tion may only be found w here the prosec utor fails to consider all the rele vant factors and their weight or rea ches a dec ision not supported by substantial evidence . See id. On revie w, the dec ision made by the district a

ttorney g ener al is pr esumed corr ect. Curry , 988 S.W .2d at 158. Ther efor e, in a close case wher e the pr osecutor c ould have leg itimately g rante d or denied the a

pplication, the trial cour

t must defer to the judg ment of t he prose cutor. See State v. Carr, 861 S.W .2d 850, 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

. For purposes of our revie w, this Court is “bound by the fa c tua l f

ind ing s ma de by

the tr ia l c ourt un le ss t

he e vid e nc e pr e po nd e ra

te s a g a ins t th e m.” B e ll, 69 S.W .3d at 177.

“Howe ver, if the evidenc e of r ecor d is undisputed and calls for no f inding of fac t to resolve the iss ue , a tria l court ’s de te rm inatio ns c on sti tut e c on c lus ion s of la w to whi c h ana

pp e llate c ourt

is not bound.” Carr , 861 S.W .2d at 856 (citations omitted). There fore
, when the f acts a re undisputed, the under ly ing issue that this Court must deter mine on appea l rema ins whether
, as a matter of law
, the district attorney

g ener al abuse d his or her discr etion in denying pr etrial diver sion. I d.

On appe al, the State conc edes that the district attorney g ener al abuse d his discretion by consideringan irre levant fa ctor, namely the fa ct that t he pretrial di version statute ha d been a mended

a ft e r the date of the De fe nd ant’ s c on du c t to make ve hic ula r ho mic ide ine lig ibl e

. I n reachin g this conclusion, the State relies on the holding in State v. McKim, 215 S.W .3d 781, 788 (Tenn. 2007)
, that a d is tr ic t a tt o r

n e y g e n e r a l a

b u s e s h is o r h e r d is c r e ti o n w h e n c a te g o r ic a ll y d e c li n in g to gr ant diversion to a cer

tain ty pes of diversion-e ligible offe nses. Although we ag ree that th e d i s t ri ct attorney g ener al abuse d his discr etion by considering the amendment to the pretria l diversion statute, we have also held t hat s uch action violates a defenda nt’s ex post fac to rig hts under Ar ticle I , Section 9 of the United States Constitution. I n State v. Michae l H

. Smit h, No. E1999-02722- CCA-R9-CD, 2001 WL 5045 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, J an. 2, 2001), w e noted that “ the [pretrial diversion] statute in eff

ect at the time of the cha

rg ed offense applies,” citing for support B oy kins v. St ate, 584 S.W .2d 194, 196 (Tenn. 1979) , which held that “ retroa ctive applicat ion of [a] stricter pr obation standard w ould be violative of [the] prohibit ion a g ainst ex post fac to la ws.” Smit h, 2001 WL 5045,

a t *2 n. 2. Because c on sid e ratio n o f t he le g isl a tur e ’s a me ndme nt o f t he pr e tr ia l di ve rs ion

statut e vio la te d th e De fe nd ant’ s e x pos t fa c to ri g hts
, we a g re e that the dis tr ic t a tto rn e y g e ne ra l a bu se d h is discretion.

We also conclude that the di s t ri ct at t o rney g ener al in this case, in we ighingag ainst the De fe n d an tt h e f

ac tt h at h i s co n d

u ct ca u s ed t h e d ea t h o f an o t h er , ab u s edh i s d i s cr et i o nb y “f o cu s [ i n g] . . . on his own opinion of what should and should not be a dive rtible offe nse.” Mc Kim, 215 S.W .3d at 788. The de ath of a

nother is an element of vehic ular homicide, se e Te nnessee Code Annotated

se c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 13 (a )( 1) ; to we ig h th e pr e se nc e of an ele men t of a div e rt ibl e c ri me a g a ins t a defe ndant tends, in contravention of the will of the leg islature, to ef fec tively remove that crime f

rom consideration for pre trial diversion.

We t he re fo re c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t atto rn e y g e ne ra l in

thi s c a se imp erm is si bly

“ un de r[t oo k] to a

pp ly a loc a l po lic y

c on tr ary to or diff

e re nt f ro m th a t pr ov ide d b y

state law” in-6-

denying dive rsion beca

use the instant offe nse involved a death. Ha mmersley , 650 S.W .2d at 356. Our c onclusion that the district attorney g ener al foc used on the ty pe o f off ense r ather

than the particula r circumstance s of the off ense or the offe nder is bolstere d by the pauc ity

of evide nce supporting the district attorney g ener al’s sole rema ining g round for denying diversion: his opinion that th e De fe nd ant w a s n ot a me na ble to c or re c tio n a nd wa s th e re fo re lik e ly

to r e -o ff e nd a s a re c kle ss driver. The dist rict attorney g ener al based this conclusion on the fifty -three -y ear -old Def endant’ s three traff ic citations and one previous ac cident. The Def endant’ s counsel desc ribe d the Def endant’ s previous ac cident and dr iving r ecor d at the hea ring befor e the tria l court on his motion for a wr it of

c e rt ior ari :

Es se nti a lly
, ano the r c ar w a s st op pe d – the re wa s [si c ] two lane s g oin g the same direc tion. The outside lane is stopped, allowed [t he De fenda nt] to pull out and the

car trave ling in the inside lane struck [ the Def endant]. Essentially , those fac ts don’t sh owany re c kle ssn e ss. Tw o sp e e din g tic ke ts in 37 y e ars do n’ t sh owre c kle ssn e ss, p ri o r h ab i tu al re ck l es s n es s

. . . . He d o es n ’th a v e a n y k i n d o f r ec o rdfo r b ei n g a

rec kless driver. L ike I said, he reg rets the decision ever y single day
, and he’s sorr y fo r t he mom e nta

ry la ps e in j ud g e me nt.

The State a sks us to remand this case to the district attorney g ener al for r econside ration of the Def endant’ s pretria l diversion elig ibilit y . Our supre me cour t has stated that “[i]f the trial court deter mines that the di strict attorney g ener al has failed to consider a nd weig h all rele vant fa ctors, the trial court m u st rever se the district attorne y g ener al’s dec ision and remand the matter for further consideration and weig hing of all the fa ctors re leva n t t o t h e pretrial diversion dete rmination.” Mc Ki m, 2 15 S.W. 3d

a t 78 8. Th is p ro c e dure sh ou ld a lso g e ne ra lly be fo llo we d in t he e ve nt t hat a district attorney g ener al relies upon irrele vant fac tors in de ny ing pretria l dive rsion, as in this case. See id. at 789.

This Court can, howe ver , re m an d a case to the trial court with an instruc tion that an order g ranting diversion be e ntere d when “there is no substantial evidence to support the decision of the prosec utor” to de ny pretria l dive rsion. State v. Gordon McGe e, Sr., No. M2007-01675-CCA-R10- CD , 2 00 9 WL

10 39 87 , at *8 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. , N a sh vil le , Jan . 1 3, 20 09 ) ( qu oti ngState v. Rus se ll L . Tipton, No. M2006-00260-CCA-R9-CO, 2 007 WL 2295610, at * 7 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug . 9, 2007)). In this case , we conclude that no substantial evidenc e supports the district attorney g ener al’s denia l of pre trial diversion. The D efe ndant has re mained consistently employ ed, has no signific ant cr iminal recor d, and has an excellent social history . He ha s no history of alc ohol or drug abuse. A lthough the district attorney g ener al in this case discussed all rele vant fac tors, his decision rested on two irrele vant factors: the l eg islature’s amendment of the pretrial diversion s tatute and the fac t that the Def

endant’ s crime caused the death of another . Although r eleva nt, the district attorney g ener al’s fur

ther c onclusion that the Def endant is not amena

ble t o corr ection and likely to re-of fend is neither supported by

the Def endant’ s driving re co rd nor c onsistent with the Defe ndant’s expressions of remorse for his conduc t and its consequenc es. We conclude that the Defenda nt has met h is b u r d e n o f p r e s e n ti n g s u b s ta n ti a l e v id e n c e th a t p r e tr ia l d iv e r s io n is a p p r o p r iate an d in the interest of jus t i ce

. See B ell, 69 S.W .3d at 179. We conclude that the district attorney g ener al’s-7-

denial is not supported by substantial e vidence

. We the ref ore rema nd this c ase and direc t that the trial court e nter a

n order direc ting that the D efe ndant be g rante d pretria l diversion.

Conclusion B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g a

uth or iti e s and re a so nin g , we re ve rs e the jud g me nt o f t he tr ia l c ourt

. We remand this ca se to the trial cour t for entr y of an or der g ranting the Def endant pr etrial diver sion.

______________________________ DAVI D H. WEL L ES, J UDGE