### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 9, 200 5

DOU GLA S HA YD EN KIRKH AM , JR . v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sum ner County

No. 820-1999 Jane Wheatc raft, Judge

No. M2004- 02635-CCA -R3-HC - F iled May 3, 2005

The pe titioner appea ls the summary dismiss al of his ha

beas corpus petition. Specifically , he alleg es fata l deficie ncies in the indictment; an invol untary , unintelligent, a nd unknowing g uiltyplea; an illega l and void sentenc e; and inef fec tive assistance of counse l. U pon revie w, we conclude that the petitioner has not presente d any claims that justify

habea s corpus re lief. Ther efor e, we aff irm the summary dismiss al of the ha

beas c orpus petition.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinio n o f t h e co u rt , in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.
Doug las Hay den Kirkham, J r., Tiptonville, Tennesse e, Pro Se

. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Richard H. Duna vant, A s s i stant Attorney Gene ral; L awr ence Ray Whit ley
, District Attorney Gene ral; and Thoma s B. De an, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Fa cts and Proce dural History

On J uly 13, 2000, the petitioner, Doug las Hay den Kirkham, J r., pled g uilty to one count of

ro bb e ry (a Cla ss C fe lon y ). He wa s se nte nc e d a s a Ra ng e I I , mu lti ple of

fe nd e r t o e ig ht y e ars , w ith the first y ear

to be serve d on furloug h to “Tee n Challeng e,” and the re mainder on pr obation. On September 29, 2004, the petitioner filed a pro s e petition for writ of habe as cor pus which alleg ed, g e ne ra lly , f

a ta l de fi c ie nc ie s in the ind ic tme nt; a n inv olu nta ry , un int e lli g e nt, a ndun kn ow ing g uil ty plea; an illeg al and void sentenc e; and ineffe ctive assist ance of counsel. By order enter ed on Oc tober 5, 20 04 , th e tr ia l c ou rt

su mma ri ly de nie d th e pe tit ion . T he pe tit ion e r now a pp e a ls t o th is C ou rt , contending that the trial court erre d in dismi ssing his petition summarily and without appointment of counse l. Upon our re view, we aff irm the trial court’s denial of ha beas r elief.-2- An a ly sis

Article I , § 15 of the Te nnessee Constit ution gua rante es the rig ht to seek habe as cor pus relief

. Further, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101 et seq. codifies the applicable proce dures f or seek i n g a writ. W hile there is no statutory time limi t in which to file for ha beas c orpus re lief, Tenne ssee law provides very narr ow g rounds upo n wh i ch such re lief may be g rante d. Tay lor v. State , 9 95 S.W. 2d78 , 8 3 (T e nn

. 19 99 ). A ha be a s c or pu s pe tit ion ma y be us e d on ly to c on te st v oid judgme nts that are f

acia lly invalid because: (1) the convicting court wa s without ju ri sdiction or authority to sentence a petiti oner; or (2) the petitioner’s sentence has expired. Arc her v. St ate, 851 S.W .2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993)

. By contra st, a voidable c onviction or sent en ce i s one that is fac ially valid, thus requiring proof be y ond the fa ce of

the re cord or j u d g ment to establish its i nvalidity . Tay lor, 995 S.W .2d at 83. The burden of proving that the judgme nt or sentenc e is void, rathe r than voidable , rests with the pe tit ion e r. Wy a tt v . St a te , 2 4 S. W.3d 31 9, 32 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . “ To e sta bli sh that th e jud g me nt i s void, the petitioner must prove that a jurisdictional defe ct appea rs in the rec ord of the origina l trial.” Dix on v. Holland, 70 S.W.3d 33, 36 (Tenn. 2002).

I nit ia lly
, the State no te s that the pe tit ion e r faile d to c omp ly wi th the statut ory

re qu ir e me nts g overning habea s corpus pe titions . Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 29-21-105 states that habe as pe tit ion s “ sh ou ld b e ma de to the c ou rt or jud g e mos t c on ve nie nt i n p oin t of dis ta nc e to the app lic a nt,
un le ss a su ff ic ie nt r e a so n b e g ive n inthe pe tit ionfo r n ot a pp ly ing to s uc h c ou rt

or jud g e .” De sp ite this requireme nt, the petitioner filed his habe as petition in Sum ner County wher e he w as convic ted, rathe r than in L ake County wher e he is inca

rce rate d. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-21- 105. Moreove r, he did not provide a ny

rea son for doing so in his petiti on. The proc edura l provisions of the habea s corpus s t at utes are mandatory and must be scrupulously

followed. Ar cher

v. State, 851 S.W .2d at 165. There fore , beca use the pe titioner failed to comply with the afor ementioned statutory require ment, the trial court c ould have dismissed the ins ta nt p e tit ionon that bas is al on e

. Se e An ton io L . Swe a tt v. Sta te , N o. M1 99 9- 01 30 0- CCA -R 3- PC, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 216 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Na shville, Mar. 6, 2000) pe rm. to appea l de nie d ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; J imm y Wayne Wils on v. State , No. 03 C01 -9 80 6- CR- 00 20 6, 19 99 Te nn . Crim. App. LEXI S 620 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knox ville, J une 24, 1999) pe rm. to appea l denied (Te nn. 1999). Howe ver, the trial court did not base its dismissal on the proce dural de ficienc ies but on the merits of t he allegations, which the court was entitled to do. See Hickman v. State, 153 S.W .3d 16, 21 (Tenn. 2004) . There fore , we will proc eed to the me rits of the petitioner’ s arg ument.

I nit ia lly , th e pe tit ion e r s e ts f orth v ari ou s a lle g a tio ns that may be taken cum ul ative ly

a s a
c o n t e n ti o nth at

h i s g u i l t y p l e a

w a s n o tk n o w i n g l y, v o l u n t ar i l y, a n d i n t e l l i g e n t l y e n t e r e d

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, he a ve rs that: 1) his ple a

wa s c oe rc e d b y

his c ou ns e l; 2 ) he wa s un a w ar e o f th e n a tu r e o f th e c h ar g e a n d th e St a te ’ s b u r d e n o f proof reg arding the eleme nts of the offe nse;-3-

3) he believe d that he wa s pleading to the m inimum sentenc e and was unaw are that hi s se nte nc e c ou ld b e e nh a nc e d w ith his prior c on vic tio ns ; 4) he wa s not informed of the r ang e of punishment he f ace d; and 5) he wa s unawa

re of the nature and conse quence s of the plea

. We first note that cha lleng es t o the validi ty of a g uilty plea render the conviction voidable, not void. Lutt re ll v . St a te , 6 44 S.W. 2d40 8, 40 9 (T e nn . Crim . App . 198 2)

. Th e re fo re , th e y are no t c og niza

ble in a habeas corpus petition but are appropriately addre ssed i n a petiti on for post-conviction relief. I d.

Ne xt, the pe tit ion e r a lle g e s th a t th e Di stric t A tto rn e y un c on sti tut ion a lly

faile d “ to d isc los e
e vid e nc e that if

it w e re pr e se nte d w ou ld h a ve be e n fa vo ra ble to the [pe tit ion e r].

. . . ” Ho we ve r, thi s claim re quires proof

bey ond the fa ce of

the re cord; ther efor e, the judg ment is facia lly valid. The proper vehicle for attacking a facially valid judgme nt based on a constitutional violation is a petition for post-c onviction relief, not a habea s corpus petition. Luttrell, 644 S.W .2d at 409. Ther efor e, the trial court pr operly

dismiss ed this issue.
The pe titioner also aver s that his sentence was illeg al bec ause it ex ce ed ed t h e statutory minimum without enhance ment fac tors being prove n by the State or identified by the sentenc ing court. Upon r eviewing the judg ment, we c onclude that the pe titioner’s sentenc e is not fac ially void. Th e app rop ri a te rang e of pu nis hme nt f

or a Ra ng e I I of fe nd e r s e nte nc e d f

or a Cla ss C fe lon y

is betwee n six and ten y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(b) (3). In the ca se sub judice , the petitioner ple d g uil ty to ro bb e ry (a Cla ss C fe lon y ) a nd re c e ive d a se nte nc e of e ig ht y e ars , wh ic h is c e rt a inl y wi thi n th e app ro pria te rang e . A c c or din g ly , th e se nte nc e imp os e d is le g a l.

T h e p et i t i oner f

urther al l ege s v ar i o u s i n s t an ce s o f i n ef fe ct i v e a s s i s t an ce o f c o u n s el i n cl u d i n g: failu re to p ro pe rl y

inv e sti g a te the c a se , f

a ilu re to a dv ise the pe tit ion e r, failu re to fi le pr op e r m oti on s, failure to present mitigating f actor s, and fa ilure t o ex er cis e due dilig ence as is require d by the Am e ri c a n B ar A sso c ia tio n. I t is we ll- se ttl e d th a t c laims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l c a n o nly be raised in a petition for post-c onviction relief. Mic hael S. Nee ly v. Ricky Be ll, W ar d en , No. M2004-01012-CCA-R3 -H C , 2 0 0 5 T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. LE XIS 4 1 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. , at Nashville, Jan. 20, 2005) (citing Passer ella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); L uttrell v. State, 64 4 S. W.2 d 4 08 , 4 09 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 82 ))

. Th e re fo re , n on e of the se c la ims are c og niza

ble in a habe as cor

pus petition, and they

wer e prope rly

dismiss ed.
The pe titioner also aver s that the indictment was “f atall y d ef ective be cause it states an of fe ns e that in c lud e s v iol e nc e or fe ar w he n in fa c t th e re wa s n on e .” Ou r s up re me c ou rt “ ha s h e ld that, f or c on sti tut ion a l pu rp os e s, ‘an in dic tme nt i s v a lidif it p ro vid e s su ff

ic ie nt i nf orma tio n: ( 1) to enable the ac cused to know the acc usation to which answer i s re q u i re d; (2) to furnish the c ourt
a de qu a te ba sis for

the e ntry of a pr op e r j ud g me nt; a nd(3 ) t o p ro te c t th e a c c us e d f ro m do ub le jeopar dy .’” H owar d Buc h an anv

. T o n y Pa r k e r , Wa r d e n , N o

. W2 0 04-1386-CCA-R3-HC, 2005 Te nn. Crim. App. LEXI S 24, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, J an. 6, 2005) (citing State v. Hill, 954 S.W .2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997) ). The i n d i ct m en t must also meet the statutory require ments as codified at Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 40-13-202:-4-

Th e ind ic tme nt mus t sta te the fa c ts co ns tituti ng the of fe ns e in or din ary

a ndc on c ise lang uag e, without prolix ity or re petition, in such a manner as t o enable a person of

c o m m o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o k n o w w h a ti s i n t e n d e d
, a n d w i t h t h a td e g r e e o f c e r t a i n t y, which will enable the court, on c onviction, to pronounce the proper judgme nt; and in no case are such words as “force and arms” or “ contra ry to the form of the statute”

n e c e s s ar y. Moreove r, our courts have noted, “a n indictment may ref er to the statute that defines the of fense and that indictment is sufficient and satisfies all constitutional and statutory require ments.” B uchanan, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 24, at *23 (citing State v. Sledge , 15 S.W .3d 93, 95 (Tenn. 2000) ; Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tenn. 1998)).
Upon re viewing the indictment in the prese n t ca s e, we conclude that it meets both the constitutional and statutory standards. Spec ifically , the indictment states that the petitioner “ on or
ab o u tt h e 2 7 d a y o f

A u g u s t , 1 9 9 9 , i n t h e C o u n t y a n d S t a t e a f o r e s a i d
, d i d u n l a w f

u l l y a n d k n o w i n g l y, th by violence, ta

ke cash from Patricia

Stewart, a g ainst the pea ce and dignity of the State of T ennesse e. I n Violation of: T.C.A. § 39-13-401.” We note that the petitioner is pr operly named, the date of the of fe ns e is g ive n, the statut e re lie d u po n is re c ite d, the statut ory la ng ua g e is t

ra c ke d, a ndthe e le me nts
re lie d u po n a

re lis te d. Ac c or din g ly , th e pe tit ion e r w a s su ff ic ie ntl y no ti fi ed of the c ha rg e s a g a ins t him, and the trial court had authority to enter the judgme nt following his plea

. Finally , the petitioner contends that the tria l court er red by summarily

dismiss ing his pe tition wi tho ut a pp oin tme nt o f c ou ns e l. Wh ile there is no fe de ra l or state c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o appointment of counse l in a habea s corpus proce eding , the trial court has a duty to appoint counsel “if ne cessa ry

. ” T en n

. Code Ann. § 40-14- 204 (2004); see a lso J ohn C. Tomlins on v. State, No. M2001-02152-CCA-R3-CO, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 549 ( Tenn. Crim. App., at Na shville, J une 28, 2002) ( citing Colema n v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 S. C t. 2546 (1991)).

I f the pe tit ion e r’ s ju dg me nts are fa c ia lly va lid and no t vo id, the tr ia l c ou rt ma y pr op e rl y dismiss a petition for writ of habea s corpus without appointing counsel a nd without hol d i ng an evidentiar y heari n g. S t at e v

. L av o n d as C o rd el l Ne l s o n , No

. M 2 0 0 3 -01525-CC A-R3-CO, 2003 Te nn. Crim. App. LEXI S 1101, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Na shville, Dec. 30, 2003) . See a lso State ex rel. Edmondson v. He nderson, 421 S.W.2d 635, 636-37 (Tenn. 1967) , which provides that a habe as corpus petition may be dis missed without a hearing and without the appointment of counsel if the petition fails to alleg e facts t hat would justify relief

. I n the i nstant matter, the trial court’s a ctions

wer e justified bec ause the petitioner did not alleg e any fac ts that j u stify

habea s corpus re lief. There fore , we a ffirm the tria l court’s de nial of habe as relief

.
Conclusion

The trial c ourt’s summary dismiss al of the ha

beas pe tition i s aff

irmed.

__________________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE