DA 15-0397

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2016 MT 39N

ZACHARY SHAFFER,

 Petitioner and Appellant,

 v.

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Respondent and Appellee.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District,

In and For the County of Carbon, Cause No. DV 15-40

Honorable Blair Jones, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Zachary Shaffer, Self-Represented, Shelby, Montana 

For Appellee:

Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant

Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Alex Nixon, Carbon County Attorney, Red Lodge, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: February 3, 2016

 Decided: February 16, 2016

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

February 16 2016

Case Number: DA 15-0397
2

Justice Patricia Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by unpublished opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports.

¶2 In 2013, a jury convicted Zachary Shaffer of felony assault on a police officer. 

Shortly thereafter, and in a separate criminal action, Shaffer entered a nolo contendere 

plea to a charge of intimidation. Following sentencing in both cases, Shaffer appealed his 

judgments claiming, among other things, he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

(IAC). This Court affirmed the judgments in a non-cite opinion, State v. Shaffer, 2014 

MT 340N, 377 Mont. 436, 348 P.3d 172, and determined that Shaffer’s IAC claims could 

not be reviewed on direct appeal. 

¶3 In April 2015, Shaffer filed a pro se Petition for Postconviction Relief (PCR) with 

the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Carbon County, claiming his trial and 

appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance and that he was maliciously prosecuted. 

In conclusory statements, he set forth several examples of counsels’ failure to adequately 

represent him. He further indicated that he would develop facts supporting his 

allegations in an “amended petition.” The District Court denied and dismissed Shaffer’s 

petition finding that Shaffer failed to provide any substantive evidence in support of his 

conclusory allegations. The court further observed that while a petitioner is permitted 

one amendment of an original PCR petition, it is inappropriate to submit a deficient 

original petition in anticipation of submitting an amended one.
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¶4 In October 2015, Shaffer filed a pro se brief on appeal to this Court. He argues 

that the District Court erred when it denied his petition without appointing counsel for 

him or providing him an evidentiary hearing. The State responds that Shaffer’s PCR 

petition was properly denied as deficient and that Shaffer was not statutorily or 

constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel for his PCR proceeding. Moreover, the 

State asserts that Shaffer’s petition before this Court seeking reversal of the District 

Court’s ruling was deficient in its failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure.

¶5 Section 46-21-104, MCA, provides, in relevant part: 

(1) The petition for postconviction relief must: 

. . .

(c) identify all facts supporting the grounds for relief set forth in the 

petition and have attached affidavits, records, or other evidence establishing 

the existence of those facts.

Shaffer’s PCR petition before the District Court failed to satisfy this statutory 

requirement, justifying the District Court’s dismissal and denial of the petition. 

¶6 Furthermore, Shaffer failed to properly brief and argue his claims on appeal before

this Court. M. R. App. P. 12(1)(g) requires parties to cite to relevant authorities and 

statutes in support of their arguments on appeal. Shaffer fails to cite to any statute, rule, 

or applicable case to support his claim that the District Court was required to appoint 

counsel or conduct an evidentiary hearing on his IAC claims. “We have repeatedly held 

that it is not this Court’s obligation to conduct legal research on behalf of a party or to 

develop legal analysis that might support a party’s position.” State v. Cybulski, 2009 MT 

70, ¶ 13, 349 Mont. 429, 204 P.3d 7. 
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¶7 While self-represented litigants are given a certain amount of latitude in legal 

proceedings, we cannot allow such latitude to prejudice the opposing party. It is 

reasonable to expect all litigants to comply in most respects with the applicable 

procedural rules. Greenup v. Russell, 2000 MT 154, ¶ 15, 300 Mont. 136, 3 P.3d 124. 

Here, Shaffer has failed to comply with these rules and has failed to demonstrate error on 

the part of the District Court. 

¶8 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the District Court’s findings were not 

clearly erroneous nor were its conclusions of law incorrect. Davis v. State, 2004 MT 112, 

¶ 13, 321 Mont. 118, 88 P.3d 1285. 

¶9 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of 

our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for unpublished opinions. In the opinion of 

this Court, this case presents questions clearly controlled by settled law. 

¶10 Affirmed.

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER

We Concur: 

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ JIM RICE