NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JERMAIN DESHAWN TROTTER, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0240

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201801799

The Honorable Derek Carlisle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Alice Jones

Counsel for Appellee

Janelle A. McEachern, Attorney at Law, Chandler

By Janelle A. McEachern

Counsel for Appellant

Jermain Deshawn Trotter, San Luis

Appellant

FILED 03-26-2024
STATE v. TROTTER

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding 

Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Jermain Deshawn Trotter appeals the superior court’s 

revocation of his probation and the resulting prison sentence. Trotter’s 

counsel filed a brief per Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. 

Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), certifying that, after a diligent search of the 

record, she found no arguable question of law that was not frivolous. 

Counsel asks this court to search the record for fundamental error. Trotter 

filed a supplemental brief and raised these issues: the witness testimony

was false and unreliable hearsay, the superior court improperly revoked his 

probation solely based on restitution money owed, and he did not receive 

a complete case record. After reviewing the record for arguable issues, we 

affirm the revocation of Trotter’s probation and the prison sentence. See 

Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83-84 (1988); State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, 

¶ 30 (App. 1999).

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2021, Trotter pled guilty to forgery, a class 4 felony. The 

superior court suspended imposing a sentence and placed Trotter on four 

years of probation. Trotter requested that his probation supervision be 

transferred to Georgia. Georgia accepted supervision. Terra Sears, a 

probation officer in Mohave County, administratively oversaw Trotter’s 

out-of-state probation.

¶3 In February 2023, Trotter was arrested in Las Vegas for

domestic battery, obtaining or using another person’s identification, and

obtaining or using a debit or credit card without the cardholder’s consent.

The next month, Sears petitioned to revoke Trotter’s probation. Sears 

alleged that Trotter violated his probation by failing to 1) maintain a 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

superior court’s findings. State v. Vaughn, 217 Ariz. 518, 519, ¶ 3, n.2 (App. 

2008).
STATE v. TROTTER

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“crime-free lifestyle” based on a 2022 theft conviction and the February 

2023 arrest; 2) report law enforcement contact within 72 hours; 3) report to 

the probation department after sentencing and release from custody; 

4) report his change in residence; 5) pay all restitution, fines, and fees; and 

6) leaving Georgia without permission.

¶4 The superior court held a contested probation violation 

hearing. The State presented several exhibits at the hearing, including

Trotter’s signed acceptance of his probation terms, the interstate compact

directive, past due notices for court-ordered financial obligations, and a Las 

Vegas police report from the February 2023 arrest. Sears testified that she 

spoke to Trotter’s probation officers in Georgia to determine Trotter’s 

situation and whether he had permission to leave the state. She stated that 

neither she nor the Georgia probation department permitted Trotter to 

leave Georgia.

¶5 Sears also testified that Trotter failed to report his contact with 

law enforcement twice. First, Trotter had law enforcement contact in Las 

Vegas in May 2022. Although Trotter needed to report this contact as a 

condition of his probation, Sears only learned of the interaction after 

running a criminal history check in March 2023. Second, Trotter was 

arrested in Las Vegas in February 2023. Trotter did not report the arrest, 

and Sears learned about it when a victim called her. Sears testified that she

spoke with the Georgia probation department, which was also unaware of 

Trotter’s February 2023 arrest. Sears explained that although the Las Vegas 

police report named “Jermain Jackson” as the arrestee, the name was 

Trotter’s alias, and the booking photo matched Trotter.

¶6 Trotter denied signing the document that showed that he had

accepted the terms of his probation. Next, he claimed he reported all law 

enforcement contact to the Georgia Probation Department. Finally, Trotter

gave conflicting testimony about whether he had permission to leave 

Georgia. He first claimed he was allowed to leave the state but later denied

having permission to leave, and finally claimed he did have permission. 

The superior court stated Trotter’s testimony was “inconsistent 

and . . . self-serving” and found Trotter’s testimony not credible.

¶7 The superior court found that Trotter violated his probation 

by failing to report law-enforcement contact, changing his residence 

without approval, leaving Georgia without permission, and failing to pay 

restitution and other fines and fees. The superior court revoked Trotter’s 

probation and sentenced him to prison for two and a half years. He received 

79 days of presentence incarceration credit. Trotter appealed.
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DISCUSSION

¶8 We have read and considered counsel’s brief and have 

reviewed the record for arguable issues. See Clark, 196 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 30. We 

find none. Trotter was present and represented by counsel at all stages of 

the proceedings against him. See State v. Jackson, 16 Ariz. App. 476, 478 

(1972). The record reflects the superior court afforded Trotter all his 

constitutional and statutory rights and conducted the proceedings 

according to the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The superior court 

held appropriate hearings, and the evidence presented at the probation 

revocation hearing and summarized above was sufficient to support the 

superior court’s findings. And Trotter was allowed to speak before

disposition. Trotter’s presumptive sentence falls within the range 

prescribed by law. See A.R.S. § 13-2002(C); A.R.S. § 13-702(D). And the 

superior court gave Trotter appropriate presentence incarceration credit.

¶9 We have also evaluated the arguments raised in Trotter’s 

supplemental brief. We address each issue in turn.

A. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Admitting Sears’s Testimony.

¶10 Trotter argues that Sears gave false and unreliable testimony

at his contested probation violation hearing. Trotter further argues that 

because Sears’s testimony was “not based on first hand oversight 

knowledge” and because his “direct supervisory probation officer” from 

Georgia did not testify, the superior court relied impermissibly on Sears’s 

“second hand hearsay.”

¶11 During probation violation hearings, “[t]he court may receive 

any reliable evidence not legally privileged, including hearsay[.]” Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 27.8(b)(3); see also State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. 72, 82 (1985). Hearsay 

testimony is admissible in probation violation hearings when the testimony 

is trustworthy. See Stotts, 144 Ariz. at 82; see also State v. Brown, 23 Ariz. App. 

225, 231 (App. 1975) (Reliable evidence is what is trustworthy.). Generally, 

communications between probation departments are sufficiently reliable to 

justify probation revocation. See, e.g., State v. Valenzuela, 116 Ariz. 61, 63 

(1977), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Ojeda, 159 Ariz. 560, 562 (1989); 

State v. Salinas, 23 Ariz. App. 232, 234 (1975) (“Unchallenged information 

presented by a county probation officer concerning communications and 

records within the probation department would normally be considered 

reliable information.”). Here, Sears testified that she communicated with 

the Georgia probation officers, who told her Trotter did not have 
STATE v. TROTTER

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permission to leave the state. The superior court did not abuse its discretion 

by admitting Sears’s testimony.

¶12 Trotter also disputes Sears’s testimony about law 

enforcement contact in Las Vegas and challenges the admission of the 

police report. He highlights that the Las Vegas police report names 

“Jermaine Jackson” instead of “Jermain Trotter.” But Sears testified that 

“Jermain Jackson” is Trotter’s alias, and the arrest booking photo matched 

Trotter as he appeared at the hearing. The superior court found that Trotter

“admitted the person in the police report is him despite the fact the name is 

Jermain Jackson.” The superior court noted that although the police report 

is hearsay, it is “reliable hearsay.” The superior court has reasonable 

discretion to determine whether the evidence is reliable. State v. Snider, 172 

Ariz. 163, 164 (App. 1992). We will not disturb the superior court’s decision 

to admit the evidence and Sears’s testimony. See Stotts, 144 Ariz. at 82.

B. The Superior Court Did Not Revoke Trotter’s Probation Just 

Because He Failed to Pay Restitution.

¶13 Trotter alleges that the superior court only revoked his 

probation because he failed to make restitution payments. He also claims 

that Sears’s “only reason for testifying for the state . . . hinges solely on 

restitution monies owed.” The court did not revoke Trotter’s probation just 

because he owed restitution. The superior court found that Trotter violated 

several other probation conditions along with his failure to pay. During 

sentencing, the superior court noted that if Trotter’s lack of payment were

his only violation, he would not be sentenced to prison. We find no error.

C. We Decline to Review Trotter’s Claim that His Counsel Failed to 

Provide Him with a Complete Record.

¶14 Trotter alleges that his counsel failed to provide him with a 

complete record of the probation revocation hearing. The record shows

Trotter’s counsel sent him all the documents from his file, including 

transcripts. Nevertheless, whether Trotter’s counsel provided him with the

complete record for his appellate review is not an appropriate claim for

appeal. If Trotter wishes, he may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, which he must do in a petition for post-conviction relief. See State v. 

Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2002).

CONCLUSION

¶15 The revocation of Trotter’s probation and his resulting prison 

sentence are affirmed. After the filing of this decision, defense counsel’s 
STATE v. TROTTER

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6

obligations pertaining to Trotter’s representation in this appeal will end 

after informing Trotter of the outcome of this appeal and his future options, 

unless counsel’s review reveals an issue appropriate for submission to the 

Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 

Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984).