IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-0908 

Filed June 25, 2014

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LUCAS DAVID REEVES,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joseph M.

Moothart, District Associate Judge. 

A defendant appeals his conviction for domestic abuse assault causing 

bodily injury. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert Ranschau, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney 

General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Jeremy Westendorf, 

Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ.
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MCDONALD, J.

Defendant Lucas Reeves appeals his conviction for domestic abuse 

assault causing bodily injury, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(2)(b) 

(2011). He argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion 

for new trial. He also contends his trial counsel provided constitutionally 

ineffective assistance by failing to object to certain statements made by the 

prosecutor during rebuttal argument. We affirm Reeves’ conviction.

I.

On February 15, 2013, a jury found Reeves guilty of the above-stated 

offense. Reeves’ trial counsel filed a motion for new trial, contending the verdict 

was against the weight of the evidence. The district court denied the motion on 

the record, which Reeves contends was an abuse of discretion. The gist of 

Reeves’ argument is the State’s case is wholly circumstantial: no witness saw the 

assault occur; and the victim, Reeves’ wife, denied the assault. 

“A court may grant a new trial where a verdict rendered by a jury is 

contrary to law or evidence.” State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006). 

Contrary to the evidence means contrary to the weight of the evidence. See 

State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Iowa 2003) (citation omitted). “The 

district court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial.” Id. at 202. 

Our review is limited to the question of whether the district court abused its 

discretion in denying the motion and not a decision on the merits of whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See id. at 203. To establish an 

abuse of discretion, the defendant must show the district court exercised its 
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discretion on grounds for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly 

unreasonable. See id. at 202. We recognize that trial courts should exercise the 

discretion to grant a new trial “carefully and sparingly.” State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 

655, 659 (Iowa 1998).

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 

motion. The district court found that the weight of the evidence—although 

circumstantial—supported the verdict. The victim was not credible. Her 

explanation of events to the police and then testimony was not internally 

consistent and was not consistent with the timeline and physical evidence. On 

the other hand, the contrary evidence in support of the verdict was credible and 

compelling. 

The contrary evidence showed the Reeveses married on June 21, 2012. 

After the wedding they returned to their apartment with another couple and 

ordered pizza. Sometime that same day, several neighbors heard a very loud 

argument coming from inside the apartment. One of those neighbors, Roberto 

Corona, saw two people, not the Reeveses, exit the apartment. Corona 

continued to hear loud arguments emanating from the Reeveses’ apartment and 

called 911. 

Around the same time, Michael Carpenter, an employee of Pizza Hut, 

arrived at the Reeveses’ apartment to deliver pizza to the Reeveses. Carpenter 

heard one male and one female arguing with each other. As Carpenter 

approached the door to the apartment, he testified, he heard sounds described 

as a fist hitting someone’s face two to three times. After the last hit, he heard a 
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female voice “gasp in horror.” Approximately ten seconds later, a male and 

female exited the apartment. The female looked “horrified,” and the male looked 

horrified and confused. Neither of the individuals exiting the apartment appeared 

injured. The female told Carpenter, “Yeah, you should probably go and call the 

police.” Carpenter left, he contacted his supervisor, and the police were called.

Officers Bose and Roberts arrived at the Reeveses’ apartment and found 

the apartment door closed and locked. Officer Roberts knocked and announced, 

but no one answered the door. After repeated attempts to have someone 

answer the door were met without any response, Officer Roberts kicked down 

the door to gain entry. Inside the apartment, the officers observed food 

containers on the floor and food splattered on the wall and kitchen floor 

consistent with an argument or fight. The defendant came out of the bathroom, 

told the officers nothing happened, and repeatedly asked why the officers were 

there. Officer Bose observed Reeves had blood on his ankle and what appeared 

to be blood smeared on his shirt. 

Officer Roberts interviewed the victim, who had a bloody, fat lip. The strap 

from her dress was torn off. She told Officer Roberts that she and the defendant 

had been wrestling. Upon hearing this, the defendant changed his story and 

agreed with the victim. The victim then told Officer Roberts she tripped on her 

dress and hit her face on a table. Her injuries were not consistent with her 

account. When Officer Roberts told the victim the police had to photograph her 

injuries, she ran away and locked herself in the bathroom and did not allow 

pictures. 
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More credible evidence supports the State’s case than Reeves’ case. 

Multiple disinterested witnesses heard arguments emanating from the apartment. 

Those witnesses independently called 911. Upon arriving shortly after receiving 

dispatch, the officers found physical evidence, including thrown food, torn 

clothing, blood stains, and physical injuries consistent with an assault. Reeves’

and the victim’s explanation of events were internally inconsistent and not 

consistent with the physical evidence. At trial, the victim contradicted herself 

about the assault; at first denying there was another couple in the apartment 

when the assault started and then later admitting to the same. We cannot say 

the district court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for new 

trial.

II.

Reeves next contends that his counsel rendered constitutionally deficient 

performance in failing to object to several remarks made during rebuttal 

argument that, he contends, constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 

In analyzing the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim, our first step is to assess whether the record 

demonstrates, as a matter of law, the existence or absence of a 

meritorious due process violation. Thus, we must consider whether 

the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct in the particulars identified 

by [defendant] and whether the record shows [defendant] was 

prejudiced, i.e., denied a fair trial.

If the record is insufficient to make this determination, we 

must preserve the defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim for a 

fuller development of the pertinent facts. If, however, the record 

shows that either element is lacking as a matter of law, we will 

affirm [defendant’s] conviction without preserving his due process 

claim for a later postconviction relief action. 
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State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869-70 (Iowa 2003). The record is sufficient to 

pass on Reeves’ claim. 

“To show a denial of due process, the defendant must establish the 

prosecutor’s misconduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” Id. at 876. 

Relevant factors include: “(1) the severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct; 

(2) the significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the case; (3) the 

strength of the State’s evidence; (4) the use of cautionary instructions or other 

curative measures; and (5) the extent to which the defense invited the 

misconduct.” Id. at 877. “The most important factor under the test for prejudice 

is the strength of the State’s case.” State v. Carey, 709 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 

2006); see id. at 560 (finding alleged misconduct by prosecutor was not 

prejudicial where “the State’s evidence was extremely strong”). We turn our 

attention to the particular statements challenged.

Reeves contends his counsel should have objected when the prosecutor 

referred to Reeves’ arguments as “garbage” and “offensive.” Reeves 

mischaracterizes the nature of the prosecutor’s statement. The prosecutor was 

not commenting on Reeves’ theory of the case. Instead, the prosecutor was 

responding to defense counsel’s statement to the jury that the State had wasted 

the jury’s time in bringing the case:

Some of you may be thinking, ‘Why are we here’? Well, let’s take a 

look. We can’t blame the police. . . . We can’t blame Mr. 

Reeves. . . . The State is the one who chooses to pursue these 

types of offenses, and they’re the ones that bring us here today.

When the prosecutor’s statement is viewed in context, we cannot conclude the 

prosecutor engaged in misconduct or this statement resulted in an unfair trial. 
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The prosecutor’s comments were not pervasive, they were not related to a 

central issue in the case, and the comments were invited by defense counsel’s 

argument that the State was wasting the jury’s time. “While more professional 

language could, and should, have been used to convey the same message, we 

should not forget that prosecutors are entitled to some latitude in crafting a 

closing argument.” See id. at 557.

Reeves next contends his counsel should have objected when the 

prosecutor commented on the victim’s contradictory testimony regarding whether 

there was or was not another man and woman in the apartment at the time the 

argument started. The victim testified that her testimony changed because she 

did not understand the State’s original questions. In rebuttal, the prosecutor 

stated:

What she testified to is not believable. They try to explain away 

how she didn’t understand my question. I don’t think I could have

been any clearer. I asked it, I don’t know, five times in different 

ways. Everything I did, I was trying to make sure that it was as 

clear as possible for her, to give her a chance to explain. ‘Oh, no.’ 

Or correct herself. “No, this is actually the way it was.” Not once 

did she get that. It was continued, ‘No, no. It was just us, just us, 

just us, just us.’

We conclude the prosecutor’s statement does not rise to the level of misconduct. 

“Counsel may draw conclusions and argue permissible inferences which 

reasonably flow from the evidence presented.” Carey, 709 N.W.2d at 554 

(citation omitted). While it is improper for the prosecutor to call a witness a liar or 

to state the witness is lying, the prosecutor is also free “to craft an argument that 

includes reasonable inferences based on the evidence and . . . when a case 

turns on which of two conflicting stories is true, [to argue that] certain testimony is 
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not believable.” Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 876 (alteration in original) (citation 

omitted). 

Reeves finally contends the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the 

reasonable doubt standard.

If you are convinced, if you’re firmly convinced that the defendant 

did this, there is no reasonable doubt. That’s it. So, as you sit here 

today, if you’ve got a gut feeling, if your gut’s telling you he did this, 

this is what he did, he hit his wife, he abused his wife, then there’s 

no reasonable doubt.

Reeves has not established the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. The 

prosecutor’s statement that there is no reasonable doubt if the jury was “firmly 

convinced” of the defendant’s guilt is contained in the jury instruction on 

reasonable doubt. Second, the defendant has not cited any authority standing 

for the proposition that the prosecutor’s statement about a “gut feeling” was 

improper. When viewed in context it appears the prosecutor connected his

statement regarding “gut feeling” to the proper “firmly convinced” language. 

Further, the record establishes that the prosecutor’s statement did not 

prejudice Reeves and deprive him of a fair trial. First, the prosecutor’s statement 

was an isolated incident. Second, and more important, the court provided 

cautionary instructions: (1) instructing the jury to decide Reeves’ guilt from the 

evidence and the jury instructions; (2) stating the correct reasonable doubt 

standard; and (3) instructing the jury that evidence did not include statements, 

arguments, or comments by the lawyers. See State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 

756 (Iowa 2006) (finding defendant was not prejudiced where the jury was 

instructed to decide the defendant’s guilt or innocence “from the evidence and 
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the law in these instructions, and that evidence did not include statements, 

arguments, and comments by the lawyers” (alteration omitted)). In a very similar 

case, our court concluded that the prosecutor’s statement made during closing 

argument that the jury should follow its “gut feeling” was not prejudicial where 

proper instructions were given and the State’s case was strong:

Further, when we consider the record as a whole, the alleged 

comment could not have misled the jurors into applying a lower 

standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court 

instructed the jury it was to base its verdict only upon the evidence 

and the instructions given by the court. The instructions identified 

the correct standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, and 

accurately defined that standard. We find this was sufficient to 

dispel any potential confusion which might have been caused by 

the prosecutor’s alleged comment. See State v. Hardin, 569 

N.W.2d 517, 522 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). In addition, as with the 

prosecutor’s misstatement of a fact, any alleged misstatement of 

law was one isolated incident. Finally, as noted earlier, the 

evidence against Morris was very strong. We conclude any alleged 

misstatement of law by the prosecutor did not deny Morris a fair 

trial.

State v. Morris, No. 98-1640, 2000 WL 381641, at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 12, 

2000). 

Finally, and this applies with equal force to each of the statements alleged 

to be improper, there is overwhelming evidence of guilt. While the State’s case 

was circumstantial, there is no distinction between direct evidence and 

circumstantial evidence. See State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Iowa 

2008). As discussed in the preceding division, law enforcement quickly 

responded to two separate calls reporting the assault. The victim and Reeves 

were found alone in their apartment with physical evidence and injuries that could 

only be explained by an assault on the victim. “The most important factor under 
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the test for prejudice is the strength of the State’s case.” Carey, 709 N.W.2d at 

559. There was no prejudice here.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, Reeves’ conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.