COURT OF CHANCERY 

OF THE 

STATE OF DELAWARE

JOSEPH R. SLIGHTS III

VICE CHANCELLOR

417 S. State Street

Dover, Delaware 19901

Telephone: (302) 739-4397

Facsimile: (302) 739-6179

Date Submitted: July 12, 2018

Date Decided: July 18, 2018

Kurt M. Heyman, Esquire Stephen B. Brauerman, Esquire

Heyman Enerio Gattuso & Hirzel LLP Bayard, P.A.

300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 200 600 N. King Street, Suite 400

Wilmington, DE 19801 Wilmington, DE 19801

Re: A&J Capital, Inc. v. Law Office of Krug

C.A. No. 2018-0240-JRS

Dear Counsel:

This letter opinion addresses Plaintiff, A&J Capital, Inc.’s (“A&J”), motion 

for summary judgment in which A&J seeks a declaratory judgment that it was 

improperly removed as manager of LA Metropolis Condo I, LLC (“LAMC” or the 

“Company”). A majority of the Company’s members purported to remove A&J as 

manager “for cause.” A&J’s motion for summary judgment posits that, as a matter 

of contract or as a matter of Delaware common law, prior to removal, the members 

were required to provide A&J with: (1) a notice of their intent to remove A&J that 

contained an explanation of the ground(s) for removal, and (2) an opportunity to 
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respond to the notice. In taking this position, A&J acknowledges that the 

Company’s operating agreement does not expressly contain either condition to 

“for cause” removal. 

For the reasons discussed below, I am satisfied that the common law does not 

alter or amend the Company’s operating agreement with respect to “for cause” 

removal procedures. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment must be 

denied. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I have drawn the facts from the admissions in the pleadings and uncontested 

facts presented in the parties’ submissions.1 I have resolved any doubt as to the 

absence of a genuine issue of fact in favor of the non-moving party.

2

A. The Parties 

Plaintiff, A&J, is a California corporation and the designated Class B Manager 

of the Company pursuant to the Operating Agreement of LAMC (the “Operating 

 

1 See Ct. Ch. R. 56(c). Citations to the Complaint will be to “Compl. ¶ __” and to the 

Def.’s Answer and Verified Countercls. to Verified Compl. will be to “Answer & 

Countercl. ¶ __.” 

2 Brown v. Ocean Drilling & Expl. Co., 403 A.2d 1114, 1115 (Del. 1979).
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Agreement”) and the Management Agreement by and among LAMC, A&J and the 

Joined Members (the “Management Agreement”),3 both dated July 11, 2014 

(collectively, the “Agreements”).4 Nominal Defendant, LAMC, is a Delaware LLC 

that was formed for the purpose of raising immigrant investor capital under the EB5 visa program administered by the United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services.5 The Company solicited capital from 200 foreign investors, and these 

investors became Class B Members of the Company.6 Defendant, Law Office of 

 

3 The Management Agreement defines “Joined Members” to be “[t]hose persons . . . who 

have joined as a party to this Agreement . . . by entering into a Joinder Agreement . . . and 

whose details are contained in each respective Joinder Agreement,” and “Joinder 

Agreement” is defined as “the Joinder Agreement to this Agreement in the form as attached 

hereto.” Compl., Ex. 2 (“Management Agreement”) at 1–2. A&J represents, and Krug 

does not dispute, that the Class B Members executed Joinder Agreements. See Pl.’s Mot. 

for Leave to File Verified Am. Compl. 4, Ex. D; Def.’s Answering Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s 

Mot. for Leave to File Am. Compl. 1–3, 6–7. 

4 Compl. ¶ 3; Answer & Countercl. ¶ 13; Compl., Ex. 1 (“Operating Agreement”) § 5.3(a); 

Management Agreement § 2(a). 

5 Answer & Countercl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 10.

6 Answer & Countercl. ¶¶ 2, 12; Operating Agreement at 2; Management Agreement at 1–

2. 
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Krug (“Krug”), is a single-person California law firm appointed as the interim 

Class B Manager following A&J’s purported removal.7

B. A&J’s Removal as Class B Manager

The Operating Agreement and Management Agreement contain three removal 

provisions that are relevant to this dispute. Under Section 4.8 of the Operating 

Agreement, “the Class B Members, by Majority Vote,8shall have the sole and 

exclusive right to approve or disapprove the following . . . (f) Subject to 5.3, 

appointment, reappointment and removal, as applicable of any Manager.”9 Pursuant 

to Section 5.3(c)(ii) of the Operating Agreement, “[t]he Class B Manager may be 

removed by Majority Vote of the Class B Members for gross negligence, intentional 

misconduct, fraud or deceit, all as more fully set forth in the Management 

Agreement.”10 Section 12(b) of the Management Agreement states, in its entirety: 

 

7 Answer & Countercl. ¶¶ 4, 27.

8 The Operating Agreement defines “Majority Vote” as “Class B Members who, at the time 

in question, have Percentage Interests aggregating more than fifty percent (50%) of all 

Percentage Interests held by all Class B Members.” Operating Agreement at 3.

9 Operating Agreement § 4.8(f). 

10 Operating Agreement § 5.3(c)(ii).
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The Class B Manager may be removed by Majority Vote (as defined in 

the Operating Agreement) of the Class B Members for gross 

negligence, intentional misconduct, fraud or deceit; provided that in 

any of such events as specified in this Section 12(b), without limiting 

any of their respective rights and remedies, the Members shall be 

entitled to exercise their respective powers under the Operating 

Agreement to appoint a new Class B Manager and to cause the 

Company to issue written notice of termination to the Class B Manager 

hereunder.11 

These three provisions—Sections 4.8(f) and 5.3(c)(ii) of the Operating Agreement 

and Section 12(b) of the Management Agreement—comprise the universe of 

contractual provisions that govern the procedure for removal of the Class B 

Manager. 

On or about March 14, 2018, A&J received a letter (dated March 14, 2018) 

notifying it that a majority of the Class B Members had voted to remove A&J as the 

Class B Manager and had appointed Krug as the interim Class B Manager 

(the “Removal Notice”).12 The Removal Notice states that “[a] majority of the Class 

B members have, in writing, voted to remove A&J [] as the Class B Manager,” but 

is silent as to the reason(s) for A&J’s removal or the details of the Class B Member 

 

11 Management Agreement § 12(b).

12 Answer & Countercl. ¶ 27.
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vote effectuating the removal.13 A&J asserts that prior to receiving the Removal 

Notice, “neither A&J nor the Company received any notice of any alleged default, 

or of the intent to hold a vote . . . by the Class B Members either to remove A&J or 

to appoint Krug in A&J’s place as Class B Manager.”14

C. Procedural Posture

The parties do not dispute that the Agreements specify, in essence, that 

removal of the Class B Manager must be “for cause.”15 They do, however, dispute 

whether the Agreements, on their face, require the Class B Members to deliver to 

the Class B Manager a notice of intent to remove and provide an opportunity to be 

heard, prior to removal. A&J construes the Agreements to require notice and an 

opportunity to respond to the notice; Krug maintains that no such requirements can

be drawn from any of the clear and unambiguous provisions at issue.16 

Alternatively, A&J argues that Delaware common law, as expressed by our courts 

 

13 Compl., Ex. 3 (Removal Notice) at 1. 

14 Compl. ¶ 29.

15 Pl.’s Opening Br. in Supp. of its Mot. for Summ J. (“Opening Br.”) 16–19; Def.’s 

Answering Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Answering Br.”) 11.

16 Opening Br. 2; Answering Br. 12–16.
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in the context of Delaware corporation law, requires that managers be given notice 

prior to a purported for cause removal. Not surprisingly, Krug disagrees, principally 

on the ground that LAMC’s governance scheme is a product of the parties’ contract 

(the Operating Agreement), and that scheme cannot be altered by the common law

or otherwise without the consent of the parties to the contract. 

Regardless of which approach the Court might take—enforcement of a notice 

requirement as a matter of contract or as a matter of common law—A&J contends 

that the Court can decide that it was improperly removed as Class B Manager as a 

matter of law on summary judgment without the need for a trial. I agree that there 

are no factual issues in dispute with respect to A&J’s motion. I disagree, however, 

with the legal premises of that motion. Simply stated, there is neither a contractual 

nor a common law basis to impose upon the Class B Members a “notice and 

response” condition as a predicate to removal of the Class B Manager for cause. 

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The court may grant summary judgment only if “there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
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law.”17 “When the issue before the Court involves the interpretation of a contract, 

summary judgment is appropriate only if the contract in question is unambiguous” 

and favors the movant’s position.

18

 If the court construes the “plain-meaning of the 

contract’s terms and provisions” in a manner differently than the construction 

proffered by the movant, the court must deny summary judgment and enforce the 

contract as written.19

A. The Agreements Do Not Contemplate Notice and an Opportunity to Be 

Heard Prior to Removal 

As noted, A&J maintains that its right to pre-removal notice is set forth in the 

Agreements themselves.20 After carefully reviewing the clear and unambiguous 

terms of the operative provisions, however, I am at a loss to see where that right is 

either expressly stated or implied. Indeed, the Agreements say nothing at all about 

notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to removal. The only “notice” that is 

required is referenced in Section 12(b) of the Management Agreement, and that 

 

17 Ct. Ch. R. 56(c).

18 United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Hldgs., Inc., 937 A.2d 810, 830 (Del. Ch. 2007).

19 Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1159–60 (Del. 2010).

20 Opening Br. 18.
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notice is an after-the-fact notice of termination, not a prior notice of the cause the 

Class B Members believe they have to justify removal. That the Management 

Agreement speaks to notice of termination after the Class B Members have voted, 

but is silent about prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, is meaningful in 

discerning that the parties did not intend to contract for pre-removal notice.21 

A&J urges the Court to infer that the procedural protections it seeks are 

embedded in the Agreements because “the common meaning of being removed ‘for 

gross negligence, intentional misconduct, fraud or deceit’ means ‘by reason of’ or 

‘due to’ those bases,” thus requiring notice prior to removal.22 In the context of noncorporate business entities, however, the entity operating agreement typically will 

expressly provide for such procedural protections when the parties intend for them 

 

21 See Haase v. Grant, 2008 WL 372471, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7 2008) (noting that the 

court’s construction of the contract at issue was supported by the fact that the parties 

evidenced their awareness and approach to dealing with certain topics (e.g., notice) in other 

provisions of their contract). 

22 Opening Br. 18.
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to apply.23 In the absence of such provisions, the Court will not infer them or rewrite 

the contract to include them.24

B. Common Law Cannot Be a Basis to Rewrite the Parties’ Agreements

A&J alternatively argues that pre-removal notice is implicit in the Agreements 

because that is a sine qua non of for cause removal recognized in our common law. 

Relying upon Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., Bossier v. Connell and Superwire.com, Inc. 

v. Hampton, A&J argues that a requirement has emerged in the common law that 

 

23 See, e.g., 2009 Caiola Family Tr. v. PWA, LLC, 2015 WL 6007596, at *14 (Del. Ch. 

Oct. 14, 2015) (observing that the Operating Agreement governing removal of the 

managing member required that “notice shall set forth the reason(s) for removal” and the 

managing member has “thirty days to commence an action challenging the removal”);

Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 2012 WL 966944, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2012) (noting that 

the procedure to remove an LLC managing member under the operative agreement 

includes a ten-day cure period after the managing member receives notice of its default).

24 Rockwell v. Rockwell, 681 A.2d 1017, 1020–21 (Del. 1986) (“This Court has held 

generally . . . that ‘Delaware follows the well-established principal that in construing a 

contract a court cannot in effect rewrite it or supply omitted provisions’”) (citations 

omitted). In this instance, the Agreements set forth a comprehensive procedure for 

removal—the Class B Members vote, and if there is a Majority Vote in favor of removal, 

then “the Members shall be entitled to . . . appoint a new Class B Manager and to cause the 

Company to issue written notice of termination to the Class B Manager. . . .” Management 

Agreement at § 12(b); Operating Agreement at § 5.3(c)(ii). That the bargained-for removal 

procedure does not contain a pre-removal notice provision, and is not, therefore, favorable 

to A&J, does not entitle A&J to rewrite the Agreements. If A&J wanted greater removal 

protections, it should have bargained for them.
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before a director of a Delaware corporation may be removed for cause, that director 

must be given pre-removal notice of the purported “cause” for removal and an 

opportunity to respond.25 According to A&J, there is simply no principled basis to 

deny a managing member of a Delaware LLC that same right and protection. 

For reasons explained below, I disagree. 

1. Limited Liability Companies Are Creatures of Contract

“Delaware law with regard to limited liability companies is contractarian.”26 

To this end, the Limited Liability Company Act (the “LLC Act”) affords parties 

broad discretion in drafting LLC agreements, provides default provisions where the 

 

25 Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 859–60 (Del. Ch. 1957) (holding that when 

removing a director of a corporation for cause, “there must be the service of specific 

charges, adequate notice and full opportunity of meeting the accusation” because the 

“accused director [is] entitled to be heard in his own defense”); Bossier v. Connell, 1986 

WL 12785, at *6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 1986) (reiterating the pre-removal notice requirement 

articulated in Loew’s); Superwire.com, Inc. v. Hampton, 805 A.2d 904, 912 (Del. Ch. 2002) 

(“A ‘for cause’ removal of a director [of a Delaware corporation] requires that the 

individual be given (i) specific charges for his removal, (ii) adequate notice, and (iii) a full 

opportunity to meet the accusation. The same is true whether the action is taken at a 

meeting of stockholders or by written consent.”).

26 Huatuco v. Satellite Healthcare, 2013 WL 6460898, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2013), aff’d, 

93 A.3d 654 (Del. 2014). See also TravelCenters of Am., LLC v. Brog, 2008 WL 1746987, 

at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2008) (observing that “limited liability companies are creatures of 

contract”).
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LLC agreements are silent and ensures that such agreements, with limited 

exceptions, will be honored by a reviewing court.27 Indeed, Section 18-1101(b) of 

the LLC Act expressly confirms that “[i]t is the policy of this chapter to give the 

maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of 

limited liability company agreements.”28 

“[A]n alternative entity, like the LLC at the center of this litigation, is not the 

same thing as a corporation.”29 The distinction is basic; the scope, structure and very 

personality of the LLC is set almost exclusively by its operating agreement.

30

 “It is 

this flexibility that gives ‘uncorporate’ entities like limited liability companies their 

 

27 See Huatuco, 2013 WL 6460898, at *1. See also Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 

727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999) (“The basic approach of the Delaware [LLC] Act is to 

provide members with broad discretion in drafting the Agreement and to furnish default 

provisions when the members’ agreement is silent.”); Walker v. Res. Dev. Co., L.L.C. (DE), 

791 A.2d 799, 813 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Once members exercise their contractual freedom in 

their limited liability company agreement, they can be virtually certain that the agreement 

will be enforced in accordance with its terms.”) (internal quotations omitted).

28 6 Del. C. § 18-1101(b).

29

 2009 Caiola Family Tr., 2015 WL 6007596, at *1.

30 R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, 2008 WL 3846318, at *1 

(Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008) (citing Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, 2008 WL 1961156, at *1 

(Del. Ch. May 7, 2008)).
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allure; a principle attraction of the LLC form of entity is the statutory freedom 

granted to members to shape, by contract, their own approach to common business 

‘relationship’ problems” (like the reputational consequences of for cause removal at 

issue in this litigation).31 

2. The Common Law Cannot Be Grafted on to the Agreements

In governance disputes among constituencies in an LLC, the starting (and end) 

point almost always is the parties’ bargained-for operating agreement, and the 

court’s role in these disputes is to “interpret [the] contract [and] effectuate the 

parties’ intent.”32 In this regard, A&J is correct that, in certain contexts, this court 

has borrowed from corporate law principles to aid in the construction of an 

alternative entity operating agreement. For example, when the parties themselves 

embrace corporate elements within their operating agreement, this court has taken 

that as a signal of the parties’ intent to model their alternative entity on a traditional 

 

31 R & R Capital, 2008 WL 3846318, at *4 (internal quotations omitted).

32 GRT, Inc. v. Marathon GTF Tech., Ltd., 2012 WL 2356489, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 21, 

2012) (internal quotations omitted).
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corporate structure.33 When the court has looked beyond the LLC agreement for 

guidance in construing its terms, however, the court has been careful “not to embrace 

analogies to other entities or legal structures too broadly or without close analysis, 

because the flexibility inherent in the limited liability company form complicates the 

task of fixing such labels or making such comparisons.”34 

Honing in on instances where this Court has borrowed from our common law 

of corporations to assist in its interpretation of alternative entity agreements, A&J 

asserts that “it is appropriate for the Court to analogize corporate law when 

interpreting the [] [A]greement[s]” because “the procedural protections established 

by Campbell and Superwire.com are common law protections . . . [that] are . . . no 

less applicable in the context of an LLC than a corporation.”35 Moreover, A&J 

 

33 See, e.g., Obeid v. Hogan, 2016 WL 3356851, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016) (“The 

choices that the drafters make have consequences. . . . If the drafters have opted for a 

manager-managed entity, created a board of directors, and adopted other corporate 

features, then the parties to the agreement should expect a court to draw on analogies to 

corporate law.”). See also id. at *1 (“By opting for a corporate-style governance structure, 

the drafters evidenced their desire to have corporate-style legal rules govern the entity.”).

34 Obeid, 2016 WL 3356851, at *6 (internal quotations omitted).

35 Opening Br. 22. 
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argues the General Assembly’s adoption of 6 Del. C. § 18-110436 reflects an 

appreciation that, in certain instances, a “purely contractarian view” must give way 

to the common law.37 In my view, A&J is wrong for two reasons. 

First, the precedents on which A&J relies to support the proposition that the 

Court should readily borrow from our corporation law when construing governance 

rights under a LLC operating agreement are distinguishable. It is one thing to look 

to the corporation law when assessing the extent to which a managing member owes 

common law fiduciary duties when those duties are not clearly defined in the entity’s 

operating agreement38; it is another thing entirely, however, to rewrite the clearly 

 

36 Section 18-1104 states, in its entirety: “In any case not provided for in this chapter, the 

rules of law and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary duties 

and the law merchant, shall govern.”

37 Pl.’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Its Mot. for Summ. J. 10 (citing In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC, 

114 A.3d 592, 605 (Del. Ch. 2015)).

38 See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 849–50 (Del. Ch. 2012), 

aff’d sub nom. Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012)

(analyzing whether “traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care apply by default as to 

managers or members of a limited liability company” and finding that under 6 Del. C. § 18-

1104, there is “justification for application of fiduciary duties grounded in equity to 

managers of LLCs to the extent that such duties have not been altered or eliminated under 

the relevant LLC agreement”) (emphasis added); In re Cencom Cable Income P’rs, L.P. 

Litig., 2008 WL 5050624, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2008) (declining to find that contractual 
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written procedures by which a managing member will be removed for cause and 

thereby impose upon the members requirements for which the parties themselves 

never bargained. 

Second, read in A&J’s light, the General Assembly intended for Section 18-

1104 single-handedly to “supplant the primacy of the LLC Agreement in the 

alternative entity context”39 in contravention of Section 18-1101(b)40 and 

corresponding jurisprudence. That construction, in my view, reads too much into 

Section 18-1104. Indeed, Delaware’s pro-contractarian policy in the alternative 

entity space is alive and well. This is perhaps best illustrated by our Supreme Court’s 

approach to contract construction in a series of decisions concerning a limited 

partnership agreement. In an early iteration of Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., 

 

principles are controlling because “the General Partner imported common law fiduciary 

duties into its relationship”) (internal quotations omitted).

39 Cf. Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, 2010 WL 3866098, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2010) (“Because 

this restriction on direct competition is an explicit provision of § 12.02 of the LLC 

Agreement, [Defendant’s] vague attempt to broaden the provision by pointing to traditional 

corporate law principles is an improper attempt to supplant the primacy of the LLC 

Agreement in the alternative entity context.”).

40 Section 18-1101(b) states: “It is the policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to 

the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company 

agreements.” 
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Inc., the Court looked to the common law of bad faith when construing contractual 

provisions that imposed a duty of good faith upon the general partner.41 Four years 

later, when construing the same limited partnership agreement in a subsequent 

dispute among the same parties, the Court “changed course” and concluded that, in 

the alternative entity context, it was appropriate to measure good faith against a more 

traditional “contractual good faith standard of care,” rather than against “common 

law standards of care and fiduciary duties.”42

LAMC is a prime example of an LLC that is expressly “uncorporate”43 in its 

governance structure. The Agreements provide for management by a single44

 

41 Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., 67 A.3d 369, 373 (Del. 2013) (borrowing 

from the common law of corporations, the court interpreted a contractual requirement that 

the general partner act in good faith as requiring a plaintiff to plead bad faith in order to 

plead a breach of that provision). 

42 Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., 159 A.3d 242, 247, 252–253 (Del. 2017) 

(“chang[ing] course” from its earlier decision and looking instead to the limited partnership 

agreement itself for guidance when defining good faith). See also id. at 259 (adopting an 

approach that “is more faithful to the specific language of the Enbridge LPA, and does not 

rely on extra-contractual notions of waste and a heightened pleading burden to plead bad 

faith”) (emphasis added).

43 R & R Capital, 2008 WL 3846318, at *4.

44 I note that the Operating Agreement also provides for a “Class A Manager” who is 

charged with the very limited responsibilities of maintaining “the Company’s compliance 

with [United States Citizenship and Immigration Services] rules and regulations” and 
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managing member rather than by a board of managers,45 and Class B Members, 

unlike stockholders in a corporation, have reserved for themselves the “sole and 

exclusive right to approve or disapprove” several operational decisions, ranging 

from the incurrence of obligations, to the approval of additional capital contributions 

that are not made by all of the members on a pro rata basis, to the admission of 

additional Class B Members.46 Under these circumstances, where the parties have 

not evidenced an intent to borrow from the corporate law to modify or add to the 

rights and obligations they bargained for in their governance agreements, I can see 

no basis to do so now simply because one of the parties wishes it had negotiated a 

better deal. 

III. CONCLUSION

By their unambiguous terms, the Agreements do not provide A&J a right to 

pre-removal notice or a right to be heard before removal. And, having considered 

 

subscription agreements utilized by LAMC to sell Class B units to each Class B Member. 

Operating Agreement at 5, § 5.3(c)(i); Answer & Countercl. ¶ 11. This is yet another 

illustration of LAMC’s “uncorporate” governance structure. 

45 Operating Agreement § 5.1.

46 See Operating Agreement § 4.8(a)–(j).
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that “[i]t is important not to embrace analogies to other entities or legal structures 

too broadly,”47 I conclude that LAMC is clearly not analogous to a corporation, in 

structure or operation, and that drawing from corporate common law to interpret the 

for cause removal provisions in the Agreements would be tantamount to rewriting 

the Company’s governance agreements without the parties’ consent. “[C]onsistent 

with Delaware’s pro-contractarian policy, a party may not come to court to enforce 

a contractual right that it did not obtain for itself at the negotiating table.”48 

The motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Very truly yours,

/s/ Joseph R. Slights III

 

47 Obeid, 2016 WL 3356851, at *6.

48 GRT, 2012 WL 2356489, at *7.