In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-19-00165-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 78th District Court

Wichita County, Texas

Trial Court No. 60,089-B

Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr

CASEY JOE COCHNAUER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Casey Joe Cochnauer appeals his conviction for two counts of indecency with a 

child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). In two issues, Cochnauer—

who represented himself with the assistance of standby counsel at trial—argues that 

the trial court deprived him of two Sixth Amendment rights: right to counsel and

right to a speedy trial. We will overrule Cochnauer’s issues and affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

I. Background

In early 2016, two brothers made an outcry about indecencies that Cochnauer 

had committed against them in early 2011 when they were thirteen and ten years old, 

respectively.

1 A Wichita County magistrate issued arrest warrants in February 2016 for 

Cochnauer, who had been incarcerated since 2012 at the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice’s Kyle Facility on unrelated charges. The warrants were served on 

Cochnauer in May 2018 at that facility. Cochnauer was tried and convicted of the 

indecency charges in April 2019, and the trial court sentenced Cochnauer in 

accordance with the jury’s punishment assessments.

Cochnauer timely appealed. We will address his two Sixth Amendment issues 

in reverse order.

1

Because evidentiary sufficiency is not an issue, we provide only the facts 

needed to dispose of this appeal.
3

II. Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial

In his second issue, Cochnauer contends that the three-year delay between the 

February 2016 issuance of the arrest warrants and his April 2019 trial violated his 

Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend VI. He argues that 

under the four-factor balancing test set out in Barker v. Wingo, he is entitled to a 

dismissal of the charges against him. See 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 

2192 (1972); Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). To assist 

in evaluating Cochnauer’s speedy-trial claim, we will set out a detailed timeline below.

A. Speedy-Trial Facts

• Early 2011, Cochnauer commits indecency with a child.

• April 20, 2012, Cochnauer begins serving an eight-year sentence for 

felonies unrelated to this case.

• Early 2016, the two complainants make their outcries.

• February 26, 2016, a magistrate issues two warrants for Cochnauer’s 

arrest.

• February 29, 2016, the Kyle Facility receives the warrants.

• May 6, 2018, the State receives a prosecution report for the 

2011 offenses.

• May 7, 2018, the arrest warrants are executed on Cochnauer.
4

• May 8, 2018, the magistrate conducts a probable-cause hearing, issues 

warnings to Cochnauer, and orders bond.

• May 10, 2018, the trial court appoints Michael Valverde as Cochnauer’s 

counsel.

• June 7, 2018, a grand jury indicts Cochnauer on two counts of indecency 

with a child. Cochnauer is served with a copy of the indictment.

• June 12, 2018, the State announces “ready” for trial.

• June 15, 2018, Valverde waives pretrial arraignment, and Cochnauer 

enters a “not guilty” plea.

• September 19, 2018, Valverde moves for the appointment of an 

investigator.

• October 19, 2018, Valverde announces “not ready” at docket call.

• November 16, 2018, Valverde announces “ready” at docket call.

• January 11, 2019, Valverde files a motion in limine.

• February 1, 2019, Cochnauer begins filing pro se motions.

• February 11, 2019, Cochnauer files his pro se “Motion to Dismiss Due 

to Violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act” (the “IADA

motion”).

• February 25, 2019, Cochnauer files his pro se Sixth Amendment speedytrial motion.
5

• March 1, 2019, Valverde moves to withdraw as counsel.

• March 7, 2019, after a hearing, the trial court denies Valverde’s motion 

to withdraw.

• March 11, 2019, after a hearing, the trial court grants Valverde’s motion 

to withdraw, grants Cochnauer’s pro se Sixth Amendment speedy-trial 

motion, and orders a special setting for trial on April 22, 2019.

• March 21, 2019, Cochnauer amends his IADA motion to add a 

complaint under the (federal) 1974 Speedy Trial Act.

• April 12, 2019, after a hearing, the trial court denies Cochnauer’s 

amended IADA motion and moves the trial to April 23, 2019.

• April 23, 2019, Coachnauer’s trial begins.

B. Error Preservation

Speedy-trial complaints are subject to error-preservation requirements. See 

Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 768–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). To preserve a 

complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely 

request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds, if not apparent from the 

context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Thomas v. State, 505 S.W.3d 

916, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Further, the party must obtain an express or implicit 

adverse trial-court ruling or object to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 

33.1(a)(2); Everitt v. State, 407 S.W.3d 259, 262–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
6

Here, Cochnauer raised speedy-trial complaints in two pro se motions. 

Cochnauer’s first motion—filed on February 25, 2019, and heard on March 11, 

2019—raised a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial complaint. In that motion, Cochnauer 

requested alternate forms of relief: “trial set for a date on or before the 8th of May 

2019, or, if a trial is not set on or before said date, Cause No. 60089-B*1-2 . . . be 

dismissed on the ground that the defendant has been denied the Constitutional Right 

to a Speedy Trial.” [Emphasis added.] The trial court granted Cochnauer’s motion and 

set the trial for April 22, 2019.2 Because the trial court granted Cochnauer one form 

of his requested relief—a trial setting on or before May 8—there is no error for us to 

review. See Hill v. State, 213 S.W.3d 533, 538 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.); 

Cline v. State, 685 S.W.2d 760, 761–62 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.).

Cochnauer’s second speedy-trial motion—the amended IADA motion—asked 

the trial court to dismiss the case based on the “Speedy Trial Act of 1974” and the 

IADA, neither of which applies to this case. The Speedy Trial Act is a federal statute 

that does not govern state-court prosecutions. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3161–74. The IADA

is inapplicable because Cochnauer’s case does not involve an interstate detainer. See 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14.

Regardless, presenting a statutory speedy-trial claim to the trial court does not 

preserve error on a claim that the State violated an appellant’s constitutional right to a 

2

The trial court later moved the trial’s start date to April 23, but regardless, the 

trial court still granted Cochnauer’s requested relief: trial on or before May 8, 2019.
7

speedy trial. See Dunn v. State, 819 S.W.2d 510, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Check v. 

State, 543 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); see also 

Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“The point of error on 

appeal must comport with the objection made at trial.”). Cochnauer’s second speedytrial motion thus did not preserve his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial complaint for

our review.

But even if Cochanuer had preserved his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial 

complaint, application of the Barker factors shows no speedy-trial violation.

C. Barker Factors

To determine when a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violation occurs, appellate

courts apply a balancing test using the Barker factors. See 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 

2192; Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808 (reciting the Barker factors). Appellate courts weigh: 

(1) the length of delay, (2) reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his 

speedy-trial right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant because of the delay. Barker, 

407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. The conduct of the State and defendant are weighed 

under each factor, though no single factor alone is necessary or sufficient to establish 

a speedy-trial violation. Hurdsman v. State, No. 02-17-00319-CR, 2018 WL 5832116, at 

*3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 8, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication).

The first factor—length of delay—is, to an extent, a triggering mechanism for

the remaining factors. Santallan v. State, 922 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 
8

1996, pet. ref’d). The “speedy-trial clock” starts only when a formal indictment, 

information, or actual arrest occurs. Id. (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 

320, 92 S. Ct. 455, 463 (1971)). When, as here, there is no prearrest indictment, the 

calculation does not include the period before arrest. See id. (excluding four years 

between issuance and execution of arrest warrants from delay calculation).

Here, although a magistrate issued the arrest warrants for Cochnauer in 

February 2016, his actual arrest did not occur until May 7, 2018. The trial began less 

than a year later on April 23, 2019. The almost year-long delay between Cochnauer’s

arrest and the start of his trial does weigh slightly against the State and is enough to 

trigger an analysis of the remaining Barker factors. See Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 

314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“In general, courts deem delay approaching one year to 

be ‘unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.’” (quoting Doggett v. United 

States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2691 n.1 (1992))).

When assessing the second factor—reasons for delay—different weight is 

given to different reasons. Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 809. For instance, deliberate delays 

to hamper the defense will weigh more heavily against the State than more neutral 

reasons such as negligence or overcrowded dockets, which will still weigh against the 

State but less heavily. Id.

Cochnauer does not argue that the delay was the result of deliberate conduct; 

instead, he complains that the State failed to explain the more than two-year delay

between the February 2016 arrest warrants and his May 2018 arrest. But as we have 
9

explained, the “speedy-trial clock” did not start to run until Cochnauer’s arrest. In 

addition, the State announced “ready” in June 2018, the month after Cochnauer’s 

arrest. This factor does not weigh against the State.

The third factor—assertion of the speedy-trial right—concerns whether and 

how a defendant asserts the right. Id. at 810. Delay in asserting a speedy-trial right

weighs against a defendant, as does requesting dismissal rather than trial. See Dragoo, 

96 S.W.3d at 314–15; see also Murphy v. State, 280 S.W.3d 445, 454 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (filing for dismissal weakens a speedy-trial claim because it 

shows a desire for no trial instead of a speedy trial). Here, Cochnauer waited until nine 

months after his arrest to assert his speedy-trial right. And only after the trial court

had granted his request for a speedy trial and specially set his case for trial two months 

later did Cochnauer seek dismissal, which undermines his claim of a speedy-trial 

violation. This factor thus weighs against Cochnauer.

The final Barker factor—prejudice—is assessed in light of what the speedy-trial 

right is designed to prevent: oppressive pretrial incarceration, a defendant’s anxiety 

and concern, or impairment of a defense. Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 315. Impairment of a 

defense is the most serious, as an inability to adequately prepare for trial skews the 

fairness of the justice system. Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193).

Actual prejudice is not required, but the defendant must show some prejudice caused 

by the delay. McCarty v. State, 498 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (citing 

Harris v. State, 489 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)).
10

Here, Cochnauer claims prejudice in the form of testimonial inconsistencies, 

anxiety and concern due to a “detainer,” and necessary witnesses’ being “gone.”3 To 

show prejudice based on unavailable witnesses, Cochnauer must show their 

unavailability at trial, that their testimony may be material and relevant to his case, and 

that he exercised due diligence in attempting to produce them for trial. See id. The 

record shows that Cochnauer’s trial subpoenas were returned or unserved because 

witnesses changed jobs or Cochnauer withdrew the subpoena. Yet this does not 

establish that the witnesses were unavailable at trial because of the delay between 

Cochnauer’s arrest and trial. Nor does it establish the relevance and materiality of 

those witnesses’ testimonies to Cochnauer’s case. Cochnauer cannot satisfy his burden

of prejudice in this case.

3

Regarding Cochnauer’s anxiety, he was already incarcerated on unrelated 

charges. Evidence of general anxiety is relevant but not sufficient proof of prejudice 

under Barker, especially when the anxiety is no greater than what is normally 

associated with a criminal investigation. See Thames v. State, No. 02-17-00295-CR, 

2019 WL 237556, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 17, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication). Moreover, there is no evidence that Cochnauer’s 

anxiety, if any, resulted from the delay in this case as opposed to his incarceration for 

the unrelated charges. See id.

Cochnauer also complains that the delay caused inconsistencies in the 

complaining witnesses’ stories. But these inconsistencies could have damaged the 

State’s case too, as well as providing a basis for Cochnauer to challenge the witnesses’ 

credibility at trial—which he did. Cf. Rivera v. State, 990 S.W.2d 882, 892 (Tex. App.—

Austin 1999, pet. ref’d) (“Time can damage either side’s case, and it is often 

impossible to determine which side has been prejudiced more severely.”).
11

Balancing the Barker factors (even if necessary to do), we conclude that 

Cochnauer’s speedy-trial right was not violated. We overrule Cochnauer’s second

issue.

III. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

In his first issue, Cochnauer argues that the trial court deprived him of his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel. He claims that the trial court unconstitutionally 

“dragooned” and “commandeered” him into representing himself at trial because

(1) he did not clearly and unequivocally assert his right to defend himself and (2) he 

did not competently, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to counsel. We 

disagree.

A. Applicable Law

While the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel, it also implies a 

right of self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 

2533 (1975). That right must be timely, clearly, and unequivocally asserted. Id. at 835, 

95 S. Ct. at 2541; Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) 

(asserting self-representation right before a jury is empaneled is timely). When the 

plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning of an accused’s statements signify a 

desire to proceed pro se, the right is clearly and unequivocally asserted. See Lathem v. 

State, 514 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (holding that “I’ll 

name myself as counsel” is a clear and unequivocal assertion of self-representation 

right). If the self-representation right is clearly and unequivocally asserted, the trial 
12

court should inform the accused about the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation so that the record will reflect that the accused “knows what he is doing 

and his choice is made with eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 

2541 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 

242 (1942)).

Exercising the self-representation right necessarily means voluntarily, 

knowingly, and intelligently waiving the opposite right to counsel. Lathem, 514 S.W.3d 

at 802–03. Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of the 

right. Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). To assess an 

effective waiver, courts consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. Faretta does not 

mandate questioning on the accused’s age, education, background, or previous mental

history, but the record must contain proper admonishments about pro se 

representation. Blankenship, 673 S.W.2d at 583. Faretta admonishments are not 

required when standby counsel is appointed and utilized. Alexander v. State, No. 02-15-

00033-CR, 2016 WL 2586602, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 5, 2016, pet. ref’d) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication); Dolph v. State, 440 S.W.3d 898, 907 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d); Rainwater v. State, 634 S.W.2d 67, 68 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1982, no pet.); see also Clark v. State, 717 S.W.2d 910, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1986) (stating that Faretta admonishments are not required for hybrid representation).
13

B. Analysis

On May 10, 2018, the trial court appointed Valverde to represent Cochnauer.

Over the next eight months, Valverde filed several motions on Cochnauer’s behalf.

Cochnauer began filing his own motions in February 2019.

In early March 2019, Valverde moved to withdraw, explaining that 

(1) Cochnauer had expressed dissatisfaction with Valverde’s services; (2) Cochnauer 

had filed motions against Valverde’s advice; and (3) Valverde could no longer 

effectively communicate with Cochnauer. At the March 7, 2019 hearing on his 

motion, Valverde explained that he had met with Cochnauer multiple times, had 

reviewed evidence with him, and had advised Cochnauer to let him review any further 

pro se motions. Cochnauer had agreed but continued to file various motions.4

Valverde then asked permission to withdraw as he was unable to “aggressively and 

zealously” represent Cochnauer.

Cochnauer stated that he did not object to Valverde’s withdrawal. The trial 

court twice lauded Valverde’s qualifications as a defense attorney before asking 

Cochnauer if he wanted to represent himself. Cochnauer replied, “No, sir, not at this 

time.” [Emphasis added.] The trial court lamented how long the case had been pending 

4

Cochnauer filed a grievance against Valverde because he refused to file more 

motions on Cochnauer’s behalf. Valverde revealed this to the trial court, but the court 

still denied the withdrawal motion. Personality conflicts and disagreements about trial 

strategy are typically not valid grounds for withdrawal. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 

566 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
14

and expressed concern that granting a withdrawal motion “at this late date on the eve 

of trial” might cause further delay, ultimately denying Valverde’s withdrawal.

At a motions hearing four days later on March 11, 2019, Cochnauer told

Valverde that he wanted to represent himself. Valverde relayed this to the trial court, 

which then addressed Cochnauer:

THE COURT: Mr. Cochnauer, we can do one of two things. Either Mr. 

Valverde can represent you or you can represent yourself. . . . Which do 

you want to do?

Mr. Cochnauer: Sir, at this moment I feel like I’m going to have to represent 

myself. [Emphasis added.]

After Cochnauer expressed this desire, the trial court questioned Cochnauer 

about his education, his familiarity with Texas’s evidence laws, and his work 

experience. Cochnauer explained that he had a high-school education with some 

college courses, that he had a 120 IQ, that he was familiar with the Texas Rules of 

Evidence, and that he had worked in construction and as a tradesman. The trial court 

then twice admonished Cochnauer that he would “get no help from the Court or 

anyone else” if he represented himself, and that he would be “standing on [his] own 

knowledge and [his] own objections to evidence.” After every question and warning, 

Cochnauer replied, “Yes, sir.” When the trial court asked if Cochnauer had ever 

represented himself in a legal matter, Cochnauer replied, “No, sir, but for the last two 

years and two months, I’ve spent two hours a day, three days a week inside the law 
15

library in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice preparing for this moment.” 

[Emphasis added.]5

The colloquy ended with the trial court’s advising Cochnauer that proceeding 

pro se was ill-advised because if he did not make the proper pleadings, potential 

defenses might be waived. Cochnauer again replied, “Yes, sir.” The trial court again 

advised Cochnauer not to represent himself, cautioned him that he would be prone to 

errors, and warned him that his decision to represent himself was final: “If we get to 

April 20th and you tell the Court that you now want to be represented by somebody, 

you’ve already waived that right today.”6 [Emphasis added.] Cochnauer replied that he 

had made his decision. The trial court then appointed Mark Barber as Cochnauer’s 

standby counsel. Cochnauer stated he had only four specific questions for standby 

counsel but “[o]utside of that, I am prepared. I was prepared for tomorrow.” [Emphasis 

added.]

5

Cochnauer stated two other times during questioning that he “fought for three 

years to get to where we are,” and that “I feel the only way that I’m going to get a 

proper defense is -- As I said, I’ve prepared for this for three years, Your Honor.”

6

The trial court made this final admonishment after an off-the-record 

conversation with Cochnauer about trial delays. The admonishment could be read as a 

misstatement about withdrawing a waiver of counsel if read literally as Cochnauer 

urges. But read contextually and in light of the trial court’s concern about further trial 

delays, the admonishment was correct about a trial court’s exercising discretion in 

denying a withdrawal waiver if withdrawal would cause unnecessary trial delays. See

Robles v. State, 577 S.W.2d 699, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (demanding 

different counsel or dismissal of counsel on the day of trial would be manipulating the 

right to counsel to obstruct the orderly procedure of courts and fair administration of 

justice.).
16

Here, Cochnauer clearly, timely, and unequivocally asserted his right of selfrepresentation. At the March 11, 2019 hearing, Cochnauer stated, “I feel like I’m 

going to have to represent myself,” after Valverde asked the court to take up his pro 

se argument.7 From there, Cochnauer proceeded to file more pro se motions, attend 

additional pretrial hearings, participate in voir dire, and represent himself throughout 

the entire trial. Moreover, the trial court appointed—and Cochnauer utilized—

standby counsel.

8 Faretta admonishments were not required in this case because 

Cochnauer received and utilized standby counsel.

9 See Dolph, 440 S.W.3d at 907; 

7

Cochnauer argues on appeal that he did not unequivocally maintain his right of 

self-representation. The record must reflect a defendant’s waiver of selfrepresentation after the right is asserted. Funderburg v. State, 717 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1986) (“A waiver may be found if it reasonably appears to the court that 

[the] defendant has abandoned his initial request to represent himself.”) (quoting

Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1982)). Cochnauer’s cited record

references do not reflect Cochnauer’s abandoning his initial request to represent 

himself. At most, the references show Cochnauer’s brief confusion and the trial

court’s and the State’s attempting to patiently assist Cochnauer in proper court 

procedure.

8

Before and during trial, Cochnauer asked questions and conferred with his 

standby counsel, allowed his standby counsel to challenge during voir dire, and 

requested assistance issuing subpoenas and drafting legal forms.

9

Yet even if we held that more specific inquiries were required in this case, the 

court’s colloquy properly informed Cochnauer of the dangers of pro se representation 

and yielded evidence that Cochnauer knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived 

his right to counsel. The trial court’s questioning revealed: (1) Cochnauer completed 

high school and had taken some college courses; (2) Cochnauer stated affirmatively

that he was familiar with Texas evidence laws and was knowledgeable enough to make 

proper objections to evidence; (3) Cochnauer worked in construction and as a 

tradesman; (4) Cochnauer spent the last two years and two months spending two 

hours a day, three days a week in the TDCJ law library preparing for this moment.
17

Rainwater, 634 S.W.2d at 68; see also Clark, 717 S.W.2d at 918. We thus overrule 

Cochnauer’s first issue.

IV. Conclusion

Having overruled Cochnauer’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr

Elizabeth Kerr

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: September 2, 2021

Additionally, the trial court asked Cochnauer at a previous pretrial hearing if he 

wanted to represent himself, and he said “no.” Cochnauer then had four days to 

contemplate the idea of pro se representation before asserting his right to selfrepresentation for the first time at the March 11, 2019 pretrial hearing. Furthermore, 

the court warned Cochnauer, twice, that proceeding pro se is ill-advised and that 

Cochnauer might waive potential defenses. These admonishments were enough to put 

Cochnauer on notice of the challenges and dangers of pro se representation and to 

give the trial court a chance to assess Cochnauer’s competency before allowing him to 

waive his right to counsel.