## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

In re C.C. , 2011 IL 111795

Caption in S upreme Court: In re C.C. and S O. C

. (The People of t he State of I llinois
, Appellant, v. Marlene L ong , Appellee ).

Docke t No. 111795

Filed Dec ember 1, 2011

Held ( Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no pa r t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Where children who wer e the subject of neg lect proce eding s had a leg al
guardia n who was their g randmother
, her remova l f rom that position by the circ uit court meant that s h e wa s no longe r a party and no longe r entitled to leg al servic es.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Appellate Court for the Four th Di s t ri ct; hear d in that
court on a ppeal from the C ircuit Court of C hampaig n County
, the Hon. Richard P. Klaus, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Appellate c ourt judg ment reve rsed; cir cuit court judg ment aff irmed.Counsel on

Appea l L isa Madig an, Attorney Gene ral, of Springf ield, and J ulia Rietz
, State’s Attorney
, of Urba

na (Michae l A. Sc o d ro, Solicitor Gene ral, and Eric Truett, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, of Chicag o, an d Patrick Delfino, Robert J

. Bide rman and L inda S. McClain, of the Offic e of t h e State’s Attorney s Ap pellate Prosecutor, of Springf ield, of counsel), for the People.

Daniel B. Kenne dy
, of Kenne dy & Hensley
, of Champaig n, for appellee

.

J ustices J USTI CE THOMAS delivere d the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.
Chief J ustice Kilbride and J ustices Fr eema n, Gar man, Kar meier, Bur

ke, and The is concurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Respondent, M ar l en e L o n g, was the leg al guar dian of her gr andchildre n, C.C. and So. C. The State filed a neg lect petition as to C.C. and So. C. in the circ uit c ourt of Champaig n County

. The petiti on named L on g, al o n g with the children’s biologica l mother and fathe r,

as responde nts

. T h e b io lo g ic al fathe r waived adjudication. L ong and the children’ s biologica l mother stipulated that the children wer e n egl ec t ed

. There afte r, the trial court enter ed a dispositi onal orde r terminatingL ong ’s guardia nship and dismissi ngher f rom the ca se. ¶ 2 L ong appea led her dismiss al from the case. The a ppellate c ourt reve rsed. 406 I ll. App. 3d 360. The appellate court held that the leg islature could not have intended that a guardia n could be dismiss ed from the case based simply upon her dismiss al as guardia n. The appellate
court also held it was in the children’ s best interests that L ong be allowed to rema in a party in the case

. This court g rante d the State’s petition for leave to appea l. I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010).

¶ 3 BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 C.C. was born on May 22, 2002, and So. C. was born on Fe bruar y 22, 2006. J acque line C. is the mother of C.C. and So. C., and Cy rus Wil dman is the putative fathe r. A third child, Sa. C. was born to J acque line on April 4, 2009. Sa. C.’s biologica l fathe r is dece ased. Only C.C. and So. C . are at issue in this appeal. ¶ 5 L ong was appointed guardia n of C.C. on October 20, 2005, and was appointed guardia n of So. C. on May 23, 2007. On May 5, 2010, the State filed a p et i t i o n for adjudication of
neg lect and shelter car e on behalf of C.C., So. C., and Sa. C. The petition named J acque line, Wil dman, and L ong , as well as Sa. C.’s putative fathe r. The petition alleg ed that it was in the best interests of the minors to be made war d s o f the court. The petition contained three

-2-counts.

¶ 6 Count I alleg ed that the children wer e neg lected pursuant t o s ec t i o n 2 -3 (1 )( b) of the J uvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 I L CS 405/2-3(1)( b) (West 2010)). Count I stated that the children’ s en v i ro n ment was injurious to their welfa re when they resided with J acque line beca

use t hat environment exposed them to domestic violence. Count I I alleg ed that the childre n wer e neg lected pur suant to section 2-3(1) (b) of the Act. That count stated that the children’ s environment wa s i n j u ri ous to their welfa

re when they resided with J acque line beca

use that environment exposed the children to substance abuse. Count I I I alleg ed that C.C. and So. C. wer e neg lec ted pursuant to section 2-3(1) (b) beca use their environment wa s i njurious to their welfare when they resided with L ong , in that L ong left the minors in the car e of a n inappropriate ca

reg iver. ¶ 7 Also on May 5, 2010, the trial court appointed the Champaig n County Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) as the guardia n ad litem for the minors. A chil d p rot ective investigator for CASA prepa red a shelter car e repor

t on May 5, 2010. The repor t stated that

on May 2, 2010, a caller to the Depa rtment of Children and Family Service s (DCFS) hotline alleg ed there was a risk of harm to Sa. C. The repor ter claimed that there had been a domestic dispute betwee n J acque line and her boy friend, a

nd that both parties we re ve ry intox icated. A fight betwee n the t wo bega n when Jacqueline’ s boy friend tried to stop her from leaving to buy coca ine. J acque line was a rre sted and c harg ed with domestic batter y

. ¶ 8 A child protec tive investigator spok e wi t h J acque line following the domestic battery incident. J acque line told the i nvestig ator that L ong was the leg al guar dian of C.C. and S o. C., but that J acque line had the children after school, until her mother g ot off wor k, and on

wee kends. ¶ 9 The investigator revie wed prior repor ts of DCFS involvement with J acque line. Among the incidents wa s one on January 4, 2007, wher e J acque line was indicated for r isk of harm
to C.C. and So. C. During that incident, So. C. was at J acque line’s residenc e during a party wher e coc aine was used. I n addition, ear lier on the day of report, C.C. was at J acque line’s residenc e “and the adults wer e smoking marijuana and [C .C.] was locked in the house.” This incident took place afte r L ongwas g iven guardia nship of C.C. ¶ 10 In another incident, on J uly 21, 2007, afte r L ong had been g iven custody of both children, J acque line was indicated for ina dequate supervision of C.C. and So. C. On that date:
“5 y ear old [C .C.] and 1 y ear o l d [ So. C.] walked over to the neig hbors’ trailer without supervision. Reporter took the children home but there was no answe r when he knocked on the door and y elled out for someone. Reporter took the children back
to his residen ce and his wife took the children, [t hen he] went into the trailer next door and c alled out for the m other [ J acque line]. The mot her was asleep, was woke [ sic ] up and told her children had left the house without any knowledg e. [J acque line]
g ot up and allowed the children to stay with the neig hbors. Reporter said he would take the children back to their mother. Reporter said he believes there is an open case

on the mother and that the g randmother [L ong ], who lives in the trailer has custody of the children. Reporter said he thinks the children may not be left alone with the

m o t h er

. R eporter thinks the g randmother is working today beca use she was not at

-3-home.”

¶ 11 The investigator’s repor t noted that protec tive custody was taken from L ong “due to the fac t that over the past sever al y ear s, [J acque line] has re s i d ed with Ms. L ong for extended periods of time. During these periods she has used alcohol and eng ag ed in behavior s that have put her children at risk. *** Ms. L ong has allowed [J acque line] to be in a car etake r role of the minor children despite her confirmation that she is awa re of her daug hter’s substance abuse issues.” ¶ 12 L ongtold the investigator that she had be en a stable car eg iver for C.C. and So. C., and that she never allowed drug s or alcohol in the house, though she was awa re of her daughter’s issues. L ong also said that J acque line helped with pic king up the children afte r school, and watche d them until L ong g ot home from work, but J ac q u el i n e d i d not keep the children overnig ht. ¶ 13 The repor

t noted that protec tive custody was taken of the children, and they wer e place d with their materna l g randf ather and his wife. The repor t stated that even afte r L ong was g iven
guardia nship of the children, there wer e subsequent indicated repor ts relating to J acque line being allowed to be the car etake r of the children. As se t forth in the re port, “Ms. L onghas raised both children, althoug h it does appea r that J acque line has resided with her m o t h er during most of those y ear s. I t i s o f co n cer n that following this most rec ent arr est, due to intox icati o n and domestic violence, Ms. L ong still was allowing her daug hter to have unsupervised contac t with the children. Ms. L ong admitted she was awa re of her daughter’s substance a

buse issues and e ntrusted the childre n in her c are despite this knowledg e.” ¶ 14 On May 6, 2010, a t em p o ra ry cu s t o d y an d ad m o nition order was enter ed plac ing temporar y custody of the minors with the Gua rdianship Administrator of DCF S. ¶ 15 At a J uly 7, 2010, adjudicator y hear ing, J acque line stipulated to c ount I I of the petition for adjudication of neg lect. Wil dman waived his rig ht to an adjudicator y h ea ri n g. L ong stipulated to count I I I

of the pe tition and waived adjudication. ¶ 16 On August 4, 2010, CASA filed a dispositi onal hear ing repor t. The repor

t noted that C.C. and So. C. wer e in relative foster place ment with their materna l g randf ather and his wife. J acqueline had enter ed a 30-day treatment prog ram. J acque line stated that she want ed t o pare nt he r children and wa s willing to make all chang es nece ssary to a ccomplish that g oal. J acque line said that the main rea son she had not pa rente d her children was that L ong made it too easy for her not to pare nt. Wil dman also indicated that he would like to ha ve custody of his biologica l children. ¶ 17 The CASA re port stated:

“Jackie has lived on and off with her mother, Marlene [,] and admits she has, for the
most part, resided with her mother, Marlene L ong [,] and h er ch i l d re n

. In spite of Marlene ’s leg al guardia

nship and there fore
, leg al responsibility to supervise [C .C. and So. C.], ther e have continued to be events in which the childre n wer e place d in unsafe situations, we re unsupervised or place d under the direc t supe rvision of their mother when she was under the influence of drug s or alcohol and witnessed their mother in domestic violence

. * * *

-4-Whil e Marlene [ L ong ’s] orig inal intention was c l ea rly to protec t her gr andson, [C .C.]
, and provide stability not provided by her daug hter, afte r five y ear s of such
guardia nship, this rela

tionship seems to only have enable d J ackie into a depende nce

on her mo t h er an d allowed her to pare nt without pare nting, to pare nt when it was convenie nt for her mother, to pa rent without the leg al responsibility

. Subsequently
, none of the children w ere adequately pare nted or super

vised.” ¶ 18 The CASA repor t ref lected the conce rn that “[t] he co-de pendent relationship of Mar lene L ong and J ackie has promoted, condoned and enable d J ackie ’s continued substance abuse.” The CAS A report stated t hat t he future p er m an en cy g oal for C.C. and S o. C. should be “a ‘re turn home to a biolog ical par ent’ a s a first choic e plac ement.” ¶ 19 Catholic Charities also prepa red a repor t for the August 4, 2010, disposi tional hear ing. The Catholic Charities repor t noted that J acque line had attended all visitation that had been offe red and was very appropr iate during visitation. J acque line indicated her desire to pare nt her c hildren ag ain. ¶ 20 Wit h reg ard to Wildman, the Catholic Charities repor t note d that Wil dman had missed only one schedule d visitation due to a miscommunication conce rning the ti me of the visitation. Wil dman ’ s visits with his children went well. The repor t indicated that Wil dman’s history of leg al problems and substance abuse, and his lack of involvement in his children’ s lives, might impact his ability to adequately pare nt his children. Howeve r, g iven Wil dman’s

s t rong motivation to pare nt, as well as his repor ted lack of leg al problems and s ub s t an ce abuse for sever al y ear s, Wil dman could play an important role in his children’ s lives. Moreove r, Wildm an’s wif e par ticipated in the we ekly visitation and the children a ppear ed to enjoy the visits. ¶ 21 The Catholic Charities repor t conce rning L ong noted that she had wee kly visitation with the children and had attended all her visits. The visits went well. Wit h reg ard to the curr ent situation, “L ong discussed the rec ent arr est of [J acque line] and expressed her surprise over the d iscovery of [J acque line’s] ong oing drug use.” L ong discussed allowing J acque line to watch C.C. and So. C. intermittently while L ong was working

. L ong stated that being the primary car eg iver of the children was difficult, and she had considere d shifting guardia nship
to her ex-husband in the past, althoug h she also stated her wish to provide the car eg iver role for the c hildren ag ain. ¶ 22 Catholic Charities rec ommended that DCFS be g rante d custody and guardia nship of the minors. ¶ 23 On August 5, 2010, the trial court enter ed a dispositi onal order finding it in the childre n’s best interests t h at t hey be made war ds of t he court and adjudge d neg lected. The t rial court found J acque line and Wil dman unfit and unable to c are for, pr otect, tra in, or discipline the minors. The trial court also found L ong unable to car e for, protec t, train, or discipline the minors. The trial court ruled that it was in C.C.’s and So. C.’s best interests that custody and
guardia nship be remove d from the responde nt pare nts and L ong and place d with DCFS. The
tr i al co u rt then dismiss ed L ong from the case and discharg ed her counsel. J acque line and Wil dman wer e order ed to cooper ate with DCFS and CASA and to comply with the terms of their ser vice plans.

-5-¶ 24 On appea l, L ong argue d t h at t h e t ri al court err ed in holding that remova l of L ongas

guardia n of C.C. and So. C. automatically terminated her party status and terminated L ong ’s ability to pa

rtake of service s. L ongdid not appeal the trial court’s finding that it wa s in the children’ s best interests to be made war ds of the court or that L ong was unable to car e for the chil d re n

. L ong also did not appea l the trial court’s decision to name the Guar dianship Administrator for D CFS as the childre n’s guardia n. ¶ 25 T he appellate court noted that the Act does not specific ally addre ss t h e s t at u s o f a guardia n who is a nece ssary party to the proce eding when the tri al court remove s that
guardia n and appoints DCFS as guardia n. 4 0 6 I l l

. App. 3d at 371-72. The appellate court conclude d that the leg islature intended for a minor’s leg al guardia n to rema in a party throug hout the proce eding s, reg ardle ss of whether the trial court remove s the guardia n from that positio n an d n am es DCFS as guar dian. Id. at 372. The appellate court also conclude d that it was in the children’ s best interests that L ong be allowed to rema in a party

. Id. at 373. The appellate court held that L ong was entitled to notice of hear ings and to prese nt evidenc e, to cross-e x amine witnesses, and to prese nt arguments. Id. The appellate court also held that L ong was entitled to keep her court-a ppointed counsel if she could not aff ord to hire her own, and could continue to rec eive any other service s to which she was entitled under the Act. Id.

¶ 26 ANALYSI S ¶ 27 The statute at issue in this ca s e i s section 1-5(1) of the Act. That section provides, in pertinent pa

rt: “Except as provi d ed in this Section ***, the minor who is the subject of the
proce eding and his pare nts, guardia n, leg al custodian or responsible relative who are parties responde nt have the ri gh t to be prese nt, to be hear d, to prese nt evidenc e materia l to the proce eding s, to cross-e x amine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files and rec ords and also, althoug h proce eding s under this Act a re n o t intended to be adver sary in char acte r, the rig ht to be repr esente d by counsel. At the reque st of any party financ ial l y unable to employ counsel, with the exception of a foster pare nt permitted to intervene under this Section, the court shall appoint the Public Def ender

or such other counsel as the case may require

. Counsel a ppointed for the minor and
any indige nt party shall app ea r at all stag es of the trial court proce eding
, and such appointment shall continue throug h the perma nency hearings and termination of
pare ntal r ig

hts p r o c e e d in g s subject to withdrawa l or substitut ion pursuant to Supreme Court Rules or the Code of Civil Procedure .” 705 I L CS 405/ 1-5(1) (West 2010). ¶ 28 In addition, section 1-5(2) (a) provides that:

“Thoug h not appointed guardia n or leg al custodian or otherwise made a party to the
proce edi ng , any curr ent or previously appointed foster pare nt or relative careg iver,

or repr esentative of an ag ency or association interested in the minor has the rig ht to be hea rd by the court, but does not there by become a party to the proce eding .” 705 I L CS 405/ 1-5(2) (a) (West 2010). ¶ 29 On appea l, the S tate argues t hat t he appellate court err ed in finding that section 1 -5 (1 ) require s a guardia

n to rema in a party to proce eding s even afte r the guardia n h as been

-6-remove d from that position. Our revie w of the construction of a statute is a question of law

that this court revie ws de novo

. State Building Venture v. O’Donne ll
, 239 I ll. 2d 151, 160 (2010). ¶ 30 The primary objective of this court in construing a statute is to asce rtain and g ive ef fec t to leg islative intent. Id. at 160. The surest and most reliable indicator of leg islative intent is
t h e l an guag e of the s tatute i tself, given it s plain and ordinary meaning

. Id. When statutory languag e is clea

r and unambiguous, it will be applied as written, without r esort to e x trinsic aids of st atutory construction. Id. This court will not depar t from the plain languag e of the
statute by rea ding into it exceptions, limit ations or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent. Id. In deter

mining the plain meaning of st atutory terms, t his court wi l l consider the
statute in its entirety
, the subject it addre sses, and the appar ent intent of the leg islature in

enac ting the statute. Id. ¶ 31 The appellate court in this case found that section 1-5(1) of the Act was silent c oncer ning the stat us of a guardia

n once the guardia

nship is remove d. The appellate court there fore conclude d that “the leg islature intended for a minor’s leg al guardia n to rem ai n a party throug hout the proce eding s, reg ardle ss of whether the trial court names DCFS as guardia n.” 406 I ll. App. 3d at 372. The appellate court noted that section 1-5(1) gi v es a guardia n not only party status, but also leg al repr esentation throug hout the proce eding s. The appellate
court there fore held that “[t] he Gene ral Assembly could not have intended a guardia n, leg al custodian, or responsible relative, who the J uvenile Court Act require s the State to name as

a responde nt, could simply be dismiss ed as a party if guardia nship of the child was awa rded to D CFS at a dispositi onal hear ing.” Id. The appellate court, howeve r, did not explain why the Genera l Assembly could not have intended a guardia n to be dis missed as a party if his

or her guardia

nship was remove d. The appellate court further held that i t wa s in the children’ s best interests that L ongbe allowe d to remain a party in the case

. Id. ¶ 32 Upo n revie w, we find that the appellate court err ed in construing section 1-5(1) of the Act. We disag ree with the appellate court that the a bsence of languag e in sec tion 1-5(1) of the Act aff

irmatively addre ssing the p ar t y status of a former guardia n mandates the conclusion that a guardia

n who has been remove d from that position nonetheless rema ins a party to the proce eding s. The appellate court err ed in relying upon the purported silenc e in section 1-5(1) in concluding that L ong remai n ed a p arty to the proce eding s even afte r she was dismissed as the c hildren’s guardia n. ¶ 33 In fac t, section 1-5(1) is not silent conce rning the party status of dismiss ed guardia ns. As noted, s ection 1-5(1) affirmatively states that t he parties to the proceeding s are “the minor who is the subject of the proce eding and his pare nts, guardian
, leg al custodian or responsible relative.” (Emphasis added.) 705 I L CS 405/1-5(1) (West 2010). The Act is clea r in including

a guardia n in the enumer ated list of who is a party responde nt. The Act also provides t h at custody or guardia

nship g rante d there under continues until the court otherwise direc ts. 705 I L CS 405/2-27(5) (West 2010). Consequently
, once the court direc ts the remova l or dismiss al of a gu ar d i an, that individual no longe r is a guardia n. Pursuant to the clea

r and unambiguous languag e in section 1-5(1), a f ormer guardia

n is not a guardia

n and, thus
, no longe r is a party responde nt to the proce eding s following her dismiss al from that position and is no longe r entitled to leg al re prese ntation as provided f or in the statute.

-7-¶ 34 When a statute lists the things to which it ref ers, there is an infere nce that all omissions should be understood as exclusions, despite the lack of any neg ative words of limit ation. People v. O’Connell
, 227 I ll. 2d 31, 37 (2007). Section 1-5(1) lists those that are nece ssary parties to the proce eding s, and section 1-5(2) (a) lists those who, while not part i es , may participate in the proce eding s. Given that the statute specific ally sets forth both the nece ssary parties and those permitted to participate as nonparties, the omission of former guardia ns or others fr om that listshould be understood a s an exclusion. ¶ 35 That section 1-5(1) is limit ed to guardia ns and not former guardia ns is further evident in examining the Act as a whole. I t is well settled that wher e the leg islature includes particula r languag e in one section of a statute, but omits it in another section of the s ame act, courts presume that the leg islature acte d intentionally in the exclusion or inclusion. In re J.L.
, 236 I ll. 2d 329, 3 4 1 (2010). Section 2-28 of the Act provides that the “cour t may remove the custodian or guardia

n and appoint another in his stead or restore the minor to the custody of his pare nts or former guardian or custodian ,” assuming t h e co u rt fi nds that the former
guardia n is now fit to car e for the minor. (Emphasis added.) 705 I L CS 405/2-28(1) (West 2010). The leg islature thus rec og nized that a former guardia n could be restore d to guardia n status. Howeve r, despite providing that former guardia ns could be re tu rn ed to guardia n status, the leg islature did not provide party status to former guardia ns in section 1-5(1) of the Act. There fore
, it would be inappropriate for this court to nonetheless infer that the leg islature intended to inc lude former guardia ns in the list of enumer ated pa rties in se ction 1-5(1)

. ¶ 36 L ong also argues t hat s he shoul d be allowed to reta in her party status beca use s h e wa s

a responsible relative as set forth in section 1-5(1)

. We disa gre e. L o n g’s leg al status reg arding the children was as their court-appointed gua rdian, not as a responsible relative. In any event, once L ong was remove d as the guardia n of the children, she no longe r had custody of the c hildren and no long er c ould have be en conside red a responsible re lative. ¶ 37 The appellate court also found that L ong should be permitted to rema in a party to the ca se beca use it was in the children’ s best interests that she rema in a party and be permitted to keep her court-a

ppointed counsel. The appellate court noted that: L ong had been t h e children’ s primary car eg iver for most of their lives; the children had strong bond s with L ong ; L ong attended all visits with the children that she had been offer ed; and, in a report prepare d b y Catholic Charities, L ong had expressed surprise over the discovery of J acque line’s ong oing drug use. 406 I ll. App. 3d at 372-73. The appellate court also stated that, in the event the trial
court decide d to terminate the pare ntal rig hts of the children’ s pare nts, L ong likely would be able to provide the court with important information reg arding the children’ s best interests, and mig ht decide to se ek re storation of her guardia nship. Id. at 372. ¶ 38 We find that the appellate court err ed in look i n g t o t h e ch i l d re n ’s best interests in deciding that L ong would rema in a party to the case even afte r she was dismiss ed as the children’ s guardia

n. Section 1-5(1) does not contain a best interests requirement in setting forth the nece ssary parties to the proce eding s. As noted, section 1-5(1) cle arly and unambiguously states that the neces s ar y parties to proce eding s are the minor and “his
pare nts, gua

rdian, leg al custodian or responsible relative who are parties r espondent.” The named parties are listed as nece ssary parties without reg ard to whether it is in the minor’s

-8-best interests to have those individuals participate in the pr ocee dings.

¶ 39 Moreove r, in removing L ong as guardia n for the children, the trial court found that it wa s not in the children’ s best interests for L ong to continue as the chil d re n ’s guardia n. Acc ording ly
, it is antithetical to then hold that it nonetheless is in the children’ s best interest for L ongto remain a

party to the proce eding s. ¶ 40 The best interests of a minor are rele vant i n deter mining lega l custody or guar dianship of the minor (see 705 I L CS 405/2-27 (West 2010)) and in re viewing the appointed leg al custodian or guardia

n of t he mi nor, i ncluding deter mining whether t o re s t o re the m inor to the cus t o d y o f h is former guardia n or custodian (see 705 I L CS 405/2-28(1) (West 2010). Consequently
, the children’ s best interests with reg ard to L ong wer e rele vant in deter mining whether to remove L ong as guardia n and would be rele vant in deter mining whether to restore L ong ’s guardia

nship. In this case , h o weve r, L ong did not challeng e the appellate court’s finding that it was in the children’s best interests t o be made war ds of the court, that L ong

was unable to car e for the children, or that L ong should be remove d as guardia n and the Guar dianship Administrator for DCFS should be named as the children’ s guardia n. Be cause L ong did not raise t h ese issues on appea l, the appellate court err ed in considering the children’ s best interests in its decision. ¶ 41 Wit h respe ct to best interests, we further note that the appellate court err ed in c onsidering the fac ts of this particula

r case in finding that a former guardia n is entitled to rema in a party to the proce eding s. The appellate court was g reatly influence d by the fac t that L ong was the
g randmother of the children, had a strong bond with the children, and had been the primary

car eg iver of the children. Howeve r, section 1-5 of the Act nece ssarily applies without reg ard
to the specific fac ts of eac h individual case

. We apply the statutes of this state as written, and do not car ve out exceptions that do not appea r in the statute simply beca use we do not like how the statute applies in a g iven case

. Consequently
, it was inappropriate for the appellate
court to c onsider the specific fac ts of this case in deter mining that L ong should be allowed to remain a

party to the proce eding s and should reta in her c ourt-appointed c ounsel. ¶ 42 Finally
, we note that the case s relied upon by the appellate court and by L ong in suppor t of a finding that L ong should be al l owed to rema in a party even afte r she is remove d as guardia n are not on point. In this court and in the appellate court, L ong cited In re Anast
, 22 I ll. App. 3d 750 (1974). In that case , the court held that the stepfathe r of two g irls, who had been awa rded custody of the g irls when he and the g irls’ biologica l m o t h er d ivorce d, was entitled to an adjudicator

y hear ing to deter

mine his fitness befor e depriving him of custody

. Anast
, 22 I ll. App. 3d at 756. The court held that the statute at issue “obviously contemplates that if a minor is under leg al guardia nship at the time a peti t i o n is filed under the Act, the
guardia n should be named.” Id. at 754. ¶ 43 Anast is inapposite. Her e, as the appellate court noted, L ong was named a responde nt in the petition and did rec eive a n adjudicator

y hearing. ¶ 44 The a

ppellate c ourt found the decision in In re A.K. , 250 I ll. App. 3d 981 (1993), to be
persua sive. There
, while a dissoluti on of marria g e was pending betwee n Br enda and Randy Kirchne r, a petiti o n wa s fi l ed alleg ing that A.K. was an abused child. A.K. was born to Br enda during her marria g e to Randy

. Br enda and Randy wer e joined as responde nt pare nts.

-9-During the proce eding s, the trial court enter ed an order that Ran dy was not the biologica l

fathe r of A.K ., and an or der w as later enter ed dismissing Randy from the c ase. ¶ 45 On appea l, the court noted that at the initiation of the juvenile proce eding s, Randy was a “pare nt” of A.K. withi n the m eaning of t he Act beca use h i s p ar entag e was presumed, so that he was proper ly made a party responde nt to the proce eding s pursuant to se ction 1-5(1) of the Act. A.K.
, 250 I ll. App. 3d at 987. The court noted, howeve r, that the leg islative scheme was sil ent concerning the position of a pre sumed fathe r once the presumption was rebutted. Id. The court held t hat one in R andy ’s position should not be dismissed from the

case until the case is conc luded. Id. at 988. ¶ 46 In so holding, the court noted that in a section 2-29 proce eding
, any former ly presumed fathe r who might qualify in other states as an “equitable pare nt” would benef it by rema ining in the proce eding “until all issues are resolved beca use he would have an opportunity to persua de the court to fra

me its dispositi onal order in such a way as to be consistent with any ability he might have to a dopt the child,” and there fore the fathe r might obtain some of the
p ro t ec tion which the “equitable pare nt” rule might g ive him. Id. at 989. Nonethele ss, the appellate cou rt aff

irmed Randy ’s dismiss al from the case , finding that he suffe red no prejudice as a r esult of his dismis sal. Id. ¶ 47 The appellate court in the instant case analog ized L ong ’s position to that of the pre sumed fathe r i n A.K. The appellate court further held t hat, i n contra st to A.K.
, the child re n i n t h i s

case would be pre

judiced by

L ong ’s dismissal from the ca se. ¶ 48 We find A. K

. t o be distinguishable from the instant case

. In contra st to the potentially shifting lega l status of a presumed fath er, the l eg al s tatus of a guardia n is clea rly set forth. Under the Act, guardia

nship of a minor includes “the duty and authority to act in the best interests of the minor.” 705 I L CS 405/1-3 (West 2010). Guar dianship includes the rig hts and responsibilities of leg al custody

. 705 I L CS 405/1-3(8)( c) (West 2010). L eg al custody is the

re l at i o nship cre ated by an order of court which imposes on the custodian cer tai n responsibilities toward the minor. 705 I L CS 405/1-3(9) (West 2010). Custody or guardia nship g rante d under the Act co n t i n u es until the court otherwise direc ts. 705 I L CS 405/2-27(5) ( West 2010). Once the court dire cts otherwise , guardia nship cea ses. ¶ 49 I n co ntrast, the leg al status of a fathe r is not nece ssarily as clea rly define d as that of a guardia n. The status of a presumed fathe r involves unique issues. For example, in A.K.
, the two-y ear limit ation period of section 8(a) (2) of the I llinois Parenta g e Act of 1984 (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, ¶ 2508(a) (2) ( now 750 I L CS 45/ 8)) ba rre d Br enda f

rom making a claim in the dissoluti on proce eding s that Randy was not the fathe r of A.K. A.K. , 250 I ll. App. 3d
at 983. Consequently
, for purposes of the dissoluti on, Randy rema ined the presumed fathe r of A.K. Howeve r, for purposes of the section 2-29 proce eding
, an order was enter ed deter mining that Randy was not the fathe r of A. K. In other case s, a presumed fathe r may have acte d as such for many y ear s befor e it is deter mined that he is not the biologica l fathe r. ¶ 50 Given the complexit ies inhere nt in the case of a presumed fathe r who is later found not to be the biologica l fathe r, we find the decision in A.K. t o b e s u i g en eris and, there fore
, inapplicable in the i nstant case

. In so h o lding, we decline to pass on the correc tness of t he decision in that case , as that issue is no t n o w b ef o re us. We simply find that the appellate

-10-court in this case err ed in analog izi ng the position of a guardia n to that of a presumed fathe r in holding that a guardia

n reta ins her par

ty status even a fter he r dismissal as g uardia n. ¶ 51 We also find that the appellate court err ed in declining to follow the anal y s i s o f t h e appellate court i n In re S.B.
, 373 I ll. App. 3d 224 (2007). In that case , C.L

. was S.B.’s
guardia n at the time t h e S t at e fi led its orig inal juvenile petition alleg ing that S.B. was neg lected. Acc ording ly
, C.L

. was named a responde nt in the petition. L ater , a dispositi onal order wa s enter ed appointing DCFS as S.B.’s guardia n and ending C.L .’s guardia nship of S.B. Ac cording ly , C.L . was dismissed from the c ase. ¶ 52 The appellate court held that at the time of the d i s m i s s al
, C

. L

. was no longe r S.B.’ s guardia n, so she no longe r had the right to be a party to the pro ce ed ings, although she had the ri gh t to be hear d pursuant to section 1-5(2) (a) of the Act as a previously appointed relative car eg iver. In re S.B. , 373 I ll. App. 3d at 227. The a ppellate c ourt held that the trial
court did not err by dismiss ing C.L

. from the case afte r the dispositi onal order was enter ed. Id. ¶ 53 The appellate court in the instant case disag re ed wi t h S.B. that the trial court prope rly dismiss ed C.L

. from the case once she was dismiss ed as C.L .’s guardia n. 406 I ll. App. 3d at 369. The appellate court in this case held that the proper proce dure would have been to allow C.L

. to rema in a party in the case

. Id. As discussed, howeve r, the S.B. co u rt was entirely

corr ect in holding that C.L

. was no longe r a party to the case once she was remove d as S.B.’s
guardia n. The a ppellate c ourt, there fore , err ed in re jectingthe cour

t’s analy sis in S.B. ¶ 54 Finally
, we note that L ong is not left without rec ou rs e. P u rs u ant to section 1-5( 2)(a ), L ong may have the rig ht to be hear d by the court as a previously appointed rela tive car eg iver i n t er es t ed in the minors. See 705 I L CS 405/1-5(2)( a) (West 2010). L ong also may seek
rest o ration of her guardia nship status pursuant to section 2-28 of the Act. See 705 I L CS 405/2-28 (West 2010). Howeve r, having been dismiss ed as guardia n of the minors, L ong no longe r was a party responde nt to the proce eding s, and was proper ly dismiss ed as a party by the trial court. The appellate court err ed in reve rsing L ong ’s dismiss al from the case and in holding that L ong was entitled to keep her court-a ppointed counsel and to rec eive any other service s to which she wa s entitled under the A ct.

¶ 55 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 56 For all of the fore g oing rea sons, we reve rse the decision of the appellate court, and af firm the judg ment of the c ircuit court.

¶ 57 Appellate c ourt judg ment reve rsed; ¶ 58 circ uit court judg ment aff irmed.

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